`

Fiscal Year 2017

Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan –

Biennial Plan Summary

Report to Congress

March 2016

National Nuclear Security Administration

United States Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page i

Message from the Administrator

This Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Fiscal Year 2017 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) – Biennial Plan Summary (FY 2017 SSMP) is a key 

planning document for the nuclear security enterprise. This year’s summary report updates the 

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic 

program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and 

organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary 

to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, 

Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning 

document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each 

year in response to new requirements and challenges. 

Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The 

science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify

for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for 

underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three 

national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site 

are primarily responsible for this continued success. 

Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons 

physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along 

with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The 

multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit 

dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three 

development flight tests.

Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons 

Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of 

approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase 

funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the 

increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed 

Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.

Pursuant to the statutory requirements, this SSMP is being provided to the following members of Congress:

 The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

 The Honorable Barbara Mikulski

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations

 The Honorable John McCain

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services

 The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page ii | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

 The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations

 The Honorable Jeff Sessions

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

 The Honorable Joe Donnelly

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services

 The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations

 The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations 

 The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

 The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

 The Honorable Mike Simpson

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Appropriations

 The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Appropriations

 The Honorable Mike Rogers

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

 The Honorable Jim Cooper

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me or Mr. Clarence Bishop, 

Associate Administrator for External Affairs, at (202) 586-8343.

Sincerely,

Frank G. Klotz
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page iii

Message from the Secretary

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is the principal 

steward of the U.S. science, technology, and engineering expertise of the nuclear security enterprise. 

This expertise is resident in the DOE national laboratories, nuclear weapons production plants, the 

Nevada National Security Site, and the NNSA Headquarters and field offices. With this expertise, our 

Nation applies scientific solutions to some of the world’s most pressing national security problems, 

including maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of 

nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and designing, developing, and sustaining the reactor 

systems that power the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines. 

The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) was established to sustain the credibility of the 

nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing. National investment in the SSP has provided more 

detailed knowledge of the stockpile than could have been obtained through nuclear explosive testing

alone. Through this program, NNSA has developed leading-edge expertise in advanced simulation and 

computing, hydrodynamic and subcritical experiments, high energy density physics, and materials and 

weapons effects science. These capabilities also support NNSA’s two other vital missions, nuclear threat 

reduction and naval nuclear propulsion. 

The SSP is a remarkable accomplishment in national security and will remain central to U.S. nuclear 

weapons policy and nuclear threat reduction goals now and for the foreseeable future. Having

commemorated the 20th anniversary of this program, as we look forward to the next generation of 

successful science-based stockpile stewardship, we must lay the foundation for the science, technology, 

and engineering capabilities necessary to support the Nation’s strategic deterrent well into the future. 

The national laboratories play a critical role in the SSP, and their unique and vital capabilities must be 

developed, sustained, and nurtured over decades. Sound stewardship of the DOE national laboratories 

has been one of my highest priorities as Secretary. Top talent must be attracted and retained by 

providing a vibrant research environment focused on challenging problems that call for multidisciplinary 

teams integrating scientific, engineering, and management expertise. 

This stewardship and further strengthening of the national laboratories is both a major responsibility of 

and opportunity for DOE in service of the national interest. This ongoing effort includes improving the 

strategic partnership between the Department and the national laboratories, forming networks of labs 

with complimentary capabilities to deliver results, and providing an environment in which DOE sets the 

mission needs and provides oversight, while the managing contractor and laboratory leadership and 

staff put together the teams and structure programs in response to the mission needs, all in the public 

interest. In addition to ensuring sound stewardship, we are also focused on enhancing the 

responsiveness of the nuclear security enterprise. Along these lines, the uranium and plutonium pit 

production programs and budgets described in this plan will position the enterprise to meet the 

requirements specified in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2015. 

Finally, current world events confirm the dynamic nature of the global threat environment and reaffirm 

the need for a strong nuclear deterrent. Talented scientists, engineers, and technicians from across the 

nuclear security enterprise will continue to make advances in modeling and simulation of U.S. and 

adversary weapon systems; conduct experiments in extreme environments at our advanced high energy 

density facilities; and pursue other scientific, experimental, engineering, and directed stockpile 

management activities to identify and address evolving global threats. This approach will enhance our 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page iv | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

ability to maintain strategic stability, strengthen regional deterrence, and provide assurance to our allies 

and partners, while we work toward reducing the overall size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and 

sustaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. The SSMP and DOE/NNSA’s 

Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats report provide the 

path forward for future planning and program activities in these two enduring mission areas.

Sincerely, 

Ernest J. Moniz
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page v

Executive Summary

This Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) – Biennial Summary Plan

(FY 2017 SSMP) updates last year’s full report on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) strategic program for maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness

of the nuclear stockpile over the next 25 years. The SSMP is published annually either in full report form

or as a summary, in response to statutory requirements, to support the President’s budget request to 

Congress for Weapons Activities. This annual plan is also used to provide a single, integrated picture of 

current and future nuclear security enterprise activities funded by the Weapons Activities account in 

support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

After an overview in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 addresses the status of the stockpile, the status of life 

extension programs (LEPs) and major alterations (Alts), and the methods used to assess and certify the 

stockpile. Chapter 3 discusses the challenges and strategies associated with the critical capabilities 

necessary to execute the Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management Programs. Chapter 4 

summarizes the budget for the key programmatic elements, the FY 2015 accomplishments, and the 

milestones and objectives. Chapter 5 presents a brief conclusion. The plan is organized to clarify the 

linkages among the essential capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise. Consideration of the 

combined effects of programmatic changes is important to ensure (1) an appropriate balance among 

near-term and long-term needs of managing the stockpile; (2) necessary sustainment and 

recapitalization of infrastructure; (3) essential investment in research, development, experiments, and 

evaluation; and (4) activities to maintain the expertise of a highly skilled workforce. 

While no significant changes have been made to the long-term strategic program of record since the 

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP) was issued in 

March 2015, much has been achieved. Extending the life of the warheads, stewardship of the stockpile 

without nuclear explosive testing, and recapitalization of key capabilities for the production of 

plutonium, uranium, and non-nuclear and high explosive components are progressing on or ahead of 

schedule. 

In FY 2015, NNSA continued to maintain the current stockpile while also laying the foundation for the 

future deterrent by making substantial progress on LEPs, leveraging world-class facilities to perform 

experiments that yield critical information, proposing and executing projects to enhance core

capabilities, and addressing the risks posed by the aging infrastructure.

1

 

 

1

As defined in Chapter 4 of the FY 2016 SSMP (March 2015), NNSA’s infrastructure is funded and managed in two categories. 

General Purpose Infrastructure includes the roads, utilities, and equipment as well as the building envelopes (walls, roofs) that 

house the programmatic infrastructure. Programmatic Infrastructure includes the scientific tools, specialized equipment, 

experimental facilities, computers, etc. that are used to carry out research, subsystem tests, experiments, production, 

sustainment, and disposition activities.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page vi | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Specific FY 2015 achievements include the following:

 W76-1 production passed the halfway mark of deliveries for the U.S. Navy’s submarine-launched 

ballistic missile fleet. With production nearing completion, NNSA and the U.S. Navy agreed to 

conclude joint flight testing of the W76-0 in FY 2016. When the LEP is completed in 2019, the 

warhead will have an additional 30 years of service life.

 NNSA and the U.S. Air Force completed three development flight tests of a B61-12 nuclear 

gravity bomb. An F-15E from Nellis Air Force Base released the B61-12 test asset and 

demonstrated its performance in a realistic guided flight environment. Additionally, the 

program has demonstrated system performance in ground tests and completed aircraft 

compatibility testing on four platforms (F-15, F-16, F-35, B-2). When finished, the B61-12 LEP 

will add at least 20 years to the life of the system and will allow NNSA to consolidate four 

variants of the B61 into one.

 NNSA capitalized on recent efficiency improvements at the National Ignition Facility, located at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California, to achieve an unprecedented 

number of experiments, with 356 laser shots in support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Four of these were first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments to explore dynamic properties of 

plutonium that have never been investigated.

 The seventeenth dynamic compression experiment using plutonium was conducted at the 

Z facility at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the world’s most 

powerful pulsed power device. The data will improve the understanding of material properties 

of plutonium under extreme pressures and temperatures to inform decisions on pit reuse for

warhead LEPs.

 The first hardware delivery for NNSA’s next-generation, high-performance computer, Trinity,

was received at Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. Trinity will have at 

least seven times better code performance than Cielo, NNSA’s leading supercomputer, and will 

be one of the most advanced computers in the world, with 40 petaflops of processing power.

Additional information regarding these and other advances that ensure the ability to achieve our 

mission is included in the chapters that follow.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page vii

Information at a Glance

3+2 Strategy for Stockpile Life Extension Programs ............................................... Section 2.2

Construction Resource Planning List

(formerly Integrated Project List for Capital Construction).................................. Section 4.8.5

Cyber Security ....................................................................................................... Section 3.6.2

Exascale Computing .............................................................................Section 3.1, Appendix B

Future Years Nuclear Security Budget..................................................................... Section 4.1

Infrastructure (General Purpose)............................................................................. Section 3.5

Life Extension Program Accomplishments............................................................... Section 2.2

Life Extension Program Funding ........................................................................... Section 4.8.4

Life Extension Program Schedules................................................................Sections 2.1.5, 2.2

Life Extension Program Status......................................................................Sections 2.2, 4.2.4

Lithium Strategy.................................................................................................... Section 3.3.4

Out-year Resource Requirements ........................................................................... Section 4.8

Physical Security.................................................................................................... Section 3.6.1

Pit Development ................................................................................................... Section 3.3.1

Plutonium Strategy ............................................................................................... Section 3.3.1

Program Accomplishments.....................................................................Chapter 4 by program

Program Changes....................................................................................Chapter 4 by program

Program Milestones and Objectives Charts............................................Chapter 4 by program

Significant Finding Investigations Numbers.......................................................... Section 2.1.2

Stockpile Size............................................................................................................ Section 1.3

Stockpile Weapons................................................................................................... Section 1.3

Surveillance Activities........................................................................................... Section 2.1.1

Surveillance Funding............................................................................................. Section 4.2.1

Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR) Irradiation Schedule........... Section 3.3.3

Uranium Strategy.................................................................................................. Section 3.3.2

Secure Transportation ............................................................................................. Section 3.7
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Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page ix

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Table of Contents

List of Figures...................................................................................................................................xii

List of Tables................................................................................................................................... xiv

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations.................................................................................................. xv

Legislative Language ...................................................................................................................... xvii

Chapter 1 Overview ........................................................................................................................1-1

1.1 Summary of the Strategic Environment for Nuclear Security..................................................1-1

1.2 Policy Framework Summary ....................................................................................................1-2

1.3 Summary of the Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile .............................................................1-2

1.4 Summary of the Nuclear Security Enterprise...........................................................................1-4

1.4.1 National Security Laboratories..................................................................................1-4

1.4.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities.....................................................................1-5

1.4.3 National Security Site ................................................................................................1-5

1.5 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan ...........................1-5

1.6 Overall Strategy, Objectives, Prioritization of Weapons Activities..........................................1-7

Chapter 2 Status of the Stockpile and Life Extension Efforts and Key Tools and Methods ..................2-1

2.1 Status of the Stockpile .............................................................................................................2-1

2.1.1 Surveillance of the Stockpile .....................................................................................2-1

2.1.2 Significant Finding Investigations..............................................................................2-3

2.1.3 Assessments of the Stockpile ....................................................................................2-4

2.1.4 Maintenance of the Stockpile....................................................................................2-4

2.1.5 Sustainment of the Stockpile.....................................................................................2-4

2.1.6 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition................................................................2-5

2.2 Modernizing the Stockpile through the 3+2 Strategy..............................................................2-5

2.2.1 W76-1 LEP..................................................................................................................2-5

2.2.2 W88 Alt 370 ...............................................................................................................2-6

2.2.3 B61-12 LEP.................................................................................................................2-7

2.2.4 W80-4 LEP..................................................................................................................2-8

2.2.5 W78/88-1 LEP (Interoperable Warhead-1) ...............................................................2-8

2.3 Methods and Information for Assessment and Certification ..................................................2-9

2.3.1 Annual Stockpile Assessment and Weapon Certification..........................................2-9

2.3.2 Predicting Weapon Performance in a Zero Yield Environment.................................2-9

2.3.3 Developing Accurate Models of Weapon Systems and Components.....................2-10

2.3.4 Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties..........................................................2-10
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Chapter 3 Capabilities that Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise.................................................3-1

3.1 Exascale Computing and the National Strategic Computing Initiative ....................................3-3

3.1.1 Current Status............................................................................................................3-3

3.1.2 Challenges..................................................................................................................3-3

3.1.3 Approach and Strategies ...........................................................................................3-5

3.2 Experiments and Subsystem Tests...........................................................................................3-5

3.2.1 Current Status............................................................................................................3-6

3.2.2 Challenges..................................................................................................................3-7

3.2.3 Strategies...................................................................................................................3-7

3.3 Strategic Materials and Core Components..............................................................................3-8

3.3.1 Plutonium ..................................................................................................................3-8

3.3.2 Uranium.....................................................................................................................3-9

3.3.3 Tritium .....................................................................................................................3-11

3.3.4 Lithium.....................................................................................................................3-12

3.3.5 High Explosives........................................................................................................3-13

3.3.6 Non-nuclear Components .......................................................................................3-14

3.4 Weapons Assembly and Disassembly ....................................................................................3-15

3.4.1 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-15

3.5 General Purpose Infrastructure and Programs......................................................................3-15

3.5.1 Current State ...........................................................................................................3-16

3.5.2 Challenges................................................................................................................3-17

3.5.3 Program Management Tools and Processes...........................................................3-17

3.5.4 Strategies and Path Forward ...................................................................................3-18

3.6 Security ..................................................................................................................................3-20

3.6.1 Physical Security ......................................................................................................3-20

3.6.2 Cyber Security..........................................................................................................3-24

3.7 Secure Transportation ...........................................................................................................3-27

3.7.1 Current State ...........................................................................................................3-27

3.7.2 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-28

Chapter 4 Budget and Changes to Programs ....................................................................................4-1

4.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget ......................................................................4-1

4.2 Directed Stockpile Work Budget..............................................................................................4-3

4.2.1 Budget........................................................................................................................4-3

4.2.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments.........................................................................................4-4

4.2.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP...............................................................................4-6

4.2.4 Milestones and Objectives ........................................................................................4-7

4.3 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget............................................................4-8

4.3.1 Science Program........................................................................................................4-8

4.3.2 Engineering Program...............................................................................................4-10

4.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program................................4-12

4.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ......................................................4-14

4.3.5 Advanced Manufacturing Development .................................................................4-15

4.4 Infrastructure and Operations Budget...................................................................................4-17

4.4.1 Budget......................................................................................................................4-17

4.4.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments.......................................................................................4-18

4.4.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.............................................................................4-19

4.4.4 Milestones and Objectives ......................................................................................4-19
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page xi

4.5 Secure Transportation Budget...............................................................................................4-19

4.5.1 Budget......................................................................................................................4-19

4.5.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments.......................................................................................4-19

4.5.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.............................................................................4-20

4.5.4 Milestones and Objectives ......................................................................................4-20

4.6 Defense Nuclear Security Budget ..........................................................................................4-21

4.6.1 Budget......................................................................................................................4-21

4.6.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments.......................................................................................4-21

4.6.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.............................................................................4-22

4.6.4 Milestones and Objectives ......................................................................................4-22

4.7 Other Weapons Activities......................................................................................................4-23

4.7.1 Budget......................................................................................................................4-23

4.7.2 2015 Accomplishments for Information Technology and Cyber Security...............4-23

4.7.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.............................................................................4-24

4.7.4 Milestones and Objectives ......................................................................................4-24

4.8 Estimates of Requirements beyond the Future Years Nuclear Security Program.................4-24

4.8.1 Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs and Its Affordability......................4-24

4.8.2 Basis for Cost Estimates...........................................................................................4-26

4.8.3 Stockpile Sustainment.............................................................................................4-27

4.8.4 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations......................................................4-27

4.8.5 Construction Costs...................................................................................................4-40

Chapter 5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................5-1

Appendix A Legislative Requirements Mapping .............................................................................. A-1

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to Statutory Reporting 

Requirements and Related Requests...................................................................................... A-1

A.2 Ongoing Requirements........................................................................................................... A-1

A.3 Other Requirements ............................................................................................................. A-11

Appendix B Exascale Computing..................................................................................................... B-1

B.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................B-1

B.2 Challenges................................................................................................................................B-2

B.3 Approach and Strategy ............................................................................................................B-2

B.4 Collaborative Management .....................................................................................................B-3

B.5 Conclusion................................................................................................................................B-4

Appendix C Glossary ...................................................................................................................... C-1
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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List of Figures

Figure 1–1. Size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2014....................................................1-3

Figure 1–2. The nuclear security enterprise..........................................................................................1-4

Figure 1–3. Management and operating headcount distribution by age .............................................1-6

Figure 2–1. Historical number of significant finding investigations opened and closed in 

calendar years 2001 to 2015 and the number that resulted in an impact to the 

stockpile..............................................................................................................................2-3

Figure 2–2. National Nuclear Security Administration warhead activities ...........................................2-4

Figure 3–1. Schedule for irradiating TPBARs in two reactors at the Tennessee Valley Authority ......3-12

Figure 3–2. NNSA general purpose infrastructure scope....................................................................3-16

Figure 4–1. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power – fiscal years 2001 through 2021..........4-2

Figure 4–2. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021 ................4-3

Figure 4–3. Goals, milestones, and key annual activities for weapon assessment, surveillance, 

and maintenance................................................................................................................4-7

Figure 4–4. Milestones for life extension programs, major weapons component production, 

and weapons alteration and dismantlement.....................................................................4-8

Figure 4–5. Science Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021 ............................4-8

Figure 4–6. Experimental and analysis milestones and objectives led by the Science Program ........4-10

Figure 4–7. Engineering Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021 ...................4-10

Figure 4–8. Engineering and technological milestones and objectives led by the Engineering 

Program............................................................................................................................4-11

Figure 4–9. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program funding schedule for 

fiscal years 2016 through 2021 ........................................................................................4-12

Figure 4–10. Milestones and objectives based on experiments on NNSA’s high energy density 

facilities led by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program..........4-13

Figure 4–11. Advanced Simulation funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021 ...................4-14

Figure 4–12. Milestones and objectives of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program..........4-15

Figure 4–13. Advanced Manufacturing Development funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 

through 2021....................................................................................................................4-16

Figure 4–14. Milestones and objectives for Advanced Manufacturing Development..........................4-16

Figure 4–15. Infrastructure and Operations funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021.....4-17

Figure 4–16. Secure Transportation funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021 .................4-19

Figure 4–17. Secure Transportation Asset Program milestones and objectives timeline ....................4-20

Figure 4–18. Defense Nuclear Security funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021.............4-21

Figure 4–19. Defense Nuclear Security program milestones and objectives timeline .........................4-22

Figure 4–20. Other Weapons Activities funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021............4-23

Figure 4–21. Information Technology and Cyber Security milestones and objectives timeline...........4-24

Figure 4–22. Estimate of out-year budget requirements for NNSA Weapons Activities in thenyear dollars.......................................................................................................................4-25
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page xiii

Figure 4–23. Detail of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities of the NNSA in 

then-year dollars ..............................................................................................................4-26

Figure 4–24. Estimate of warhead-specific sustainment costs.............................................................4-27

Figure 4–25. W76-1 life extension program cost FY 2016 to completion.............................................4-30

Figure 4–26. B61-12 life extension program cost FY 2016 to completion ............................................4-31

Figure 4–27. W88 Alt 370 (with CHE refresh) cost FY 2016 to completion...........................................4-32

Figure 4–28. W80-4 life extension program cost FY 2016 to completion.............................................4-33

Figure 4–29. IW-1 life extension program cost FY 2021 through FY 2041............................................4-34

Figure 4–30. IW-2 life extension program cost FY 2023 through FY 2041............................................4-35

Figure 4–31. IW-3 life extension program cost FY 2030 through FY 2041............................................4-36

Figure 4–32. Next B61 life extension program cost FY 2038 through FY 2041.....................................4-37

Figure 4–33. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for fiscal years 2016 

through 2041 (then-year dollars).....................................................................................4-38

Figure 4–34. FY 2016 SSMP versus FY 2017 SSMP independent cost estimates..................................4-39

Figure 4–35. NNSA Construction Resource Planning List......................................................................4-41
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page xiv | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

List of Tables

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.......................................1-3

Table 2–1. Fiscal year 2015 actual and fiscal year 2016 projected core Directed Stockpile Work 

Program stockpile evaluation activities (as of January 31, 2016) ......................................2-2

Table 2–2. Major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2015 and planned for FY 2016 

and the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FY 2017 through 2021) 

(as of January 31, 2016)......................................................................................................2-2

Table 3–1. Critical capabilities that support the mission of the nuclear security enterprise ..............3-2

Table 3–2. FY 2015 NNSA physical security technology deployment................................................3-21

Table 3–3. NNSA cyber security technologies....................................................................................3-25

Table 4–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget for Weapons Activities 

in fiscal years 2016 through 2021 ......................................................................................4-2

Table 4–2. Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2021 ....................................4-3

Table 4–3. Overview of planned FYNSP infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization...............4-18

Table 4–4. Total estimated cost for W76 life extension program .....................................................4-30

Table 4–5. Total estimated cost for B61-12 life extension program..................................................4-31

Table 4–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alt 370 (with CHE refresh) life extension program ..........4-32

Table 4–7. Total estimated cost for W80-4 life extension program ..................................................4-33

Table 4–8. Total estimated cost for IW-1 life extension program .....................................................4-34

Table 4–9. Total estimated cost for IW-2 life extension program .....................................................4-35

Table 4–10. Total estimated cost for IW-3 life extension program .....................................................4-36

Table 4–11. Total estimated cost for next B61 life extension program...............................................4-37

Table 4–12. Total cost of construction for fiscal years 2022–2041 .....................................................4-40
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page xv

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Alt Alteration

ARES Advanced Radio Enterprise System

ASC Advanced Simulation and Computing

ASCR Advanced Scientific Computing Research

CD Critical Decision

CRISP Core Infrastructure, Risk-Informed Strategic Planning

DARHT Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

DM Deferred Maintenance

DNS Defense Nuclear Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DSW Directed Stockpile Work

ECSE Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

ERM Enterprise Risk Management

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act

FY Fiscal Year

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program

G2 Generation 2

GTS Gas Transfer System

HE High Explosives

HED High Energy Density

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning

ICE Independent Cost Estimate

IDC Integrated Design Code

IDS Intrusion Detection Systems

IW Interoperable Warhead

KCNSC Kansas City National Security Campus

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANSCE Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

LEP Life Extension Program

LEU Low Enriched Uranium

LLC Limited Life Component

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page xvi | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

M&O Management and Operating

MaRIE Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extreme

MESA Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications

MGT Mobile Guardian Transporter

Mod Modification

NIF National Ignition Facility

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

Pantex Pantex Plant

PF-4 Plutonium Facility

PIDAS Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System

R&D Research and Development

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

RTBF Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities

SAR Selected Acquisition Report

SGT Safeguards Transporter

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SNM Special Nuclear Material

SRS Savannah River Site

SSMP Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program

STA Secure Transportation Asset

TA Technical Area

TPBAR Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rod

TRIM Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications

U.S.C. United States Code

U1a U1a Complex

UAS Unmanned Aerial Systems

WR War Reserve

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex

Z Z facility
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page xvii

Legislative Language

Title 50 of United States Code Section 2523 (50 U.S.C. § 2523), requires that:

the NNSA Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate

officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually 

update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, 

stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, 

program direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The 

plan shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent 

annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. 

Pursuant to previous statutory requirements, NNSA has submitted reports on the plan to Congress 

annually since 1998, with the exception of 2012.

2

 Starting in 2013, full reports on the plan are to be 

submitted every odd-numbered year, with summaries of the plan provided in even-numbered years. 

This Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

(FY 2017 SSMP) is a summary of the 25-year strategic plan, including a discussion of updates to the 

Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and newly added requirements from the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Section 3112, to establish a stockpile 

responsiveness program in support of the Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management Programs. 

The majority of this FY 2017 SSMP is captured in this single, unclassified document. A classified Annex to 

the FY 2017 SSMP is also provided. The Annex contains supporting details concerning the U.S. nuclear 

stockpile and stockpile management. 

 

2

In 2012, a Fiscal Year 2013 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan was not submitted to Congress because analytic work 

conducted by the Department of Defense and NNSA to evaluate the out-year needs for nuclear modernization activities across 

the nuclear security enterprise was ongoing and not yet finalized. 

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-1

Chapter 1

Overview

1.1 Summary of the Strategic Environment for Nuclear 

Security

The United States and its allies and partners are confronted with a rapidly changing global security 

environment. Many sources of potential conflict persist, particularly in regions with an active and 

growing terrorist presence. State and non-state actors continue to pursue a diverse set of nuclear 

capabilities that threaten multiple strategic domains. Moreover, while the size of the Russian and 

U.S. nuclear arsenals has been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear 

weapons and large stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials remain. Other countries, such as 

China and North Korea, are increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Preventing nuclear proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism remains one of the United States’ highest nuclear policy priorities. Likewise, as 

long as nuclear deterrence remains a major element of U.S. national security, the United States must 

ensure that its nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective. 

Although the principal role of the stockpile is to undergird America’s national security, the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent also contributes to the security of its allies and partners around the world. By extending 

deterrence to these states, the United States not only helps promote peace and stability, but also 

removes incentives to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities, thereby strengthening nonproliferation. 

These assurances remain vital to U.S. and allied security and play a critical role in maintaining stability in 

strategically vital regions across the globe. Tailoring strategies in response to U.S. and allied needs in 

the fast-moving global security environment will require periodic adjustments to the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE’s) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan (SSMP). This 25-year plan of record, developed in conjunction with the Department 

of Defense (DOD) and other interagency partners, is designed to keep the stockpile safe, secure, and 

effective to ensure U.S. national security and honor America’s commitments to its allies. As the United 

States continues to reduce the size of the operational and deployed strategic stockpile under the New 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, an increasing premium is being placed on the safety, security, and 

reliability of the weapons it retains.

As detailed in the Enterprise Strategic Vision (DOE/NNSA August 2015), current and evolving strategic 

environmental challenges that influence the Stockpile Stewardship Program and nuclear weapons 

planning include the following:

1

 Much of the United States arsenal has aged beyond its originally anticipated lifetime.

 United States nuclear infrastructure has, in part, aged beyond its originally anticipated service 

life. Recapitalization of key infrastructure capabilities must continue for a significant time 

period.

 

1

For further description of today’s challenging environment and NNSA’s approach to executing its mission within that 

environment, see Enterprise Strategic Vision (DOE/NNSA August 2015) at http://nnsa.energy.gov/content/strategic-vision. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-2 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 Global expansion of civil nuclear power production and the spread of civil nuclear materials 

challenge national and international capabilities to manage and secure these materials. 

Moreover, virtually all countries use radiological sources for industrial and medical purposes, 

creating the attendant risk of loss of regulatory control over radiological materials.

 The United States and its allies continue to face the risk of nuclear or radiological attack by a 

variety of terrorist groups or nation states. The expansion of global trade and the increasing 

sophistication of illicit trafficking networks could enhance opportunities for state and non-state 

actors to acquire nuclear and radiological materials, equipment, and technology. 

1.2 Policy Framework Summary

The role of nuclear weapons as part of the nuclear security enterprise is established as a matter of 

national policy. DOE/NNSA draws its mission and authority from the Atomic Energy Act

(42 United States Code [U.S.C.] § 2011 et seq.) and the National Nuclear Security Administration Act

(50 U.S.C. § 2401, et seq.). The National Nuclear Security Administration Act directs DOE/NNSA “To 

maintain and enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear weapons 

stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test, in order to meet national security 

requirements” (50 U.S.C. § 2401, (b) (2)). 

This direction is supplemented by Presidential and DOE policy guidance documents that provide 

additional direction regarding how the nuclear weapons mission is accomplished. These documents 

include the February 2015 National Security Strategy (White House 2015), the Nuclear Posture Review

Report (DOD 2010), and the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive, Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy 

of the United States (PPD-24). These documents and the imperatives and limitations they impose are 

described in more detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, of the March 2015 FY 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 requires DOE/NNSA to establish a stockpile 

responsiveness program “to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities 

required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear 

weapons.” This legislation is intended to ensure the nuclear security enterprise workforce is sufficiently 

challenged through integrated warhead life cycle activities (design, develop, manufacture, prototype, 

build, and experiment) to ensure that mission needs can be met without new underground nuclear 

explosive testing. DOE/NNSA is already implementing a number of activities that meet the intent of this 

legislation and is in the process of analyzing current programs to ensure national security mission needs 

and proficiencies are met now and maintained into the future.

Achieving this goal requires the modernization of aging facilities, upgrading and exercising critical 

capabilities, and investing in the human capital necessary to ensure the nuclear security enterprise of 

the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective. In order to achieve these goals, 

DOE/NNSA works in coordination with the Nuclear Weapons Council and interagency partners. 

1.3 Summary of the Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The size and composition of the nuclear weapon stockpile has evolved in response to changes in the

global security environment and national security needs, as described in Section 1.1 and shown in 

Figure 1–1. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-3

Figure 1–1. Size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2014

Table 1–1 reflects the major characteristics of the current stockpile, which is composed of two types of 

submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads, two types of intercontinental ballistic missile warheads, 

several types of bombs, and a cruise missile warhead delivered by aircraft.

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems

Warheads—Strategic Ballistic Missile Platforms

Type

a

Description Delivery System Laboratories Mission Military

W78 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W87 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LLNL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W76‐0/1 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwater

to surface

Navy

W88 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwater

to surface

Navy

Bombs—Aircraft Platforms

B61‐3/4/10 Non‐strategic bomb F‐15, F‐16, certified

NATO aircraft

LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force/Select 

NATO forces

B61‐7 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B61‐11 Strategic bomb B‐2 bomber LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B83‐1 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

Warheads—Cruise Missile Platforms

W80‐1 Air‐launched cruise missile

strategic weapons

B‐52 bomber LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

LANL = Los Alamos National Laboratory NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory SNL = Sandia National Laboratories

a

The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb type (e.g., “-0/1” for the W76) represents the modification associated 

with the respective weapon.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-4 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

The classified Annex to this document provides more specific technical detail on the stockpile by 

warhead type.

1.4 Summary of the Nuclear Security Enterprise

The mission is supported by three crosscutting capabilities: science, technology, and engineering; 

people and infrastructure; and management and operations. These capabilities are spread across the 

DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise at NNSA Headquarters (located in Washington, DC; Germantown, 

Maryland; and the Albuquerque Complex in Albuquerque, New Mexico); the NNSA field offices; four 

production facilities; three national security laboratories, two of which include production missions; and 

a national security site (see Figure 1–2). At these locations, a highly trained workforce consisting of 

Federal employees (more than 1,500), employees of our management and operating (M&O) partners

(more than 35,000), and assigned members of the military ensure the success of the NNSA mission. 

NNSA Headquarters develops the strategy and oversees and coordinates activities to ensure they are 

accomplished in an efficient and fiscally responsible manner. 

Figure 1–2. The nuclear security enterprise

1.4.1 National Security Laboratories

The national security laboratories are Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, 

California; Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico; and Sandia National 

Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, California.

2

 Their primary mission is to 

develop and sustain nuclear weapons design, simulation, modeling, and experimental capabilities and 

competencies to ensure confidence in the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. Additional core 

missions include plutonium research and development (R&D); tritium R&D; high explosives (HE) and 

 

2

Some research and development capabilities also exist at DOE’s Savannah River National Laboratory in Aiken, South Carolina,

in support of the national security laboratories’ gas transfer system design and certification activities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-5

energetic materials R&D; special nuclear material (SNM) accountability, storage, protection, handling, 

and disposition; pits, detonators, neutron generators, and other non-nuclear component production; 

research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts for stockpile stewardship; engineering, 

design, and technical systems integration for Secure Transportation Asset; and nonproliferation, 

counterterrorism and counterproliferation. In addition to the national security laboratories, NNSA also 

has ongoing work performed by other DOE national laboratories, supporting both Weapons Activity and 

the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs.

1.4.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

The nuclear weapons production facilities include the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC) in 

Kansas City, Missouri; Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas; Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina.

3

These facilities conduct a 

range of activities that include assembling, disassembling, rebuilding, repairing, maintaining and 

surveilling stockpile weapons and weapon components; fabricating joint test assemblies; assembling

and disassembling test beds; conducting interim staging and storing of nuclear components from 

dismantled weapons; performing pit requalification, surveillance, and packaging; producing and 

procuring non-nuclear weapons components; extracting and recycling tritium; loading tritium and 

deuterium into gas transfer system (GTS) reservoirs of nuclear weapons; performing surveillance of GTSs

to support certification of the stockpile; manufacturing uranium components for nuclear weapons, 

cases, and other weapons components; evaluating and performing tests of these components for 

surveillance purposes; storing Category I/II quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU); conducting

dismantlement, storage, and disposition of HEU; and supplying HEU for use in naval reactors. In 

addition, the nuclear weapons production facilities process uranium and plutonium to meet 

DOE/NNSA’s nonproliferation goals and counterterrorism activities.

1.4.3 National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada, provides facilities, infrastructure, and 

personnel to the national security laboratories and other organizations to conduct nuclear and nonnuclear experiments. It is the primary location where experiments using radiological and other highhazard materials are conducted and the primary location where HE-driven plutonium experiments can 

be conducted. 

1.5 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan

DOE/NNSA has made substantial progress on near-term priorities, including life extension programs 

(LEPs), to ensure the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

Efforts on the Navy’s W76-1 and W88 warheads, the Air Force’s B61-12 gravity bomb, and the 

accelerated schedule for the W80-4 warhead for the Air Force’s Long-Range Stand Off cruise missile are 

under way. In addition, NNSA has continued the design phase for the Uranium Processing Facility at 

Y-12 and is beginning infrastructure and service activities at the site of the future facility. The Uranium 

Processing Facility will ensure the ability to produce uranium components for the stockpile and support 

nuclear propulsion for the Navy.

 

3

Some production capabilities also exist at LANL and SNL. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-6 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Despite these accomplishments, continued investment is required to modernize aging nuclear 

facilities and infrastructure that support the Nation’s nuclear weapons policies and force 

structure, and to address the most pressing security challenges. Key considerations include the 

following: 

 The nuclear weapons stockpile is aging and contains many obsolete technologies that must be 

replaced as the service lives of the warheads are extended. This requires significant investment 

in new technologies and tools to certify warheads.

 The trustworthiness of the nuclear weapon supply chain that provides necessary parts 

(e.g., radiation-hardened electronics) must be sustained to deal with the potential for sabotage, 

malicious introduction of an unwanted function, or subversion of a function without detection.

 The DOE/NNSA mission depends on facilities, infrastructure, and equipment for success. 

Current demands of the LEPs, along with stewardship demands of the stockpile, have increased 

loads on an aging NNSA infrastructure. Without infrastructure recapitalization, the risk to 

nuclear weapon maintenance and LEPs will increase. 

 At most sites, the number of employees eligible for retirement is increasing (see Figure 1–3) and 

aggressive programs to recruit and retain high-quality individuals and provide new personnel

with opportunities to acquire the experience and expert judgment to sustain the stockpile are 

needed. Preservation and transfer of institutional and technical knowledge prior to the exodus 

of retirement-eligible members are critical to the continuity of nuclear weapons work. 

Figure 1–3. Management and operating headcount distribution by age
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-7

Although significant portions of the Nation’s stockpile are aging and the nuclear security enterprise is 

even older, NNSA is sustaining the arsenal through LEPs and is beginning to modernize the infrastructure 

to ensure the nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, reliable, and effective in the long term in the 

absence of underground nuclear explosive testing. Substantial progress has been made, but NNSA’s 

workforce must continue to maintain the cutting-edge scientific expertise and facilities needed to 

ensure continued success into the future.

1.6 Overall Strategy, Objectives, Prioritization of Weapons 

Activities

DOE/NNSA and DOD play critical roles in implementing the Administration’s agenda for maintaining 

strategic stability with other major nuclear powers, deterring potential adversaries, and reassuring the 

Nation’s allies and partners as to the national security commitments of the United States. NNSA’s role is 

to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective, and DOD’s role is to 

ensure the weapons can be delivered effectively. These respective efforts are coordinated through the 

congressionally-mandated Nuclear Weapons Council, which is made up of senior officials from both 

organizations who work together to determine the options and priorities that shape national strategies

and budgets for developing, producing, and retiring nuclear weapons and weapon delivery platforms.

DOE/NNSA priorities are to sustain and maintain the stockpile while balancing the investments in both 

infrastructure and RDT&E to meet technical and national 

security challenges in both the near and long term.

The major strategies for sustaining and maintaining the 

stockpile are as follows:

 To extend the life of the stockpile, refresh obsolete 

technology, address security concerns, and meet 

nonproliferation obligations, NNSA will continue to 

pursue the “3+2” Strategy. This strategy transitions

the stockpile to three interoperable ballistic missile 

warheads (each type would have a common nuclear 

explosive package and common or adaptable nonnuclear components) and two air-delivered warheads 

or bombs, as described in more detail in Section 2.2 of 

this document.

 To sustain the ability to assess and certify the 

stockpile, NNSA will continue science-based stockpile 

stewardship by conducting experimental research and 

incorporating new knowledge into models and 

advanced computer codes. This strategy has allowed 

the stockpile to be assessed as safe, secure, reliable, 

and effective for nearly two decades without 

underground nuclear explosive testing. 

Major goals of Weapons Activities

 Complete W76-1 production by 2019.

 Cease programmatic operations at the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory 

by 2019.

 Complete B61-12 first production unit by 

March 2020.

 Complete W88 Alteration 370 first 

production unit (with refreshed 

conventional high explosive) by 2020.

 Complete W80-4 first production unit 

by 2025.

 Ensure the capability to produce 50 to 

80 pits-per-year by 2030.

 Cease enriched uranium programmatic 

operations in Building 9212 at the Y-12 

National Security Complex by 2025.

 Accelerate dismantlement of weapons 

retired prior to FY 2009.

 Provide experimental and computational 

capabilities to support stockpile 

assessment certification.

 Enhance predictive modeling capability to 

certify and assess via experimental data 

and implementation of advanced 

scientific tools.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-8 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 To address infrastructure and equipment issues, DOE/NNSA will improve the data used to plan 

and prioritize investments within the current budget-constrained environment.

 To augment the first two strategies, the stockpile responsiveness program that is under 

development will provide a greater breadth of opportunities to exercise key capabilities and 

skills to ensure the readiness to respond to the needs of the stockpile and nuclear deterrence. 

Additionally, exercising these capabilities will provide a mechanism to preserve and transfer 

knowledge across the workforce.

Additional activities that exist to address other issues include:

 NNSA is making investments to determine the potential of additive manufacturing to reduce 

development and production costs, as well as recapitalization costs of production capabilities. 

Additive manufacturing may also allow greater in-house production of nuclear weapon parts.

 To address supply chain issues, NNSA has established a Nuclear Enterprise Assurance program 

to address threats to critical products and processes. The program will focus on the need to 

enhance and protect designs, establish robust and secure manufacturing processes, and 

augment supply chain management to ensure malicious hardware and software do not enter

nuclear security enterprise products. 

 NNSA and DOE’s investment in exascale computing will advance the time frame over which 

these capabilities can be applied to stockpile stewardship and ensure that the computing needs 

of the nuclear security enterprise are addressed.

Implementation of these strategies will allow NNSA to perform its nuclear weapons mission and, in 

particular, accomplish the goals listed in NNSA’s 2015 Enterprise Strategic Vision and the March 2015 

FY 2016 SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-1

Chapter 2

Status of the Stockpile and Life Extension 

Efforts and Key Tools and Methods

Stockpile management encompasses a range of activities to assess the current condition of the 

stockpile, perform routine maintenance to ensure weapon operability, and extend weapon lifetimes by

20 to 30 years. The status of the stockpile and the activities to keep it safe, secure, reliable, and 

effective are described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. High-level descriptions of the tools and methods of the 

RDT&E programs for warhead assessment are provided in Section 2.3.

2.1 Status of the Stockpile

The stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and effective. On an annual basis, the Directors of the national 

security laboratories (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command submit

letters to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense providing that the assessment of the stockpile. These 

Annual Assessment Reports provide relevant information on the

safety, security, and reliability of each weapon type that could affect 

military utility. Core surveillance, non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests, 

subcritical experiments, materials evaluation, enhanced surveillance, 

and modeling and simulation contribute to the analysis. Much of this 

information is generated through the execution of the programs in the 

Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) and RDT&E budget categories. 

2.1.1 Surveillance of the Stockpile

Surveillance allows integration across test regimes to demonstrate 

performance requirements, such as laboratory and flight tests and 

component and material evaluations. The comparability of data over time provides the ability to 

predict, detect, assess, and resolve aging trends and anomalous changes in the stockpile, as well as 

develop and implement modernization programs to address or mitigate issues or concerns.

Specifically, the Surveillance Program addresses the (1) design integrity of refurbished warheads, 

(2) detection of the number of changes over time in aging warheads, and (3) safety of the inactive 

stockpile. Reductions in laboratory and flight tests and component evaluations create new challenges in 

the ability to make confident assessments of weapon safety, performance, and reliability. In response 

to these challenges, NNSA is furthering its efforts to leverage tools and data from different weapon and 

warhead types that have similar materials or components to understand the behavior in response to a 

variety of environments and conditions, while capitalizing on innovative enhanced surveillance 

techniques. 

Table 2–1 depicts the number of disassembled and inspected warheads for each warhead type and the 

number of flight and laboratory tests and major material and component evaluations conducted in 

FY 2015 and planned for FY 2016. Table 2–2 shows surveillance requirements for the FY 2017 Future 

Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) as compared to the actual FY 2015 and planned FY 2016 

surveillance evaluations. 

Annual Assessment Process

The science-based Stockpile 

Stewardship Program has allowed 

the Secretaries of Energy and 

Defense to certify to the President 

for the twentieth time that the 

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile 

remains safe, secure, and effective

without the need for underground 

explosive nuclear testing.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-2 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Table 2–1. Fiscal year 2015 actual and fiscal year 2016 projected core Directed Stockpile Work 

Program stockpile evaluation activities (as of January 31, 2016)

Warheads

D&Is

JTA

Flights

Test Bed

Evals

Pit

NDE

Pit

D-Tests a

CSA

NDE

CSA

D-Tests

GTS

Tests

HE

D-Tests b

DCA

Tests

Program

Totals

Fiscal Year

15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 16

B61 14 3 6 6 1 6 27 25 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 10 4 1 0 22 53 79

W76-0 4 4 0 5 8 0 16 25 0 2 12 6 2 2 8 18 0 12 7 8 57 82

W76-1 18 29 3 3 1 21 32 25 0 2 7 14 0 3 6 13 10 10 25 22 102 142

W78 3 10 2 1 4 8 6 25 1 3 10 9 0 2 8 8 3 3 3 9 40 78

W80-0/1 4 11 4 5 2 0 15 25 0 0 1 0 2 1 10 9 4 8 0 8 42 67

B83 4 2 2 1 2 2 36 25 1 2 1 1 1 1 7 7 3 1 8 0 65 42

W84 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

W87 11 9 2 3 9 6 17 25 0 0 0 0 1 1 16 8 0 1 4 4 60 57

W88 5 8 7 4 7 0 13 25 0 3 2 19 1 2 12 17 4 4 14 14 65 96

Totals 63 77 26 28 34 43 162 200 2 12 33 53 8 14 67 90 28 40 61 87 484 644

CSA = canned subassembly

D&I = disassembly and inspection

DCA = detonator cable assembly

D-tests = destructive tests

GTS = gas transfer system

HE = high explosive

JTA = joint test assembly

NDE = nondestructive evaluation

a

A pause in plutonium operations in the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) caused postponement of most FY 2015 pit D-test requirements.

b

Beginning in FY 2015, HE D-Tests are being counted as a major activity.

Table 2–2. Major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2015 and planned for FY 2016 and the 

Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FY 2017 through 2021) (as of January 31, 2016)

Major 

Activity

FY 2015

Actual

FY 2016

Plan

FY 2017

Requirements

FY 2018

Requirements

FY 2019

Requirements

FY 2020

Requirements

FY 2021

Requirements

FYNSP

Total a

D&Is 63 77 70 68 68 89 86 458

JTA Flights 26 28 25 23 21 26 31 154

Test Bed

Evaluations

34 43 87 41 58 56 73 358

Pit NDEs 162 200 200 200 200 200 200 1,200

Pit D-Tests b2 12 13 5 16 8 8 62

CSA NDEs 33 53 57 54 56 37 36 293

CSA D-Tests 8 14 18 12 21 15 14 94

GTS Tests 67 90 86 87 78 69 72 482

HE D-Tests c28 40 33 33 37 32 29 204

DCA Tests 61 87 73 87 65 61 55 428

TOTALS 484 644 662 610 620 593 604 3,733

CSA = canned subassembly

D&I = disassembly and inspection

DCA = detonator cable assembly

D-tests = destructive tests

GTS = gas transfer system

HE = high explosive

JTA = joint test assembly

NDE = nondestructive evaluation

a

FYNSP-forecasted quantities do not reflect reductions that may result from the lowering of stockpile readiness proposed for 

certain weapons.

b

A pause in plutonium operations in the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) caused postponement of most of the FY 2015 pit D-test 

operations.

c

Beginning in FY 2015, HE D-Tests are being counted as a major activity.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-3

LANL restarted pit surveillance activities in early 2016 after pausing in plutonium operations at the 

Plutonium Facility (PF-4) in 2013. Table 2–2 also reflects the recovery schedule for pit destructive tests 

across the FYNSP period. NNSA and the U.S. Navy agreed to conclude joint flight tests for the W76-0 in 

FY 2016, with the last production unit of the W76-1 scheduled for completion in FY 2019. Moreover, in 

anticipation of completion of the B61-12 LEP and gaining confidence in the B61-12, Nuclear Weapons

Council members agreed on surveillance test reductions for the B83 and four the B61 variants that are 

to be replaced by the B61-12 (-3, -4, -7, and -10) to partially offset the added cost of conventional high 

explosive replacement in the W88.4 The approximate 10 percent decrease in total tests between 

FY 2017 and FY 2018 is predominately the result of the pending decrease in weapon variants enabled by 

the B61-12. Weapon alterations (Alts) implemented across the FYNSP (e.g., the W87 Alt 360 for the GTS 

and the W88 Alt 370 replacement of the arming, fuzing, and firing assembly and the conventional high

explosive) will require additional surveillance tests during phase-in periods. 

2.1.2 Significant Finding Investigations

The evaluation and investigation of anomalies identified through experiments, assessments, 

surveillance, DOD operations, and other activities are assessed under so called “significant finding 

investigations.” The cause of an anomaly and the impact to weapon safety, security, performance, and 

reliability are determined through the significant finding investigation process. Figure 2–1 below depicts

the recent history of these investigations.

Figure 2–1. Historical number of significant finding investigations opened and closed in

calendar years 2001 to 2015 and the number that resulted in an impact to the stockpile

 

4

See Chapter 2, pp. 2-1, 2-7, 2-8, 2-21, and 2-22 of the FY 2016 SSMP.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-4 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

2.1.3 Assessments of the Stockpile

The annual stockpile assessment process evaluates the safety, performance, and reliability of weapons 

based on physics and engineering analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. Assessments may 

also evaluate the effect of aging on performance and quantify performance thresholds, uncertainties, 

and margins. Available sources of information on each weapon type (including surveillance, non-nuclear 

hydrodynamic tests, subcritical experiments, materials evaluation, enhanced surveillance techniques, 

and modeling and simulation) contribute to these evaluations. 

2.1.4 Maintenance of the Stockpile

Weapons contain limited life components (LLCs) such as GTSs, neutron generators, and power sources 

that require periodic replacement to sustain system functionality. LLCs are required for warhead 

performance, and NNSA and DOD jointly manage component delivery and installation. 

2.1.5 Sustainment of the Stockpile 

The Nation’s stockpile is annually assessed for sustainability. As weapons systems age, or when issues

arise through significant finding investigation or other assessments, sustainment activities may warrant 

LEPs, Alts, or modifications (Mods) to address the aging or performance issues, enhance safety features, 

and/or improve security. An Alt to a weapon is a change to a component that does not alter the 

weapon’s operational capability. A Mod to a weapon alters the operational capabilities of a warhead;

however, in accordance with current policy, the change is made in a way that does not alter the military 

capability (e.g., improving security). In either case, the technologies used are typically more modern 

than the technologies they replace and are developed and matured as part of the RDT&E programs. An 

LEP comprehensively analyzes all components of a weapon and either reuses, refurbishes, or replaces

components to purposefully extend the service life of the weapon. An LEP typically requires NNSA to 

certify the weapon’s protected period (that is, its new lifetime) for 20 to 30 years. NNSA activities for 

LEPs and major Alts of specific weapon types are illustrated in Figure 2–2. Section 2.2 illustrates the 

3+2 Strategy, under which LEPs and stockpile modernization are planned. 

Figure 2–2. National Nuclear Security Administration warhead activities
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-5

2.1.6 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

Weapons are retired as a result of changes to military requirements 

or surveillance evaluations, including disassembly and destructive 

tests of certain components. A retired weapon is no longer part of 

the stockpile. The Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition 

program is the process whereby major components are 

disassembled and the components are assigned for reuse, storage, 

recycling, surveillance, or disposal.5 NNSA committed to 

dismantling nuclear weapons retired prior to FY 2009 by the end of 

FY 2022. In FY 2015, NNSA fell behind schedule because of safety 

reviews, unusually high lightning events, and a worker strike at 

Pantex. The FY 2017 SSMP classified Annex shows the shortfall in 

FY 2015 and NNSA’s recovery schedule in FY 2016 and FY 2017. At 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference on April 27, 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry 

announced that “President Obama has decided that the United States will seek to accelerate the 

dismantlement of retired nuclear warheads by 20%.” To meet the accelerated rate, NNSA will hire, 

train, and certify additional weapons dismantlement technicians starting in FY 2017 and will increase 

weapons dismantlement by 20 percent starting in FY 2018. The accelerated rate will allow NNSA to 

complete the dismantlement commitment a year early, before the end of FY 2021.

2.2 Modernizing the Stockpile through the 3+2 Strategy

The 3+2 Strategy is the program of record that guides NNSA’s life extension efforts and rightsizes the 

stockpile. As each of the 12 warheads or bomb variants within the seven deployed warhead families 

enters an LEP, the strategy will transition the stockpile to three interoperable nuclear explosive 

packages to be used in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles and. 

will also include two air-delivered weapons—one bomb and one cruise missile.

NNSA will evaluate options to improve safety and security and reuse, as well as refurbish or replace

components and systems to extend the service life of weapons by an additional 20 to 30 years. LEPs 

represent prime opportunities to improve safety, security, and reliability. Critical and timely 

investments in areas such as technology maturation, RDT&E, Laboratory Directed Research and 

Development, and Plant Directed Research and Development will position NNSA to capitalize on 

innovative technological options. 

Implementation of the 3+2 Strategy is a long-term investment in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The 

strategy is driving investments in new technologies and execution of the LEPs. Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.5 

describe the FY 2015 accomplishments and the FYNSP schedule for LEPs and major Alts. See Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.4.1.1 to 2.4.1.5 in the FY 2016 SSMP for more extensive descriptions of these programmatic 

efforts. Funding requirements are detailed in Chapter 4 of this FY 2017 SSMP.

2.2.1 W76-1 LEP

The W76-1 LEP extends the original warhead service life from 20 years (as designed) to 60 years. 

Completion of production is scheduled for no later than the end of FY 2019. The W76-1 first production 

 

5

A detailed description of the Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition process is on the NNSA website at

http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/dismantlementanddisposition.

Dismantlement and Disposition

The Weapons Dismantlement and 

Disposition program has developed 

plans to recover its schedule and has 

kept on pace to receive additional 

W76-0 retired units, reduced its 

component inventories, exceeded 

secondary dismantlement at the 

Y-12 National Security Complex, and 

begun efforts to support the W80-4 

Life Extension Program.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-6 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

unit was completed in September 2008, and the first delivery of warheads to the U.S. Navy took place in 

FY 2009. The program is making all deliveries on schedule and under budget.

FY 2015 Accomplishments

In January 2015, the W76-1 LEP passed the halfway point in the total number of refurbished warheads 

scheduled for delivery to the U.S. Navy according to the current program of record.

In FY 2015, KCNSC resumed full-rate production and requalification of most W76-1 components,

following relocation of activities from the Kansas City Plant to the new KCNSC. One remaining 

component is on schedule to complete requalification activities in FY 2016.

Deliverables, Plans, Schedules, and Milestones

The deliverables for the W76-1 LEP through the end of full production are as follows:

 Achieve or exceed annual refurbished warhead production rates at the Pantex Plant.

 Deliver the refurbished warheads on schedule to the U.S. Navy.

 Produce and deliver joint test assemblies for surveillance flight tests.

 Execute retrofit evaluation system test and stockpile surveillance activities to facilitate 

completion of Annual Assessment and Weapon Reliability activities. 

2.2.2 W88 Alt 370

The W88 Alt 370 first production unit is scheduled for December 2019. The Alt 370 includes a new 

arming, fuzing, and firing system, lightning arrestor connector, trainers, flight test assemblies, and 

associated handling gear and spares. In November 2014, the scope of the W88 Alt 370 was changed to 

include replacement of the conventional high explosive main charges and associated components. 

Changes in initial cost estimates for the main-charge replacement have been reflected in this SSMP 

compared to the FY 2016 SSMP (see Chapter 4). The Alt 370 conversion is scheduled concurrently with 

LLC exchanges of the GTSs and neutron generators. The program is running on schedule and within 

budget.

FY 2015 Accomplishments

 Completed the third major flight test, the Follow-on Commanders Evaluation Test 51. 

 Tested functional component prototypes in stockpile-to-target-sequence environments. 

 Conducted additional radar fuzing ground tests. 

 Maintained Interface Requirements Agreements with other programs to document the W88 

Alt 370 dependencies on programmatic deliverables.

 Completed implementation of an EIA-7486-compliant earned value management system to 

improve the scope, cost, and integrated resource-loaded schedule management, and initiated 

an Integrated Baseline Review. 

 Completed 11 of 14 major component Baseline Design Reviews and three Final Design Reviews.

 

6

Earned Value Management Systems ANSI/EIA-748-C Intent Guide, National Defense Industrial Association, Integrated Program 

Management Division, April 2014.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-7

Deliverables, Plans, Schedules, and Milestones

The deliverables for the W88 Alt 370 Program are as follows:

 Obtain Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2017. 

 Conduct the system-level Final Design Review in FY 2018. 

 Conduct the final flight test qualification (demonstration and shakedown operation tests) 

in FY 2019. 

 Complete the first production unit by December 2019. 

 Conduct the Final Design Review and Acceptance Group Review in FY 2020. 

 Obtain Phase 6.6 (Full-Rate Production) approval in FY 2020. 

2.2.3 B61-12 LEP

The B61-12 LEP will consolidate and replace the B61-3, -4, -7, 

and -10 to reduce the number of gravity bombs in the stockpile, 

consistent with Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2010) 

objectives. The first production unit is planned for FY 2020. The 

program is running on schedule and within budget. 

FY 2015 Accomplishments 

 Executed vibration fly-around and instrumented 

measurement vehicle flight to validate flight environments 

on three additional platforms, including the F-35 and 

the B-2. 

 Completed the first system-level Flight Test Development 

Unit tests for ballistic and guided flight at the Tonopah Test 

Range. Completed a system-guided flight test in the “All-upAround” configuration in October 2015 at Tonopah.

 Completed first hydrodynamics experiment to support 

certification of the B61-12 LEP. 

 Implemented EIA-748-compliant earned value management 

system to improve the scope, cost, and integrated resourceloaded schedule management.

 Maintained Interface Requirements Agreements with other 

programs to document the B61-12 dependencies on 

programmatic deliverables. 

Deliverables, Plans, Schedules, and Milestones 

The following are deliverables and planned milestones through the 

end of the program:

 Baseline the system design in FY 2016.

 Participate in the FY 2016 Air Force Design Review and 

Acceptance Group Review to assess design and qualification 

against military requirements. 

B61-12 Flight Test

NNSA and the U.S. Air Force 

completed the third development flight 

test of a B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb 

at Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, on 

October 20, 2015. The test used 

representative non-nuclear 

components, but no highly enriched 

uranium or plutonium. The bomb 

hardware was designed and 

manufactured by the nuclear security 

enterprise and mated to the tail-kit 

assembly section provided by the 

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. 

This B61-12 LEP test provides 

additional confidence in the weapon 

system and instrumentation designs 

prior to authorizing Phase 6.4

(Production Engineering) in 2016.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-8 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 Obtain Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2016. 

 Conduct first system qualification drop test in FY 2017. 

 Complete the first production unit in FY 2020. 

 Conduct the Final Design Review and Acceptance Group Review in FY 2020. 

 Obtain Phase 6.6 (Full Rate Production) approval in FY 2020. 

2.2.4 W80-4 LEP

This LEP will consider W80-based reuse, refurbishment, and replacement options for nuclear and nonnuclear components for the cruise missile to replace the Air Force’s aging air-launched cruise missile

(ALCM). Key design requirements include use of the existing insensitive high explosive design;

incorporation of modern components and safety features; maximum use of non-nuclear components 

developed for other LEPs; and exploration of enhanced surety options. The first production unit is 

scheduled for FY 2025. 

FY 2015 Accomplishments 

 Completed Phase 6.1 (Concept Study) and received Nuclear Weapons Council approval to enter 

Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study). 

 Delivered Phase 6.1 Report and the draft military characteristics and stockpile-to-targetsequence to the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Deliverables, Plans, Schedules, and Milestones 

The following are some of the deliverables for the W80-4 LEP during the FY 2017 FYNSP:

 Provide Phase 6.2 Report identifying preferred design options to Nuclear Weapons Council 

Standing and Safety Committee in FY 2017. 

 Obtain Phase 6.2a approval in FY 2018 and present a Weapon Design and Cost Report outlining 

the program baseline, development plans, and design down-select recommendation. 

 Obtain Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) approval at the start of FY 2019. 

– Develop a Baseline Cost Report and a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and complete a 

detailed design with regard to safety, performance, and production.

– Produce the final draft of military characteristics and stockpile-to-target-sequence and a 

draft addendum to the Final Weapon Development Report for review by the Design Review 

and Acceptance Group. 

2.2.5 W78/88-1 LEP (Interoperable Warhead-1)

The LEP objective is to deploy an interoperable nuclear explosive package for use in the Mk21

intercontinental ballistic missile and the Mk5 submarine-launched ballistic missile aeroshells, with 

adaptable non-nuclear components. This LEP is referred to as the first interoperable warhead option, 

the Interoperable Warhead (IW-1). 

Deliverables, Plans, Schedules, and Milestones 

IW-1 LEP specific activities are scheduled to recommence in FY 2020 to achieve a first production unit in 

FY 2030. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-9

2.3 Methods and Information for Assessment and Certification

2.3.1 Annual Stockpile Assessment and Weapon Certification

Certification is the process whereby all available information on the performance of a weapon system is 

considered and the Laboratory Directors responsible for that system certify—before the weapon enters 

the stockpile—that it will meet, with any noted exceptions, the military characteristics within the 

environments defined by the system’s stockpile-to-target-sequence. In contrast, the annual stockpile 

assessment is the process whereby the current status of each weapon system is evaluated on the basis 

of everything known about that system; the annual assessment does not replace or repeat the 

certification of the weapon system. 

Both processes rely on assembling a body of evidence—based on experiments, physical and 

environmental tests, destructive and nondestructive evaluations, and modeling and simulation—and 

then making an assessment at the part, component, subsystem, and system levels to determine 

whether all the required performance characteristics are met. Both assessment and certification are 

quantitative processes that combine data and theory with simulations of nuclear weapons and arrive at 

a conclusion based on the judgment of experts that the body of evidence is sufficient. 

2.3.2 Predicting Weapon Performance in a Zero Yield Environment

Today, NNSA relies on a combination of experiments and integrated design codes (IDCs) running on high 

performance computers to predict weapon performance. To provide a predictive capability, NNSA must 

know how accurately the code simulations can describe a real weapon—that is, knowing the error in the 

simulation predictions is critical. To determine that error, scientists at LANL and LLNL compare the 

simulation results with data generated from small-scale laboratory experiments; large-scale experiments 

at facilities such as the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) and LANL, the National 

Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL, and the Z facility (Z) at SNL; subcritical (i.e., zero yield) experiments 

underground at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site; as well as data from nearly 40 years of 

U.S. underground nuclear explosive testing. Even in the era of underground nuclear explosive testing, 

theory and modeling were necessary for assessment because weapons could not be tested at all 

relevant scales in all relevant environments, and diagnostics could not provide data on all performance 

metrics of interest. Predictive capabilities are important because they allow weapon designers to 

extrapolate from the data obtained from legacy nuclear explosive testing and modern non-nuclear

experiments to regimes that cannot be probed experimentally. 

The results of modern simulations conducted with the new IDCs, while of lower fidelity than the 

experimental data, can capture the physics of interest and provide information that contributes to the 

body of positive evidence that a weapon will perform as required. These complex, multi-dimensional

IDCs are progressively eliminating phenomenological models that have used ”knobs” to adjust the 

models to match the available data. To accomplish this, stockpile stewardship scientists have broken

down the operation of a weapon into a sequence of individual steps, analyzed those steps through 

computational models and experiments, and then reintegrated the steps through large-scale weapon 

simulation codes and computational tools. The process has required the development of new 

experimental facilities that can approach the densities, pressures, velocities, temperatures, and 

timescales relevant in a nuclear detonation; the development of high-fidelity weapon simulation codes; 

the development and acquisition of high performance computers; and the acquisition of detailed data to 

validate and calibrate the models. New approaches have also become necessary to qualify the nuclear 

and non-nuclear components against hostile nuclear attack using new or improved experimental tools 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-10 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

and simulation codes. Although NNSA has made significant progress in eliminating these knobs, much 

research and experimentation remains to be performed.

2.3.3 Developing Accurate Models of Weapon Systems and Components

Understanding the full-system behavior of a weapon from the knowledge of its component subsystems 

is one of the most difficult aspects of modeling such a complex system. The physical processes that a 

nuclear weapon undergoes extend from the microscale to the macroscale in both time and length. The 

processes that must be modeled at these widely disparate scales include material damage, mixing of 

fluids, and detonation of HE. Moreover, a full-system numerical simulation of the weapon depends 

upon accurate, reliable models for material equations of state, material motion, interaction of neutrons 

with materials, radiation flow, etc. These models are based on data from experiments that represent 

some, but not all, of the regimes experienced by a nuclear weapon. As a specific example, to inform 

decisions on developing replacements for particular materials and components and on when LEPs, 

Mods, and Alts ought to occur, NNSA is improving models for the long-term aging behavior of materials 

and components by deploying advanced diagnostics and technologies and applying new evaluation 

techniques as part of Enhanced Surveillance.

2.3.4 Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties

Using predictive capabilities to assess and certify the performance of 

a weapon is a tremendous challenge. This RDT&E challenge is 

addressed through the quantification of margins and uncertainties 

methodology, which evaluates the confidence of a prediction in 

terms of the degree to which the operation of a weapon is judged to 

lie safely within the bounds of judiciously chosen operating 

characteristics. Confidence is numerically represented as a 

confidence factor—that is, as the ratio of margin over uncertainty. 

The margin (M) is measured based on how much “room” is available 

between the predicted value of a metric and the boundary where 

that metric becomes unacceptable. Uncertainty (U) is a measure of 

the ability to predict the metric based on both the values that are 

measured (via experiments) and the values that are calculated (via

databases for physical quantities, physical models, and numerical 

simulations). An analogy can be drawn between the quantification 

of margins and uncertainties methodology and the process to 

approve a new drug by the Food and Drug Administration (see 

text box). 

A value of the confidence factor significantly greater than 1.0 is 

desirable. A value at or less than 1.0 motivates actions to increase 

the confidence factor by increasing the margin. These actions might 

include shortening the interval between LLC replacements. Another way to increase the confidence 

factor would be to reduce the uncertainty. This could be done by focusing R&D resources on areas of 

physical uncertainty, such as the specific characteristics of strategic materials to which weapon 

performance is sensitive, or by improving the fidelity of models used to simulate the operation of the

warhead. Both of these approaches are being pursued by the RDT&E programs.

Analogy between “Quantification of 

Margins and Uncertainties”

Methodology and the Process to 

Approve a New Drug

The Food and Drug Administration

requires that a drug’s efficacy be 

demonstrated before it can be 

approved. NNSA requires positive 

evidence that a nuclear weapon will 

work; the absence of evidence that 

the weapon does not perform safely, 

securely, and reliably is not sufficient. 

The Food and Drug Administration

requires documentation of 

contraindications and possible side 

effects of the drug. Similarly, NNSA

requires documentation of the effects 

of aging and obsolescence of 

components on the behavior of a 

weapon and of how that weapon 

performs under specific conditions.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-1

Chapter 3

Capabilities that Support the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise

In this summary SSMP, DOE/NNSA is using an updated approach to describe how the stockpile is 

supported and maintained. Specifically, NNSA is focusing on a set of key capabilities necessary to 

execute the mission and maintain deterrence. Many, if not most, of these capabilities are unique to the 

nuclear security enterprise, such as the production of uranium and plutonium components and the 

design and certification of nuclear warheads. The planning described herein reflects consideration of 

the sustainment and, where necessary, the improvement and/or recapitalization of these capabilities, 

consistent with the anticipated needs of the stockpile and in response to unforeseen geopolitical and 

technological challenges. 

Continued investment in these critical capabilities is necessary to improve the understanding of nuclear 

weapons performance, provide confidence in the aging and evolving stockpile, and maintain and 

develop scientific and engineering capabilities. Sophisticated tools and methods are used to assess the 

challenges of technology maturation and, in particular, to certify the W88 Alt 370, the B61-12, and the 

down-selection and development of W80-4 technical design options. In the long term, unique 

capabilities remain crucial to annual assessments of weapons, future LEPs and Alts, and other activities 

related to NNSA’s stewardship of nuclear weapons without nuclear explosive testing. 

Congress recently directed DOE/NNSA to initiate a Stockpile Responsiveness Program to augment 

activities that have routinely been part of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. NNSA 

has implemented several activities within its current Stockpile Stewardship Program and Stockpile 

Management Program portfolios to address Section 3112 of the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization 

Act, and “carry out a Stockpile Responsiveness Program . . . to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and 

continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, 

produce, and deploy nuclear weapons.” Activities that support a responsive nuclear security enterprise 

include the following:

 The Joint Technology Demonstrator (a United States and United Kingdom collaboration) 

exercises the workforce throughout the design, develop, manufacture, and prototype life cycle. 

 NNSA intends to increase operational efficiencies to ensure that the rate of hydrodynamic 

experiments (including subcritical experiments conducted at the Nevada National Security Site) 

is sufficient to train and exercise the workforce of designers, engineers, experimentalists, and

fabrication and assembly personnel.

 The rate of experiments is increasing at other facilities, most notably at the National Ignition 

Facility, that exercise designers, engineers, fabricators, and assembly personnel. 

 Defense Programs began pre-Phase 6.1 Certification Readiness Exercises to examine potential 

LEP options early in order to identify and reduce the technical LEP risks and support LEP 

certification processes. These include hydrodynamic experiments to provide a technical 

assessment of proposed LEP options.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-2 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 The Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence portfolio provides training and development activities 

for designers, engineers, and experimentalists. Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence is principally 

funded in the Primary Assessment sub-program of the Science program. Foreign weapons 

assessments are funded from outside Weapon Activities in collaboration with the intelligence 

community.

 Defense Programs conducted 120-day studies of interoperable warhead concepts.

 A continuous cycle of manufacturing technology development and maturation activities ensures 

that modern, well understood, and sustainable manufacturing capabilities are ready for future 

stockpile sustainment needs.

Critical capabilities listed in Table 3–1 allow DOE/NNSA to execute the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Program and are also applicable to NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission [see Prevent, 

Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017 – FY 2021), 

NNSA 2016]. NNSA will more fully develop a comprehensive list of the essential capabilities as part of 

the FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. Sections 3.1 – 3.7 summarize the status of

current capabilities, the challenges the workforce faces in applying them, and the strategies to address 

those challenges in order to enhance the capabilities. The general purpose infrastructure of the nuclear 

security enterprise and the highly skilled workforce that exercises these capabilities were described in 

Chapters 4 and 7 and Appendix D of the FY 2016 SSMP. Except where updated here, the conclusions 

about the infrastructure and workforce remain valid.

Table 3–1. Critical capabilities that support the mission of the nuclear security enterprise 

Sections Critical Capabilities

3.1 Exascale Computing and the National Strategic

Computing Initiative

Exascale computing, computational science, component design

3.2 Experiments and Tests Hydrodynamic tests, subcritical experiments, assessments, high 

energy density physics, environmental tests, small-scale 

experiments

3.3 Strategic Materials and Core Components

3.3.1 Plutonium Pit production, storage, R&D

3.3.2 Uranium HEU component production, storage, LEU production, R&D

3.3.3 Tritium Recycle and supply, reservoir loading, storage, R&D

3.3.4 Lithium Production, storage, R&D

3.3.5 High Explosives HE component production, storage, R&D

3.3.6 Nonnuclear Components Gas transfer systems, power sources, neutron generators, 

radiation-hardened microelectronics, production, R&D

3.4 Weapons Assembly and Disassembly Cell and bay operations, weapon and component storage, NDE, 

surveillance

3.5 General Purpose Infrastructure Utilities, roads, HVAC, fire, radioactive waste storage and disposal

3.6 Security Physical security, cyber security

3.7 Secure Transportation Transport of weapons, components, and strategic materials

HE = high explosive

HEU = highly enriched uranium

HVAC = heating, ventilating, and air conditioning

LEU = low-enriched uranium

NDE = nondestructive evaluation

R&D = research and development
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-3

3.1 Exascale Computing and the National Strategic Computing 

Initiative

The President signed an Executive Order on July 29, 2015 establishing the National Strategic Computing 

Initiative. Among other goals, the Executive Order directed the NNSA and DOE Office of Science to 

execute a joint program focused on advanced simulation through a capable exascale computing 

program that emphasizes sustained performance on mission relevant applications. Mission-relevant 

applications in the NNSA are its integrated design codes (IDCs) and supporting modeling and simulation 

capabilities. These capabilities enable NNSA to evaluate and address the performance, safety, 

effectiveness, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile; determine the effects of manufacturing 

imperfections; predict the impact of future manufacturing techniques, to include additive 

manufacturing; quantify margins and uncertainties; and resolve the effects of asymmetric features, 

which require three-dimensional simulations. Modeling and simulation capabilities rely on IDCs, science 

codes, and high performance computing systems, together with the necessary hardware and software. 

3.1.1 Current Status

The first phase of the Trinity system at LANL has at least seven times more processing capability than

NNSA’s current supercomputer, Cielo (also at LANL). When fully built out by the end of FY 2016, Trinity 

will have more than 40 petaflops of processing power. In 2015, 

NNSA also continued its CORAL collaboration with LLNL; the DOE 

Office of Science national laboratories at Oak Ridge, Tennessee,

and Argonne, Illinois; and IBM and other vendors. CORAL will help 

develop next-generation computing platforms to dramatically 

improve the ability to run increasingly complex codes and will 

represent a significant step on the path to exascale computing. In 

addition, NNSA’s Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) 

Program is maturing the predictive and three-dimensional 

simulation capabilities of its IDCs and expanding its computational 

resources to address the evolving needs of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. 

The first phase of Trinity is operational and two vendor-staffed 

Centers of Excellence have been established to work with staff at 

the national security laboratories. This will ensure the codes are 

compatible and performing well on the Trinity and upcoming 

Sierra advanced technology systems. 

3.1.2 Challenges

Today, NNSA is seeing a significant degradation in time-to-solution 

as its IDCs are transferred (or “ported”) to run on its current 

“fastest” capability-class platform, Sequoia at LLNL. Performance 

degradation of weapon codes is expected to increase unless active 

measures are taken, as the architectures that industry will provide 

become increasingly taxing on the ASC code base. Vendors are reacting to disruptions that result from 

the breakdown of historical scaling laws (Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling) that worked well at larger 

feature (transistor) sizes. As a consequence, technologies that DOE and NNSA must address include 

multi-levels of memory on a node; a variety of processors, including graphical processing units, low 

20 Years of Science-Based

Stockpile Stewardship

In October 2015, NNSA commemorated 

the twentieth anniversary of the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. The 

efforts of some of the world’s best 

scientists and engineers using 

extraordinary tools at NNSA’s sites have 

allowed the Nation to maintain 

confidence in the nuclear deterrent 

without nuclear explosive testing. Many 

were skeptical in 1995 that this would be

possible. The investment in the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program has 

enabled resolution of many stockpile 

issues and provided more detailed 

knowledge than had been attained 

through nuclear explosive testing. With 

this history and a commitment to 

revitalize the infrastructure, NNSA is 

actively ensuring its capabilities to 

deliver another 20 years and beyond of 

Stockpile Stewardship Program 

success.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-4 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

power cores (as in Sequoia), and reduced instruction set computer processors, with these often 

combined in complex formations on a node; new interconnects; intrusive power management software; 

and hierarchical models for secondary storage, like file systems. 

The next generation of advanced computing hardware presents significant challenges to current IDCs 

and Science Codes. The existing IDCs will require extensive modifications or may be replaced by entirely 

new codes to run efficiently on the emerging computer architectures. Because of the reliance of the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program on simulations for assessment and certification, DOE/NNSA must 

continue to provide and improve simulation capability during the transition to new architectures. This 

requirement places additional demands on the scientists and engineers at the national security 

laboratories as they strive to satisfy current Stockpile Stewardship Program demands while preparing 

codes for more advanced computer technologies.

The simulation challenges of the Stockpile Stewardship Program require enormous computing capability 

when applied to the physics of nuclear weapons. Historical test anomalies have proven that small, 

seemingly insignificant features in a weapon design can have a profound impact on its performance, 

driving a continued need for deeper understanding. Better surveillance capabilities are uncovering the 

evolution of features as a result of aging that are inherently three-dimensional in nature and require 

high resolution to model. Because of the heavy reliance on simulations in these areas, multiple codes 

with different algorithmic approaches increase confidence in the overall assessment. 

In addition to the large capability-class problems that push the limits of computing resources with one 

or a handful of simulations, assessing the impact of a feature that may have a random aspect to its 

nature requires large ensembles of simulations to bound the effects. One cannot assume that the 

specific representation of a feature uncovered in surveillance represents the worst case. Variations 

must be performed to bound the overall impact, which might require hundreds of thousands of 

simulations.

The vast amount of data produced by new experiments, experimental capabilities, and diagnostics (e.g., 

at NIF, DARHT, and subcritical experiments at the U1a Complex [U1a]) provide both an opportunity and 

a challenge. The data allow detailed validation of IDCs and their material databases; however, improved 

data analysis techniques are also required. 

Improving the physics fidelity of IDCs by removing various approximations will decrease the uncertainty 

in the confidence factor used in the quantification of margins and uncertainties process, as well as make 

the IDCs more predictive when applied to regimes outside of what was tested; however, this will come 

at the expense of increased computational resources, which have been the limiting factor. In addition, a 

correlation frequently exists between the fidelity needed in a Science Code to generate physical data 

and the ease with which that data can be obtained experimentally. The more extreme the phase space, 

and thus the harder the experiment, the greater the fidelity needed in the Science Code simulations.

The nationwide demand for computer scientists means that programs at the NNSA national security 

laboratories must compete with other industries and Government departments to recruit and retain 

qualified personnel. One advantage the three NNSA laboratories still have in recruiting is the challenge 

of cutting-edge technology and computer hardware. This is still a draw for top talent and is one more 

reason why NNSA needs to remain at the forefront of technology. However, private sector 

compensation and benefits are often higher. Additionally, some sites have difficulty attracting 

computer scientists due to their remote locations. These realities present the NNSA laboratories with a 

very difficult challenge in staffing critical skills to support ongoing and future stockpile stewardship 

missions. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-5

3.1.3 Approach and Strategies

Historically, industry has delivered new leading-edge systems every four to five years. Exascale systems

will require more than incremental technology improvements. An exascale system will be much more 

difficult to achieve than previous systems; however, these barriers can be overcome, in part by relaxing 

constraints and in part by adapting and augmenting the existing ASC and DOE’s ASCR Programs, to

include research activities at universities, vendor-laboratory partnerships, development of prototype 

systems, and strategic acquisitions. Because of the complexity of exascale computing, these approaches 

are being augmented by substantial new efforts.

Given the challenges of achieving exascale computing, code developers must recognize the trends and 

opportunities of architecture and technologies, and the platform developers must understand the 

intended applications. Through ASC and DOE Office of Science investments, exploratory research has 

begun on the hardware and architecture, software stacks, and numerical methods and algorithms for 

mission applications, as well as determining tradeoffs in the design of exascale hardware, system 

software, and application codes.

The realization of an exascale system involves complex tradeoffs among algorithms; hardware (e.g.,

processors, memory, energy efficiency, reliability, and interconnectivity); and software (programming 

models, scalability, data management, productivity, etc.). Applications software must be redesigned 

and restructured to meet challenges that hardware and software research cannot resolve fully. 

The strategy to address these challenges will focus in four areas: 

 Application Development: developing next-generation codes to address extreme parallelism, 

reliability and resiliency, memory hierarchies, and other performance issues caused by nextgeneration computing hardware.

 Software Technology: developing an expanded, vertically integrated software stack to support 

applications on next-generation hardware.

 Hardware Technology: supporting vendor R&D activities to deploy next-generation systems 

suitable for DOE/NNSA applications.

 Exascale Systems: supporting non-recurring engineering activities by vendors; reducing the 

costs of system expansion and site preparation; providing the associated power and cooling 

needed to run the next-generation supercomputers; and enhancing acquisition and support of 

prototypes and testbeds for application, software, and hardware evaluation activities.

The goal of this strategy is to field a usable exascale system for stockpile applications by the mid-2020s.

3.2 Experiments and Subsystem Tests

Unique experimental facilities are required to exercise the capability to conduct hydrodynamic 

experiments, which provide essential data in support of the Annual Assessment process, resolution of 

significant finding investigations, assessment of LEP options, and advancement of a simulation-based 

predictive capability. These facilities include U1a, DARHT, the Contained Firing Facility, the High 

Explosives Applications Facility, and the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) proton 

radiography capability. Surrogate experiments provide information on the behavior and interaction of 

non-nuclear components, scaling, physical integrity, surety, etc. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-6 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Subcritical experiments at U1a involve high explosives and 

plutonium in configurations and quantities such that no selfsustaining nuclear fission chain reaction can result. The data

allow inference regarding the performance of a full-scale device

and build confidence in stockpile assessments to validate models 

in weapon simulation codes and enhance the ability to predict 

the behavior of life-extended weapons. Focused subcritical 

experiments at U1a investigate specific physics and material 

properties that are important to the dynamic behavior of 

plutonium in weapons design and systems. Integral subcritical 

experiments that capture the behavior of imploding systems 

using plutonium (under conditions that ensure it remains 

subcritical) can be designed to constrain parameters and, when 

coupled with historical nuclear testing data, can explore 

confidence in predictive codes. This capability serves as a 

valuable training ground for next-generation weapon designers 

to challenge their ability to couple theory, modeling, simulation, 

experimentation, and analysis.

Facilities to test non-nuclear-explosive-package components are 

critical to developing new LEP options and eventual certification. 

Facilities such as HERMES, Saturn, the Annular Core Research 

Reactor, the Ion Beam Laboratory, NIF, and Z are all necessary to 

test and validate codes for neutron and radiation effects on 

weapon components. Furthermore, environmental test facilities 

are vitally important to weapon certification and include a 

number of capabilities such as centrifuges, wind tunnels, drop tests, thermal facilities, electromagnetic 

test chambers, and sled tracks.

3.2.1 Current Status

The major experimental facilities have been operating effectively over the past year, and improvements 

in shot rate and the ability to conduct plutonium experiments have been introduced at NIF. Proposals 

for additional capabilities to understand the behavior of materials (Matter-Radiation Interactions in 

Extreme [MaRIE]) and improve understanding of the hydrodynamic behavior of plutonium in subcritical 

experiments (Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments [ECSE]) have reached Critical Decision 

(CD)-0 (approve mission need) since the FY 2016 SSMP was published. With the restructuring of the NIF 

effort to balance high energy density (HED) stockpile stewardship experiments with experiments to 

understand ignition, NIF’s contribution to stewardship has increased. The capability to conduct 

experiments with plutonium at HED conditions at NIF was demonstrated in FY 2015; in FY 2016, the NIF 

experimental throughput will continue to increase. Additionally, researchers at NIF conducted first-of-akind shock physics experiments exploring dynamic properties of plutonium that have never been 

investigated, further improving our understanding of the stockpile.

The mission need for the U1a Complex Enhancements Project (part of an ECSE initiative) has been 

submitted as a line-item project to provide infrastructure at U1a for studies of late-time hydrodynamic 

behavior with more energetic radiographic sources, as well as to explore the reactivity of imploding 

systems within the early 2020s time frame. 

National Ignition Facility

During 2015, researchers conducted an 

unprecedented number of experiments at 

NIF, with 356 laser shots in support of the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. This 

level of effort represents an 85 percent 

increase over FY 2014 and an 18 percent 

increase over the goal for FY 2015. The 

experiments included code and model 

validation to assess the safety and 

reliability of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. Four were first-of-a-kind shock 

physics experiments to explore dynamic 

properties of plutonium that have never 

been investigated, further improving the

understanding of the stockpile. 

Joint Actinide Shock Physics 

Experimental Research Experiments

The two-stage gas gun platform at this 

facility executed ten dynamic materials 

properties experiments in FY 2015, seven

of which used actinide materials 

(plutonium and other materials) of interest 

to both stockpile stewardship and nuclear 

counterterrorism.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-7

3.2.2 Challenges

One challenge of the experiments and tests program is to increase the pace of acquiring, at the required

precision, data relevant to weapons physics to provide insight into underlying physical processes and 

phenomena and validate the codes and models needed to develop predictive capabilities for stockpile 

applications. Additional challenges include increasing the resolution and penetrating power of 

radiographic diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic experiments and measuring the nuclear properties 

of imploding subcritical assemblies, which lead to the need for ECSE. Simultaneously measuring the 

microstructure and properties of materials under extreme conditions is required to develop and certify 

new and newly manufactured materials in a responsive manner without nuclear explosive testing. 

Another challenge involves the need for a trusted supply of strategically radiation-hardened (rad-hard) 

microsystems, including microelectronics, sensors, and other critical components. As microfabrication 

facilities and expertise continue to move off-shore, production options for custom components are 

increasingly limited, and the current NNSA production infrastructure has reached its design end of life. 

Accordingly, NNSA is working to ensure a supply of trusted rad-hard components.

3.2.3 Strategies

In FY 2015, NNSA’s HED community delivered an integrated 10-year HED Strategy that outlined the 

experimental plans and objectives that are focused on acquisition of weapons-physics-relevant data in 

the HED physics regime. In addition, the community delivered a long-term national HED Diagnostics 

Plan to develop and deliver transformational capabilities to acquire data at the precision needed for 

model validation. The HED effort provides a critical national resource to investigate crucial weapons 

physics issues, as well as opportunities to train the next generation of weapons stewards. 

Initiatives are under way to provide the enhanced capabilities to improve subcritical hydrodynamic 

experiments. ECSE will provide radiography at the resolution and penetrating power required to see 

what is occurring within a plutonium pit as it implodes. A neutron-diagnosed subcritical experiment 

capability will allow measurements of the nuclear properties of an imploding subcritical mass. Both of 

these initiatives will fill important gaps in NNSA’s experimental capability for certifying modernized 

weapons. 

MaRIE, a facility concept currently under development, would combine several different types of 

diagnostic probes (protons, photons, neutrons) for in situ, real-time characterization of the state of 

materials under extreme conditions of temperature, pressure, and radiation. MaRIE would, for the first 

time, allow rapid, thorough characterization of microstructure, physical properties, and material in a 

single facility. These capabilities are essential to achieve the goals of rapidly developing new materials 

from conception to fabrication, characterization, and application, while avoiding the indirect 

methodologies of the past and present. MaRIE is currently at the CD-0 phase of planning, with an 

Analysis of Alternatives scheduled to begin in spring 2016.

Defense Programs is also studying options for the future supply of trusted strategic rad-hard 

microelectronics because the current NNSA production facility, Microsystems and Engineering Sciences 

Applications (MESA) at SNL, has reached its design end of life and increased performance requirements 

for interoperable nuclear explosive packages will require a new capability. The Analysis of Alternatives, 

which is currently in progress to explore trusted microsystems capabilities, will provide valuable 

information concerning the present state of Government and commercial options judged against 

capability requirements, risk, and cost. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-8 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.3 Strategic Materials and Core Components

Strategic materials are key to ensuring safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent, as well as addressing national security concerns such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism. 

These materials require a highly skilled workforce and significant programmatic infrastructure. Weapons 

components created with these strategic materials cannot be produced outside the United States. 

NNSA has long-term strategies to maintain the facilities, scientific equipment, and manpower to sustain 

the strategic materials. A common obstacle is the need to refurbish or replace the aging and obsolete 

facilities in which these materials are handled. The strategies below outline solutions to such challenges 

or offer bridging strategies to manage implementation of capability investments. Also highlighted are 

specific aspects of the plutonium, uranium, tritium, lithium, and HE material strategies, as well as the 

infrastructure requirements for weapons assembly and disassembly and unique non-nuclear 

components.

3.3.1 Plutonium

The use of plutonium requires proper storage facilities, safe and 

secure disposal pathways, unique equipment and facilities for 

R&D activities, and modern plutonium pit production 

capabilities. Almost all plutonium processing for the nuclear 

weapons program (i.e., recovery, characterization, component 

fabrication, nondestructive analysis, and surveillance), as well as 

basic applied research on plutonium, is conducted in LANL’s 

Technical Area 55 (TA-55). 

3.3.1.1 Recent Challenges and Strategies

Aged Plutonium Processing Facilities

NNSA is addressing the aging infrastructure at LANL and 

modernizing the waste processing and treatment facilities 

through recapitalization and line-item projects, including the 

TA-55 Reinvestment Project, Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement Project, Radiological Liquid Waste 

Treatment Facility Project, and Transuranic Waste Facility 

Project. 

Expanded Storage Capacity for Plutonium from Retired 

Weapons

The largest portion of the U.S. weapons-usable plutonium inventory is in the form of thousands of 

retired pits. As more weapons are dismantled, the staging capacity at Pantex is projected to become

inadequate within the next decade. In the near term, NNSA will execute a strategy to stage the pits in 

nuclear material bays until a long-term staging facility is available. A potential long-term solution is a 

new facility at Pantex, the Material Staging Facility, which completed CD-0 Mission Need in FY 2015. 

Resuming Plutonium Operations at PF-4

Since pit production paused in 2013, LANL has worked to restart all operations safely. In early FY 2016, 

LANL resumed machining operations for pit surveillance activities and plans to manufacture a 

development pit by the end of FY 2016. Full operations at PF-4 are scheduled in late 2016. The 

Plutonium Sustainment Program at KCNSC provides manufacturing capabilities for shells and other nonZ facility

In 2015, Sandia National Laboratories

researchers at Z conducted the 

seventeenth dynamic compression 

experiment using plutonium. The data 

generated by this and previous 

experiments will improve understanding of 

the material properties of plutonium under 

extreme pressures and temperatures to

inform decisions on pit reuse in warhead 

LEPs.

U1a Subcritical Experiments

The Orpheus experiment in the Lyra

series of subcritical experiments at the 

Nevada National Security Site was 

executed in 2015. The experiment 

provided rich data on the early-time 

hydrodynamic performance of surrogates 

for plutonium using several newly 

developed diagnostics.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-9

nuclear pit components. These interdependent efforts are critical to support a pit manufacturing 

capacity of 10 War Reserve (WR) pits in 2024, 20 WR pits in 2025, and 30 WR pits in 2026, followed by 

50 to 80 pits per year by 2030.

Resuming Operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The radiological release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in February 2014 stopped transuranic waste 

shipments and imposed an operational constraint on plutonium programs at TA-55 and throughout the 

nuclear security enterprise. Phase I of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Recovery Plan has been 

completed. Phase II involves initial resumption of waste disposal operations by December 2016, 

followed by installation and operation of a new ventilation system.

3.3.1.2 Long-term Plutonium Sustainment Strategy

Modernization of Plutonium Capabilities

To meet weapon-grade plutonium requirements for the 

stockpile, in January 2014, NNSA adopted a three-step strategy, 

as detailed below. 

 The first two steps optimize the use of LANL’s existing 

facilities for analytical chemistry and material 

characterization capabilities to end program operation 

in the early Cold War-era Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research facility (scheduled for FY 2019):

– Some laboratory space in the Radiological 

Laboratory Utility Office Building, completed 

in 2012, is being reconfigured and equipped for 

analytical chemistry and material characterization operations to maximize use of existing 

facilities. 

– LANL is repurposing space for new glove boxes and analytical chemistry and material 

characterization operations in PF-4 at TA-55 to ensure these capabilities will support pit 

production and other activities at LANL. 

 The third step, the Plutonium Modular Approach, is currently envisioned to construct two

separate laboratory modules to conduct operations over the long term and extend the lifetime 

of PF-4. CD-0 Mission Need for the Plutonium Modular Approach Project was approved in 

November 2015, and an Analysis of Alternatives is under way to prepare for CD-1. 

3.3.2 Uranium

Uranium is a strategic national defense asset with different assays and enrichments (depleted uranium, 

low-enriched uranium [LEU], and HEU)

7

being used in a wide variety of applications, including weapon 

components, naval reactors, and fuel in commercial power reactors for the production of tritium. The 

infrastructure to store and process uranium is mostly at Y-12, with some R&D capabilities located at 

LANL and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 

 

7

Depleted uranium is primarily U238; LEU is 3-5 percent U235; and HEU is primarily U235.

Plutonium Strategy

To meet pit production requirements and 

address the need for a responsive 

infrastructure, NNSA is investing in 

plutonium infrastructure through line-item 

construction projects, as well as pit 

production equipment and resources. 

NNSA and DOD remain committed to 

achieving a 50 to 80 pits-per-year capability 

as part of a responsive infrastructure. 

NNSA is currently evaluating how best to 

begin demonstrating higher levels of pit 

manufacturing capacity in 2027.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-10 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.3.2.1 Challenges

 Provide a new Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 by 2025 

to replace some uranium processing capabilities in the 

Manhattan Project era facility, Building 9212, and relocate 

other capabilities to existing Y-12 buildings. 

 Reduce inventory of in-process enriched uranium 

materials at Y-12 to improve safety.

 Maintain the LEU capability for the nuclear security 

enterprise.

3.3.2.2 Long-term Sustainment Strategy

NNSA approved the long-term strategy to produce, process, 

recycle, and store uranium. The strategy is as follows:

 End enriched uranium programmatic operations in 

Building 9212 by 2025.

 Sustain and modernize the manufacturing capabilities for 

casting, machining technology, and purified metal 

production.

 Upgrade the electrical and heating, ventilating, and air 

conditioning (HVAC) systems of enduring facilities. 

 Transfer classified components and enriched uranium 

material inventories to the Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility for secure storage.

The strategy to maintain the LEU capability for the nuclear security 

enterprise is as follows:

 Secure existing sources of unobligated8LEU using 

obligation exchanges9and downblending the HEU from the current inventory to provide 

unobligated LEU to extend the tritium fuel need date to the 2038 to 2041 timeframe. 

Downblending must begin in FY 2019 to preserve the downblending capability and ensure 

extension of the need date.

 Continue research on centrifuge technology including the AC100 and a smaller centrifuge 

design. Develop a detailed acquisition strategy with industry to deploy an LEU capability for 

tritium production and identify options to supply enriched uranium for all national security and 

nonproliferation mission requirements for some yet-to-be-determined time in the future. 

 

8

Unobligated materials are not encumbered or “obligated” by international treaties or agreements such as peaceful nuclear 

cooperation agreements.

9

Unobligated LEU is owned within the U.S. commercial reactor industry. “Trading” or exchanging U.S.-owned, but obligated, 

LEU with commercial owners will preserve nuclear security enterprise access to the unobligated materials.

Uranium Strategy

The Uranium Processing Facility provides 

critical capabilities to the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons program, Naval Reactors, and 

nonproliferation missions. NNSA is 

committed to ending enriched uranium 

programmatic operations in Y-12’s 

Building 9212 and delivering the Uranium 

Processing Facility by 2025 for no more 

than $6.5 billion. NNSA is reducing 

sources of mission and safety risk in the 

existing buildings to ensure that long-term 

enriched uranium operations continue 

safely.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-11

3.3.3 Tritium

Because of its short half-life, tritium must be periodically replenished in nuclear weapons. Tritium is 

recovered from gas transfer system reservoirs at SRS. The recovery process provides the majority of 

SRS’s inventory to fill the reservoirs. The Material Recycle and Recovery program is responsible for that 

mission. Producing new tritium10 to maintain the SRS inventories is the responsibility of the Tritium 

Sustainment program. Maintaining the infrastructure associated with the production, purification, 

storage, and recycling of tritium is vital to meet national security needs. R&D is also required to 

understand and advance tritium technologies to support the limited life gas transfer system components 

and the production and gas handling infrastructure. In 2015, NNSA appointed a Tritium Strategic 

Material Manager as a single point of contract for issues involving the GTS tritium supply chain.

3.3.3.1 Challenges

 Tritium gas processing and support equipment in the aged SRS H-Area New Manufacturing 

facility will require replacement within the FYNSP period. While production outages are 

carefully planned to avoid impacting mission schedules, in some instances, NNSA and SRS will 

likely have to work with DOD to adjust schedules to accommodate this work.

 SRS must restore full Tritium Extraction Facility staffing 

by the end of FY 2016 to allow time for training and 

qualification and to establish the proficiency needed 

when full-time operations begin in FY 2019.

 Production of tritium must ramp up to 2800 grams over

two 18-month reactor cycles by 2025. Appropriate 

license amendment requests and a step-wise increase 

of tritium-producing burnable absorber rod (TPBAR)

irradiation at the Watts Bar Reactor are the near-term 

actions to meet this requirement.

 SRS must replace H-Area New Manufacturing chillers to 

be in compliance with U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency regulations. SRS has developed a mission strategy that replaces the chillers by the 

late 2020s.

3.3.3.2 Long-term Sustainment Strategy

DOD and NNSA have requirements to improve performance margins and to reduce the frequency of gas 

reservoir exchanges, which translates into increased demand for tritium. NNSA updated its tritium 

production plan accordingly, as illustrated in Figure 3–1. Each horizontal bar in Figure 3–1 represents an 

18-month irradiation cycle at Tennessee Valley Authority commercial nuclear reactor sites. Beginning 

with the 2017 irradiation cycle and subsequent cycles, the number of TPBARs must be increased, and 

eventually two reactors will be required. The tritium to be recovered through stockpile returns and 

dismantlement of weapons has been factored into the assessment of production needs. 

 

10 Tritium is produced by irradiating lithium-aluminate pellets with neutrons in a commercial nuclear power reactor. TPBARs 

are similar in dimension to reactor fuel rods and, with irradiation, tritium is produced and captured on getters. When the 

TPBARs are processed, the tritium is extracted, purified, and stockpiled.

Tritium Supply Chain

Management

NNSA strengthened the management of the 

tritium supply chain by appointing a 

Strategic Material Manager for Tritium. An 

enterprise-wide team conducted a supply 

and demand analysis that defined the 

requirements validated by the Nuclear 

Weapons Council. NNSA updated its

tritium production planning to address the 

current requirements.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-12 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 3–1. Schedule for irradiating TPBARs in two reactors at the Tennessee Valley Authority

3.3.4 Lithium

Lithium is used in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components for NNSA and lithium materials 

are provided to the Department of Homeland Security and the DOE Office of Science. The infrastructure 

to produce lithium components is at Y-12. NNSA will appoint a Lithium Strategic Material Manager in 

2016.

3.3.4.1 Challenges

Building 9204-2, the main facility for lithium production at Y-12, is over 70 years old and is one of the 

oldest operating facilities in the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA will continue to use 9204-2 and its 

process equipment to meet near-term stockpile needs while developing a plan for the Lithium 

Production Capability to address long-term capability requirements.

3.3.4.2 Long-term Sustainment Strategy

The strategy for lithium is as follows:

 A few processes will be restarted in Building 9204-2 in the near term to provide additional 

feedstock material. In lieu of full purification capabilities, material recycle is the only source of 

lithium for weapon systems. 

 To address long-term requirements, an Analysis of Alternatives is under way and is expected to 

finish by the third quarter of FY 2016. 

 A bridging strategy is being executed to ensure safe operations in the current production facility 

and sustain capabilities and material supplies at Y-12 until the new lithium production capability 

is in place around 2028. 

 Nuclear weapons production planning has identified a number of retired weapons systems and 

canned subassembly inventories that could be a source for lithium salt recycling to augment the 

currently certified sources. LANL and LLNL must certify these additional sources before they can 

be used for LEP components.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-13

3.3.5 High Explosives

High explosives (HE) are used in the nuclear explosive package

and non-nuclear support systems. A broad range of activities 

in synthesis, formulation, processing, characterization, and 

dynamic tests of energetic materials, components, and 

subassemblies are conducted to support the mission. The 

infrastructure to support these efforts includes unique 

experimental facilities, characterization laboratories, 

contained firing sites, an outdoor test area, isostatic pressing, 

and the synthesis plant. 

Challenges and Strategies

 Risk to HE operations has been reduced through the 

construction of the High Explosive Pressing Facility, 

which consolidates operations from numerous 

buildings and greatly reduces movement of HE within 

Pantex. Operations at the new facility are scheduled 

to begin in September 2016. 

 HE storage at LANL and LLNL is currently adequate, 

however many of the Pantex facilities are World War II-era buildings that have been identified 

for replacement. When built, these facilities were not constructed to meet modern safety 

design criteria for HE. 

 Additionally, other HE facilities (including buildings and structures associated with HE research, 

development, test, and evaluation at LANL and LLNL) require recapitalization to support LEP

activities, improve efficiencies, and reduce downtime. NNSA will continue to meet its near-term 

mission commitments and strengthen core capabilities, while planning and making capital 

investments in projects that include new facilities, modernizing other facilities, consolidating like 

activities, returning several capabilities to their intended 

purpose, and demolishing several facilities that are not 

economically feasible or are no longer needed.

 HE and other energetic materials are used in more than

50 non-nuclear components within the nuclear stockpile 

(e.g., explosive detonators, timers and drivers for neutron 

generators, initiators for spin-rocket motors and explosive 

firing sets). These non-nuclear components developed at 

SNL span a wide range of functions, designs, and 

chemistries that make it difficult for commercial vendors to 

meet all nuclear weapon requirements. The stringent 

specifications and diversity of the energetic materials do 

not provide the economic incentives necessary for commercial vendors to improve their existing 

processes. A new capability is under development to reprocess available energetic materials by 

engineering their purity and morphology for existing and future applications.

High Explosives

The Pantex Plant is currently the only 

national supplier of several War Reservequality high explosives (HE), including 

hexanitrostilbene, pentaerythritol tetranitrate, 

and plastic bonded explosive (PBX)-9012. 

The HE pressing operations are being 

conducted in a World War II-era facility until

the High Explosive Pressing Facility is 

commissioned and startup activities 

commence in 2016.

Insensitive High Explosive (IHE) 

Research and Development

These explosives are more resistant to 

shock and fire than conventional high 

explosives. The IHE in the present 

stockpile were developed in the 1970s. 

The new generations of IHE under 

development are lighter and take up 

less volume than the first-generation 

IHE.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-14 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.3.6 Non-nuclear Components

3.3.6.1 Gas Transfer Systems

NNSA delivers tritium-filled GTSs, an LLC, to DOD as part of the nuclear weapon stockpile. GTSs are 

designed, produced, filled, and delivered for existing and future weapon systems. SNL and LANL are 

responsible for the design of the GTSs to meet performance characteristics of the weapon systems. 

Savannah River National Laboratory partners with these national security laboratories to conduct GTS 

R&D. The Savannah River National Laboratory works closely with SNL and LANL, in particular, to 

evaluate new GTS designs produced at KCNSC and conducts tests to qualify the new designs. In 

response to this expanding role, Savannah River National Laboratory is enhancing its tritium processing 

infrastructure, separate from its tritium production facilities, to accommodate these R&D needs.

Recent Challenges and Strategies 

 Formal risk analyses continue to show deteriorating infrastructure as a primary risk to the 

continuity of SRS’ stockpile missions. The Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications 

(TRIM) Program is NNSA’s primary strategy for mitigating infrastructure risks at SRS. In FY 2015, 

NNSA approved CD-0 for the TRIM Program’s Tritium Production Capability line-item project 

based on the Acquisition Advisory Board’s validation of mission need. NNSA will execute this 

project after a preferred alternative is identified via the formal Analysis of Alternatives process.

 Limited capacity for GTS function tests at SRS are forcing trade-offs between surveillance and 

R&D needs at the national security laboratories. With the need for GTS function tests 

forecasted to grow, SRS will study options, including multi-shift operations on existing 

equipment. 

 Because of complex system designs and concurrent production of multiple weapon systems, 

GTS loading capacity at SRS will be insufficient unless modifications are made. As a result, NNSA 

will modify process equipment in multiple SRS facilities by FY 2020 to establish the additional 

loading capacity to support mission requirements.

 Production welding equipment and precision turning equipment at KCNSC should be replaced to 

maintain the programmatic schedule. The existing equipment was transferred from Rocky Flats 

in the early 1990s. Upgrades to production welding and precision turning equipment are in 

KCNSC plans.

3.3.6.2 Power Sources

Challenges and Strategies 

Facility conditions at SNL are becoming inadequate for power source production, placing battery 

deliveries to support stockpile modernization schedules at risk. The current facility was not designed to

contain the powersource capability, and the associated infrastructure has exceeded its design life and is

becoming unreliable. To meet the mission needs for the power source capability, the new Weapons 

Engineering Facility is on the NNSA Construction Resource Planning List in Figure 4–35 of Chapter 4 in this 

FY 2017 SSMP. 

3.3.6.3 Neutron Generators

No updates in the FY 2017 SSMP.

3.3.6.4 Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics

NNSA requires a trusted supply of radiation-hardened advanced microsystems, including R&D 

capabilities to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent in an 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-15

increasing geopolitical threat environment. The MESA fabrication facilities at SNL are the only source of 

custom, strategic, radiation-hardened microelectronics for nuclear weapons. 

Challenges and Strategies 

 A clear path forward is needed to sustain an adequate supply of trusted, strategic, radiationhardened advanced microsystems. Through the CD process, NNSA is evaluating the mission

need and program requirements.

 The silicon fabrication infrastructure continues to deteriorate and is at risk for a major failure. 

The silicon fabrication facility at MESA that delivers custom integrated circuits reached the end 

of its design life in 2013 and relies on fabrication tools that are no longer supported by 

manufacturers. NNSA is determining how to qualify new processes associated with converting 

from 6-inch to 8-inch wafer tooling at SNL’s MESA facilities. 

3.4 Weapons Assembly and Disassembly

As part of maintenance and surveillance, weapons are selected for disassembly and inspection. 

Weapons sampled from production lines or returned from DOD are inspected during disassembly. 

Necessary maintenance is performed, as well as some surveillance activities, including component and 

material inspections and evaluations. Reassembly is then performed. Most assembly and disassembly 

activities are done at Pantex, with some evaluation and reacceptance activities performed at SNL, LLNL, 

LANL, and KCNSC. The activities within the assembly and disassembly capability are cell and bay 

operations, weapon and component storage, and nondestructive evaluation and surveillance. 

3.4.1 Challenges and Strategies 

 Cell and bay operations, weapon and component storage, and nondestructive evaluation and 

surveillance are inadequate at Pantex because of infrastructure deficiencies (e.g., fire 

suppression systems and radiological alarm monitoring systems that limit performance and for 

which refurbishment is required to return the key assets to adequate conditions). The 

infrastructure decline at Pantex is being arrested through reinvestments that will mitigate the 

effects on cell and bay operations and nondestructive evaluation and surveillance. For weapon 

and component staging, the proposed Material Staging Facility would offset the decline and 

operational challenges. 

 Explosive facilities for hydrodynamics assembly are inadequate to substandard at LLNL. Small 

investments are in place at LLNL and the equipment status is trending toward an adequate 

rating within the FYNSP. Weapons test assembly fabrication will require some major building 

system recapitalization.

3.5 General Purpose Infrastructure and Programs

General purpose infrastructure includes all nuclear security enterprise infrastructure (such as roads, fire 

suppression systems, site utilities, and equipment) that is not specifically program-focused, but supports

mission execution. Also included in this category are the building envelopes (e.g., roofs, walls) that 

house the programmatic infrastructure,

11 as well as surveillance and maintenance of excess (that is, 

 

11 Programmatic infrastructure includes the scientific devices and diagnostic equipment, core capabilities, and processes 

housed within the buildings of the general purpose infrastructure. The programmatic infrastructure allows NNSA to conduct 

research, tests, production, sustainment, and disposition related to the entire range of its national security commitments.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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unused) general purpose and programmatic infrastructure. A variety of new tools, techniques, and 

approaches have been designed and deployed to enhance NNSA’s ability to manage an exceedingly 

diverse and complex suite of infrastructure assets. In addition, NNSA has focused on ways to operate 

more efficiently and prioritize its investments better across the nuclear security enterprise. These new 

approaches have already yielded some success, but many challenges remain, and NNSA must sustain 

these efforts over the next 25 years to ensure the ability to support its mission needs fully. 

For information on NNSA’s programmatic infrastructure, refer to the Experiments and Tests capabilities 

discussion in Section 3.2 and the strategic material and core component capabilities discussions in 

Section 3.3.

3.5.1 Current State

NNSA’s ability to meet national security mission needs depends on a safe and reliable general purpose 

infrastructure. The condition and age of this infrastructure poses increasing risk for NNSA in meeting its 

mission. This challenge is made more difficult since that infrastructure is failing at an increasing 

frequency because of its age and condition. As shown in Figure 3–2, more than half of NNSA’s facilities 

are more than 40 years old, nearly 30 percent date to the Manhattan Project era, and 12 percent are 

excess. The state of NNSA’s general purpose infrastructure is in decline and, in some instances, cannot 

fully support mission activities in terms of availability, capacity, or reliability. Increased investment is 

required to avoid unacceptable risk to capabilities, the workforce, the public, and the environment.

Figure 3–2. NNSA general purpose infrastructure scope
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-17

NNSA is taking steps to arrest the declining state of its general purpose infrastructure by making better 

use of existing resources and working to enhance these resources. To do so, NNSA is deploying 

innovative management tools to facilitate a data-driven planning process that will lead to risk-informed 

investment decisions.

3.5.2 Challenges

The main challenges facing NNSA with respect to sustainment, modernization, and operation of its 

general purpose infrastructure are:

 the growing need for refurbishment or modernization of key infrastructure assets,

 the allocation of limited capital construction resources to replace these assets,

 halting the growth of deferred maintenance (DM), especially that associated with missionessential assets, and

 the backlog of excess assets awaiting decontamination and decommissioning, which results in 

ongoing costs to manage risks in unoccupied space.

These interrelated challenges must be considered as a whole to develop an integrated approach to 

investment planning to ensure resources are prioritized to address the greatest risks. NNSA must also 

become more efficient and resourceful in prioritizing the funding it receives.

3.5.3 Program Management Tools and Processes

This section summarizes the cutting-edge management tools and processes NNSA is deploying to make 

data-driven, risk-informed investment decisions to address its general purpose infrastructure challenges.

BUILDER is a web-based software tool that enables decisions concerning when, where, and how to best 

maintain, repair, and recapitalize infrastructure. Developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 

BUILDER Sustainment Management System has been recognized12 by the National Academies of 

Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine as a best-in-class practice for infrastructure management. BUILDER 

uses pre-existing engineering data to predict facility and component conditions, prioritize maintenance 

work, and support analysis of different spending scenarios.

NNSA’s ultimate goal is to collect all condition assessment data in BUILDER and use it as the auditable, 

consistent single source of information on the condition of all NNSA general purpose infrastructure. 

BUILDER implementation is under way and will be completed by early 2018. When this implementation 

is complete, NNSA will use BUILDER to calculate a more consistent and accurate DM picture of the 

nuclear security enterprise.

Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a risk-based methodology that measures “consequence to 

mission” and the “likelihood of the consequence occurring.” ERM provides a framework to evaluate the 

potential impact of investment efforts and opportunities for future investment. This ERM strategy 

represents a fundamental shift in the methods and tools that NNSA has used over the past 15 years and 

will require lower-priority (hedge) assets to be repurposed or dispositioned.

Enterprise Management Information System Generation 2 (G2) empowers the M&O partners to 

manage infrastructure at the project level with appropriate transparency and provides NNSA senior 

management with a common, transparent picture of the allocation and execution of general purpose 

 

12 See Predicting Outcomes of Investments in Maintenance and Repair of Federal Facilities, The National Academies Press, 2012.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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infrastructure spending. G2’s flexibility13 provides this transparency without burdening M&O partners

with unnecessary additional data tracking and reporting requirements in the following manner:

 Tracks scope, schedule, cost, risk, and prioritization data.

 Automates change control, business rules, and notifications.

 Maintains geospatial data for maps, diagrams, photos, inventories, and condition.

 Uses ERM questions and formulas to prioritize projects.

Mission Dependency Index measures the consequence to the mission by combining the impact if the 

asset were lost, the difficulty to replace the asset, and the interdependency of assets. The Mission 

Dependency Index also shows the interconnectivity of facilities. Combining this with BUILDER condition 

and functionality data will allow NNSA to understand the risks associated with the condition and 

functionality of its assets and the potential impacts to its mission.

New DOE Laboratory Operations Board Assessment Tools. In 2013, the Secretary of Energy formed the 

National Laboratory Operations Board to provide a nuclear security enterprise-wide forum to engage 

DOE’s national laboratories and programs in a joint effort to identify opportunities for improving 

effectiveness and efficiency of operations. The Laboratory Operations Board established an integrated 

plan to conduct the Department’s first assessment of its general purpose infrastructure across all 

17 DOE laboratories, as well as its NNSA sites, nuclear weapons production plants, and the Nevada 

National Security Site, using common standards and a DOE-wide approach. This assessment influenced 

the infrastructure portions of NNSA’s FY 2017 Budget Request, which will allow NNSA to prevent the 

growth in the DM backlog above the FY 2015 end-of-year levels.

3.5.4 Strategies and Path Forward

This section summarizes the strategies NNSA is developing and deploying to address its general purpose 

infrastructure challenges, including those being used for long-term strategic planning.

Core Infrastructure Risk-Informed Strategic Planning

NNSA will implement the planning process via the Core infrastructure, Risk-Informed Strategic Planning 

(CRISP) Team. CRISP is a multi-organization, nuclear security enterprise-wide team that includes 

representatives from all NNSA field offices and M&O partners. The CRISP mission is to develop datadriven, risk-informed strategic planning processes to improve general purpose infrastructure investment 

decision-making. CRISP will identify high-priority, nuclear security enterprise-wide actions that put 

NNSA on the path to achieving its vision. 

NNSA Master Asset Plan

The Master Asset Plan serves as the roadmap to meet NNSA’s general purpose infrastructure needs; it 

provides a prioritized sequencing of major capital investments over a minimum of 25 years to meet 

NNSA mission requirements. The new NNSA Master Asset Plan process draws on the DOE Office of 

Science's proven infrastructure strategic planning process and includes three major process elements:

 Mission Strategic Planning, 

 Infrastructure Analysis, and 

 Infrastructure Roadmap.

 

13 See FY 2015 SSMP, Chapter 8, Section 8.10.12, p. 8-23.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-19

Asset Management Program

The Asset Management Program funds prioritized repair and replacement of major building systems 

that are common across the nuclear security enterprise. Asset Management Program funds were first 

applied to roofs.14 In 2015, the program was expanded to include HVAC equipment. The Asset 

Management Program uses systems engineering and supply chain management strategies to increase 

purchasing power and improve the timeliness of procurements in order to improve the condition of 

these systems faster and more economically than decentralized approaches. 

Decontamination and Decommissioning 

NNSA’s strategy for tackling the decontamination and decommissioning backlog is driven by the 

principles of enterprise risk management, i.e., applying funding to tasks that will eliminate the most risk 

for the least investment. To measure these risks, NNSA is developing a Mission Risk Index, which factors 

in surveillance and maintenance, operating costs and missions, and safety of the workforce and public. 

NNSA’s highest disposition funding priorities are to stabilize degraded process-contaminated buildings, 

characterize their hazards and conditions, remove hazardous materials, and place these buildings in the 

lowest risk condition possible. While process-contaminated buildings pose the greatest hazards, nonprocess-contaminated buildings also pose risks to the workforce, the public, and the environment as a 

result of structural degradation, industrial contamination, and increased vulnerability to fire or other 

accidental events.

Capital Construction Projects

NNSA’s general purpose infrastructure capital investments balance the need to modernize the aging 

nuclear security enterprise with the risk management of maintaining existing facilities and capabilities 

beyond their intended lifetimes. The projects listed below, as well as other planned capital 

improvements, are necessary to sustain existing infrastructure needs and provide the capabilities to 

meet future mission demands.

 Emergency Operations Centers at Y-12, LLNL, and SNL are being planned to improve emergency 

management response and survive high-consequence natural phenomena.

 The electrical distribution system projects at LANL, LLNL, and the Nevada National Security Site 

will improve the capability, capacity, and reliability to support mission-essential activities.

 The new fire station at Y-12 will improve emergency response capabilities.

 The new High Pressure Fire Loop for Zone 11 at Pantex will provide a reliable fire protection 

system to support HE production and development operations.

Public Private Partnerships

NNSA is committed to satisfying its programmatic needs through a rigorous acquisition and project 

management process. Consistent with DOE’s recently instituted policies, NNSA conducts an Analysis of 

Alternatives—independent from the contractor organization that would benefit from the project—for 

all projects greater than $10 million prior to selecting an alternative at CD-1. As part of the Analysis of 

Alternatives process, NNSA evaluates all options, including capital construction, use of public-private 

partnerships, and other alternatives. This evaluation includes life-cycle cost analysis that takes into 

account all relevant cost drivers, including whether third-party financing may be cost-feasible based on 

 

14 See the FY 2011 SSMP, Annex A, pp. 147 and 149 and Figure A-11-2 on p. 148. The Roof Asset Management Program 

component of NNSA’s Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program received the first prize for Real Property Innovation 

in the 2008 General Services Administration’s annual competition. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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application of the criteria in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11.

15

 If NNSA chooses 

to pursue a public-private partnership, additional considerations will need to be addressed and the 

proposal will have to be submitted through the normal channels.

In April 2015, the NNSA Administrator approved leasing as the preferred alternative to recapitalize aging 

infrastructure for administrative services at Pantex and directed the use of a “Sources Sought” process 

as the first step toward developing a specific proposal, which has been submitted to OMB for review and 

approval. As with any proposed public-private partnership, this proposal must be compliant with OMB 

Circulars A-11 and A-94.

16

 

Halting the Growth of Deferred Maintenance

Many NNSA buildings vital to mission success are being used well past their intended lifetimes and have 

substantial maintenance backlogs. NNSA’s total DM at the end of FY 2015 was $3.67 billion.

NNSA’s strategy for reducing DM has two main elements. The first, centered on the Secretary of 

Energy’s initiative to avoid increased DM, entails revising NNSA’s approach to managing its 

infrastructure to ensure that senior decision-makers understand the funding required for current 

maintenance needs while also reducing DM to an acceptable level of risk. The second, equally 

important element involves to making DM estimates auditable and comparable across all sites and 

improving how required maintenance is identified.

The reduction in DM will be accomplished by prioritizing NNSA’s routine investments in general purpose 

infrastructure. This approach will allow NNSA to make risk-informed strategic choices that address the 

DM backlog, dispose of unneeded facilities, and revitalize the general purpose infrastructure. NNSA 

recognizes that these goals will not be met quickly and that arresting the declining state of the general 

purpose infrastructure will require steady commitment over many years. The tools and processes being 

implemented, along with sustained investment in that infrastructure, will set NNSA on the right path to 

ensuring a viable, safe, and effective nuclear security enterprise well into the future.

3.6 Security

3.6.1 Physical Security

Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) provides the physical security 

for the Nation’s nuclear materials and infrastructure assets,

as well as the personnel security of the workforce at NNSA 

Headquarters, field offices, and the eight M&O partner sites. 

DNS works in coordination with complementary programs, 

such as Counterintelligence and Insider Threat, to protect 

NNSA assets from theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, 

unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile or 

noncompliant acts that may adversely affect national 

security, program continuity, and employee security. The 

physical security mission is carried out at each field location 

by dedicated cadres of highly trained security professionals, 

employing an array of weapons and technologies deployed to address general and site-specific threats.

 

15 OMB Circular No. A-11 “Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget”

16 OMB Circular No. A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs."
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-21

The following sections describe the current status for deploying systems to protect the general purpose 

and programmatic infrastructure, nuclear materials, and workforce by addressing near-term challenges 

and developing long-term strategies to ensure future security capabilities.

3.6.1.1 Current Status for Deployment of Physical Security Tools and Processes

NNSA deploys technologies at its sites for alarm management and control, intrusion detection and 

assessment, access controls, barriers and locks, secure storage, communications, materials 

accountability, technical surveillance countermeasures, and protective forces. Table 3–2 shows which 

NNSA M&O partner sites deploy each type of technology. These tools and processes are then briefly 

described.

Table 3–2. FY 2015 NNSA physical security technology deployment

Technology Description LANL NNSS Pantex Y-12 KCNSC LLNL SNL SRS

Alarm Management

Argus X X X X

Other X X X X

Intrusion Detection

PIDAS X X X X

Intrusion Detection System X X X X X X X X

Access Controls

Badge Readers X X X X X X X X

Barriers and Locks

Vehicle Gates X X X X X X X

Vehicle Barriers X X X X X X X

Entry Booths X X X X X X

Pedestrian Gates and Turnstiles X X X X X X X X

Security Doors X X X X X X X X

Locking Mechanisms X X X X X X X X

Materials Control and Accounting X X X X (a) X X X

Technical Surveillance and Countermeasures X X X X X X X X

Contraband Detection and Tactical Systems

Metal Detection

Please refer to the version of this chart included in the classified Annex for 

specific locations where these systems are deployed.

Explosives Detection

K-9 Explosives Detection

Package X-Ray

SNM Detection

Ground Radar

Blue Force Tracker

Sniper Detection

Wireless Communications

Tactical Surveillance

Remotely Operated Weapons Systems

KCNSC = Kansas City National Security Campus

LANL = Los Alamos National Laboratory

LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

NNSS = Nevada National Security Site

Pantex = Pantex Plant

PIDAS = Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System

SNL = Sandia National Laboratories

SNM = special nuclear material

SRS = Savannah River Site

Y-12 = Y-12 National Security Complex

a

KCNSC does not have SNM and therefore does not have a Materials Control and Accounting program.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Alarm Management and Control Systems. NNSA sites that possess Category I or II quantities of special 

nuclear materials are expected to use the Argus system developed by LLNL. This proprietary system 

meets all DOE requirements for protecting these materials. LANL, Y-12, Pantex, and LLNL (although no 

longer a Category I/II site) have fully implemented Argus. The Nevada National Security Site and the SRS 

Tritium Facility are on schedule to replace their legacy systems with Argus as high-priority security 

projects. SNL and KCNSC use other commercial systems.

Intrusion Detection Systems. An integrated, multilayered suite of barriers, sensors, and assessment 

systems protects NNSA assets, including the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System 

(PIDAS) for Category I or II quantities of SNM. For exterior applications within a PIDAS, most sites have 

deployed a combination of passive and active sensors (e.g., bi-static microwave sensors, infrared 

sensors, fence detection systems, buried-line sensors, unattended ground sensors, long-range radar 

systems, and electromagnetic field detection systems). For interior applications, all sites use balanced 

magnetic switches on doors and dual-technology interior sensors on vaults and vault-type rooms.

Access Control Systems. Access control systems use a combination of entry control and contraband 

detection for authorized entry and exit. NNSA is in various stages of fully implementing the Identity, 

Credential, and Access Management program according to the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access 

Management Roadmap. 

Barriers and Lock Systems. State-of-the-art barrier technologies are used at some NNSA facilities, along 

with low-technology barriers (such as concrete blocks or razor wire). 

Secure Storage Systems. These systems provide additional barriers when practical for specific material. 

Materials Control and Accounting. NNSA has deployed specific technologies (e.g., accounting software, 

tamper-indicating devices and dispensers, measurement devices, and barcode readers).

Package Inspection Systems. Several sites have deployed x-ray inspection equipment at shipping and 

receiving facilities to prevent the introduction of contraband into protected or material access areas.

Communication Systems. These systems allow members of NNSA’s Protective Force to communicate 

with each other securely and with system redundancy. 

Protective Force Tactical Systems. NNSA tactical systems increase protective force lethality and 

survivability. These systems include hardened vehicles and fighting positions, protective force tracking 

systems, friend or foe identification systems, Boomerang Sniper Detection System, non-explosive 

mechanical and thermal breaching equipment, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System gear, and

remotely operated weapons systems.

3.6.1.2 Challenges

 Identify emerging threats and ensure capabilities are developed and implemented to counter 

them.

 Fill Protective Force vacancies across the nuclear security enterprise. 

 Develop time-phased maintenance programs and master schedule for upgrades and 

replacements across the nuclear security enterprise. 

 Integrate and standardize safeguards and security policies and procedures across the nuclear 

security enterprise.

 Ensure security is considered in the planning for all new construction and for all adjustments to 

the layouts of the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities. 

 Assess and address the full range of threats, from protestor incursions to active/violent insiders.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-23

Among the challenges we confront, the emerging threat posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) is 

among the most pressing. UAS technical capabilities and availability are rapidly expanding and their

ability to carry substantial payloads is likewise increasing. Along with the technical capability to counter 

the UAS threat we are also working to develop the policy and the means to determine hostile intent, 

essential to selecting an appropriate and effective response. The NNSA, like other government agencies, 

has encountered actual incursions, a circumstance that adds a degree of urgency to our efforts to field a 

C-UAS capability along with the policy for its use. 

3.6.1.3 Strategies

NNSA is addressing the challenges of managing security risks for nuclear weapons and related programs

described below.

Ten-Year Plan. Historically, DOE’s implementation of physical security technology has been site-centric,

with no corporate direction on how to select, install, operate, and maintain technologies at all the sites. 

This approach has led to individual site solutions that have increased the funding requirements to 

manage multiple systems that perform similar functions. NNSA is aware of these issues and has been 

working actively to address them and, in FY 2015, NNSA established baseline data for tracking security 

infrastructure and technology.

Roadmap. In 2015, DNS developed and began implementing a Security Roadmap to guide the efforts to 

address shortcomings identified in a series of security reviews by congressional and other Governmental 

panels. (See GAO Report to Congressional Requesters – Nuclear Security: NNSA Should Establish a Clear 

Vision and Path Forward for Its Security Program, May 2014, GAO-14-208.)

Strategic Plan for DNS. The priorities outlined in the DNS Strategic Plan include sustaining the security 

enhancements implemented at the sites since September 11, 2001; continuing to reduce physical 

security vulnerabilities; leading efforts to integrate security initiatives with DOE program offices,

government agencies, and international partners; and assisting NNSA sites in applying risk management 

principles and processes to achieve cost-effective physical security. 

Layered Protection Area. NNSA is continuing to apply its physical security technology capabilities using

a ‘layered protection strategy’ at the boundaries of designated protected areas and within material 

access areas around what is referred to as a ‘property protection area.’ Barriers of various types are 

being used within these areas, along with personnel identification and verification procedures.

Collaboration with Other Parts of Defense Programs. DNS is participating in the Construction Working 

Group and the Management Council to ensure a proper interface is achieved to maintain close 

collaboration with other parts of Defense Programs and all other parts of NNSA.

Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing (CSTART). In an effort to enhance 

standardization, integration and cost effectiveness across the nuclear security enterprise, Public Law 

113-66, 50 United States Code 2515 created CSTART to leverage national laboratory expertise to provide 

objective expertise on the full range of security program needs. CSTART is located at SNL in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico and operated by a dedicated program management office. While SNL 

manages CSTART, the initiative employs a very collaborative approach which includes working with 

other national laboratories, DOD, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to achieve enterprise 

solutions for security challenges. We are leveraging CSTART to address a number of strategic 

challenges, to include development of Counter-UAS capabilities. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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3.6.2 Cyber Security

NNSA is pursuing an information technology and cyber security transformation strategy to lower costs, 

improve security, and enable collaborative solutions. The strategy is driven by Government‐wide 

mandates, including the Office of Management and Budget’s 25-Point Implementation Plan to Reform 

Federal Information Technology Management (White House 2010) and Executive Order 13576,

Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and Accountable Government (White House 2011). NNSA’s Cyber 

Security Program is responsible for fostering a culture to ensure that information technology systems 

and projects are coordinated across NNSA, have the necessary cyber security protection, and are aligned 

with DOE requirements and objectives. These are mandated by the Federal Information Security 

Modernization Act (FISMA) and the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). 

Because of the highly complex and global nature of the stockpile stewardship and stockpile 

management missions, electronic information and information assets must be managed and protected 

using a risk management approach. All information collected, created, processed, transmitted, stored, 

or disseminated by or on behalf of NNSA on automated information systems requires a level of 

protection commensurate with the risk to that information and associated information‐processing 

systems. Moreover, because of the geographically diverse nature of the nuclear security enterprise, the 

risk management approach must be flexible, comprehensive, coordinated, and cost-effective to ensure 

that security considerations are fully integrated into the architecture of the nuclear security enterprise 

and NNSA business processes.

3.6.2.1 Program Goals

The overarching goal of NNSA’s Cyber Security Program is to implement a flexible, comprehensive 

information technology and cyber security system to ensure the protection of NNSA’s classified and 

sensitive information assets related to the nuclear weapons stockpile via the following approaches:

 improving cyber security protections for NNSA mission data,

 maintaining a relevant NNSA Cyber Security Program,

 solidifying NNSA’s evolving incident management capabilities, and 

 realizing the management and resource benefits of implementing the 2015 Federal Information 

Technology Acquisition Reform Act.

NNSA’s Cyber Security Program is also aligned with the Office of Management and Budget’s 2012 Digital 

Government Strategy, the 2012 Federal Information Technology Shared Services Strategy, the 2011 

Federal Cloud Computing Strategy, the 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act, the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act, 

the 2002 e-Government Act, the 2013 Federal Enterprise Architecture Model, FITARA, FISMA, and other 

information technology and cyber initiatives within the Federal Government.

3.6.2.2 Threat Identification and Prioritization

The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical 

infrastructure. To strengthen the resilience of this infrastructure, President Obama issued Executive 

Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” on February 12, 2013. The Executive 

Order directed the National Institute of Standards and Technology to work with stakeholders to develop 

a voluntary framework. Version 1.0 of the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 

was published in February of 2014. In addition to being aligned with the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology framework, FISMA requires agencies to develop and implement an organization-wide 

information security program to address the identification and prioritization of threats as they apply to 

an agency’s information security. NNSA’s Cyber Security Program meets the FISMA threat-based 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-25

requirements with a range of mechanisms designed to match the cyber program investment to the 

observed, perceived, and anticipated threats to NNSA. These mechanisms include site assessment visits, 

nuclear security enterprise and site-specific risk management boards, security controls assessment, and 

the cyber security threat statement. The NNSA Threat and Risk Statement identifies risks facing NNSA, 

focuses efforts on those with the highest residual risk, and provides resource guidance to prioritize 

resources to protect the most valuable information and systems. Current prioritized programming 

decisions are documented in the upcoming annual budget request and embedded in the annually issued 

NNSA Cyber Program Execution Guidance. 

Combined, NNSA’s threat identification and prioritization mechanisms provide a robust and evolving 

framework that leverages the joint knowledge and capabilities of the entire cyber security workforce.

3.6.2.3 Technologies

Table 3–3 provides a summary listing of deployed cyber security technologies. The security tools that 

are currently deployed throughout the NNSA nuclear security enterprise are then briefly described. 

Table 3–3. NNSA cyber security technologies

Cyber Security

Technology Security Focus Site(s)

Intrusion Detection 

System 

Inspects all inbound and outbound network activity and identifies

suspicious patterns.

All Sites

Vulnerability Scanning Identifies vulnerabilities that can be exploited or threaten computing

systems in a network.

All Sites

Firewalls Prevents unauthorized access to or from a private network. All Sites

Antivirus Program Searches a hard disk or other media for known viruses and removes them. All Sites

Encryption Protects sensitive information during storage and transmission and reduces

the risk of intentional and accidental compromise or alteration of data.

All Sites

Data Loss Prevention Protects the confidentiality and integrity of mission essential data on

classified networks.

All Sites a

Data at Rest Prevents unauthorized access to sensitive data on portable devices carried 

outside of site installations using encryption.

All Sites

Network Monitoring Discerns the security posture of the environment at that given instant,

collects the various alerts, assigns a standardized criticality level, logs all of 

the information to a centralized database, and concurrently displays 

network traffic in a summarized view.

All Sites

Enterprise Forensics Provides real-time, remote or client-side inspections at the binary level of all 

data on a given system.

Information 

Assurance Response 

Center, SNL, LLNL, 

LANL b

Automated Security 

Control Assessment

Provides guidance and outreach to promote a higher level of understanding 

and acceptance of requirements and assists senior NNSA management in 

program implementation.

All Sites

a

SNL has implemented digital rights management software which will be implemented at all sites in upcoming years based 

on maturity of the product.

b

All sites have some version of forensics and the Information Assurance Response Center provides this service for all 

locations. The locations identified in the table have additional capabilities that are leveraged for the enterprise as a whole. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-26 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). NNSA’s host-based IDS and network-based IDS enhance data 

protection through sustained availability and reliable integrity in both classified and unclassified 

environments. All inbound and outbound network activity is inspected and screened, and alerts are 

based on predefined rules of suspicious patterns that may indicate an attempt to break in or 

compromise a system. When triggered, the network-based IDS begin capturing network traffic related 

to the event in question, and data are made available to security analysts. A notification is also sent to 

the Security Information and Event Management tool, and the next phase of defense-in-depth 

protection begins.

A new high-bandwidth solution complements IDS to provide intelligent traffic visibility networking that 

improves the ability to see into the network infrastructure from both the nuclear security enterprise and 

local site perspective. The ability to share the same data stream across multiple monitoring tools allows 

NNSA to be more agile, secure, and cost-effective. The network infrastructure upgrade implementation 

provides flexibility to test new tools by sharing data from a single point, integrate new technology as it is 

developed, and improve network monitoring. 

Vulnerability Scanning. Vulnerability scanning across the nuclear security enterprise employs software 

that seeks out security flaws based on a database of known flaws, tests systems for the occurrence of 

these flaws, and generates a report of the findings that can be used to tighten the network’s security. 

Firewalls. Firewalls prevent unauthorized access to or from private networks connected to the Internet. 

Firewalls can be implemented in both hardware and software or a combination thereof. 

Antivirus Program. This commercial software searches a hard disk or other media for known viruses 

and removes any that are found. Most antivirus programs include an auto-update feature that allows 

the program to download profiles of new viruses as soon as they are discovered. 

Encryption. Encryption and protocols work as technical controls to protect information as it passes 

throughout a network and resides on computers. These methods protect sensitive information during 

storage and transmission and provide important functionality to reduce the risk of intentional and 

accidental data compromise and alteration. 

Data Loss Prevention. Digital rights management software and encryption may complement both 

classified and unclassified network data loss prevention solutions. The software prevents data from 

being copied from unauthorized access points and offers technical controls to mitigate data spillage. 

NNSA’s implementation of the technology has progressed to functional requirements refinement, tool 

investigation, and initial implementation.

Data at Rest. This technology prevents unauthorized access to sensitive data through both technical 

and procedural security controls. Data at Rest implements passwords to inhibit a hard drive from 

spinning while the drive contents are encrypted. If a machine is stolen, these safeguards prevent data 

from being mined from the device. NNSA portable devices employ Data at Rest technologies to provide 

data confidentiality for equipment carried outside of site installations, with continuous monitoring 

mechanisms that can be implemented to prevent theft. 

Network Monitoring and Security Information and Event Management. This technology facilitates 

gathering, analyzing, and presenting information from network and security devices and identifying and 

accessing management applications. Security Information and Event Management provides 

vulnerability management and policy compliance tools; operating system, database, and application 

logs; and external threat data. A key focus of Security Information and Event Management is monitoring 

and managing user and service privileges, directory services, and other system configuration changes 

and providing log auditing and review of incident responses. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-27

Enterprise Forensics. Enterprise forensics is the ability to perform real-time, remote inspections at the 

binary level of all data on a given system. The inspections include operating memory, physical storage 

devices, and virtualized mechanisms in use on any machine at a given time. All authentications for this 

system are centrally controlled and maintained in accordance with existing Federal policy.

Automated Security Control Assessment. The NNSA Cyber Security Program will continue to provide 

agency-wide cyber security guidance and outreach to promote a higher level of understanding and 

acceptance of requirements and assist senior NNSA management in program implementation. This 

guidance and outreach provides a comprehensive set of cyber security performance metrics across the 

agency that enables program offices and contractor-run facilities to improve their FISMA reporting, 

increase oversight and monitoring of FISMA compliance requirements within NNSA, standardize cyber 

security performance requirements that incorporate Government requirements and industry best 

practices, and institute an improved review cycle to ensure continual update to plans of action and 

milestones.

3.7 Secure Transportation

The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program provides safe, secure transport of the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons, weapons components, and SNM. The STA Program supports LEPs, LLC exchanges, 

surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation initiatives, and experimental programs for the NNSA 

mission. The STA Program also provides secure transport for DOD and other Government agencies on a 

reimbursable basis. The program modernizes mission assets and infrastructure, strengthens mission 

support systems, and improves its workforce capability and performance. The pillars of the STA security 

concept are specialized vehicles, secure trailers, highly trained Federal agents, and robust 

communication systems. 

3.7.1 Current State

The STA Program operates a number of specialized vehicles and 

aircraft for the safe and secure transportation of cargo using highly 

trained Federal agents. DOE/NNSA continues to recruit and retain 

Federal agents to meet security postures and workload 

requirements. 

STA is stabilizing and balancing vehicle production to replace aging 

vehicles to meet convoy security configurations. The Escort Vehicle 

Light Chassis production is nearing completion, and the Replacement 

Armored Tractors will be completed in FY 2018. 

The STA Program completed an Analysis of Alternatives for the replacement of the Safeguards 

Transporter (SGT) and started SGT risk-reduction initiatives to extend the life of the SGT. The Mobile 

Guardian Transporter (MGT) will be the next-generation specialized trailer. The STA Program has 

completed the SGT replacement look-ahead studies, estimates, and concept-development tasks 

associated with the MGT. The MGT will use a modern 

transportation industry design approach and provide a 

sustainable platform for long-term viability.

STA has retrofitted four of five Federal agent units’ mission 

support vehicles with the Advanced Radio Enterprise System 

(ARES), and the new Support Vehicle 2 will also include ARES. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-28 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

When the ARES implementation is complete, the Federal agents will have an overarching command and 

control communication capability during normal and emergency situations.

Strategic upgrades will be made to the trailer communication system. These upgrades will ensure a 

reliable communication architecture is in place during convoy operations. The upgrade will apply to the 

existing SGT fleet and to the MGT.

The Transportation Command and Control System will be enhanced with the implementation of the 

Mission Management System’s common operating system. NNSA plans to streamline and consolidate 

ARES and the Transportation and Emergency Control Center systems. 

3.7.2 Challenges and Strategies

Facilities. The STA Program manages facilities and infrastructure to maintain long-term viability to 

support mission requirements identified in the Ten-Year Site Plan. Funds are allocated for minor 

construction projects, life-cycle replacements, repairs, and reduction of the DM backlog to ensure 

resources are managed in a cost-effective manner.

Industry best practices are implemented to maintain facilities in a safe and operable condition and to 

meet all security requirements. The STA’s Facility Board prioritizes and matches mission needs to 

existing funding. The STA Program established a new Alternate Operations Facility as a backup location 

for mission support communications. 

Human Capital Base. The people of the STA Program constitute an invaluable resource. Federal agents 

must be capable of responding to unpredictable situations across the full spectrum of threat scenarios. 

The STA Program is focused on recruiting, stabilizing, and retaining the Federal agent workforce. The 

objective is 370 Federal agents, and the STA Program’s strategic initiative is to recruit and hire Federal 

agents to restore strength levels to support the required security postures and workload requirements 

and to keep pace with normal attrition and retirements.

Additional detailed information about the STA Program’s accomplishments, objectives, and changes 

from the FY 2016 SSMP may be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.5 (Secure Transportation Budget). 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-1

Chapter 4

Budget and Changes to Programs

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the key programmatic elements in the Weapons Activities budget for 

the FY 2017 FYNSP and includes figures that display budgetary information for specific activities 

associated with these key elements, based on current plans and the best available data. The current 

program and schedules are the current program of record as approved by the joint DOD and DOE

Nuclear Weapons Council and the two Department Secretaries. It is important to recognize that, for the 

FYNSP years beyond the budget year, maturation in planning may necessitate adjustment of funding 

levels in these years. These adjustments will be accomplished as part of future budget processes.

Each programmatic section also includes a summary of the major FY 2015 accomplishments, updates to 

the strategic plans and long-term budget trends since the FY 2016 SSMP, and a milestones and 

objectives chart that projects future plans. Section 4.8 describes resource requirements for the 20 years 

beyond the FYNSP and includes detailed information about the estimated costs for LEPs, major Alts, and 

major construction projects. 

4.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget

Table 4–1 shows the FYNSP budget for Weapons Activities. The budget structure reflects changes from 

the FY 2016 structure used in the FY 2016 SSMP to align with the way in which Congress appropriated 

monies for FY 2016. The new Infrastructure and Operations line consolidates almost all of what had 

been in the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Program and the new (in FY 2015) 

Infrastructure and Safety line in the FY 2016 SSMP, except for a few materials-related activities that have 

been moved to a renamed Strategic Materials line (formerly named Nuclear Material Commodities) in

DSW. Additional changes to the budget structure below the level of detail in Table 4–1 are described in 

the pertinent sections below.

Figure 4–1 shows how the level of funding in the FY 2017 President’s budget request over the FYNSP 

compares with the Weapons Activities purchasing power in prior years (in 2010 dollars, a nadir year for 

Weapons Activities). The figure also displays how the composition of this funding has varied over time. 

Program funding totals have been adjusted to better reflect an “apples-to-apples” comparison of yearto-year funding or funding among programs. One adjustment has removed the Nuclear

Counterterrorism Incident Response funding because, as of the FY 2016 budget, this program was

moved from Weapons Activities to the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account. In addition, all 

programmatic construction has been moved to Infrastructure – Construction. In the early years of 

Weapons Activities, programmatic construction was funded by the sponsoring programs. 

The most significant change over the period displayed in Figure 4–1 is the increase in funding for DSW,

which, by FY 2021, is expected to triple compared with its FY 2001 value. Some amount of this increase

is more apparent than real because of a number of changes to the budget structure over the intervening 

years. For example, pit production activities, originally funded as a campaign, were moved into DSW as 

Plutonium Sustainment in FY 2008. In addition, as described in the FY 2016 SSMP, Tritium Sustainment

Program funding, some Uranium Sustainment funding, and Domestic Uranium Enrichment funding were

added to DSW in the FY 2016 FYNSP. However, a significant amount of this increase can be explained by 

the increased funding for multiple LEPs and the DSW efforts that support those LEPs. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-2 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Pie charts for the FY 2017 budget and tables of the FY 2017 FYNSP breakdown, with comparisons to the 

FY 2016 reference year, are in the following sections.

Table 4–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget for Weapons Activities 

in fiscal years 2016 through 2021a

Activity

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2016

Enacted

2017

Request

2018

Request

2019

Request

2020

Request

2021

Request

Directed Stockpile Work 3,387.8 3,330.5 3,752.0 3,781.9 3,938.6 4,268.2

Science Program 423.1 442.0 489.7 514.7 526.5 506.1

Engineering Program 131.4 139.5 143.8 146.0 146.6 147.4

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 

High Yield Program 511.1 523.0 544.9 556.9 569.6 568.8

Advanced Simulation and Computing Program 623.0 663.2 668.2 685.5 707.7 720.3

Advanced Manufacturing Development 130.1 87.1 69.8 66.5 77.7 87.9

Secure Transportation Asset 237.1 282.7 330.1 355.1 341.0 331.8

Infrastructure and Operations 2,279.1 2,722.0 2,645.9 2,792.9 2,829.1 2,885.8

Defense Nuclear Security 682.9 670.1 681.0 692.1 704.9 721.9

Information Technology and Cyber Security 157.6 176.6 178.7 184.3 188.7 192.5

Legacy Contractor Pensions 283.9 248.5 157.1 87.4 87.4 87.4

Adjustments b0.0 (42.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 

Weapons Activities Total 8,846.9 9,243.1 9,661.3 9,863.3 10,117.9 10,518.2

a

Totals may not add because of rounding. 

b

Adjustments include rescissions and use of prior-year balances.

Figure 4–1. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power – fiscal years 2001 through 2021
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-3

4.2 Directed Stockpile Work Budget

4.2.1 Budget

As noted in Section 4.1, Nuclear Material Commodities has been renamed Strategic Materials. This 

category includes (in addition to Uranium Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment, Tritium Sustainment, 

and Domestic Uranium Enrichment) Strategic Materials Sustainment, which funds recycling, recovery, 

and storage of strategic materials (previously funded by Material Recycle and Recovery, and Storage, 

respectively, in RTBF) along with support for materials other than those mentioned above, such as 

lithium. The Strategic Materials line also includes the Nuclear Materials Integration funding that was 

previously part of Site Stewardship. These changes are consistent with the way Congress appropriated 

funds for FY 2016.

The Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services lines in Figure 4–2 include the Surveillance Program 

funding shown in Table 4–2 below with prior years shown for historical comparison.

Figure 4–2. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021

Table 4–2. Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2021

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Surveillance 

Program Funding

181 239 239 217 225 236 217 213 231 241 251 239
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-4 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.2.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

4.2.2.1 FY 2015 Directed Stockpile Work Accomplishments

Major DSW accomplishments since the FY 2016 SSMP, in addition to the Annual Assessment Reports,

generation of the Laboratory Director Letters to the President, and scheduled replacements of LLCs,

include the following:

W76-1 LEP, W88 Alt 370, B61-12 LEP, and W80-4 LEP

 See Section 2.2 for LEP and Alt accomplishments.

Stockpile Systems

 Conducted surveillance activities for all weapon systems using data collection from flight tests, 

laboratory tests, and component evaluations to assess stockpile reliability without nuclear 

explosive tests. 

 Completed the first production unit of the new B61 Joint Test Assembly configuration. 

 Completed close-out activities for the B83 Alt 353 gas transfer system and initiated the life 

storage program. 

 Completed closeout activities for Joint Test Assembly Sustainment of the B83. 

 Met DOD requirements for the W87 Small Ferroelectric Neutron Generator retrofits.

 Executed the first extended-range flight tests for the W78 and W87 instrumented Joint Test 

Assemblies.

Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

 Continued to make progress toward NNSA’s goal of dismantling weapons retired prior to 

FY 2009 by the end of FY 2022. Developed plans to accelerate weapon dismantlement so this 

goal could be accomplished one year sooner. 

 Exceeded planned canned subassembly dismantlement at Y-12.

 Supported the Navy request to return W76-0 warheads early, avoiding several million dollars in 

future staging costs.

Stockpile Services

 Developed a more accurate method to ensure nuclear explosives are initiated uniformly. 

 Performed analyses, with DOD, for key surety decisions, and added new capabilities to 

accommodate cyber and insider threats. 

 Exceeded goal for High Resolution Computed Tomography surveillance by 10 percent.

 Demonstrated a GTS design that meets DOD requirements and initiated pre-production 

activities ahead of schedule. 

 Conducted a hydrodynamic test at LANL’s DARHT for W88 legacy and Alt 370 qualification effort.

 Archived past weapons data and converted sunset technology files to state-of-the-art data 

storage and security systems. 

 Conducted seven Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research plutonium shots, five 

Phoenix experiments, and one weapon system hydrodynamic experiment. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-5

 Supported development of a new HE for flight test diagnostics and qualification activities.

 Continued technology maturation of the integrated system architecture multi-application 

transportation device for all air-delivered weapons to support a Full-Scale Engineering 

Development start in FY 2018.

4.2.2.2 FY 2015 Strategic Materials Accomplishments

Major Accomplishments in strategic materials since the FY 2016 SSMP include the following:

Tritium

 Completed Cycle 13 irradiation with 704 TPBARs.

 Submitted license amendment request for the Tennessee Valley Authority on March 31 to the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to increase production above 704 TPBARs to 1,792 maximum.

Plutonium

 Completed assembly and test of live power supply unit.

 Initiated Phase II equipment installation in the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building and 

decontamination and decommissioning and equipment installation in PF-4.

 NNSA authorized restart of several PF-4 readiness activities, including the T-Base II lathe, 

machining operations, and the Isotope Facility Impact Tester in FY 2015. 

Lithium

 Finalized a revised lithium bridging strategy that, via a new nuclear weapon dismantlement plan, 

will provide a future supply of lithium materials for the stockpile beyond 2028. 

 Obtained approval for the new dismantlement plan with issuance of the Production and 

Planning Directive 2016-0.

Domestic Uranium Enrichment

 Identified available uranium inventory to extend the need date for unobligated fuel for tritium 

production by about 10 years. This saves $1.3 billion through FY 2021 by deferring the need to 

reestablish a domestic uranium enrichment capability.

Uranium

 Published, for the first time, a Uranium Mission Strategy and Uranium Mission Requirements 

document that outline NNSA’s long-term strategy to sustain and modernize uranium 

capabilities.

 Shipped 12.3 metric tons of enriched uranium metal from Area 5 to the Highly Enriched 

Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 for secure storage, exceeding the FY 2015 goal by 50 percent.

 Achieved critical decision to install a rotary calciner in Building 9212 and an electro-refiner in 

Building 9215. The calciner provides the capability to convert low-equity solutions into a safe, 

storable oxide and the electro-refiner provides the capability to purify enriched uranium metal.

 Completed Site Readiness for the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 on schedule and 

$20 million under budget.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-6 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.2.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

4.2.3.1 LEPs and Major Alterations

Funding for the W88 Alt 370 increased in the FYNSP based on an updated estimate to add some 

additional scope needed for the conventional high explosive refresh. However, NNSA is still in the 

process of completing a Baseline Cost Report for the entire W88 Alt 370 (with conventional high 

explosive refresh included) by September 2016.

4.2.3.2 Stockpile Systems

No substantive changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.

4.2.3.3 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

The increase in funds over the FYNSP is related to the strategy to mitigate requirements for selected LEP 

materials, the W84 project scope, and continued effort and progress toward meeting the President’s 

intent to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent. The latter goal was 

made official policy during the U.S. announcement at the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 27, 2015.

4.2.3.4 Stockpile Services

Production Support

 While generally at the same level of funding as in the FY 2016 SSMP, this subprogram now 

includes activities, formerly in RTBF, to maintain workforce critical skills at enterprise sites.

Research and Development

 The funding decrease over the FYNSP reflects a narrowing of technology development efforts to 

allow for increased investment in critical infrastructure.

R&D Certification and Safety

 The funding decrease over the FYNSP reflects a reprioritization within NNSA to support 

infrastructure investments. This includes a reduction in early technology development and 

advanced engineering efforts required to support the stockpile and future LEPs.

Management Technology and Production

 The funding decrease over the FYNSP reflects reductions in multi-system activities that support

assembly and disassembly operations, assessment and studies, and multi-weapon management 

support. 

4.2.3.5 Strategic Materials

Uranium Sustainment

 The decrease in funding over the FYNSP represents a reduction in support for acceleration of 

activities to replace uranium capabilities supported by Process Technology Development within 

Advanced Manufacturing.

Plutonium Sustainment

No substantive change from the FY 2016 SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-7

Tritium Sustainment

No substantive change from the FY 2016 SSMP.

Domestic Uranium Enrichment

In FY 2015, the Domestic Uranium Enrichment program worked across DOE to conduct several 

congressionally directed analyses that contributed to development of DOE’s Tritium and Enriched 

Uranium Management Plan through 2060. As a result of those analyses, the Domestic Uranium 

Enrichment program developed a three-pronged strategy that will be implemented beginning in FY 2016 

and includes using existing uranium inventory to extend the need date for LEU for tritium production 

until 2038 to 2041, preserving and advancing centrifuge technology in the near term, and developing an 

acquisition strategy to re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability to meet national security 

requirements at some point in the future. 

Strategic Materials Sustainment

The re-establishment of a purified depleted uranium supply has been deferred until evaluation of 

existing supplies and future demand is completed. Support to lithium direct material manufacturing 

associated with other DSW activities has been increased, as has funding for inactive actinide processing 

at Y-12, recovery of spent californium sources, and processing of sodium-bonded fuel experiment 

assemblies.

4.2.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–3. Goals, milestones, and key annual activities for weapon assessment, surveillance, 

and maintenance
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-8 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–4. Milestones for life extension programs, major weapons component production, 

and weapons alteration and dismantlement

4.3 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget

4.3.1 Science Program

4.3.1.1 Budget

The Science Program now includes a funding line for Academic Alliances and Partnerships to consolidate 

funding that was originally found in the other subprograms that make up this program. That funding 

line also includes the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program funding that was previously in 

Site Stewardship.

Figure 4–5. Science Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-9

4.3.1.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments in the Science Program since the FY 2016 SSMP include the following:

Advanced Certification

 Executed experiments to complete analysis of the use of advanced materials and manufactured 

components for potential stockpile applications.

 Assessed uncertainty of a critical performance characteristic for two systems, using a common

method for modeling an underground nuclear explosive test and a proposed modern 

uncertainty quantification methodology.

Primary Assessment Technologies

 Developed new concepts for subcritical experiments, including neutron diagnosed subcritical 

experiments to assess late-time nuclear reactivity.

 Completed HED experiments on the behavior of materials and plasmas in regimes relevant to 

stockpile primaries to improve the understanding of boost.

Dynamic Materials Properties

 Characterized insensitive high explosive to support improved safety and pit reuse options.

 Delivered experimental data on plutonium, uranium, surrogate, and non-nuclear component 

materials for Annual Assessments and the closure of significant finding investigations.

 Executed experiments for future LEPs to evaluate the dynamic response of components and 

materials made with advanced manufacturing techniques.

Advanced Radiography

 Provided input to CD-1 for a line-item construction project to enhance experimental and 

diagnostic capabilities to certify a Long-Range Standoff pit and future LEPs. 

 Implemented the capability to demonstrate a Dense Plasma Focus prototype to meet neutron

diagnosed subcritical experiments source requirements for late-time nuclear reactivity 

measurements.

Secondary Assessment Technologies

 Executed plan for achieving the Secondary LEP Capability Level-1 milestone.

 Advanced the radiation effects science mission for weapons outputs and effects (including 

impulse and systems-generated electromagnetic pulse) to support Annual Assessments and 

LEPs.

 Conducted opacity experiments on the Z and NIF and modeled radiochemistry nuclear crosssection networks.

4.3.1.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

No substantive changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-10 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.3.1.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–6. Experimental and analysis milestones and objectives led by the Science Program

4.3.2 Engineering Program

4.3.2.1 Budget

Figure 4–7. Engineering Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-11

4.3.2.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

Engineering Accomplishments

 Performed Concepts Comparison for a W88-0/Mk5 Integrated Surety Architectures solution for 

two proposed designs, with evaluations focused on several keys areas, including technical 

effectiveness and suitability, technical and manufacturing readiness, cost, and risk. The Alt 940 

design was chosen for implementation with W88-0/Mk5 and could serve as point of departure 

for future applications.

 Continued advancement in a neutron imaging capability demonstrating the next advanced 

nondestructive evaluation technique for the W80-4 LEP. The work included neutron imaging 

studies at LANSCE, along with system design and component purchases. 

 Provided necessary experimental data supporting the W88 Alt 370, observing neutron and 

radiation effects on III-V heterojunction bipolar transistors. Tests included detailed linear 

accelerator experiments at the Little Mountain Test Facility, shedding light on the response of 

III-V substrate to ionizing radiation.

 Conducted a record number of hostile environment x-ray experiments at NIF and Z, involving 

LLNL, LANL, SNL and the Atomic Weapons Establishment, to provide validation data and insights 

into coupling effects such as high-flux, warm x-ray system generated electromagnetic pulse.

 Completed computational simulations of the F-35 weapons bay that has provided valuable data 

for the harsh aeroacoustics environment that can impart structural damage to a captive B-61 

prior to release. These simulations revealed the effects of geometric complexities subsequently 

measured in a model weapons bay with flight representative features.

4.3.2.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

Shifted the priority emphasis of the program in FY 2016 to the immediate needs of DSW.

4.3.2.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–8. Engineering and technological milestones and objectives led by the Engineering Program
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-12 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

4.3.3.1 Budget

Figure 4–9. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2016 through 2021

4.3.3.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Accomplishments

 Surpassed the goal to conduct 300 data-acquiring shots on NIF; increased the number of such 

shots by 85 percent compared to FY 2014.

 Achieved groundbreaking pressures at LLNL and SNL for high-Z materials (e.g., plutonium, 

uranium) and obtained weapons-relevant data that were previously inaccessible.

 Increased hot-spot pressures by 200 percent compared to the FY 2014 record via laser-driven 

direct-drive cryogenic targets at Omega.

 Achieved record neutron yields using the magnetized liner inertial fusion approach at SNL’s Z.

 Obtained data relevant to critical nonproliferation mission needs from material science.

 The Omega laser facility has conducted 25,000 target shots, achieving a significant milestone 

after 45 years of operation.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-13

4.3.3.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Changes 

No substantive changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.

4.3.3.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–10. Milestones and objectives based on experiments on NNSA’s high energy density facilities 

led by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-14 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

4.3.4.1 Budget

Figure 4–11. Advanced Simulation funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021

4.3.4.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

Advanced Simulation and Computing Accomplishments

 Created W80-4 program pilot development plan and implemented system-scale electrical 

simulation tools for DSW applications.

 Completed a key deliverable for modeling, validation, and uncertainty quantification of random 

vibration on reentry, including models for driving component vibration of the Mk5/W88 system.

 Procured and installed Phase I cabinets for the new Trinity supercomputer at LANL.

 Developed a unified creep plasticity damage model to assess the structural response of the 

B61-12 system in normal and abnormal mechanical environments.

 Determined material strength parameters to improve models for plutonium in DSW simulations.

4.3.4.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

No substantive changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-15

4.3.4.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–12. Milestones and objectives of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

4.3.5 Advanced Manufacturing Development

Advanced Manufacturing Development focuses on strategies to develop next-generation production 

processes and manufacturing tools so that future weapons systems are affordable, agile, and assured. 

Digital Manufacturing, which combines additive metal and polymer manufacturing with model-based 

designs and optical inspection, is impacting the NNSA stockpile stewardship and management mission 

and could effectively shorten the design iterations and increase production agility while minimizing costs 

and providing fast, efficient, end-to-end manufacturing. In addition, developing production tools 

through augmented reality eliminates the opportunities for manufacturing defects, improves production 

throughput and efficiencies, and limits the ergonomic strains of production operators. 

The strategic developments anticipated include:

 deploying advances in production technology to allow demonstration of novel design concepts

and shorter time to prototype manufacturing builds, thereby reducing costs;

 designing trustworthiness into the basic weapon architecture and enhanced techniques to 

validate product and supply chain integrity and assurance;

 developing new, faster methods to qualify and certify non-nuclear processes and components;

and 

 deploying new advanced design architectures and layered surety into systems.

Strategic partnerships with universities and industry consortia ensure the nuclear security enterprise will 

leverage the results from private industry and academia. These partnerships also expose students and 

professionals to the challenging work within the nuclear security enterprise and help to develop a 

pipeline of talent for the future workforce.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-16 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.3.5.1 Budget

Figure 4–13. Advanced Manufacturing Development funding schedule for 

fiscal years 2016 through 2021

4.3.5.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

 Established partnership agreements with universities to perform additive manufacturing and 

material characterization research.

 Demonstrated use of additive manufacturing in tools, fixtures, and molds to reduce flow time, 

decrease costs, and accelerate development times.

 Delivered the first lot of development compression pads for the W88 arming, fuzing, and firing 

system using Direct Ink Write technology.

4.3.5.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

Priorities were realigned from technology development efforts to address higher NNSA priorities. 

4.3.5.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–14. Milestones and objectives for Advanced Manufacturing Development
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-17

4.4 Infrastructure and Operations Budget

NNSA has made significant progress in improving its infrastructure planning and management tools. 

These efforts include implementing tools to reshape the nuclear security enterprise and improve 

infrastructure investment planning and implementation for future needs. (The program management 

tools and processes are summarized in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3.) 

4.4.1 Budget

As described in Section 4.1, the Infrastructure and Operations budget consolidates most of what was 

previously in RTBF and Infrastructure and Safety in last year’s SSMP. Infrastructure and Operations 

retains the Operations of Facilities, Maintenance and Repair of Facilities, Recapitalization, and 

Construction subprograms that were in Infrastructure and Safety in the FY 2016 SSMP. An additional 

funding line, Safety and Environmental Operations, consolidates activities that were previously in 

Infrastructure and Safety. 

In response to Government Accountability Office recommendations, the following information is 

provided to improve transparency in the budget. Table 4–3 below compares investments in 

Maintenance and Recapitalization to benchmarks (based on the percentage of Replacement Plant Value) 

derived from the DOE Real Property Asset Management Plan and associated guidance. To address these 

benchmark shortfalls, NNSA has increased the maintenance and recapitalization funding from the 

FY 2016 through FY 2020 FYNSP Request by $948 million and expanded the Asset Management 

Programs that use supply chain management practices to increase purchasing power for common 

building components across the nuclear security enterprise (e.g., roofs and heating, ventilating, and air 

conditioning). NNSA is also assessing the potential to close down excess and underutilized facilities to 

reduce the NNSA footprint. 

Figure 4–15. Infrastructure and Operations funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-18 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Table 4–3. Overview of planned FYNSP infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization 

Fiscal Year (dollar in millions) and percentages

FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017* FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021

Replacement Plant Value (RPV) 47,800 46,500 47,300 48,200 49,200 50,200 51,200

Maintenance 

Benchmark

2-4% RPV

Infrastructure & Operations

Maintenance Investments 227.0 277.0 294.0 305.0 327.0 315.0 328.0

Other Maintenance Investments 

(direct- and indirect-funded)

476.4 517.8 492.4 494.6 516.4 473.4 484.0

Total Maintenance Investments 703.4 794.8 786.4 799.6 843.4 788.4 812.0

Maintenance as % RPV 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6%

Recapitalization

Benchmark

1%

Infrastructure & Safety

Recapitalization Investments 168.8 253.7 554.6 335.0 339.6 353.3 374.7

Other Recapitalization 

Investments 55.8 98.8 112.6 119.9 132.7 150.2 120.2

Total Recapitalization 

Investments 224.6 352.5 667.3 454.8 472.3 503.5 494.9

Recapitalization as % RPV 0.5% 0.8% 1.4% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%

* The FY 2017 Infrastructure & Safety Recapitalization amount includes a one-time increase of $200 million for the disposition of 

the Kansas City Bannister Federal Complex, which is not included in RPV estimates for FY 2016 through FY 2021.

Note: Numbers may not sum due to rounding.

4.4.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

Major accomplishments in this area include the following:

 Implemented Enterprise Risk Management framework to drive prioritization of investments. 

 Developed Mission Dependency Index algorithm further to integrate several criteria for 

increased fidelity in prioritizing investments: the impact to the stockpile mission if the asset 

were lost, the difficulty to replace the asset, and the interdependency of assets.

 Developed G2 program management system further to standardize and automate processes for 

scope, cost, and schedule management.

 Completed framework and first draft of the NNSA Master Asset Plan to create and document a 

long-range vision for infrastructure planning and strategies. 

 Made progress in increasing buying power, speeding up deactivation and decommissioning of 

excess facilities, and halting growth of DM.

 Developed and piloted, as part of the Asset Management Program, an approach to HVAC with a 

focus on energy-efficient systems that save operational costs. The effort will enter the program 

implementation phase in FY 2016 and be fully funded at $10 million per year in FY 2017.

 Finalized plans to demolish two of ten highest-risk excess facilities and perform characterization, 

stabilization, and roof repairs on several of the other top ten excess facilities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-19

4.4.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

Several projects, scheduled to start sometime during FY 2016 through FY 2020, have been deferred to 

outside the current FYNSP period to address higher NNSA priorities. These include Energetic Materials 

Characterization (LANL), the Weapons Engineering Facility (SNL), the HE Component Fabrication & 

Qualification Facility (Pantex), and the HE Science and Engineering Facility (Pantex).

The U1a Complex Enhancements Project at the Nevada National Security Site is scheduled to start in 

FY 2017.

4.4.4 Milestones and Objectives

The schedules for construction projects are reflected in the Construction Resource Planning List found in 

Section 4.8.5.

4.5 Secure Transportation Budget

4.5.1 Budget

Figure 4–16. Secure Transportation funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021

4.5.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

 Completed 130 shipments without compromise or loss of nuclear weapons or components or 

release of radioactive material.

 Executed SGT risk-reduction initiatives: acquisition of components, refurbishment, and repair to 

ensure reliable safe operation.

 Accepted delivery of 76 of 89 Escort Vehicle Light Chassis to complete production in early 

FY 2016.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-20 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 Accepted delivery of 19 of 42 Replacement Armored Tractors, with the goal of finishing 

production by FY 2018.

 Retrofitted four of five Federal agent units’ mission support vehicles with ARES. The last unit is 

scheduled for completion in FY 2017.

 Established a new Alternate Operations Facility to serve as a backup location for mission support 

communications.

4.5.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

 Vehicle production is continuing, with the Replacement Armored Tractor to be completed in 

FY 2018, a year earlier than expected in the FY 2016 SSMP.

 The Escort Light Chassis production will be completed and enter into life-cycle production in 

2017, a year later than expected in the FY 2016 SSMP.

 The ARES installation and retrofits will be completed in FY 2017, a year later than expected in 

the FY 2016 SSMP. 

4.5.4 Milestones and Objectives

 Execute Secure Transportation Fleet Plan to deliver tractors and escort vehicles to sustain 

mission and training operations.

 Complete prototype of Support Vehicle 2 with modular ARES and prepare platform for 

production.

 Finalize evaluation of SGT risk-reduction components that need to be procured.

 Complete reviews of MGT conceptual design and begin system development.

 Recruit and hire 48 Federal agents to achieve the goal of 370.

Figure 4–17. Secure Transportation Asset Program milestones and objectives timeline
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-21

4.6 Defense Nuclear Security Budget

4.6.1 Budget

Figure 4–18. Defense Nuclear Security funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021

4.6.2 FY 2015 Accomplishments

Policy, Planning, Guidance

 Developed and issued NNSA Security Roadmap.

 Completed draft Field Installation Guide for security system to enhance standardization efforts.

 Completed Phase I of Physical Security Technical Standard Guide for use enterprise-wide.

 Completed draft NNSA Test and Evaluation process for enterprise security systems.

Physical Security Management and Technology Enhancement Initiatives

 Completed Phase I of legacy alarm system field panel upgrade project ahead of schedule at 

LANL. 

 Completed Portal 8 entry control facility enclosure at Y-12 to enhance access control at the 

Protected Area.

 Completed installation of razor tape around tritium limited area at SRS.

 Executed first facility-wide, live-active-shooter drill at KCNSC.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-22 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Standardization Initiatives

 Implemented a standard handgun—the Glock Model 17—across all sites to allow bulk 

ammunition procurements and facilitate cross-training of protective forces.

 Completed Access Control Standardization at the KCNSC New Mexico facility on time, providing 

a single access control system at KCNSC and its New Mexico location using the information 

technology standard failover capability, which will lower costs. 

 Completed Phase I of Enterprise Risk Management initiative by conducting peer reviews to 

baseline the vulnerability and risk assessment programs at all NNSA sites.

Protective Force Training Reform Initiatives

 Conducted a pilot Adaptive Leader Training Workshop designed to improve problem solving, 

accountability, initiative, and awareness of protective force leaders at the sites. 

 Partnered with the University of Tennessee’s Institute for Assessments and Evaluations within 

the College of Education to create a Protective Force Instructor Evaluation program.

4.6.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

No substantive changes from the FY 2016 SSMP.

4.6.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–19. Defense Nuclear Security program milestones and objectives timeline
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-23

4.7 Other Weapons Activities

4.7.1 Budget

Figure 4–20. Other Weapons Activities funding schedule for fiscal years 2016 through 2021

4.7.2 2015 Accomplishments for Information Technology and 

Cyber Security

Policy, Planning, Guidance

 Developed implementation plans for the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act

and Multi-Factor Authentication.

 Issued revised budget processes and procedures for Cyber Security and Information Technology.

 Completed Phase II of site Cyber Security baseline budget process.

 Completed draft baseline staffing profile for Cyber Security.

Information Technology and Cyber Security

 Completed Phase I of the Multi-Factor Authentication implementation requirements. 

 Completed implementation of virtual desktop infrastructure solution within the classified 

environments.

 Completed development of software application development and testing environment. 

NNSA Information Assurance Response Center

 Completed implementation of hand-off and rollover processes and procedures with the Joint 

Cybersecurity Coordination Center.

 Completed Phase II of network sensor upgrade across the NNSA sites.

 Completed Phase II of the NNSA Information Assurance Response Center and move to the 

Nevada National Security Site.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-24 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.7.3 Changes from the FY 2016 SSMP

In previous SSMPs, Site Stewardship has appeared in the pie chart for Other Weapons Activities. This 

funding line no longer exists. Its activities are now funded in DSW, Science, or Infrastructure and 

Operations, as described above.

4.7.4 Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–21. Information Technology and Cyber Security milestones and objectives timeline

4.8 Estimates of Requirements beyond the Future Years 

Nuclear Security Program

4.8.1 Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs and Its 

Affordability

Figure 4–22 shows Weapons Activities funding in the FY 2017 President’s budget and estimates for 

budget requirements for FY 2022 through FY 2041. The figure displays the relative makeup of the 

Weapons Activities program in terms of its major portfolios for the period from FY 2016 through FY 2041 

by using program FYNSP values for FY 2016 through FY 2021 and estimated nominal program costs for 

FY 2022 through FY 2041. This information shows the potential evolution in program makeup and does 

not represent the precise costs in the out years for any of the portfolios shown. 

The potential future cost for the program in the years beyond the FYNSP should be interpreted as the 

range between the red “high range” total lines and the green “low range” total lines for Weapons 

Activities shown in the figure. This range of total cost is necessary because of the significant 

uncertainties in the individual components that make up the estimate, in particular, for the LEPs and 

construction costs, which are described in more detail in the following sections. These same 

uncertainties are also present during the FYNSP period and may, as planning for these types of efforts 

mature, necessitate adjustments to the amounts shown for FY 2018 through FY 2021.

Figure 4–22 also displays a blue line that represents the nominal total shown in the FY 2016 SSMP so 

that a comparison can be made between Figure 4–22 and Figure 8–12 in the FY 2016 SSMP. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-25

Figure 4–22. Estimate of out-year budget requirements for NNSA Weapons Activities

in then-year dollars

The dashed black line in Figure 4–22 represents the FY 2017 President’s budget for FY 2017 through

FY 2026, with the FY 2026 total escalated for FY 2027 through FY 2041 at the same 2.25 percent rate 

used in all the budget requirements estimates for those years. This line is intended to reflect the level of 

funding the Weapons Activities program might expect to receive for these out years, but is subject to 

annual adjustment based on the results of the programming cycle and interactions with stakeholders. 

Figure 4–23 in this section shows, in greater detail, the cost range for Weapons Activities in the out

years. 

The nominal cost of the overall program for FY 2022 through FY 2041 in Figure 4–23 falls within +5.2 and 

-9.4 percent of the escalated (dashed black) FY 2021 line. The uncertainty (resulting from the estimated 

costs of the LEPs and construction) from the nominal value ranges from +10.3 percent to -7.5 percent. 

While the nominal cost of the program does exceed the escalated line over the period from FY 2022 

through FY 2026 by up to 5.2 percent (representing a potential $2.9 billion overage or 5.1 percent of the 

potentially available resources over this period), the escalation line falls within the high to low cost 

range in this period. In the years beyond FY 2026, the escalation line general falls around the high end 

of the potential cost range. The approximate billion-dollar reduction that occurs in FY 2027 is a result of 

the winding down of a number of number of construction projects slated for the FY 2022 through 

FY 2026 period to include MaRIE, the Radiation Hardened Microelectronics Capability, and a number of 

HE-related facilities. The program, as planned, is therefore generally affordable and more executable 

than the program proposed in the FY 2016 SSMP as a result of the FY 2017 programming process,
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-26 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

adjustments of funding levels mandated by Congress in currently applicable budget acts, and the formal 

process of multi-agency budget development. 

Figure 4–23. Detail of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities of the NNSA

in then-year dollars

4.8.2 Basis for Cost Estimates

As noted in Section 4.8.1, Figure 4–22 displays both the FYNSP budget numbers and an estimate of 

program costs for the 20 years beyond the FYNSP. The FYNSP numbers were generated as part of the 

DOE planning and programming process that informed development of DOE’s portion of the FY 2017 

President’s budget request and reflect the roll-up of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of individual 

estimates developed interactively by NNSA’s M&O partners and Federal program managers using 

historical cost data, current plans for programs and projects, and expert judgment. 

The basis for the cost estimates beyond the FYNSP vary depending on the individual programs or 

subprograms. Some portions of the Weapons Activities program are assumed to continue beyond the 

FYNSP at the same level of effort as in the FYNSP.

15

 For these cost projections, escalation factors based 

on numbers provided by the Office of Management and Budget for 2017 were used.

16

Some portions of the program cannot or should not be assumed to proceed at the same level of effort 

for FY 2022 through FY 2041. This would be true for major construction projects, LEPs, and, because of 

 

15 Projection of budget requirements for these efforts in this way assumes the continued manageability of whatever risks are

present during the FYNSP at the same level of effort following the FYNSP period as, typically, is represented by the funding level 

of the last year of the FYNSP.

16 Escalation rates for FY 2022-2026 matched those in the FY 2017 President’s budget for those years. Rates for FY 2027 and 

beyond were 2.25, consistent with Office of Management and Budget projections of the Consumer Price Index.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-27

the future evolution in the current stockpile to a 3+2 Strategy configuration, stockpile sustainment as 

represented by the funding lines for stockpile systems. The estimates and the basis for each of these 

elements of the Weapons Activities program are described in more detail in the following sections.

4.8.3 Stockpile Sustainment

Sustainment costs include warhead-specific assessment activities, LLC exchanges, required and routine 

maintenance, safety studies, periodic repairs, resolution and timely closure of significant finding 

investigations, military liaison work, and surveillance to assure the continued safety, security, and 

reliability of the stockpile. These costs are incurred every year that a weapon is in the stockpile. 

Figure 4–24 shows, in then-year dollars, the annual sustainment cost for FY 2017 through FY 2021

attributable to a particular warhead type based on FYNSP numbers, an estimate of the total sustainment 

cost by year for warheads of all types for FY 2022 through FY 2041, and the average cost from FY 2003 

through FY 2016. The FY 2022 through FY 2041 costs account for the increased sustainment costs to be 

incurred during the transition from the current stockpile to the 3+2 stockpile.

Figure 4–24. Estimate of warhead-specific sustainment costs

4.8.4 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

LEPs are undertaken separately from stockpile sustainment, with the goal of extending the lives of 

warheads for several additional decades. Major Alts make component changes to warheads and can 

have significant costs. Alts will not address all the aging issues in a warhead such that they would be 

considered an LEP. Both LEPs and major Alts may be subject to SAR requirements to Congress. These 

quarterly reporting requirements begin in the first quarter following entry into Phase 6.3 (Full-Scale 

Engineering Development) of the Phase 6.x process and constitute the first official performance

baseline. Many of the estimates presented in the SSMP are independent planning estimates, not
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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program baselines (as would be found in SARs), and are used for planning purposes and for 

benchmarking LEP performance at various program and budgetary milestones.17

The Defense Programs’ Office of Cost Policy and Analysis is responsible for performing the independent 

cost estimates (ICEs) for the SSMP.

18 These ICEs use independent analysts and methodologies separate 

from the individual program offices. They provide both a check estimate of the baselined LEP programs 

(such as the W76-1 or B61-12) and an initial, but high-fidelity, planning estimate for pre-baselined LEP 

programs (such as the W80-4 and the IW-1, -2, and -3). For instance, at least four years of Defense 

Programs ICEs will be published prior to the initial W80-4 Program estimate at Phase 6.2A (Design 

Definition and Cost), which will likely constitute the performance baseline for that LEP. Defense 

Programs believes these early-stage, high-fidelity estimates are important for resource planning; 

however, an estimate made in advance of completion of an LEP study is not the final word regarding

what an LEP will ultimately cost.

Figures 4–25 through 4–32 and Tables 4–4 through 4–11 show the cost profiles for each LEP and major 

Alt for FY 2016 through FY 2041. Each contains a “top-down” planning estimate (ICE), as well as a 

detailed “bottom-up” estimate if the respective program has completed its Phase 6.2A baseline. 

All the ICE profiles include a “high” and “low” estimate range and are produced using a model based on 

the “top-down” approach for concept assessment, technology maturation, engineering development, 

production development (including initial low-rate production), and full-rate production. These costs 

are then distributed using well-established idealized cost distributions to provide some sense of the 

required year-by-year cost profiles for resource planning. The cost model is based, to a large extent, on 

the W76-1 program actuals, as it is currently the only LEP to complete development and most of 

production. These planning ICEs are produced independently of future budget availability and may 

therefore differ from proposed budgets, which can be affected by external funding constraints.

The Defense Programs ICEs are based on: 

 LEP actual costs to date;

 W76-1 actual costs to date for LEP development and production;

 a standard LEP Work Breakdown Structure;

 evaluations of LEP scope and complexity by independent program and subject matter experts;

 estimates of non-LEP line-item costs, which are also critical to an LEP’s success (namely Other 

Program Money and DOD costs) provided by program office experts;

19

 

17 When performed in advance of the LEP being baselined, the scope assumed for the estimate is one that reasonably meets 

current policy for life extensions (such as an upgrade to surety) in addition to extending the life of the warhead. The cost range 

of the estimate reflects the uncertainty in implementing that “point” solution rather than the potential cost of a range of 

options, as will be done as part of the LEP studies. When performed following the completion of LEP studies and baselining, the 

estimate uses the same scope as selected for the LEP baseline, which may differ from what was used for the planning estimate.

18 A technical paper containing additional detail on the LEP cost model methodology was published in 2015 at several 

professional cost estimating forums and is available upon request.

19 The SSMP figures attempt to account for all costs needed to execute each LEP or major Alt, regardless of the color of money.

This is why the cost model is designed to estimate funding streams, not only for the LEP line items, but also for earlier-stage 

technology maturation activities covered by Other Program Money and even DOD, if applicable. As the overall program 

integrator, the Federal program manager assists in identifying the Other Program Money and DOD funding needed for their 

respective LEP to be successful.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-29

 development costs distributed using standard, well-known Rayleigh profiles (these profiles are 

based on a data set of previously executed major defense acquisition programs); and

 production costs distributed using a similar nonlinear cost growth profile exhibited by the 

W76-1 program, adjusted for relative complexity.

The estimates presented reflect complexity factors evaluated by both the Federal program managers 

and a broad ranging team of subject matter experts from the national security laboratories and the 

nuclear weapons production facilities. This integrated team of subject matter experts and Federal 

program managers provides significant technical expertise on each LEP and major Alts by evaluating the 

relative scope complexity by Work Breakdown Structure element between the W76-1 and their 

respective LEPs. Coupled with the scope and scheduling experience of the Federal program managers, 

the ICE LEP estimates reflect a reasonable range of cost uncertainty based on the best information 

available. 

If no bottom-up estimate exists for a specific program, such as for the W80-4 and IWs, which are at a 

pre-Phase 6.2A baseline, the midpoint between the high and low estimates is used as the nominal cost 

of the LEP or major Alt and shown on the bars in Figures 4–26 through 4–32.

The high and low lines on each LEP cost figure (included for all systems except the nearly complete 

W76-1) reflect the cost estimate uncertainties aggregated from the broad range of assessed complexity 

factors. The published cost ranges attempt to account for unforeseen technical issues, budget 

fluctuations, and even the level of component maturity available at a future date. 

One important note is that early-stage LEPs can experience occasional, but significant, scope additions 

or redefinitions, possibly resulting in substantial changes in the cost range. This potential for differences 

in planning assumptions exists because LEPs in Phase 6.1 (Concept) or 6.2 (Feasibility Study and Option 

Down-Select) contain considerable design uncertainty. For example, the current W80-4 estimate

assumes a moderate nuclear explosive package refurbishment. As design options are down-selected, 

the estimate may result in changes to the cost and program scope. Major differences in year-to-year 

planning assumptions will hopefully be minimal and exclusively for early-stage programs; however, if 

and when these differences occur, NNSA will publish them in the subsequent SSMP and provide a brief 

explanation of the change.

In cases where LEP or major Alt planning has proceeded through Phase 6.2A, the nominal total cost and 

cost profile being used is the official baseline for the effort, as reported in the SAR. For the first SAR, this 

is typically the total cost and cost profile reported in the Weapon Design Cost Report that is produced by 

Phase 6.2A of the Phase 6.x process. These bottom-up estimates are prepared by the project team 

based on a detailed Work Breakdown Structure and a master integrated schedule that captures all major 

activities and their costs, as estimated by the organizations that will be performing the work. These 

estimates also include specific consideration of project risks and the project management reserve and 

contingency based on these risks.

Those figures and tables displaying both the bottom-up program-based and model top-down high and 

low independent cost ranges show transparently the degree of consistency between the two estimates 

and the underlying methodologies. If total costs are comparable and their general profiles are similar, 

NNSA has confidence the baseline bottom-up estimate is reasonable. If total costs are similar for both,

but there is a year-by-year profile discrepancy, NNSA has greater confidence in the bottom-up baseline 

estimate because it is based on a project-specific integrated schedule, rather than an idealized 

distribution and historic project estimates. For this reason, NNSA does not perform or encourage 

additional year-by-year comparisons between its two cost estimates beyond what is described above. 
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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For each figure, the associated table displays the high, low, and nominal estimated total cost to NNSA 

and DOD in both constant FY 2016 and then-year dollars.20 These are in Tables 4–4 through 4–11. The 

total estimated cost is provided because portions of four programs (the IW-1, -2, -3, and the next B61 

LEP) fall outside the 25-year window for the FY 2017 SSMP. While figures are in then-year dollars, total 

estimated costs in current constant-year (FY 2016) dollars are also provided to assist in comparing LEPs 

scheduled over different time frames.21 When compared, consideration should be given to the different 

quantities of warheads being refurbished. Production costs, following studies, and development and 

production engineering, are to a great degree driven by the total number of warheads undergoing 

refurbishment. The classified Annex to this report provides information on these production quantities.

Figure 4–25. W76-1 life extension program cost FY 2016 to completion

Table 4–4. Total estimated cost for W76 life extension program

FY 1999 – FY 2020

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

SAR Value 4,065 3,621 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR

 

20 The DOD costs are for weapon components for which DOD is responsible, such as arming and fuzing. While not budgeted or 

executed by NNSA, these estimated costs are published to be as transparent as possible of the “all in” costs for each LEP.

21 For LEPs for which no SAR or Weapon Design and Cost Report has been prepared, only the cost range is provided in constantyear dollars for comparison to other LEPs. Moreover, when a SAR or Weapon Design and Cost Report value is provided, this 

represents only the costs associated with Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) and forward without Other Program Money, 

based on reporting requirements.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-31

Figure 4–26. B61-12 life extension program cost FY 2016 to completion

Table 4–5. Total estimated cost for B61-12 life extension program

FY 2009 – FY 2025

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 9,186 9,625 181 193

Low Total 7,014 7,312 49 50

SAR Total 6,961 7,372 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-32 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–27. W88 Alt 370 (with CHE refresh) cost FY 2016 to completion

In November 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council approved the addition of scope for the conventional 

high explosive refresh to the original Alt 370 non-nuclear scope. Additional funding was added to the 

effort based on a preliminary estimate. That estimate was updated in 2015 to reflect some additional 

scope needed for the conventional high explosive refresh and is reflected in the funding totals 

requested in the FY 2017 FYNSP. However, NNSA is still in the process of completing a Baseline Cost 

Report for the entire W88 Alt 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh included) by 

September 2016. Once completed, this Baseline Cost Report will be the cost and schedule baseline for 

the W88 Alt 370 program and will be reflected in future SARs and future budget materials. For planning 

purposes, the costs shown for FY 2022 through FY 2025 are the midpoint of the Defense Programs ICE 

prepared for this effort. No SAR value is reflected in the table below; however, for planning purposes, a 

budget requirement total is included.

Table 4–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alt 370 (with CHE refresh) life extension program

FY 2010 – FY 2025

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 2,706 2,880 1,039 1,106

Low Total 2,134 2,274 879 937

Budget Requirement NA 2,600 NA 1,022
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-33

Figure 4–28. W80-4 life extension program cost FY 2016 to completion

Some amount of the funding in FY 2016 is expected to carry over to FY 2017 because of the late receipt 

of full funding, which will augment the funding available for FY 2017 study and technology maturation 

activities.

Table 4–7. Total estimated cost for W80-4 life extension program

FY 2015 – FY 2032

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 8,369 9,938 209 251

Low Total 6,140 7,352 55 67

Budget Requirement NA 8,645 NA 159
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-34 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–29. IW-1 life extension program cost FY 2021 through FY 2041

The ICE models assume a standard 12-year study and development period in advance of the first 

production unit. The IW-1 LEP, after deferral, is slated to recommence in FY 2020, compressing that 

period slightly, in part to account for the work accomplished in FY 2014 and before. To avoid an

unexecutable “ramp” in funding from FY 2020 through FY 2021, additional funding has been added in 

the FY 2022 through FY 2029 period to provide the nominal funding profile shown with the required 

amount of funding in advance of the first production unit.

Table 4–8. Total estimated cost for IW-1 life extension program

FY 2013-2014, FY 2020-2043

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 10,630 14,694 3,189 4,445

Low Total 7,974 11,198 1,063 1,503

Budget Requirement NA 12,946 NA 2,974
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-35

Figure 4–30. IW-2 life extension program cost FY 2023 through FY 2041

Table 4–9. Total estimated cost for IW-2 life extension program

FY 2023 – FY 2049

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 11,218 17,249 3,189 4,944

Low Total 8,497 13,301 1,063 1,675

Budget Requirement NA 15,275 NA 3,309
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-36 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–31. IW-3 life extension program cost FY 2030 through FY 2041

Table 4–10. Total estimated cost for IW-3 life extension program

FY 2030 – FY 2057

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 10,698 19,461 3,189 5,850

Low Total 8,262 15,320 1,063 1,984

Budget Requirement NA 17,390 NA 3,916
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-37

Figure 4–32. Next B61 life extension program cost FY 2038 through FY 2041

Table 4–11. Total estimated cost for next B61 life extension program

FY 2038 – FY 2057

(Dollars in Millions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2016 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 12,075 24,296 210 425

Low Total 8,981 18,184 56 113

Budget Requirement NA 21,240 NA 269
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-38 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–33 is a one-chart summary of the total projected nuclear weapons life extension costs from 

FY 2016 through FY 2041, based on the LEP schedule reflected in Chapter 2, Figure 2–10, of this 

FY 2017 SSMP and the nominal LEP costs shown in Figures 4–25 through 4–32.

22 The dotted line shows 

the total LEP cost reflected in the FY 2016 SSMP. 

Figure 4–33. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs

for fiscal years 2016 through 2041 (then-year dollars)

The principal differences between the FY 2016 and FY 2017 LEP costs are as follows:

 For those efforts reporting SAR values, the W76-1 LEP decreased slightly based on current 

execution, the B61-12 LEP decreased slightly as a result of reported Other Program Money costs, 

and the W88 Alt 370 increased as previously described.

 For those LEPs making use of ICE values for their nominal costs:

– The assumed escalation factor beyond the FYNSP in FY 2021 was increased from last year’s 

2.24 percent to the updated Office of Management and Budget–published 2.25 percent 

value. This resulted in only a very minor change to any LEP estimate.

– The W80-4 program had a new work scope addition identified during its development, 

resulting in a moderate increase to the overall program. The work scope on all other 

components was only slightly changed from last year.

 

22 Nominal costs are used to allow for comparison of total LEP costs from SSMP to SSMP. Unless baselined, the cost of any 

particular LEP should be regarded as a cost range as shown in the tables accompanying each LEP figure.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-39

– The IW-1, -2, and -3 programs had a shared component that was re-evaluated to be much 

simpler than in last year’s SSMP, which affected all three systems to a similar and significant 

extent. The other work scope components were only slightly changed from last year.

 In addition to affecting the costs shown in Figure 4–33, changes to the ICE models will have also 

affected the high and low lines shown on Figures 4–26 through 4–32 from what was shown in 

the FY 2016 SSMP. Changes to those lines for the efforts that report SAR costs are as follows:

– The B61-12 estimate in Figure 4–26 reflects a new feature in the LEP cost model to account 

for risks, particularly those previously identified, and have either subsequently been avoided

or occurred. This model improvement should result in programs naturally narrowing from a 

larger to a smaller uncertainty range over time, which better reflects reality. This is 

exhibited most clearly in this year’s B61-12 high and low range compared to last year’s 

published range.

– The W88 Alt 370 program had an expanded work scope addition identified during its 

development, resulting in a moderate increase to the overall program. The work scope on 

all other components were only slightly changed from last year. In addition, the model’s 

assumed time-phasing was adjusted to better match the program’s progress to date.

The total side-by-side differences between this and last year’s ICEs are provided in Figure 4–34 below.

Figure 4–34. FY 2016 SSMP versus FY 2017 SSMP independent cost estimates
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-40 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.8.5 Construction Costs

The budget requirement estimate for construction in FY 2022 and beyond, as part of the Infrastructure

construction total included in Figure 4–22, is based on the set of projects in the NNSA Construction 

Resource Planning List23 shown in Figure 4–35. Because of the preliminary planning status for most of 

these projects, many have been binned in one of three cost ranges. For projects estimated to cost more

than $500 million, upper bounds were estimated based on the best available data. The projects in the 

Construction Resource Planning List that will start beyond the FYNSP have also been binned in the 

five-year period in which they are expected to start, based on “hard requirements” for their completion 

or general priority. These are listed in alphabetical order in each bin because they are not in priority 

order within the bin. Construction funding for each of these periods is based on the total cost of the 

projects started in that period spread over the five years of the period.24 It should be noted that this list 

does not constitute a specific 25-year construction plan, but rather as input to a method to forecast 

potential future construction costs. Specific decisions about funding individual projects will be made as 

part of the annual programming process for the FYNSP and in accordance with DOE construction-related

orders.

Table 4–12 shows the low, high, and midpoint total costs for executing all the projects on the 

Construction Resource Planning List that are scheduled for FY 2022 and beyond. As can be inferred from 

this table, significant uncertainty exists in these construction cost estimates because of the immaturity 

of planning for these projects. Most have not achieved CD-0 Mission need under DOE Order 413.3, nor 

have Analyses of Alternatives been conducted, which might result in decisions to pursue nonconstruction solutions to the mission need or significant changes to the construction cost estimates.

Table 4–12. Total cost of construction for fiscal years 2022–2041

Then-Year Dollars in Millions Low High Midpoint

Total Construction Resource 

Planning List cost

11,143 33,847 a20,131

a

The “high” estimate for construction includes provisional funding for a domestic uranium enrichment

capability.

If the midpoint cost is compared to the value in the FY 2016 SSMP (for the overlapping years of the two 

estimates for construction, FY 2022 through FY 2040) the difference is an increase of about $2.2 billion. 

The increase is the result of the addition of 11 projects to the Construction Resource Planning List (in 

red) and increases in early projected cost ranges for MaRIE, the Radiation-Hardened Foundry, and the 

Plutonium Modular Approach.

 

23 In the FY 2016 SSMP, this list was labeled “NNSA Integrated Project List for Capital Construction.” The name has been 

changed to better reflect the use of this information, which is to produce a reasonable estimate of required out-year 

construction resources.

24 For projects whose construction period exceeds five years, the project cost was split over two five-year periods.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-41

Figure 4–35. NNSA Construction Resource Planning List

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 5-1

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This DOE/NNSA FY 2017 SSMP, together with its classified Annex, is a key planning document for the 

nuclear security enterprise. It is a summary plan that updates the FY 2016 SSMP, the 25-year strategic 

program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and 

organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure to ensure 

mission success. The NNSA Federal workforce prepares each SSMP in collaboration with its eight M&O 

partners. The plans in the FY 2017 SSMP were also coordinated with DOD through the Nuclear Weapons 

Council, which promulgates most requirements to ensure the Nation’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, 

secure, and effective. As with previous SSMPs, a new version is published each year as NNSA updates its 

strategic plans in response to new requirements and challenges related to stewardship and 

management of the stockpile.

Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. Once 

again, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense 

to assess that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground 

nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national 

security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the Nevada National Security Site 

are primarily responsible for this continued success. 

The research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of 

weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics 

experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security 

enterprise. The multiple LEPs that are underway made progress toward their first production unit dates. 

The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three 

development flight tests. 

Changes in plans since the FY 2016 SSMP include the following:

 In FY 2015, warhead dismantlement did not proceed at a rate to allow dismantlement of all 

weapons retired prior to FY 2009 by FY 2022. NNSA intends to increase that rate, starting in 

FY 2018, to recover the shortfall and complete the dismantlement a year early (by FY 2021 if the 

full amount of the requested funding is provided). 

 Some Infrastructure and Operations projects have been deferred beyond the FY 2017 Future 

Years Nuclear Security Program to address higher NNSA priorities.

 With a restructuring to balance the effort on stockpile stewardship against the effort to 

understand ignition, the National Ignition Facility’s contribution to stewardship has increased. 

 An Enhanced Capability for Subcritical Experiments initiative has been approved to develop the 

capability to explore the late-time hydrodynamic behavior of scaled imploding systems at the 

U1a Complex using more energetic radiographic sources, as well as neutron reactivity.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 5-2 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 Several programs have been realigned because of higher priorities. The Engineering Program is 

shifting its emphasis to the immediate needs of the Directed Stockpile Program. Advanced 

Manufacturing Development has been realigned to address higher priorities.

NNSA recognizes the challenge of maintaining a quality workforce, which is crucial to mission success. 

Consequently, NNSA has already instituted several efforts to ensure that the workforce is challenged 

and exercised throughout the entire nuclear weapons life cycle. NNSA will also continue to examine 

how to best achieve a responsive infrastructure. 

The schedule for the LEPs and major Alts is unchanged from the FY 2016 SSMP:

 Complete production of the W76-1 warheads by FY 2019.

 Deliver the first production unit of the B61-12 by FY 2020.

 Deliver the first production unit of the W88 Alt 370 (with refresh of the conventional high 

explosive) by FY 2020.

 Achieve a first production unit of the W80-4 by FY 2025.

Out-year objectives include the following:

 Produce 10 War Reserve pits in 2024, 20 War Reserve pits in 2025, and 30 War Reserve pits 

in 2026.

 Attain a 50 to 80 pits-per-year capability as part of a responsive infrastructure by 2030.

 End enriched uranium operations in Building 9212 at Y-12 National Security Complex and deliver

the Uranium Processing Facility for no more than $6.5 billion by 2025.

 Implement the 3+2 Strategy for a smaller stockpile with upgraded safety and security and 

interoperable nuclear explosive packages (for missile warheads).

Unforeseen technological challenges, new requirements, and geopolitical events could affect the 

priorities underlying this strategic plan. The major challenge is continuing to balance requirements.

These include meeting the near-term needs of the stockpile, sustaining or recapitalizing the 

infrastructure, and advancing the understanding of the performance of weapons in the stockpile. A 

responsive infrastructure will only be feasible through proper planning and national leadership 

commitment.

NNSA has confidence in its ability to execute the program described in this FY 2017 SSMP if funded at 

the requested levels. The LEPs are on schedule and, once completed, will assure an extended service 

life and improve the safety and effectiveness of the stockpile. With Congress’ support, the safety, 

security, and reliability of the stockpile can be maintained and the Nation’s stewardship sustained.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-1

Appendix A

Requirements Mapping

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to 

Statutory Reporting Requirements and Related Requests

The FY 2017 SSMP consolidates a number of statutory reporting requirements and related congressional 

requests. This appendix maps the statutory and congressional requirements to their respective chapter 

and section in the FY 2016 SSMP and FY 2017 SSMP. 

A.2 Ongoing Requirements

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

§ 2521. Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, 

shall establish a stewardship program to ensure –

(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of 

the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system 

integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and 

certification; and 

(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without 

the use of underground nuclear weapons testing.

Unclassified

All Chapters

Unclassified

All Chapters

(b) Program elements

The program shall include the following:

(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to 

enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with 

respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.6.2;

Appendix C

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.1.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.4; 

Appendix B

(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, 

such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, 

plasma physics, and materials research.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5, 3.6, 

3.7

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.2; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.3

(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the 

experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced 

hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for 

above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5, 3.6, 

3.7; Chapter 4,

Section 4.3.3

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.2; Chapter 4, 

Section 4.8.5
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page A-2 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced 

experimental facilities of the United States, including -

(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory;

(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility at Los 

Alamos National Laboratory;

(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and 

(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5, 3.6, 

3.7

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.3.1, 

4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 

4.8.5

(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with 

production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the 

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including -

(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and

(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national 

security laboratories.

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.4.6;

Chapter 4,

Section 4.4

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3.1, 

3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 

3.3.5, 3.3.6; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1, 4.3, 

4.8.5

(1) With respect to exascale computing—

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop and 

carry out a plan to develop exascale computing and incorporate such computing 

into the stockpile stewardship program under section 4201 of the Atomic 

Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) during the 10-year period beginning on the 

date of the enactment of this Act.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.6.2;

Appendix C

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1.1,

3.1.2, 3.1.2; 

Appendix B

(b) MILESTONES.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include major 

programmatic milestones in—

(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile 

stewardship program; and

(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale 

computing.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.6.2;

Appendix C

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1.1, 

3.1.2, 3.1.3; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.4; 

Appendix B

(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.—In developing the plan required 

by subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the 

Under Secretary of Energy for Science, the Secretary of Defense, and elements 

of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))).

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.6.2;

Appendix C

Unclassified

Appendix B

(d) INCLUSION OF COSTS IN FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.—

The Administrator shall—

(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations 

reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under 

section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 

2453) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the costs of—

(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing 

into the stockpile stewardship program; and

(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to 

exascale computing; and

(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description 

of the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of 

Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.

Unclassified

Appendix C

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.4; 

Appendix B
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-3

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Administrator shall submit the plan 

required by subsection (a) to the congressional defense committees with each 

summary of the plan required by subsection (a) of section 4203 of the Atomic 

Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) submitted under subsection (b)(1) of that 

section during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

this Act.

(f) EXASCALE COMPUTING DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘exascale 

computing’’ means computing through the use of a computing machine that 

performs near or above 10 to the 18th power floating point operations per 

second.

50 U.S. Code § 2522

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

§ 2522. Report on stockpile stewardship criteria 

(a) Requirement for criteria

The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging 

whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for 

determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are 

performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that 

the stockpile is safe and reliable.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4.2

Classified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.2

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.3.1, 

2.3.2; Chapter 3, 

Section 3.1, 3.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.3.1, 

4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4

(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), 

shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense. 

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

§ 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and infrastructure 

plan

(a) Plan requirement

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other 

appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal 

Government, shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the 

nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile 

stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile surveillance, program direction, 

infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The 

plan shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of 

the most recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.

Unclassified

All Chapters 

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

(b) Submissions to Congress

(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each evennumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional 

defense committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a). 

N/A Unclassified

All chapters

(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each oddnumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional 

defense committees a detailed report on the plan developed under 

subsection (a). 

Unclassified

All chapters

N/A

(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be 

submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page A-4 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(c) Elements of biennial plan summary

Each summary of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a 

minimum, the following:

(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the 

number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each 

warhead type.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1

Classified Annex

(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life 

extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace 

warhead types.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2; 

Chapter 4

Classified Annex

(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of 

science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information.

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1, 3.2

(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including 

programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of 

human capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.6; 

Chapter 3, 

All Sections; 

Chapter 4, 

All Sections

(5) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

N/A Unclassified

Executive 

Summary; 

Chapter 5

(6) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate. N/A Unclassified

Chapter 5

(d) Elements of biennial detailed report

Each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall 

include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship and management—

(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number 

and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each 

warhead type;

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.2; 

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.4.1

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on 

the date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the 

date of the report—

(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and 

inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; 

and

(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of 

nuclear weapon;

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.9.1, 

8.9.2

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.1.2

N/A

(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension 

programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace 

warhead types;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.3, 2.4; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.9.2

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3

N/A

(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the 

lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the 

nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active 

and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.1

N/A

(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, 

and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.1.2, 2.4.3, 2.5.1; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4.2, 

3.5.1, 3.6.1, 3.6.4

N/A

(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the 

Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads 

in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive 

warheads);

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.2; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.3 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3

N/A

(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and 

modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, 

as needed;

Classified

Chapter 2; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.1.3

N/A

(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for 

carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 

2524 of this title, including information relating to the aging of materials 

and components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement 

or substitution of materials;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.4.5

N/A

(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and 

missions for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons 

production facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, 

mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization 

activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.4; 

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.3.2

N/A
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full 

and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peerreview process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile required under section 2525 of this title;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.3

N/A

(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile 

management program required by section 2524 of this title, including 

allocations of funds by weapon type and facility; and

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.4; 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.1, 8.9

N/A

(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out 

the program required under section 2524 of this title.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.1

N/A

(2) With respect to science-based tools— N/A

(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.1.1; 

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4.2

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in 

subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such 

information and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such 

information based on the criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) 

of this title; and

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4.2

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including 

any updates to such criteria).

N/A

(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 

(a) of this title by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the 

national security laboratories, which shall set forth—

N/A

(A) an identification and description of—

(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship 

program; and

(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of 

nuclear testing;

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.3

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security 

laboratory to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, 

and reliable without the use of nuclear testing;

Unclassified

Chapter 3

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security 

laboratory that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the 

science-based tools expected to exist during the period covered by the 

future-years nuclear security program; and

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.3

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies 

required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program 

and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the 

Administration, including—

Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.4.2

N/A

(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by 

discipline, required to maintain such competencies; and

Unclassified

Appendix D

N/A

(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at 

the time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected 

to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear 

security program.

Unclassified

Appendix D

N/A

(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure— N/A

(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the 

Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements 

prescribed in—

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3

N/A

(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in 

the most recent national security strategy report of the President 

under section 404a of this title if such strategy has been submitted 

as of the date of the plan; 

N/A

(ii) the most recent quadrennial defense review if such strategy has 

not been submitted as of the date of the plan; and

N/A

(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the 

plan;

N/A

(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under 

subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the 

plan; and

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.2.4

N/A

(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines 

necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), 

including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which 

such estimated levels of annual funds are based.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.4, 8.5, 

8.9

N/A

(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States— N/A

(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the 

Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once 

directed by the President to conduct such a test;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be 

appropriate;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that 

are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site; and

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities 

described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants 

described in subparagraph (D).

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile 

and stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the 

following:

N/A

(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to 

understand plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under 

manufactured and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4.2

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1

N/A

(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for 

plutonium at elemental and bulk conditions.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1, 3.5.3, 

3.6.1, 3.6.4

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1

N/A

(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for 

plutonium and plutonium components.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.6; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.3

N/A

(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance 

under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and 

nonmanufactured conditions.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.6.2

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1

N/A

(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the 

assessments described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3, 3.4.2

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2

N/A

(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, 

technology, and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over 

the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program under 

section 2453 of this title.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3

N/A

(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified 

under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3

N/A

(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the 

integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile 

stewardship needs.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.6; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.3

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(7) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

Unclassified

Executive 

Summary

N/A

(e) Nuclear Weapons Council assessment N/A N/A

(f) Definitions

In this section:

(1) The term “budget”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the 

budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the 

President under section 1105(a) of title 31.

(2) The term “future-years nuclear security program” means the 

program required by section 2453 of this title.

(3) The term “nuclear security budget materials”, with respect to a 

fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the 

Administrator in support of the budget for that fiscal year.

(4) The term “quadrennial defense review” means the review of the 

defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried 

out every four years under section 118 of title 10.

(5) The term “weapons activities” means each activity within the 

budget category of weapons activities in the budget of the 

Administration.

(6) The term “weapons-related activities” means each activity under

the Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear 

weapons technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including 

activities related to—

(A) nuclear nonproliferation;

(B) nuclear forensics;

(C) nuclear intelligence;

(D) nuclear safety; and

(E) nuclear incident response.

50 U.S. Code § 2524

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

§ 2524. Stockpile management program

(a) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security 

and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in 

support of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective 

management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the 

extension of the effective life of such weapons. The program shall have the 

following objectives:

(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile of the United States.

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.1.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2

(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground 

nuclear weapons testing.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Section 3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2
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50 U.S. Code § 2524

FY 2016

Response

FY 2017 

Response/Updates

(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile.

Unclassified

Chapter 1,

Section 1.3

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.5.2

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2

(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the 

stockpile.

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.2

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 3.2.3

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.1.1, 

2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 

2.2.4; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1, 3.2, 

3.3.5

(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person 

or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.2;

Chapter 6,

Section 6.1.5

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.4; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2, 3.6.1; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.2.2

(b) Program limitations

In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the 

Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—

(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the 

objectives identified in subsection (a); and 

N/A

(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall--

(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the 

maximum extent feasible, components that are well understood or are 

certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons 

testing; and

(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the 

nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the 

existing stockpile.

N/A

(c) Program budget

In accordance with the requirements under section 2529 of this title, for each 

budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, 

the amounts requested for the program under this section shall be clearly 

identified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support 

of that budget.

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

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A.3 Other Requirements

FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, Pu L. 113-66

FY 2016 

Response

FY 2017

Response/Updates

Section 3112 of this Act adds the following section to 50 U.S.C. 2521-

Section 4219—Plutonium Pit Production Capacity

(a) REQUIREMENT—Consistent with the requirements of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security 

enterprise--

(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;

(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;

(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits;

(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and

(5) during a pilot period of not less than 90 days during 2027 (subject to 

produce war reserve plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to produce 80 

pits per year. In a coordinated manner, DOE and DOD may slip this 

requirement up to 2 years.

Unclassified

Message from 

the Secretary;

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.6;

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.3

Classified

Chapter 2,

Section 2.1.2

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.3.1; 

Chapter 5

50 U.S. Code § 2453 

FY 2016 

Response

FY 2017

Response/Updates

(b) Elements

(5) A plan, developed in consultation with the Director of the Office of 

Health, Safety, and Security of the Department of Energy, for the research 

and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of the 

technologies employed within the nuclear security enterprise to address 

physical and cyber security threats during the applicable five-fiscal-year 

period, together with—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.6; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.6, 4.7

(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the 

technologies deployed to address the physical and cyber security threats 

posed to that site; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.6, 3.6.1, 

3.6.2

(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used 

by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical 

and cyber security technologies; and 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.6

(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program 

element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the 

Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will 

help carry out that plan.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.6, 4.7
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, Pu L. 113-66

FY 2016 

Response

FY 2017

Response/Updates

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF TWO-YEAR DELAY OF DEMONSTRATION REQUIREMENT—

The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense may jointly delay, for not 

more than two years, the requirement under subsection 2 (a)(5) if—

(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy jointly submit 

to the congressional defense committees a report describing—

(A) the justification for the proposed delay;

(B) the effects of the proposed delay on stockpile stewardship and 

modernization, life extension programs, future stockpile strategy, 

and dismantlement efforts; and

(C) whether the proposed delay is consistent with national policy 

regarding creation of a responsive nuclear infrastructure; and

(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command submits to 

the congressional defense committees a report containing the 

assessment of the Commander with respect to the potential risks to 

national security of the proposed delay in meeting

(A) the nuclear deterrence requirements of the United States 

Strategic Command; and

(B) national requirements related to creation of a responsive 

nuclear infrastructure.

(c) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year 

thereafter through 2027, the Secretary of Energy shall certify to the congressional 

defense committees and the Secretary of Defense that the programs and budget 

of the Secretary of Energy will enable the nuclear security enterprise to meet the 

requirements under subsection (a)

Administrator’s 

Letter

Section 3119—Production of Nuclear Warhead for Long-Range Standoff Weapon 

(a) First Production Unit. The Secretary of Energy shall deliver a first 

production unit for a nuclear warhead for the long-range standoff weapon by 

not later than September 30, 2025.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.4, 

2.4.1, 2.5.2

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.5, 

2.2.4

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. 1735, Section 3112 FY 2016 Response

FY 2017

Response/Updates

Sec. 3112. STOCKPILE RESPONSIVENESS PROGRAM

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) a modern and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is only one 

component of a nuclear posture that is agile, flexible, and responsive to 

change; and

(2) to ensure the nuclear deterrent of the United States remains safe, 

secure, reliable, credible, and responsive, the United States must 

continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, 

design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Introduction

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle A of title XLII of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 

(50 U.S.C. 2521 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following 

new section:

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-13

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. 1735, Section 3112 FY 2016 Response

FY 2017

Response/Updates

Sec. 4220. STOCKPILE RESPONSIVENESS PROGRAM

‘‘(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to identify, 

sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required 

to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and 

deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the nuclear deterrent of the United States 

remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and responsive.

N/A

(b) PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the 

Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry 

out a stockpile responsiveness program, along with the stockpile stewardship 

program under section 4201 and the stockpile management program under 

section 4204, to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise 

all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer,

certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Introduction

(c) OBJECTIVES.—The program under subsection (b) shall have the following 

objectives:

(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the 

capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, 

engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to 

carry out all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with 

respect to both the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of 

the Department of Defense.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Introduction

(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience 

with respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process 

from one generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the 

following generation.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Introduction

(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the 

range of capabilities required, including prototypes, flight testing, and 

development of plans for certification without the need for nuclear 

explosive testing.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.2; 

Chapter 3, 

Introduction; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.2.2

(4) Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines 

to minimize the amount of time and costs leading to an engineering 

prototype and production.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Introduction; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.5

(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of 

all relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the 

Department of Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Introduction

(d) JOINT NUCLEAR WEAPONS LIFE CYCLE PROCESS DEFINED.—

In this section, the term ‘joint nuclear weapons life cycle process’ means the 

process developed and maintained by the Secretary of Defense and the 

Secretary of Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and 

retirement of nuclear weapons.’’.

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2016

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page B-1

High Performance Computing

NNSA has taken major steps to support the 

President’s Executive Order, the National Strategic 

Computing Initiative, while advancing stockpile 

stewardship capabilities. In 2015, Los Alamos and 

Sandia National Laboratories received the first 

hardware delivery for Trinity, NNSA’s nextgeneration, high performance computer. Trinity will 

be one of the most advanced computers in the world, 

with initially at least seven times better performance 

than the Cielo supercomputer. NNSA continued its 

CORAL collaboration with Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory, the DOE national laboratories at 

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Argonne, Illinois, and 

with IBM, Intel, and other vendors to develop nextgeneration platforms that will dramatically improve 

the ability to run complex codes. CORAL will be a 

significant step on the path to exascale computing.

The Advanced Simulation and Computing 

Crossroads supercomputer, which will be ready for 

production use in FY 2021, is not expected to be an 

exascale system, but will help maintain momentum 

on that path. NNSA’s participation in DOE’s

Exascale Computing Project, a portion of the 

National Strategic Computing Initiative, should allow 

deployment of a capable exascale system within the 

next decade. The synergy between the Exascale 

Initiative and the ASC Platform Procurement plan 

would provide the first exascale-class capable 

machine at LLNL in the mid 2020s.

Appendix B

Exascale Computing

This appendix updates the plan to develop an exascale computing system for stockpile stewardship, as 

outlined in Appendix C of the FY 2016 SSMP.

B.1 Introduction

The predictive capabilities of ASC’s IDCs are the 

products of scientific and engineering advances and 

extraordinary increases in computing capabilities.

These capabilities are sufficient to support NNSA

missions today; however, they must be improved to 

support future missions. Aging of weapon components, 

advanced and additive manufacturing techniques, and 

LEPs and Alts are moving the stockpile further from 

original design configuration and associated

underground nuclear explosive test data. In part, 

predictive capability is currently limited by 

approximations in the physics models, the inability to 

resolve critical geometric and physics features at very 

small length scales, and the unmet computing cycle 

needs to quantify margins and uncertainties. Progress 

in limiting many of these problems requires NNSA to 

move beyond today’s computer systems to capable

exascale1computing systems.

Computer hardware and architectures are evolving 

rapidly in response to market pressures created by 

mobile computing devices and other consumer 

electronics that are not focused on high performance 

computing. Making computer circuits faster by 

shrinking the components is becoming no longer

economically feasible. The computer industry is 

responding by incorporating more processing cores on a 

single chip, resulting in “multi-core” chips, with many 

cores running in parallel to complete a single 

computation. The historically slow improvement in

memory devices, relative to the speedup in computing,

has also led to the memory subsystem becoming the 

primary driver of cost and power consumption. Any 

 

1

A capable exascale computing system is a system that can perform at least 1018 floating point operations per second and can 

increase sustained mission application performance at least 25-fold over the current largest ASC supercomputer, Sequoia.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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exascale system built with off-the-shelf components is not envisioned being viable for stewardship 

applications in the next decade.

President Obama formally recognized the challenges of next-generation computing by establishing the 

multiagency National Strategic Computing Initiative on July 29, 2015. DOE is the lead agency 

responsible for executing a program focused on advanced simulation via exascale computing, which is a 

component of the initiative. An Exascale Computing Project currently being developed by NNSA in 

concert with the DOE Office of Science will emphasize sustained performance on applications to support 

DOE missions. 

B.2 Challenges

Providing capable exascale computing while maintaining and modifying the IDCs requires an effort to:

 develop computing systems that provide at least a 25-fold increase in sustained application code 

performance over the current largest ASC supercomputer, Sequoia,

 limit system power consumption to no more than 30 megawatts, and

 address code performance issues caused by next-generation hardware.

To partially address these challenges, ASC established the Advanced Technology Development and 

Mitigation subprogram to mitigate the risk that IDCs will not run effectively on future high performance 

computing platforms. This subprogram is rewriting key application packages for next-generation 

systems and engaging early with hardware vendors on applications of critical importance to stockpile 

stewardship. With the exception of platform acquisitions, NNSA’s exascale preparation work is entirely 

in the Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram. 

NNSA will continue to acquire the high performance computing systems on a strategically 

predetermined schedule to meet the needs of the weapons program. Developing and adapting IDCs to 

the new architectures is part of ASC’s core mission, as is system acquisition. Both are activities that have 

been achieved over previous generations of computer upgrades, and both will continue to be funded 

outside a national exascale program.

B.3 Approach and Strategy

Historically, industry has delivered new leading-edge systems every four to five years. Capable exascale 

systems will require more than incremental technology improvements. A capable exascale system will 

be much more difficult to achieve than previous systems; however, these barriers can be overcome, in 

part by relaxing constraints and in part by adapting and augmenting the existing ASC and DOE’s ASCR

Programs, which include research activities at universities, vendor-laboratory partnerships, 

development of prototype systems, and strategic acquisitions. Because of the complexity of exascale 

computing, these approaches are being augmented by substantial new efforts.

Given the challenges of achieving capable exascale computing, code developers must recognize the 

trends and opportunities of architecture and technologies, and the platform developers must 

understand the intended applications. This system-level design process among applications, software,

and hardware developers is referred to as the co-design process. Through ASC and ASCR investments, 

several “co-design centers” have already begun to perform exploratory research to co-design the 

hardware and architecture, software stacks, and numerical methods and algorithms for mission 
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Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page B-3

applications, as well as to determine tradeoffs in the design of exascale hardware, system software, and 

application codes.

The realization of a capable exascale system involves complex tradeoffs among algorithms; hardware 

(e.g., processors, memory, energy efficiency, reliability, and interconnectivity.); and software 

(programming models, scalability, data management, productivity, etc.). Applications software must be 

redesigned and restructured to meet challenges that hardware and software research cannot resolve

fully. 

The strategy to address these challenges will focus in four areas: 

 Application Development: developing next-generation codes to address extreme parallelism, 

reliability and resiliency, memory hierarchies, and other performance issues caused by nextgeneration computing hardware.

 Software Technology: developing an expanded, vertically integrated software stack to support 

applications on next-generation hardware.

 Hardware Technology: supporting vendor R&D activities to deploy next-generation systems 

suitable for DOE/NNSA applications.

 Exascale Systems: supporting non-recurring engineering activities by vendors, reducing the 

costs of system expansion and site preparation, providing the associated power and cooling 

needed to run the next-generation supercomputers, and enhancing acquisition and support of 

prototypes and testbeds for application, software, and hardware evaluation activities.

ASC has developed several key milestones from FY 2017 to FY 2023 to ensure its code performance 

objective is achieved. These milestones, which can be found in Chapter 4 under Section 4.3.4, represent 

advances in codes and computing systems to achieve a viable path to exascale. These milestones also 

contribute to Predictive Capability Framework pegposts.

B.4 Collaborative Management

ASC is partnering with DOE’s ASCR to execute an Exascale Computing Project that will fully address 

exascale computing challenges. The effort will use teams comprised of personnel from a mix of DOE 

laboratories, large and small high performance computing vendors, and universities selected through 

peer review processes to conduct research, development, and engineering. Recognizing the synergies 

available through collaboration, ASC and ASCR are committed to joint planning and execution of 

activities to tackle a common set of problems to achieve common objectives, eliminate duplication, 

focus the vendor community, decrease costs by increasing acquisition volumes, and improve solutions 

using the broad, combined experience and strengths of both programs.

Joint activities include collaborations with vendors, co-design efforts, high performance computing

system procurement, and exascale planning. However, each program (ASC and ASCR) will continue to 

have its own unique challenges that must be addressed for full utilization of exascale resources. Budget 

authority for the current advanced technologies work, which is congruent with the path to exascale, 

continues to reside within the respective ASC and ASCR Programs.
March 2016 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page B-4 | Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

B.5 Conclusion

Developing and using a capable exascale computing system will be a tremendous challenge. Driven by 

market forces and faced with physical limitations in microprocessors, the computing industry is driving 

toward immensely complex computer architectures composed of massive, multi-core processors with 

inadequate memory systems. NNSA’s ASC is navigating this complex landscape by working aggressively 

with vendors; co-designing hardware, software, and next-generation codes; and developing software 

technologies to mitigate the performance impact on IDCs. ASC, in collaboration with ASCR, is making 

steady progress. Should a multi-year Exascale Computing Project be approved, this progress will 

accelerate substantially and will increase the clout of high performance computing within the 

marketplace by providing “trickle-down” benefits for the broader computing community.
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Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page C-1

Appendix C

Glossary

3+2 Strategy—The strategy to reduce the stockpile size and number of warhead types, increase 

interoperability, and provide flexibility to respond to geopolitical and technological surprise. The 

objective is a stockpile consisting of three interoperable warheads deployed on both submarinelaunched and intercontinental ballistic missiles and two air-delivered warheads or bombs.

Alteration (Alt)—A limited scope change that affects assembly, tests, maintenance, and/or storage of 

weapons. An alteration may address identified defects and component obsolescence; it does not 

change a weapon's operational capabilities.

Annual Assessment Process—The authoritative method to evaluate the safety, reliability, performance, 

and military effectiveness of the stockpile; it is a principal factor in the Nation’s ability to maintain a 

credible deterrent without nuclear explosive testing. The Directors of the three national security 

laboratories complete annual assessment of the stockpile, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 

Command provides a separate assessment of military effectiveness. The assessments also determine

whether an underground nuclear explosive testing must be conducted to resolve any issues. The 

Secretaries of Energy and Defense submit the reports unaltered to the President, along with any 

conclusions they deem appropriate.

B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP to consolidate four families of the B61 bomb into one and 

to improve the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the U.S. arsenal.

Boost—The process that increases the yield of a nuclear weapons primary stage through fusion 

reactions.

Canned subassembly—A component of a nuclear weapon that is hermetically sealed in a metal 

container. A canned subassembly and the primary make up a weapon’s nuclear explosive package.

Certification—The process whereby all available information on the performance of a weapon system is 

considered and the Laboratory Directors responsible for that system certify—before the weapon enters 

the stockpile—that it will meet, with noted exceptions, the military characteristics within the 

environments defined by the stockpile to system’s stockpile-to-target-sequence.

Component—An assembly or combination of parts, subassemblies, and assemblies mounted together 

during manufacture, assembly, maintenance, or rebuild.

Construction Resource Planning List—An enterprise-wide chronological project list of approved and 

proposed construction projects that indicates rough orders of magnitude for the total project cost and 

schedule. Near-term approved projects (usually within the Future Years Nuclear Security Program) are 

in more advanced stages of development. Proposed projects are pre-conceptual and have not been 

fully scoped. The project list is re-evaluated each budget year, and schedules shift based on mission 

need and funding availability. 

Conventional high explosive—A high explosive that detonates when given sufficient stimulus via a highpressure shock. Stimuli from severe accident environments involving impact, fire, or electrical discharge 

may also initiate a conventional high explosive. See also insensitive high explosive.
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Co-design—An inclusive process to develop designs that encourages participants to find solutions within 

the context of the total system, rather than based on individual areas of expertise and interest.

Deuterium—An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one neutron and one proton.

Exascale computing—The use of systems capable of at least a thousand petaflops or a quintillion (1018) 

floating point operations per second.

First production unit—The first completed item of a weapon system delivered to a user (e.g., DOD).

Fission—The process whereby the nucleus of a particular heavy element splits into (generally) two nuclei 

of lighter elements, with the release of substantial energy.

Floating point operations per second (flops)—The number of arithmetic operations performed on real 

numbers in a second; used as a measure of the performance of a computer system.

Fusion—The process whereby the nuclei of two light elements, especially of the isotopes of hydrogen 

(namely, deuterium and tritium), combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element with the release of 

substantial energy and a high energy neutron.

Future Years Nuclear Security Program—A detailed description of the program elements (and associated 

projects and activities) for the fiscal year for which the annual budget is submitted and the four 

succeeding fiscal years.

High explosives—Materials that detonate, with the chemical reaction components propagating at 

supersonic speeds. HE are used in the main charge of a weapon primary to compress the fissile material 

and initiate the chain of events leading to nuclear yield. See also conventional high explosive and 

insensitive high explosive.

High performance computing—The use of supercomputers and parallel processing techniques with

multiple computers to perform computational tasks. 

Ignition—The point at which a nuclear fusion reaction becomes self-sustaining—that is, more energy is 

produced and retained in the fusion target than the energy used to initiate the nuclear reaction.

Insensitive high explosive—A high explosive substance that is so insensitive that the probability of 

accidental initiation or transition from burning to detonation is negligible.

Integrated Design Code—A simulation code containing multiple physics and engineering models that 

have been validated experimentally and computationally. An Integrated Design Code is used to 

simulate, understand, and predict the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear components and nuclear 

weapons under normal, abnormal, and hostile conditions.

Interoperable warhead—A warhead that has a common nuclear explosive package, is integrated with 

systems to maximize the use of common and adaptable non-nuclear components, and can be deployed 

on multiple delivery platforms.

Life cycle—The series of stages through which a component, system, or weapon passes from initial 

development until it is consumed, disposed of, or altered in order to extend its lifetime.

Life Extension Program (LEP)—A program that refurbishes warheads of a specific weapon type by 

replacing aged components to extend the service life of a weapon. LEPs can extend the life of a 

warhead by 20 to 30 years, while increasing safety, improving security, and addressing defects.

Limited life component—A weapon component or subsystem whose performance degrades with age 

and must be replaced. 
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Modernization—The changes to nuclear weapons or infrastructure due to aging, unavailability of 

replacement parts, or the need to enhance safety, security, and operational design features. 

Modification (Mod)—A modernization program that changes a weapon’s operational capabilities. A 

Mod may enhance the margin against failure, increase safety, improve security, replace limited life 

components, and/or address identified defects and component obsolescence.

National security laboratory—The term refers to Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National 

Laboratories, or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Non-nuclear components—The parts or assemblies designed for use in nuclear weapons or in nuclear 

weapons training; such components are not available commercially (e.g., radiation-hardened electronic 

circuits or arming, fuzing, and firing components) and do not contain special nuclear material.

Nuclear explosive package—An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials, as well as 

the main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation. 

Nuclear security enterprise—The physical infrastructure, technology, and human capital at the national 

security laboratories, the nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site.

Nuclear Weapons Council—The joint DOE/DOD council composed of senior officials from both 

departments who recommend the stockpile options and research priorities that shape national policies 

and budgets to develop, produce, surveil, and retire nuclear warheads and weapon delivery platforms

and who consider the safety, security, and control issues for existing and proposed weapons programs.

Nuclear weapons production facility—The term refers to the National Security Campus, Pantex Plant, 

Y-12 National Security Complex, or Savannah River Site. Also includes Los Alamos National Laboratory 

and Sandia National Laboratories with respect to some specific weapons production activities.

Out years—The years that follow the five-year period of the Future Years Nuclear Security Program. 

Pit—The critical core component of a nuclear weapon that contains fissile material.

Phase 6.x Process—An expanded subset of the Quantity Production and Stockpile phase (Phase 6) of the 

Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process. The Phase 6.x Process provides a framework to conduct and 

manage life extension activities for existing weapons.

Quantification of margins and uncertainties—The methodology used in the post-nuclear-testing era to 

facilitate analysis and communicate confidence in assessing and certifying that stockpile weapons will 

perform safely, securely, and reliably. Scientific judgment of experts at the national security 

laboratories plays a crucial role in this determination, which is based on metrics that use experimental 

data, physical models, and numerical simulations.

Safeguards Transporter—A highly specialized trailer designed to safeguard nuclear weapons and special 

nuclear materials while in transit.

Secondary—The portion of a warhead that provides additional energy release and is activated by energy 

from the primary.

Significant finding investigation—A formal investigation by a committee, chaired by an employee of a 

national security laboratory, to determine the cause and impact of a reported anomaly and to 

recommend corrective actions as appropriate.
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Subcritical experiment—An experiment conducted underground at the Nevada National Security Site 

that is specifically designed to obtain data on nuclear weapons for which less than a critical mass of 

fissionable material is present and hence no self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction can occur, 

consistent with a comprehensive nuclear explosive test ban.

Surety—The assurance that a nuclear weapon will operate safely, securely, and effectively if deliberately 

activated and that no accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations will occur. Factors contributing

to that assurance include model validation for weapon performance based on experiments and 

simulations, materiel (e.g., military equipment and supplies), personnel, and execution of procedures.

Surveillance—Activities to determine whether nuclear weapons meet established safety, security, and 

reliability standards.

Sustainment—A program to modify and maintain a set of nuclear weapon systems.

Test readiness—The preparedness to conduct an underground nuclear explosive testing if required to 

ensure the safety and effectiveness of the stockpile or if directed by the President for policy reasons. 

Tractor—A modified and armored vehicle to transport the Safeguards Transporter trailer.

Tritium—A radioactive isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains two neutrons and one proton and 

that is produced in nuclear reactors by the action of neutrons on lithium nuclei.

W76-1 LEP—A life extension program for the W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, 

delivered by a U.S. Navy Trident II.

W78—An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, delivered by the U.S. Air Force Minute Man III 

LGM-30.

W80-4 LEP—A life extension program for the W80 warhead aboard a cruise missile, delivered by the 

U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber and future launch platforms.

W88—A submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, delivered by a U.S. Navy Trident II D5 Fleet 

Ballistic Missile.

W88 Alt 370—An alteration of the W88 warhead to replace the arming, fuzing, and firing components

and the conventional high explosive main charge.

Warhead—The part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munitions that contains either the 

nuclear or thermonuclear system intended to inflict damage.

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A Report to Congress

Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – 

Biennial Plan Summary

March 2016