FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ERIC JAMAR GOODALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-10004

D.C. No.

2:15-CR-00077-

JCM-VCF-1

ORDER AND 

AMENDED 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 8, 2021

San Francisco, California

Filed October 13, 2021

Amended December 28, 2021

Before: Susan P. Graber and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit 

Judges, and Kathryn H. Vratil,

* District Judge.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Lee

* The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
2 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel dismissed, as barred by the appellate waiver 

in his plea agreement, Eric Goodall’s appeal seeking to 

vacate his conviction and sentence for brandishing a firearm 

in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c).

After Goodall filed his appeal, the Supreme Court held 

in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), that 

§ 924(c)’s “residual clause” defining a “crime of violence” 

was unconstitutionally vague. Goodall asserted that his 

§ 924(c) conviction must be vacated because a Hobbs Act 

conspiracy is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s 

“elements clause,” which remains valid post-Davis.

The panel held that Goodall’s appellate waiver 

forecloses any challenge to his conviction because the 

provision, in which he waived “the right to appeal any . . . 

aspect of the conviction or sentence,” meets both conditions 

for enforcement: (1) the text of the broad appellate waiver 

bars any challenge based on Davis; and (2) the waiver was 

knowing and voluntary. The panel explained that when a 

defendant waives his appellate rights, he knows that he is 

giving up all appeals, no matter what unforeseen events may 

happen.

The panel also held that the “illegal sentence” exception 

to an appellate waiver does not apply. The panel declined to 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 3

extend United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 

2016), which held that an appellate waiver does not apply to 

an “illegal sentence,” to invalidate an appellate waiver if the 

conviction was later found to be illegal. The panel wrote that 

“illegal sentence” has a precise legal meaning, which does 

not include illegal convictions; and that the rationale for the 

“illegal sentence” exception rests on the inherent uncertainty 

in sentencing, which does not exist for convictions. The 

panel wrote that although there always remains a chance the 

law could change in a defendant’s favor, the defendant 

knowingly and voluntarily assumes that risk because he 

receives a presumably favorable deal under existing law. 

The panel noted that the practical effect of Goodall’s 

argument could undo nearly all appellate waivers, yielding 

perverse consequences.

COUNSEL

Angela H. Dows (argued), Premier Legal Group, Las Vegas, 

Nevada, for Defendant-Appellant.

Elizabeth Olson White (argued), Appellate Chief; Peter S. 

Levitt, Assistant United States Attorney; United States 

Attorney’s Office, Reno, Nevada; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Andrea K. George, Executive Director and Colin G. Prince, 

Chief Appellate Attorney, Federal Defenders of Eastern 

Washington, Spokane, Washington; for Amici Curiae 

Federal Public Defenders of the Ninth Circuit.
4 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

ORDER

The Opinion filed on October 13, 2021, is amended as 

follows: 

On slip opinion page 18, line 24, insert a footnote after 

<invitation.> stating: <Defendant did not raise, and we do 

not consider, the applicability, if any, of an exception for a 

miscarriage of justice. We express no view on the viability 

of that exception in other circumstances.>

The Clerk shall file the amended opinion submitted with 

this Order.

Appellant’s Petitions for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing 

En Banc (Dkt. No. 62) are otherwise DENIED. No further 

petitions for rehearing may be filed.

OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

Facing potentially more than seven decades in prison for 

his role in a string of armed robberies, Eric Goodall struck a 

plea deal. He pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to 

commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) and one 

count of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a 

crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)). He also accepted 

a 20-year sentencing recommendation and agreed to waive 

his right to appeal his conviction or sentence. The district 

court imposed an even shorter sentence of 14 years’ 

imprisonment. About a year and a half after his sentencing, 

the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 

(2019), held that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 5

cannot be a crime of violence under the residual clause of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

Goodall now tries to wriggle his way out of his plea deal. 

Despite his appellate waiver, Goodall seeks to vacate his 

§ 924(c) conviction, arguing that he could not have 

knowingly waived an appellate issue not yet in existence at 

the time of his plea deal. He also asks this court to expand 

our “illegal sentence” exception to an appellate waiver and 

carve out yet another exemption for an “illegal conviction.” 

See United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1124–25 (9th 

Cir. 2016).

We uphold the appellate waiver in Goodall’s plea 

agreement and thus dismiss his appeal. By waiving his 

appellate rights, Goodall knowingly and voluntarily 

assumed the risk that the law might change in his favor. We 

also decline to expand the “illegal sentence” exception. Our 

decision in Torres carefully circumscribed the definition of 

“illegal sentence,” and its reasoning does not apply to 

purportedly “illegal convictions.”

BACKGROUND

I. Goodall and his crew rob a series of stores in Las 

Vegas.

In a span of two months, Eric Goodall and his two 

associates, T.P.F. and P.A.V., perpetrated a series of armed 

robberies in Las Vegas. The group first targeted T.P.F.’s 

former employer, the Beauty Supply Warehouse. T.P.F. 

dropped Goodall and P.A.V. off at the store. Once inside, 

Goodall brandished a firearm and demanded that the store 

clerks turn over all the cash in the store. After the workers 

handed over about $3,500, Goodall and P.A.V. escaped and 

jumped into T.P.F.’s getaway car. Using some of their ill-
6 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

gotten gains from the robbery, Goodall illegally bought a 

TEC-9 handgun.

About a month later, the trio then set their sights on a 

different Beauty Supply Warehouse. T.P.F. again dropped 

Goodall and P.A.V. off at the store. The pair repeated their 

routine with Goodall clutching his new TEC-9 gun and 

demanding cash from the register. After clearing the cash 

register, Goodall and P.A.V. forced the manager and his 

employees, at gunpoint, to open the safe in the back of the 

store. After taking the cash, the pair fled in T.P.F.’s getaway 

car. They made off with $1,900.

The group struck again about a week later at an 

O’Reilly’s Auto Parts store. This time, all three men entered 

the store. Goodall acted as a lookout while T.P.F. and 

P.A.V. wielded handguns and demanded the money in the 

cash register. Again, the three men ordered the clerks to 

open the safe in the back of the store. Despite threats to 

shoot them, the clerks could not open the safe because of its 

ten-minute timer, so the trio fled with only $1,135.92.

Goodall then split off from the group and went solo. He 

drove to a second O’Reilly’s on West Craig Road with his 

TEC-9. Flashing his TEC-9, Goodall demanded cash from 

the register before forcing the clerks to the back of the store 

to open the safe. In total, he left with $615. The next day, 

Goodall targeted a Cricket Wireless Store. Repeating his 

strategy, Goodall left the store with $3,848 from the store’s 

register and safe. Two days later, Goodall robbed another 

Cricket Wireless store. This time, Goodall became more 

violent. When the employees could not open the safe, 

Goodall began counting down from five, threatening to 

shoot them when he reached zero. Goodall eventually left 

the store with just the petty cash box containing $600.
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 7

Later that day, Goodall reunited with T.P.F. and P.A.V. 

for what would be the group’s last heist. In Goodall’s words, 

the group wanted to “go big,” this time targeting the National 

Jewelry Liquidation Center. In preparation, the group went 

to Wal-Mart to purchase rubber gloves and pantyhose. They 

arrived at the jewelry store just before 2:00 P.M. The 

jewelry store’s security was far tighter, employing an “airlock” entry system. Goodall and P.A.V. posed as cleaners 

to gain entry. Once the staff unlocked the door, Goodall and 

P.A.V. donned their pantyhose face masks and entered with 

firearms in hand. As Goodall and P.A.V. ordered the 

customers and employees to the floor, T.P.F. backed the 

vehicle up to the store’s doors, preventing anyone from 

entering or exiting.

Goodall and P.A.V. repeatedly threatened those inside 

the store as Goodall forced the manager at gunpoint to open 

display cases and a timed safe. In total, the pair stuffed over 

$700,000 in watches, jewelry, and other valuable items into 

a knapsack. Hearing a helicopter overhead and fearing law 

enforcement’s imminent arrival, Goodall and P.A.V. hopped 

into the getaway vehicle with their knapsack. Unknown to 

them, one of the items contained a GPS tracking beacon.

T.P.F. sped away from the scene. But the Las Vegas 

police used the GPS beacon to close in on the getaway car. 

Driving recklessly to evade arrest, T.P.F. struck a curb near 

the Mirage Hotel and Casino. Goodall and P.A.V. jumped 

out of the car and fled on foot. The police, however, caught 

up to them and arrested them.

II. Goodall agrees to a plea deal.

A grand jury returned a four-count indictment against 

Goodall, charging him with two counts of Hobbs Act 
8 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

Conspiracy1 (Counts One and Two), 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 

and two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence (Counts Three and Four), 

18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. The two Hobbs Act 

Conspiracy charges served as the predicate “crimes of 

violence” for the § 924(c) charges.

Goodall pleaded guilty to Counts One, Two, and Four on 

May 26, 2015. The government agreed to drop Count Three, 

under which Goodall, if convicted, would have faced an 

additional 25-year consecutive sentence. United States v. 

Beltran-Moreno, 556 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2009). As part 

of the plea agreement, and central to this appeal, Goodall 

agreed to a broad appellate waiver:

The defendant knowingly and expressly 

waives: (a) the right to appeal any sentence 

imposed within or below the applicable 

Sentencing Guidelines range as determined 

by the Court; (b) the right to appeal the 

manner in which the Court determined the 

sentence on the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742; and (c) the right to appeal any other 

aspect of the conviction or sentence and any 

order of restitution or forfeiture.

The defendant also knowingly and expressly 

waives all collateral challenges, including

any claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to his 

conviction, sentence, and the procedure by 

1 The Hobbs Act prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion 

affecting interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951. Section 1951 also proscribes conspiracy to commit robbery or 

extortion without reference to the conspiracy statute at 18 U.S.C. § 371.
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 9

which the Court adjudicated guilt and 

imposed sentence . . . .” (emphasis added).

The only grounds for appeal that Goodall preserved were 

“non-waivable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel” 

and sentences that are “an upward departure or an upward 

variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range determined 

by the Court.”

Goodall appeared before the district court for sentencing 

on December 20, 2017. Although Goodall had pleaded 

guilty, he now questioned the legality of his § 924(c) 

conviction. One month after Goodall pleaded guilty, the 

Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 

591, 606 (2015), that the so-called “residual clause”2 in the 

definition of a “violent felony” under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally 

vague. Goodall argued that the similarly worded “residual 

clause” in § 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” was 

also unconstitutionally vague. If true, Goodall maintained 

that his conviction for Hobbs Act conspiracy could not 

constitute a “crime of violence,” making his § 924(c) 

conviction legally defective.

The government urged the district court to focus on the 

facts Goodall admitted in the plea agreement: that he 

conspired to commit—and committed—eight armed 

2 The Armed Career Criminal Act defines a “violent felony” as “any 

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . ” 

that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another” or “is burglary, arson, or 

extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 

§ 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The emphasized clause is known as 

the “residual clause.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 594.
10 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

robberies, and he personally brandished a firearm during 

those robberies. The government claimed that Goodall 

could have been charged with eight counts of Hobbs Act 

robbery (rather than conspiracy), which constitutes a crime 

of violence. If so, he would have faced 127 years in prison 

but for the leniency under the plea agreement that Goodall 

now attacks.

Before sentencing, the parties jointly agreed to 

recommend a 240-month sentence to the court. The court 

rejected the stipulated 240-month sentence as “excessive” 

under the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Instead, 

the court sentenced Goodall to only 168 months: 84 months 

for the Hobbs Act conspiracy counts and 84 months for the 

§ 924(c) conviction, the mandatory minimum sentence for 

that offense. As for Goodall’s objection under Johnson, the 

court advised, without deciding the issue, that Goodall could 

try his luck on appeal.

III. Goodall appeals to vacate his § 924(c) conviction.

On December 29, 2017, Goodall filed an appeal, asking 

this court to vacate his § 924(c) conviction and its 84-month 

sentence. About a year and a half later, the Supreme Court 

held in United States v. Davis that § 924(c)’s “residual 

clause” defining a “crime of violence” was 

unconstitutionally vague. 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). We 

ordered supplemental briefing, asking the parties to address 

Davis’s effect on this appeal.

Goodall asserts that, post-Davis, only § 924(c)’s 

“elements clause”3 defining a “crime of violence” remains 

3 Section 924(c) defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has 

as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 11

valid and that his conviction must be vacated because a 

Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a “crime of violence” under the 

“elements clause.” The government concedes that a Hobbs 

Act conspiracy is not a “crime of violence” under the 

“elements clause,” but argues that Goodall’s appellate 

waiver bars his challenge. And even if Goodall succeeds on 

his appeal, the government argues that he likely will be 

resentenced to far more prison time than the 168 months he 

had received.4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether a defendant waived his right 

to appeal under a plea agreement. United States v. Watson, 

582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009).

against the person or property of another” (i.e., the “elements clause”), 

or “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 

against the person or property of another may be used in the course of 

committing the offense.” (i.e., the “residual clause”). 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(3).

4 On remand, Goodall would remain obligated under his plea 

agreement to request a sentence of 240 months in prison. If the court 

accepted this recommendation, Goodall would serve another six years in 

prison. But if Goodall were to request less than 240 months, he would 

breach the plea agreement, freeing the government from its obligations. 

The government claims that it could then pursue a superseding 

indictment and conviction on eight substantive Hobbs Act robberies and 

the eight corresponding § 924(c) offenses, which would result, upon 

conviction, in mandatory prison time of 56 years on the § 924(c) counts, 

along with any time the court might impose on the robbery convictions. 

We need not, and do not, decide whether the government’s interpretation 

is correct.
12 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

ANALYSIS

I. Goodall’s Appellate Waiver Forecloses Any 

Challenge to His Conviction.

An appellate waiver is enforceable if “(1) the language 

of the waiver encompasses [the defendant’s] right to appeal 

on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and 

voluntarily made.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 

1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 

2007) (en banc). Because the waiver provision in Goodall’s 

plea agreement meets both conditions, we must enforce it.

A. The text of the broad appellate waiver bars any 

challenge based on Davis.

We start with the “fundamental rule that plea agreements 

are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law 

standards.” United States v. Clark, 218 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We thus “will generally enforce the plain language 

of a plea agreement if it is clear and unambiguous on its 

face.” Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1153 (applying rule to waiver 

provision).

Goodall agreed to a broad appellate waiver: He waived 

“the right to appeal any . . . aspect of the conviction or 

sentence.” (emphasis added). The provision has two narrow 

exceptions to the broad waiver: an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim and an upward departure from the Sentencing 

Guidelines range. The parties—and we—agree that neither 

exception applies here. Goodall, however, insists that the 

waiver does not preclude his appeal because it did not 

explicitly relinquish his appeal based on Davis. In other 

words, Goodall asks us to require the government to 
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 13

enumerate every possible ground for appeal, both known and 

unknown, to enforce a plea deal.

But the plain text of the plea agreement forecloses 

Goodall’s argument. He waived his “right to appeal any . . .

aspect of the conviction or sentence.” And under the 

expressio unius canon of construction, the two narrow 

exceptions to the waiver confirm that Goodall’s waiver of 

“any other aspect of his conviction or sentence” includes this 

appeal. See Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1234 

(9th Cir. 2013) (under the expressio unius rule of contract 

interpretation, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion 

of all others). Faced with this type of broad waiver, we 

“have consistently read general waivers of the right to appeal 

to cover all appeals.” United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 

1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). And even if a 

plea agreement “does not specifically contemplate” the 

defendant’s argument on appeal, a waiver’s “broad language 

clearly bars” bringing an appeal. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1154 

(holding that defendant’s waiver of “any and all rights to 

appeal” precludes appeals based on “all grounds”). That is 

the case here.

B. Goodall knowingly and voluntarily waived his 

right to challenge his § 924(c) conviction.

We next consider Goodall’s argument that his waiver—

even if it applies to his Davis challenge—was not knowing 

and voluntary. After Goodall entered his guilty plea, the 

Supreme Court decided Johnson and Davis. Goodall 

contends that these two cases render his appellate waiver 

unknowing and involuntary because he could not possibly 

have contemplated this argument when he waived his 

appellate rights.
14 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

We have found appellate waivers knowing and voluntary 

despite later changes in the law. “[A] change in the law does 

not make a plea involuntary and unknowing.” United States 

v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005). That a 

defendant does not “foresee the specific issue that he now 

seeks to appeal does not place that issue outside the scope of 

his waiver.” United States v. Johnson, 67 F.3d 200, 203 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Navarro-Botello, 

912 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument 

that an appellate waiver is “involuntary because it is 

logically impossible to make a knowing and intelligent 

waiver of unknown rights.”).

When a defendant waives his appellate rights, he knows 

that he is giving up all appeals, no matter what unforeseen 

events may happen. In exchange for the waiver, a defendant 

receives “certainty derived from the negotiated plea with a 

set sentence parameter.” Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320; 

see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 

(1987) (“[T]he certain benefits of escaping criminal 

prosecution exceed the speculative benefits of prevailing” in 

a future action.). Here, the government dropped one 

§ 924(c) count (which reduced the mandatory minimum 

sentence by 25 years) and agreed to recommend a 240-

month sentence. When Goodall agreed to this plea 

agreement, he apparently believed that it was a good deal for 

him. Just because Goodall’s choice looks less favorable 

“with the benefit of hindsight[] does not make the choice 

involuntary.” Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 320. A plea 

agreement is no different in this respect from any other 

contract in which someone may have buyer’s remorse after 

an unforeseen future event—the contract remains valid 

because the parties knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the 

terms. There is no do-over just because a defendant later 
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 15

regrets agreeing to a plea deal. We thus find that Goodall’s 

waiver of his appellate rights was knowing and voluntary.

II. The “illegal sentence” exception to an appellate 

waiver does not apply.

Finally, Goodall latches onto our decision in Torres, 

828 F.3d at 1125, in which we held that an appellate waiver 

does not apply to an “illegal sentence.” Goodall argues that 

we should extend Torres beyond an “illegal sentence” and 

invalidate an appellate waiver if the conviction was later 

found to be “illegal.” We decline to do so.

In Torres, we refused to enforce an appellate waiver 

when the defendant received a sentencing enhancement 

under an unconstitutionally vague provision of the 

Sentencing Guidelines. Torres, 828 F.3d at 1125. Because 

the defendant’s sentence with the enhancement was greater 

than what was statutorily authorized for the conviction, his 

sentence was “illegal,” and we vacated the sentence. Id.

But this case is different from Torres. Rather than 

challenge his sentence, Goodall seeks to vacate his § 924(c) 

conviction. And that key difference matters for two reasons.

First, we limited Torres to an “illegal sentence” based in 

part on the technical definition of that term. As we have 

explained, “the phrase ‘illegal sentence’ has a precise legal 

meaning,” which does not include illegal convictions. See 

United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(quoting United States v. Fowler, 794 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th 

Cir. 1986)). An illegal sentence is one “not authorized by 

the judgment of conviction, . . . in excess of the permissible 

statutory penalty for the crime, or [that] is in violation of the 

Constitution.” United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 943 

(9th Cir. 1993). This definition is imported from our 
16 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

circuit’s case law interpreting an earlier version of Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which stated that a “court 

may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” See Fowler, 

794 F.2d at 1448. That exception for correcting an illegal 

sentence allowed the defendant in Torres to vacate his illegal 

sentence. Rule 35, however, did not authorize (and does not 

authorize) corrections for illegal convictions. See Johnson, 

988 F.2d at 943 (rejecting Rule 35 motion because defendant 

“argue[d] he should not have been convicted . . . .”).

Second, our rationale for the “illegal sentence” exception 

rests on the inherent uncertainty in sentencing. When the 

parties agree to a plea deal, the sentence remains unknown 

because the sentencing “does not occur contemporaneously 

with the plea and waiver.” United States v. MedinaCarrasco, 815 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 2015) (Friedman, J., 

dissenting). Rather, the district court decides later and need 

not follow the plea deal’s recommendation or the Sentencing 

Guidelines. So the court may impose a longer sentence than 

what the parties agreed because it believes that the defendant 

deserves a harsher sentence. Or the court may issue a longer 

sentence because it erred in applying the Sentencing 

Guidelines. And in some cases, a court might mistakenly 

impose a sentence greater than the one authorized by law. 

Thus, “the mistakes from which one might have reason to 

appeal have not yet occurred at the time a defendant waives 

the right to appeal or collaterally attack” the sentence. Id. In 

short, the sentence is beyond the control of the parties and 

their plea agreement.

But that uncertainty does not exist for convictions. The 

contours of a conviction are fully known when the defendant 

pleads guilty and waives his appellate rights. The defendant 

admits his guilt, the facts alleged in the plea agreement, and 

the sufficiency of the facts to establish his guilt on each 
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 17

element of the crime charged. He also knows precisely what 

he is “giving up in exchange for the benefits of the guilty 

plea at the very moment the plea is entered—a trial and the 

constitutional rights that accompany it.” Id. Although there 

always remains a chance the law could change in the 

defendant’s favor, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 

assumes that risk because he receives a presumably 

favorable deal under existing law.

The Seventh Circuit recently agreed that defendants 

assume the risk of later changes in the law. In Oliver v. 

United States, 951 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2020), the Seventh 

Circuit rejected an argument identical to Goodall’s. The 

defendants pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including a 

§ 924(c) charge, after committing a string of robberies. Id.

at 843. In exchange for the government’s agreement to 

dismiss several charges and recommend a more lenient 

sentence, the defendants waived their right to appeal their 

convictions or sentences. Id. And, as here, the defendants 

later sought to vacate their § 924(c) convictions under 

Johnson and Davis, arguing that they were not convicted of 

a predicate “crime of violence.” Id. at 844.

The Seventh Circuit denied their challenge, holding the 

defendants to the terms of their plea bargain. While the 

Seventh Circuit does not recognize an “illegal sentence” 

exception, the court enforced the appellate waiver because it 

held that defendants assume the risk that the law may 

change. Id. at 845. The “major purpose of an [appellate] 

waiver is to account in advance for unpredicted future 

developments in the law.” Id. at 845. Waivers “allocate the 

risk of the unknown for both sides: ‘By binding oneself one 

assumes the risk of future changes in circumstances in light 

of which one’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one.’” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th 
18 UNITED STATES V. GOODALL

Cir. 2005)). At the time of their pleas, the defendants in 

Oliver “obtained substantial benefits in exchange for their 

promises. The government dropped other robbery and 

firearm charges and recommended favorable departures 

from the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 846. Likewise here, 

Goodall cannot enjoy the fruits of his favorable plea 

agreement and then later claim the deal is rotten.5

Lastly, we cannot turn a blind eye to the practical effect 

of Goodall’s argument. If the “illegal sentence” exception is 

as broadly construed as Goodall urges, a defendant could try 

to nullify an otherwise valid appellate waiver by simply 

alleging error in the conviction. This interpretation might 

undo nearly all appellate waivers, past and present, yielding 

“perverse consequences.” Id. And the government would 

then become wary of offering plea agreements if the 

defendant could evade his obligations so easily. Id. (“If a 

defendant can make a seemingly beneficial plea agreement 

and can then renege,” the government would instead charge 

defendants “with all applicable crimes and see what sticks 

after the appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 

benefits of plea bargaining—efficiency and finality—would 

thus erode, as defendants seek to have their cake and eat it 

too. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).

That is precisely what Goodall seeks to do. The 

government did not pursue many robbery and firearm 

charges and made a lenient sentencing recommendation in 

exchange for Goodall’s plea. If Goodall had been charged 

5 Two other circuits have agreed to the general principle that a 

defendant cannot raise a constitutional challenge to a conviction if he 

waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack it. United States v. 

Barnes, 953 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 438 (2020); 

United States v. Lloyd, 901 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2018).
UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 19

with all possible crimes, Goodall’s “crime of violence” 

argument would not even exist. And the government 

dropped one § 924(c) count, which would have added 

another 25-year mandatory sentence. Rather than accept the 

benefit of his bargain, Goodall seeks to parlay the plea 

agreement’s leniency into reversible error. We decline the 

invitation.6

CONCLUSION

We DISMISS Goodall’s appeal as barred by the 

appellate waiver in his plea agreement.

6 Defendant did not raise, and we do not consider, the applicability, 

if any, of an exception for a miscarriage of justice. We express no view 

on the viability of that exception in other circumstances.