Filed 8/19/21 Estate of Brown CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

Estate of MANDANA KABIRI

BROWN, Deceased.

B305891

(Los Angeles County

ROXANA K. CHAMOUILLE, as 

Administrator,

 Petitioner and Respondent,

 

 v. 

KIRK BROWN,

Objector and Appellant.

Super. Ct. No. 18STPB01561)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Clifford L. Klein, Judge. Affirmed.

Kirk Brown, in pro per., for Objector and Appellant.

Buchalter and Robert M. Dato; Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, 

Birnberg, Coleman & Gold, Jamie N. Gonzalez and Jeffrey M. 

Oberto for Petitioner and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Roxana Kabiri Chamouille filed a probate petition when 

her sister, Mandana Kabiri Brown, died. The probate court 

appointed Chamouille special administrator of Mandana’s estate

after Chamouille produced a holographic will she claimed was 

signed by Mandana. The holographic will gave most of 

Mandana’s assets to Chamouille, some assets to their (Mandana

and Chamouille’s) parents, and almost nothing to Mandana’s 

husband, Kirk Brown (Brown). Brown filed two petitions to 

contest the will, alleging the holographic will was a forgery. The 

probate court dismissed each petition because Brown did not 

serve all interested parties. Chamouille filed a request to 

approve her final accounting. Brown did not object to the

accounting, and the probate court entered a final distribution 

order. Brown appeals from that order. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Chamouille Files a Probate Petition

Brown and Mandana married in 2015, and Mandana died 

in January 2018. In February 2018 Chamouille filed a petition to 

admit Mandana’s will to probate, attaching the holographic will 

Chamouille alleged Mandana wrote and signed in January 2016. 

The will gave Mandana’s residential property on Jasmine Avenue 

in Los Angeles (by far her most valuable asset) to Chamouille, 

her jewelry to Chamouille’s daughter, and her car to Nasrin 

Mohebkhosravi, Mandana and Chamouille’s mother. The will 

also gave three bank accounts and a pension plan to Chamouille, 

Nasrin, and Ali Kabiri, Chamouille and Mandana’s father. The 
3

will gave Brown some of Mandana’s household items and 

appliances, to “be decided” by Chamouille, Nasrin, Ali, and 

Brown “among themselves.” Pursuant to Chamouille’s request, 

the probate court appointed her special administrator of the 

estate. 

B. Brown Unsuccessfully Attempts To Contest the Will

In April 2018 Brown, represented by the first of three 

attorneys who would represent him in the probate proceedings,

filed a separate probate petition, alleging Mandana died intestate 

and asking the probate court to appoint him administrator of her 

estate. The probate court denied the petition without prejudice, 

and Brown did not refile it. In May 2018 Brown filed a petition 

contesting the holographic will, but he did not serve the petition 

on all interested parties. At Brown’s request, the court appointed 

a forensic handwriting expert to examine the holographic will. 

The expert ultimately concluded there was a “strong probability 

that [Mandana] did author” the will.

At some point prior to August 2018, Brown’s attorney 

stopped representing him. By October 2018 Brown was still 

representing himself and had not properly served his petition to 

contest the holographic will. The probate court denied Brown’s 

petition without prejudice, admitted the holographic will, and 

appointed Chamouille administrator of the estate. The court, 

however, ruled Brown could file and serve a new petition to 

contest the will.

In December 2018 Brown, now represented by his second 

attorney, filed a new petition to contest the will and asked the 

court to appoint a new forensic handwriting expert to examine

the holographic will. Again, however, Brown did not serve the 
4

petition on all interested parties. In May 2019 the court 

authorized a new expert to examine the will. According to 

Brown’s second attorney, the expert reviewed Mandana’s 

signatures and handwriting samples and reached an opinion that

was “not favorable to [Brown].” 

Brown’s second attorney also withdrew, and Brown 

retained a third attorney in June 2019. The probate court denied 

Brown’s petition to contest the will, again without prejudice, 

because Brown still had not served all interested parties. Brown 

did not file another petition to contest the will.

C. The Court Approves Chamouille’s Accounting and 

Enters a Final Distribution Order

In November 2019 Chamouille filed a request to approve 

her accounting and to close the estate. According to Chamouille, 

the estate initially had total assets of $1,705,990, $1,635,000 of 

which was the value of the Jasmine Avenue property (which 

Mandana left to Chamouille). The value of the household 

furnishings (which Mandana left in part to Brown) was $1,000. 

At the time Chamouille filed her request to approve the final 

accounting, the value of the estate had decreased to $1,647,197. 

Chamouille also asked the court to approve over $100,000 in fees 

and costs for her attorneys and $9,400 in reimbursement for her. 

Brown did not object to the accounting or appear at the 

January 2020 hearing on Chamouille’s request to approve the

accounting. On March 26, 2020 the probate court granted 

Chamouille’s request and entered a final distribution order. In 

addition to approving the accounting, the court ordered Brown to 

vacate the Jasmine Avenue property.
5

Three weeks later Brown filed a notice of appeal that did 

not specify which order Brown was appealing from. The notice of 

appeal cited Code of Civil Procedure section 917.4, which states 

that, absent a bond, the perfecting of an appeal does “not stay 

enforcement of the judgment or order in the trial court if the 

judgment or order appealed from directs the sale, conveyance or 

delivery of possession of real property which is in the possession 

or control of the appellant or the party ordered to sell, convey or 

deliver possession of the property . . . .”

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability

1. Brown May Appeal from the Final Distribution 

Order

Chamouille contends this court does not have jurisdiction 

to hear Brown’s appeal because the notice of appeal was 

defective. While the notice of appeal may not have been as 

specific as it might have been had an attorney prepared it, it was 

good enough.

A notice of appeal must “identif[y] the particular judgment 

or order being appealed” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2)), 

and Brown’s did not. But “‘“notices of appeal are to be liberally 

construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably 

clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where 

the respondent could not possibly have been misled or 

prejudiced.’”” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 

8 Cal.5th 875, 882; see Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School 

Dist. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 783.) “Once a notice of appeal is 
6

timely filed, the liberal construction requirement compels a 

reviewing court to evaluate whether the notice, despite any 

technical defect, nonetheless served its basic function—to provide 

notice of who is seeking review of what order or judgment—so as 

to properly invoke appellate jurisdiction.” (K.J., at p. 883.)

Although Brown did not cite the specific order he was 

appealing from, he did cite Code of Civil Procedure section 917.4, 

which, as stated, governs stays in appeals from orders directing

the conveyance and delivery of possession of real property. The 

March 26, 2020 order, which the probate court entered three 

weeks before Brown filed the notice of appeal, authorized 

Chamouille to take possession of the Jasmine Avenue property, 

directed that the property was “to be titled in the name of” 

Chamouille, and stated Brown had “no legal right to live at” the 

property and had to “vacate” the property. Liberally construed, 

the notice of appeal referred to, and provided sufficient notice 

Brown was appealing from, the March 26, 2020 order.

Moreover, in designating the record on appeal, Brown 

stated he was appealing from an order dated March 28, 2020. 

(See C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th

688, 697, fn. 7 [“Although [the appellants] failed to specify the 

date of the order being appealed, there is no question they sought 

review of . . . the only appealable order included in their 

designation of the record on appeal.”]; D’Avola v. Anderson (1996) 

47 Cal.App.4th 358, 362 [“[i]n determining whether a respondent 

has been misled by errors on the face of the notice of appeal, a 

reviewing court may consider the contents of the designation of 

record”].) There was no March 28, 2020 order. But under the 

circumstances, it was reasonably clear Brown was referring to
7

the March 26, 2020 order, and Chamouille was not prejudiced by 

any defect in the notice of appeal.

2. Brown May Not Appeal from the Other Orders 

Discussed in His Brief

In his brief, Brown discusses several other orders: the 

orders denying his petitions to contest the will; an order, entered 

after the final distribution order, denying Brown’s motion for an 

order “granting him rights to his music” and ruling “Brown’s 

music was not part of the estate”; and an order, also entered after 

the final distribution order, sanctioning Brown $31,000. None of 

these orders is appealable.

An order denying a petition to contest a will is not 

appealable; instead, an aggrieved party may challenge the order 

in an appeal “from an order admitting the will to probate.” 

(Estate of Patterson (1934) 220 Cal. 370, 371; see Estate of Weber

(1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 22, 24 [“[a] dismissal of a contest filed 

before a will is admitted to probate is not . . . appealable”]; Estate 

of Herrington (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 389, 390 [order granting 

motion for nonsuit on a will contest is not appealable but is 

“reviewable on appeal from an order admitting the will to 

probate”]; see also Prob. Code, § 1303, subd. (b) [order admitting 

or refusing to admit a will to probate is appealable].)1 In October 

2018 the probate court denied Brown’s first petition to contest the 

will, and in December 2018 the court admitted the will to 

probate. Brown could have challenged the order denying his 

petition to contest the will in an appeal from the December 2018 

order, but Brown did not appeal from that order. (See Estate of 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
8

Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450, fn. 5 [the “orders 

listed as appealable in the Probate Code must be challenged 

timely or they become final and binding,” and they “may not be 

collaterally attacked in a subsequent appeal from the final order 

of distribution”]; see also Estate of Reed (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th

1122, 1127 [“‘Once a final, appealable order or judgment has been 

entered, the time to appeal begins to run.’”].)2

Brown’s attempt to appeal from the other two orders he 

mentions in his opening brief—the order determining Brown’s 

music was not part of the estate and the order imposing 

monetary sanctions—fares no better. Neither order is before this 

court. According to Brown, the probate court entered both orders 

in or around October 2020—six months after he filed his notice of 

appeal (and three months after he filed his notice designating the 

record on appeal). Brown cites no authority that would allow us 

to construe his notice of appeal to refer to these orders, which the 

probate court entered after Brown filed his notice of appeal, or 

that these orders are appealable (See Estate of Allen (1917)

175 Cal. 356, 357 [it is a “well-settled rule that the appellate 

jurisdiction in probate matters extends only to such orders and 

judgments as are specified” by statute]; Estate of Dito (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 791, 799, fn. 5 [“In probate matters, there is no 

right of appeal unless the Probate Code specifically authorizes an 

appeal from the challenged order.”].)

2 Several months after the court admitted the will to probate, 

Brown filed his second petition to contest the will. The court 

denied the petition in July 2019. Even assuming Brown could 

have appealed from the court’s July 2019 order, Brown did not 

timely appeal from that order.
9

B. Brown Has Not Shown the Probate Court Erred in 

Entering the Distribution Order

1. The Probate Court Did Not Violate Brown’s Due 

Process Rights

Brown argues the probate court violated his due process 

rights by refusing to permit his (third) attorney to “enter his 

appearance for Brown at the March 26, [2020] accounting 

hearing.” Generally, “‘[w]e review procedural due process claims 

de novo because “the ultimate determination of procedural 

fairness amounts to a question of law.”’” (Severson & Werson, 

P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944; see Brown 

v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 155, 168 [“‘“Because 

[the appellant’s] contention regarding procedural matters 

presents a pure question of law involving the application of the 

due process clause, we review the trial court’s decision de 

novo.”’”].) Had the probate court actually refused to allow 

Brown’s attorney to appear at the hearing, the court may have 

violated Brown’s due process rights. (See Roa v. Lodi Medical 

Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 925 [“Although the right to be 

represented by retained counsel in civil actions is not expressly 

enumerated in the federal or state Constitution, our cases have 

long recognized that the constitutional due process guarantee 

does embrace such a right.”]; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles

(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1398 [“A civil litigant has a 

constitutional right to be represented by counsel at trial.”]; Vann 

v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 200 [“There is a 

constitutional basis for the right to counsel in noncriminal 

proceedings and, in its narrowest definition, it is the right to 

appear by counsel in any adversary proceedings in which the 
10

adversary party has the benefit of the right to counsel.”].) The 

problem for Brown is that there is no evidence this occurred. 

Brown cites nothing in the record showing that the court refused 

to allow him or his attorney to appear at the hearing on 

Chamouille’s request for an order approving her accounting. (See 

Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 [“the burden is on 

an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented 

to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error 

that justifies reversal of the judgment”]; Menges v. Department of 

Transportation (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 13, 27 [“‘“To demonstrate 

error, appellant must present . . . citations to facts in the record 

that support the claim of error.”’”].) 

Nor does the record support Brown’s contention. The 

transcript reflects that neither Brown nor his attorney appeared 

at the hearing, but nothing suggests the court refused to allow 

them to appear. Brown’s contention is also belied by the probate 

court’s other actions. After Brown’s first attorney ceased

representing him, the probate court continued the proceedings for 

over two and a half months to allow Brown to find a new 

attorney. And the probate court allowed two additional attorneys 

to represent Brown, and allowed Brown to refile his petition to 

contest the will.

Brown’s argument the probate court did not allow him or 

his attorney to file objections to Chamouille’s accounting fails for 

the same reasons. Chamouille served Brown, through his 

attorney, with her accounting and a proposed final distribution 

order. Brown does not cite anything in the record showing, nor 

does the record suggest, the probate court did not allow Brown to 

file objections.
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2. Brown Has Not Shown the Probate Court Erred 

in Approving the Accounting 

Brown also takes issue with certain portions of the 

distribution order. In particular, Brown argues the probate court

“failed to assess” whether he had a community property interest

in the Jasmine Avenue residence, the Wells Fargo bank account, 

and Mandana’s pension plan. (See Estate of Fincher (1981) 

119 Cal.App.3d 343, 349 [surviving spouse may assert a claim to 

community property in a proceeding to determine distribution 

rights]; Estate of Hartnett (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 280, 283 

[same].) An order directing distribution of property from a 

decedent’s estate is appealable. (§ 1303, subd. (g).)

There are several problems with Brown’s argument. First, 

Brown did not make the argument in the probate court, thus 

forfeiting it. Chamouille’s accounting stated that all of the assets 

described in her accounting, including the Jasmine Avenue 

property, were Mandana’s separate property. As discussed,

Brown did not object. (See Estate of Herzog (2019) 

33 Cal.App.5th 894, 907 [failure to raise an argument in the 

probate court forfeits the issue on appeal]; Estates of Collins & 

Flowers (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1256 [“‘“if [a] new theory 

contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are 

open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at 

trial, the opposing party should not be required to defend against 

it on appeal”’”].)

Second, even if Brown had not forfeited the argument, he

has not shown the probate court erred. Brown presented no 

evidence he had a community property interest in the Jasmine

Avenue property, the Wells Fargo account, or Mandana’s 
12

pension.

3 He did not show, for example, he or Mandana

contributed community funds to these assets, much less how 

much in community funds either one of them contributed. Brown 

cannot maintain on appeal that the probate court should have 

considered an argument he never raised before the court entered 

the distribution order. Brown must show the probate court erred, 

for example, by including in the distribution order property that 

was not part of the estate. (See Estates of Collins & Flowers, 

supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 [“We presume the trial court’s 

factual findings are supported by the evidence, and it is the 

appellant’s burden to show that they are not.”].) He has not.

3 The distribution order does not appear to include the Wells 

Fargo bank account or Mandana’s pension. While the order 

states that Chamouille is authorized to disburse funds from the 

Wells Fargo account and the pension, the portion of the court’s 

order listing the estate’s assets does not include either. And 

Chamouille’s accounting did not list funds from the Wells Fargo 

account or the pension as an asset of the estate. In fact, counsel 

for Chamouille represented to the court during one of the 

hearings: “Just to be clear, Your Honor, pension funds are not 

subject to the probate . . . . They are outside of the probate 

estate.” 
13

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Brown’s motion to augment the 

record is denied. Chamouille is to recover her costs on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

IBARRA, J.

*

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.