17-313 

Tai v. Sessions 

BIA 

A079 141 088

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 25th day of July, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

GERARD E. LYNCH, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

ZOU ZONG TAI, AKA ZONG TAI ZOU, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 17-313

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Jay Ho Lee, New York, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Matthew B. 

George, Benjamin Mark Moss, Trial 

Attorneys, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC. 
2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Zou Zong Tai, a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 11, 

2017, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen as 

untimely. In re Zou Zong Tai, No. A079 141 088 (B.I.A. Jan. 

11, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 The applicable standards of review are well established. 

See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 

2008). It is undisputed that Tai’s 2016 motion to reopen 

was untimely because it was filed more than nine years 

after his removal order became final in 2007. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day deadline for motions to 

reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Ineffective 

assistance of counsel may equitably toll the time 

limitation on a motion to reopen if the movant has 

exercised “due diligence” in pursuing the claim. See 

Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2008). 

The movant “is required to exercise due diligence both 
3

before and after he has or should have discovered 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 132. “[T]here 

is no period of time which . . . is per se unreasonable, 

and, therefore, disqualifies a petitioner from equitable 

tolling–or, for that matter, any period of time that is per 

se reasonable.” Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710, 715 

(2d Cir. 2007). 

 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

Tai failed to establish due diligence throughout the entire 

nine-year period he sought to toll. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (“An 

abuse of discretion may be found . . . where the Board’s 

decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably 

departs from established policies, is devoid of any 

reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory 

statements; that is to say, where the Board has acted in an 

arbitrary or capricious manner.” (citations omitted)). Tai 

claimed to have consulted six to seven law offices from 

2008 to 2010 and twelve to thirteen law offices from 2011 

to 2016; however, he submitted only business cards to 

corroborate these 18 to 20 consultations. Moreover, Tai 

merely asserted that each law office declined to assist him 
4

because his petition for review from the denial of his 

initial application had been unsuccessful; he did not 

elaborate further on those consultations or indicate 

whether he discussed his prior attorneys’ performance or 

the possibility of filing a motion to reopen his 

proceedings. Regardless, even crediting Tai’s estimate 

that he visited at least one law office every six months 

from 2011 to 2016, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 

finding lack of due diligence because Tai did not explain 

why he waited six months or more between visits during this 

five-year period. See Rashid, 533 F.3d at 133 (“[A]n alien 

is required to exercise due diligence during 

the entire period he seeks to toll.”). Moreover, given 

that Tai was ordered removed in 2007 and has no 

authorization to remain in the United States, the BIA 

reasonably determined that his sporadic law office 

consultations did not reflect diligence. See Cekic v. 

INS, 435 F.3d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that twoyear delay between time petitioners learned of expiration 

of their status and moved to reopen constituted a lack of 

diligence). 
5

 We reject Tai’s argument that the BIA’s reasoning was 

insufficient. Given Tai’s minimal evidence to support his 

claim, the lack of detail regarding any of his legal 

consultations, and the BIA’s citation to authority requiring 

due diligence throughout the entire period to be tolled, the 

BIA’s conclusion that Tai did not demonstrate due diligence 

was within its discretion. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court