Fiscal Year 2019

Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan –

Biennial Plan Summary

Report to Congress

October 2018

National Nuclear Security Administration

United States Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page i

Message from the Administrator

The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Fiscal Year 2019 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (SSMP) describes DOE/NNSA’s 

plans to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and to 

maintain the scientific and engineering tools, capabilities, and infrastructure that underpin the nuclear 

security enterprise. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to 

Reduce Global Nuclear Threats report, which outlines NNSA’s equally vital missions to reduce the threats 

of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. In keeping with our commitment to Congress, updated 

versions of these reports are published each year.

The fiscal year (FY) 2019 SSMP summarizes the activities being performed within DOE/NNSA’s national

laboratories, production facilities, and security site in support of our enduring national security missions. 

In particular, this report describes the path to completing production of W76-1 warheads by FY 2019; 

delivering the first production unit of the B61-12 gravity bomb by FY 2020; delivering the first production 

unit of the W88 Alteration 370 by FY 2020; and achieving a first production unit of the W80-4 warhead by 

FY 2025. With four modernization programs underway, NNSA is at its busiest since the Cold War era.

The FY 2019 SSMP also reflects DOE/NNSA’s increased commitment to revitalizing and reinvigorating the 

facilities and corresponding infrastructure that make up the nuclear security enterprise. DOE/NNSA 

infrastructure has long been underfunded and overdue for the upgrades necessary to create a modern, 

efficient, nuclear complex that can meet NNSA’s national security missions today and into the future. 

With the assistance and support of Congress, NNSA will be able to continue to halt the growth of deferred 

maintenance and modernize the nuclear security enterprise. As expressly stated in the Nuclear Posture 

Review (DOD 2018), there is no margin for further delay in the sustainment of a modern, resilient, and 

responsive infrastructure for the enterprise.

Continued investment in the repair and recapitalization of DOE/NNSA’s laboratories, production facilities, 

and security site are crucial to NNSA’s capabilities and most importantly, to our workforce. NNSA’s 

workforce is our greatest asset, and providing quality facilities is necessary to recruit and retain the worldclass scientific and engineering talent on which our nuclear deterrent, and indeed the security of the 

United States, so greatly depends. 

In addition to summarizing the achievements and status of the current program of record, the FY 2019 

SSMP describes the work that NNSA will execute in support of the Nuclear Posture Review, which 

addresses worsening global threat conditions and underscores the need for a modern, flexible, and 

resilient nuclear enterprise. DOE/NNSA’s program of record for maintaining the nuclear weapons 

stockpile is being updated in coordination with the Nuclear Weapons Council and the interagency process 

that weighs and prioritizes missions and resources. 

The challenges facing our Nation are real and pressing. The unprecedented range and mix of threats 

underscore the need for the United States to maintain a diverse set of nuclear capabilities that can provide 

flexible, tailored options to enhance deterrence and to achieve objectives should deterrence fail. As 

described in this report, the scientific and technological expertise found at DOE/NNSA’s laboratories, 

production facilities, and other sites is the intellectual backbone through which the United States can 

continue to deter adversarial aggression and preserve peace for our Nation and our allies.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page ii | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Pursuant to the statutory requirements, this FY 2019 SSMP is being provided to the following members of 

Congress:

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable James Inhofe

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Lamar Alexander

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Deb Fischer

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Joe Donnelly

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey

Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Mike Simpson 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Appropriations
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page iii

The Honorable Mike Rogers

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Jim Cooper

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me or Nora Khalil, Associate 

Administrator for External Affairs, at (202) 586-7332. 

Sincerely,
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page v

Message from the Secretary

National security is a fundamental mission of the Department of Energy (DOE). Maintaining a safe, secure, 

and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile consistent with the President’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is chiefly 

performed through the work of DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This mission 

accounts for more than a third of the Department’s discretionary budget. It comprises the developments 

made at the national security laboratories in science-based stockpile stewardship, advanced 

manufacturing, laser science and optics, high performance computing, and many other areas of benefit 

to DOE as well as other departments and agencies throughout the Government and our Nation. 

The recently released Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2018) addresses the dynamic nature of today’s threat 

environment and the implications for our Nation’s nuclear security mission. A safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear deterrent remains an essential element of our Nation’s defense, both to deter attacks and to 

protect our interests and those of our allies. DOE/NNSA will work in close partnership with the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to provide additional diversity in the attributes and flexibility of our 

deterrence options, as directed in the Nuclear Posture Review. This year’s Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (SSMP) outlines the groundwork to support 

these objectives. Future editions of the SSMP will continue to document plans and progress.

The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program has allowed DOE and DOD to certify to the President 

for the 22nd consecutive year that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective

without the use of nuclear explosive testing. This impressive scientific achievement is enabled by 

DOE/NNSA’s most valuable resource, its workforce. DOE/NNSA’s ability to recruit, train, and retain the 

next generation of world-class scientists, engineers, and technicians is a major priority. An additional 

priority is the revitalization and modernization of the facilities and related infrastructure of the nuclear 

security enterprise.

With continued congressional support for the program described in this FY 2019 SSMP, we will continue 

to meet our Nation’s evolving nuclear security requirements while keeping the nuclear deterrent safe, 

secure, and effective. 

Sincerely, 

Rick Perry
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page vii

Executive Summary

This Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (SSMP)

describes the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) strategic 

program for maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile over the next 

25 years. DOE publishes the SSMP annually, either in full report form or as a summary, in response to 

statutory requirements, to support the President’s Budget for Weapons Activities. This annual plan 

provides a single, integrated picture of current and future nuclear security enterprise activities and 

capabilities funded by the Weapons Activities account in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent and is 

developed to be consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Council’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2017–

2042. 

This SSMP lays the foundation for meeting the tenets laid out in the National Security Strategy

(White House 2017) and the Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2018). Examination of the Weapons Activities 

capabilities in Chapter 3, “Capabilities That Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise,” is the first step in 

ensuring that these capabilities enable the capacity and flexibility to meet shifting requirements, as well 

as national security needs over the coming decades. Additionally, an effective, responsive, and resilient 

nuclear weapons infrastructure staffed by a trained and ready workforce is essential to the United States’

capacity to adapt to these shifting requirements. The analysis of the capabilities and the infrastructure 

that enable them is further detailed in the chapters that follow.

Highlights of near-term and out-year mission objectives include the following:

 Complete production of the W76-1 warheads by FY 2019.

 Deliver the first production unit of the B61-12 by FY 2020 and complete production by FY 2024.

 Deliver the first production unit of the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 (with refresh of the conventional 

high explosive) by December 2019 and complete alterations by FY 2024.

 Achieve a first production unit of the W80-4 by FY 2025, with completion of the life extension 

program (LEP) by 2031, and ensure alignment with the Department of Defense (DOD) Long Range 

Stand Off program.

 Advance the W78 warhead replacement 1 year to begin in FY 2019 to support fielding on the 

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent by FY 2030.

 Sustain the B83-1 until a suitable replacement is identified.

 Explore future ballistic missile warhead requirements. 

 Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 

80 pits per year in 2030. 

 Create an effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear infrastructure that ensures the availability 

of the strategic materials to meet military requirements.

 Advance the innovative experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, and computational 

capabilities necessary to ensure stockpile safety, security, reliability, and responsiveness. 

 Phase out mission dependency on Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and 

deliver the Uranium Processing Facility for no more than $6.5 billion by the end of 2025.
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 Implement the strategy to achieve the strategic priorities laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review, 

as further defined by the Nuclear Weapons Council.

 Achieve exascale computing and deliver a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s.

 Ensure an enduring trusted supply of strategic radiation-hardened microsystems beyond 2025.

 Develop an operational enhanced capability (advanced radiography and reactivity 

measurements) for subcritical experiments by the mid-2020s.

 Implement the Stockpile Responsiveness Program that fully exercises the workforce and 

capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise.

Life Extension and Major Alteration Program Highlights

 As of May 2018, NNSA completed 95 percent of the total production units of the W76-1 LEP, one 

of the two warheads associated with the Navy’s submarine-launched ballistic missile. This LEP 

will add an additional 30 years of service life to the W76. NNSA has delivered more than 

90 percent of the total warheads to the Navy.

 The B61-12 LEP, a nuclear gravity bomb for the Air Force, is currently in production engineering 

and continues to meet its qualification test schedule; multiple flight tests were completed during 

the past year. This LEP remains on track for a first production unit in 2020. Once completed, the 

LEP will add at least 20 years to the life of the system and consolidate four models of the B61 into 

a single variant.

 The W88 Alt 370 program accelerated activities for the change-out of the high explosive in the 

W88, the other submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead. The program is currently in the 

production engineering phase and remains on schedule for a first production unit in December 

2019.

 NNSA made significant progress on the W80-4 LEP and entered the design definition and cost 

study phase in September 2017. The W80-4 is the nuclear warhead planned for incorporation 

into the Air Force’s new Long Range Stand Off weapon system, which will replace its aging airlaunched cruise missile.

Infrastructure and Operations Program Highlights

NNSA is long overdue for infrastructure upgrades to create a modern nuclear security enterprise that will

reduce risk to the mission and improve staff, public, and environmental safety. More than half of NNSA’s 

facilities are over 40 years old; nearly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project era; and 10 percent 

are currently excess and no longer needed. In 2017, guided by an updated infrastructure roadmap, NNSA 

leveraged new management tools to prioritize investments across the enterprise. NNSA continued to 

meet the long-term challenge of modernizing its infrastructure and providing high-quality facilities for its

high-quality workforce via progress on the following projects:

 The Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 achieved the 90-percent design phase, which is required 

to baseline the cost and schedule of nuclear projects, and completed the Construction Support 

Building. The completion of the $27.5 million Construction Support Building on time and 

$5 million under budget marks a major milestone for the project, which will replace an early Cold 

War plant with a modern, more efficient, and safer facility for conducting highly enriched uranium 

operations at Y-12.

 NNSA approved Critical Decision 4 (CD-4, Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion) at 

the High Explosive Pressing Facility at the Pantex Plant (Pantex), signaling the beginning of testing 
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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page ix

process equipment and training staff prior to commencing operations. The High Explosive 

Pressing Facility will improve operational safety and security, thereby enhancing the quality and 

efficiency of high explosives production at Pantex.

 NNSA relocated many of its Pantex employees into the John C. Drummond Center (formerly 

known as the Pantex Administrative Support Complex). This facility was built by a private 

developer using third-party financing and provides a modern, energy-efficient workspace. The 

relocation of approximately 1,000 employees will allow for disposition of 1950s era buildings and 

the elimination of roughly $20 million in deferred maintenance at Pantex.

 Two critical subprojects for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project 

at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) are on track to achieve CD-4 by FY 2022 on budget and 

schedule. The CMRR project will make it possible for mission-critical technical capabilities, such 

as analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and metallurgy research and development, to 

be relocated to modern laboratory facilities that meet or exceed current safety and 

environmental protection standards.

 Working with the Army Corps of Engineers, NNSA completed the 100-percent design phase for 

the Albuquerque Complex Project and broke ground on July 2, 2018. This is an important 

milestone on the path to a modern and efficient facility for over 1,200 DOE and NNSA employees 

in New Mexico.

 NNSA approved the start of operations at the Transuranic Waste Facility at LANL in 

September 2017, completing the project $2 million under budget and 4 months ahead of 

schedule. The facility will safely store transuranic solid waste from LANL in accordance with 

nuclear facility requirements.

 A groundbreaking was held at the Nevada National Security Site for the Mercury Modernization

program. Mercury serves as the “base camp” for the Nevada National Security Site, housing 

facilities such as the operations command center, a fuel station, office buildings, and other

support structures. The modernization effort will consolidate facilities into a smaller footprint, 

reduce energy costs, and provide a modern, sustainable infrastructure.

 Working with the State of Missouri, NNSA transferred excess Federal property at the Bannister 

Road Federal Complex in Kansas City to private developers. The transfer will save taxpayers 

approximately $700 million and will lead to further community development.

Experimental Highlights

 The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory completed its 

2,000th experiment in August 2017. NIF broke its own record for neutron yield twice in the past 

year, achieving a yield of 54 kilojoules and doubling the previous record from 2014. High energy 

density and inertial confinement fusion experiments support stockpile stewardship, as well as 

other national security applications and discovery science.

 The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at LANL completed seven 

integrated hydrodynamic experiments that examined the effects of component aging and the 

changes proposed in the LEPs.

 The Z pulsed power facility (Z) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) executed over 

140 experiments in FY 2017. As the world’s most powerful and efficient laboratory radiation 

source at several weapon-relevant pulse durations and frequencies, Z is capable of creating 
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weapon-relevant conditions that enable experiments to further our knowledge of weapon 

physics.

 The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) gas gun at the Nevada National 

Security Site completed 18 experiments, including two with plutonium. Sixteen experiments on 

other special nuclear materials readied the platform for advanced diagnostics in support of 

upcoming plutonium experiments.

 The Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) Complex at SNL produced 

integrated circuits for the nuclear security enterprise, including circuits used in state-of-the-art 

diagnostic detectors.

 The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) fielded 122 experiments for NNSA and 546 

experiments for other users including other government organizations, universities, and industry 

(under proprietary user agreements). The proton radiography facility and the Lujan Center facility 

both executed shots in support of the B61-12 LEP and future stockpile options. The Weapons 

Neutron Research Facility measured nuclear criticality data, as well as radiochemical data from 

underground tests.

High Performance Computing

The Trinity high performance computing system at LANL began full operations. Trinity is one of the most 

advanced computers in the world and performs more than 30 times better than the laboratory’s former 

supercomputer, Cielo. With a speed of 41 petaFLOPS,

1 Trinity provides computing resources to support 

the highly accurate multi-dimensional modeling necessary to understand and predict performance as 

nuclear weapons age.

Conclusion

While executing the current plan, DOE/NNSA had an outstanding FY 2017. NNSA maintained the existing 

nuclear weapons stockpile, made impressive progress on a number of LEPs, and continued to advance the 

science and engineering capabilities that underpin the Nation’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.

NNSA continued to extend the life of existing U.S. nuclear warheads by replacing nuclear and non-nuclear 

components with systems that use modern technologies. Unique, state-of-the-art capabilities for 

research, development, testing, evaluation, and production enabled this critical effort. Finally, the scopes, 

budgets, and schedules of the LEPs, infrastructure modernization efforts, and DOE’s nuclear delivery 

systems have been fully integrated and coordinated.

Additional information regarding these and other advances that ensure NNSA’s ability to achieve its

mission is included in the chapters that follow. 

 

1 PetaFLOPS = one million billion or 1015 floating point operations per second. 
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Information at a Glance

Exascale Computing.................................................................................................Appendix B

Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget ..................................... Section 4.1; Table 4-1

High Explosive Strategy....................................................................................... Section 3.10.3

Infrastructure (General Purpose)........................................................................... Section 3.31

Infrastructure (Programmatic)............................................................................... Section 3.31

Life Extension Program Accomplishments............................................................ Section 4.2.2

Life Extension Program Funding .....Sections 4.2.1, 4.7.4; Figures 4-23–4-31; Tables 4-4–4-11

Life Extension Program Schedule...............................................................................Figure 2-3

Life Extension Program Status................................................................................. Section 2.3

Lithium Strategy.................................................................................................... Section 2.4.6

Ongoing NNSA Capital Acquisition Projects

(formerly NNSA Construction Resource Planning List).....................Section 4.7.5; Figure 4-33

Out-year Resource Estimates............................................................Section 4.7.1; Figure 4-21

Pit Development ................................................................................................... Section 2.4.1

Plutonium Strategy ............................................................................................... Section 2.4.1

Program Accomplishments.....................................................................Chapter 4 by program

Program Milestones and Objectives Charts............................................Chapter 4 by program

Radiation-Hardened Electronics............................................................................ Section 3.16

Secure Transportation ........................................................................................... Section 3.28

Significant Finding Investigations........................................................Section 2.2.3; Figure 2-1

Stockpile Responsiveness ................................................................................Sections 1.5, 1.7

Stockpile Size..........................................................................................Section 1.4; Figure 1-3

Stockpile Weapons.................................................................................. Section 1.4; Table 1-1

Surveillance Activities........................................................................................... Section 2.2.2

Surveillance Funding............................................................................ Section 4.2.1; Table 4-2

Workforce ................................................................................................................ Section 1.8
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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Table of Contents

Legislative Language ....................................................................................................................... xix

Chapter 1 Overview .......................................................................................................................1-1

1.1 Policy Framework Summary ....................................................................................................1-2

1.2 Summary of Strategic Environment for Nuclear Security........................................................1-3

1.3 Summary of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise........................................................1-3

1.3.1 National Security Laboratories..................................................................................1-4

1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Sites...........................................................................1-5

1.3.3 Nevada National Security Site ...................................................................................1-5

1.4 Summary of the Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile .............................................................1-5

1.5 Overall Strategy, Objectives, and Prioritization of Weapons Activities...................................1-7

1.6 Partnership with the Department of Defense .........................................................................1-8

1.7 Stockpile Strategy ....................................................................................................................1-8

1.8 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan .........................1-10

Chapter 2 Status of the Stockpile and Modernization Efforts...........................................................2-1

2.1 Stockpile Management Overview and Nuclear Enterprise Assurance ....................................2-1

2.2 Status of the Stockpile .............................................................................................................2-1

2.2.1 Weapons Assessment, Reliability, Certification, and Prediction of Performance.....2-1

2.2.2 Surveillance of the Stockpile .....................................................................................2-3

2.2.3 Significant Finding Investigations..............................................................................2-5

2.2.4 Maintenance of the Stockpile....................................................................................2-5

2.2.5 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition................................................................2-8

2.3 Modernizing and Sustaining the Stockpile...............................................................................2-9

2.3.1 W76 LEP.....................................................................................................................2-9

2.3.2 B83-1 Alt 353 and Alt 753 Strategic Bomb ..............................................................2-11

2.3.3 B61-12 LEP ...............................................................................................................2-11

2.3.4 W88 Alt 370 .............................................................................................................2-12

2.3.5 W80-4 LEP................................................................................................................2-12

2.3.6 W78 Replacement Warhead (Formerly Interoperable Warhead 1)........................2-13

2.3.7 Ballistic Missile Warhead (IW or BM-Y) and Ballistic Missile Warhead 

(IW or BM-Z) ............................................................................................................2-14

2.3.8 Sea-Launched Cruise Missile ...................................................................................2-14

2.4 Strategic Materials.................................................................................................................2-14

2.4.1 Plutonium ................................................................................................................2-14

2.4.2 Uranium...................................................................................................................2-15

2.4.3 Depleted Uranium ...................................................................................................2-16
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2.4.4 Uranium (Domestic Uranium Enrichment)..............................................................2-16

2.4.5 Tritium .....................................................................................................................2-17

2.4.6 Lithium.....................................................................................................................2-18

2.4.7 Material Recycle and Recovery and Storage ...........................................................2-19

Chapter 3 Capabilities That Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise................................................3-1

3.1 Simulation Codes and Models .................................................................................................3-5

3.1.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals..................................................3-6

3.1.2 Status of Simulation Codes and Models....................................................................3-6

3.1.3 Challenges and Strategies..........................................................................................3-7

3.2 High Performance Computing..................................................................................................3-7

3.2.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals..................................................3-7

3.2.2 Status of High Performance Computing....................................................................3-7

3.2.3 Challenges and Strategies..........................................................................................3-9

3.3 Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry .......................................................................................3-9

3.3.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals..................................................3-9

3.3.2 Status of Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry........................................................3-10

3.3.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-10

3.4 Atomic and Plasma Physics....................................................................................................3-10

3.4.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-10

3.4.2 Status of Atomic and Plasma Physics ......................................................................3-11

3.4.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-11

3.5 High Energy Density Physics ..................................................................................................3-11

3.5.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-12

3.5.2 Status of High Energy Density Physics.....................................................................3-13

3.5.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-13

3.6 Laser, Pulsed Power, and Accelerator Technology ................................................................3-13

3.6.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-14

3.6.2 Status of Laser, Pulsed Power, and Accelerator Technology ..................................3-14

3.6.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-14

3.7 Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors .................................................................3-15

3.7.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-15

3.7.2 Status of Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors....................................3-15

3.7.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-16

3.8 Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments..........................................................................3-16

3.8.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-17

3.8.2 Status of Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments.............................................3-17

3.8.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-17

3.9 Chemistry ...............................................................................................................................3-18

3.9.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-18

3.9.2 Status of Chemistry..................................................................................................3-18

3.9.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-19

3.10 High Explosives Science and Engineering ..............................................................................3-19

3.10.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-19

3.10.2 Status of High Explosives Science and Engineering.................................................3-19

3.10.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-20

3.11 Materials Science and Engineering........................................................................................3-20

3.11.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-20
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3.11.2 Status of Material Science and Engineering ............................................................3-21

3.11.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-21

3.12 Weapons Physics Design and Analysis...................................................................................3-21

3.12.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-21

3.12.2 Status of Weapons Physics Design and Analysis.....................................................3-22

3.12.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-22

3.13 Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration ......................................................3-23

3.13.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-23

3.13.2 Status of Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration.........................3-23

3.13.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-23

3.14 Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering Sciences......................................3-24

3.14.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-24

3.14.2 Status of Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering Sciences........3-25

3.14.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-25

3.15 Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and Manufacturing............................................3-25

3.15.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-26

3.15.2 Status of Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and Manufacturing ..............3-26

3.15.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-26

3.16 Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics Design and Manufacturing .......................................3-26

3.16.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-27

3.16.2 Status of Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics Design and Manufacturing .........3-27

3.16.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-27

3.17 Weapon Component and System Prototyping ......................................................................3-28

3.17.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-28

3.17.2 Status of Weapon Component and System Prototyping.........................................3-28

3.17.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-29

3.18 Advanced Manufacturing.......................................................................................................3-29

3.18.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-29

3.18.2 Status of Advanced Manufacturing .........................................................................3-30

3.18.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-30

3.19 Weapon Component and Material Process Development....................................................3-31

3.19.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-31

3.19.2 Status of Weapon Component and Material Process Development ......................3-31

3.19.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-32

3.20 Handling, Packaging, Processing and Manufacturing of Energetic and 

Hazardous Materials..............................................................................................................3-32

3.20.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-32

3.20.2 Status of Handling, Packaging, Processing, and Manufacturing of 

Energetic and Hazardous Materials.........................................................................3-33

3.20.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-33

3.20.4 Lithium.....................................................................................................................3-33

3.21 Handling, Packaging, Processing, and Manufacturing of Special Nuclear Materials.............3-34

3.21.1 Plutonium ................................................................................................................3-34

3.21.2 Uranium...................................................................................................................3-36

3.21.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-37
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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3.22 Tritium Production, Handling, and Processing.......................................................................3-39

3.22.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-39

3.22.2 Status of Tritium......................................................................................................3-39

3.22.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-40

3.23 Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing, and Manufacturing............................3-40

3.23.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-40

3.23.2 Status of Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing, and 

Manufacturing .........................................................................................................3-40

3.23.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-41

3.24 Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly ........................................3-41

3.24.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-42

3.24.2 Status of Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly...........3-42

3.24.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-42

3.25 Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly .........................................................................3-43

3.25.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-43

3.25.2 Status of Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly ...........................................3-43

3.25.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-43

3.26 Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication ...........................................................................3-43

3.26.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-44

3.26.2 Status of Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication..............................................3-44

3.26.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-44

3.27 Weapon Component and System Surveillance and Assessment...........................................3-45

3.27.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-45

3.27.2 Status of Weapon Component and System Surveillance ........................................3-45

3.27.3 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-46

3.28 Secure Transportation ...........................................................................................................3-46

3.28.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-46

3.28.2 Status of Secure Transportation..............................................................................3-47

3.28.3 Challenges................................................................................................................3-47

3.28.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy................................................................................3-48

3.29 Physical Security.....................................................................................................................3-48

3.29.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-48

3.29.2 Status of Physical Security .......................................................................................3-49

3.29.3 Challenges................................................................................................................3-51

3.29.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy................................................................................3-51

3.30 Information Technology and Cybersecurity...........................................................................3-52

3.30.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-52

3.30.2 Status of Information Technology and Cybersecurity .............................................3-53

3.30.3 Challenges................................................................................................................3-54

3.30.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy................................................................................3-55

3.31 Infrastructure and Operations...............................................................................................3-56

3.31.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals................................................3-57

3.31.2 Status of Infrastructure and Operations..................................................................3-57

3.31.3 Challenges................................................................................................................3-60

3.31.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy................................................................................3-61

3.32 Measures for a Resilient, Flexible, and Responsive Nuclear Security Enterprise ..................3-63
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page xvii

Chapter 4 Budget and Fiscal Estimates............................................................................................4-1

4.1 Fiscal Year 2019 Nuclear Security Program Budget.................................................................4-1

4.2 Directed Stockpile Work ..........................................................................................................4-2

4.2.1 Directed Stockpile Work Budget ...............................................................................4-2

4.2.2 Directed Stockpile Work Accomplishments ..............................................................4-3

4.2.3 Directed Stockpile Work Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.......................................4-7

4.2.4 Directed Stockpile Work Milestones and Objectives ................................................4-9

4.3 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation ......................................................................4-10

4.3.1 Science Program......................................................................................................4-10

4.3.2 Engineering Program...............................................................................................4-12

4.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program................................4-15

4.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ......................................................4-18

4.3.5 Advanced Manufacturing Development Program...................................................4-21

4.4 Secure Transportation Asset..................................................................................................4-22

4.4.1 Secure Transportation Asset Budget.......................................................................4-22

4.4.2 Secure Transportation Asset Accomplishments......................................................4-23

4.4.3 Secure Transportation Asset Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP ..............................4-23

4.4.4 Secure Transportation Asset Milestones and Objectives........................................4-23

4.5 Infrastructure and Operations...............................................................................................4-24

4.5.1 Infrastructure and Operations Budget ....................................................................4-24

4.5.2 Infrastructure and Operations Accomplishments...................................................4-25

4.5.3 Infrastructure and Operations Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP ...........................4-28

4.5.4 Infrastructure and Operations Milestones and Objectives.....................................4-28

4.6 Other Weapons Activities......................................................................................................4-28

4.6.1 Other Weapons Activities Budget ...........................................................................4-28

4.6.2 Defense Nuclear Security ........................................................................................4-29

4.6.3 Information Technology and Cybersecurity ............................................................4-31

4.7 Budget Estimate Requirements Beyond Fiscal Year 2019 and Basis of Estimates ................4-33

4.7.1 Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs Executability and 

Associated Risk ........................................................................................................4-33

4.7.2 Basis for Cost Estimates...........................................................................................4-35

4.7.3 Stockpile Sustainment.............................................................................................4-35

4.7.4 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations......................................................4-36

4.7.5 Construction ............................................................................................................4-47

Chapter 5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................5-1

Appendix A Requirements Mapping .............................................................................................. A-1

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to Statutory Reporting 

Requirements and Related Requests...................................................................................... A-1

A.2 Ongoing Requirements........................................................................................................... A-1

A.3 Other Requirements ............................................................................................................. A-14

Appendix B Exascale Computing Initiative...................................................................................... B-1

B.1 Challenges................................................................................................................................B-1

B.2 Approaches and Strategies......................................................................................................B-2

B.3 Conclusion................................................................................................................................B-2
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Appendix C Weapons Activities Capabilities................................................................................... C-1

Appendix D Glossary ..................................................................................................................... D-1

Appendix E List of Figures and Tables..............................................................................................E-1

Appendix F Acronyms and Abbreviations........................................................................................F-1
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page xix

Legislative Language

Title 50 of United States Code Section 2523 (50 U.S.C. § 2523), requires that:

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials 

of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually update 

a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile 

stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program 

direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan shall 

be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent annual 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. 

Pursuant to previous statutory requirements, the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 

Administration (DOE/NNSA) has submitted reports on the plan to Congress annually since 1998, with the 

exception of 2012.

1

 Starting in 2013, full reports on the plan are to be submitted every odd-numbered 

year, with summaries of the plan provided in even-numbered years. 

The majority of the Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan 

Summary (SSMP) is a summary of DOE/NNSA’s 25-year program of record to maintain the safety, security,

and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile and is captured in this single, unclassified document. A classified 

Annex to the SSMP contains supporting details concerning the U.S. nuclear stockpile and stockpile 

management.

 

1

In 2012, a Fiscal Year 2013 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan was not submitted to Congress because analytical work 

conducted by DOD and NNSA to evaluate the out-year needs for nuclear modernization activities across the nuclear security 

enterprise had not yet been finalized. 

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-1

Chapter 1

Overview

The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is tasked with carrying 

out most of DOE’s national security responsibilities. That mission and authority is drawn from the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954 (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] § 2011 et seq.) and, more specifically, the National 

Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. § 2401 et seq.), from which DOE/NNSA’s core mission pillars

are derived. These pillars include maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; preventing, 

countering, and responding to the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism worldwide; and providing

naval nuclear propulsion (see Figure 1–1).

Figure 1–1. DOE/NNSA mission pillars and cross-cutting capabilities

Accomplishing these missions requires cross-cutting capabilities that support each mission pillar, including 

advances in world-class science, technology, and engineering (ST&E); supporting the people and 

modernizing the infrastructure that make up the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise; and maintaining

a management culture that efficiently operates a safe, secure enterprise.

1

 

1 Additional details are available in the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Enterprise Strategic 

Vision, August 2015. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Achieving success in the Weapons Activities mission areas that support the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

pillar requires unique capabilities to maintain the stockpile while ensuring the ability to adapt and respond 

to a dynamic security environment, as well as to geopolitical and technological surprises. The capabilities 

that enable the critical missions of weapons activities are defined in Appendix C, “Weapons Activities 

Capabilities,” and discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Each capability is complementary and supports multiple 

elements of the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise and the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. Continued 

investment in these capabilities is necessary to sustain and modernize nuclear weapons, improve 

understanding of nuclear weapons performance, maintain confidence in the aging and evolving stockpile, 

and ensure that the nuclear security enterprise remains responsive. 

This Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (SSMP) is

DOE/NNSA’s 25-year strategic program of record for the nuclear weapons mission and was developed to 

be fully consistent with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the Nuclear Weapons Council’s Strategic 

Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2017–2042. The annual SSMP has two primary purposes:

 The SSMP documents DOE/NNSA’s plans to maintain and extend the life of the nuclear stockpile,

enhance understanding of the internal nuclear weapons function through science-based stockpile 

stewardship, modernize the supporting infrastructure, and sustain DOE/NNSA’s highly skilled 

workforce.

 The SSMP provides DOE/NNSA’s formal response to multiple statutory reporting requirements, a 

full listing of which can be found in Appendix A, “Requirements Mapping.”

The FY 2019 SSMP includes budget information for the FY 2019 Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

(FYNSP), along with life extension program (LEP)schedules, preliminary infrastructure resource planning, 

and the long-term DOE/NNSA strategy through FY 2043 to ensure the Nation’s nuclear deterrent.

2

1.1 Policy Framework Summary

The National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. § 2401, 

(b) (2)) directs DOE/NNSA “To maintain and enhance the safety, 

reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear weapons 

stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test, to meet 

national security requirements.” 

Presidential and DOE policy documents provide additional direction to

DOE/NNSA on accomplishing the nuclear weapons mission. The 2017 

National Security Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the 

U.S. Armed Forces (NSPM-1) directed that, “The Secretary [of Defense]

shall initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review to ensure that the 

United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, 

ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and 

reassure our allies.”3 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2018) and 

the 2017 National Security Strategy provide guidance for NNSA and 

influenced the development of the FY 2019 SSMP. The 2018 Nuclear 

 

2 See 50 U.S.C. § 2453, Future-years nuclear security program, for a detailed description of the FYNSP.

3 See Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces, National Security Presidential Memorandum for the 

Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Section 3(b), January 27, 2017.

“Recapitalizing the nuclear 

weapons complex of 

laboratories and plants is also 

long past due; it is vital we 

ensure the capability to design, 

produce, assess, and maintain 

these weapons for as long as 

they are required.” 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-3

Posture Review reinforced the requirement for a nuclear weapons

infrastructure that has the design, engineering, and manufacturing 

capabilities necessary to be flexible and responsive to meet changing 

geopolitical challenges. Evaluation of DOE/NNSA’s Weapons Activities 

capabilities, discussed in Chapter 3, “Capabilities That Support the 

Nuclear Security Enterprise,” is the first step in ensuring DOE/NNSA’s

capacity and flexibility to meet shifting requirements over the coming 

decades.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review also provided policy direction, in the 

near term, to modify a small number of submarine-launched ballistic 

missile warheads to provide a low-yield option and, in the long term, to 

pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. Aspects of

the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review policy direction have been 

implemented and are included in the FY 2019 budget request. 

DOE/NNSA’s program of record for maintaining the nuclear weapons 

stockpile will continue to be updated in coordination with the Nuclear 

Weapons Council and the interagency process that weighs and 

prioritizes missions and resources. Additional updates will be included 

in the 2020 SSMP, as appropriate.

1.2 Summary of Strategic Environment for Nuclear Security

The current strategic environment includes an unprecedented range and 

mix of threats, including major conventional, chemical, biological, 

nuclear, space, and cyber threats, as well as violence perpetrated by nonstate actors. The resulting increased uncertainty and risk requires the 

United States to maintain a diverse set of nuclear capabilities that can 

provide flexible, tailored options for deterring threats from across the

spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. The U.S. nuclear triad

(which includes capabilities via sea, land, or air) and nonstrategic nuclear 

forces provide the diversity of platforms, weapons, and modes of 

operation necessary to allow the United States to implement its 

strategies for deterrence and achieve its objectives should deterrence 

fail. 

1.3 Summary of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear 

Security Enterprise

The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise (Figure 1–2) consists of NNSA Headquarters (located in 

Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and Albuquerque, New Mexico); the NNSA field offices; the

three national security laboratories (two of which have production missions); the four nuclear weapons 

production sites; and the Nevada National Security Site. NNSA implements the overall nuclear weapons 

strategy, in collaboration with its management and operating (M&O) partners, and oversees and 

coordinates activities to ensure they are accomplished in an efficient, fiscally responsible manner.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture 

Review found that the current 

threat environment and an 

uncertain future necessitate a 

national commitment to maintain 

modern and effective nuclear 

forces, as well as the 

infrastructure needed to support 

them. Sustaining and replacing 

existing nuclear capabilities is 

critical to preserving our ability to 

deter threats to the Nation. 

“Nuclear weapons...are the 

foundation of our strategy to 

preserve peace and stability by 

deterring aggression against the 

United States, our allies, and our 

partners.”
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-4 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 1–2. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise

1.3.1 National Security Laboratories

Three national security laboratories are devoted to nuclear weapons design and data interpretation:

 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California;

 Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico; and

 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California.

4

The primary mission of these national security laboratories is to develop and sustain nuclear weapons 

design, simulation, modeling, and experimental capabilities and competencies to ensure confidence in 

the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. All three laboratories are Federally Funded Research and 

Development Centers (FFRDCs).

5 The national security laboratories engage in long-term research, 

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities for the nuclear weapon missions and apply ST&E to 

solve other national challenges, such as nuclear threat reduction. Other DOE national laboratories also 

support the Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs.

 

4 DOE’s Savannah River National Laboratory at the Savannah River Site also conducts research and development in support of 

tritium processing and gas transfer system design and certification activities.

5 FFRDCs are unique nonprofit entities sponsored and funded by the U.S. Government to meet special long-term research or 

development needs that cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor resources. FFRDCs are operated, 

managed, and/or administered by either a university or consortium of universities, another not-for-profit or nonprofit 

organization, or an industrial firm either as an autonomous organization or an identifiable separate operating unit of a parent 

organization.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-5

1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Sites

The four nuclear weapons production sites conduct a range of stockpile management activities:

6

 The Kansas City National Security Campus in Kansas City, Missouri, produces non-nuclear 

components.

 The Pantex Plant (Pantex) in Amarillo, Texas, manufactures and tests high explosive (HE)

components and assemblies and disassembles and refurbishes stockpile weapons and 

components.

 The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, manufactures uranium 

components and dismantles and stores highly enriched uranium (HEU).

 The Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina, extracts, recycles, and loads tritium into gas 

transfer systems.

In addition, these facilities process uranium and plutonium to support DOE/NNSA’s nonproliferation 

goals and counterterrorism activities.

1.3.3 Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site partners with the national security laboratories to provide facilities, 

infrastructure, and personnel to conduct unique nuclear and non-nuclear experiments that are essential 

to maintaining the stockpile. It is the primary location where experiments with radioactive and other 

high-hazard materials are conducted and the only location where HE-driven plutonium experiments can 

be conducted at weapon-scale with weapon-relevant amounts of special nuclear material. The Nevada 

National Security Site also develops and deploys state-of-the-art diagnostics and instrumentation, 

analyzes data, stores programmatic materials, conducts criticality experiments, and supports other 

DOE/NNSA activities.

1.4 Summary of the Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The size and composition of the nuclear stockpile has evolved as a consequence of the changing global 

security environment and U.S. national security need. The average age of weapons in the stockpile 

remains high. Many weapons are well past their original design life and require stockpile management to 

assess their condition and perform routine maintenance to ensure operability and extend weapon

lifetimes. The evolution in the size and age of the nuclear weapons stockpile is illustrated in Figure 1–3.

The current stockpile consists of active weapons, which are maintained to meet military requirements, as 

well as inactive weapons, which are used to augment or replace warheads in the active stockpile as 

necessary. Retired weapons are not included in the count of stockpile weapons. Table 1–1 reflects the 

major characteristics of the Nation’s current stockpile, which is composed of two types of submarinelaunched ballistic missile warheads, two types of intercontinental ballistic missile warheads, several types 

of bombs, and a cruise missile warhead.

The classified Annex includes specific technical details about the stockpile by warhead type.

 

6 Some production capabilities also exist at LANL and SNL. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-6 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 1–3. Size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2017

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems

Warheads—Strategic Ballistic Missile Platforms

Type

a

Description Delivery System Laboratories Mission Military

W78 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W87 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LLNL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W76‐0/1 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwaterto 

surface

Navy

W88 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwaterto 

surface

Navy

Bombs—Aircraft Platforms

B61‐3/4 Non‐strategic bomb F‐15, F‐16, certified

NATO aircraft

LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force/Select 

NATO forces

B61‐7 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B61‐11 Strategic bomb B‐2 bomber LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B83‐1 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

Warheads—Cruise Missile Platforms

W80‐1 Air‐launched cruise 

missile strategic weapons

B‐52 bomber LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

LANL = Los Alamos National Laboratory NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory SNL = Sandia National Laboratories

a The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb type (e.g., “-0/1” for the W76) represents the modification associated with 

the respective weapon.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-7

1.5 Overall Strategy, Objectives, and Prioritization of Weapons 

Activities

DOE/NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) implement the 

Nation’s objectives to maintain strategic stability with other major 

nuclear powers, deter potential adversaries, and reassure allies and 

partners regarding the national security commitments of the 

United States. DOE/NNSA priorities are to sustain and maintain the 

stockpile while balancing infrastructure and RDT&E investments to 

meet technical and national security challenges.

There are four major strategies to sustain and maintain the stockpile:

 Extend the life of the stockpile; replace obsolete technology;

enhance stockpile safety and security; and meet military 

requirements, treaties, and other international obligations. 

 Assess and certify the stockpile through science-based stockpile 

stewardship by conducting experiments and direct weapon 

surveillance, incorporating new knowledge into the models 

embedded in the design codes, and enhancing the

computational capabilities of those codes. 

 Address aging infrastructure and equipment obsolescence by 

improving processes to plan and prioritize investments. Make 

additional facility and infrastructure investments, target 

reduction of safety and programmatic risk, and dispose of

excess facilities at the eight M&O partner sites. 

 Augment the Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management Programs with an effective 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program7to provide a greater breadth of opportunities to exercise key 

capabilities and skills. Exercising these capabilities also will provide a mechanism to preserve and 

transfer knowledge across the workforce. 

Additional activities to sustain and maintain the stockpile include the following:

 DOE/NNSA is investing in additive manufacturing to reduce development and production costs,

improve cycle time, and ensure against product and manufacturing obsolescence. Advanced 

manufacturing may also enable novel design opportunities and increase in-house production of 

nuclear weapon components.

 To better assure supply chain protection and viability, DOE/NNSA has implemented several 

initiatives in the Nuclear Enterprise Assurance program to address threats to critical products and 

processes. The program focuses on restricting information, enhancing and sustaining designs,

establishing robust secure manufacturing and testing processes, and augmenting supply chain 

management to ensure malicious hardware and software do not enter nuclear security enterprise 

products. 

 

7 For additional information, see the DOE/NNSA February 2018 report to Congress, Stockpile Responsiveness.

“We will modernize our nuclear 

enterprise to ensure that we have 

the scientific, engineering, and 

manufacturing capabilities 

necessary to retain an effective 

and safe nuclear Triad and 

respond to future national security 

threats.”
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-8 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 NNSA and DOE are also investing in the DOE-wide 

Exascale Computing Initiative to ensure that future high 

performance computing architectures meet the needs 

of the nuclear security enterprise.

1.6 Partnership with the Department 

of Defense

DOE/NNSA and DOD work collaboratively to maintain and 

modernize the stockpile and delivery systems. DOE/NNSA’s role 

is to ensure that nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and 

reliable, and DOD’s role is to provide a range of delivery options 

that can be tailored to meet the desired objectives.

These complementary efforts are coordinated through the 

congressionally mandated Nuclear Weapons Council. The

Council is a joint DOD-DOE activity established by 

10 U.S.C. § 179 to facilitate cooperation and coordination, 

reach consensus, and establish priorities between the two 

agencies in fulfilling dual responsibilities for stockpile 

management. The Council is also the focal point for routine 

interagency activities to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons 

stockpile. 

1.7 Stockpile Strategy

The Nuclear Weapons Council is reviewing the current strategic 

plan to align objectives with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

Given the changes in the global security environment since the 

2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review directed a review of the roles of nuclear 

weapons in the national security of the United States, the strategy for fulfilling these roles, and the 

capabilities required to implement the strategy.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for a tailored and flexible approach to provide deterrence across a 

spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. The increasing need for diversity and flexibility of 

platforms, weapons, and modes of operation reinforces the necessity to continue sustaining and 

modernizing the enduring stockpile. 

To meet the emerging requirements of U.S. strategy, the United States will enhance the flexibility and 

range of its tailored deterrence options in a variety of ways, including the following:

 Modifying a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads to provide a 

low-yield option.

 In the longer term, pursuing a modern, nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile.

 Retaining the B83-1 and B61-11 gravity bombs in the stockpile until there is sufficient confidence 

in the B61-12 gravity bomb that will be available in 2020 and a suitable replacement for the B83-1 

is identified.

Major Goals of Weapons Activities

 Complete W76-1 production by FY 2019.

 Cease programmatic operations at the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

facility at LANL. 

 Deliver the first production unit of the 

B61-12 by FY 2020 and complete 

production by FY 2024.

 Deliver the first production unit of the 

W88 Alt 370 (with refresh of the 

conventional high explosives) by 

December 2019 and complete alterations 

by FY 2024.

 Synchronize NNSA’s W80-4 life extension 

with DOD’s Long Range Stand Off

program and complete the LEP by 2031.

 Provide the enduring capability and 

capacity to produce plutonium pits at a 

rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year 

in 2030. 

 Phase out mission dependency on 

Building 9212 at Y-12 by the end of 2025.

 Provide experimental and computational 

capabilities to support annual assessment 

and certification of the stockpile.

 Enhance the predictive capability to certify 

and assess via theory, modeling, and 

experimental validation using advanced 

scientific tools.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-9

The United States must have the ability to maintain and certify a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal. Synchronized with DOD replacement programs, DOE/NNSA will sustain and deliver on time the 

warheads needed to support the Nation’s strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities in six ways: 

 Complete the W76-1 LEP by FY 2019.

 Complete the B61-12 LEP by FY 2024.

 Complete the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 by FY 2024.

 Synchronize NNSA’s W80-4 life extension with DOD’s Long Range Stand Off program and 

complete the W80-4 LEP by FY 2031.

 Advance the W78 warhead replacement 1 year to FY 2019 to support fielding on the GroundBased Strategic Deterrent by 2030 and investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive 

package in a Navy flight vehicle.

 Explore future ballistic missile warhead requirements based on the threats and vulnerabilities of 

potential adversaries, including the possibility of common reentry systems for Air Force and Navy 

systems. 

The United States will pursue initiatives to ensure the capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the 

nuclear weapons infrastructure and the skills of the workforce, including the following:

 Pursue a joint DOD and DOE advanced technology development capability to ensure that efforts 

are appropriately integrated to meet DOD needs.

 Provide the enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 

80 pits per year in 2030. 

 Ensure that current plans to reconstitute the U.S. capability to produce lithium compounds are 

sufficient to meet military requirements.

 Complete the Uranium Processing Facility to provide sufficient uranium components to meet 

military requirements.

 Ensure the reactor capacity to produce an adequate supply of tritium to meet military 

requirements.

 Ensure continuity in the U.S. capability to develop and manufacture secure, trusted strategic 

radiation-hardened microelectronic systems beyond 2025 to support stockpile modernization.

 Pursue the Stockpile Responsiveness Program established by Congress to expand opportunities 

for young scientists and engineers to advance warhead design, development, and production 

skills.

 Develop an NNSA roadmap that sizes production capacity to modernization and hedging 

requirements.

 Retain confidence in nuclear gravity bombs to meet deterrence needs.

 Maintain and enhance the computational, experimental, and testing capabilities to annually 

assess nuclear weapons.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 1-10 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

1.8 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan

DOE/NNSA has made substantial progress on near-term priorities, 

including LEPs, to ensure the stockpile remains safe, secure, and 

effective as long as nuclear weapons exist. DOE/NNSA surpassed the 

95 percent mark of the total production units of W76-1 warheads to 

the Navy as of May 2018, delivered more than 90 percent of the total 

warheads to the Navy, and authorized the national security

laboratories and nuclear weapons production sites to enter 

Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) for the B61-12 LEP. In addition, 

planning activities for the W88 conventional high explosive refresh 

were accelerated and combined with replacement of the weapon’s 

arming, fuzing, and firing systems, along with safety enhancements. This resulted in a single W88 Alt 370 

effort by the time the program received authorization to transition to Phase 6.4 in February 2017. The 

W80-4, a life-extended version of the existing cruise missile warhead (W80-1), entered Phase 6.2A (Design 

Definition and Cost Study). Major investments in infrastructure are currently underway to address a 

number of critical capabilities identified in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, such asthe Uranium Strategy, 

which includes the Uranium Processing Facility Project, and the Plutonium Strategy, which includes the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project. 

Notwithstanding these accomplishments, the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise requires major 

recapitalization, as do all three legs of the nuclear triad, to ensure that the deterrent is modern, robust, 

flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats. NNSA’s missions

depend on specialized facilities, infrastructure, and equipment. DOE/NNSA must build a more modern 

enterprise to guarantee capabilities to continue to meet the Nation’s requirements; keep the nuclear 

deterrent safe, secure, and effective; and improve worker and public safety. More than half of NNSA’s 

facilities are over 40 years old, and the demands of the LEPs and the Stockpile Stewardship Program have 

increased the loads on the aging infrastructure. Without infrastructure modernization, the risk to NNSA’s 

missions will increase. Workforce, ST&E, and infrastructure needs are discussed further in Chapter 3,

“Capabilities That Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise,” and Chapter 4, “Budget and Fiscal Estimates.”

There are three key considerations:

 The nuclear weapons stockpile requires updated technologies that will require significant 

investment in new processes, technologies, and tools to produce, qualify, and certify warheads in 

accordance with the stringent specifications the stockpile requires.

 The trustworthiness of the nuclear weapon supply chain that provides specialized components

(e.g., radiation-hardened electronics) must be sustained to protect against the potential for 

sabotage, malicious introduction of an unwanted function, or subversion of a function without 

detection. NNSA’s radiation-hardened silicon microelectronics facility, the Microsystems and

Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) Complex at SNL, relies on tools and capabilities that are 

no longer supported by manufacturers. DOE/NNSA is installing new tooling and planning 

recapitalization efforts to extend the life of the MESA facilities. DOE/NNSA is also engaging with 

DOD and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory to establish research 

and development efforts that could also serve as a production capability.

 The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise has many retirement-eligible employees who will be 

leaving the workforce in the near future (Figure 1–4). In order to prepare for this loss of expertise, 

“Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons 

complex of laboratories and plants is 

also long past due; it is vital we 

ensure the capability to design, 

produce, assess, and maintain these 

weapons for as long as they are 

required.”

2018 Nuclear Posture Review
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 1-11

aggressive programs are necessary to recruit and retain high-quality individuals and provide new 

personnel with opportunities to acquire the experience and expert judgment needed to sustain 

the stockpile. 

Figure 1–4. Management and operating partners headcount distribution by age

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-1

Chapter 2

Status of the Stockpile

and Modernization Efforts

This biennial summary plan reflects the current approved program of record, consistent with Presidential 

direction and congressional authorizations and appropriations. However, due to the release of the 

National Security Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and DOD’s National Defense Strategy, it is 

anticipated that implementation plans and congressional action may impact ongoing program work. 

2.1 Stockpile Management Overview and Nuclear Enterprise 

Assurance

Stockpile management encompasses annual assessment of the stockpile; certification of a weapon before 

it enters the stockpile;surveillance and maintenance throughout the weapon’s lifetime;significant finding 

investigations (SFIs); plans for major alterations (Alts), modifications (Mods), or life extension programs 

(LEPs) as the stockpile ages and as policy changes; dismantlement and disposal of retired weapons; 

recovery and reuse of material from dismantled weapons; and procurement and production of strategic 

materials to support the stockpile. As part of these activities, DOE/NNSA also manages limited life 

component (LLC) exchanges, addresses issues that affect stockpile reliability, and manages nuclear and 

non-nuclear materials. The Nuclear Enterprise Assurance program focuses on designing, developing, 

producing, and maintaining weapon components while mitigating the consequences of threats ranging 

from subversion to counterfeiting attempts.

2.2 Status of the Stockpile

The status of the stockpile is determined annually through multi-layered assessments of the safety, 

security, and reliability of the weapons, based on surveillance, maintenance, physics and engineering 

analyses, non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests, computer simulations, material evaluation, and other sources 

of information. The Directors of the three national security laboratories and the Commander of 

U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) prepare annual assessment letters to document their 

independent perspectives. These letters are included in the congressionally mandated Report on 

Stockpile Assessment, which the Secretaries of Energy and Defense sign and deliver to the President.

2.2.1 Weapons Assessment, Reliability, Certification, and Prediction of 

Performance

The assessment and certification processes determine whether the parts, components, subsystems, and 

systems meet all required weapon performance characteristics. Both processes are quantitative and rely 

on assembling and combining data from experiments, physical and environmental tests, destructive and 

nondestructive evaluations, models, and simulations. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-2 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

2.2.1.1 Annual Assessment

The overall assessment philosophy and approach involve quantification of weapon characteristics and 

rigorous reviews of the results and certification basis by teams of weapons scientists and engineers. The 

teams responsible for assessing each weapon type include individuals with extensive weapon experience 

and access to both historical and new data. The Annual Assessment Reports are reviewed by independent 

peers, subject matter experts appointed by program managers, senior laboratory managers, and the 

Directors of the three national security laboratories.

The Laboratory Directors’ letters include the state of each warhead’s existing certification, based on

information generated by the Stockpile Stewardship Program each year. Assessments may also evaluate 

the effect of aging on weapon performance and quantify the changes to performance thresholds, 

uncertainties, and margins.

2.2.1.2 Weapon Reliability

Nuclear weapon reliability is the probability that a designated weapon can deliver the specified nuclear 

yield at the target. An annual weapon reliability assessment is compiled into the Weapon Reliability 

Report, which concerns the military effectiveness of the stockpile. This is the principal DOE/NNSA report 

on reliability that USSTRATCOM uses for overall strategic planning actions and targeting. 

2.2.1.3 Certification

Certification is the process whereby all available information on the performance of a weapon system is 

considered when making the determination that a weapon will meet (with noted exceptions) the

prescribed military characteristics within the environments defined by the system’s stockpile-to-target 

sequence. The Laboratory Directors responsible for each system make this certification before the 

weapon enters the stockpile. 

2.2.1.4 Prediction of Weapon Performance

DOE/NNSA relies on a combination of experiments and integrated design codes (IDCs) to predict weapon 

performance. This is accomplished by developing high-fidelity weapon simulation codes and acquisition 

of high performance computers, as well as by acquiring detailed data to calibrate and validate the models 

in the codes. To provide a predictive capability, DOE/NNSA must know how accurately the code 

simulations can describe real weapon performance because understanding any error in the simulation 

predictions is critical. To determine that error, LANL and LLNL scientists compare the simulation results 

with data generated from small-scale laboratory experiments, large-scale experiments, subcritical 

experiments, and nearly 50 years of U.S. nuclear explosive testing. Predictive capabilities allow weapon 

designers to extrapolate from legacy nuclear explosive testing, modern non-nuclear experiments, and 

nuclear subscale or subsystem experiments to regimes that cannot be probed experimentally.

Although DOE/NNSA has made significant progress in eliminating phenomenological models, much 

computational and experimental research remains to be performed. Stockpile stewardship scientists have 

broken down the operation of a weapon into a sequence of individual steps, analyzed those steps through 

models and experiments, and then reintegrated the steps through large-scale IDCs and computational 

tools. This process can be enhanced by new facilities that support experiments that approach the 

densities, pressures, velocities, temperatures, and timescales relevant in a nuclear detonation. Improved 

experimental tools and simulation codes can also be used to qualify nuclear and non-nuclear components 

for a broader set of environments in which components could be expected to function. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-3

Development of Accurate Models of Weapon Systems and Components

Understanding the full-system behavior of a weapon, based only on knowledge of its component 

subsystems, is one of the most difficult aspects of modeling a nuclear weapon. The processes that must 

be modeled include material damage, mixing of fluids, and detonation of high explosives (HE). A fullsystem simulation depends on accurate, reliable models for material equations of state, material motion, 

interaction of neutrons with materials, radiation flow, etc. These models are based on data from 

experiments that represent some, but not all, of the environments experienced by the weapon. 

Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties

Using predictive capabilities to assess and certify the performance of a weapon is a tremendous challenge. 

A methodology for quantifying the margins and uncertainties addresses this challenge. This methodology 

evaluates the confidence in a prediction in terms of the degree to which the operation of a weapon is 

judged to be within the bounds of judiciously chosen operating characteristics. Confidence is numerically 

represented as a confidence factor. This factor is the ratio of the margin (M) over uncertainty (U), or 

M/U.1 A confidence factor significantly greater than 1.0 is desirable. A value at or less than 1.0 motivates 

actions to increase the confidence factor by increasing the margin or decreasing the uncertainty. 

Increasing the margin might include shortening the interval between LLC replacements. Decreasing the 

uncertainty can be done by focusing research and development (R&D) resources on areas such as the 

specific characteristics of the strategic materials to which weapon performance is sensitive (like the 

uncertainty in cross-sections) or by improving the fidelity of the models used to simulate the operation of 

the warhead, as validated by experimental results. The research, development, test, and evaluation

(RDT&E) programs pursue both approaches.

2.2.2 Surveillance of the Stockpile

DOE/NNSA’s surveillance activities provide data to evaluate the condition of the stockpile in support of 

annual assessments of safety, security, reliability, and performance. In addition, the cumulative body of 

surveillance data supports decisions regarding weapon life extensions, Alts, Mods, repairs, and rebuilds. 

The Surveillance program has six goals:

 Identify defects (e.g., from manufacturing, design, and adversary exploitation) that affect safety, 

security, performance, or reliability.

 Identify and associate possible failure mechanisms to surveillance measurements and then judge 

the risks to safety, security, and performance based on the surveillance data.

 Calculate the margins between design requirements and performance at the component and 

material levels.

 Identify age-related changes and trends at the subsystem or component and material levels. 

 Further develop capabilities for predictive assessments of stockpile components and materials.

 Provide critical data for the semiannual (May and November) Weapons Reliability Report and the

annual Report on Stockpile Assessments.

 

1 Margin is measured based on how much “room” is available between the predicted value of a metric and the boundary where 

that metric becomes unacceptable. Uncertainty is a measure of the ability to predict the metric based on both the measured 

values (via experiments) and the calculated values (via databases for physical quantities, physical models, and numerical 

simulations). 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-4 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

The Surveillance program consists of the Stockpile Evaluation program and the Enhanced Surveillance

subprogram, which are described below.

 The Stockpile Evaluation program conducts surveillance evaluations of both the existing stockpile 

(i.e., stockpile returns) and newly refurbished LEP weapons (using Retrofit Evaluation System Test 

selections).

 The Enhanced Surveillance subprogram provides the diagnostics, processes, and other tools 

needed by the Stockpile Evaluation program to predict and detect initial or age‐related defects, 

assess reliability, and estimate component and system lifetimes.

These two program elements work closely together to execute the Surveillance program and develop new 

surveillance capabilities at the system, component, and material levels. System-level flight tests are 

conducted jointly with the Air Force and Navy. Newly produced weapons or those returned from the 

stockpile are disassembled, and their non-nuclear components, along with surrogate parts for the nuclear 

components, are used to build a joint test assembly (JTA), which is delivered to DOD for flight testing. 

Some JTAs contain extensive telemetry instrumentation, while others contain high-fidelity mock nuclear 

assemblies to recreate the mass properties of War Reserve weapons as closely as possible. These JTAs 

are flown on the respective DOD delivery platform to gather information to assess the effectiveness and 

reliability of both the weapon and the launch or delivery platform, as well as the associated crews and 

procedures. Stockpile laboratory tests at the subsystem or component level assess major assemblies and 

components and, ultimately, the materials that compose the components (e.g., metals, polymers, glasses, 

plastics, ceramics, foams, electronics, optics, and explosives). This surveillance process enables detection 

and evaluation of aging trends and anomalous changes at the component or material level and prevents 

introduction of malicious functions by adversaries.

NNSA conducts stockpile evaluation through weapon disassembly and inspection, stockpile flight testing, 

stockpile laboratory testing, component testing and material evaluation, and test equipment. The 

number of disassembly and inspections and major component tests completed in FY 2017 and planned 

for FY 2018 are detailed in Table 2–1.

Table 2–1. Fiscal years 2017 actual and 2018 planned Directed Stockpile Work Program 

stockpile evaluation activities (as of March 5, 2018)

Warheads

D&Is

JTA

Flights

Test Bed

Evals

Pit

NDE

Pit

D-Tests

CSA

NDE

CSA

D-Tests

GTS

Tests

HE

D-Tests

DCA

Tests

Program

Totals

Fiscal Year

17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 17 18

B61 11 9 5 5 4 4 20 15 0 1 13 9 2 3 17 8 0 0 10 16 82 70

W76-0 4 4 0 2 5 0 4 4 0 2 4 4 1 1 12 9 3 3 9 10 42 39

W76-1 20 29 1 6 24 19 31 29 0 1 24 8 4 3 13 9 3 3 22 21 142 128

W78 8 8 3 4 0 0 22 19 1 2 8 8 3 2 8 6 3 3 0 17 55 69

W80-1 0 19 4 4 8 10 35 40 0 3 0 0 1 1 7 5 4 4 8 28 67 114

B83 2 2 1 1 1 1 11 9 1 2 0 0 1 1 5 2 1 1 6 0 29 19

W84 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 3

W87 8 9 3 2 9 8 12 12 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 5 1 1 3 5 41 43

W88 7 7 4 4 12 4 15 25 1 1 0 0 2 2 13 15 1 3 7 7 62 68

Totals 65 88 21 28 63 46 150 153 2 12 49 29 15 14 79 59 16 19 65 105 525 553

CSA = canned subassembly

D&I = disassembly and inspection

DCA = detonator cable assembly

D-tests = destructive tests

GTS = gas transfer system

HE = high explosive

JTA = joint test assembly

NDE = nondestructive evaluation
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-5

The numbers of major surveillance evaluations completed in FY 2017, planned for FY 2018, and planned 

within the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) are detailed in Table 2–2. The national security 

laboratories, in conjunction with NNSA and the nuclear weapons production sites, continually refine these 

planning requirements based on new surveillance information, annual assessment findings, and analysis 

(or reanalysis) of historical information using modern assessment methodologies and computational 

tools.

Table 2–2. Major surveillance evaluations completed in fiscal years 2017, planned for fiscal year 2018, 

and baselined for the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (fiscal years 2019 through 2023)

(as of March 5, 2018)

Major 

Activity

FY 2017

Actual

FY 2018

Planned

FYNSP (FY 2019 through FY 2023)

FY 2019

Requirements

FY 2020

Requirements

FY 2021

Requirements

FY 2022

Requirements

FY 2023

Requirements

FYNSP

Total a 

D&Is 65 88 79 92 89 78 82 420

JTA Flights 21 28 20 26 29 23 25 123

Test Bed 

Evaluations 63 46 47 70 60 60 46 283

Pit NDEs 150 153 187 202 225 217 222 1053

Pit D-Tests 2 12 19 17 17 14 21 88

CSA NDEs 49 29 43 43 75 68 63 292

CSA D-Tests 15 14 19 14 18 22 19 92

GTS Tests 79 59 103 69 63 55 59 349

HE D-Tests 16 19 21 42 37 36 33 169

DCA Tests 65 105 63 82 94 84 92 415

TOTALS 525 553 601 657 707 657 662 3284

CSA = canned subassembly

D&I = disassembly and inspection

DCA = detonator cable assembly

D-tests = destructive tests

FY = fiscal year

FYNSP = Future Years Nuclear Security Program

GTS = gas transfer system

HE = high explosive

JTA = joint test assembly

NDE = nondestructive evaluation

a FYNSP-forecasted quantities do not reflect reductions that may result from the lowering of stockpile readiness proposed for certain weapons.

Note: Totals are preliminary counts as of March 5, 2018

2.2.3 Significant Finding Investigations

SFIs are conducted when anomalies arise that have the potential to affect safety, security, reliability, or 

performance. SFIs are usually triggered during surveillance or are identified during weapons production, 

DOD operations, reacceptance and rebuild, and dismantlement. The SFI process includes determining the 

cause; ascertaining the impact on weapon system performance, reliability, security, and safety; and 

recommending corrective actions, if applicable. A majority of SFIs are closed without significant impact 

to the stockpile (Figure 2–1). If the finding has significant impact, it can result in a change to the reported 

reliability, issuance of an exception to the Major Assembly Release, or an Alt, Mod, or LEP. 

2.2.4 Maintenance of the Stockpile

Weapons contain LLCs (such as gas transfer systems [GTSs], power sources, and neutron generators) that

require periodic replacement to sustain system functionality. Many of the age-related changes affecting 

these components are predictable and well understood. LLC exchanges periodically replace these 

components throughout the lifetime of the weapon. NNSA produces the LLCs, while NNSA and DOD 

jointly manage component delivery and installation of replacements before warhead performance or 

personnel safety are adversely affected. NNSA activities for sustainment of legacy weapons are illustrated 

in Figure 2–2.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-6 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 2–1. Historical number of significant finding investigations opened, closed, and closed with

significant impact for calendar years 2001 to 2017

Figure 2–2. Sustainment of legacy weapons
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-7

2.2.4.1 Gas Transfer Systems

Status

Tritium-filled GTSs are designed, produced, filled, and delivered to DOD for existing and future weapon 

systems. SNL and LANL have the design agency role, while the Kansas City National Security Campus 

(KCNSC) is the manufacturer. Modern GTS designs have extended LLC intervals and have increased the

weapon performance margin, thereby improving maintenance efficiency and enhancing weapon safety 

and reliability. LANL conducts function testing of preproduction development hardware at the Weapons

Engineering Tritium Facility to validate the performance characteristics and provide tritium R&D to inform 

GTS designs supporting the current and future stockpile. The Savannah River National Laboratory at SRS 

works closely with SNL and LANL to evaluate new GTS designs and verify that the GTSs can be loaded in 

the production facilities and meet weapons systems performance characteristics. In parallel with R&D 

efforts, SRS maintains production facilities for tritium-loading operations, GTS surveillance, and tritium 

recovery from end-of-life GTSs. SRS is the only location in the enterprise for GTS tritium operations and 

is the primary source for tritium R&D. The supply of tritium to fill reservoirs is discussed further in 

Section 2.4.5.1, “Tritium Supply, Recovery, and Recycle.”

Challenges

Formal risk analyses indicate that deterioration of infrastructure and programmatic equipment is a 

primary risk to the continuity of SRS’ efforts. To meet increasing program schedules and requirements, 

production and infrastructure capability and capacity at SRS and KCNSC must be increased. Increased 

volume also requires large increases in technical staffing levels, which is complicated by extended 

clearance times. DOE/NNSA faces infrastructure challenges in aging facilities, as well as evolving 

requirements that affect facility modifications.

Long-Term Sustainment Strategy

SRS will maintain both production and R&D capabilities by (1) refurbishing or constructing more capable 

R&D, (2) recapitalizing the existing process equipment and infrastructure, and (3) fully replacing some 

production facilities through line-item construction, such as the Tritium Production Capability. To address 

capacity, SRS will modify the process and infrastructure equipment in multiple facilities by FY 2020 and 

has requested additional staff for some production and infrastructure areas. For example, in FY 2016, SRS 

started a project to establish a new capability to unload GTSs more efficiently from currently fielded and 

future LEPs.

KCNSC is executing a plan to increase capacity by replacing and adding additional multi-axis machines and 

replacing other machining in key areas.

2.2.4.2 Power Sources

Status

All legacy and planned nuclear weapons, as well as life-extended warheads, require compact, highpowered, highly variable power sources that are reliable for multi-decadal lifetimes. Requirements for 

size, weight, long life, responsiveness, and output are unique to nuclear weapon applications. In general, 

such devices are not available via commercial vendors. The capability to produce these devices also 

supports other national security missions that require advanced power sources with similarly stringent 

requirements. In addition to prototyping and parts development, this capability includes the full life cycle 

requirements of power source components through early-stage R&D and modeling, technology 

maturation, design and development, production, surveillance, and disassembly.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-8 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Challenges

SNL has primary production responsibility for power source components. SNL’s power sources capability 

includes research, design, production, and surveillance activities. The facility housing the power sources 

capability was not originally built for this purpose, is well beyond its design life, and does not meet 

evolving mission needs and modern building code requirements. Corrective measures and modifications 

have been employed to convert the facility to meet evolving mission requirements, but the investments 

are not cost-effective, resulting in the need for an alternative solution. New facilities and infrastructure 

are required to meet the long-term, full life cycle requirements. Instabilities in the supplier base have also

put the primary production capability at risk, and facility inadequacies put SNL’s RDT&E and production 

capabilities at an elevated risk of not meeting the mission.

Long-Term Sustainment Strategy

To address the current, inadequate facility, SNL is working with DOE/NNSA to relocate the power sources 

capability to a new facility, the cost of which is incorporated within the FYNSP planning period.

2.2.4.3 Neutron Generators

Status

Neutron generators are highly complex LLCs that provide neutrons at specific timing and rates to initiate 

weapon function. SNL’s Neutron Generator Enterprise, which is an integrated national security laboratory

and nuclear weapons production facility, manages the entire life cycle of neutron generators to meet 

NNSA’s commitments, including scientific understanding through design, development, qualification, 

production, surveillance, dismantlement, and disposal.

Challenges

Aging facilities, infrastructure, and equipment are the primary challenges to sustaining neutron generator 

production. Near-term investments will focus on sustainment through recapitalization of existing 

facilities, infrastructure, and equipment, while making incremental improvements in process efficiency 

and cleanliness. 

Long-Term Sustainment Strategy

SNL’s Neutron Generator Enterprise is conducting formal planning to establish long-term capabilities that 

will ensure mission deliverables are met while allowing consolidation, increased flexibility, and expanded 

capabilities. These improvements include clean room enhancements, advanced additive manufacturing, 

increased use of automation, and streamlined safety and security management.

2.2.5 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

The Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program takes retired weapons2 and disassembles them 

into their major components. Those components are then assigned for reuse, storage, surveillance, or 

disposal. Dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons is scheduled to provide material and components 

for the stockpile (including LEPs) and external customers, to maintain the proficiency of technicians, and 

to balance the work scope at the nuclear weapons production facilities. 

Dismantlement rates are affected by many factors, including, logistics, legislation, weapon system 

complexity, and the availability of qualified personnel, equipment, and facilities. DOE/NNSA’s current 

dismantlement plan balances these constraints while maintaining strict adherence to the funding and 

schedule limits initiated in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, and

 

2 Retired weapons are no longer part of the stockpile because of changes in military requirements or surveillance evaluations.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-9

continued in the FY 2018 NDAA, which cap Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition funding through 

FY 2021 and limit the rate of dismantlements to that described in the FY 2016 SSMP. Chapter 3, 

Section 3.25, “Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly,” has more detail on the status of the 

equipment and facilities required to conduct Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition activities.

2.3 Modernizing and Sustaining the Stockpile

As weapons systems age or issues arise through SFIs or other assessments, sustainment activities may 

warrant LEPs, Alts, or Mods to address material aging or performance issues, enhance safety features, 

and improve security. New technologies are typically more modern than those they replace and are 

developed and matured as part of NNSA’s Phase 6.x Process.

3

 These modernization programs are

described below.

 Life Extension Programs. An LEP is intended to evaluate an entire weapon system and refurbish, 

reuse, or replace components to extend the service life of a warhead while increasing safety and 

improving security. LEPs require routine Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to Congress.

 Alterations. An Alt is a material change to, or a prescribed inspection of, a nuclear weapon or 

major assembly that does not alter its operational capability but is sufficiently important to the 

user regarding assembly, maintenance, storage, or test operations to require controlled 

application and identification. Minor Alts are less intrusive, less costly changes that are performed 

on a priority basis; major Alts are governed by the Phase 6.x Process and require an SAR to 

Congress. 

 Modifications. A Mod is a change to a major assembly that alters the nuclear weapon’s 

operational capabilities. This change involves the user and requires positive control to ensure 

that an operational capability is clearly defined. A change in operational capability results from a 

design change that affects delivery (employment or utilization), fuzing, ballistics, or logistics.

NNSA activities for LEPs and major Alts of specific weapons are illustrated in Figure 2–3.

2.3.1 W76 LEP

2.3.1.1 W76-1 LEP

The W76-1 LEP extends the original W76-0 warhead service life. The W76-1 first production unit was 

completed in September 2008, and the first delivery of refurbished warheads to the Navy, using the 

original W76-0 pits, was in FY 2009. The last production unit is scheduled for delivery no later than the 

end of FY 2019. The program is making all warhead deliveries to the Navy on schedule and under budget.

Status

According to the current program of record, as of the end of June 2018, NNSA had delivered more than 

90 percent of the total production units to the Navy. In FY 2018, Pantex remains on track to meet the 

cumulative warhead production and delivery requirements. 

 

3 Since the cessation of nuclear testing, NNSA spends the vast majority of its time and effort in Phase 6 of the life-cycle. The 

Phase 6.X Process provides the framework for modern stockpile sustainment activities and each subphase of the process mirrors 

the life-cycle phases shown below. The Phase 6.X Process activities are for non-routine nuclear weapon Alts at the system, 

subsystem, or component level; LEPs; and other warhead modernization activities, while the life-cycle phases below are 

associated with weapon introduction into the stockpile through retirement. The Phase 6.X Process is not intended to replace 

established Phase 6 activities such as routine maintenance, stockpile evaluation, enhanced surveillance, and annual assessment. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 2-10 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 2–3. National Nuclear Security Administration warhead activities

The deliverables for the W76-1 LEP through the end of full production are as follows:

 Achieve or exceed annual refurbished warhead production rates at Pantex.

 Deliver the refurbished warheads on schedule to the Navy.

 Produce and deliver JTAs for surveillance flight tests. 

 Execute retrofit evaluation system test and stockpile surveillance activities to facilitate 

completion of annual assessment and weapon reliability activities.

Challenges

During FY 2018, the following areas challenged DOE/NNSA’s ability to meet its warhead production and 

delivery commitments to the Navy:

 Technical issues associated with production of various warhead components.

 Failure of aging production equipment and facility infrastructure.

Despite these challenges, DOE/NNSA is meeting its FY 2018 requirements and cumulative warhead 

production schedule. 

Mitigations/Strategies

Multiple strategies and approaches were used to mitigate program risk associated with production and 

delivery challenges, including the following:

 Strategic acceleration of raw material procurement.

 Increased component production quantities to provide a positive margin for component delivery 

schedules.

 Procurement of new production equipment to mitigate against aging and single-point failures.

 Use of production efficiencies to reduce program costs and gain a positive schedule margin.
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2.3.1.2 W76-2 

NNSA will support the Low Yield Ballistic Missile, as stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. While 

NNSA awaits congressional appropriations to implement the W76-2 program, it has examined notional 

manufacturing plans to de-conflict with other major weapon modernization programs. 

2.3.2 B83-1 Alt 353 and Alt 753 Strategic Bomb

The B83-1 gravity bomb holds at risk a variety of protected targets. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

directs sustaining the B83-1 past its current planned retirement date until a suitable replacement is 

identified. NNSA is coordinating with DOD to determine the period for sustaining the B83-1 and the 

schedule for restarting limited Alt 353 and Alt 753 programs if necessary. 

2.3.3 B61-12 LEP

The B61 gravity bomb is the oldest nuclear weapon in the stockpile. The B61-12 LEP addresses multiple 

components that are nearing end of life, as well as military requirements for reliability, service life, field 

maintenance, safety, and use control. The life extension scope includes refurbishment of both nuclear 

and non‐nuclear components and incorporates component reuse where possible. With the addition of 

an Air Force-procured tailkit assembly, the B61‐12 LEP will consolidate and replace the B61-3, -4, -7, 

and -10 bomb variants, to reduce the overall number of gravity bombs.

Status

As of March 2018, the program continues in Phase 6.4, which is the final development phase prior to 

production of War Reserve units. The B61-12 LEP has completed final design reviews of major 

components to allow the DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons production facilities to begin final Process ProveIn of the production processes. Qualification of component production processes, including certified 

tooling and testers, is scheduled to continue in FY 2018. This qualification will enable the nuclear weapons 

production facilities to begin shipment of first production units for components to Pantex in FY 2019. 

System qualification of the B61-12 continues on schedule with the completion of over 45 system tests 

since the start of Phase 6.4, including seven qualification flight test releases using F-16 and F-15 aircraft 

at the Tonopah Test Range. Certification activities that the weapon meets DOD requirements, such as 

joint qualification activities and testing, will continue to support the program as it moves to the first 

production unit, Phase 6.5 (expected in March 2020).

The B61-12 LEP is executing within the cost documented in the December 2017 Baseline Cost Report, 

which estimated program costs at $7.605 billion (then-year dollars). The B61-12 LEP is continuing to 

leverage other DOE/NNSA programs for multi-system production process improvements. The costs of 

these related programs are estimated to be $648 million. The overall program cost is $8.253 billion, which 

is within 1.1 percent of the initial baseline SAR that was provided to Congress in FY 2013.

Challenges

Risks for the B61-12 LEP are similar to those for other LEPs and major Alts; these risks include late 

component design changes in Phase 6.4, integration risks with Air Force systems, and delayed deliverables 

from other programs needed for the B61-12.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA closely monitors component development and schedule progress with Air Force partners to 

manage any design changes and minimize impacts to the schedule. DOE/NNSA also manages all programs 

closely to understand any impacts to B61-12 deliverables.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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2.3.4 W88 Alt 370

The W88 Alt 370 includes a new arming, fuzing, and firing (AF&F) system, conventional high explosive 

(CHE) refresh to replace the main HE charges, a lightning arrestor connector, trainers, flight test 

assemblies, and associated handling gear. The late addition of the CHE refresh required acceleration and 

compression of the design and development activities in the late stages of Phase 6.3. This was required 

to align with the original Alt 370 scope by Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering). The W88 Alt 370 

conversion is scheduled concurrent with LLC exchanges of the GTSs and neutron generators. 

Status

The W88 Alt 370 program is now in Phase 6.4 and on schedule for the first production unit by the first 

quarter of FY 2020. The Follow-on Commander’s Evaluation Test-53) flight test and the critical systemlevel and AF&F tests were completed in 2017. Final development testing (Commander’s Evaluation 

Test-1) is scheduled for FY 2018, with remaining qualification flights planned for FY 2019. The remaining 

hydrodynamic tests for the program are planned in FY 2018. The last Final Design Reviews were 

completed early in FY 2018; most components have begun Process Prove-In builds, and Production 

Readiness Reviews have been conducted.

DOE/NNSA completed a high-fidelity cost estimate (the Baseline Cost Report) in FY 2017. The report

estimate is $2,618 million; which is approximately $255 million (or 11 percent) higher than the estimate 

in the 2015 SAR. The increased costs were primarily caused by increased testing and qualification, as well 

as planning margins for treating technical risks, accompanied by some offsetting reduction in the scope 

associated with the nuclear components. This estimate represents the program baseline and is reflected 

in the FY 2017 SAR.

Challenges

The W88 Alt 370 faces a continued risk of late component design changes in Phase 6.4. As an integrated 

program with shared technology between the Air Force and Navy, changes or delays to one program may 

directly impact progress on the other.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA closely aligns efforts on the W88 Alt 370 Program with those of its DOD partners to manage 

design changes and minimize production impacts. This close collaboration ensures scope, schedule, and 

cost decisions are aligned with strategic-level priorities.

2.3.5 W80-4 LEP

DOD intends to replace the aging air-launched cruise missile with the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile 

in order to maintain the bomber force’s vital stand-off weapon deterrent capability. In close coordination 

with DOD, DOE/NNSA is extending the W80 warhead through this LEP for use in the LRSO missile. 

Status

The W80-4 LEP is currently in Phase 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost Study), during which the design will 

continue to be refined and the DOE/NNSA team will continue working closely with the LRSO missile 

development team and contractors. The primary Phase 6.2A deliverable will be the W80-4 LEP Weapon 

Design and Cost Report, which will describe a bottom-up planning baseline used to further inform 

DOE/NNSA and stakeholder decisions and integration with LRSO missile development.
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Challenges

The program faces the unique risk of a parallel design with the Air Force LRSO weapon. This is the first 

effort in more than 30 years to design a warhead and delivery platform on similar timeframes. Changes 

or delays to either program may directly affect progress on the other. The W80-4 LEP has experienced a 

loss of $120 million in productivity due to delays associated with Continuing Resolutions since the 

beginning of FY 2016. As a result, ramp-up of management and operating program staffing was 

constrained for 3 years across the entire nuclear security enterprise, preventing the program from 

reaching the required staffing levels and affecting the Federal program office’s ability to complete Phases 

6.2 and 6.2A on schedule (a 4-month delay).

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA closely aligns W80-4 LEP efforts with those of DOD to refine program goals and define the 

interface scope in detail. This collaboration ensures coordinated cost-informed decisions and interdepartmental schedule alignment. Component product realization teams have completed Component 

Scope and Requirements Exchange between national security laboratories and nuclear weapons 

production sites. This early engagement increases the effectiveness of the product realization teams and

reduces risks when combined with application of lessons learned from other programs.

2.3.6 W78 Replacement Warhead (Formerly Interoperable Warhead 1)

In FY 2014, the W78 Replacement Warhead program’s planned first production unit milestone was 

delayed from FY 2025 to FY 2030. Phase 6.2 activities were suspended, but are now scheduled to restart 

in FY 2019. The program objective is to develop and produce W78 Replacement Warheads for use in the 

Mk21 aeroshell and investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive package in a Navy aeroshell.

Challenges

Three main challenges face the W78 Replacement Warhead program:

 Development must be integrated with potentially two service aeroshell acquisition schedules, as 

well as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent delivery platform acquisition program.

 Production is predicated on all newly manufactured components and a nuclear material 

manufacturing modernization strategy that relies on large, multi-year investments in component 

and material capabilities.

 Program success is contingent on the development of new technologies to address antiquated 

design, material obsolescence, and performance expectations. Additionally, the W78 

Replacement Warhead program must meet stringent technical requirements, including a greater

component life expectancy, as well as expectations such as reduced manufacturing cost and 

development time, increased safety and security, and improved maintainability.

Mitigations/Strategies

To mitigate these challenges, DOE/NNSA:

 Has established early integration and communication with both the Air Force and Navy to 

coordinate strategic planning;

 Has actively supported commodity and capability programs that will provide the materials, 

components, and capabilities in-time for the future stockpile;
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 Is working on a technology readiness assessment for the W78 Replacement Warhead that helps

identify the technology development elements and processes required to reach proven maturity 

levels; and,

 Is incorporating lessons learned from previous LEPs and major modernization programs in W78 

Replacement Warhead program documents, including the W78 Replacement Program Plan, 

Requirements Management Plan, Risk Management Plan, Configuration Management Plan, 

System Engineering Plan, Integrated Phase Gate Plan, Program Protection Plan, and Program 

Control Plan.

2.3.7 Ballistic Missile Warhead (IW or BM-Y) and Ballistic Missile 

Warhead (IW or BM-Z)

DOD and NNSA will leverage the interoperability considerations associated with the W78 Replacement 

Warhead for development of follow-on ballistic missile systems. 

2.3.8 Sea-Launched Cruise Missile

NNSA will support the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), as requested by DOD. 

NNSA will support these efforts through the Nuclear Weapons Council, but will not create a formal 

program until the AoA is concluded.

2.4 Strategic Materials

Strategic materials are key to ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent, as well as addressing national security concerns such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism. 

Sustaining the capabilities to store and process these materials requires a highly skilled workforce and 

significant programmatic infrastructure. Weapons and test components created with these strategic 

materials generally cannot be produced outside the United States. In addition to managing individual 

materials, DOE/NNSA is responsible for planning, prioritizing, and supplying the required quantities of 

materials by recycling, recovering, and storing nuclear and select non-nuclear material for nuclear security 

missions. DOE/NNSA has long-term plans to maintain the facilities, scientific equipment, production

capabilities, and manpower to sustain the supply of strategic materials. A common obstacle is the need 

to refurbish or replace the aging and obsolete facilities where these materials are handled. The strategies 

presented below for the individual materials and supporting programs outline solutions to such challenges 

or offer bridging strategies to manage implementation of capability investments. A detailed look at 

NNSA’s strategic material capabilities is provided in Chapter 3, Sections 3.20 through 3.22.

2.4.1 Plutonium

Status

An agile, reliable, and flexible capability to process and handle plutonium is essential to assess and 

maintain a credible nuclear weapons stockpile. Plutonium requires proper storage facilities, safe and 

secure disposal pathways, and unique equipment and facilities. The manufacture and surveillance of pits 

and other plutonium components, as well as experiments and analysis of plutonium alloys, currently occur 

at LANL’s Plutonium Facility (PF-4). SNL, LLNL, Pantex, and the Nevada National Security Site also provide 

critical expertise, capabilities, and facilities to support DOE/NNSA’s defense-related plutonium missions. 

DOE/NNSA evaluated its options to achieve long-term sustained production levels of no fewer than 80 pits 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-15

per year in 2030. On May 10, 2018, the Administrator informed Congress that NNSA’s recommended 

alternative is to repurpose the SRS Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to produce 50 War Reserve 

plutonium pits per year in 2030, while maximizing pit production at LANL to produce at least 30 pits per 

year by 2026.

Challenges

DOE/NNSA faces several plutonium challenges. DOE/NNSA must ramp up pit production over the next 

decade to meet a capacity of 80 pits per year in FY 2030. The current schedule includes a War Reserve 

first production unit in FY 2023, building to a production capability of 10, 20, and 30 War Reserve pits per 

year in 2024, 2025, and 2026, respectively. Meeting these deliverables remains a challenge as DOE/NNSA 

continues to re-optimize existing available space and invest in manufacturing equipment, associated 

facilities, and staff. DOE/NNSA also faces space challenges caused by the need to store retired pits and 

the aging Cold War-era infrastructure. A detailed description of DOE/NNSA’s plutonium challenges is 

provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.21.1.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA will continue to invest in PF-4 to establish an enduring 30-pits-per-year production capability 

at LANL by FY 2026 and will maintain LANL as the Nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence for Research 

and Development. To evaluate options in meeting the additional high-hazard, high-security space 

requirements and sustain long-term production levels of no fewer than 80 pits per year in 2030, 

DOE/NNSA completed a formal AoA in October 2017, as well as an engineering assessment and workforce 

analyses. These results informed the decision to repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility for 

pit production and assess opportunities for LANL to produce more than 30 pits per year. DOE/NNSA is 

addressing plutonium infrastructure challenges through construction projects such as the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility and is modernizing waste processing and treatment facilities 

through recapitalization and line-item projects, including the Technical Area (TA)-55 Reinvestment 

Project, Radiological Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Project, and Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facility Project.

2.4.2 Uranium

Uranium is a strategic national defense asset with different enrichments (depleted uranium, low-enriched 

uranium, and highly enriched uranium) used for a wide variety of applications, including weapon 

components, naval reactors, and commercial power reactors for the production of tritium. The primary 

production infrastructure to process and store uranium is at Y-12, with R&D capabilities at LANL and LLNL.

A detailed discussion of DOE/NNSA’s uranium efforts is in Chapter 3, Section 3.21.2.

Status

DOE/NNSA’s uranium processing infrastructure faces significant challenges as a result of age. DOE/NNSA 

is implementing the Building 9212 Exit Strategy to phase out mission dependency on this building. In 

phasing out mission dependency on Building 9212, DOE/NNSA is enacting a series of enriched uranium 

capability relocations into other Y-12 facilities, investing in modernization projects, and constructing the 

Uranium Processing Facility. The facility is slated to achieve Critical Decision 4 (CD-4; Approve Start of 

Operations or Project Completion) by the end of FY 2025. Existing processes are slated to be simplified 

or eliminated to increase safety and efficiency, and new technologies will be deployed.

Challenges

DOE/NNSA’s uranium challenges primarily involve transition of enriched uranium capabilities into existing 

and new-build facilities. This transition involves implementing the Building 9212 Exit Strategy to shut 

down Building 9212’s production processes, drain and isolate systems, and facilitate post-operations 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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cleanout of the facility. DOE/NNSA must extend the life of other Y-12 facilities while the Uranium 

Processing Facility is constructed to contain processes that cannot be transferred to another facility. 

DOE/NNSA also faces challenges in maintaining subject matter expertise at the national security 

laboratories in base R&D capabilities and production support, as a result of retirements combined with 

industry competition for a small pool of highly skilled, technical employees.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA is maintaining direct communications with Y-12, LANL, and LLNL to support accomplishment 

of the overall mission while closely tracking the progress of construction and relocation activities. 

DOE/NNSA is continuing to advance technologies currently planned for deployment in the field, as well as 

technologies required to meet future mission needs.

2.4.3 Depleted Uranium

Depleted uranium is a byproduct of the enrichment process that has a lower ratio of uranium-235 to 

uranium-238 than naturally occurring uranium. DOE/NNSA has a long-term requirement for high-purity 

depleted uranium feedstock to meet national security needs.

Status

DOE/NNSA is currently exhausting usable inventories of high-purity depleted uranium metal feedstock. 

While DOE/NNSA has a large quantity in the form of depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) gas, there is 

no capability to convert the gas to the depleted uranium tetrafluoride (DUF4) that provides feedstock 

material for conversion to depleted uranium metal. DOE/NNSA will work to re-establish this capability 

beginning in FY 2019. NNSA published the Depleted Uranium/Binary Strategy in September 2017, 

outlining the plan to maintain this material, and held a Depleted Uranium Strategy meeting in 

February 2018 to discuss updates to the depleted uranium supply and demand model, validation of 

material requirements, technologies to meet future mission needs, and the status of legacy processes at 

Y-12.

Challenges

DOE/NNSA estimates a shortfall of usable depleted uranium in the 2029 to 2031 timeframe and must 

adjust accordingly.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA continues to advance technologies currently planned for deployment in the field, as well as 

technologies that will be required to meet future mission needs. DOE/NNSA is investigating alternative 

processes and technology improvements to increase the efficiency of traditional manufacturing 

processes.4 After evaluating various options for re-establishment of the capability to convert DUF6, 

DOE/NNSA plans to begin re-establishment in FY 2019. 

2.4.4 Uranium (Domestic Uranium Enrichment)

Enriched uranium contains higher concentrations of the fissile uranium-235 isotope than natural uranium 

and is required at various levels of enrichment and forms for national security missions. Domestic 

uranium enrichment provides a reliable supply of enriched uranium.

 

4 The majority of this work is funded by the Material Recycle and Recovery Program and Storage Program.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-17

Status

The U.S. Government currently has no uranium enrichment capability. Mission needs for enriched 

uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States’ remaining highly enriched uranium stockpile, which 

is a finite, currently irreplaceable source. DOE/NNSA is funding two centrifuge R&D programs for potential 

deployment in an enrichment facility.

Challenges

Construction of an enrichment facility would carry a large budgetary requirement around the same time 

that DOE/NNSA is engaged in other large-scale construction projects to maintain strategic materials 

capabilities.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA established CD-0 (Approve Mission Need) in December 2016 and began an AoA in 

August 2017. DOE/NNSA is on schedule to re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability for 

future national security needs.

2.4.5 Tritium

Tritium, a critical component for the functioning of the pits in the stockpile, reaches the pit through a GTS. 

Because tritium decays at 5.5 percent per year, GTSs are considered LLCs. Each system must be regularly 

cycled through SRS’s tritium facilities for tritium to be recovered and recycled once the system reaches its 

end of life. New GTSs are filled and sent back to the military (or Pantex) to meet LLC exchange schedules.

To maintain these LLCs, an inventory of tritium is maintained at SRS’s tritium facilities. Outlined below 

are the two sources of tritium that maintain this inventory: (1) recovery and recycle and (2) production 

via irradiation of lithium targets. DOE/NNSA’s tritium capability is further discussed in Chapter 3, 

Section 3.22.

2.4.5.1 Tritium Sustainment, Recovery, and Recycle

Status

DOE/NNSA’s ability to process tritium and fill reservoirs is sufficient for the current stockpile. However, 

DOE/NNSA is evaluating future tritium supply to support the complex system designs and concurrent 

production of multiple weapon systems described in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Because of current 

processing technology, a significant amount of tritium is obligated to maintain production/loading system 

functionality and is not available for GTS loading. Recapitalization efforts are necessary to sustain 

processing capabilities and are often competing with other program priorities. Alternative concepts are 

being evaluated to determine whether the system can be made more efficient to free this obligated 

tritium without interrupting production. Other aspects of tritium processing (purification and separation 

of hydrogen isotopes) meet current demand. However, alternative technologies, materials, and 

equipment may also provide cost benefits and efficiencies for continuous tritium processing and handling 

in the future.

Challenges

DOE/NNSA faces a number of challenges, such as:

 An aging infrastructure that must be maintained to last year’s beyond designed life status.

 Availability of unique equipment and qualified vendors to deal with low molecular weight 

materials, such as hydrogen isotopes.

 Retention of specialized staff.
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Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA is working to develop appropriate commercial supply chains, assess procurement processes 

to aid in retaining the tritium supplier base, and the ability to refurbish and replace unique equipment. 

DOE/NNSA is also working to establish pathways with local educational institutions for training and hiring

personnel while exploring and developing new strategies for training and retaining experienced staff.

2.4.5.2 Tritium Production

Status

DOE/NNSA is meeting its production goals. The tritium production goals in the 2015 Baseline Change 

Proposal were independently certified by the Nuclear Weapons Council, as requested by Congress. The 

Baseline Change Proposal increased tritium production requirements from approximately 1,700 grams to 

2,800 grams per 18-month cycle by 2025, which necessitates the use of two reactors.

Challenges

DOE/NNSA must demonstrate the ability to produce 2,800 grams of tritium per cycle by 2025 and faces 

challenges in leveraging a declining nuclear industrial base, a result of the decreased status of nuclear 

power in the U.S. energy market. DOE/NNSA will monitor the nuclear industry as it evolves and will 

explore its options amid a high degree of uncertainty.

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA is working to maximize tritium production as tritium-producing burnable absorber rod 

production increases and to monitor programmatic risk to ensure the supply chains are sustainable.

DOE/NNSA is preparing for the future by considering tritium production alternatives beyond 2040. While 

there are a range of options, such as building new reactors or extending their licensing of existing reactors, 

strategies will depend on where the commercial nuclear industry stands at that time. 

2.4.6 Lithium

DOE/NNSA uses lithium to manufacture nuclear weapon components and supplies lithium to the 

Department of Homeland Security, the DOE Office of Science, and others. More detailed information on 

DOE/NNSA’s lithium efforts is contained in Chapter 3, Section 3.20.4.

Status

DOE/NNSA has completed a formal AoA for a new lithium production capability and started work on CD-1 

(Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range). CD-4 (Approve Start of Operations or Project 

Completion) is slated for 2027. DOE/NNSA has also updated the Lithium Strategy Document and 

developed the Lithium Technology Maturation Plan. To introduce efficiencies into the current process 

and prepare for the lithium production capability, DOE/NNSA has completed a Technology Readiness 

Assessment for lithium purification and production technologies.

Challenges

The United States no longer maintains full lithium purification capabilities and relies on recycling as its

primary source of lithium for weapon systems. At 75 years old, the current lithium processing facility at 

Y-12 is one of the oldest operating facilities in the nuclear security enterprise. Until a new lithium 

production capability is operational, much of the risk to lithium sustainment is associated with the age of

the existing facility.
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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 2-19

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA will continue using the current lithium processing facility and equipment to meet near-term 

stockpile needs while implementing a lithium bridging strategy and establishing a new lithium production 

capability to address long-term capability requirements. DOE/NNSA has identified a number of weapons 

systems and canned subassembly inventories that can serve as a source for recycled lithium for future LEP 

use, once certified by LANL and LLNL. DOE/NNSA will also take steps to upgrade the lithium facility and 

develop and mature new purification and production technologies to make the current process more 

efficient. These technologies will be used as part of the new lithium production capability when 

operational.

2.4.7 Material Recycle and Recovery and Storage

The MRR and Storage programs are integral to strategic materials sustainment. With materials recycled 

from assembly operations, LLCs, and weapons dismantlement, the MRR program provides vital quantities 

of strategic materials (i.e., plutonium, uranium, lithium, and tritium) to sustain the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent. Using these recycled materials allows the nuclear security enterprise to forego the expense of 

producing new quantities of these materials. The MRR and Storage programs interface closely with other 

programmatic work scopes. These interfaces directly support the Federal managers for sustainment of 

tritium, uranium, plutonium and for the proposed lithium sustainment, as well as LEPs and weapons 

dismantlement and disposition. The following important efforts are overseen by the MRR and Storage

programs:

 De-inventory of LANL’s Chemistry and Metallurgy Research and PF-4 vault facilities.

 Re-establishment of the capability to deliver high-purity depleted uranium feedstock.

 Production of purified lithium metal at Y-12.

 Recycle, recovery, and purification of tritium after LLC unloading to enable loading the gas into 

GTSs.

The Storage program manages materials storage by providing receipt costs, inventory logistics for nuclear 

and non-nuclear materials, surveillance, and storage of dismantled warhead components.

Status

The nuclear security enterprise’s recent efforts in these areas include the following:

 SRS completed tritium recycle and recovery activities ahead of schedule in support of mission 

requirements and improved its operational interface with DOE’s Office of Science.

 Y-12 demonstrated the ability to increase production of purified enriched uranium metal to meet 

Defense Programs requirements, replenished the purified metal working inventory, and provided

a risk mitigation inventory.

 Y-12 continued to minimize technology risk on the production microwave with the completion of 

a carbon reduction study report.

 Y-12 reduced the Storage program’s operational risk by improving consumables inventory 

management (e.g., use of a rackable can storage box); by re-containerizing 120 carbon steel cans 

in support of a Defense Board commitment to remove all such cans from long-term storage in the

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility; and by continuing improvements in non-enriched 

uranium storage areas.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 LANL’s first waste shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) since its reopening occurred

on November 16, 2017, using the Mobile Loading Unit at TA-55. The first shipment of four waste 

drums from TA-55 to the TRU Waste Facility occurred in the week of October 10, 2017. As of 

March 30, 2018, 28 transuranic drums have been shipped to the TRU Waste Facility. It is expected 

that the operational tempo will increase to a level sustaining operational needs. 

 LANL performed significant work on risk reduction activities and vault material disposition,

including the reduction of material-at-risk on the LANL PF-4 main floor and implementing a push 

inventory management tool for transuranic waste to ensure efficient supply chain management.

 LANL’s Storage program installed equipment to better evaluate container performance and 

support reducing the risk of employee exposure.

 Pantex deployed the Laser Gas Sampling Station II in FY 2017. Completion of full qualification 

across all active stockpile pits is planned in FY 2018. CoLOSSIS II (Confined Large Optical 

Scintillator Screen and Imaging System) was installed in FY 2017; qualification and authorization 

is planned in the fourth quarter of FY 2018. Pantex, in coordination with LLNL, demonstrated 

significant diagnostic capability sustainment and improvement with the installation of the 

CoLOSSIS II equipment.

 The Nevada National Security Site’s Storage program reduced operational risk through an 

accelerated effort to characterize legacy items.

Challenges

DOE/NNSA faces storage capacity constraints and competing demands, especially for plutonium and 

transuranic waste. LANL’s recently operational TRU Waste Facility is essential for providing waste staging 

capacity until WIPP begins accepting full shipments from LANL. DOE/NNSA must also re-establish a 

capability to produce depleted uranium and depleted uranium-alloyed feedstock and effectively and 

efficiently execute the recapitalization efforts necessary to sustain its processing and storage capabilities. 

Mitigations/Strategies

DOE/NNSA will continue its strategy to repurpose and reconfigure nuclear material bays to stage 

plutonium pits until a long-term staging facility is available. The proposed Material Staging Facility at 

Pantex is a potential solution that has recently completed CD-0 (Approve Mission Need). LANL has 

developed a strategic plan to manage transuranic waste until WIPP is fully operational. LANL’s TRU Waste 

Facility will help maintain storage in the meantime. Initial, critical, high-priority shipments to WIPP have

begun, although full shipments will not resume until FY 2023, when a new ventilation system will be

installed and operational. The sites have already initiated comprehensive assessments of storage process 

health, and DOE/NNSA will begin to establish a depleted uranium capability in FY 2019. DOE/NNSA sites 

are working to develop comprehensive recapitalization plans to sustain their processing and storage 

facilities, including hydride storage for tritium operations at SRS and reducing the dependence on 

Building 9212 at Y-12.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-1

Chapter 3

Capabilities That Support the Nuclear

Security Enterprise

DOD and DOE/NNSA together deliver the capabilities required to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent 

that will provide the Nation with the ability to adapt and respond to a dynamic security environment,

emerging strategic challenges, and geopolitical and technological surprises. Underpinning this 

responsibility for the deterrent is the technical expertise resident at DOE/NNSA’s national laboratories, 

production sites, and Nevada National Security Site and the nuclear weapons infrastructure. 

Capabilities that address critical elements of the life cycle of U.S. nuclear weapons are depicted in 

Figure 3–1. Each capability is complementary and supports multiple elements of the weapons life cycle. 

Continued investment is necessary to sustain and modernize nuclear weapons, improve understanding of 

nuclear weapons performance, maintain confidence in the aging and evolving stockpile, and ensure that 

the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise remains responsive. Achievement of these capabilities occurs 

at appropriate levels, as defined by both the Nuclear Weapons Council and the interagency process that 

weighs and prioritizes missions and resources. Definitions for each of these capabilities can be found in 

Appendix C, “Weapons Activities Capabilities,” while current resource prioritizations can be found in 

Chapter 4.

Figure 3–1. Weapons Activities capabilities

From 1945 to 1991, U.S. nuclear warheads were designed, developed, produced, and deployed in the 

stockpile (usually for a period of 15 to 20 years) and then retired and dismantled to be replaced by new, 

more modern weapons that generally offered unique military capabilities and improved safety and 

security features. This continuous replacement cycle was used to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons exploited 

technological advances and optimized military performance. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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In 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced the end of additional production of nuclear weapons 

consistent with the shutdown of the Rocky Flats Plant and a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing, 

which began in 1992 and has continued ever since. As a result, the nuclear weapons acquisition model

was eventually supplanted by indefinite retention of the weapons in the legacy stockpile. To fulfill this 

mandate, stockpile life cycle strategies evolved to maintain an established stockpile of aging weapons 

through stockpile refurbishment life extension programs (LEPs). This evolution resulted in an increased 

focus (more than 90 percent of current weapons activities) on the Maintain, Assess, and Repair/Refurbish 

portions of the life cycle. Innovative science and engineering approaches to diagnose and analyze both 

the current state of nuclear weapons in the stockpile and the trajectory of weapons and components as 

they age have increased in importance. Since 2015, NNSA has worked to establish the congressionally 

mandated Stockpile Responsiveness Program to ensure that NNSA exercises and maintains the necessary 

capabilities to complete the full weapons life cycle illustrated in Figure 3–2.

1

Figure 3–2. Joint DOD–DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons life-cycle phases

Figure 3–3 depicts the importance of each Weapon Activities capability for each phase of the nuclear 

weapon life cycle. Dark green signifies that a given capability is required to successfully complete that life

cycle phase. Medium green signifies that a capability is important to the success of a life cycle phase. 

Light green signifies that a capability contributes less directly to a phase. Each capability is required for at 

least one phase. Some cross-cutting capabilities are required throughout the full life cycle, such as 

Physical Security, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, and Environmental Management. The level 

of importance of a capability in a particular phase may vary slightly depending on the scope of the work 

necessary for a given weapon system or situation, and the timing or preparation for work supporting a 

particular phase may occur in tandem with earlier design and implementation phases. 

 

1 Please refer to the Nuclear Matters Handbook for more information.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-3

Capability

Joint Nuclear Weapon Life Cycle Phases

Phase 1

Phases 2

and 2A Phase 3

Phases 4, 5, 

and Part of 6

Part of 

Phase 6 Phase 7

Concept

Study

Feasibility

Study,

Design 

Definition &

Cost Study

Development

Engineering

Production 

Engineering, 

Initial Production,

& Quantity 

Production

Stockpile 

Maintenance & 

Evaluation

(Certify & Assess)

Retire,

Dismantle,

Dispose

Simulation Codes and Models

High Performance Computing

Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry

Atomic and Plasma Physics

High Energy Density Physics

Laser, Pulsed Power, and Accelerator 

Technology

Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and 

Sensors

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments

Chemistry

High Explosives Science and Engineering

Materials Science and Engineering

Weapon Physics Design and Analysis

Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and 

Integration

Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and 

Engineering Sciences

Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and 

Manufacturing

Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics Design 

and Manufacturing

Weapon Component and System Prototyping

Advanced Manufacturing

Weapon Component and Material Process 

Development

Handling, Packaging, Processing, and 

Manufacturing of Energetic and Hazardous 

Material

Handling, Packaging, Processing, and 

Manufacturing of Special Nuclear Material

Tritium Production, Handling, and Processing

Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, 

Processing, and Manufacturing

Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing 

and Assembly

Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly

Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication

Weapon Component and System Surveillance 

and Assessment

Secure Transportation

Physical Security

Information Technology and Cybersecurity

Importance of Capability to the Process Step

Required for successful execution Important for success Contributes to success

Figure 3–3. Weapons Activities capabilities
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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People and Infrastructure

Providing the necessary capabilities to support all phases of the nuclear weapon life cycle depends on a 

workforce with specialized skills in a broad array of technical fields. Recruiting, retaining, and training the 

current and future workforce in essential areas of expertise are critical to mission delivery. Closely related 

to attracting and retaining the workforce is providing the specialized facilities and equipment needed to 

enable this workforce to deliver world-class work products using unique tools, platforms, and processes. 

The workforce with the requisite skills (e.g., scientists, engineers, production personnel) and the 

associated facilities and equipment help to accomplish the following mission objectives: 

 Sustain today’s nuclear stockpile and ensure continued safety, security, and effectiveness.

 Extend the life of a select sub-set of nuclear warheads and design, develop, and produce nuclear 

weapons as needed for today and into the future.

 Assess and report annually whether the safety and reliability of the future nuclear stockpile can 

be assured in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and, as a safeguard, maintain a nuclear 

test capability.

 Maintain the capability to design, develop, certify, and produce nuclear warheads with new or 

different military capabilities if required in the future.

 Provide an effective response to technical problems with a warhead or to adverse geopolitical 

developments that call for force augmentation. 

Over the past several decades, the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of aging 

and underfunding. Previous Nuclear Posture Reviews highlighted the need to maintain a modern nuclear 

weapons infrastructure. To achieve this goal, DOE/NNSA developed 

a list of major programmatic facilities and major capital acquisition 

project proposals through the following efforts: the Master Asset 

Plan (MAP) Deep Dives, the Construction Working Group, and the 

Integrated Planning Group, which includesrepresentatives from all of 

the sites and responsible Federal offices across DOE/NNSA. In 2018, 

there are almost 300 major programmatic facilities2 with an average 

age of 44 years in operations. The current Weapons Activities 

program of record and program-vetted project proposals are the basis for NNSA’s cost estimates for the 

addition of new capabilities and the sustainment of existing major facilities. NNSA will track the average 

age of major programmatic facilities from the FY 2019 SSMP onwards to judge the adequacy of the longterm infrastructure modernization plan. Table 3–1 contains low- and high-estimate projections in thenyear dollars for Weapon Activities major capital acquisition projects for the 25 years between FY 2019 and 

FY 2043. Several of these projects contain a high degree of scope and cost uncertainty, resulting in a wide

cost range. Each capability will be evaluated for future need, and capabilities will be examined as 

resourcing decisions are made. Once NNSA conducts analyses of alternatives, some planned acquisitions 

may convert to alternate strategies to meet mission needs. These decisions could change projections. 

This year’s SSMP “High” estimate benefits from three improvements to prior SSMP projection

methodology:

 

2 Major facilities are defined as those whose recapitalization, including equipment, will require line-item project(s) as cost 

estimates are greater than $20 million.

“There is now no margin for further 

delay in recapitalizing the physical 

infrastructure needed to produce 

strategic materials and components 

for U.S. nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Posture Review, 2018
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-5

 Expanding the planning process to include collecting and validating capital acquisition 

requirements over the full 25-year SSMP timeframe.

3

 Performing a cost estimate for every validated project proposal (either a Defense Programs’

independent cost estimate [ICE] or site estimates for refurbishment projects),

4, 5

in addition to 

conducting ICEs or reviews prior to each critical decision (CD).

 Updating the “High” estimate to represent the 85th percentile of the estimated confidence level 

range for each project.

6

Table 3–1. Weapons Activities major capital acquisition estimated costs, fiscal years 2019–2043

Then-Year Dollars, in Billions Low a High b

Weapons Activities major capital acquisition estimated costs 61.1 90.7

a “Low” reflects the Infrastructure and Operations Construction portfolio’s FY 2023 amount in Chapter 4, Figure 4–21, 

escalated at 2.1 percent inflationary rate.

b “High” reflects the program-provided Infrastructure and Operations Construction portfolio with the 85th percentile of the 

Defense Programs independent cost estimates confidence level range, which is based on the underlying scope and cost 

uncertainties.

DOE/NNSA continues to analyze this portfolio’s long-term needs, and the next SSMP will include further 

changes to align DOE/NNSA’s needs with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

For each of the 30 Weapons Activities capabilities, this chapter discusses the contributions the capabilities

provide to the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise goals, current status, and challenges, as well as the 

long-term vision and strategy to address those challenges.

3.1 Simulation Codes and Models

Maintaining and enhancing the necessary simulation and modeling capabilities involves developing and 

using computer programs (i.e., codes) that simulate the physical behavior of nuclear weapons and 

components and address production. To enable analysis of a variety of weapons systems’ needs,

DOE/NNSA codes operate on computers ranging in capacity from desktop machines to the world’s largest 

high-performance supercomputers. Modifying a computer code for use on more than one high 

performance computing (HPC) platform often requires significant refactoring of the code to ensure 

optimal performance. Simulation codes are categorized as integrated design codes (IDCs) and weapon 

science codes. IDCs perform large-scale, physics-rich simulations, while weapon science codes model 

detail phenomena and inform the models in the IDCs where experimental results are lacking.

The Simulation Codes and Models capability allows the nuclear security enterprise to model the 

extraordinary complexity of nuclear weapons systems and is essential to maintaining confidence in the 

performance of the aging stockpile without underground testing. 

 

3 Table 3–1 reflects only the 20-year post-Future Years Nuclear Security Program planning horizon in last year’s SSMP.

4

It was assumed that KCNSC will not require a line-item project to maintain forecast capabilities during the planning period.

5 The provisional $15 billion “High” estimate for domestic uranium enrichment capability in last year’s SSMP remains unchanged.

6 Use of the 85th percentile is consistent with DOE Order 413.3B guidance to select an acceptable point estimate selection.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-6 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Discrepancies between experimental data and simulations 

often shed light on needed improvements in algorithms and 

models in the codes, as well as the physical data used by the 

codes. Once validated against experimental data, the 

simulation codes provide insight into the physics at play in the 

experiments by providing information far beyond what is

obtained through diagnostic measurements. Simulation 

codes are heavily used in preparation for experiments to

provide information on, for example, optimal placement and 

timing of diagnostics, containment of materials and blast, and 

to ensure that a subcritical experiment remains subcritical. 

Simulation codes are also used to analyze the safety of 

assembly and disassembly procedures at the plants. 

DOE/NNSA’s simulation codes have proven to be invaluable 

in predicting weapons performance and analyzing the results 

of weapons-related experiments, including historical nuclear 

tests. 

The Simulation Codes and Models capability depends on HPC

to provide the necessary platforms and is regularly used by all 

other Weapon Activities capabilities. 

3.1.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security 

Enterprise Goals

Current simulation capabilities and computer platforms, coupled with advanced model development and

focused experiments, have enabled weapons designers to continue certifying the stockpile to date. This 

includes resolution of all significant finding investigations (SFIs), aging and safety assessments, and 

certification of changes due to LEPs (notably, weapon response to hostile environments, for which 

physical testing is limited). The improved fidelity of simulations has allowed the nuclear security 

enterprise to resolve many of the remaining questions related to underground tests that were first raised 

when the tests were performed.

3.1.2 Status of Simulation Codes and Models

The Simulation Codes and Models capability is supported by several funding sources and, in turn,supports 

many weapon systems and capabilities within the nuclear security enterprise. The investment in this 

capability has adequately supported the necessary enhancements identified a decade ago. Current 

changes in the nuclear security landscape, including evolving hostile requirements and data on material 

aging, may force reprioritizations in the annual budget process to sustain the capability for the future. 

DOE/NNSA must be able to anticipate the effects of aging and proactively act before those effects become 

issues for the stockpile. Better understanding of fundamental material property changes that occur with 

age as well as in weapons science simulations requires additional investments in model and database 

development. 

Codes, Computers, and Component 

Development

Scientists determined that a certain class of 

weapons physics simulations of the B61 

nuclear explosive package (NEP) required 

computing exceeding the capability of Cielo, 

NNSA's most capable computing platform at 

that time. The Trinity computer, at 

41 petaFLOPS, is sized to perform those 

simulations. The Trinity acquisition project 

began in 2013, technology demonstrations 

and transitioning of codes began in 2014, and 

the complete system was accepted in late 

2016. In 2017, these B61 simulations were 

completed on Trinity, resulting in a validated 

NEP model for this class of operation.

Image from a 3D simulation of an ICF capsule 

implosion showing density (left) and 

temperature (right) isocontours
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-7

3.1.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

The ongoing shift in computer architectures continues to 

degrade efficiency and portability of current IDCs and

weapons science codes.

Short-term: Optimize current codes for advanced 

technology hardware.

Longer term: Develop next-generation simulation tools with 

algorithms and data structures designed for exascale 

architectures.

The migration to new computing platforms diminishes the 

rate at which new physics capabilities are provided to the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Develop and implement a broader range of tools to enable 

more rapid design, evaluation, and qualification of new 

materials for a range of mission applications while keeping 

costs manageable.

The ability to simulate the effects of aging and 

manufacturing changes is limited.

Collaborate with the Experimental Sciences Program to 

develop the experiments, models, and databases needed to 

simulate the effects of aging and manufacturing changes. 

Develop a higher-fidelity simulation capability to model 

effects of adversarial threats on weapons systems.

Develop computational resources to evaluate fully the 

multitude of inherently three-dimensional scenarios of 

threat encounters. 

Continue ongoing efforts to develop systems of simulation 

codes that work together to solve the multiple physics 

aspects and timescales of adversarial threats. Validate 

capabilities with results from the experimental efforts in

other capabilities areas, such as high energy density physics.

Quickly evolve the ability to perform rapid evaluations of 

new materials and model additive manufacturing 

techniques. 

Continue current efforts to model additive manufacturing

processes and couple these more closely with molecular 

dynamics and mesoscale modeling to enhance the utility of 

these models. 

3.2 High Performance Computing

The HPC capability includes developing, deploying, and operating very high-capacity computers (along 

with the requisite software, hardware, facilities, and underpinning infrastructure) to achieve the 

resolution, dimensionality, and complexity required of the simulation codes used to model performance 

of weapon systems, components, and relevant experiments.

As the key enabler of simulation codes and modeling, HPC directly or indirectly supports both simulation 

capabilities and many Weapons Activities capabilities related to validation of models or qualification of 

weapon components and systems. 

3.2.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The HPC capability is the linchpin enabler for multi-dimensional computer simulation and modeling. While 

this capability has garnered accomplishments related to approaching exascale computational speeds, its

principal contribution to the nuclear security enterprise is supporting the modeling and simulation codes 

that allow qualification of weapon components and systems without nuclear testing. In particular, two 

important contributions are assessing the performance and safety of the nuclear explosive package (NEP), 

as well as of the full warhead system in the stockpile-to-target sequence (STS) environments.

3.2.2 Status of High Performance Computing

HPC technologies are evolving to ever-increasing numbers of computing cores and more heterogeneous 

architectures. The current generation of IDCs was not originally developed for this technology evolution, 

resulting in degraded efficiency on recent HPC platforms. Since this degradation will further worsen on 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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future HPC platforms, a next generation of IDCs (requiring new capabilities in numerical methods, 

software design, and development) will help optimize the use of new HPC technologies.

Current HPC technologies are the foundation for a future exascale supercomputer capability. These 

capabilities include HPC computation, storage and analysis technologies, large-scale power and cooling 

infrastructure, and staff drawn toward designing and operating HPC platforms at the very largest scale. 

Software and computer engineering and science activities support long-term simulation and computing 

goals relevant to both exascale computing and DOE/NNSA’s national security missions.

The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program has three major interdependent components 

(Figure 3–4) that must evolve together to contribute to DOE/NNSA missions: codes, computing platforms, 

and facilities. These three components work together to enable the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

mission by employing simulation in lieu of nuclear testing.

Figure 3–4. Coordinated high performance computing components

As computer architectures have evolved, demands on supporting infrastructure to provide adequate 

power and cooling have grown dramatically. In addition, computer vendor offerings are evolving and 

requiring more sophisticated programming models, software designs, and algorithms in the codes that 

run on these advanced systems. If DOE/NNSA is to meet the requirement for significant advances in 

modeling capabilities in the future, all three HPC components must be addressed in an integrated and 

consistent manner over the next decade.

In response to these challenges, the ASC Program’s system acquisition strategy incorporates three key 

objectives:

 Meet the mission needs of the Stockpile Stewardship Program

 Actively engage the U.S. HPC technology sector

 Manage the timing and impact of technological disruptions

This capability will require significant investment in the future to keep pace with the nuclear security 

enterprise’s continually increasing simulation demands. Another challenge, over which the ASC Program 

has dwindling influence, is the very rapid technological disruption taking place. The ASC Program has a 

clearly defined strategy of siting HPC platforms at regular intervals to meet mission need. The ASC 

Program carefully manages and coordinates code development and facility upgrades with advanced 

platform acquisitions to assure the effective use of HPC for DOE/NNSA.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-9

3.2.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

HPC architectures have evolved from what is used in the 

nuclear security enterprise, resulting in IDCs that are not 

effectively using the advances in computational capabilities.

Evolve HPC tools for a next generation of IDCs to achieve 

new levels of capability through sophisticated programming 

models, software designs, and numerical algorithms.

Provide appropriately sized facilities and supporting 

infrastructure (power and cooling) to house exascale 

platforms. 

Plan and secure capital investment funding for nextgeneration computing facilities and infrastructure.

Coordinate system procurements with the Office of Science.

Aggressively pursue power and cooling efficiencies, and 

build on recent programmatic planning and execution 

successes to deliver large-scale power and cooling 

infrastructure.

3.3 Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry

Nuclear physics is the study of atomic nuclei and interactions, especially fission and fusion. Knowledge of 

the probabilities of interactions of neutrons with fissile material, as well asinteractions of light nuclei that 

can result in fusion, is necessary to understand the physics of nuclear detonations and inform the design 

of the NEP. Actinide chemistry is a branch of nuclear chemistry that studies the actinide series of 

elements, which are especially applicable to DOE/NNSA activities. Actinide chemistry capabilities include 

synthesis, purification, and characterization in support of the stockpile. 

Radiochemistry is the chemistry of radioactive materials. This capability is important in evaluating data 

from legacy underground tests, as well as data from experiments that explore the nature of nuclear 

material behavior. These tests and experiments are performed at major NNSA facilities such as the Los 

Alamos Neutron Science Center, the Device Assembly Facility/National Criticality Experiments Research 

Center, National Ignition Facility (NIF), Omega Laser Facility (Omega), and Z pulsed power facility (Z). 

Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry capabilities provide data and interpretations from nuclear explosion 

debris. Such data enable simulations and decisions about nuclear explosions associated with the current 

and future stockpile. In addition, these capabilities provide information that is directly integrated into 

computer simulations used by the design community and generate the data against which calculated 

results are compared for accuracy. These data are the most accurate information against which integral 

performance calculations can be compared. Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry capabilities are also 

essential for development of new experimental capabilities, such as neutron diagnosed subcritical 

experiments, and will be key to the interpretation of neutron diagnosed subcritical experiment data. 

Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry capabilities particularly support Weapon Physics Design and Analysis, 

which depends on Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors to collect data, as well as HPC and 

Simulation Codes and Models to interpret the data. These capabilities are tightly coupled with many other 

science capabilities, such as Atomic and Plasma Physics and Materials Science and Engineering. 

3.3.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Measurements made at DOE/NNSA facilities that serve Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry capabilities

are used to study key aspects of the fission and fusion processesthat are relevant to stockpile stewardship 

programs, as well as to underwrite analysis of historical test data. As such, Nuclear Physics and 

Radiochemistry are critical to the sustainment and future viability of the stockpile. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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3.3.2 Status of Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry

In addition to the major facilities, there are many smaller, supporting laboratory facilities across the 

DOE/NNSA complex that provide specific complementary capabilities. These key facilities are in high 

demand, putting a strain on the operations of the facilities and the experimental machines housed. 

Progress has been made on addressing infrastructure gaps, including approvals for establishing new 

facilities to make some needed improvements. 

3.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Data generated from nuclear tests last held over 25 years ago

have not been preserved in an easily accessed format. 

In FY 2017, NNSA began a multi-year weapons research, 

development, test, and evaluation program to preserve 

radiochemical data, including digitizing historic media (e.g., 

paper, microfiche, etc.).

Many DOE/NNSA facilities central to nuclear physics and 

radiochemistry efforts are aging and in need of upgrades. 

Current efforts to address laboratory facility deficiencies 

are supported by DOE/NNSA infrastructure programs using 

a serial approach. Plans to clean and refurbish laboratories 

extend to approximately 2021. Additional proposals will be 

submitted to address the remaining deficiencies.

Much of DOE/NNSA’s experimental science equipment will 

reach its end of life within the SSMP planning period. Much 

of this equipment will require a step up to the next

generation to sustain Nuclear Physics and Radiochemistry

capabilities. 

DOE/NNSA is working on long-term strategic visions for 

improving several next-generation experimental science 

equipment that will sustain Nuclear Physics and 

Radiochemistry capabilities into the future. 

3.4 Atomic and Plasma Physics

Atomic physics is the study of atoms and the interactions of electrons with x-rays. Plasma physics is the 

study of the fourth state of matter, in which energy added to a material splits into ionized atoms and 

unbound electrons. The extremely high temperatures and densities created in nuclear weapons

detonations generate plasma and x-rays; involve these states of matter interacting and evolving over short

timescales; and are rich in complex phenomena.

The Atomic and Plasma Physics capability produces fundamental results that are used in radiationhydrodynamic codes that are essential to the Simulation Codes and Models capability. These results 

include opacities (describing material absorption of radiation), equations of state (EOS) (material 

responses to pressure), and transport properties of materials (the ways heat and radiation propagate). 

These results are challenging to acquire due to the extreme temperatures and pressures involved.

3.4.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Experiments to validate our opacity, EOS, and transport models, as well as the physics simulations used

to understand these experiments, continue to improve. Detailed experiments to better understand EOS 

are extending the range of pressure conditions (1 to ~800 megabars [Mbar]) and the atomic numbers of 

the materials studied. Opacity measurements are executed on multiple platforms to validate and improve 

confidence in DOE/NNSA’s model to ensure understanding of the complexity of the plasma environment 

and its interplay with the radiating plasma atoms, as well asthe regimes over which model approximations 

remain valid. Simulations of stockpile and non-stockpile systems have been performed to assess the 

sensitivity of results to variants in opacity tables, leading to a fundamental understanding of opacity 

effects on performance and the identification of focus areas for future theory and experimental efforts.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-11

3.4.2 Status of Atomic and Plasma Physics

To model, design, and interpret stockpile-related experiments, simulation tools require validated opacity, 

EOS, and transport data. Depending on the pressure, density, and temperature regime, such data can be 

provided through measurements or a combination of theoretical calculations. 

The vast range of regimes and extreme conditions achieved by nuclear devices provides challenges for 

complete experimental validation of data tables. However, reproducible measurements achievable at 

aboveground experimental facilities provide confidence in DOE/NNSA models. These measurements

provide the necessary data to allow examination of the fundamental physical processes and inherent 

assumptions. Experimental platforms have recently been developed at NIF, Z, and Omega, as well as the

Jupiter laser facility, to provide measurements of EOS and opacity in specific physical regimes. Several 

platforms have been developed to measure the EOS of both low atomic number (low-Z) and high atomic 

number (high-Z) materials that are relevant to programmatic needs. For low-Z materials (Z less than 10) 

such as carbon, DOE/NNSA is able to measure pressures above 100 Mbar, but is currently limited to 

pressures up to several tens of Mbar in higher-Z materials. The absorption opacity of mid-Z materials at 

densities near 1 percent of solid density can also be measured. 

Computational methods now routinely provide the ability to compute EOS from first principles over a 

wide range of phase space, particularly for low-Z materials. Higher-Z materials still present a challenge 

for most theoretical techniques due to both the higher computational expense and the need for novel 

approaches to the physics that is relevant to these materials. 

3.4.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

DOE/NNSA needs an EOS platform that can measure data 

for high-atomic number materials at high pressures (above 

100 Mbar), particularly in a broad range of density and 

pressure conditions. The ability to measure data at these

pressures is needed to extend current data sets to 

additional stockpile conditions. 

Develop and test new experimental platforms, such as 

targets with well-controlled porosity or multi-shock, as well 

as ramp-drive platforms to provide results in these 

environments. Develop both equilibrium and nonequilibrium opacity platforms to directly benchmark models. 

New and improved diagnostics are needed to more 

accurately determine the experimental conditions of 

temperature and density.

Develop a national diagnostic plan identifying 

transformational diagnostics to provide the required data. 

Techniques for computing opacities are limited by how 

efficiently the tools can compute, store, and analyze the 

simulation results. 

Mature and validate a new computational technique for 

calculating opacities for high atomic number materials. 

The capability to produce EOS results is limited to idealized 

materials and does not include more complex materials,

such as foams or additive manufacturing lattice structures. 

High-Z materials typically present a challenge for firstprinciples theoretical methods. 

Develop and mature first-principles EOS modeling tools and 

techniques for non-equilibrium conditions and complex 

materials. HPC platforms advancements will be needed to 

efficiently execute computationally intensive methods.

3.5 High Energy Density Physics

High Energy Density (HED) Physics is the study of matter and radiation under extreme conditions, typically 

defined as material at energy densities greater than 100 kilojoules per cubic centimeter, which is 

equivalent to pressures greater than approximately 1 million times the Earth’s atmosphere (1 Mbar). The

overwhelming majority of the yield of the Nation’s nuclear weapons is generated when the conditions 

within the NEP are in the HED state. HED science proficiency is required to maintain core technical 

competency and ensure adequate understanding of the complex nature of these systems.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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DOE/NNSA has three cutting-edge experimental HED facilities 

that were developed and are maintained by the Inertial 

Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program to enable access to HED 

regimes that are relevant to nuclear weapons: NIF at LLNL, Z at 

SNL, and Omega at the University of Rochester Laboratory for 

Laser Energetics. High-energy and high-power laser and pulsed 

power drivers are key to generating HED environments of 

interest. These investments have already enabled critical 

contributions to the sustainment of the Nation’s nuclear 

stockpile. 

HED experiments underpin the validation of the computer 

models used to qualify nuclear weapon components and 

systems in the absence of nuclear testing. These HED 

experiments support capabilities such as Simulation Codes and 

Models; Radiation Effects Analysis, Testing and Engineering 

Sciences; Weapon Physics Design and Analysis; and Weapon 

Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration activities, as well 

as scientific inquiry into the fundamental nature of matter found 

throughout the universe (astrophysics and planetary science). 

The Advanced Diagnostics and Sensors capability ensures

collection of data for these environments. 

3.5.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Experiments performed in the HED regime provide the scientific understanding and data required to 

validate the physics models upon which DOE/NNSA’s nuclear weapon simulation capabilities are built. 

The HED regime includes the study of dynamic material properties in extreme conditions, radiation 

transport, radiation hydrodynamics, thermonuclear burn, low-energy nuclear physics, hydrodynamic 

instability-induced mix, boost physics, and radiation opacities. In addition, the radiation and neutrons 

produced by HED platforms are routinely applied to testing and validating models for outputs, 

environments, and radiation effects geared toward improving our understanding of vulnerability, 

hardness, and survivability. 

One of the primary research interest areas within the HED capability is generating high fusion energy 

yields through ICF experiments on the NIF and Z. The value of ICF to the Stockpile Stewardship Program

supports the following areas: 

 Acquisition of material properties data.

 Testing and validation of opacity, radiation transport, and radiation-hydrodynamic computational 

algorithms that are important to integrated weapon design codes.

 Testing and validation of radiation effects sciences design codes.

 Experimental examination of models associated with boost, vulnerability, and hardness.

 Capability to measure outputs from a modest gain ICF capsule to uniformly heat and measure the 

properties of samples at relevant conditions.

 Large fusion yield experimental platforms to provide direct access to the weapons-performancerelevant regimes that reduce the need for physical scaling or extrapolation in all key HED areas.

High Energy Density Plutonium

Experiments

In 2006, experiments at the Z pulsed power 

facility measured the properties of 

plutonium under extreme pressures for the 

first time. Executing follow-on experiments 

required reconfiguring Z to improve safety. 

In 2010, this was completed and plutonium 

experiments resumed. Through April 2017, 

21 plutonium experiments were performed 

at Z and the material property results were 

used to validate, test, and improve 

simulation codes and models. The latest 

experiment evaluated one of the oldest 

(51.5 years) plutonium samples taken from 

the stockpile, and the results were used in 

the annual stockpile assessment.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-13

3.5.2 Status of High Energy Density Physics

Across all three major HED facilities, the experimental platforms have produced data that are relevant to 

the performance of nuclear weapons. These environments include neutron and x-ray bursts, fusion 

stagnation pressures, complex radiation hydrodynamics, and material and plasma behaviors at high 

pressure and density regimes that were previously inaccessible. These advances provided immediate 

mission impact in predictive nuclear weapon performance and survivability and are crucial for advancing 

predictive capabilities in energy densities of interest. The ICF Program is committed to achieving a robust 

burning-plasma platform and eventually a high fusion energy yield (greater than 200 megajoules) in 

support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Again, progress continues to be excellent, as evidenced 

by record-breaking experimental outputs from all three major HED facilities in 2017.

These breakthroughs were enabled in part by increased operational tempos at the facilities. However, 

these increased tempos have increased wear and tear on the major experimental facilities, equipment, 

and diagnostics supporting HED, thus increasing the potential for disruption of experimental schedules 

(with potential effects to mission partners) and unplanned repair costs. More diligent operational 

monitoring and a focus on consistent capital reinvestment are required to address this issue.

3.5.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Confidently predicting performance of ICF targets used in 

HED physics facilities to achieve fusion ignition, followed by 

developing a high-yield platform.

Execute a program of experiments at the HED facilities to 

characterize fusion phenomena; then use results to build a 

predictive modeling capability.

Reducing test costs for HED environments across nuclear 

weapons applications. 

Improve predictive capability of science and engineering models 

in HED environments to reduce test needs. 

Sustaining current and expected operational tempos at 

major HED facilities. 

Sustain maintenance and capital investments in major HED

facilities.

Using HED experimental data to better understand evolving 

hostile environments.

Develop high-fidelity diagnostics, advanced experimental 

platforms, and predictive capabilities and simulations. 

Developing and fielding new technologies for HED 

experiments and diagnostics at major facilities; developing 

the next generation of HED scientists. 

Expand intermediate-scale HED capability for prove-in of new 

technologies and training of future HED scientists. 

Maintaining the complementary and leading-edge 

capabilities at NIF, Omega, and Z to support exploration of 

the HED regime for near- and long-term Stockpile 

Stewardship Program applications.

Prioritize the near-term Stockpile work and facility allocations 

that support that immediate scope; reduce – but strive to not 

eliminate – longer-term scientific Stockpile Stewardship Program 

work.

3.6 Laser, Pulsed Power, and Accelerator Technology

This capability is a collection of advanced technologies that safely create and probe conditions at pressure, 

temperature, and/or radiation conditions that are relevant to those present in a nuclear weapon during 

detonation. This capability includes research and development (R&D) to provide experiment driver 

technologies that extend the range of accessible laboratory environments ever closer to those in nuclear 

weapons. 

Several complex, high-profile facilities are the backbone of this capability, including (but not limited to) 

NIF, the Dual-Axis Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), and Z. More information on the major facilities 

that contribute to this capability may be found in the FY 2018 SSMP.

Laser, Pulsed Power, and Accelerator technologies underpin the fundamental capabilities that support 

and strengthen many areas of the stockpile, notably Weapon Physics Design and Analysis; Materials 

Science and Engineering; Atomic and Plasma Physics; Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments; HED
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-14 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Physics; Simulation Codes and Modeling; Weapon Engineering Design, Analysis and Integration; and 

Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering Sciences.

3.6.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Many stockpile stewardship activities require emulating and probing conditions close to those present in 

a nuclear weapon detonation. The machines and facilities that provide laser, pulsed power, and 

accelerator capabilities are used to generate nuclear weapon-relevant experimental data for the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program in the areas of hydrodynamics, material properties under extreme dynamic 

conditions, radiation transport, nuclear physics, radiation effects, and thermonuclear fusion and burn 

physics. These results then contribute to three goals:

 Annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile in the face of increasing challenges due to aging or 

remanufacture

 Resolving SFIs and stockpile issues

 Exploring and enabling options for future stockpile life extensions and approaches to certification 

Improved and extended facilities extend the range of accessible conditions so that further investments in 

this driver technology capability can increase confidence in our assessment models in more extreme 

conditions.

3.6.2 Status of Laser, Pulsed Power, and 

Accelerator Technology

DOE/NNSA sponsors or conducts thousands of experiments 

annually at the laser, pulsed power, and accelerator facilities

across the Nation. This operational tempo has increased wear 

and tear on machines, components, equipment, diagnostics, 

and supporting infrastructure, necessitating constant 

replacement of equipment to prevent single-point failures that 

would disrupt a full test schedule.

While current experimental facilities continue to achieve 

required scientific results and modest progression to higher 

pressures, temperatures, and radiation environments, 

investments in upgrades or new facilities will likely be required 

for future leaps forward in plasma temperature, radiation 

environments, and driving pressures.

3.6.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

The current laser, pulsed power, and accelerator facilities have 

yet to generate environments for certain types of experiments 

that are necessary to validate modeling and simulation 

capabilities for the full nuclear weapon life cycle. 

Sustain driver technology R&D and apply technology 

advances to extend the capability of existing or new 

machines and facilities to produce higher-fidelity, more 

extreme nuclear weapons-relevant environments.

Reliability, availability, and experimental tempo activities, as well 

as maintaining older equipment, use up significant resources.

Modernize facilities and equipment and increase 

operational resources where identified.

The increased capability of peer nations threatens U.S. preeminence in HED science, ICF, and other relevant science and 

technologies.

Use the technology sustainment area of interest as a 

means to train personnel and advance the state of the

art in technologies to cost-effectively extend the ranges 

of current facilities.

What is Pulsed Power?

In the early days, this technology was often 

called “pulse power” instead of pulsed 

power. In a pulsed power machine, lowpower electrical energy from a wall plug is 

stored in a bank of capacitors and leaves 

them as a compressed pulse of power. The 

duration of the pulse is increasingly 

shortened until it is only billionths of a 

second long. With each shortening of the 

pulse, the power increases. The final result 

is a very short pulse with enormous power, 

whose energy can be released in several 

ways. The original intent of this technology 

was to use the pulse to simulate the bursts 

of radiation from exploding nuclear 

weapons. Now, these bursts are used to 

drive creative sources to generate a variety 

of tailored radiation and neutron outputs.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-15

3.7 Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors

Measuring phenomena in experiments and tests relevant to nuclear 

weapons presents challenges due to the extreme environments 

created and the stringent requirements for precision and accuracy. 

The Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors capability is 

used to develop, deploy, use, and analyze data from advanced 

diagnostics and sensors to provide such measurements and to

advance the technology and techniques to capture the behaviors 

unfolding in these experiments. Examples of advanced diagnostics 

currently in development include dynamic radiography (i.e., several 

flash x-ray images taken over the course of an explosion), timeresolved x-ray diffraction (measures material crystal structure), and 

multi-dimensional tomography of microstructures (reconstructing 

the interior features of a component from x-rays taken from many 

angles).

Many experimental and test capabilities depend on advanced 

diagnostics and sensors. These include Nuclear Physics and 

Radiochemistry; Atomic and Plasma Physics; High Energy Density 

Physics; Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments; and Laser, 

Pulsed Power, and Accelerator Technology. Environmental effects 

testing and analysis capabilities also depend on advanced diagnostics 

and sensors to help certify weapon systems and components, as 

does the Weapon Component and System Surveillance and 

Acceptance capability to support annual assessments. 

3.7.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Developing, deploying, and analyzing data from advanced diagnostics and sensors is a key capability used

for the experimental and surveillance elements of stockpile stewardship. Developing experimental 

capabilities to measure nuclear weapon-relevant results is accomplished with coordinated development 

of driver technology, e.g., accelerators, the diagnostic techniques and instruments provided by this 

capability, and experimental methods. The Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors capability, 

which is closely tied with simulation and analysis, addresses new and emerging issues that arise from the 

continually advancing scientific understanding of the stockpile to ensure the safety, reliability, and 

performance of the stockpile. 

Efforts in this capability to develop and deploy diagnostics that function in intense environments also 

provide the opportunity to develop and exercise the nuclear security enterprise’s ability to design, build, 

and operate devices that are similar to those used in nuclear testing. This is essential to preserving 

DOE/NNSA’s responsiveness and ability to return to nuclear testing, if ever required.

3.7.2 Status of Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors

The Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors capability is heavily used to collect the data needed 

to assess NEP aging effects, to study and map hydrodynamic processes that occur in a weapon implosion, 

and to improve understanding of the thermonuclear burn and boost processes. Sustainment of 

DOE/NNSA’s ability to certify weapons without nuclear testing is highly dependent on continued 

improvements in advanced diagnostics and sensors, which will correspond with continued improvements 

Diagnostics for Hydrotests

Hydrotests performed at the DARHT 

facility mimic the implosion of a warhead 

primary in order to gather data to 

validate computational models. 

Diagnostic technologies developed for 

these hydrotests include stop-motion 

x-ray imaging capturing five images per 

test, as well as velocity measurements 

capturing millions of data points during 

the implosion. Development of DARHT’s 

accelerator and pulsed power 

technology started in the mid-1990s; the 

facility was completed in 2008. Through 

FY 2017, 62 hydrotests were performed 

at DARHT.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-16 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

and confidence in our Simulation Codes and Models capability. DOE/NNSA’s advanced diagnostic 

capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following: 

 The Cygnus Dual Beam Radiographic Facility at the Nevada National Security Site U1a Complex 

(U1a) provides flash radiography to measure the behavior of materials during subcritical 

experiments.

 High-resolution, high-speed x-ray imaging is used to measure fusing regions in NIF, Z, and Omega 

experiments.

 High-speed velocimetry measurements are used to measure combustion in high explosives (HE).

 Advanced neutron imaging and energy measurements are used measure nuclear reactions.

There is currently no DOE/NNSA facility that can adequately diagnose the high-density stages of plutonium

in subcritical experiments. DOE/NNSA is executing the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments 

(ECSE) program at the Nevada National Security Site to address this capability gap. 

3.7.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

There is a gap in the ability to measure state of 

plutonium in high density, high pressure 

conditions.

Develop and deploy enhanced (short, multi-pulse) radiographic imaging 

capabilities through ECSE, HED physics experimental efforts, and other 

planned capital investments.

Additional capability is needed to increase the

quantity and quality of data returned on each 

experiment. Capability gaps exist to:

– Verify survivability in currently inaccessible 

test environments;

– Increase amount of data that can be 

captured from a single experiment; and

– Improve fidelity of radiography data from 

experiments.

Strategies vary depending on testing site, but include:

– Develop high-fluence, burst neutron sources to enable enhanced 

diagnostic capabilities for survivability and radiography.

– Deploy Multiplexed Photon Doppler Velocimetry and laser optical 

ranging in multiple test and experiment facilities.

– Expand use of thick scintillator-based imaging of flash x-ray systems 

to image hydrodynamic tests.

– Execute National Diagnostics Plan for ICF to develop and deploy 

transformational diagnostics needed for HED experiments

Deliver higher fidelity experimental data for

development and subsequent calibration and 

validation of materials models, for weapons 

materials under extreme conditions.

Develop improved diagnostics capabilities to better capture 

temperature, phase, microstructure, and chemistry data for materials 

under extreme conditions.

3.8 Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments

This hydrodynamic and subcritical experiment capability is used to understand the behavior of imploding 

primaries without creating nuclear yield. Hydrodynamic experiments involve weapon-like geometries, 

but use surrogate, rather than fissile, material. The surrogate material replicates the behavior of the fissile 

material and provides data on implosion dynamics. Subcritical experiments involve fissile material driven 

by HE in a variety of configurations, some of which approximate those of a weapon. Because of the 

configurations and quantities of the fissile material and explosives present, these experiments never 

create self-sustaining nuclear chain reactions. It is this explicit combination of hydrodynamic testing with 

surrogate materials and subcritical experiments with plutonium that provides the breadth of validation 

data and the material properties required to build nuclear weapon design and safety simulation 

capabilities. These experiments, in turn, require advanced accelerators and diagnostics to fully execute 

and capture these data, which enable the use of modeling to certify weapons reliability and safety, rather 

than nuclear testing.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-17

This capability depends on a broad swath of other enterprise capabilities, including HPC; Simulation Codes 

and Models; Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors; Handling, Packaging, Processing and 

Manufacturing of Special Nuclear Materials; and a variety of specialized facilities for experimental 

execution, some of which include pulsed power and accelerator facilities. The most notable of these are 

U1a at the Nevada National Security Site (for subcritical experiments), DARHT at LANL, the Contained 

Firing Facility at LLNL, and several outdoor firing sites at LANL, LLNL, and the Nevada National Security 

Site.

3.8.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

DOE/NNSA’s Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments capability supplies data to weapon physicists and 

engineers, allowing assessment of potential impacts of design changes, material substitutions, or 

component changes associated with LEPs, alterations (Alts), or modifications (Mods) on weapon 

performance, safety and surety. Experiments are also used to assess the effects of component aging or 

defects identified during stockpile surveillances. The data obtained are used for the annual assessment 

process and certification decisions, as well as to advance nuclear weapon science, refine weapon 

computational models, develop emergency response tools, assess foreign and terrorist designs, gauge 

technological surprise, and develop the skills and experience of weapon designers and engineers.

The Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments capability was used in FY 2017 to inform direct stockpile 

work, weapon science, subcritical campaigns, and other national security needs. Experiments directly 

supporting the B61-12 LEP, W88 Alt 370 with conventional high explosive (CHE) refresh, W80-4 LEP

certification activities, and annual assessment improved the models underpinning DOE/NNSA’s

understanding of pit reuse and weapon safety. 

3.8.2 Status of Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments

The Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments capability is supported by several funding sources. The 

National Hydrodynamic Testing Complex supports base operations at the various facilities conducting

experiments for the National Hydrodynamic Test Plan, while the sponsors of the individual experiments 

(Experimental Science, Directed Stockpile Work [DSW], Nuclear Counterterrorism, or the like) provide 

experiment-specific support. As the facilities age, additional investments are required to maintain this 

capability, and the demand for higher cadence is stressing the workforce and specialized facilities that are 

operating at near capacity. 

3.8.3 Challenges and Strategies

The programs supported by the Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments capability require more testing 

opportunities. Many future experiments will require enhanced or novel diagnostic measurements to 

provide the data necessary to adequately characterize and constrain computational models. These

programmatic demands come with the imperative of ensuring that the capability manages the risks 

inherent in explosive testing to protect DOE/NNSA’s staff, the environment, and the public.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-18 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Existing subcritical experiments capabilities lack the ability to 

perform multi-frame penetrating radiographs on hydrodynamic 

experiments with plutonium pits. 

Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments 

program will close capability gaps in the mid-2020s. 

Existing subcritical experiments capability cannot measure 

reactivity of subcritical assemblies. 

The high-energy flash x-ray systems on DARHT Axis 1 and at the 

Contained Firing Facility are increasingly expensive to operate due 

to age and underlying technologies. 

Investigate replacing DARHT Axis 1 with an enhanced 

capability that will include a multi-frame capability. 

Throughput of experiments at DARHT depends on weather 

conditions. The original firing point was configured for outdoor 

testing and has not been modified to take full advantage of testing 

in vessels. Downtime affects staff safety, data quality, and the 

efficiency of facility operations, as well as the throughput of 

experiments. 

A weather enclosure for the DARHT firing point has 

been designed and is planned for construction in 

FY 2019-2020. In conjunction, the firing point will be 

reconfigured to improve staff safety and the 

operational efficiency of the facility, as well as to

enhance data quality. 

Aging infrastructure at firing sites, as well as the upstream and 

downstream facilities that support shots at the firing sites limits 

the potential cadence. 

Baseline capability investment is being developed to 

sustain and enhance hydrodynamic capabilities at 

firing sites.

Design, procurement and long-term acquisition and support of 

confinement vessels used for the Hydrodynamic and Subcritical 

Experiments capability at all firing facilities is a challenge because 

vessels are approaching lifetime limits. 

DOE/NNSA is establishing an enduring vessel 

procurement funding strategy with the intention to 

re-establish domestic fabrication and manufacturing 

capability for vessels. 

3.9 Chemistry

Chemistry is the study of the fundamental (or elemental) composition, structure, bonding, and properties 

of matter. Chemistry is essential for purifying, synthesizing, processing, and fabricating materials. The 

stability of these materials and how properties and reactivity of materials change with time must be 

understood to ensure the quality, performance, and safety of the stockpile.

This capability depends on the Materials Science and Engineering capability to address complex issues,

such as corrosion, that involve chemistry at a material’s surface and can have a significant effect on 

performance. 

3.9.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Chemistry capability, within the context of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, synthesizes and 

formulates new or replacement materials, characterizes the composition and structure of stockpile 

materials, and connects chemical signatures to service requirements. Chemistry capabilities cover all 

materials currently fielded or proposed for near-term LEPs, including organics, explosives, composites, 

plutonium, and uranium. 

3.9.2 Status of Chemistry

DOE/NNSA maintains the experimental and computational capabilities needed to inform the selection of 

materials for system design (LEPs) and modernization and to develop chemistry and physics-based models 

that describe and predict the behaviors of weapon materials over time. These capabilities provide the 

experimental data and essential chemistry knowledge required for annual assessments, certification of 

the stockpile, and future sustainment options. Capabilities are distributed across design and production 

facilities within the complex and include chemical synthesis, analytical chemistry, and surface science.

R&D is ongoing to support qualification of weapons, develop new materials, understand aging-related 

chemical changes, and control chemical environments over time.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-19

3.9.3 Challenges and Strategies

Chemistry capability challenges are focused on developing simulation tools and maturing this capability. 

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Chemistry models of aging materials do not include 

mesoscale phenomena, degradation of organics and 

energetics, and corrosion of metals.

Develop experiments, models, and databases needed to 

simulate effects of aging and manufacturing changes. 

New material formulations have not adequately 

matured to enable transfer to industry so commercial 

material sources can provide required materials.

Improve automated synthesis, analytical chemistry, and 

characterization processes to successfully transfer production 

of material sources to industry

A comprehensive suite of radiological facilities that can 

address the varied needs of the mission is lacking.

Develop and execute a sustainment plan to maintain required 

synthesis, analytical chemistry, and characterization facilities 

and expertise for the purpose of preserving applied chemistry 

and materials capabilities with a sustainable infrastructure.

3.10 High Explosives Science and Engineering

This capability conducts experiments and modeling activities to qualify and predict the behavior of 

explosives under a wide range of nuclear weapons operating conditions. These activities directly support 

stockpile stewardship of energetic materials through weapons assessments, stockpile maintenance, 

sustainment through LEPs, weapons surveillance, SFIs, and technical guidance for weapon dismantlement, 

as well as disposition activities. The work also involves a range of activities to understand the properties,

engineering, and physics performance of the energetic materials, explosive components, and warheadlevel assemblies.

The HE Science and Engineering capability incorporates a variety of physics, chemistry, materials science, 

and other disciplines to study the behavior of HE or more generally energetic materials through a 

comprehensive suite of experimental, theoretical, and computational research skills and highly trained 

personnel.

3.10.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The HE Science and Engineering capability contributes to the nuclear security enterprise by delivering HE 

materials that are used both in the NEP and in non-nuclear components for stockpile sustainment and 

modernization. 

3.10.2 Status of High Explosives Science and Engineering

DOE/NNSA has a broad legacy infrastructure that is used to formulate, process, and test both CHE and 

insensitive high explosive (IHE) materials. This infrastructure includes synthesis and characterization 

laboratories, fabrication operations, and an indoor and outdoor firing site capability. DOE/NNSA 

maintains these capabilities to support novel explosive material development, understand the effects of 

novel and traditional processing operations, and advance physics-based HE models. These models are 

used to predict explosive performance over a wide range of conditionsto provide the essential knowledge 

required for annual assessment, certification of the stockpile, LEPs, and future sustainment options. 

Experiments related to this capability are conducted at laboratory facilities across the DOE/NNSA 

complex.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-20 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.10.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Aging HE facilities across the complex require recapitalization, 

consolidation, and modernization to support LEP activities and 

emerging weapon program needs.

Develop and execute plans to ensure modernization of

HE/energetic materials design and production 

infrastructure to meet immediate programmatic needs, 

while maintaining the technological capacity to support 

the long-term HE mission.

Maintain production and processing capability for all CHE and 

IHE materials when critical ingredients associated with these 

materials are no longer commercially produced. 

Re-establish capability to manufacture and qualify IHE for 

LEPs. Working groups will be formed to address specific 

materials.

Stringent specifications and diversity of non-nuclear energetic 

materials do not provide economic incentives necessary for 

commercial vendors to improve existing processes. In 

addition, the number of commercial vendors has decreased. 

Collaborate with DOD and industrial partners to produce 

HE and preserve in-house production authority, such as 

for War Reserve detonator powder production. 

Acceptance of new HE materials and components for use in 

nuclear weapons lacks a uniform approach for accelerated 

certification.

Maintain timely delivery of HE materials and technologies 

to meet weapon program requirements and priorities by 

ensuring a ready science and engineering capability to 

develop and qualify materials. 

3.11 Materials Science and Engineering

In the context of the nuclear security enterprise, materials science is the characterization and 

understanding of how all the materials in a nuclear weapon system perform throughout the entire life

cycle. Materials engineering involves evaluation and selection of materials for performance in diverse 

and extreme environments. Strength, aging, compatibility, viability, and damage mechanisms are among 

the material characteristics to be understood. The Materials Science and Engineering capability plays a 

key role in resolving stockpile and production issues, validating computational models, and developing 

new materials (e.g., materials produced through additive manufacturing).

This capability within the nuclear security enterprise encompasses a broad array of Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities that include, but are not limited to, the following: 

 Achieving fundamental understanding of the properties and structure of materials.

 Behavior and performance of materials when processed or exposed to a range of conditions.

 Synthesis of new materials.

 Exploration of new materials for use in current and new applications to improve the cost and 

performance characteristics of products and systems in which they are used.

The Materials Science and Engineering capability is integral to all aspects of nuclear weapon research, 

design, development, test, processing, and manufacture, resulting in a strong interdependence with other 

Weapons Activities capabilities. 

3.11.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Materials Science and Engineering capability activities are key to the entire weapon life cycle, including 

such activities as basic characterization of material properties and the behaviors of properties under 

extreme conditions; model validation; selection of suitable materials to meet specifications; examining 

the effects of aging; and safe transport and disposal. This capability is important for both the NEP itself 

and for the non-nuclear components and systems that ensure the weapon will function as expected.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-21

3.11.2 Status of Material Science and Engineering

Materials science efforts across the nuclear security enterprise have yielded important results in the 

characterization of current stockpile materials under extreme conditions. This capability must now 

address the performance of the stockpile as material properties change due to aging of materials and 

modernized processes to produce those materials. This capability will require expanded experimental 

and computational investigations and strengthened partnerships between DOE/NNSA production and 

design agencies. To achieve these goals, efforts will focus on three aspects of this capability:

 Conducting R&D into innovative new materials for future insertion in weapons.

 Conducting R&D to characterize material behavior under extreme conditions for certification of 

weapons.

 Providing consistent, reliable support for early- and mid-career staff to develop the unique skills 

and understanding of materials uniquely required by the weapons program.

3.11.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Assess stockpile impacts of material changes due to aging, 

obsolescence, replacement for hazard mitigation, high cost 

and production modernization for NEP and non-NEP 

materials.

Expand experimental and computational abilities to study 

these material changes through design-production agency 

partnerships, as well as to rapidly identify and deliver 

solutions to emerging materials issues.

Aging equipment and facilities pose risk to the development 

of new materials, as well as to advanced evaluation and 

assessment of materials behavior, to support development, 

design, production, and surveillance activities. 

Execute capital reinvestment in key facilities and equipment 

for materials science and engineering capabilities to support 

nuclear weapons throughout their lifecycle.

3.12 Weapons Physics Design and Analysis

Design and analysis of the NEP is required to maintain existing U.S. nuclear weapons, modernize the 

stockpile, evaluate possible proliferant nuclear weapon designs, and respond to emerging threats, 

technological innovations, or surprises. Elements of this capability include concept exploration, 

satisfaction of specifications, conceptual design, detailed design and development, production process 

development, qualification and certification against requirements, as well as evaluation of weapons 

effects.

This capability uses scientific and technological advances from capabilities such as Simulation Codes and 

Models, Material Science and Engineering, Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments, HPC, HED Physics, 

and HE Science and Engineering in order to: (1) understand the impacts of materials behavior, including 

aging and remanufacture on weapon performance; (2) evaluate LEP design options; (3) enhance the 

weapons certification process; (4) refine computational tools and methods; (5) advance the physical 

understanding of surety mechanisms; (6) understand failure modes; (7) assess new manufacturing 

processes; (8) deliver design options to support future LEPs; and (9) provide rapid support to stockpile 

needs. This competency underpins DOE/NNSA’s capabilities in Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, 

and Integration; Environmental Effects Analysis; and Weapons Surety.

3.12.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapons Physics Design and Analysis capability is a key tool in the annual assessment of the U.S. 

nuclear weapons stockpile and the certification of warheads without resorting to nuclear testing. Several 

physics issues that are relevant to understanding the performance, safety, and reliability of the stockpile 

have been resolved in the past decade, including the Energy Balance, Primary Certification, and Secondary 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Certification milestones. The continued execution of current LEPs is enabled by this capability, which is

being extended to address evaluation of alternative materials and reuse of legacy components for current 

and future LEPs for the purpose of enabling a more rapid establishment of processes to produce materials 

and components.

3.12.2 Status of Weapons Physics Design and Analysis

The Weapons Physics Design and Analysis capability currently has the tools and methods to design and 

analyze NEPs, as well as certify future stockpile options with new safety and security features. The 

capability is sufficient to meet the present nuclear stockpile annual assessment process and the programs 

of record for modernization. 

DOE/NNSA’s present assessment capability is satisfactory for evaluating the current state of materials and 

components. However, it has not reached the state where entirely new issues can be analyzed 

responsively or with confidence. This is concerning because the complex’s ability to rebuild large numbers 

of stockpile units requires at least a decade to accomplish according to the planned LEP schedule. This 

slow response time could leave large holes in the enterprise’s deterrent capabilities if the enterprise does 

not become more flexible and agile in both assessment and production capabilities, as well as system 

capacity.

Similarly, should the requirements for DOE/NNSA’s current systems change in the future (in response to 

the changing threat environment or an inability to manufacture current materials going forward), the 

nuclear security enterprise’s design physics and analysis tools may require expanded predictive 

capabilities to certify systems that were never demonstrated through underground nuclear testing. 

A non-nuclear approach to integrated certification testing could become essential for future systems. 

Such approaches are being investigated through the Science Program by developing potential non-nuclear 

experimental capabilities and boost physics metrics that can quantify performance without an 

underground nuclear test. 

Recapitalization of existing scientific, technical, and engineering facilities and capabilities is needed in the 

near future so that execution of the LEP program of record can continue. Facilities and equipment 

throughout the complex are wearing out, failing, and increasingly delaying execution of the program. This

results in increased and unplanned costs.

3.12.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Developing and exercising design (rather than 

assessment) skills in physics, engineering, and 

chemistry and materials science personnel.

Short-term: Certification Readiness Exercises, Capabilities for Nuclear 

Intelligence Practicums, and other design studies.

Longer-term: Experience through the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review-tasked 

design studies and Stockpile Responsiveness Program exercises.

Developing and exercising certification 

methodologies using recently developed physics 

performance metrics on device designs that do 

not have underground test data.

Short-term: Development of metrics and the methodologies for applying 

them.

Longer-term: Execution of subcritical and HED experiments from which 

metrics can be extracted or validated.

Reuse design capability should new component 

production be unable to meet LEP 

requirements. The ability to simulate the effects 

of aging and manufacturing changes is limited.

Short-term: Reliance on current simulation capabilities (validated by AGEX) 

to model reuse design options. 

Longer-term: Development of certification methodologies for reuse and 

replacement designs. 

Agile and responsive design capabilities will be 

needed to mitigate emerging adversary threats 

to deterrence. 

Short-term: Reliance on current simulation capabilities (validated by 

experiments).

Longer-term: Development of design skills to take advantage of advanced 

manufacturing and testing capabilities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-23

3.13 Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration

The Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration capability relies heavily on weapon science 

and engineering capabilities, systems engineering tools (e.g., model-based design), and approaches to 

derive, analyze, and validate system requirements and perform system trades. Elements of this capability 

span the following life cycle phases: concept exploration, consideration of requirements, conceptual 

design, detailed design and development, production, qualification, and certification. This capability also 

includes understanding and developing the interfaces among the non-nuclear subsystems, between the 

non-nuclear components and the NEPs, and between the warhead and DOD delivery systems.

This capability is supported by and leverages other capabilities such as HE science and engineering;

weapons surety design and analysis for use in control component applications; weapon component and 

system prototyping to qualify new configurations and designs; simulation codes and modeling to quickly 

realize designs and promote innovation through rapid feedback; environmental effects analysis, testing, 

and integration to support design and qualify weapon components and systems; and HPC.

3.13.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration capability underpins DOE/NNSA’s ability to 

develop, test, qualify, and certify designs to support a responsive deterrent. This capability employs 

science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) methods to ensure that the integrated solution meets all 

performance, safety, security, and reliability requirements in the most effective manner. It is foundational

to all aspects of nuclear weapon research, design, development, test, and manufacture.

3.13.2 Status of Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration

Much of the Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration capability is being exercised by the

multiple concurrent LEPs and Alts, on top of the base workload, to sustain the existing stockpile. Because 

of the focus of these modernization activities is on extending the life of current stockpile weapons, there 

has been a decline in capabilities to develop new concepts that address military requirements that differ 

significantly from those addressed by current stockpile systems. This is expected to be addressed through 

the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to work on new concepts in concert with DOD, which will provide

relevant work to recruit, retain, and train the next generation of weapon designers.

3.13.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Traditional weapon development cycles are long, limiting the 

ability to respond in a timely manner to emerging threats. Rapid 

development and incorporation of emerging technologies into 

weapon systems presents both opportunities and risk in a 

stockpile that must be certified without nuclear testing and meet 

extended lifetime requirements.

Seek ways to accelerate the development cycle, respond 

more quickly to emerging threats, and invest in technology 

development and process improvements to increase the 

speed that weapon systems are updated and recertified.

Weapon design, engineering, and production requires use of new 

processes or materials (due to manufacturing availability). New 

processes or materials present certification and qualification 

challenges, especially as weapons design moves further away 

from the underground tested design.

Engage material science capability early in design process 

to inform process development and material choices. 

Perform system trade analyses to develop new materials 

that can support weapon life extensions.

Cold War-era facilities need to be refurbished and/or replaced to 

ensure a responsive and resilient capability.

Pursue facility recapitalization, as well as needed 

equipment replacements, through a carefully planned, 

prioritized, and executed investment program.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-24 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.14 Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering 

Sciences

The Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering Sciences capability encompasses analyzing 

and testing the effects of different environments on weapon systems and components using an array of 

engineering science test equipment, tools, and techniques. Examples of environments (normal,

abnormal, and hostile) include shock, vibration, radiation, 

acceleration, thermal, electromagnetic, and pressure. Examples 

of engineering sciences that support this analysis include 

radiation effects, thermal and fluid sciences, structural 

mechanics, dynamics, and aerodynamics.

Engineering sciences drive understanding and innovation by 

integrating theory, computational simulation, and experimental 

discovery and validation across length and timescales to 

understand and predict the behavior of complex physical 

phenomena and systems to meet national security missions.

This capability also requires a broad range of facilities and 

equipment to reproduce relevant environments (shock, 

vibration, temperature, g-loading, radiation, electro-magnetic 

pulse, aging), as well as the tools to conduct the tests and 

capture data that determines the response to those 

environments. This work is performed in specialized 

environmental chambers, blast tubes, centrifuges, wind tunnels, 

accelerators, reactors, and many specialized laboratory-scale 

facilities. 

Nuclear and non-nuclear component and system design, 

qualification, and certification depend on the Environmental 

Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering Sciences capability. 

Environmental tests supported by the HED Physics; Laser, Pulsed 

Power, and Accelerator Technology; Advanced Diagnostics and 

Sensors; Simulation Codes and Models; and HPC capabilities are 

foundational for every element of the nuclear weapons mission.

3.14.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapons Effects Analysis, Testing, and Engineering Sciences capability provides the fundamental, 

sustained engineering R&D for nuclear weapon design, qualification, certification, and assessment, as well 

as the ability to predict the response of weapon components and subsystems to aging and normal, 

abnormal, and hostile environments in several ways:

 Integrating theory development, experimental discovery and diagnostics, modeling, and 

underlying computational approaches to improve the ability to account for and predict complex 

behavior in engineered systems.

 Providing fundamental understanding of aging phenomena to support component lifetime 

assessments.

 Supporting development of advanced component and materials testing processes to ensure highlevel weapon reliability and certification.

Environmental Effects on Electronics

Radiation-hardened microelectronics used 

in warheads employ specialized designs 

and fabrication techniques developed by 

DOE/NNSA scientists and engineers. 

Researchers recently measured the 

impact of intense radiation on the W88 

Alt 370 electronics at DOE/NNSA 

radiation-effects test facilities. The tests 

provided data, gathered using advanced 

diagnostics and sensors, for validation of 

the models used to calculate the 

performance margins and uncertainties for 

the most sensitive circuit features. The 

calculations serve as an element in the 

qualification of the W88 Alt 370.

The Annular Core Research Reactor 

radiation-effects test facility.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-25

 Providing experimental capabilities, diagnostics, and data needed to discover physics for 

understanding component, subsystem, and weapon performance when subjected to STS

environment regimes.

 Providing tools and testing technologies necessary to ensure components and systems meet 

requirements in hostile environments.

3.14.2 Status of Environmental Effects Analysis, Testing, and 

Engineering Sciences

The major environmental test facilities are meeting current test needs for qualification and assessment. 

However, many are aging and beyond their design lives and are in need of major refurbishment over the 

next decade, especially considering the heavy demand imposed by multiple LEPs. The same is true for the 

programmatic equipment supporting the environmental test and engineering sciences facilities. 

Assuming the availability of investment funding, plans are in place to address these needs within the SSMP 

planning period. In addition, there is a need to enhance environmental testing capabilities in multiple 

combined environments such as combined radiation environments, combined radiation and 

mechanical/thermal environments, and combined thermal and mechanical (aerodynamic) environments 

without radiation. These additional capabilities in combined environments are driven by the emerging 

requirements of flight scenarios and associated adverse environments, which are either man-made or 

natural.

3.14.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Emerging and future requirements for certification of weapon 

systems are driving the need to provide more testing of 

components and systems in the combined radiation environments 

experienced by nuclear weapons during their anticipated life cycle. 

Plan facility and equipment investments to ensure 

continuity of this capability. Priority needs include a 

new capability for experiments and tests in combined 

nuclear environments. 

Ability to perform in situ experiments in combined mechanical, 

thermal, radiation and electromagnetic radiation environments.

Pursue enhanced combined hostile, normal, abnormal 

environment testing capabilities to meet evolving and 

future mission requirements.

Aging facilities, equipment, structures, and infrastructure that 

support this capability across the DOE/NNSA nuclear security 

enterprise are being degrading faster than anticipated.

Risk of single-point failure due to breakdown of programmatic 

equipment is increasing due to deferred maintenance and 

replacement of key equipment.

Plan for systematic recapitalization of programmatic 

capital equipment, test facilities, and infrastructure

will reduce the risk of the unavailability of test 

capabilities that could delay qualification and physics 

experiments. 

3.15 Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and 

Manufacturing

The Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and Manufacturing capability includes the development, 

analysis, integration, and manufacture of safety and use control systems to prevent accidental nuclear 

detonation and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, all of which are necessary to ensure a safe and 

secure stockpile. All aspects of this capability require strict classification control, as well as secure facilities 

and equipment to perform surety activities.

The Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and Manufacturing capability is integral to all aspects of 

nuclear weapon research, design, development, testing, processing and manufacture, resulting in a strong 

interdependence with other Weapons Activities capabilities.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-26 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.15.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and Manufacturing capability integrates ST&E to create 

surety components and system architectures that ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons 

throughout their lifecycle. For example:

 Consolidating multiple science and engineering disciplines and ensuring that emerging 

technologies (e.g., future safety mechanisms and next-generation use control technologies) meet 

specified design requirements. These activities are focused on development of future safety 

mechanisms and next-generation use control technologies. 

 Performing the Joint Integrated Lifecycle Surety (JILS) Assessment, a joint DOE/NNSA/DOD activity 

to examine the relative benefits of proposed surety technologies. JILS provides specific input to 

the Use Control Program Officers Group on the impact of proposed policy changes from a security 

perspective.

 Focusing Integrated Surety Architectures activities on improving DOE/NNSA transportation surety 

by integrating nuclear weapon shipping configurations with physical security elements.

3.15.2 Status of Weapons Surety Design, Testing, Analysis, and 

Manufacturing

A variety of surety technologies and approaches have been or are currently under development to 

improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Technologies that improve performance margins 

and reliability have recently been applied to stockpiled weapons. Additional technologies are under 

development to improve intrinsic surety and enable more optimally designed warheads for improved 

robustness, reliability, and performance. 

3.15.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Sustaining technology maturation activities of advanced 

and exploratory technology development in the area of 

surety.

Weapons surety can leverage planned investments in the 

Weapon Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration 

capability to ensure the ST&E base needed for maturing 

advanced technologies to increase weapons surety and 

reduce the risk associated with insertion of advanced 

technologies remains strong.

Continuously creating and evolving highly advanced surety 

technologies that are independent of specific weapon 

types or insertion opportunities and can result in major 

surety improvements.

Establish a balanced program for weapon surety within 

DOE/NNSA for creating and evolving highly advanced surety 

technologies that are independent of specific weapon types. 

3.16 Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics 

Design and Manufacturing

The Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics Design and Manufacturing

capability provides collocated research, development, and production to 

support the design, manufacturing, and testing of radiation-hardened 

microsystems that will function properly when exposed to intense 

radiation environments. The design of radiation-hardened components 

depends on environmental analysis, testing, and engineering sciences for 

validation.

The Radiation-Hard electronics

technology is designed to survive 

strategic levels of radiation.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-27

3.16.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Microsystems perform critical sensing, arming, fuzing, and firing (AF&F) functions to meet safety, security, 

and reliability requirements. A strategic radiation-hardened capability is critical to providing an effective, 

credible deterrent and to DOE/NNSA’s ability to build and certify weapons that can survive the hostile 

environments they might encounter during the STS. 

3.16.2 Status of Radiation-Hardened Microelectronics Design and 

Manufacturing

The Microsystems, Engineering, Science and Applications (MESA) facilities at SNL are DOE/NNSA’s only 

source of trusted, strategic radiation-hardened microsystems for the nuclear security enterprise. MESA 

has supported every LEP and major Alt since 2005. Over 27,000 War Reserve, diamond-stamped parts 

have been delivered to date for the current programs, with a total of over 179,000 parts scheduled to be 

delivered through FY 2026, of which more than 13,000 parts are to be delivered for the W80-4 LEP. MESA 

continues to produce radiation-hardened microelectronics for stockpile modernization. MESA’s Silicon 

Fabrication facility (SiFab) was commissioned in 1988 and is currently 5 years beyond the intended 25-year 

design life. In FY 2019, SiFab will complete its Sandia Silicon Fabrication Revitalization program, which

provides the needed tools and infrastructure updates necessary for delivery of War Reserve-qualified 

parts for the B61-12 LEP. However, ongoing investments in infrastructure and tools to support the MESA 

complex (SiFab, the Microsystem Fabrication facility [MicroFab], and utility buildings) and supporting 

capabilities (packaging and test, validation and failure analysis, and quality) are required. These 

investments must be sustained to ensure this capability is well positioned to continue to provide key 

technologies to meet planned LEPs and evolving national security needs for strategic radiation-hardened 

microsystems beyond 2025. Without sustained investment and eventual large-scale recapitalization, the 

MESA complex will experience failures due to aging and will become obsolete. Planning is underway for 

a long-term sustainment of MESA.

To ensure SiFab sustainability for the near term, MESA will convert existing wafer processing tools from a 

6-inch wafer capability to a more widely supported 8-inch wafer capability. This conversion addresses 

risks to the supply chain (e.g., where a majority of SiFab tools have either marginal support or no 6-inch 

parts are available). MESA’s 8-inch conversion schedule supports the nuclear deterrent program 

schedule. 

3.16.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Research, develop and deliver advanced radiationhardened microsystem technologies that meet 

current and emerging requirements to ensure an 

effective nuclear deterrent. 

Complete MESA’s SiFab conversion of wafer processing tools from 

6-inch to more supportable 8-inch per plan. Develop a long-term 

executable plan that identifies annual investments required for the 

following:

 Targeted R&D and technology maturation programs for 

producing future radiation-hardened microelectronics.

 Infrastructure, tools, and supporting capabilities (SiFab, 

MicroFab, utility buildings, packaging and testing).

Replace unsupportable or obsolete tools with more 

modern, sophisticated, and capable tooling that

cannot be supported by the current infrastructure.

Assess critical tool replacement requirements against existing 

infrastructure over a planning period. Pursue a flexible facility 

solution for housing future-generation tools and capabilities.

Continue to maintain a stable and competent 

workforce during low production demands due to 

conversion efforts as new processes are certified. 

Execute to a resource loaded schedule, while monitoring identified 

risk areas.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-28 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.17 Weapon Component and System Prototyping

The Weapon Component and System Prototyping capability develops, 

qualifies, and manufactures high-fidelity, full-scale prototype weapon 

components and systems to reduce the cost and cycle times required 

to develop modern designs and technologies prior to producing a 

component. This capability includes the ability to design, manufacture, 

and employ mock-ups with sensors to support laboratory and flight 

tests that will provide evidence that a component can function with 

DOD delivery systems in realistic environments. Identifying, 

developing and sustaining process expertise and prototyping is crucial 

to scientific understanding, production agility, responsiveness, and 

efficiency in the ever-changing threat environment.

Prototyping capabilities are used to develop, fabricate, produce, and qualify designs and are 

interdependent with several other Weapon Activities capabilities, most notably Radiation-Hardened 

Microelectronics Design and Manufacture, Simulation Codes and Models, and Advanced Manufacturing,

to achieve efficient, cost-effective final design hardware. This

capability is also interdependent with the Handling, Packaging, 

Processing, and Manufacturing of Energetic and Hazardous Material;

Metal and Organic Material Fabrication; Non-Nuclear Weapon 

Component Manufacturing and Assembly; Handling, Packaging, 

Processing, and Manufacturing of Special Nuclear Material; and HE 

Science and Engineering capabilities.

The High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test (HOT SHOT) 

program will provide a lower-cost alternative to conventional flight 

tests, with the ability to duplicate many of the integrated reentry 

vehicle environments needed to qualify components, technologies,

and subsystems. HOT SHOT activities are focused on maturing the next 

generation of innovative concepts and technologies through a series 

of tests and analyses to significantly increase data supporting future 

stockpile insertions. 

3.17.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security 

Enterprise Goals

To qualify components and systems, DOE/NNSA requires capabilities 

to provide rapid development cycles enabled by modular systems, 

rapid prototyping, and integrated simulation. The ability to realize 

designs quickly will promote innovation as risks and barriers to 

participation are lowered through rapid feedback. 

3.17.2 Status of Weapon Component and 

System Prototyping

Many weapon components in today’s systems use legacy technologies 

that are decades old and have not been commercially supported for 

many years. Future LEPs must address new safety, security, and performance requirements that are not 

achievable or provided in many older designs because of technology limitations and/or component size 

Additive manufacturing room

and full-scale B61 mock-up

High Operational Tempo Sounding 

Rocket Flight Test (HOT SHOT) 

Launch

The first HOT SHOT from the Kauai 

Test Facility in Hawaii in May 2018 

supported seven experiments on 

component technologies, additive 

manufacturing processes, model 

validation, and data communications. 

The HOT SHOT program provides an 

agile, risk-tolerant technology 

maturation platform to deepen 

scientific understanding by testing in 

relevant environments at a lower cost 

than operational system flight tests.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-29

and weight restrictions. These issues drive the need to refresh designs continuously to address technology 

obsolescence, end-of-life or aging concerns, and changing requirements. 

3.17.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

New capabilities, such as modularity, foundation bus 

connectivity, and rapid product realization, have not 

been evaluated in relevant environments. This poses 

a risk to insertion into future systems.

Provide a high-tempo flight test capability to drive innovative design 

practices and allow new technologies to gain the necessary flight 

pedigree to ensure low risk in a systems context.

Current processes and capabilities are inadequate for 

fast design, production, testing, and qualification of 

new equipment and technologies.

Pursue advanced manufacturing technologies that enable costeffective, rapid-prototype iteration and faster transition from design 

to production, as well as understanding and assuring the properties 

and performance of additive manufacturing materials and 

components.

Aging infrastructure and legacy processes increase risk 

to meeting the mission due to inability to be 

economically and rapidly modified for new 

technologies.

Develop a business model that includes proactive maintenance and 

upgrades for sustaining facilities and infrastructure, to include an 

approach for managing substandard facilities that house critical 

functions or operations.

Resources required to meet stockpile modernization 

commitments have driven significant investment 

reductions in equipment, infrastructure, and facilities. 

This has reduced the ability to innovate for the future.

Establish joint projects and milestones between multiple sites, 

programs, and agencies to enable early prototyping and technology 

development and maturation. This approach will facilitate a 

collaborative scope, joint priorities, and combining of resources.

3.18 Advanced Manufacturing

The Advanced Manufacturing capability develops, demonstrates, and transitions improved production 

processes (including tools, fixtures, parts, and materials) to ensure the safety, security, and performance 

of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This capability enables the nuclear security enterprise to respond to 

emerging issues with the current stockpile and adapt new processes for follow-on use to gain production 

efficiencies. The term advanced manufacturing can encompass a broad range of technologies, such as 

robotics, artificial intelligence, HPC, etc. Within DOE/NNSA, the predominant focus is currently on additive 

manufacturing, which is sometimes called three-dimensional (3D) printing. All future non-nuclear 

component production activities will depend on this emerging capability to achieve efficiencies of time 

and cost, while also enabling greater agility across the nuclear security enterprise.

The Advanced Manufacturing capability relates most closely to the Non-Nuclear Weapon Component 

Manufacturing and Assembly, Weapon Component and System Prototyping, and Weapon Component 

and Material Process Development capabilities.

3.18.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Additive manufacturing is required for DOE/NNSA‘s ability to support current and long-term stockpile 

stewardship needs due to the obsolescence of certain manufacturing technologies and materials that are 

used to produce nuclear weapons. Additive manufacturing is also essential to reducing the long 

development times and high costs that are currently associated with stockpile systems (times and costs 

that are unlikely to be acceptable in the future).

Additive manufacturing is already being used to reduce time and costsfor non-stockpile applications, such 

as development hardware, tooling, models, mock-ups, training aids, etc. Estimated savings are already 

on the order of millions of dollars per year. As use of additive manufacturing increases, this capability will

significantly reduce cost and schedule risks by providing a more versatile and agile manufacturing 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-30 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

capability for both development and production builds. This capability will substantially reduce the time 

and costs for small-lot development builds, as well as enable rapid cycles of learning to reduce risk and 

create more optimized final designs. As experience and confidence in this emerging technology increase, 

much greater savings will be realized for stockpile production hardware.

Additive manufacturing will also provide exceptional control during production by keeping a greater 

portion of the production process in-house, thereby reducing the risks associated with reliance on unduly 

inefficient or intermittently unavailable suppliers. This control enables DOE/NNSA to meet DOD

requirements while enhancing safety and security and remaining responsive to evolving national security 

requirements. 

Additive manufacturing enables new design possibilities that may be used to great advantage in future 

systems (e.g., shapes that are impossible or impractical to manufacture with traditional methods) or

smooth transitions (graded material interfaces between dissimilar materials) to address issues such as 

thermal expansion mismatch. 3D printing of electrical and electronic components,such as sensors, power 

sources, etc., may also create new design alternatives for future systems, especially modular and selfaware systems.

3.18.2 Status of Advanced Manufacturing

All of the DOE/NNSA sites are working collectively to rapidly advance additive manufacturing technology 

for nuclear deterrence applications. DOE/NNSA has established a multi-site Additive Manufacturing 

Coordinating Team to assure coordination of activities across the enterprise. However, additive 

manufacturing is still an emerging technology that urgently requires additional scientific understanding 

and development to achieve the high level of rigor required for many stockpile applications. There are a 

few low-risk additive manufacturing parts under strong consideration for current LEPs; however, 

additional work will be needed to gain the confidence required to apply additive manufacturing to more 

critical weapon applications. 

Continued investments in process and materials R&D, equipment, and infrastructure are essential if 

additive manufacturing is to be advanced as a capability and broadly implemented for nuclear weapon

development and production. The resulting benefits in agility, cost, and time savings will pay strong 

dividends on the investments to mature this critical technology.

3.18.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

There is currently no reliable, cost effective, means to certify 

additive manufacturing production parts. 

DOE/NNSA will task the Additive Manufacturing Coordination 

Team to develop a qualification and certification framework 

that can be applied to multiple additive manufacturing 

processes.

Advance the development of next generation additive 

manufacturing technology for weapon production.

The swiftly changing nature of the capability causes a rapid 

rate of obsolescence of equipment.

Develop an acquisition strategy to regularly procure 

equipment for this emerging capability.

There is insufficient dedicated space for additive 

manufacturing development activities. New additive 

manufacturing technologies will compete for floor space 

now being occupied by equipment sustaining older, sunset 

technologies.

Complete setup of an Advanced Manufacturing Facility at 

KCNSC. Pursue space options at other sites as needs arise 

and capability needs increase.

The current lead time to assess new manufacturing 

technologies for the stockpile is 7–10 years.

Apply principles of accelerated cycles of learning to emerging 

additive manufacturing processes and materials to reduce 

lead times.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-31

3.19 Weapon Component and Material Process Development

The Weapon Component and Material Process Development capability is focused on research,

development, engineering, and integration of technologies into production operations to improve cycle 

time, cost, safety, security, reliability, and performance. This process entails improving required 

manufacturing, scientific, and engineering capabilities while providing DOE/NNSA with cost-effective 

production processes that reduce risks for future weapons systems. Development of these technologies 

is subject to a technology readiness level and manufacturing readiness level assessment process.

The Weapon Component and Material Process Development capability is integral to all aspects of nuclear 

weapon research, design, development, testing, processing and manufacture, resulting in a strong 

interdependence with other Weapons Activities capabilities.

3.19.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapon Component and Material Process Development capability develops innovative 

manufacturing processes necessary to replace sunset technologies, upgrade existing technologies, and 

introduce future technologies to support maintaining the 

safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. It also 

provides improvements in technology and new manufacturing 

techniques to lessen schedule and cost risks in future 

applications.

3.19.2 Status of Weapon Component and 

Material Process Development

Programs associated with the Weapon Component and 

Material Process Development capability continue to develop 

and improve multi-system component and manufacturing 

processes to avoid costs and reduce schedule risk for the 

nuclear security enterprise. Work scopes focus on the 

following areas: 

 Replacing aging and obsolete manufacturing and 

inspection processes by incorporating digital and 

advanced manufacturing on the production line.

 Advancing the development of hardware, materials, 

equipment, and development processes, as well as

demonstrating that technology or manufacturing 

readiness levels are sufficient to transition to a 

program of record.

 Conducting studies that identify options for advanced 

capabilities and replacement of sunset technologies 

affecting the enduring and future stockpile.

 Investigating options for limited life components 

(LLCs) and other replacement components.

Finding Better Processes

DOE/NNSA engineers and developers are 

constantly seeking better manufacturing 

processes to meet national security mission 

demands. For example, cellular silicone is 

used in stockpile applications, but the 

peroxide used to cure cellular silicone has not 

been commercially available since 2001 due 

to significant safety concerns associated with 

the traditional production process. 

DOE/NNSA engineers recently developed a 

method to safely manufacture this silicone 

material using microreactor technology. 

Because the peroxide curing agent is 

produced on-demand and in small quantities, 

it is inherently safe. This new process was 

rapidly transferred from R&D to full-scale 

production. The process is being used to 

produce development parts and will be used 

to produce W80-4 parts. This microreactor 

silicon manufacturing process mitigates a 

critical material supply risk and is expected to 

save over $1 million.

Micromixer chip for rapid mixing

in the microreactor.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-32 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.19.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Limited opportunities to insert refurbished and new parts 

into the stockpile due to the 7-10 years of development 

before the start of Alts and LEPs.

Develop more opportunities to insert refurbished and new 

parts prior to the start of Alts and LEPs.

The supply chain for current materials, such as magnesium 

oxide for thermal batteries or polymers, is becoming 

obsolete.

Develop in-house capabilities to produce the needed 

materials.

Aging facilities are beyond expected life. Facilities are 

degrading faster than anticipated due to multiple LEP and 

Alt workloads.

Develop new and improved manufacturing processes that 

have smaller footprints, reduce cost and cycle time, and 

increase throughput and capacity.

3.20 Handling, Packaging, Processing and Manufacturing of 

Energetic and Hazardous Materials

The Handling, Packaging, Processing, and Manufacturing of 

Energetic and Hazardous Materials capability includes the 

means to safely and securely handle, package, process, 

manufacture, and inspect products made from energetic and 

hazardous materials. Hazardous materials (e.g., lithium, 

beryllium, mercury) have the potential to harm humans, 

animals, or the environment. Energetic materials (e.g., 

explosives and propellants) and hazardous materials require 

special conduct of operations, containment equipment, and 

facilities to handle, process, or manufacture products from 

these materials. Across the nuclear security enterprise, 

DOE/NNSA laboratories and production sites handle energetic 

and hazardous material as a part of the nuclear weapon 

sustainment and LEP missions.

The Handling, Packaging, Processing, and Manufacturing of Energetic and Hazardous Materials capability

is required to support Defense Programs’ goals of executing DOE/NNSA’s weapon component life 

extension, dismantlement, and surveillance (including core surveillance and joint test assembly [JTA]

production) missions. 

3.20.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Hazardous and energetic materials are used both in the processes to produce weapon systems and in the 

weapon systems themselves. Across the complex, the Handling, Packaging, Processing, and 

Manufacturing of Energetic and Hazardous Material capability expands capacity through recapitalizing

space and equipment, increases efficiency through process refinement, and addresses an increasing 

workload by taking advantage of advanced manufacturing initiatives, consolidating activities into modern 

facilities, and recapitalizing where facility upgrades are not immediately anticipated. Recapitalization of 

facilities and equipment reduces maintenance downtime and repeated work, increases staging capacity,

and allows better management of the workload.

Replacing 1940s era Facilities at Pantex

Many buildings, across the complex, date 

back to the Manhattan Project. Two major 

proposed projects at Pantex, the High 

Explosive Formulation facility and 

Laboratory Replacement Facility, will 

replace buildings that have served the 

complex since before the successful Trinity 

test in 1945. The proposed High Explosive 

Formulation facility will replace around eight 

buildings with original construction dates 

ranging from 1942 to 1966.

Replacing 1940s-Era Facilities at Pantex

Many buildings across the complex date 

back to the Manhattan Project. Two major 

proposed projects at Pantex, the High 

Explosive Formulation facility and 

Laboratory Replacement facility, would 

replace buildings that have served the 

complex since before the successful Trinity 

test in 1945. Requirements are being 

formulated for the proposed High Explosive 

Formulation facility and it could replace up 

to eight buildings with original construction 

dates ranging from 1942 to 1966.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-33

3.20.2 Status of Handling, Packaging, Processing, and Manufacturing of 

Energetic and Hazardous Materials

The equipment used to support this capability has many single points of failure due to the unique and 

complex nature of the equipment. Energetic and hazardous material equipment is maintained through 

rigorous corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance, and calibrations. Programmatic supporting 

equipment and infrastructure need upgrades. Replacements and upgrades are ongoing to address the 

most critical needs to continue supporting mission deliverables. 

Handling of hazardous components requires personnel with extensive training and a focus on safe 

operations. Rates of retirement, retention, and the length of the clearance process for employees create 

risks to this capability across the nuclear security enterprise. Due to increased workload demands and 

staff attrition, some activities within this capability have a workforce that is relatively new to the job.

3.20.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Maintaining aging equipment until upgrades or 

replacements can be executed.

Maintenance, Operations, and Stockpile Services funding helps 

keep aging equipment available for LEPs and current stockpile 

systems. In cases where manufacturers cannot support activities 

(due to part or manufacturer obsolescence), creative methods for 

procurement have involved using the additive manufacturing 

capability to manufacture parts, etc.

Avoiding loss of subject matter experts in key areas. National security laboratories and nuclear weapons production 

sites, anticipating multi-year training and clearance requirements, 

have increased hiring and are working to pass on knowledge from 

subject matter experts near retirement age. Knowledge from 

subject matter experts is also being captured through 

documentation programs targeting critical knowledge areas.

Vended components are impacting mission schedules 

due to difficulty in maintaining qualified vendors for 

quality and Nuclear Enterprise Assurance 

complexities.

DOE/NNSA is working toward establishing clear requirements for 

Nuclear Enterprise Assurance and, when necessary, looking to 

bring capabilities that are putting mission schedules at risk back 

into the core complex.

Continuing operations in aging facilities with 

increasing safety, security, and environmental 

requirements and maintaining them until their 

transition to newly deployed facilities.

Sites and programs are working together to make short-to 

medium-term recapitalization investments where reasonable and

to find creative solutions to maintain facilities past their useful life. 

3.20.4 Lithium

3.20.4.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

DOE/NNSA uses lithium to manufacture nuclear weapon components. DOE/NNSA also supplies lithium 

materials to the Tritium Sustainment Program (for the production of tritium-producing burnable absorber 

rods [TPBARs]), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOE’s Office of Science. 

3.20.4.2 Status of Lithium

DOE/NNSA’s lithium work is performed at Y-12 in a Manhattan Project-era facility that has experienced 

accelerated degradation due to the use of hazardous chemical production process equipment that is often 

at its end of life. The process equipment is well past its end of life. Most of the operating equipment was 

installed in the 1980s, and the purification equipment was shuttered in 2013 due to increased 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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maintenance costs and decreased reliability. The program currently relies on a material recycle process 

that includes surface cleaning of qualified material prior to its use in the production process.

DOE/NNSA will maintain and restart required lithium capabilities to support Defense Programs 

requirements until the new lithium production capability is online. This includes recapitalization of 

needed infrastructure and process equipment, continuous management of the supply and demand signal, 

and maturation of technologies to make lithium processing safer and more efficient.

3.20.4.3 Challenges and Strategies

A Lithium Bridging Strategy has been developed to identify how major challenges will be addressed. 

Implementation plans are being developed to determine more specific actions necessary.

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

The Lithium Bridging Strategy depends on lithium 

technology development work in Building 9202.

DOE/NNSA will develop and mature lithium production 

technologies to introduce efficiencies into the current 

process and prepare for insertion of these new technologies 

into the lithium production capability.

The Lithium Bridging Strategy also depends on the ability of 

Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition to dismantle 

weapons systems to provide needed lithium materials for 

LEPs.

A few processes will be restarted in the existing lithium 

processing facility in the near term to provide additional 

feedstock material. In addition, a new material recycle 

cleaning station is being deployed to provide additional 

recycling capacity. 

3.21 Handling, Packaging, Processing, and Manufacturing of 

Special Nuclear Materials

Special nuclear material (SNM) is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as all isotopes of plutonium, 

uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235. Plutonium and enriched 

uranium operations are central to supporting the DOE/NNSA mission pillars of maintaining a safe, secure,

and effective nuclear deterrent and providing operational support for the naval nuclear propulsion plants. 

Accomplishing these missions requires the ability to handle, package, process, manufacture, and inspect 

SNM-based products. This capability spans a number facilities and programs across the nuclear security 

enterprise. A common obstacle is the need to refurbish or replace the aging and obsolete facilities in 

which these and other strategic materials are handled. The strategies presented below for the overall 

capability are organized by the individual materials and supporting programs. The following sections also 

outline solutions or bridging strategies to address and manage implementation of capability investments

for each type of SNM.

3.21.1 Plutonium

3.21.1.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Manufacture and surveillance of pits and other plutonium components, as well as experiments and 

analysis of plutonium alloys, occur primarily at LANL’s Plutonium Facility (PF-4). SNL, LLNL, Pantex, and 

the Nevada National Security Site also provide the necessary expertise, capabilities, and facilities to 

support DOE/NNSA’s defense-related plutonium missions.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-35

3.21.1.2 Status of Plutonium

The use of plutonium requires proper storage facilities, safe and secure disposal pathways, unique 

equipment and facilities for R&D activities, and modern plutonium pit production capabilities. Almost all 

plutonium processing for the nuclear weapons program (i.e., recovery, characterization, component 

fabrication, nondestructive analysis, and surveillance), as well as basic applied research on plutonium, is 

conducted in LANL’s TA-55. PF-4 within TA-55 is a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility and is the only

DOE/NNSA facility that is currently authorized to produce pits for the enduring stockpile. DOE/NNSA 

continues to invest in PF-4 to establish an enduring 30-pits-per-year production capability by FY 2026, and 

to maintain LANL as the Nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence for Research and Development. Meeting

future production requirements requires an additional high-hazard, high-security footprint to produce an 

additional 50 pits per year, for an ultimate long-term sustained production level of at least 80 pits per year 

in 2030.

An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) completed in September 2017 identified LANL and SRS as two alternative 

locations to accomplish this enduring mission. To further inform the identification of a preferred 

alternative, NNSA completed an engineering assessment and workforce analysis in May 2018. The 

engineering assessment and AoA provided analysis related to cost, schedule, risk, and feasibility for the 

alternatives. The workforce analysis examined workforce and staffing environments at SRS and LANL and 

found that both localities demonstrate the ability to meet future staffing requirements for plutonium pit 

production. 

On May 10, 2018, the Administrator informed Congress that NNSA’s recommended alternative is to 

repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at SRS for production of 50 War Reserve 

plutonium pits per year in 2030, while maximizing pit production at LANL to produce at least 30 pits per 

year by 2026. This alternative is the optimal path forward to meet pit production requirements while 

managing the risks and costs associated with increasing production rates and maintaining existing 

plutonium operations at LANL. A conceptual design for repurposing MFFF will be used to develop CD-1 

for the Deputy Secretary’s final review and decision.

DOE/NNSA continues to invest in facilities and equipment (i.e., acquire, install, configure and authorize 

equipment for operation) to replace an aging base capability to manufacture and certify pits. Through a 

series of TA-55 Reinvestment Projects (TRP I, TRP II, and TRP III), DOE/NNSA has addressed PF-4’s aging 

infrastructure and systems. Additionally, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project 

maintains continuity in analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities by transitioning 

these activities from the Cold War-era Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility to newer facilities. The 

first two subprojects have approved baselines and are on schedule to be completed in 2022.

The largest portion of the U.S. weapons-usable plutonium inventory is in the form of retired pits. 

DOE/NNSA continues to execute a strategy to repurpose and reconfigure nuclear material bays to stage 

the pits recovered from dismantlement, surveillance, and disassembly for LEP weapons to address pit 

staging capacity at Pantex until a long-term staging facility is available. Additionally, the LANL and LLNL 

national security laboratories continue to direct pit surveillance to be conducted annually at LANL, Pantex, 

the Nevada National Security Site, and LLNL. DOE/NNSA continues to invest in additional pit 

nondestructive evaluation throughput capacity (e.g., the Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and 

Imaging System [CoLOSSIS] II and the Laser Gas Sampling Station II) to collect sufficient pit surveillance 

data to support the laboratories’ annual assessment report.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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3.21.1.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Additional Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility space will be 

required to manufacture at least 80 pits per year. Acquiring 

the necessary facility and transitioning and operating at full 

capacity will pose several integration and schedule 

challenges.

NNSA’s recommended alternative is to repurpose the SRS’s 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to produce 50 War 

Reserve plutonium pits per year in 2030. Concurrently, 

NNSA will continue to invest in LANL to produce an enduring 

30 War Reserve pits per year in 2026.

The staging capacity at Pantex is projected to become 

inadequate within the next decade as more weapons are 

dismantled, creating additional operational inefficiencies 

involving required movements of these items.

To address long-term pit staging capacity at Pantex, a new 

Material Staging Facility at Pantex is being planned. CD-0

(Mission Need) for the facility was completed in FY 2015.

Continued management of transuranic (TRU) waste 

generated from de-inventory of the PF-4 vault and Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research directly, is critical to avoid imposing

an operational constraint on plutonium programs throughout 

the nuclear security enterprise. Startup of LANL’s TRU Waste 

Facility is essential to provide waste staging capacity until the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) begins accepting full 

shipments from LANL.

LANL continues to manage TRU waste, which reduces the 

operational risk to plutonium programs. LANL has 

developed a strategic plan for the management of newly 

generated TRU waste until WIPP is fully operational. 

Additionally, startup of and continued shipments to LANL’s 

TRU Waste Facility will help maintain adequate TRU waste 

storage at LANL for nuclear mission work until WIPP 

shipments fully resume. 

The only pit production workforce capability in the Nation 

currently exists at LANL. 

LANL has developed a plan to acquire, train, and retain staff 

to support the 30-pits-per-year production mission. Training 

of the initial SRS personnel to support 50 pits per year will 

be accomplished during production at PF-4 with LANL 

personnel.

The long-term supply of plutonium-238 will be insufficient to 

meet the Nation’s needs for use by Defense Programs, the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other 

Government agencies. 

NNSA is investigating preliminary options to establish a

domestic capability to produce new plutonium-238.

3.21.2 Uranium

3.21.2.1 Highly Enriched Uranium

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is uranium in which the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium-235 

is increased to 20 percent or greater.

Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Uranium is a strategic national defense asset with different assays and enrichments (depleted uranium, 

low-enriched uranium, and HEU) being used in a wide variety of applications, including weapon 

components, naval reactors, and fuel in commercial power reactors for the production of tritium.

Status of Highly Enriched Uranium

The primary production infrastructure to process and store uranium is at Y-12; R&D capabilities are 

located at LANL and LLNL. Y-12’s Building 9212 is over 70 years old, contains the most hazardous enriched 

uranium operations, and does not meet modern nuclear safety and security standards. DOE/NNSA is 

phasing out mission dependency on Building 9212 through a series of enriched uranium capability 

relocations into existing facilities at Y-12, as well as the Uranium Processing Facility when completed. To 

successfully execute this transition, new technologies will be deployed, and existing processes will be 

simplified or eliminated to increase the overall safety and efficiency of enriched uranium operations. 

During this transition period, material risk reduction efforts will continue.
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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-37

Infrastructure investment in Buildings 9215 and 9204-2E is integral to the overall strategy. These two 

buildings were constructed in the 1950s and late 1960s, respectively, and their construction predates 

many of the modern safety standards applicable to nuclear facilities. The infrastructures and 

programmatic equipment in both buildings are degrading due to age and condition, and replacement 

facilities are not planned for several decades. Both the machining operations provided in Building 9215 

and the assembly and disassembly operations occurring in Building 9204-2E must safely continue with 

high reliability through the 2040s. The Plant Laboratory, Building 9995, was built in the 1950s to support 

operations in Building 9212. This facility provides chemical analysis for the entire site. The infrastructure 

and analytical chemistry capabilities in Building 9995 also require additional investments to continue to 

support the mission.

The Uranium Processing Facility will provide new floor space for the high-hazard, high-security operations 

in Building 9212 that are not suitable to relocate to existing facilities. Completion and startup of the 

Uranium Processing Facility will enable DOE/NNSA to fully phase out mission dependency on 

Building 9212. 

3.21.3 Challenges and Strategies

A Uranium Mission Strategy has been developed to identify how challenges will be addressed. 

Implementation plans are being developed to determine specific actions necessary. 

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Transition enriched uranium capabilities into existing 

and new-build facilities to phase out mission 

dependency on Building 9212. 

Implement the Building 9212 Exit Strategy, which entails complex 

activities to shut down Building 9212 production processes, drain 

and isolate systems, and facilitate post-operations clean-out of the 

facility.

Extend the operational lifetime of existing enriched 

uranium processing facilities (Buildings 9215, and 

9204-2E and the Plant Laboratory in Building 9995).

Sustain existing enriched uranium capabilities through enhanced 

equipment maintenance and the purchase of critical spare parts to 

improve the availability and reliability of production systems. 

Current extended life programs investments focus on electrical 

modernization in 9204-2E and 9215.

Construct the Uranium Processing Facility to house 

processes currently performed in Building 9212 that 

cannot be transferred to another operating facility.

Capability relocations into existing facilities are executed through 

the Process Technology Development projects (i.e., Electro Refining, 

Calciner, Chip Processing/Direct Chip Melt, and 2MeV Radiography). 

The Uranium Processing Facility will provide new floor space for the 

high-hazard, high-security operations in Building 9212 that are not 

suitable to relocate to existing facilities.

Maintain subject matter expertise at the national 

laboratories in base R&D capabilities to support HEU

production.

Continue two-way communications between the nuclear weapon 

production facilities and the national security laboratories. The 

laboratories will determine a path forward to provide the expertise 

necessary to meet production needs and recommend 

improvements that can be applied to HEU production.

3.21.3.1 Domestic Uranium Enrichment

Enriched uranium contains higher concentrations of the fissile uranium-235 isotope than natural uranium. 

Enriched uranium is required at various levels of enrichment and forms for national security and 

nonproliferation missions, including, but not limited to nuclear weapon components, Naval Reactors, 

power reactor fuel for tritium production, research reactors, and medical isotope production. NNSA is 

currently conducting an AoA to determine how best to meet the mission need for enriched uranium.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

A domestic uranium enrichment capability provides a reliable supply of enriched uranium to support the 

tritium production, nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors missions.

Status of Domestic Uranium Enrichment

The United States currently has no domestic uranium enrichment capability. Mission needs for enriched 

uranium are currently fulfilled using the United States’ remaining HEU stockpile, which is a finite source. 

DOE/NNSA is funding a down-blending campaign to extend the need date for low-enriched uranium fuel 

for tritium production to 2038-2041. Current HEU inventories are anticipated to supply Naval Reactors 

through the 2050s. In support of the domestic uranium enrichment program, DOE/NNSA is funding two

separate centrifuge R&D programs at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The first is the continued 

development of Centrus Energy Corporation’s AC100 centrifuge; the second is a smaller alternative 

designed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The Domestic Uranium Enrichment program established CD-0

(Mission Need), for re-establishment of a domestic uranium enrichment capability and has initiated an 

AoA. The capability will be established in time to meet the 2038 need for tritium production.

Challenges and Strategies to Address Them

The capability to enrich uranium faces manageable challenges. The table below captures some of the 

major challenges and the activities to address them.

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Only one down-blender is operational for national security 

purposes, and that operation will be closed down if 

DOE/NNSA stops providing material. DOE/NNSA needs to 

decide in the early to mid-2020s whether the downblending capability should be maintained. Additional downblending would require reallocating material from other 

programs and further diminishing a currently irreplaceable 

resource.

DOE/NNSA plans to re-establish a domestic uranium 

enrichment capability in time for the tritium need date and 

does not anticipate requiring additional down-blending 

beyond currently planned campaigns.

3.21.3.2 Depleted Uranium

DOE/NNSA has a long-term requirement for high-purity depleted uranium metal feedstock to meet 

national security mission needs. 

Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The capability to produce, process, and handle depleted uranium supports a number of key missions 

within the nuclear security enterprise, from providing parts for LEPs to the down-blending of HEU to lowenriched uranium.

Status of Depleted Uranium

Inventories of high-purity depleted uranium metal feedstock are being exhausted. DOE has a large 

quantity of depleted uranium in the form of depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) gas, a byproduct of 

enriching uranium, stored in cylinders at its sites in Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. Currently, 

DOE/NNSA does not have the capability to convert it to depleted uranium tetrafluoride (DUF4).

DOE/NNSA has evaluated various options for re-establishment of the capability to convert DUF6 to DUF4

and has made a decision regarding the path forward. Re-establishment efforts will begin in FY 2019.
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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-39

Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Commercial capabilities do not exist to convert 

DUF6 to DUF4. DOE/NNSA projects a shortfall of 

depleted uranium between FY 2029 and FY 2031.

Continue advancing those technologies that are currently planned for 

deployment in the field as well as technologies that will be required to 

meet future mission needs.

Investigate alternate processes and technology improvements that 

can increase the efficiency of traditional manufacturing processes.

DOE/NNSA has evaluated various options for re-establishment of the 

capability to convert DUF6 to DUF4 and has made a decision regarding

the path forward. Re-establishment efforts will begin in FY 2019.

3.22 Tritium Production, Handling, and Processing

Tritium is a material used to increase weapon system margins to 

ensure the weapon system meets required military 

characteristics. The creation, handling, and processing of tritium 

includes the recovery, extraction, refinement, storage, filling, and 

inspection of gas transfer systems (GTSs). Tritium has a 12-year 

half-life and must be periodically replenished in GTSs. The Tritium 

Production, Handling, and Processing capability is vital to the NonNuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly 

capability. 

3.22.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security 

Enterprise Goals

Tritium is a key material for the proper functioning of nuclear 

weapons. DOE/NNSA delivers tritium-filled GTSs (which are LLCs)

to DOD as part of the nuclear weapon stockpile. GTSs are 

designed, produced, filled, and delivered for existing and future 

weapon systems. The Savannah River National Laboratory

partners with the national security laboratories to conduct GTS 

R&D. 

3.22.2 Status of Tritium

Tritium Recycle and Recovery

DOE/NNSA’s ability to maintain the tritium capability is sufficient 

to meet the current stockpile and other national security needs. 

The capability requires continual processing of tritium and other 

isotopes to maintain the purity requirements specified by the 

design agencies, as well as the ability to handle and store large 

quantities of tritium. 

Tritium Production

Production of tritium is increasing, as 

planned, to meet the goal of producing 

2,800 grams per reactor cycle by 2024. 

The production of tritium is one element 

necessary for NNSA to supply limited life 

components to the military. This year, 

1,104 TPBARs are being irradiated in the 

Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor. The goal is to 

insert at least 1,792 TPBARs in each of 

the two Watts Bar reactors in FY 2023. 

Three consecutive cycles of tritium 

extraction from irradiated TPBARs have 

been completed using recently upgraded 

extraction processing equipment and 

infrastructure. Completing three cycles of 

tritium extraction demonstrates that tritium 

production and extraction have been 

reconstituted, adding to the tritium 

inventory used to fill GTS reservoirs for the 

stockpile and to meet national security 

requirements.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Tritium Production

DOE/NNSA is meeting its production goals defined in FY 2015 baseline change proposal. Tritium 

production rates will increase from approximately 1,700 grams to 2,800 grams per cycle by 2025 through 

a stepwise increase of irradiating TPBARs to meet tritium requirements, as certified by the Nuclear 

Weapons Council. This capability uses very unique and specialized equipment that often has single source 

suppliers. Ensuring capable vendors and/or development capabilities is necessary to maintain this 

capability.

3.22.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

The Watts Bar Nuclear Plan Unit 1 and 2 licenses will be at 

the 60- and 40-year renewal points, respectively, in 2055. 

NNSA must monitor the nuclear energy industry during this 

time and its impact on the approaches being evaluated.

Studies over the next several years will look at various 

approaches to meeting long-term tritium production needs

and will explore ways to mitigate such risks. 

The gas transfer system loading capacity is insufficient to 

support the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review strategy because 

of the complex system designs and concurrent production of 

multiple weapon systems.

Modifications to the loading process equipment in multiple 

SRS facilities will be implemented by FY 2020 to support the 

mission and avert this issue.

Recapitalization efforts are necessary to sustain processing 

capabilities and are often competing with other program 

priorities.

Capabilities to recover and recycle tritium will be 

maintained and technology investments will be reviewed to 

determine the best investments to efficiently operate and 

maintain this infrastructure. A comprehensive 

recapitalization plan is being developed to ensure continuity 

of GTS operations, such as the isotope separation column 

and storage bed replacement.

3.23 Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing, and 

Manufacturing

Beyond plutonium, uranium, and HE, a large array of weapon components and materials must be 

produced within the nuclear security enterprise, either because they have unique requirements, they are 

classified, the raw materials have limited to no other use, or all three. Production of these components

requires the enterprise to synthesize materials and process, manufacture, and inspect the resulting 

components using our knowledge of material behavior, compatibility, and aging.

3.23.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing, and Manufacturing capability to synthesize, 

fabricate, or manufacture organic, inorganic, and non-SNM metallic components has enabled the 

development, certification, and production of all legacy systems, as well as the corresponding LEPs and 

Alts, and has been central to performing the science experiments that build confidence in the ongoing 

reliability of the nuclear deterrent. This capability has provided test and War Reserve components, as 

well as a wealth of data on the static and dynamic materials properties of materials that are critical for 

design and certification of weapons.

3.23.2 Status of Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing, and 

Manufacturing

The nuclear security enterprise maintains a broad and specialized capability to fabricate, process, 

prototype, and manufacture all organic and metallic materials and components for weapon systems. This 
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enterprise-wide capability also plays a critical role in the focused and integrated experiments that, when 

coupled with HPC capabilities, enable continued certification in the absence of testing. This capability 

plays a critical and indispensable role in all LEPs. While many of the enterprise’s relevant legacy facilities 

and equipment are adequate to meet today’s needs, these facilities continue to age. The capability is also

increasingly at risk due to changes in the availability of raw materials (feedstocks) and the evolving health 

and safety concerns that are increasingly associated with legacy processes. New, digital advanced 

manufacturing methods (including additive) are being developed and matured across the complex for 

metal, organic, and inorganic materials. Coupled with advances in computational design and machine 

learning-enabled defect detection and correction, these capabilities should enable a more responsive 

enterprise.

3.23.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Aging infrastructure: Complex-wide, major 

building systems, as well as synthesis, processing, 

manufacturing, and characterization capabilities 

are sized for a Cold War complex and are 

increasingly beyond designed service life or are 

out of date regarding modern environment, 

safety, and health standards.

Develop more responsive and efficient capabilities through 

reinvestment in capital and adoption of modern technical 

approaches. Continue support for a rational transition to advanced 

manufacturing processes and digital manufacturing paradigms. 

Some examples include:

 Create new additive production facilities at KCNSC.

 Continue reinvestment in the Beryllium Technology Facility and 

the SIGMA facility replacement (LANL).

 Modernize facilities across the complex to support new 

manufacturing processes.

Qualification and certification: Almost all 

materials and components within future systems 

will need to be replaced due to changes in 

feedstocks, manufacturing methods, and/or 

component designs. These changes can be 

necessitated by supply chain disruptions; evolving 

environment, safety, and health requirements;

process obsolescence; or evolving design 

requirements. Development of efficient 

approaches to qualification and certification is

required.

Close integration with the material science, system and component 

engineering, and design physics communities and adoption of 

advanced and digital manufacturing approaches will be critical to 

providing a responsive route to qualification and certification. The 

use of advanced data informatics and machine learning should be 

developed and exploited to accelerate qualification of new processes 

or updates to old processes. Improved capabilities in nondestructive 

evaluation and in-situ characterization tools will also facilitate 

science-based understanding of material and component process 

linkages to performance and thus enable more efficient qualification. 

Workforce Sustainment: Strategies are needed for 

workforce sustainment, particularly in areas 

dominated by legacy manufacturing processes. 

Adoption of modern and cutting-edge manufacturing approaches will 

provide a draw for the next generation of nuclear security enterprise

staff, including additive manufacturing and computational design of 

materials and components.

3.24 Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and 

Assembly

The Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly capability includes the manufacture, 

assembly, and inspection of all non-nuclear weapon components. Many non-nuclear weapon 

components require special manufacturing and inspection protocols. Non-nuclear weapon components 

include power sources, radiation-hardened microelectronics, neutron generators, GTSs, AF&F assemblies, 

environmental sensing devices, structural parts, cushions, pads, spacers, engineered polymeric 

components, and other specialized electro-mechanical components. During the construction of the 

weapon, this capability validates the following:
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 Parts are manufactured within acceptable tolerances.

 Materials meet design specifications.

 Assemblies fit together precisely.

 Connectors connect firmly and fit perfectly into allotted spaces.

To provide high-quality products, this capability depends on the Weapon Engineering Design, Analysis, 

and Integration capability, as well as that Weapon Component and System Prototyping capabilities are

exercised with precision. The Advanced Manufacturing capability is also strongly tied to this capability. 

3.24.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly capability results in the delivery of 

all non-nuclear weapon subcomponents and component assemblies in nuclear warheads. Much progress 

has been made in rapid prototyping and the Advanced Manufacturing capability, which has accelerated 

production, reduced production issues, and delivered better overall products at lower costs. 

3.24.2 Status of Non-Nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and 

Assembly

Most of the production of non-nuclear components occurs at KCNSC. While the leased KCNSC facility is 

relatively new and is well configured with appropriate flexibility for manufacturing, many pieces of 

existing programmatic equipment were moved from the old Bannister facility. As a result, the continuity 

of operations is at risk as that equipment ages and approaches end of life or becomes obsolete.

DOE/NNSA is becoming more dependent on internal suppliers because it is becoming more difficult to 

find trusted sources for non-nuclear weapon components such as power sources and radiation-hardened 

microsystems. As this occurs, more investment in facilities, equipment, and infrastructure is needed for 

certain product lines.

The Neutron Generator Enterprise at SNL has production lines and programmatic equipment that require 

sustained investments over time to keep the production capability responsive. The same is true for the 

radiation-hardened microsystems capability. Prudent asset management and monitoring of equipment 

has kept the neutron generator enterprise robust. In the long term, capital reinvestment will be crucial 

to maintaining the suite of DOE/NNSA’s manufacturing capabilities.

3.24.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Aging and inadequate specialized facilities and 

equipment for manufacturing non-nuclear weapon 

components put sufficient mission capacities and 

reliability at risk.

The Capability-Based Investments program is providing interim 

relief for some of the critical equipment needs related to these key 

product lines.

Leverage industrial best management practices to apply across key 

component production areas.

Long-term, DOE/NNSA must plan and execute major investments in 

facilities, infrastructure, and equipment for key production sites.

Weapon program schedules and requirements are 

driving the need for increased production capacity 

across all areas. As a result, more manufacturing 

floor space and associated support space. 

DOE/NNSA will develop options for additional space or more 

efficient use of existing space. The most prudent option will be 

implemented.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-43

3.25 Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly

The Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly capability involves assembly, disassembly, and inspection 

of nuclear weapons systems. Weapons system assembly involves final assembly of the nuclear and nonnuclear components. Lower-level assembly operations are required for both nuclear and non-nuclear 

components.

This capability is integral to surveillance, production, and prototyping of systems for DOD; DOE/NNSA 

activities associated with the Weapon Component and System Surveillance and the Assessment and

Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication capabilities; and weapon dismantlement and disposition.

3.25.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly capability provides disassembly, inspection, and storage 

or disposal of the components of a nuclear weapon through special conduct of operations, quality control, 

equipment, and facilities throughout the nuclear security enterprise.

3.25.2 Status of Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly

The Weapon System Assembly and Disassembly capability includes performing hazards analysis and 

weapons response studies for authorization bases, as well as providing engineering evaluations in support 

of weapon disassembly for surveillance activities.

Equipment support is a large part of this capability and is maintained through rigorous corrective 

maintenance, preventative maintenance, and calibrations. Examples of equipment supporting this 

capability include gloveboxes, ovens of many types, lathes of varying sizes, environmental chambers and

rooms, nondestructive laser gas sampling devices, coordinate measurement machines, radiography 

machines, etc.

3.25.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Aging equipment and facilities that support this capability are 

worn out and/or have not been replaced. 

DOE/NNSA continues to execute a strategy for major facilities, 

infrastructure, and equipment projects that includes 

refurbishments and replacements to support weapon 

assembly and disassembly operations.

The largest portion of the U.S. weapons-usable plutonium 

inventory is in the form of retired pits. As more weapons are 

dismantled, the staging capacity is projected to become 

inadequate within the next decade. 

DOE/NNSA is working on a strategy to address staging 

capacity issues for the future. 

3.26 Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication

The Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication capability includes design and fabrication of special test 

equipment to simulate environmental and functional conditions and collect performance and diagnostic 

data to evaluate against requirements. Data from the test equipment provide evidence for process 

qualification, weapon certification, reliability, surety, product acceptance, and stockpile evaluation and 

are used to evaluate performance at all levels of assembly.

This capability is integral to several other DOE/NNSA Weapon Activities capabilities in aspects of nuclear 

weapon research, design, development, testing, processing, and manufacture, resulting in a strong 

interdependence with other Weapons Activities capabilities.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 3-44 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

3.26.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security 

Enterprise Goals

The Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication capability designs 

and produces testing equipment to provide the ability to test, 

surveil, assess, and certify weapon components in the stockpile. 

Test equipment provides mechanical, electrical, and radiofrequency stimuli to the system in a specified sequence to 

simulate a weapon employment scenario and collects data on 

performance of components, subsystems, and systems. 

This capability also performs design and fabrication of test-specific 

hardware (e.g., test-specific cables/connectors and containment 

structures), centrifuges, environmental chambers, telemetry 

systems, radar/tracking systems, and similar equipment necessary 

to enable mission simulation and data collection.

3.26.2 Status of Testing Equipment Design 

and Fabrication

The Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication capability

underpins design and stockpile evaluation activities through 

advanced system and component test equipment that has been

developed to diagnose margins and robustness at the system and 

component level.

3.26.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Replacement parts, software upgrades, maintenance for test 

equipment, and test-specific hardware, are often hard to 

acquire.

Develop a modular approach to system testers that will 

enable more commonality and flexibility across systems to

provide more cost-effective spares management, upgrade

or repair frequencies, and operations, as well as a reduced 

footprint.

Testing hardware performance under more realistic 

environmental conditions, such as combinations of stimuli.

Obtain a design and fabricating test capability that will 

stress components and systems under multiple concurrent 

environments. This capability will qualify and assess 

designs under more realistic conditions and emerging 

threat scenarios.

Recapitalizing one-of-a-kind testing equipment that is nearing

or beyond end of life and subject to single-point failures (e.g., 

system-level acceptance testers, unique centrifuges).

Develop and execute a strategy to replace or modernize 

existing facilities and recapitalize programmatic equipment 

to prevent technical obsolescence. 

Modern weapon systems require testers to collect and save 

large volumes of data for acceptance and surveillance. 

Handling, storage, transport, retrieval, and searching this data 

set are challenging.

DOE/NNSA is working with a larger consortium on 

developing solutions for handling, storage, transport, 

retrieval, and searching large amounts of data.

Testers are often viewed as a commodity that should be 

procured from industry. However, given that test equipment 

directly interacts with nuclear weapon hardware, maintenance 

of an in-house design and manufacturing capability needs to 

be balanced with industry engagement and procurement. 

Where the risks and benefits are appropriate, DOE/NNSA 

sites will continue to maintain critical capabilities in house, 

while utilizing industry standards, hardware, and software.

Testing Equipment Architecture 

That Saves Time and Money

A common tester architecture (CTA) 

consisting of standardized hardware and 

software is used to reduce costs and 

development time for production testers. In 

2017, use of the CTA saved more than 

55,000 engineering hours and provided 

cost avoidance of $6.8 million for testers 

being built for B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 

370. CTA development began in 2008, and 

was qualified for production use in 2013. 

CTA has been implemented in more than 

100 testers to date. The majority of W80-4 

testers will be CTA-based.

CTA tester used to develop new 

CTA based capabilities
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-45

3.27 Weapon Component and System Surveillance and 

Assessment

The surveillance capability evaluates weapons and components 

across test regimes to demonstrate that stockpile systems continue 

to meet design and performance requirements. Such evaluations 

take place through inspections, laboratory and flight tests, 

destructive and nondestructive tests, and component and material 

appraisals. Comparing surveillance results over time provides the 

ability to detect, assess, and resolve aging trends and anomalous 

changes in the stockpile; potentially predict phenomena before the 

stockpile is affected; and address or mitigate issues or concerns. 

Specifically, surveillance addresses the following concerns:

 Component quality and assembly of refurbished warheads.

 The ability of the weapons to perform in DOD’s STS environments.

 Growth of defects over time in aging warheads.

 The safety of the inactive stockpile.

Surveillance activities provide the assessment community with key data for determining the stockpile’s 

safety, security, and reliability throughout each weapon’s lengthy life cycle.

The Weapon Component and System Surveillance and Assessment capability is integral to all aspects of 

nuclear weapon and component research, design, development, testing, processing and manufacture, 

resulting in a strong interdependence with other Weapons Activities capabilities.

3.27.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Weapon Component and System Surveillance and Assessment capability provides data to evaluate 

the condition of the stockpile in support of the annual assessments of safety, security, reliability, and 

performance. The cumulative body of surveillance data supports decisions regarding weapon life 

extensions, Alts, Mods, repairs, and rebuilds.

3.27.2 Status of Weapon Component and System Surveillance

The Weapon Component and System Surveillance capability can be 

subdivided into Stockpile Evaluation and Enhanced Surveillance 

activities. Stockpile Evaluation conducts surveillance evaluation of 

both the existing stockpile and new production. Enhanced 

Surveillance provides diagnostics, processes, and other tools to 

Stockpile Evaluation to predict and detect initial or age-related 

defects, assess reliability, and estimate component and system 

lifetimes. 

Surveillance data are gathered through a number of methods. In the 

case of flight tests (also discussed in Section 3.17), recently produced 

weapons or those returned from the stockpile are disassembled; nonnuclear components, along with surrogate parts for nuclear 

components, are used to build a JTA, which is delivered to DOD for 

flight testing. In a similar manner, hardware from newly produced or 

A B-2 drops a B61 Joint Test Assembly 

during a surveillance flight test.

Surveillance Capability Risk 

Assessment

The Office of the Nuclear Weapon 

Stockpile has developed and 

deployed a prototype Surveillance 

Capability Risk Assessment 

System. After completing an initial 

data call, the Risk Assessment 

System has informed risk 

management plans and driven 

actions to address surveillance 

capability concerns in the nuclear 

security enterprise. The current 

goal is to transition the system from 

a “snapshot” mechanism to a 

sustainable management tool.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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returned stockpile weapons are utilized for system or component laboratory testing. Finally, in 

accordance with a 7-year baseline established by the NNSA’s Surveillance Executive Steering Committee,

the Surveillance program continues to provide data evaluating the condition of the stockpile in support of 

the annual assessments. The surveillance mission currently anticipates meeting national security 

laboratory needs with an acceptable level of risk.

3.27.3 Challenges and Strategies

Challenge Strategy to Address Challenge

Increased workload throughout the enterprise,

coupled with aging facilities and equipment, is a

risk.

DOE/NNSA is deploying innovative management tools to facilitate a 

data-driven, risk-informed planning process that will guide investment 

decisions. Sites are also making efforts within budgets to recapitalize 

facilities and equipment in support of multiple capabilities.

Limited availability of test assets to surveil. Shift to an agile surveillance approach that can respond to risks related 

to aging and continue developing a systematic capability risk assessment 

process.

Develop new capabilities to surveil emerging characteristics in a 

stockpile that has exceeded its design life, including pursuing improved, 

novel, nondestructive techniques.

Existing JTAs delivered to DOD for flight testing 

are unsustainable due to sunset technologies 

and data limitations.

Develop new JTAs to improve diagnostics capabilities for detecting 

smaller changes in an aging stockpile and support missile qualification.

Capabilities that directly support surveillance 

have deteriorated in recent years and require 

recapitalization to sustain execution.

Working closely with programs that maintain these capabilities, 

DOE/NNSA has developed risk-driven plans for recapitalization of 

capabilities as needed to sustain performance of the Surveillance 

program.

3.28 Secure Transportation

The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program provides safe, secure transport of the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons, weapon components, and SNM throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The pillars of STA 

are specialized vehicles, secure trailers, leading-edge communication systems, and highly trained Federal 

Agents. 

3.28.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

Nuclear weapon LEPs, LLC exchanges, surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation activities, and 

experimental programs rely on transport of weapons, components, and SNM on schedule and in a safe 

and secure manner. The STA capability supports DOE/NNSA’s goal to reduce the danger and 

environmental risk of domestic transport of nuclear cargo, and consolidate storage of nuclear material. 

This capability provides secure transport for a variety of Government agencies. Because of the control 

and coordination required and the potential security consequences of material loss or compromise, the

STA is Government-owned and operated and is subject to the reporting requirements of the Government 

Performance and Results Act.

NNSA Defense Programs and DOD are the STA’s highest-priority customers; however, this capability also 

provides secure transport for other DOE/NNSA programs and offices, such as the NNSA Nuclear 

Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program, NNSA Office of Naval Reactors, and DOE Office of 

Nuclear Energy. The STA Program has safely and securely completed 100 percent of shipments without 

compromise, loss of components, or release of radioactive material.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-47

3.28.2 Status of Secure Transportation

The STA Program maintains assets to support DOE/NNSA missions 

based on changing customer needs and current and future 

threats. These assets include Federal Agent equipment, vehicles 

(armored tractors, trailers, and escort vehicles), and aircraft.

The process of identifying, designing, procuring, and 

manufacturing these vehicles takes several years. The vehicle 

fleet is being updated with next generation armored tractors and 

escort vehicles. The STA Program continues to design, develop, 

and test subsystems and components for the Mobile Guardian 

Transporter (MGT), which will replace the existing Safeguards 

Transporter (SGT). The life of the SGT will be extended until the 

MGT is produced and operational. The MGT will assure the safety and security of existing and planned 

cargoes, protect the public, and meet nuclear explosive safety standards. The STA Program is also 

reviewing options to replace its aging DC-9 aircraft.

The STA is committed to a stable human resources strategy to achieve an optimal workforce level and 

meet priorities and mission requirements. It takes many years to achieve any substantial growth in the 

Federal Agent workforce due to retirements, the stringent hiring process, and attrition. 

The current STA mission capacity meets the prioritized DOE/NNSA stockpile refurbishment and 

modernization initiatives and other DOE workloads. The Secure Transportation Steering Committee will 

continue to balance and prioritize customer requests against STA capacity. Since its formal creation in 

1974, the STA Program has maintained a legacy of no loss of cargo and no release of radioactive material 

from any shipment. However, aging transportation assets must be replaced to maintain this safe and 

secure convoy profile. 

3.28.3 Challenges

The STA Program has structured resources to address near- and long-term stockpile needs. Programmatic

challenges are listed below.

 Replace the SGT trailer fleet. SGTs began reaching end-of-design-life in 2018, years before the 

first MGT will enter production. The STA Program implemented risk-reduction initiatives and 

allocated resources to extend the life and maintain the capability of the SGT fleet until the MGTs 

are produced and operational.

 Respond to sunset technology. Resources reaching the end of service life must be evaluated and 

replacement activities carefully managed so that STA can achieve the greatest benefit through life

cycle management, steady-state vehicle procurement, and maintenance initiatives.

 Forecast and meet future workload. Future workload planning depends on the DOE/NNSA and 

DOD shipping forecasts, consolidation of requests, synchronization of site activities, duration of 

various weapon activities, and handling and delivery requirements for specific cargo.

 Strengthen staffing. The STA Program is focused on recruiting, stabilizing, and retaining the 

Federal Agent workforce to keep pace with attrition and eligibility for retirement after 20 years. 

In addition, the STA Program is focused on hiring and retention of Federal pilots. The complexity 

of the hiring process, security clearance timelines, and Human Reliability Program certification 

process impacts the Federal pilot and Federal Agent workforce.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 Maintain and update facilities. Minor construction projects, life cycle replacements, repairs, and 

reduction of the deferred maintenance backlog are necessary to ensure cost-effective 

management. The STA Program will implement industry best practices to maintain facilities in a 

safe and operable condition and meet all security requirements. The STA Program’s Facility Board 

prioritizes and matches mission needs to funding levels.

 Replace aging aircraft. The STA Program currently owns three aircraft: one DC-9 and two Boeing 

737s. The DC-9 aircraft is over 48 years old, has limited performance, and is becoming difficult to 

maintain. Multiple aircraft types stress the pilot and maintenance workforce. The STA Program

recently completed a Business Case Analysis for replacement of the DC-9 aircraft and evaluated 

purchase options of new or used aircraft, types of aircraft, and lease and buy options.

3.28.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy

To shape the organization for future operations, the STA Program has established a 5-year strategic plan 

that includes key strategies that are focused on improvement and change to meet long-term goals and 

objectives through the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP). The key strategies are: 

(1) strengthen communications, capabilities, and leadership throughout the entire workforce; 

(2) enhance the already strong safety and security focus throughout the organization; and (3) modernize

and strengthen mission assets and infrastructure through continuous innovation.

3.29 Physical Security

The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) provides the physical 

security program for the Nation’s nuclear materials and 

infrastructure assets, as well as the personnel security clearances of 

the workforce at the NNSA field offices and the eight management 

and operating (M&O) partner sites. Beginning in FY 2019, NNSA will 

assume responsibility for funding the clearances of NNSA 

Headquarters personnel, consistent with direction provided in the 

Joint Explanatory Statement attached to the Fiscal Year 2017 

Omnibus Appropriations Act. DNS coordinates with other programs 

(e.g., Counterintelligence and Insider Threat) to protect NNSA assets 

from theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, 

compromise, and other hostile or noncompliant acts that may 

adversely affect national security, program continuity, and employee security. DNS also provides facility 

clearances for contractors performing classified work for NNSA and administersthe classification program

to ensure information is properly identified for handling and protection. The physical security mission is 

carried out at each field location by dedicated and highly trained security professionals who employ an 

array of weapons and technologies to address general and site-specific threats.

3.29.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The programs and capabilities mentioned in Section 3.29.2 are arrayed against a broad range of threats 

to DOE/NNSA Headquarters and field offices, national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production

sites, and the Nevada National Security Site. Physical security includes the safeguards and security 

programs that provide the day-to-day secure environment necessary to implement DOE/NNSA’s national 

security mission.

FY 2017 Defense Nuclear Security 

Accomplishments

 Submitted the 10-Year Physical

Security Refresh Plan to Congress.

 Approved deployment and 

operational testing of a Counter 

Unmanned Aircraft System.

 Instituted a Security Management 

Improvement Program to ensure 

continuous improvement of the

security program.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-49

3.29.2 Status of Physical Security

DOE/NNSA has a network of programs and technical capabilitiesthat are integrated to achieve the highest 

possible level of protection for personnel, sensitive information, weapons-grade SNM, and mission-critical 

facilities. DOE/NNSA deploys various technologies at M&O partner sites for alarm management and 

control, intrusion detection and assessment, access controls, barriers and locks, secure storage, material 

control and accountability, package inspection, communications, protective forces, and technical 

surveillance countermeasures. These technologies are described below.

Alarm Management and Control Systems. DOE/NNSA sites with Category I or II quantities of SNM are

expected to use the proprietary Argus system that meets all DOE/NNSA requirements for intrusion 

detection and access control to protect these materials. Three Category I sites have fully implemented 

the system, and the fourth site will complete installation in the fourth quarter of FY 2019. Three of the 

four non-Category I sites employ non-Argus, commercial systems. Two of these sites are scheduled to 

replace legacy systems with Argus in the near future, leaving just one non-Argus site in the enterprise.

Intrusion Detection Systems. An integrated, multi-layered suite of barriers, sensors, and assessment 

systems, including the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) for Category I or II 

quantities of SNM, protects NNSA assets. For applications that are exterior to facilities within a PIDAS, 

most sites deploy both passive and active sensors (e.g., bi-static microwave sensors, infrared sensors, 

fence detection systems, buried-line sensors, unattended ground sensors, long-range radar systems, and

electromagnetic field detection systems). For interior applications, all sites use balanced magnetic 

switches on doors and/or passive alarm devices on vaults and vault-type rooms. 

Access Control Systems. Access control systems use a combination of entry control and contraband 

detection technology to ensure authorized entry and exit. NNSA isin various stages of implementing the

Identity, Credential, and Access Management program according to the Federal Identity, Credential, and

Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation Guidance.

Barriers and Lock Systems. State-of-the-art barrier technologies are used at some facilities, along with 

low-technology barriers such as concrete blocks or razor wire. 

Secure Storage Systems. These systems provide additional barriers when practical for specific materials.

Material Control and Accountability. NNSA has deployed specific technologies (e.g., accounting 

software, tamper-indicating devices and dispensers, measurement devices, and barcode readers) at sites 

with SNM. NNSA has sponsored a project to modernize a software application that will serve as the 

standard core nuclear material accountability system. This software application provides sites and 

facilities with basic nuclear accountability capabilities and can be extended to accommodate site- or 

facility-specific requirements.

Package Inspection Systems. Several sites have deployed x-ray inspection equipment at shipping and 

receiving facilities to prevent introduction of contraband into protected or material access areas.

Communication Systems. These systems allow members of NNSA’s Protective Force to communicate 

securely and with system redundancy.

Protective Force Training Reform Initiative. In 2010, DNS worked closely with DOE’s National Training 

Center and Protective Force in response to multiple external audit reports spanning the last two decades 

that addressed Protective Force training program deficiencies. Exhaustive analyses revealed that clear, 

nuclear security-focused training objectives and performance expectation parameters common to all 

NNSA Protective Force mission areas were needed. These analyses assisted Protective Force training 

managers in defining training content, methods of instructional delivery, and appropriate annual training 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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hours. Overall, the analysis showed Protective Force training programs were decentralized and had little

apparent continuity in program planning, management, and execution among the eight sites. The 

hallmark initiative under the training reform is the Enterprise Mission Essential Task List (EMETL).

Enterprise Mission Essential Task List. All DOE/NNSA field sites have implemented the EMETL, which

fundamentally restructures Protective Force training with a primary focus on critical tasks that directly 

contribute to mission success. EMETL identifies real-time training focused on improving performance and 

provides a clear picture of the best options for utilizing precious resources (time, money, and personnel) 

for making needed improvements. EMETL requires sites to conduct rigorous, formal, eyes-on assessments 

of the Protective Force’s ability to perform specific individual, collective, and leadership tasks to identify 

areas in which improvement is needed. This innovation improves stakeholders’ understanding of actual 

performance capabilities, allows finite resources to be targeted toward areas with the highest priority for 

improvement, and ultimately improves mission performance. EMETL requires both on- and off-post and 

performance testing of various tasks, with continuous assessment by stakeholders each quarter. Local 

site Training, Operations, Performance Testing, Vulnerability Assessment groups and field offices are all 

stakeholder organizations within the construct of the EMETL program.

Protective Force Tactical Systems. DOE/NNSA tactical systems increase Protective Force lethality and 

survivability. These systems include hardened vehicles and fighting positions, Protective Force tracking 

systems, friend or foe identification systems, shooter detection systems, non-explosive mechanical and 

thermal breaching equipment, multiple integrated laser engagement system gear, and remotely operated 

weapons systems.

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures. Technical surveillance countermeasures are defined as the 

systematic physical and electronic examinations of designated areas by federally trained, qualified, and 

equipped persons to discover electronic eavesdropping devices and electronic security hazards and 

weaknesses.

DNS recently implemented a consolidated enterprise approach that will result in substantial cost savings.

Enterprise Safeguards and Security Planning and Analysis Program (ESSPAP). ESSPAP is the strategic 

process that NNSA uses to conduct vulnerability assessments and risk analyses to meet the intent of DOE’s 

Design Basis Threat, which sets the safeguards and security standards for protecting Departmental 

operations and assets, including SNM and classified information. This process provides managers at all 

levels of the organization who have authority to accept risk with a consistent approach to guide and 

manage the safeguards and security program throughout the national security enterprise. ESSPAP 

standardizes vulnerability assessment methodology, modeling and simulation tools, and data analytics 

into a comprehensive enterprise security risk management process. The directive provides NNSA sites

with programmatic technical guidance on conducting security analysis and planning activities to enable 

identification and communication of security risks in clear, concrete, and consistent terms.

Physical Access Controls(PACS) and Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS) Depot and Modernization. NNSA 

has established a PACS and IDS equipment depot to centrally fund, procure, and manage all security 

system-related parts for six of the eight field sites. NNSA is also developing a standardized security 

systems training program for operators and system maintainers.

Security Management Improvement Program (SMIP). SMIP drives continuous, enterprise-wide 

improvement of the DNS program through consistent, effective, and efficient execution and program

integration. SMIP enhances the ability of field security programs to understand security conditions, 

enabling better-informed decisions on oversight and execution activities and the allocation of finite 

resources.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-51

3.29.3 Challenges

A major challenge for NNSA, and the Government more broadly, is identifying and addressing new and 

emerging security threats. Each threat is assessed and prioritized according to national security 

importance, taking into consideration the effectiveness of existing security measures. Through tactical 

and strategic planning and collaboration with counterparts, DOE/NNSA has developed programs to meet 

security challenges. As systems age and technology advances, meeting current and future challenges 

remains difficult.

Challenges for DNS include the following:

 Identify emerging threats and ensure capabilities are developed and implemented to counter 

threats.

 Recruit, stabilize, and retain Protective Force personnel to keep pace with attrition and 

retirements.

 Develop time-phased maintenance programs and a master schedule for upgrades and 

replacements at all DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise sites.

 Integrate and standardize policies and procedures for safeguards and security at all DOE/NNSA 

nuclear security enterprise sites.

 Ensure security is considered in planning all new construction and any adjustments to facilities at

the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production sites.

 Assess and address the full range of threats, from protestor incursions to active, violent insiders 

or intruders.

3.29.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy

Strategies for responding to physical security challenges are described below.

Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing (CSTART). DNS is continuing its efforts 

with CSTART to enhance standardization, integration, and cost-effectiveness across the DOE/NNSA 

nuclear security enterprise. This initiative, which DHS manages, uses a collaborative approach that 

includes working with SNL, LANL, and LLNL, as well as other DOE national laboratories, DOD, and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to achieve enterprise-wide solutions to security challenges. DNS uses 

CSTART to address the challenges of managing security risks for nuclear weapons and related programs, 

including the Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program; counter unmanned aircraft system (CUAS) 

solutions; command, control, and display equipment; ultra-high reliability wireless; enterprise 

vulnerability assessment; and the enterprise standard personnel positive identification and verification 

booth, field installation guide, and the Physical Security Technology Standards Guide. 

Counter Unmanned Aircraft System. In 2015, the NNSA Administrator tasked DNS to develop and 

implement an enterprise-wide program to protect NNSA facilities against unauthorized unmanned aircraft 

systems (UAS). DNS rigorously tested and evaluated competing technology platforms, which led to the

decision to deploy a mature, commercial off-the-shelf CUAS to meet this threat. Initial deployment and 

operational testing of the system is in process. The estimated schedule for full operational capability is 

October 2018.

DNS is confronting the following major issues deploying an enterprise-wide CUAS capability:

 Maintaining a CUAS protective envelope that meets or exceeds the evolving technical and payload 

capabilities of UAS that are readily available to adversaries.

 Cultivating a sufficient range of comprehensive scenarios against which the effectiveness of a 

CUAS may be assessed. Such assessments may include modeling and simulation to assist the 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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M&O partner sites with effectively developing tailored rules of engagement to mitigate 

unauthorized UAS.

Like other Government agencies, NNSA has encountered numerous incursions, adding a degree of 

urgency to the DNS effort to field a viable CUAS capability and policy for its use.

10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan. Historically, DOE’s implementation of physical security 

technology has been site-centric, with no corporate direction on how to select, install, operate, and 

maintain technologies at all sites. This approach has led to solutions at each site that increase the funding 

requirements to manage multiple systems performing similar functions. NNSA has worked to address 

these issues and, in August 2017, sent a report to Congress detailing security system priorities over the

next 10 years. The execution of the 10-Year Plan is codified in the Security Infrastructure Revitalization 

Program.

DNS Strategic Plan. The priorities in the DNS Strategic Plan include sustaining the security enhancements 

implemented at the sites since September 11, 2001; continuing reduction of physical security 

vulnerabilities; leading efforts to integrate security initiatives with DOE program offices, Government 

agencies, and international partners; and assisting NNSA sites in applying risk management principles and 

processes to achieve cost-effective physical security.

Layered Protection Areas. NNSA applies its physical security technology capabilities by using a “layered 

protection strategy” at the boundaries of designated protected areas and within material access areas 

around what is referred to as a “property protection area.” Barriers of various types are used within these 

areas, along with personnel identification and verification procedures.

Departmental Collaboration. DNS participates in the Construction Working Group, the Integrated 

Planning Group, and the Management Council to maintain close collaboration with other parts of NNSA, 

including Defense Programs. Under one of the Security Roadmap initiatives, DNS revitalized collaboration 

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, DHS, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, and DOD to 

identify opportunities for collaborating on respective nuclear security programs. DNS also provides 

specialized nuclear security support for NNSA stakeholders who are engaged in nuclear nonproliferation, 

emergency response, homeland security, intelligence work, and the work of other U.S. Government 

agencies in these areas.

3.30 Information Technology and Cybersecurity

The cybersecurity infrastructure supports cybersecurity operations and activities at NNSA sites through a 

defense-in-depth approach that consists of three major components: personnel, technology, and 

operations. 

3.30.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

The Information Technology (IT) and Cybersecurity Program contributes to the nuclear security enterprise 

in the following ways:

 Enabling classified and unclassified collaborative solutions for weapons activities throughout the 

enterprise.

 Providing the technology infrastructure and protections for all collateral classified networks 

within NNSA and DOE.

 Informing and advising incident responders of other Government organizations about known 

threats.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-53

 Coordinating with other Government programs (e.g., 

Intelligence, DOD, and DHS) to establish and maintain 

strong cybersecurity defenses to ensure electronic 

information and information assets are performing 

necessary operations and are protected from 

compromise, unauthorized access, and malicious acts 

that will adversely affect national and economic security 

and operational readiness.

 Fostering collaboration and coordination with 

international partners.

 Defending electronic information and information assets 

from current and evolving threats to business and 

mission operations.

 Maintaining the integrity and availability of Internetbased functions and transactions that are essential to 

NNSA’s mission, operational needs, and Federal 

obligations.

 Providing dedicated, highly trained professionals who 

employ an array of technologies to address general and 

site-specific threats to business and mission operations.

3.30.2 Status of Information Technology and Cybersecurity

NNSA’s IT and Cybersecurity program maintains management, operations, and technical security 

safeguards for adequate protection of information assets. The tools deployed (Table 3–2), and the 

workforce that develops and uses them, provide the first lines of defense against known adversaries and 

emerging threats. 

Investment Prioritization Methodology

The 2002 Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires agencies to develop and 

implement an organization-wide information security program to address identification and prioritization 

of threats as applied to the agency’s information security. NNSA’s IT and Cybersecurity Program meets 

the FISMA threat-based requirements through application of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology risk management framework, as influenced by DOE Order 205.1B, Cyber Security Program,

and further outlined in NNSA Baseline Cybersecurity Program policy. 

NNSA’s Chief Information Security Officer and IT and Cybersecurity Program and other IT managers use 

results from multiple ongoing activities to identify and prioritize needed investments based on threats 

and the degree of risk posed to NNSA information assets and business operations. These activities include

the following areas:

 Intelligence analyses

 System authorization activities

 FISMA Performance Reports

 Program reviews, audits, and inspections

 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan

 Technical impact assessments

 Operational impact assessments

Cyber Warfare

Aggressive cyber warfare capabilities are 

emerging and adversaries are expending 

considerable effort designing and using 

cyber weapons in attempts to infiltrate, 

disrupt or disable networked systems 

critical to NNSA business and mission 

operations. While information assets today 

remain secure and effective, NNSA is 

taking steps to address challenges to 

network defense, authentication, data 

integrity, and secure, assured, and reliable 

information flow across enterprise 

networks. These steps encompass a wide 

range of cyber and physical security 

activities that comprise a defense-in-depth 

strategy against current and emerging 

dangers. Under this multilayered strategy, 

NNSA strives to prevent malicious acts of 

adversaries from obtaining nuclear 

weapons information, and technology. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 3–2. NNSA cybersecurity technologies

3.30.3 Challenges

The cyber threat landscape is always evolving, with the most sophisticated threats changing to adapt to 

whatever defenses are mounted against them. NNSA is committed to providing an IT infrastructure to 

protect the highly complex, global nature of the stockpile 

stewardship and management missions using a collaborative, 

intelligence-driven approach to cyber operations and a response 

that engages the full capabilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise, DOE, and the Federal Government. 

Mission-enhancing scientific computing and networking 

capabilities need to be robust and reliable. Networking 

capabilities must include first-in-class cores, have distribution 

layers, and provide pervasive indoor and outdoor wireless access. 

Not all buildings support network speeds that are fast enough for 

today’s scientific computing and, with technology’s reliance on 

computers, capacities are being exceeded across the NNSA complex. Continued investment is needed in 

network communications systems and central networking and telecommunications facilities.

Cybersecurity

Technology Security Focus

Intrusion Detection 

System 

Inspects all inbound and outbound network activity and identifies suspicious patterns.

Intrusion Prevention 

System

Monitors networks and/or system activities for malicious activities, such as security threats or 

policy violations. 

Vulnerability Scanning Identifies vulnerabilities that can be exploited or threaten computing systems in a network.

Firewalls Prevents unauthorized access to or from a private network.

Multilayered Malware 

Protection

Searches a hard disk or other media for known viruses, Trojans, spyware, and many other kinds of 

malware and removes them.

Encryption Protects sensitive information during storage and transmission and reduces the risk of intentional 

and accidental compromise or alteration of data.

Data Loss Prevention Protects the confidentiality and integrity of mission-essential data on classified and unclassified 

networks and devices.

Network Monitoring Discerns the security posture of the environment at that given instant; collects the various alerts;

assigns a standardized criticality level; logs all of the information to a centralized database; and 

concurrently displays network traffic in a summarized view.

Enterprise Forensics Provides real-time, remote or client-side inspections at the binary level of all data on a given 

system.

Automated Security 

Control Assessment

Provides guidance and outreach to promote a higher level of understanding and acceptance of 

requirements and assists senior NNSA management in program implementation.

Supply Chain Risk 

Management

Ensures the trustworthiness of the supply chain for national security systems, new technologies 

and products, and managed services to counter adversaries. 

Continuous Monitoring Maintains ongoing awareness based on three unique tiers: (1) organization, (2) mission and 

business, and (3) information system levels. Includes assessment and peer reviews of IT and 

Cybersecurity Program elements and continues to mature methodologies to address evolving 

threats.

Resource Management Challenges

Resource requirements for cybersecurity 

and information technology requirements 

will vary directly with any increases in 

weapons program workloads. Additional 

work locations, increasing workforce 

numbers, and adding shifts will result in 

additional demand for cyber and 

information technology resources to 

ensure a secure and innovative work 

environment.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-55

3.30.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy

The NNSA Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) is focused on assuring and securing NNSA 

information assets. The OCIO continually builds on past successes and addresses new and rapidly evolving 

IT and cybersecurity challenges. Using an integrated, multi-site approach, NNSA will provide increased 

benefits to the management and staff of the eight M&O partners through increased efficiencies, reduced 

redundancies, and closer alignment with mission activities. NNSA will accomplish these improvements by 

careful planning and cooperation among leadership, customers, and stakeholders. The strategy includes 

the following elements:

 Establish and measure progress against a suite of updated program metrics and key performance 

indicators.

 Continue to provide agency-wide cybersecurity guidance and outreach to promote a higher level 

of understanding and acceptance of requirements and to assist senior NNSA management in 

program implementation. The guidance and outreach will allow program offices and contractorrun sites to increase oversight and monitoring of compliance with Federal mandates such as the 

FISMA and 2014 Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, as well as Cyber Sprint, 

the National Insider Threat Program, Continuous Diagnostic Monitoring, and Incident Handling.

 Create new computing capacity through a network of DOE/NNSA application hosting 

environments that will achieve enhanced solutions to IT and cybersecurity issues by integrating 

sites and operating environments. The strategy to accomplish this new capacity will include the 

following activities:

– Modernize current services by capitalizing on cloud technology to increase performance, 

strengthen security, and realize efficiencies.

– Provide secure delivery of managed services to meet business needs across NNSA.

 Continue to deploy a physical and logical architecture solution that streamlines business 

processes and maintains strong authentication capabilities to maintain compliance with 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Cyber 

Sprint Multifactor Authentication mandates, and the FICAM Roadmap and Implementation 

Guidance issued by the Federal Chief Information Officer Council. 

 Improve interoperability by enhancing the nuclear enterprise’s architecture, policies, and 

standards. Specifically focus efforts on updating technical and data standards to achieve 

enterprise-wide interoperability and modernize existing applications, networks, and system 

services to leverage application programming interfaces and optimize them for mobile use.

 Continue a baseline pilot program that includes a suite of tools to provide a unified 

communications system. Thissuite will include instant messaging, voice, web conferencing, video 

conferencing, and email capabilities.

 Continue modernization of the Enterprise Secure Network by enhancing the core services and 

collaborative capabilities and consolidating disparate networks.

 Bolster the enterprise network security posture by addressing known critical vulnerabilities and 

strengthening M&O cybersecurity operations at each NNSA site. 

 Modernize the Cybersecurity infrastructure, which is comprised of almost 100 sensors and over 

70 data acquisition servers dispersed nationwide for NNSA’s Information Assurance Response 

Center (IARC). IARC is responsible for providing 24-hour, 365-days per year cybersecurity services 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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to 66 current (and any future) NNSA and DOE networking enclaves. IARC’s services and service 

levels meet strict Federal requirements that permit sites to maintain mission-essential access to 

the Federal classified networks, SIPRNET, and the Enterprise Secure Network. IARC also provides 

near-real-time network defense and incident response services that protect these classified and 

unclassified enclaves and information from attacks. As a participant with the Joint Cybersecurity 

Coordination Center Program, IARC also supports enterprise-level cyber threat management and 

situational awareness for DOE/NNSA. 

 Implement the NNSA Application Modernization Strategy, which seeks to minimize the number 

of disparate NNSA Federal business and mission support IT applications in favor of a platformbased approach. Implementation will facilitate reductions in hardware, software, and labor costs 

via rapid application development, single sign-on, and maximum reuse of hardware 

infrastructure, software licenses, custom code, logic/workflows, and data objects. The NNSA 

Application Modernization Strategy is an organized effort to cultivate enterprise-wide adoption 

of shared infrastructure capabilities by the NNSA Federal and M&O communities.

 Continue to mature continuous monitoring capabilities to provide strong cybersecurity situational 

awareness to NNSA senior leadership.

 Implement a Telecommunications Security Program to deliver more effective oversight and

greatly reduce negative impacts to mission programs while increasing visibility, oversight of risks, 

and governance of this critical function.

 Develop an integrated IT investment strategy that considers, not only networking and 

cybersecurity hardware, but also real property assets, including communication hubs and 

associated utilities.

3.31 Infrastructure and Operations

As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review points out, DOE/NNSA is long 

overdue to create a modern, efficient nuclear security enterprise 

for its missions that will ensure a resilient, enduring, and credible 

stockpile; reduce the risk to the mission; and improve staff, public, 

and environmental safety. The increased load on the existing 

infrastructure demanded by multiple concurrent LEPs, along with 

the RDT&E activities in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, have

highlighted this concern. 

Safely operating and modernizing DOE/NNSA infrastructure to 

meet mission demands, now and in the future, involves many 

complex challenges that are made more difficult because that 

infrastructure is failing at an increasing rate due to age and 

condition. To address these challenges, DOE/NNSA has made 

significant efforts to modernize the infrastructure, eliminate 

excess facilities, and improve management practices. DOE/NNSA 

has also increased resources allocated to improving the condition 

and functionality of the infrastructure and disposing of unneeded 

facilities. 

“Over the past several decades, the 

U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure has 

suffered the effects of aging and 

underfunding. Over half of NNSA’s 

infrastructure is over 40 years old, and a 

quarter dates back to the Manhattan 

Project era. All previous NPRs have 

highlighted the need to maintain a 

modern nuclear weapons infrastructure, 

but the United States has fallen short in 

sustaining a modern infrastructure that is 

resilient and has the capacity to respond 

to unforeseen developments. There is 

now no margin for further delay in 

recapitalizing the physical infrastructure 

needed to produce strategic materials 

and components for U.S. nuclear 

weapons.” 

Nuclear Posture Review 2018
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-57

3.31.1 Contributions to Nuclear Security Enterprise Goals

DOE/NNSA’s physical infrastructure is funded and managed under two categories: General Purpose 

Infrastructure and Programmatic Infrastructure:

 General Purpose Infrastructure includes infrastructure that is not specifically dedicated to 

programmatic efforts (such as roads, office buildings, and site utilities), but supports mission 

execution. This category also includes offices, operational support, general laboratories, general 

building systems (e.g., fire suppression and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC]) in 

production facilities, and excess (unused) infrastructure. The NNSA Office of Safety, 

Infrastructure, and Operations plans and manages these aspects of physical infrastructure and is 

responsible for updating the aging general infrastructure. Maintenance of general infrastructure 

is key to mission support. For example, the availability of modern HVAC systems is necessary to 

maintain temperature control when manufacturing parts to support life extension development 

schedules.

 Programmatic Infrastructure includes specialized experimental facilities, high-performance 

computers, diagnostic equipment, processes, and other capabilities housed within the buildings. 

Programmatic infrastructure allows DOE/NNSA to conduct research, tests, production, 

sustainment, and disposition for national security missions and is managed through the relevant 

capability that is directly supported.

These two categories differ in a number of respects, leading to distinct approaches and processes for the 

short- and long-term management of physical assets. Both must be maintained safely until revitalization 

or disposition of these assets. DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure vision, mission, and general purpose scope are 

shown in Figure 3–5.

3.31.2 Status of Infrastructure and Operations

Some aspects of the infrastructure are failing at an increasing rate because of age and condition, posing 

unacceptable risks in terms of availability, capacity, and reliability for weapons activities capabilities and 

the safety of the workforce, as well as the public and the environment. DOE/NNSA is taking steps to arrest 

the declining state of general purpose infrastructure by enhancing and optimizing resources, including 

deploying innovative management tools to facilitate a data-driven, risk-informed planning process that 

will guide investment decisions. Sites are also making efforts within site budgets to recapitalize facilities 

and equipment in support of multiple capabilities. 

However, as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review points out, “There is now no margin for further delay in 

recapitalizing the physical infrastructure to produce strategic materials and components for U.S. nuclear 

weapons.” Despite recent accomplishments, significant additional infrastructure investments and 

recapitalization efforts are still needed to arrest the rate of decline of facilities and infrastructure. 

NNSA’s FY 2017 infrastructure operations and modernization accomplishments are detailed below:

Recapitalize and Maintain

In FY 2017, DOE/NNSA completed 47 recapitalization projects, a 56 percent increase from 2016. This 

improved performance reflects the impact of advanced planning based on detailed data, the use of the 

reporting tools and processes mentioned above, and the response to increased funding. The following 

are examples of several completed recapitalization projects that address specific criteria in the risk-based 

assessments: 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 3–5. NNSA infrastructure vision, mission, and general purpose scope

 SNL Building 905 Addition and Renovation. DOE/NNSA added 15,000 square feet to and 

renovated 6,000 square feet in the Energetic Components Facility. This project relieved severe 

office overcrowding, restored nonhazardous laboratory space to its original function, and created 

needed support spaces, including conference rooms and a shared library.

 SNL Building 870 Renovation. DOE/NNSA achieved significant recapitalization and increased 

system reliability for the “backbone” mechanical infrastructure in SNL’s primary neutron

generator production facility. DOE/NNSA upgraded an obsolete pneumatic controls system with 

direct digital control; replaced a number of marginally performing air handling units; and 

increased cooling reliability and efficiency. 

 LANL TA-55 Facility Control System Upgrades. DOE/NNSA modified embedded systems that 

provide information about plant conditions and monitor the safe operability of PF-4. These 

enhancements are required to support the redundancy and operability of the nuclear production 

facilities.

 Pantex Flame Detection Systems and Radiation Alarm Monitoring Systems Fiber Optic Network 

Replacement under the Pantex Bay and Cell Safety System Improvements Portfolio. NNSA 

replaced more than 12 miles of telephone lines with a fiber network to accelerate and modernize 

transmission of signals from the new Flame Detection Systems and Radiation Alarm Monitoring 

Systems in production bays and cells to the site’s Emergency Operations Center.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-59

 Nevada National Security Site U1a Fire Protection Installation. Site management addressed

active fire suppression system vulnerabilities by installing fire barriers, air compressors, and fan 

controls and removing combustible legacy wiring, all of which were needed to maintain the 

operability of present and future experiments performed in this facility.

 Nevada National Security Site Hill 200 Electrical Power Line Upgrade. In January 2017, site 

management replacement a 1.7-mile segment of a 23-mile, 60-year-old power transmission line 

that was at high risk of failure. The transmission line and poles were rerouted from an inaccessible 

hilltop to an easier, safer road level adjacent to Mercury Highway. Transmission line concerns 

were realized when the twin wooden power transmission poles broke at several locations in the 

old 1.7-mile section of Hill 200 in March 2017. 

 Y-12 9201-1 Elevator #1 Replacement. DOE/NNSA replaced a deficient component that could 

have resulted in a catastrophic cylinder failure, potentially leading to injury or death and loss of 

finished DSW weapons components. This overdue activity arrested deferred maintenance and 

improved productivity.

 LLNL B321 Complex HVAC Modernization. DOE/NNSA replaced the HVAC controls in B321A, C, 

and E to meet the program requirement to maintain close temperature control and a high degree 

of HVAC infrastructure reliability for machining capabilities to support the W80-4 LEP. The 

complex had an antiquated control system that was installed in 1987 and no longer met program 

requirements. The Building 321 Complex serves several LLNL programs with unique, on-demand 

capabilities that are unavailable or impractical to obtain from the commercial marketplace.

 LLNL B133 Replace Mission Critical HVAC. DOE/NNSA replaced the existing, outdated control 

system for the chiller plant and cooling towers supporting a large office/laboratory facility housing 

Weapons and Global Security missions, thus halting the growth of deferred maintenance.

 Roofing Asset Management Program (RAMP). DOE/NNSA completed over 752,000 square feet

of roof replacements and repairs and pre-approved 17 new contractors. 

 Cooling and Heating Asset Management Program (CHAMP). DOE/NNSA completed pilot projects 

at SRS, SNL, and the Nevada National Security Site. A design and construction management 

contract was awarded in April 2017. Since then, DOE/NNSA completed nine HVAC assessments

and LLNL Building 311 Chiller Replacement.

Acquire Through Construction

 Administrative Support Complex at Pantex. Construction was completed and the new facility 

opened in April 2018 as a leased building. The Administrative Support Complex, now named the 

John C. Drummond Center, will house approximately 1,100 employees who previously occupied

functionally inadequate and technologically obsolete buildings. The new facility helps eliminate

approximately $20 million in deferred maintenance. 

 Approval of Design and Construction for the Albuquerque Complex Project. This project 

obtained CD-2/3 approval in April 2018 with construction to be completed by 2022. The project 

will design and construct approximately 333,000 square feet of Leadership in Energy and 

Environment Design (LEED) Gold certified office space for approximately 1,200 employees. The 

project will include approximately 22,000 square feet of vault-type rooms and/or Sensitive 

Compartmented Information Facility space. The proximity of the Albuquerque Complex to two 

DOE/NNSA national laboratories and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force 

Base makes it an ideal location for an NNSA field installation. NNSA has a long-term commitment 

at this installation, and it will remain the primary field support office for NNSA and house multiple 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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organizations that fulfill unique and essential roles within the nuclear weapons enterprise by 

providing programmatic, technical support, legal, security, procurement, human resources, 

business, and administrative functions that directly support the DOE/NNSA national security 

mission.

Disposition

During the next 10 years, DOE/NNSA’s total disposition requirement (currently excess facilities, plus 

facilities proposed as excess to mission requirements at DOE/NNSA sites through FY 2027) is about 

10 million gross square feet. Deferred maintenance and long periods between shutdown and demolition 

can combine to create increased risk. DOE/NNSA’s highest disposition priorities are to stabilize degraded 

process-contaminated facilities, characterize hazards and conditions, remove hazardous materials, and 

place facilities in the lowest risk condition possible until DOE’s Office of Environmental Management can 

accept the transfer of responsibility. 

While process-contaminated facilities pose the greatest hazards, non-process contaminated facilities also 

pose risks to staff, the public, and the environment due to structural degradation, industrial 

contamination, and increased vulnerability to fire. Personnel entering these facilities to perform required 

maintenance and surveillance are at risk from the degraded conditions.

In FY 2017, NNSA’s budget included more than $250 million to continue reducing the risks posed by excess 

facilities and to demolish buildings. NNSA’s FY 2017 funding supported the following work:

 Transfer of the Bannister Road Federal Complex to the 

private sector for redevelopment and remediation.

 Continued risk reduction at Y-12’s Alpha 5 and Beta 4 to 

reduce risks identified by the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) and Office of the Inspector General.

7

 Demolition of the Alpha 5 Annex and Buildings 9111, 9112, 

and 9616-10 at Y-12.

 Disposal of Buildings TA-16-0280 and TA-3-0035 and 

characterization of Building TA-16-0306 in the HE area at 

LANL.

 De-inventory of Building 236H and disposal of Building 232-1H at SRS.

3.31.3 Challenges

Three main challenges face NNSA with respect to sustainment, modernization, and operation of the

infrastructure:

 The growing need for refurbishment or modernization of key infrastructure assets.

 Reducing deferred maintenance, especially maintenance associated with mission-essential assets.

 The backlog of excess assets awaiting decontamination and decommissioning, which results in 

ongoing costs to manage risks in unoccupied space.

 

7

IG Audit Report, “The Department of Energy’s Management of High-Risk Excess Facilities”, DOE/IG-0931, January 23, 2015.

GAO, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, “DOE Facilities: Better Prioritization and Life Cycle Costs Analysis 

Would Improve Disposition Planning”, GAO-15-272, March 2015.

Bannister Facility Disposition
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-61

These interrelated challenges must be considered holistically in order to develop an integrated approach 

to investment planning that ensures use of resources is prioritized to address the greatest risks. Despite 

efforts to plan and prioritize infrastructure needs, NNSA is constantly challenged by the magnitude of 

failing and obsolete infrastructure. 

Planning and managing the extensive, diverse general purpose infrastructure across DOE/NNSA’s eight 

sites requires a deep understanding of the function, age, and condition of an asset so that it can be 

constructed and kept fit for mission use. To that end, a variety of new tools, techniques, and approaches 

have been designed and deployed to enhance NNSA’s ability to manage an exceedingly diverse and 

complex suite of infrastructure assets. In addition, NNSA is focused on ways to operate more efficiently 

and prioritize its investments better across its nuclear security enterprise. These new approaches have 

already yielded some success, but many challenges remain, and NNSA must sustain these efforts over the 

next 25 years to ensure the ability to support its mission needs fully. 

Figure 3–6 illustrates the cyclical nature of asset management from acquisition to disposition and captures 

the evolving interplay among these elements to support DOE/NNSA’s national security missions.

Figure 3–6. Asset life cycle portfolio management

3.31.4 Long-Term Vision and Strategy

NNSA is working to right-size and modernize its aging infrastructure and has formulated strategies to 

recapitalize key capabilities within its nuclear security enterprise. NNSA continues to develop and 

implement an integrated approach to investment planning to ensure that resources are prioritized to 

address the greatest needs with respect to consolidation, modernization, replacement, and disposition of 

the infrastructure. NNSA is also devising and deploying approaches for more efficient use of allocated 

funding in accordance with the following goals:

 Modernize: Arrest the declining state of NNSA infrastructure, improve productivity, lower 

operating costs, increase the percentage of facilities in good condition, decrease deferred 

maintenance, and reduce infrastructure gaps and risks.

 Streamline: Shrink the NNSA footprint, reduce energy consumption, improve sustainability, 

eliminate excess facilities, decrease underutilized space, and reduce carrying costs.

 Sustain: Make cost-effective infrastructure investments in accordance with commitments to 

maintain new facilities; repurpose sound but underutilized facilities; and expand use of supply 

chain procurements that increase purchasing power to repair building systems that are common 

NNSA-wide.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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In the past fiscal year, NNSA has made significant progress in deploying tools to make data-driven, riskinformed investment decisions to address its primary infrastructure challenges, as summarized below. 

These tools are described in detail in the FY 2018 SSMP, Section 4.3.3.1.

NNSA is developing and deploying a number of long-term strategies to address its general purpose 

infrastructure challenges. Addressing these challenges requires balanced investment decision-making 

across the four key elements shown in Figure 3–6 above: acquire, maintain, recapitalize, and dispose. 

The MAP outlines NNSA’s infrastructure vision to meet mission requirements over the next several years, 

provides an integrated view of NNSA’sinfrastructure, and highlights current and future infrastructure gaps 

and their risk to mission execution. 

The MAP is the result of an in-depth, rigorous process, where “Infrastructure Deep Dives” are conducted 

at DOE/NNSA sites throughout each year. Deep Dives facilitate a holistic understanding of the demands 

that program drivers place on DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure; the current infrastructure conditions, gaps, and 

risks; and the prioritized infrastructure investments that are necessary to reduce those risks. 

DOE/NNSA is seeking to strategically balance use of all its available resources to modernize, streamline, 

and sustain the infrastructure. As demonstrated in the MAP, DOE/NNSA is currently implementing 

processes to identify and understand the infrastructure’s condition, functionality, gaps, and risks, as well 

as their impacts. These processes are assisting DOE/NNSA in making integrated investment decisions 

concerning all infrastructure resources according to a comprehensive NNSA-wide long-range vision. 

Ongoing efforts, such as expanding asset management programs and comprehensive area planning, are 

being implemented to improve conditions and functionality faster and more economically while gaining 

operational efficiencies. Combined with increased funding in the future, these strategies will allow NNSA 

to more rapidly and effectively address the issues of an aging infrastructure across its nuclear security 

enterprise. 

Capital Construction Projects

DOE/NNSA’s general purpose infrastructure capital investments modernize its aging nuclear security 

enterprise by replacing existing facilities and Weapons Activities capabilities that are beyond their 

intended lifetimes. The projects below, as well as other planned capital improvements, are part of the 

longer-term strategy to ensure that NNSA can meet future mission demands. 

 Emergency Operations Centers at Y-12, LLNL, and SNL. This project will improve emergency 

management response and survive high-consequence natural phenomena. The first Emergency 

Operations Center at Y-12 is being planned and will more effectively and efficiently support 

missions by consolidating the Plant Shift Superintendent’s Office, the Emergency Command 

Center, the Technical Support Center, and the Fire Department Alarm Room in a survivable 

facility. The current onsite facility is not compliant with Comprehensive Emergency Management 

System requirements to be capable of supporting continuous emergency operations for an 

extended period of time and surviving various severe events, such as earthquakes and tornadoes.

 Expand Electrical Distribution System at LLNL. This project began construction in 2018 and will 

expand the electrical distribution systems along the east side of the site and provide a new 

electrical connection to the SNL-California site. Additionally, it will supplement the existing 

distribution system with new 15-kilovolt underground electrical distribution systems, load grid 

switchgear, and connection for additional future electrical supply. This result will be improved 

site capability, capacity, and reliability.

 Construction to Replace TA-3 Substation at LANL. This new substation, which will be completed

in FY 2018 or early FY 2019, will be a modern substation with components designed to provide 
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Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 3-63

increased distribution capacity, improved reliability, reduced maintenance, support for greater 

operational flexibility, and increased staffsafety. The new substation will provide separate power 

feeds to both LANL and Los Alamos County.

 Construction of a New Fire Station at Y-12. The current Y-12 fire station was built 70 years ago 

and is located within the most highly protected area of the plant, with a proximity to hazardous 

operations. Seismic, tornado, hazardous material release, and security events could render the 

existing fire station inaccessible. Many of the hazardous materials releases analyzed in the 

Emergency Planning Hazard Assessments would have a very short travel time before impacting 

the fire station. Moving the new fire station out of the protected area will improve response time 

and enable better access to the new facility by first responders. 

 New Power Transmission System at Nevada National Security Site. This project involves 

designing and constructing a 138-kilovolt line that will replace and upgrade approximately 

23 miles of the degraded existing power transmission system to provide reliable power and 

communications distribution within the Nevada National Security Site Mission Corridor in 

Mercury, Nevada. The reliability of the existing system continues to be at risk as poles fail, which

can result in unscheduled outages that could impact the mission and operations.

Public-Private Partnerships

DOE/NNSA is using public private partnerships where appropriate and cost-effective (e.g., the lease of 

KCNSC and the John C. Drummond Center at Pantex). DOE/NNSA will consider alternative financing in its 

AoAs by performing life cycle cost analyses that take into account all relevant cost drivers and third-party 

financing feasibility, based on the application of criteria in OMB Circular A-11.8 It is not likely, however, 

that operating lease solutions will be viable for many of the enduring infrastructure needs described 

elsewhere in this SSMP. In some cases, a capital lease may be possible. The requirement for the full 

amount of the lease to be in hand at the start of the lease means capital leases are not viable strategies 

for avoiding the large upfront cost of ownership. 

3.32 Measures for a Resilient, Flexible, and Responsive 

Nuclear Security Enterprise

The Office of Defense Programs, in conjunction with the national laboratories, sites, and plants, is 

developing long-term measures for determining success in meeting the goal of a resilient, flexible, and 

responsive enterprise. Success will require strengthening the capabilities base of the DOE/NNSA nuclear 

security enterprise, including personnel, facilities, equipment, science, engineering, computing, 

technology, materials, production, manufacturing processes, and business practices. Additionally, 

measures will be developed to identify how quickly the weapons complex should be able to complete 

activities such as LEPs and making necessary modifications to weapons. During FY 2019, the Office of 

Defense Programs will establish a framework and rationale for the current and future capabilities and 

capacities of the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise to inform decision-makers about which 

capabilities should be downgraded, upgraded, replaced, or acquired.

 

8 OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, 2017, Executive Office of the President, Office of 

Management and Budget, July.

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-1

Chapter 4

Budget and Fiscal Estimates

Chapter 4 is an overview of the key programmatic elements proposed in the Weapons Activities budget 

request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. The chapter displays budgetary information based on the program of 

record, including out-years (FY 2020 through FY 2023). The FY 2019 budget request is foundational for 

the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. DOE/NNSA will continue to work with DOD through the Nuclear 

Weapons Council to translate Nuclear Posture Review policy into requirements.

Each programmatic section in this chapter compares the FY 2019 budget request to the FY 2018 enacted 

budget and includes program accomplishments, changes from the FY 2018 SSMP, and a milestones and 

objectives chart projecting long-term strategies. Information on the status of the 30 Weapon Activities 

capabilities can be found in Chapter 3, “Capabilities That Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise.” This 

is also followed by a section that describes cost projections beyond the Future Years Nuclear Security 

Program (FYNSP) and the basis of those cost projections.

4.1 Fiscal Year 2019 Nuclear Security Program Budget

Table 4–1 is a list of program budget requests for Weapons Activities for FY 2019–FY 2023.

Table 4–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget request for

Weapons Activities in fiscal years 2019 through 2023a

Activity

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2018

Enacted

2019

Request

2020

Request

2021

Request

2022

Request

2023

Request

Directed Stockpile Work 4,009.4 4,666.2 5,097.9 5,412.2 5,635.3 5,838.4

Science Program 474.5 564.9 572.3 637.8 604.7 571.7

Engineering Program 183.1 211.4 226.5 235.9 245.9 255.7

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 

High Yield Program 544.9 418.9 428.0 437.5 447.2 457.0

Advanced Simulation and Computing Program 746.2 703.4 717.8 703.0 799.7 782.3

Advanced Manufacturing Development 85.5 96.8 105.1 117.6 119.6 123.2

Secure Transportation Asset 291.2 278.6 339.7 332.4 339.9 347.6

Infrastructure and Operations 3,117.8 3,002.7 3,233.6 3,343.0 3,357.6 3,440.7

Defense Nuclear Security 770.6 690.6 796.9 773.1 773.9 785.1

Information Technology and Cybersecurity 186.7 221.2 291.3 281.2 291.2 291.7

Legacy Contractor Pensions 232.1 162.3 72.8 63.8 59.5 55.3

Weapons Activities Total 10,642.1 11,017.1 11,881.9 12,337.5 12,674.6 12,948.6

a The budgetary information in this SSMP reflects the FY 2019 President’s Budget Request and not the appropriation 

from H.R. 5895 - Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations 

Act, 2019. Totals may not add because of rounding.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-2 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–1 illustrates the level of funding proposed for FY 2019–FY 2023 compared with the Weapons 

Activities purchasing power in prior years (in 2010 dollars). The figure also displays the composition of 

funding in major elements over time. Program funding totals have been adjusted to reflect an equivalent

comparison of year-to-year funding or funding among elements. One adjustment removed the Nuclear 

Counterterrorism Incident Response funding (about $250 million annually), which moved to the Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation in FY 2016. In addition, most programmatic construction was

moved to Infrastructure – Construction. In the beginning of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, 

programmatic construction was funded by the sponsoring program. 

Figure 4–1. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power – fiscal years 2001 through 2023

The most significant change over the period displayed in Figure 4–1 is the increase in purchasing power 

for Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), which, as of the FY 2019 request, is nearly quadruple what it was in 

FY 2001. Part of this increase is the result of changes to the budget structure over the intervening years. 

A significant amount of this increase can be attributed to funding for multiple LEPs and the DSW activities 

that support those LEPs. For example, pit production activities, originally funded as a campaign, became 

part of DSW in FY 2009 and were renamed Plutonium Sustainment in FY 2010. In addition, funding for

Tritium Sustainment was added to DSW in the FY 2016 FYNSP.1

The pie chart figures that follow in each section enumerate the FY 2019 budget request; the tables

compare the FY 2019 request to the FY 2018 enacted budget.

4.2 Directed Stockpile Work

Directed Stockpile Work Budget

The Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services lines in Figure 4–2 include the Surveillance program funding 

listed in Table 4–2.

 

1 See FY 2016 SSMP, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.6, pp. 2-33 to 2-37.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-3

Figure 4–2. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023

Table 4–2. Surveillance program funding for fiscal years 2013 through 2023

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Surveillance Program 

Funding a

217 225 236 217 213 231 243 237 251 257 265

a Surveillance numbers for FY 2018 and FY 2019 represent current planning estimates. Prior year numbers reflect 

actual expenditures.

Directed Stockpile Work Accomplishments

Major DSW accomplishments since the FY 2018 SSMP, in addition to the Annual Assessment Reports,

Laboratory Director Letters to the President, and scheduled replacements of limited life components 

(LLCs), are detailed in the following sections.

4.2.2.1 Life Extension Programs

W76-1 Life Extension Program

The W76-1 LEP continued to be ahead of cumulative production and deliveries to the Navy within 

allocated budgets. The program remains on schedule to complete all warhead production and deliveries 

by the end of FY 2019. 

 Completed 95 percent of the cumulative warhead production quantities as of May 2018, ahead 

of the production baseline.

 Delivered 91 percent of the cumulative warhead production quantities to the Navy as of 

May 2018, on target with the delivery baseline.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-4 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

W88 Alteration 370

The W88 Alt 370 Program continued fabrication of pre-production Process Prove-In (PPI) and Qualification 

Evaluation (QE) functional hardware at the component; subassembly; and integrated arming, fuzing, and 

firing (AF&F) assembly levels for final qualification and validation.

 Obtained DOE/NNSA approval of Phase 6.4, Production Engineering.

 Published the Baseline Cost Report.

 Fully integrated the additional scope associated with conventional high explosive (CHE) refresh.

 Completed follow-on Commander Evaluation Test – 53 qualification flight test.

 Completed Nuclear System Final Design Review.

 Fabricated pre-production (PPI and QE) functional hardware at the component;subassembly; and 

integrated AF&F assembly levels for final qualification/validation (October-December 2017 and 

January-March 2018).

 Conducted remaining Final Design Reviews, including the System Final Design Review 

(October and December 2017 and January 2018).

 Delivered Commander Evaluation Test -1 flight test bodies (first quarter of FY 2018).

 Built two hydrodynamic test articles to be tested in the third and fourth quarter of FY 2018.

B61-12 Life Extension Program

The B61-12 is in Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) and will receive authorization for Phase 6.5 (First 

Production) by September 2019. The program remains on schedule and budget.

 Completed three system qualification flight tests at the Tonopah Test Range (following 

completion of three system development flight tests in FY 2015).

 Completed first compatibility flight test with the Air Force B-2 in June 2017.

 Completed two hydrodynamic physics tests at LANL to verify the performance of the B61-12 

nuclear explosive package in cold temperature environments.

 Completed Final Design Reviews for major components and successfully initiated component PPI

and QE activities at the DOE/NNSA nuclear weapon production facilities.

 Maintained 11 Interface Requirements Agreements with other programs to document B61-12 

dependencies on programmatic deliverables.

 Loaded B61-12 gas transfer system (GTS) reservoirs 18 months ahead of schedule.

W80-4 Life Extension Program

The W80-4 LEP is currently in Phase 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost Study). DOE/NNSA will continue to 

refine the design and synchronize activities with the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile development 

team.

 Performed System Requirement Gate and System Feasibility Gate Reviews in FY 2017.

 Conducted an Inter-Laboratory Peer Review in FY 2017.

 Completed stand-up of Product Realization Teams.

 Provided input to the LRSO Project Officers Group Phase 6.2 Report, identifying preferred design 

options for the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee.

 Completed LEP interface requirements agreements with the other DOE/NNSA programs 

responsible for providing key capabilities essential to execution of W80-4 program plans.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-5

 Obtained approval to enter Phase 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost Study) in FY 2018 and 

presented a plan to develop the LEP’s Weapon Design and Cost Report, which will better define 

the cost range and preliminary schedules.

4.2.2.2 Stockpile Systems

 Delivered all scheduled LLCs for the B61, W76, W78, W80, B83, W87, and W88.

 Conducted stockpile surveillance activities to ensure adequate data was available to assess the 

health of the stockpile.

 Completed the first production unit of new B61 joint test assembly (JTA) configurations via 

successful conduct of the JTA Modernization project.

 Conducted cable pull-down test of B61-11.

 Continued planning and early development for the W76 JTA 3 (JTA 1 refresh).

 Completed renewal of the W76 10-Year Nuclear Explosive Safety Study for assembly and 

disassembly to allow continuation of nuclear explosive operations.

 Started W78 repairs.

 Completed W80-1 Alt 369 first production unit.

 Completed Customer Requirements Review and Preliminary Design Review for JTA6R 

development.

 Met DOD requirements for W87 small ferroelectric neutron generator retrofits.

 Initiated W87 Joint Environmental Test Unit Product Realization Team to support Ground-Based 

Strategic Deterrent.

 Continued development of W88 Alt 940 integrated surety architecture transportation solution.

 Continued development for next W88 neutron generator and GTS LLC cycle.

4.2.2.3 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

 Provided critical material for Naval Reactors, the Lithium Strategy, and LEPs through completing 

weapon and canned subassembly dismantlement requirements.

 Exceeded component disposition site goals and managed limited storage space for future LEP 

requirements.

 Completed W84 safety testing planning.

4.2.2.4 Stockpile Services

 Completed the first restart of equipment at Y-12, supporting the Lithium Bridging Strategy ahead 

of schedule. 

 Continued efforts to remove single points of failure throughout production operations. 

 Initiated an Environmental Room Controls Upgrade Project at Y-12 that will support extending the 

life of the assembly and disassembly operations area. 

 Reduced product acceptance time for application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) products by 

certifying more inspectors at SNL and deploying the bar-coded processing electronic production 

control system. 

 Implemented the Common Tester Architecture to allow plug and play testers on the shop floor.

 Completed analytical tests for production quality assurance and reduced the average backlog of 

work orders at KCNSC.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-6 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 Archived past weapons data and converted sunset technology files to state-of-the-art data 

storage and security systems. 

 Transitioned a matured integrated surety architecture capability to stockpile systems for further 

development and integration activities. 

 Progressed the development of new initiation systems and materials to enhance the safety and 

reliability of the detonation.

 Completed significant progress toward re-establishing depleted uranium machining capabilities 

at Y-12. 

 Installed and certified a replacement centrifuge arm at the Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory. 

 Provided direct support to Stockpile Systems for flight tests.

 Expedited throughput of product definition that is critical to support for modernization programs 

ranging from DOE/NNSA national security laboratories to nuclear weapons production sites

through Product Realization Information Management and Exchange (PRIME).

 DOE/NNSA’s Office of Technology Maturation’s Technology Development Strategic Plan for the

early development of innovative technologies.

 Began establishment of the High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test (HOT SHOT)

program. HOT SHOT is intended to provide a lower-cost alternative to conventional flight tests, 

as well as the ability to duplicate many of the integrated reentry vehicle environments to qualify 

components, technologies, and subsystems.

 Matured new process technologies (electro-refiner, calciner, direct chip melt) to allow transfer of 

capabilities into other nuclear facilities at Y-12. 

4.2.2.5 Strategic Materials

This section lists the FY 2017 accomplishments, as well as some FY 2018 accomplishments, for each of the 

five strategic materials and sustainment activities.

Uranium

 Initiated planning and prioritization efforts to implement the Building 9212 Exit Strategy.

 Increased the reliability of existing uranium capabilities in casting sustainment and machining 

sustainment investments. 

 Removed enriched uranium material from Area 5 to achieve the Y-12 de-inventory milestone and 

continued enabling efforts to establish and maintain target working inventory levels. 

Plutonium

 Fabricated two development W87-like pits.

 Continued investments to replace end-of-life pit production equipment, installed equipment to 

increase production capacity, and supported certification activities to reduce mission risk. 

Tritium

 Submitted license amendment request to irradiate up to 1,792 tritium-producing burnable 

absorber rods (TPBARS) in Watts Bar Unit 2 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for approval. 

Loaded 1,104 TPBARs into Watts Bar Unit 1.

 Extracted tritium from 900 TPBARs at SRS’s Tritium Extraction Facility and conducted three backto-back extraction cycles.

 Provided 100 percent on-time delivery of GTSs, with 127 DOD schedule change requests.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-7

 Maintained a 0.04 percent GTS Cost of Nonconformance versus an FY 2017 goal of less than 

0.25 percent.

 Conducted an independent project review in November 2017 and independent cost review for 

the Tritium Production Capability line item in February 2018. (The preferred alternative was 

selected in July 2016.) 

 Met Material Recycle and Recovery (MRR) Program Production and Planning Directive goals for 

recovery and recycle of tritium from returned reservoirs. (Also see Strategic Materials 

Sustainment.)

Domestic Uranium Enrichment

 Initiated Analysis of Alternatives (AoAs) to identify and evaluate solutions to the low-enriched 

uranium mission need.

 Completed design of the OR-1 centrifuge at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

 Initiated down-blending offering for Tritium Down-Blend campaign to extend need date for lowenriched uranium fuel for tritium production to 2041.

Lithium

 Restarted salvage operations. 

 Began execution of the Material Conversion Equipment Restart project.

 Met all DSW deliverables for material and parts production. 

 Completed non-metallic options evaluation for future LEP production.

Strategic Materials Sustainment

 Continued to complete recycle and recovery of tritium at SRS ahead of schedule in support of 

mission requirements and improved operational interface with DOE’s Office of Science in 

managing tritium production byproducts that are intrinsically valuable to the Nation.

 Y-12 continues to minimize technology risk and provide justification for increased utilization on 

the production microwave with the completion of a carbon reduction study report.

 Accomplished significant work on risk reduction activities and vault material disposition at LANL, 

including continuing to reduce the material-at-risk (MAR) on the LANL Plutonium Facility (PF-4)

main floor and implementing a push inventory management tool for transuranic (TRU) waste to 

ensure efficient supply chain management.

 Completed first LANL waste shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant since its reopening on 

November 16, 2017, using the Mobile Loading Unit at Technical Area (TA)-55. The first shipment 

of four waste drums from TA-55 to the TRU Waste Facility occurred in the week of 

October 10, 2017. As of March 30, 2018, 28 TRU drums have been shipped to the TRU Waste 

Facility. It is expected that the operational tempo will increase to a level sustaining operational 

needs. 

 Demonstrated the ability to produce purified enriched uranium metal at Y-12 to meet Defense 

Programs requirements. 

Directed Stockpile Work Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

4.2.3.1 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

 The B61-12 LEP had no substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.

 The W88 Alt 370 had no substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-8 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 The W80-4 LEP had no substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP as of the date of this SSMP. 

Completion of the Weapons Design and Cost Report will provide the first bottom-up cost and 

schedule estimates and may result in changes to DOE/NNSA’s DSW work plans.

4.2.3.2 Stockpile Systems

 No substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.

4.2.3.3 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

 No substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.

4.2.3.4 Stockpile Services

Production Support

 Continued growth of workforce and equipment base capabilities, as required to support the 

increased system modernization workload.

Research and Development Support

 Expanded investment in weapon data archiving activities, including preservation of testing data 

and computer platforms for making data available to weapon scientists and support of 

implementation for Nuclear Enterprise Assurance and supply chain risk management for research 

and development (R&D) activities.

Research and Development Certification and Safety

 Increased investments in low-cost alternative demonstrators for future systems (e.g., the

W78 Replacement Warhead) to demonstrate capability enhancements.

Management Technology and Production

 Continued growth in multi-weapon activities, as needed to support fielding the Alt and Mod 

systems following the first production unit.

 Defense Programs began establishment of the HOT SHOT program. HOT SHOT is intended to 

provide a lower-cost alternative to conventional flight tests, as well as the ability to duplicate 

many of the integrated reentry vehicle environments to qualify components, technologies, and 

subsystems.

4.2.3.5 Strategic Materials

Uranium Sustainment

 An update to the Uranium Mission Strategy was issued in May 2017. This document provides an 

integrated strategy to sustain and modernize uranium capabilities and infrastructure. The focus

for the strategy is directly tied to the overarching modernization strategy, the risk reduction 

activities to ensure a seamless transition to the new strategic objectives, and the ongoing 

activities to sustain successful stewardship of uranium.

Plutonium Sustainment

 The number of development W87 pits increased in line with mission goals.

 On May 10, 2018, the Administrator informed Congress that NNSA’s recommended alternative is 

to repurpose the SRS Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility for the production of 50 War Reserve 

plutonium pits per year in 2030, while maximizing pit production at LANL with at least 30 pits per 

year by 2026. A conceptual design for repurposing MFFF will be used to develop CD-1 for the 

Deputy Secretary’s final review and decision
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-9

Tritium Sustainment

 Transport of TPBARs between the Tennessee Valley Authority and SRS is being re-evaluated due 

to increased TPBAR irradiation. Preliminary modeling indicates that higher-capacity casks (casks

holding greater than 300 TPBARs each) will be needed to meet the Tennessee Valley Authority 

and SRS operating schedules. Limited opportunities at the Tennessee Valley Authority will be 

available to load and ship TPBARs to SRS and vice versa, so increased capacity per shipment is 

considered a mission need and an overall cost-effective investment. (This program scope is being 

transferred from the Component Manufacturing Development program.)

Domestic Uranium Enrichment

 No substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.

Lithium

 The addition of a Lithium Sustainment funding line is reflected in the in FY 2019 budget request.

Strategic Materials Sustainment

 No substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP. Efforts to re-establish the capability to produce 

depleted uranium and depleted uranium-alloyed component feedstock were initiated by the MRR

Program.

Directed Stockpile Work Milestones and Objectives

Figure 4–3 illustrates ongoing activities with key annual deliverables for weapon assessment, surveillance, 

and maintenance. Figure 4–4 illustrates milestones for LEPs, Alts, component production, and 

dismantlement.

Figure 4–3. Goals, milestones, and key annual activities for weapon assessment, surveillance, 

and maintenance
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-10 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–4. Milestones for life extension programs, major weapons component production, 

and weapons alteration and dismantlement2

4.3 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Science Program

4.3.1.1 Science Program Budget

Science Program funding for FY 2018–2023 is illustrated in Figure 4–5.

Figure 4–5. Science Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023

 

2 Reference above to IWs are not necessarily in conformance with future ballistic missile systems as referred to in the 2018 

Nuclear Posture Review. The nomenclature here matches the unchanged financial Budget and Reporting codes.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-11

4.3.1.2 Science Program Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions by the Science Program and subprograms since the 

FY 2018 SSMP are detailed in this section.

Advanced Certification

 Validated an LLNL design concept for the W80-4 in a hydrodynamic test executed at the Dual-Axis 

Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT).

 Conducted two hydrodynamic tests as part of the Certification Readiness Exercises for pit re-use 

and the use of insensitive high explosives (IHE) for primary options for the future stockpile.

 Conducted hubcap experiments with advanced manufactured components in support of the Joint 

Technology Demonstrator.

Primary Assessment Technologies

 Executed the Eurydice surrogate and Vega subcritical experiments, completing the Lyra subcritical 

experiment series to inform materials models used in annual assessments. 

 Completed the Level 1 Advanced Safety Concepts milestone and complimentary Predictive 

Capability Framework (PCF) pegpost for the future stockpile.

Dynamic Materials Properties

 Executed plutonium material strength experiments at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and 

obtained scientifically significant plutonium strength data at pressures relevant to the stockpile.

 Delivered plutonium data from NIF, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER), 

Z pulsed power facility (Z), and small-scale experiments at TA-55 to validate the plutonium 

equation of state and plutonium aging models that are directly relevant to stockpile assessments, 

stockpile certification, and future stockpile options, including the B61-12 LEP. 

 Completed first set of physics experiments on SNL’s Thor intermediate-scale, pulsed power 

accelerator.

 Delivered high explosives (HE) data from experiments at the Dynamic Compression Sector that 

support the development of more advanced models of the detonation and performance of IHE.

Advanced Radiography

 Invented a new, laser-triggered gas switch that may reduce the cost and complexity of 

underground pulsed-power drivers for advanced radiography, as well as eliminate the need for 

the use of sulfur hexafluoride in those drivers. 

 Demonstrated a 6th generation linear transformer driver cavity that meets performance, 

reliability, and lifetime requirements for next generation pulsed power systems for future hostile 

environments and high energy density physics missions.

Secondary Assessment Technologies

 Modeled underground nuclear explosive tests and validated weapons design codes to inform 

future secondary reuse or remanufacture decisions.

 Concluded a high energy density (HED) Shear campaign at NIF that provided an essential data set 

to understand shear forces in the HED regime of the stockpile. 

 Used the Advanced Radiographic Capability at NIF to obtain data on an HED platform. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-12 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Academic Alliances and Partnerships

 Completed review of Stewardship Science Academic Alliances Center of Excellence applications 

for the FY 2018 academic programs to continue strengthening and expanding the program 

between the academic community and the scientists at DOE/NNSA laboratories.

Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

 Achieved CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) for the U1a Complex 

Enhancements Project, 17-D-640.

 Completed an Independent Cost Review and an Independent Project Review of the CD-1 package 

for the Advanced Sources and Detectors Major Item of Equipment that included a conceptual 

design report.

 Conducted two static neutron diagnosed subcritical experimentseries of tests with special nuclear 

material (SNM) to inform options for a diagnostic source.

4.3.1.3 Science Program Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

No substantive changes from the FY 2018 SSMP.

4.3.1.4 Science Program Milestones and Objectives

Science milestones and objectives are illustrated in Figure 4–6.

Figure 4–6. Experimental and analysis milestones and objectives led by the Science Program

Engineering Program

4.3.2.1 Engineering Program Budget

Engineering Program funding for FY 2018–2023 is illustrated in Figure 4–7.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-13

Figure 4–7. Engineering Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023

4.3.2.2 Engineering Program Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from the Engineering Program and its subprograms

since the FY 2018 SSMP are detailed in this section.

Enhanced Surety

 Launched a full-scale 6- to 8-year multi point safety experiment to study long-term maturity 

compatibility and aging effects. 

 Redesigned a surety component, including modeling, fabrication, and assembly, that increased 

the life of the component by 10-fold and reduced the size by 75 percent for use in future reentry 

body and reentry vehicle-required systems.

 Completed and delivered next-generation surety hardware builds that are integrated with 

advanced architectures to the joint technology demonstrator team.

Weapons Systems Engineering Assessment Technology

 Completed a demonstration test that combined acceleration, spin, and vibration on mock 

hardware provided by the W87 Alt Fuze program.

 Exercised a micro-digital-image-correlation diagnostic for observing and quantifying the damage 

and failure of HE at the crystal-binder length scale. This supports the development of high-fidelity 

mock HE, reducing risk and addressing the safety challenges associated with environmental 

testing.

 Measured coefficient of thermal expansion data of two enduring systems’ case parts. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-14 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Nuclear Survivability

 Completed relevant program dependencies for the W88 Alt 370 program, including uncertainty 

quantification threat assessment of III-V electronics, device and component photocurrent and 

photoconductivity tests, and cable and terminal protection device evidence. 

 Calculated initial threat response for the latest builds of four III-V heterojunction bipolar 

transistors-based discrete and small-scaled integrated circuits in the W88 Alt 370 fireset. 

 Began research effort to understand system-generated electromagnetic pulse and source region 

electromagnetic pulse effects in detonator cable assemblies, including design of the detonator 

electromagnetic response chamber. 

 Performed experimental campaigns at NIF and the Omega Laser Facility (Omega) for the hot 

uranium experiment for the Output Uncertainty Quantification effort.

Enhanced Surveillance

 Developed new acoustic/vibration diagnostic technique that nondestructively provides detailed 

information on timing, aging trends, and the performance of safety components and launch 

accelerometers in both laboratory and flight tests. 

 Completed destructive and nondestructive thermal battery component and materials aging tests 

and accelerated aging studies of lithium and iron disulfide chemistry batteries, using the B61 main 

and pulsed batteries as representative examples.

 Developed new code for simulation of integrated aging effects in LEP components.

 Performed significant number of material aging studies to identify aging signatures in weapons 

materials via the development of material aging models. 

4.3.2.3 Engineering Program Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

 Increased support for early confidence testing of multi-point safety subsystems for future 

weapons.

 Continued development of weapon security technologies for several Air Force venues. 

 Added development of experimental test facilities for future delivery systems, investments in 

ground test capabilities for coupled environments, development of new diagnostics to collect 

adequate data from testing, and development of advanced methodologies for measuring 

engineering performance of materials, components, and systems for future qualification.

 Added support for experimental laboratory platforms and modeling capabilities to quantify 

margins and uncertainties for key failure modes, as well as studies of evolving threats and 

mitigating technologies for survivability.

 Added support for advanced imaging development and testing (neutron imaging and x-ray graded 

collimation); scintillator development and diagnostics, identification, and quantification of aging 

processes in high-risk materials; and development and validation of accelerated aging techniques 

for materials used in non-nuclear components.

 The Stockpile Responsiveness Program will exercise capabilities through the execution of two 

challenge problems in support of Nuclear Posture Review objectives.

4.3.2.4 Engineering Program Milestones and Objectives

Engineering milestones and objectives are illustrated in Figure 4–8.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-15

Figure 4–8. Engineering and technological milestones and objectives led by the Engineering Program

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

4.3.3.1 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program Budget

The funding schedule for this program is illustrated in Figure 4–9.

Figure 4–9. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2018 through 2023
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-16 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

4.3.3.2 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 

High Yield (ICF) Program and subprograms are detailed in the following six subsections.

Ignition

 Held inaugural “Red Team” meeting to conduct an internal review of the ICF Program.

 Generated highest fusion yield-to-date at NIF (54 kilojoule total fusion yield; 1.7 x 1016 primary 

deuterium neutrons) by advancing hohlraum drive symmetry control and reducing fill-tube 

degradation effects. Much research remains as this yield is approximately a factor of 30 less than 

the “ignition” energy range that would signify neutron energy output greater than the input 

energy.

 Validated physical processes occurring during an implosion with the convergence ratio necessary 

to achieve ignition on NIF.

 Achieved a record yield for cryogenic deuterium-tritium laser-direct-drive implosions on the 

Omega.

 Demonstrated improved laser coupling in laser-direct-drive implosions using wavelength 

detuning at NIF.

 Modeled engineering features on liquid layer experiments using Advanced Simulation and 

Computing (ASC) code.

Support of Other Stockpile Programs

 In stockpile related work, conducted two plutonium strength experiments at NIF to compare with 

weapons performance assessment models.

 Supported measurement at Z of the equation of state of a uranium alloy relevant to future 

subcritical experiments. 

 Completed STAR and Z experiments for cross-platform comparisons with NIF and other facilities 

as part of the national tantalum strength milestone.

 Set new Z facility records for less than 20 kilo-electron volt x-ray output (increase of greater than 

50 percent) and peak current to a radiation source for vulnerability and hardening studies.

 Used the Advanced Radiographic Capability to measure the evolution of targets relevant to 

stockpile surveillance and weapons performance assessment.

 Completed a multi-year NIF campaign to validate an important ASC mix model.

Diagnostics, Cryogenics, and Experimental Support

 Introduced the first transformational diagnostics at NIF, Z, and Omega to provide dramatic 

improvements in HED measurement capability. 

 Obtained first images with the Polar Neutron Imaging System at NIF to constrain symmetry 

assumptions of the hot core.

 Deployed new laser-tracker-based diagnostic alignment system to increase the accuracy and 

efficiency of instrument pointing.

 Recorded the first images with the R&D 100 Award-winning ultrafast X-ray Imager detectors at Z.

 Installed a third NIF target positioner and a fourth diagnostic inserter to increase experimental 

flexibility and efficiency.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-17

Pulsed Power Inertial Confinement Fusion

 Increased magnetized liner inertial fusion (MagLIF) initial target magnetization by 50 percent, 

resulting in an increase in neutron yield by 66 percent and a new record for this ICF concept.

 Increased laser energy coupled to MagLIF fuel to greater than 1 kilojoule using two co-injected 

laser beams.

 Improved MagLIF yield reproducibility, reducing variability from greater than or equal to 

15 percent to ±10 percent by coating liners. 

Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas

 Provided more than 300 HED experiments for academic users to train the next generation of 

stockpile stewards.

Facility Operations and Target Production

 Commissioned Centipede pulser for the ECSE project as part of multi-year plan for multi-pulse 

radiography.

 Demonstrated multiple shots at 2.5 megajoule full-NIF-equivalent performance on one quadrant

of NIF, paving the path to full NIF operation at 2.5 megajoule with modest optical system changes 

(40 percent increase in total energy). The total energy increase in the capsule center has not been

experimentally determined.

 Increased NIF operating efficiency and shot rate at high energies by reducing the damage per highenergy shot to the grating debris shields.

 Commissioned world’s most advanced linear transformer driver cavity test facility where a single 

cavity produced 950 kiloamperes and 88 gigawatts output.

4.3.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program Changes from the 

FY 2018 SSMP

 Completed the milestone, Assessed requirements for a high-yield platform to support LEP and 

long-term stockpile modernization.

 Completed the milestone, Obtain deuterium-tritium burn and other data required to support the 

FY 2019 PCF pegpost.

 Completed the milestone, Use symmetrically driven implosions to investigate performance scaling 

and cliffs.

 The FY 2020 milestone, Obtain time-resolved diffraction data at a scale that can support highpressure, high-Z material studies, was postponed to FY 2021 to meet high-priority NNSA mission 

needs.

 To meet high-priority NNSA mission needs, the FY 2020 milestone, Determine the efficacy of NIF 

for ignition and credible physics-scaling to multi-megajoule yields for all ICF approaches was 

postponed to FY 2025.

 To meet high-priority NNSA mission needs, the FY 2021 milestone, Deliver capability on the NIF to 

measure high-Z material temperatures enabling high fidelity equation of state measurements, was 

postponed to FY 2024.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-18 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

 The FY 2022 milestone, Establish mission need for a high yield platform to support LEP and longterm stockpile modernization, was postponed to FY 2026 to meet high-priority NNSA mission 

needs.

 The FY 2022 milestone, Conduct major program review to assess the facility investments needed 

to meet future stockpile stewardship requirements, was postponed to FY 2027 to meet highpriority NNSA mission needs.

4.3.3.4 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program Milestones and 

Objectives

Program milestones and objectives based on experiments at the different facilities, are illustrated in 

Figure 4–10.

Figure 4–10. Milestones and objectives based on experiments on DOE/NNSA’s high energy

density facilities led by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program

Advanced Simulation and Computing Program

4.3.4.1 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program Budget

The funding schedule for this program is illustrated in Figure 4–11. The funding schedule for the NNSA 

Exascale Computing Initiative, which is executed with the ASC program's budget, is presented in 

Appendix B, Table B–1.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-19

Figure 4–11. Advanced Simulation and Computing Program funding schedule

for fiscal years 2018 through 2023

4.3.4.2 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from the ASC Program and subprograms since the 

FY 2018 SSMP are detailed in the following six subsections.

Integrated Codes

 Demonstrated improvements of ASC production weapons codes on Sierra Early Access Systems.

 Supported stockpile safety, security, and reliability by conducting thermal/mechanical modeling 

for crash and burn use cases at SNL.

 Completed a capability assessment for simulating weapons performance in limited hostile 

environments at LANL.

Physics and Engineering Modes

 Delivered improved code capabilities and physics models to support the FY 2019 PCF pegpost.

 Validated models and assessed the overall simulation capability for acoustic vibrations during 

reentry.

 Improved performance of IHE detonation models at non-ambient temperature conditions and for 

corner turning.

Verification and Validation

 Delivered capability for verification and validation assessments of code implementations of 

physics models and numerical algorithms in support of future capability framework pegposts.

 Completed verification on multi-physics performance model for a single-cell thermal battery.

 Established verification test problems and suites for code physics validation.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Computational Systems and Software Environment

 Finished evaluation of proposals for Crossroads system that is scheduled to be deployed in 

FY 2021 as replacement for Trinity.

 Accepted Sierra initial delivery system and finalized application development environment 

software stack for the full system to be deployed in early FY 2019.

Facility Operations and Use Support

 Completed advanced infrastructure planning report for the Exascale Computing Facility 

Modernization project, including detailed construction project drawings and specifications, in 

order to execute the project and proceed to Critical Decision (CD)-2/3.

 Completed required documentation for readiness for construction approval of the Exascale-Class 

Computer Cooling Equipment project.

Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation

 Deployed initial capability of an ARM-based advanced architecture prototype system and trilaboratory software environment to explore an alternative architecture path for beyond exascale 

computing.

 Demonstrated capabilities and assessed feasibilities of tri-laboratory next-generation codes on 

the Sierra Early Access Systems.

4.3.4.3 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

Several changes to the milestones and objectives occurred as indicated in Figure 4–12.

 The Advanced Technology System (ATS)-3 milestones slipped 1 year because the industry did not 

meet the program’s technology needs and budget parameters for system acquisition.

 The ATS-5 milestones slipped 1 year due to a revised program deployment schedule.

4.3.4.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Program Milestones and Objectives

Milestone and objectives for this program are illustrated in Figure 4–12.

Figure 4–12. Milestones and objectives of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-21

Advanced Manufacturing Development Program

4.3.5.1 Advanced Manufacturing Development Program Budget

The funding schedule for this program is illustrated in Figure 4–13.

Figure 4–13. Advanced Manufacturing Development Program funding schedule for 

fiscal years 2018 through 2023

4.3.5.2 Advanced Manufacturing Development Program Accomplishments

Major accomplishments and significant contributions from the Advanced Manufacturing Development 

Program and subprograms since the FY 2018 SSMP are detailed as follows.

 Developed direct ink write technology that is now the preferred manufacturing method for the 

W88 Alt 370. This new technology helps reduce the pad production schedule by 50 percent.

 Developed first small batch of additively manufactured chip slapper detonators (baselined for 

insertion in the B61-12 LEP), reducing process development time by 50 percent.

3

 Introduced new additively manufactured electrical connection to prevent the accumulation of 

frost on safety components, reducing the cost of developing a solution.

 Developed coating that results in a quicker, cleaner, and less labor-intensive cleaning process for 

removing contaminates from dismantled components.

 Aligned product acceptance testers to assure readiness in meeting War Reserve production 

capacity for the B61-12 LEP, W88 Alt 370, and MK21 Fuze programs.

 Charted path to qualify and certify newly manufactured IHE in support of B61-12, W80-4, and 

future weapon systems. This path will reduce the future shortage of one of the components in 

IHE and help meet legacy characteristics and performance requirements.

 Transitioned ASIC production control software to the Electronic Production Control System, which 

automates tracking of ASICs through production. The Electronic Production Control System

reduces human error in recording information and reduces costs.

 

3 With advanced manufacturing processes having become standard practice for major aspects of LEP execution, AMD no longer 

tracks its total cost saving relative to previous manufacturing methods. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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4.3.5.3 Advanced Manufacturing Development Program Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

The milestone, Transfer tritium processing technologies to Tritium Sustainment Program (FY 2020), has 

been removed from the chart because the scope transfer has been completed.

4.3.5.4 Advanced Manufacturing Development Program Milestones and Objectives

Program milestones and objectives are illustrated in Figure 4–14.

Figure 4–14. Milestones and objectives for Advanced Manufacturing Development Program

4.4 Secure Transportation Asset

Secure Transportation Asset Budget

The funding schedule or this program is illustrated in Figure 4–15.

Figure 4–15. Secure Transportation Asset funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-23

Secure Transportation Asset Accomplishments

In FY 2017, the Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program accomplished the following:

 Completed 100 percent of shipments safely and securely, without compromise, loss of 

components, or release of radioactive material.

 Enhanced reliability and availability of mission support communications.

 Developed and implemented Safeguards Transporter (SGT) risk reduction initiatives, thereby 

extending the life of the SGT.

 Accepted delivery of 14 escort vehicles (light chassis), eight support vehicles, and seven

replacement armored tractors.

 Completed Mobile Guardian Transporter (MGT) crash unit manufacturing readiness review.

Secure Transportation Asset Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

 STA conducted a Business Case Analysis to replace its aging DC-9 aircraft. This was previously 

listed as an AoA.

 Identified the following new key strategies for STA’s 5-year strategic plan:

– Strengthen communications, capabilities, and leadership throughout the entire workforce.

– Enhance strong safety and security focus throughout the organization.

– Modernize and strengthen mission assets and infrastructure through continuous innovation.

 Rephrased milestone, Last SGT certification expires, to Last SGT reaches end of design life-cycle.

 Changed references to “RAT II” to “next-generation armored tractor” for clarification.

 Rephrased milestone, Complete RAT II Design, to Complete next-generation armored tractor 

specifications and requirements.

 Changed the date of the milestone, MGT production begins, from FY 2024 to FY 2025 to address 

DOE/NNSA higher-priority items within the FY 2019 FYNSP.

 Changed the date of the milestone, Complete MGT production, from FY 2033 to FY 2034 to 

address NNSA higher-priority items within the FY 2019 FYNSP.

Secure Transportation Asset Milestones and Objectives

The milestones in Figure 4–16 move STA toward defined goals. STA continuously evaluates the 

operational environment to ensure safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons and SNM. To stabilize 

operating budgets and support steady-state production, STA has adjusted out-year plans for all escort 

vehicles, armored tractors, and facilities maintenance and upgrades. Aviation conducted a business case 

analysis in support of the DC-9 aircraft replacement. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-24 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–16. Secure Transportation Asset Program milestones and objectives

4.5 Infrastructure and Operations

DOE/NNSA has made significant progress in improving infrastructure planning and management tools, 

including implementing tools to reshape its nuclear security enterprise and improve infrastructure 

investment planning and implementation for future needs.

Despite planning and prioritization of infrastructure needs, DOE/NNSA continues to be challenged by the 

magnitude of failing and obsolete infrastructure. Recognizing that unplanned failures will occur, 

DOE/NNSA is maintaining the flexibility to respond to emerging issues. NNSA is also implementing a 

prioritization process that maximizes risk reduction per infrastructure dollar invested to optimize the use 

of infrastructure resources.

Infrastructure and Operations Budget

The funding schedule for Infrastructure and Operations is illustrated in Figure 4–17.

Figure 4–17. Infrastructure and Operations funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-25

Infrastructure and Operations Accomplishments

The following five subsections detail NNSA’s infrastructure operations and modernization 

accomplishments in FY 2017.

General Purpose Infrastructure – Including Minor Construction and Maintenance

 Disposition Completed for Former Bannister Road Federal Complex, Kansas City 

– DOE/NNSA saved approximately $700 million in a successful, 4-year effort after the Former 

Bannister Road Federal Complex in Kansas City was transferred to a private developer. With 

zero safety issues and the General Services Administration providing 106 acres of surplus land, 

DOE/NNSA transferred the combined property to a private developer who accepted 

responsibility for demolition and for undertaking environmental actions in accordance with 

the Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Facility permit. DOE/NNSA, in collaboration with 

the State of Missouri, funded the demolition and environmental remediation activities 

through an Environmental Services Cooperative Agreement. After these activities are 

completed, the developer will pursue and fund redevelopment of the site.

 SNL’s Primary Neutron Generator Production Facility

– Significantly recapitalized and increased system reliability for the backbone mechanical 

infrastructure in SNL’s primary neutron generator production facility.

– Upgraded an obsolete pneumatic controls system with direct digital control, replaced many

marginally performing air handling units, and increased cooling reliability and efficiency. 

Recapitalize and Maintain

In FY 2017, DOE/NNSA completed 47 recapitalization projects, a 56 percent increase from 2016. This 

improved performance reflects the impact of advanced planning based on detailed data and the use of 

the reporting tools and processes described above and is the result of increased funding. The following 

are examples of several completed recapitalization projects that address specific criteria in the risk-based 

assessments:

 Building 905 Addition and Renovation at SNL

– SNL added 15,000 square feet to the Energetic Components Facility and renovated 

6,000 square feet. This project relieved severe office overcrowding; restored nonhazardous 

laboratory space to original function; created needed support spaces, including conference 

rooms and a shared library; and achieved Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 

(LEED) Gold certification. 

 TA-55 Facility Control System Upgrades (programmatic risk) at LANL

– Modified embedded systems that provide information about plant conditions and monitor 

the safe operability of PF-4. These enhancements are required to support the redundancy 

and operability of the nuclear production facilities.

 Flame Detection Systems and Radiation Alarm Monitoring Systems Fiber Optic Network 

Replacement under the Pantex Bay and Cell Safety System Improvements Portfolio (safety risk)

– Replaced more than 12 miles of telephone lines with a fiber network to accelerate and 

modernize transmission of signals from the new Flame Detection Systems and Radiation 

Alarm Monitoring Systems in production bays and cells to Pantex’s Emergency Operations 

Center.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 U1a Fire Protection Installation (safety risk) at the Nevada National Security Site

– Addressed active fire suppression system vulnerabilities by installing fire barriers, air 

compressors, and fan controls and removing combustible legacy wiring. These improvements 

were needed to maintain the operability of the present and future experiments performed in 

this facility.

 Hill 200 Electrical Power Line Upgrade at the Nevada National Security Site (return on 

investment and deferred maintenance)

– Replaced 1.7-mile segment of a 23-mile 60-year-old power transmission line that was at high 

risk of failure in January 2018. Transmission line and poles were rerouted from an inaccessible 

hilltop to an easier and safer road level next to Mercury Highway. (Transmission line concerns 

were realized when twin wooden power transmission poles broke at several locations in the 

old Hill 200 1.7-mile section in March 2017.)

 9201-1 Elevator #1 Replacement at Y-12 (deferred maintenance reduction)

– Replaced deficient component that could have caused a catastrophic cylinder failure,

resulting in injury or death and loss of finished DSW weapons components.

– This overdue activity arrested deferred maintenance and improved productivity.

 B321 Complex Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Modernization at LLNL 

(programmatic risk)

– Replaced HVAC controls in B321A, C, and E to meet the program requirement of maintaining 

close temperature control and a high degree of HVAC infrastructure reliability for machining 

capabilities to support the W80-4 LEP.

 B133 Replace Mission-Critical HVAC at LLNL (programmatic risk)

– Replaced existing, outdated control system for the chiller plant and cooling towers supporting 

a large office/laboratory facility housing weapons and global security missions.

A comparison of investments in Maintenance and Recapitalization to benchmarks, based on the

percentage of Replacement Plant Value and derived from the DOE Real Property Asset Management Plan 

and associated guidance, is summarized in Table 4–3.

Table 4–3. Projected fiscal year 2018 NNSA infrastructure maintenance and 

recapitalization investments

FY 2017 a FY 2018 FY 2019

Replacement Plant Value (RPV) ($B) 52.4 50.4 51.4

Maintenance 

Benchmark

2 to 4% RPV

Maintenance and Repair of Facilities Investments ($K) 324,000 515,138 365,000

Other DOE/NNSA Maintenance Investments (direct and 

indirect funded) ($K) 492,395 494,604 507,550

Total DOE/NNSA Maintenance Investments ($K) 816,395 1,009,742 872,550

Maintenance as % RPV 1.56% 2.00% 1.70%

Recapitalization

Benchmark

1%

Infrastructure & Safety Recapitalization Investments ($K) 630,509 482,661 431,631

Total DOE/NNSA Recapitalization Investments 743,148 612,661 540,688

Recapitalization as % RPV 1.42% 1.22% 1.05%

$B = billion dollars

$K = thousand dollars

a The FY 2017 Infrastructure & Safety Recapitalization amount includes a one-time increase of $200 million for the 

disposition of the Kansas City Bannister Road Federal Complex, which is not included in RPV estimates for FY 2017–2019.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-27

Disposition

In FY 2017, DOE/NNSA’s budget included more than $250 million to continue reducing the risks posed by 

excess facilities and to demolish buildings. FY 2017 funding for DOE/NNSA supported:

 Continued risk reduction at Y-12’s Alpha 5 and Beta 4 to reduce risks identified by the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) and Office of the Inspector General;

 Demolition of Alpha 5 Annex and Buildings 9111, 9112, and 9616-10 at Y-12;

 Disposal of Buildings TA-16-0280 and TA-3-0035 and characterization of Building TA-16-0306 in 

the HE area at LANL; and

 De-inventory of Building 236H and disposal of Building 232-1H at SRS.

Planned disposition activities in FY 2018 include:

 Characterization and planning for disposition of the TA-16-0460 complex at LANL;

 Disposition of the Kirtland Operations NC-135 site; the Mercury Dorms and Bowling Alley at the 

Nevada National Security Site; SNL’s Mt. Haleakala site; Building 11-015A at Pantex; and 

Building 363 at LLNL; and

 Risk reduction activities at Y-12’s Alpha 5 and Beta 4.

Roof Asset Management Program (RAMP) and Cooling and Heating Asset Management Program 

(CHAMP)

RAMP

 Completed over 770,000 square feet of roofs replacement and repairs. 

 Introduced technical assurance roof coring strategy to verify the composition of existing roofs 

prior to design.

 Pre-approved 17 new contractors.

 Started FY 2018 roof designs in fall of 2017.

 Have $31 million in roof projects ready to award in FY 2018.

CHAMP

 Completed pilot projects at SRS, SNL, and the Nevada National Security Site.

 Awarded CHAMP Design and Construction Management contract in April 2017.

 Completed nine HVAC assessments in FY 2017.

 Completed LLNL Building 311 Chiller Replacement in fall of 2017.

 Began FY 2018 Designs.

Capital Construction Projects, Including Major Construction

DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure capital investments modernize its aging nuclear security enterprise by 

replacing existing facilities and weapons activities capabilities that are beyond intended lifetimes. The 

projects below, as well as other planned capital improvements, are necessary to provide capabilities to 

meet future mission demands.

 Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12. Continued progress on construction of new-build Uranium 

Processing Facility subprojects, including pouring the foundations for the mechanical and 

electrical, salvage and accountability, and main processing buildings. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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 Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement at LANL. The Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement (CMRR) project at LANL is on track to achieve the CD-4 milestone by 

FY 2022 on budget and schedule.

 Albuquerque Complex Project. Received Approval of Design and Construction for the 

Albuquerque Complex Project at SNL on April 20, 2018, with completion by 2022. This project will 

design and construct approximately 333,000 square feet of LEED Gold office space for 

approximately 1,200 employees that provide programmatic, technical support, legal, security, 

procurement, human resources, business, and administrative functions that directly support 

DOE/NNSA’s national security missions. DOE/NNSA has a long-term commitment at this 

installation, and it will remain the primary field support office for DOE/NNSA.

 Emergency Operations Center at Y-12. DOE/NNSA completed design and began construction 

planning. The project will improve the emergency management response and ability to survive 

high-consequence natural phenomena. The Emergency Operations Center will more effectively 

and efficiently support Y-12’s missions by consolidating the Plant Shift Superintendent’s Office, 

the Emergency Command Center, the Technical Support Center, and the Fire Department Alarm 

Room in a single survivable facility. 

 Expand Electrical Distribution System at LLNL. DOE/NNSA began design and construction in 2018 

to improve capability, capacity, and reliability at the site. This project will expand the electrical 

distribution systems along the east side of the site and provide a new electrical connection to the 

Sandia-California site. Additionally, the project will supplement the existing distribution system 

with new 15-kilovolt underground electrical distribution systems, load grid switchgear, and a 

connection for added future electrical supply. 

 Construction to replace TA-3 substation at LANL. A new modern replacement substation will be 

completed in early FY 2019 and have components that are designed to provide increased 

distribution capacity, improved reliability, reduced maintenance, support for greater operational 

flexibility, and increased staff safety. The project will provide separate power feeds to both LANL

and Los Alamos County.

Infrastructure and Operations Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP

DOE/NNSA has established, per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, the 

Infrastructure Modernization Initiative program with the goal of reducing deferred maintenance and 

repair needs by no less than 30 percent by 2025.

Infrastructure and Operations Milestones and Objectives

Major capital acquisition project schedules are reflected in Figure 4–33, DOE/NNSA major capital 

acquisition projects and project proposals, in Section 4.7.5.

4.6 Other Weapons Activities

Other Weapons Activities Budget

The funding schedule for Other Weapons Activities is illustrated in Figure 4–18.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-29

Figure 4–18. Other Weapons Activities funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023

Defense Nuclear Security

4.6.2.1 FY 2017 Accomplishments for Defense Nuclear Security

NNSA’s missions are carried out in a secure environment protected by safeguards and security personnel, 

layers of physical security technology, and sophisticated cybersecurity systems. Together, this approach 

protects DOE/NNSA’s facilities, SNM, employees, networks, and information. In FY 2017, NNSA’s Defense 

Nuclear Security Program maintained a path of continual improvement, implementing 42 of the 56 key 

initiatives contained in the NNSA Security Roadmap, along with a number of other activities that 

contribute to program effectiveness, including the following:

 The Security Management Improvement Program helps ensure continuous improvement of the 

physical security program and relies on Headquarters and field collaboration to prioritize and 

implement risk-based solutions within an effective oversight regimen. Baseline visits at two 

laboratories were completed, and visits to the remaining sites are scheduled.

 The Test and Evaluation program assessed alternatives for a system to address the threat posed 

by unmanned aircraft systems. Operational testing and employment is underway at LANL, to be 

followed by installation of protective measures at the three additional sites housing critical SNM.

 An enterprise-wide Security Culture campaign was initiated, with site-by-site visits and awareness 

presentations to the workforce emphasizing an individual commitment toward the goal of 

“Protecting What is Ours,” the program’s theme.

 A Security Infrastructure Revitalization Plan was completed. This plan is the implementing 

document for a 10-year effort to refresh and replace vital security technology and infrastructure. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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The Security Infrastructure Revitalization Plan provides a time-phased, prioritized approach to 

system refresh requirements. 

 First two Tactical Casualty Care Courses for Protective Force members were completed. This 

course is a crowning achievement in DOE/NNSA’s Protective Force Training Reform initiative.

The Headquarters Security Officer organization implements all aspects of the DOE security program for 

NNSA Headquarters operations, which serve approximately 2,500 stakeholders. The organization also 

handles the NNSA Headquarters Facility Survey and Approval Program and assists all NNSA Headquarters 

offices in preparing for third-party security assessments and surveys. In FY 2017, the office facilitated 

approximately 300 VIP and foreign national visits to Headquarters offices.

NNSA continues to provide comprehensive support in the areas of Personnel and Facility Clearance 

processing. In FY 2017, over 27,000 adjudicative actions were performed, and three national-level 

requirements were implemented on schedule. In support of critical NNSA classified work, over 50,000 

pages were reviewed. NNSA’s automated clearance work flow system was selected by DOE/NNSA 

leadership as the system for all DOE cognizant personnel security offices. Four of the eight offices, 

comprising over 80 percent of DOE clearances, are now operating on this system. 

4.6.2.2 Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP for Defense Nuclear Security

The Prioritization and Resource Allocation Decision Environment tool was used to develop an objective 

standardized approach for prioritizing the large number of potential refresh projects at each location. The 

tool provides an optimal, cost-effective schedule of recommended physical security system investments 

over a 10-year period, as outlined in the 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan submitted to 

Congress in August 2017. This assumes that appropriate funding is provided in each of the years 

represented. If that does not occur, projects will slide into later years, resulting in increased costs.

Changes to milestones in the 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan included the following:

 Complete Zone 4 and 12 PIDAS Refurbishment at Pantex Plant (FY 2028), was changed to Complete 

Pantex PIDAS Physical Security System Components and Infrastructure Refresh (2020-2021).

 PIDAS Modernization/CAS relocation at Y-12 (FY 2028), was changed to Complete Y-12 perimeter 

area reduction, PIDAS modernization, and entry control facility upgrade (2022-2023).

 Complete entry control facility upgrade at Y-12 (FY 2037-2038), was changed to Complete Y-12 

protected area reduction, PIDAS modernization, and entry control facility upgrade (FY 2023).

 Complete NNSS and LANL PIDAS Modernization (2027-2028), was added.

 Complete Security System Refresh Projects across NNSA Enterprise as outlined in the 10-Year 

Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan submitted to Congress, August 2017 (2027-2028), was 

added.

4.6.2.3 Milestones and Objectives for Defense Nuclear Security

Program milestones and objectives are illustrated in Figure 4–19.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-31

Figure 4–19. Defense Nuclear Security program milestones and objectives timeline

Information Technology and Cybersecurity

4.6.3.1 2017 Accomplishments for Information Technology and Cybersecurity

DOE/NNSA prioritizes the delivery of information technology (IT) and cybersecurity solutions that support

and secure DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security missions. Protection of all IT assets includes both prevention of 

intrusions and attacks that aim to harm and mitigation of infiltration. In the current cyber and political 

environment, it is critical to maintain the public’s confidence in DOE/NNSA’s ability to protect agency 

assets from threats and demonstrate dedication to security and diligence by use of established cyber 

defenses and continuous monitoring, as well as leveraging modern IT tools and processes for optimal 

workforce performance and security controls. Major accomplishments in FY 2017 included the following:

 Continued recapitalization of the Enterprise Secure Computing program and completed 

implementation of a virtual desktop infrastructure nationwide.

 Assessed operational readiness across the enterprise through the efforts of the IT and 

Cybersecurity Program Budget Re-baseline Analysis. Additional completed efforts completed 

included development of an updated IT and Cybersecurity Program Work Breakdown Structure. 

 Published the 2017-2019 NNSA Office of the Associate Administrator for Information 

Management and Chief Information Officer Strategic Implementation Plan. The plan sets forth

six strategic principles to support achievement of DOE/NNSA’s mission to maintain and enhance 

the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and is aligned with 

the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Enterprise Strategic 

Vision (August 2015)4 and the Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global 

Nuclear Threats (FY 2016–FY 2020).

5 The plan is supported by crosscutting activities of advancing 

 

4 The DOE/NNSA Enterprise Strategic Vision (August 2015) can be found at

https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/migrated/nnsa/2017/11/f45/Final_Strategic_Vision_2015_9-3_screen%20quality.pdf

5 Prevent, Counter, and Respond-A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016-FY 2020) can be found at

https://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/dnn/npcr
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-32 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

science, technology, and engineering; supporting our people and modernizing our infrastructure; 

and developing a management culture that is directly mapped to the U.S. Department of Energy

Cyber Strategy6 and DOE’s 2015 Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan.

7

Through regular coordination with leadership, IT organizations, partners in the laboratories and field, and 

associates across the Federal IT space, DOE/NNSA identified an opportunity to push modernization efforts 

and implement an IT construct that will use brokered and managed information management services. 

Worked with the DOE Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) to modernize and strengthen the 

Department’s aging IT infrastructure and to provide innovative ways to consume, leverage, share, and 

safeguard information and related assets. DOE/NNSA’s focus on a managed service model takes

advantage of emerging technologies and provides opportunities to participate in economies of scale and 

rely on industry’s rapid development and testing practices for a safe, secure, and modern technology. 

Additional accomplishments included the following:

 Maintained a defense-in-depth approach to achieving cybersecurity in a highly networked 

complex environment for 62,812 users of 194 Federal Information Security Management Act 

(FISMA) systems. 

 Completed Assessment Methodology for conducting assessments against IT requirements at 

DOE/NNSA sites. These assessments will enable the NNSA OCIO to design a more enterprisecentric approach for the IT program.

 Completed a number of IT and Cybersecurity Program Inspections. For example, inspected 

unclassified environments at LLNL, the Office of Secure Transportation, and the Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility at SRS. Conducted Command Cyber Readiness Inspections(CCRIs) of the NNSA 

SECRET Network nodes at LANL, SRS, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the Defense 

Information Systems Agency. CCRIs assess the readiness of sites to maintain secure connection 

to the NNSA SECRET Network. Also conducted CCRIs on NNSA Enterprise Secure Network nodes 

at Pantex and Headquarters-East to determine the sites’ readiness to maintain secure connection.

 Published the updated NNSA Supplemental Directive, Baseline Cybersecurity Program. This

directive incorporates and requires an IT and Cybersecurity Program consistent with the unified 

cybersecurity framework in national policies, instructions, standards, and guidelines. The 

Committee on National Security Systems and the National Institute of Standards and Technology

issues the guidelines. By implementing the updated directive, DOE/NNSA program offices and 

sites can effectively meet FISMA, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, and other Federal requirements

to ensure cost-effective security controls and investments that are aligned with current threats.

 Participated in interagency and foreign partnerships and projects that will increase data-sharing 

capabilities and mitigate nuclear threats at home and abroad. The Joint Development 

Environment (JODE) project is the key to ensuring the success of augmenting classified 

collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK). The first phase of 

enhancing classified U.S.-UK communications began in December 2015, with the team embarking

on an effort to expand the communication capabilities of the existing Enterprise Secure Network 

UK Gateway. That phase was completed and deployed in July 2017; the team also began planning 

execution of subsequent phases in FY 2017. 

 Maintained the SysAdmin, Audit, Network, and Security Voucher Program. The SysAdmin, Audit, 

Network, and Security program provides DOE/NNSA personnel performing cybersecurity 

 

6 The U.S. Department of Energy Cyber Strategy can be found at http://energy.gov/cio/downloads/doe-cyber-strategy-0

7 DOE’s 2015 DOE Sustainability Performance Plan can be found at

http://www.energy.gov/management/spo/downloads/2015-strategic-sustainability-performance-plan
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-33

management, operations, and oversight functions information security courses to maintain 

cybersecurity professional certifications in accordance with Federal requirements. 

 Established SNL as the lead laboratory responsible for creating the NNSA Center of Excellence for 

Cyber Threat Intelligence. The vision for the Center is for each site to have the opportunity to 

play a role as leader, member, or supporter. The initial phase was focused on implementing tools 

to collect and analyze data sets to address a broad range of enterprise cybersecurity 

requirements. The NNSA Center of Excellence will also encourage technology transfer to 

maximize the use of cybersecurity products developed at SNL for other Government agencies.

 Began modernization of the cybersecurity infrastructure for the Information Assurance Response 

Center, which provides near-real-time network defense and incident response services. 

 Completed the draft model for the iJC3 East-West capabilities. 

4.6.3.2 Changes from the FY 2018 SSMP for Information Technology and Cybersecurity

 Extended the milestone, Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) implementation,

from FY 2019 to June 30, 2022, to address evolving requirements. 

 Extended the milestone, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Continuous Diagnostics 

Program dashboard development and implementation, from FY 2022 to FY 2024

(September 30, 2024). The milestone was modified to accommodate DHS’s and DOE’s 

progression with requirements, architecture development, and project plans/implementation 

targets.

4.6.3.3 Milestones and Objectives for Information Technology and Cybersecurity

Program milestones and objectives are illustrated in Figure 4–20.

Figure 4–20. Information Technology and Cybersecurity milestones and objectives timeline

4.7 Budget Estimate Requirements beyond Fiscal Year 2019

and Basis of Estimates

Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs Executability and 

Associated Risk

Figure 4–21 depicts updated Weapons Activities required funding beyond the FYSNP, based on the 

program in the FY 2019 President’s Budget request. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the FY 2019 

budget request is foundational for the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Figure 4–21 displays NNSA’s budget 

estimates for the 24 years beyond FY 2019, based on the program of record described in Chapters 1
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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through 3. The figure displays the relative makeup of the Weapons Activities Program in terms of major 

portfolios for the period from FY 2018 through FY 2043, based on estimated program costs. This 

information illustratesthe potential evolution in program makeup. It does not represent the precise costs

for any of the portfolios other than for FY 2019–FY 2023. 

Figure 4–21. Estimated out-year budget estimates for NNSA Weapons Activities

in then-year dollars

The projected future cost for the program for FY 2020–FY 2043 should be interpreted as the range 

between the red high-range total lines and the green low-range total lines for Weapons Activities in the 

figure, which represent a quantification of risk. This total cost range is necessary due to the uncertainties 

(risks) related to the individual components of the estimates, the LEPs, and the construction costs 

described later in this chapter. 

The yellow line in Figure 4–21 represents the nominal total from Figure 8-19 in the FY 2018 SSMP and 

portrays the relative magnitude of the cost projections. As can be seen in this year’s figure, the budget 

estimates for the FY 2019–FY 2023 period reflect both an increase in costs for some programs and 

activities and a bringing forward of some costs as originally reflected in the FY 2023–FY 2027 period. Such 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-35

costs are for construction of facilities for which planning and estimates have matured within the past year, 

as discussed in Section 4.7.5.2.

The nominal cost of the program from FY 2018–FY 2019 increases by approximately 3.5 percent, and over 

the FY 2020–FY 2023 period, the cost increases at an annual average rate of approximately 4.1 percent. 

The greater-than-inflation increases to the program estimated over the FY 2019–FY 2023 period reflect 

the execution of programs or efforts for which funding over that period increases at more than a current 

services rate because of planned increases in work scopes. These efforts include the LEPs, construction 

projects, and strategic materials increases to meet demands.

Regarding affordability, the nominal cost of the program does not exceed the escalated line after the 

FYNSP years. In the out-years, after the FYNSP, the escalation line generally falls within the high to low 

cost range. Therefore the program, as planned, is generally affordable and executable, as a result of the 

FY 2019 – 2023 programming process, adjustments of funding levels mandated by Congress in current 

applicable budget acts, and the formal process of multi-agency budget development.

Basis for Cost Estimates

As noted in Section 4.7.1, Figure 4–21 displays the request for FY 2019–FY 2023 and an estimate of

program costs for the years beyond FY 2023. The FY 2019–2023 request numbers were generated as part 

of the DOE planning and programming process and reflect the roll-up of individual estimates developed 

interactively by NNSA’s management and operating (M&O) partners and Federal program managers using 

historical cost data, current plans for programs and projects, and expert judgment. Similar inputs were 

generated and used to develop budget estimates for FY 2020–FY 2023, which will be refined during the 

FY 2020–2024 budget process. The budget estimates for FY 2024 and beyond reflect the costs of 

continuing the program of record described in this SSMP.

The basis for the cost estimates beyond the FYNSP varies, depending on the individual programs or 

subprograms. Some portions of the Weapons Activities Program are assumed to continue beyond the 

FYNSP at the same level of effort as during the FYNSP.

8

 For these cost projections, escalation factors based 

on numbers provided by the Office of Management and Budget for 2019 were used. 

Some portions of the program will not proceed at the same level of effort for FY 2024 through FY 2043.

This applies to major construction projects, LEPs, and, because of the future evolution in the current 

stockpile configuration, stockpile sustainment, as represented by the funding lines for stockpile systems. 

The estimates and the basis for each of these elements of the Weapons Activities program are described 

in more detail in the following sections.

Stockpile Sustainment

Sustainment costs include warhead-specific assessment activities; LLC exchanges; required and routine 

maintenance; safety studies; periodic repairs; resolution and timely closure of significant finding 

investigations; military liaison work; and surveillance to ensure the continued safety, security, and 

effectiveness of the stockpile. These costs are incurred every year that a weapon is in the stockpile. 

Figure 2–2 in Chapter 2 provides a roadmap of currently planned activities for legacy weapons.

 

8 Projection of budget estimates for these efforts in this way assumes the continued manageability of whatever risks are present 

during the FYNSP at the same level of effort following the FYNSP period, as is typically is represented by the funding level of the 

last year of the FYNSP.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 4–22 enumerates, in then-year dollars, the annual sustainment cost for FY 2019 through FY 2023

that is attributable to a particular warhead type based on updated FY 2019 numbers, as well as an 

estimate of the total sustainment cost by year for warheads of all types for FY 2024 through FY 2043.

Figure 4–22. Estimate of warhead-specific sustainment costs

Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations

LEPs are undertaken separately from stockpile sustainment, with the goal of extending the lives of 

warheads for several more decades. Although major Alts also make component changes, those changes 

do not address all of the aging issues in a warhead that would require an LEP. Figure 2–3 in Chapter 2 

provides a roadmap of currently planned activities for legacy weapons.

4.7.4.1 Cost Estimates throughout the Phase 6.x Process

LEPs and major Alts are governed by the Phase 6.x Process and supplemented with DOE/NNSA and 

Defense Programs guidance. Various organizations perform cost estimates throughout the process; the 

initial estimate is the Defense Programs independent cost estimate (ICE) for the SSMP.

9 These are 

initiated more than a decade prior to the program’s feasibility study and are considered planning 

estimates for long-term projections and budget deliberations when the program enters the FYNSP. 

Defense Programs ICEs are notably:

 Performed by an independent organization separate from the Federal program office;

10

 Based on a known scope and cost uncertainty at the time and updated annually for the SSMP;

11

 

9 Defense Programs ICEs are performed by the Office of Cost Policy and Analysis for LEPs and major Alts every year for the SSMP.

10 GAO extolls the value of ICEs using a different methodology and the potential benefit to decision-makers in its GAO Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide.

11 Planning estimates assume scopes are in line with current policy objectives (such as a commitment to surety upgrades), in 

addition to extending the warhead life. The cost estimate range reflects the uncertainty in implementing a single assumed point 

solution, rather than the range of every possible design solution.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-37

 Inclusive of both LEP (development and production) and non-LEP line-item costs that are critical 

to program success (namely Other Program Money and DOD costs);

12 and

 Unconstrained from future budget availability, which may differ from future budget amounts if 

programming is constrained.

These Defense Programs ICEs are:

 Performed using a “top-down” analogy method that is consistent with early-stage planning;

13

 Informed by ongoing program costs (development of the W76-1, B61-12, and W88 Alt 370; 

production of the W76-1) and the evaluation of the relative complexities of the future systems;

14

and

 Based on time-phased development15 costs using standard, well-known Rayleigh profiles, as well 

as production costs using a nonlinear cost growth profile similar to that of the W76-1.

As LEPs or Alt progress through the Phase 6.x Process, the DP program office works in conjunction with 

the national security laboratories, weapons plants, and test site to produce the Weapons Design and Cost 

Report prior to Phase 6.3, the Baseline Cost Report (BCR) prior to Phase 6.4, and the BCR Update prior to 

Phase 6.5.

An NNSA independent cost review (ICR) is conducted prior to Phase 6.2A, and an NNSA ICE is conducted 

prior to entry into Phases 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.16 The NNSA Administrator approves the program baseline prior 

to Phase 6.3 based on consideration of the program office estimate and the NNSA ICE. This baseline 

supersedes previous planning estimates and becomes the program of record, which is transmitted 

annually to Congress as part of the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR).

4.7.4.2 Fiscal Year 2019 through Fiscal Year 2043 Estimates

Figures 4–23 through 4–30 and Tables 4–4 through 4–11 provide cost estimates for each LEP and major 

Alt for the 25-year SSMP timeframe, including:

 Program estimates (available for the W76-1, B61-12, and W88 Alt 370);

 Defense Programs ICEs for every system, including a high and low range; and

 A summary table with high, low, and nominal (proposed budget or SAR Value) estimates for 

DOE/NNSA and DOD, in both constant FY 2018 and then-year dollars.

17, 18

 

12 The weapon programs depend on an adequately funded base of other DOE/NNSA capabilities, are incremental to that base, 

and reflect both program’s budgeted line item and increments to other critical activities (such as early-stage technology 

maturation [called Other Program Money]). As the overall program integrator, the Federal program manager identifies the 

funding streams needed for the program to be successful.

13 Additional detail on the cost estimating methodology of Defense Programs ICEs can be found in the technical paper “Planning 

For The Future: Methodologies for Estimating U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Cost” (Lewis et al. 2016, Cost Engineering, 58 [5], pp. 6-12).

14 These program and subject matter experts evaluate the relative scope complexity between the near-complete W76-1, B61-12, 

and W88 Alt 370 compared to each planned future LEP, which aids in providing a cost estimate range based on underlying 

technical and cost uncertainties.

15 Development costs include all design agency and production development costs, which is how DOD defines research, 

development, test, and evaluation and is consistent with Rayleigh profile usage in cost estimating.

16 NNSA ICEs are statutorily performed by the Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation.

17 DOD amounts reflect the weapon components for which they are responsible, such as arming and fuzing. While not budgeted 

or executed by DOE/NNSA, these costs reflect the program’s best approximation and are published for transparency because 

they better reflect anticipated all-in costs. 

18 The total estimated cost is provided because LEP profiles have later portions that extend beyond the published 25-year SSMP 

timeframe.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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As a result of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the W76-2 Program will leverage efforts of the W76-1 LEP 

to provide a low-yield version of the W76 warhead. The President budgeted $50 million in FY 2019 for 

the short term procurement of the W76-2. In FY 2019 R&D for the sea-launched cruise missile was not 

budgeted in the request, and the intent was to defer the study until FY 2020. The sea-launched cruise 

missile will be a major new addition in the next decade. DOE/NNSA will continue to work with DOD 

through the Nuclear Weapons Council to translate Nuclear Posture Review policy into requirements.

The funding values in the figures (bars) and the proposed budget line in the tables reflect the SAR values 

for those programs that have a published SAR. For early-stage programs without a program estimate 

(such as the W80-4 and the W78 Replacement Warhead) the figures and tables reflect the current 

proposed FYNSP budget and, for years beyond the FYNSP, the midpoint between the Defense Programs

ICE high and low. This funding is included in the LEP DSW total in Figure 4–21.

Things to note when comparing estimates to one another:

 The constant-year estimates in the tables are the most comparable because inflation effects 

become significant over these timeframes. Consideration should also be given to the varying 

quantities of warheads being refurbished for each system. The classified Annex provides 

additional information on production quantities.

 Published estimate ranges are meant to reflect the underlying programmatic uncertainty at that 

point in time. Early-stage programs, particularly those before Phase 6.3, may experience 

significant scope changes, as the Nuclear Weapons Council may update and/or down-select

design options and significantly impact the work scope and cost estimate.

 The SAR totals in each table do not include pre-Phase 6.2 costs, but these costs are included in 

the Defense Programs ICEs for completeness.

 When comparing a top-down Defense Programs ICE to the official bottom-up program 

counterpart (such as for the B61-12), DOE/NNSA primarily compares the total estimate amounts 

and the general shape of the time-phased profiles. If these two are in relative agreement, 

DOE/NNSA has increased confidence in the program estimate. DOE/NNSA does not perform or

encourage additional year-by-year comparisons between the two published estimates.19

 

19 The Defense Programs ICE profile reflects an idealized schedule and unconstrained budget, whereas the program profile is 

based on an integrated baseline schedule and programming results. This makes reconciling minor year-by-year profile 

discrepancies between the estimates generally infeasible; when differences arise, DOE/NNSA has much greater confidence in the 

year-by-year phasing of its baselined program estimate.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-39

Figure 4–23. W76-1 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2018 to completion

Table 4–4. Total estimated cost for W76 Life Extension Program

FY 2001 – FY 2020

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

SAR Value 4.2 3.6 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

Figure 4–24. B61-12 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2018 to completion

The nominal values for development and production in Figure 4–24 and Table 4–5 reflect DOE/NNSA’s FY 2016 

Baseline Cost Report as the B61-12 LEP entered Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering). 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Table 4–5. Total estimated cost for B61-12 Life Extension Program

FY 2009 – FY 2025

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 9.4 9.5 0.2 0.2

Low Total 7.3 7.3 0.1 0.1

SAR Total (FY 2012 – FY 2025) 7.4 7.6 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

Figure 4–25. W88 Alteration 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh) cost

fiscal year 2018 to completion

In November 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council approved additions to the scope for the CHE refresh as part 

of the W88 Alt 370. DOE/NNSA has completed a Baseline Cost Report that included the CHE refresh and other 

changes. The numbers in Figure 4–25 and Table 4–6 reflect the updated baseline.

Table 4–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alteration 370

(with conventional high explosive refresh) Program

FY 2010 – FY 2025

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 3.1 3.1 1.0 1.0

Low Total 2.4 2.4 0.9 0.9

SAR Total (FY 2013 – FY 2025) 2.5 2.6 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-41

Figure 4–26. W80-4 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2018 to completion20

Table 4–7. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Life Extension Program

FY 2015 – FY 2032

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 10.3 11.7 0.2 0.3

Low Total 6.7 7.6 0.1 0.1

Proposed Budget NA 10.0 NA 0.2

 

20 For the W80-4 Warhead, Other Program Money scope and funds are managed by the Federal program office and are included 

in the budget line above.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 4–27. W78 Replacement Warhead Life Extension Program

(formerly known as the Interoperable Warhead 1 [IW1]) cost fiscal year 2019 to completion21

The Defense Programs ICE models assume a standard 12-year study and development period in 

advance of the first production unit. The W78 Replacement Warhead LEP is slated to recommence in 

FY 2019. Estimated Other Program Money is included in the W78 Replacement Warhead budget line

for the FYNSP. This estimate does not include the incremental cost to get to a 30-pit-per-year 

plutonium capability by FY 2026 to support this LEP. These costs are captured as a discrete increment 

to Plutonium Sustainment in DSW. 

Table 4–8. Total estimated cost for W78 Replacement Warhead Life Extension Program

FY 2013-2014, FY 2019-2041

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 11.5 15.1 3.3 4.4

Low Total 7.5 9.9 1.1 1.5

Proposed Budget NA 12.5 NA 2.9

 

21 For the W78 Replacement Warhead, Other Program Money scope and funds are managed by the Federal program office and 

are included in the FYNSP budget line above.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-43

Figure 4–28. Ballistic Missile Warhead (IW or BM-Y) Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2023 

through fiscal year 2043

Table 4–9. Total estimated cost for IW2 Life Extension Program

FY 2023 – FY 2050

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 12.5 18.9 3.3 5.1

Low Total 8.3 12.7 1.1 1.7

Proposed Budget NA 15.8 NA 3.4
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 4–29. Ballistic Missile Warhead (IW or BM-Z) Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2030 

through fiscal year 2043

Table 4–10. Total estimated cost for IW3 Life Extension Program

FY 2030 – FY 2057

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 11.8 20.6 3.3 5.9

Low Total 8.0 14.2 1.1 2.0

Proposed Budget NA 17.4 NA 3.9
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-45

Figure 4–30. Next B61 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2038 through fiscal year 2043

Table 4–11. Total estimated cost for next B61 Life Extension Program

FY 2038 – FY 2058

(Dollars in Billions)

NNSA DOD

FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2018 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

High Total 13.7 26.3 0.2 0.4

Low Total 9.5 18.3 0.1 0.1

Proposed Budget NA 22.3 NA 0.3

Figure 4–31 is a one-chart summary of the projected total nuclear weapons life extension costs from 

FY 2018 through FY 2043, based on the LEP schedule reflected in Chapter 2, Figure 2–3, of this SSMP, and 

the nominal LEP costs shown in Figures 4–23 through 4–30.

22 The dotted line shows the total projected 

LEP cost reflected in the FY 2018 SSMP. 

 

22 Nominal costs are used to allow a comparison of the total LEP costs from SSMP to SSMP. Unless baselined, the cost of any 

particular LEP should be regarded as a cost range, as shown in the tables accompanying each LEP figure.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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Figure 4–31. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs

for fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2043 (then-year dollars)

Two adjustments to the LEP Defense Programs independent cost estimate model this year have affected

the costs depicted in Figure 4–31. The changes to the cost estimate model have also affected the high 

and low lines in Figures 4–24 through 4–30:

 For the LEP components that use the B61-12 or the W88 Alt 370 as the reference for the 

complexity comparison, the Baseline Cost Report scope and cost estimate were used instead of 

the previous Weapons Design and Cost Report scope and cost estimate. This change generally 

lowered the estimated cost of development for the LEPs. 

 The production model was updated with FY 2018 W76-1 production costs and quantities. This 

change generally increased the cost of production for the LEPs, particularly for the IWs (also 

referred to as BM-Y and BM-Z) which have significantly longer production runs. 

The principal differences between the FY 2018 and FY 2019 LEP cost estimates are as follows:

 LEPs that use SAR values. The W76-1 LEP increased slightly, based on current execution. The 

slight decreases in the B61-12 LEP and the W88 Alt 370 costs are primarily the result of the model 

changes described above.

 LEPs that use Defense Programs ICEs. The W80-4 program cost reflects additional scope for the 

secondary than was assumed in the FY 2018 SSMP countered by the model changes described 

above. The IWs(or BM-Y and BM-Z) reflect an increase in production costs because ofthe changes 

in the production model described above.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-47

The total side-by-side differences between this year’s and last year’s cost estimates are shown in 

Figure 4–32.

Figure 4–32. Fiscal year 2018 versus fiscal year 2019 SSMP Defense Programs

independent cost estimates

Construction

4.7.5.1 Cost Estimates throughout the Capital Acquisition Process

Programmatic Capital Acquisitions account for over 90 percent of the Infrastructure and Operations

Construction Budget; the remaining costs are for general construction. In FY 2017, Defense Programs 

prioritized developing improved programmatic capital acquisition cost and schedule estimates to inform 

long-term planning. 

The capital acquisition process is governed by DOE Order 413.3B and outlines which DOE/NNSA elements 

are responsible for performing cost estimates throughout the acquisition timeline. Beginning with this 

FY 2019 SSMP, additional Defense Programs ICEs have been performed for the SSMP.23 Since these ICEs

are performed at a very early pre-acquisition stage (often more than a decade before a project’s initial 

CD-0 milestone), these planning estimates primarily inform the portfolio’s long-term cost projections and 

are supplemental to DOE acquisition requirements. 

 

23 ICEs are a best practice identified by the GAO and other professional organizations as a tool to objectively compare to program 

estimates and identify potential issues early.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-48 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

These Defense Programs ICEs are notably: 

 Performed by an independent organization separate from the Federal program office;

24

 Performed using a top-down parametric method that is consistent with early-stage planning;

25

 Based on historic NNSA project schedules and costs;

 Time-phased into fiscal year profiles using standard Weibull distributions, which are commonly 

used in cost estimating;

 Fully unconstrained of future budget availability, which may differ from future budget amounts if 

programming is constrained; and,

 Based on anticipated project scopes and cost uncertainties at the time, updated annually for the 

SSMP.Once a project begins the acquisition process, the approved cost estimate ranges at CD-0 

(Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) supersede previous planning estimates and 

become the planning basis for resource planning. The project then progresses as described in 

DOE Order 413.3B (alternative selection and cost range at CD-1, performance baseline at CD-2, 

etc.). 

Since planning estimates begin significantly before the project’s acquisition process and years before its 

feasibility study, DOE/NNSA assumes a high-level scope that is in line with current policy objectives and 

best known information at the time. However, the scope assumptions for these planning estimates do 

not predetermine the actual project’s acquisition strategy or the outcome of subsequent AoAs, and should 

be considered notional until the project reaches its performance baseline at CD-2.

4.7.5.2 Fiscal Year 2019 through 2043 Estimates

The budget estimate for capital acquisition in FY 2019 through FY 2023, which is part of the Infrastructure 

and Operations-Construction total included in Figure 4–21, reflects the DOE/NNSA current program.

DOE/NNSA is executing the schedules of multiple ongoing major capital acquisition projects, such as the 

Uranium Processing Facility and U1a Complex Enhancements projects. In addition, a list of major capital 

acquisition project proposals have been developed through the efforts of a series of working groups and 

deep dives with representatives from DOE/NNSA sites and responsible Federal offices. DOE/NNSA 

reviewed hundreds of project proposals in 2017. The schedule for the highest-priority project proposals

is depicted by major capital acquisition projects and project proposals listed in Figure 4–33.

26

 Projects are 

color-coded by high-end estimate, as well as status in the capital acquisition process. Projects with a 

formal Federal acquisition decision are shown with solid colors. Projects that are currently under study 

and review for a formal Federal acquisition decision are shown with a solid core and transparent ends.

Projects that are proposed, but not yet under formal review and study are shown with a transparent line. 

This planning schedule will be updated annually. Changes will be made based on available funding and 

programmatic priorities.

 

24 Defense Programs ICEs are performed by the Office of Cost Policy and Analysis.

25 GAO extolls the value of ICEs using a different methodology and the potential benefit to decision-makers in its GAO Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide.

26 Results in Figure 4–33 are accurate as of March 2018 FY 2020 Planning activities. FY 2021 activities are underway and will be 

reflected in the FY 2020 SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 4-49

Figure 4–33. DOE/NNSA major capital acquisition projects and project proposals
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 4-50 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

The current program and the program-vetted project proposals are the basis for the cost estimates. 

Table 4–12 lists low and high estimate projections in then-year dollars for Defense Programs capital 

acquisition projects from FY 2019 through FY 2043. As mentioned in the previous section, several of these 

projects contain a high degree of scope and cost uncertainties, resulting in a significant cost range. This 

year’s SSMP high estimate benefits from several improvements to prior SSMP projection methodology, 

including the following:

 Collecting and validating capital acquisition requirements over the full 25-year SSMP timeframe

 Performing a cost estimate for every validated project proposal (either a Defense Programs ICE, 

as described in the previous section for new construction projects, or site estimates for 

refurbishment projects)27 28

 Updating the high total to represent the 85th percentile of the confidence range for each project

and anticipated future scope 29

 Expanding the table’s time horizon to match the full 25-year SSMP timeframe30

It is problematic to make comparisons to previous SSMP estimates, considering the number of significant 

concurrent updates this year, as these changes collectively result in a substantial increase over last year’s 

published estimates. DOE/NNSA continues to analyze this portfolio’s long-term needs, and the next SSMP 

will include further changes to align it with the recently published 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 

Table 4–12. Weapon Activities capital acquisition estimated costs, fiscal years 2019 through 2043

Then-Year Dollars, in Billions Low a High b

Weapon Activities capital acquisition estimated costs 61.1 90.7

a “Low” reflects the Infrastructure and Operations Construction portfolio’s FY 2023 estimate in Figure 4-21, with an 

escalated 2.1 percent inflationary rate.

b “High” reflects the program provided Infrastructure and Operations Construction portfolio with the 85th percentile 

of the Defense Programs independent cost estimates confidence level range, which is based on the underlying 

scope and cost uncertainties.

 

27 The provisional $15 billion high estimate for the Domestic Uranium Enrichment capability in last year’s SSMP remains 

unchanged.

28 It is also assumed that KCNSC will not require a line-item project to maintain forecast capabilities during the planning period.

29 Use of the 85th percentile is consistent with DOE Order 413.3B guidance to select an acceptable point estimate from a 

confidence level range. The new high estimate includes additions to the scope from the FY 2018 SSMP (such as non-nuclear 

production facility modernization) consistent with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Last year’s low estimate reflected an even 

lower amount of new infrastructure scope, including no funds for Plutonium Pit Production or Domestic Uranium Enrichment 

projects.

30 The table reflects only the 20-year post-FYNSP planning horizon in last year’s SSMP.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 5-1

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This DOE/NNSA Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Summary

(SSMP), together with the classified Annex, is a key planning document for the nuclear security enterprise. 

The SSMP represents the 25-year strategic program that is a collection of the plans developed across 

numerous DOE/NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, 

capabilities, and infrastructure to ensure mission success. The DOE/NNSA Federal workforce prepares 

each SSMP in collaboration with management and operating partners. The plan in the FY 2019 SSMP is 

also coordinated with DOD through the Nuclear Weapons Council and is consistent with the Nuclear 

Weapons Council’s Strategic Plan for 2017–2042. This SSMP is NNSA’s foundation for meeting the nuclear 

weapons mission tenets laid out in the December 2017 National Security Strategy (White House 2017) 

and the Nuclear Posture Review (DOD 2018). As with previous SSMPs, a new version is published each 

year as DOE/NNSA updates its strategic plans in response to new demands and challenges related to 

stewardship and management of the stockpile. As such, the FY 2019 SSMP builds on previous SSMPs and 

updates the costs and resources required for execution of the program based on current mission needs, 

the strategic environment, and new guidance. 

While executing the current plan, DOE/NNSA had an outstanding FY 2017. DOE/NNSA maintained the 

existing nuclear weapons stockpile, made impressive progress on a number of life extension programs 

(LEPs), and continued to advance the science and engineering capabilities that underpin the Nation’s 

Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Although many warheads in America’s nuclear weapons stockpile have exceeded their original design 

lives, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to maintain the safety, reliability, security, and 

effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This effort harnesses leading-edge science, engineering, 

high performance computing, and advanced manufacturing to enable the Secretaries of Energy and 

Defense to annually inform the President regarding the safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile 

without nuclear explosive testing. 

The Stockpile Management Program also continued to extend the life of existing U.S. nuclear warheads 

by replacing nuclear and non-nuclear parts or inserting new parts that use modern technologies. 

DOE/NNSA’s state-of-the-art capabilities for research, development, test, evaluation, and production 

enabled this critical effort. The scope, budgets, and schedules of the LEPs; infrastructure modernization;

and DOD nuclear delivery systems have been fully integrated through coordinated and tightly coupled 

efforts. 

To facilitate future scientific and engineering excellence at the national security laboratories and nuclear 

weapons production sites, DOE/NNSA has expanded university collaborations and science, technology, 

engineering, and mathematics educational outreach in applied and technical research supporting 

technology development. In addition, DOE/NNSA has increased direct mission-specific activities by its 

Federal, laboratory, and contractor partners. 
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page 5-2 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

In the near term, DOE/NNSA began addressing infrastructure challenges and broke ground on 

construction projects that will provide high-quality workspace for the workforce and serve the nuclear 

security enterprise for decades to come. 

Finally, to meet DOE/NNSA’s continued support for the nuclear deterrent into the 2030s and beyond will 

require significant, sustained investment. Over the past several decades, the U.S. nuclear weapons 

infrastructure realized the effects of aging and underfunding. All previous Nuclear Posture Reviews 

highlighted the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure. To achieve this goal,

DOE/NNSA has developed a list of major capital acquisition project proposals that will be evaluated 

against current and future capability needs as resourcing decisions are made.

Highlights of DOE/NNSA’s near-term and out-year objectives include the following:

 Advance the innovative experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, and computational 

capabilities to ensure stockpile safety, security, reliability, and responsiveness. 

 Complete production of the W76-1 warheads by FY 2019.

 Deliver the first production unit of the B61-12 by FY 2020 and complete production by FY 2024.

 Deliver the first production unit of the W88 Alt 370 (with refresh of the conventional high 

explosive) by FY 2020 and complete alterations by FY 2024.

 Synchronize DOE/NNSA’s W80-4 LEP with DOD’s Long Range Stand Off program. Achieve a first 

production unit of the W80-4 by FY 2025 and complete the LEP by 2031.

 Advance the W78 warhead replacement by 1 year to FY 2019 to support fielding of the GroundBased Strategic Deterrent by FY 2030.

 Sustain the B83-1 until a suitable replacement is identified.

 Explore future ballistic missile warhead requirements. 

 Provide an enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium pits at a rate of no fewer than 

80 pits per year in 2030. 

 Create an effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear infrastructure that ensures the availability 

of strategic materials to meet military requirements.

 Phase out mission dependency on Building 9212 at Y-12 and deliver the Uranium Processing 

Facility for no more than $6.5 billion by the end of 2025.

 Implement the strategy to achieve the strategic priorities laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review, 

as determined by the Nuclear Weapons Council.

 Achieve exascale computing and deliver a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s.

 Ensure an enduring trusted supply of strategic radiation-hardened microsystems beyond 2025.

 Develop an operational enhanced capability (advanced radiography and reactivity 

measurements) for subcritical experiments by the mid-2020s.

 Implement the Stockpile Responsiveness Program.

The key long-term challenge is balancing near-term commitments with essential nuclear security 

enterprise capability requirements, given resource constraints. These commitments include meeting the 

near-term needs of the stockpile, sustaining or recapitalizing the infrastructure, and advancing the 

understanding of the performance of weapons in the stockpile. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page 5-3

DOE/NNSA has confidence in its ability to execute the program described in the FY 2019 SSMP. The LEPs 

remain on schedule and, once completed, will extend the service life for the stockpile and improve safety 

and effectiveness. With Congress’ support, the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the current 

stockpile can be maintained to meet the Nation’s national security needs. 

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-1

Appendix A

Requirements Mapping

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to 

Statutory Reporting Requirements and Related Requests

The Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (SSMP)

consolidates a number of statutory reporting requirements and related congressional requests. This 

appendix maps the statutory and congressional requirements to the respective chapter and section in the 

FY 2019 SSMP. 

A.2 Ongoing Requirements

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

§ 2521. Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, 

shall establish a stewardship program to ensure –

(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the 

United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system 

integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and 

certification; and 

(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the 

use of underground nuclear weapons testing.

Unclassified

All Chapters

Unclassified

All Chapters

(b) Program elements

The program shall include the following:

(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to 

enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with 

respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.2, 3.7, 

3.7.1; Appendix C

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1, 

3.2; Appendix B

(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such 

as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma 

physics, and materials research.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.4, 3.7.2;

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3.1, 

8.3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4, 

3.5, 3.6, 3.8, 

3.10, 3.11

(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the 

experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced 

hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for 

above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.7.2; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3.1

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.7.5
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page A-2 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced 

experimental facilities of the United States, including -

(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory;

(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory;

(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and 

(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 3.2.1, 

3.7.2; Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3.1, 

8.3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3–

3.8, 3.12, 3.14

(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with 

production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the 

safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including -

(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and

(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national 

security laboratories.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.4, 

2.2.6, 2.4.1–2.4.6; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.4, 

4.3.3, 4.3.4; 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.1, 8.3.1, 

8.7.5

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.4,

2.4.1–2.4.7;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.16–

3.26

(1) With respect to exascale computing—

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop and 

carry out a plan to develop exascale computing and incorporate such computing 

into the stockpile stewardship program under section 4201 of the Atomic Energy 

Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of 

the enactment of this Act [Dec. 26, 2013]

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.2, 

3.7.1; Appendix C

Unclassified

Appendix B

(b) MILESTONES.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include major 

programmatic milestones in—

(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile 

stewardship program; and

(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.2; 

Appendix C

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.19; 

Appendix B

(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.—In developing the plan required by 

subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the Under 

Secretary of Energy for Science, the Secretary of Defense, and elements of the 

intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))).

(d) INCLUSION OF COSTS IN FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.—The 

Administrator shall—

(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations 

reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under 

section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 

2453) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the costs of—

(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into 

the stockpile stewardship program; and

(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale 

computing; and

(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of 

the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of 

Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.1, 8.3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3.4
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-3

50 U.S. Code § 2521

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Administrator shall submit the plan required 

by subsection (a) to the congressional defense committees [Committees on Armed 

Services and Appropriations of Senate and the House of Representative] with each 

summary of the plan required by subsection (a) of section 4203 of the Atomic 

Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) submitted under subsection (b)(1) of that 

section during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 

Act.

(f) EXASCALE COMPUTING DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘exascale 

computing’’ means computing through the use of a computing machine that 

performs near or above 10 to the 18th power floating point operations per 

second.

50 U.S. Code § 2522

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

§ 2522. Stockpile stewardship criteria 

(a) Requirement for criteria

The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging 

whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for 

determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are 

performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that the 

stockpile is safe and reliable.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.2, 

3.7.1, 3.7.2; 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3.1, 

8.3.2, 8.3.3, 8.3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 

2.2.1–2.2.4

(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall 

coordinate with the Secretary of Defense. 

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

§ 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness

plan

(a) Plan requirement

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other 

appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, 

shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile 

management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program direction, 

infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan 

shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most 

recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

(b) Submissions to Congress

(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each evennumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a). 

N/A Unclassified

All chapters

Classified Annex

(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each oddnumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a). 

Unclassified

All chapters

Classified Annex

N/A

(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted 

in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page A-4 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(c) Elements of biennial plan summary

Each summary of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a 

minimum, the following:

N/A

(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the 

number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each 

warhead type.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.4;

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.2, 

2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.1

Classified Annex

(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life 

extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace 

warhead types.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.1;

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1, 4.2, 

4.2.1, 4.2.2

(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of 

science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.2.3;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1–3.27

(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including 

programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of human 

capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1,

Sections 1.5, 1.8;

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.28–

3.31; Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.2, 

4.5, 4.5.1–4.5.4, 

4.7.5

Classified Annex

(5) A summary of the status, plans, and budgets for carrying out the stockpile 

responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4

(6) A summary of the plan regarding the research and development, 

deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of technologies described in subsection 

(d) (7).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3

(7) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) regarding the 

execution of programs with current and projected budgets and any associated 

risks.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.7.1

(8) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

N/A Unclassified

Executive 

Summary; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.3, 

4.3.1–4.3.5, 

4.4.9, 4.5.3, 

4.6.2, 4.6.3, 4.7, 

4.7.3, 4.7.4, 4.7.5

Classified Annex
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-5

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(9) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate. N/A Unclassified

Classified Annex

(d) Elements of biennial detailed report

Each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall include, 

at a minimum, the following:

(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and 

stockpile responsiveness—

(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and 

age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead 

type;

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.4; 

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.2.2, 

2.3

Classified Annex

N/A

(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the 

date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of 

the report—

(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and 

inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and

(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of 

nuclear weapon;

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.7.1–

8.7.4

Classified Annex

N/A

(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension 

programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead 

types;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.3, 

2.3.2–2.3.6; 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.2.4, 

8.7.4

Classified Annex

N/A

(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the 

lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the 

nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and 

inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.2.1, 

2.2.2; Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.3

N/A

(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and 

reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.5

N/A

(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the 

Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in 

the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5.1–

3.5.10

Classified Annex

N/A

(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and 

modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as 

needed;

Unclassified

Chapter 2; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4.2

N/A
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page A-6 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for 

carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 2524 

of this title, including information relating to the aging of materials and 

components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or 

substitution of materials;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.2, 

2.2.3; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.3, 

3.5.3, 3.5.6, 3.5.8, 

3.7.2

N/A

(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions 

for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production 

facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to 

ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and 

mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.3, 1.3.1, 

1.3.2, 1.3.3; 

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.3.1–

2.3.6; Chapter 7; 

Appendix E

N/A

(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full 

and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review 

process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile required under section 2525 of this title;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.5.2

N/A

(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile 

management program required by section 2524 of this title, including 

allocations of funds by weapon type and facility; and

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.1, 8.2.1, 

8.3.1–8.3.3, 8.7.4

N/A

(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the 

program required under section 2524 of this title;

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.1

N/A

(M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the 

stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title; 

Unclassified 

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.7.3;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1, 3.2.3; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.1

N/A

(N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the 

program required under section 2538b of this title; and

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.1

N/A

(O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear 

weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national 

security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and 

development that includes separate comments on the plan from the 

Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.

N/A

(2) With respect to science-based tools—

(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear 

weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5.2

N/A

(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in 

subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information 

and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on 

the criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) of this title; and

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.6.2

N/A

(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including any 

updates to such criteria).

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 

(a) of this title by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the 

national security laboratories, which shall set forth—

(A) an identification and description of—

(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; 

and

(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear 

testing;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5.1–

3.5.10

Classified Annex

N/A

(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory 

to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable 

without the use of nuclear testing;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 

3.2.1–3.2.4, 3.7, 

3.7.1, 3.8

N/A

(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory 

that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based 

tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program; and

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5.1–

3.5.10

Classified Annex

N/A

(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies 

required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program 

and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the 

Administration, including—

Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.5.3

N/A

(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, 

required to maintain such competencies; and

Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.2; 

Appendix E

N/A

(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the 

time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist 

during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security 

program.

Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Sections 7.6.1, 

7.6.2; Appendix E

N/A

(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—

(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the 

Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed 

in—

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1, 4.2.4, 

4.3.3, 4.3.4

N/A

(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the 

most recent national security strategy report of the President under 

section 3043 of this title if such strategy has been submitted as of the 

date of the plan; 

(ii) the most recent quadrennial defense review if such strategy has 

not been submitted as of the date of the plan; and

(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan;

(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under 

subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan; 

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.4, 

4.3.4

N/A

(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines 

necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), 

including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which 

such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and

Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Sections 8.5, 8.5.1, 

8.7.1, 8.7.2, 8.7.4

N/A
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(D) a description of—

(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the 

Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance 

and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and 

(II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on 

maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and

(III) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs 

complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of 

the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that 

such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement 

plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan 

for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise are being properly sustained.

(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—

(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the 

Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once 

directed by the President to conduct such a test;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.8

N/A

(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.8

N/A

(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site;

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.8

N/A

(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site; and

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.8

N/A

(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities 

described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants 

described in subparagraph (D).

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.8

N/A

(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and 

stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:

(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand 

plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured 

and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.

Unclassified

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.6.1, 

3.6.2

Classified Annex

N/A

(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium 

at elemental and bulk conditions.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.4, 3.4, 3.4.1,

3.7.2

Classified Annex

N/A

(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for 

plutonium and plutonium components.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.1

N/A

(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance 

under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and 

nonmanufactured conditions.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.2

Classified Annex

N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments 

described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5, 3.6.2

Classified Annex

N/A

(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, 

and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period 

covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 2453 

of this title.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.2.1,

8.3.1–8.3.4

N/A

(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified 

under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program.

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3.1–

8.3.4

N/A

(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the 

integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile 

stewardship needs.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.1

N/A

7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle 

sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security 

enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal 

years following the date of the report, together with—

N/A N/A

(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the 

technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats 

posed to that site; 

N/A N/A

(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used 

by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical 

and cybersecurity technologies; and 

N/A N/A

(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program 

element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the 

Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will 

help carry out that plan.

N/A N/A

(8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be 

executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.

N/A N/A

(9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

Unclassified

Chapter 8

N/A
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

(e) Nuclear Weapons Council assessment 

(1) For each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2), the 

Nuclear Weapons Council shall conduct an assessment that includes the 

following:

(A) An analysis of the plan, including—

(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security 

strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense 

review, as applicable under subsection (d)(4)(A), and the Nuclear 

Posture Review;

(ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described 

under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) and the schedule 

described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection are adequate to 

support such requirements; and

(iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program 

under section 2538b of this title in a manner that meets the objectives 

of such program and an identification of any improvements that may 

be made to the plan to better carry out such program.

(B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements 

for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise.

(C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not 

adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under 

subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure 

recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment 

with respect to—

(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; 

and

(ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile.

(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits 

the plan under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to 

the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment 

required under paragraph (1).

N/A N/A

(f) Definitions – In this section:

(1) The term “budget”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for 

that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 

1105(a) of title 31.

(2) The term “future-years nuclear security program” means the program 

required by section 2453 of this title.

(3) The term “nuclear security budget materials”, with respect to a fiscal year, 

means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support 

of the budget for that fiscal year.

(4) The term “quadrennial defense review” means the review of the defense 

programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years 

under section 118 of title 10.

(5) The term “weapons activities” means each activity within the budget 

category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration.

(6) The term “weapons-related activities” means each activity under the 

Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons 

technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—

(A) nuclear nonproliferation;

(B) nuclear forensics;

(C) nuclear intelligence;

(D) nuclear safety; and

(E) nuclear incident response.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-11

50 U.S. Code § 2524

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

§ 2524. Stockpile management program

(a) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security and 

in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in support 

of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective management of 

the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the extension of the 

effective life of such weapons. The program shall have the following objectives:

(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile of the United States.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2, 2.3

Unclassified

Chapter 2,

Sections 2.1, 

2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3

(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear 

weapons testing.

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.6, 3.7, 

3.7.1, 3.7.2

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.1; 

Chapter 3,

Sections 3.1–3.14

(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3, 

2.3.1–2.3.6

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.7; 

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.5

(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the 

stockpile.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1–

2.2.5, 2.4.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.7.1, 

3.7.2

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1–

2.2.5, 2.4.6

(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or 

entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies.

Unclassified

Chapter 5

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1;

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.15,

3.16

(b) Program limitations

In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the 

Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—

(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the objectives 

identified in subsection (a); and 

(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—

(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the 

maximum extent feasible, components that are well understood or are 

certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons 

testing; and

(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the 

nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the 

existing stockpile.

(c) Program budget

In accordance with the requirements under section 2529 of this title, for each 

budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the 

amounts requested for the program under this section shall be clearly identified in 

the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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50 U.S. Code § 2538a 

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

§2538a. Plutonium pit production capacity Unclassified Unclassified

(a) Requirement

Consistent with the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise-

(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits;

(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits;

(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits;

(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and

(5) during a pilot period of not less than 90 days during 2027 (subject to 

subsection (b)), demonstrates the capability to produce war 

reserve plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to produce 80 pits per year.

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.1

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.4.1

(b) Authorization of two-year delay of demonstration requirement

The Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense may jointly delay, for not 

more than two years, the requirement under subsection (a)(5) if-

(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy jointly submit to the 

congressional defense committees a report describing-

(A) the justification for the proposed delay;

(B) the effects of the proposed delay on stockpile stewardship and 

modernization, life extension programs, future stockpile strategy, and 

dismantlement efforts; and

(C) whether the proposed delay is consistent with national policy regarding 

creation of a responsive nuclear infrastructure; and

(2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command submits to the 

congressional defense committees a report containing the assessment of the 

Commander with respect to the potential risks to national security of the 

proposed delay in meeting-

(A) the nuclear deterrence requirements of the United States Strategic 

Command; and

(B) national requirements related to creation of a responsive nuclear 

infrastructure.

(c) Annual certification

Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year thereafter through 2027 (or, if the 

authority under subsection (b) is exercised, 2029), the Secretary of Energy shall 

certify to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense that 

the programs and budget of the Secretary of Energy will enable the nuclear security 

enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a).

N/A N/A

(d) Plan

If the Secretary of Energy does not make a certification under subsection (c) by 

March 1 of any year in which a certification is required under that subsection, by 

not later than May 1 of such year, the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council 

shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to enable the nuclear 

security enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a). Such plan shall 

include identification of the resources of the Department of Energy that the 

Chairman determines should be redirected to support the plan to meet such 

requirements.

N/A N/A
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page A-13

50 U.S. Code § 2538b

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

§ 2538b. Stockpile responsiveness program Unclassified Unclassified

(a) Statement of policy

It is the policy of the United States to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and 

continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, 

develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the 

nuclear deterrent of the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and 

responsive.

All Chapters All Chapters

(b) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with 

the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a stockpile responsiveness program, along 

with the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 of this title and the 

stockpile management program under section 2524 of this title, to identify, sustain, 

enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required to 

conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy 

nuclear weapons.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.5, 1.7.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.1, 3.2.3, 

3.4.1, 3.4.4;

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3.2

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.5, 1.7

(c) Objectives The program under subsection (b) shall have the following objectives:

(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the 

capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, 

engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out 

all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both 

the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of the Department of 

Defense.

(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with 

respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process from one 

generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following 

generation.

(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of 

capabilities required, including prototypes, flight testing, and development of 

plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.

(4) Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines to 

minimize the amount of time and costs leading to an engineering prototype and 

production.

(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all 

relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the Department of 

Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.

(6) The retention of the ability, in consultation with the Director of National 

Intelligence, to assess and develop prototype nuclear weapons of foreign 

countries and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.1, 1.5, 

1.7.3; Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.2, 

2.5.3; Chapter 3; 

Chapter 7, 

Sections 7.5.4, 

7.6.3

Unclassified

Chapter 3

(d) Joint nuclear weapons life cycle process defined

In this section, the term “joint nuclear weapons life cycle process” means the 

process developed and maintained by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of nuclear 

weapons.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page A-14 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

A.3 Other Requirements

H.R.244 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 115-31

FY 2018

Response

FY 2019 

Response

SEC. 4. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.

The explanatory statement regarding this Act, printed in the House section of the 

Congressional Record on or about May 2, 2017, and submitted by the Chairman of the 

Committee on Appropriations of the House, shall have the same effect with respect to 

the allocation of funds and implementation of divisions A through L of this Act as if it 

were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

Congressional Record – House, Vol 163, No 76—Book II, page H3753, May 3, 2017

(Explanatory Statement to Accompany the FY 17 Omnibus Appropriations

[P.L. 115-31]]

Life Extension Reporting. – The NNSA is directed to provide to the Committees on 

Appropriations of both Houses of Congress a classified summary of each ongoing life 

extension and major refurbishment program that includes explanatory information on 

the progress and planning for each program beginning with the award of the phase 6.3 

milestone and annually thereafter until completion of the program.

Classified Annex Classified Annex
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page B-1

Appendix B

Exascale Computing Initiative

The December 2017 National Security Strategy mandatesthat “to maintain our competitive advantage, the 

United States will prioritize emerging technologies critical to economic growth and security, such as data 

science, encryption, gene editing, new materials, nanotechnology, advanced computing technologies, and 

artificial intelligence.” In addition, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that the Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) will “maintain and enhance the computational, 

experimental, and testing capabilities needed to annually assess nuclear weapons.” In order to maintain 

competitive advantage and the capabilities for the annual assessment, the United States must retain 

primacy in high-performance computing (HPC). HPC will also help ensure national security, economic 

prosperity, technological strength, and scientific and energy research leadership. Failure to address 

national security, science, and growing big data needs will open the door to other nations to take the lead,

not only in high-end computing, but eventually in science, national defense, and energy innovation, as well 

as in the commercial computing market. 

In 2015 the National Strategic Computing Initiative was established to maximize the benefits of HPC for 

U.S. economic competitiveness, scientific discovery, and national security. DOE, through a partnership 

between the DOE Office of Science and NNSA, is responsible for executing the joint Exascale Computing 

Initiative. This initiative focuses on advanced simulationsthrough an exascale-capable computing program 

and emphasizes sustained performance and analytic computing to advance DOE/NNSA missions. The 

objectives and associated scientific challenges define a mission need in the early to mid-2020s for a 

computing capability of 2 to 10 exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOPS = 1018 floating-point operations per second).

B.1 Challenges

To deliver the exascale computing capability for the nuclear security mission within the next decade, while 

maintaining and modifying the integrated design codes, NNSA will accomplish the following:

 Develop HPC technologies and systems, in close partnership with computer vendors, to provide 

at least a 25-fold increase in sustained application code performance over the currently largest 

Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) supercomputer, Trinity, which is a 41-petaFLOPS 

system; 

 Address code performance on the next-generation hardware, which is anticipated to incorporate 

multi-core, heterogeneous computing architectures;

 Develop a tri-laboratory, open-sourced software stack that will run efficiently on the new 

advanced architecture prototype systems to assess the viability of an alternative HPC architecture 

path for ASC; and 

 Refurbish or construct computing facilities that will be capable of siting exascale platforms with 

increasing and evolving structural integrity, power, and cooling requirements.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

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B.2 Approaches and Strategies

To achieve exascale goals, the DOE/NNSA will interact with industry in HPC technology development. Past 

partnerships between the U.S. Government and industry have led to development of innovative 

technologies that met both Federal Government and private sector objectives. NNSA will continue its

partnership with the DOE Office of Science on the Exascale Computing Initiative, including investments in 

research and development of software tools and applications with computer vendors, the national 

laboratories, and universities. In addition, DOE/NNSA are collaborating on the joint April 2018 CORAL-2 

(Collaboration of Oak Ridge, Argonne, and Livermore) procurement, which will deliver an exascale-class 

system to DOE’s Office of Science in FY 2021–2022 and another to NNSA in FY 2023. This joint 

procurement will allow the program offices to share critical non-recurring engineering development costs 

with the selected vendor(s). The current spend plan in the mid-2020s is shown in Table B–1. This spend 

plan does not support delivery of exascale by 2023.

Table B-1. NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023

Exascale Computing Initiative Elements

(dollars in millions) FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023

Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation 170 95 50 61 56 36

Computational Systems and Software 

Environment – El Capitan System

1 21 25 46 53 24

Facility Operations and User Support – Construction 

(Exascale Computing Facility Modernization)

3 23 50

Facility Operations and User Support – Construction 

(Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment)

24 2

Total 174 163 127 107 109 60

In addition to hardware and software technology development efforts, exascale systems must meet 

exacting power usage, reliability, and functionality criteria. Each exascale-class platform will require 

between 30 and 45 megawatts per year to operate, as well as requisite cooling. Managing a service load 

of this magnitude, which is over and above existing requirements in ASC facilities, will necessitate major 

facility modernizations. Currently, ASC is supporting two construction projects in its Exascale Computing 

Initiative portfolio. At LLNL, the Exascale Computing Facility Modernization (ECFM) project is intended to 

fill this gap by providing 85 megawatts of power, 18,000 tons of additional water cooling, and structural 

reinforcement capable of supporting 315 pounds per square foot of rack load by early in calendar year 

2022. Critical Decision 0 (CD-0, Approve Mission Need) for the ECFM project was approved in April 2017. 

CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) was approved May 29, 2018. The ECFM is essential 

for LLNL to site the NNSA exascale system at the beginning of FY 2023. At LANL, the Exascale Class 

Computer Cooling Equipment Project was approved for CD-2/3 (Approve Performance Baseline/Approve 

Start of Construction) on April 4, 2018. This project will expand the warm water cooling capacity in 

Building 2327 to about 9,300 tons, enabling the siting of the Advanced Technology System (ATS)-3 

Crossroads supercomputer and future systems at LANL.

B.3 Conclusion

DOE/NNSA, through the ASC Exascale effort, is investing in products and approaches that are directly 

related to anticipated disruptive changes in the HPC ecosystem. Activities include research and 

development partnerships with multiple HPC vendors, development of next-generation weapons codes 

with new simulation capabilities, and procurement of an advanced architecture prototype system with a 
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potential alternative HPC software stack. Cooperation with computer vendors has also led to significant 

advances in HPC software and hardware technologies. These activities have provided experience and 

lessons learned and have already delivered a variety of software development tools and libraries on which 

many ASC applications now rely. To complete this effort, DOE/NNSA must conduct more intensive 

research, development, and engineering to deploy an exascale capability in the mid-2020s.

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Appendix C

Weapons Activities Capabilities

This table represents the breadth of capabilities that delineate critical functions of Weapons Activities in 

the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) nuclear security 

enterprise. The table includes a definition for each capability as well as the relevant section(s) of the 

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary (SSMP) for each 

one. These capabilities should not be viewed in isolation or as mutually exclusive, as many overlap and 

are complementary. They represent the underlying disciplines, activities, and specialized skills required 

to meet NNSA missions.

Capability Definition

Relevant 

Section of 

FY 2019 SSMP

Advanced 

Experimental 

Diagnostics and 

Sensors

Advanced diagnostics and sensors are used to measure what is occurring. 

Standard diagnostics provide less data than required to fully capture the 

behavior of many tests and experiments; continued development is 

reducing these limitations. An example of an advanced diagnostic is

static or dynamic radiography. Radiography is an imaging technique that 

uses x-rays or sub-atomic particles (e.g., protons, neutrons) to view the 

internal structure of an object that is opaque to visible light. Static 

radiography of a stationary object is used during the post-fabrication 

inspection process to ensure that components have been fabricated 

correctly and are free of defects. Dynamic radiography takes multiple 

images of an object as it is imploding or expanding.

Section 3.7

Advanced 

Manufacturing

Advanced manufacturing uses innovative techniques from industry, 

academia, or internal research and development to reduce costs and 

production time, improve safety, and control waste streams. Examples 

include additive or digital manufacturing, use of microreactors, 

microwave casting, and electrorefining. 

Section 3.18

Atomic and Plasma 

Physics

Atomic physics is the study of atoms and the interaction of their 

electrons with x-rays. Plasma physics is the study of the fourth state of 

matter, which contains ionized atoms and unbound electrons. The 

extremely high temperatures in nuclear weapons generate plasma and 

x-rays. 

Section 3.4

Chemistry Chemistry is the study of the fundamental (or elemental) composition, 

structure, bonding, and properties of matter. Chemistry is essential for 

purifying, synthesizing, processing, and fabricating materials. The 

stability of these materials and how properties and material reactions

change with time must be understood to ensure quality, performance, 

reliability, and safety of the stockpile.

Section 3.9
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Capability Definition

Relevant 

Section of 

FY 2019 SSMP

Environmental Effects 

Analysis, Testing, and 

Engineering Sciences

Environmental effects analysis, testing, and engineering sciences use an 

array of test equipment, tools, and techniques. Examples of 

environments (normal and abnormal) include shock, vibration, radiation, 

acceleration, temperature, electrostatics, and pressure. The engineering 

sciences that support this analysis include thermal and fluid sciences, 

structural mechanics, dynamics, and aerodynamics. 

Section 3.14

Handling, Packaging, 

Processing, and 

Manufacturing of 

Energetic and 

Hazardous Material 

Hazardous and energetic materials require safe and secure handling, 

packaging, processing, manufacturing, and inspection. Lithium, 

beryllium, and mercury have the potential to harm humans, animals, or 

the environment. Energetic materials (e.g., explosives, propellants) and 

hazardous materials require special conduct of operations, containment 

equipment, and facilities to handle, process, or manufacture products 

containing these materials. 

Section 3.20

Handling, Packaging, 

Processing, and 

Manufacturing of 

Special Nuclear 

Materials

Special conduct of operations, physical security protection, facilities, and 

equipment are required to handle, package, process, manufacture, and 

inspect components that contain special nuclear materials 

(e.g., plutonium, enriched uranium). 

Section 3.21

High Energy Density 

Physics

High energy density physics is the study of matter and radiation under 

extreme conditions such as those in a nuclear weapon and in 

experiments at facilities such as the National Ignition Facility, Omega

Laser Facility, and the Z pulsed power facility that provide fundamental 

data for validating computational models.

Section 3.5

High Explosives 

Science and 

Engineering

High explosives science and engineering is the study of how energetic 

materials detonate, how the explosive shock wave propagates through a

material, and how to select, synthesize, and manufacture high explosives 

for specific applications. Knowledge of the performance of high 

explosives is important to predict the performance of a weapon.

Section 3.10

High Performance 

Computing

High performance computing requires software, hardware, and facilities 

of sufficient power to achieve the resolution, dimensionality, and 

complexity in simulation codes to model the performance of weapon

systems and components.

Section 3.2

Hydrodynamic and 

Subcritical 

Experiments

A hydrodynamic experiment is performed to understand the dynamics of 

an implosion. A subcritical experiment contains special nuclear material

that never achieves a critical configuration and does not create nuclear 

yield. Both types of experiments provide data essential to predict the 

performance of nuclear weapons and validate the multi-physics design 

codes and the models embedded in these codes.

Section 3.8

Information 

Technology and 

Cybersecurity

Information technology and cybersecurity provides infrastructure and 

protection for all networks and systems to support both classified and 

unclassified environments. It ensures electronic information and 

information assets are performing necessary operations and are 

protected from compromised, unauthorized access and malicious acts 

that would adversely affect national and economic security.

Section 3.30
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Capability Definition

Relevant 

Section of 

FY 2019 SSMP

Laser, Pulsed Power, 

and Accelerator 

Technology

These enhanced technologies provide data at pressure, temperature, and 

radiation conditions close to those in a nuclear weapon while ensuring 

safe, reliable, efficient operation of the lasers, pulsed power devices, and 

accelerators. Lasers and pulsed power devices accumulate energy over 

long periods and release it very quickly. Accelerators use 

electromagnetic fields to accelerate charged particles to very high 

speeds. The charged particles can produce high-energy x-rays to take 

radiographs or high-energy neutrons for nuclear physics investigations.

Section 3.6

Materials Science and 

Engineering

Materials science, in the context of stockpile stewardship, is the study of 

how materials in a nuclear weapon behave under both extreme and 

moderate conditions of temperature and pressure. Materials 

engineering involves the evaluation and selection of materials for these 

environments. Strength, aging, compatibility, viability, and damage 

mechanisms are among the material characteristics to be evaluated. 

Materials science and engineering play a key role in resolving stockpile 

and production issues, validating computational models, and developing

new materials (e.g., materials produced through additive manufacturing).

Section 3.11

Metal and Organic 

Material Fabrication, 

Processing, and 

Manufacturing

Although many components in weapons are supplied by U.S. industries, 

specialized components and materials must be produced within the 

nuclear security enterprise. This production requires synthesis of organic 

materials and processing, manufacturing, and inspection of metallic and 

organic products, based on knowledge of material behavior, 

compatibility, and aging. 

Section 3.23

Non-Nuclear Weapon 

Component 

Manufacturing and 

Assembly

Many non-nuclear weapon components (e.g., microelectronics; gas 

transfer systems; arming, fuzing, and firing assemblies; environmental 

sensing devices; radars; neutron generators; batteries) require special 

manufacturing, assembly, and inspection protocols. 

Section 3.24

Nuclear Physics and 

Radiochemistry 

Nuclear physics is the study of atomic nuclei and their interactions,

especially fission and fusion. Knowledge is required of the probabilities 

of interactions of neutrons with fissile material and of light nuclei that 

can result in fusion. Radiochemistry, the chemistry of radioactive 

materials, is used to evaluate data from legacy underground tests as well 

as from experiments at the National Ignition Facility, Omega Laser 

Facility, and the Z pulsed power facility.

Section 3.3

Physical Security Physical security protects the Nation’s nuclear materials and 

infrastructure assets and the workforce at NNSA sites involved in 

Weapon Activities. It protects assets from theft, diversion, sabotage, 

espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile or 

noncompliant acts that may adversely affect national security, program 

continuity, and employee security.

Section 3.29

Radiation-Hardened 

Microelectronics 

Design and 

Manufacturing

Design, production, and testing of radiation-hardened microelectronics is 

required for nuclear weapons to function properly in hostile 

environments. This capability requires a secure, trusted supply chain, 

including quality control of materials used in the process and the 

products.

Section 3.16
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Capability Definition

Relevant 

Section of 

FY 2019 SSMP

Secure Transportation Protection and movement of nuclear weapons, weapon components, 

and special nuclear material between facilities includes the design and 

fabrication or modification of vehicles, design and fabrication of special 

communication systems, and training of Federal agents. 

Section 3.28

Simulation Codes and 

Models

Advanced computer codes and the models embedded in these codes are 

developed and used to simulate the behavior of nuclear weapons. NNSA 

codes operate on computers ranging from desktop machines to the 

world’s largest high performance supercomputers.

Section 3.1

Testing Equipment 

Design and 

Fabrication

Design and fabrication of special test equipment to simulate 

environmental and functional conditions must ensure that products 

meet specifications. Data from test equipment provide evidence for 

qualification, certification, reliability, surety, and surveillance. 

Section 3.26

Tritium Production, 

Handling, and 

Processing

Tritium has a 12-year half-life and must be periodically replenished in gas 

transfer systems. Production, handling, and processing of tritium 

includes the recovery, extraction, refinement, storage, filling, and 

inspection of gas transfer systems. 

Section 3.22

Weapon Component 

and Material Process 

Development

Process development of weapon components involves small-lot 

production, precise controls, and a deep understanding of the hazards of 

working with special nuclear materials and other exotic materials. 

Component process development is also required whenever process 

changes are made to reduce cost and production time.

Section 3.19

Weapon Component 

and System 

Prototyping

Development, qualification, and manufacture of high-fidelity, full-scale 

prototype weapon components and systems reduce the cost and life

cycle time to develop and qualify new designs and technologies. This 

capability includes the ability to design, manufacture, and employ 

mockups with sensors to support laboratory and flight tests that provide 

evidence that components can function with Department of Defense

delivery systems in realistic environments. 

Section 3.17

Weapon Component 

and System 

Surveillance and 

Assessment

Surveillance enhances integration across test regimes to demonstrate 

performance requirements for stockpile systems by inspections, 

laboratory and flight tests, non-destructive tests, and component and 

material evaluations. The comparability of data over time provides the 

ability to predict, detect, assess, and resolve aging trends and anomalous 

changes in the stockpile, as well as to address or mitigate issues or 

concerns. Assessment is the analysis, largely through modeling and 

simulation, of data gathered during surveillance to evaluate the safety, 

performance, and reliability of weapon systems and the effect of aging 

on performance, uncertainties, and margins.

Section 3.27

Weapons Engineering 

Design, Analysis, and 

Integration

Elements of weapons engineering capability include the following life

cycle phases: concept exploration, satisfaction of requirements, 

conceptual design, detailed design and development, production, and 

certification and qualification. This capability also includes system 

integration, which includes understanding and developing the interfaces

among the non-nuclear subsystems, between the non-nuclear 

components and the nuclear explosives package, and between the 

DOE/NNSA and Department of Defense systems.

Section 3.13
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Capability Definition

Relevant 

Section of 

FY 2019 SSMP

Weapon System 

Assembly and 

Disassembly

Weapons system assembly involves the final assembly of the nuclear and 

non-nuclear components. Assembly requires special conduct of 

operations, equipment, and facilities. Disassembly, inspection, and 

storage or disposal of the components require similar special conduct of 

operations, quality control, equipment, and facilities. 

Section 3.25

Weapons Physics 

Design and Analysis

Design and analysis of the nuclear explosive package is required to

maintain existing U.S. nuclear weapons, modernize the stockpile, 

evaluate possible proliferant nuclear weapons, and respond to emerging 

threats, unanticipated events, and technological innovation. Elements of 

design capability include concept exploration, satisfaction of

specifications, conceptual design, detailed design and development, 

production process development, and certification and qualification. 

Weapons physics analysis includes evaluation of weapons effects.

Section 3.12

Weapons Surety 

Design, Testing, 

Analysis, and 

Manufacturing

Weapons surety design, analysis, integration, and manufacturing employ 

a variety of safety and use control systems to prevent accidental nuclear 

detonation and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons to ensure a safe 

and secure stockpile. This knowledge, infrastructure, and equipment 

require strict classification control and secure facilities and equipment.

Section 3.15

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Appendix D

Glossary

3D printing—Also known as additive manufacturing, which turns digital three-dimensional models into 

solid objects by building them up in layers.

abnormal environment—An environment as defined in a weapon’s stockpile-to-target sequence and 

military characteristics in which the weapon is not expected to retain full operational reliability, or an 

environment that is not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and associated activities. 

additive manufacturing—A manufacturing technique that builds objects, layer by layer, according to 

precise design specifications, compared to a traditional manufacturing technique, in which objects are 

carved out of a larger block of material or cast in molds and dies. 

advanced manufacturing—Modern technologies necessary to enhance secure manufacturing capabilities 

and provide timely support for critical needs of the stockpile.

alteration (Alt)—A material change to, or a prescribed inspection of, a nuclear weapon or major assembly 

that does not alter its operational capability, yet is sufficiently important to the user regarding assembly,

maintenance, storage, or test operations to require controlled application and identification. 

annual assessment process—The authoritative method to evaluate the safety, reliability, performance, 

and military effectiveness of the stockpile by subject matter experts based upon new and legacy data, 

surveillance, and modeling and simulation. It is a principal factor in the Nation’s ability to maintain a 

credible deterrent without nuclear explosive testing. The Directors of the three national security 

laboratories complete annual assessments of the stockpile, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 

Command provides a separate assessment of military effectiveness. The assessments also determine

whether underground nuclear explosive testing must be conducted to resolve any issues. The Secretaries 

of Energy and Defense submit the reports unaltered to the President, along with any conclusions they

deem appropriate.

arming, fuzing, and firing (AF&F) system—The electronic and mechanical functions that ensure a nuclear 

weapon does not operate when not intended during any part of its manufacture and lifetime, but does

ensure that the weapon will operate correctly when a unique signal to do so is properly activated. 

B61—An air-delivered gravity bomb.

B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP to consolidate four families of the B61 bomb into one and 

improve the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the U.S. arsenal.

B83—An air-delivered gravity bomb.

Boost—The process that increases the yield of a nuclear weapon’s primary stage through fusion reactions.

canned subassembly (CSA)—A component of a nuclear weapon that is hermetically sealed in a metal 

container. A CSA and the primary make up a weapon’s nuclear explosive package.
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certification—The process whereby all available information on the performance of a weapon system is 

considered and the Laboratory Directors responsible for that system certify, before the weapon enters 

the stockpile, that it will meet, with noted exceptions, the military characteristics within the environments 

defined by the stockpile-to-target sequence.

co-design—An inclusive process to develop designs that encourages participants to find solutions within 

the context of the total system rather than based upon individual areas of expertise and interest.

component—An assembly or combination of parts, subassemblies, and assemblies mounted together 

during manufacture, assembly, maintenance, or rebuild. In a system engineering product hierarchy, the 

component is the lowest level of shippable and storable entities, which may be raw material, procured 

parts, or manufactured items.

Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)—A dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of 

Government networks and systems. CDM provides Federal departments and agencies with capabilities 

and tools that identify cybersecurity risks on an ongoing basis, prioritize these risks based upon potential 

impacts, and enable cybersecurity personnel to mitigate the most significant problems first. Congress 

established the CDM program to provide adequate, risk-based, and cost-effective cybersecurity and to 

allocate cybersecurity resources more efficiently.

continuous monitoring—A strategy that enables information security professionals and others to see a 

continuous stream of near real-time snapshots of the state of risk to their security, data, network, end 

points, and even cloud devices and applications.

conventional high explosive (CHE)—A high explosive that detonates when given sufficient stimulus via a 

high-pressure shock. Stimuli from severe accident environments involving impact, fire, or electrical 

discharge may also initiate a CHE. See also “insensitive high explosive.”

critical decision (CD)—The five levels a DOE project typically progresses through, which serve as major 

milestones approved by the Chief Executive for Project Management. Each CD marks an authorization to 

increase the commitment of resources and requires successful completion of the preceding phase. These 

five phases are CD-0, Approve Mission Need; CD-1, Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range; 

CD-2, Approve Performance Baseline; CD-3, Approve Start of Construction/Execution; CD-4, Approve Start 

of Operations or Project Completion.

cybersecurity—The physical, technical, administrative and management controls for providing the 

required and appropriate levels of protections of information and information assets against unauthorized 

disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction, whether accidental or intentional. Cybersecurity also 

ensures the required and appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability for 

the information stored, processed, or transmitted on electronic systems and networks.

data loss prevention (DLP)—DLP is a strategy for making sure that end users do not send sensitive or 

critical information outside the corporate network. DLP also includes software products that aid network 

administrators in controlling what data end users can transfer.

defense-in-depth—The security approach whereby layers of cybersecurity and information assurance 

solutions are used to establish an adequate security posture. Implementation of this strategy also is 

recognized due to the highly interactive nature of the various systems and networks. Cybersecurity 

defense-in-depth must be considered within the context of the shared risk environment, given that any 

single system cannot be adequately secured unless all interconnected systems are adequately secured.
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design life—The length of time, starting from the date of manufacture, that a nuclear weapon is designed 

to meet its stated military requirements.

deuterium—An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one neutron and one proton.

down-select—The process of narrowing the range of design options during the Phase 6.x Process,

culminating in a final design (normally exercised when moving from Phase 6.1 to 6.2, from Phase 6.2 to 

6.2A, and from Phase 6.2A to 6.3) through analysis of the ability to meet military requirements and 

assessment of schedule, cost, material, and production impacts. 

encryption—Technical controls to protect information as it passes throughout a network and resides on 

computers. These methods protect sensitive information during storage and transmission and provide 

functionality to reduce the risk of both intentional and accidental data compromise and alteration.

enterprise forensics—The performance of real-time, remote inspections at the binary level of all data on 

a given system. The inspection includes operating memory, physical storage devices, and virtualization 

mechanisms on any machine at a given time. 

Enterprise Governance, Risk, and Compliance (EGRC)—The official corporate and enterprise program 

repository used to conduct continuous performance monitoring and reporting of information security 

program management, operations, and technical controls (e.g., authority-to-operate packages, 

deviations, incident management reporting).

Enterprise Information System—Systems within NNSA for which the authorization boundary covers 

multiple sites and multiple local Authorization Official jurisdictions.

exascale computing—Computing systems capable of at least 1 exaFLOPS, or a billion calculations per 

second. Such capacity represents a thousand-fold increase over the first petascale computer that came 

into operation in 2008. See also “floating point operations per second (FLOPS).”

firewalls—Systems that can be implemented in hardware and/or software that are designed to prevent 

unauthorized access to or from private networks connected to the Internet. 

first production unit—The first completed component of a nuclear weapon delivered to a user (e.g., the 

DOD).

fiscal year—The Federal budget and funding year that starts on October 1 and goes to the following 

September 30.

fission—The process whereby the nucleus of a particular heavy element splits into (generally) two nuclei 

of lighter elements, with the release of substantial energy.

floating point operations per second (FLOPS)—The number of arithmetic operations performed on real 

numbers in a second; used as a measure of the performance of a computer system.

fusion—The process whereby the nuclei of two light elements, especially the isotopes of hydrogen 

(namely, deuterium and tritium), combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element with the release of 

substantial energy and a high-energy neutron.
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Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)—A detailed description of the program elements (and 

associated projects and activities) for the fiscal year for which the annual budget is submitted and the four 

succeeding fiscal years.

general purpose infrastructure—The buildings, equipment, utilities, roads, etc., that support operation of 

the nuclear security enterprise, but are not specifically programmatic-focused. 

high explosives (HE)—Materials that detonate, with the chemical reaction components propagating at 

supersonic speeds. HE are used in the main charge of a weapon primary to compress the fissile material 

and initiate the chain of events leading to nuclear yield. See also “conventional high explosive” and 

“insensitive high explosive.”

high performance computing (HPC)—The use of supercomputers and parallel processing techniques with 

multiple computers to perform computational tasks. 

ignition—The point at which a nuclear fusion reaction becomes self-sustaining—that is, more energy is 

produced and retained in the fusion target than the energy used to initiate the nuclear reaction.

Information Assurance Response Center—The NNSA facility that continuously monitors all activity going 

through the nuclear security enterprise computer firewall system, providing intrusion detection and event 

forensics.

information system—A combination of information, computer, and telecommunications resources and 

other information technology and personnel resources that collect, record, process, store, communicate, 

retrieve, and display information. 

information technology (IT)—The equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment used 

in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, 

interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information. IT includes computers, ancillary 

equipment, software, firmware, and related procedures, services, and resources. 

Information Technology Infrastructure—The shared technology resources that provide the platform for 

the specific information system applications at a site or NNSA/DOE-wide. It consists of a set of physical 

devices and software applications that are required to operate the entire nuclear security enterprise.

insensitive high explosive (IHE)—A high explosive substance that is so insensitive that the probability of 

accidental initiation or transition from burning to detonation is negligible.

integrated design code (IDC)—A simulation code containing multiple physics and engineering models that 

have been validated experimentally and computationally. An IDC is used to simulate, understand, and 

predict the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear components and nuclear weapons under normal, 

abnormal, and hostile conditions.

interoperable warhead (IW)—A warhead that has a common nuclear explosive package and adaptable 

non-nuclear components.

intrusion prevention—A network security device that monitors network activities for malicious activities 

such as security threats or policy violations. The main function of an intrusion prevention system is to 

identify suspicious activity, log the information, and report it. 
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Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (JC3)—The cybersecurity incident response coordination, 

reporting, and tracking element for the entire DOE enterprise. JC3 provides computer security support to 

collect, analyze, and share cybersecurity information for all of DOE, including DOE’s Energy Information 

Administration and Power Marketing Administration, as well as NNSA’s national security laboratories, 

nuclear weapons production facilities, and Nevada National Security Site. JC3 is managed and operated 

by the DOE Chief Information Officer.

joint test assembly (JTA)—An electronic unit that contains sensors and instrumentation that monitor the 

weapon hardware performance during flight tests to ensure that the weapon components will function 

as designed. An NNSA-developed configuration, based on NNSA-DOD requirements, for use in the flight 

test program.

life cycle—The series of stages through which a component, system, or weapon passes from initial 

development until it is consumed, disposed of, or altered in order to extend its lifetime.

life extension program (LEP)—A program that refurbishes warheads of a specific weapon type by replacing 

aged components to extend the service life of a weapon. LEPs are designed to extend the life of a warhead 

by 20 to 30 years, while increasing safety and security and addressing defects.

lightning arrestor connector—Advanced interconnect nuclear safety devices designed to limit voltage 

during lightning strikes and other extreme high-voltage, high-temperature environments.

limited life component—A weapon component or subsystem whose performance degrades with age and 

must be replaced. 

manufacturing readiness level (MRL)—A means of communicating the degree to which a component or 

subsystem is ready to be produced. MRLs represent many attributes of a manufacturing system 

(e.g., people, manufacturing capability, facilities, conduct of operations, and tooling) and generally are 

low at the beginning of product development, with the highest of nine levels being steady-state 

production.

modernization—The changes to nuclear weapons or infrastructure due to aging, unavailability of 

replacement parts, or the need to enhance safety, security, and operational design features. 

modification (Mod)—A modernization program that changes a weapon’s operational capabilities. A Mod 

may enhance the margin against failure, increase safety, improve security, replace limited life 

components, and/or address identified defects and component obsolescence. 

multilayered malware protection—Commercial software that guards against multiple threat vectors such 

as viruses, spyware, and Trojans. The software searches a hard disk or other media for known threat 

vectors and removes any that are found.

national security laboratory—Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, or Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory.

national security system—Any telecommunications or information system operated by the 

U.S. Government, the function, operation, or use of which involves intelligence activities, cryptologic 

activities related to national security, command and control of military forces, equipment that is an 

integral part of a weapon or weapons system, or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or 

intelligence missions. The term excludes any system used for routine administrative and business 

applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). 
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network—In relation to information technology and cybersecurity, a network is composed of a 

communications medium responsible for the transfer of information and all components attached to that 

medium.

network intrusion detection (NID)—An intrusion detection system inspects all inbound and outbound 

network activity and identifies suspicious patterns that may indicate an attempt to break in or 

compromise a system. That NID system (a) monitors all network traffic by inspecting and screening all 

inbound and outbound information technology network activity for patterns that may indicate an attempt 

to break in or compromise a system and (b) provides alerts based on predefined rules. These rules or 

signatures are updated as needed to reflect information learned from exploitation or attack attempts. 

When triggered, an NID system begins capturing network traffic related to the event in question, and the 

data are made available to security analysts. Notification is also sent to the Security Information and 

Event Management tool. 

network monitoring—The use of a system that constantly monitors a computer network, providing

vulnerability management and policy compliance tools; operating system, database, and application logs; 

and compilation of external threat data. A key focus is to monitor and manage user and service privileges, 

directory services, and other system configuration changes. Network monitoring also provides log 

auditing and review of incident responses.

NNSA Information Technology System—An information system that is owned and/or operated by NNSA 

or by contractors on behalf of NNSA to accomplish a Federal function. Regardless of whether NNSA 

Federal employees have access, this does not include information systems operated by management and 

operating contractors unless such systems’ primary purpose is to accomplish a Federal function.

non-nuclear components—The parts or assemblies designed for use in nuclear weapons or in nuclear 

weapons training that do not contain special nuclear material; such components (e.g., radiation-hardened 

electronic circuits or arming, fuzing, and firing components) are not available commercially.

nuclear explosive package (NEP)—An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials, as well 

as the main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation. 

nuclear forensics—The investigation of nuclear materials to find evidence for the source, trafficking, and 

enrichment of the material. 

nuclear security enterprise—The physical infrastructure, technology, and workforce at the national 

security laboratories, the nuclear weapons production sites, and the Nevada National Security Site. 

Nuclear Weapons Council—The joint DOE/DOD Council composed of senior officials from both 

departments who recommend the stockpile options and research priorities that shape national policies 

and budgets to develop, produce, surveil, and retire nuclear warheads and weapon delivery platforms and 

who consider the safety, security, and control issues for existing and proposed weapons programs.

nuclear weapons production site —The Kansas City National Security Campus, Pantex Plant, Y-12 National 

Security Complex, or Savannah River Site. Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National 

Laboratories also perform some specific weapons production activities.

Other Program Money—Funding that is found outside of a life extension program (LEP) funding line (in 

other program lines), but is directly (uniquely) attributed to an LEP. Such funding would not be needed 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page D-7

were it not for the LEP, although the activity or effort might still be done at some future point along a 

different timeline.

out-years—The years that follow the 5-year period of the Future Years Nuclear Security Program. 

Phase 6.x Process—A time and organizational framework to manage the existing nuclear weapon systems 

that are undergoing evaluation and implementation of refurbishment options to extend the stockpile life 

or to enhance system capabilities. The Phase 6.x Process consists of sub-phases, which basically 

correspond to Phases 1 through 6 of the nuclear weapons lifecycle.

physical security—The application of physical or technical methods that protect personnel; prevent or 

detect unauthorized access to facilities, material, and documents; protect against espionage, sabotage, 

damage, and theft; and respond to any such acts that occur.

pit—The critical core component in the primary of a nuclear weapon that contains fissile material.

Predictive Capability Framework (PCF)—A framework that defines high‐level research, development, test, 

and evaluation activities to be executed by Defense Programs. The PCF identifies the complex set of 

interlinked analytical, computational, and experimental activities needed for stockpile assessment, the 

evaluation of some surveillance data, and the coordination of related efforts.

primary—The first stage of a two-stage nuclear weapon.

programmatic infrastructure—Specialized experimental facilities, computers, diagnostic instruments, 

processes, and capabilities that allow the nuclear security enterprise to carry out research, testing, 

production, sustainment, and other direct programmatic activities to meet national security missions. 

Protected Distribution Systems—Wireline or fiber-optic distribution systems used to transmit and protect 

unencrypted classified signal and data lines that exit secure areas and traverse through areas of lesser 

classification or security control. 

quantification of margins and uncertainties—The methodology used in the post-nuclear-testing era to 

facilitate analysis and communicate confidence in assessing and certifying that stockpile weapons will 

perform safely, securely, and reliably. Scientific judgment of experts at the national security laboratories 

plays a crucial role in this determination, which is based on metrics that use experimental data, physical 

models, and numerical simulations. 

quantum computing—The area of study focused on developing computer technology based on the 

principles of quantum-mechanical theory, which explains the nature and behavior of energy and matter 

on the atomic and subatomic level.

radiation case—A vessel that confines the radiation generated in a staged nuclear weapon.

reservoir—A vessel containing deuterium and tritium that permits its transfer as a gas in a nuclear 

weapon.

Retrofit Evaluation System Test—A test program conducted during retrofit of an NNSA weapon system on 

randomly selected, newly retrofitted weapons to determine the effect of the retrofit on the weapon 

system’sreliability and to verify that the purpose of the retrofit is fully achieved. The program may consist 

of flight testing and/or laboratory testing.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-8 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan– Biennial Plan Summary

Safeguards Transporter (SGT)—A highly specialized trailer designed to safeguard nuclear weapons and 

special nuclear materials while in transit.

secondary—The second stage of a two-stage nuclear weapon that provides additional energy release in 

the form of fusion and is activated by energy from the primary.

security—An integrated system of activities, systems, programs, facilities, and policies to protect classified 

matter, unclassified controlled information, nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon 

components, and DOE’s and its contractors’ facilities, property, and equipment.

security area—A defined area containing safeguards and security interests that requires physical 

protection measures. The types of security areas used by DOE/NNSA include property protection areas, 

limited areas, exclusion areas, protected areas, material access areas, and functionally specialized security 

areas such as sensitive compartmented information facilities, classified computer facilities, and secure 

communications centers.

security system—The combination of personnel, equipment, hardware and software, structures, plans 

and procedures, etc., used to protect safeguards and security interests.

service life—The duration of time that a nuclear weapon is maintained in the stockpile from Phase 5/6.5 

(First Production) to Phase 7 (Retirement, Dismantlement, and Disposition). The terms “stockpile life,” 

“deployed life,” and “useful life” are subsumed by service life. 

significant finding investigation (SFI)—A formal investigation by a committee, chaired by an employee of 

a national security laboratory, to determine the cause and impact of a reported anomaly and to 

recommend corrective actions as appropriate.

special nuclear material (SNM)—Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes 

uranium-233 or uranium-235. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines three categories of quantities 

of SNM according to the risk and potential for its use in the creation of a fissile explosive. Category I is 

the category of the greatest quantity and associated risk; Category II is moderate; Category III is the 

lowest.

stockpile-to-target sequence—A document that defines the logistical and employment concepts and 

related physical environments involved in delivering a nuclear weapon from storage and assembly, testing

it, transporting it, and delivering the weapon to a target.

subcritical experiment—An experiment specifically designed to obtain data on nuclear weapons for which 

less than a critical mass of fissionable material is present and, hence, no self-sustaining nuclear fission 

chain reaction can occur, consistent with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

supply chain risk management (SCRM)—The coordinated efforts of an organization to help identify, 

monitor, detect, and mitigate threats to supply chain continuity. Threats to the supply chain include cost 

volatility, material shortages, supplier financial issues and failures, and natural and manmade disasters. 

SCRM strategies and software help an organization foresee potential issues and adapt to both those risks 

and unforeseeable supply chain disruptions as quickly and efficiently as possible.

surety—The assurance that a nuclear weapon will operate safely, securely, and reliably if deliberately 

activated and that no accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations will occur. Factors contributing 

to that assurance include model validation for weapon performance based on experiments and 

simulations, material (e.g., military equipment and supplies), personnel, and execution of procedures.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page D-9

surveillance—Activities that provide data for evaluation of the stockpile, giving confidence in the Nation’s 

deterrent by demonstrating mission readiness and assessment of safety, security, and reliability

standards. These activities may include laboratory and flight testing of systems, subsystems, and 

components (including those of weapons in the existing stockpile, newly produced weapons, or weapons 

being disassembled); inspection for unexpected wear or signs of material aging; and destructive or 

nondestructive testing.

sustainment—A program to modify and maintain a set of nuclear weapon systems.

technology maturation—Advancing laboratory-developed technology to the point at which it can be 

adopted and used by U.S. industry. 

technology readiness level (TRL)—A measurement system to assess the maturity level of a particular 

technology that includes nine levels, where TRL 1 is the lowest (the associated scientific research is 

beginning) and TRL 9 is the highest (a technology has been proven through successful operation). 

test readiness—The preparedness to conduct underground nuclear explosive testing if required to ensure 

the safety and effectiveness of the stockpile or if directed by the President for policy reasons. 

threat information—Any information related to a threat that might help an organization protect itself 

against a threat or detect the activities of an actor. Major types of threat information include indicators;

tactics, techniques, and procedures; security alerts; threat intelligence reports; and tool configurations.

tractor—A modified and armored vehicle to transport the Safeguards Transporter trailer.

tritium—A radioactive isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains two neutrons and one proton and is 

produced in nuclear reactors by the action of neutrons on lithium nuclei.

virtual desktop infrastructure—Software technology that separates the desktop environment and 

associated application software from the physical client device used to access it.

vulnerability scanning—The application of software that seeks out security flaws based on a database of 

known flaws, testing systems for the occurrence of these flaws, and generation of a report of the findings 

that can be used to tighten a networks security. 

W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP for the W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, 

delivered by a Navy Trident II.

W78—An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, delivered by an Air Force Minute Man III LGM-30.

W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP for the W80 warhead aboard a cruise missile, delivered by 

the Air Force B-52 bomber and future launch platforms.

W88—A submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead delivered by a Navy Trident II.

W88 Alt 370—An alteration of the W88 warhead to replace the arming, fuzing, and firing components and 

to refresh the conventional high explosive main charge.

warhead—The part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munitions that contains either the 

nuclear or thermonuclear system intended to inflict damage.
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page D-10 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan– Biennial Plan Summary

wireless security (WISEC)—Security solution designed to test and evaluate the impact of mobile and fixed 

wireless communication devices used in or near classified and sensitive unclassified activity areas for the 

purpose of determining risks and countermeasures.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page E-1

Appendix E

List of Figures and Tables

List of Figures

Figure 1–1. DOE/NNSA mission pillars and cross-cutting capabilities....................................................................1-1

Figure 1–2. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise ........................................................................................1-4

Figure 1–3. Size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2017........................................................1-6

Figure 1–4. Management and operating partners headcount distribution by age ..............................................1-11

Figure 2–1. Historical number of significant finding investigations opened, closed, and closed with 

significant impact for calendar years 2001 to 2017.............................................................................2-6

Figure 2–2. Sustainment of legacy weapons..........................................................................................................2-6

Figure 2–3. National Nuclear Security Administration warhead activities...........................................................2-10

Figure 3–1. Weapons Activities capabilities ...........................................................................................................3-1

Figure 3–2. Joint DOD-DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons life-cycle phases ..................................................................3-2

Figure 3–3. Weapons Activities capabilities ...........................................................................................................3-3

Figure 3–4. Coordinated high performance computing components....................................................................3-8

Figure 3–5. NNSA infrastructure vision, mission, and general purpose scope.....................................................3-58

Figure 3–6. Asset life cycle portfolio management ..............................................................................................3-61

Figure 4–1. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power – fiscal years 2001 through 2023............................4-2

Figure 4–2. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023..................................4-3

Figure 4–3. Goals, milestones, and key annual activities for weapon assessment, surveillance, 

and maintenance .................................................................................................................................4-9

Figure 4–4. Milestones for life extension programs, major weapons component production, 

and weapons alteration and dismantlement.....................................................................................4-10

Figure 4–5. Science Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023............................................4-10

Figure 4–6. Experimental and analysis milestones and objectives led by the Science Program..........................4-12

Figure 4–7. Engineering Program funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023 .....................................4-13

Figure 4–8. Engineering and technological milestones and objectives led by the Engineering Program ............4-15

Figure 4–9. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2018 through 2023 ....................................................................................................4-15

Figure 4–10. Milestones and objectives based on experiments on DOE/NNSA’s high energy density 

facilities led by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program ...........................4-18

Figure 4–11. Advanced Simulation and Computing Program funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2018 through 2023 ....................................................................................................4-19

Figure 4–12. Milestones and objectives of the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ...........................4-20

Figure 4–13. Advanced Manufacturing Development Program funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2018 through 2023 ....................................................................................................4-21
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page E-2 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

Figure 4–14. Milestones and objectives for Advanced Manufacturing Development Program ............................4-22

Figure 4–15. Secure Transportation Asset funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023 .........................4-22

Figure 4–16. Secure Transportation Asset Program milestones and objectives ....................................................4-24

Figure 4–17. Infrastructure and Operations funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023.......................4-24

Figure 4–18. Other Weapons Activities funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023..............................4-29

Figure 4–19. Defense Nuclear Security program milestones and objectives timeline ...........................................4-31

Figure 4–20. Information Technology and Cybersecurity milestones and objectives timeline..............................4-33

Figure 4–21. Estimated out-year budget estimates for NNSA Weapons Activities in then-year dollars................4-34

Figure 4–22. Estimate of warhead-specific sustainment costs...............................................................................4-36

Figure 4–23. W76-1 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2018 to completion .................................................4-39

Figure 4–24. B61-12 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2018 to completion.................................................4-39

Figure 4–25. W88 Alteration 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh) cost 

fiscal year 2018 to completion ..........................................................................................................4-40

Figure 4–26. W80-4 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2018 to completion .................................................4-41

Figure 4–27. W78 Replacement Warhead Life Extension Program (formerly known as the IW1) cost 

fiscal year 2019 to completion ..........................................................................................................4-42

Figure 4–28. Ballistic Missile Warhead (IW or BM-Y) Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2023 

through fiscal year 2043 ....................................................................................................................4-43

Figure 4–29. Ballistic Missile Warhead (IW or BM-Z) Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2030 

through fiscal year 2043 ....................................................................................................................4-44

Figure 4–30. Next B61 Life Extension Program cost fiscal year 2038 through fiscal year 2043 .............................4-45

Figure 4–31. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for fiscal year 2018 

through fiscal year 2043 (then-year dollars) .....................................................................................4-46

Figure 4–32. Fiscal year 2018 versus fiscal year 2019 SSMP Defense Programs independent cost estimates ......4-47

Figure 4–33. DOE/NNSA major capital acquisition projects and project proposals...............................................4-49
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page E-3

List of Tables

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.........................................................1-6

Table 2–1. Fiscal years 2017 actual and 2018 planned Directed Stockpile Work Program stockpile 

evaluation activities (as of March 5, 2018)..........................................................................................2-4

Table 2–2. Major surveillance evaluations completed in fiscal years 2017, planned for fiscal year 2018, 

and baselined for the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (fiscal years 2019 through 2023) 

(as of March 5, 2018)...........................................................................................................................2-5

Table 3–1. Weapons Activities major capital acquisition estimated costs, fiscal years 2019–2043 .....................3-5

Table 3–2. NNSA cybersecurity technologies......................................................................................................3-54

Table 4–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget request for Weapons Activities 

in fiscal years 2019 through 2023........................................................................................................4-1

Table 4–2. Surveillance program funding for fiscal years 2013 through 2023......................................................4-3

Table 4–3. Projected fiscal year 2018 NNSA infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization investments.....4-26

Table 4–4. Total estimated cost for W76 Life Extension Program ......................................................................4-39

Table 4–5. Total estimated cost for B61-12 Life Extension Program ..................................................................4-40

Table 4–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alteration 370 (with conventional high explosive refresh) 

Program .............................................................................................................................................4-40

Table 4–7. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Life Extension Program...................................................................4-41

Table 4–8. Total estimated cost for W78 Replacement Warhead Life Extension Program ................................4-42

Table 4–9. Total estimated cost for IW2 Life Extension Program .......................................................................4-43

Table 4–10. Total estimated cost for IW3 Life Extension Program .......................................................................4-44

Table 4–11. Total estimated cost for next B61 Life Extension Program................................................................4-45

Table 4–12. Weapon Activities capital acquisition estimated costs, fiscal years 2019 through 2043 ..................4-50

Table B–1 NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative funding schedule for fiscal years 2018 through 2023 .............. B-2

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page F-1

Appendix F

Acronyms and Abbreviations

3D three-dimensional

AF&F arming, fuzing, and firing

Alt alteration

AoA Analysis of Alternatives

ASC Advanced Simulation and Computing

ASIC application-specific integrated circuit

ATS Advanced Technology System

CCRI Command Cyber Readiness Inspections

CD Critical Decision

CHAMP Cooling and Heating Asset Management Program

CHE conventional high explosive

CMRR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

CoLOSSIS Confined Large Optical Scintillator Screen and Imaging System

CSTART Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing

CTA common tester architecture

CUAS Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System

DARHT Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNS Office of Defense Nuclear Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DSW Directed Stockpile Work

DUF4 depleted uranium tetrafluoride

DUF6 depleted uranium hexafluoride

ECFM Exascale Computing Facility Modernization

ECSE Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

EMETL Enterprise Mission Essential Task List

EOS equations of state

ESSPAP Enterprise Safeguards and Security Planning and Analysis Program

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center

FICAM Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act

FY Fiscal Year

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program

GAO Government Accountability Office
October 2018 | Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration

Page F-2 | Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

GTS gas transfer system

HE high explosives

HED high energy density

HEU highly enriched uranium

HOT SHOT High Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket Flight Test

HPC high performance computing

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

IARC Information Assurance Response Center

ICE independent cost estimate

ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield

IDC integrated design code

IDS Intrusion Detection Systems

IHE insensitive high explosive

IT information technology

IW interoperable warhead

JASPER Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

JILS Joint Integrated Lifecycle Surety

JODE Joint Development Environment

JTA joint test assembly

KCNSC Kansas City National Security Campus

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANSCE Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design

LEP life extension program

LLC limited life component

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LRSO Long Range Stand Off

M&O management and operating

MagLIF magnetized liner inertial fusion

MAP Master Asset Plan

MAR material-at-risk

Mbar megabar

MESA Microsystems and Engineering Science Applications

MGT Mobile Guardian Transporter

MicroFab Microsystems Fabrication facility

Mod modification

MRR Material Recycle and Recovery

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NEP nuclear explosive package

NIF National Ignition Facility

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | October 2018

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary | Page F-3

OMB Office of Management and Budget

Omega Omega Laser Facility

PACS Physical Access Controls

Pantex Pantex Plant

PCF Predictive Capability Framework

petaFLOPS quadrillion floating point operations per second

PF-4 Plutonium Facility

PIDAS Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System

PPI Process Prove-In

QE Qualification Evaluation

R&D research and development

RAMP Roof Asset Management Program

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

SAR Selected Acquisition Report

SFI significant finding investigation

SGT Safeguards Transporter

SiFab Silicon Fabrication facility

SMIP Security Management Improvement Program

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SNM special nuclear material

SRS Savannah River Site

SSMP Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

ST&E science, technology, and engineering

STA Secure Transportation Asset

STS stockpile-to-target sequence

TA Technical Area

TPBARs tritium-producing burnable absorber rods

TRU transuranic

U.S. United States

U.S.C. United States Code

U1a U1a Complex

UAS unmanned aircraft systems

UK United Kingdom

USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex

Z Z pulsed power facility


A Report to Congress

Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management

Plan – Biennial Plan Summary

October 2018

U.S. Department of Energy

National Nuclear Security Administration

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585

DOE/NA-0072