No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 1

candidate for membership in either the European Union or NATO.

Under these circumstances, the challenge is to provide Ukraine sufficient time to 

consolidate successful democratic governance and develop domestic consensus on 

this critical strategic choice. Rather than 

pressing Ukraine toward early accession, the 

new U.S. administration should keep open 

the possibility of NATO membership, but for 

the time being encourage Ukraine to follow 

the model of Finland, another nonaligned 

Partner for Peace, as it attempts to reconcile 

the competing popular factions in the country 

and to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and 

Eurasian neighbors. By nurturing its political stability, the United States will enhance 

Ukraine’s value to the Alliance over the 

longer term.

The Dilemma 

Ever since Ukraine declared independence 

in August 1991, its main security preoccupation and challenge has been its search for identity. Nostalgic to maintain its long and close 

association with Russia, which has become 

increasingly competitive with the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 

European Union (EU), and at the same time 

eager to become a more cooperative and close 

partner with the Euro-Atlantic community, 

Since independence, Ukrainians have 

been evenly split between those who desire 

to be part of the Euro-Atlantic (European 

Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 

community and those who gravitate toward 

Eurasia (Russia and the Commonwealth of 

Independent States). During the 1990s, when 

the European Union and NATO were focused 

on Central Europe and Russia was politically 

down and economically weak, Ukraine was 

able to have it both ways.

Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has 

made significant progress developing a EuroAtlantic–style democratic political system, 

demonstrated a vibrant open media and civil 

society, and successfully advanced civilian 

oversight of its Euro-Atlantic–oriented military, 

which has built strong ties with NATO.

Despite this progress, Ukrainian opinion 

remains sharply divided on integration 

into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Attempts by 

Ukrainian leaders and some current members 

of NATO to promote a Membership Action 

Plan, in the hope that public opinion would 

follow, have backfired. Not only has Russia, 

now more autocratic, responded with missile 

threats, cutting gas supplies, and meddling in 

Ukraine’s domestic politics, but the crosscutting internal and external pressures are 

aggravating profound political instability, 

actually making Ukraine a less appealing 

 Strategic Forum No. 238

February 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Ukraine Against Herself: 

To Be Euro-Atlantic, 

Eurasian, or Neutral?

by Jeffrey Simon

Ukraine has consistently tried to have it both 

ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian political 

leaders’ aspirations for membership in EuroAtlantic institutions have been driven, in part, 

by the desire to solidify independence from 

Russia. This impulse has roots that go back to 

the earliest days of its independence, when the 

fate of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on 

Ukrainian territory was being decided and Kyiv 

appealed to the United States and its NATO 

Allies for security guarantees against the specter of Russian resurgence. 

Yet at the same time, Ukraine’s history, 

culture, and economy are closely entwined 

with Russia’s. Ethnic Russians and others 

living in eastern Ukraine are more negative about NATO and the EU than those in 

the western part of the country because they 

see such integration with the West as jeopardizing a good relationship with Russia. 

Since about half of Ukraine’s population 

is Russian-speaking, and about 17 percent 

are ethnic Russians, the country’s prospective membership in NATO and the EU has 

been met with apprehension by roughly 60 

percent and 45 percent of Ukraine’s citizenry, respectively. In fact, roughly 45 percent of the population would rather participate in Russia’s Common Economic Space 
2 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009

than the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Hence, 

Ukraine’s progress toward its government’s 

stated goals of NATO and EU membership has been anything but easy, stumbling 

over these domestic obstacles, which even 

4 years after the Orange Revolution remain 

the most important barrier to the country’s 

Euro-Atlantic progress. 

Internal Symptoms of 

Crisis

This Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 

dichotomy and tension have been reflected 

in Ukraine’s often tumultuous domestic 

politics and had an impact upon its constitutional development. Indeed, since 

the Orange Revolution brought Viktor 

Yushchenko to the presidency in January 

2005 with an agenda to bring Ukraine closer 

to the Euro-Atlantic community and after 

four governments marked by political turmoil, Ukraine’s efforts to define itself as 

either Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian continue to 

be plagued by its lack of public and political 

elite support and absence of strategic focus.

With popular support for NATO and EU 

integration consistently at only 20 percent 

and 45 percent, respectively, Ukraine’s centrist 

political parties have not even developed a 

consensus on the issue in the decade or more 

that it has been on the national agenda:

■ Of the eight parties with seats in the 

Rada following the March 1998 parliamentary elections, only the People’s Movement of 

Ukraine (with 9.4 percent of the vote and 46 

of the Rada’s 450 seats) supported NATO integration, while the others opposed it, with platforms either to remain allied with Russia in 

the Commonwealth of Independent States 

(CIS) or to be neutral.

■ In the March 2002 election, of the 

seven Rada parties, only Yushchenko’s Our 

Ukraine (NU), which received 23.6 percent of 

the vote and 112 seats, sought membership 

in NATO and the EU. Prime Minister Viktor 

Yanukovych was interested in a “single economic space” to bind Ukraine with Russia, 

Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

■ In the March 2006 election, five parties won seats. Again, only Yushchenko’s 

NU bloc (81 seats) supported NATO integration, while former Prime Minister 

Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYT (Bloc of Yulia 

Tymoshenko) (129 seats) was noncommittal, and the other three parties commanding a total of 240 seats—a clear majority—

were opposed.1 

In other words, despite the remarkable 

consolidation of democratic governance in 

Ukraine and the clear erosion of support for 

the Communist Party over the past 17 years, 

this has not translated into popular support 

for membership in NATO. Indeed, the policy 

differences rapidly metastasized into a struggle over constitutional prerogatives between 

the president, the prime minister, and the 

Rada. When the new government convened 

in 2006, it was under a constitution that had 

been amended in December 2004 during the 

heavily contested presidential elections of 

the Orange Revolution. No longer could the 

president appoint or fire the prime minister, who is now selected by a majority of the 

Rada members, changing the power relationship between the two. President Yushchenko’s 

challenge would now be how to stitch together 

a governing coalition that could put aside 

past personal and political differences, build 

a consensus on NATO–EU integration, and 

convince society of its worthiness to rule. 

Unfortunately, he failed.

While an Orange (Yushchenko and 

Tymoshenko) coalition attempted to form 

a government in coalition with Oleksandr 

Moroz’s Socialist Party, Moroz instead opted 

to enter a Yanukovych-led “anti-crisis” government, along with Petro Symonenko’s 

Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), that 

would lead Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. Problems immediately arose over the 

president’s prerogative in foreign and security policy and the Rada’s control of the purse 

and power to dismiss ministers. When Prime 

Minister Yanukovych went to Brussels on 

September 14, 2006, to withdraw Ukraine’s bid 

for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), 

Yushchenko cried betrayal. Conversely, when 

Yanukovych visited the European Union to 

request Ukraine’s accession, EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrer-Waldner 

informed him that the EU had no plans to 

offer membership, but instead proposed closer 

economic and political ties. This rejection 

undermined Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic supporters, who took up the argument that NATO 

was a first step toward the more popular (but 

unwelcoming) EU.

The foreign policy rift between the president and prime minister was magnified by 

confusion over authority and led to a major 

constitutional crisis. The situation deteriorated 

further after the cabinet returned a number of 

presidential decrees unapproved. Yanukovych 

bypassed the president and foreign minister by conducting negotiations with Russia 

on Ukrainian membership in the Common 

Ukraine’s efforts to 

define itself as either 

Euro-Atlantic or Eurasian 

continue to be plagued 

by its lack of public and 

political elite support and 

absence of strategic focus

Dr. Jeffrey Simon is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense Univeristy. Comments may be addressed to Dr. Simon at jeffreysimon94@gmail.com.
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 3

Economic Space and providing Russia a stake 

in the Ukrainian gas transport system. In 

response, President Yushchenko dissolved the 

Rada on the grounds that Yanukovych was 

usurping the president’s powers and subverting the will of the people.

Political destabilization worsened when 

the government accelerated its efforts to strip 

away the president’s powers. Yushchenko 

reacted by firing Prosecutor General 

Svyatoslav Piskun on May 24, 2007; Interior 

Minister Vasyl Tsushko retaliated by deploying 

troops to prevent the newly appointed minister from taking office. When Yushchenko 

announced that he was taking control of 

the interior ministry and ordered its troops 

to Kyiv, Tsushko countermanded the order. 

Fortunately, violence was avoided during a 

tense 2-month standoff, which resulted in an 

agreement to hold new parliamentary elections. The entire episode, however, strongly 

indicated the need for constitutional reform.

The September 2007 parliamentary election resulted in a fragile Tymoshenko and 

Yushchenko (BYT–NU) coalition government 

with 30.7 and 14.2 percent of the vote, respectively, and only 227 seats of the Rada’s 450. 

Yanukovych’s Party of Regions (PRU) won 34 

percent of the popular vote and 175 seats, and 

the Communist Party acquired 27 seats. As 

had been the case during Tymoshenko’s previous tenure as prime minister in 2005, she 

and the president found it difficult to work 

together, and their political infighting continued. Even after the Russian invasion of 

Georgia in August 2008, when Yushchenko 

criticized Russia and visited Tbilisi (with fellow presidents from Poland, Lithuania, 

Latvia, and Estonia) to render moral support to Georgia, Prime Minister Tymoshenko 

refused to support him, and her government 

collapsed. After months of continued political 

turmoil and once again facing the prospect of 

new elections, which would most likely result 

in yet another unstable coalition government, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko appeared 

to reach an uncertain peace on December 

10, 2008, by reforging their Orange coalition. Only time will tell how stable this new 

arrangement will be.

Political Schizophrenia

While the Ukrainian political leadership 

has been slower than its neighbors to publicly promote the virtues of NATO integration, 

its military outreach toward NATO and other 

European countries has been fairly impressive. Even though Ukraine’s first Military 

Doctrine in October 1993 specifically rejected 

membership in military blocs, it was the first 

CIS state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace 

(PFP) in February 1994. In December 1995, 

Ukraine deployed 400 mechanized troops to 

NATO’s Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) 

and increased the number to 550 in the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR). From 1995 

through December 1999, when they withdrew, 

more than 2,800 Ukrainian servicemen took 

part in this NATO mission.2

What is particularly important, though, 

is not just the troop numbers. NATO provided 

much-desired operational experience.3 On 

the other hand, the missions were extremely 

costly. While Ukraine had been active in 

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Angola and in the Former Republic 

of Yugoslavia,4 the UN had always reimbursed 

Ukraine for these operations. Indeed, UN 

peacekeeping was actually a money-maker for 

the Ukrainian armed forces, which received 

$72.5 million for UN operations from 1992–

1999, far more than they had expended.5

In marked contrast, Ukraine’s defense 

ministry had to pay for NATO operations from 

its cash-starved budget, which also meant 

that in order to save money, Ukrainians 

deployed for 12 months, while their Polish 

partners rotated every 6 months. But the 

lengthier deployments paid benefits by raising their professional expertise, which the 

military recognized and appreciated.6 As has 

been the experience in many other post-communist transition countries,7

 it is plausible 

(though no public data are available) that for 

professional reasons a higher percentage of 

Ukrainian servicemen support NATO integration than is found in the wider population.

At the July 1997 Madrid Summit, 

Ukraine signed a “Charter on a Distinctive 

Partnership”8 that elaborated new areas for 

consultation and cooperation with NATO, 

to include creating Joint Working Groups 

on Defense Reform and Civil Emergency 

Planning and establishing a NATO Liaison 

Office in Ukraine’s defense ministry. In addition to the 2,800 troops to NATO IFOR/

SFOR, Ukraine deployed 250 troops to 

Kosovo (KFOR) in September 1999, increasing the force to more than 330 in 2001, 

as part of a joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion.9

 Ukraine ratified a PFP Status of Forces 

Agreement (SOFA) in May 2000, condemned 

on September 14, 2001, the acts of terrorism committed against the United States, and 

signed an Exchange of Classified Information 

Agreement with NATO in 2002.10

Ukraine first officially stated its intention to join the Alliance at the Reykjavik 

NATO-Ukraine Foreign Ministers session in 

May 2002.11 Despite NATO concerns about 

Ukraine’s transfer of air defense equipment 

to Iraq (for example, Kolchuga radars12), 

the NATO-Ukraine Commission adopted an 

Action Plan at the November 2002 Prague 

Summit that provides a framework for 

intensified consultations and cooperation.13

Ukraine was the 

first country in the 

Commonwealth of 

Independent States to 

join NATO’s Partnership 

for Peace in February 

1994
4 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009

2006 for the retraining and resettlement of 

decommissioned military officers. The third, 

for which the agreement was signed in June 

2006, is the largest, allocating €25 million 

over 10 years to destroy 1,000 man-portable 

air defense missiles, 1.5 million small arms, 

and 133,000 tons of munitions.19 Surplus 

weapons and ammunition are a serious security issue. Ukraine maintains roughly 16,000 

tons of liquid propellants and nearly 760,000 

tons of surplus ammunition, of which 

480,000 tons have expired their storage terms 

and must be disposed of.20 In 2004, 92,000 

tons of ammunition exploded at a depot in 

the southern Zaporizhia region, spraying 

debris and shells and destroying buildings in 

nearby villages.21 To deal with such crises, the 

NATO-Ukraine 2006 Action Plan established a 

special National System of Coordination and 

Cooperation with NATO.

In 2008, Ukraine maintained about 600 

service personnel in peacekeeping operations; it had 185 service personnel in KFOR 

and 2 liaison officers (and 150 policemen) in 

the UN Mission in Kosovo, and provided 43 

personnel to support NATO’s training mission in Iraq.22 In December 2006, President 

Yushchenko authorized the Ukrainian navy 

to participate in Operation Active Endeavor

in the Mediterranean Sea, and in early 

2008 sent 10 Ukrainian peacekeepers to 

serve with the Canadians in Afghanistan. 

In an apparent effort to win further supUkrainian supporters portray this Action 

Plan as preparation for its ultimate accession to the MAP.

While Ukraine did not participate in 

direct military operations in Afghanistan, it 

provided overflight rights for NATO military 

transports on their way there. Later, in 2003, 

Ukraine did send 1,650 troops to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom with the joint UkrainianPolish battalion as part of the Polish-led 

Multinational Division Central-South. After 

30 months and loss of 18 lives, Ukraine withdrew from Iraq in December 2005.14

In June 2004, President Leonid Kuchma 

replaced Ukraine’s 1993 Military Doctrine 

with a new one that portrays NATO as the 

basis for the European security system and 

pledges to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration.15 At NATO’s June 2004 Istanbul Summit, 

Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk presented the new doctrine as well as Ukraine’s 

Strategic Defence Bulletin, which stresses 

that “future membership in NATO and 

the EU continued to be the main priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy.”16 After 

NATO expressed concerns about the status of Ukraine’s democratic development 

in light of the so-called Gongadze affair,17

President Kuchma issued yet another decree 

in July 2004 that removed preparations 

for NATO membership from the doctrine.18

After the 2004 Orange Revolution, President 

Yushchenko once again altered Ukraine’s policy, reaffirming interest in joining the MAP 

and NATO and reinstating the provisions 

in favor of joining the EU and NATO in the 

country’s Military Doctrine. On that basis, 

NATO and Ukraine launched an “intensified 

dialogue” on membership in April 2005, and 

military activities proliferated.

To date, three major projects have been 

carried out in Ukraine using NATO/PFP 

trust funds. The first, completed in 2003 in 

Donetsk, destroyed 400,000 anti-personnel 

landmines. Another, led by the Netherlands, 

was established in Khmelnitsky in January 

port from Washington, President Yushchenko 

announced in April 2008 that Ukraine will 

also send 15 peacekeepers to Iraq.23

Despite this extensive record of military cooperation, it became abundantly 

clear in the 4 months of “Orange” factions’ squabbling after the March 2006 parliamentary election that integration into 

the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and specifically into NATO, was not a high priority for 

most Ukrainians, but was instead becoming an increasingly divisive issue for the 

country. Yushchenko, who supported EuroAtlantic integration, emerged greatly weakened, while the Yanukovych-led PRUSocialist-Communist governing coalition 

had little interest in convincing society of 

the importance of NATO membership. Some 

European members of the Alliance were disturbed by anti-NATO demonstrations that 

erupted against Sea Breeze military exercises 

in Crimea, the hardening of Russia’s position on Ukraine-NATO ties, and Yanukovych’s 

September 14, 2006, announcement to the 

Ukrainian-NATO Commission that Ukraine 

would suspend negotiations on membership, 

even though it would enhance cooperation 

with NATO.24 Days later, the Rada adopted 

a resolution supporting Yanukovych, stating that NATO membership would be decided 

only via national referendum.

In early 2007, public opinion polls indicated that most Ukrainians believed NATO 

was fomenting insecurity and showed opposition to joining the Alliance actually increasing to nearly two-thirds of the electorate.25

At about the same time, the United States 

began promoting its missile defense system 

in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the 

U.S. Senate formally endorsed NATO enlargement by five members, to include Ukraine.26

These actions, too, were divisive, even within 

the Ukrainian cabinet. At a March 16, 2007, 

news conference, Defense Minister Anatoliy 

Grytsenko described U.S. missile defense as a 

“benefit . . . [that] could become an imporin early 2007, public 

opinion polls indicated 

that most Ukrainians 

believed NATO was 

fomenting insecurity 

and showed opposition 

to joining the Alliance 

increasing to nearly twothirds of the electorate
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 5

tant element of the pan-European security system,” adding that “Ukrainian and 

Russian officers, if they want, can familiarize themselves with the characteristics 

of these facilities and carry out verification.”27 But Prime Minister Yanukovych, who 

had put NATO on hold, openly warned that 

deployment near Ukraine could harm relations with Russia.

Since the September 2007 parliamentary elections, the new government 

has exerted little effort to build a national 

consensus on NATO. After Tymoshenko 

took over as prime minister once more in 

December, the new leadership—Yushchenko, 

Tymoshenko, and Rada Speaker Arseniy 

Yatsenyuk—again reversed Ukraine’s course 

on NATO membership, sending a letter (on 

January 16, 2008) to NATO requesting a 

MAP at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. 

Predictably, the Russians responded with 

threats and another energy crisis, and when 

the Alliance convened in Bucharest, the 

Allies were divided and rejected MAPs for 

Ukraine (as well as Georgia). However, they 

“agreed that these countries will become 

members of NATO” at some point, adding 

that it was necessary to engage in “intensive 

engagement . . . at a high political level”28 to 

assess progress on their MAP applications.

In the aftermath of Bucharest, confusion reigned in Kyiv, Moscow, and among 

some NATO Allies as to what the Alliance 

really meant by the Bucharest Summit statement, particularly looking forward to NATO’s 

April 2009 60th anniversary summit. Some in 

Kyiv hyped the offer of eventual membership 

to mask their disappointment in not getting a MAP, while those in Moscow, who were 

opposed to further NATO enlargement, were 

energized to prevent Ukraine’s accession 

by dividing the Allies. Disunity in Ukraine 

was exacerbated by the events of August 

2008 when Russia responded to Georgian 

President Mikheil Saakashvili’s assertion of 

sovereignty over South Ossetia with a fullscale invasion and Russian President Dmitry 

Medvedev’s issuance of a doctrine claiming 

the existence of Russian “privileged interests”29 in the former Soviet space.

President Yushchenko (along with 

the three Baltic presidents and Poland’s 

Lech Kachynski) went to Tbilisi to render moral support and sought a Rada condemnation of the Russian invasion, but 

Tymoshenko instead criticized Yushchenko 

and broke from the coalition. Opposition 

leaders Yanukovych (PRU) and Symonenko 

(KPU) supported Russia and called for official Ukrainian recognition of Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia. After the government collapsed, Yushchenko again called for new 

elections, which will result in Ukraine’s fifth 

government since January 2005.

In sum, Ukraine remains schizophrenic 

and gridlocked. Some internal political forces, 

supported by external forces, want to pull 

Ukraine in a Euro-Atlantic direction, while 

others, also supported by external forces, want 

closer association with Russia and the CIS. 

Hence, Ukraine’s political leadership skids 

back and forth, contributing to internal instability and to the Ukrainian public’s confusion 

about NATO, in the process confirming legitimate questions in the minds of some NATO 

Allies about the depth of Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration.

NATO Influence

At the outset of its existence as an independent nation, Ukraine faced daunting, 

even unique, defense reform challenges. With 

47 million people, it was by far the largest of 

the former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states not 

to have inherited its own armed forces from 

the communist predecessor regime—it had 

to build a national security establishment 

from scratch. Lessons from transitions in 

states confronting less severe challenges suggest that continuity in leadership is necessary to stabilize and deepen defense reforms 

so they can take root. Yet this kind of continuity is precisely what Ukraine has lacked. 

The country has had nine defense ministers since independence, an average of one 

every 22 months (see table). As has already 

been seen, the deep cleavages over the country’s security orientation have been a major 

contributor to this instability. It should come 

as no surprise that the constant leadership 

changes have tended to retard defense reform 

and to contribute to politicization of the 

armed forces, turmoil in the ministry, and 

operational disasters.

The impact of this instability on 

defense reform is visible on a number of 

fronts, including the stop-and-go history of 

“Ukrainization” (replacing the Russian language and traditions of the military with 

Ukrainian ones), removal of corrupt officers,30 and decisions on defense production 

and procurement. Yet if internal and external pressures to move toward NATO membership have often been divisive and destabilizing, close military contact with the NATO 

countries through PFP and other mechanisms has nevertheless yielded a number of 

important defense reform benefits.

Depoliticization. Not the least important of these is the progressive depoliticization 

of the armed forces. In the early years, political leaders of all factions tried to use the military for partisan political advantage, as when 

Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky issued a 

memorandum urging members of the armed 

forces to vote for President Leonid Kravchuk in 

the 1994 presidential election.

Ukraine’s political 

leadership skids back 

and forth, contributing 

to internal instability and 

to the Ukrainian public’s 

confusion about NATO
6 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009

tled instead into a pattern of civilian defense 

leadership. After Kuchma defeated Kravchuk 

for the presidency in 1994, he replaced 

Radetsky33 (the minister who had ordered 

military personnel to vote for Kravchuk) 

with Ukraine’s first civilian defense minister, 

Valerii Shmarov, in an attempt to gain control of the armed forces.34 But many military 

personnel lacked confidence in the civilian 

Shmarov, and the poor condition of the armed 

forces further contributed to his unpopularA decade later, the norm had changed 

completely. When President Kuchma directed 

Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk to order 

troops to support Kuchma’s chosen successor, 

Yanukovych, in the 2004 election, Marchuk 

refused. Kuchma fired Marchuk and reinstated Colonel General Oleksander Kuzmuk 

as minister, but to no avail, as Kuzmuk also 

refused to get the military involved in politics. 

Indeed, during the Orange Revolution at the 

end of 2004, Defense Minister Kuzmuk continued to hold the armed forces above politics, assuring demonstrators that the armed 

forces would not be used against the people,31

while his predecessor, Marchuk, also called 

on President Kuchma and Prime Minister 

Yanukovych to exercise good sense and ensure 

that there would be no bloodshed in Ukraine.32

Civilianization. Simultaneously, after 

a series of fits and starts, Ukraine seems to 

have broken with the Soviet model of having a 

serving officer as minister of defense and setUkrainian Defense Ministers and Armed Forces

Defense Minister Appointment Comments Size of Armed Forces*

Colonel General 

Kostyantyn Morozov August 1991 Oversees creation of Ukrainian armed forces; 

resigns over increasing Communist criticism

January 1, 1992:

n 900,000 total

n 720,000 military

n 180,000 civilian

Colonel General Vitaliy 

Radetsky December 1993 Slows “Ukrainization” and discourages political 

activities in armed forces 

Valerii Shmarov September 1994 First civilian; Kuchma appointment; continued 

military decline

Colonel General 

Oleksander Kuzmuk June 1996 Forced to resign; lies about downing civilian 

airliner over Black Sea

Colonel General 

Volodymyr Shkidchenko November 2001 Forced to resign; air show disaster and continued 

degradation of armed forces

January 1, 2001:

n 415,850 total

n 314,395 military (−57%)

n 101,455 civilian (−43%)

Yevhen Marchuk June 2003 Second civilian; fired; refuses to order armed 

forces to vote for Yanukovych

January 1, 2003:

n 390,015 total

n 295,495 military (−6%)

n 94,525 civilian (−7%)

Colonel General 

Oleksander Kuzmuk September 2004

Return signals failed effort to politicize armed 

forces; calls for military neutrality in presidential 

election

Anatoliy Grytsenko January 2005 Third civilian; stabilizes ministry; armed forces 

atrophy

January 1, 2005:

n 285,000 total

n 210,000 military (−29%)

n 75,000 civilian (−21%)

Yuriy Yekhanurov December 2007 Fourth civilian; needs to develop an all-volunteer 

force by 2010 of 143,000 total

January 1, 2008:

n 200,000 total

n 152,000 military (−28%)

n 48,000 civilian (−36%)

*Statistics from Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin Until 2015 (Defence White Paper) (Kyiv: Ministry of National Defence, 2004), 13, 21, 58;

White Book 2005: Defence Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, 2006), 13; White Book 2006, 90; and White Book 2007, 15.
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 7

ity. It was not until 2003 that another civilian 

was named to the position, the same Yevhen 

Marchuk who would be dismissed—and 

replaced by a general—for refusing to get the 

military involved in the 2004 election.

After the Orange Revolution, 

Yushchenko appointed Anatoliy Grytsenko 

as defense minister and Leonid Polyakov 

as first deputy minister. As former military 

officers with professional military educational experience in the United States and 

substantial exposure to Western models of 

defense management, both Grytsenko and 

Polyakov understood better than any of their 

predecessors what defense reforms and modernization tasks were necessary to enhance 

Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO. Under 

their mandate, the defense ministry exhibited signs of institutional improvement and 

friction with the General Staff moderated 

somewhat, although the armed forces continued to atrophy for want of resources. 

Grytsenko was succeeded as minister in 

December 2007 by Yuriy Yekhanurov, an 

economist with a background in industrial 

management, further solidifying the trend 

toward civilianization of the ministry.

Planning and Organization.

For the first decade, Ukraine’s force “planning” was nonexistent; underfunded defense 

budgets caused continuous “freefall” of the 

armed forces. It was only in November 2001 

that Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko introduced serious planning to the defense ministry. Shkidchenko had been the key author of 

Ukraine’s first real strategic document, State 

Program on Armed Forces Development 

and Reform, 2001–2005, calling for the 

transformation of Ukraine’s 310,000-man 

armed forces into a smaller force designed 

for limiting local conflicts and resolving 

emergencies on Ukraine’s territory.35 The 

country’s first comprehensive defense policy review, the Ukrainian Strategic Defence 

Review to 2015, was published in June 2003 

on Yevhen Marchuk’s watch.

Improvement of the planning process at 

the strategic level was carried forward after 

the Orange Revolution, when, with NATO 

assistance, Deputy Minister Polyakov created a Defence Policy and Strategic Planning 

Department in the ministry that, for the 

first time, linked defense policy to plans.36

The influence of exposure to NATO was also 

evident in a series of organizational steps 

undertaken by Grytsenko and Polyakov. 

Based on lessons learned from participating 

in NATO expeditionary operations, Ukraine’s 

defense leaders reorganized the General 

Staff to fit assigned missions and to align 

the military command to NATO standards.37

To rationalize the budget, Grytsenko subordinated the Department of Finance and the 

Department of Surplus Funds and Lands to 

himself. To retain and promote capable personnel, the Personnel Policy Directorate 

developed a personnel policy concept and 

built a database system to track English language–trained personnel38—clearly something driven by recognition of the need to 

be able to work effectively with NATO forces. 

Finally, the General Staff formed a Joint 

Operational Command with responsibility to 

employ all combined armed task forces in 

Ukraine and overseas.39

Challenges Remain

Notwithstanding the commendable and 

even remarkable advances that have been 

made, particularly considering the point 

from which the Ukrainian forces began in 

1991, Ukrainian leaders are cognizant of 

how far they have to go before the country 

can function militarily on anything resembling a NATO level. The need for vastly 

improved operational capacity has repeatedly been highlighted by Ukrainian forces’ 

experience in operations with U.S. and other 

NATO forces. Ukraine needs to create more 

standing units, modernize equipment, and 

improve language skills, a point that was 

highlighted when a Ukrainian contingent in 

Iraq found itself under enemy fire and was 

unable to communicate in English with forward air controllers to request F–16 support.40 These shortfalls were recognized in 

the defense ministry’s 2006 and 2007 Target 

Plans for the armed forces, prepared in support of President Yushchenko’s February 

2007 National Security Strategy of 

Ukraine, which stressed the need to improve 

interoperability under the ministry’s socalled NATO Action Plan.

The ministry’s main priorities were to 

reduce and reorganize the troops to better 

suit the threats faced by Ukraine. The most 

daunting challenges, however, would involve 

switching to an all-volunteer force by 2010 as 

mandated by the president, destroying surplus 

weapons and military equipment, updating 

and modernizing essential equipment, and 

harnessing technology to support Ukraine’s 

defense industry. Although Grytsenko placed 

a high priority on these issues, combat readiness continued to deteriorate because of 

chronic underfunding. In March 2007, 

Grytsenko noted that Ukraine’s first-line 

Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) “would 

not be combat ready in one to two years 

when about 50 percent of the equipment 

will stop working.”41 His options to solve the 

resources problem were limited by lack of 

funds.42 Although the law “On Defence of 

Ukraine” calls for the allocation of 3 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, 

the defense ministry was consistently receiving only about half this amount or less 

between 2000 and 2005.43 As a result of these 

shortfalls, the ministry was not only unable 

Ukrainian leaders are 

cognizant of how far 

they have to go before 

the country can function 

militarily on anything 

resembling a NATO level
8 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009

to provide adequate resources for weapons 

repair and modernization for the JRRF, but 

declining operating funds also led to inadequate training for the force.44 Though the 

defense ministry had abandoned the practice of using outdated munitions for training 

after two major missile disasters in 2000 and 

2001—including the downing of a Russian 

Tu-154 passenger aircraft over the Black Sea 

with a defective S–200 surface-to-air missile, 

killing all 78 aboard—Grytsenko was forced 

to resume this practice even for the most 

elite JRRF units in October 2006.45

President Yushchenko’s mandate to 

move Ukraine to an all-volunteer force by 

2010 also ran up against budget realities, 

ultimately becoming a political issue during 

the September 2007 parliamentary campaign, 

as Tymoshenko actually advocated accelerating the schedule to 2008. Grytsenko argued 

that this was impossible on the grounds that 

selecting appropriate personnel required a 

well-developed human resource policy, which 

simply did not exist.46 Despite the significant 

improvements in civilian oversight and management and in accountability and transparency during Grytsenko’s tenure, the constant 

need to accommodate ambitious plans to 

insufficient resources led to a steady decline 

in both the size and capabilities of the force 

during his tenure.47

Grytsenko’s successor, Yuriy Yekhanurov, 

continues to face the same challenges that 

stymied his predecessors—to create an allvolunteer force, modernize its equipment, 

enhance its readiness, redress sociopolitical 

problems (such as inadequate housing), and 

prepare for NATO membership, all on a shoestring budget. Yekhanurov’s efforts to augment the 2008 defense budget, which was 

only 1 percent of GDP,48 unfortunately proved 

unsuccessful. Although the Russian invasion 

of Georgia has prompted plans for the addition of 2 billion hryvnyas (approximately 

$375 million) in 2009 to upgrade existing 

and form new army units in the south and 

east, it remains to be seen if these plans will 

actually materialize. 

External Environment 

Transformed

Domestic tensions between those 

Ukrainians who support closer ties to Russia 

and the rest of the CIS and those who favor 

integration with the EU and NATO have 

often resulted in Ukraine’s schizophrenic 

policies pulling in opposite directions. 

These internal pressures are aggravated and 

made more difficult to resolve by the profound transformation that has taken place 

in Ukraine’s external environment over the 

last decade.

A key element in this transformation 

is Ukraine’s increased strategic importance 

as an energy bridge. The country’s vulnerability to energy-related pressure, and the 

degree to which this vulnerability could 

exacerbate political instability, became evident in January 2006, when Gazprom, 

the world’s largest natural gas producer 

(half-owned by the Russian government), 

cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and then 

restored them subject to a doubling of the 

price. Since roughly 75 percent of Russian 

gas exports to Europe flows through 

Ukrainian pipelines, the cutoff affected 

not only Ukraine but its EU neighbors as 

well. Ukraine, which needs to meet its own 

domestic requirements, was caught between 

the EU and Russia, both of whom have 

an interest in safe transit of gas through 

Ukraine. When Prime Minister Yuriy 

Yekhanurov agreed to pay Russia nearly 

double the price it had previously paid for 

gas ($130 per thousand cubic meters, still 

less than half the European market price of 

$315), the Rada flexed its new constitutional 

powers, dismissed the government, and 

renewed political instability ensued.

These problems resurfaced in December 

2007 when Tymoshenko took over as prime 

minister for the second time and moved to 

raise the pipeline transit fees charged to 

Gazprom. Gazprom responded by demanding repayment of $1.5 billion in debt and 

threatening to cut Ukraine’s domestic natural gas supply by 25 percent. At the same 

time, Russia sought to drive a wedge between 

Ukraine and the EU countries by reassuring 

Europeans that they would not suffer shortages as a result of Russian action against 

Ukraine. In March, Gazprom claimed that it 

had not received its money and cut supplies 

of Russian gas by 25 percent, and then by 

another 25 percent a day later. After Ukraine 

threatened to reduce gas deliveries to Europe, 

Russia and Gazprom, not wanting to further 

harm relations with the West, restored deliveries and signed an agreement holding prices 

steady at $179 per thousand cubic meters 

through 2008. This agreement, however, only 

deferred the issue. At the end of 2008, with 

Ukrainian elections looming, Prime Minister 

Tymoshenko was again in Moscow to negotiate the size of its debt (which Russia claims 

to be $2.4 billion in arrears) and 2009 price 

of gas (which Russia threatens to raise to 

more than $400 per thousand cubic meters).

How Ukraine ultimately resolves its 

internal debate over its strategic alignment 

is further complicated by the fact that the 

Euro-Atlantic community is itself divided 

over what it wants for Ukraine. When the EU 

rebuffed Yanukovych in September 2006, 

it had the effect of undermining pro-NATO 

how Ukraine ultimately 

resolves its internal 

debate over its strategic 

alignment is further 

complicated by the fact 

that the Euro-Atlantic 

community is itself 

divided over what it 

wants for Ukraine
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 9

Ukrainians, who had argued that joining 

the relatively unpopular NATO would provide a pathway to membership in the much 

more popular EU. The same message of divisions among the Euro-Atlantic countries was 

further driven home in April 2008, when 

President George W. Bush failed to get the 

Bucharest NATO Summit to support Ukraine’s 

bid for a Membership Action Plan. The EU’s 

recent Stabilization and Accession Agreement 

(SAA) with Ukraine, in marked contrast to its 

SAAs with the Balkan states, offers no prospect for future membership. At the December 

2–3, 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers session, 

NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Summit decision, made note of Ukraine’s progress, but 

added that significant work remained; hence, 

it did not grant Ukraine a MAP. The foreign 

ministers, though, did amend the NATOUkraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, 

and agreed to provide further assistance to 

Ukraine, develop Annual National Programs 

to advance reforms, and augment the NATO 

liaison office in Kyiv.49

Last, but far from least, the strategic 

position of Ukraine’s powerful Russian neighbor to the north and east has undergone a 

transformation of its own. Given the fundamental sympathy for Russia felt by much of 

Ukraine’s population, Moscow’s renewed credibility as a major power would in itself tend 

to tug Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. In 

addition, however, Russia has become much 

more assertive and intrusive, thanks in part 

to the consolidation of autocratic power 

under Vladimir Putin as well as the strong 

Russian reaction to NATO enlargement, missile defense, and other perceived manifestations of Western aggrandizement.

The dilemma of how to deal with 

a resurgent Russia was crystallized by 

Moscow’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia. 

The invasion forced Ukrainian politicians to 

focus on the defense sector and reassess the 

country’s Military Doctrine, but did little to 

resolve the tension between Euro-Atlanticists 

and Eurasianists in the Ukrainian political elite. While the current government has 

responded by seeking to strengthen defense 

capabilities, including the deployment of air 

defense units in the Crimea and along the 

eastern border with Russia,50 others feel the 

need to placate Russia.

Ukraine’s transformed external environment has aggravated its internal problems, 

which in turn have further complicated its 

external problems. Not only has the dichotomy 

between eastern autocratic and western democratic neighbors increased, so too has their 

willingness to meddle in Ukraine’s politics. 

Ukraine’s increased strategic importance as a 

natural gas bridge for both the Euro-Atlantic 

and Eurasian communities combined with 

Russia’s renewed assertiveness in other former Soviet republics has resulted in increasing equivocation within NATO and the EU and 

exacerbated internal problems for Ukraine.

The Challenge Ahead

The prospects for Ukrainian membership in Euro-Atlantic structures thus remain 

uncertain, in part because of Russia’s opposition, in part because of ambivalence 

among NATO and EU members, and in part 

because of divisions within Ukraine itself. 

Given the cross-cutting pressures, it is understandable that Ukraine’s political leaders 

and society have yet to make a clear strategic 

choice. Ukraine cannot at this point make a 

firm decision in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration given Russia’s opposition—reinforced by periodic flexing of its military and 

economic muscle—and the Euro-Atlantic 

community’s own failure to clarify its objectives for Ukraine.

So where does Ukraine stand? On the 

positive side, in marked contrast to the autocracies that continue to rule most of the other 

former Soviet states, Ukraine has resoundingly shown that it prefers Euro-Atlantic–style 

democracy, as evidenced by repeated free and 

fair elections followed by orderly transfer of 

power between rival parties, a thriving open 

media, and vibrant institutions of civil society. On the negative side, Ukraine’s external 

environment has been transformed. During 

the 1990s, Russia was weak and more cooperative; now it is more competitive. The more 

the United States and some Allies promote 

NATO accession, the more Russia interferes, 

and the more the Ukrainian government is 

destabilized, further undermining its EuroAtlantic options.

The challenge for the United States is 

to nurture Ukraine’s political stability and 

keep its Euro-Atlantic options open. This is 

difficult because the EU, which enjoys significantly greater Ukrainian domestic support, has clearly indicated that it is not yet 

ready for Ukraine. While Allies disagree 

over the timing of Ukraine’s MAP accession, due in part to the low popular support 

the Alliance enjoys within Ukraine, the April 

2008 Bucharest Summit did provide a longterm membership horizon reiterated at the 

December 2008 foreign ministerial. But government stability is needed in Kyiv to reassure 

many skeptical European Allies and to build 

confidence among Ukrainian society.

Ukraine needs time to make a strategic 

choice that can muster a popular consensus 

within the country. At this point, assertive U.S. 

promotion of Ukrainian accession to NATO is 

counterproductive: it engenders divisiveness 

with some Allies, encourages Russian interference, and, most importantly, shifts Ukraine’s 

internal politics in an undesirable direction, 

not only has the 

dichotomy between 

eastern autocratic and 

western democratic 

neighbors increased, so 

too has their willingness 

to meddle in Ukraine’s 

politics
10 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009

strengthening the hand of the Eurasianists at 

the expense of Euro-Atlanticists. The United 

States needs to foster a Euro-Atlantic orientation in Ukraine, but should exercise 

restraint in doing so. Thus, the United States 

should stress the language of the Bucharest 

Summit and promote NATO cooperation with 

Ukraine’s military independent of the issue of 

membership. Such cooperation has had positive effects on Ukrainian military reform, 

not only making the country a more credible 

candidate for eventual Alliance membership 

but also generating a constituency within 

Ukraine’s elite that is receptive to the EuroAtlantic connection.

To achieve a Ukrainian political consensus on strategic direction, those leaders who 

favor Euro-Atlantic integration will have to 

navigate a number of upcoming challenges.

First, since independence, the victorious coalitions and centrist opposition political parties have been unable to lay out a clear 

and politically compelling strategic rationale 

for membership in NATO or the EU. They 

seem to have thought that they could lead the 

country to membership and that consensus 

support would be generated as a result. If so, 

it clearly has not worked.

Second, since the Orange Revolution, 

even those elements that favor Euro-Atlantic 

integration have been more focused on the 

institutional power struggle between president and prime minister—a struggle contributing to chronic instability and reversals 

of policy direction—than on resolving the 

fundamental issue of the country’s strategic 

orientation. This instability, of course, further weakens the confidence in many NATO/

EU capitals that Ukraine is a suitable candidate for membership.

Third, Kyiv needs to coordinate its outreach to its western EU neighbors—Poland, 

Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania—to promote a more effective, open EU policy 

toward Ukraine.

For its part, the Obama administration needs to recognize that its influence is 

limited, that it needs to act with restraint, 

and that it must closely consult with Allies. 

The United States is not an EU member, and 

many members see the U.S. promotion of 

Ukraine’s membership as interference. Hence, 

the United States should encourage Ukraine’s 

political leaders to follow the “non-aligned” 

EU example of Finland as it attempts to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 

neighbors. This means the United States 

should openly support Ukraine’s place in the 

Euro-Atlantic community by actively promoting its military ties with the Alliance and EU 

neighbors. By placing a priority on nurturing Ukraine’s political stability, the United 

States will enhance its membership prospects 

if society ultimately decides to make a EuroAtlantic choice.

Notes

1 Political Commentary, no. 1 (31), January 2006, 

International Center for Policy Studies, Kyiv, 4. The three other 

parties are former Prime Minister (and failed presidential candidate) Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions with 186 seats, 

Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party of Ukraine with 33 seats, and 

Petro Symonenko’s Communist Party of Ukraine with 21 seats.

2 Ukrainian Ministry of Defence Homepage on 

Peacekeeping, available at <www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=e

n&part=peacekeeping&sub=history>.

3 For a discussion of this broader issue, see Jeffrey 

Simon, NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New 

Members and Partners, Occasional Paper 1 (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, March 2005).

4 Angola with 226 troops between January 1996–February 

1999, and Yugoslavia in the United Nations (UN) Protection 

Force with 6,400 servicemen taking part over the mission’s duration between 1992–1995, in Eastern Slavonia with 1,000 servicemen between April 1996–January 1998, and in Macedonia with 

4 to the UN Preventative Deployment Force from June 1995–

March 1999.

5 Roman Woronowycz, “Ukrainian Troops Not Yet Ready 

to Serve As Peacekeepers in Kosovo,” The Ukrainian Weekly 67, 

no. 26 (June 27, 1999).

6 Ibid. Lieutenant Colonel Krivchenko noted that NATO 

operations in the former Yugoslavia provided Ukraine the opportunity “to raise the expertise of veterans and new recruits. . . . 

[adding] a helicopter squad gets a month of training in two-tothree days in Kosovo.”

7 For example, according to former Romanian Defense 

Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu, an internal poll of the Romanian 

military in January-February 2001 indicated military support 

for NATO at 83.6 percent compared to 75.5 percent for the general population. See Ioan Mircea Pascu, The Battle for NATO: 

Personal Report (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2008), 310, fn. 104.

8 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine, Madrid, July 9, 1997, 

available at <www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm>.

9 See <www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=pea

cekeeping&sub=kosovo_kfor>. Also see Roman Woronowycz, 

“Ukraine’s Troops Play Key Role in Peacekeeping Operations,” 

The Ukrainian Weekly 69, no. 1 (January 7, 2001).

10 Leonid I. Polyakov, U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations 

and the Value of Interoperability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. 

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 2004), 

9–10.

11 Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko sought “a qualitatively new level” in its relationship with NATO because “enlargement is an important feature for strengthening European security.” NATO Press Release (2002) 062, May 15, 2002.

12 In March 2002, Director General Valery Malev of the 

Donetsk-based company Topaz was killed in a road accident 

just as a Rada commission announced that it had evidence suggesting illicit arms sales to Iraq. See Jonathan Marcus, “What 

Ukraine’s Kolchuga Radar Does,” BBC News, October 14, 2002.

13 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan Adopted at Prague, 

November 22, 2002, available at <www.nato.int/docu/

update/2002/11-november/e1122c.htm>.

14 See <www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peace

keeping&sub=Iraq>.

15 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 8, no. 115 

(June 18, 2004).

16 Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin Until 2015 

(Defence White Paper) (Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, 2004), 13.

17 In fall 2000, journalist Georgiy Gongadze, who had 

been critical of the government, was brutally murdered. Reports 

of evidence implicating former President Kuchma, former 

Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko, and other Interior Ministry 

officers have circulated widely. Taras Kuzio has written on this; 

see “New Evidence of High-Level Involvement in Politically 

Motivated Murders in Ukraine,” The Ukrainian Weekly 71, no. 

40 (October 5, 2003), and “Closing the Books on the Gongadze 

Case,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 2, no. 42 (March 2, 2005).

18 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 8, no. 141 

(July 27, 2004).

19 NATO Update, “Largest Ever Demilitarization Project 

Launched in Ukraine,” available at <www.nato.int/docu/

update/2006/06-june/e0619a.html>.

20 White Book 2007: Defence Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv: 

Ministry of Defence, 2008), 25.

21 Major General Leonid Holopatyuk, Chief of General 

Staff Department of Euro-Atlantic Integration Issues, Associated 

Press, Kyiv, May 23, 2006.

22 See figure 6.3, “Participation of Ukrainian 

Peacekeeping Contingents and Personnel in Peacekeeping 

Operations,” in White Book 2006: Defence Policy of Ukraine

(Kyiv: Ministry of Defence, 2007), 60. On March 17, 2008, one 

policeman was killed and 20 were wounded near Mitrovica. See 

Ukraine News Agency, November 5, 2008.

the challenge for the 

United States is to 

nurture Ukraine’s 

political stability and 

keep its Euro-Atlantic 

options open
No. 238, February 2009 Strategic Forum 11

23 “Ukraine’s president orders to send 15 peacekeepers to 

Iraq,” Kyiv Post, April 14, 2008, available at <http://unian.net/

eng/news/news-246307.html>.

24 Peter Finn, “Ukraine’s Yanukovych Halts NATO Entry 

Talks,” The Washington Post, September 15, 2006, A15.

25 In February 2007, 64.1 percent of the population was 

opposed to NATO entry, up from 61.8 percent in November 2006, 

and 60 percent in August. Interfax-AVN, Kyiv, March 12, 2007.

26 Associated Press, Washington, DC, March 9, 2007.

27 Olha Volkovetska, “Grytsenko Considers Anti-missile 

System in Czech Republic and Poland Strengthening European 

Security,” Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, March 16, 2007.

28 NATO Press Release PR/CP(2008)049, “Bucharest 

Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and 

Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic 

Council,” April 3, 2008, paragraph 23. It also noted that the 

Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2008 would make an 

assessment of progress and have the authority to decide on MAP 

applications.

29 Interview with Dmitry Medvedev, Television Channel 

One, Rossia, NTV, August 31, 2008, accessed at <http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82916_206003.

shtml>.

30 John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, 

McNair Paper 42 (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 1995), 58.

31 Taras Kuzio, “Security Forces Begin to Defect to Viktor 

Yushchenko,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 137 (December 

1, 2004).

32 “Former Defense Minister Says Yushchenko Won,” Kyiv 

Post, November 16, 2004.

33 See Ukrayina Moloda (Kyiv), March 21, 2002 

(FBIS-SOV-2002-0321). General of the Army Radetsky is now 

Commandant of the National Defence Academy.

34 Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 1994, 7.

35 James Sherr, A New Defence Minister in Ukraine, 

Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Brief No. 86, 

November 19, 2001, 4.

36 In 2006, 2007, and 2008, the ministry’s PolicyPlanning Department published White Books (Defence Policy 

of Ukraine in 2005, 2006, and 2007) that outlined many 

defense lessons and objectives.

37 In early 2006, Defense Minister Grytsenko claimed the 

General Staff rearrangement “will enable us to speed up integrationist processes in the Ukrainian Army.” Tatiana Ivzhenko, 

“Kyiv Expects an Invitation to Join NATO by Late Spring,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), March 14, 2006. To accomplish this, the General Staff’s Main Directorate of Personnel 

(J1) now included the former Directorate for Welfare Policy 

and Social Support. It also established a Main Intelligence 

Directorate (J2) and Joint Support Forces, responsible for management of logistics within the armed forces, at the end of 2006, 

with plans to create a Support Forces Command (J4) by the end 

of 2008. The Main Operations Directorate (J3) was now tasked 

to develop plans to deploy armed forces and new training policies. The defense ministry also made efforts to improve the 

organizational structure and personnel strength of the Main 

Directorate for Defence Planning (J5). See figures 3.18, 3.19, and 

3.20 in White Book 2005: Defence Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv: 

Ministry of Defence, 2006), 38–40; and annex 4, figure 2, White 

Book 2006, 89.

38 Interview with Jim Greene, Head of NATO Liaison 

Office, Kyiv, in Washington, DC, January 3, 2008.

39 White Book 2007, 13.

40 Ukraine withdrew its contingent, but has provided a 

new group of 43 Ukrainians to train police and border troops in 

Iraq. Personal interview with senior defense official, Kyiv, April 

6, 2005.

41 He also noted that within the next 5 years most of the 

air force’s fighter aircraft, missiles, and launch systems will be 

obsolete and that more than 60 percent of the antiaircraft artillery had been in use for more than 20 years. See “Ukraine’s 

Armed Forces: Whither Reforms?” ICPS Newsletter, No. 10 (357), 

March 19, 2007. These problems were evident even during 

Defense Minister Marchuk’s tenure in 2003–2004, when roughly 

60 percent of the armored personnel carriers on their way to 

participate in peacekeeping operations broke down.

42 Training plans for 2006 and 2007 called for 400 

trained crews to fly 35,000 hours, maintaining an annual minimum-maximum of 90 to 120 flight hours. In reality, fuel supplies of only 40 percent meant that JRRF pilots averaged only 70 

hours in 2006, and Main Defense Forces pilots only 23 hours. 

See “Army: General Overview of the Current Situation in the 

Ukrainian Armed Forces,” Defense Express (Kyiv), November 

1, 2007.

43 The armed forces had been funded at roughly 50 percent of the minimal required funding during 2000–2002 

(Ukrainian hryvnyas [UAH] 2.08 to 3.07 billion), and up to 

60 to 70 percent during 2003–2004 (UAH 4.17 to 5.16 billion). 

In 2005, personnel costs alone consumed 81.5 percent of the 

defense budget, leaving only 12 percent for training and modernization, and 6.5 percent for weapons, equipment, and infrastructure. For the first time in 2005, its UAH 6.01 billion allocation almost met the full appropriation. See chapter 10, “Funding 

of the Armed Forces,” White Book 2005, 99–100. According to 

Ivan Marko, director of the defense ministry finance department, the army was only allocated 67 percent of the total 

planned budget as of September 18, 2006. Instead of proportional distributions, 40 percent of the budget was allocated in 

the fourth quarter, and roughly UAH 500 million was unable to 

be spent. In addition, the UAH 840 million from the sale of military camps and UAH 176 million from military property never 

materialized. See Valentin Badrak, “Ukrainian Armed Forces: 

Budget Turmoil,” Zerkalo Nedeli 36, no. 615 (September 29, 

2006), available at <www.mw.ua/2000/2040/54593>. Although 

the 2007 defense budget allocated UAH 9.13 billion (1.33 percent GDP), in reality the defense ministry received only UAH 

8.071 billion (1.18 percent GDP). See annex 1, “Defence Ministry 

Budget Implementation 2007,” White Book 2007, 103.

44 Funds dispersed for JRRF training were only 55.6 percent of the 2005 plan, 53.5 percent for 2006, and only 48.9 percent for 2007. See table 4.1, White Book 2007, 42.

45 Ibid. For example, all of Ukraine’s MiG–29 R–73 airto-air missiles and 95 percent of the ground-to-air (Strela and 

Igla) antiaircraft missiles had expired in 2003. At the end of 

2006, 60 percent of the Mi-24 helicopters and 32 percent of the 

Mi-8s were depleted.

46 Total force strength declined to 221,000 (165,000 military and 56,000 civilian) at the end of 2006; and 200,000 

(152,000 military and 48,000 civilian) at the end of 2007. See 

Petro V. Kanana, “Ukraine and NATO Membership,” presentation at Washington, DC, Reagan Center Conference, October 

17–18, 2006.

47 Annex 5, figure 2, “Strength of the Armed Forces of 

Ukraine in 2004–2007,” White Book 2006, 90.

48 BBC Monitoring Service, December 24, 2007.

49 Final Communique, Meeting of the North Atlantic 

Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO 

Headquarters, Brussels. NATO Press Release (2008)153, 

December 3, 2008, paras. 18–19.

50 According to Deputy Chief of General Staff Lieutenant 

General Ihor Romanenko, a new air defense and antiaircraft 

missile regiment had been formed at the end of 2007 in Donetsk 

and Luhansk regions, adding that new regiments needed to be 

created on the left bank of the Dnieper. See Fedir Oryshchuk, 

Kyiv Post, August 21, 2008.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
12 Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009

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