United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-40413

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Clovis Shantez Liggins,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:15-CV-763

Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Clovis Shantez Liggins, federal prisoner # 16490-078, was convicted 

of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or possess, with intent to distribute,

five kilograms or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 14, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 19-40413 Document: 00515822221 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/14/2021
No. 19-40413

2

cocaine), and 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a), 846. He was sentenced to, inter alia, life imprisonment.

During Liggins’ criminal proceedings, the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act 

(FSA) was enacted. The FSA, inter alia, increased the quantity of crack 

cocaine necessary to impose the enhanced sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) from 50 grams or more to 280 grams or more. 

Notwithstanding the FSA’s enactment, Liggins’ amended indictment

alleged a conspiracy involving, inter alia, 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. 

Importantly, the jury’s special verdict also attributed to him 50 grams or 

more of crack cocaine.

The presentence investigation report (PSR) determined Liggins was 

responsible for 1285.6 grams of crack cocaine and, according to the 2010 

version of the statute, he was subject to a mandatory life sentence because of 

his two prior felony drug convictions. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010). 

At sentencing, the district court noted that, under the FSA’s amendments, 

50 grams of crack cocaine would not mandate a life sentence. See id. The 

court, however, reasoned it was not bound by the jury’s drug-quantity 

determination because the jury found Liggins responsible for 50 grams or 

more of crack cocaine. The court then relied on the PSR, along with evidence 

presented at trial, to find Liggins responsible for 280 grams or more of crack 

cocaine. Consequently, the court imposed a mandatory life sentence under

28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).

Pursuant to a certificate of appealability granted by our court, Liggins, 

proceeding pro se, contests the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

motion. He contends: the court engaged in improper factfinding that 

increased his minimum statutory sentencing range in violation of Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 

(2000); and his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

Case: 19-40413 Document: 00515822221 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/14/2021
No. 19-40413

3

(IAC) by failing to challenge the court’s factfinding at sentencing. Liggins

asserts he should have been sentenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), 

under which he would have faced a statutory sentencing range of 120 months

to life. See 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2010) (stating an offense involving 28 

grams or more of crack cocaine results in a statutory range of 120-months’

imprisonment to life for a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction). 

Regarding § 2255 motions, we review the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error; its legal conclusions, de novo. United States v. Cavitt, 

550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). To succeed on an IAC claim, defendant 

must show counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and, as a result, 

defendant was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984).

The Government concedes the court engaged in improper factfinding 

that increased Liggins’ mandatory minimum sentence. Under Alleyne, “facts 

that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury”. 

In that regard, our court has explained a court may not disregard a jury’s 

drug-quantity finding as it pertains to a mandatory minimum sentence. See 

United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 612 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We agree with 

[defendant] that the sentencing judge was in error insofar as he looked to a 

crack cocaine calculation that was in excess of the jury’s finding and that 

would trigger a higher sentence than the quantity found by the jury”.). In 

addition, the Government acknowledges: in the light of Akins, appellate 

counsel rendered deficient performance by failing on appeal to challenge the 

judicial factfinding; and Liggins suffered prejudice because of the error.

VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing.

Case: 19-40413 Document: 00515822221 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/14/2021