# EUR-Lex - 52014JC0012 - EN

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# 52014JC0012

**JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013 /* JOIN/2014/012 final */**

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1. Introduction

The European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) aims at developing a special relationship between the EU and each
of its partner countries, contributing to an area of security, prosperity and
good neighbourliness. 2013 has seen some progress towards these objectives.
Reform efforts, both in eastern and southern ENP countries, continued and the
EU supported these efforts. But it was also, once again, a year of crises,
reflecting political instability and continuing difficult socio-economic
conditions across a number of countries in the neighbourhood. Security
challenges — both domestic and regional — increased and, in some countries,
partly reversed democratic reform achievements of previous years and stunted
prospects for economic recovery.

This joint
communication, accompanied by a set of joint staff working documents,[1] looks at how the EU and partner countries[2] have progressed in implementing jointly
agreed reform objectives, and addressed particular challenges facing both
sides.

Developments in 2013 —
both positive and negative — underlined that the success of the policy is directly
dependent on the ability and commitment of governments to reform and to deepen
relations with the EU, as well as on the capacity to explain and gain popular
support and adherence to this agenda. Tailored to support reforms and
incremental change over a period of time, the policy has faced some challenges in
steering partners towards adopting policies that would bring more security, and
more democratic and economic reform in moments of abrupt change and rupture of
political and social stability.

Partners’ reform paths
and ambitions in their relations with the EU, as well as the challenges they face,
are becoming more diverse. The choices made by some countries will require
greater differentiation in the relations between the EU and its partners, in
order to respond to the expectations and needs of each partner, while also
safeguarding the EU's own strategic interests. The EU remains committed to
building partnerships with each of its neighbours that reflect their individual
needs, capacity and reform objectives.

Achieving the agreed
reform objectives in partner countries is also influenced by their regional
environment, and other players' actions and — sometimes conflicting —
objectives. Some eastern European partner countries, in addition to the still
fragile nature of their political reforms, slow economic growth, and structural
economic weaknesses, have faced clear outside pressure, such as potential
changes in energy pricing and artificial obstacles to trade, because of their
objective of establishing closer links with the EU. In the Southern
Neighbourhood, the actions of several regional or global players have also
affected developments such as the conflict in Syria and the political (and
economic) crisis in Egypt. With the view to making the ENP more effective and
relevant, the EU will for its part continue to reach out to and engage with
these regional and global players to ensure that reform efforts are not
thwarted by conflicting policy objectives. EU's neighbourhood partners as well
as their immediate neighbours all stand to gain from democratic and economic
reforms.

The dramatic events in
Ukraine have demonstrated how an uncommitted government, disconnected from the
wider sentiment of the population and subject to unacceptable external pressure
can provok great political and social disarray.

The EU is acting
decisively in cooperation with its international partners to support the
country's new authorities to stabilise the situation, preserve the country’s
unity while fully respecting all communities and groups of population and
address the people’s aspirations. To this effect the European Commission announced
on 5 March 2014 a Support Package for Ukraine[3],
frontloading and reinforcing many of the EaP policies and instruments. The
proposed measures could bring overall support of at least EUR 11 billion over
the coming years from the EU budget and EU-based international financial
institutions in addition to the significant funding being provided by the IMF
and the World Bank. Underpinning this approach is the ambition to help Ukraine
fulfil the aspirations, which have been clearly demonstrated by citizens and
civil society in the unprecedented events in Kiev and throughout the country.

On 18 March 2014, the
Russian Federation signed a treaty with the de facto authorities of the
Republic of Crimea and of the City of Sevastopol, sealing the de facto
annexation of Crimea with immediate effect. As stated by Presidents H. Van Rompuy
and JM. Barroso on 18 March, the European Union does neither recognise the
illegal and illegitimate referendum in Crimea nor its outcome. The sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine must be respected. The
European Union does not and will not recognise the annexation of Crimea and
Sevastopol to the Russian Federation.

The European Council
shares the view on the illegality of the referendum and the ensuing steps, as
expressed in its conclusions on 20 March 2014. On the next day, the EU and
Ukraine signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement, and
confirmed their commitment to proceed to the signature and conclusion of the
remaining parts of the Agreement which together with the political provisions
constitute a single instrument. As stated in the recent Foreign Affairs Council
conclusions[4],
the Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in the EU-Ukraine
cooperation.

Continuing crises in
the Southern neighbourhood, in particular the continuing civil war in Syria and
its negative impact on the neighbouring countries, have also required sustained
attention and engagement by the EU. Thanks to the competences attributed under
the Lisbon Treaty, an increasing array of policy instruments, both political
and technical, are now at the disposal of the EU and have allowed the EU to
play a heightened political role in the transitional process that Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya are going through.

The High
Representative/Vice President established strong ties with the various
political actors and has had unique access even in particularly challenging
circumstances, her meeting with Mr Morsi being perhaps the most prominent
example. This has meant that the EU can be vocal with the authorities on those
values that it holds dear.

The EU Special
Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood, Bernardino Leon and the EU
Special Representative for Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis have also played a
unique part by providing good offices and raising the EU's profile in the
region.

The EU has also taken
immediate and substantial measures to address the consequences of the Syrian
civil war and its growing regional implications, e.g. for refugee flows and the
risk of strife in Syria’s neighbouring countries. The Joint Communication 'Towards
a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis'[5] was accompanied by
additional financial assistance of EUR 400 million in 2013 to deal with the
consequences of the crisis. Mindful of the unprecedented effects the crisis has
on the Syrian people as well as on the stability of neighbouring countries, the
EU has been the largest donor to the victims of the Syria crisis,
providing massive humanitarian and non-humanitarian support.

While in several cases
it was able to rise to the challenge and react rapidly, the EU should continue to reflect on how the policy and its
instruments can better respond to the very diverse contexts in partner
countries, and how some components may need to be adjusted, including through
the use of additional policy instruments. The need to act rapidly in different
kind of situations, with different kind of decision making procedures, has to
be taken into account when developing the legislation of EU's policy and
financial instruments, such as the framework legislation for Macro-Financial
Assistance, simplified procedures in the area of trade policy, or efforts to
use more rapid decision making procedures for the use of CSDP instruments. This
is an area the EU institutions and Member States should focus on, to enable the
EU to react better and quicker to developments in its neighbourhood, and to
respond to partners’ changing needs.

2. Implementation

As in 2012, partner
countries’ progress in implementing their reform commitments has been very
uneven.

In the Southern
Neighbourhood, the overall political situation often hampered partner
countries’ readiness to implement the agreed reform agenda. In Tunisia, the
democratic transition moved forward thanks to inclusive dialogue and despite
major security threats throughout 2013. The appointment of a new government in
mid-December and the subsequent adoption of a new constitution in January 2014
were major democratic steps. In Morocco, a difficult political context
contributed to a limited implementation of commitments enshrined in the constitutional
reform of 2011. In Egypt, after popular demonstrations and an ultimatum set by
the armed forces, President Mohammed Morsi was ousted, and replaced by an
interim president. Libya still faces serious security challenges, both domestic
and affecting the whole Northern African region (e.g. the Sahel, and the Mali
crisis). Lebanon, where a new government has been appointed, and Jordan
struggle with the impact of the Syrian civil war on their political, economic
and social systems, seriously compromising their ability to carry out political
and structural reforms. The US renewed its efforts to foster peace between
Israelis and Palestinians, leading to a resumption of negotiations in July with
the aim of reaching an agreement on all final status issues within nine months.

In the eastern ENP
countries, while democratic structures are getting stronger in some countries,
wide-ranging reforms were sometimes prevented or slowed by vested political or
economic interests. Moldova and Georgia have concluded the negotiations and
initialled the Association Agreements including Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA), made progress in political and judicial reforms, and continued
the reforms to prepare for the implementation of the AA/DCFTAs. However, the
political crisis in Moldova at the beginning of 2013 highlighted the vulnerability
of some of the state institutions to vested interests, the limits of the
constitutional system of checks and balances, and the still fragile nature of
the reform achievements. Georgian elections in autumn 2013 marked its second
democratic transition of power in the last 18 months, and a significant
constitutional shift from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system.
Armenia held presidential elections in February 2013 which, despite remaining
violations, were seen as generally well administered and respectful of
fundamental freedoms. Armenia had negotiated an AA/DCFTA but did not initial it
after its decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union. Ukraine's reform process
got entirely stalled following the suspension of the preparations for signing
the Association Agreement. This suspension sparked massive civil protests
(so-called "Euromaidan") in support of political association and
economic integration with the EU. Azerbaijan needs to make further efforts in
upholding fundamental rights and freedoms. Belarus made no progress in
political reforms.

Individual countries’ implementation of key recommendations made in
2013

Armenia addressed
some of the key recommendations. It established a working group to submit
proposals in response to the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations on elections. It took
some action against high-level corruption, but the Ethics Commission was still
not effective. It continued developing the ‘regulatory guillotine’ programme
that is expected to reduce the administrative burden as well as opportunities
for corruption. It established a new Interagency Commission on the
implementation of the Human Rights Protection National Strategy. It adopted
amendments to the law on alternative military service and a law on equal rights
and opportunities for men and women. There were limited developments regarding
reforms in the public administration and some measures were taken to reform the
judiciary and to advance sectoral reforms and regulatory approximation to the
EU acquis.

Azerbaijan acted on some
of the key recommendations. It partly addressed public financial management
issues and took measures to fight corruption.

Georgia acted on
most of the key recommendations issued in last year’s ENP progress report. It
delivered presidential elections in line with international standards. It
continued to reform the justice system and advanced sectoral reforms and
regulatory approximation to the EU acquis. It actively participated in
the Geneva discussions and took measures to improve the living conditions of
internally displaced persons (IDPs), with the support of the EU; it also
renewed its commitment to a genuine engagement with the breakaway regions.

Moldova
addressed
many of the key recommendations contained in last year’s ENP progress report.
It completed the implementation of the visa liberalisation action plan; took
forward judicial and law enforcement reforms; started restructuring the
anti-corruption framework; stepped up its implementation of the human rights
action plan and the action plan in support of the Roma people; maintained its
dialogue with Tiraspol; and continued with challenging regulatory and sectoral
reforms.

Ukraine partly
addressed some of the recommendations of the last progress report related with
the electoral law and practice and the judiciary, but the suspension of
preparations for signature of the AA/DCFTA stalled the reform process.

Due
to political events, Egypt did not address the key recommendations
contained in last year’s ENP progress report with the exception of the
signature of the regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential
rules of origin. Therefore, most of the recommendations are still pertinent.

Israel addressed
some of the key recommendations from last year report. The regional Convention
on pan-European rules of origin was signed as well as the EU-Israel
comprehensive civil aviation agreement, and the ACAA came into force.

Jordan acted upon
a number of key recommendations contained in last year’s ENP progress report,
notably the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy and the ratification of the
regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin.

Lebanon took up
several of the recommendations contained in the 2012 Progress Report, including
limited progress towards ACAA negotiations as well as drafting legislation on
public procurement, fight against corruption, and migrant workers. That
legislation, however, was not adopted by parliament.

Morocco addressed
a majority of the key recommendations. The Committee of Ministers approved the
government’s plan for equality and the draft law creating an authority for
equality and the fight against discrimination (APALD). Progress was also made
on the anti-corruption framework (i.e. the status of the relevant authority).
The national justice reform charter was published and two related organic laws
were drafted. In addition, negotiations on a DCFTA started and preparations for
an ACAA agreement remained on track.

Palestine:
The
Palestinian Authority signed the regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean
preferential rules of origin, thus implementing one of the recommendations of
last year’s ENP progress report. Nevertheless, most of the key recommendations
made in the report have yet to be addressed, and remain valid.

Tunisia
delivered
mostly on recommendations relating to the consolidation of democracy (adopting
a constitution and setting up a legal framework for the prevention of torture,
the media, judicial independence, anti-corruption measures, and transitional
justice) and preparations for the next elections (appointing members of the
superior independent elections instance). On its bilateral commitments, it made
progress towards a partnership for mobility. Tunisia has also signed the
regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin.

The High
Representative, the Commission and EU Delegations in partner countries stepped
up efforts to communicate the policy to partner countries and the public. For
the Eastern Partnership, the EU launched a ‘visibility strategy’ in 2013. This
strategy is intended to ensure that those who will be affected by and who stand
to benefit from the Eastern Partnership are properly informed not only of the
expected long-term benefits, but of the concrete changes the policy will bring
to their countries. Covering all countries of the ENP, the European
Neighbourhood Info Centre web portal (www.enpi-info.eu), an online resource which
is already in place, provides up-to-date information in four languages on
cooperation projects in ENP countries. The Neighbourhood Info Centre is one of
components of the ENPI regional communication programme (2011-2013). This
programme also covers journalist training and networking, student conferences,
media monitoring and opinion polling surveys covering the ENP area.

The main messages of
EU communication are that the ENP helps to make Europe and its neighbourhood a
better, safer and more prosperous place, and that the ENP improves people’s
lives, by contributing to more democratic, open and equal societies and to
greater prosperity, and by creating networks between the EU and neighbouring
countries. The EU also stresses that the ENP benefits everyone, including
stakeholders beyond the neighbourhood. Co-ownership and mutual accountability
are at the core of the ENP. For example, Association Agreements and DCFTAs with
our partner countries also offer opportunities and benefits to the neighbours
of the neighbours. Cooperation and the creation of networks do not stop at the
borders of the ENP partners, but reach beyond them. It is an inclusive policy.

However, there is a
case to be made for the EU to explain better the concrete benefits of its
initiatives. It will need to ensure that ongoing negotiations are conducted
swiftly and that agreements can enter into force as soon as feasible and bring
tangible benefits. At the same time, both EU and Member States need to ensure
that the policy remains attractive and responds to the needs of their partners.
In particular in areas where important policy competences rest with the Member
States, the EU needs to work even more closely with its Member States to
deliver on its commitment towards its partners.

2.1. Deep and sustainable democracy

Despite efforts and
improvements in some areas, the picture in 2013 was rather mixed overall, with
some worrying trends. In Georgia, Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia, the authorities
showed a clear commitment to reform. Developments throughout the year in Egypt
have shown the risks and pitfalls a democratic transition can run into when the
process is conducted in a non-inclusive, partisan manner.

Only a few elections
were held in neighbourhood countries in 2013. The presidential elections in
Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Armenia were genuine democratic elections,
whereas presidential elections in Azerbaijan did not fully meet international
standards. A constitutional referendum was held in Egypt in January 2014. The
turn-out was relatively low and little room was left to the opposition during the electoral campaign.

Fundamental
freedoms are under threat in certain parts of the
neighbourhood, but progress in the treatment of minorities, for instance in
Moldova, and the adoption of a new constitution in January 2014 in Tunisia are
paving the way for greater respect for the rule of law and, as a consequence,
for democracy and fundamental freedoms, in those countries.

In a number of
countries, no improvements were made, and restrictions of freedom of
assembly and association were maintained. In Egypt, over 1300 people died
following the dispersal of protests by the security forces in 2013 and a new
law restricted freedom assembly while a draft law on associations contains also
restrictive provisions. These will have to be brought into compliance with the
newly adopted constitution. In Armenia, the Ombudsman highlighted failure to
prosecute police perpetrators of violence against peaceful protesters, and
labour and trade-unions' rights face restrictions. In Azerbaijan involvement in
any ‘legally banned assembly’ can now lead to two years of imprisonment under
the new criminal code. In Algeria, the law on associations contains problematic
provisions and its implementation remains very controversial; Israel maintains
restrictions on freedom of assembly. In Palestine, a draft law might worsen the
situation of trade unions in the Gaza Strip. Where freedom of association is
lacking, the protection and promotion of collective rights are affected.

In Ukraine, reports of
police intimidation of journalists became more frequent in 2013 and early 2014.
There were some positive developments in Moldova and Georgia. In Tunisia,
emblematic cases concerning activists showed that despite profound positive
change, freedom of speech was still not guaranteed. Similar cases
occurred in Morocco.

In Belarus, the
situation as regards upholding human rights, the rule of law and democratic
principles remained of concern.

Justice systems across the region need further reform. In several
countries, the independence of the judiciary is still not fully guaranteed. In
Egypt, as in Israel, Lebanon and Jordan, civilians can still be tried in
military courts. Nevertheless, judicial reform to strengthen the rule of law is
under way in Georgia, Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine. The adoption of a new
constitution in Tunisia in January 2014 also paves the way for the separation
of powers and the rule of law.

Torture and ill-treatment in prisons
persists, to differing degrees, across the neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the
first and very symbolic measure voted by the Tunisia Constituent National
Assembly when its suspension ended in October 2013 was a national mechanism to
prevent torture.

Some
progress in the fight against corruption was made in the legal
frameworks of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Morocco, which still need to be
implemented. Other countries like Lebanon, Armenia, and Azerbaijan still lack
strong and effective anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms.

The need to reform the
police in order to restore public confidence and accountability is a
shared concern across the neighbourhood. Human rights are still not upheld in
prisons or by the police and army in several countries.

Countries in the
neighbourhood show persistent signs of social divisions, reflecting
discrimination against women and minorities. Gender-based violence, and
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation against the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community, is of increasing concern,
with the exception of Israel where there is no legal discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

The rights of persons
belonging to minorities are challenged in most of the neighbourhood
countries. The spectrum of exclusion extends from increasing violence and hate
speech in political life against minorities in Armenia, Ukraine, Palestine and
Israel to sectarian fighting during all of 2013 in Egypt.

Discrimination and
violence against children are largely ignored despite being a problem in
many countries of the neighbourhood, particularly those in conflict or crisis.
Growing numbers of children are dropping out of school, or cannot get access to
education, thereby being deprived of future opportunities. This trend further
compounds the existing problem of large numbers of young people facing numerous
obstacles to equitable access to decent employment and livelihoods.

2.2 Support for civil society

Willingness to reform
cannot be imposed from outside and the expectation for reform must come from
within societies. By engaging directly with people, opening travel and study
opportunities for citizens (even unilaterally), and promoting networking
between communities (business, research, universities, arts, culture, etc.),
and supporting civil society, EU policy can act as a catalyst in this process.

The revised ENP set
out the EU’s commitment to a strong partnership with societies, and
considerably strengthened the tools at the disposal of the EU to engage with,
and support , civil society in the ENP regions.

Consultations of civil
society organisations have become a structural element of EU cooperation in
Neighbourhood countries. Civil society is regularly consulted on policy
elements as well as on operational issues in the preparation and programming of
EU financial support. The Civil Society Forum National Platforms in EaP
countries offer a unique opportunity for civil society organisations to debate
EaP priorities, provide input on progress on the implementation of jointly
agreed reforms in the areas of democracy, good governance and economic
development.

In the Southern
Neighbourhood, civil society plays a key role in several countries in the
implementation of social programmes funded by the EU (literacy programmes, care
for children, gender equality, etc.). Efforts have also been made to establish a
structured dialogue between civil society, the authorities and the EU at
regional level.

Throughout 2014, EU
Delegations in ENP countries will develop country roadmaps for engagement with
civil society. The purpose of the roadmaps will be to develop a common
strategic framework for EU Delegations and Member states engagement with civil
society at country level. The EU will also continue to strengthen its direct
support to civil society and social partners, to empower citizens to express
their concerns, contribute to policy making, and hold governments to account.

2.3. Sustainable economic and social development

Across both the
Eastern and the Southern Neighbourhoods, the economic environment has remained
challenging. Economic growth in most partner countries remained weak, as a
result not only of the recession in the euro area and weak growth in Russia,
but also of the lack of progress on structural reform.

The EU has continued
to strengthen the macroeconomic dialogues with all of its neighbours both to
the east and south except Libya and Syria. They are useful for maintaining an
open exchange of views on domestic economic and financial developments both in
partner countries and in the EU, on the policy challenges facing the
neighbourhood and on cooperation between the EU and its neighbours. They are
also useful for reviewing the implementation of the economic reform priorities
set in the ENP Association Agendas and Action Plans.

In addition to
macroeconomic dialogues, the Commission holds discussions on economic policy
with partner countries that benefit from EU Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA).
MFA is designed to financially support partner countries while they address
macroeconomic imbalances and implement growth-oriented structural reform. In
2013, the EU was preparing new programmes for Jordan and Tunisia, in addition
to the existing programmes for Georgia and Ukraine. There were no disbursements
under the MFA to Ukraine in 2013 as there is no IMF arrangement in place for
this country. Armenia submitted a request for an MFA programme in February 2013
and the Commission is currently considering a proposal.

As a result of delayed
economic recovery, together with a lack of structural reforms and improvements
to the business and investment environment, socio-economic challenges remain
daunting. High unemployment remains a particular challenge in the south, where
wage incomes have also continued to stagnate or decline in real terms. Poverty
also affects sizeable parts of the population in most ENP partner countries,
particularly in rural areas. Children are particularly vulnerable and affected.
The EU has continued to support measures to improve social protection, reduce
poverty and create jobs.

EU cooperation with
ENP partners has long emphasised private-sector development — a key to
inclusive economic growth and job creation. Developing a vibrant private
sector, in particular by fostering small and medium-sized enterprises, can
support better governance and democracy. A stronger private sector also
strengthens the constituency for democratic reforms through the creation of a
middle class.

Corruption has been
identified as a major obstacle to investment and business, both in eastern and
southern ENP countries. Decoupling the private sector and economic benefits
from vested interests and political office, along with improving access to
justice, is essential if economic dynamism, investment and entrepreneurship are
to flourish to create the jobs needed.

The EU supports
inclusive economic development, and in particular private-sector development,
and employment, through SME development, infrastructure development, support
for job training and entrepreneurship through a range of policy initiatives,
and financial support.

DCFTAs, which have
been, or are being, negotiated with a number of ENP partners can, beyond
liberalising trade, be powerful tools in improving transparency and the
regulatory framework in general. The ENP Action Plans agreed with partners
involve significant work in areas such as enterprise policy and technical
regulations and standards.

In the Southern
Neighbourhood, Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation has long provided a
framework for developing enterprise policy based on the Euro-Mediterranean
Charter for Enterprise, which is currently being assessed and revised to also
incorporate components of the Small Business Act for Europe (SBA)[6]. Several ENP partner countries have adopted
reference documents inspired by the SBA, to stimulate entrepreneurship and
favourable business conditions to create growth and jobs. In the Eastern
Partnership region, the first SBA Assessment was concluded in 2012. The
recommendations provided were considered very useful by partner countries and
are currently being implemented in the majority of countries. A second
assessment – to monitor progress in implementation – will commence in the first
half of 2014.

2.4. Strengthening trade ties

The EU remains the
main trading partner for almost all ENP partners.

Association Agreements
including DCFTAs with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia were finalised (Armenia has
since turned towards the Eurasian Customs Union which is incompatible with
signing an AA/DCFTA with the EU). Ukraine decided to suspend preparations for
the signature of the Association Agreement/DCFTA, citing concerns about the
potential impact of this agreement on its economy and on its economic relations
with Russia. In the south, Morocco started negotiations on a DCFTA.
Preparations with Tunisia advanced, but political uncertainty delayed the start
of negotiations. Jordan continued preparations which are also well advanced. A
first meeting of a dialogue on the DCFTA with Egypt took place in June 2013,
but following the political turmoil over the summer and the change of
government, no further progress was made in 2013.

Work on the Agreements
on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs)
progressed with some partners. The ACAA with Israel entered into force in
January 2013. Preparatory work on similar agreements continued in the other
Southern Mediterranean partners with varying degrees of progress. These
agreements are powerful instruments for economic integration with the EU. The
partner countries are adapting their legislation and standards to the EU acquis
in priority industrial sectors where there is EU legislation, together with
their standardisation, accreditation, conformity assessment, metrology and
market surveillance entities. In specific sectors chosen by partners, they can
trade with the EU under the same terms as EU Member States trade with each
other.

2.5. Migration and mobility

There were crucial
developments in cooperation on freedom, security and justice (FSJ) in 2013,
most notably concerning mobility and migration. Visa liberalisation action
plans (VLAPs) continued to be used by Ukraine and Moldova as instruments of
deep and structural reform for the broader FSJ sector, and both countries made
substantial progress in implementing their VLAPs. The Commission proposal to
move Moldova to the positive list under Regulation 539/2001 and grant Moldovan
citizens who are holders of biometric passports visa-free travel to the
Schengen area was agreed to by the European Parliament and approved by the
Council in March 2014 .

This development is a
major step in the area of people-to-people contacts, creating positive momentum
for other EaP partners. After presenting its VLAP in February, Georgia made
very good progress in implementing the first-phase benchmarks. The EU-Azerbaijan
Visa Facilitation Agreement was signed at the Vilnius Summit in November
and the EU-Azerbaijan Mobility Partnership in December. The
EU-Azerbaijan readmission agreement was initialled in July 2013. Following the EaP
Summit in Vilnius, negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements
between the EU and Belarus were launched.

Important achievements
were recorded in the Southern Neighbourhood. A Mobility Partnership
between the EU and Morocco was signed in June, the first with a southern
ENP partner, and one with Tunisia was signed on 3 March 2014. The
challenge is now to implement the projects set out in the mobility
partnerships. Negotiations on a Mobility Partnership were also opened with Jordan
in December. The tragic sinking of a migrant vessel off the coast of Lampedusa
led the Commission to present a set of proposals[7]
which was discussed at the European Council[8]
in December, with the aim of boosting EU action to prevent the loss of
migrants’ lives in the Mediterranean.

Good progress was
achieved in the area of social security coordination in relation to
labour mobility with the Southern partner countries. The technical discussions
on the implementation of the provisions from the Association Agreements with
Morocco and Israel were completed. Further technical exchanges are needed with
Algeria and Tunisia.

2.6. Financial support

EU financial support
is important to help partner countries in implementing jointly agreed
objectives and their reform agenda. From 2007 to 2013, partners received
substantially more funding than initially programmed. Overall, partners have
received above EUR 13 billion. This included additional support of
EUR 2,6 billion mobilised, inter alia, in response to the establishment of the
Eastern Partnership in 2009, the Arab revolutions of 2011 and continuous needs
in Palestine and Syria.

In 2013 alone, assistance
for the ENP partners from the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)
reached EUR 2,56 billion, the highest annual level over the whole seven-year
period. Part of this was the additional incentive-based support (under the
SPRING and EaPIC programmes) for the countries most committed to reforms and
progressing in the area of deep and sustainable democracy.

The EU also provided
substantial resources via the international financial institutions, in
particular the EIB and EBRD, notably to small and medium-sized enterprises.

In 2013, the EU has
finalised the general overhaul of its financial instruments in the context of
the modernised multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020,
including the European Neighbourhood Instrument. Through this new instrument
support to our neighbours becomes faster and more flexible, allowing for
increased differentiation and incentives. Despite the financial crisis and a
reduced overall EU budget, the level of funding secured for the ENI amounts to
EUR 15.4 billion, which underlines the priority the EU gives to the region.

The ENI will provide the bulk of funding to the 16 ENP
partners. It provides for greater coherence between policy and financial
assistance and lays down mechanisms for applying the incentive-based approach,
to encourage reforms in the partner countries, It will provide support through
bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes.

2.7. Sector cooperation

The ENP offers to
partners a very concrete set of opportunities through sector policies. These
cover a broad range of issues. Based on convergence with EU norms and
standards, sector policy dialogue and regulatory cooperation are basic elements
of the ENP and a practical application of the EU’s policy in the neighbourhood.
They support reforms aimed at securing well-governed institutions and access to
social services for all citizens, creating the right conditions for inclusive
economic growth and job creation.

The ENP region saw
intense political activity, which set the future course in the areas of energy
and transport. The Energy Community Treaty continued to be the main
framework for cooperation with the eastern partners; its Ministerial Council
decided to extend the Treaty until 2026 and welcomed Georgia’s application for
full membership. A list of major energy infrastructure projects was agreed. The
adoption of the final investment decision by the
Shah Deniz II consortium in December 2013 was a major step to bring
forward the Southern Gas Corridor. An EU-Israel comprehensive air services
agreement was signed in June. An EU-Ukraine comprehensive air services
agreement was initialled to coincide with the Vilnius Summit, and negotiations
are being held with Azerbaijan and Tunisia.

Several partners
conducted inter-ministerial work on climate change, including Jordan’s
adoption of an integrated climate change policy. The EU launched regional
technical assistance projects (Clima East and Clima South). These projects
support all partners’ efforts to make the transition towards low carbon
development and climate resilience. Further policy cooperation will also be
needed for negotiations on a new international climate agreement to be
concluded in Paris in 2015.

All partner countries
are very actively participating in ENP environment regional projects,
leading to real progress towards more resource-efficient economic development
and other policy goals for the sector. The Third Eastern Partnership Summit in
Vilnius recognised environment as a priority, with agreement to continue the
process of regulatory approximation and policy convergence. Five ENP countries
have decided to enhance their cooperation with the European Environment Agency,
and an UfM Ministerial meeting on Environment and Climate Change is planned for
May 2014.

The establishment with
ENP partners of a Common Knowledge and Innovation Space (CKIS) advanced
further, linking up the EU and partners through policy dialogue, national and
regional capacity building, cooperation on research and innovation and
increased mobility for researchers. A new, dedicated Panel on Research
and Innovation was created under the EaP, while cooperation in the Southern
Neighbourhood continued in the framework of the Monitoring Committee for
Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation in Research and Technological Development under
the UfM. Armenia, Israel and Moldova formally asked to be associated to the
EU’s Horizon 2020 programme for research and innovation, so as to make full use
of the opportunities offered by the EU’s biggest ever programme on research.
Negotiations with Israel on association with the programme were completed in
December 2013, while formal talks with Moldova started in January 2014.

Education, youth and culture continued to be a feature of cooperation between
the EU and ENP partners, with the exchange of 3175 students and academics under
Erasmus Mundus. As a result of a dedicated window for students from Southern
Mediterranean partner countries, in 2013 the highest ever number of students
from these countries received a scholarship to obtain their degree in the EU.
The Education Ministers session of the Eastern Partnership dialogue held in
Yerevan highlighted the achievements of previous academic cooperation programmes
and endorsed the objectives of the new Erasmus+ programme. More than 9600 young
people and youth workers from neighbouring countries and 710 volunteers could
benefit from the Youth in Action programme. The first EaP Ministerial
Conference on Culture reaffirmed the role of culture in human and
socio-economic development.

The European
Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
(ENPARD), part of the EU’s commitment to growth and stability in the
neighbourhood, recognises the importance of agriculture for food security,
sustainable development and job creation in rural areas. The ENPARD involves a participatory method of policy
formulation. It fits well with the broader challenges faced in ENP
countries but will require sustained political support if it is to be carried
through in practice. Implementation of ENPARD will start in Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia in 2014. The first meeting of the Panel on Agriculture and
Rural Development under the Eastern Partnership dialogue took place in May 2013
and the second in January 2014. The Eastern Partnership ministerial meeting on
agriculture and development with a focus on the implementation on ENPARD was
held in Chisinau in January 2014.

Health cooperation with southern neighbourhood partners was strengthened
through inter alia, the launch of a Mediterranean Programme in Intervention
Epidemiology Training for southern neighbours, while eastern neighbours were
involved in EU meetings of the HIV/AIDS Think Tank and Civil Society Policy
Forum.

The EU continued its
constructive cooperation in the area of integrated maritime policy with
the ENP-Mediterranean partners and initiated a comprehensive dialogue with the
Eastern partners from the Black Sea coastal states.

During 2013, the EU
adopted a new generation of programmes under its Multiannual Financial
Framework 2014-2020; many of these are open to ENP partners. The EU continues,
under its strengthened ENP framework, to actively encourage partners to
participate in EU programmes and agencies.

2.8 Security sector reform and conflict resolution

The EU is supporting
reform of the security institutions of former authoritarian regimes into more
transparent, accountable and democratically controlled security sectors.

The EU is already
involved in several countries in border management, monitoring or
advice/support missions, both in the east (EUBAM Moldova, EUMM Georgia) and in
the south (EUBAM Libya, and EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS in Palestine). These
missions, mostly conducted under the CSDP, have been complemented by long-term
programmes aiming at capacity building and at paving the way to institutional
reforms. In the south, cooperation has been already implemented with a number
of countries. In Tunisia, a peer review of the police was undertaken by
European experts to serve as a basis for defining national strategic
orientations. The EU is also supporting the development of a national
capability for security and stabilisation in Lebanon.

In the east, partner
countries are encouraged to ‘reform the security and law enforcement sectors
(including the police) and establish democratic control over armed and security
forces’.[9]For
Moldova, reform of security and law enforcement sectors was initiated in 2013,
and police and border management will be a focal sector of EU support in the
framework of the European neighbourhood instrument (ENI) from 2014 onwards. In
addition to the experience of the Eastern Partnership Police Cooperation
Programme, a new panel on cooperation in CSDP was set up under the EaP’s
‘multilateral track’ in 2013. This panel will focus on CSDP matters in order to
help eastern partners improve their capacity and their contributions to CSDP
missions and operations, and to share information among EaP countries, Member
States and EU institutions.

The EU also continued
to be an active partner in international conflict resolution fora, such as the
Geneva International Discussions, the 5+2 talks and continued providing full
support to the OSCE-led Minsk Group. The EU Special Representative for the
South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia facilitated dialogue between the
parties.

As regards the Middle
East Peace Process, the EU remained fully supportive of the on-going
US-brokered direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians and expressed
on several occasions its readiness to use all the instruments at its disposal
to support the parties' quest for a comprehensive agreement on all final status
issues. In the Council Conclusions of December 2013, the EU’s foreign ministers
agreed to provide an unprecedented package of European political, economic and
security support to both parties in the context of a final status agreement.
The EU maintained its support for Palestinian institution-building and
governance, private-sector development and humanitarian aid. The EU also
maintained the EUBAM Rafah Mission's capacity to be redeployed on the Rafah
crossing point, once political and security conditions allow.

3. Eastern and southern dimensions of the ENP

3.1. Eastern Partnership

Cooperation
between the EU and its eastern European partners — Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine — intensified in 2013. Several
partner countries took important steps forward in the process of closer
political association and economic integration with the EU. A milestone was the
Third Eastern Partnership Summit, held in Vilnius, Lithuania on 28-29 November
2013. Vilnius was an occasion to take stock of progress since the Second
Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw and to chart the way ahead for the next
two years. While the next phase of the Eastern Partnership will be marked by
greater differentiation in bilateral relations, there is also a need to develop
further a common agenda of relevance to all six partner countries. Looking
ahead, the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership will continue to
reinforce the goals and objectives of the bilateral track, while encouraging
dialogue and cooperation on a common set of issues, as defined in the work
programmes of the four thematic EaP platforms. Multilateral ministerial
contacts are essential in this regard, and one priority will be the
continuation of informal Eastern Partnership dialogues. These meetings have
proved to be an excellent means of initiating regular, informal exchanges
between foreign ministers both on the Eastern Partnership agenda and on foreign
policy issues of common concern thus contributing to increasing political and
security policy convergence and effectiveness in the field of foreign policy.
Likewise, opportunities for sector-specific ministerial meetings modelled on
the transport and justice ministerial meeting that took place in 2013 should be
sought.

In
its May 2011 communication on the ENP,[10]
the Commission and the High Representative pointed out that the values upon
which the European Union is built — freedom, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law — are also at the heart of
the process of political association and economic integration. These are the
same values that are enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and
on which Articles 8 and 49 are based.

Priorities
for further work over the coming years are detailed in the 2013 Eastern
Partnership Implementation Report annexed to this communication.

3.2 Southern Mediterranean
partnership for democracy and shared prosperity

Reacting to historic events in the Arab world in 2011,
the EU offered its Mediterranean partners a partnership
for democracy and shared prosperity.[11] The Roadmap
adopted in 2012 set out objectives to be pursued under the partnership. Its implementation in 2013 has, however,
been greatly influenced by the continuously momentous political developments in
the Southern Mediterranean.

In political terms,
2013 was dominated by increasingly complex and different situations in the
Southern Neighbourhood countries, whose regional integration was further
challenged. The ongoing conflict in Syria continued to affect the situation in
the whole region, with spill-overs affecting the political stability of some
neighbours. The region has faced a flood of refugees with more than 2.5 million
having fled Syria for neighbouring countries.

Political and
religious polarisation affects many Mediterranean countries, such as Egypt,
where the July events led to the ousting of President Morsi. While progress
continued to be made on building and strengthening the institutional basis for
democracy, in some countries this process was challenged as a result of
internal political conflicts. The EU, however, has remained firm in continuing
and even strengthening cooperation and assistance to the Southern Mediterranean
countries though the mechanisms available under bilateral political dialogues
and assistance programmes.

Priorities
for further work over the coming years are detailed in the 2013 Partnership
for democracy and shared prosperity Implementation Report annexed to this
communication.

4. The EU as diplomatic actor and provider of security

The
promotion of stability, security and sustainable development gave rise to the
ENP and remains a major EU objective. Security, in the broadest possible sense,
demands transparent and accountable governance, respect for fundamental rights
and freedoms, and economic and employment prospects.

The EU and its
partners in the neighbourhood face long-standing and emerging security
challenges within a rapidly changing and complex geostrategic environment. Serious
security challenges also include terrorism, and organised crime including
smuggling of human beings, drugs, and firearms. The unstable security
situation, coupled with a number of ‘frozen conflicts’ which prevent the EU and
its partners from fully reaping the benefits of cooperation under the ENP,
underlines the need for the EU to further strengthen its contribution to
security in its neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing its own security. This is
an area of shared interest for the EU and a number of its partners, even those
partners which have so far shown little willingness, or capacity, to fully
engage with the EU under the renewed ENP. However, there is a clear need to
cooperate more closely in addressing regional security challenges. The EU, and
its Member States through bilateral efforts, have a strong role to play based
on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, aimed at
preventing and managing conflicts and their causes.

Joint crisis
management can be strengthened by further encouraging and facilitating
partners' participation in CSDP missions. The Framework agreements on
participation in CSDP missions (FPAs) the EU has concluded with Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia should be further implemented. Discussions on possible FPAs
and possible participation in CSDP missions should continue, in particular with
Jordan and Morocco.

In order for the ENP
to remain relevant to partners even in the context of sustained, and
multiplying, political, economic and security crises, the EU, through the ENP,
should seize opportunities for action based on diplomacy, conflict prevention
and mediation. Such action should also foster traditional security capabilities
e.g. in the areas of military advice and training, police, justice and border
management cooperation, and should assist partners, where possible, with
implementing their international obligations on broader security challenges under
the relevant treaties. In particular, the EU needs to focus more on supporting
reforms in the direction of a more transparent, accountable and democratically
controlled security sector, to provide an enabling environment for democracy
and inclusive growth, both in the east and in the south.

The efficiency and
sustainability of EU support require greater consistency between overall
strategic and political bilateral objectives, including in the field of CSDP
and cooperation with partner countries. The EU’s comprehensive approach to
external conflict and crises[12]
will allow the EU to adapt its response to the specific needs of ENP partners
in crisis and post-crisis situations using all its existing policy and
financial tools. A more coherent, joined-up, use of the EU’s instruments,
including Member States’ bilateral activities with partners in the
neighbourhood, will improve the EU’s ability to address both short- and
long-term challenges and needs in the region.

5. Conclusions

The ENP is a policy of
continuous engagement. The value of the policy does not lie only in the
achievements of its individual components (e.g. political reform/democratisation,
market integration, better mobility and people-to-people contacts, and sector
cooperation). It also anchors countries/societies in transition, and even in
crisis situations, to the EU, by proposing a set of values and standards to
guide their reform efforts, and generally through the creation of networks
linking them to the EU and beyond to other partners. It is a framework — to
work towards, and safeguard, democracy, freedom, prosperity and security for
both the EU and its partners. While this may require continuous scrutiny of the
appropriateness and suitability of the policy and its instruments, there are
compelling reasons for it to remain the framework for the EU’s relations with
its neighbours for the years to come.

At the same time, the
EU needs to make efforts to ensure more coherence in EU policy objectives, and will
need to further reflect on better ways to prevent crises and respond to
fast-changing situations, by adapting its decision making procedures and, if
appropriate, using additional policy instruments. The EU and its Member States
should focus on how to enable the EU to better react to developments in its
neighbourhood, and to respond to partners’ changing needs.

The EU’s objective
remains to ensure that the ENP is relevant and effective for all its partners,
including those facing pressures and conflicts. The ENP needs to effectively
contribute to conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and to provide
the right set of incentives for partners to move towards democratic, economic
and structural reforms.

[1]               This joint communication is accompanied by: twelve
Country Progress Reports assessing the implementation of the ENP in 2013 in
countries with which an ENP Action Plan or an equivalent document has been
agreed; two regional progress reports reviewing the progress made in 2013 in
the implementation of the Eastern Partnership and the Partnership for Democracy
and Shared Prosperity; and a statistical annex.

[2]               The European Neighbourhood includes Algeria, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the
Republic of Moldova (hereafter referred to as Moldova), Morocco, Palestine (this
designation used in this document does not entail any recognition of Palestine
as a state and is without prejudice to positions on the recognition of
Palestine as a state), Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

[3]               SEC(2014) 200

[4]               Council Conclusions on Ukraine, Foreign Affairs
Council meeting Brussels 10 February 2014

[5]               JOIN(2013) 22/2, Towards a comprehensive EU
approach to the Syrian crisis

[6] COM(2008) 394
final, "Think Small First". A "Small Business Act" for
Europe

[7]               COM(2013)
869 final on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean,

[8]               European Council 19/20 December 2013, Conclusions, EUCO
217/13

[9]               See EaP roadmap 2012-2013, SWD(2012) 109 final.

[10]              COM(2011) 303, 25.5.2011 A new response to a
changing Neighbourhood.

[11]             COM(2011) 200, 8.03.2011 A partnership for
democracy and shared prosperity.

[12]             JOIN(2013) 30 final, The
EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises.