OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

 

Catalyst for Improving the Environment

Evaluation Report

EPA’s Response to the

World Trade Center Collapse: 

Challenges, Successes, and

Areas for Improvement 

Report No. 2003-P-00012

August 21, 2003
Report Contributors: Rick Beusse Dana Gilmore

James Hatfield Sarah Fabirkiewicz

Chris Dunlap Steve Schanamann

Geoff Pierce Eric Hanger

Abbreviations

 

AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Level

AHERA Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act

ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COPC Contaminants of Potential Concern

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

f/cc Fibers per Cubic Centimeter

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRP Federal Response Plan

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

NCP National Contingency Plan

NESHAP National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NYCDDC New York City Department of Design and Construction

NYCDEP New York City Department of Environmental Protection

NYCDOH New York City Department of Health

OCEMR Office of Communications, Education, and Media Relations

OIG Office of Inspector General

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PAHs Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons

PCBs Polychlorinated Biphenyls

PCM Phase Contrast Microscopy

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PLM Polarized Light Microscopy

PM Particulate Matter

s/mm2 Structures Per Millimeter Squared

TEM Transmission Electron Microscopy

TERA Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment

TSP Total Suspended Particulates

VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds

WTC World Trade Center

Cover photo: New York Police Department photograph 
 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

 WASHINGTON, DC 20460

 THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

August 21, 2003 

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Final Evaluation Report: EPA’s Response to the World Trade Center 

Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement

Report No. 2003-P-00012

TO: Marianne L. Horinko 

Acting Administrator 

 Attached is our final report regarding the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) response

to the World Trade Center (WTC) collapse. This report contains findings that describe problems

encountered in responding to the WTC collapse and corrective actions the Office of Inspector

General (OIG) recommends. This report represents the opinion of the OIG and the findings

contained in this report do not necessarily represent the final EPA position. Final determinations

on matters in the report will be made by EPA managers in accordance with established

procedures. 

Action Required

 In accordance with EPA Directive 2750, as the action official, you are required to provide this

Office with a written response within 90 days of the final report date. The response should

address all recommendations. For the corrective actions planned but not completed by the

response date, please describe the actions that are ongoing and provide a timetable for

completion. Where you disagree with a recommendation, please provide alternative actions for

addressing the findings reported. 
 We appreciate the efforts of EPA officials and staff, as well as those of New York City, in

working with us to develop this report. If you or your staff have any questions regarding this

report, please contact me at (202) 566-0847 or Kwai Chan, Assistant Inspector General for

Program Evaluation, at (202) 566-0827. 

Nikki L. Tinsley 

Attachment

cc:

Thomas J. Gibson, Chief of Staff, Office of the Administrator 

Jane M. Kenny, Regional Administrator, EPA Region 2

Barry N. Breen, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and 

 Emergency Response

Jeffrey R. Holmstead, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation

J. Paul Gilman, Ph.D., Assistant Administrator for Research and Development 

Kimberly Terese Nelson, Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information

Lisa B. Harrison, Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Public Affairs

Kathleen Callahan, Assistant Regional Administrator for New York City Response and 

 Recovery Operations

Mary U. Kruger, Director, EPA Office of Homeland Security

2
i Report No. 2003-P-00012

Executive Summary

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York

City and the environmental aftermath were unprecedented. Airborne dust from

the collapse of the towers blanketed Lower Manhattan and was blown or

dispersed into many of the surrounding office buildings, schools, and residences. 

This complex mixture of building debris and combustion by-products contained

such ingredients as asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and concrete dust. Responding to

this crisis required organizations from all levels of government to coordinate their

response efforts and to make critical public health and safety decisions quickly,

and without all of the data that decision-makers would normally desire. 

Unfortunately, this country may experience more terrorist attacks, and a response

to such a tragedy could be needed again. Accordingly, we initiated this

evaluation, in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Deputy Administrator, to evaluate EPA’s response to September 11. During our

evaluation, we sought to answer six specific questions that address how EPA

responded and how it could better respond in the future. Those questions, along

with summaries of what we found and recommendations for each, follow. 

 1. Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA’s major

public communications regarding air quality and associated health risks resulting

from the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers?

EPA’s early public statements following the collapse of the WTC towers

reassured the public regarding the safety of the air outside the Ground Zero area. 

However, when EPA made a September 18 announcement that the air was “safe”

to breathe, it did not have sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket

statement. At that time, air monitoring data was lacking for several pollutants of

concern, including particulate matter and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 

Furthermore, The White House Council on Environmental Quality influenced,

through the collaboration process, the information that EPA communicated to the

public through its early press releases when it convinced EPA to add reassuring

statements and delete cautionary ones. An EPA draft risk evaluation completed

over a year after the attacks concluded that, after the first few days, ambient air

levels were unlikely to cause short-term or long-term health effects to the general

population. However, because of numerous uncertainties – including the extent of

the public’s exposure and a lack of health-based benchmarks – a definitive

answer to whether the air was safe to breathe may not be settled for years to come. 

Details regarding the handling of indoor contamination are discussed in relation to

Objective 2 below. 

EPA has initiated actions to strengthen its risk communication procedures for

emergency situations, including the development of a draft Plan for Incident
ii Report No. 2003-P-00012

Communication. We recommend that the EPA Administrator continue these

efforts and develop procedures for emergency risk communication to ensure that

public pronouncements regarding health risks and environmental quality are

adequately supported with available data and analysis and are appropriately

qualified.

 

 2. Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and controlling

risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area

consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies, guidance, and practice? 

EPA’s actions to evaluate, mitigate, and control risks to human health from

exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area were consistent with applicable

statutes and regulations. These statutes and regulations do not obligate EPA to

respond to a given emergency, allowing for local agencies to lead a response, and

New York City in fact exercised a lead role regarding indoor air. Nonetheless, we

believe EPA could have taken a more proactive approach regarding indoor air

cleanup. After the City was criticized for its response, EPA began to assume a

lead role in February 2002. Prior to initiation of the EPA-led cleanup, many WTC

area residents had returned to their homes, and a study indicated most of them had

not followed recommended cleaning practices. The full extent of public exposure

to indoor contaminants resulting from the WTC collapse is unknown.

We recommend that the EPA Administrator coordinate with other Federal, State,

and local agencies to develop protocols for determining how indoor

environmental concerns will be handled in large-scale disasters. We also

recommend that EPA work with the Department of Homeland Security and other

Federal agencies to develop and publish oversight criteria, including State and

local agency reporting requirements, for handling indoor air contamination.

 3. Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards followed during

WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why not?

We could not conclusively determine the extent to which required work practices

regarding the control of asbestos were followed at the WTC site during demolition

and debris removal. Since asbestos is a known human carcinogen, EPA has

established stringent work practices to control emissions of asbestos resulting

from demolition and renovation projects. We found that a significant requirement

to reduce emissions in emergency demolitions – wetting damaged buildings

before demolition and keeping the waste material wet after demolition – was

followed. However, work practices applicable to the transport of debris from the

site were employed inconsistently. The specific impact on air quality of any

variance from EPA’s asbestos emergency work practices is unknown.

We recommend that the EPA Administrator develop specific procedures for

ensuring that Federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate NESHAP

work practices for catastrophic emergency situations involving asbestos.
iii Report No. 2003-P-00012

 

 4. To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air quality and

associated health risks: (a) received by the public; (b) understood by the public; and

(c) effective in getting people to take the desired actions to reduce their potential

health risks? 

After the WTC terrorist attack, people received information from many different

sources, and many factors – in addition to government communications – could

have influenced their actions. Information is a critical component in helping the

public minimize their exposure to potential health hazards. However, evidence

gathered through government hearings, news polls, health studies, and our

interviews indicated that the public did not receive sufficient air quality

information and wanted more information on associated health risks. Also,

evidence indicated that government communications were not consistently

effective in persuading the public to take recommended precautions. Because of

these concerns, the OIG conducted a survey of New York City residents regarding

government communications. These results will be reported separately.

EPA has initiated several actions to improve its risk communications procedures

during emergencies. Further, EPA is working with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency to clarify roles and responsibilities for ensuring worker

safety during an emergency response. We recommend that EPA continue to

coordinate efforts to establish clear Federal roles.

 5. What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response and

recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air quality? 

The majority of officials contacted indicated EPA did not need to take additional

actions to address outdoor ambient air quality concerns. However, concerns were

expressed regarding indoor contamination, and several more measures can be

taken to ensure that indoor cleanup effectively minimizes health risk exposure. 

We recommend that EPA implement a testing program to ensure the indoor

cleanup effectively reduced health risks from all pollutants of concern, and

implement a verification program to determine whether previously cleaned

residences have been recontaminated.

 

 6. Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing with air

pollution resulting from environmental catastrophes? 

The events of September 11 had national security ramifications not previously

experienced, and many persons interviewed spoke highly of the response of EPA

and its employees. Still, we, as well as EPA and others, have identified lessons

learned from the response that can improve EPA’s preparedness for future

disasters. An overriding lesson learned was that EPA needs to be prepared to

assert its opinion and judgment on matters that impact human health and the

environment. Although many organizations were involved in addressing air
iv Report No. 2003-P-00012

quality concerns resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have

demonstrated that, ultimately, the public, Congress, and others expect EPA to

monitor and resolve environmental issues. This is the case even when EPA may

not have the overall responsibility to resolve these issues or the necessary

resources to address them. 

EPA has initiated many actions as a result of its own internal lessons learned

exercises. Based on our review, we our making a number of recommendations to

improve EPA’s emergency response capabilities in three areas: (1) contingency

planning, (2) risk assessment and characterization, and (3) risk communication. 

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation

In her August 8, 2003 response to the draft report, the EPA Acting Administrator

stated that she was proud of the men and women of EPA and that the Agency’s

response was extraordinary. Although she generally agreed with the

recommendations of our draft report (with the exception of Chapter 6), she

responded that our report lacked sufficient acknowledgment of EPA’s efforts in

several areas. For example, she noted that our report focused too heavily on the

Agency’s press releases and did not sufficiently consider the Agency’s other

forms of communication or the Agency’s “lessons learned” efforts. She provided

several specific comments outlining the Agency’s disagreement with some of the

report’s findings and conclusions. A detailed summary of the Agency response

and our evaluation is included at the end of each chapter. The Agency’s complete

response and our evaluation of that response are included as Appendices Q and R,

respectively.

New York City officials responded to excerpts from the draft report and provided

us with specific comments and clarifications which we incorporated into the final

report, as appropriate. New York City’s response is attached as Appendix S and

our evaluation of that response is attached as Appendix T.
v Report No. 2003-P-00012

Table of Contents

Executive Summary .............................................................. i

Chapters

1 Introduction ...................................................... 1

Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background ................................................................. 1

Scope and Methodology ....................................................... 5

 

2 EPA Statements About Air Quality Not Adequately Qualified .............. 7

Communicating Information to the Public Critical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

What EPA Said in Its Major Public Communications .................................. 8

Data Available at the Time Did Not Fully Support EPA Press Releases ................... 9

Council on Environmental Quality Influenced EPA Press Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

September 13 Press Release Also Revised to Eliminate Cautionary Statements . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Recent Conclusions About WTC Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3 EPA’s Response to Indoor Environment Consistent With Statutes

and Regulations But May Have Delayed Needed Health Protection . . . . . . . . 21

Concerns Expressed Regarding Indoor Contamination Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Responses to Indoor Contamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authority for Indoor Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Prior Responses to Releases of Hazardous Substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4 Asbestos Emission Control Work Practices Inconsistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Application of NESHAP Demolition and Renovation Regulations to the WTC Disaster . . . . . . . . 33

Asbestos Work Practices Used in the WTC Complex Demolition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Asbestos Still in Many U.S. Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vi Report No. 2003-P-00012

5 Air Quality-Related Communications Not Effective in 

Getting Public and Workers to Take Recommended Precautions . . . . . . . . . . 41

NYCDOH Survey Found Residents Wanted More Air Quality Information 

 and Did Not Use Recommended Cleaning Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Telephone Poll Indicated Public Did Not Believe Air Was Safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Unprotected Workers Cleaned Contaminated Offices and Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Ground Zero Workers May Not Have Received Sufficient Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

 Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6 Further Actions Needed to Address Current WTC Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

WTC Outdoor Monitoring Ended June 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Indoor Residential Cleanup Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Actions Can Be Taken to Provide Additional Assurance

 That Indoor Cleanup Is Protective of Human Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

7 EPA Should Continue Efforts to Improve Contingency Planning . . . . . . 55

Various Actions Initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

OIG Observations for Improving Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Contingency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Risk Assessment and Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Risk Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

EPA Actions to Improve Its Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

 

Appendices

 

A Federal Agencies Responding to the WTC Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

B Details on Scope and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

C EPA September 18, 2001 Press Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

D Screening Levels Used by EPA to Assess Outdoor Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

E EPA Outdoor Air Asbestos Sampling for September 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

F EPA Outdoor Bulk Dust Asbestos Test Results for September 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

G EPA September 16, 2001 Press Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

H EPA September 13, 2001 Press Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

I Non-Governmental Environmental Experts Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

J NYCDEP October 25, 2001 Instructions to Residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

K Indoor Air and Dust Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

L Details on Use of Respirators at Ground Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

M Cleaning Procedures for Residents Opting to Have Their Residences Cleaned . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

N Details from EPA and Non-EPA Lessons Learned Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

O Details on Health-Based Benchmarks Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

P EPA Letter Concerning Worker Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Q EPA Response to the Draft Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

R OIG Evaluation of the Agency’s Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

S New York City Response to Draft Report Excerpts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

T OIG Evaluation of New York City’s Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

U Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
1 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chapter 1

Introduction

Purpose

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on this country and their environmental

aftermath were unprecedented. Unfortunately, further terrorist attacks on this

country remain likely and a response to such a tragedy could be needed again. 

Accordingly, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this evaluation, in

consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Deputy

Administrator, to evaluate EPA’s response to the collapse of the World Trade

Center (WTC) towers on September 11. The objectives of our evaluation were to

answer the following:

• Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA’s

major public communications regarding air quality and associated health risks

resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers?

• Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and

controlling risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in the

WTC area consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies, guidance,

and practice? 

• Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards followed

during WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why not?

• To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air

quality and associated health risks: (a) received by the public; (b) understood

by the public; and (c) effective in getting people to take the desired actions to

reduce their potential health risks? 

• What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response and

recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air quality?

• Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing with

air pollution resulting from future catastrophes? 

Background

On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, terrorists flew two hijacked

commercial jets into the WTC towers. Both towers collapsed within 2 hours of

impact, killing almost 2,800 people, including 343 firefighters and 60 New York

City and Port Authority police officers. In addition to the devastating loss of life,
2 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Dust cloud from the WTC collapse. Source: NYPD

Street level conditions in Lower Manhattan after collapse.

Source: wtcphotos by flagsoncars.com

the dust and debris emanating from the collapse and the ensuing fires created

environmental concerns for the public that have persisted more than a year after

the disaster. 

Airborne dust from the collapse of the towers blanketed Lower Manhattan and

was blown or dispersed into many of the surrounding office buildings, schools,

and residences. One person described the aftermath in Lower Manhattan as

“looking like a blizzard” had hit. However, this blizzard did not deposit snow,

but instead a complex mixture of building debris and combustion by-products. 

This mixture included, among other substances, asbestos, lead, glass fibers, and

concrete dust.

In addition to the initial dispersion of

dust and debris, fires at the site

created various emissions of

potentially harmful pollutants. These

fires were not officially declared

extinguished until December 19,

2001, and debris continued to

smolder and fires flared up for weeks

after that. Emissions resulting from

these fires included particulate

matter, various metals,

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),

volatile organic compounds (VOCs),

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons

(PAHs), and dioxin.

On September 11, 2001, the

President signed a major disaster

declaration for the five counties of

New York City to provide assistance

to New York State, thus activating

the Federal Response Plan (FRP). 

The FRP establishes the process and

structure for the Federal Government

to provide assistance to local

agencies when responding to the

consequences of any major disaster

or emergency declared under the

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief

and Emergency Assistance Act, as

amended (42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq.). 

The FRP employs an operational 
1 Incident Command System Principles include use of common terminology, modular organization,

integrated communications, unified command structure, action planning, manageable span of

control, pre-designated facilities, and comprehensive resource management.

3 Report No. 2003-P-00012

structure based on the principles of the Incident Command System,1 a system

adopted by the fire and rescue community. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for

administering the FRP. This plan includes 12 Emergency Support Functions,

which describe the types of support provided to local authorities and identify the

Federal agencies responsible for leading and assisting in providing that support. 

To obtain assistance under the FRP, a State requests assistance from FEMA,

which in turn issues a mission assignment to the appropriate Federal lead agency

as outlined in the Emergency Support Functions.

EPA is the designated lead agency for Emergency Support Function No. 10,

“Hazardous Materials Annex.” The intent of this function is to provide support to

State and local governments in responding to an actual or potential discharge

and/or release of hazardous materials following a major disaster or emergency,

including the release of airborne contaminants. To ensure the most efficient and

effective use of resources in responding to an actual or potential release of

hazardous materials, this function also places the response mechanisms of the

National Contingency Plan within the FRP coordination structure. The National

Contingency Plan is the implementing regulation for EPA’s Superfund program,

and provides guidelines and procedures for responding to releases and threatened

releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants, including releases

that threaten air quality.

Early Response 

Various circumstances complicated the Government’s and EPA’s ability to

respond to environmental concerns in what was an unprecedented and extremely

difficult situation. The New York City Office of Emergency Management’s

Emergency Operations Center was destroyed in the attacks. EPA’s Region 2

office, about a half-mile from the WTC site, was evacuated and not re-opened

until 2 weeks after the attacks. Electrical power was lost in Lower Manhattan, as

well as radio and telephone communications. Further, transportation to Lower

Manhattan was halted, as well as commercial air travel nationwide. 

As with most disasters, local authorities were the first responders. “Ground

Zero,” as the seven-building WTC area site would become known, was initially a

search and rescue effort under the direction of the Fire Department of New York

and, subsequently, a recovery operation under the jurisdiction of the New York

City Department of Design and Construction (NYCDDC) and the Fire

Department of New York. According to New York City’s Deputy Assistant Chief
4 Report No. 2003-P-00012

of the Fire Department, “the complexity of the activity performed at one site –

rescue, recovery, demolition, and construction – at one time is unprecedented.” 

The New York City Office of Emergency Management was responsible for

coordinating the response efforts of approximately 150 governmental agencies

and non-governmental organizations. Further complicating the situation was the

fact that the area was treated as a crime scene, with law enforcement authorities

strictly limiting access for agencies such as EPA, particularly in the first 48 hours.

Nonetheless, EPA officials immediately recognized the need to monitor

environmental conditions after the attacks occurred. After the collapse, EPA

on-scene coordinators collected bulk dust samples that were analyzed for asbestos

and lead. EPA’s Edison, New Jersey, location provided workspace for essential

Region 2 personnel while EPA’s New York City office was closed. The

Environmental Response Team in Edison also collected ambient air samples in

New Jersey and Brooklyn on September 11, which were analyzed for the presence

of asbestos, lead, and VOCs. On September 12, nine ambient (outdoor) air

samples were collected from Ground Zero. 

As the first week progressed, the assessment of environmental conditions became

a primary emphasis for EPA and other Federal, State, and local government

organizations. An EPA air monitoring specialist in Research Triangle Park, North

Carolina, took a team to New York and helped develop a monitoring network to

assess the ambient air conditions for the general public around Lower Manhattan. 

In addition, a multi-agency task force was established to address environmental

concerns, with EPA eventually being designated the lead agency for managing all

of the ambient air data collected by the various government agencies. 

In addition to responding to the air quality issues, which are the focus of this

report, EPA conducted many other response activities. These included overseeing

the removal of hazardous wastes, monitoring and assessing water quality,

monitoring environmental conditions at the landfills, and establishing and

operating personal and truck washing stations at the disaster site and landfills. 

Hazardous material removed from the site included an estimated 236 batteries,

802 containers, and 3,049 cylinders that had potential to cause environmental and

human health damage. Further, approximately 639,465 gallons of fuel oil and/or

oily water mixture were pumped from basements, manholes, trenches, and

underground storage tanks. A NYCDDC official told us that EPA’s response was

“phenomenal” in his opinion and that EPA’s response crews were on top of every

issue. 

Other Federal agencies in addition to EPA were involved in providing support to

local authorities regarding environmental quality and safety. For example:

• FEMA was in charge of coordinating the FRP.
5 Report No. 2003-P-00012

• The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), within the

Department of Labor, conducted ambient and bulk dust sampling within the

immediate Ground Zero work zone and provided guidance to Ground Zero

workers regarding the use of personal protective equipment. 

• Within the Department of Health and Human Services:

< The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

assisted in ensuring worker health and safety.

< The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)

provided technical assistance to the New York City Department of

Health by conducting an indoor residential sampling and assessment

project.

< The Public Health Service provided assistance to the New York City

Department of Health.

Appendix A provides further details on the various tasks performed by these and

other Federal Agencies.

Scope and Methodology

Our evaluation focused on EPA’s response to air quality concerns – both ambient

and indoor – for the period September 2001 through April 2003. Our work was

performed at various EPA offices and the offices of several other Federal

agencies, such as FEMA, OSHA, and ATSDR. We also performed work at

various New York City offices. Further, we visited and consulted selected health

research, air quality testing, academic, and environmental organizations.

Our approach included the independent review and verification of WTC air

monitoring and bulk dust data. For example, we randomly selected monitoring

results posted on EPA’s web site and traced the test results back to the raw data to

verify the accuracy of the information posted. Further, we selected certain data

from EPA’s “NYC Response” database and determined whether it was included

on EPA’s public web site.

Our approach included a synthesis of WTC-related research reports, independent

legal interpretation of applicable statutes and regulations, and independent

analysis of EPA technical decisions used in interpreting and presenting air quality

information. We interviewed key officials within and outside of EPA who

collected, analyzed, interpreted, or made decisions with WTC air monitoring and

bulk dust data, as well as environmental and medical external experts. We

conducted our field work during the period June 2002 through July 2003. We 
6 Report No. 2003-P-00012

conducted this review in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued

by the Comptroller General of the United States.

A detailed description of our scope and methodology is in Appendix B. 
7 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication

1. Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner.

2. Plan carefully and evaluate your efforts.

3. Listen to the public’s specific concerns.

4. Be honest, frank, and open.

5. Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources.

6. Meet the needs of the media.

7. Speak clearly and with compassion.

Chapter 2

EPA Statements About Air Quality

Not Adequately Qualified

EPA’s early statements reassured the public regarding the safety of the air outside

the Ground Zero perimeter area. However, when EPA made a September 18

announcement that the air was “safe” to breathe, the Agency did not have

sufficient data and analyses to make the statement. The White House Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) influenced, through the collaboration process, the

information that EPA communicated to the public through its early press releases

when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones. 

Conclusions from an EPA draft risk evaluation completed over a year after the

attacks have tended to support EPA’s statements about long-term health effects

when all necessary qualifications are considered. However, EPA’s statements

about air quality did not contain these qualifications. (Details on indoor air are in

Chapter 3.)

Communicating Information to the Public Critical

Communicating the potential health risks resulting from an environmental hazard

is a key mechanism for warning the public to mitigate potential exposures and

take other precautions to avoid unnecessary health risks. However, an emergency

situation often presents significant challenges. 

EPA has many years of experience in communicating environmental risks to the

public, especially through its Superfund program. The Agency has issued

numerous guidance documents on how to effectively communicate risks to the

public, including EPA’s “Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication”

(see box). EPA and the New York City Department of Health were significantly

involved in

communicating

information on the

air quality in Lower

Manhattan after the

WTC disaster. 
2 www.epa.gov/oig

8 Report No. 2003-P-00012

What EPA Said in Its Major Public Communications

EPA used various methods to inform the public after September 11, including

attending public forums; having interviews with newspaper, television, and radio

reporters; and posting information on its public web site. Our analysis focused

primarily on the information provided through press releases since the Agency

develops its position through a deliberative process that represents the Agency’s

official position.

EPA issued five press releases within 10 days after September 11, 2001, four

more through the end of December, and another four through the end of May

2002. EPA’s WTC press releases from September through December 2001

reassured the public about air quality. Although EPA’s press releases generally

recommended that rescue and cleanup workers take precautions to reduce their

exposure to pollutants, EPA’s basic overriding message was that the public did

not need to be concerned about airborne contaminants caused by the WTC

collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both indoor and outdoor air.

For example, EPA Region 2 officials told us that the September 18 statement

made by the EPA Administrator (see Appendix C) that the air was “safe” to

breathe only applied to:

• long-term health effects – not short-term or acute health effects;

• the general public – not Ground Zero workers;

• outdoor air – not indoor air;

• healthy adults – not sensitive sub-populations such as children and the

elderly; and

• asbestos – not other air pollutants.

 

However, except for the second point, the statements issued by EPA in press

releases throughout 2001 generally did not contain the above qualifications. For

the general public, EPA’s overriding message was that there was no significant

threat to human health. 

Key air quality related statements from EPA press releases issued during 2001

following the WTC collapse are in Table 2-1. The full text of each of these press

releases are available at our web site.2
9 Report No. 2003-P-00012

 Table 2-1: Key Air Quality Statements from 2001 Press Releases 

Date Key Statement

 09-13-01 “Monitoring and sampling conducted on Tuesday and Wednesday have

been very reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the

public to environmental contaminants. . . . EPA and OSHA will work

closely with rescue and cleanup crews to minimize their potential

exposure, but the general public should be very reassured by initial

sampling.”

 09-16-01 “Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New

York’s financial district” (quoting Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA).

“The Agency is recommending that businesses in the area planning to

reopen next week take precautions including cleaning air conditioning

filters and using vacuums with appropriate filters to collect dust.”

 09-18-01 “I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C.

that their air is safe to breath [sic] . . . ” (quoting EPA Administrator).

09-21-01 “NYC Monitoring Efforts Continue to Show Safe Drinking Water & Air”

(press release heading).

10-03-01 “Data Confirms No Significant Public Health Risks; Rescue Crews and

Nearby Residents Should Take Appropriate Precautions. . . ” (press

release sub-heading).

10-30-01 “While we have fortunately not found levels of contaminants that pose a

significant health risk to the general public, our efforts to monitor the

area and keep the public informed of our findings have not waned. “ 

Agency officials stressed that press releases were only one of many forms of

communication used to provide air quality information to the public, and that

public forums and media interviews were also important. Further, EPA provided

public access to its monitoring data through its public web site, which included

interactive maps that could be used to identify monitoring results. In regard to the

monitoring data, we found no evidence that EPA attempted to conceal data results

from the public.

Data Available at the Time Did Not Fully Support EPA Press Releases

Information and the analyses of available data did not fully support the statement 

made in the September 18, 2001, release, which quoted the EPA Administrator as

saying the air was “safe” to breathe. Four factors in particular posed limitations

on the conclusions that could be made at that time about air quality: 
10 Report No. 2003-P-00012

• A lack of data results for many pollutants,

• An absence of health benchmarks for asbestos and other pollutants, 

• Imprecise optical asbestos sampling methodologies, and

• Over 25 percent of the bulk dust samples collected before September 18

showed the presence of asbestos above the 1 percent benchmark.

EPA did not have monitoring data to support reassurances made in press releases

up to September 18 because it lacked monitoring data for several contaminants,

particularly PCBs, particulate matter, dioxin, and PAHs. 

According to a draft evaluation entitled Exposure and Human Health Evaluation

of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster, by EPA’s Office of

Research and Development, that Office was not able to make health risk

evaluations for exposures in the first couple of days because of the lack of

monitoring data. For several pollutants of concern, sampling did not begin until

September 16, and in many cases the results were not known until after the

September 18 press release was issued. EPA was not able to obtain samples and

monitor air due to difficulties in access and security, power supply sources,

equipment availability, and analytical capacity. As a result, data available before

September 18 for making conclusions about air quality for pollutants other than

asbestos was limited.

Table 2-2 shows when air monitoring began and when the data results first

became available for each pollutant of concern.
11 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Table 2-2: Outdoor Sampling Timeline for Pollutants of Concern

Pollutant Sampling Source Sampling

Started 

Results Available[1]

Lead Dust September 11 September 12

Asbestos Bulk Dust 

Ambient Air

September 11

September 12

September 12

September 13

Benzene [2] Air Grab Samples September 16 September 17

Mercury Ambient Air

Dust

September 16

September 16

September 18

September 20

Lead Ambient Air September 16 September 20 [3] 

PAHs

Cadmium

Chromium 

Manganese

Ambient Air September 16 September 20 

PAHs Dust September 16 September 22

Dioxin Dust

Ambient Air

September 16

September 16

September 24 [4]

September 28

PCBs Ambient Air September 16 September 28 

PM2.5

PM10 [5]

Ambient Air September 21 October 4

TSP [5] Ambient Air No Monitoring No Monitoring

Notes:

[1] = Based on Daily Summaries of monitoring results prepared by Region 2 staff in Edison,

New Jersey, which were used to brief management on data results.

[2] = EPA sampled for additional VOCs on this date as well.

[3] = EPA’s Health Risk Evaluation reported lead results were known on September 18.

[4] = EPA’s Health Risk Evaluation reported dioxin results were known on September 23.

[5] = “PM” stands for “Particulate Matter.” PM2.5 represents “fine” particulate matter less

than or equal to 2.5 micrometers in diameter. PM10 refers to particulate matter less

than or equal to 10 micrometers, with the fraction between 2.5 and 10 micrometers

known as “coarse.” “TSP” stands for “Total Suspended Particulates,” and includes

all sizes of particles. 

Health-based benchmarks for short-term and acute exposures did not exist for

pollutants of concern resulting from the collapse of the WTC. For asbestos, EPA

used benchmarks originally designed for other purposes to assess potential health

risks from breathing the air following the WTC collapse. Because health-based

benchmarks for short-term exposures did not exist for most of the other

pollutants, EPA revised benchmarks for lifetime (30-year) exposures to develop

screening levels for short-term (1-year) exposures. Further, health-based

benchmarks did not exist for assessing the risk to human health from exposure to

the combination of air pollutants that were emitted. 
12 Report No. 2003-P-00012

EPA did not have health-based benchmarks for airborne asbestos nor for asbestos

in bulk dust. Consequently, EPA used criteria from two programs originally

developed for other purposes.

• Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA): Criteria for this

program were developed for air monitoring inside schools following an

asbestos abatement program, to clear those schools for re-entry. For the

WTC testing, EPA used AHERA criteria to evaluate the ambient (outdoor)

air quality for asbestos. However, this is not a health-based standard. The

AHERA standard for re-entering schools was established at 70 structures

per millimeter squared (s/mm2) in 1987 because this was considered to be

the amount of background contamination found on the filters used to

collect air samples when the AHERA standard was issued. Due to filter

improvements over the years, the amount of background contamination

today is considerably less, but the AHERA standard has not been revised.

• Asbestos National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

(NESHAP): Criteria for this program were developed to identify

asbestos-containing material subject to demolition and renovation work

practices. This criteria states that material containing at least 1 percent

asbestos, by volume, is considered asbestos-containing material and

subject to EPA’s NESHAP regulations. The 1 percent threshold, based on

the smallest amount that can be measured using Polarized Light

Microscopy, is not a health-based standard. This was emphasized in a

September 19 e-mail from an EPA Branch Chief, who has testified as an

Agency expert at an asbestos penalty hearing that: “Additionally, 1%

asbestos in a material is not a safe level of asbestos [emphasis in original

quotation] . . . one-half percent asbestos-containing material (ACM) could

be just as hazardous as 20% ACM depending on the condition of the

material and how it is handled.” New York City also recommended that

building owners use this 1 percent benchmark in determining whether the

interior of buildings should be cleaned for asbestos (see Chapter 3). 

Guidelines were not available to assess the impact of acute (up to 8 hours)

exposures. People caught in the initial debris and dust cloud on September 11

were potentially exposed to high levels of various pollutants for a short duration. 

EPA has been funding a program to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels

(AEGLs), but none of these levels had been finalized at the time of the WTC

disaster. The program had developed several draft AEGL’s but these draft AEGLs

were not applicable to the pollutants of concern at the WTC site.

In general, EPA did not have benchmarks to evaluate short-term exposures such

as those experienced from the WTC collapse. For the WTC situation, EPA

adjusted the Superfund 30-year exposure benchmarks to 1-year (short-term)

exposure benchmarks. (See Appendix D for a list of benchmarks used by EPA in
13 Report No. 2003-P-00012

assessing WTC ambient data.) Since this was done very quickly during an

emergency situation, these benchmarks were not subjected to peer review. 

In addition to not knowing the health impacts of certain individual pollutants,

information was not available on the cumulative or synergistic impacts of being

exposed to several pollutants at once. For example, one medical expert suggested

there may be a synergistic effect between PAHs and asbestos, since PAHs

resemble cigarette tar. Studies have shown the lung cancer risk from exposure to

asbestos is increased exponentially for cigarette smokers. In addition, this expert

noted that the combination of high pH and the small shards of glass found in

WTC dust could have had a synergistic impact on the acute respiratory symptoms

that many people experienced. 

There were limitations with all three methods used to analyze asbestos

concentrations in the ambient air and bulk dust in Lower Manhattan. These

limitations, which were not noted in EPA’s press releases, restricted EPA’s ability

to make definitive assessments about the health risks posed by asbestos. 

However, even with these limitations, sufficient data existed to identify the

presence of asbestos in the dust and ambient air, and to warrant that persons

working around the dust take necessary precautions to not inhale the dust. The

three methods used and their limitations follow:

• Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) is a sensitive method generally

used to analyze air samples collected from a relatively clean indoor

environment. At the WTC site, many samples could not be analyzed because

the filters being used to collect asbestos were overloaded with particulates. 

For example, 24 of the 69 samples collected as of September 17 could not be

analyzed because the filters were overloaded. 

 

• Phase Contrast Microscopy (PCM), which was used to analyze asbestos

concentrations in ambient air beginning September 18, can only count fibers

in the filter greater than 5 micrometers in length. A study at the WTC site

found that the majority of the asbestos fibers at the site were less than

5 micrometers in length.

 

• Polarized Light Microscopy (PLM) was used to measure asbestos in bulk dust. 

This method is primarily an estimation method that is not very precise, and

has a detection limit of 1 percent. Therefore, using this method against a strict

benchmark is not reliable.

According to EPA, essentially all outdoor areas at the WTC site were vacuumed,

and the detection methods did not impact the action actually taken to remove the

dust from outdoor areas. See Appendix E for a summary of EPA’s outdoor air

asbestos sampling results.
14 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Some Asbestos Readings Exceeded Levels of Concern

Over 25 percent of the bulk dust samples that EPA had collected and analyzed by

September 18 showed the presence of asbestos above the 1 percent threshold used

by EPA to indicate significant risk. In addition, New York City used the 1 percent

threshold to determine whether the removal of indoor dust was subject to its

Asbestos Control Program regulation. The level of asbestos in dust was a concern

because of the potential for the dust to be disturbed and become airborne, and thus

inhaled. As noted above, this level is not a health-based standard and dust that

contains less than 1 percent could pose a health risk. See Appendix F for results

of EPA outdoor asbestos bulk testing.

EPA and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP)

conducted extensive ambient air monitoring for asbestos around Ground Zero and

Lower Manhattan after September 11. This sampling was conducted at up to 60

sites and a total of almost 10,000 samples were analyzed using TEM. During the

month of September 2001, EPA and New York City monitoring recorded 30

exceedences of the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2. However, after September

2001 the number of AHERA exceedences decreased significantly. For the period

October 2001 through May 2002, seven exceedences of the AHERA standard

were recorded, as shown in Table 2-3. 

Table 2-3. Ambient Asbestos Readings in Lower Manhattan In Excess of 70 s/mm2

Date Reading (s/mm2) Location 1

10/09/01 104.99 Chambers Street

11/28/01 124.44 North Side of Stuyvesant High School

12/27/01 204.44 Albany and Greenwich

01/14/02 72.00 Pier 6 bus sign 

02/05/02 88.00 Liberty and Trinity

02/11/02 213.33 Church and Dey

05/25/02 336.00 West Street (near Stuyvesant H.S.)

1 Excludes four exceedences at worker wash tent.

 

Council on Environmental Quality Influenced EPA Press Releases

 

Coordination and collaboration impacted the completeness of the information and

the substance of the message EPA communicated to the public through its press

releases. As a result of the White House CEQ’s influence, guidance for cleaning

indoor spaces and information about the potential health effects from WTC debris

were not included in EPA’s issued press releases. In addition, based on CEQ’s

influence, reassuring information was added to at least one press release and

cautionary information was deleted from EPA’s draft version of that press release.
3 EPA’s Office of Communication, Education and Media Relations (OCEMR) issued the press

releases. The OCEMR Associate Administrator left the Agency in December 2001 and OCEMR

was renamed the Office of Public Affairs in July 2002.

4 In this context, professional cleaning refers to the use of a certified asbestos cleaner trained in the

proper use of personal protective equipment and procedures to prevent re-contamination.

15 Report No. 2003-P-00012

EPA officials told us that EPA’s WTC press releases issued during the weeks

following September 11 were discussed in conference calls that included EPA

officials, OSHA, and CEQ. Accordingly, the content of an EPA press release

issued during this period could come from several different sources.

Few written records were available on the process used to prepare WTC press

releases. We found draft versions for two of the press releases. However, the

White House’s role in EPA’s public communications about WTC environmental

conditions was described in a September 12, 2001, e-mail from the EPA Deputy

Administrator’s Chief of Staff to senior EPA officials:

All statements to the media should be cleared through the

NSC [National Security Council] before they are released.

According to the EPA Chief of Staff, one particular CEQ official was designated

to work with EPA to ensure that clearance was obtained through NSC. The

Associate Administrator for the EPA Office of Communications, Education, and

Media Relations (OCEMR)3

 said that no press release could be issued for a 3- to

4-week period after September 11 without approval from the CEQ contact.

 Although EPA’s position has been that WTC area residents should obtain

“professional cleaning,”4

 EPA’s press releases did not instruct residents to do so. 

Instead they instructed residents to follow recommended and proper cleaning

procedures and referred the public to the New York City Department of Health

(NYCDOH) for recommended cleaning procedures. We asked the OCEMR

Associate Administrator whether her office had considered advising the public

through a press release that they needed to obtain professional cleaning for their

indoor spaces. The Associate Administrator stated: “It was in a press release: it

was removed by. . . [the CEQ contact].”

OCEMR’s records contained a document, entitled “PM FACT SHEET,” that

discussed the health risk to “sensitive populations” from exposure to particulate

matter. We asked the Associate Administrator whether she had considered

putting any of this information in a press release. She said she had, but the CEQ 

official discouraged her from doing so. Her recollection was that he told her

health effects information should not be included in EPA’s press releases, and 

that anything dealing with health effects should come from New York because

they were on the ground and they were already dealing with it. 
16 Report No. 2003-P-00012

The extent of the CEQ official’s influence on EPA’s WTC press releases was

most clearly illustrated by the changes that were made to a draft press release

dated September 14, 2001, that was issued on September 16, 2001. Every change

that was suggested by the CEQ contact was made. The CEQ official’s suggested

changes added reassuring statements and deleted cautionary statements. 

Details on these various revisions based on the CEQ contact’s input, including

comparisons of draft and issued versions, are in Table 2-4, while the actual press

release is in Appendix G. It should be noted that our analysis of CEQ’s input was

limited because CEQ officials chose not to meet with us. Details on this

limitation are in Appendix B.

Table 2-4: Impact of CEQ Instruction on September 16 EPA Press Release 

Statement Deleted From the Draft and Not Replaced

The concern raised by these samples would be for the workers at the cleanup site and for those workers

who might be returning to their offices on or near Water Street on Monday, September 17, 2001. 

Statements Significantly Revised

Draft Press Release Issued Press Release 

Recent samples of dust gathered by

OSHA on Water Street show higher

levels of asbestos in EPA tests. 

The new samples confirm previous reports that ambient air

quality meets OSHA standards and consequently is not a

cause for public concern. New OSHA data also indicates that

indoor air quality in downtown buildings will meet standards.

 

EPA has found variable asbestos levels in bulk debris and

dust on the ground, but EPA continue [sic] to believe that

there is no significant health risk to the general public in the

coming days. Appropriate steps are being taken to clean up

this dust and debris.

Seven debris and dust samples

taken Thursday, showed levels of

asbestos ranging from 2.1 percent to

3.3 percent. EPA views a 1 percent

level of asbestos as the definition for

asbestos-containing material. 

Debris samples collected outside buildings on cars and other

surfaces contained small percentages of asbestors, [sic]

ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 - slightly above the 1 percent trigger

for defining asbestos material. 

Statements Added to the Issued Press Release Based on CEQ Instructions

CEQ Instructions Statements Added to Issued Press Release

“Add sentence about OSHA monitors

walking the streets yesterday and

wearing personal monitors and

coming up clean.”

OSHA staff walked through New York’s financial district on

September 13th, wearing personal air monitors and collected

data on potential asbestos exposure levels. All but two

samples contained no asbestos. Two samples contained

very low levels of an unknown fiber, which is still being

analyzed.

“INSERT HENSHAW quote

somewhere around here”

“Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to

work in New York’s financial district,” said John L. Henshaw,

Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA.

“Add OSHA indoor air sampling data

sentence.”

Air Samples taken on Sept. 13th inside buildings in New York’s

financial district were negative for asbestos.
17 Report No. 2003-P-00012

We were unable to identify any EPA official who claimed ownership of EPA’s

WTC press releases issued in September and early October 2001. When we asked

the EPA Chief of Staff whether she could claim ownership of EPA’s early WTC

press releases, she replied that she was not able to do so “because the ownership

was joint ownership between EPA and the White House,” and that “final approval

came from the White House.” She also told us that other considerations, such as

the desire to reopen Wall Street and national security concerns, were considered

when preparing EPA’s early press releases. The OCEMR Associate

Administrator said of the September 16 release: “I did not feel like it was my

press release.”

September 13 Press Release Also Revised to Eliminate

Cautionary Statements

Cautionary statements in a draft version of the September 13, 2001, press release

(see Appendix H) were removed and replaced with more reassuring statements. 

For example, the second clause of the caption to the draft press release, which

noted that EPA was testing for environmental hazards, was replaced with a

statement reassuring the public about environmental hazards. Further, the press

release did not contain a statement in the draft version that EPA considered

asbestos hazardous in this situation. We were unable to locate any record that

explained why the changes were made, and the OCEMR Associate Administrator

did not recall ever having seen the draft. The major differences between the draft

and the issued press release are shown in Table 2-5.

Table 2-5: Significant Changes to the September 13 EPA Press Release

Draft Press Release Issued Press Release

Caption to press release: 

EPA Initiating Emergency Response

Activities, Testing Terrorized Sites

For Environmental Hazards

Revised caption to press release: 

EPA Initiating Emergency Response Activities, Reassures

Public About Environmental Hazards

Preliminary results of EPA’s

sampling activities indicate no or

very low levels of asbestos. 

However, even at low levels, EPA

considers asbestos hazardous in

this situation and will continue to

monitor and sample for elevated

levels of asbestos and work with the

appropriate officials to ensure

awareness and proper handling,

transportation and disposal of

potentially contaminated debris or

materials.

EPA is greatly relieved to have learned that there appears to

be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York

City,” said Administrator Whitman. “We are working closely

with rescue crews to ensure that all appropriate precautions

are taken. We will continue to monitor closely.”

Public health concerns about asbestos contamination are

primarily related to long-term exposure. Short-term, low-level

exposure of the type that might have been produced by the

collapse of the World Trade Center buildings is unlikely to

cause significant health effects. EPA and OSHA will work

closely with rescue and cleanup crews to minimize their

potential exposure, but the general public should be very

reassured by initial sampling.
5 “Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site,” David J.

Prezant et al, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, No. 11, September 12, 2002. 

18 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Recent Conclusions About WTC Air Quality

The only formal risk evaluation of the health effects from exposure to the outdoor

air in Lower Manhattan following the WTC collapse was performed by EPA’s

Office of Research and Development. This evaluation, still in draft form as of

July 2003, concluded that, except for the rescue and cleanup workers at Ground

Zero who were not wearing respirators, as well as unknown exposures to the

public during the first few days, persons in the area were unlikely to suffer adverse

heath effects from the outdoor air. 

The report also had a caveat for the conclusions drawn in the report relative to

human health risks. The draft report stated:

This report should be viewed as the first phase of an ongoing

analysis, and the conclusions and findings cited below should not

be considered the final EPA judgment. At this point, the available

data and analysis are still too preliminary to support reliable

quantitative predictions of potential human health risks.

We spoke to a number of experts in the field of environmental monitoring,

including physicians, industrial hygienists, and researchers These experts

generally agreed that the levels of airborne asbestos detected in the air outside the

perimeter of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not present a significant

increase in long-term health risk to the public. Appendix I lists the experts we

interviewed during this evaluation.

We noted that several health studies pointed to potential problems for firefighters,

rescue workers, and other persons working within the confines of Ground Zero

who did not wear respirators:

• A study of firefighters with “World Trade Center Cough” concluded that

“intense, short-term exposure to materials generated during the collapse of the

World Trade Center was associated with bronchial responsiveness and the

development of cough.”5

• The preliminary results of a Mount Sinai School of Medicine study on

workers directly involved in rescue and recovery found that 78 percent of

those sampled had suffered lung ailments and 88 percent had experienced ear,

nose, and throat problems in the months immediately following the attack.
6 “Prospective Study of Pregnant Women and Infants Exposed in Utero to WTC Air Pollution,”

Columbia University; and “Study of Pregnant Women and Children Near WTC,” Mt. Sinai School

of Medicine. 

19 Report No. 2003-P-00012

At the time we completed our report, no studies of the health effects of the WTC

collapse on the general public had been completed, although we noted studies6

were underway to determine the effects of the WTC collapse on pregnant women

and their children. Further, in January 2003, New York City and Federal health

officials announced a plan to study residents and employees in Lower Manhattan

to identify whether there will be long-term pulmonary effects associated with

exposure to WTC dust and air. 

Recent Developments

EPA has initiated actions to strengthen its risk communication procedures for

emergency situations. For example, EPA’s Office of Public Affairs has prepared

a draft “Plan for Incident Communication” that establishes basic incident

procedures and assigns responsibilities and authorities. Further, the Agency

intends to use this plan as the basis for more inclusive best-practices emergency

communications guidance. 

Conclusions

EPA’s early statement that the air was safe to breathe was incomplete in that it

lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not supported by the data available at

the time. CEQ influenced the final message in EPA’s air quality statements. 

Competing considerations, such as national security concerns and the desire to

reopen Wall Street, also played a role in EPA’s air quality statements. The

“safety” of the air in Lower Manhattan after the collapse of the WTC towers is

still being debated and studied. However, given the current lack of health-based

benchmarks, the lack of research data on synergistic effects, and the lack of

reliable information on the extent of the public’s exposure to these pollutants, the

answer to whether the outdoor air around WTC was “safe” to breathe may not be

settled for years to come.
20 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Recommendation 

We recommend that the EPA Administrator:

 2-1. Develop procedures for emergency risk communication to ensure that

EPA’s public pronouncements regarding health risks and environmental

quality are adequately supported with available data and analysis.

Additional recommendations regarding contingency planning, risk

characterization and assessment, and risk communication are presented in 

Chapter 7.

Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation

In her August 8, 2003 response to our draft report, the EPA Acting Administrator

stated that the report placed too much emphasis on EPA’s press releases and did

not sufficiently acknowledge EPA’s many other communications. She further

noted that EPA’s early statement that the air was safe to breathe was made in

direct response to the public’s concern about asbestos contamination following the

WTC collapse, and that the press release detailed the monitoring that led to the

statement and made it clear that further monitoring would take place. The Acting

Administrator also pointed out that EPA never withheld data from the public and

made its extensive monitoring data available on its interactive web site. With

respect to CEQ’s involvement in the preparation of EPA’s press releases, the

Acting Administrator stated that the Agency coordinated with CEQ and that this

coordination was neither unusual nor unexpected during a catastrophic disaster on

the scale of the WTC attacks. Further, she noted that EPA acknowledges that

mistakes were made and things could have been done better, and that there are

lessons to be learned in the difficult area of risk communication. Improving risk

communications is an Agency priority as it implements its “lessons learned.” 

In our opinion, Agency press releases are a very important form of

communication. As detailed in our draft report, EPA press releases result from a

deliberative process that should reflect the Agency’s official position on

significant issues. Press releases are made available to essentially all news media

and may be quoted or paraphrased in radio, television, and other forms of

communication. In our opinion, the Agency could have provided more complete

and useful information in the press releases. Further, we reviewed other agency

forms of communication including all communication-related documents

provided by the Agency. These documents included videotaped interviews,

newspaper articles, briefing notes, and other forms of communication. With

respect to the Agency’s early statement about the air quality, we fully recognize

the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the time the statement was made

about the air being safe to breathe. It continues to be our opinion that there was

insufficient information to support the statement. 

The Agency’s complete written response to our draft report and our detailed

evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively. 
21 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chapter 3

EPA’s Response to Indoor Environment

Consistent With Statutes and Regulations

But May Have Delayed Needed Health Protection

EPA’s actions to evaluate, mitigate, and control risks to human health from

exposure to indoor air pollutants in the WTC area were consistent with applicable

statutes and regulations. EPA is not obligated to respond to a given emergency,

and New York City exercised a lead role regarding indoor air. Nonetheless, we

believe EPA could have taken a more proactive approach regarding indoor air

cleanup. EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency

initiated a multi-agency task force to address concerns about the indoor

environment. Prior to initiation of the EPA-led cleanup, many WTC area

residents had returned to their homes, and a study indicated most of them had not

followed recommended cleaning practices. The full extent of public exposure to

indoor contaminants resulting from the WTC collapse is unknown. 

Concerns Expressed Regarding Indoor Contamination Response

The public and elected officials began raising concerns about the extent that

indoor spaces were contaminated with asbestos and other contaminants shortly

after the WTC collapse. New York City, which initially took lead responsibility

for addressing indoor air, was criticized for:

• Delegating testing and remediation efforts to building owners and residents. 

• Not enforcing proper procedures for cleaning asbestos.

• Giving improper advice to the public on testing and cleaning procedures.

EPA was criticized for not initially taking a greater role in indoor testing and

cleaning. U.S. Congressman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), whose district includes

Lower Manhattan, contended that EPA violated the law by allowing New York

City to handle indoor air quality and not exercising oversight authority pursuant to

the National Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA maintained that the NCP does not

create a right to a Federal response and its approach to indoor air was a “proper

and legal exercise of our discretion” under the NCP.

In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, EPA undertook several activities to

address various issues related to indoor air. However, according to EPA

documentation, New York City officials stated on September 30, 2001, that the

City would not be requesting assistance from EPA regarding residential sampling

or reoccupation issues, or roof debris cleanup.
22 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Indoor dust contamination from WTC debris. Source: EPA/ORD - - photo courtesy of Dr. Lung Chi Chen

- NYU

Responses to Indoor Contamination

Initially, building owners were held responsible for cleaning up their own

buildings, including interiors and exteriors. According to New York City

officials, the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was

discussed with FEMA and EPA; and the initial federal position was that the

Stafford Act (the implementing statute for the FRP) did not provide direct funding

to New York City for this cleanup. New York City officials said that during this

discussion they informed the federal agencies that building owners would be

responsible for funding the cleanup of their buildings and the federal agencies

agreed with this position. Under this arrangement, owners of rental units were

responsible for cleaning apartment walls, ceilings, and floors; common areas, such

as hallways and lobbies; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)

systems, when deemed necessary as explained in guidance provided by New York

City. Renters were responsible for cleaning personal belongings. In residentowned condominiums, residents were responsible for cleaning their units, while

building owners were responsible for cleaning common areas and HVAC systems.

Table 3-1 notes key instructions New York City provided to building owners and

residents regarding the potential for indoor contamination resulting from the

collapse of the WTC towers and steps for cleaning the indoor contamination. 

Copies of the instructions are available on our web site.
23 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Table 3-1: Actions by New York City

 

Date Key Statement

09-14-01 NYCDEP provided a notice to building owners entitled “Clean-up of Asbestos Containing

Material.” For “minimal dust accumulations (light coating)” the notice recommended

using wet methods and/or vacuums equipped with HEPA (high efficiency particulate air)

filters. For “accumulations of dust that included pieces of debris” the procedures

provided for two options. Building owners could assume that the material was asbestoscontaining material and have it cleaned in accordance with NYCDEP Asbestos

Abatement Program removal procedures, or have the material sampled by a NYCDEP

certified investigator or New York State Department of Labor inspector to determine

whether the material was asbestos-containing material and subject to New York City’s

Asbestos Abatement Program removal procedures. Asbestos-containing material was

identified as any material containing more than one percent asbestos.

 09-16-01 The NYCDEP issued a “Public Notice” flyer to building owners that discussed building

maintenance issues. The notice stated that building owners/managers should have

possible contamination problems reviewed by competent professionals.

 09-17-01 NYCDOH issued a press release that recommended that individuals reentering their

residences and places of work remove dust by using a wet rag or wet mop, and vacuum

with a HEPA filtration vacuum. If a HEPA vacuum was not available, the press release

recommended using HEPA bags or dust allergen bags with a regular vacuum cleaner. 

EPA’s web site also linked to these instructions.

09-26-01 NYCDEP issued a notice to building owners entitled “Clean-up of Debris inside Buildings”

which was identical to the notice issued on 9-14-01 except for three items. First, the

notice did not say “accumulations of dust that include pieces of debris . . may be

assumed to be ACM (asbestos-containing material).” Second, the notice stated that

such accumulations “can be sampled” (rather than “must be sampled”) by a NYCDEP

certified investigator or New York State Department of Labor inspector. Third, the notice

stated that EPA had studied the situation and reported “that the potential presence of

ACM in dust and debris is minimal.” 

 10-25-01 NYCDEP described benchmarks and guidelines used to evaluate environmental

conditions in a letter to Lower Manhattan residents dated October 25. In regard to

cleaning indoor spaces the letter stated: “If more than 1 percent asbestos was found

and testing and cleaning was necessary, it had to be performed by certified personnel.” 

In addition, the statement indicated landlords should not reopen any building until a

competent professional had properly inspected their building. The City’s Asbestos

Abatement Program requires that building owners file a written notification with the

NYCDEP for asbestos abatement projects that do not require plan or permit approval

from the City’s Buildings Department. NYCDEP officials told us this notification applied

to buildings owners who found more than 1 percent asbestos in bulk dust in their

buildings (see Appendix J for a copy of the instructions).

NYCDEP officials told us that in September 2001 they began visually inspecting

the exteriors of over 1,000 buildings and identified 323 with visible dust. 

NYCDEP documentation indicated that 102 of these 323 building exteriors were

subsequently cleaned by the building owners. NYCDEP officials told us that the

remaining owners stated they could not afford to clean their buildings, and these

buildings were cleaned by NYCDEP with funding provided by FEMA. 

To determine the extent of indoor contamination in Lower Manhattan residences,
7 The U.S. Coast Guard maintains strike teams that typically deploy for responses to oil and

hazardous chemical spills and were deployed in response to the WTC attacks.

24 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Indoor dust contamination from WTC debris. Source: EPA/ORD - Photo courtesy of Dr. Lung Chi Chen -

NYU

the NYCDOH and ATSDR initiated an indoor air study in November 2001. The

sampling phase was completed in December 2001, preliminary results released to

the public in February 2002, and the final report issued by ATSDR in September

2002. The results of this study are discussed later in this chapter. 

In the weeks following the disaster, EPA was involved in testing various indoor

spaces. EPA worked with the U.S. Coast Guard7

 to monitor offices in the Wall

Street area so that employees could enter their offices and obtain needed files.

On September 13, 2001, EPA tested for asbestos in its building located at

290 Broadway. Further, on September 17, 2001, EPA sampled dust in the Jacob

Javits Convention Center complex, and on October 23, 2001, tested in the

Department of Justice offices on 100 Church Street.

Details on the results of EPA’s indoor testing, as well as General Services

Administration testing of Federal buildings and three significant non-EPA studies,

are in Appendix K.

Also, EPA conducted preliminary indoor assessments of 11 buildings at the

request of the Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force. These preliminary

assessments included inspecting the interiors of the buildings, discussing cleanup

plans with building owners/managers, and collecting dust samples from four of

the buildings – three schools and one apartment building. An EPA Situation
25 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Report for September 27-29, 2001, noted that a projected future action was to

“finalize sampling plan for residential buildings.” However, EPA’s Situation

Report for September 30 noted:

Residential sampling/reoccupation: On 9/30/01, EPA spoke to

US Public Health Service and NYSDOH (New York State

Department of Health) who have been discussing issue with

NYCDOH. NYC will not be requesting State or Federal assistance

for residential sampling or reoccupation issues. The Federal

Response Plan assigns responsibility to the U.S. Public Health

Service under ESF-8, Health and Medical Services, when state and

local resources request Federal assistance for medical and public

health assistance.

In addition, correspondence from the Region 2 Regional Administrator indicated

that in an October 9, 2001, meeting between FEMA, EPA, and New York City

officials, City officials stated that they would not be requesting EPA’s assistance

for residential sampling or reoccupation issues. The September 30 report also

indicated that New York City would not be requesting Federal assistance for

cleaning roof debris. New York City officials disagreed with the characterizations

of their statements presented in these documents and told us that they repeatedly

expressed the position that the City welcomed any authorized federal assistance at

that time. 

Though EPA press releases through 2001 generally addressed outdoor air and not

indoor contamination, the September 16 and October 3 releases discussed

cleaning procedures that business owners and residents should take in cleaning

indoor spaces. The press releases advised residents and business owners they

could clean their own spaces if they used “appropriate” vacuum filters, and

followed “recommended” and “proper” procedures. These press releases did not

define what “appropriate,” “recommended,” and “proper” procedures meant.

Initially, EPA deferred to New York City to provide guidance for cleaning indoor

spaces. As noted in Chapter 2, EPA was prepared to include recommendations in

its press releases that residents obtain professional cleaning of their residences.

The absence of instructions recommending that residents obtain professional

cleaning in the initial weeks following the disaster may have increased the longterm health risks for those who cleaned WTC dust without using respirators and

other professional cleaning equipment.

EPA’s web site and press releases deferred to the NYCDOH guidance even

though EPA’s position on indoor cleaning was different than the City’s. EPA’s

basis for deferring to New York City was summarized by the testimony of the

Region 2 Administrator before the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and

Public Works on February 11, 2002. The Administrator, when asked if the
26 Report No. 2003-P-00012

NYCDOH provided adequate cleanup directions to residents, answered as

follows:

Consistent with their responsibility for the indoor environment, the

City DOH, working with ATSDR and the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC) took the lead on the development

and dissemination of public health recommendations related to

building cleanups. DOH statements emphasizing wet wiping,

moping and use of HEPA vacuums were reasonable. EPA’s advice

has been more conservative and suggested that people

encountering more than minimal amounts of dust should consider

this as a “worst case” and likely to be contaminated with asbestos.

Under these circumstances, they should hire a certified asbestos

cleanup contractor. . . ”

Asbestos medical experts we consulted agreed that professional cleaning was

preferred for the asbestos contamination found. Further, the experts stated that, at

a minimum, if members of the public were to clean residences themselves, they

should have been instructed to wear respirators. A study by NYCDOH found that

most residents did not follow the City’s recommended cleaning practices. 

Although not specifically mentioned in the study, this conclusion would suggest

that these residents did not obtain professional asbestos abatement contractors to

clean their residences. The increased risk that residents placed themselves in by

cleaning residences themselves is not known. 

Although Agency press releases did not recommend professional cleaning of

residences, EPA officials told us that they consistently recommended that

residents obtain professional cleaning during interviews, public forums, and other

communications. We were unable to determine when EPA first told the public

that they should obtain professional cleaning for WTC-contaminated indoor

spaces. The earliest instance we could locate was on October 26, 2001, when the

EPA Administrator recommended professional cleaning in a televised interview

on MSNBC:

However, again, as we said from the beginning, if you live there

and you have any kind of breach - a window open, a broken

window, anything like that in your apartment - or you have a heavy

amount of dust - you should get a professional cleaner to clean it

out . . . but just wiping it down, using your regular vacuum

cleaner, that’s not good enough. But - you know - we provided

that information and it is up to the City Health Department and

OSHA and others to follow-up. . . 
27 Report No. 2003-P-00012

EPA also posted information on its public web site that recommended that indoor

spaces with “more than a minimal amount of dust” be cleaned by a “professional

asbestos contractor.” We could not identify the exact date this information was

posted, but determined that it was on EPA’s web site by December 11, 2001. 

In February 2002, EPA initiated a multi-agency task force on indoor

contamination. The former EPA Chief of Staff told us that EPA initiated this

effort because “Over time, we saw that New York City was not prepared to handle

all the issues related to indoor air and offered to support them.” The task force

developed a plan in which EPA assumed the lead role for overseeing a FEMAfunded cleanup of residences in Lower Manhattan. EPA, New York City, and

FEMA officials announced this plan to the public on May 8, 2002. Residents of

Lower Manhattan living south of Canal Street could request testing and cleaning

of their residences, or just testing. Public registration for the indoor testing and

cleaning program ended December 28, 2002. This residential cleanup program is

discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 

EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authority for Indoor Environment

EPA does not have clear statutory authority to establish and enforce health-based

regulatory standards for indoor air. EPA is provided the authority to respond to

releases of hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund). 

Specifically, under Section 104(a) of CERCLA, EPA is authorized, consistent

with the NCP, to remove or remediate any hazardous substance that is released

into the environment, or any pollutant or contaminant that may present an

imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. Asbestos is a

hazardous substance under CERCLA.

Neither CERCLA nor the implementing regulations under the NCP obligate EPA

to undertake response actions. As provided in the NCP, “activities by the Federal

and State governments in implementing this subpart are discretionary

governmental functions” that do not create “a right to federal response” nor “any

duty of the Federal government to take any response action at any particular time”

(40 CFR § 300.404(h)(3)). Moreover, CERCLA contemplates State participation

in response actions (42 U.S.C. 9621(h)), and the NCP allows for States to assume

the lead agency role.

CERCLA only applies to the release of hazardous substances “into the

environment.” CERCLA defines “environment” as “the navigable waters ... and

... any other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or

subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States.” Courts have held the

emissions of dust within enclosed buildings are not releases “into the

environment” and therefore are not CERCLA releases. However, in the WTC

case, the contamination of indoor spaces was caused by an external event – the

collapse of the WTC. The collapse itself caused a release of hazardous substances
8 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the

Homeland and Americans Overseas,” May 22, 1998.

28 Report No. 2003-P-00012

into the “environment” when a huge dust plume was released into the ambient air. 

Matter from the dust plume then entered buildings in the surrounding area. In

such a case, when the release “into the environment” ends up contaminating

enclosed structures, CERCLA provides EPA the authority to take any actions

necessary to eliminate or mitigate the threat to public health from the release.

A 1998 Presidential Decision Directive8

 (PDD 62) tasked EPA with the leadership

role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or

biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This leadership role was

discussed in the EPA Administrator’s November 28, 2001, testimony before a

Congressional Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, wherein she

noted that:

Under the provisions of PDD 62, signed by President Clinton in

1998, the EPA is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning up

buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological

agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This responsibility draws

on our decades of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by

toxins through prior practices or accidents.

The expectation that EPA should be the lead agency for responding to indoor

contamination has been clarified since September 11, 2001. The July 2002

National Strategy for Homeland Security issued by the Department of Homeland

Security states that:

“After a major incident, the Environmental Protection Agency will be

responsible for decontamination of affected buildings and neighborhoods

and providing advice and assistance to public health authorities in

determining when it is safe to return to these areas.” 

 

Prior Responses to Releases of Hazardous Substances

 

Due to the magnitude of the WTC collapse, it is difficult to compare the WTC

response with responses to other emergencies. However, we noted other

emergencies involving indoor contamination in which EPA’s and other

government entities’ response to those emergencies appeared more proactive or

comprehensive than the response to the WTC incident. 

• In 1989, a relevant emergency response occurred in Gramercy Park in New

York City. A steam pipe exploded, disbursing asbestos-contaminated mud

into nearby buildings. The NYCDOH declared a public health emergency and

evacuated residents until their apartments were decontaminated. An EPA
9 The indoor air clearance memorandum for Libby had not been finalized at the time we drafted this

report. A preliminary clearance level of non-detect for asbestos was being used; based on the

method detection limit used in Libby, the clearance level being used is similar to the clearance

level being used for residences in Lower Manhattan. 

29 Report No. 2003-P-00012

guidance document that addresses the applicability of the Asbestos NESHAP

to emergency situations discussed the Gramercy Park incident and concluded

that a Federal response under CERCLA could have been undertaken if deemed

necessary. However, in this case a Federal response was not needed in light of

the City’s response. 

• In 1999, under its CERCLA authority and in cooperation with local health

authorities, EPA started testing homes in Libby, Montana, and conducting

other emergency removal activities. Asbestos contamination in Libby and

EPA’s response to that incident have been compared to the WTC situation. 

The contamination in Libby resulted from many years of mining activity, as

well as extensive community use of by-products from the mine. Cleaning of

residences and businesses in Libby, which was designated a Superfund site on

November 25, 2002, is projected to be completed in 2005.9

Conclusions

For indoor environment concerns resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers,

EPA had the authority to act under CERCLA but was not obligated to do so. 

Guidelines exist for determining whether an emergency response is warranted;

however, these guidelines are not definitive. Under the NCP, it was within EPA’s

discretion to defer to New York City the responsibility for responding to indoor

contamination concerns. EPA’s action was consistent with the FRP, which is

intended to supplement local government response.

Although EPA acted within its discretion, a 1998 Presidential directive and the

more recent National Strategy for Homeland Security task EPA with taking the

leadership role in cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical

or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. EPA needs to work with the

Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to determine the nature and

form with which the Federal government should assume a more direct role in

addressing indoor environment concerns, under what circumstances this direct

role should occur, and the oversight mechanisms to be employed when local

agencies undertake such responses. In the WTC case, the delay in providing a

government-organized and adequately monitored cleanup in Lower Manhattan

may have contributed to unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants

by unprotected workers and residents. 
30 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Recommendations

We recommend that the EPA Administrator coordinate with the Department of

Homeland Security, FEMA, other appropriate Federal agencies, and those State

and local governments having jurisdiction over potential terrorist targets to:

 3-1. Develop protocols for determining how indoor environmental concerns

will be handled in large-scale disasters, to include addressing: 

• The agency or agencies responsible for testing and/or overseeing

testing of indoor spaces;

• Sampling methods to be used in analyzing indoor contamination;

• Benchmarks to be used in assessing whether the indoor contamination

poses a threat;

• Under what circumstances government-assisted cleanups are

warranted;

• How these cleanups will be funded; and

• The agency or agencies responsible for communicating testing results

and appropriate cleaning instructions.

 3-2. Develop and publish oversight criteria and State and local agency reporting

requirements for those agencies involved in cleaning up buildings and other

sites contaminated by pollutants resulting from terrorist attacks or other

disasters. 

Additional recommendations related to responding to indoor environmental

concerns are in Chapters 6 and 7.

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation

The Agency disagreed that unprotected workers and residents may have

experienced unnecessary exposures to asbestos or other pollutants as a result of

the delay in providing a government-organized and monitored cleanup, because

(1) their recommended cleaning instructions (use of wet mops and HEPA

vacuums) were proven effective in EPA studies, and (2) the Agency

recommended professional cleaning when residents encountered more than

minimal dust. The Agency generally agreed with the recommendations. 

EPA’s study of cleaning effectiveness concluded that 1 to 3 cleanings were

needed to achieve the health-related benchmarks and did not address the exposure

experienced by an unprotected person who may be performing these

recommended cleaning procedures. Also, a NYCDOH study conducted in

October 2001 concluded that the majority of households polled did not follow the

recommended procedures of wet mopping and HEPA vacuuming. Also, a study

of immigrant workers used to clean indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan around
31 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Ground Zero reported that the workers often did not wear respiratory protection

and experienced numerous respiratory symptoms. With respect to professional

cleaning, EPA’s press releases did not recommend this approach. Therefore, we

continue to believe delays in implementing a government organized cleanup

resulted in unnecessary exposure to asbestos and other contaminants. The

Agency’s full written response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of

that response are contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively. 

New York City officials disagreed with some of the draft report’s

characterizations of its position on the indoor response and offered clarifications

which we incorporated into the final report. New York City’s response to draft

report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices S

and T, respectively.
32 Report No. 2003-P-00012
33 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chapter 4

Asbestos Emission Control Work Practices

Inconsistent 

Since asbestos is a known human carcinogen, EPA has established stringent work

practices to control emissions of asbestos resulting from demolition and

renovation projects. Evidence indicated that a significant requirement in

emergency demolitions – wetting damaged buildings before demolition and

keeping the waste material wet after demolition – was followed at the WTC site. 

However, work practices applicable to the transport of debris from the site were

employed inconsistently. The specific impact on air quality of any variance from

EPA’s asbestos emergency work practices is unknown, although outdoor air

monitoring showed seven asbestos readings above the AHERA standard after

September 2001. 

Application of NESHAP Demolition and Renovation Regulations

to the WTC Disaster

The applicability of the Asbestos NESHAP regulations to the demolition of

damaged WTC Complex buildings and the removal of WTC building debris was

discussed by EPA officials as early as September 12, 2001. An EPA official told

us that EPA did not want to insist on any NESHAP requirement that would

impede or deter the WTC search and rescue operation. An EPA Office of

Enforcement and Compliance Assurance official involved in these early

discussions told us that, in theory, NESHAP would apply to all dust and debris

from the WTC disaster and subsequent demolition and removal efforts if that

material contained more than 1 percent asbestos. However, in his opinion, a

literal interpretation of the requirements was not realistic under the circumstances. 

The Regional Counsel for EPA Region 2 told us that he concluded the Asbestos

NESHAP was not applicable to the transport of steel from the towers since the

collapse did not meet the definition of a NESHAP demolition. However, he did

not render an opinion on the applicability of the NESHAP to the demolition and

removal of the three buildings that had not fully collapsed. 

The Asbestos NESHAP regulations (40 CFR Part 61 Subpart M) prescribe

requirements for industries and operators of certain activities to reduce the

emissions of asbestos, including the demolition and renovation of buildings that

contain asbestos. Generally known as the asbestos NESHAP work practice

standards, many of these are applicable to emergency situations involving

asbestos, as explained in EPA’s “Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency
10 This guidance was issued to assist EPA regional offices and State and local agencies in managing

potential asbestos hazards resulting from a catastrophic accident or disaster after three emergencies

involving asbestos occurred in 1989. 

34 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Situations Involving Asbestos”10 issued in February 1992. For example, asbestoscontaining buildings that are in danger of imminent collapse and are ordered by

the government to be demolished must be wetted down to reduce emissions. 

Further, asbestos-containing waste must be adequately wetted at all times after

demolition and kept wet during the handling and loading for transport to a

disposal site.

Additionally, in response to questions about the proper handling of WTC dust and

debris from a law firm representing Local 78, Asbestos, Lead and Hazardous

Waste Laborers, OSHA issued an “interpretive letter” in January 2002 stating that

the WTC dust was presumed to contain asbestos and the WTC demolition and

salvage was subject to the Construction Asbestos Standard.

Asbestos Work Practices Used in the WTC Complex Demolition

The NESHAP emergency requirement – wetting damaged buildings before

demolition and continuous wetting of the debris after demolition – appeared to

have been followed. However, implementation of work practices to reduce

asbestos emissions during transport of asbestos-containing debris appeared to be

inconsistent. 

The New York State Department of Labor is delegated responsibility for

implementing all Federal regulations under the NESHAP program. NYCDEP is

responsible for the asbestos abatement program in New York City. Even though

authority to run the program in New York was delegated to the State and local

agencies, EPA retains the authority to oversee agency performance and to enforce

NESHAP regulations as appropriate. 

NYCDDC was responsible for demolition and debris removal at the site. 

NYCDDC retained four construction companies to perform the demolition and

debris removal. In addition, wetting and misting operations at the site were

arranged by one of the four companies. According to New York City officials,

because of the unprecedented nature of the situation, formal written contracts with

detailed statements of the work were not prepared. Instead, daily meetings were

held to plan the day’s activities and address any special work practices that may

be required to reduce possible emissions of asbestos.

EPA and New York State asbestos NESHAP regulations require that a

notification be filed by building owners even in emergency situations. The

process provides an opportunity for government officials to discuss and agree to

preferred work practices to be used in demolition and renovation operations. 
35 Report No. 2003-P-00012

WTC complex. Source: New York Times

Notification of a NESHAP demolition and removal operation was not filed for the

WTC. City officials stated that a written notification was not filed for WTC

buildings 4, 5, and 6 because they were advised by the property owners that there

was no asbestos-containing material in the above-ground structures. NYCDDC

officials told us that they were advised by the Port Authority that subsequent to

the WTC bombing in 1993, they initiated a program to remove asbestoscontaining materials from the WTC complex. In regard to the WTC towers, the

Port Authority advised the NYCDDC that one tower contained asbestos fireproofing up to approximately the 40th floor while the other tower did not use

asbestos-containing fire-proofing. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator’s

understanding was that only accessible asbestos-containing material was removed

from WTC buildings 4, 5, and 6.

Although a formal notification was not filed, New York City officials told us that

proper planning was ensured through the use of daily health and safety meetings. 

These meeting included representatives from a number of City, State, and Federal

agencies, including EPA. New York City officials maintained that EPA had

functional notice of NESHAP related activities through its participation at these

meetings and that it was doubtful that notification would have changed the

manner in which these activities were conducted. 

Demolition of Damaged Buildings 

 

 In addition to WTC 1 and 2 (North and South Towers, respectively), WTC 3

(Marriott Hotel) collapsed from tower debris and WTC 7 also collapsed after

burning for approximately 7 hours. The remaining three buildings in the WTC

Complex – WTC 4 (South Plaza),

WTC 5 (North Plaza), and WTC 6

(U.S. Customs) – were all significantly

damaged. According to an EPA

On-Scene Coordinator, the damaged

buildings were considered in danger of

collapse. 

The demolition of all WTC complex

buildings to ground level was completed

by late December 2001. WTC 4 and

WTC 5 were brought down by a weight

that was suspended by a cable. Use of

this wrecking device required a special

approval from the New York City

Department of Buildings, which was

granted. WTC 6 was brought down with

mechanical grapplers and cutting shears.
11 Amosite is a form of amphibole asbestos. Several studies suggest that amphibole asbestos may be

more harmful than chrysotile asbestos, particularly for mesothelioma. Test results from the site

showed that the asbestos was predominantly chrysotile, not amphibole.

36 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Both NYCDDC and OSHA officials told us that the WTC site was under

continuous dust suppression, and the latter said this dust suppression was very

successful. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator told us that once dust suppression

began, water was sprayed wherever there was dust and, to the best of his

knowledge, this practice was successful. OSHA officials further stated that it

would have been too dangerous to send abatement contractors into WTC 4,

WTC 5, or WTC 6 to remove asbestos-containing material before demolition.

 Both NYCDDC and EPA officials told us that when asbestos-containing material

(e.g., pipe wrapping, steel insulation) was encountered during the removal, it was

tested and treated in accordance with asbestos abatement procedures. According

to the NYCDDC official, the majority of the asbestos-containing material was

encountered when removing the remnants of the basement levels of WTC 6.

EPA Situation Reports confirmed statements about asbestos abatements and

recorded instances where asbestos was found during debris removal and asbestos

abatements performed. For example, the EPA May 23, 2002, Situation Report

noted that:

Twelve (12) bulk asbestos samples were taken in the B1, B2, B3, levels

of (WTC) Building 6. The samples were taken from sprayed on

insulation at the request of NYC DOI. Of the twelve samples, nine (9)

should (sic) results were in excess of 1% Chrysotile asbestos, the

results ranged from 1.30% to 30.80%. The three samples that were

not above 1% were detect for Chrysotile asbestos. 

According to the April 5, 2002, Situation Report, bulk testing showed that one

sample of the pipe wrap that was being removed as part of this abatement

contained 66 percent amosite11 asbestos.

Work Practices Related to Transporting Waste Not Always Followed 

To minimize dust emissions, City, State, and Federal officials established

procedures for trucks hauling debris from the site. These procedures included the

use of tarps (nylon mesh) to cover debris and procedures for wetting down the

trucks before they left the site. The truck wetting operation was performed by

contractors for EPA. The large volume of traffic made ensuring compliance with

procedures difficult. Particularly in the weeks immediately following the disaster,

trucks hauling debris from the site did not consistently stop to be wetted down

before leaving the site. As a result, New York City obtained assistance from the

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Police and the

National Guard to ensure that trucks stopped at the wash stations before leaving
12 New York City officials disagreed with the report’s characterization of the debris removal

operation. They stated that the requirement for dump trucks to be covered started September 12,

and that this requirement was enforced. They also said that the vehicles did not require

decontamination since they were not transporting hazardous waste as defined by EPA under 40

CFR Part 260-280; and while decontamination procedures were not required, wash down

procedures were mandated.

37 Report No. 2003-P-00012

the site. Even after getting assistance, EPA Situation Reports indicated that the

trucks were not stopping long enough to get completely wetted down. 

Similar observations were reported in an October 6, 2001, report funded by the

National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, which discussed worker

safety issues at WTC. The report noted that:

Vehicles leaving the site with debris, either dumps or lowboys with

large sections of steel beams, are not deconned (decontaminated)12

and the dumps do not have covers over the loads. As a

consequence, potentially hazardous dust and debris is tracked off

site or is blown from the loads during transit. 

EPA Situation Reports indicated that as late as October 13, 2001, this was still a

problem. However, around this time period, New York City officials began

issuing summonses to truck operators and their employers for failure to secure

loads and to stop and be wetted down. City officials told us that approximately

300 summonses were issued and that compliance with the requirement for trucks

to get wetted down before leaving the site was almost 100 percent by late October

to early November 2001. 

However, certain requirements for transporting debris from the site were

suspended by the Governor of New York in an Executive Order dated October 9,

2001. This Order temporarily suspended regulations regarding the transportation

and handling of certain solid waste resulting from the WTC disaster. The Order

applied to persons working at the site under the supervision of New York State or

the New York City government officials and suspended requirements to:

• Obtain permits for collection, transportation, and delivery of regulated waste

to staging areas or disposal locations owned or operated by the City.

• Comply with hazardous waste management standards at the site, during the

transportation of waste from the disaster site to staging areas or disposal

locations owned by the City of New York, and in connection with the

temporary storage of such waste at these staging area or disposal locations.

Once debris was loaded onto trucks at Ground Zero it was transported to piers and

unloaded on barges that carried the debris to landfills. The manner in which these

trucking and barge operations were conducted was discussed at hearings held by
38 Report No. 2003-P-00012

the EPA Superfund Ombudsman, Congress, New York City Council, and New

York State Assembly. Concerned citizens and local elected officials testified at

these hearings that trucks hauling debris from Ground Zero were not marked as

carrying hazardous material, nor were they covered in such a manner to prevent

dust from escaping. In addition, people testified that the wetting of debris at the

barge operation at Pier 25, which was located north of Ground Zero and near

Stuyvesant High School and residences, was inconsistent and resulted in the

release of dust into the air. Parents of children at Stuyvesant High School and

other members of the public raised concerns that these barge operations were

re-contaminating Stuyvesant High School and other buildings in that area.

EPA officials told us they asked New York City to consider alternatives for the

placement of the barge, and while New York City officials were understanding of

the concerns of the residential and school communities located nearby, viable

alternatives were not available. Thus, emphasis was placed on ensuring use of

appropriate work practices during unloading of debris-carrying trucks and transfer

to barges. Further, the EPA Region 2 Regional Administrator advised us that

EPA sampled for the potential air quality impact of these barge operations from

September 22, 2001, through May 31, 2002, and found that “99.83% of samples

were below the screening level.” She further noted that the New York City

Department of Education collected daily air samples at Stuyvesant and other

nearby schools from October 4, 2001, to the end of June 2002, and found that “the

overwhelming majority of daily sampling has resulted in no structures detected.” 

We contacted the president of a consulting firm hired by the Stuyvesant High

School Parents’ Association to review environmental test results for Stuyvesant

High School. He told us that ambient asbestos testing at the school was

conducted in accordance with AHERA standards and elevated levels of airborne

asbestos were not found. However, he said that elevated levels of particulate

matter were recorded that could have come from the debris off-loading operation

or diesel fuel emissions from the trucks transporting the debris. 

Asbestos Still in Many U.S. Buildings

Asbestos is present in many buildings across the country and is still used in some

building materials. For example, a 1984 building study by EPA found that, on

average, 20 percent of all buildings in the United Stated contained asbestos. 

These averages were higher for some cities. A 1988 building survey found that,

overall, 68 percent of the buildings in New York City contained asbestos. 

Further, although the use of asbestos-containing material has been banned from

some products, it is still used in others. For example, asbestos-containing material

is still allowed in pipeline wrap, asbestos-cement corrugated sheet, asbestoscement flat sheet, roofing felt, millboard, vinyl-asbestos floor tile, asbestoscement shingle, and roof coatings.
39 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Conclusions

Although many steps were taken to reduce asbestos emissions from the WTC site,

problems were encountered in fully implementing the applicable NESHAP

requirements for emergency situations, such as ensuring that trucks transporting

debris were adequately wetted down before leaving the WTC site. Further, the

placement of a WTC debris unloading and transfer operation near schools and

residences compounded the potential impact of not implementing normally

required NESHAP requirements. Given the likelihood that many buildings across

the country may contain asbestos, EPA and State and local agencies need to

establish improved monitoring and oversight procedures for ensuring that

appropriate NESHAP work practices are followed in responding to situations that

cause widespread building damage. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the EPA Administrator:

4-1. Ensure that EPA Regional and Headquarters personnel are aware of the

“Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos,”

including its application in the event of future terrorist attacks or other

disasters. 

4-2. Develop specific monitoring, reporting, and oversight procedures for

ensuring that Federal, State, and local responders follow the appropriate

Asbestos NESHAP work practices, including initiating enforcement

actions when EPA observes violations of NESHAP work practices. 

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation

The Agency noted in its response that ensuring compliance with NESHAP work

practices in the immediate aftermath of the WTC collapse and fires was

“extremely difficult” not because of a lack of knowledge about what was required,

but because of the practicality of implementing these practices under the extreme

conditions of duress. Further, the Agency noted that over time, these problems

were eliminated to the maximum extent possible. The Agency agreed with the

recommendations. The Agency’s full written response to our draft report and our

detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R,

respectively. 

New York City offered additional information and clarification as to how

NESHAP work practices were discussed and implemented at the site. We added

this information to the final report. New York City officials objected to the

inclusion of testimony from the EPA Superfund Ombudsman hearing on the basis

of it being unsubstantiated and to the discussion of lead levels at Stuyvesant High

School on the basis of not being relevant to the Chapter. We disagree and have

retained that information in the final report. New York City’s response to draft

report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices S

and T, respectively.
40 Report No. 2003-P-00012
41 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chapter 5

Air Quality-Related Communications

Not Effective in Getting Public and Workers

to Take Recommended Precautions

A critical component in helping the public minimize exposure to potential health

hazards resulting from a terrorist attack or other disasters involves communicating

risk information to the public. Armed with such information, the public can take

positive steps to mitigate potential exposures as well as other precautions to avoid

unnecessary health risks. After the terrorist attack on WTC, government

communications were criticized for not providing timely and accurate information

to the public. Evidence gathered through studies and various governmental

hearings indicates that the public and Ground Zero workers did not receive

sufficient air quality information, wanted more information on the associated

health risks, and did not consistently take precautions recommended by

government communications to minimize their health risk. Because of these

concerns, the OIG conducted a survey of New York City residents regarding

government communications. These results will be reported separately. 

NYCDOH Survey Found Residents Wanted More Air Quality

Information and Did Not Use Recommended Cleaning Procedures

From October 25 through November 1, 2001, NYCDOH conducted a door-todoor survey of residents in Lower Manhattan’s Battery Park City, Southbridge

Towers, and Independence Plaza. All of these neighborhoods were in close

proximity to the WTC towers. A representative sample of apartments from each

of these three areas was selected and a total of 414 interviews were conducted. 

The survey reached two conclusions related to air quality:

• Residents of Lower Manhattan were worried about their health and safety. 

There was a tremendous concern about the air quality and its potential effects

on health. The high proportion of the population experiencing symptoms

likely to be related to respiratory irritants contributed to this concern. 

• The majority of households had not been cleaned according to

recommendations, possibly increasing the exposure to respiratory irritants. 

Specifically, in regard to air quality information, the report noted that:

The topics of most interest to this population related to air quality, its

safety and its effect on the physical health of both adults and children

(70% said they wanted more information about air quality). There is a
13 Blum and Weprin Associates, New York Daily News, March 2002, margin of error plus or minus 4.5

percent.

14 “Assessing the Health of Immigrant Workers Near Ground Zero: Preliminary Results of the 

World Trade Center Day Laborer Medical Monitoring Project”; Ekaterina Malievskaya, M.D., Nora

Rosenberg, Steven Markowitz, M.D.; American Journal of Industrial Medicine; December 2002.

42 Report No. 2003-P-00012

need for more information regarding the potential risks from exposure to

the dust and debris that continues to be emitted from the WTC site. 

Related to this topic, 35% of the respondents reported that they needed

more information regarding cleaning.

 The report noted that only 40 percent of the residents said they cleaned their

homes according to the recommended methods of wet moping hard surfaces and

using HEPA vacuums on carpeting. The report noted two limitations on its

results. First, the survey only included three selected neighborhoods in Lower

Manhattan and did not include residents who had not re-occupied their apartments

at the time of the survey. Second, the report noted that normally respiratory

symptoms (e.g., symptoms related to allergies) increase during the time of year the

survey was conducted.

Hearings held by a Congressional Subcommittee, the EPA Superfund

Ombudsman, New York City Council, and New York State Assembly included

testimony indicating that the public desired more information regarding air

quality. Further, several reports detailing lessons learned from the WTC response

noted problems with government communications regarding air quality. These

reports and their conclusions are discussed in Chapter 7.

Telephone Poll Indicated Public Did Not Believe Air Was Safe

A telephone poll13 conducted in March 2002, after many news articles were

published questioning the air quality information that the government had issued,

found that 70 percent of those surveyed did not believe environmental protection

and other government agencies when they said the air quality around the WTC

site was safe. The poll surveyed 511 randomly dialed residences from the five

boroughs of New York City. We contacted one of the principals of the polling

organization, who told us the answers to the lone question asked about air quality

were consistent among all groups polled. 

Unprotected Workers Cleaned Contaminated Offices and Residences

Preliminary results of an independent study14 of the health of day laborers who

cleaned indoor spaces near Ground Zero noted that these workers were generally

not provided with respirators or any personal protective equipment. Further, the

workers were not informed about the contents of the dust they removed from

offices and apartments, nor were they informed of any environmental test results
15 “Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster,” Bruce

Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002.

43 Report No. 2003-P-00012

on the dust and debris that they removed. Moreover, most of these workers

reported health symptoms that first appeared or worsened after September 11,

2001. These symptoms included coughing, sore throat, nasal congestion, chest

tightness, headaches, fatigue, dizziness, and sleep disturbances. The results were

based on examinations of 418 workers from January 15 through February 28,

2002. 

Ground Zero Workers May Not Have Received Sufficient Information

A widely publicized aspect of the WTC response was the lack of respirator use by

rescue and construction crews. It was beyond the scope of this review to

determine the extent that respirators were not used and why this occurred. 

However, we reviewed EPA’s efforts to provide respirators, reviewed accounts of

respirator use in various articles and reports, and inquired about respirator use and

availability during our interviews with EPA, other Federal agency, New York

City, and non-government officials. Our limited work in this area indicated that

respirators were generally available but were not worn for a number of reasons. 

A significant factor was the desire to save lives without regard for personal safety

in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. Other reasons appeared to include the

respirators’ interference with the ability of emergency workers to communicate,

lack of training, lack of enforcement of safety measures at the site, and conflicting

messages about the air quality at Ground Zero.

A detailed discussion on the use of respirators by rescue and construction crews at

Ground Zero, including EPA activities to encourage respirator use as well as the

health impacts of the lack of respirator use, are in Appendix L.

A January 2002 report15 concluded that respirator use was compromised, in part,

due to mixed messages that workers received about the importance of respiratory

protection. For example, the report noted that air monitoring information was

often within OSHA permissible limits or below the analytical method limit of

detection. Thus, on one hand workers had information suggesting that the air

quality was not bad, but a message to wear respirators on the other. This report

also noted the poor example set by political figures, celebrities, and even

supervisors who visited the site but did not wear respirators. 

The experiences of the Laboratory Director of an environmental testing firm hired

to conduct testing for one of the companies conducting the site clean-up was

consistent with information presented in the report on respiratory usage at the

WTC site. This individual, with many years experience in asbestos toxicology

and applied environmental hygiene, told us that he interpreted EPA’s statement

that the air was safe to breathe to apply to Ground Zero. The Laboratory Director
16 “World Trade Center Disaster: Structural Engineers at Ground Zero,” August Domel, Jr., Ph.D.,

S.E., P.E., November 2001.

44 Report No. 2003-P-00012

said that the construction company that hired him also interpreted EPA’s

statement to apply to Ground Zero, and on the basis of EPA’s statements about air

quality, company officials questioned the Laboratory Director’s recommendations

that workers wear respirators. Although he was able to convince his client that

respirators were needed, he told us that it was difficult to convince workers to

wear respirators. 

A November 2001 report16 prepared for the National Council of Structural

Engineers Associations - Structural Engineering Emergency Response Plan

Committee similarly noted that structural engineers at the site had concerns about

environmental contamination at Ground Zero but proceeded with their work given

the urgency of the situation. The report noted that although structural engineers

assumed the air quality was being monitored by government agencies, specific

information on the results of this monitoring did not filter down to the structural

engineering teams. Further, structural engineers did not know if they were

wearing the correct respirators. The report cited the following joint EPA and

OSHA statement as an example of information that the authors concluded did not

provide sufficient information on air quality or the proper respirators needed:

. . . EPA and OSHA are providing real-time analysis in the

immediate vicinity of the debris pile at Ground Zero. . . . . . This

information helps response workers on the scene determine what

level of respiratory protection is appropriate to use (U.S. Dept. of

Labor Press Release 01-339)

Recent Developments

EPA has initiated several actions to improve its risk communications to the

public. These actions are discussed in Chapters 2 and 7. In regard to worker

safety, EPA is participating in a FEMA-led Interagency Health and Safety

Coordinating Committee to provide unified safety and occupational health

leadership, guidance, and policy development for all Federal agencies under the

Federal Response Plan. In particular, the Committee plans to develop an

Emergency Support Function for Safety and Occupational Health.

Conclusions

The public wanted better information about air quality than they received from

government sources. A NYCDOH study, other lessons learned reports, and

testimony provided at various hearings suggest that the public did not receive

adequate air quality information and that individuals cleaned their residences

without using proper procedures and personal protection. In addition, workers at
45 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Ground Zero may not have used respirators due, in part, to inadequate EPA and

other government communication. 

EPA was one of many governmental and non-governmental agencies that

communicated health risk information to workers and the public. The levels of

non-adherence to the risk communications of these governmental agencies

suggests that all the participating levels of government need to re-examine their

policies, procedures, and practices for ensuring that necessary precautions are

consistently followed to reduce human exposure to contaminants. 

Recommendation

We recommend that the EPA Administrator: 

5-1. Coordinate with FEMA and other applicable Federal agencies to clearly

establish Federal agency responsibilities, roles, and procedures during an

emergency response that ensure that:

• Workers responding to emergencies are adequately protected by the

development and strict enforcement of health and safety plans. 

• Health hazard information is effectively communicated to emergency

response crews. 

• Sufficiently detailed health risk information is effectively

communicated to the public, including actions that the public should

take to reduce their potential exposure to harmful pollutants. 

Additional recommendations relevant to the issues discussed in this chapter are

included in Chapters 2, 3, and 7. Also, additional recommendations may be

presented in our subsequent report on the results of our public survey. 

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation

EPA agreed with the recommendation but noted that it and other Agencies

provided the public with the most comprehensive and up-to-date information

available. In regard to worker safety, EPA noted that it supported OSHA in many

ways, including a long-term effort to educate workers about the need to wear

respirators. The Agency’s complete written response to our draft report and our

detailed evaluation of that response are contained Appendices Q and R,

respectively. 
46 Report No. 2003-P-00012

New York City officials responded that our report should not discuss respiratory

issues related to Ground Zero since this was OSHA’s responsibility and not

EPA’s. New York City offered several revisions to this section if we were to

retain it in our report. We incorporated New York City’s suggested changes

where appropriate but have retained our discussion of respiratory issues as

Appendix L since EPA supported OSHA in this activity. New York City’s

response to draft report excerpts and our evaluation of that response are contained

in Appendices S and T, respectively. 
47 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chapter 6

Further Actions Needed

to Address Current WTC Response 

Monitoring data showed that ambient air levels in Lower Manhattan had generally

returned to pre-September 11 levels in mid-2002 or earlier, and as such, EPA

ceased outdoor monitoring in June 2002. Further, all debris had been removed

from the site by June 2002. However, concerns about indoor contamination

resulting from the collapse remained at the time we completed our review in April

2003, even though EPA, FEMA, and New York City had initiated a multi-million

dollar Indoor Air Residential Assistance program that included testing and

cleaning of residences in Lower Manhattan. Additional measures can be taken to

ensure cleanup provides reasonable assurance that the public’s exposure to

asbestos and other contaminants in residences and workspaces in Lower

Manhattan is within the acceptable risk guidelines.

WTC Outdoor Monitoring Ended June 2002

EPA ceased all WTC-related outdoor air monitoring in Lower Manhattan on

June 20, 2002, with EPA concluding that, for the most part, outdoor ambient air

pollution levels had returned to pre-September 11 levels. Generally, ambient

pollutant levels in Lower Manhattan noticeably decreased in January 2002, once

the fires at Ground Zero were essentially extinguished. Some spikes in benzene

were recorded in January and February 2002, as a result of fires that flared up

during removal operations. From March 2002 through June 20, 2002, the only

elevated readings recorded were for asbestos. The elevated readings occurred in

March and April 2002 at the worker wash station and in May 2002 at the

monitoring site near the barge operation. 

Our review of monitoring data as well as discussions with EPA, other Federal

agencies, New York City, and selected external health research, air quality testing,

academic, and environmental organization officials supported EPA’s view that the

outdoor ambient air pollution levels in Lower Manhattan had, for the most part,

returned to pre-September 11 levels for those pollutants where pre-September 11

monitoring data existed. 

Indoor Residential Cleanup Program 

The testing and cleaning of residences was one of several activities included in an

overall Indoor Air Residential Assistance Program funded by FEMA at an

estimated cost of $60 to $80 million. In addition to testing and cleaning of

residences, the program included:
48 Report No. 2003-P-00012

• identifying contaminants of potential concern resulting from the WTC attack.

• conducting a confirmation cleaning study to evaluate the effectiveness of

various cleaning techniques in achieving health-based benchmarks. 

• conducting a study of Upper Manhattan to determine background (normal)

levels of contaminants.

• inspecting and cleaning building exteriors in Lower Manhattan.

• cleaning two unoccupied residential buildings.

 The indoor residential cleanup program was administered by EPA and New York

City. FEMA officials told us that they normally do not fund indoor cleanups of

private spaces related to a disaster unless an immediate hazard is declared. FEMA

officials told us that New York City officials indicated a formal cleanup program

was not needed. Therefore, in May 2002, the EPA Region 2 Administrator

provided FEMA with a memorandum that furnished the necessary justification to

authorize funding. 

Public registration for the testing and cleaning program ended on December 28,

2002. As of July 17, 2003, EPA had reported the following test results.

Table 6-1: Test Results for Indoor Asbestos Testing as of July 17, 2003

Type of

Request

Total

Requests

Tests

Completed

Residences

Cleared1

Residences

Not

Cleared2

Not

Determined 3

Test

Results

Pending4

Test Only 730 729 691 8 30 1 

Clean and Test 3,436 3,425 3,256 36 133 11

Notes

1 = Ambient levels were below the clearance standard of .0009 fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc).

2 = Ambient levels were above the clearance standard of .0009 f/cc.

3 = Samples could not be analyzed because of overloaded filters or other reasons. Re-testing to be performed. 

4 = Testing not begun or results not yet analyzed.

Residents could choose to have “testing only” of their residence or they could

choose to have “cleaning and post-cleaning testing” of their residence. Residents

requesting to only have their residence tested could choose between one of two

sampling options: aggressive sampling or modified aggressive sampling. 

Aggressive sampling used a leafblower to stir up any settled dust by blowing air

against walls, ceilings, floors, and other surfaces prior to collection of air samples. 

Modified aggressive sampling did not use leaf blowers. For either sampling

option, the air samples were to be analyzed for asbestos only. In addition to

testing indoor air for asbestos, EPA planned to collect pre- and post-cleaning wipe

samples for a limited number of residences (approximately 250) and test these

samples for dioxin, total metals, and mercury.

For residents requesting “cleaning and post-cleaning testing,” two approaches 

were used to clean the residences. The cleaning approach was based on the extent
49 Report No. 2003-P-00012

of dust contamination as determined through visual inspection. If a visual

inspection of the residence and the building’s common spaces (including elevator

shafts) revealed minimal dust accumulations (light coating), “Scope of Work A”

applied. If visual inspection indicated large or significant accumulations of dust

or debris from the WTC collapse in residences, portions of the residence, or the

building’s common spaces, “Scope of Work B” applied. In general, “Scope of

Work B” included additional cleaning of surfaces not included in “Scope of

Work A.” Appendix M describes the two approaches available for residents

requesting cleaning and post-cleaning testing. 

A significant issue with respect to developing health-related benchmarks

(or clearance standards) is the extent of prior or background contamination, 

particularly in urban areas. This information is needed to determine the impact of

a disaster on the indoor environment. Studies have shown that these background

levels can exceed concentrations that may present a greater than 1-in-1,000,000

excess lifetime cancer risk (the desired cleanup goal for the Superfund program). 

In the WTC case, EPA’s background study of Upper Manhattan suggests that the

background concentrations for asbestos in indoor air and dioxin in settled dust

were at levels that presented a greater than 1-in-1,000,000 excess cancer risk.

Concurrent with the start of the indoor cleanup, a multi-agency workgroup of

Federal, State and city officials identified contaminants of potential concern

(COPC) related to the WTC collapse and developed health-related benchmarks for

these COPCs, including asbestos, lead, dioxin, PAHs, fibrous glass, and

crystalline silica. Three of these COPCs are considered cancer causing: asbestos,

dioxin, and PAHs. For each of the three carcinogens, the workgroup established a

health-related benchmark that equated to an increased lifetime cancer risk of 1-in10,000. This means that if 10,000 people are exposed to a single COPC at the

established benchmark level for 30 years, there may be one more case of cancer

than if the group had not been exposed. 

In September 2002, the multi-agency workgroup published these COPCs in a peer

review draft entitled “World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting

Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks,”

which was peer reviewed by the Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment

(TERA) organization in October 2002. TERA’s peer review report was issued on

February 7, 2003. The group’s suggestions included:

• Expanding the list of COPCs as appropriate,

• More clearly explaining the methodology for selecting the COPCs,

• Adding criteria to account for potential exposures through contact with dust in

the risk-based screening for COPC selection,

• Adding parameters for children’s exposure, and

• More fully describing the approach for considering the health effects of

mixtures of COPC. 
50 Report No. 2003-P-00012

The workgroup issued a revised COPC document in May 2003 that included

responses to the peer review panel’s comments. Given the significance of the

panel’s comments, the fact that additional information has been developed since

the peer review was conducted, and the potential for this document to be used as a

basis for future indoor cleanups, we believe the revised COPC document should

be submitted for a second peer review as suggested by the TERA panel.

Actions Can Be Taken to Provide Additional Assurance 

That Indoor Cleanup Is Protective of Human Health

The residential cleanup effort represents a significant undertaking by EPA,

FEMA, and New York City. Nonetheless, it has been criticized by some groups. 

The geographical coverage of the cleanup, limited to residences south of Canal

Street, has been questioned. The testing and cleanup procedures have been

criticized, particularly the fact that EPA has not required all apartments within a

building to be cleaned. In addition, not requiring the cleaning of all HVAC

systems was criticized as a limitation that could lead to re-contamination of clean

residences. 

Additional actions can be taken to provide greater assurances that the program is

fully protective of human health. These actions include:

• Ensuring that the cleanup meets minimum Superfund site cleanup goals,

• Treating impacted buildings as a system,

• Employing sampling methods (i.e., aggressive) to ensure that asbestos is at or

below acceptable levels,

• Including workspaces as well as residential buildings, and

• Including all geographic areas impacted by WTC dust. 

Discussions on each of these actions follow.

Indoor Cleanup Level Does Not Meet Minimum Superfund Levels 

Although the indoor cleanup in Lower Manhattan was not being conducted as a

Superfund cleanup, Superfund regulations and guidelines provide useful criteria

for evaluating the health protectiveness of the Lower Manhattan cleanup and

whether it provides reasonable assurance that the public’s risk of exposure to

asbestos and other contaminants had been minimized. 

The NCP describes specific criteria for determining the cleanup goals for

contaminated sites placed on the National Priorities List. The NCP requires that

for known or suspected carcinogens, acceptable exposure levels are generally

concentration levels that represent between a 1-in-10,000 and 1-in-1,000,000

increased lifetime cancer risk. The NCP lists nine factors, including cost,
51 Report No. 2003-P-00012

exposure, uncertainty, and technical limitations, that may justify a cleanup remedy

that departs from the 1-in-1,000,000 cleanup goal. 

In contrast to the above criteria, EPA’s Lower Manhattan indoor cleanup

established a 1-in-10,000 risk as the goal of the cleanup for asbestos. The

program does not include monitoring for the presence of the other COPCs,

including dioxin and PAHs, which are known carcinogens. The COPC document

established benchmarks for these two pollutants that also correspond to a 1-in10,000 increased risk. Although the assumption is that the cleaning methods

prescribed for asbestos will clean the residence of other pollutants as well, the

post-cleaning testing does not provide assurance that these other pollutants were

removed. However, under Superfund guidance, the risk from exposure to

multiple carcinogens is considered additive. Thus, if all three pollutants were

cleaned up to levels that equate to a 1-in-10,000 risk for each pollutant, the

combined risk would be considered greater than 1-in-10,000.

The TERA peer review addressed the risk level established for the COPCs. The

panel suggested that the document more clearly explain how the impact of being

exposed to mixtures of the COPCs was considered in developing the benchmarks. 

Further, panel members disagreed with the rationale for using an upper level

excess lifetime cancer risk of 1-in-10,000. The workgroup’s response to the peer

review panel stated the risk level was appropriate because of practical sampling

limitations for asbestos, noting a sampling time of 800 hours would be required to

achieve the air monitoring results needed to support a 1-in-1,000,000 increased

lifetime risk level. The workgroup acknowledged that running multiple pumps

concurrently could reduce total sample time, but did not judge this practical since

more than 6,000 individual residences signed up for the cleaning program. 

Need to Treat Impacted Buildings as a System

Tests of indoor asbestos contamination have shown that the distribution of

asbestos within indoor spaces is not consistent. Selective cleaning of apartments

does not ensure that uncleaned residences or uncleaned objects in apartments are

free of asbestos contamination. In the case of centralized HVAC systems,

selective cleaning does not ensure that cleaned apartments will not be

re-contaminated by uncleaned apartments through the HVAC system. 

Consequently, the cleaning of contaminated buildings should proceed by treating

the building as a system. 

This systematic approach to cleaning would require that the exterior of the

building be cleaned first before the building is re-occupied. All possible entrances

for outside air should be sealed off and the building HVAC shut down during

exterior cleaning. Once the exterior is cleaned, interior cleaning can begin. For

buildings with centralized air and heating, the interior surfaces of supply ducts and

return air plenums, fan housings, and filter housings should be cleaned. Filters

should be removed, filter tracks cleaned, and new filters installed. The above
52 Report No. 2003-P-00012

actions are necessary to prevent uncleaned sub-parts of the HVAC system from

re-contaminating the system. When cleaning individual rooms, each air supply or

return register should be sealed to prevent re-entrainment of toxicants into the

HVAC system. 

According to EPA officials, as of July 2003, 143 buildings had been cleaned,

including 28 HVAC systems. 

Non-Aggressive Sampling Does Not Provide Assurance Residents

Will Not be Exposed to Potentially Harmful Levels of Asbestos

The non-aggressive sampling option available to residents does not provide

assurances that residents will not be exposed to potentially harmful levels of

asbestos. AHERA protocols for building clearance after abatement require

aggressive sampling to re-entrain (stir) settled dust before air samples are taken. 

The modified aggressive option available to residents may not re-suspend asbestos

particles clinging to surfaces within the residence. 

Comprehensive Health Protection Would Also Include Workspaces 

EPA, FEMA, and New York City implemented a cleaning and testing program for

residences but not workspaces. Some have complained about this limitation,

noting that a program of comprehensive health protection would address indoor

contamination in workspaces. The EPA Region 2 Assistant Administrator for

WTC Recovery Operations told us that EPA had discussed this issue with OSHA,

and that workers or employers could contact OSHA if they had concerns about

possible asbestos contamination in their work places. Further, EPA indicated that

OSHA was prepared to address any workplace issues brought to its attention. 

Cleanup Boundary Not Scientifically Developed

The northern boundary of the cleanup area (Canal Street), coincides with the

initial exclusion zone developed on September 11. However, this boundary was

not based on systematic and representative sampling to determine the likely outer

boundary of WTC contamination. Several indoor sampling efforts were

conducted after September 11, but none were designed to determine the

geographic extent of WTC dust contamination. Consequently, it has not been

determined whether buildings north of Canal Street or east of Lower Manhattan,

in Brooklyn, were contaminated.

EPA officials told us that the Canal Street boundary represented a conservative

one based on visual inspection of how far dust and debris from the collapse

traveled as well as their interpretation of various data, including images obtained

by overhead flights. We also discussed the path of the dust and smoke plume with

an Office of Research and Development researcher. He told us that his modeling

demonstration as well as satellite images taken by the U.S. Geological Survey
53 Report No. 2003-P-00012

indicated that dust from the collapse did not extend beyond Canal Street.

Environmental experts told us that ideally a sampling plan should have been

implemented that collected and analyzed samples starting at Ground Zero and

radiating outward in concentric circles until the boundary of WTC contamination

was determined. 

Conclusions

Extensive ambient monitoring data collected after September 11 demonstrated

that outdoor air quality levels around Lower Manhattan eventually returned to preSeptember 11 levels. As such, EPA does not need to take additional actions to

address outdoor ambient air quality concerns specifically related to the collapse of

the WTC towers.

EPA, in cooperation with FEMA and New York City, initiated a large-scale

indoor cleanup. In our opinion, this cleanup should meet the minimum criteria for

protecting human health that EPA has established for Superfund cleanups. Also, 

the indoor cleaning and testing program should employ aggressive testing in all

residences and treat buildings as a system. Additionally, EPA should evaluate the

potential health risks for pollutants of concern in workspaces and for geographic

areas north of Canal Street, in Brooklyn, and any other areas where

meteorological data show pollutants of concern may have been deposited.

Recommendations

We recommend that the EPA Administrator ensure that EPA Region 2:

6-1. Submit the revised “World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting

Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based

Benchmarks” document to TERA for a second peer review. 

6-2. Implement a post-cleaning testing program to ensure that, in addition to

asbestos, the indoor cleanup program has reduced residents’ risk of

exposure from all of the identified COPCs to acceptable limits.

6-3. Due to concerns over possible re-contamination of residences cleaned

under the Indoor Air Residential Assistance program, EPA should treat

buildings as a system and implement a post-cleaning verification program

to ensure that residences cleaned by the program have not been

re-contaminated. 

6-4. Work with FEMA and OSHA to assess whether the ongoing residential

testing and cleaning program should be expanded to address potential

contamination in workspaces in Lower Manhattan, or whether other

measures need to be taken to ensure that workspaces are not contaminated

with WTC dust.
54 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Agency and New York City Comments and OIG Evaluation

The Agency disagreed with the recommendations presented in this Chapter. The

Agency responded that EPA’s indoor cleanup program was sufficient and that

EPA studies and data indicated a more widespread cleanup program is not

warranted. Because asbestos is a carcinogen with no commonly accepted safe

level of exposure, and approximately 18,000 residential units in Lower Manhattan

have not been tested or cleaned through the indoor residential program, we

continue to believe our recommendations are warranted to assure adequate health

protection for residents in Lower Manhattan. The Agency’s complete written

response to our draft report and our detailed evaluation of that response are

contained in Appendices Q and R, respectively. 

New York City’s response provided some technical clarifications which we made. 

New York City’s response to our draft report excerpts is provided in Appendix S.
55 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chapter 7

EPA Should Continue Efforts to

Improve Contingency Planning

 

The events of September 11 represented an attack on the U.S. mainland not

previously experienced in this country’s history. The response to this tragedy was

trying and difficult for all parties involved, including environmental professionals. 

Many of the persons we interviewed spoke highly of the response of EPA and its

employees. Still, lessons were learned from the September 11 response that can

be used to improve the Agency’s ability to respond to future disasters. The

primary lessons learned from our evaluation relate to:

• Contingency planning

• Risk assessment and characterization

• Risk communication

An overriding lesson learned was that EPA needs to be prepared to assert its

opinion and judgment on matters that impact human health and the environment. 

Although many organizations were involved in addressing air quality concerns

resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that,

ultimately, the public, Congress, and others expect EPA to monitor and resolve

environmental issues. This is the case even when EPA may not have the overall

responsibility to resolve these issues or the necessary resources to address them. 

Various Actions Initiated

EPA and several non-EPA groups and individuals prepared “lessons learned”

reports on the government’s response to environmental issues resulting from

September 11. We generally agree with the recommendations made in these

reports. A summary on the previous lessons learned areas follows in Table 7-1. 

Further details on the lessons learned as part of both EPA and non-EPA reviews

are in Appendix N.
56 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Table 7-1: Previous Lessons Learned Reviews 

Type of Review Lessons Learned Areas

EPA Office of Solid Waste and

Emergency Response, per request

by EPA Administrator, determined

lessons learned between

September 11, 2001, and October 19,

2001. Results were summarized in a

final report dated February 1, 2002.

• Decision making and communication

• Emergency response structure and plans

• Data analysis and information

management infrastructure

• Public information dissemination

• Resources

• Safety and security

• Environmental vulnerabilities

EPA Region 2 conducted a regionspecific lessons learned analysis. The

Region held an “after action session”

in Edison, New Jersey, on January 9-

10, 2002, and issued a final report

dated January 8, 2003.

Overarching Recommendation Areas

• Planning

• Coordination

• Resources

Specific Recommendation Areas

• Public risk communication

• Data management

• Regional crisis management structure

EPA Office of Research and

Development held a data-oriented

lessons learned workshop in

November 2002. The report was

still in draft as of our review.

• Quality assurance project plan

• Mechanism for tracking monitoring tasks

• Improved health-related benchmarks for

asbestos and short-term exposures of

pollutants in general

• Identification of technical expertise teams

that could be called on to assist with

technical decisions

Environmental experts and others

prepared lessons learned reports from

September 2002 to December 2002.

• Better risk communication

• Health-related benchmarks assessing

exposure

• Clearer lines of authority between

government agencies in responding to

environmental issues

In September 2002, EPA issued its “Strategic Plan for Homeland Security,” which

outlines the Agency’s plan for meeting its homeland security responsibilities. 

This Strategic Plan includes many proposed actions recommended in EPA’s

February 2002 Lessons Learned report. The goals of the plan are grouped under

four major mission areas:

• Critical Infrastructure Protection

• Preparedness, Response, and Recovery

• Communication and Information

• Protection of EPA Personnel and Infrastructure

The second and third mission areas – “Preparedness, Response, and Recovery”

and “Communication and Information” – are particularly relevant to the issues
17 OIG has ongoing and planned work to evaluate EPA’s efforts related to the other major homeland

security missions not addressed in this report.

57 Report No. 2003-P-00012

discussed in this report.17 Within these two major areas, the Homeland Security

plan lists several actions that were recommended in the February 2002 Lessons

Learned Report as well as issues identified in this report.

OIG Observations for Improving Emergency Response 

Observations developed by our evaluation, as well as any Agency actions already

underway to address these observations, are summarized in Table 7-2, and

discussed in detail in the sections that follow.

Table 7-2: Summary of OIG Observations 

Contingency Planning

• Environmental Threats from Potential Terrorist Attacks Need to Be Assessed

• Roles and Responsibilities Within EPA Need to Be Delineated

• Roles and Responsibilities With Outside Agencies Need to Be Delineated

Risk Assessment and Characterization

• Health-Based Benchmarks Needed

• Sampling and Data Collection Protocols Needed

• Monitoring Capabilities Need to Be Increased

Risk Communication

• Better Communication Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Needed

• Risk Communications Need to Acknowledge Uncertainties

• Procedures Needed to Ensure Consistency in Communications

• Communications Need to Identify External Influences

• Environmental Data from Sources Outside EPA Need to Be Addressed

Contingency Planning

EPA has many years experience in responding to environmental emergencies and

has established policies and procedures to deal with such emergencies. EPA’s

Lessons Learned Report identified issues related to contingency planning and

made recommendations for improvements in this area. Additionally, EPA’s 

Homeland Security strategy includes actions to address this area. Notably, the

Agency has started efforts to upgrade the National Incident Coordination Team,

which coordinates EPA’s response to large-scale emergencies. The events of

September 11 demonstrate the following areas where the Agency’s emergency

response mechanisms can be improved.
58 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Environmental Threats from Potential Terrorist Attacks

Need to Be Assessed 

It is understandable that the government and others were not fully prepared for

what happened on September 11. Now that the country has experienced such an

attack and lives under the threat of future attacks, it is important that the Agency

anticipate and plan for different disaster scenarios. To the extent that EPA can

anticipate various scenarios and plan for the type of environmental response

needed before a disaster strikes, the Agency’s response efforts can be more

focused on appropriate implementation and avoid making interpretative, technical,

and policy-setting decisions with potential public health implications during the

stressful and time-demanding circumstances created by an emergency.

The experience of September 11 has provided the Agency with considerable

information on what to expect of a large-scale disaster involving office and multifamily residential buildings in a densely populated urban environment. However,

disasters involving other scenarios, other types of targets, and other locations may

present different challenges. For example, New York City has significant

emergency response and environmental resources - other cities may not and may

require more assistance from EPA. In addition, EPA Region 2’s office was

located within New York City and close to the disaster site, and EPA’s national

Environmental Response Team was located in nearby Edison, New Jersey,

approximately 30 miles away. This was important, because air travel was

curtailed for several days after the attacks. EPA may not be as closely located to

the next disaster.

Disasters in different parts of the country could present different, perhaps greater,

environmental exposures than at WTC. EPA researchers told us the tall buildings

in New York City combined to create a “chimney effect” that helped to push air

and pollutants upward and away from street level. Winds also helped disperse

and dilute WTC airborne emissions, and rain during the first week helped

alleviate dusty conditions. If a similar disaster were to strike in a city with

different geography and weather patterns, a more serious exposure scenario could

develop. 

Accordingly, EPA should work with the Department of Homeland Security and

other agencies to share information on high-risk targets and areas, and develop

plans for responding to an emergency situation in those areas. These plans 

should address the different scenarios anticipated from a disaster involving these

targets and how EPA, other Federal, and the appropriate State and local agencies

should respond to these different scenarios. 
59 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Roles and Responsibilities Within EPA Need to Be Delineated

EPA needs to delineate roles and responsibilities for its various programs offices

when responding to emergencies, including how these roles and responsibilities fit

within the incident command structure. Despite the commendable actions of

many EPA personnel, the Agency should outline roles and responsibilities for its

program offices beforehand to provide a more efficient and coordinated response

to future disasters. 

For example, within 3 days of the disaster, EPA officials within the Office of 

Radiation and Indoor Air and the Office of Air Quality and Planning Standards

had developed a web site with such captions as “Protecting Yourself from

Asbestos Exposure,” “Health Effects of Dust and Smoke,” and “Strategies for

Clean Up Inside Residences and Businesses.” However, this web site was not

activated and made available to the general public. One EPA official told us there

was an overwhelming amount of activity going on and that this information

probably “got lost in the fray.” EPA Region 2 officials could not recall why the

web site was not activated.

Also, although EPA’s National Exposure Research Laboratory team made it to

New York on September 16 to help implement an ambient monitoring network, 

they were unable to gain access to the site and start monitoring until

September 21. The Laboratory’s monitoring team’s abilities were especially

needed since they had air monitoring equipment that could run on both electrical

and battery power, and they had airborne particulate matter monitors. 

In its lessons learned report, EPA Region 2 recommended that the Region identify

a team of dedicated people who will respond in the event of a new crisis. In our

opinion, other EPA regions should follow Region 2’s lead and identify specific

areas of expertise that may be needed in the event of an emergency, and assemble

teams of experts that can be mobilized to quickly provide this support. These

areas may include specialized sampling techniques, exposure modeling and

assessment, and risk assessment. Also, EPA Headquarters should develop

national teams to support or augment Regional response when needed, including

guidelines for determining when a response should be elevated to a national level. 

Roles and Responsibilities With Outside Agencies 

Need to Be Delineated

A response to an event the size of the WTC incident requires the efforts and

coordination of numerous government organizations, including Federal, State, and

local governments. Our discussions with EPA and non-EPA officials, as well as

WTC “lessons learned” reports from other organizations, indicated that there were

overlapping and sometimes confusing roles and responsibilities for the various

responding organizations. For example, early in the response, various agencies

were conducting numerous sampling efforts. Particularly for asbestos, different
60 Report No. 2003-P-00012

sampling methods were being used with the results being reported in different

metrics, which made the results more difficult to interpret. A senior New York

City Office of Emergency Management official told us that roles and

responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local agencies in responding to a disaster

were unclear on September 11, 2001, and were still unclear when we met with

him during the summer of 2002.

EPA has addressed coordination with other organizations in both its Headquarters

and Region 2 lessons learned reports. For example, the Headquarters Report

recommended that EPA collaborate with OSHA and the Department of Health

and Human Services to clarify the Agency’s role in protecting the health and

safety of responders, and that EPA coordinate with Department of Homeland

Security to develop a coordination strategy for all responders during national

emergencies. Region 2 management and staff recommended that their Region

clearly identify scope and boundaries of their work in an emergency; and educate

EPA and other Federal and State officials about the scope, boundaries and

authorities of the various emergency response plans and systems. We agree with

these recommendations. These coordination efforts should also take place in all

EPA regions and include FEMA, and should address likely sources of funding for

these activities. 

Risk Assessment and Characterization

The WTC disaster pointed to the need for better risk assessment and

characterization procedures and tools for addressing the types of environmental

concerns resulting from large-scale disasters. A significant challenge encountered

by EPA and other organizations was how to characterize health risks to the public

in the absence of health-based benchmarks. The need for consistent sampling

protocols and special monitoring requirements was also demonstrated.

Health-Based Benchmarks Needed

Government entities, such as EPA, OSHA, ATSDR, and NIOSH, have developed

guidelines for many of the contaminants found in Lower Manhattan. However,

existing health benchmarks were not applicable to exposures experienced by the

general public in Lower Manhattan. Many of the benchmarks available at that

time to assess the exposure risks for contaminants found in the ambient air were:

occupational standards based on an 8-hour-per-day exposure; guidelines based on

long-term exposures; or standards, such as those for asbestos, that were not health

based. Details on some of these issues are in Chapter 2.

 OSHA and NIOSH have developed occupational standards to protect industrial

workers from pollutant exposures, but these standards are based on an 8-hour-aday exposure. In general, these standards were not applicable to characterizing

risks for residents who experienced exposures greater than 8 hours a day in indoor
61 Report No. 2003-P-00012

and outdoor settings. Some of the screening levels developed to assess the subchronic risks from the contaminants created by the WTC collapse were developed

by adjusting emergency removal guidelines listed in EPA’s Hazard Evaluation

Handbook to take into account shorter exposure periods. These guidelines are

based on a 30-year exposure period and correspond to a 1-in-10,000 increased

lifetime cancer risk for carcinogens. 

Further, some of the benchmarks used to assess air quality and bulk dust in Lower

Manhattan were criteria- or condition-based standards and not health-based

standards. For example, the benchmark used to assess asbestos risk from WTC

dust was developed to determine when asbestos containing material was subject to

demolition and renovation regulations. For future disasters, health benchmarks

are needed to address the types of exposures experienced at the WTC site, which

included:

• acute or high concentration exposures up to 8 hours

• sub-chronic (2 weeks to 1 year) exposures 

• indoor air exposures 

• exposure to asbestos 

• synergistic or multiple pollutant exposures 

Details on each of the above benchmarks are in Appendix O.

We recognize that it is not possible to anticipate all the scenarios and develop

standards that address all possible pollutants that may result from a disaster. 

Thus, we believe an agreed-upon framework for quickly developing additional

guidelines and benchmarks in an emergency situation is needed. This process

could include a panel of scientific experts that would be available in an emergency

to analyze the available risk data and establish appropriate health-based

benchmarks for the pollutants of concern

As discussed above, a multi-agency workgroup developed health-related

benchmarks for six pollutants of concern related to indoor environment

contamination from the WTC collapse that underwent peer review in October

2002. We believe the Agency should expand on these efforts to identify

benchmarks for other pollutants of concern and for outdoor and indoor exposures

based on threat assessments discussed earlier in this chapter. Related to this

effort, EPA should collect information on background levels (i.e., pollutant

concentrations under normal conditions), to properly assess the impact that a

disaster has on the concentration of these pollutants of concern in the

environment.
62 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Sampling and Data Collection Protocols Needed

EPA, other government organizations, and non-governmental organizations

undertook extensive monitoring efforts in the months following September 11. 

Extensive sampling was done around the work zone to monitor conditions for first

responders. To assess ambient conditions for the general public, EPA established

an ambient monitoring network in coordination with New York City and New

York State officials. EPA also developed a draft Quality Assurance Project Plan

for the WTC ambient monitoring network; however, the plan was not finalized. 

A comprehensive Quality Assurance Project Plan outlines the objectives of the

monitoring, identifies the monitoring and sampling methodologies, identifies the

siting of monitors, and outlines monitoring exit strategies. In essence, the Plan

helps to ensure that sufficient data is collected of adequate quality for the

decisions to be made. 

The Quality Assurance Project Plan should also address the format and means of

transmitting data. In the WTC response, various government agencies collected a

large amount of environmental data for Lower Manhattan in the months following

September 11. The Office of Environmental Information maintains the New York

City Response Monitoring Data Retrieval database, which stores the monitoring

data collected by the various Federal, State, and City environmental agencies

involved in the response. According to a report prepared by an EPA contractor

that analyzed trends in the data, the database contained 263,000 monitoring results

for 605 contaminants through April 24, 2002. Because the data came in different

formats, consistent sampling, monitoring, and quality assurance information was

not provided for each of the pollutants monitored, and in many instances this data

was not provided. Our review of information in the database confirmed the trends

noted by the contractor.

Providing standardized guidance for the organizations reporting data to EPA

would improve the consistency of the data. A complete data set would make

future assessments of the data easier to complete. Both EPA Region 2 and EPA

Headquarters’ Lessons Learned reports made recommendations to improve data

collection. The Region 2 Lessons Learned report recommended that all

organizations submit data in an electronic format, and standardized formats

should be used as much as possible. The report also recommended that easy-tounderstand context and explanations be provided for the data, to allow data and

risk assessments to be released to the public more quickly. 

EPA’s Office of Environmental Information has created a standardized template

for future responses by making a generic shell of the New York City Monitoring

Database. This Office is also exploring longer-term improvements. With regard

to WTC data, Region 2 officials have been working to improve the data in the

“NYC Response” database by requesting that organizations perform a quality

assurance review of the data they submitted to EPA. Once this process is
63 Report No. 2003-P-00012

completed, the data will become available to the public on a CD-ROM. We agree

that EPA should continue to explore long-term improvements for data collection.

Monitoring Capabilities Need to Be Increased

The amount of monitoring data for pollutants other than asbestos was limited in

the first few weeks following September 11. In the beginning, monitoring efforts

were hampered by several factors. There were difficulties associated with getting

access and security, power supply sources, equipment availability, and analytical

capacity. One environmental monitoring expert who participated in

environmental sampling and analysis after the WTC collapse suggested that

emergency response monitors must be improved and recommended that

lightweight and manageable battery operated air samplers be developed that are

able to measure a wide range of particles and gaseous substances.

In the case of a major disaster that causes a significant dispersion of particulates,

the levels of TSP can be a concern, particularly in regard to acute respiratory

symptoms. However, in the WTC response, these particles were not monitored

because of a lack of TSP monitors. The availability of TSP monitors has

decreased over time as EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards program

has shifted its focus from measuring TSP to measuring smaller particles. While

health studies support measuring smaller particles from the standpoint of the

National Ambient Air Quality Standards program, experts told us that it is useful

to measure the levels of TSP in a disaster to determine potential short-term or

acute health effects.

EPA Headquarters’ Lessons Learned Report addressed equipment needs and

recommended that EPA clearly identify such needs. In addition, the Office of Air

Quality and Planning Standards acquired funding for a Mobile Rapid Response

Laboratory to collect data quickly in emergency situations and transmit data to a

central database via satellite. The Office of Air Quality and Planning Standards

plans to establish two such mobile laboratories. 

Risk Communication

The collapse of the WTC towers disrupted normal communication infrastructures,

yet required that difficult decisions about the condition of the environment be

made quickly and under extreme stress. Under these conditions, EPA made

extraordinary efforts to successfully assemble an extensive amount of information

on its web site and otherwise communicate to the public. Despite these efforts,

the information EPA communicated was in some cases inconsistent with prior

Agency positions, inconsistent with other communications regarding the WTC

disaster, or incomplete. Some of these communication problems may have been

avoided if the Agency had updated policies and procedures in place for

communicating to the public and had followed existing risk communication
64 Report No. 2003-P-00012

guidelines established for the Superfund program. Based on its experience with

the WTC response and the subsequent anthrax contamination responses, EPA has

initiated various actions to improve its communication practices. 

Better Communication Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Needed

Officials from EPA’s OCEMR and its successor office, the Office of Public

Affairs, in Washington, D.C., were not able to provide us with current written

policies or procedures for communicating with the public. Although not

established as official Agency communication policy, EPA’s Superfund program

has issued several guidance documents regarding risk communication. EPA’s risk

communication principles and recommended practices are contained in EPA’s

Superfund Community Involvement Handbook. This Handbook identifies the

“Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication,” presented in Chapter 2. As

explained in the following, EPA’s risk communications did not consistently

adhere to the principles and guidelines discussed in its Superfund guidance.

Risk Communications Need to Acknowledge Uncertainties

EPA’s Superfund Community Involvement Handbook specifically discusses

uncertainties (“Be willing to discuss uncertainties”), and the fourth rule states:

If you do not know an answer or are uncertain, acknowledge it and

respond with the answer as soon as possible. Do not hesitate to

admit mistakes or disclose risk information. Try to share more

information not less; otherwise, people may think you are hiding

something.

As detailed previously in this report, EPA’s statement that the air was safe to

breathe was not qualified (except for rescue and cleanup personnel at Ground

Zero). Further, EPA’s press releases did not discuss any of the uncertainties

associated with this statement. 

Dr. Peter Sandman, founder of the Environmental Communication Research

Program at Rutgers University, provided 26 recommendations for risk

communication. These include that one should “acknowledge uncertainty” and

urged “never using the word ‘safe’ without qualifying it.”

Procedures Needed to Ensure Consistency in Communications

EPA communications after the WTC catastrophe sometimes gave conflicting

information in regard to the same issue or were inconsistent with prior Agency

positions. Specifically, information provided orally about cleaning of indoor

spaces was not consistent with the messages given in Agency press releases. 
65 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Also, EPA communications about the risk from asbestos were not entirely

consistent with prior Agency public positions regarding asbestos risk. 

EPA’s communications during the WTC crisis – that the general public did not

need to be concerned about short-term exposure to WTC asbestos – were

inconsistent with the Agency’s prior position that all asbestos exposure is

hazardous to human health. EPA’s historical position, as detailed in the Federal

Register, has been that:

. . . short-term occupational exposures, have also been shown to

increase the risk of lung cancer and mesothelioma. In addition,

there are many documented cases of mesothelioma linked to

extremely brief exposure to high concentrations of asbestos or

long-term exposure to low concentrations. . . . EPA has concluded

that it is prudent to treat all fiber types as having equivalent

biological activity...Available evidence supports the conclusion

that there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos. (April 25, 1986

Federal Register Volume 51, page 15722)

However, EPA’s position in its September 13, 2001, press release was that the

public did not need to be concerned about short-term exposure to WTC asbestos. 

The confusion of some residents may have been reflected at a May 8, 2002, press

conference, when the questioner quoted EPA’s 1986 position and asked the 

Region 2 Administrator: 

Available evidence supports the conclusion that there is no safe

level for exposure to asbestos. So what science are you citing that

there is a safe level? 

The EPA Region 2 Administrator replied:

We are talking about very short term exposure to quantities of

[unintelligible word] that - we know exactly that these buildings

came down and they contained asbestos. There are other places in

the country perhaps where people have been exposed over long

periods of time - based on using substances containing asbestos -

and breathing them - as part of their household. We know this was

a one time - you know buildings came down, and that is what

needs to be cleaned up so there is not that risk of long term

exposure.

The research community has not reached consensus on the relative risk to human

health from exposure to different types and sizes of asbestos, and EPA’s approach

has been to not distinguish between fiber types and sizes when characterizing the

risk from asbestos exposure. Many experts and studies support the general

message EPA conveyed about asbestos exposure and risk after the WTC
66 Report No. 2003-P-00012

catastrophe, and research may ultimately prove these statements correct. 

However, this position was different from prior Agency pronouncements, and can

create doubts in the public’s mind about EPA’s statements. 

Communications Need to Disclose External Participation

As discussed previously in this report, EPA officials were not the sole determiners

of the information that was included in its press releases, nor the information that

was excluded. This was demonstrated by the EPA OCEMR Associate

Administrator’s statement that residential cleaning instructions were deleted from

a draft press release by the CEQ contact official. The extent of outside influence

was further illustrated by the statement from the EPA Administrator’s Chief of

Staff that she could not claim ownership of EPA’s early WTC press releases

because “the ownership was joint ownership between EPA and the White House.”

In a time of disaster, EPA officials should be careful to ensure that EPA’s press

releases reflect EPA’s professional judgment based on sound science,

acknowledge the participation of outside parties, and provide accurate information

about the environment to the public in accordance with EPA’s mission. 

Environmental Data from Sources Outside EPA Need to Be

Addressed

In the aftermath of the WTC collapse, several entities were involved in collecting

data on environmental conditions. This included private firms; research

organizations; Federal agencies; and State, local, and city governments. Several

days after the attacks, EPA was designated as the lead agency for collecting and

storing all of the WTC monitoring data. This designation did not include being

the sole spokesperson for communicating the results of this monitoring data. 

 EPA was subsequently criticized for not including other organizations’

monitoring results in its public communications. For example, EPA was

criticized for not putting the results of sampling done by the U.S. Geological

Survey on EPA’s web site, or at least discussing this data. The U.S. Geological

Survey monitoring had found high pH levels in the WTC dust, which reportedly

contributed to the burning of respiratory pathways experienced by first responders

and others who breathed WTC dust. An EPA spokesperson stated that EPA had

not intended to keep the information from the public, and EPA thought the

information had been posted on the U.S. Geological Survey’s web site. EPA

officials also told us that the high levels of pH found in the dust was to be

expected because of the pulverized concrete.
67 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Another monitoring study was highly publicized by the media, but was not

discussed in EPA communications. This study was conducted by a collaborative

association of aerosol scientists that specialize in fine particulate ambient

monitoring techniques. This group found that the air around Lower Manhattan

contained high levels of fine particulates and metals, particularly in readings taken

on October 3, 2001. We spoke to the author of this study who told us that he had

tried to work with EPA regarding his group’s test results before releasing it to the

press, but was unsuccessful. EPA correspondence indicated the EPA officials

were invited to the press release for this study, but were not aware of the study

prior to that invitation.

EPA needs to develop a policy, in conjunction with other Federal agencies,

outlining how organization(s) will coordinate the reporting of environmental data

after a disaster. This policy should address the State and local government role in

these communications, as well as how to address data collected by research or

academic organizations. 

EPA Actions to Improve Its Communications

Both EPA’s Headquarters and Region 2 Lessons Learned Reports address

communication issues and provide recommendations to improve the Agency’s

response in this area. EPA’s Headquarters report recommended that EPA develop

policies and procedures for disseminating public information during national

emergencies within the established emergency response plans and structures. The

report also recommended that EPA coordinate with other organizations outside to

identify and address obstacles to timely and consistent presentation of

environmental information during national emergencies. In regard to releasing

monitoring data, the report recommended that EPA clearly define a process for

approving and coordinating the release of information to other agencies and the

public. Also, EPA’s Lessons Learned report recommended that EPA work with

the Department of Homeland Security to have EPA designated the lead agency for

environmental data during national emergencies when both EPA and other

agencies are conducting environmental analyses.

Region 2’s lesson learned report recommended that Region 2 develop a

comprehensive approach to handling crisis communications, and that this

approach include other Federal and State partners. In addition, mechanisms

should be in place for resolving differences about the interpretation of risk and the

appropriate response. 

These recommendations, if properly implemented, should help ensure technical

consistency and accuracy in the Agency’s public information, and accountability

for press release content. 
68 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Recent Developments

In May 2003, EPA participated in a Department of Homeland Securityadministered Top Officials exercise with other Federal, State, local, and Canadian

government organizations. This exercise simulated weapons of mass destruction

incidents with the goals of: (1) improving the nation's capacity to manage extreme

events; (2) creating broader frameworks for the operation of expert crisis and

consequence management systems; (3) validating authorities, strategies, plans,

policies, procedures, and protocols; and (4) building a sustainable, systematic

national exercise program to support the national strategy for homeland security. 

Further, on June 27, 2003, EPA issued the EPA National Approach to Response

Policy to implement a new approach to responding to Nationally Significant

Incidents. The Policy calls for a multi-faceted and coordinated approach to

managing EPA’s emergency response assets during a Nationally Significant

Incident. A key aspect of the policy is that it requires EPA to operate under an

Incident Command System approach based on the National Interagency Incident

Management System. EPA plans to supplement the Policy with guidance to fully

characterize roles and responsibilities within the Agency to manage a Nationally

Significant Incident. As noted in the Policy, Homeland Security Presidential

Directive-5 calls for the development of a new National Response Plan and a

single, comprehensive National Incident Management System. As standards,

guidelines, and protocols are developed to implement the national system, EPA

will modify its National Approach to Response Policy as necessary. 

Conclusions

Although many organizations were involved in addressing air quality concerns

resulting from the WTC collapse, subsequent events have demonstrated that, 

ultimately, the public and others expect EPA to monitor and resolve

environmental issues, even though EPA may not have the overall responsibility to

resolve these issues or the necessary resources to address them. These issues

range from collecting, interpreting, and communicating environmental

information to cleaning up any environmental contamination. EPA must be

prepared to take a leadership role, within the evolving framework established by

the Department of Homeland Security and existing statutes, in fulfilling its

mission of “protecting human health and the environment,” if another large-scale

disaster occurs.
69 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Recommendations

This chapter summarizes observations based on work conducted to answer the

objectives discussed in Chapters 2 through 6. These prior chapters contain

recommendations that address specific issues related to those objectives. 

Recommendations to address observations not covered in the prior chapters are

included in this chapter. 

We recommend that the EPA Administrator:

7-1. Work with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to

share information on likely targets and threats and collaboratively develop

approaches to address these threats. Such approaches should include, at a

minimum:

a. Identifying the pollutants expected to be emitted from such targets,

b. Assessing the pathways of human exposure to those pollutants, 

c. Developing approaches to monitoring and assessing environmental

contamination from those targets, and

d. Establishing plans of action for reducing human exposure from these

pollutants. 

7-2. Define and clarify internal EPA organizational roles and responsibilities in

responding to large-scale disasters. This should include designating teams

of Agency experts – at both the National and Regional level – that can be

mobilized to quickly provide needed technical support during a response. 

These areas may include specialized sampling techniques, exposure

modeling and assessment, and risk assessment. 

7-3. Develop and improve health-related benchmarks that can be used to assess

health risk in emergencies. Specifically: 

a. Continue agency work on Acute Exposure Guideline Levels,

b. Develop sub-chronic exposure guidelines for pollutants determined to

be a high priority as a result of terrorist attacks or other large-scale

disasters,

c. Develop health-related benchmarks for asbestos in air,

d. Develop benchmarks for assessing potential exposure from

contaminant levels in dust,

e. Continue to develop and refine benchmarks for COPCs in indoor

environments,

f. Conduct research to determine the synergistic impact of exposure to

multiple pollutants, and

g. Develop expert panels that can be used to quickly develop healthrelated benchmarks in emergency situations. 
70 Report No. 2003-P-00012

7-4. Develop an emergency quality assurance sampling plan to be used as a

guidance for monitoring environmental conditions after a large-scale

disaster. This plan should address:

a. Monitoring objectives,

b. Preferred sampling and analytic methods for high-priority pollutants,

c. Siting of monitors, 

d. Quality control, and 

e. Data reporting formats 

7-5. Improve monitoring capabilities by:

a. Making TSP monitors available for use in emergency situations, and

acquiring other monitors as determined,

b. Continuing the mobile monitoring laboratory project, and

c. Exploring new technologies for monitoring in extremely dusty

conditions

7-6. Require that the Office of Public Affairs develop emergency

communications policy and procedures consistent with the principles of

risk communication provided in EPA’s “Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk

Communication.” 

Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation

The Agency generally agreed with the recommendations in this Chapter. With

respect to the conclusion, the Agency emphasized that it exercised its opinions

and judgments on matters impacting human health and the environment and will

continue to do so within the context of its authorities and its role under the Federal

Response Plan. The Agency’s complete written response to our draft report and

our detailed evaluation of that response are contained in Appendices Q and R,

respectively. 
71 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix A

Federal Agencies Responding to the WTC Collapse

Agency Role

Federal Emergency

Management Agency 

Managed and coordinated Federal Government response. Provided

funding for response including cleaning of building exteriors and cleaning

of indoor residential spaces.

U.S. Department of

Health and Human

Services

National Institute for

Occupational Safety and

Health

Performed various activities related to worker health and safety, which

included:

• Assessing jobs and work locations for health potential hazards.

• Helping site managers select appropriate equipment for sampling, use it

properly, and institute procedures for analyzing data.

• Helping select appropriate personal protective equipment and coordinate

deployment of respirators. 

• Developing procedures for cleaning and sanitizing respirators.

• Developing and disseminating written guidelines for worker safety and

health.

• Conducting health hazard evaluations to assess worker health.

• Providing technical assistance to NYCDOH to develop voluntary registry

of individuals who worked at, lived near, or responded to the WTC

attack. 

U.S. Department of

Health and Human

Services

Agency for Toxic

Substances and Disease

Registry

Provided various types of monitoring and health assessment support,

including:

• Assisting EPA and other agencies in sampling dust and air at Ground

Zero and evaluating data to assess health risks. 

• Providing technical assistance to NYCDOH on environmental medicine, 

• Participating in the World Trade Center Environmental Assessment

Workgroup, which was made up of representatives from ATSDR and

other Federal agencies. 

• Using geographic information systems to map environmental sampling

results and other data for Lower Manhattan. 

U.S. Department of

Health and Human

Services

National Institute of

Environmental Health

Sciences

Funded research and training to address health concerns resulting from

the WTC collapse. 
Agency Role

72 Report No. 2003-P-00012

U.S. Department of

Labor

Occupational Safety and

Health Administration

Conducted various risk assessment and monitoring activities related to

worker protection at the Ground Zero Site. This included:

• Taking air and bulk samples to date for asbestos, silica, lead, and other

heavy metals, carbon monoxide, noise, and numerous organic and

inorganic compounds. 

• Providing 24-hour laboratory support to analyze air and bulk samples

taken at the site. 

• Distributing sampling results to workers and other safety and health

representatives at the site, and posting the sampling results on the

agency’s web site, and 

• Providing guidance on appropriate personal protection equipment and

feasible control measures based on monitoring results. 

Distributed respirators and conducted fit testing for the Fire Department of

New York and other rescue workers. 

Conducted initial safety assessment of the site within 24 hours of the

attack to identify hazards and potential health and safety risks to workers

involved in the recovery, and provided around-the-clock monitoring of the

site to identify and alert workers to safety and health hazards. 

Provided various safety and health support functions such as helping

develop an environmental, safety, and health plan; distributing personal

protective equipment to workers; and conducting job hazard analyses. 

Provided support to promote site safety and health, which included 

sponsoring weekly meeting regarding safety and health issues. 

United States Coast

Guard

Operated Incident Command Center in Edison, New Jersey.

Conducted air-monitoring operations in buildings in Manhattan's financial

district. 
73 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix B

Details on Scope and Methodology

 Objective 1. Did the available monitoring data and analyses of that data support EPA’s

major public communications regarding air quality and associated health

risks resulting from the collapse of the WTC towers?

We requested all data and correspondence used to support “major” EPA

pronouncements regarding air quality. We defined “major” as press releases,

testimony, television, and other public appearances. This effort primarily focused

on, but was not limited to, data collected and pronouncements made during the

period September 2001 through December 2001. The data we reviewed included

“Daily Summary Sheets” prepared by EPA staff, and the raw data sheets that

showed the results of air and dust samples and were the basis for the daily

summaries. In addition, we obtained access to the “New York City Response”

database maintained by EPA’s Office of Environmental Information and

downloaded selected data from the database and compared it to the raw data

sheets. We also reviewed monitoring results from other organizations, including:

• New York State Department of Conservation

• New York City Department of Environmental Protection

• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

• New York City Board of Education

• Operating Engineers National Hazmat Program

• New York State Public Employees Safety and Health Bureau

• U.S. Geological Survey

• Occupational Safety and Health Administration

• DELTA Group

• New York University

• Environmental and Occupational Health Sciences Institute

• ConEd

• Turner Construction

We interviewed Region 2 officials to determine their views on what monitoring

data showed and the messages conveyed by EPA press releases. In addition, we

interviewed EPA officials within the Office of Research and Development, Office

of Air and Radiation, and Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. We

also interviewed officials outside EPA to obtain their views on EPA’s statements

about air quality and the support for these statements. These interviews included

officials and researchers from OSHA, FEMA, NYCDOH, NYCDEP, the Mount

Sinai School of Medicine, New York University, the Environmental and

Occupational Health Sciences Institute, and the DELTA Group.
74 Report No. 2003-P-00012

We also reviewed available correspondence and documentation related to the

preparation of the EPA press releases. Further, we interviewed principal EPA

officials involved in the preparation of press releases, including the EPA

Associate Administrator for OCEMR, the Associate Administrator for the Office

of Public Affairs (formerly OCEMR), the EPA Administrator’s former Chief of

Staff, and the Region 2 Communications Division Director.

Limitations: Our review of the process and the support for information in EPA

press releases on air quality was limited since CEQ officials declined to meet with

us to discuss their role in the preparation of press releases. Our written request for

an interview was declined by a White House legal counselor, who noted there

were “institutional concerns about interviewing White House employees.” 

Further, there was a lack of documentation in general regarding preparation of

press releases. We only found documentation regarding the preparation of two of

six press releases issued during the period September 12, 2001, through

October 3, 2001. This documentation included a draft copy of the EPA press

release issued on September 16; a single e-mail about this draft press release from

CEQ; and a draft copy of the September 13 EPA press release. 

Objective 2. Were EPA actions and decisions in regard to evaluating, mitigating, and

controlling risks to human health from exposure to indoor air pollutants in

the WTC area consistent with applicable statutes, regulations, policies,

guidance, and practice? 

We reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance related to emergency

responses, including CERCLA (Superfund) and implementing regulations, and the

FRP. We also reviewed EPA’s authority to test and clean indoor spaces, and the

applicability of this authority to the WTC response. We interviewed EPA and

FEMA officials about the applicability and requirements of these statutes. We

also identified EPA and other government actions taken in response to other

disasters to compare prior indoor responses to the WTC indoor response.

We identified and reviewed reports of indoor testing conducted by both

government and non-government entities. This included indoor air and dust

testing conducted by EPA, ATSDR, contractors for the General Services

Administration, consultants for the Ground Zero Task Force, and an

environmental firm hired by one of the debris removal construction companies. 

We also interviewed officials both within and outside the government to

determine their views regarding the extent of indoor contamination and the

adequacy of the government’s response.
75 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Objective 3. Were asbestos demolition and renovation work practice standards

followed during WTC cleanup and recovery operations and, if not, why

not?

To determine the requirement applicable to emergency situations, we reviewed the

Asbestos National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (40 CFR Part

61 Subpart M), EPA’s “Guidelines For Catastrophic Emergency Situations

Involving Asbestos,” and other EPA background documents on NESHAP. We

also reviewed New York City’s “Asbestos Control Program” rules and New York

State’s Industrial Code Rule 56, which governs asbestos emission in the State.

We interviewed EPA and New York City officials to discuss the applicability of

NESHAP rules to the WTC response. This included the EPA Region 2 Counsel,

officials from the EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance and the

Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, and officials from NYCDEP and

NYCDDC. To determine the extent that NESHAP work practices were followed

in demolishing damaged buildings and removing debris from the WTC site, we

interviewed officials who were present at the site during these operations

including EPA on-scene coordinators, and officials from New York City and

OSHA. We also reviewed transcripts of EPA Superfund Ombudsman, United

States Senate Subcommittee, New York State Assembly, and New York City

Council hearings on this issue. Further, we reviewed reports from persons present

at the site, EPA situation reports, and other reports of activities at the site.

Limitations: Information on which we based conclusions includes personal

accounts of the work activities obtained from interviews and hearings, and reports

describing work practices at the site. Further, it was beyond the scope of our

review to determine whether all NESHAP regulations applicable to emergency

situations were followed or the extent to which they may have been followed. We

also did not evaluate compliance with worker protection requirements.

 

Objective 4. To what extent were EPA and government communications regarding air

quality and associated health risks: (a) received by the public;

(b) understood by the public; and (c) effective in getting people to take the

desired actions to reduce their potential health risks? 

To obtain information on the impact EPA pronouncements had on the actions of

area residents and workers, we reviewed testimony at hearings before a United

States Senate Subcommittee, EPA’s Superfund Ombudsman, the New York State

Assembly, and the New York City Council. In addition, we reviewed the results

of surveys of people’s actions and opinions, and reviewed reports prepared by

officials present during the WTC response. At the time this report was prepared,

we were in the process of conducting a random survey of New York City residents

to obtain information on the public’s satisfaction with the air quality information

provided by the government after the WTC response, how the public interpreted 
76 Report No. 2003-P-00012

this information, and actions taken by the public to reduce their exposure to

potential contaminants. The results of this survey will be presented in a separate

OIG report.

Limitations: Except for a survey by NYCDOH and a random telephone poll of

New York residents, the information we reviewed was not collected by statistical

sampling methods and may not be representative of the public’s and emergency

crews’ actions with respect to government communications.

 

Objective 5. What additional actions, if any, should EPA take to improve its response

and recovery efforts in the WTC area related to ambient and indoor air

quality? 

 This objective primarily focused on the indoor residential cleanup – the only

significant EPA WTC recovery activity ongoing at the time we completed our

review. We did not audit the results of the cleaning and testing to determine

compliance with the prescribed procedures of the program or to determine the

actual effectiveness of cleaning conducted. Our analysis was based on a review of

the procedures for the testing and cleanup by our certified industrial hygienist, a

comparison of those procedures to commonly accepted asbestos abatement

procedures, and a comparison of the cleanup goals to remediation goals that

would have been required if this were a designated Superfund site. We also 

reviewed a peer review report of COPCs developed by EPA for indoor cleanup.

 

Objective 6. Should EPA revise its preparation and contingency planning for dealing

with air pollution resulting from environmental catastrophes? 

To answer this question, we summarized lessons learned from the work we

conducted to complete our other objectives. We also interviewed EPA officials,

other government officials, and non-government environmental experts to obtain

their suggestions for improving EPA’s capability to respond to similar disasters in

the future. We also reviewed EPA and non-EPA “lessons learned” reports. 

Prior Audit Coverage

The OIG has not conducted any prior evaluations of EPA responses to large-scale

disasters. However, our report on EPA’s actions related to asbestos

contamination in Libby Montana (EPA’s Actions Concerning AsbestosContaminated Vermiculite in Libby, Montana; 2001-S-7; March 31, 2001)

discussed several issues related to the regulation and analysis of health risks from 

asbestos that were relevant to this evaluation.
77 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix C

EPA September 18, 2001 Press Release
78 Report No. 2003-P-00012
79 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix D 

Screening Levels Used by EPA

to Assess Outdoor Air Quality

Pollutant Screening Level Source 

Asbestos

(Ambient Air)

70 s/m2 AHERA clearance level to re-enter school after asbestos

abatement. Represents minimum detection limit of method in use

at time standard set.

Asbestos

(Bulk Dust)

1% asbestos The Asbestos NESHAP (40 CFR Part 61) level at which a material

is considered asbestos-containing and subject to NESHAP removal

regulations. 

Benzene 0.02 ppm [1] California-EPA toxicity studies. 

.21 ppm [3] Region 2 [2]

PCBs .73 ug/m3 [1] Region 2 [2]

9 ug/m3 [3] Region 2 [2]

Chromium .6 ug/m3 [3] Region 2 [2]. Based on risk for Chromium Hexavalent (the most

toxic form of Chromium). 

Cadmium .2 ug/m3 [1] California-EPA toxicity studies

3 ug/m3 [3] Region 2 [2] 

Manganese .5 ug/m3 [1] Region 2 [2]

Particulate

Matter 2.5

40 ug/m3 Air Quality Index. Represents caution level for sensitive

populations for 24-hour average exposure.

65 ug/m3 

(24 hr avg)

National Ambient Air Quality Standard

Particulate

Matter 10

150 ug/m3 Air Quality Index and National Ambient Air Quality Standard

Lead 1.5 ug/m3 

(3 mo avg)

National Ambient Air Quality Standard

.1 ug/m3 Default value in EPA’s Integrated Exposure Uptake/ Bio-kinetic

Model for Lead in Children.

PAHs 6 ug/m3 [3] Region 2 developed from EPA’s “Hazard Evaluation Handbook:

A Guide to Removal Actions,” and EPA National Center for

Environmental Assessment provisional inhalation Slope Factor for

Benzo(a)pyrene. 

Dioxin .162 ng/m3 [3] Region 2 [2] 

Sulfur Dioxide .14 ppm

(24 hr avg)

National Ambient Air Quality Standard

Acetone 1.5 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

Benzaldehyde 860 ppm Not identified

1,3 Butadiene .01 ppm [1] [3] Region 2 developed using EPA’s “Hazard Evaluation Handbook:

A Guide to Removal Actions,” and proposed reference

concentration. 
Pollutant Screening Level Source 

80 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Chloro-methane .4 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

2.6 ppm [3] Region 2 [2] 

1,4 Dioxane .5 ppm [3] Region 2 [2] 

Ethanol 45 ppm American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists

Threshold Limit

Ethylbenzene2.5 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

Freon 22 140 ppm Not Identified

Propylene simple asyphyxiant

Styrene 2.3 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

Alpha methyl

styrene

.1ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

Tetrahydro-furan .9 ppm [3] Region 2 [2] 

Toluene 1.1 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

Xylenes 1 ppm ATSDR Minimum Risk Level x 10. Represents screening level for

chronic (over 365 days) exposure. Used to identify contaminants

of potential concern. 

Acetaldehyde .05 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

1.3 ppm [3] Region 2 [2] 

Formaldehyde .04 ppm ATSDR Minimum Risk Level for acute exposure. Represents

screening level for acute (1- to 14-day) exposure to identify a

potential concern. 

.35 ppm [3] Region 2 [2] 

Acrolein .0001 ppm [1] Region 2 [2] 

Notes:

[1] = Represents risk of non-cancer disease based on a 1-year continuous exposure at screening level. The

hazard quotient represents the ratio of the potential exposure to the substance and the level at which no

adverse health effects are expected. If the quotient is greater than 1, then adverse health effects are

possible. For WTC’s response, the screening level established equals a hazard quotient of 10. 

[2] = Region 2 developed the screening level using EPA’s “Hazard Evaluation Handbook: A Guide to Removal

Actions,” and toxicity criteria from EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System database. 

[3] = Represents a 1-in-10,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer based on a 1-year continuous exposure at the

screening level.

 
81 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix E

EPA Outdoor Air Asbestos Sampling

for September 2001

Date

Sample

Collected

No. of

Samples 

Collected

Sampling

Location

No. of Samples

Exceeding

70s/mm2

No. of

Samples Not

Analyzed [1]

Date

Results

Available

9/11 4 Brooklyn [2] 9/12

9/11 4 New Jersey [2] 9/12

9/12 9 Ground Zero [2] 9/13

9/13 1 Lower Manhattan [2] 9/14

9/15 16 Lower Manhattan 2 [3] 7 9/16 

9/16 20 Lower Manhattan 1 [4] 9 9/17

9/17 23 Lower Manhattan 0 8 9/18

9/18 12 Lower Manhattan 0 9/19

9/18 13 Lower Manhattan 0 3 9/20

9/18 4 New Jersey 0 1 9/20

9/18 2 New Jersey 0 9/22

9/19 12 Lower Manhattan 0 [5] 9/20

9/19 11 Lower Manhattan 0 9/21

9/19 13 Lower Manhattan 0 9/23

9/19 3 New Jersey 0 9/22

9/20 18 Lower Manhattan 0 9/21

9/20 2 New Jersey 0 9/22

9/20 4 New Jersey 0 9/23

9/21 13 Lower Manhattan 0 9/22

9/21 4 New Jersey 0 9/24

9/22 13 Lower Manhattan 0 9/23

9/22 15 Lower Manhattan 1 [6] 1 9/24

9/22 4 New Jersey 0 9/26

9/23 29 Lower Manhattan 1 [7] 3 9/25

9/23 4 New Jersey 0 9/27

9/24 16 Lower Manhattan 0 9/25

9/24 16 Lower Manhattan 0 9/26

9/24 4 New Jersey 0 9/27

9/25 17 Lower Manhattan 0 9/28

9/25 4 New Jersey 0 9/28

9/26 17 Lower Manhattan 0 9/28

9/26 16 Lower Manhattan 3 [8] 9/29

9/26 4 New Jersey 0 9/29

9/27 18 Lower Manhattan 0 9/29

9/27 17 Lower Manhattan 0 9/30

9/28 17 Lower Manhattan 0 9/29
Date

Sample

Collected

No. of

Samples 

Collected

Sampling

Location

No. of Samples

Exceeding

70s/mm2

No. of

Samples Not

Analyzed [1]

Date

Results

Available

82 Report No. 2003-P-00012

9/28 17 Lower Manhattan 0 10/01

9/28 4 New Jersey 0 9/30

9/29 16 Lower Manhattan 0 10/01

9/29 17 Lower Manhattan 1 [9] 10/02

9/29 4 New Jersey 0 10/01

9/30 17 Lower Manhattan 2 10/02

TOTALS 474 11 32

Notes: 

[1] = Not analyzed due to filter overloading or other sampling problems.

[2] = No sample results reported for this method.

[3] = Results were 128 and 160 s/mm2.

[4] = Result was 90 s/mm2.

[5] = TEM results were reported in fibers per cubic centimeter. Results in s/mm2 not reported on 

 daily summary sheet. 

[6] = Result was 80 s/mm2.

[7] = Result was 88.89 s/mm2.

[8] = Results were 177.78, 97.78, and 71.11 s/mm2.

[9] = Result was 80 s/mm2.
83 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix F

EPA Outdoor Bulk Dust Asbestos Test Results

for September 2001 1

 

Date

Sample

Collected

No. of

Samples

Collected Location

No. of 

Results

> 1% Asbestos

Date Results

Reported in Daily

Summary

9/11 4 Ground Zero 1 9/12

9/12 7 Ground Zero 0

9/12 5 Brooklyn 0 9/13

9/13 0

9/14 12 Financial District 0 9/15

9/15 29 West of Broadway 13 9/16

9/16 5 South of Ground Zero 5 9/17 and 9/18

9/17 13 Perimeter of Ground Zero 0 9/18

9/18 11 Perimeter of Ground Zero 6 9/20

9/19 16 Various Lower Manhattan locations 12 9/21

9/20 7 Various Lower Manhattan locations 0 9/21

9/21 11 Around WTC 0 9/22

9/21 1 Beam from South Tower 0 9/23 

9/22 0

9/23 11 Around Ground Zero 0 9/25

9/24 0

9/25 13 Various Lower Manhattan locations 0 9/28

9/26 0

9/27 0

9/28 0 

9/29 0

9/30 0

Totals 145 37

1 = Excludes bulk testing at landfill.
84 Report No. 2003-P-00012
85 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix G

EPA September 16, 2001 Press Release
86 Report No. 2003-P-00012
87 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix H

EPA September 13, 2001 Press Release 
88 Report No. 2003-P-00012
89 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix I

Non-Governmental Environmental Experts

Interviewed

Philip Landrigan, M.D. Director/Attending, The Mount Sinai Hospital 

 Chairman & Professor, Mount Sinai School of Medicine

Stephen Levin, M.D., Assistant Attending, The Mount Sinai Hospital 

 Associate Professor, Mount Sinai School of Medicine

George Thurston, Sc.D. Associate Professor of Environmental Medicine, 

New York University School of Medicine

Paul Lioy, Ph.D. Director, Exposure Measurement and Assessment

Division, Environmental and Occupational Health

Sciences Institute

Hugh Granger, Ph.D., CIH Toxicologist and Laboratory Director, HP Environmental,

Inc.

Piotr Chmielinski, M.S., CIH Director of Industrial Hygiene, HP Environmental, Inc.

Thomas Cahill Professor of Atmospheric Science/Physics,

University of California–Davis, Director, DELTA Group

Michael Beard Research Environmental Chemist, Center for

Environmental Measurements, Research Triangle

Institute

 

Michael Gallo, PhD., Director, Toxicology Division, Environmental and

Occupational Health Sciences Institute

Howard Bader, P.E. President, H.A. Bader Consultants, Inc.
90 Report No. 2003-P-00012
91 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix J

NYCDEP October 25, 2001 Instructions to Residents
92 Report No. 2003-P-00012
93 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix K

Indoor Air and Dust Test Results

EPA conducted indoor air monitoring and indoor dust wipe sampling in the weeks after the

collapse. This EPA indoor air monitoring (prior to the FEMA-funded residential cleanup) was

limited primarily to testing for asbestos in buildings. EPA’s dust wipe sampling tested for

metals, PCBs, and dioxin. 

On September 13, 2001, 14 air samples were collected from 26 Federal Plaza, 290 Broadway,

and Chase Manhattan Plaza, and analyzed for asbestos. All samples were analyzed by TEM and

the results converted to PCM equivalent readings in fibers per cubic centimeter (f/cc). One of the

14 samples exceeded the New York City standard for asbestos clearance of .01 f/cc

(see Table K-1).

Table K-1: Indoor Air Test Results from September 13, 2001

Address 

Sample 

ID 

Sample

Volume 

[1]

PCM Analysis TEM Analysis

f/cc

f/mm2

[2] f/cc s/mm2

s = .5- 5

[3]

s > 5

[4]

Chase Manhattan Plaza 571 np na na 0.0098 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (13th floor) 16370 np na na 0.0064 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (13th floor) 16371 np na na <0.0033 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (Lobby S.) 16372 np na na 0.0072 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (Lobby W.) 16373 np na na 0.0037 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (39th floor) 16374 np na na <0.0038 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (38th floor) 16375 np na na <0.0039 na na na

26 Federal Plaza (26th floor) 16376 np na na <0.0038 na na na

290 Broadway (8th floor) 27490 np na na 0.0042 na na na

290 Broadway (Lobby) 27491 np na na <0.0043 na na na

290 Broadway (22nd floor N.) 27492 np na na <0.0041 na na na

290 Broadway (22nd floor S.) 27493 np na na 0.004 na na na

290 Broadway (LL-1) 27494 np na na 0.013 na na na

290 Broadway (LL-2) 27495 np na na 0.0044 na na na

KEY:

np = sample volume not provided on data sheets.

na= not analyzed for this metric.

NOTES:

[1] = sample volume for TEM (AHERA method) is 1200 liters for 25 mm filter

[2] = fibers per millimeter squared

[3] = structures equal to or greater than 0.5 micrometers and less than or equal to 5 micrometers in length

[4] = structures greater than 5 micrometers in length

During the period September 17 to November 3, 2001, EPA collected dust wipe samples within

four buildings: Stuyvesant High School, Public School 234, Manhattan Borough Community

College, and the Jacob Javits Convention Center. The samples were analyzed for various metals

at all locations, while at Stuyvesant and the Community College samples were also collected and

analyzed for PCBs and dioxin. Fifty-four percent of the sample results were below the minimum 
94 Report No. 2003-P-00012

detection limit, while the remaining 46 percent detected contaminants in varying levels. The

highest recorded amount for each pollutant at each location is shown in Table K-2.

Table K-2: Highest Recorded Readings for Dust Wipe Samples

Analyte Stuyvesant

High School

Jacob

 Javits

Convention

Center

Manhattan

Borough

Community

College

Public

School

234

 Unit

Aluminum 320 220 570 83 ug/wipe

Antimony 0.81 1 0.79 0.15 ug/wipe

Arsenic 0.1 0.24 0.38 <0.1 ug/wipe

Barium 4.2 9.3 9.4 2.1 ug/wipe

Beryllium <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 ug/wipe

Cadmium 0.59 0.47 2 <0.25 ug/wipe

Calcium 3300 1900 5000 1400 ug/wipe

Chromium 3.3 2.1 4.4 0.6 ug/wipe

Cobalt <0.5 <0.5 1.1 <0.5 ug/wipe

Copper 5 7.3 9.8 6.1 ug/wipe

Iron 360 580 840 200 ug/wipe

Lead 4.5 6.3 9.7 1.5 ug/wipe

Magnesium 370 240 670 160 ug/wipe

Manganese 15 8.9 28 3.9 ug/wipe

Mercury .01 0.02 <.01 ug/wipe

Nickel 1.5 1.9 2.4 <0.5 ug/wipe

Potassium 110 380 220 <100 ug/wipe

Selenium <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 ug/wipe

Silver <.25 0.26 <.25 <.25 ug/wipe

Sodium <25 1300 280 250 ug/wipe

Thallium <.01 <.01 <.01 390 ug/wipe

Vanadium <0.5 <0.5 1.2 0.81 ug/wipe

Zinc 55 93 150 39 ug/wipe

PCBs-totals 0 na 0 <5 ng/100cm2

TEQ (ND=1/2) 0.0046 na .0055 0.0082 ng/100cm2

 na = samples not analyzed for this pollutant. 

On September 26, 2001, bulk dust samples from 110 Greenwich were collected and analyzed

for various pollutants. For those pollutants where a screening level existed, the test results were

all below the applicable soil screening levels contained in EPA’s Hazard Evaluation Handbook. 

Table K-3 presents the results of testing at 110 Greenwich. 
95 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Table K-3: Bulk Dust Sampling at 110 Greenwich

Analyte Result [1] Screening Level [2]

Aluminum 18900 mg/Kg 780000 mg/kg

Antimony < 5.75 mg/Kg 310 mg/kg

Aroclor 1016 < 740 ug/kg

Aroclor 1221 < 740 ug/kg

Aroclor 1232 < 740 ug/kg

Aroclor 1242 < 740 ug/kg

Aroclor 1248 < 740 ug/kg

Aroclor 1254 < 740 ug/kg

Aroclor 1260 < 740 ug/kg

Asbestos [3]

Arsenic < 0.96 mg/Kg 43 mg/kg

Barium 195 mg/Kg

Beryllium 1.76 mg/Kg 15 mg/kg

Cadmium 3.8 mg/Kg 390 mg/kg

Calcium 186000 mg/Kg

Chromium 71.5 mg/Kg 3900 mg/kg

Cobalt 5.6 mg/Kg 47000 mg/kg

Copper 93.2 mg/Kg 31000 mg/kg

Iron 7410 mg/Kg 230000 mg/kg

Lead 97.7 mg/Kg

Magnesium 19100 mg/Kg

Manganese 757 mg/Kg 18000 mg/kg

Mercury 0.37 mg/Kg 78 mg/kg

Nickel 15.5 mg/Kg 16000 mg/kg

Potassium 5400 mg/Kg

Selenium < 0.96 mg/Kg 3900 mg/kg

Silver 4.91 mg/Kg 3900 mg/kg

Sodium 3880 mg/Kg

TEQ ( ND =1/2) 60.9pg/g 410 pg/g

Thallium < 0.96 mg/Kg 55 mg/kg

Vanadium 18.3 mg/Kg 5500 mg/kg

Zinc 791 mg/Kg 230000 mg/kg

[1] = All samples collected on September 26, 2001.

[2] = Residential soil screening level from EPA’s Hazard Evaluation Handbook.

Only accounts for health risk from ingestion.

[3] = No result reported in NYC Response database.

 

On October 10, 2001, two bulk dust samples inside 100 Church Street were collected

and analyzed for asbestos. The results of this testing, done at the Department of

Justice’s request, found that one of the samples contained 1.1 percent asbestos while

the other was non-detect. 

On October 23, 2001, 10 air samples were collected at 100 Church Street and analyzed

for asbestos. The samples were analyzed by both the TEM and PCM methods. All

TEM results were below the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2 and all PCM results were

below .01 f/cc. This testing was performed on the 18th and 19th floors after these floors

had been cleaned. 
96 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Table K-4: Indoor Air Test Results from October 23, 2001

Address 

Sample 

ID 

Sample

Volume 

[1]

PCM Analysis TEM Analysis

f/cc

f/mm2

[2] f/cc s/mm2

s = .5- 5

[3]

s > 5 

[4]

100 Church St (front of 1927/8) 11931 2400 0.002 9.55 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (Lobby) 11932 2400 0.002 11.46 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (1909/1910) 11933 2160 0.003 15.92 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (1902/1903) 11934 2400 0.001 7.64 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (Alley 1960) 11935 2400 <0.001 <7 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (Alley 1941) 11936 2400 <0.001 <7 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (1935/1937) 11937 2400 0.004 21.66 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (1835/1837) 11938 2400 <0.001 <7 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (18FL-SW corner) 11939 2400 <0.001 <7 na <20 0 0

100 Church St (18th main lobby) 11940 2400 0.005 30.57 na <20 0 0

KEY:

np = sample volume not provided on data sheets.

na= not analyzed for this metric.

NOTES:

[1] = sample volume for TEM (AHERA method) is 1200 liters for 25 mm filter

[2] = fibers per millimeter squared

[3] = structures equal to or greater than 0.5 micrometers and less than or equal to 5 micrometers in length

[4] = structures greater than 5 micrometers in length

General Services Administration Monitoring of Federal Buildings

From September 13, 2001, through January 2, 2002, the General Services Administration, which

is responsible for Federal building management, arranged for indoor environmental testing at

Federal buildings located at 290 Broadway, 26 Federal Plaza, 201 Varick Street, and 1 Bowling

Green. Over 100 air samples were analyzed and all samples were below the AHERA standard of

70 s/mm2. All but four air samples analyzed by TEM were non-detect for asbestos. The four

samples that detected asbestos all occurred between September 13 and September 19, 2001. Two

samples showed 25 s/mm2 and two samples could not be analyzed because the filters were

overloaded. The only testing for asbestos in dust was conducted on September 14, 2001. Three

dust samples collected in the lobby of 290 Broadway and two collected outside the building on

September 13, 2001, showed the presence of chrysotile asbestos by TEM analysis. The results

for these tests only reported whether asbestos was present or not, not the percentage of asbestos

in the sample. Table K-5 through K-7 provide more information on the results of indoor testing

of Federal buildings. 
18 Eric J. Chatfield, Ph.D., Chatfield Technical Consulting Limited, and John R. Kominsky,

M.Sc.,CIH, CSP, CHMM, Environmental Quality Management, Inc.; October 12, 2001.

97 Report No. 2003-P-00012

K-5: Asbestos Air Testing

Location Sampling 

Period

PCM Results (0.01 f/cc) TEM Results (70 s/mm2)

 No. of 

 Samples 

 No. above 

 0.01 f/cc

No. of

Samples

No. above

70 s/mm2

290 Broadway 09/13/01 - 09/28/01 18 0 58 0

10/09/01- 10/23/01 16 0 16 0

12/03/01 - 01/02/02 21 0 21 0

1 Bowling Green 10/12/01- 10/25/01 18 0 16 0

Note: All results were non detect except for 4 of the 58 samples collected between 9/13/01 and 9/28/01. 

Two of these sample showed asbestos levels of 25 s/mm2 by TEM and 2 samples could not be

analyzed because of overloaded filters.

K-6: Asbestos Dust Testing at 290 Broadway

Sample Collection Information PLM TEM

Date Type No.

 No. of Samples 

Asbestos Detected

 No. of Samples

Asbestos Detected

09/14/01 Vacuum 5 Not Analyzed 5

09/14/01 Tape 50 0

09/14/01 HVAC Filter 3 0 0

K-7: Non-Asbestos Air Sampling Results

Pollutant

Screening

Level Test Method

 290 Broadway 500 Pearl Street

No. of

Samples

No. Above

Screening

Level

No. of

Samples

No. Above

Screening

Level

Lead 50 ug/m3 NIOSH 7082 3 060

Respirable Dust 5.0 mg/m3 NIOSH 0600 3 060

Carbon Dioxide 5000 ppm Telaire CO2 3 060

Carbon Monoxide 50 ppm SGA91 3 060

VOCs 1 ppm [1] H-Nu Photo 3 0 6 0

[1] = Method Detection Limit

Other Indoor Air Studies

“Characterization of Particulate Found in Apartments After Destruction of the World

Trade Center.”18 This study was conducted at the request of the Ground Zero Elected Officials

Task Force. This study selected two residential apartment buildings for sampling – one

presumed to have significant WTC dust contamination and the other not – based on their

locations. Six air samples were collected from inside one apartment building and five from the

other. All 11 samples were analyzed by the TEM method. The study found higher levels of 
19 Dr. E.B. Ilgren, MD, MA, D Phil, October 11, 2001.

20 New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, as

part of the World Trade Center Environmental Assessment Workgroup, September 2002.

98 Report No. 2003-P-00012

airborne asbestos in apartment building expected to have WTC dust contamination. Further, the

study found that asbestos levels in both buildings exceeded the AHERA standard of 70 s/mm2:

• Asbestos concentrations ranged from 6,277 to 10,620 s/mm2 in the building expected to

experience significant WTC dust contamination.

 

• Asbestos concentrations ranged from 141 to 379 s/mm2 in the building not expected to

experience significant WTC dust contamination. 

“Health Risks from Exposures to Asbestos and Inorganic Metals Due to Collapse of the

World Trade Center.19 The results of the aforementioned “Characterization of Particulate

Found in Apartments After Destruction of the World Trade Center” study were analyzed by a

consultant for the Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force to address possible health risks to

residents and workers from exposure to the levels of inorganic metals and asbestos

contamination found in the study. 

“Final Report of the Public Health Investigation to Assess Potential Exposures to Airborne

and Settled Surface Dust in Residential Areas in Lower Manhattan, NYCDOH, and

ATSDR.”20 This was the largest study in terms of buildings analyzed and was conducted by

ATSDR and NYCDOH. The final report was issued in September 2002. The study collected

dust and air samples in and around 30 residential buildings (encompassing 59 apartment units) in

Lower Manhattan, along with 4 buildings north of 59th Street for comparison purposes. Of the

59 apartments sampled, 50 – or 85 percent – had been reportedly cleaned (professionally or

otherwise) prior to ATSDR’s sampling.

 The study concluded that the increased risk of cancer or other adverse lung health effects from

prolonged exposure to WTC dust was greater than 1-in-10,000 for those areas sampled. This risk

was based on several worst-case scenario assumptions. These worst-case assumptions were that

apartments tested would not be cleaned after sampling, all fibers detected were asbestos, and the

levels detected in the study represented long-term levels. The report noted that for individuals

who frequently clean their apartments using HEPA vacuums and damp cloths/mops or take part

in the EPA cleaning program, it was unlikely their exposure would resemble worst-case

conditions. The report noted that when evaluating the health risks from indoor contamination, it

did not take into account the potential effects of high doses of dust, fibers, and other materials

that people in the WTC area at the time of the attacks may have experienced. The report noted

these exposures could add to the public’s risk of long-term health effects. 
21 “Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) Response to the World Trade Center Disaster:

Initial WETP Grantee Response and Preliminary Assessment of Training Needs,” Donald

Elisburg, John Moran, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences WETP, National

Clearinghouse for Worker Safety and Health Training, October 6, 2001.

22 “Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster,” Bruce

Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002.

99 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix L

Details on Use of Respirators at Ground Zero

Reports on Lack of Respirator Use

An October 2001 report21 by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences discussed

worker safety issues at the WTC site for the period up to October 5, 2001. The report’s

observations generally focused on construction workers at the site and not Fire Department

rescue team or Federal disaster assistance personnel. According to the report:

• Respiratory protection was rare with the exception of heavy equipment operators. Further,

workers were observed in the smoke plume emanating from the pile without hard hats, eye

wear, or respirators.

• Workers did not decon [decontaminate] after leaving the site. The hand/face and boot wash

stations did not appear to be used by most of the workers.

• During the September 22-26, 2001, period, an increase in worker protection was observed,

notably respiratory protection. Vehicles leaving the site began to be hosed down. 

• There was no evidence that any safety and health program was operating at the site. The lack

of an operating safety and health program was confirmed by various support personnel,

workers, and government officials.

A January 2002 report22 prepared by a certified industrial hygienist for the Operating Engineers

National Hazmat Program noted that during the period October 2 -16, 2001, less than half of the

heavy equipment operators regularly used respirators when working on the “pile” at Ground

Zero, and often this use decreased to less than one-third of the workers This report, which

discussed respiratory protection lessons from the WTC disaster, concluded that the respirators

NIOSH recommended for use at the site were correct and sufficiently protective provided that

they were properly tested and conscientiously worn.

In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report noted that workers

conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh Kills landfill were wearing half-face

respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvek suits. The author noted that respiratory

protection compliance by workers at Fresh Kills was reported to be approximately 90 percent as 
23 NIOSH recommended the use of half-face negative pressure respirators with P-100, organic

vapor/acid gas (P-100/OV/AG) cartridges. Respirators must be properly fitted to provide adequate

protection against airborne hazards.

100 Report No. 2003-P-00012

opposed to 30-50 percent compliance at the WTC site. The author observed that:

“. . . debris is pulled by workers from the smoking, twisted wreckage of the World

Trade Centers and then wetted and hauled to a site where the debris is carefully

sorted by workers wearing more protective clothing, much more consistently.” 

Moreover, the author noted that workers at the landfill were officially informed that not wearing

respirators would result in disciplinary action. OIG investigators from our New York office who

participated in the recovery operations confirmed the report’s conclusions about the difference in

respiratory use between the WTC and landfill sites.

EPA Actions to Encourage Respirator Use

As demonstrated by a fact sheet prepared on September 11, 2001, EPA’s emergency response

officials immediately recognized the need for and recommended the use of air purifying

respirators23 at Ground Zero (a copy of this document is available on our OIG web site). 

EPA officials told us this fact sheet was provided to a FEMA official, but was not issued. We

contacted a FEMA representative who told us that the flyer was not issued because it was

decided that New York City should handle worker protection issues.

EPA also provided respirators for workers at the site. According to a May 1, 2002, letter from

EPA’s Region 2 Administrator to Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Senator George

Voinovich (R-OH), EPA had distributed 22,100 air purifying respirators and 30,500 sets of P100

particulate cartridges to New York City by September 22, 2001. Additionally, 600 respirators

(MSA and 3m brand) and 2,000 cartridges (GME-P100) were provided to the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation and the New York State Department of Health. The

bulk of EPA-procured equipment was transported from EPA’s Edison facility by the New York

National Guard to the New York City Office of Emergency Management for distribution to

response workers.

As the rescue phase progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they were concerned

about the lack of respirator use at Ground Zero and outlined these concerns in a letter to

NYCDOH dated October 5, 2001. This letter outlined the threat of potential exposure of workers

to hazardous substances. The letter noted that EPA “... has recommended, and continues to

recommend, that workers utilize personal protective equipment and the personal wash stations to

prevent the spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes,

cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc.” The letter stated that EPA had observed

very inconsistent compliance with its recommendations, but did not have the authority to enforce

compliance with non-EPA/United States Coast Guard employees. The letter concluded by

recommending that the Incident Commander adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety

Plan. A copy of the letter is in Appendix P. 
24 “Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site,” David J.

Prezant, M.D., et al, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, No. 11, September 12, 2002.

25 “Lesson Learned for Public Health from September 11, 2001: A One-Yar Perspective,” Philip J.

Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., et al, September 2002.

101 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Health Impacts of Lack of Respirator Use at Ground Zero

Two studies documented acute health effects suffered by emergency and construction workers at

Ground Zero. A study24 of firefighters who responded to the collapse concluded that intense,

short-term exposure to material generated during the collapse of the World Trade Center was

associated with bronchial responsiveness and the development of cough. The study found that

the following percentages of firefighters developed “World Trade Center cough” that was severe

enough to require at least 4 weeks of medical leave:

• 8 percent of the firefighters with a high level of exposure to contaminants at the site

(i.e., present at the WTC collapse).

• 3 percent of the firefighters with a moderate level of exposure to contaminants at the site

(i.e., present within first 2 days after the collapse).

• 1 percent of the firefighters with a low level of exposure to contaminants at the site

(i.e., present within 3-7 days of the collapse). 

Initial findings of medical examinations of workers directly involved in rescue and recovery

efforts also found evidence of acute health impacts. Preliminary results of these examinations

released in January 2003 and reported in the Washington Post concluded that 78 percent of those

sampled had suffered lung ailments and 88 percent had experienced ear, nose, and throat

problems in the months immediately following the attack. Further, a September 2002 report25 by

the Mount Sinai School of Medicine concluded that protection of workers at Ground Zero was

“seriously inadequate.” The report noted that the response of workers in the first few hours and

days after the attack without regard to their personal safety was laudable and understandable. 

However, according to the Mount Sinai report, a lack of enforcement of worker protection

measures in the weeks and months that followed was not excusable. 
102 Report No. 2003-P-00012
103 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix M

Cleaning Procedures for Residents

Opting to Have Their Residences Cleaned

Cleaning

Procedures

 Scope of Work 

A B

Common

Areas

Cleaned if requested by the building

owner. Procedures included

vacuuming, wet wiping, and cleaning of

carpets using a water extraction

cleaner. Surface not cleaned by wet

methods to be vacuumed two times.

Cleaned if requested by the building owner. 

Procedures included vacuuming, wet wiping,

and cleaning of carpets using a water

extraction cleaner. Additionally, all surfaces

except for carpet and fabric covered furniture

to be cleaned a second time.

HVAC

Systems

HVAC systems determined to be

impacted by WTC dust to be cleaned in

accordance with a site-specific scope of

work prepared by the monitoring

contractor and approved by EPA. In

the event that the entire HVAC system

needs cleaning, a separate site-specific

contract will be awarded by NYCDEP

for the work. Work to be completed

before initiation of cleaning of common

spaces and residences in the building.

HVAC systems determined to be impacted by

WTC dust to be cleaned in accordance with a

site-specific scope of work prepared by the

monitoring contractor and approved by EPA. 

Work to be completed before initiation of

cleaning of common spaces and residences

in the building.

Residences Cleaned using HEPA vacuums, water

extraction cleaners, and wet wiping.

First foot of all exhaust duct work to be

vacuumed. 

Cleaned using HEPA vacuums, water

extraction cleaner, and wet wiping. First foot

of all exhaust duct work to be vacuumed. 

Additionally, all surfaces except for carpet and

fabric covered furniture to be cleaned a

second time. 

Worker

Protection

No specific measures described in the

scope of work.

Residents not allowed in work areas, except

residents may be present in their residence

during cleaning when the work area can be

isolated by barriers. 

Asbestos abatement procedures to be

employed include, among others: use of

personal protective equipment including

respirators, a properly enclosed

decontamination system, posting of warning

signs, isolation barriers to seal off openings,

and all waste generated during the cleaning

being treated as asbestos-containing waste

and disposed in accordance with applicable

rules and regulations. 
104 Report No. 2003-P-00012
105 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix N

Details from EPA and Non-EPA

Lessons Learned Reports

 Recommendations of EPA Lessons Learned Reports

Headquarter’s Lessons Learned Report

1. Clarify Involvement of Senior EPA Leaders, and Confirm Authority of Emergency Response

Personnel in Decision-Making and Communications During National Emergencies

1. Issue a national policy for EPA’s implementation of a NIIMS-type ICS structure to meet its

needs in responding to national emergencies.

2. Ensure all EPA emergency personnel are trained and equipped to effectively implement EPA’s

ICS (including relevant portions of the NCP).

3. Develop a process to involve senior EPA management in policy and strategic decision-making

as appropriate for national emergencies.

4. Revise Regional and area plans to incorporate national ICS policy.

5. Develop a national terrorism training and exercise strategy/program using ICS to strengthen

on-scene and management response coordination.

2. Revisit, and Revise as Needed, Existing Internal and External Emergency Response

Coordination Plans and Structures; Conduct Interagency Training and Exercises to Solidify

Government-wide Understanding of Roles, Responsibilities, and Capabilities

1. Examine existing coordination structures within the Agency (e.g., NICT, Regional Incident

Coordination Team (RICT)) to ensure adequate participation and efficient operational

capability.

2. Consider how to better use the NRT and the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG)

during national emergencies, and ways to quickly access the senior leadership of member

organizations.

3. Better educate EPA’s responders in the existing EPA, OSHA, and State roles for the protection

of the health and safety of all responders.

4. Collaborate with OSHA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies

to clarify the Agency’s role in assuring protection of the health and safety of all responders.

5. Develop a structure for intra-agency coordination that encompasses all levels of management

during national emergencies.

6. Communicate new and revised structure and processes to emergency response staff and all

involved levels of agency leadership.

7. Coordinate with the OHS to develop a coherent coordination strategy for all responders during

national emergencies; specifically, address the need to improve emergency coordination with

the FBI.
106 Report No. 2003-P-00012

3. Develop an Emergency Response Infrastructure to Address both Data Analysis Issues and

Information Management

1. Clearly define a process for approving and coordinating the release of information to other

agencies and the public; ensure program staff on AA and Office level (e.g., OSWER and

OERR) review information before it is released.

2. Establish a forum for Regional emergency response, Regional labs, and OERR’s analytical

staff to specify and address analytical needs during emergencies.

3. Ensure that prompt communication of analytical results to emergency response staff is

addressed in response procedure revisions.

4. Continue the Environmental Assessment Workgroup (EAWG) to address interagency sampling

and analysis needs. 

5. Ensure laboratory analysis and data management of health, safety, and risk information are

incorporated in emergency response plans.

6. Work with OHS and other emergency response organizations to have EPA designated the lead

agency for environmental data during national emergencies when both EPA and other agencies

are conducting environmental analyses.

7. Ensure that sufficient laboratory capabilities for national emergencies are readily available to all

Regions.

4. Develop EPA Policies and Procedures for Public Information Dissemination During National

Emergencies, Within Established Emergency Response Plans and Structures

1. Continue developing a network of tools to facilitate public communication.

2. Clarify roles, authorities, protocols, and contingency plans for Headquarters, Regional,

Community Outreach, and Regional Press Office staff during national emergencies.

3. Coordinate with OHS, CEQ, and other response partners to identify and address obstacles to

timely and consistent presentation of environmental information during national emergencies.

5. Increase the Agency’s Emergency Response Resources, and Address the Unique Demands

of OSC Positions in Human Resource Processes 

1. Assess additional personnel needs for responding to national emergencies while maintaining

emergency response preparedness.

2. Establish Western Environmental Response Team (WERT)

3. Pursue personnel classification and associated human resource practice changes to

acknowledge the unique expectations and demands placed on OSCs during national

emergencies.

4. Support WERT readiness needs.

5. Identify geographic distribution and readiness of supplies, equipment, and contractor capacity.

6. Identify and meet emergency response staff personal safety needs, including providing both

equipment and training/exercises.

7. Assess additional analytical program resource needs for national emergencies.

8. Establish a process to support responders logistically during national emergencies.

9. Clearly articulate additional equipment response resource needs in the budget requests for FY

2003 and beyond.

6. Invest in the Safety and Security of EPA Staff and Facilities, Including Telecommunications

Needs

1. Review all COOPs to ensure all facilities are included, and bring COOP planning, training, and

exercises in line with current threats.

2. Improve and update employee evacuation planning.

3. Review stress management assistance provided to Headquarters, Regions 2 and 3, and ERT. 

Assess stress levels of EPA emergency response employees, and determine whether

additional action should be taken.

4. Address, using currently available resources, all possible facility security needs, at both

government-owned and private buildings.
107 Report No. 2003-P-00012

5. Provide telecommunications redundancy nationwide that will provide for ongoing

communication (voice and data) to EPA’s workforce during a national emergency, as well as

emergency notification systems.

6. Provide central communication principles using the web to ensure EPA employees are given

the latest, most recent information.

7. Determine whether a Headquarters-sponsored stress management system should be more

formally deployed in future national emergencies.

8. Broaden health monitoring for OSCs and other Agency response personnel to make it

consistent nationwide.

9. Systematically follow through on facility security improvements requiring additional resources.

7. Identify and Address National Environmental Vulnerabilities

1. Complete EPA efforts to identify national environmental vulnerabilities posed by public and

private utilities/facilities.

2. Coordinate with State, local, and other environmental regulators to plan for reducing

environmental vulnerabilities. 

3. Increase technical support by EPA and States to identify and assist in corrective actions to

reduce vulnerabilities

4. Increase inspections to identify and oversee corrective actions to reduce environmental

vulnerabilities caused by permit or regulation violations.

5. Examine EPA’s authorities and regulations to identify any changes needed to effectively

address vulnerabilities.

Region 2 Lessons Learned Recommendations

Overarching Recommendations

1. EPA Region 2 should undertake an effort to connect with senior officials of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Health and Human

Services on a routine basis to ensure EPA mission is clearly understood.

2. Region 2 needs to develop a comprehensive approach to emergency management and response,

perhaps based upon the NFPA 1600 Standard, that includes all divisions in the region. This would:

• Spread responsibility across the organization so that one division is not the sole source of

information, staffing responsibilities, decision making, and documentation.

• Provide for a consistent, expandable and contractible structure and process for the Region that

is understood across organizational boundaries.

• Routinize emergency/disaster response.

3. Region 2 should identify a team of dedicated people who will respond in the event of a new crisis.

This would limit the stress on personnel who might otherwise be pulled from the current response to

another, as well as allowing designated staff to prepare, to the extent possible, for the possibility of

mobilization. This could be accomplished by assigning an individual to a particular task until they are

directly and explicitly relieved. In addition, a feedback mechanism could be established to

encourage and solicit concerns during and after a response.

4. The Region’s Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) needs to be reviewed and updated.

5. Senior leadership of Region 2 and Regional staff not currently assigned to emergency response

who might respond in a disaster, should participate in introductory training and education on basic

disaster management and response. This would include intergovernmental relationships that are

inherently different than typical Superfund emergency response and removal.
108 Report No. 2003-P-00012

6. Public information, risk communications, and crisis communications must be organized and

strategized in advance of a disaster. Region 2 should develop a comprehensive approach - which

includes Headquarters and regional Federal and State partners - on how to handle crisis

communications. Then, in a disaster event, relationships are established, lines of coordination and

communication are established, and communications/public affairs officers can focus on tactics

rather than trying to develop a framework in the midst of the emergency. Mechanisms should be in

place for resolving differences about the interpretation of risk and the appropriate response.

7. Nationally, EPA should examine policies and procedures for ESF #10 activation and coordination

with USCG to ensure roles and responsibilities are executed according to the FRP.

Additional Recommendations

1. As soon as possible, educate Region 2 personnel and management on Agency and Region

responsibilities and authorities during a disaster or crisis with emphasis on the relationship between

the Stafford Act, FRP, National Contingency Plan (NCP) and ICS. Include suggested peer

relationships with counterpart agencies at all levels, but especially at the senior management level

(e.g., regional administrators).

2. National Issue - Adopt an incident management system that is consistent across all regions, has

common terms and plugs into other crisis/consequence management structures. National and

regional management systems should be compatible 

Regional Issues - Create Regional crisis management structure, staffed by people with authority,

commitment and qualifications, to improve roles and communication between management and

OSCs. system for Region 2 that:

• Expands or contracts as needed to address both crises and routine events.

• Prescribes specific people to fill roles during an event. The Coast Guard “watch quarter

station bill” or synchronization matrix may serve as a model.

• Includes mechanism for provision of resources, “protect” incident managers.

• Has agreements, plans and procedures for internal communications during a crisis.

• Includes a crisis management team that supports the incident management system in terms

of the Region 2 operating principles.

Regional Interagency Coordination Team (RICT)

• Training for backup staff

• Mobilize Regional resources

• Signed agreement by Division Directors

• Ensures leadership/managerial backup

Regional Incident Command System (ICS)

• Dedicated and known backup

• Clear commander

• Known ability to expand and contract

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

• Physically separate from branch

3. Develop a Regional Strategy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for communicating risk to

the public during a crisis.

• Include processes and resources needed to obtain and manage information.

• Include links to incident management structure, data management mission.

• Include defined up-front risk parameters and benchmarks.
109 Report No. 2003-P-00012

4. Develop a logistics and support capability for incident management system that:

• May include standing/expedient contracts, especially for sampling and analytical services, as

well as data management.

• Obtains facilities and other support resources.

• Includes resource management and contracts in the development.

• Include processes for intra and inter-agency coordination.

5. Develop agreements and processes for the emerging data generation and management mission

including:

• Developing methods and demonstrating a commitment to plan (identify data monitoring

objectives, sampling and analytic methods, and benchmarks).

• Ensure the process/system is flexible and could include external contributors and users.

Define users and contributors.

6. Need a corporate philosophy on how to manage expectations in a crisis (internally outside of

Region 2 emergency responders and externally). Consider:

• Expectations of elected officials and the public

• Part of incident management system specific to health and well-being

7. Develop a crisis management plan. SOPS, COOP, should address all issue categories

• Mechanism for elevating to Incident of National Significance

• Separate policy and communications priorities from operational priorities

• Establish protocol for continuing response if local/State counterparts are unavailable for any

reason 

• Inventory of regional resources

• Expedited contract authorities

8. Clearly identify scope and boundaries of work within authorities and expertise. (e.g. logistical tasks) 

(e.g. accept only Mission Assignment with authority?)

• Educate Region 2, EPA Headquarters, and other Federal and State agencies about scope,

boundaries and authorities with emphasis on the relationship between the Stafford Act, FRP,

NCP and ICS.

• Manage expectations

• Establish and maintain relationships and contacts
110 Report No. 2003-P-00012

 Major Conclusions of Non-EPA Lessons Learned Reports

Lessons Learned for Public Health from September 11, 2001: A One Year Perspective;

Philip J. Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., Jordan Slutsky, Angali Garg, M.S., Mona Lisa Mouallem,

Lauri Boni; Center for Children’s Health and the Environment of the Mount Sinai School of

Medicine; September 2002: 

• Inadequate preparation for disaster as public health authorities had not established

partnerships with agencies outside the health field

• Unclear lines of authority which resulted in poor risk communications, a disorganized

approach to worker health and safety, and failure to agree on who should clean up

residences.

• Neither workers or the public were provided accurate information on health risks in the first

weeks after the attacks.

• Protection of workers was seriously inadequate

• Lack of exposure standards for chemicals in settled dust or on surfaces inside buildings 

Lessons Learned on Environmental, Occupational, and Residential Exposures From the

Attack on the World Trade Center; Paul J. Lioy, Ph.D. and Michael Gochfeld, M.D., Ph.D;

American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

 • Improved data collection for emergencies is needed. This should include development of :

< improved portable and flexible emergency response monitors,

< strategies for the rapid acquisition of settled particulate material samples in

catastrophic events that yield resuspendable dust/smoke, and

< a rapid method for determination of site-specific and event-specific analytes that could

cause acute or chronic effects. 

 • Need to develop emergency response standards for :

< community evacuation, worker re-entry, and residential/commercial re-entry, in various

community or occupational zones at increasing distances from a disaster site, and 

< Short-term exposure in establishing evacuation and restricted entry zones, and

determining an “all clear” based on potential acute health outcomes.

• Need to develop a formal post-disaster cleanup protocol and a lead agency to implement

the program so that cleanup can proceed without delay. Also need to develop a set of

residential dust/smoke clearance levels to permit safe re-entry after cleanup.

• Need to conduct research on the design of respirators to ensure that they will be used in

emergency response. Many of the existing non-air pack respirators are heavy and not

easily worn over the nose and mouth during complex operations.
111 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Risk Communication in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Disaster, George D.

Thurston, S.cD. and Lung Chi Chen, PhD, American Journal of Industrial Medicine,

December 2002: 

• The public wants facts upon which they can make individual decisions, not just

reassurances.

• The government needs to develop peer-reviewed pollution benchmarks of “acceptable” and

“unacceptable” exposures applicable to such disaster situations and make them available

to the public and media.

• Physicians, scientists, and other exposure/health effects experts need to be consulted

regarding the appropriateness of government monitoring and health effects assessments

on a real-time basis.

Perspective on the Tragedy at the World Trade Center, Joel Shufro, American Journal of

Industrial Medicine, December 2002:

 

• A new regulatory framework regarding potentially toxic exposures is needed,

• Government agencies saw their role as reassuring the public or said little, rather than use

their position as a bully pulpit to provide the public with information they could use to make

informed decisions,

• The absence of strong enforcement and leadership on the part of EPA, OSHA, PESH, the

New York City Department of Health and New York City Department of Environmental

Protection resulted in unnecessary exposure of workers and community residents to toxic

substances,

• A uniform sampling protocol and centralized collection of all testing results is needed, and

• Government agencies appear to have ignored their own precedents [e.g. government

intervention in Gramercy Park and Libby, Montana].

Health Effects of World Trade Center Site Workers, Stephen Levin, MD, Robin Herbert, MD,

Gwen Skloot, MD, Jamie Szeinuk, MD, Alvin Teirstein, MD, David Fischler, MD, Debra Milek,

MD, George Piligian, MD, Elizabeth Wilk-Rivard, MD, and Jacqueline Moline, MD; American

Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002: 

• The importance of an advisory to health care providers ASAP to assist with their evaluation

and clinical management of the physical and psychological problems WTC-related patients

experienced. 

• Immediate capture of registry (contact) information for volunteers and workers.

• Rapid distribution of appropriate respiratory protection and a peer-based structure for

encouraging consistent use.

• Rapid mobilization of resources for pro-active medical evaluation/treatment–respiratory,

musculoskeletal, and psychological–during the weeks following exposure at the disaster

site.

• Testing of indoor settings, including analysis of settled dust and aggressive air monitoring,

to establish a gradient of exposure with distance from Ground Zero to guide

recommendations regarding clean-up and reoccupancy.

• Communication by public health agencies regarding exposure hazards in lay language,

with focus not only on long-term cancer risks, but on short-term health consequences as

well.

• Greater attention to human health experience, rather than exclusive focus on air monitoring

for the usual suspects.
112 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Respiratory Protection at the World Trade Center: Lessons From the Other Disaster, Bruce

Lippy, CIH, CSP, January 15, 2002: 

• The chosen respirators were correct.

• Compliance with the requirements was poor at Ground Zero.

• Workers received mixed messages about the importance of wearing respiratory protection.

• Achieving high compliance with respiratory requirements in not unrealistic in these

situations.

Safety and Health of Heavy Equipment Operators at Ground Zero, Bruce Lippy, CIH, CSP,

American Journal of Industrial Medicine, December 2002: 

• Except for asbestos, the few excess pollutant readings at the site were almost always

associated with specific tasks.

• In the eagerness to declare the New York Financial District safe for re-occupancy,

Government communications blurred the distinctions between the OSHA and EPA

asbestos standards.

• The lack of a clear command structure at the site thwarted efforts to enforce the use of

personal support equipment and other risk-reduction measures.

• Need to consider the use of OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency

Response Standard in responding to terrorist incidents. 

Firefighter Safety and Health Issues at the World Trade Center Site, Ronald Spadafora,

Deputy Assistant Chief, Fire Department of New York, American Journal of Industrial

Medicine, December 2002:

• Safety controls must be instituted by the uniformed services for the protection of the

rescuers no matter how great the life hazard,

• The Site Safety Officer role in the FDNY’s Incident Command Structure is a crucial one. 

This position must be filled immediately at the scene of a terrorist attack or similar event,

• Schedule an adequate number of Safety Chiefs on duty at any given time,

• Firefighters must be informed of the dangers in their work environment prior to the start of

the detail, when possible,

• A universal-fit respirator cartridge should be available to rescue workers,

• Respirators should have built-in voice emitters to enhance communication, and

• Lighter personal protective equipment (hard hat, military fatigues/boots, safety

glasses/goggles) for rescue and recovery workers must be made readily available. 
113 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix O

Details on Health-Based Benchmarks Needed

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels. EPA is responsible for a program involving entities inside

and outside the government to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs). These

guidelines are developed by the National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline

Levels for Hazardous Substances. The AEGLs address exposures to pollutants that last for

10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours, and are established to address three

potential types of health impacts from these acute exposures: non-disabling, disabling, and

death. This program has finalized a limited number of AEGLs; however, none of the finalized

guidelines addressed the primary pollutants of concerns for Lower Manhattan after September

11. EPA’s Office of Research and Development and the Office of Prevention, Pesticides and

Toxic Substances are currently working to establish needed AEGLs. 

Sub-Chronic Guidelines. EPA also did not have sub-chronic guidelines for the contaminants

found in Lower Manhattan on September 11. ATSDR defines sub-chronic as exposures lasting

2 weeks to 1 year. In general, EPA’s benchmarks have focused on lifetime cancer risk over a

30-year exposure period. Because sub-chronic guidelines did not exist for the WTC pollutants of

concern, these 30-year benchmarks were adjusted to fit the situation found at WTC. For

example, to assess sub-chronic (1 year) exposure to dioxin in the ambient air, EPA took the

dioxin 30-year exposure benchmark and adjusted it to reflect a 1-year exposure by multiplying

the 30-year exposure benchmark by 30. These guidelines should be developed, to the extent

possible, before a disaster strikes so that the process can be properly peer reviewed and any

necessary revisions made before they are needed.

 

Indoor Air Benchmarks. EPA also did not have risk-based indoor air or bulk dust benchmarks

for the pollutants found in dust deposited indoors. A work group formed after September 11,

consisting of officials from Federal, New York State, and New York City agencies, developed

indoor air benchmarks for COPCs resulting from the WTC towers collapse. These benchmarks,

identified in a document entitled “World Trade Center Indoor Air Assessment: Selecting

Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks,” were initially

published in draft in September 2002. The document was peer reviewed and a revised interim

final version was published in April 2003. The COPC report could be used as a starting point in

developing health benchmarks for additional pollutants that may be encountered in future

disasters. EPA’s Homeland Security Strategy includes plans to identify chemical and biological

substances for which indoor air reference levels (benchmarks) may be needed, and establish

advisory indoor air reference levels for the substances identified.

Health-Based Benchmarks for Asbestos. As addressed in Chapter 2, health-based asbestos

standards for indoor and outdoor air do not exist. The AHERA standard, used as a primary WTC

benchmark to communicate asbestos risk for ambient air, is the filter background contamination

level estimated when the TEM protocol was developed. Filters with smaller asbestos

contamination levels are now available, so that smaller concentrations of asbestos can now be
114 Report No. 2003-P-00012

reliably measured. The TEM analysis of asbestos data in response to the WTC disaster suggests

that the minimum detection limit may now be approximately 15 to 20 s/mm2.

A significant issue with regard to indoor spaces was the potential exposure from asbestos in dust. 

In assessing the need for asbestos abatements in indoor spaces in New York City, the City relied

on the NESHAP definition of asbestos-containing material, which defines asbestos-containing

material as 1 percent or more asbestos by volume. This is not a health standard, and dust with

less than 1 percent asbestos could pose a health risk. Risk assessors employ a mathematical

formula to estimate the amount of asbestos in dust that can be expected to become airborne in

order to evaluate the potential risk to human health from asbestos in dust. This factor is known

as the “K Factor.” However, this factor is not deemed reliable at this time. The panel that

completed the peer review for EPA’s indoor standards did not endorse the asbestos-settled dust

benchmark because the “the K-factor methodology is, at this time, inadequate for predicting

inhalation exposure from asbestos surface loading measurement.” 

We believe EPA should review the AHERA standard and determine whether the standard needs

to be revised in light of the fact that better filters are available today, and continue the work of

the indoor COPC group to develop health-related screening levels for asbestos in dust

Benchmarks for Exposure to Multiple Pollutants. The synergistic impacts of multiple

pollutants on human health in the aftermath of an air quality emergency, such as occurred on

September 11, are unknown. Synergistic effects have been documented between asbestos and

cigarette smoke. For example, the lung cancer risk from exposure to asbestos is increased if the

individual exposed to asbestos is a cigarette smoker. Researchers interviewed indicated that

there could be other synergistic effects caused by the wide array of pollutants generated by the

collapse of the WTC, but research is not available to make this determination. 
115 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix P

EPA Letter Concerning Worker Protection
116 Report No. 2003-P-00012
117 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix Q

EPA Response to the Draft Report
118 Report No. 2003-P-00012
119 Report No. 2003-P-00012
120 Report No. 2003-P-00012

 
121 Report No. 2003-P-00012

 

 
122 Report No. 2003-P-00012
123 Report No. 2003-P-00012
124 Report No. 2003-P-00012
125 Report No. 2003-P-00012
126 Report No. 2003-P-00012
127 Report No. 2003-P-00012
128 Report No. 2003-P-00012
129 Report No. 2003-P-00012
130 Report No. 2003-P-00012
131 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix R

OIG Evaluation of EPA’s Response to the Draft Report

Transmittal Memorandum

Note 1 - We believe the report’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations properly

consider the unprecedented circumstances in which the response to the WTC tragedy

was carried out. For instance, we point out the unprecedented nature of these events

in the first line of the Executive Summary and the first line of Chapter 1. We do not

believe that a response to such a tragedy can be conducted under a business as usual

attitude. However, an emergency response should not preclude the Agency from

following previously established guidance and practices regarding public safety and

protection from hazardous substances conceived and designed to be applied in times

of crisis. This position is consistent with the intent of EPA’s Guidelines for

Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbestos issued in 1992. These

guidelines were issued after emergency responses to three incidents in 1989 focused

attention on the need to consider asbestos along with other emergency response

activities. Additionally, although the initial emergency response was carried out

under trying conditions, as time passed the crisis nature of the response subsided and

the Agency had the opportunity to consider its actions carefully before continuing its

response efforts. For example, decisions regarding the approach to addressing indoor

contamination evolved over time, after extensive deliberations, and well after the

initial emergency response had subsided. We also note that, except for the

recommendations in Chapter 6, the Agency agreed with the recommendations in five

other chapters of the report, which does not suggest that we misunderstood the

circumstances that the Nation, EPA, or the City faced following the disaster. 

Note 2 - We agree that the Agency should be proud of the response of its men and women in

the aftermath of the WTC attacks and collapse. We also agree that the Agency’s

response was made under extremely trying circumstances as detailed in Chapter 1 of

the report. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this report are in no

manner intended to disparage the valiant contributions of EPA personnel, or those of

any other responding organization. 

Note 3 - We agree with the need for coordinated federal efforts and the concept of centralized

communications during a time of national emergency. In the report we recommend

that EPA develop emergency communications policy and procedures which are

consistent with the “Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication,’ the fifth of

which is to “coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources.” 

We do not believe the report “goes to great length to erroneously criticize” CEQ’s

efforts “to coordinate health and safety communications.” In accordance with the first

assignment objective, the report appropriately examines the analytical basis for EPA’s

major public communications regarding air quality. To the extent that reassuring

words were added to EPA’s draft press release and cautionary words were deleted, it
132 Report No. 2003-P-00012

is important to understand the basis for such changes in the Agency’s risk

communications. The report also provides the former EPA OCEMR Associate

Administrator’s explanation for why EPA’s press releases did not discuss health

effects or contain a recommendation that residents obtain professional cleaning. 

Additionally, as noted by the former EPA Chief of Staff, factors other than protecting

human health and the environment entered into the determinations of the information

that would be communicated to the public, including national security considerations

and the desire to re-open Wall Street.

Note 4 - We agree that EPA made its data available to the public. However, based on the

documentation we reviewed and our discussions with numerous environmental

experts, both within and outside of EPA, we do not agree that the Agency’s statement

on September 18, 2001 that the air was safe to breathe reflected the Agency’s best

professional advice. In contrast, based on the circumstances outlined in Chapter 2 of

the report, it appeared that EPA’s best professional advice was overruled when

relaying information to the public in the weeks immediately following the disaster.

Note 5 - We applaud EPA’s efforts to evaluate its response and implement changes. We

believe the report sufficiently acknowledges EPA’s efforts to implement its “lessons

learned.” The draft report’s Executive Summary acknowledges EPA’s “lessons

learned” efforts and highlights specific actions the Agency initiated. In addition,

Chapter 7 of the report discusses EPA’s “lessons learned” efforts in great detail. 

Note 6 - We do not believe the report “is flawed in its lack of recognition” of the issues

discussed. In regard to the absence of a long-term health threat, the Agency did not

have a sound basis for reaching this conclusion at the time for the numerous reasons

detailed in the report. Further, as noted in the report, the position that EPA took

regarding WTC is inconsistent with the Agency’s historical position that there is no

safe level of asbestos.

In regard to the comment about the Agency advising people who were experiencing

acute health problems to see their physician, no supporting documentation has been

identified which shows that EPA instructed residents to see their physicians. We also

provided agency officials with the opportunity to provide us with documentation

which supported specific statements, but none has been provided to date. 

In regard to EPA discussing acute health problems, we reviewed extensive

information on EPA’s risk communications, including all of the documents and

videocassettes which were provided by Region 2 and EPA’s Office of Public Affairs. 

We agree there were instances where documentation indicated agency spokespersons

discussed acute health problems. However, as detailed in the draft report, EPA’s

press releases generally did not discuss potential acute health problems or the need to

see a physician (except for rescue and cleanup workers at Ground Zero). The words

“physician,” “doctor,” “acute,” “symptoms,” and “sensitive,” do not appear in any of

EPA’s WTC press releases. Considering the totality of all the information we

reviewed, it is our opinion that EPA did not communicate a clear, or consistent

message on this subject. We agree that EPA advised rescue and cleanup workers to 
133 Report No. 2003-P-00012

take safety precautions. This agreement is detailed on page 9 of the draft report and

illustrated in Appendix P.

We do not agree that EPA “emphasized” the need for professional cleaning because

this concept was not discussed in EPA’s press releases. According to the OCEMR

Associate Administrator, a recommendation to obtain professional cleaning was

deleted from an EPA press release by a CEQ official. As detailed in the draft report,

EPA’s press releases referred the public to a New York City Department of Health

web site which recommended that people clean their own residences and businesses

using wet rags, wet mops, and HEPA vacuums. 

Note 7 - We do not believe that “The Report erroneously focuses” on five early Agency press

releases. We reviewed many different types of information from many different

sources including videocassettes which were provided by Region 2. We made

extensive efforts to locate all relevant records. For example, by contacting the

Administrator’s Press Secretary and Scheduling Director, we were able to determine

the date of a videotaped newscast which showed the Administrator advising the

public orally about obtaining professional cleaning on October 26, 2001. Similarly,

we worked closely with Region 2 officials and agreed with their analysis that EPA’s

web site recommended professional cleaning at least as early as December 11, 2001. 

In summary, although EPA’s subsequent communications sometimes added

information or clarification to the message presented in the press releases, the

Agency’s overall message of reassurance about long-term health impacts did not

change.

In regard to the comment in the response to the draft report about EPA’s “massive

outreach program,” we note, as detailed in the draft report, that a NYCDOH study,

other lessons learned reports, and testimony provided at various hearings indicated

that the public did not receive adequate air quality information and that individuals

cleaned their residences without using proper procedures or personal protection.

Note 8 - We agree there were no health-based standards for many of the pollutants encountered

in the aftermath of the WTC attacks, and the report does not intend to find fault with

EPA or any other government organization for not having developed those

benchmarks beforehand. However, we do not agree with using certain criteria-based

benchmarks – particularly the NESHAP asbestos-containing material definition of

one percent asbestos – as health-related benchmarks when environmental

professionals clearly acknowledge that this standard is not protective of health. 

Note 9 - The Agency is to be commended for its proactive approach to analyzing its response

to the WTC collapse and initiating improvements to its emergency response

capabilities. We disagree with the Agency’s comment that this report “trivializes both

the horrendous event that occurred and the extraordinary efforts of EPA and other

responders.” The primary objective of the report is to ensure that, if such a tragedy

were to happen again; the public and emergency responders impacted by the disaster

would receive the best available advice, protection, and assistance that the

Government can provide. 
134 Report No. 2003-P-00012

General Observations

Note 10 - We agree that the Agency’s response to the WTC collapse was unprecedented and

enormous in terms of resources and human effort. Page 5 of the draft report

acknowledged the many other activities – in addition to the air quality related

activities – that EPA conducted in response to this tragedy. 

Note 11 - We agree that the Agency undertook extraordinary efforts to provide information to

the public and we acknowledge that the documents we reviewed indicated EPA

provided full disclosure of sampling results. However, in our opinion, the importance

of Agency press releases should not be minimized. As detailed in the draft report,

EPA press releases result from a deliberative process that should reflect the Agency’s

official position on significant issues. Press releases are made available to essentially

all news media and may well be quoted or paraphrased in radio, television, and other

forms of communication. In our opinion, the Agency could have provided more

complete and more useful information in its press releases.

We also agree that future incidents may involve scenarios that cannot be anticipated. 

In order to address this possibility, the draft report recommends that EPA designate

teams of Agency experts – at both the National and Regional level – who can be

mobilized quickly to provide needed technical support during a response, and that the

Agency develop expert panels that can be used to quickly develop health-related

benchmarks in emergency situations. 

Chapter 2

Note 12 - We fully recognize the extraordinary circumstances that existed at the time the

statement was made about the air being safe to breathe. However, for the reasons

detailed in the draft report, there was insufficient information to support the statement

made and the principle of acknowledging uncertainty was relevant. 

We disagree with the assertion that EPA’s statement about the air being safe to

breathe would clearly be understood by New Yorkers as applying exclusively to

asbestos. The press release sentence which preceded the subject statement asserts that

New Yorkers are “not being exposed to excessive levels of asbestos or other harmful

substances . . . .” The same press release also states that sample tests results are

“below established levels of concern for asbestos, lead and volatile organic

compounds.”

Note 13 - We agree that, to our knowledge, EPA never withheld data from the public, and the

draft report makes this point (page 10). The draft report does not imply that it is

“unusual” or “unexpected” for the Agency to coordinate with CEQ during a

“catastrophic disaster.” In such a situation we would expect EPA to coordinate with

numerous government entities and any non-government entity that could provide

needed services. However, we would expect EPA to remain fully committed to its 
135 Report No. 2003-P-00012

mission of “protecting human health and the environment” during a catastrophic

disaster. We understand that national security considerations or the desire to re-open

Wall Street may affect certain communications. However, in our opinion, if such

considerations cause EPA to omit or change statements that would otherwise have

been made in its efforts to fulfill its mission, the Agency risks harm to its long term

credibility as an authoritative source of health information for the public in times of

crisis. EPA needs to acknowledge significant collaborations and, where necessary,

qualify its communications appropriately. We agree with the goals of EPA’s

Homeland Security Strategic Plan which commit EPA to disseminating quality

environmental information to all levels of government, industry and the public.

Chapter 3

Note 14 - We agree that, from the beginning, EPA and other government entities provided

advice to residents to cleanup indoor spaces using wet rags, wet mops, and HEPA

vacuums. As detailed in the draft report, EPA’s Administrator and various Agency

spokespersons orally advised the public to obtain professional cleaning when the dust

was in their residences was “more than minimal,” “a heavy amount,” etc. However,

we note the Agency’s web site referred readers to NYC guidance and that a

NYCDOH press release reassured residents that it was “unnecessary to wear a mask”

while cleaning indoor spaces, and if a HEPA filtration vacuum was not available,

simply “wetting the dust down with water and removing it with rags and mops is

recommended.”

In regard to potential exposures to asbestos and other contaminants, we note that a

study of immigrant workers used to clean indoor space contaminated with WTC dust

disclosed that these workers were not provided with personal protective equipment. 

The study reported that these workers reported health symptoms including coughing,

sore throat, nasal congestion, chest tightness, headaches, fatigue, dizziness, and sleep

disturbances that worsened after September 11, 2001. Further, a NYCDOH survey

conducted in October 2001 found that the majority of residents polled had not

followed the recommended cleaning procedures of using wet rags and HEPA

vacuums. With respect, to the effectiveness of the cleaning studies, we note that

EPA’s Confirmation Cleaning Study report dated May 2003 found that:

. . . one to three cleanings were necessary to reduce contamination levels to

below health-based benchmarks, and the number of cleanings required generally

correlated with the levels of contamination initially identified in the units.

We continue to believe unprotected workers and residents may have experienced

unnecessary exposures to asbestos and other pollutants.

Note 15 - We agree EPA repeatedly stated that workers at Ground Zero should wear respirators,

and that the Agency raised these concerns to local officials as discussed in Appendix

L of the report. However, EPA’s advice that workers wear respirators was directed to

Ground Zero workers at the debris pile, and not to workers who cleaned contaminated

indoor spaces outside the perimeter of Ground Zero. In regard to EPA’s statements
136 Report No. 2003-P-00012

that they repeatedly advised sensitive sub-populations and people experiencing acute

symptoms to consult a physician, we note that these warnings were not presented in

EPA’s press releases. We attempted to verify the extent to which EPA advised these

other groups through other forms of communication. For example, we reviewed

briefing notes prepared for public meetings that EPA. These briefing notes showed

that EPA officials intended to discuss sensitive populations at two public meetings in

October 2001. We also reviewed newspaper and other news articles to determine

when EPA publicly provided such advice. Based on the evidence EPA provided to

us, and our own independent research, we were not able to conclude that EPA 

“... repeatedly advised anyone with acute symptoms to consult with their

physicians...” 

Chapter 4

Note 16 - We acknowledge the difficulty in implementing NESHAP work practices in the

aftermath of the WTC collapse and agree that these work practices should not be

implemented to the detriment of rescue operations in any emergency situation. 

However, even in the aftermath of an emergency, appropriate measures should be

taken to the extent practical to reduce the exposure of emergency responders, clean-up

crews, and the surrounding public to asbestos emissions. 

Chapter 5

Note 17 - We agree that EPA conducted many activities to support efforts to alert Ground Zero

workers to health-related issues, and we discuss these actions in Appendix L of the

report.

Note 18 - EPA notes that the public sometimes wants information that is not scientifically

available, or is not available quickly. We agree that this may sometimes be the case. 

EPA guidance in discussing the 4th rule of the “The Seven Cardinal Rule of Risk

Communication” states: “If you do not know an answer or are uncertain, acknowledge

it and respond with the answer as soon as possible.” 

Chapter 6

Note 19 - The Agency states that there are many residential and commercial buildings below

Canal Street, and that a cleanup program including all of them would be a

monumental undertaking that EPA studies and data indicate is not necessary. We

agree that this would require a significant effort. However, the former EPA

Administrator stated in September 2001 that the President made it to clear to spare no

expense and to do everything needed to make sure the people of New York City were

safe as far as the environment was concerned. 

Note 20 - We agree that the vast amount of outdoor dust and debris has been removed, and thus

exterior sources for contamination of indoor spaces have been significantly reduced. 

However, any indoor spaces contaminated with WTC dust that have not been cleaned

using proper techniques will likely remain contaminated. The Agency notes that in
137 Report No. 2003-P-00012

95% of the residences that were cleaned and tested or cleaned only, the asbestos

readings were non-detect. It is encouraging that 95% were non-detect. However, it is

not clear which sampling methods were used in obtaining these readings, what

asbestos levels were present in the remaining 5 percent, and whether EPA believes

possible asbestos contamination in 5 percent of the residences is acceptable. See note

24 for our comments regarding cleaning effectiveness.

Note 21 - Concerning the use of aggressive sampling, we agree that the use of a leaf blower

does not represent normal activity in a residence. Neither does the use of a leaf

blower represent normal activity in a school room, although the AHERA standard

requires its use for clearing a school room after an asbestos abatement. Under a

standard asbestos cleaning, all items in a room would be cleaned thoroughly, even

documents as was done when cleaning a courthouse in Titusville, FL. In a private

residence, especially when cleaning is voluntary and the owner can refuse to have

individual items touched, it is extremely difficult to ensure that each item is cleaned

of every microscopic asbestos fiber, yet this degree of cleaning should be the intent of

the cleanup. Use of a blower prior to aggressive sampling serves to stir up the air, reentrain dust and fibers in the air stream, and allow negative air filtration equipment to

trap fibers that have been missed in the wet cleaning process or skipped entirely. It

thus can be as much a cleaning procedure as a sampling procedure. We believe it is a

necessary adjunct to the type of cleaning performed in NYC.

Note 22 - We accept EPA’s statement that Agency officials qualitatively evaluated the potential

for health risks beyond the current boundaries established for the residential cleanup. 

However, if a future disaster were to occur, we believe the boundaries of any

government-organized cleanup should be based on a systematic, quantitative approach

to determining the extent of contamination. 

Note 23 - EPA issued a revised “World Trade Center Indoor Environment Assessment:

Selecting Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based Benchmarks,”

as well as a “Response to Peer Review Comments on the Report.” We note that both

these documents cite the “World Trade Center Background Study Report” and the

“Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study” which were issued in

April and May 2003, respectively. Neither of these documents were available when

the TERA panel peer reviewed the original COPC document in October 2002. In

light of the significant, detailed comments that the peer review panel had on the

original report, the detailed responses made in EPA’s response document, and the fact

that additional information is now available that was not available during the first

peer review, we continue to believe it is appropriate that EPA re-submit the revised

report, with newly issued supporting documentation, for peer review.

Note 24 - EPA states the belief that “. . . health-based asbestos-in-air clearance testing is

effective in reducing the potential for risk related to [other] WTC contaminants.” We

note that 82% of the residential units re-cleaned during the Cleaning Study [Interim

Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study, Vol. 1, pp.113-114] had to be

re-cleaned because the sampling filters were too clogged with dust to be analyzed. 

While we agree with the decision to re-clean residences under this circumstance, we
138 Report No. 2003-P-00012

also interpret this to mean that, after cleaning, the units were still too dusty to pass the

clearance test over 80 percent of the time. This is evidence that the cleaning process,

although conducted under close EPA oversight, was often not successful. We had no

evidence that this cleaning process would be more successful under the oversight of

others, nor that the risks from exposure to other contaminants would be significantly

reduced when the residence passes the asbestos clearance test.

Note 25 - Our recommendation applies to the interior building system in buildings with central

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), composed of furnace/cooling coils

and condenser, plenum, filtration system, supply ducts, and return ducts or return

open air plenums. We continue to believe that these buildings should be treated and

cleaned as an entire building system rather than as individual apartments because of

the high likelihood that uncleaned subparts of the system will re-contaminate the

entire system when the system is re-energized after cleaning of registers/ducts in a

single or small group of apartments. We do not believe the absence of “widespread

exceedences” provides sufficient assurances that public health is protected. EPA’s

own regulations state that asbestos is a known human carcinogen with no known safe

level of exposure. 

Note 26 - As indicated on page 9 of its response, EPA indicates that it has coordinated with

OSHA throughout the indoor cleaning program, and that OSHA is prepared to address

worker complaints. While we commend EPA and OSHA for coordinating on this

issue, we continue to believe EPA, OSHA, and FEMA should assess the need for a

work space cleaning program and formally come to an agreement as to whether or not

work spaces should be addressed pro-actively by a cleaning program. 

Chapter 7

Note 27 - Based on the events that unfolded after September 11, 2001 it is clear that the public

looks to EPA for its advice and opinions on issues related to the environment. We

expect that the public and the Department of Homeland Security will continue to look

to EPA for its professional advice and judgment on matters related to the

environment. 
139 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix S

New York City’s Response to Draft Report Excerpts
140 Report No. 2003-P-00012
141 Report No. 2003-P-00012
142 Report No. 2003-P-00012
143 Report No. 2003-P-00012
144 Report No. 2003-P-00012
145 Report No. 2003-P-00012
146 Report No. 2003-P-00012
147 Report No. 2003-P-00012
148 Report No. 2003-P-00012
149 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix T

OIG Evaluation of New York City’s Response to Draft

Excerpts

The following numbered notes respond to the numbered comments in New York City’s response

in Appendix S.

1. We agree that there were a number of factors that caused EPA to assume a lead role in

responding to indoor environmental concerns, and that only presenting the criticism of 

NYC and not EPA would be misleading. Our draft already recognized that EPA was

criticized as well and that this also influenced their actions regarding indoor concerns. The

sentence has been clarified by deleting the lead-in clause that only cited criticism of New

York City. The sentence now reads as follows:

EPA began to assume a lead role in February 2002, when the Agency initiated a

multi-agency task force to address concerns about the indoor environment

2. We presented the criticism as background information that is necessary for the reader to

understand the information that follows and to put this information into proper context. 

Regarding indoor asbestos contamination, evidence does not support the City’s contention

that there is “no evidence to support a claim that any significant number of buildings were

contaminated with asbestos.” Appendix K to our report points out that an October 12, 2001

study of two residential buildings – one presumed to have significant WTC dust

contamination and the other not – found that both buildings had significant asbestos

contamination, ranging from 6,277 to 10,620 s/mm2 in one building and from 141 to 379 in

the other building – all of which are above the 70 s/mm2 level. As we also point out, from

September 2001 to September 2002 (when the indoor testing and cleaning program was

implemented), many residents returned and cleaned their own residences, leaving it

unknown as to the level of WTC dust contamination that actually was deposited in their

residences. Further, EPA recent cleaning confirmation study report notes that one to three

cleanings were necessary to achieve the health related clearance levels. We do not believe

changes are needed. 

3. We do not agree with removing the cited information. In our opinion, an EPA Regional

Administrator’s letter to a United States Congressman is evidence that we can cite in our

report. Further, EPA’s Situation Reports represent evidence we can cite as these are

contemporaneous documents, that are completed soon after events are observed. We have

included NYC’s position on this issue by adding the following sentence to the paragraph:

New York City officials disagreed with the characterizations of their

statements presented in these documents and told us that they repeatedly

expressed the position that the City welcomed any authorized federal

assistance at that time. 
150 Report No. 2003-P-00012

4. No change is needed as this portion of the draft was removed during the editing process.

5. The City’s position has been included in the final report as follows (revised sentences in

italics):

Initially, building owners were held responsible for cleaning up their own

buildings, including interiors and exteriors. According to New York City officials,

the issue of funding the cleanup of privately owned buildings was discussed with

FEMA and EPA; and the initial federal position was that the Stafford Act (the

implementing statute for the FRP) did not provide direct funding to New York

City for this cleanup. New York City officials said that during this discussion they

informed the federal agencies that building owners would be responsible for

funding the cleanup of their buildings and the federal agencies agreed with this

position. Under this arrangement, owners of rental units were responsible for

cleaning apartment walls, ceilings, and floors; common areas, such as hallways

and lobbies; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, when

deemed necessary as explained in guidance provided by New York City. Renters

were responsible for cleaning personal belongings. In resident-owned

condominiums, residents were responsible for cleaning their units, while building

owners were responsible for cleaning common areas and HVAC systems.

6. No change is needed as this phrase was deleted during the editing process.

7. See response to note 3.

8. See response to note 1 where we explain that there were a number of factors that caused

EPA to assume a lead role in responding to indoor environmental concerns. However,

according to the EPA Chief of Staff, who was highly knowledgeable of EPA’s reasons for

becoming involved in indoor environmental concerns, EPA’s reasons were as stated. 

Further, recognizing the importance of this information, we confirmed this and other

information obtained from the Chief of Staff in writing. 

9. A site does not have to be officially declared a "hazardous waste site" in order to engage

state/local response. The NCP Part 300.500 contains the state role provisions. Nothing in

this section precludes state/local involvement based on a formal declaration of the site. 

CERCLA and the NCP plainly allow states to respond on their own to non-NPL sites, and

to decide whether to become the lead or support agency in Fund-financed sites. 

Nonetheless, NYC’s suggested footnote has been added to ensure clarity in describing the

response.

10. The cited sentence is based on evidence presented in the report which suggests that persons

cleaning apartments that contained WTC dust may have increased their long-term health

risks if they did not wear appropriate personal protective equipment. In regard to the

“Interim Final WTC Residential Confirmation Cleaning Study,” the study report notes that

1 to 3 cleanings were necessary to achieve the health-related clearance levels, with the

number of cleanings related to the extent of dust in the unit. Further, the clearance levels
151 Report No. 2003-P-00012

were established to correspond to a 1 in 10,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer. As a

matter of comparison, for a Superfund site cleanup the desired cleanup goal is a 1 in

1,000,000 increased lifetime risk of cancer with a minimum goal of 1 in 10,000. 

11. See response to note 2. 

12. No comment needed.

13. Suggested change made.

14. Section clarified by adding the following statement:

New York City officials maintained that EPA had functional notice

of NESHAP related activities through its participation at these

meetings and that it was doubtful that notification would have

changed the manner in which these activities were conducted. 

15. The report already points out that asbestos removal activities prior to September 11, 2001,

were of accessible asbestos materials, not all asbestos materials. No change made. 

16. The last sentence of the footnote was revised as follows: 

They also said that the vehicles did not require decontamination since they were not transporting

hazardous waste as defined by EPA under 40 CFR Part 260-280; and while decontamination

procedures were not required, wash down procedures were mandated.

17. Testimony at EPA Superfund Ombudsman, Congressional, New York State Assembly, and

New York City Council hearings is sufficient evidence to indicate a concern with removal

activities. The OIG draft report presents a balanced discussion of this issue, as the

testimonial evidence was supplemented with the results of ambient air readings in the area

around the barge as well as a consultant’s opinion on the impact this may have had on

Stuyvesant High School. 

18. Questions about lead contamination at Stuyvesant High School were raised in the news as

well as at EPA Superfund Ombudsman hearings. This information was retained in the final

report. 

19. This paragraph was moved to Chapter 2 and revised during the editing process. During this

process the specific statements questioned by New York City were eliminated. Further, the

final report now includes the total number of air samples analyzed by the TEM method. 

20. This paragraph was revised to eliminate the reference to a “public health emergency.” The

correct reference should be “immediate hazard.” We retained the FEMA officials’

statement about New York City’s position on the formal indoor cleanup program because

this was the position presented to us during our October 21, 2002 interview with the New

York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Assistant Commissioner for
152 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Environmental Health. We have also retained reference to the memorandum provided by

the EPA Region 2 Administrator. The questioned paragraph was revised as follows:

The indoor residential cleanup program was administered by EPA and New York

City. FEMA officials told us that they normally do not fund indoor cleanups of

private spaces related to a disaster unless an immediate hazard is declared. FEMA

officials told us that New York City officials indicated a formal cleanup program

was not needed. Therefore, in May 2002, the EPA Region 2 Administrator

provided FEMA with a memorandum that furnished the necessary justification to

authorize funding. 

21. With regard to federal agency responsibilities, we agree that worker safety and personal

protective measures are within the jurisdiction of OSHA. However, protecting human

health and safety in an emergency is a shared goal, and one in which EPA actively

supported OSHA. Additionally, EPA was criticized for its efforts in this area and may

again face similar challenges in the future. Therefore, this is a legitimate topic for us to

address in our report. 

22. The cited report is a public document, issued by a Federal Agency, therefore it is sufficient

evidence for us to cite. In addition, the report’s findings related to safety measures at the

site were corroborated by press accounts, our interviews, and reports from various officials

present at the site. Further, we do not agree with New York City’s interpretation of RCRA

regulations. Asbestos, is a hazardous substance under CERCLA and, therefore, the OSHA

definition of a hazardous waste operation as involving hazardous substances is appropriate. 

Therefore, we have retained this section in our report. 

23. This section was revised to better reflect the cited report’s information and to eliminate any

misperception that the author’s conclusions are those of our report. The section was

revised as follows:

In contrast to the recovery operation at the WTC site, the January 2002 report

noted that workers conducting WTC debris sorting and inspection at the Fresh

Kills landfill were wearing half-face respirators, hard hats, eye protection, and

Tyvek suits. The author noted that respiratory protection compliance by workers

at Fresh Kills was reported to be approximately 90 percent as opposed to 30-50

percent compliance at the WTC site. The author observed that:

“. . . debris is pulled by workers from the smoking, twisted

wreckage of the World Trade Centers and then wetted and

hauled to a site where the debris is carefully sorted by

workers wearing more protective clothing, much more

consistently.” 

Moreover, the author noted that workers at the landfill were officially informed

that not wearing respirators would result in disciplinary action. OIG investigators

from our New York office who participated in the recovery operations confirmed
153 Report No. 2003-P-00012

the report’s conclusions about the difference in respiratory use between the WTC

and landfill sites.

24. We do not agree with characterizing respirator use at Ground Zero as “less than 100%

compliance.” We agree that the paragraph should be revised to directly quote the cited

letter and to eliminate the use of the term “decontamination.” The paragraph was revised to

read as follows: 

As the rescue phase progressed, EPA emergency response officials told us they

were concerned about the lack of respirator use at Ground Zero and outlined these

concerns in a letter to NYCDOH dated October 5, 2001. This letter outlined the

threat of potential exposure of workers to hazardous substances. The letter noted

that EPA “. . has recommended, and continues to recommend, that workers utilize

personal protective equipment and the personal wash stations to prevent the

spread of asbestos and other hazardous substances from the WTC to their homes,

cars, public transportation, food service locations, etc.” The letter stated that EPA

had observed very inconsistent compliance with its recommendations, but did not

have the authority to enforce compliance with non-EPA/United States Coast

Guard employees. The letter concluded by recommending that the Incident

Commander adopt and enforce a site-wide Health and Safety Plan. A copy of the

letter is in Appendix P. 
154 Report No. 2003-P-00012
155 Report No. 2003-P-00012

Appendix U

Distribution

EPA Headquarters

Acting Administrator 

Acting Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response

Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation

Assistant Administrator for Research and Development 

Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information

Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Public Affairs

Comptroller (2731A)

Agency Audit Follow-up Coordinator (2724A)

Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Air and Radiation

Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Research and Development

Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Environmental Information

Audit Follow-up Coordinator, Office of Public Affairs

Associate Administrator for Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations (1301A)

Director, Office of Regional Operations (1108A)

EPA Regions

Regional Administrators 

Regional Audit Follow-up Coordinators

New York City Agencies

City of New York Law Department

EPA Office of Inspector General

Inspector General (2410)

Assistant Inspector General for Program Evaluation

Assistant Inspector General for Human Capital

Assistant Inspector General for Planning, Analysis and Results

Media and Congressional Liaison

Counsel

Science Advisor

Product Line Directors

Editor

Human Resource Center Managers