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27–742 PDF 2018

EXAMINING THE SHIPMENT OF ILLICIT DRUGS IN 

INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 7, 2017 

Serial No. 115–38 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina 

Blake Farenthold, Texas 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA General Counsel 

MARY DOOCY, Counsel 

KILEY BIDELMAN, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Mark Meadows, North Carolina, Chairman 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia, Vice Chair 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 7, 2017 ....................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

The Hon. Gregory Thome, Director, Office of U.N. Specialized and Technical 

Agencies, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Mr. Guy Cottrell, Chief Postal Inspector, United States Postal Service 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Mr. Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Ms. Lori Rectanus, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32 

Ms. Tammy Whitcomb, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Postal Service, Office 

of the Inspector General 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 45 


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EXAMINING THE SHIPMENT OF ILLICIT 

DRUGS IN INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

Thursday, September 7, 2017 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:12 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jody Hice presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hice, Meadows, Jordan, Blum, 

Connolly, Norton, Clay, and Lawrence. 

Mr. HICE. The Subcommittee on Government Operations will 

come to order. 

Let me first of all just say thank you for your patience, all of you. 

Sometimes around here we never know when votes are going to 

occur, and we thought we would be able to start around 2:00, so 

your patience is greatly appreciated. I am sure we will have some 

other members show up along the way, but we will go ahead and 

get started. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

Again, I welcome you here today to discuss this very important 

issue. Last year, 62,000 Americans died from drug overdoses. That 

is a staggering number. More than died in both Vietnam and Iraq 

wars combined. The opioid crisis is the deadliest drug epidemic in 

American history, and it only continues to worsen. 

In my home State of Georgia, opioids are the main cause of overdose deaths. Almost as many Georgians die annually from drug 

overdose as do from car accidents. In 2015, 55 of the counties in 

Georgia out of 159 counties had a higher drug overdose rate than 

the U.S. average. That is a significant uptick from just 11 years 

ago when only 26 Georgia counties were higher than the U.S. average. 

In May, a mass overdose swept through Georgia, took a lot of the 

hearts and emotions of the people of Georgia. There were four people who died within a 48-hour period of time of taking pills that 

they thought were Percocet. Tragically, this is only one example of 

the many incidents that have occurred in recent years due to our 

country’s insatiable desire for drugs. 

While the United States makes up about 5 percent of the world’s 

population, we consume an overwhelming share of the world’s pain 

medication. With any drug epidemic, supply reduction is an essential element to drug control, be it domestic or international. 


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When it comes to our nation’s opioid epidemic, the ability to purchase drugs with just one click of a computer and have those drugs 

brought to this country is easy for most anyone to accomplish. 

Americans are now able to easily purchase powerful synthetic 

opioids, particularly from China, and have them shipped straight 

to their doorstep here in the United States via the United States 

Postal Service. 

Despite the billions of dollars our country spends each year on 

personnel, technology, and infrastructure to protect our southern 

borders, the U.S. Postal Service allows international packages to 

enter our country virtually unchecked. Because the U.S. Postal 

Service is not required to follow the same customs standards as its 

private competitors, it has become an attractive courier for international drug traffickers. 

With the rise of e-commerce, the volume of inbound international 

mail has exploded to hundreds of millions of pieces each year. This 

massive volume, coupled with lax security standards, has created 

a significant security weakness, which often results in a failure to 

detect drugs shipped through the Postal Service. 

So, today, we are going to learn about how the U.S. Postal Service’s lax security standards have led to an influx of illicit drugs entering our country. We will also explore ways in which the U.S. 

Postal Service can close that security gap between the mail service 

and the private competitors. 

The U.S. Postal Service has already taken steps for which we are 

grateful, such as increased collection of electronic advanced data to 

heighten security of inbound international mail. They have also 

embarked on pilot programs in partnership with CBP to target certain mail for inspection. And while these pilot programs are a step 

in the right direction, the postal inspector general and GAO have 

found that there is substantial room for improvement, so we look 

forward to their testimony here today. 

We will also hear from CBP and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service about procedures that have been effective in thwarting contraband from entering our country, as well as what procedures could 

be effective in the future. 

The majority of illicit synthetic opioids from China enter the 

United States via the Postal Service under the terms governed by 

the United Nations’ Universal Postal Union Treaty. Today, we will 

hear from the State Department about international efforts to stop 

illicit drugs from being sent through the mail. 

As the number of Americans overdosing and dying from these 

drugs continues to rise, it is important that we act now, so I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses today as we explore how we 

can work together to stop the supply of illicit drugs entering our 

country and better fight our nation’s drug epidemic. 

Mr. HICE. When the ranking member arrives, he will be allowed 

time for his opening statement, but for now, let me introduce our 

panel of witnesses, after which each of you will have an opportunity to give your opening statement. 

I am pleased to welcome Mr. Gregory Thome, director of the Office of U.N. Specialized and Technical Agencies at the State Department; Mr. Guy Cottrell, is that correct? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. 


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Mr. HICE. Chief postal inspector for the United States Postal 

Service; Mr. Todd Owen, executive assistant commissioner at the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency; Ms. Lori Rectanus, director for Physical Infrastructure Issues that the Government Accountability Office; and Ms. Tammy Whitcomb, acting inspector 

general for the United States Postal Service. 

All of you, we welcome you here. And, Mr. Cottrell, I understand 

that you have someone with you today, is that correct? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Could you please introduce that person? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. It’s Robert Raines. He is a postal operations 

manager just in case there are any technical operations questions. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. And where is Robert? 

Okay, sir. Thank you, and welcome. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify, so if you would please each of you rise and raise 

your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. HICE. The record will reflect that all witnesses have answered in the affirmative. 

Thank you, you may be seated. 

Are you ready for your opening statement or do you want to —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I do. I do. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. All right. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE. All right. We are going to begin with your opening 

statements in here in just a moment. The ranking member, Mr. 

Connolly, has arrived, so I will yield to him for his opening statement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to keep 

people waiting. We had 10 votes, and I got a little delayed on the 

Floor. 

But thank you for having this hearing, and thank you all for 

being here. 

Opioid abuse is now one of the biggest public health threats we 

face as a nation, and that threat is growing exponentially and in 

a frightening way. According to data released just a few days ago 

by the National Center of Health Statistics, more than 64,000 

Americans died from drug overdoses in 2016. This figure is an increase of more than 20 percent over the previous year. This data 

shows that synthetic opioids like fentanyl now cause more deaths 

than any other type of drug. 

According to the Center for Health Statistics, death from synthetic opioids doubled from 2015 to 2016 to just over 20,000. A New 

York Times headline this weekend proclaimed that deaths from 

fentanyl have increased by 540 percent over the last three years 

alone. 

In my native State of Virginia, deaths from synthetic opioids rose 

from 263 in 2015 to 692 one year later. And sadly, Virginia is hardly alone among States in seeing deaths from opioids double or triple in that time period. 

Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis, 

headed by Governor Christie of New Jersey, recently warned, and 

I quote, ‘‘We are miserably losing this fight to prevent fentanyl 


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from entering our country and killing our citizens. The commission 

emphasized to President Trump that ‘‘The first and most urgent 

recommendation of the commission is direct and completely within 

your control, Mr. President. Declare a national emergency.’’ President Trump held a news conference in which he said the words the 

opioid crisis is an emergency, but he hasn’t declared it as such, a 

national emergency. 

Among many other thoughtful recommendations, the Christie 

commission urged the government to intercept fentanyl and other 

synthetic opioids in envelopes and packages at mail processing distribution centers across the country. The Federal agency responsible for preventing fentanyl from coming into this country through 

international mail and express consignment packages like FedEx 

and UPS is the Customs and Border Protection agency. CBP is 

statutorily required, and I quote, ‘‘to ensure the interdiction of persons and goods illegally entering or exiting the United States.’’ 

CBP inspects inbound international mail received by the United 

States Postal Service. CBP inspects inbound international express 

commercial packages at express consignment carrier hubs. 

According to data provided by CBP to our staff prior to this hearing, the greatest increases in the rates of seizure of fentanyl have 

been in the mail and express consignment packages. Right now, 

however, CBP does not appear to know if it is using the most effective tools to find fentanyl in international mail and packages. 

The GAO will warn us today that for one targeting method, the 

use of advanced data on mail and express shipments, CBP has not 

done the analysis necessary to evaluate its effectiveness and this 

targeting method relative to other methods. 

Troubling is that customs may not be using all available data to 

target mail for inspection and investigation and may be targeting 

only a small number of packages per day and may not even be targeting whole classes of mail. In fact, using existing data already 

collected by the Postal Service, the Postal Service’s inspector general recently linked a package intercepted by CBP that contained 

fentanyl to hundreds of additional packages that likely contained 

fentanyl but were apparently allowed to enter into the United 

States. This could point to a potentially much bigger problem 

wherein CBP is failing systematically to uncover those illicit shipping networks. 

Given the urgent and growing threat that fentanyl and other 

synthetic opioids pose to the United States, as well as the recommendation of the Christie commission to increase our ability to 

detect and interdict drugs inbound and international mail and express consignments using enhanced technology, more manpower, 

and expanded canine deployment, it is critical that we ascertain 

which methods of interdicting drugs on inbound mail and consignments are most effective and replicating them. 

One thing is clear, however, and that is that President Trump’s 

proposed wall won’t stop the most dangerous drugs from coming 

into the United States. Effective targeting methods are what we 

need and will have to be expanded and enhanced if we are going 

to win this battle. I know we are going to do it on a bipartisan 

basis. 


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I look forward to hearing from CBP particularly on how it plans 

to address current deficiencies in its interdiction efforts and lessons 

learned and help turn the tide of this incredible public health crisis. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

The witnesses have been introduced and sworn in, so we are 

ready for your opening testimonies. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to five minutes. Your entire 

written testimony and statement will be made part of the record. 

As a reminder, two things: Press the button for your microphone, 

and please pull your microphone up so that we can hear you clearly 

as you are speaking. The clock in front of you will show your time. 

It will turn yellow about 30 seconds, and red, it is time to land the 

plane. So we are again glad to have you. 

And, Mr. Thome, you are recognized for five minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY THOME 

Mr. THOME. Chairman Hice, Ranking Member Connolly, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear 

before you today to discuss the shipment of illicit drugs in the 

international mail, as well as the differences between international 

mail and private express shipments as they relate to abuse of the 

mail by traffickers. 

The Department of State take these matters very seriously. And 

while international mail is only one of the avenues traffickers may 

try to exploit, we are making concerted efforts in cooperation with 

the U.S. Postal Service and U.S. CBP to make reforms to the system of global mail exchange that will improve security and support 

drug interdiction. 

The Department has statutory responsibility for the formulation, 

coordination, and oversight of international postal policy. The Universal Postal Union, or UPU is the principal venue where we discharge this responsibility, working closely with both the Postal 

Service and American express delivery services such as UPS and 

FedEx. 

Like our partners, the Department is aware that the exchange 

of advanced electronic data, or AED, can help mitigate the risk 

posed by traffickers. However, in considering a policy response that 

would best serve all stakeholders, it is important to bear in mind 

the fundamental differences between USPS and private express 

companies. 

First, because of U.S. national treaty obligations as a member of 

the UPU, USPS must receive mail items from 191 foreign postal 

operators. This means it has limited ability to collect AED or otherwise control the mail items it receives until they are tendered to 

it in the United States. Private express companies, in contrast, control collection and delivery of the items they transport, as well as 

the entire logistics chain in between. 

Second, USPS engages in international mail exchange as the designated operator of the United States, meaning it cannot, except in 

very rare cases, refuse mail, and it must guarantee delivery to any 


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address in the United States. Private express companies, on the 

other hand, have no universal service obligation and are free to 

pick and choose their customers, accepting only the mail they judge 

to be reliable. 

Third, there is a wide discrepancy between the ability to collect 

AED. Express carriers can unilaterally impose data collection requirements on their overseas customers whereas USPS cannot and 

must instead convince 191 postal services of the benefit and the security that providing AED will offer. 

While these differences pose challenges, the good news is that 

postal services worldwide are now eager and determined to collect 

and exchange AED. Postal operators see that delays caused by customs processing are a major impediment to their ability to grow 

their business. They know they need to interface more swiftly with 

mailers and transport companies, and their customers increasingly 

demand the ability to track packages in real time and to easily exchange merchandise. Use of AED is the only solution to these business challenges. 

The UPU has become a partner to the United States in championing the increased use of AED both for business and security 

reasons. In 2012, the U.S. successfully secured amendments to the 

UPU convention that committed each member to a security strategy that includes complying with requirements for AED. Indeed, 

the UPUs recently adopted business plan calls for all postal services worldwide to have the capability to exchange data in place by 

the end of 2020. And we anticipate that the UPU will give final approval for an advanced electronic data messaging standard this October. 

As significant as these achievements are, there are still obstacles 

to overcome. The main impediment to widespread exchange of AED 

is the very limited ability of most countries’ postal services to collect and transmit it. Many post offices in the developing world do 

not have internet or even reliable sources of electricity. This makes 

collection and transmission of data for postal items extremely difficult. Even in developed countries, most postal services do not yet 

have the needed infrastructure for item-level data exchange. Indeed, few if any countries now have the capacity to provide it for 

100 percent of their mail requiring customs declaration. 

Nevertheless, the tide has turned. Postal services around the 

world understand the need to incorporate AED into the fabric of 

global mail exchange not just because the U.S. and other countries 

are beginning to require it but because it is essential to their business models. This is why USPS is successfully expanding its network of pilot projects, and this is why we are witnessing a rapid 

increase in the flow of AED for premium products worldwide. 

In closing, we are confident that the number of countries able to 

provide AED and the proportion of their mail streams that it covers 

will continue to grow. I want to assure the subcommittee that the 

State Department will spare no effort in working to further accelerate this process. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Thome follows:] 


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Testimony ofiO/STA Director Gregory Thome 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 

Hearing of September 7, 2017 

Chairman Meadows, Ranking member Connolly, members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the shipment of illicit drugs in the 

international mail and the differences between international mail and private express shipments 

that relate to abuse ofthe mail by drug traffickers. Because of the rapid increase in highly potent 

synthetic opioids entering the country, the Department of State takes this matter very seriously. 

While recognizing that international mail is only one of the avenues that drug traffickers may try 

to utilize, we are concerned that the growing volume of e-commerce-linked shipments represents 

vulnerability, even if we do not understand the full magnitude of the threat. Accordingly, State 

is making concerted efforts, in cooperation with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to make reforms to the system of global mail exchange 

that will improve the security of the mail stream and support interdiction efforts. 

The Department of State has statutory responsibility for the formulation, coordination, 

and oversight of foreign policy related to international postal services and other international 

delivery services. In considering the policy response to the risk posed by abuse of the 

international mail, the differences between these two types of services are significant. In this 

regard, the fundamental difference between USPS and private express companies is the nature of 

the enterprise they are engaged in. 

USPS dispatches and receives mail items from 191 foreign postal operators and has 

limited ability to control the international mail items it receives until they are tendered to it in the 

United States. Private express companies, in contrast, control collection and delivery of the 

items they transport, as well as the entire logistics chain in between. This difference gives 

express carriers clear accountability for the items they bring into the country. A second, related 

difference is that USPS engages in international mail exchange as the designated operator of the 

United States, discharging our national treaty obligations as a member of the Universal Postal 

Union (UPU). Private express companies' shipment of items to the United States, on the other 

hand, is founded only on their own business decisions. One implication of this difference is that, 

unlike USPS and other designated postal operators, express companies have no universal service 

obligation and are free to pick their customers, accepting only those they judge reliable. A third 

difference, which flows from the first two, is the wide discrepancy in the availability of advance 

electronic data for international mail relative to private express shipments. Since this data assists 

CBP in its targeting of items for inspection, this discrepancy is often cited as a vulnerability of 

international mail. In other words, as regards the collection of electronic data, express carriers 

can unilaterally impose data collection requirements on their overseas customers, whereas USPS 

cannot and must work in partnership with 191 different postal services to convince them of the 

benefits and security that providing electronic data will offer to all. 

The UPU is the principal international venue where the Department discharges its 

responsibilities related to postal affairs. For this reason, I will limit my remarks to efforts 

underway within that body to expand the exchange of advance electronic data. 
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The UPU is an intergovernmental organization with a membership that comprises nearly 

all of the world's countries. It is the first multilateral body the United States joined and the 

conference that led to its establishment was an initiative of the Lincoln Administration. The 

UPU's mission entails guaranteeing the free circulation of postal items over "a single postal 

territory composed of interconnected networks." The UPU is essentially a compact between the 

world's nations that their postal services will deliver one another's mail according to common 

rules and on the basis of reciprocity. 

UPU member countries gather periodically in World Postal Congresses to update and 

renew the UPU's Constitution, General Regulations and Convention and to make other 

decisions, such as the election of members of its interim bodies, including the Postal Operations 

Council (POC). The United States has been a member of the POC since its establishment and 

currently chairs one of its main committees, the Committee on Supply Chain Integration, which 

has responsibility for customs, security, transportation and standards. The United States also 

chairs the Standing Group on Postal Security, which is led by Chief Inspector Cottrell. These 

key roles position us very well to lead efforts to accelerate the exchange of advance electronic 

data in the current Congress cycle. 

The UPU Congress, and the forty-member POC, write and adopt the Acts of the Union, 

which are the rules of the road for international mail exchange. U.S. delegations to UPU 

meetings have worked for many years to incorporate advance electronic data into the Acts and to 

increase the willingness and ability of foreign postal operators to provide it. Although we 

continue to urge a more rapid implementation, we have had significant achievements, the pace 

has accelerated, and our efforts are bearing fruit. 

At the 25'h Postal Congress in Doha, Qatar, in 2012, the United States was successful in 

securing amendments to Article 9 of the UPU Convention that committed each member state to 

adopt and implement a security strategy that " .. .include[ s] the principle of complying with 

requirements for providing electronic advance data on postal items adopted by the Council of 

Administration and Postal Operations Council, in accordance with UPU technical messaging 

standards." Developing the implementing measures for this commitment has been and remains 

a top priority for U.S. delegations at the UPU, and we have nearly achieved that goal. 

With active participation and technical input by the United States, the UPU cooperated with the 

World Customs Organization to develop an electronic system to allow for the capture, 

transmission, and receipt of advance electronic data. 

In February of 2016, after several years of discussions, the POC adopted regulations 

implementing the advance electronic data provision of the 2012 Article 9 Convention 

amendment and a Roadmap for their implementation. The United States now leads the steering 

committee that coordinates the work required to reach the Roadmap's milestones, which include 

final adoption of the technical messaging standard for item-level data a goal we expect to 

achieve at the next POC meeting this October. 

As significant as these achievements are, there are still obstacles to overcome. The main 

impediment to widespread exchange of advanced electronic data is the very limited ability of 
9 


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most countries' postal services to collect and transmit it. The recently adopted 2017-2020 UPU 

Business Plan, which the U.S. championed, calls for all postal services to have the capability to 

exchange item-level data by the end of2020. 

The technical ability to exchange this data does not, however, translate directly into the 

ability to collect and enter it. Many post offices in rural areas of the developing world do not 

have Internet connectivity or even reliable sources of electricity, which makes collection and 

transmission of data for postal items extremely difficult. Even in developed countries, most 

postal services have been slow to invest in the required infrastructure for item-level electronic 

data exchange-- and few, if any, countries now have the ability to provide it for 100% of their 

mail requiring customs declarations. 

The U.S. supports UPU-provided capacity building activities, while also advocating for 

more liberal policies for the use ofUPU Quality of Service Fund (QSF) resources to expand 

funding options available to developing countries for the needed investments. Measures adopted 

at the most recent Postal Congress, held in Istanbul last fall, will significantly expand the pool of 

QSF resources by adding China and other middle income countries to the category of payers and 

by creating a Common Fund to support postal modernization in the least developed countries. In 

addition, the UPU is devoting approximately half of its cooperation budget over this Congress 

cycle to a project designed to position postal services in developing countries to realize the 

benefits of e-commerce-driven growth in postal volumes. A major focus of this program is 

advance electronic data. 

China will not be eligible for new QSF funds after December. It could, however, potentially 

participate in future QSF Common Fund activities or apply to have part of its very substantial unused 

QSF balance allocated for an AED-related projects. India, which is emerging as a source country for 

synthetic opioids, remains eligible for new QSF direct funding, which it could use for AED-Iinked 

investments and is likely to benefit from both QSF Common Fund and UPU Development Cooperation 

projects. 

These efforts are greatly aided by the fact that rapid acceleration of investment in, and 

use of, electronic data for customs and security will primarily be driven by the business needs of 

postal operators themselves. Increasingly, postal operators see that delays caused by customs 

processing are a major impediment to growth in the use of the international mail fore-commerce 

transactions. Exchange of advance electronic data is the only solution to this problem and to 

others ranging from the return of merchandise subject to duty to interface with mailers and 

transportation companies. 

Another significant development with implications for advance electronic data is the 

momentous decision of the 26'h World Postal Congress, in Istanbul in 2016 to launch the 

Integrated Product Plan (IPP), which aims to modernize the UPU's product offerings with an eye 

toward e-commercc and the changing needs of customers and supply chain partners, including 

customs authorities. This far-reaching effort has clear benefits for the customs processing of 

mail. Phase I, which will commence in January of2018, will introduce a new division of mail 

products into items containing documents and those containing goods. This split will facilitate 

compliance with customs requirements, in particular provision of advance electronic data, since 
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Phase 1 also entails a requirement for mail items containing goods to have a UPU standard bar 

code label, which is a critical enabling condition. 

Furthermore, the regulations approved by the POC in February of last year will allow 

members to impose requirements for advance electronic data for items containing goods, 

provided these requirements take into account the capabilities of the network and the countries 

on which they apply. The thinking behind this limitation in the regulations is that demanding the 

impossible as a condition for receiving another country's mail is the same as refusing to deliver it 

at all. Such requirements would undermine the reciprocity that is at the heart of the UPU. Since 

there are, however, countries that are able to provide advance data for significant portions of 

their postal volume, the Acts will soon accommodate requirements that they provide it, so long 

as these requirements are tailored to the capacity of individual sending countries in order not to 

disrupt the flow of international mail. 

Postal services around the world understand the need to incorporate advance electronic 

data into the fabric of global mail exchange, not only because the United States and other 

countries will begin to require it but because it is essential to the evolution of the post. This 

realization accounts, in part, for USPS's expanding network of pilot projects and its success in 

increasing the flow of advance electronic data for premium products. It also accounts for the 

emphasis placed on facilitating advance data exchange within the UPU's activities. 

Consequently, as work on the UPU Roadmap for advance electronic data progresses and IPP 

implementation proceeds, the number of countries able to provide data and the proportion of 

their mail stream that it covers will continue to grow. I assure the Subcommittee that the 

Department of State will spare no effort in working to accelerate this process. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. !look forward to answering your questions and those of other 

members of the Subcommittee. 
11 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cottrell, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GUY COTTRELL 

Mr. COTTRELL. Good afternoon, Chairman Hice, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

calling this hearing on drug trafficking and security standards used 

by the U.S. Postal Service and private carriers. My name is Guy 

Cottrell. I’m the chief postal inspector for the United States Postal 

Inspection Service. In this role, I oversee the law enforcement arm 

of the Postal Service. Our mission is to support and protect the 

Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers. 

As one of America’s oldest Federal law enforcement organizations, the more than 2,700 men and women of the Postal Inspection 

Service enforce the laws that defend the Nation’s mail system from 

illegal or dangerous use and ensure public trust in the mail. To 

that end, the investigation of contraband in international mail is 

among the highest priorities of the Inspection Service, and we play 

an active role in the national effort to address the problem of 

fentanyl and synthetic opioid distribution. We work closely with 

Federal and local law enforcement partners on criminal investigations, information-sharing, and we used data analysis to target inbound international mail. 

We have continually evolved our methods, expanded resources, 

and strengthened strategic law enforcement partnerships. As a result, we have seen significant improvements in our ability to seize 

fentanyl and synthetic opioids from the mail. From fiscal year 2016 

through August of fiscal year 2017, we have achieved a 3–1/2-fold 

increase in international parcel seizures and an eight-fold increase 

in domestic parcel seizures related to synthetic opioids. 

As we continue to utilize and develop our available resources to 

identify illicit drugs located in the United States and take appropriate action, we will continue to enhance investigative techniques 

and data analytics to better forecast and target incoming parcels 

in order to seize fentanyl and synthetic opioids sent through the 

mail. 

Mr. Chairman, the Postal Service, in collaboration with the State 

Department and Customs and Border Protection, plays a leadership role in advocating for the global collection and exchange of advanced electronic data, or AED, on international mail. Through negotiation and advocacy and by targeting those countries of interest 

identified by customs which are known to be sources of illicit 

opioids, inbound AED has grown rapidly in the past few years. 

Most international mail currently arrives in the United States at 

one of five international service centers. The Inspection Service’s 

investigative authority begins once inbound mail is released from 

the first point of entry by our customs counterparts. While AED is 

used to strengthen our investigations and identify trends, operation 

methodologies, and potential suspects, we consider AED only one 

part of a multilayered approach the Inspection Service takes regarding contraband interdiction. 

To be successful in thwarting the international drug trade, cooperation and teamwork between law enforcement agencies is critical. Information-sharing is an invaluable asset at the importation 


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and street level and everywhere in between. Utilizing technology, 

maximizing the effectiveness of operational processes, and infusing 

this information with real-time intelligence is critical to the efforts 

of combating fentanyl and synthetic opioid distribution. 

For those items for which AED is furnished, customs has an enhanced ability to target items for inspection. The Postal Service 

currently receives data on a substantial amount of inbound shipments, including those originating in China. The percentage of inbound items with AED is expected to continue to grow, especially 

as we expand partnerships with commercial providers and as more 

countries develop their capacities. 

Mr. Chairman, the Postal Inspection Service, working with our 

law enforcement partners and Postal Service management, is committed to preventing illicit items from entering the Nation alongside legitimate commerce and communication. We stand alongside 

those agencies that share our mission to combat illegal drugs and 

contraband. We additionally concur with the recommendations of 

the Government Accountability Office to further assess the value of 

AED in support of national investigation and interdiction efforts. 

The Postal Service and the Postal Inspection Service will continue to take all practicable measures to ensure the security of our 

nation’s mail and provide the American public the best, most efficient service possible. 

Again, I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Cottrell follows:] 


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Statement of Guy Cottrell 

Chief Postal Inspector 

United States Postal Inspection Service 

Before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of 

The Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

United States House of Representatives 

September 7, 2017 

Good morning, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you, Chairman Meadows, for calling this hearing on drug 

trafficking and security standards used by the U.S. Postal Service and private carriers. 

My name is Guy Cottrell, and I serve as the Chief Postal Inspector for the United States 

Postal Inspection Service (Inspection Service). In this role, I oversee the law 

enforcement arm of the Postal Service whose mission it is to support and protect the 

Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers. As one of America's 

oldest federal law enforcement organizations, we enforce the laws that defend the 

nation's mail system from illegal or dangerous use, and ensure public trust in the mail. 

To that end, we play an active role in the effort to address the problem of fentanyl and 

synthetic opioid distribution. I appreciate your interest in understanding the Inspection 

Service's role and exploring ways to ensure and strengthen our nation's mail security. 

Responding to the Opioid Crisis 

In plain terms, the role of the Inspection Service is to investigate mail-related crimes. 

When investigating contraband in international mail, we utilize a multi-layered approach. 

This approach, which I describe later in this testimony, combines our capabilities with 

the expertise of our law enforcement partners. 1 In addition, we use data analysis and 

information sharing to target inbound international mail that arrives in the United States 

at one of five International Service Centers (ISCs). 2 

Congress has given U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) the responsibility and 

authority to search items at the first point of entry into the United States, including the 

authority at these locations to open and inspect all inbound items without a warrant to 

identify prohibited items. The Inspection Service's investigative authority usually begins 

1 CBP, Drug Enforcement Agency, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Area, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and local agencies. 2 The Postal Service operates five JSCs that send and receive international mail shipments. These include 

facilities in New York NY, Miami FL, Chicago IL, San Francisco CA, and Los Angeles CA. There are four 

additional international mail receiving offices of exchange in New Jersey, Honolulu, San Juan, and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands. 
14 


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once inbound international mail is released from the first point of entry by our CBP 

counterparts. If the Inspection Service suspects that an item contains contraband, 

postal inspectors generally need to present probable cause to a federal judge and 

secure a federal search warrant before opening any incoming international mail piece 

that is within a class sealed against inspection. 

Detecting the importation of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids in the U.S. Mail is a key 

priority for the Inspection Service. We are continuously refining our law enforcement 

operations, target focus, and personnel resources to maximize our capabilities. 

Currently, the Inspection Service is focusing on several different investigative 

approaches: 

• We review past and current Inspection Service and CBP seizure data to improve our 

investigative efforts and develop leads. We have launched a Cyber and Analytics 

Unit to enhance investigative techniques and analytics to better forecast and target 

international parcels. 

• We have full-time personnel at the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) 

International Organized Crime Center (IOC-2), the Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, and the CBP National Targeting 

Center (NTC). Being embedded in these locations allows the Inspection Service to 

share intelligence, coordinate cases and conduct joint enforcement operations 

domestically and internationally. 

• The Inspection Service also partners with High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

(HIDTA) Task Forces, OCDETF, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) to coordinate investigative information and real-time intelligence. These 

relationships strengthen cohesive communication and data sharing partnerships that 

enable the identification of criminal networks, which would not be possible without 

interagency cooperation. 

• We currently participate in the ONDCP Federal Law Enforcement Secure 

Conference Group, the Interagency Implementation Group, and the DEA's 

Heroin/Fentanyl Task Force to stay abreast of the latest trends in criminal activity 

and transnational threats. 

• We continue to work with Postal Service management to enhance operational 

processes and equipment that utilizes advanced technologies. This includes 

transitioning from manually sorting parcels to automated operations at the ISCs. We 

are investing in an opiate antidote to enhance employee safety and researching 

some of the latest investigative technologies such as handheld narcotics analyzers. 

Moving forward, we will continue to review new technology and deploy it as 

warranted. 

As a result of these efforts and partnerships, some of our successes include: 

2 
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• In March of this year, information was received regarding 300 inbound parcels of 

interest. Combining the efforts of the Inspection Service, Homeland Security 

Investigations (HSI), and DEA, numerous leads were sent to destination field 

divisions. CBP was able to intercept 133 of the mailings at ISCs. Postal 

inspectors were able to intercept 145 parcels. Of these parcels, all contained a 

synthetic opioid, or a controlled or unknown substance. The Inspection Service, 

HSI Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department conducted 

additional follow-up in a related 4-day operation and intercepted an additional 

135 parcels, 130 of which contained contraband, with 67 of those destined for the 

United States. This is an on-going international investigation. 

• Recent investigations include multiple arrests: a fentanyl redistributor in Portland, 

OR; an individual receiving fentanyl patches and other narcotics in Montgomery, 

AL; and a Damascus, MD, distributor linked to an international fentanyl supplier. 

• We currently have at least 100 open cases nationwide with at least 25 of those 

believed to have a dark-web or international online vendor nexus. These include 

a fentanyl distributor linked to over 3,000 transactions; an investigation that has 

revealed a large-scale pill press operation that netted the operator at least $1.2 

million; and a case involving several thousand mailings of what is believed to be 

U-47700, a synthetic opioid. This last case located a clandestine drug 

manufacturing and milling operation as a result of the analysis of intelligence 

from multiple agencies. 

As the importation of synthetic opioids has evolved, we continue to enhance our 

investigative methods, deploy additional resources as needed, and strengthen strategic 

partnerships. Consequently, we have seen significant improvements in our ability to 

seize fentanyl and synthetic opioids from the U.S. Mail. From fiscal year (FY) 2016 

through August of FY2017, we have achieved a greater than 300 percent increase in 

international parcel seizures and a greater than 800 percent increase in domestic parcel 

seizures related to synthetic opioids. 

As we continue to utilize and develop our available resources to identify illicit drugs 

located in the United States and take appropriate action, we will continue to enhance 

investigative techniques and analytics to better forecast and target incoming parcels in 

order to seize fentanyl and synthetic opioids sent through the U.S. Mail. 

Status of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

MOUs are a vital tool for interagency cooperation. An MOU between the Postal Service 

and CBP, which defines the participants' roles and responsibilities in relation to their 

mutual cooperation, was completed on September 1, 2017. It solidifies the interagency 

partnership between CBP, the Postal Service and the Inspection Service at aiiiSCs. 

3 
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Growing Advance Electronic Data CAED) 

The Growth of AED 

AED includes the sender's full name and address (including full business name), the 

recipient's full name and address, the stated content description, unit of measure and 

quantity, weight, value, and date of mailing. Since the enactment of the Trade Act of 

2002, the United States and a number of other industrialized countries have improved 

technical capabilities to provide AED. Today, the Postal Service collects AED for more 

than 90 percent of its outbound international mail and in July- the most recent month 

for which we have finalized results- AED was received for 40.2 percent of inbound 

mail. 3 To put this in perspective, comparing data from FY 2015 to the present, AED for 

inbound international mail has increased from approximately one percent to its present 

percentage. 

The increase in the percentage of inbound items with AED is expected to continue to 

grow, especially as we increase our partnership with commercial providers and more 

countries develop their capacities to provide this data. 

While the Postal Service has been a leading proponent of AED, it is faced with certain 

constraints. As the designated postal operator of the United States, the Postal Service 

is obligated to accept and deliver letter and parcel post from nearly every country in the 

world. However, the Postal Service cannot set the postage prices paid by foreign 

shippers, and also cannot unilaterally set the rates for letter post and parcels (except 

certain expedited items) paid by foreign postal operators for delivery within the United 

States. Further, the Postal Service does not control the induction of foreign mail 

destined for the United States, so it cannot control the collection and transmission of 

AED abroad. 

Bilateral and Multilateral AED-Sharing Agreements 

The Postal Service has prioritized obtaining AED from the largest volume foreign postal 

operators (FPOs), which collectively account for over 90 percent of all inbound volumes. 

Earlier this year, Postal Service management adopted a policy of requiring AED to 

accompany any package flows for which rates are established under bilaterally 

negotiated arrangements with FPOs (that is, agreements establishing inbound 

international mail rates for which there is a single counterparty). In accord with 

implementation of this policy, the Postal Service has entered into bilateral agreements 

with AED requirements for package flows covered by the agreements with the FPOs of 

Australia, China, Hong Kong, and Korea. The Postal Service will continue its efforts to 

negotiate AED requirements in other bilateral agreements, including a bilateral with 

Canada Post that is scheduled to expire at the end of calendar year 2017. 

The Postal Service continues to lead the initiative for the exchange of AED through 

3 Volumes measured exclude letter- and flat-shaped letter post items and military mail. 

4 
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multilateral agreements and strategic alliances. The Kahala Posts Group (KPG) is an 

organization composed of several large volume postal operators. Through that 

organization, the Postal Service has shared AED best practices, assisted in the 

development of a Data Sharing Agreement (DSA), and encouraged members to commit 

to the collection of AED and set performance standards for themselves. As a result, 

KPG continues to prioritize AED efforts. Each of the eleven members submitted AED 

targets and timelines to support those goals. The Postal Service continues to engage 

members to track progress on those project plans as well as monitor their performance. 

Data sharing agreements have also been executed with many other countries, as Postal 

Service management strives to make AED exchanges the norm in cross-border postal 

exchanges. 

Partnerships with Commercial Providers of Inbound International Shipments 

The Postal Service accelerates AED collection through its Global Direct Entry (GDE) 

Wholesaler Program. Private sector companies that participate in GDE are required to 

provide inbound international shipments and parcels with AED to CBP using the 

commercial customs clearance process. Once cleared by CBP, companies enter the 

shipments and parcels as domestic mail into the Postal Service network. Prospective 

GDE wholesalers must meet certain criteria and receive approval from the Postal 

Service before participating in the program. 

Actions Through the Universal Postal Union 

Further, the Postal Service works closely with the United States Department of State, 

which has lead responsibility for representing the United States Government in the 

Universal Postal Union (UPU), the 192-member international organization charged with 

facilitating the exchange of mail among member countries through treaty agreements. 

At the UPU, United States initiatives have included advocating in favor of proposals for 

AED requirements with supporting features like mandatory barcodes, and have 

contributed to the UPU membership's increase in adoption and implementation of AED 

messaging and security standards. 

As Chief Postal Inspector, I serve as Chairman of the Postal Security Group (PSG), 

within the UPU located in Berne, Switzerland. Chief Postal Inspectors have chaired this 

group since 1997. The PSG has provided training, support materials and assistance to 

posts during the last 20 years. After the Yemen incident in October 2010, the PSG 

spearheaded the development of improved security standards for the world's posts, 

known as S58 - General Security Measures and S59 - Office of Exchange and 

International Airmail Security. The Inspection Service serves as a consultant to the 

PSG for training that directly supports the aforementioned security standards. Security 

standards S58 and S59 are meant to standardize dedicated security guidelines around 

the world. They establish a security assessment and evaluation process that recognizes 

successful compliance. 

The PSG will also continue to compile information and disseminate best practices 

among its member countries in its efforts to improve security in postal networks. 

5 
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UsingAED 

International Mail Processing 

In the current process, inbound international mail from foreign postal operators arrives 

at one of our ISCs. After an initial bulk screening by CBP, inbound international items 

are unloaded and individual mail bags and receptacles receive a receipt scan by the 

Postal Service. At this point, items requested by CBP are presented to CBP for further 

inspection. 

For those items for which AED are furnished, CBP has an enhanced ability to target 

items for inspection. Once CBP has completed its inspection and assessed any 

applicable duties and taxes, those items that are cleared are released to the Postal 

Service for processing and delivery. 

ISC Pilot Programs 

As briefly mentioned earlier, the Postal Service and the Inspection Service are 

continuing to coordinate with CBP to enhance our current operational processes and 

equipment at our ISCs. The Postal Service began a pilot program in mid-2015 at the 

New York ISC to use inbound AED to facilitate more advanced targeting by CBP. The 

Postal Service provides AED to CBP that can be used to review and target specific mail 

pieces prior to arrival at the ISC. CBP identifies the individual target items, and the 

Postal Service locates the target items within the inbound receptacles based on AED. 

Once located, the Postal Service presents the targeted items to CBP for inspection. 

With the lessons learned from the original pilot, the Postal Service and CBP expanded 

the program to two other ISCs over the past three months. The Postal Service is 

actively working with CBP to expand this approach to the remaining two ISCs in the 

near future. Over the last six months, the Inspection Service and CBP have more than 

tripled the number of holds placed on a daily basis, as well as expanded both the 

countries and types of packages available for targeting, as sorting has advanced from 

manual to automated. As the Postal Service continues to advance mail sorting 

technology, these successes will grow. 

The increase in the percentage of inbound items with AED is also expected to continue 

to grow, especially as more countries develop their capacities to generate AED with 

outbound dispatches. It should be emphasized that the Postal Service currently 

receives data on a substantial amount of inbound shipments, including those originating 

in China, which is a source of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids. 

The GAO recently completed a report on International Mail Security. The Postal 

Service agrees with the recommendation that CBP, in coordination with the Postal 

Service, (1) establish measurable performance goals to assess pilot programs, and (2) 

evaluate the costs and benefits of using AED to target mail for inspection in comparison 

with other targeting methods. This will be important to determine before spending 

6 
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significant resources. 

The Postal Service and CBP meet weekly to review the status of the pilot program. The 

workgroup has already begun working through the methodology for determining 

performance goals for the pilot programs, comparing data on holds placed and ensuring 

information is shared among the stakeholders. The Postal Service is prepared to 

support CBP in the evaluation of costs and benefits of AED as needed. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the Inspection Service understands and appreciates the concerns about 

illegal drugs and contraband entering the United States through various delivery 

networks, including the maiL 

While AED is used to strengthen our investigations and further identify trends, 

operational methodologies and potential suspects, it is only part of the multi-layered 

approach the Inspection Service uses for contraband interdiction. The Inspection 

Service relies heavily on the principle that every law enforcement agency brings value 

and potentially vital information to help identify major drug traffickers. Information can 

originate from the local level with an arrest, a tip from an informant, or interdiction 

initiatives that lead to a seizure. For continued success in thwarting the international 

drug trade, cooperation and teamwork between law enforcement agencies has proven 

critical. Information sharing is an invaluable asset at the importation and street level, 

and everywhere in between. Leveraging technology, maximizing the effectiveness of 

automation, and utilizing intelligence is critical to the efforts of combatting fentanyl and 

synthetic opioid distribution. 

Throughout our 242-year history, the Inspection Service and the Postal Service have 

been and will continue to be committed to taking all practicable measures to ensure the 

security of our nation's mail, and to provide the American public the best, most efficient 

service possible. Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

### 

7 
20 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Owen, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TODD C. OWEN 

Mr. OWEN. Good afternoon. Vice Chairman Hice, Ranking Member Connolly, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the role of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection in combating the flow of dangerous 

illicit drugs into the United States specifically through international mail and express courier facilities. 

Before I provide my formal comments on the topic of today’s 

hearing, I would first like to publicly recognize the men and women 

of U.S. Customs and Border Protection who responded to the Houston area in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts. Over 600 CBP air and marine interdiction 

agents, Border Patrol agents, and Customs and Border Protection 

officers with 50 vessels and 25 aircraft responded under very dangerous and very challenging conditions and rescued 1,362 people. 

And as Hurricane Irma takes aim at the U.S. mainland, CBP 

stands ready again to provide assistance and any necessary rescue 

and recovery efforts. 

As the unified border security agency of the United States, CBP 

plays a critical role in our nation’s efforts to keep dangerous drugs 

from entering our communities. CBP’s Office of Field Operations 

interdicts drugs and other dangerous items at our ports of entry, 

including multiple mail and express courier facilities, by leveraging 

advanced data, automated targeting, and intelligence-driven strategies, and using various types of detection technology as part of our 

multilayered risk-based approach to enhance the security of our 

borders. 

In fiscal year 2016, across the Nation, CBP seized more than 3.3 

million pounds of narcotics. While most smuggling attempts occur 

at the Southwest border ports of entry, smuggling in the mail and 

express courier environments is a growing threat, especially the 

smuggling of illicit synthetic drugs such as fentanyl. Each day, over 

1 million packages arrive into our international mail and express 

courier facilities. With the explosion of e-commerce, these volumes 

continue to grow. 

Upon arrival, every package is screened through radiation detection equipment for the presence of radioactive materials. And 

thanks to the support of Congress, CBP has made significant investments and improvements in our targeting, detection, and identification capabilities. These resources, along with enhanced information-sharing agreements, and law enforcement partnerships 

such as the one we have with the U.S. Postal Service are critical 

components in CBP’s ability to detect and deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in international mail and express courier environments. 

Specific to the threat posed by fentanyl and other synthetic 

opioids, so far this fiscal year in the mail and express courier environments, CBP has made 242 seizures of fentanyl, totaling almost 

300 pounds. In contrast, in the land environment, CBP has made 

46 seizures totaling approximately 494 pounds. So while we encounter more fentanyl by weight in the land environment, we make 


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more seizures in the mail and express consignment arenas. Furthermore, the average purity of fentanyl in the mail and express 

environment is over 90 percent, whereas the average purity of 

fentanyl seized in the land border environment is approximately 7 

percent. 

Because synthetic opioids represent significant health and safety 

risks to our officers and our narcotics detection canines, CBP has 

deployed throughout our ports of entry a full suite of safety and 

personal protective equipment, as well as naloxone, a potentially 

lifesaving drug used to immediately counteract the effects of unintentional exposure. 

In conclusion, CBP will continue to work with our law enforcement partners, the international community, and our international 

partners to refine and enhance the effectiveness of our targeting, 

detection, and interdiction measures at all ports of entry, including 

international mail and express courier facilities. 

Vice Chairman Hice, Ranking Member Connolly, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:] 


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TESTIMONY OF 

TODD C. OWEN 

Executive Assistant Commissioner 

Office of Field Operations 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Department of Homeland Security 

For a Hearing 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Operations 

ON 

"Examining the Shipment of Illicit Drugs in International Mail'' 

September 7, 2017 

Washington, D.C. 
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Introduction 

Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) in combating the flow of dangerous illicit drugs into the United 

States, specifically through international mail and express consignment carrier (ECC) shipments. 

As America's unified border agency, CBP plays a critical role in the Nation's efforts to keep 

dangerous drugs from harming the American public. CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) 

interdicts drugs at our ports of entry (POEs) and multiple mail and ECC facilities, leveraging 

targeting and intelligence-driven strategies, and working with our partners to combat Drug 

Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) as part of our multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the 

security of our borders. This layered approach reduces our reliance on any single point or 

program and extends our zone of security outward ensuring our physical border is not the first or 

last line of defense, but one of many. 

Illicit Drug Trends, Interdictions, and Challenges 

While most illicit drug smuggling attempts occur at Southwest land POEs, the smuggling of illicit 

synthetic drugs in the mail and ECC environment is a growing threat that we need to work to 

address. Several different types of illicit synthetic drugs, also called "designer drugs'', are 

currently being sold and shipped to end-users in the United States, including synthetic opioids 

such as fentanyl, 1 synthetic cannabinoids, 2 and synthetic cathinones. 3 CBP seizures of fentanyl, 

the most frequently seized synthetic opioid, 4 remain relatively small compared to other opioids 

such as heroin, 5 but have significantly increased over the past three years, from approximately two 

pounds seized in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 to approximately 544 pounds seized in FY 2016. 6 

lllicit synthetic drugs are often purchased from foreign sellers through online transactions. The 

drugs are then shipped to the United States and delivered to domestic purchasers- DTOs and 

individuals primarily via U.S. mail or ECC. DTOs and individual purchasers move synthetic 

drugs such as fentanyl in small quantities, making detection and targeting a significant challenge. 

1 Along the Southwest border, the practice of mixing synthetic opioids into heroin makes it more challenging for CBP 

to accurately quantify how much synthetic opioid is seized at the border. 2 Synthetic cannabinoids are drugs that do not contain marijuana but are phtmrlaCtJlo:gic:ally 

tetrahvdrocannabinol. (bJ!l!ls;:!!:i!~Sf':lf.Jiilll..!.m!lli'~:ill.lilll\;;;if>26lli!llii!0_llf!Uilln) 3 Synthetic eathinones. more 

4 stimulant f(mnd in the khat ":~r~;,~;(~~~~,;~~~:;;~~f,j~~,~~~~~~:;~~~~f~;i~~;;~~'~;2,;7;~~; '!~:;'jts) While fentanyl is the most fr types 

analogues, including acetylfentanyl, para-fluorobutyrylfentanyl. 

pentanoylfentanyl. alpha-methyl para-fluorofentanyl. carfentanil. 

!uranyl fentanyl. and most recent!) aery I fentanyl. mcthoxyacetylfentanyl. Also. CBP's 

Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate has presumptively identified n-hexanoyl fentanyl and 

benzoyl fentanyl. and are working diligently to confirm these new substances. 5 1n FY 2016, CBP officers and agents seized or disrupted more than 3.3 million pounds of narcotics across the 

country. including approximately 46,000 pounds of methamphetamine, approximately 200,000 pounds of cocaine. 

and approximately 4,800 pounds of heroin. https://vmw.cbp.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/assets/documcnts/2016-Dcc/CBPfy20 16-bordcr-sccurity-repot1.pdf. 6 This includes approximately 440 pounds seized at POEs (including mail and ECC facilities) and 104 pounds seized 

at U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints. 

Page I of7 
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Follow-on investigations, which are conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI), are also challenging because these shippers often 

are not the hierarchically structured DTOs we usually encounter. 

In FY 2017 to date, 7 CBP has made 90 seizures of fentanyl totaling approximately 217 lbs. in the 

ECC environment and 152 seizures totaling approximately 82 lbs. of fentanyl in the international 

mail environment. CBP has also made 46 seizures at land POEs totaling approximately 494 lbs.; 

however, the average purity of fentanyl in the international mail and ECC environments is over 90 

percent, whereas the average purity of fentanyl in the land border environment is only 7 percent. 

Purchasers can also access open source and dark web marketplaces for the tools needed for 

manufacturing synthetic drugs. In the case offentanyl, powdered fentanyl, pill presses, and 

binding agents can be purchased online and then shipped into the United States. 8 ln FY 2014, 24 

pill press/tablet machines were seized by CBP, and the number increased to 51 in FY 2015 and 58 

in FY 2016. 

International Mail and Express Consignment Carrier Operations 

In the ECC environment, shipments are processed at 26 facilities located throughout the United 

States. Prior to arrival of the express parcels, CBP reviews the manifest information transmitted 

by the ECC operators and targets those packages requiring examination. All parcels presented to 

CBP for examination are subjected to Non-Intrusive Inspection (Nil) to include x-ray and gamma 

ray imaging. CBP operates in all 26 facilities nationwide. 

CBP also operates within nine International Mail Facilities (IMF), inspecting international mail 

arriving from more than 180 countries. Upon arrival in the United States, all international mail 

parcels are screened for radiological threats. International mail requested for inspection by CBP is 

then turned over to CBP by the United States Postal Service (USPS). CBP x-rays all international 

mail packages presented by USPS and physically examines those deemed to be high-risk. 

Currently, in the international mail environment, there is limited advance information available. 

The lack of advanced manifest data, which would aid in targeting shipments, as well as the sheer 

volume of mail and potentially hazardous nature of various types of illicit drugs, present 

challenges to CBP's interdiction efforts in the international mail environment. The detection of 

illicit synthetic drugs in particular remains challenging. Illicit drug manufacturers seek to outpace 

the law by continually manufacturing new drug analogues, challenging CBP's targeting and 

detection capabilities. 

Although the processing of inbound international mail is primarily manual, requiring CBP officers 

to sort through large volumes of parcels, CBP officers utilize experience and training to identify 

items that potentially pose a risk to homeland security and public safety while facilitating the 

movement oflegitimatc mail. On April20, 2017, CBP officers working at the IMF in Chicago, 

Illinois, intercepted a package from China destined for Lafayette, Indiana, that was not manifested 

and had no declared value. CBP officers selected the package for further examination due to prior 

7 As of August 27,2017. 8 U.S. law enforcement suspects that there are also some clandestine fentanyl production labs in Mexico that likely 

obtain precursor chemicals from China. 

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seizures utilizing similar packaging. A physical examination of the package revealed 2.27 pounds 

of a fentanyl analogue. CBP has also worked in coordination with local police departments, as in 

the case of a man arrested in Rohnert Park, California, in late 2016 for collecting a package 

shipped internationally through the mail containing $30,000 worth ofMDMA also called Ecstasy 

or Molly. 9 

CBP Resources and Capabilities to Target, Detect, and Interdict Illicit Drugs 

Thanks to the support of Congress, CBP has made significant investments and improvements in 

our drug detection, identification, and targeting capabilities. These resources, along with 

enhanced information sharing and partnerships, are critical components ofCBP's ability to detect 

and deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in the international mail and ECC environments. 

Advance Information and Targeting 

An important clement ofCBP's layered security strategy is obtaining advance information to help 

identify shipments that are potentially at a higher risk of containing contraband. Under the 

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act or SAFE Port Act of2006, (Pub. L. No. I 09-347), 

CBP has the legal authority to collect key air and maritime cargo data elements provided by air, 

sea, and land commercial transport companies (carriers)- including ECCs and importers. This 

information is automatically fed into CBP's Automated Targeting System, an intranet-based 

enforcement and decision support system that compares cargo and conveyance information against 

intelligence and other enforcement data. 

CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is where advance data and access to law enforcement and 

intelligence records converge to facilitate the targeting of travelers and items of cargo that pose 

the highest risk to our security- in all modes of inbound transportation. The NTC takes in large 

amounts of data and uses sophisticated targeting tools and subject matter expertise to analyze. 

assess, and segment risk at every stage in the cargo/shipment and travel life cycles. As the focal 

point of that strategy, the NTC leverages classified, law enforcement, commercial. and opensource information in unique, proactive ways to identify high-risk travelers and shipments at the 

earliest possible point prior to arrival in the United States. 

Because of the complex tracking systems used by ECCs. when CBP identifies a high-risk 

shipment in the ECC environment, it has the ability to place an electronic hold and to notifY· the 

carrier that a particular parcel needs to be presented to CBP for inspection. The major 

international air shipping carriers have a tracking number system that allows them to pull these 

parcels for inspection when they are scanned into the computer system upon arrival at an air hub. 

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As mentioned above, in the international mail environment, there is limited advance information 

available. USPS receives mail from more than 180 countries, the vast majority of which arrives 

via commercial air or surface transportation. The international mail system is not integrated and 

few foreign postal administrations provide advance manifest data to USPS (which may then be 

passed on to CBP). Hence, within the mail environment, CBP Officers must rely on intelligence 

and physical or x-ray examinations to carry out their enforcement mission. CBP and the USPS 

have been conducting an advance data pilot on express mail and e-packets from select countries, 

and CBP continues to work with the USPS to address the issue of electronic advanced data and, 

through its participation on U.S. delegations to meetings of the Universal Postal Union, is working 

to expand its use globally. 10 

Detection Technology and Canines 

CBP officers utilize Nil, spectroscopic and chemical testing equipment, and detection canines to 

detect and identify illicit drugs at international mail and ECC facilities. Canine operations are an 

invaluable component ofCBP's counternarcotic operations. CBP canine teams work at 

international mail facilities to examine millions of foreign mail shipments coming into the United 

States from all parts of the world. Synthetic opioids present unique challenges to canine teams due 

to the potency of the drug and the associated danger to the health and safety of the canines and 

their handlers. CBP recently assessed the feasibility of safely and effectively adding fentanyl as a 

trained odor to OFO's deployed narcotic detection canine teams. 11 On June 23, 2017, CBP 

successfully completed its first Fentanyl Detection Canine Pilot Course, which added the odor of 

fentanyl and its analogues to six OFO canine handler teams. CBP continues to conduct special 

research to detennine the detection and identification of signature odor profiles for fentanyl 

compounds to aid in our detection capabilities. 

The narcotics seized through the mail and at ECC facilities usually have a very high purity 

compared to seizures along the Southwest border due to the DTO practice of mixing synthetic 

opioids with other substances. 12 Therefore, at lMFs and ECC facilities, CBP officers use Fourier 

10 49 U.S.C. 4490l(a) states: "The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for the screening of 

all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles. 

that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft." Under 49 C.F.R. 1540.5, '"Cargo means property tendered for air 

transportation accounted for on an air waybill. All accompanied commercial courier consignments whether or not 

accounted for on an air waybill, are also classified as cargo. Aircraft operator security programs further define the 

terms 'cargo' and 'non-U.S. Mail':· Under TSA regulations, international mail destined for the United States is 

considered cargo and, as a result, is subject to all existing security controls. These security controls. which include 

screening for unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and other destructive substances or items in accordance with TSA 

regulations and security program requirements, are applied to international mail prior to transporting on aircraft at 

Last Point of Departure locations to the United States. These requirements are not dependent on advance electronic 

manifest data, as provided by ECC operators and other participants in the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot 

program. 

11 CBP offices involved in this assessment include OFO, the Office of Training and Development CBP Canine 

Training Program, the Laboratory and Scientific Services Directorate, and the Office ofChicfCouncil. Labor 

Employee Relations, and Occupational Safety and Health Divisions. 12 Synthetic drugs seized in the mail environment generally contain a purity greater than 90 percent with the exception 

of two drug classes: naturally occurring drugs and certain forms of steroids. In contrast, the purity of seizures along 

the Southwest border, and particularly of synthetic opioids, average about seven percent controlled substance content. 

At limited land POEs, officers use Gemini Raman Spectroscopy and handheld narcotics analyzer equipment and :--ilK 

narcotic field drug test kits that have the ability to make identifications of illicit substances. However, detecting 

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Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FT-IR), Gemini Raman Spectroscopy, 13 handheld narcotics 

analyzers, and NIK narcotic field drug test kits 14 to test suspect substances and obtain a 

presumptive result. When illicit drugs are seized at an IMF or ECC facility, the sample data is then 

transmitted directly to CBP's Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate (LSSD) for 

scientific identification and interpretation. 

CBP also performs illicit synthetic drug detection in the field with LSSD's Field Triage Infrared 

Reach back Program, which utilizes ruggedized FTlR equipment, the data from which is 

transmitted from officers in the field to scientific personnel at LSSD to provide presumptive 

results. When any synthetic opioids are detected by the reachback program, LSSD notifies key 

CBP personnel at the NTC as well as the liaisons with DEA's Special Operations Division, so they 

can generate near real-time intelligence and see if controlled deliveries can be executed. LSSD is 

working to expand the field testing program, along with the scientific assets and personnel who 

are able to provide real-time chemical composition determinations. 15 

In the fourth quarter ofFY 2016, OFO conducted a pilot with the San Diego Field Office and the 

LSSD Los Angeles Laboratory to evaluate new testing methods for the identification of fentanyl. 

The pilot tested four handheld tools along with a new reagent test kit to provide immediate 

presumptive testing for fentanyl. Of the four tested, the Gemini Analyzer proved to be the most 

reliable instrument. The Gemini system combines Raman with FT-IR technology and 

encompasses a software library that evaluates and identifies liquid and chemical explosives. Based 

on the results of the pilot, OFO procured twelve Gemini systems and assigned a Program Manager 

to provide a Fentanyl Safety Brief for the CBP officers across San Diego, Tucson, El Paso, and 

Laredo Field Offices. Currently, OFO is working to procure more than 60 additional handheld 

analyzers, test kits, and the necessary protective equipment to conduct non-contact sampling onsite. The systems will be deployed in the mail and ECC cargo facilities and at POEs on the 

Southwest border. CBP will prioritize procurement and deployment plans of additional devices 

based on the availability of funds and analysis of synthetic drug interdiction rates. 

Technology and canine detection capabilities are critical components ofCBP's security operations 

at mail and ECC cargo facilities. These capabilities arc used in conjunction with advance 

information and targeting capabilities to effectively and efficiently detect and interdict dangerous 

illicit drugs. 

Workforce Protection 

CBP's frontline operations, including drug interdiction activities, are extremely hands-on. The 

potential for contact with dangerous substances especially illicit synthetic opioids- is a very real 

synthetic opioids that are mixed with cutting agents, such as lactose and dipyrone, which are regularly found at 

Southwest LPOEs, remain a challenge for the current technology. 13 Raman spectroscopy is a technique used in chemistry to provide a structural fingerprint by which molecules can be 

identified. 

14 The NlK field presumptive test kits are chemical screening kits used to identify the most commonly encountered 

narcotic and street drugs. 15 LSSD has provided triage on 5,299 submissions during FY 2015, and 8,384 submissions for FY 2016. Since the 

inception of the program, LSSD has triaged 20,158 submissions within a business day and has generated many 

controlled deliveries because of the rapid turnaround. 

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health and safety risk to law enforcement personnel and canines. For example, in its pure powder 

form, fentanyl is approximately 50-100 times more potent in its intensity, speed of action, and 

effect on organs than morphine, and, at first glance, it is often mistaken for other drugs, which 

appear as white powders such as cocaine or heroin. Due to the risk of unintentional exposure and 

subsequent hazardous drug absorption and/or inhalation, the confirmatory testing for the presence 

of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl is best executed in a laboratory by trained scientists and 

technicians. 16 

Explicit instructions, including guidance to canine handlers, have been distributed to the field 

regarding the safe handling of fentanyl. Additionally, in response to increased seizures at LPOEs 

and the upsurge in the use of heroin (which is increasingly cut with fentanyl) across the Nation, in 

October 2015 CBP completed Phase I of a pilot program to train and equip CBP officers with 

naloxone, a potentially life-saving drug for the treatment of opioid exposure. During Phase I, CBP 

officers, at seven participating POEs 17 received training on recognizing the signs and symptoms of 

opioid exposure, administering naloxone, and were certified as CPR instructors. In February 

2016, CBP initiated Phase 2 ofthe Naloxone Initiative Pilot Program, expanding the pilot to an 

additional eight POEs and deploying 602 dual-dose Narcan Nasal Spray® kits to the field. 18 The 

naloxone program has also expanded to LSSD to help protect its scientists both in its main and 

satellite laboratories. CBP was the first Federal law enforcement agency to implement such a 

program. 

Information Sharing and Operational Coordination 

Substantive and timely information sharing is critical to targeting and interdicting shipments 

containing illicit drugs. CBP contributes to the whole-of-government effort to identify and disrupt 

sophisticated routes and networks used by DTOs for the smuggling of illicit drugs by sharing 

critical information on individuals and cargo with investigative and intelligence partner agencies. 

To bolster its targeting mission in the international mail and ECC environments, the NTC 

collaborates with critical partners on a daily basis, including ICE-HSI, the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Food and Drug Administration 

Office of Criminal Investigations (FDA/OCI), other members of the Intelligence Community, and 

the United States Postal Inspection Service (US PIS). CBP is sharing information with these 

agencies and conducting joint enforcement initiatives, including intelligence-driven operations 

designed to identify and disrupt drug smuggling. As of April 2017, the NTC has two permanent 

US PIS employees working in the NTC narcotic targeting units under a recent MOU. Moreover, 

NTC works in close coordination with several pertinent task forces including the Organized Crime 

Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, as well as the 

Department of Homeland Security's Joint Task Force-West and Joint Task Force-Investigations. 

16 Expedited analysis can have a turnaround time of a day or two; the turnaround time for non-expedited samples can 

be up to two months. Routine samples arc treated as non-expedited. Samples that are treated as expedited arc 

samples that are destined for controlled deliveries, have an impending court date, person or persons under arrest or 

detention, or are otherwise deemed a priority. 17 Phase 1 Naloxone Pilot Program POEs include El Paso; Laredo; Fort Lauderdale International Airport; John K. 

Kennedy International Airport; San Luis: San Ysidro; and Seattle/Blaine. 18 Phase 2 Naloxone Pilot Program POEs include Miami Int'l/Miami Seaport; Boston; Buffalo; Detroit; Newark; 

Chicago: Houston Int'l!Houston Seaport; and Dallas. 

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The OFO Tactical Operations Division directs special enforcement operations, in concert with 

ICE-HSI and other law enforcement partners, to identify and disrupt drug smuggling at targeted 

POEs, IMFs, and ECC facilities. These operations involve Nil technology, canine enforcement 

teams, Antiterrorism-Contraband Enforcement Teams, Special Response Teams, and other law 

enforcement partner resources. For example, in January 2017, CBP officers at the John F. 

Kennedy (JFK) International Airport IMF partnered with ICE-HSI, DEA, FDA, U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission to launch "Operation Mail 

Flex." This five-day joint operation targeted and interdicted illicit fentanyl and other opioids 

shipments that posed a health and safety risk to consumers. Operation Mail Flex focused on 

express mail originating in China and Hong Kong. This successful operation resulted in the 

seizure of2.4 kilograms (5.3 I pounds) of fentanyl and 134 other controlled substances. It also 

resulted in the seizure of l ,297 non-compliant imports and provided law enforcement officers with 

the opportunity to conduct eight controlled deliveries to unsuspecting drug smugglers. CBP is 

also conducting other special enforcement operations, including "Operation Crush" at the ECC 

facilities in Cincinnati, Louisville, and Memphis to seize hard narcotics such as fentanyl. 

Additionally, CBP is a key partner in the implementation of the Office of National Drug Control 

Policy's (ONDCP) Heroin Availability Reduction Plan (HARP). CBP also participates in the 

Department of Justice's Nationwide Deconfliction System operated by DEA, conducting 

interagency deconfliction and coordination, and is the second most prolific user among all federal 

agencies. CBP is also working with the Heroin and Fentanyl Working Group at the DEA Special 

Operations Division, alongside ICE-HSl, and at the El Paso Intelligence Center to link drug 

seizures to international and domestic distribution networks. 

Conclusion 

There is no single entity or single solution that can stop the flow of dangerous illicit drugs into the 

United States or keep them from harming the American public. Tackling this complex threat 

involves a united, comprehensive strategy and an aggressive approach by multiple entities across 

all levels of government. With continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our 

partners, will continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness of our detection and 

interdiction capabilities to combat transnational threats and the entry of dangerous illicit drugs into 

the United States. 

CBP will continue to work with our government and private-sector partners to improve the 

efficiency of information sharing and operational coordination to address the challenges and 

threats posed by illicit narcotic smuggling in the international mail environment. CBP, and 

specifically OFO, will also continue to work with USPS and US PIS to improve interdiction in the 

mail environment through improved advanced data, and other security best practices at the 

Nation's IMFs. 

Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testifY today. I look forward to your questions. 

Pagc7of7 
30 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Rectanus, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LORI RECTANUS 

Ms. RECTANUS. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Hice, 

Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the invitation to be here to discuss our report that 

is being released today. That report discussed the efforts that CBP 

and the Postal Service were taking to use electronic advanced data 

to enhance the security of international inbound mail. CBP and the 

Postal Service deserve credit for their efforts in this area, but we 

found they lacked the information to know whether their efforts 

are fully achieving the intended purposes. 

For the last few years at the New York International Service 

Center, CBP and the Postal Service have been testing the effectiveness of targeting items based on electronic advanced data. Through 

these pilots, CBP uses the data to identify about 15 pieces of mail 

each day that the Postal Service is supposed to set aside for inspection. Presenting these mail pieces has proved challenging primarily 

because the volume of mail received, how the items are shipped, 

and in some cases the accuracy of the data provided. 

The ISC receives thousands of large sacks of mail every day, and 

each sack could contain hundreds of pieces of mail. Employees 

must often manually sort through these sacks to find the individual 

items. Such a time- and labor-intensive understandably can miss 

things. Since the pilots began through the end of 2016, the Postal 

Service was able to provide between 58 and 82 percent of the requested items. Recently, the Postal Service has begun testing software and hardware to better locate requested items. 

Whether the pilots are meeting their goals, however, is unknown 

because the agencies have not developed metrics for what success 

looks like and what might be feasible. Such analysis is particularly 

critical given the pilots expansion, which will not only include additional locations but will involve greater volumes of mail and associated resources. 

On a broader scale, there remain unanswered questions about 

whether the benefits of using electronic advanced data for targeting 

outweigh the costs or the challenges associated with getting the 

data. 

Regarding benefits, officials report that using electronic advanced 

data could increase efficiency, that is, allow CBP to reduce the volume of mail to be inspected while achieving the same or better seizure rates. However, while CBP has collected data on seizure rates 

for the pilots, it doesn’t have seizure rates for other targeting methods, so we don’t know how targeting based on electronic advanced 

data compares to other targeting methods. 

Regarding costs, neither agency has fully assessed what this effort has or could cost. The Postal Service reported that it spent 

about $3 million on hardware and software upgrades and additional personnel to identify the small amount of targeted mail in 

the pilots. However, we don’t know what additional costs might be 

borne by designated postal operators to collect or provide the information or what cost the Postal Service could incur when collecting 

data from these foreign operators. Moreover, the Postal Service has 


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31 

not estimated what expansion might cost. Given the Postal Service’s financial condition, it would be good to have a better understanding of these costs before proceeding and determining the best 

way to move forward. 

A considerable challenge that needs to be addressed is that the 

Postal Service cannot mandate the provision of this data or guarantee its accuracy. We do recognize that in the last few years the 

Postal Service has worked to increase the amount of electronic advanced data, but it is still limited, and its accuracy is unknown. If 

the amount or quality of the data is limited, this could also impact 

the effectiveness targeting. 

In conclusion, the rapid growth in international commerce requires a thoughtful, well-reasoned approach that provides assurance not only of efficient resource use but also of enhanced mail security. Both CBP and the Postal Service agreed with our recommendations to assess the pilots’ performance and evaluate the 

costs and benefits of using electronic advanced data. We look forward to working with them in their efforts. 

Chairman Hice and Ranking Member Connolly and members of 

the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased 

to answer any questions. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Rectanus follows:] 


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For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00p.m. ET 

Thursday, September 7, 2017 

GA0-17-796T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on 

Government Operations, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

INTERNATIONAL MAIL 

SECURITY 

CBP and USPS Should 

Assess Costs and Benefits 

of Using Electronic 

Advance Data 

Statement of Lori Rectanus, Director, Physical 

Infrastructure Issues 
33 


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Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our August 2017 report on 

international mail security, which we are publicly releasing today. 1 The 

expanding international use of e-commerce and the ease and expediency 

of cross-border transactions have resulted in a much higher volume of 

global trade, as consumers may be importing goods when they make 

purchases over the Internet This expansion could increase the potential 

for threats to national security, in addition to public health and safety, 

because international mail and express cargo can be used to send illegal 

or otherwise prohibited items to the United States. For example, there has 

been a recent increase in deaths in the United States related to the 

synthetic opioid fentanyl, a controlled substance. which could arrive in the 

United States in international mail or express cargo. 2 

The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and express consignment operatorssuch as FedEx, OHL, and the United Parcel Service (UPS) -play key 

roles handling inbound international items. 3 U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, also has 

a critical role as the primary federal agency tasked with targeting and 

inspecting suspicious inbound international items and seizing illegal 

goods entering the country. Some members of Congress and others have 

called for additional security efforts related to inbound international mail, 

such as increasing the collection of electronic advance data (EAD) that 

may provide CBP with information to better focus its targeting and 

1GAO, International Mail Secunty. Costs and Benefits of Using Electronic Data to Screen 

Mail Need to Be Assessed, GA0~17~606 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2017) 

2

!n genera!, under federal statute, controlled substances may only be imported into the 

United States for medical and scientific purposes or other legitimate needs of the United 

States. In addition, federal statute and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 

regulations prohibit any person or entity from importing any controlled substance into the 

United States unless that person or entity is registered w1th DEA and specifically 

authorized by DEA to import the controlled substance. 

3

Express consignment operators are, in genera!, defined as those entities moving cargo 

by special express commercia! service under closely integrated administrative control with 

reliable, timely, door-to-door delivery. Under the Trade Act of2002, as amended, and 

implementing regulations, aU cargo, including express cargo but not including inbound 

international mail, is subject to requirements for electronic advance data (EAD}. For the 

purposes of this statement, the term inbound international items will refer to those items 

handled by USPS and express consignment operators. but does not include non-express 

cargo shipped to the United States. 

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34 


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inspection efforts. These data include the sender's name and address, 

recipient's name and address, contents' description, number of pieces, 

and total weight. 

My remarks today are based on our report, which addressed (1) types of 

items CBP has seized from mail and express cargo sent to the United 

States; (2) how inbound international items are inspected as they arrive in 

the United States; and (3) options to collect EAD for mail and the costs 

and benefits of using these data to target mail for inspection. For the 

purposes of this statement, I will focus primarily on our findings related to 

USPS's and CBP's efforts to obtain and use EAD to target mail for 

inspection. Specific details that are related to the screening process and 

foreign postal operators and that CBP and USPS considered sensitive 

are not included in our report or this statement. 

For our report, we reviewed and analyzed data on seizures of mail and 

express cargo items as documented in CBP's Seized Asset and Case 

Tracking System (SEACATS). We reviewed applicable laws and 

regulations; USPS and CBP guidance; USPS Office of Inspector 

General's reports; international mail agreements, including requirements 

set by the Universal Postal Union (UPU)4 and agreements for EAD with 

foreign postal operators; and proposed federal legislation. We interviewed 

officials from USPS, the Department of State, CBP, and the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and representatives from 

the three largest express consignment operators (based on CBP cargo 

volume data for fiscal year 2015): UPS, FedEx, and DHL. 

We reviewed available information related to pilot programs conducted by 

USPS and CBP using EAD to target mail for inspection for the period 

from July 2014 through January 2017 (the time period for which data 

were available). We compared available documentation on the goals and 

performance of the pilots to federal internal control standards related to 

defining program goals. 5 We did not assess the effectiveness of CBP's 

screening efforts for inbound international express cargo or mail because 

that was outside the scope of our review. To assess USPS's and CBP's 

efforts to collect and implement EAD, we compared these efforts to GAO 

4-rhe international movement of mail amongst member countries is governed under the 

Universal Postal Convention by the UPU, a United Nations specialized agency with over 

190 UPU member countries. 

5

GAO, Standards for Internal Control ;n the Federal Government, GAO·'I4·1'04G 

(Washington, D.C.· September 2014). 

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CBP Seizes a Variety 

of Inbound Items That 

May Pose Threats to 

U.S. Safety and 

Security 

guidance on program evaluation• Further details on our scope and 

methodology are included in our report. The work on which this statement 

is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

In summary, we found that CBP seizes a variety of inbound items, 

including drugs and merchandise, through inspections of express cargo 

and mail as it arrives in the United States. However, CBP and USPS have 

not established rneasureable goals for pilot programs to use EAD for 

targeting mail for inspection, nor have they identified the potential costs 

and benefits of using EAD. Given the challenges associated with 

collecting and using EAD, CBP should, in coordination with USPS, 

establish measureable goals for pilot programs and evaluate the costs 

and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection compared with 

other targeting methods. CBP and USPS agreed with these 

recommendations and CBP plans to implement them by February 28, 

2018. 

In our report, we found that, according to data from CBP's Seized Asset 

and Case Tracking System (SEACATS), during fiscal years 2012 through 

2016 CBP conducted about 308,000 seizures of inbound international 

items that may pose a threat to U.S. security, health and safety, business, 

and ecology. Of those, CBP seized about 70 percent from mail and 30 

percent from express cargo. 7 Seized items are categorized in SEACA TS 

as either drugs or merchandise. Among the approximately 308,000 

seizures, illegal or inadmissible drugs accounted for about 4 7 percent of 

total seizures and merchandise accounted for about 53 percent. 

According to testimony by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

official, a recent increase in deaths related to the synthetic opioid fentanyl 

has resulted in an increased focus on identifying methods by which 

6

GAO. Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GA0~12-208G (Washington, D.C .. January 

2012) 

7Th is does not necessarily indicate a higher rate of seizures from mail compared to 

express cargo, as seizure rates may be affected by differences in inbound volume among 

mail and express cargo, as we!! as differences in CBP inspection processes for each, as 

discussed in our report. 

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USPS's and CBP's 

Pilot Programs Lack 

Performance Targets 

traffickers bring fentanyl into the United States. 8 In fiscal years 2012 

through 2015, CBP's seizure data reflect zero seizures of fentanyl, but 

according to CBP, fentanyl seizures would have been captured under 

other categories in SEACATS. According to CBP, a specific category 

code for fentanyl was added to SEACATS in fiscal year 2016. SEACATS 

reflects 53 seizures of fentanyl in fiscal year 2016 via both mail and 

express cargo. 

As mail and express cargo arrive in the United States, both USPS and 

express consignment operators provide items to CBP for inspection. 

Express consignment operators accept items for delivery to the United 

States at points of sale in foreign countries and provide EAD to CBP prior 

to the items' scheduled arrival in the United States. CBP then analyzes 

the EAD and provides lists of targeted items to express consignment 

operators. However, unlike express consignment operators, USPS is not 

currently required to provide CBP with EAD for inbound international mail 

and does not have control over mail prior to its arrival in the United 

States. Thus, USPS relies on foreign postal operators to collect and 

provide EAD voluntarily or by mutual agreement. According to USPS 

data, USPS received EAD for about one third of all inbound international 

mail (excluding letters, flats, and military/diplomatic mail) for the period 

from April2016 through March 2017. For the month of March 2017 (the 

most recent data available at the time of our review), USPS data indicate 

that EAD was available for roughly half of all inbound international mail 

(excluding letters, flats, and military/diplomatic mail)-' 

In 2014 and 2015, USPS and CBP initiated two pilot programs at the New 

York International Service Center (ISC) to target certain mail for 

inspection using some of the EAD obtained under data-sharing 

agreements with foreign postal operators. At the time of our review, CBP 

did not use EAD to target mail for inspection outside of these pilots. 

According to USPS documents, the goal of these pilots is to test the 

8

Matthew C. Allen, Assistant Director of Homeland Security Investigative Programs. 

Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

Department of Homeland Security, Fentanyl: The Next Wave of the Opioid Crisis, 

testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 

Commerce. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 115th Gong., 151 Sess .. March 

21, 2017 

9

USPS told us in August 2017 that it had recently updated its methodology for calculating 

the percentage of mail for which EAD is available. 

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effectiveness of placing holds on mail that has been targeted by CBP 

based on EAD. Under the pilots, CBP uses EAD to target a small number 

of pieces of mail each day. According to USPS officials, when USPS 

employees scan either individual targeted pieces or larger sacks 

containing this targeted mail, they are alerted that CBP has targeted the 

item and set the item or sack aside for inspection. Since the pilots began, 

USPS has made efforts to locate and provide CBP with the targeted mail 

and CBP has collected performance data on the percentage of targeted 

mail USPS has provided for inspection: about 82 percent for one pilot, 

and about 58 percent for the other. 

In our report we note that, according to USPS and CBP, USPS has been 

unable to provide some targeted mail for inspection because locating 

targeted mail once it arrives at an ISC has been a challenge. Specifically, 

USPS ISCs may receive thousands of large sacks of mail per day that are 

scanned as they are accepted. Each sack may contain hundreds of 

pieces of mail that are not individually scanned upon arrival. As a result, 

locating a targeted item requires manually sorting through the entire sack, 

and USPS employees may overlook the item while sorting through the 

larger sack to locate targeted mail. According to USPS officials, at the 

time of our review they were testing an automated method to identify 

targeted mail within these larger sacks. 

Standards for internal control in the federal government state that defining 

program goals in specific and measurable terms allows for the 

assessment of performance toward achieving objectives. 10 However, 

while USPS and CBP have collected some performance information for 

these pilots (including the percentage of targeted mail provided for 

inspection), this information is not linked to a specific performance target 

agreed upon by USPS and CBP-such as a specific percentage of 

targeted mail provided to CBP for inspection. Further, the agencies have 

not conducted an analysis to determine if the pilot programs are achieving 

desired outcomes. 

In our report, we concluded that, because CBP and USPS lack clear 

performance goals for these pilots, they risk spending additional time and 

resources expanding them prior to fully assessing the pilots' success or 

failure. As such, we recommended that CBP, in conjunction with USPS, 

( 1) establish measureable performance goals for pilot programs and (2) 

Page 5 GA0~17~796T International Mail Security 
38 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 26 here 27742.026

USPS and CBP Have 

Not Evaluated 

Relative Costs and 

Benefits of Increased 

Use of Electronic 

Advance Data 

assess the performance of the pilots in achieving these goals. The 

Department of Homeland Security concurred with this recommendation 

and plans to implement it by February 28, 2018. 

In our report we found that the costs and benefits of using EAD to target 

mail for inspection are unclear. For example, according to USPS and 

CBP officials, increasing the use of EAD to target mail for inspection may 

have benefits, such as reducing the volume of inspected mail and 

increasing the percentage of inspections that result in identification of a 

threatening or illegal item. This potential outcome could decrease time 

and resources needed for the screening process-potentially decreasing 

costs-and may increase the security of inbound mail. However, the 

costs of collecting and implementing the use of EAD are not yet known, 

and neither USPS nor CPS currently collect the data necessary to know 

whether using EAD might increase the security of inbound mail or 

decrease the time and costs associated with screening. 

Specifically, regarding the costs of collecting EAD, USPS has not 

calculated the current costs of collecting EAD from countries with which it 

has data-sharing agreements, but officials stated that USPS does not 

incur significant additional costs for each new designated postal operator 

or type of mail for which it begins collecting EAD. 11 While some of the 

costs of obtaining EAD may be borne by designated postal operators in 

other countries, rather than directly by USPS, costs to USPS to use EAD 

to target mail for inspection may include: 

equipment and personnel required to identify targeted mail (such as 

equipment required to sort through hundreds of pieces of mail to 

identify a single piece of mail), and 

software upgrades required to exchange data with foreign postal 

operators and with CBP. 

In our report we found that an analysis of the costs associated with 

planned efforts is particularly critical given USPS's financial challenges. 12 

11 Designated postal operators are postal operators that have been designated by UPU 

member countries to provide universal postal service. 

12USPS has been on GAO's High Risk List based on USPS's deteriorating financial 

condition since July 2009. GAO, High Risk: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While 

Substantial Efforts Needed on Others; Restructuring the US. Postal SeNice to Achieve 

Sustainable Financial Viability, GAO~'l7-317 (Washington. D.C .. Feb.15, 2017) 

Page 6 GA0~17-796T International Mail Security 
39 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 27 here 27742.027

As we recently found, USPS reported a net loss of $5.6 billion in fiscal 

year 2016-its 10th consecutive year of net losses. In light of this 

situation, any expenditure of financial resources to make any additional 

infrastructure and information technology upgrades necessary to 

implement the use of EAD for targeting merit careful consideration. 

Beyond costs, in our report we also determined that USPS and CBP have 

not performed an analysis of the benefits of using EAD to target mail for 

inspection, including the effectiveness of targeted inspection based on 

EAD relative to other methods of selecting mail for inspection.'' Thus, the 

extent to which targeting based on EAD might result in an increased 

ability to identify threats or other benefits over current methods is 

unknown. For example, CBP has collected data on the percentage of 

inspections resulting in a seizure for mail inspected as a result of 

targeting in the pilot programs at the New York ISC. However, CBP does 

not collect comparable data for seizures resulting from inspections 

conducted based on current methods of choosing mail for inspection. 

Moreover, USPS and CBP experience challenges related to inspecting 

mail that may limit their ability to effectively use EAD to target mail for 

screening and, thus, to experience EAD's possible benefits. For example, 

USPS depends on foreign postal operators to make EAD available. 

According to USPS and State Department officials, however, those 

operators may not share the same security priorities as USPS and CBP 

and may not make EAD available. If the amount of available EAD remains 

limited for inbound mail, this may reduce the effectiveness of CBP's 

targeting efforts or could constrain CBP's ability to reduce the volume of 

mail it inspects. 

Our prior work has found that in designing preventive measures-such as 

the screening of inbound mail to identify potential threats-it is helpful to 

conduct a thorough assessment of vulnerabilities as well as cost-benefit 

analyses of alternative strategies. 14 In the absence of information on the 

relative costs of various methods of selecting mail for inspection as well 

as their effectiveness at identifying potential threats in inbound mail, 

USPS and CBP are unable to fully understand whether obtaining 

13Specific details regarding methods for selecting mail for inspection that CBP considered 

sensitive are not included in this statement 

Page 7 GA0*17w796T International Mail Security 
40 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 28 here 27742.028

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

(102273} 

additional EAD for targeting purposes will provide security or resource 

benefits. 

In our report, we therefore concluded that, particularly in light of the 

challenges that collecting and using these data present, it is important 

that CBP and USPS carefully consider actions to enhance inbound 

international mail security to avoid wasting time and money on potentially 

ineffective and costly endeavors. As such, we recommended that CBP, in 

conjunction with USPS, evaluate the relative costs and benefits of 

collecting EAD for targeting mail for inspection in comparison to other 

methods. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with this 

recommendation and plans to implement it by February 28, 2018. 

In conclusion, existing pilots could be used as an opportunity for CBP and 

USPS to: (1) articulate performance goals for the pilots, (2) collect data 

and assess the pilots on their success in enabling USPS to provide 

targeted mail to CBP for inspection, and (3) assess the costs and benefits 

of various methods of choosing mail for inspection. We are encouraged 

that USPS and the Department of Homeland Security agreed with our 

findings and recommendations. Effective implementation of our 

recommendations should help CBP and USPS ensure that efforts to 

collect and use EAD to target mail for inspection achieve the desired 

security and resource benefits. 

Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact Lori Rectanus, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues at (202) 

512-2834 or Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony 

are Derrick Collins and Katie Hamer. Other staff who made contributions 

to the report cited in this testimony are identified in the source product. 

Page 8 GA0-17-796T International Mail Security 
41 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 29 here 27742.029

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42 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 30 here 27742.030

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0 Please Print on Recycled Paper. 
43 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Whitcomb, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TAMMY WHITCOMB 

Ms. WHITCOMB. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Hice, 

Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. 

The explosion of global e-commerce has led to rapid growth in inbound international mail parcels. Unfortunately, illicit drugs can 

hide within this traffic. There is a need for more effective ways to 

monitor inbound mail and find high-risk shipments. We believe 

data analytics can contribute to a solution. 

The Postal Service has been working with international postal 

operators to increase the amount of advanced electronic data it receives on parcels inbound to the United States. This data includes 

information on the sender, addressee, and contents of the mail 

piece. The Postal Service and U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

are currently conducting a pilot using this data, which allows CBP 

to target parcels more effectively for inspection. 

Last May, I testified before the Senate regarding the pilot and 

our work in this area. During that hearing, concerns were raised 

about the safety of postal employees who might be exposed to parcels containing dangerous opioids. In July, our office started to examine whether we could use advanced electronic data to determine 

the risks to postal employees from opioid parcels. 

Coincidentally, at the same time, we joined a narcotics trafficking investigation that appeared to involve a Postal Service employee. The case was initiated because CBP had seized a parcel 

containing the opioid fentanyl from an international shipper to a 

U.S. address. The investigation remains ongoing. However, this is 

the first investigation where we suspect that a Postal Service employee facilitated the illegal distribution of fentanyl. 

Using evidence from this investigation, we searched the advanced electronic data for more parcels sent from the same international address. We found more than 450 additional parcels sent 

between February and June of this year. The parcels were destined 

for locations nationwide, and other indicators suggested that many 

were suspicious. 

We took the analysis a step further to see whether the U.S. addresses that received these suspect parcels received other international parcels, and we identified an additional international shipper that sent parcels to some of the same addresses. When we 

searched the data for the second shipper, we found more than 

2,400 additional parcels shipped between February and June of 

2017. 

When we asked CBP, they confirmed they had seized a parcel 

containing fentanyl from this second shipper earlier this year. It 

appeared to us that the second shipper likely shared some customers with the first shipper, and in fact, one U.S. recipient received a total of 23 parcels from the two shippers. Using data analytics, we were able to turn shipping data from one fentanyl parcel 

into information about two suspect shippers and more than 2,800 

suspicious parcels. 

While our analysis is still ongoing and providing new insights 

daily, a number of opportunities are already clear. Analyzing adVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:05 Jan 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\27742.TXT APRIL

KING-6430 with DISTILLER
44 

vanced electronic data, in combination with other postal databases, 

could shine a spotlight on international drug trafficking through 

the mail and facilitate prevention efforts in the originating countries. 

Additionally, in many instances, parcels from suspect shippers 

can be identified while they are still in transit between countries, 

which should help ensure that they are seized at our border. And 

for those parcels that may get into the domestic mail stream, analytics will help law enforcement track down the individuals who 

are trafficking or receiving these dangerous opioids. 

All of these opportunities require resources and strong collaboration between Federal agencies. We have already met with representatives from CBP, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, the 

Postal Inspection Service, and the Postal Service to share these discoveries and to discuss how to work together in the future using 

analytics. 

We believe this type of analysis is an exciting breakthrough for 

investigating trafficking through the mail, but there are a number 

of challenges ahead. First, more resources are needed to capitalize 

on these techniques, including more data experts and tools to generate leads and more assistance from law enforcement to follow 

them up. 

Second, although the amount of advanced electronic data is growing, it is still not yet available for all inbound parcels. 

Third, legal barriers to opening parcels may hinder investigations given the volume of suspect parcels. 

Finally, and most importantly, the successful use of analytics requires moving beyond traditional case-by-case, parcel-by-parcel investigative practices and instituting a high-level strategic collaborative approach to stop drug trafficking through the mail. If these 

challenges can be solved, data analytics promises to help government and law enforcement focus on the areas of greatest impact in 

order to prevent these dangerous opioids from entering our country 

in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I’m happy to answer any questions. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Whitcomb follows:] 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
45 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 31 here 27742.031

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Government Operations 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

United States House of Representatives 

Oral Statement 

Examining the Shipment of Illicit Drugs in International Mail 

September 7, 2017 

Tammy Whitcomb 

Acting Inspector General 

United States Postal Service 
46 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 32 here 27742.032

Good afternoon, Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and members 

of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss our work using data 

analytics to uncover drug trafficking in international mail. 

The explosion of global ecommerce has led to rapid growth in inbound 

international mail parcels. Unfortunately, illicit drugs can hide within this traffic. 

There is a need for more effective ways to monitor inbound mail and find highrisk shipments. We believe data analytics can contribute to a solution. 

The Postal Service has been working with international postal organizations to 

increase the amount of advance electronic data it receives on parcels inbound to 

the United States. This data includes information on the sender, addressee, and 

contents of the mail piece. The Postal Service and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) are currently conducting a pilot using this data, which allows 

CBP to target parcels more effectively for inspection. Last May, I testified before 

the Senate regarding the pilot and our work in this area. During that hearing, 

concerns were raised about the safety of postal employees who might be 

exposed to parcels containing dangerous opioids. 

In July, our office started to examine whether we could use advance electronic 

data to determine the risks to postal employees from opioid parcels. Coincidently, 

at the same time, we joined a narcotics trafficking investigation that appeared to 

involve a Postal Service employee. The case was initiated because CBP had 

seized a parcel containing the opioid fentanyl from an international shipper to a 

U.S. address. 

The investigation remains ongoing. However, this is the first investigation where 

we suspect that a Postal Service employee facilitated the illegal distribution of 

fentanyl. 
47 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 33 here 27742.033

Using evidence from this investigation, we searched the advance electronic data 

for more parcels sent from the same international address. We found more than 

450 additional parcels sent between February and June of this year. The parcels 

were destined for locations nationwide, and other indicators suggested that many 

were suspicious. 

We took the analysis a step further to see whether the U.S. addresses that 

received these suspect parcels received other international parcels, and we 

identified an additional international shipper that sent parcels to some of the 

same addresses. When we searched the data for this second shipper, we found 

more than 2,400 additional parcels shipped between February and June of 2017. 

When we asked CBP, they confirmed they had seized a parcel containing 

fentanyl from the second shipper earlier this year. It appeared to us that this 

second shipper likely shared some customers with the first shipper, and in fact, 

one U.S. recipient received a total of 23 parcels from the two shippers. Using 

data analytics, we were able to turn shipping data from one fentanyl parcel into 

information about two suspect shippers and more than 2,800 suspicious parcels. 

While our analysis is still ongoing and providing new insights daily, a number of 

opportunities are already clear. Analyzing advance electronic data in combination 

with other postal databases could shine a spotlight on international drug 

trafficking through the mail and facilitate prevention efforts in the originating 

countries. Additionally, in many instances, parcels from suspect shippers can be 

identified while they are still in transit between countries, which should help 

ensure they are seized at our border. And for those parcels that make it into the 

domestic mail stream, analytics will help law enforcement track down the 

individuals who are trafficking or receiving these dangerous opioids. All of these 

opportunities require resources and strong collaboration between federal 

agencies. 

2 
48 


KING-6430 with DISTILLERInsert offset folio 34 here 27742.034

We have already met with representatives from CBP, the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 

General, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Postal Service to share these 

discoveries and to discuss how to work together in the future using analytics. 

We believe this type of analysis is an exciting breakthrough for investigating 

trafficking through the mail, but there are a number of challenges ahead: 

• First, more resources are needed to capitalize on these techniques, 

including more data experts and tools to generate leads and more 

assistance from law enforcement to follow them up. 

• Second, although the amount of advance electronic data is growing, it is 

not yet available for all inbound parcels. 

• Third, legal barriers to opening parcels may hinder investigations given the 

volume of suspect parcels. 

• Finally, and most importantly, the successful use of analytics requires 

moving beyond traditional case-by-case, parcel-by-parcel investigative 

practices and instituting a high-level strategic, collaborative approach to 

stop drug trafficking through the mail. 

If these challenges can be solved, data analytics promises to help government 

and law enforcement focus on the areas of greatest impact in order to prevent 

these dangerous opioids from entering our country in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work. I am happy to answer any 

questions. 

3 
49 

Mr. HICE. Thank you very much, and we will now begin our time 

for members to ask questions. And I will begin by recognizing myself for five minutes. 

Ms. Whitcomb, how many pieces of inbound international mail 

did the Postal Service receive last year? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. I believe the number is about 275 million parcels 

received via inbound international mail. 

Mr. HICE. Do you have any tracking information as to which 

countries those come from? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. I think the Postal Service does. I don’t know if 

Mr. Cottrell may have some better information on that. I don’t personally have that with me today. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Mr. Cottrell, do you keep track of where those 

come from? 

Mr. COTTRELL. The Postal Service does, sir. That’s not my arena, 

but we certainly can provide that information for you afterwards. 

Mr. HICE. Would they also keep track of any increase of mail 

coming from a country? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So, over the last five years if an increase is 

coming, say, from China, we would know about that? Okay. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. If I could just add that, yes, the vast majority of the 275 million parcels that came in last year are coming 

from China, and that number continues to increase with e-commerce. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Now, unlike—and I will go back, Ms. Whitcomb, 

to you here. Unlike the Postal Service competitors, the Postal Service, post office is not required to provide the electronic advanced 

data to CBP for targeting purposes. Now, my question is does this 

mean—how is this inbound mail sorted? Does it have to be done 

by hand? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. How is it sorted? 

Mr. HICE. Well, yes. When you are looking for a potential target —— Ms. WHITCOMB. Right. 

Mr. HICE.—how is that done? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. I believe that the Postal Service, as Ms. 

Rectanus mentioned, has to look through parcels and sacks and 

things like that when CBP requests a specific parcel to review. And 

then the Postal Service has to locate that parcel and then provide 

it to CBP. 

Mr. HICE. But that has to be done by hand? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. I believe so. Is that correct? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir, if I may, yes, it is a very manual process. 

When all the international mail is received, the big sacks first come 

through all the radiation detection equipment, so that is the first 

step. After there are no radioactive materials in any of the parcels, 

then we work to identify those sacks in the mail that we want to 

see, and then those are brought to us. We then send them through 

the x-ray systems, we send them through the canines, we manually 

open them, so without advanced data to target ahead of time, it is 

a very manual, very labor-intensive process. 

Mr. HICE. So that is a daunting task. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir, it is. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
50 

Mr. HICE. Is there any way that you can possibly under that scenario keep up with the requirement? 

Mr. OWEN. The volumes are very challenging. We of course 

prioritize the incoming mail based on threat, and we devote our resources to those that represent the greatest threat, but the volume 

is overwhelming, yes, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So you are not able to keep up with what is required from CBP? I don’t see any way. 

Mr. OWEN. But if —— 

Mr. HICE. What percentage are you behind? 

Mr. OWEN. Oh, I don’t think we have a number as to how much 

we look at because of the different layers that we have, so there 

is, again, advanced targeting when the data is available. Those 

shipments will be placed on hold and physically presented to us. 

And then again, we basically take sacks coming from a particular 

country of interest and start running all of those packages through 

x-rays, through the canines. We physically open them, so it is— 

again, it’s a very manual process to keep up with the flows each 

day. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So you can’t consistently present all the mail 

to CBP as required, correct? 

Mr. OWEN. No. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So is there a memorandum of understanding 

of what is supposed to occur? Mr. Cottrell, this is probably best for 

you. 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I do have my operations man 

Robert Raines. He can explain some of the inroads we’ve made in 

automating some of these processes to try to make it a little more 

manageable for customs. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Mr. RAINES. Yes, sir, so we’ve actually developed —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. HICE. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Just one second. I have no objection at all to the 

testimony of the gentleman. I just would remind you he is not 

sworn in. 

Mr. HICE. He was —— 

Mr. COTTRELL. He was sworn. 

Mr. HICE. You were sworn in, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You were? 

Mr. RAINES. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. He was recognized before —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Before I got in? Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE.—and was sworn in. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excuse me. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you. 

Mr. RAINES. Since May, we’ve developed technology to scan most 

of these parcels in large sacks, and we automatically run them on 

automation equipment to sort them for CBP, and they—we provide 

them with the single package they’re looking for. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So is there a memorandum of understanding 

that has been signed or will it be signed? 

Mr. RAINES. Yes, sir. It was signed. 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
51 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Can you provide a copy of that to this committee? All right. 

Real quickly, let me go back to Mr. Cottrell here. I want to go 

back to where I was getting to a little earlier in terms of keeping 

track of countries and increased mail or whatever, packages coming 

from China. What percentage would you have any idea of incoming 

international mail comes from China? 

Mr. COTTRELL. I’m going to deflect that to Mr. Raines, too. 

Mr. RAINES. It’s—a significant portion of mail does come from 

China. 

Mr. HICE. Like what does that mean, 10 percent, 20 percent, just 

a guess? 

Mr. RAINES. No, it’s larger than 20 percent. 

Mr. HICE. Has that number increased over the last five years? 

Mr. RAINES. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. How much so? 

Mr. RAINES. It increases double digits every year. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Are there any other countries where we are seeing increased —— 

Mr. RAINES. We see increases from other countries, not as significant as China. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So there is something that would potentially 

raise a red flag, what is going on, why are we receiving more from 

China or is that standard? 

Mr. RAINES. I think it’s a—there are a lot of low-value items that 

get shipped from China, so we see, from an e-commerce perspective, that that’s a growing industry. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. My time is expired. I will recognize the ranking 

member, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I must say to the 

gentleman, I am very impressed with what you just said about 

China. I knew it was big; I didn’t know it was that big. That is 

pretty impressive. 

Is it not true that at most of the fentanyl coming into the United 

States is coming from China? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. I could take that. The fentanyl that’s coming 

into the United States has two pathways. There is the products 

that are coming from China that typically arrive through the international mail and the express courier facilities, and then there is 

the fentanyl that’s coming from Mexico that of course enters the 

Southwest border. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And what would be the ratio would you say, 

China versus Mexico as a source? 

Mr. OWEN. I’m not sure we have a ratio. The purity of what is 

coming out of China is much, much more significant than the —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. OWEN.—purity of what is coming out of Mexico. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And more lethal? 

Mr. OWEN. And more lethal, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Okay. Thank you. While I got you, Mr. 

Owen, the statutory responsibility and authority of CBP with respect to interdiction of anything coming into the United States is 

contained in section 211 of title 6 of the U.S. code, is that correct? 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
52 

Mr. OWEN. I assume so sir, yes. I’m not sure the code, but we 

do have the border search authority for everything that comes in 

and leaves the United States, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. It is not the Postal Service’s responsibility; 

it is yours? 

Mr. OWEN. It’s our responsibility, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right. So help us understand how it 

works. When does the handoff go? How does that work? Once you 

have done whatever you do, when does it become the Postal Service’s responsibility? 

Mr. OWEN. Once we clear the parcels, then it turns—becomes domestic and it’s turned over to the Postal Service, as with all cargo. 

So all cargo, including the mail and parcels arrive from foreign, 

they’re presented to CBP for inspection. After we inspect and release that cargo, it then gets turned over to the carrier, in this case 

the Postal Service, to take it from there. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And to understand how we do it right now, we 

have got five centers that receive mail from overseas? 

Mr. OWEN. We actually have nine international mail facilities. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Nine. 

Mr. OWEN. We call them something different, but yes —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

Mr. OWEN.—there’s nine facilities. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And the volume is roughly about a million a day? 

Mr. OWEN. About a million a day —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. A million a day. That is —— 

Mr. OWEN.—between mail and express. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Packages is a subset but a big part of the subset, 

as Ms. Whitcomb points out. 

Mr. OWEN. Well, the mail in the Postal Service and the express 

in the express courier facilities, the DHL, FedEx, UPS. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. So you got these nine centers, but 

you’re not laboriously looking at every single piece at every single 

center, right? 

Mr. OWEN. No. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. No, we are not. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How does it work? 

Mr. OWEN. The way it works is, again, we perform a risk assessment based on what’s coming in, so if we have advanced data, that 

data is run through our automated targeting system, and it will 

bounce against different criteria that we have as to help us identify 

those packages that are higher risk. If those are high risk, we place 

them on hold, and whether it’s the Postal Service or the express 

consignment company and that environment would present those 

packages to us. 

Outside of the advanced data, the cargo from the mail that does 

not currently have the data, again, it’s a manual process that is 

screened for radiation, put on x-ray conveyor belts. We open things. 

The canines will run it, that manual process. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Now, and I am not making a judgment. 

Based on what we’ve heard in the testimony, Ms. Whitcomb comes 


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along and says we got this new technique, analytics, that actually 

is more efficient than the current system and gives us a higher rate 

of probability of catching fentanyl, which, after all, we all want 

done. Is that correct, Ms. Whitcomb? Have I characterized part of 

what the conclusion of your testimony would be? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. I would conclude that we believe that the analytics that we did identified some —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Ms. WHITCOMB.—additional process. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But that’s a technique not being used by CBP 

across —— 

Ms. WHITCOMB. I’d—we are not the OIG that does oversight for 

CBP, so I’m not sure exactly how they do their —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Owen? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, we do that type of targeting, that type of postseizure analysis out at our national targeting center out near Dulles Airport. We will take the variables from one specific seizure and 

make connections to identify other high-risk shipments and then 

take those appropriate actions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. So whether we call it data analytics or post-seizure 

analysis —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. OWEN.—it’s work that we’ve been doing for some time within 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. But Ms. Whitcomb has testified that 

they did something you didn’t catch. 

Mr. OWEN. Based on the seizure that they worked, their review 

did that, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. And, I mean, it was fairly impressive data 

if it at all—again, I’m not trying to say yours is—I’m trying to say, 

can we improve our detection? And it sounds like what Ms. 

Whitcomb described, we are on to something. We can make ourselves more efficient and make it may be less labor-intensive, while 

having a better payoff in catching the fentanyl coming into the 

country. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. OWEN. I would agree that based on post-seizure work, making connections can help us be more effective, and that is work that 

we are currently doing out at the national targeting center, that we 

been doing for many, many years. We’d welcome a visit from you, 

sir, or from any of the members here so we can really get into the 

weeds and show you the great analytical work, the counter-network 

work that we’re doing out there. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Where is this? 

Mr. OWEN. It’s out near Dulles Airport, sir —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh —— 

Mr. OWEN.—so you’re back there —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY.—it would be a welcome thing to have CBP —— 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY.—meet with me a Dulles Airport. We are not 

going there. You are now testifying before Congress. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. We will go where we want to go. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. CONNOLLY. But I won’t go there. Okay. I think my time is 

up. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And you are very lucky, Mr. Owen. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Blum, is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. BLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the panelists for being here today. I appreciate your insights. 

Mr. Owen, I believe you said—I wrote down here you said this 

is a very manual process. You also said the backlog continues to 

grow. How much of the process—I am from the private sector, so 

I am interested in this. How much of the process is manual today 

and how much is automated, whether through analytics, technology? What are the percentages today? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, the percentages, if you look at last year’s data— 

so we received 275 million parcels in the mail. We received another 

98 million through the express courier facilities. The 98 million we 

currently receive the advanced information on, okay, so all of that 

is done through advanced targeting. We have the systems controls 

to present the shipments that we’ve identified as high risk to us. 

Within the 275 million that we’ve been working with the Postal 

Service on where we had very little advanced data a year ago, we 

now have advanced data coming to us from 18 countries and in 

particular from China, which is helping us to reduce from that 

manual process to a more targeted process based on the presence 

of that advanced data that we can analyze, place holds on the shipment of concern. 

Mr. BLUM. That is the analytics portion of this, correct? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. So the pendulum is definitely shifting from 

where we had a much more of a manual process before we received 

advanced data to less of a manual process as we receive data now 

from 18 countries and growing. 

Mr. BLUM. Of the packages that are targeted, what percentage— 

does every single one of those require manual intervention? 

Mr. OWEN. Basically, yes. Every one —— 

Mr. BLUM. Every single one does? 

Mr. OWEN.—that is targeted has to be open and physically inspected to determine what’s inside. The typical seizure that we see 

in these parcels in terms of fentanyl and opioids is a baggie of 200 

to 500 grams of white powder, so we’re talking very small seizures, 

less than half-a-pound, generally manifested as something lawful 

and legitimate, aspirin, or acetaminophen. We have to take the 

substances from those baggies, those white powders, do some field 

testing to first make an additional identification. Then, it needs to 

go to a more structured laboratory within CBP or the DEA to make 

that final determination as to what that white powder is. It can be 

a very time-consuming process for each one of these half-a-pound 

shipments that were we’re seizing in the mail facilities. 

Mr. BLUM. So we want to obviously intercede in these illicit drug 

shipments. What happens, though, when we do find illicit drugs? 

Are we going back to the country of origin? Are we trying to find 


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and prosecute the people? Or is there so much of this that that 

can’t be done? 

Mr. OWEN. When we will make the introductions, the first effort 

that we take is with our criminal investigators, with Homeland Security investigations, as well as with the postal inspectors. We will 

then try to process that seizure where we can result in an arrest 

of who was bringing that cargo into the country. 

With that as well, we also take the specifics from the seizure and 

it goes into the analytical work that we’ve been speaking of with 

the IG here as—to help identify further targets down —— 

Mr. BLUM. You have this funnel of packages, and you winnow it 

down by using analytics? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. 

Mr. BLUM. Okay, now, to that portion of the funnel, can we use 

technology so maybe every package doesn’t need to be handopened? 

Mr. OWEN. You know, that’s —— 

Mr. BLUM. I mean, is that in the future or is that now that we 

could be doing that? 

Mr. OWEN. That is the future. There—you know, the ideal endstate for us is to have a technology that can look inside the package without having to open it and identify if there’s a synthetic 

item in there, a concern to that part. There are several manufacturers that are working on that type of technology, so if we can 

have that technology that is automatic that will give us an alert 

that we’ve got an issue of concern within this package, that will be 

really a game-changer in this space that we struggle with. 

Mr. BLUM. And that is being developed currently? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, there are several manufacturers that are working towards that end with —— 

Mr. BLUM. That would be a game-changer, would it not? 

Mr. OWEN. It would be a game-changer, yes, sir. 

Mr. BLUM. Last question, and if you already answered it, I apologize. The only responsibility of the United States postal system is 

to turn over, correct, or to present international packages to CBP, 

correct? That has not been done to the extent it is supposed to per 

policy? Am I correct in that statement? I believe I am correct. I just 

want to know why. 

Mr. THOME. That is not a policy, sir. It’s our policy when CBP 

asks for packages for presentation, we present it to them. We’ve 

gotten much better, as we spoke before. When it was a manual 

process, we had a little more difficulty in finding the packages. But 

since we’ve automated that process, we’ve gotten much better at 

presenting CBP the items that they’re asking for. And we continue 

to work and apply extra resources and automation to make that 

better. 

Mr. BLUM. And I’ve got 13 seconds left, and I just want to say 

that the United States Postal Service and CBP, I think you both 

do amazing jobs. And I have toured many of the facilities, and hats 

off to you. Keep up the good work. 

And I yield back the time I do not have. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from D.C., Ms. Norton. 


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Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for this 

timely hearing. 

I want to echo the words of my colleague about the work that the 

Postal Service is doing and the improvements you have made. 

I am interested in the most effective way of capturing illegal substances. I am concerned that we use 21st-century technology. There 

was technology discussed I think by my colleague in his question 

as well. I am very bothered by the increase in overdose deaths from 

opioids. I mean, I saw the heroin epidemic, I saw the crack cocaine, 

and this notion of doubling deaths in a single year could not be 

more disturbing. 

Commissioner Owen, has there not been an increase in the 

amount of fentanyl seized in inbound international mail? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, there has. We seized about 440 pounds last year, 

and we’re over 800 pounds so far this fiscal year. 

Ms. NORTON. So that is twice the seizures? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. And is that using technology? 

Mr. OWEN. Part of that is record-keeping because before 2016 we 

did not have special categories for the fentanyl. Everything was 

considered an opioid, and the data would flow into the opioid category. Based on what we started to see in 2015 and ’16, we broke 

out that. So we have better record-keeping, but —— 

Ms. NORTON. So you think it is record-keeping more than —— 

Mr. OWEN. No, I think we can better capture what we are seizing 

in terms of the fentanyl and the synthetics, but I agree that there 

is much more coming in now than there had been several years 

prior. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, you have also seen amounts, I understand— 

I believe that was in your testimony—an amount seized at the 

Southwest border but less than the increases in seizures in the 

mail and express confinements. Is that the case? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, the seizures from the Southwest border are larger in quantity but fewer in number, whereas again the seizures in 

mail and express are much more great in number but very small 

quantities. 

Ms. NORTON. But they are purer? 

Mr. OWEN. They are more pure, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. And what accounts for that? 

Mr. OWEN. The—because, again, these are chemical compounds 

and there is the ability to make them to different strengths if you 

will, so the products coming from China are much more pure, much 

more dangerous than the products coming in from Mexico right 

now. 

Ms. NORTON. Could you tell me how many officers are assigned 

to examine mail at your facilities—at your international mail facilities? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, within the international mail facilities, we have 

just over 200 officers that work. Again, the mail facilities, of those 

nine, there are five that are significant in volumes. The other four 

are very, very small. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, as I understand, officers are being rotated 

away from the customs districts to go to the Southwest border. Is 

that true? 


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Mr. OWEN. We have struggling—we are struggling with staffing 

issues in the Arizona ports of entry, as well as Southern California, 

so on a 90-day basis, we have 150 officers from around the country 

that are on temporary reassignment down there. 

Ms. NORTON. So that such an officer cannot examine international mail because he has been sent to the Southwest border 

—— Mr. OWEN. Right, we have 20 field offices around the country, 

and we take two to three from each field office each 90-day period, 

so it’s a small impact to the individual locations to support the activities on the Southwest border that are struggling with their 

staffing challenges. 

Ms. NORTON. Now, again, I’m trying to find the best way to get 

a hold of this problem, and I know that the President’s fiscal year 

2018 budget requested $1.6 billion for construction of a border wall. 

Now, the President has not formally declared an emergency or 

asked Congress for emergency resources to deal with the fentanyl 

crisis, so I suppose this question is for Ms. Rectanus. Is that how 

you say your name? What effect will building a southern wall have 

on stopping fentanyl being shipped in the mail or through express 

carriers? 

Ms. RECTANUS. That is not an issue that we have explored, so 

I would maybe refer that to my CBP colleague. GAO has not done 

any analysis of that. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I need to know, how does it get here, and if 

there was a wall, would that have any effect in keeping fentanyl 

from getting to the United States? Who can answer that question, 

please? 

Mr. OWEN. As we take efforts to secure the Southwest border, 

that will help prevent the narcotics coming in from Mexico. And 

again, we do have Mexican fentanyl that’s coming in as well. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, you do, and it is up to you to find the most 

effective way to stop what amounts to an opioid crisis and to suggest what is the most—we don’t want to have hearings that see a 

doubling every single year. I haven’t seen a crisis like this, and I 

have seen some terrible drug crises in my time in Congress. So I 

would like you to—I would like—and I don’t know which of you is 

responsible to investigate what is the best way to deter fentanyl 

coming into the United States and to at least reduce the opioid 

deaths in our country, and I would ask you to report back to the 

chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentlewoman. I now recognize the distinguished chairman of this committee, who is sitting way down there. 

He ought to be sitting here, but the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for actually conducting the hearing and obviously taking the leadership role here 

as I was having to resolve something that actually Congressman 

Heath Shuler and I worked for a long time. He was a Member that 

held my seat, a Democrat, before I came, and we had been working 

on something for five years and it got resolved today, and so my 

apologies for not being here on time. But I thank you for your leadership and your help. 


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So let me weigh in a little bit, I guess. You know, Mr. Owen, you 

know, I have visited your facility in Dulles, as you well know, and 

certainly have a lot of compliments on what you do and the work 

that you do. We have got a crisis on our hands, and we have got 

to figure a different way of dealing with this. So I guess my question to you is if there is an unlimited budget, which there is not, 

I mean, what would you do differently today? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, if there was an unlimited budget —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Because—and let me tell you the reason why I 

ask that because one of the questions when I was sitting here listening to this you were saying, well, we’re looking at that post-seizure, and we’re looking, you know, back from a historical perspective. But you don’t know what you haven’t caught, so, I mean, you 

know, how can we do that on the front end instead of looking at 

it in retrospect? And all that is great. I think you have to look at 

it from a historical standpoint, but you don’t know what you 

haven’t caught, so what do we need to do in terms of giving you 

tools to do this better? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, I think the most fundamental is to continue on 

the work that we’re doing with the Postal Service to receive the advanced information. By having the information ahead of the shipments’ arrival, we can do much greater targeting —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. And what advanced information are you talking 

about? 

Mr. OWEN. The advanced information as to the shipper of the 

goods, the recipient of the goods, the description. There’s different 

data sets that we receive —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. And why would you not have that? We currently 

don’t have that with many of the countries from the Postal Service 

because of the international agreements as to the way the data is 

governed. And the Postal Service and the State Department could 

speak to that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Mr. Cottrell, I mean, why would they not have 

that? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Well, we’ve made tremendous —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I mean, if I ship on anything else, you got to have 

a sender and a receiver, so why would they not have that with you? 

Mr. COTTRELL. The Postal Service is a leading proponent to get 

more AED, Mr. Chairman, but we do—are faced with certain constraints, as the State Department spoke to earlier. We don’t control 

what foreign posts mail into this country, so we have taken great 

steps. The 18 to 20 large —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you are saying it is the State Department’s 

problem? I want to make sure I am clear. We got all the experts 

up there. I’m going to find out whose problem it is. Mr. Owen says 

it is not his. He says it is somewhere else, so whose problem is it? 

Mr. COTTRELL. I think it is a combination, sir. It’s us working 

with the foreign post to —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. The buck stops somewhere. Who does it stop 

with? The State Department? 

Mr. COTTRELL. I’ll let you answer, Mr. Thome, if you want. 

Mr. MEADOWS. No, hold on. Let me make sure. 

Mr. COTTRELL. Sure. 


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Mr. MEADOWS. You are under oath. Is it your fault or is it someone else’s fault? 

Mr. COTTRELL. I don’t know that it’s anyone’s fault, sir. It’s treaties that are in place that the United States has entered into agreements. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So go ahead and weigh in at the State 

Department. 

Mr. THOME. Thank you —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Because I am having a hard time explaining to 

my constituents back home when we have a fentanyl problem why 

the State Department wouldn’t look at this a little differently. So 

we have got a treaty that is a problem? 

Mr. THOME. I would echo a little bit what my Postal Service colleague said. It’s not really that it’s anyone’s —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. It didn’t work real well for your postal colleague, 

so I don’t know that I would echo it. 

Mr. THOME. It’s —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So go ahead. 

Mr. THOME. It’s not really the fault of any one on this panel or 

any of the Federal agencies —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well —— 

Mr. THOME.—that are working this —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, then tell me whose fault it is because we 

will get them in here and make sure that they are here because 

I think that we have bipartisan interest on this particular subject. 

So whose fault is it? 

Mr. THOME. Well, the issue is that for the U.S. Postal Service, 

according to our treaty obligations, they must accept mail from foreign postal services. So unlike the express service as a —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So we need to un-ratify the treaty? 

Mr. THOME. No, it’s not as much a question of the treaty that 

causes us the problem. It’s the question of the capacity of the foreign posts to provide the data. Now, as I said in my testimony —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, we don’t have to receive that. I mean, I 

have looked at it. I mean, it becomes a decision by the State Department on what qualifies and what doesn’t. Is that not correct? 

Mr. THOME. Well, as things stand right now, we accept the mail 

from foreign postal services to facilitate the global exchange of 

mail. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And so as things stand right now, it is not working. Are you required to do that? 

Mr. THOME. As things stand right now in terms of the broad 

mass of legitimate commerce, it is indeed working quite well and 

expanding. We do need to focus on —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you are saying a little bit of drugs along with 

the regular commerce is okay. Is that your sworn testimony here 

today? 

Mr. THOME. I am certainly not saying that, sir. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, that is what it sounded like. 

Mr. THOME. What I’m saying is we need to now focus on further 

convincing posts which are—and again, the time has come —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So how do I do that? How does a Member of Congress—because, listen, this isn’t my first rodeo on this issue, and 

I have got major issues with it both from a cost standpoint and 


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now from an oversight standpoint. So how do we fix it? Because the 

Postal Service says it is not them. They indicate that it is a joint 

State Department/postal system issue. So I need to get to the bottom line. I mean, who do we need to—do we need to have Secretary 

Tillerson in here to figure out how to fix it? 

Mr. THOME. Well, we are working already toward fixing it, and 

we are working together to convince other Postal Services that it’s 

in their best interest to provide this —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. So how —— 

Mr. THOME.—and we’re succeeding. 

Mr. MEADOWS. And I appreciate the indulgence of the chair. Give 

me one last question. How are we encouraging other people to comply, other countries? How are we doing that? 

Mr. THOME. There’s two main avenues through which we do it. 

One is that the U.S. Postal Service is increasingly entering into bilateral agreements. I can’t speak to those agreements because 

they’re —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Proprietary. Go ahead. 

Mr. THOME.—proprietary. And then the other avenue is the Universal Postal Union where we have been actively engaged in helping countries expand their ability to provide this data. Once upon 

a time, they were not interested in this, but that has changed. 

They see the business model —— 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So let me close because I am out of time. 

The message that you need to take back and I guess Mr. Cottrell 

and I see my friends at the postal system there behind you need 

to take back is the time for us kicking the can down the road is 

over, all right? And we are going to get to the bottom of it, and you 

need to take it to those entities and say that now it is raised to 

the level of attention that we have got to deal with it. And we are 

going to continue to bring you back until we fix it. You tell me 

what you need from a resource standpoint, but we are going to fix 

this problem or we are going to take more severe action. Does that 

make sense? Is that fair? So can both of you report back to this 

committee in 90 days with an action plan on how we are going to 

encourage those others to comply? 

All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. And again, thank you for your 

leadership in this subcommittee and the full committee as a whole. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The STOP Act would require the Postal Service to collect and 

transmit the same kind of electronic data to customs as the express 

consignment carriers already provide to customs. GAO testified 

today that Customs and Border Patrol have not evaluated the effectiveness of using electronic advanced data. So the STOP Act is 

premature since it assumes the effectiveness of using the data before a thorough evaluation of its use has been performed. 

But I think there are other problems with the STOP Act as well. 

The STOP Act is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 

differences between the Postal Service and consignment carriers. 

Chief Cottrell, is it not true that, as the designated postal operator 

for the United States Postal Service is required by international 


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treaty established by the Universal Postal Union to accept and deliver mail that is shipped to the U.S. from the nearly 200 member 

nations of the UPU —— 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY.—is that correct? Express consignment carriers like 

UPS and FedEx are under no such requirement. They can choose 

their customers and the packages that they are willing to deliver. 

Isn’t that right? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. Isn’t it also true that UPS and FedEx can 

charge the delivery rates that they want to charge for shipping 

packages, but the Postal Service must abide by the international 

postal rates established by the UPU, is that right? 

Mr. COTTRELL. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY. In addition, unlike UPS and FedEx, the Postal Service 

does not decide whether or not to accept foreign packages from 

mail, and foreign postal operators are the ones who accept the 

packages that the Postal Service is obligated under international 

agreement to deliver in the U.S., is that correct? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY. While express consignment carriers can get the data 

from their customer at the time they accept a package from a foreign shipper, the Postal Service does not have the same ability to 

collect that information at the time a package is tendered. Isn’t 

that right? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY. There is also a misunderstanding of the authorities 

and duties of customs and the Postal Service. Commissioner Owen, 

customs has the responsibility to, and I am quoting from a statute, 

‘‘protect against the entry of dangerous goods.’’ Do I have that correct? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CLAY. As a result, Customs and Border Patrol has a lot of 

authority to search for and seize international mail and packages. 

Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CLAY. For example, is Customs and Border Patrol required 

to obtain a warrant prior to inspecting mail or packages? 

Mr. OWEN. No, we are not. We have border search authority that 

allows us to inspect anything crossing our borders. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you for that response. And, Chief Cottrell, 

under what circumstances may the Postal Service seize and open 

mail packages for inspection? 

Mr. COTTRELL. We gain probable cause and we get a search warrant from a Federal judge. 

Mr. CLAY. So you have to go through the due process of getting 

a search warrant? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. And this is also different from what express 

consignment carriers can do, correct? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. CLAY. Don’t they have the authority to inspect their customers’ packages to determine whether the package contains what 

the customer says it does? 


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Mr. COTTRELL. They create their own policies, yes, sir. They can 

open their packages. 

Mr. CLAY. And that is different from the Postal Service? 

Mr. COTTRELL. It’s different from mail, yes. 

Mr. CLAY. Given that the Postal Service and express consignment carriers operate very differently, it does not make sense to 

impose burdensome and impractical mandates on the Postal Service in a misguided effort to seek parity between the Postal Service 

and private carriers. 

And so, Mr. Chairman, I think that the STOP Act may be premature, especially if we don’t have all of the information we need 

to determine if we can—if the Postal Service can even do what we 

want them to do. And so I would ask that we move cautiously on 

any legislation that would impact the operation of our Postal Service. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

And the chair will recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, 

Mrs. Lawrence, for five minutes. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and my ranking member 

who is here, for this hearing. 

As we know, the opioid epidemic is one of the Nation’s foremost 

health crises. And coming from Michigan in 2015, I am so passionate about this. There are 2,000—2,000—human beings in my 

State overdosed on opioids, and that is a 13 percent increase over 

the previous year. 

So one of the things I want to be clear about because my colleague seems to be pointing the finger at the Postal Service that 

compliance and a sense of urgency in addressing this issue is not 

where it should be. Ladies and gentlemen, this crisis has forced all 

of us in law enforcement and those of us who are in the State Department and customs to reevaluate, based on the increase in numbers we are seeing and the human part of this that has equated 

to overdose and unfortunately deaths in our country. 

Now, one of the things my colleague did a great job outlining, 

there is an international treaty. And what we all know as the 192- 

member countries called the Universal Postal Union, the UPU. And 

being a member of that is not something that the Postal Service 

unilaterally or independently decided to join. It is a requirement as 

a Federal agency to be in compliance. So one of the areas we need 

to look at because we do need to have focus on this is through the 

State Department. That is our treaties and responsibility and limitations that is required of us by the UPU. The Postal Service must 

comply to those regulations as a Federal agency. 

And while we are bipartisan in saying we must look at new processes and are we being efficient, without being in mind, I would 

like to ask a question of Mr. Owen. Can you comment, because we 

are using CBP’s EDA. That is what we are using, right, to screen 

our parcels. Am I correct? 

Mr. OWEN. The advanced ED —— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. EAD. 

Mr. OWEN. EAD, the electronic —— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. You are using that right now. That is your process? 


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Mr. OWEN. Yes, we screen the advanced electronic information to 

identify those shipments —— 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Okay. 

Mr. OWEN.—that are at greater risk, yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. Can you comment, is this the most efficient 

process? Has there been any recommendations—when is the last 

time you had an evaluation to see if we are using the best technology in comparison to other targeting techniques? Because, obviously, we can’t keep using the same processes considering the impact and the vast seriousness of this issue. 

Mr. OWEN. We are constantly refining our targeting systems with 

new information, new sources of information, different capabilities 

that are out there than what had been there several years ago. So 

our targeting has gotten much, much stronger over the last several 

years to identify those shipments, be it in mail or the land border 

or the seaports that pose the greater risk. So we continue to 

strengthen our targeting and analytical capabilities that we have 

so that our resources are being directed where they’re most effective. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. One of the things I want to say here at this 

hearing—and I am going to ask the same question of you Ms. 

Whitcomb—is that so often we will have the representatives of an 

organization come before us and paint us a picture that we are 

doing a great job with the resources we have, but after the hearing, 

we will hear a different story—if we had the ability to use new 

technology, if we had the funding—and that is something that I 

really want to push your agency to be honest with us. 

There has been a request for you to report back to this committee 

how can we be more efficient. So through the Postal Service, 

through the State Department, through the Inspection Service, be 

honest with us. This is not an attack of you as an organization. 

This is a bipartisan effort to attack this problem. And unless you 

are honest and provide us with the information, we cannot move 

forward. So I want to ask the same question of the Postal Service. 

What can we do? Are there new technologies? How can we use the 

resources that we are expecting in the Postal Service to address 

this issue? 

Ms. WHITCOMB. Based on the work that we’ve done, we believe 

that data analytics are a really important part of a solution to this 

problem. The data, the advanced electronic data, you have heard 

from the panelists, that is growing. We’re getting more and more 

of that data, and I know that CBP, the Inspection Service, and our 

office are looking at how we can use that data and how we can use 

analytics layered onto that data to identify these parcels before 

they ever get into the mail stream, even possibly before they ever 

leave the originating country. If we can do that, I think there are 

some real opportunities there to stop these really dangerous opioids 

from entering the country. So I think there’s an opportunity to collaborate among the panelists that you see here and even others to 

work together on identifying the best way to use data analytics to 

address this problem. 

Mrs. LAWRENCE. My time is up, and I will yield back to the chair 

saying that I want us as a committee to direct a collaboration so 

that we can have all these parties, not individual silos. How can 


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they collaborate because they can’t exist alone so that we can move 

forward in Congress and supporting a collaborative effort to attack 

this issue. Thank you so much. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentlewoman. 

Just before we close, let me just ask a couple of just real quick 

questions. Mr. Cottrell, is the Postal Service working with the recommendations from the GAO? 

Mr. COTTRELL. We were directed to work with customs to set up 

the metrics and evaluate the effectiveness of the AED in our investigative processes, so we will be working with Mr. Owen and his 

team. 

Mr. HICE. Specifically towards those recommendations? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. And, Ms. Rectanus, let me just real quickly, in 

your report you discussed two pilot programs at the New York 

International Service Center. In both those pilot programs USPS 

agreed to provide EAD to CBP for certain mail. One of those pilots—explain what percentage UPS successfully provided to the 

CBP for targeting? 

Ms. RECTANUS. Sure. There are two pilots. The first pilot, we— 

when we looked at the presentation data, it did seem like Postal 

Service had gotten better over the period of time ultimately averaging about 80 percent —— 

Mr. HICE. Okay. What was the other one? 

Ms. RECTANUS.—of the packages presented. The other pilot, 

when we looked at the data monthly, it really varied, but they average about 58 percent over this period. 

Mr. HICE. Why the discrepancy? 

Ms. RECTANUS. Excuse me? 

Mr. HICE. Why a discrepancy between the two? 

Ms. RECTANUS. I think—well, part of it probably had to do with 

the type and the level of data that they were getting from the countries that were involved in those pilots, and I think partly also it 

was volume and it was the type of product I think that was involved that allowed the Postal Service to be able better to identify 

the particular packages. And again, they are only—they were only 

asking for 5 or 10 packages from each of those pilots, so it wasn’t 

a huge number either. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Now, in 2016, we all know the Postal Service reported like $5.6 billion loss, 10 consecutive years now with a loss. 

In light of this, just curiosity between the two of you, has USPS 

and CBP, have you considered the cost and the benefits, analysis 

of increased electronic data? 

Mr. OWEN. No, that again is one of the recommendations that 

both agencies agreed with that we need to do more of that to 

take—make sure we’re being effective with the data that is being 

provided. So we both did concur with those recommendations from 

GAO. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. So that discussion is going to be underway? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HICE. All right. With that, I am going to yield the final two 

minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina. 


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Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So let me do two clarify things. Is it Mr. Thome? Is that—what? 

Mr. THOME. Thome. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thome. All right. Mr. Thome, the next Universal 

Postal Union meeting is where and when? 

Mr. THOME. The next UPU Congress is an extraordinary Congress in Ethiopia in 2018. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So would it not be appropriate to get 

a couple of members of this committee to go with you and accompany you to that particular meeting? Is that something that you 

can arrange? 

Mr. THOME. I certainly could add you to our delegation, and 

you’d be more than welcome. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So if you would reach out to the committee there on doing that. 

Mr. Cottrell, is the postal system willing to provide all their postal data so that we can do—retroactively look at all these cases? 

And are you currently doing that? 

Mr. COTTRELL. Yes, sir. The Postal Service currently provides 

over 90 percent AED for our outbound product. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. And so from GAO perspective, what 

more needs to be done there? 

Ms. RECTANUS. As far as the cost and benefits and sort of looking 

at the pilots’ performance, our focus was really given the Postal 

Service’s financial situation and this small percentage of their revenue and volume that come from international mail, albeit growing. What we wanted was some kind of united conversation between the folks to say what is feasible? What do we think is really 

effective and what do we think is—sort of is the juice worth the 

squeeze? 

Given that—right now, the pilots have been very, very small, and 

there is a very small number of pieces of mail and packages that 

have been involved, so we would want them to identify what percentage of mail should the Postal Service be able to present to 

CBP, and if they aren’t, then why not, and kind of get that figured 

out before we expand it fully and move on with getting more advanced data if we’re not ready to use it yet. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So, Mr. Cottrell, what percentage is reasonable? 

Mr. COTTRELL. I want to make sure I’m understanding your 

question. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I mean, you just heard what she said. I 

mean, we’ve got small pilots. I mean, at what percentage of 

deliverables would be a reasonable percentage? 

Mr. COTTRELL. We’re providing everything we get, which, as of 

July, was about 40 percent, to customs, so it’s up to us and customs 

to work together to identify as much as we can and then work to 

pull that out and get it in front of customs. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I think we are talking over each other. I will follow up. I am assuming that I see a very receptive nod from behind 

you, and so we will work through that together. 

Here is the interesting thing, and I will close with this. We need 

better collaboration between the entities. To suggest that one group 

is responsible and another one is not is like telling TSA and all the 

international travel we have coming in here that it is okay to let 


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a terrorist come in from some foreign country just because we have 

an agreement with them, Mr. Thome. 

So what we have to do is—this is taking people’s lives. Let’s treat 

it that way and start to work with better collaboration. Does that 

make sense for all of you to do that? Are you committed to do that? 

Anyone not? 

Let the record reflect everybody answered in the affirmative. I 

will yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE. I thank the gentleman. 

I would like to again extend a thank you to all our witnesses for 

taking time to appear here before this subcommittee today and particularly for your patience during the voting series. 

The hearing record will remain open for two weeks for any member to submit a written opening statement or questions for the 

record. 

If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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