Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 7, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 60339 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–1093; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–SW–020–AD; Amendment 

39–17989; AD 2014–20–16] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Brantly 

International, Inc. Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for Brantly 

International, Inc. (Brantly) Model B–2, 

Model B–2A, and Model B–2B 

helicopters with certain main rotor 

blades. This AD requires inspecting 

each main rotor (M/R) blade for a crack 

or delamination and removing the blade 

if a crack exists or if the delamination 

exceeds certain thresholds. This AD was 

prompted by multiple reports of M/R 

blade cracks and an incident in which 

a crack that originated near the M/R 

blade trailing edge resulted in the loss 

of a large section of the M/R blade. The 

actions of this AD are intended to 

prevent loss of the M/R blade and 

subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

DATES: This AD is effective November 

12, 2014. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain documents listed in this AD 

as of November 12, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Brantly 

International, Inc, 621 South Royal 

Lane, Suite 100, Coppell, Texas 75019, 

telephone (972) 829–4638, email 

tarcher@superiorairparts.com. You may 

review a copy of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

Docket Operations Office between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, any 

incorporated-by-reference service 

information, the economic evaluation, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Operations Office (phone: 800– 

647–5527) is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations 

Office, M–30, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Marc Belhumeur, Senior Project 

Engineer, Rotorcraft Certification Office, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5170; email 

7-AVS-ASW-170@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On October 16, 2012, at 77 FR 63285, 

the Federal Register published our 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 

which proposed to amend 14 CFR part 

39 by adding an AD that would apply 

to Brantly Model B–2, Model B–2A, and 

Model B–2B helicopters, with an M/R 

blade, part number (P/N) 248–101, 248– 

202, or 248–404, installed. The 

proposed requirements were intended to 

prevent loss of the M/R blade and 

subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

The NPRM was prompted by a 2007 

incident in New Zealand in which a 

large inboard section of the M/R blade 

of a Brantly B–2B helicopter separated 

from the helicopter during flight. The 

pilot was able to land the helicopter 

without further damage. Laboratory 

analysis concluded that the M/R blade 

failure was caused by hydrocarbon 

contaminants inside the blade’s skin-tofoam bond and that the fracture 

originated near the blade’s trailing edge. 

There were three other reports of 

portions of M/R blades separating 

during flight and another five reports of 

M/R blades having cracks or other 

defects found during inspections. 

Comments 

After our NPRM (77 FR 63285, 

October 16, 2012), was published, we 

received comments from 10 

commenters. 

Request 

Allow Some Cracking, Delamination, 

and Imperfections 

Two commenters requested that the 

AD allow cracks in accordance with 

approved maintenance inspection 

procedures and criteria. Three 

commenters requested that the AD 

allow some delamination as provided 

for in Brantly’s service information, 

which is up to 10 square inches of 

delamination outside of the inboard 12 

inches of the M/R blade. Four 

commenters requested that some 

imperfections be allowed in the blades 

as listed in the approved factory 

maintenance inspection procedures. 

Some of these commenters stated that a 

small dent, nick, crease, wrinkle, or 

bend in the skin of the blade, especially 

in the middle or trailing edge, does not 

cause the blade to crack and is not 

necessarily a safety issue. These 

commenters expressed concern that 

many Brantly helicopters will be 

grounded because of slight 

imperfections in the main rotor blades 

that are not a safety issue. 

We disagree with allowing any crack 

in a blade, but we agree the AD should 

allow some delamination and 

imperfections. A crack in a blade 

renders it unairworthy, and no data 

supports that any crack in these blades 

is a safe condition. Also, no supporting 

data justifies allowing 10 square inches 

of delamination to address the unsafe 

condition, and such a large area is not 

supported by any known industry 

standards. We are changing the AD, 

however, to allow up to 2 square inches 

of delamination outside of the inboard 

12 inches. We are also removing the 

dent, nick, crease, wrinkle, bends, extra 

hole, and inadequate rivet spacing 

requirements from the AD. Although 

eliminating these conditions is good 

design practice, the data we have does 

not support that a crack in the Brantly 

rotor blade skins was caused by small 

dents, nicks, creases, wrinkles, bends, 

extra hole, or inadequate rivet spacing. 

Remove Certain Blades From the 

Applicability 

Two commenters requested that we 

remove blade P/Ns 248–101 and 248– 

202 from the applicability of the AD. 

These commenters did not believe the 

unsafe condition applies to these blades 

because they are significantly different 

in composition and bonding agent than 

the P/N 248–404 blade. The commenters 

stated the –101 and –202 blades develop 

cracks from improper maintenance, 

rigging, and operation. 

We disagree. Failures and fractures 

have occurred in the field in the P/N 

248–202 blades, and we have been 

provided with no supporting data that 

shows they occurred because of 

improper rigging, maintenance, or 

operation of the aircraft. Brantly, with 

help from a laboratory report written by 

a metallurgical engineering company, 

concluded that the M/R blade failure 

was caused by hydrocarbons 

contamination inside the blades’ skinto-foam bond and that the fractures 

originated near the trailing edge. The 

P/N 248–101 and P/N 248–404 blades 

are similar in construction to the P/N 

248–202 blades, and thus are included 

and addressed in this AD. The AD does, 

however, address the blades separately 

by not requiring inspecting the P/N 


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60340 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 7, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

248–404 blades until after 10 years or 

1,000 hours time-in-service (TIS), 

instead of within 8 hours TIS like the 

other blades. 

Eliminate or Change the Eddy Current 

Inspection Requirements 

Eight commenters requested that we 

eliminate the eddy current inspection 

from the AD. Five commenters 

requested replacing the eddy current 

inspection with other types (visual, tap 

test, fluorescent or dye penetrant) of 

inspection. Some commenters said eddy 

current testing was impractical because 

it could not be done successfully at 

certain locations. Many commenters 

believed an eddy current inspection 

would not successfully detect a crack or 

would provide false readings. One 

commenter stated that the eddy current 

inspection would destroy the blade. 

We disagree. An eddy current 

inspection is needed to detect a 

potential unsafe condition, and it is a 

reasonable, widely used, and costeffective procedure. No alternate 

procedure has been provided that can 

address the unsafe condition as reliably. 

Visual or magnifying glass inspections 

are not as effective as eddy current 

inspections. The eddy current 

inspection procedure has been validated 

and is similar to other blade crack 

inspections. While there may be some 

false indication, these should be false 

positives, which can be re-evaluated. 

The procedure is a nondestructive 

inspection and if done correctly, will 

not destroy any blade. The procedure 

can be done in the field by a qualified 

inspector if the inspection area is clean, 

has proper lighting, and has the proper 

equipment. We have not been provided 

with any supporting data that justifies 

eliminating the eddy current inspection 

from the AD. 

We do agree with one commenter who 

requested a visual inspection before the 

first flight of each day being performed 

by the helicopter owner or operator, 

since this is best accomplished as part 

of the other daily inspections and does 

not require tools. We also agree with 

reducing the scope of the eddy current 

inspection area to just the first inboard 

12 inches because this is where the 

fractures have occurred. Eddy current 

inspecting the outboard area would not 

be effective in finding the unsafe 

condition. The AD reflects these 

changes. 

Replace the Inspection Requirements 

Two commenters suggested replacing 

the AD requirements with different 

requirements. One commenter requested 

a mandatory inspection to identify those 

main rotor blades not produced or 

repaired using an FAA approved quality 

system or materials or processes. The 

commenter believed such blades alone 

may contain the unsafe condition due to 

unapproved blade spars and hinge 

blocks. Another commenter proposed a 

check of all used blades because the 

unsafe condition is caused by incorrect 

installation of the blade damper units. 

We disagree. The lab report 

concluded that the M/R blade failure 

was caused by hydrocarbons 

contamination inside the blades’ skinto-foam bond and that the fracture 

originated near the trailing edge. No 

data supports a conclusion that the spar 

or hinge block were unapproved or that 

the rivet hole edge distance or pattern 

caused the unsafe condition. Also, no 

data shows that the damper caused the 

unsafe condition and thus an initial 

check for improper damper installation 

is not merited. There is history that the 

incident helicopter may have had quick 

starts and that the dampers had to be 

replaced, but the quick starts and 

damper issues have not been 

substantiated to be the root cause. 

Allow Routine Maintenance To Correct 

The Unsafe Condition 

Five commenters stated that routine 

maintenance inspections are sufficient 

to detect a crack in the blades. One 

commenter requested that a revision to 

the Brantly Service Bulletin would 

correct the blade problem and provided 

suggested content. 

We disagree. The failures that have 

occurred in the field show that the 

blades have an unsafe condition and 

that the current routine maintenance 

and inspection procedures do not have 

adequate methods to address it. The 

procedures in the commenter’s 

suggested revision of the service 

bulletin are also inadequate to address 

the unsafe condition because those 

procedures do not include a necessary 

eddy current inspection and allow too 

much duration between magnifying 

glass inspections. Additionally, the FAA 

does not have the authority to require 

Brantly to revise its service information 

with a specific maintenance procedure. 

Rather, we correct an unsafe condition 

by mandating certain actions through an 

AD. 

Withdraw the NPRM Because There Is 

No Unsafe Condition 

One commenter requested we 

withdraw the AD for more analysis and 

testing of the blades. The commenter 

questioned the data and analyses relied 

upon to conclude an unsafe condition 

exists on these blades and suggested the 

FAA has insufficient information upon 

which to make its determination. The 

commenter stated the FAA should 

determine the precise root cause and the 

exact serial number series of affected 

blades before issuing an AD. Another 

commenter requested that we perform 

‘‘a verification and validation on actual 

Brantly helicopter blades’’ before 

issuing the AD. Four commenters stated 

that no blade failures have caused an 

accident or loss of life and that the blade 

problem that prompted this AD resulted 

from the aircraft owner’s improper 

maintenance. 

We disagree. Improper maintenance 

and operation has not been shown to be 

the root cause of the blade failures. The 

root cause of the failures has been 

demonstrated by Brantly with help from 

a laboratory report written by a 

metallurgical engineering company. The 

report took into account stresses and 

loading and determined that skin 

fracture was propagated by corrosion 

fatigue and mechanical fatigue. The 

report concluded that the M/R blades 

failure was caused by hydrocarbons 

contamination inside the blades’ skinto-foam bond and that the fracture 

originated near the trailing edge. 

Additional information about the data 

and analyses we relied upon in issuing 

this AD includes the following. The 

original blades were certificated using a 

crack initiation methodology (e.g., using 

the S–N curves and Miner’s Rule). 

Shortly after certification, a fatigue test 

was accomplished on the mid-span of 

the spar and skin. Stereomicroscopy, 

wavelength dispersive X-ray 

spectroscopy, combustion testing, 

tensile testing, peel testing, scanning 

electron microscopy, micro Fourier 

infrared spectroscopy, and hardness 

testing were all performed to determine 

the causes of the delamination and 

crack propagation. An M/R blade failure 

analysis, risk analysis, cost analysis, and 

economic analysis were performed 

before we issued the NPRM. The 

failures were found in the skin-to-foam 

bond and in the skin and rivets at the 

rivet joints attaching the skin to the 

hinge block and/or spar. The cracks 

originated near the skins’ trailing edge 

and propagated between rivet holes and 

into the leading edge rivet holes. These 

rivets carry shear between the hinge 

block and skin and the spar and skin. 

Per the laboratory report, the bonding 

material between the skin to foam was 

3M 1239 & 3M 11239A, the foam core 

was Stafoam AA604, the type of rivets 

were AA1100, and the blade was P/N 

248–202. No serial number sequence 

has been determined or is needed since 

only the part numbers are necessary to 

identify the applicable blades. 

We also disagree that loss of life or 

significant damage to an aircraft must 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 7, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 60341 

occur for us to determine that there is 

an unsafe condition. Because it is a 

critical component, failure of an M/R 

blade could have catastrophic 

consequences. However, the 

commenters are correct that the event in 

New Zealand was classified as an 

incident instead of an accident because 

the helicopter landed without further 

damage. We have revised the preamble 

of this AD to reflect this change. 

Blade Repairs 

One commenter requested the FAA 

license a certified repair center to 

rebuild the blades if they crack before 

the spar and hinge-block have reached 

their life limit. Another commenter 

asked us to approve a blade re-skinning 

or repair process instead of the blade 

replacement requirement in the AD. 

Three commenters stated that no 

replacement blades exist, and therefore 

if the AD is adopted as proposed, it will 

ground all flying Brantly helicopters 

until a source for new blades is found 

or a facility is certified to re-build the 

blades. 

We disagree. We are unaware of any 

approved process specification or data 

to rebuild or re-skin blades to an 

airworthy condition. Assuming such a 

process does exist, requiring a repair 

center to rebuild or re-skin the blades is 

beyond the authority of the FAA. To the 

extent spare blades may not exist to 

replace blades that fail the inspection 

requirements of this AD, the FAA 

cannot base its AD action on whether 

spare parts are available or can be 

produced. While every effort is made to 

avoid grounding aircraft, we must 

address the unsafe condition. 

Issue an SAIB 

One commenter requested that we 

issue a special airworthiness 

information bulletin (SAIB) with certain 

visual inspection and maintenance 

procedures and provided proposed 

contents. 

We disagree. An SAIB contains nonmandatory information and guidance for 

certain safety issues. The SAIB is an 

information tool to alert, educate, and 

make recommendations to the aviation 

community about ways to improve the 

safety of a product. An SAIB may not be 

issued where there is an unsafe 

condition. The FAA has data supporting 

its determination that an unsafe 

condition exists with the specified 

Brantly main rotor blades. 

We also disagree with the proposed 

SAIB contents. No supporting data has 

been provided demonstrating how the 

proposed inspection and maintenance 

practices would stop the blade skins 

from cracking or delaminating from the 

foam core because of random overload 

events and improper operation. Also, no 

supporting data has been provided that 

shows that an improperly manufactured 

or installed hinge block caused the 

unsafe condition. The proposed SAIB 

content also eliminates the necessary 

eddy current inspection and reduces the 

10x magnifying glass inspection, which 

we have determined are necessary to 

correct the unsafe condition. 

Training Programs 

One commenter requested education 

and training for maintenance providers, 

operators, and owners with respect to 

the blades. Specifically, the commenter 

wanted the training to include the 

significance of the placards, type 

certificate data sheet (TCDS) 

instructions, and operating limitations. 

The commenter stated that Brantly 

helicopters are safe and attributed the 

blade failures to lack of education and 

proper maintenance and operation of 

the aircraft and its components. 

We disagree. Individuals responsible 

for maintaining and operating an 

airworthy helicopter are required to 

know the significance of placards, TCDS 

instructions, and operating limitations. 

While additional training may be 

beneficial, we have no information to 

suggest that it would correct the unsafe 

condition. 

FAA’s Determination 

We have reviewed the relevant 

information, considered the comments 

received, and determined that an unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of these same 

type designs and that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

requirements as proposed with the 

changes described previously. We have 

also made minor editorial changes in 

referencing the service information to 

meet current publishing requirements. 

These changes are consistent with the 

intent of the proposals in the NPRM (77 

FR 63285, October 16, 2012) and will 

not increase the economic burden on 

any operator nor increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Related Service Information 

We reviewed Brantly International 

Inc. Service Bulletin No. 111, dated 

February 10, 2011 (SB 111). The bulletin 

describes procedures for inspecting the 

M/R blades at intervals not to exceed 

300 hours TIS using Eddy Current 

Procedure ET002, performing a visual 

inspection using a 10X power 

magnifying glass, and conducting a tap 

test every 25 hours TIS and a visual 

inspection of the M/R blades before the 

first flight of the day. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

Service Information 

SB–111 requires accomplishment of 

sections 1 and 2 before further flight. 

The AD requires them to be completed 

within 8 hours TIS. SB–111 allows up 

to 10 square inches of delamination 

outside of the inboard 12 inches of the 

M/R blade. The AD only allows up to 

2 square inches of delamination outside 

of the inboard 12 inches of the M/R 

blade. SB–111 requires inspecting for 

nicks, creases, wrinkles, bends, 

additional holes, extra rivets, and 

inadequate rivet spacing and replacing 

the blade if any of these conditions are 

found. The AD only requires inspecting 

for a crack and delamination and 

replacing the blade if there is a crack or 

if there is delamination in certain areas 

or exceeding a certain amount. SB–111 

calls for eddy current inspections of the 

entire blade. The AD requires eddy 

current inspections for cracks only 

within the inboard 12 inches. Lastly, 

SB–111 specifies a daily inspection of 

the M/R blade. We are making a change 

from the NPRM to allow an owner/

operator (pilot) holding at least a private 

pilot certificate to perform a daily check 

of the M/R blade. The performance of 

the check is required to be entered into 

the aircraft’s maintenance records 

showing compliance with this AD in 

accordance with applicable regulations. 

This authorization marks an exception 

to our standard maintenance 

regulations. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 76 

helicopters of U.S. registry. We estimate 

the following costs to comply with this 

AD, using an average of $85 per workhour: 

• For the visual check before the first 

flight of each day, we estimate that it 

requires about one half work-hour for a 

labor cost of about $43 per inspection 

cycle. No parts are needed, so the total 

cost for the U.S. fleet is $3,268. 

• For the eddy current inspection, we 

estimate that it requires about three 

work-hours for a labor cost of $255 per 

inspection cycle. No parts are needed, 

so the total cost for the 76-helicopter 

U.S. fleet is $19,380 per inspection 

cycle. 

• For the visual inspection with the 

magnifying glass and the tap inspection, 

we estimate that it requires about three 

work-hours for a labor cost of $255 per 

inspection cycle. No parts are needed, 

so the total cost for the U.S. fleet is 

$19,380 per inspection cycle. 

• Replacing an M/R blade, if needed, 

requires about two work-hours for a 

labor cost of $170. An M/R blade costs 


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60342 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 7, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

$7,500 for a total cost of $7,670 per 

helicopter, assuming one M/R blade is 

replaced. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that This AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska to the extent that it justifies 

making a regulatory distinction; and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared an economic evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2014–20–16 Brantly International, Inc.: 

Amendment 39–17989; Docket No. 

FAA–2012–1093; Directorate Identifier 

2011–SW–020–AD. 

(a) Applicability 

This AD applies to the Brantly 

International, Inc., (Brantly) Model B–2, 

Model B–2A, and Model B–2B helicopters, 

with a main rotor (M/R) blade, part number 

(P/N) 248–101, 248–202, or 248–404, 

installed, certificated in any category. 

(b) Unsafe Condition 

This AD defines the unsafe condition as a 

crack or delamination in an M/R blade. This 

condition could result in loss of an M/R 

blade and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

(c) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective November 12, 

2014. 

(d) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 

(e) Required Actions 

(1) Before the first flight of each day, 

visually check the top and bottom of each M/ 

R blade for a crack. Pay particular attention 

to the M/R blade root area, the area around 

the lead/lag damper mounting fork, and the 

trailing edge. These actions may be 

performed by the owner/operator (pilot) 

holding at least a private pilot certificate, and 

must be entered into the aircraft records 

showing compliance with this AD in 

accordance with 14 CFR 43.9 (a)(1) through 

(4) and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v). The record 

must be maintained as required by 14 CFR 

91.417, 121.380, or 135.439. 

(2) Within 8 hours time-in-service (TIS), for 

a helicopter with an M/R blade, P/N 248–101 

or P/N 248–202, and for a helicopter with an 

M/R blade P/N 248–404 with 10 or more 

years or 1,000 or more hours TIS, whichever 

occurs first, remove each M/R blade and: 

(i) Using an inspector qualified to the 

American Society for Nondestructive Testing 

(ASNT) Level II or equivalent, eddy current 

inspect each M/R blade for a crack in 

accordance with paragraph 4 and paragraphs 

7 through 17 of Brantly International B–2 

Main Rotor Blade Root Skin Inspection 

Technique Number ET002, dated November 

2007 (technique), except this AD only 

requires you to inspect the inboard first 12 

inches of the top and bottom of each blade. 

Note 1 to paragraph (e)(2)(i) of this AD: A 

copy of the Technique is attached to Brantly 

International, Inc., Service Bulletin No. 111, 

dated February 10, 2011 (SB 111). 

(ii) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 

300 hours TIS or five calendar years, 

whichever occurs first, repeat the eddy 

current inspection in accordance with the 

requirements of paragraph (e)(2)(i) of this AD. 

(iii) Using a metallic coin or tap hammer, 

tap inspect each M/R blade for delamination 

in the bonded areas as shown on SB–111, 

Section 4. Pay particular attention to the root 

area in the first 12 inches of the top and 

bottom of each M/R blade. 

(iv) Using a 10X or higher power 

magnifying glass, visually inspect the top and 

bottom of each M/R blade for a crack. 

(v) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 25 

hours TIS, repeat the tap inspection in 

accordance with the requirements of 

paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this AD and the visual 

inspection using a 10X or higher power 

magnifying glass in accordance with the 

requirements of paragraph (e)(2)(iv) of this 

AD. 

(3) Before further flight, remove from 

service any M/R blade with a crack, 

delamination within the inboard 12 inches, 

or total delamination greater than 2 square 

inches outside the inboard 12 inches. 

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Rotorcraft Certification 

Office, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this 

AD. Send your proposal to: Marc Belhumeur, 

Senior Project Engineer, Rotorcraft 

Certification Office, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, 

Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222–5170; 

email 7-AVS-ASW-170@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(g) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 6210, Main Rotor Blade. 

(h) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Brantly International B–2 Main Rotor 

Blade Root Skin Inspection, Technique 

Number ET002, dated November 1, 2007. 

(ii) Brantly International Inc., Service 

Bulletin No. 111, dated February 10, 2011. 

(3) For Brantly service information 

identified in this AD, contact Brantly 

International, Inc., 621 South Royal Lane, 

Suite 100, Coppell Texas, 75019, telephone 

(972) 829–4638, email tarcher@

superiorairparts.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 


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1 Interested parties can find these documents 

under either the ‘‘Emission Model and Conformity’’ 

or ‘‘Project-Level Conformity’’ topics on this Web 

site. 

2Nonattainment and maintenance areas located 

in California use the latest approved version of the 

Emission FACtor (EMFAC) model. 

Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., 

Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 

19, 2014. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–23592 Filed 10–6–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Parts 51 and 93 

[FRL–9917–26–OAR] 

Official Release of the MOVES2014 

Motor Vehicle Emissions Model for 

SIPs and Transportation Conformity 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) is approving and 

announcing the availability of the Motor 

Vehicle Emissions Simulator model 

(MOVES2014) for official use outside of 

California. MOVES2014 is the latest 

state-of-the art upgrade to EPA’s 

modeling tools for estimating emissions 

from cars, trucks, buses, and 

motorcycles, based on the latest data 

and regulations. MOVES2014 is 

approved for use in state 

implementation plans (SIPs) and 

transportation conformity analyses 

outside of California. This notice starts 

a two-year grace period before the 

MOVES2014 emission model is required 

to be used in new regional emissions 

analyses and new hot-spot analyses for 

transportation conformity 

determinations outside of California. 

DATES: EPA’s approval of the 

MOVES2014 emissions model for SIPs 

and transportation conformity analyses 

in states other than California is 

effective October 7, 2014. This approval 

also starts a two-year transportation 

conformity grace period that ends on 

October 7, 2016, after which 

MOVES2014 is required to be used for 

new transportation conformity analyses 

outside of California. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical model questions regarding the 

official release or use of MOVES2014, 

please email EPA at mobile@epa.gov. 

For questions about SIPs, contact Rudy 

Kapichak at Kapichak.Rudolph@epa.gov 

or (734)214–4574. For transportation 

conformity questions, contact Astrid 

Larsen at larsen.astrid@epa.gov or 

(734)214–4812. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

contents of this document are as 

follows: 

I. General Information 

II. What is MOVES2014? 

III. SIP Policy for MOVES2014 

IV. Transportation Conformity and 

MOVES2014 

I. General Information 

A. Does this action apply to me? 

Entities potentially impacted by the 

approval of MOVES2014 are those that 

adopt, approve, or fund transportation 

plans, transportation improvement 

programs (TIPs), or projects under title 

23 U.S.C. or title 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53 

and those that develop and submit SIPs 

to EPA. Regulated categories and 

entities affected by this action include: 

Category Examples of regulated entities 

Local government .................................... Local transportation and air quality agencies, including metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). 

State government .................................... State transportation and air quality agencies. 

Federal government ................................ Department of Transportation (Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA)). 

This table is not intended to be 

exhaustive, but rather provides a guide 

for readers regarding entities likely to be 

affected by the release of MOVES. Other 

entities not listed in the table could also 

be affected. To determine whether your 

organization is affected by this action, 

you should carefully examine the 

transportation conformity applicability 

requirements in 40 CFR 93.102. If you 

have questions regarding the 

applicability of this action to a 

particular entity, consult the persons 

listed in the preceding FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section. 

B. How can I get copies of MOVES2014 

and other related information? 

The official version of the 

MOVES2014 model, along with user 

guides and supporting documentation, 

are available on EPA’s MOVES Web site: 

www.epa.gov/otaq/models/moves/

index.htm. 

Individuals who wish to receive EPA 

announcements related to the 

MOVES2014 model should subscribe to 

the EPA-MOBILENEWS email listserv. 

To subscribe to the EPA-MOBILENEWS 

listserv, send a blank email to EPA at 

join-EPA-MOBILENEWS@lists.epa.gov. 

Your email address will then be added 

to the list of subscribers and a 

confirmation message will be sent to 

your email address. For more 

information about the EPAMOBILENEWS listserv, visit EPA’s Web 

site at www.epa.gov/otaq/models/

mobilelist.htm. 

Available guidance on how to apply 

MOVES2014 for SIPs and transportation 

conformity purposes can be found on 

EPA’s transportation conformity Web 

site, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/

stateresources/transconf/policy.htm,1

including ‘‘Policy Guidance on the Use 

of MOVES2014 for State 

Implementation Plan Development, 

Transportation Conformity, and Other 

Purposes’’ (EPA–420–B–14–008, July 

2014). 

EPA will continue to update these 

Web sites as other MOVES support 

materials and guidance are developed or 

updated. 

II. What is MOVES2014? 

MOVES2014 is EPA’s latest motor 

vehicle emissions model for state and 

local agencies to estimate volatile 

organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen 

oxides (NOX), particulate matter (PM2.5

and PM10), carbon monoxide (CO), and 

other precursors from cars, trucks, 

buses, and motorcycles for SIP purposes 

and conformity determinations outside 

of California.2 The model is based on 

analyses of millions of emission test 

results and considerable advances in the 

Agency’s understanding of vehicle 

emissions. The first model in the 

MOVES series, called MOVES2010, was 


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