COLUMBIA CLASS 

SUBMARINE

Immature 

Technologies Present 

Risks to Achieving 

Cost, Schedule, and 

Performance Goals

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2017

GAO-18-158

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-158 a report to 

congressional committees

December 2017

COLUMBIA CLASS SUBMARINE 

Immature Technologies Present Risks to Achieving 

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals

What GAO Found

Additional development and testing are required to demonstrate the maturity of 

several Columbia class submarine technologies that are critical to performance, 

including the Integrated Power System, nuclear reactor, common missile 

compartment, and propulsor and related coordinated stern technologies (see 

figure). As a result, it is unknown at this point whether they will work as 

expected, be delayed, or cost more than planned. Any unexpected delays could 

postpone the deployment of the lead submarine past the 2031 deadline.

Further, the Navy underrepresented the program’s technology risks in its 2015 

Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) when it did not identify these

technologies as critical. Development of these technologies is key to meeting

cost, schedule, and performance requirements. A reliable TRA serves as the 

basis for realistic discussions on how to mitigate risks as programs move forward 

from the early stages of technology development. Not identifying these 

technologies as critical means Congress may not have had the full picture of the 

technology risks and their potential effect on cost, schedule, and performance 

goals as increasing financial commitments were made. The Navy is not required 

to provide Congress with an update on the program’s progress, including its 

technology development efforts, until fiscal year 2020—when $8.7 billion for lead 

ship construction will have already been authorized. Periodic reporting on 

technology development efforts in the interim could provide decision makers

assurances about the remaining technical risks as the Navy asks for increasing 

levels of funding.

Columbia Class Submarine Critical Technologies

Consistent with GAO’s identified best practices, the Navy intends to complete 

much of the submarine’s overall design prior to starting construction to reduce 

the risk of cost and schedule growth. However, the Navy recently awarded a 

contract for detail design while critical technologies remain unproven—a practice 

not in line with best practices that has led to cost growth and schedule delays on 

other programs. Proceeding into detail design and construction with immature 

technologies can lead to design instability and cause construction delays. The 

Navy plans to accelerate construction of the lead submarine to compensate for 

an aggressive schedule, which may lead to future delays if the technologies are 

not fully mature before construction starts, planned for 2021.

View GAO-18-158. For more information, 

contact Shelby S. Oakley at (202) 512-4841 or 

oakleys@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy’s Columbia class ballistic 

missile submarines will replace the 14 

Ohio class that currently provide the 

sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad,

slated to begin retiring in 2027. The 

first Columbia must begin patrols in 

2031 to prevent a gap in deterrent 

capabilities; the class will ultimately 

carry up to 70 percent of the nation’s 

strategic nuclear capability. The 

program is a top Navy priority with an 

expected cost of $267 billion over its

life cycle, including $128 billion to 

research, develop, and buy 12 

submarines. 

House Report 114-102 included a 

provision for GAO to examine the 

Columbia class program. Among other 

things, this review examines (1) the 

status of key Columbia class 

technologies; and (2) potential risks 

with the Navy’s planned approach for 

design and construction.

GAO reviewed the Navy’s technology 

readiness assessment, technology 

development plan, and the status of 

key prototyping efforts, and compared 

efforts with GAO’s identified best 

practices for shipbuilding programs 

and technology readiness 

assessments. GAO also assessed the 

status of design maturity and the 

Navy’s acquisition strategy and 

interviewed relevant officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO had suggested a matter for 

congressional consideration related to 

additional reporting on the Columbia 

class technologies, but removed it 

because of recent legislation that 

implements this requirement.

Department of Defense comments on 

the draft were incorporated as 

appropriate in this report.
Page i GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Letter 1

Background 3

Major Funding Commitments Planned, but Reporting on the 

Progress of Several Key Immature Technologies Is Not 

Required 21

The Navy Plans to Leverage Completed Design to Mitigate 

Aggressive Schedule, but Ongoing Technology Development 

Likely to Undermine This Goal 32

Columbia Class Is Not Funded Adequately to Address Program 

Risks 40

Conclusions 44

Matter for Congressional Consideration 45

Agency Comments and our Evaluation 46

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 50

Appendix II Department of Defense Technology Readiness Levels 52

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 53

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58

Tables

Table 1: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 19

Table 2: Comparison of Criteria for Identifying Critical Technology 

Elements (CTE) 27

Table 3: Assessment of Columbia Class Key Technology Efforts 

Using GAO’s Critical Technology Element (CTE) Criteria 28

Table 4: Department of Defense Technology Readiness Levels 

(TRL) 52

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figures

Figure 1: The United States Nuclear Triad 4

Figure 2: Responsible Parties and Key Components of Columbia 

Class Submarine 6

Figure 3: Columbia Class Submarine Key Technical Efforts 7

Figure 4: Notional Columbia Class Submarine Common Missile 

Compartment 8

Figure 5: Comparison of Nuclear Mechanical Drive with Nuclear 

Electric Drive 10

Figure 6: Notional Depiction of Major Components of the 

Columbia Class Coordinated Stern 12

Figure 7: Overview of Columbia Class Life-Cycle Cost Estimate 

(Then-Year Dollars, Millions) 13

Figure 8: Acquisition Plans for the Columbia Class Submarine (in 

calendar year) 14

Figure 9: Acquisition Framework for Columbia Class Submarine 

Program 15

Figure 10: Comparison of Design Phases for Columbia Class 

Submarine and Typical Surface Ships 17

Figure 11: GAO Assessment of Maturity of Columbia Class Critical 

Technologies (as of November 2017) 22

Figure 12: Concurrency of Navy Technology Development and 

Detail Design and Lead Ship Construction 36

Figure 13: Estimated and Actual Schedules for U.S. Navy Lead 

Submarines (months) 38

Figure 14: Plans for Early Start of Lead Columbia Construction 

Focus on Critical Areas 39

Figure 15: Cost Growth in Program Budgets for the Three Lead 

Navy Submarines Authorized to Start Construction since 

1989 43
Page iii GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Abbreviations

CAPE Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis 

and Program Evaluation

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CMC Common Missile Compartment

CTE Critical Technology Element

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

GFI Government Furnished Information

IPS Integrated Power System

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SAS Stern Area System

SSBN Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command

TRA Technology Readiness Assessment

TRL Technology Readiness Level

VFI Vendor Furnished Information

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Page 1 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 21, 2017

Congressional Committees

The Navy plans to buy 12 Columbia class nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarines (called SSBNs) armed with nuclear warheads as the 

replacement to the Ohio class, the current sea-based leg of the nation’s 

strategic nuclear deterrent. The Columbia class fleet will replace the 14 

Ohio class SSBNs as they begin to retire in 2027 after over 42 years, 

longer than any prior class of submarine. The Navy plans to use new 

technologies related to submarine propulsion, missile tubes, and stealth 

to ensure that the Columbia class will remain functional throughout its 

planned 42.5-year service life. The Navy has identified the Columbia 

class program as its top acquisition priority and is investing significantly in 

this effort—approximately $267 billion (then-year dollars) in total, 

including $128 billion (then-year dollars) to research, develop, and buy 12 

submarines.1 In fiscal year 2017, the Navy began buying materials and 

starting detail design, with plans to begin construction of the lead 

submarine in fiscal year 2021. To avoid a gap in the nation’s sea-based 

deterrent as the Ohio class SSBNs retire, the lead ship will need to make 

its first patrol in fiscal year 2031. Given the criticality of the program’s 

deterrence mission and the magnitude of the cost and schedule 

pressures, any challenges could have far-reaching consequences for the 

nation’s defense. 

In light of the Columbia class investment requirements, the House Armed 

Services Committee report for the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that we examine the program. This 

report examines (1) the status of key Columbia class technologies and 

related reporting requirements; (2) risks, if any, with the Navy’s planned 

approach for design and construction; and (3) whether expected funding 

levels for the Columbia class will be adequate moving forward.

 1

This $128 billion represents the total acquisition cost, including test and evaluation, and 

military construction costs. The Navy estimates that approximately $140 billion will be 

needed to operate and sustain the submarines over their life cycle. Then-year dollars 

reflect the effects of inflation, including escalation up to and during the year of the 

appropriation, and throughout the period during which dollars are expended from the 

Treasury.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

To assess the status of development of key Columbia class technologies, 

we reviewed the Navy’s technology development plan and the status of 

key prototyping efforts, and compared them with GAO’s identified best 

practices for shipbuilding programs. We also reviewed the program’s 

Technology Readiness Assessment and compared it to criteria in GAO’s 

Technology Readiness Assessment guide.2 GAO’s guide draws heavily 

from the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), 

and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) best 

practices, and establishes a methodology based on those best practices 

that can be used across the federal government for evaluating technology 

maturity, particularly as it relates to determining a program or project’s 

readiness to move past key decision points that typically coincide with 

major commitments of resources. We interviewed Navy officials and 

analyzed available documentation related to the Navy’s technical efforts. 

We also examined acquisition laws, regulations, and policies to determine 

the reporting requirements for the Columbia class program following the 

program’s Milestone B decision, which occurred in January 2017.

To assess the risks, if any, with the Navy’s planned approach for design 

and construction of the Columbia class, we compared the status of design 

maturity with Navy and shipyard plans to identify any delays. We also 

compared planned design maturity and schedule projections with those of 

prior U.S. submarine programs to assess realism of these estimates. We 

assessed the program’s acquisition strategy, including plans to accelerate 

the start of submarine construction and manage shipyard workload 

across the Columbia and ongoing Virginia class submarine programs 

(which will be built in the same shipyards) to identify factors related to 

potential cost, schedule, and oversight risks. Our assessment leverages, 

among other things, our prior work on shipbuilding programs.3

To assess whether expected funding levels for the Columbia class will be 

adequate moving forward, we compared program cost estimates to 

 2

GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Evaluating the 

Readiness of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects, GAO-16-410G 

(Washington, D.C.: August 2016).

3

GAO, Ford Class Aircraft Carrier: Poor Outcomes Are the Predictable Consequences of 

the Prevalent Acquisition Culture, GAO-16-84T (Washington D.C. Oct. 1, 2015); Best 

Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding 

from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington D.C. May 13, 2009); and Defense 

Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy 

Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 (Washington D.C. Feb. 28, 2005). 
Page 3 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

historical data on lead ship cost performance and the Navy’s expected 

budget for the program to assess the realism of these estimates. We also 

reviewed the program’s life-cycle cost estimate and independent cost 

estimate.

For all objectives, we interviewed officials from the Navy’s Columbia class 

submarine program office; the Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsUndersea Warfare; Naval Sea Systems Command Naval Nuclear 

Propulsion Program; Naval Undersea Warfare Center; Naval Surface 

Warfare Center Carderock Division; Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) Director Operational Test and Evaluation; Office of Naval 

Intelligence; OSD Acquisition Technology and Logistics (AT&L); OSD 

Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE); and the prime contractor 

shipyard General Dynamics Electric Boat and its sub-contractor 

Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding, among others.

Appendix I presents a more detailed description of the scope and 

methodology of our review.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2016 to December 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent is spread among three legs, as 

depicted in figure 1. Background
Page 4 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 1: The United States Nuclear Triad

DOD has continued to reinforce the high priority of the Columbia class 

program to the nation’s long-term defense. SSBNs are designed to 

maximize stealth to remain undetected while on patrol at sea. This 

survivability gives the United States a credible ability to retaliate if faced 

with an attack targeting other legs of the triad, and explains DOD’s 

decision to ultimately deploy up to 70 percent of the nation’s nuclear 

warheads on SSBNs.

As stated in its April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, DOD 

determined that ensuring a survivable U.S. deterrent requires continuous 

at-sea deployments of SSBNs in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, as 

well as the ability to surge additional submarines in crisis. Currently, 14 

Ohio class SSBNs provide the sea-based strategic deterrent. The Navy 
Page 5 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

commissioned the lead ship of this fleet in 1981.4 The first Ohio class 

SSBN to retire—SSN 730—will leave service in 2027 and plans are to 

retire one per year following this. When these submarines retire, they will 

have been in service over 40 years, longer than any previous 

submarines.5 Navy officials have stated that the legacy Ohio fleet cannot 

be life-extended any longer than what is planned due to aging issues.

The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) retains operational control of 

the strategic triad and determines how many SSBNs are needed to patrol 

on a day-to-day basis. STRATCOM and the Navy have determined that 

10 operationally available SSBNs are needed to meet mission 

requirements. As a result, the lead Columbia class submarine must be 

available for its first deterrent patrol in the first quarter of fiscal year 2031 

to coincide with the planned 2031 retirement of SSN 734, or the Navy will 

not have 10 operationally available SSBNs, thereby requiring DOD to 

identify other steps to ensure it can meet current deterrent requirements.

The Navy expects that it can meet mission requirements with 12 

Columbia class submarines carrying 16 missile tubes (equating to a total 

of 192 available tubes) in lieu of 14 Ohio class submarines carrying 24 

tubes (336 total available tubes). Currently, it takes 14 Ohio class 

submarines to provide 10 operationally available SSBNs due to 

maintenance needs that can take up to 4 submarines out of the patrol 

rotation at any given time. The Navy plans to reduce the number and 

duration of required maintenance periods for the Columbia class, allowing 

just 12 Columbia class submarines to provide the required 10 operational 

submarines at all times. Between fiscal year 2031-2040, the Navy plans 

to have a mix of 10 operationally available Columbia and Ohio class 

submarines. In fiscal year 2041, with the retirement of the final Ohio class 

submarine, this is to increase to 11 Columbia class, and finally to 12 

operationally available Columbia class submarines by fiscal year 2042.6

 4

Originally, 18 Ohio class were built, but the first 4 were converted into conventionally 

armed guided missile submarines in the early 2000s. The conversion process started in 

2002 and ended in 2007. 

5

The other legs of the triad are also aging. DOD is currently embarked on separate efforts 

to recapitalize each leg of the triad, with investments in the Columbia class SSBN, a new 

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent intercontinental ballistic missile, and the B-21 strategic 

long-range strike bomber. We have ongoing work assessing the status of these additional 

efforts.

6

The final Ohio class submarine is slated to retire in 2039.
Page 6 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

The Columbia class program is comprised of several major lines of 

effort—hull and supporting systems, the strategic weapons system; and 

the nuclear reactor-based propulsion plant—which are managed by 

different program offices, as depicted in figure 2.

Figure 2: Responsible Parties and Key Components of Columbia Class Submarine

The Navy is introducing new technologies to improve capabilities where 

required while leveraging systems from existing submarine programs—

the Virginia and Seawolf attack submarines and the Ohio class SSBNs—

in order to ensure commonality with the submarine fleet and reduce 

development needs for the Columbia class to limit technical risk. For 

example, the program is re-using over 19,000 Virginia class standard 

parts including fittings, valves, and switches and leveraging the Navy’s 

Columbia Class 

Technology Efforts
Page 7 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Submarine Warfare Federated Tactical System program, which integrates 

more than 40 independent electronics systems into a common combat 

system for use by multiple program offices.

The Navy has identified several key technical efforts for the Columbia 

class program: (1) the Common Missile Compartment, (2) Integrated 

Power System, (3) Stern Area System, and (4) propulsor. Other systems 

that we consider key technical efforts include the nuclear reactor and the 

coordinated stern, a system-of-systems that includes the propulsor and 

submarine maneuvering components. These areas are depicted in Figure 

3 and defined below.

Figure 3: Columbia Class Submarine Key Technical Efforts

Since 2008, the United States and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have been 

jointly developing a common system to house the tubes that will carry 

submarine launched ballistic missiles.7 Columbia class SSBNs and U.K. 

 7

The United Kingdom is developing a replacement to its Vanguard class SSBN; this class 

is scheduled to retire before the Columbia class. The United States and United Kingdom 

have cooperated on SSBNs since the signature of the1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, 

whereby the U.S. agreed to sell submarine launched ballistic missiles and the 

accompanying launch subsystems (less warheads) to the United Kingdom for use on its 

indigenously built nuclear-powered SSBNs. In 1980, the United Kingdom requested and 

was granted approval for sale of Trident I missiles (less warheads) and equipment; in 

1982 the agreement was again leveraged to sell the United Kingdom the updated Trident 

II (D5) missile in order to maintain commonality with the United States.

Common Missile Compartment 

(CMC)
Page 8 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

SSBNs will carry the Trident II D-5 missile for the first portion of their 

respective operational lives; the U.S. missiles armed with nuclear 

warheads which are maintained by the Department of Energy (DOE).8

Figure 4 shows a notional example of the CMC.

Figure 4: Notional Columbia Class Submarine Common Missile Compartment

In addition to the missile tubes, the CMC also provides systems to 

support the missiles and the launch equipment, including power, cooling, 

gas venting, and launch hardware and software. The Navy’s Strategic 

Systems Program is responsible for CMC development efforts.

 8

Ohio class SSBNs carry the Trident II D-5 missile, which has been in operation for over 

25 years. The Navy initiated a life extension program in 2002 to extend the service life to 

45 years, or 2042.The Navy plans for an eventual replacement for the D-5 Trident II but 

specifics have not yet been determined. There are separate efforts underway or recently 

completed to refurbish and extend the life of the nuclear warheads and reentry systems 

for an additional 30 years. These upgrade programs are being executed in partnership 

with the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration. 
Page 9 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

The IPS includes an electric drive system to propel the submarine 

through the water, unlike other current U.S. submarines which use a 

mechanical drive system. IPS is powered by the nuclear reactor, which is 

a separate system. As shown in figure 5, with a nuclear electric drive 

system, steam from the nuclear reactor turns a turbine creating electricity, 

which is then directly used to power electric motors. This is in contrast 

with a nuclear mechanical propulsion system, where steam from the 

nuclear reactor turns a turbine creating high-speed rotation; a reduction 

gear then slows the speed of this rotation to a speed that is suitable for 

use by the propulsor.

Integrated Power System (IPS) 

and Nuclear Reactor
Page 10 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 5: Comparison of Nuclear Mechanical Drive with Nuclear Electric Drive

To provide power to the electric drive, the Columbia class nuclear 

propulsion plant relies on a life-of-the-ship reactor core—called S1B—that 

is planned to remain in service without refueling, almost 10 years longer 

than current U.S. Navy nuclear reactors. The Virginia class also uses a 

life-of the-ship reactor core, but the Columbia class reactor needs to be 

more powerful to drive the larger submarine, and needs to last longer to 

allow for the 42.5-year Columbia class service life of versus 33 years for 

the Virginia class. By using a life-of-the-ship reactor, the Columbia class 
Page 11 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

will not require a mid-life refueling. This will reduce the mid-life 

maintenance period from 27 months for Ohio class to 16 months for 

Columbia class. This reactor is being developed by the Naval Nuclear 

Propulsion Program (also known as Naval Reactors) and the Naval 

Nuclear Laboratory (operated by Bechtel Marine Propulsion Corporation).

SAS is a technical feature of the stern that is comprised of three 

subcomponents; details of which are classified.

The Columbia class will use a propulsor instead of a propeller to drive the 

submarine through the water. The design of the propulsor relies on 

several other technical features that form a system-of-systems, 

sometimes referred to as the coordinated stern. The coordinated stern is 

where the rudder and other control surfaces are mounted; these control 

surfaces are used for submarine maneuvering and are critical to 

submarine performance. The coordinated stern consists of interrelated 

technology elements, including the propulsor and advanced propulsor 

bearing, the stern control surface configuration, and the propulsor shaft 

and bearing.

The propulsion shaft and bearing connects the propulsion system to the 

propulsor, transferring energy from the propulsion system to the propulsor 

to drive the submarine through the water. The Navy plans to use a new 

design “X-stern” configuration instead of the cruciform stern used in other 

submarines. Figure 6 depicts the major components of the coordinated 

stern, omitting a depiction of the classified Stern Area System.

Stern Area System (SAS)

Propulsor/Coordinated Stern
Page 12 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 6: Notional Depiction of Major Components of the Columbia Class Coordinated Stern

The Navy expects to require over $267 billion (then-year dollars) in total 

life-cycle costs for the Columbia class program. Figure 7 shows the 

break-down of this amount between operations and support costs and 

acquisition costs, as well as the elements comprising the $128 billion in 

acquisition costs.

Acquisition Strategy for 

the Columbia Class
Page 13 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 7: Overview of Columbia Class Life-Cycle Cost Estimate (Then-Year Dollars, Millions)

The approximately $128 billion total acquisition cost includes funding the 

Navy expects it will need to research, develop, and build its Columbia 

class SSBN.

Due to their size and complexity, submarines require funding for design, 

long-lead materials (such as nuclear propulsion plant components), and 

construction over many years. To accomplish these activities, the Navy 

awards contracts over several phases of design and construction. Figure 

8 outlines major acquisition plans for the Columbia class.
Page 14 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 8: Acquisition Plans for the Columbia Class Submarine (in calendar year)

In 2014, Congress created a National Sea-based Deterrence Fund to 

provide DOD with greater discretion to fund the design, construction, and 

purchase of the Columbia class.9 Since then, Congress has provided the 

Navy with enhanced acquisition authorities to buy and construct 

submarines and certain key components early, in bulk, and continuously.

The Columbia class program entered the Technology Development 

phase of the defense acquisition process in January 2011. The schedule 

to acquire the Columbia class was shifted in 2011 when the Navy decided 

 9

10 U.S.C. § 2218a: National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund.
Page 15 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

to delay the start of construction of the lead submarine by 2 years—from 

2019 to 2021—due to budget constraints. The first patrol date for the lead 

ship was also shifted from fiscal year 2029 to fiscal year 2031. In January 

2017, the Columbia class program achieved Milestone B—considered the 

official start of a DOD acquisition program—and moved into the 

Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the acquisition 

process. The program does not envision holding a Milestone C, which 

typically denotes a program’s approval to enter the production and 

deployment phase as shown in figure 9, but does plan to have an OSDlevel review prior to authorizing the construction of the lead ship.

Figure 9: Acquisition Framework for Columbia Class Submarine Program

Shipbuilding programs have slightly different decision points than other 

DOD weapon systems, partly because of the timing of the Milestone B 

decision for ships.10 Milestone B for ship programs usually occurs after 

development of ship specifications and system diagrams is well under 

way.

 10Milestone B for most weapon systems acquisitions occurs at the start of engineering and 

manufacturing development, several years before production of the system begins. The 

most common practice in ship programs is for milestone B to be aligned with the decision 

to authorize the start of detail design.
Page 16 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

As part of the Columbia class Milestone B decision, OSD approved a Low 

Rate Initial Production quantity of 12 submarines, the total quantity 

expected for the class. According to the Navy, the program awarded a 

$5.1 billion detail design contract to Electric Boat in September 2017 for 

work including design completion, component and technology 

development, and prototyping efforts. Detail design is typically funded 

with Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy funds (the Navy’s procurement 

fund for buying ships) and represents a further refinement of the design of 

the ship and ultimately generation of work instructions needed by the 

shipyard in advance of lead ship construction. The program was granted 

approval to begin early detail design work in January 2017.11

In shipbuilding, the design phase generally encompasses three activities: 

basic design, functional design, and detail design. These steps occur 

after the Navy sets the technical requirements for the ship. At a high level:

• basic design serves to outline the steel structure of the ship;

• functional design routes distributive systems—such as electrical or 

piping systems—throughout the ship; a three-dimensional (3D) 

computer-aided design model is often generated; and

• detail design completes the design work for even the lowest-level 

items, and ultimately furnishes the work instructions for the shipyard 

workers to use in constructing the ship. During this phase, all aspects 

of the ship are defined, and two-dimensional paper or 3D electronic 

drawings (also called work instructions) are generated.

For the Columbia class program, the Navy defines design in two phases: 

arrangements, which program officials describe as a combination of basic 

and functional design; and disclosures, which they describe as a 

combination of detail design and generation of work instructions. Figure 

 11The Columbia class program was granted approval—via a continuing resolution (CR) 

anomaly passed by the Congress—to use $773 million in Shipbuilding and Conversion, 

Navy funds to begin detail design, even though this work had not yet been already 

authorized by the prior year spending bill. Regular annual appropriations acts that provide 

funding for the continued operation of federal agencies are considered by Congress 

annually. When action on regular appropriation bills is not completed before the beginning 

of the fiscal year, a continuing resolution may be enacted to provide funding for the 

affected agencies. There are a number of standard provisions enacted in most continuing 

resolutions that, when taken together, establish an expectation that agencies will continue 

to carry out the status quo during a continuing resolution, unless otherwise specifically 

stated.
Page 17 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

10 shows the phases of design for the program as compared with typical 

surface ship terminology.

Figure 10: Comparison of Design Phases for Columbia Class Submarine and Typical Surface Ships

Two shipbuilders—General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington 

Ingalls Industries Newport News—are responsible for designing and 

building nuclear submarines.12 For the Columbia class program, Electric 

Boat is the prime contractor for design and construction, with Newport 

News as a subcontractor. Similar to the Virginia class program, each 

shipyard will build modules of the submarine, but Electric Boat will be 

responsible for final delivery of the submarine to the Navy.

For more than a decade, our work on major acquisitions has shown that 

part of an effective management process is assessing how far a 

technology has matured and how it has been demonstrated, which 

indicates the technology’s readiness to be integrated into a system and 

the degree of program risk. DOD acquisition instruction requires that 

programs complete a technology readiness assessment (TRA) at 

 12Electric Boat designed and built the entire class of Ohio SSBN. Electric Boat and 

Newport News share responsibility for the ongoing construction and delivery of 14 Virginia 

class attack submarines, with more under construction and planned.

Technology Readiness 

Assessment
Page 18 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Milestone B.13 A TRA is a systematic, evidence-based process that 

evaluates the maturity of hardware and software technologies critical to 

the performance of a larger system or the fulfillment of the key objectives 

of an acquisition program. A reliable TRA illuminates concerns and 

serves as the basis for realistic discussions on how to mitigate potential 

risks as programs move from the early stages of technology 

development.

TRAs do not eliminate technology risk but, when done well, can illuminate 

concerns and serve as the basis for realistic discussions on how to 

mitigate potential risks as programs move from the early stages of 

technology development, where resource requirements are relatively 

modest, to system development and beyond, where resource 

requirements are often substantial. In addition, TRAs help legislators, 

government officials, and the public hold government program managers 

accountable for achieving their technology performance goals.

A main element of a TRA is the identification of critical technology 

elements (CTE) and assessment of the appropriate Technology 

Readiness Level (TRL), used to measure the readiness of technologies to 

be incorporated into a weapon or other type of system. TRLs range from 

1 (least mature) to 9 (most mature), as shown in table 1.14

 13Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02; Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System, Aug. 10, 2017.

14TRLs were pioneered by NASA and adopted by DOD to determine the readiness of 

technologies to be incorporated into a weapon or other type of system. A description of 

the TRLs is in appendix II.
Page 19 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Table 1: Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 

TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported

TRL 2 Technology concept and/or applications formulated

TRL 3 Analytical and experimental function and/or characteristic proof of concept

TRL 4 Component validation in a laboratory environment

TRL 5 Component validation in a relevant environment

TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 

environment

TRL 7 System prototype near or at the planned operational system demonstrated 

in an operational environment

TRL 8 Actual system completed and qualified through test and demonstration.

TRL 9 Actual system proven through successful mission operations.

Source: GAO.| GAO-18-158

a

This table is based on Department of Defense 2011 Technology Readiness Assessment criteria and 

was reported in GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Evaluating the 

Readiness of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects, GAO-16-410 (Washington, 

D.C., August 2016).

Current DOD guidance assigns the program manager responsibility for 

identifying CTEs. The program manager identifies possible technologies, 

then, in consultation with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Research and Engineering—ASD(R&E)—and with the program 

executive office and component acquisition executive approval, identifies 

the subject matter experts needed to perform the TRA.15 For the 

Columbia class TRA, the expert team was comprised of Navy program 

management and technical personnel. ASD(R&E) reviews the list of 

critical technologies provided by the program manager and recommends 

technologies to add or delete. Ultimately, the program submits the TRA 

report to ASD(R&E), who independently assesses the maturity of the 

technologies. The ASD(R&E) prepares a memorandum based on the 

assessment that is transmitted to the milestone decision authority, along 

with the TRA Report.

The TRA is also an element of the Milestone B approval process. Section 

2366b, title 10, U.S. code states that a major defense acquisition program 

may not receive Milestone B approval until the milestone decision 

 15ASD(R&E) provides S&T leadership throughout the Department of Defense. For Navy 

programs, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 

Acquisition serves as the Navy Acquisition Executive. The Assistant Secretary has 

authority, responsibility and accountability for all acquisition functions and programs.
Page 20 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

authority has, among other things, certified that the CTE has been 

demonstrated at a TRL 6.16 A program may request a waiver from OSD if 

the maturity provision cannot be met. The statute requires that:

• Every waiver determination must be submitted in writing to the 

congressional defense committees within 30 days after the waiver 

request by the program is authorized.

• The milestone decision authority reviews the program not less often 

than annually until the milestone decision authority determines that 

the program satisfies all certification and determination components.

In addition, in 2015 Congress required program acquisition strategies to 

include a comprehensive approach to risk management, including the 

consideration of techniques such as technology demonstrations and 

decision points for disciplined transition of planned technologies into 

programs or the selection of alternative technologies.17

Recognizing the importance of the TRA to risk management, in 2016, 

GAO developed a Technology Readiness Assessment Guide.18 This 

guide has two purposes: (1) to describe generally accepted best practices 

for conducting effective evaluations of technology developed for systems 

or acquisition programs; and (2) to provide program managers, 

technology developers, and governance bodies with the tools they need 

to more effectively mature technology, determine its readiness, and 

manage and mitigate risk. As noted above, we developed the guide by 

drawing heavily from DOD, DOE, and NASA best practices, terminology, 

examples, and credible resources, materials, and tools developed and 

applied by experts and organizations in order to capture the current 

thinking on technology readiness and maturity.19 In our guide, we identify 

criteria for a CTE, namely that it is a technology that is “new or novel, and 

needed for a system to meet its anticipated operational performance 

requirements; or that poses major cost, schedule, or performance risk 

during design or demonstration”.

20 According to our guide, re-used 

existing technologies can also become critical if they are being used in a 

 1610 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(2).

1710 U.S.C. § 2431b.

18GAO-16-410G.

19GAO-16-410G.

20GAO-16-410G.
Page 21 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

different form, fit, or function—as is the case with the propulsor and 

coordinated stern.

Several key technical efforts remain immature as the Columbia class 

program moves into its design phase—a practice counter to best 

practices we have previously identified. These efforts include the 

integrated power system, nuclear reactor, propulsor/coordinated stern, 

stern area system, and common missile compartment. While the Navy 

made progress in some areas—such as prototyping efforts for the missile 

compartment and nuclear reactor—all of these systems continue to 

require development and testing to mature them to TRL 7, the point at 

which GAO’s technology readiness guide considers a technology mature. 

Any challenges in development could put the program at risk of costing 

more, taking longer to develop, or jeopardizing the program’s ability to 

meet its expected performance requirements. However, the Navy 

identified only two of the submarine’s technologies as “critical” in the 

program’s 2015 TRA, thereby underrepresenting the technology risk in 

the program. Underreporting technical risks can hinder Congress’ and 

other decision makers’ full understanding of the program’s progress. This 

is especially important because the Navy has already requested $1.6 

billion for advanced procurement and recently awarded the detail design 

contract. Moreover, there is no requirement that the Navy report to 

Congress on its progress in developing and testing the technologies until 

after the program completes its production readiness review in May 2020 

after the Navy requests another $8.7 billion in funding for the construction 

of the lead submarine.

Based on our assessment of the Navy’s documentation, the IPS, 

propulsor, and SAS are not yet at a TRL 7, and thus pose risk given their 

current level of demonstrated maturity and importance for meeting 

program cost, schedule, and performance requirements. Our previous 

work on shipbuilding best practices has found that technology maturity 

must be proven before a design can be considered stable, and production 

outcomes cannot be guaranteed until a stable design is demonstrated. In 

May 2009, we recommended that, before a contract is awarded for detail 

design, new ship critical technologies should be matured into actual 

system prototypes and successfully demonstrated in an operational 

environment (TRL 7). DOD concurred with this recommendation, but 

Major Funding 

Commitments 

Planned, but 

Reporting on the 

Progress of Several 

Key Immature 

Technologies Is Not 

Required

Several Technologies 

Remain Immature as 

Detail Design Begins
Page 22 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

added that modeling and simulation should be considered appropriate in 

some cases in lieu of actual prototype testing.21

While the Navy has made progress in reducing technical risks in many 

areas, such as starting construction of the first CMC, the program 

(according to the Navy) awarded a detail design contract in September 

2017, with several key technologies not yet at a TRL 7.

The nuclear reactor, IPS, propulsor and coordinated stern, and SAS all 

have potentially significant effects on design and construction of the 

Columbia class because they encompass much of the design and 

physical structure of the submarine. Based on our analysis, we found that 

IPS, SAS, the propulsor and coordinated stern are not yet at a TRL 7, as 

depicted in figure 11. The nuclear reactor and CMC are further along in 

prototyping work but still require testing in an operational environment to 

achieve a TRL 7.

Figure 11: GAO Assessment of Maturity of Columbia Class Critical Technologies (as of November 2017)

 21GAO-09-322.

Demonstrating Technology Maturity

Based on our work on best practices in 

weapon system acquisitions, we have 

previously recommended that programs fully 

mature technologies to TRL 7—versus TRL 6 

as required by DOD—prior to passing 

Milestone B and entering the engineering and 

manufacturing development phase. TRL 7 

represents a major step up from TRL 6, 

requiring demonstration of an actual system 

prototype in an operational environment such 

as in an aircraft, vehicle, or space. We have 

previously identified that demonstrating 

technologies in an operational environment 

provides a higher level of technology 

understanding and reduces risk prior to 

starting product development. DOD has 

historically disagreed with this recommended 

practice.

Source: GAO. | GAO-18-158.
Page 23 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

If any of these systems do not develop as planned, the Navy and the 

shipyards could be required to complete some redesign, or, if risks 

manifest later, they may force costly workarounds or construction rework. 

In addition, these systems also enable many performance attributes 

ranging from weapon launch to speed and maneuverability, so 

performance could be negatively affected. The status of these 

technologies is discussed in detail below.

According to officials from Naval Reactors, the permanent magnet motorbased electric drive system—a key component of IPS for the Columbia 

class—is at a TRL 6, below the TRL 7 recommended by our work on best 

practices. Naval Reactors has yet to develop an IPS prototype that is 

near or at the planned operational system configuration (integrated and 

full-size) and has been tested in an operational environment. The Navy 

has experimented with electric drive technology on submarines in the 

past with two now-decommissioned nuclear-powered attack submarines, 

but these submarines used different motor technology than what is 

planned for the Columbia class, and thus are not representative. The TAKE 1 Lewis and Clark class of dry-cargo ammunition ships and DDG 

1000 Zumwalt class destroyer are current U.S. Navy electric drive ships 

in operation, but these two systems are somewhat different than what is 

planned for the Columbia class and neither is powered by a nuclear 

reactor. The Navy is currently developing the IPS and producing a 

number of pre-production prototypes.

Naval Reactors officials told us that they are confident that the IPS will 

meet requirements based on 20 years of development and testing of the 

underlying permanent magnet motor technology. They also noted that this 

technology is proven based on testing of the smaller-scale prototype 

motor to validate the main propulsion motor design. However, Naval 

Reactors is still developing and producing the system’s major 

components. Testing of a full-scale prototype under full power, which we 

would consider evidence that the technology is mature, is not scheduled 

to occur until fiscal years 2018-2020. In a land-based test facility, the 

Navy plans to integrate all the IPS systems in a ship-representative 

layout. Successful completion of this testing is an important step in 

mitigating risk. In contrast, the DDG 1000 program only tested its electric 

drive system at the land based test facility at one-half of the ship’s power 

generation and electric propulsion system configuration, and as a result 

performance problems were not discovered until well after installation and 

when system testing on the ship was run at full power. Thus, the Navy’s 

planned full-scale prototype testing for Columbia class should prevent a 

Integrated Power System
Page 24 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

similar experience, since it will test a full-sized and full-power system 

rather than a partial system.

According to officials from Naval Reactors, as a result of its statutory 

mandate, its programs follow a different development process than typical 

DOD programs and do not use documents typical of other Navy 

programs, such as an Integrated Master Schedule or a Test and 

Evaluation Master Plan. Instead, officials from Naval Reactors told us that 

they use a rigorous process to assess, manage and control technical risk 

during development and testing to manage its day-to-day technical 

efforts. Based on descriptions provided by Naval Reactors officials, the 

Navy has been operating a Columbia-like experimental reactor in a landbased environment for many years to demonstrate some Columbia class 

submarine systems. Naval Reactors officials said that this experience 

gives them confidence that the Columbia class reactor will be delivered to 

the shipyard on time and will meet all requirements.

Naval Reactors has design and development work remaining before it 

awards the contract for reactor core production in fiscal year 2019. Naval 

Reactors budget documentation shows that reactor design work is 

planned to be 65 percent complete in fiscal year 2018. While we 

recognize that it would not be realistic to expect Naval Reactors to test 

the reactor in a submarine to achieve a TRL 7, a completed design would 

still be required to produce a final configuration to demonstrate 

technology maturity.

Neither the propulsor nor other related components of the coordinated 

stern have been demonstrated through testing in a near or planned 

operational system configuration, a key element for achieving TRL 7. 

Navy officials told us that the propulsor effort is based on prior experience 

with propulsors and that it will resemble the Virginia-class propulsor 

design. However, according to Navy documentation, the propulsor will be 

different in form, fit, and function than prior propulsors, and the final 

configuration has yet to be selected or tested. Specifically, the following 

components require additional design work and testing prior to 

demonstrating a representative prototype:

• Propulsor: The Navy is working with various partners to refine two 

different high-level propulsor designs. The program also faced a year 

delay in completing the first phase of design work, which 

subsequently delayed large-scale vehicle testing. Further, the Navy 

still has to complete large-scale prototype testing of different propulsor 

Nuclear Reactor

Propulsor/Coordinated Stern
Page 25 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

designs that are being evaluated for an eventual down-select to one 

vendor for production.

• Propulsor shaft: The system that connects the propulsion to the 

motors—which the Navy states is similar to shafting systems used on 

previous submarine classes but with different materials and size and 

weight—is still in concept and preliminary design phases. Main shaft 

design development and testing is being performed to select materials 

and inform design efforts.

• Advanced propulsor bearing: The Navy has yet to complete the 

preliminary design of the advanced propulsor bearing, with prototype 

test in a full scale configuration planned to begin in fiscal year 2019. 

Navy officials told us that they believe that the final design and 

material selections will exceed the reserved weight and size margins 

of the shafting or bearing system.

• X-stern: the final X-stern configuration has yet to be tested with a final 

design propulsor.

Our assessment of the propulsor and coordinated stern system design 

indicates that it is not yet mature enough to provide the basis for a 

prototype in final form, fit, and function—key elements of achieving TRL 

7.

The Navy identified the SAS as a TRL 4 at Milestone B. The preliminary 

design review for the SAS is planned for March 2018. This review 

establishes the baseline (hardware, software, human/support systems) 

and underlying architectures to ensure that the system has a reasonable 

expectation of satisfying requirements within the current budget and 

schedule. The critical design review—a technical review that ensures that 

a system can proceed into fabrication and demonstration and can meet 

stated performance requirements within cost, schedule, and risk—is not 

planned until March 2020.

A TRL 4 represents a relatively low level of maturity compared to the 

eventual system. At this low level of maturity, there are no assurances 

that the SAS will work as planned, which would likely result in the 

Columbia class not meeting certain requirements or in cost and schedule 

increases. The Navy plans to hold a critical design review for SAS in 

fiscal year 2019. The Navy has identified existing fleet technologies as 

backups for two SAS components, but officials noted that if these are 

used the submarine will not meet current requirements. According to the 

program office, there is no backup technology for one other SAS 

component, and, if that element—currently a TRL 4—does not develop as 

Stern Area System
Page 26 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

planned, it will be omitted, meaning that the program will lack that 

capability.

Specific details of SAS are classified and cannot be included in this 

report.

The shipbuilders and the Navy have described CMC as complex to build. 

The Navy and the two shipyards—with consultation from the United 

Kingdom, which will also leverage the CMC design on its new SSBN—

have conducted risk-reducing prototyping work and are building a 

representative CMC to demonstrate production processes. In fact, 

Columbia class representative missile tubes will be first installed on a 

United Kingdom submarine, scheduled for mid-2020. The Navy has plans 

for a robust land-based test procedure for both the missile tubes and the 

CMC as a system that will provide an operationally similar environment to 

a submarine; however, this testing has yet to start and will not conclude 

for several years.

While the Navy conducted the 2015 Columbia class TRA in accordance 

with a DOD-approved plan, it did not follow our identified best practices 

for identifying all critical technology elements (CTE), resulting in an 

underrepresentation of the technical risk facing the program. Specifically, 

the TRA only identified 2 CTEs: the SAS and a carbon dioxide removal 

system. CTEs are required to be at TRL 6 at Milestone B (the official start 

of a program). For the Columbia class program, OSD approved Milestone 

B in January 2017. The Navy received a waiver at Milestone B for the 

SAS because the system was still immature, as discussed above. The 

carbon dioxide removal system has matured since the TRA following 

demonstration on an operational submarine, and no longer requires 

active risk mitigation efforts.

We compared the Navy’s 2015 Columbia class TRA to criteria 

documented in GAO’s TRA Guide and DOD’s own guidance. In doing so, 

we found that 4 additional key technical efforts—IPS, nuclear reactor, and 

propulsor/coordinated stern, and the CMC—meet the criteria for a CTE. 

Since the Navy did not identify these technologies in the TRA, it also did 

not assign them a TRL. Their exclusion is significant because the 2015 

TRA represents a key independent review and technical risk assessment 

used by DOD to certify to Congress that the Columbia class program’s 

technologies had been demonstrated in a relevant environment (TRL 6) 

Common Missile Compartment

The Navy Has Not 

Appropriately Identified 

Technologies as Critical,

Which Underrepresents 

the Program’s Technical 

Risk
Page 27 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

at Milestone B.22 Because not all of the CTEs were identified, DOD and 

Congress lack an important oversight tool for assessing technology 

maturity and evaluating program risk. Further, this certification is the only 

required reporting on technology development prior to the Navy 

requesting authorization for construction of the lead ship. Some of the 

concerns that we identified are discussed in detail below.

The team responsible for preparing the 2015 Columbia class TRA did not 

identify all appropriate CTEs because it used a more restrictive definition 

of a CTE than that recommended in our best practices guide and DOD’s 

2011 TRA guide.23 Table 2 compares the criteria in the three sources.

Table 2: Comparison of Criteria for Identifying Critical Technology Elements (CTE) 

GAO Technology Readiness 

Assessment Guide Criteriaa

Department of Defense (DOD) 

Technology Readiness 

Assessment Guide Criteriab Navy Criteria for the Colombia Class 

Programc

Criteria for 

Identifying CTEs

The technology is new or novel, and 

needed for a system to meet its 

anticipated operational performance

requirements; or

poses major cost, schedule, or 

performance risk during design or 

demonstration.

The technology may pose major 

technological risk during 

development, particularly during 

the Engineering and 

Manufacturing Development 

phase of acquisition.

The technology is a technology 

development effort,d and is one on 

which the system depends to meet 

operational requirements or on which 

the program depends to meet cost and 

schedule objectives;

And is new or novel and unproven;

Or is used or applied in a new or novel 

and unproven manner or environment.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and Navy documents. | GAO-18-158

a

GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Evaluating the Readiness of 

Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects, GAO-16-410G (Washington, D.C.: August 

2016).

b

Department of Defense Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance, April 2011; DOE, 

Technology Readiness Assessment Guide DOE G 413.3-4A, Oct. 22, 2015.

c

2015 Technology Readiness Assessment for the Columbia Class Submarine.

d

The Navy did not define “technology development effort” in their 2015 Columbia class Technology 

Readiness Assessment.

As reflected in table 2, not only does the Navy’s TRA definition require a 

technology to meet a number of criteria to be considered a CTE, it also 

 22ASDR&E also provides an independent technical assessment to OSD in support of the 

Milestone B review, but uses the Navy’s TRA as a key input to its decision-making 

process.

23Our TRA best practices guide was published after the Navy’s TRA, but is valid for 

comparison because of the implications for the program going forward and because DOD 

officials provided input into developing our best practices.

Conflicting Criteria for 

Identifying Critical 

Technologies
Page 28 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

has to be considered a technology development effort. According to the 

Columbia class program office, the TRA team based this definition on a 

2011 OSD AT&L memorandum issued contemporaneously with the 2011 

TRA guidance that states: “TRAs should focus only on technology 

maturity, as opposed to engineering and integration risk.” However, our 

analysis of this memo found that it also directs programs to use DOD’s 

TRA guidance and CTE definition, which are broader and more consistent 

with our definition of a CTE. The 2015 Columbia class TRA does not 

further define what constitutes a technology development effort, with the 

Navy applying this as a criterion without defining what the criteria actually 

meant. Moreover, the TRA does not provide any definition or criteria for 

what it considers engineering and integration risk. We determined that the 

Navy under-identified program technical risks because the Navy’s criteria 

were more restrictive than GAO’s CTE definition.

We further assessed the specific technologies in the Columbia class 

program against our technology readiness criteria for a CTE, as shown in 

table 3.

Table 3: Assessment of Columbia Class Key Technology Efforts Using GAO’s Critical Technology Element (CTE) Criteria

Technology

GAO Critical Technology Criteriaa and GAO Assessment

Did the Navy identify it as a 

critical technology?

GAO criteria 1: Is it new or novel 

and needed to meet performance 

requirements?

GAO criteria 2: Does it pose 

major cost, schedule, or 

performance risk?

Integrated Power 

System (IPS)

Yes.

The Navy has limited past experience 

with ships or submarines exclusively 

powered by electric drive. The system 

being developed for the Columbia 

class will be different from the electric 

drive systems equipped on U.S. Navy 

ship classes and on two legacy 

submarines. It is critical to meeting 

performance requirements. 

Yes.

Delays could have significant 

impacts to production since its 

systems traverse much of the 

design, resulting in potentially 

significant cost growth due to 

schedule slips and work arounds.

If it does not work as intended, 

the program would be likely 

unable to meet performance 

requirements. 

No.

The Navy’s Technology 

Readiness Assessment (TRA) 

team determined that IPS 

impacted operational 

requirements and was used in 

a new or novel and unproven 

manner or used in a new or 

novel and unproven 

environment, but was deemed 

not to be a technology 

development effort so it was 

not identified as a CTE. 

Several Critical Technologies 

Not Identified
Page 29 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Technology

GAO Critical Technology Criteriaa and GAO Assessment

Did the Navy identify it as a 

critical technology?

GAO criteria 1: Is it new or novel 

and needed to meet performance 

requirements?

GAO criteria 2: Does it pose 

major cost, schedule, or 

performance risk?

Nuclear Reactor Yes.

A new design and technical features 

enable it to function longer than any 

other submarine. It is also critical to 

reducing maintenance periods that 

enable the Navy to reduce the fleet by 

2 submarines compared to the 

existing fleet of 14.b

Yes.

If the reactor cannot provide lifeof-the-ship capability, the Navy 

will need to procure more 

submarines to compensate for 

the additional extended 

maintenance period, adding 

billions of dollars to the program.

If it does not work as intended, 

the program would likely be 

unable to meet performance 

requirements.

No.

The Navy’s 2015 Columbia 

class TRA does not include 

analysis of the nuclear reactor. 

The TRA team only assessed 

technologies under the 

cognizance of the Columbia 

class program office; the 

nuclear reactor is under the 

cognizance of Naval Reactors. 

Propulsor/ Coordinated 

Stern

Yes.

According to the Navy, the propulsor; 

X-stern configuration; and shafting 

system are all new designs, 

representing the next generation from 

current components with different 

performance requirements.

The propulsor will be an advanced 

design that is required to be different 

in size and weight and operate at a 

different number of rotations per 

minute than prior propulsors to 

account primarily for the larger 

submarine. It will also be required to 

perform to different survivability and 

maintenance requirements than prior 

submarines.

Program will use a non-traditional 

type of stern that is different from 

prior configurations to meet specific 

requirements.

The shafting system will be 

redesigned from prior submarines 

(e.g., different diameter shaft and 

bearings) to support the different 

propulsor.

Other program office documentation 

identified propulsor performance and 

coordinated stern as technology 

development efforts.

Yes.

Late delivery of the propulsor or 

other elements of the 

coordinated stern could lead to 

cost growth and compromise the 

submarine delivery schedule.

If the propulsor and related 

components do not work as 

required, the Navy may have to 

accept reduced performance 

attributes.

The propulsor shaft needs to 

achieve a 12-year service life 

and meet a requirement to 

complete shaft replacement 

within a four month dry dock 

period. Achieving this change-out 

time helps enable the Navy to 

procure 12 submarines instead of 

14. 

No.

The Navy’s TRA team 

determined that the 

propulsor/coordinated stern 

impacted operational 

requirements and was 

used/applied in a new or novel 

manner but not used/ applied 

in an unproven or in a new or 

novel and unproven 

environment.

This system was not deemed a 

technology development effort. 
Page 30 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Technology

GAO Critical Technology Criteriaa and GAO Assessment

Did the Navy identify it as a 

critical technology?

GAO criteria 1: Is it new or novel 

and needed to meet performance 

requirements?

GAO criteria 2: Does it pose 

major cost, schedule, or 

performance risk?

Stern Area System Yes.

Details classified.

Yes.

Not achieving required 

capabilities could result in the 

Columbia class not meeting 

certain requirements. Details 

classified.

Yes.

The Navy’s TRA team 

determined that the Stern Area 

System was a critical 

technology.

Common Missile 

Compartment (CMC)

No.

Not new or novel, but critical to 

meeting performance requirements.

According to Navy officials, CMC is 

based on prior technology fielded 

Ohio class submarines, albeit with 

some repackaging and updated 

technology.

Since CMC includes the hardware 

and software that launches the 

ballistic missiles from the submarine, 

this component is critical to meeting 

performance requirements. 

Yes.

Not delivering a working CMC 

would compromise performance 

requirements. CMC is integral to 

the hull of the submarine, so any 

delays could challenge 

construction efficiencies and thus 

lead to cost and schedule 

growth.

Further, the CMC carries the 

strategic weapon system that is 

the primary mission of a ballistic 

missile submarine. The Navy 

faces the challenge of restarting 

production of missile tubes and 

parts from a dormant industrial 

base (the last submarine ballistic 

missile tubes were built in the 

early 1990’s). The CMC will also 

require new materials.

No.

The Navy’s TRA team did not 

evaluate the CMC.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.| GAO-18-158

a

GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Evaluating the Readiness of 

Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects, GAO-16-410G (Washington, D.C.: August 

2016).

b

Ohio class submarines have a mid-life maintenance period where the nuclear reactor is refueled that 

lasts almost 3 years; the new life-of-core reactor for the Columbia class submarine is planned to 

eliminate a year from this maintenance period.

As shown in table 3, by applying the additional “technology development 

effort” criteria in the 2015 Columbia class TRA, the TRA team eliminated 

several systems from CTE consideration without criteria or a definition of 

what constitutes a technology development effort. Some of these systems 

were previously identified as CTEs in other recent Navy documentation. 

The TRA team did not identify the nuclear reactor as a CTE because this 

system is under the cognizance of Naval Reactors and not the Columbia 

class program office. Officials from Naval Reactors told us that they do 

not conduct TRAs, but rather follow a different and more iterative process 

to manage their technology development efforts.
Page 31 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

While the Navy did not identify all of the program’s CTEs as compared 

with the TRA criteria in our guide, it is tracking these efforts to manage 

technology risks. For example, 3 of the 4 CTEs we identified are also 

identified in Navy documents as “key technical efforts” with active risk 

mitigation plans.24 We will continue to track the progress of these efforts 

in our future work.

As the Columbia class program moves into its detail design and 

construction phase, it will be more than 2 years before the next 

requirement for a formal DOD report to Congress on the progress of the 

technology efforts. This will occur at some point after the program’s 

Production Readiness Review is completed in May 2020.25 In the 

meantime, the Navy plans to request another $8.7 billion (in addition to 

the $1.6 billion already requested) for lead ship construction. If a typical 

budget schedule is followed, this request will come before Congress in 

February 2020. The Navy plans to begin construction of the lead 

submarine starting in fiscal year 2020. Congress will be asked to approve 

lead ship construction absent key information on the maturity of the 

critical technologies that, at present, are not up to the maturity levels that 

would provide assurance they will work as intended. Without additional 

updates on the progress of technology maturity between now and 2020, 

we believe Congress will not have information it needs to evaluate 

technical risk in advance of the Navy’s requests for considerable 

increases in program funding. As previously discussed, there is currently 

no DOD requirement to submit such reports to congressional oversight 

committees.

 24The Navy did not include the nuclear reactor as a key technical effort.

25The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires programs to 

submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the results of any production 

readiness review and certify to the congressional defense committees that the review 

supports the start of construction, and includes (among other things) an assessment 

including of the maturity of developmental command and control systems, weapon and 

sensor systems, and hull, mechanical and electrical systems. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 124 

(2008).

Required Report to 

Congress on Technology 

Efforts Will Not Occur Until 

after Lead Ship 

Authorization
Page 32 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

The Navy is prioritizing design completion before starting construction, 

which is a good practice that is in accordance with our work on best 

practices because it helps reduce cost and schedule challenges in 

construction. However, since some of the key technologies are not fully 

matured, detail design work is proceeding with notional or placeholder 

data representing these key systems. As a result, the design will likely 

remain immature once construction starts in fiscal year 2021. We have 

previously reported that concurrency of technology development and 

design increases the risk of design rework—or having to make 

modifications to design drawings to accommodate any changes needed 

as a result of technologies changing size, shape, or weight as they 

mature—and potentially can result in negative cost and schedule 

impacts.26 Further, the Navy faces an aggressive production schedule in 

order to deliver the lead submarine by fiscal year 2031, which will be 

required to prevent a gap in U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities. According 

to our analysis of previous submarine program schedules, the Columbia 

class program’s schedule is aggressive in its expected short duration to 

build the lead submarine. The program office intends to mitigate this 

schedule challenge, in part, by starting construction of portions of the 

submarine earlier than initially planned. If this early construction occurs 

and the Navy does not alter design plans, construction of some parts of 

the lead submarine could outpace a finalized design for developing other 

components, which increases the risk of rework during construction and 

could further delay completion.

The Columbia class program is prioritizing a high level of design 

completion prior to the start of construction of the lead submarine of the 

class. The program plans to complete 100 percent of design 

arrangements and 83 percent of design disclosures prior to the start of 

construction of the lead submarine. In our 2009 report on best practices in 

shipbuilding, we identified design maturity as important step in reducing 

cost and schedule risk. As such, we recommended that the design be 

stabilized through completion of basic and functional design and 3D 

product modeling prior to the start of construction for a new ship. 

Because, as mentioned previously, the Navy defined design 

arrangements on the Columbia class program as being equivalent to 

basic and functional design, having 100 percent of the arrangements 

 26GAO-09-322.

The Navy Plans to 

Leverage Completed 

Design to Mitigate 

Aggressive Schedule, 

but Ongoing 

Technology 

Development Likely 

to Undermine This 

Goal

Consistent with Best 

Practices, Program Has 

Prioritized Design 

Completion, but Immature 

Technologies May 

Compromise Design 

Maturity
Page 33 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

completed prior to the start of Columbia class construction would meet 

the intent of our prior recommendation.

Further, our analysis found that the Columbia class program’s planned 

level of design completion prior to starting construction is much higher 

than most recent Navy shipbuilding programs. For example, the Virginia 

class attack submarine program started construction with only 43 percent 

of the design complete compared with a planned 83 percent completion 

for the Columbia class. The Columbia class program also plans to have a 

52 week buffer between the completion of design for an area of the 

submarine and the start of construction on that area, which is intended to 

allow time to address any challenges that may arise and thus minimize 

schedule delays. Additionally, the Navy plans to have all components fully 

developed 8 months before they are required in the shipyard, which will 

provide some additional schedule buffer to address challenges before the 

components are actually needed for construction.

To facilitate design completion, the Navy made a commitment at the start 

of the program to set realistic and reasonable requirements and to keep 

those requirements stable throughout the program. This approach is also 

in keeping with our previously identified best practices, which highlight the 

importance of demonstrating balance among program requirements, 

technology demands, and cost considerations. The Columbia class 

program has not had any significant requirements changes since DOD’s 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the Capability 

Development Document in 2015. Setting realistic and reasonable 

requirements also permitted the Navy and shipyards to reuse some 

design elements for components of the submarine that are similar in 

design and function to the Virginia class instead of requiring new design 

work. Similarly, the program has worked to keep stable ship specifications 

to minimize design disruptions.

The technical specifications for the ship have been set since 2014, and 

the program manager maintains personal visibility and accountability over 

any proposed deviations or changes to the specifications. According to 

the program manager, to date there have been minimal changes made to 

the technical baseline. These steps help to minimize design rework that 

can be caused by changing requirements, as was seen on the Littoral 

Combat Ship program, and that can lead to cost increases or scheduled 
Page 34 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

delays.27 The program has also conducted some prototyping efforts—

including building representative portions of the submarine to 

demonstrate that its design tool can send the correct information to the 

shop floor to build the ship—and has plans for more.

However, based on our analysis of the program’s current technology 

development plan and status, it is unlikely that the Navy’s planned 83 

percent of design disclosures will be finalized at the time construction 

begins for the lead ship in 2021. Similar to many shipbuilding programs, 

the Columbia class program plans to continue to mature technologies into 

their final form while detail design is underway. As we have previously 

reported, to offset this risk, shipbuilding programs, including the Columbia 

class, often include design “reservations” for space, weight, power, 

cooling, and other key attributes to reserve a footprint for components. As 

contractors or government employees develop and refine technologies or 

systems, they provide vendor furnished information (VFI) or government 

furnished information (GFI) to the shipyards to update the design. 

Completion of the detail design of the submarine—and subsequent 

achievement of design stability to support a properly sequenced 

construction phase—requires shipbuilders to have final information on the 

form and fit of each system that will be installed on the ship, including the 

system’s weight and its demand for power, cooling, and other supporting 

elements.28

As development proceeds on a new technology, initial assumptions about 

size, shape, weight, and power and cooling requirements can change, 

potentially significantly. These changes in VFI or GFI—if not resolved 

early in the design phase—can introduce considerable volatility to the 

design process for a lead ship. As such, in our May 2009 report, we 

recommended that, to attain the level of knowledge needed to retire 

design risk and reduce construction disruptions, complete—versus 

notional—VFI or GFI must be incorporated for the design to be truly 

 27GAO-09-322.The Navy sought to concurrently design and construct two lead ships in 

the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program in an effort to rapidly meet pressing mission 

needs. Implementation of a new design standard required program officials to redesign 

major elements of each LCS design to meet enhanced survivability requirements, even 

after construction had begun on the first ship. While these changes improved the 

robustness of the LCS designs, they contributed to out-of-sequence work and rework on 

the lead ships. See GAO-13-530.

28GAO-09-322.
Page 35 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

stable.29 DOD concurred with this recommendation. We have previously 

reported that other Navy programs have run into difficulties, including outof-sequence or more costly construction work, when space, weight, 

power, and cooling reservations are based on immature or ill-defined 

technologies or components that have changed in size, weight, or other 

attributes when they are finalized. Ramifications from such changes can 

ripple through much of the ship design. For example, we reported in 2009 

that during construction of the Seawolf-class attack submarine, the 

AN/BSY-2 combat system did not fit into the space and weight 

reservations that the Navy had allocated within the submarine’s design. 

As a result, a portion of the submarine had to be redesigned at additional 

cost.30

However, the Navy has entered the detail design phase for the Columbia 

class with incomplete technical data on several key components that are 

either significant in size relative to the submarine or spread throughout a 

number of spaces of the submarine. These components include IPS, the

nuclear reactor, the propulsor and coordinated stern, and SAS. This 

situation is problematic because even if the Columbia class design is 83 

percent complete, if it contains many reservations for systems that are not 

fully developed the design will continue to be immature and subject to 

change. Thus, the 83 percent completion metric may be somewhat 

meaningless since elements of the design are uncertain and could 

change because of the incomplete technology development efforts.

As shown in figure 12, the Columbia class program has entered the detail 

design phase with a number of technologies still in development or design 

finalization, which means that the VFI/GFI for these systems are not yet 

final. This figure also depicts our recommended knowledge points for 

shipbuilding programs, which align with contract award for detail design 

and the start of lead ship construction. The concurrency depicted 

between phases could be further exacerbated if the Navy pursues plans 

to start construction of some components early.

 29GAO-09-322.

30GAO-09-322.
Page 36 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 12: Concurrency of Navy Technology Development and Detail Design and 

Lead Ship Construction

As is shown in figure 12, the Navy plans to continue technology 

development while executing detail design; this concurrency may 

potentially extend through construction if the Navy pursues its plans for 

early construction. For example, the Navy and the shipyards are currently 

designing the stern of the submarine—with 95 percent of stern 

arrangements planned to be complete by December 2017—but the final 

configuration of the propulsor has yet to be determined. As currently 

planned, the Navy will not complete prototype testing until the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2020, and development and design of the SAS is 

planned to continue until the end of fiscal year 2021—almost a year after 

the start of lead ship construction. The Navy believes it is managing this 

stern risk by controlling the interfaces through an Interface Control 

Document that identifies set design constraints. According to Navy 

officials, all aspects of the propulsor design that could impact the overall 

ship design such as size, weight, and arrangements of major subassemblies of the propulsor are already finalized, and that the systems 

are currently tracking to the reservation allowances. However, until a final 

representative prototype is tested as a system, the possibility of design 

changes and broader design impacts remains. Although the Navy plans 

to have arrangements for the stern 100 percent complete at construction 
Page 37 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

start, the VFI or GFI for these important systems will not be finalized until 

later after these systems finish development.

Additionally, the electric drive of IPS has already experienced 

manufacturing problems that could compromise its ability to meet its 

schedule if further challenges arise. According to Naval Reactors officials, 

a manufacturing defect was identified in February 2017 that affected the 

assembly of the first production-representative propulsion motor intended 

for installation in the land-based test facility to prove out the integration of 

all the electric drive components. The officials explained that the vendor 

responsible for the motor is in the process of repairing the defect—a 

process that will take up to 9 months to complete. As a result, Naval 

Reactors is now executing a schedule recovery plan to regain some 

schedule margin. Part of this plan involves using a smaller scale 

prototype motor in initial land-based test facility testing to prove out 

system integration. This plan means that initial full-scale system testing 

will be conducted with a different motor, albeit one with the same 

electromagnetic properties. Further, this delay will leave less margin to 

account for any unexpected challenges encountered in developmental 

testing.

The Columbia class program has an aggressive schedule to deliver the 

lead submarine in time to begin patrols in fiscal year 2031. The Navy 

plans for 84 months, or 7 years, to build the lead submarine. While 

imperatives associated with our nation’s nuclear deterrent are driving this 

planned schedule, our analysis shows that it is significantly shorter than 

what the Navy has achieved on any recent lead submarine construction 

effort—including during high levels of Cold War submarine production. 

The Navy expects that the Columbia class will be built in the same 

timeframe as was planned for the lead Virginia class submarine—a 

submarine that is one and a half times smaller and has less estimated 

construction man hours than the Columbia class. Figure 13 shows the 

estimated and actual timeframes for constructing prior lead submarines

as compared with the 84 month estimate for the Columbia class lead 

submarine.

Aggressive Construction 

Schedule for Lead 

Submarine 

Unprecedented
Page 38 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 13: Estimated and Actual Schedules for U.S. Navy Lead Submarines 

(months)

Further, there are industrial base implications to this aggressive schedule. 

The Navy and the two shipyards will be trying to attain this level of 

unprecedented schedule performance with the lead submarine while the 

shipbuilders are also starting work on the first few Virginia class 

submarines built in a new Block V configuration.31 Virginia class program 

officials told us that the ramp-up to building two attack submarines per 

year has resulted in recent cost and schedule growth at the shipyards. 

The addition of Block V and Columbia-class will likely create additional 

schedule pressures with the increase in workload required to build those 

submarines compared with non-Block V version submarines.

In an effort to mitigate the risks associated with its aggressive delivery 

schedule, the Navy is planning to start construction of a number of parts 

 31Block V represents an improvement in capabilities for the Virginia class program and will 

require a significant increase in labor hours needed to build the submarine, including the 

insertion of a new 80 foot long Virginia Payload Module with Tomahawk missile tubes.
Page 39 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

of the structure of the lead submarine years earlier than the date of lead 

ship authorization in fiscal year 2021. This plan, called advanced 

construction, would use expanded acquisition authorities provided by 

Congress in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund.32 The Navy and 

its shipbuilders intend to start construction as early as 2019 on numerous 

areas of the submarine’s structure. Specifically, the Navy and shipyards 

plan to start building the stern, bow and missile command and control 

module as early as 6 months before fiscal year 2021, citing the disruptive 

effects of delays to these three “super-modules” that are also critical to 

ensuring an on-time delivery. These super-modules also comprise vital 

areas of the submarine, including the CMC, IPS and the coordinated 

stern. The shipyards have proposed moving 500,000-600,000 labor hours 

of construction work to before ship authorization. Figure 14 shows the 

super-modules of the submarine that the Navy plans to start early.

Figure 14: Plans for Early Start of Lead Columbia Construction Focus on Critical Areas

However, the Navy has yet to finalize or fund the approach for this type of 

early work. Starting construction early for the lead and follow submarines 

provides schedule relief to the Navy and shipbuilders, but these plans 

may further exacerbate the existing overlap of technology development 

and design and construction, which was discussed above. Moving 

construction earlier could challenge the Navy’s goal to have all 

 3210 U.S.C. § 2218a. National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund.
Page 40 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

components developed 7 months before they are required in the 

shipyard. Further, the shipbuilders acknowledge that early construction 

plans will result in increased overlap between various stages of design 

activities in certain areas, including the bow and stern. If Congress funds

the Navy’s plans to fund advanced construction work, this incomplete 

VFI/GFI situation will likely be worsened and could disrupt the optimal 

build strategy.

We have previously reported that programs starting construction of the 

lead ship of a class without a mature, stable design has been a major 

source of cost growth and schedule delays in Navy programs. We have 

also reported that when a schedule is set that cannot accommodate 

program scope, delivering an initial capability is often delayed and higher 

costs are incurred because problems typically occur that cannot be 

resolved within compressed, optimistic schedules. The Navy’s Columbia 

class plans put the program at risk of cost and schedule growth. 

However, its options for reducing concurrency are, at this point, limited 

due to the schedule imperatives driven by the lead ship patrol deadline.

Our analysis determined that it is more likely than not that the Columbia 

class program will exceed the Navy’s $128 billion (then-year dollars) 

estimate of total acquisition cost to which the program will be funded. 

Specifically, the program’s 2017 Milestone B cost estimates are optimistic 

because they do not account for a sufficient amount of program risk due 

to ongoing technology development, as well as the likely costs to design 

and construct the submarines. In addition, the Navy has budgeted the 

program to a confidence level for the program that is lower than what 

experts recommend, with a particularly optimistic estimate for the lead 

ship.33 While there may be situations when this would be appropriate, this 

is not the case for the Columbia class program due to the technical and 

design risks that we identified above. As a result, program costs will more 

likely than not exceed requested funding, particularly for lead ship 

construction. Due to the significant level of funding required for this 

program, even a small percentage of cost growth could have far-reaching 

consequences on the Navy’s long-range plans to fund construction of its 

future fleet. For this review we conducted an initial analysis of the Navy’s 

cost estimate but did not assess if it was conducted in accordance with all 

 33GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington D.C.: March 2009).

Columbia Class Is 

Not Funded 

Adequately to 

Address Program 

Risks
Page 41 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

of the best practices identified in our cost estimating guide. We plan to 

more fully assess the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimate for the entire 

Columbia class, including the program’s risk analyses, in future work.

From early on, the Navy recognized the need to control costs for the 

Columbia class. In fact, the program’s cost estimates have decreased 

significantly since the program’s inception due to Navy decisions early in 

the program to trade off some capabilities and the incorporation of 

updated actual cost data from the continued procurement of Virginia class 

submarines. At Milestone B, OSD determined that Columbia class 

procurement costs had fallen almost 40 percent since the program’s 

original estimate.34 However, while the Navy did conduct a risk analysis 

for its recent Columbia class cost estimates, the confidence level of the 

Navy’s estimate at Milestone B for acquisition of the entire class is 45 

percent. This means that it is more likely than not that actual costs to 

research, develop, and buy the submarines will exceed the Navy’s $128 

billion estimate.

This situation is particularly apparent at this point with regard to costs to 

design the class and build the lead submarine. Any difficulties in ongoing 

technology development efforts would likely worsen the picture. At 

Milestone B, the Navy’s point estimate to develop the technologies, 

design the class, and build the lead Columbia was at a 43 percent 

confidence level.

Experts agree that programs should be budgeted to at least the 50 

percent confidence level, but budgeting to a higher level (e.g., 70 to 80 

percent, or the mean) is a common practice to cover increased costs 

resulting from unexpected design complexity and technology uncertainty, 

among other things.35 Navy cost guidance recommends using the “risk 

adjusted mean” for the cost for the program, which usually lies between 

50 and 60 percent. If the Navy budgeted to an estimate at a higher 

confidence level like the risk adjusted mean, its Milestone B point 

estimates—meaning the selected estimate of cost—would be higher, 

reducing the probability of overruns occurring. According to Navy cost 

 34Decisions earlier in the program that traded off capabilities—namely, reducing the 

planned buy from 14 to 12 submarines and the number of missile tubes from 20 to 16—

significantly reduced costs prior to the program’s 2011 Milestone A.

35GAO-09-3SP.

Confidence Levels and the 

Navy’s Estimate

Confidence Levels

A confidence level is stated as a percentage 

depicting the probability that the program’s 

cost will actually be at some value or lower, 

calculated after conducting a risk analysis to 

identify and quantity program risks and 

determine the effects of these risks on its 

point estimates.

Source: GAO. | GAO-18-158.
Page 42 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

analysts, the program’s total acquisition cost, which the Navy estimated at 

Milestone B at $128 billion (then-year dollars), would exceed $131 billion 

(then-year dollars) at 50 percent confidence, which is the bottom range of 

the risk adjusted mean confidence level.

Even if the Navy budgeted to the 90 percent—a “worst-case” scenario 

where significant programmatic challenges are realized and the 

probability of cost overruns is low—confidence level, Columbia class lead 

ship costs would not be dissimilar to cost outcomes on other lead ship 

programs. We have observed in prior work that cost growth for recent 

lead ships across the Navy’s shipbuilding portfolio is 28 percent on 

average.36 For example, the Navy’s lead Virginia class submarines (SSN 

774 and SSN 775)—the most similar class to Columbia in terms of 

technology and component development as well as aspects of its design 

and build plans—experienced 15 and 24 percent budget growth 

respectively, with average cost growth of 28 percent for the three most 

recent lead submarines (see figure 15).

 36See, for example: GAO-05-183; GAO-09-322; GAO-16-84T. 

Cost Growth Potential 

Based on the Navy’s 

Estimate
Page 43 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Figure 15: Cost Growth in Program Budgets for the Three Lead Navy Submarines 

Authorized to Start Construction since 1989

Note: SSN 775, the second Virginia-class submarine, was constructed in a different shipyard than the 

first submarine in the class with the same design—SSN 774.

The 28 percent cost growth we have observed is slightly more than the 22 

percent cost increase between the Navy’s point estimate and the 90 

percent confidence level, meaning that even if the Navy budgeted the 

program to the 90 percent confidence level there would still be historical 

shipbuilding precedence for further cost growth. In particular, if costs to 

build the lead Columbia class submarine grow similar to the lead Seawolf 

and Virginia class submarines, the cost to construct the submarine would 

exceed the Navy’s Milestone B estimate by more than $2.5 billion. This 

would represent a total approaching $12 billion (then-year dollars) versus 

the current estimate of $9.2 billion for the lead submarine.37 Due to the 

magnitude of the Columbia class program’s expected cost, any cost 

growth, including for design and construction of the lead ship could 

impact the availability of funds for other Navy priorities.

 37$9.2 billion multiplied by 1.28 (average cost growth) equals $11.8 billion.
Page 44 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and CAPE also analyzed 

Columbia class program costs. CBO predicted higher costs than the Navy 

estimate. In its 2017 assessment of the Navy’s long-term shipbuilding 

plans, CBO concluded that the Navy underestimated the cost of the total 

Columbia class procurement by $8 billion (2017 dollars).38

CAPE estimated a lower cost, but also identified areas where reliable cost 

data were unavailable. The independent cost estimate prepared by CAPE 

in support of the program’s Milestone B reflects a 3 percent lower total 

program life-cycle cost (2017 dollars) than the Navy estimate. In setting

the program baseline in January 2017, DOD pragmatically opted to use 

the Navy’s higher estimate ($7.3 billion) instead of CAPE’s $7 billion 

estimate for the average unit cost to procure a Columbia class submarine 

(calendar year 2017 dollars). According to CAPE officials, this difference 

in estimates is largely due to CAPE incorporating more recent Virginia 

class actual cost data into its estimate than the Navy. However, CAPE 

also identified that there is a lack of reliable cost data on some contractorfurnished materials and government furnished equipment (GFE) for the 

Columbia class program, which limited the quality of the estimate. GFE 

comprises critical areas of the Columbia class submarine, including the 

strategic weapon system managed by Strategic Systems Program and 

the IPS developed by Naval Reactors.

The Columbia class submarine will be a significant DOD acquisition for 

the next several decades due to cost and mission importance in 

guaranteeing the nation’s strategic deterrence. Failure to meet the 

aggressive patrol dates required of the program could challenge the Navy 

in effectively meeting strategic patrol requirements, and not delivering the 

required level of performance could compromise the Navy’s plan to 

operate this class through 2080.

Given the risks facing the program and the significance of potential delays 

or cost growth, we believe this program warrants increased attention to 

and scrutiny over what we consider to be its critical technologies 

(inclusive of the program’s stated technology development efforts),

several of which remain immature. Specifically, technologies such as IPS 

and the propulsor and coordinated stern demand more specific 

 38CBO, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2017 Shipbuilding Plan, (Washington, D.C.:

February 2017).

Conclusions
Page 45 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

congressional visibility to ensure they stay on track. These areas also 

warrant specific assurances from the Navy that they will be delivered on 

time and will perform as required. This assurance could augment the 

Milestone B certifications which were predicated on a TRA that was not 

representative of the technical risk facing the program. Further, such 

information would help bolster confidence for Congress that the program 

technologies will be matured in time to support construction, which is 

especially important as the Navy pursues plans to start construction of the 

lead ship early. Without putting in place a requirement for the Navy to 

provide these assurances on a periodic basis, Congress will not have the 

information until after the Navy has asked for another $8.7 billion in 

funding for lead ship construction. It is also important for Congress to be 

informed of the impact on performance requirements if technologies are 

delayed or fail to mature as planned.

The Columbia class program is also facing risks from its aggressive and 

concurrent schedule as a result of the continued and pressing need for it 

to meet the Navy’s nuclear deterrent requirements as the legacy 

submarine fleet that cannot be life extended any longer. Typically 

addressing risks of such concurrency is accomplished by, among other 

things, delaying milestones until more knowledge is obtained. Doing so 

helps reduce concurrency and bring more stability to the design before 

construction activities begin. Recognizing the mission imperatives that are 

driving Columbia class’s aggressive and concurrent schedule it is unlikely 

that the Navy will have the ability to slow the pace of the program in order 

to reduce cost and schedule risk. Therefore, additional reporting to 

decisionmakers on the status of key technologies could help ensure they 

fully understand the risks of such an approach and account for such risks 

when making programmatic decisions.

In our draft report we had suggested a matter for congressional 

consideration related to additional Navy reporting on the Columbia class 

technologies, but we have since removed it because the recently passed 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018 includes Navy 

reporting requirements for the Columbia class program that would 

achieve the intent of our matter.

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration
Page 46 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

We provided a draft of this product to DOD for comment. The Navy 

provided technical comments earlier in the review process which we 

incorporated where appropriate. In its written comments, reproduced in 

appendix III, DOD’s position was that there is not a need for additional 

congressional reporting on the Columbia class program because there 

are new reporting requirements in the conference report accompanying 

the NDAA for fiscal year 2018. We agree that the reporting requirements 

in the section 231 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018 meet the intent of our 

matter for congressional consideration. These new reporting 

requirements for the Navy became law on December 12, 2017, after we 

sent the report to DOD and appropriate congressional committees. We 

agree that the reporting requirements meet the intent of our matter for 

congressional consideration. Accordingly, we have removed our matter 

from this report. 

In addition, DOD also disagreed with our characterization of technical 

risks facing the Columbia class program and its TRA. Specifically, DOD 

stated that the program is meeting statutory and DOD maturity standards 

and met or exceeded DOD technology maturity requirements. DOD also 

stated that the program’s TRA was conducted in accordance with a 2011 

DOD policy memo that directed TRA’s should focus only on “technology 

maturity, as opposed to engineering and integration risk.” However, 

neither this policy memo nor the Columbia class TRA define what 

constitutes engineering and integration risk and it is unclear what criteria 

the Navy used in making these determinations. Our report acknowledges 

that DOD followed statutory and DOD requirements for the two 

technologies that the Navy identified as critical technologies in the 

program’s TRA. However, our report also identifies several other 

technologies that we believe should have also been subject to these 

requirements had the Navy conducted a TRA in accordance with our 

identified best practices. By applying our identified best practices, we 

believe these efforts would have been considered critical technologies 

and would have been subject to an evaluation of technology maturity 

levels, additional reporting requirements and, potentially, identification of 

additional risk mitigation efforts. 

DOD also disagreed with our criteria for identifying a critical technology 

and assessing maturity. DOD asserted that applying our criteria would 

result in nearly every system on a submarine becoming a critical 

technology. We disagree. Our criteria are consistent with DOD’s own 

criteria for identifying critical technologies, and only focus on those that 

are most significant to a program. Given the program’s cost and schedule 

risks and operational imperatives, we believe that appropriately identifying 

Agency Comments 

and our Evaluation
Page 47 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

the critical technologies is an important step in acknowledging and 

mitigating program risk. DOD also stated that achieving a TRL 7 by 

milestone B would be unrealistic because of the difficulties in testing 

some systems in an operational environment prior to launching the 

submarine. We agree that in some cases testing at sea is not practical 

and testing in a relevant environment may be sufficient to demonstrate 

maturity. However, achieving a TRL 7 is not only based on the test 

environment; it is also based on demonstrating a prototype near or at the 

planned operational system configuration, which requires a design 

resembling the final configuration. The Columbia class program has yet to 

complete this type of prototype for the key systems we identified. As we 

stated in the report some systems, like the propulsor, do not yet have a 

final design. While we do not expect the Navy to test every critical 

technology on a submarine at sea to demonstrate maturity, we would 

expect testing of a prototype near or at the planned operational system 

configuration prototype in a relevant environment. For example, prototype 

testing of the electric drive at a land-based test facility would demonstrate 

maturity—but is not planned for several years—well after the submarine’s 

design and potentially construction is underway. While such concurrency 

introduces cost, schedule and technical risk, we have previously reported 

that programs may choose to move forward with these risks, but should 

acknowledged and appropriately resource the program to address the 

risks should they materialize. As we stated in the report, this is not the 

case for the Columbia class program: some risks have not been properly 

identified and the cost estimate does not fully account for the margin of 

technical and schedule risks facing the program. 

DOD also provided a table of Columbia class practices, reprinted with our 

comments in appendix III.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and 

other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on 

GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 48 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or oakleys@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to the report are listed in appendix IV.

Shelby S. Oakley

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 49 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 50 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

This report examines (1) the status of key Columbia class technologies 

and congressional reporting requirements on this status, (2) risks, if any, 

with the Navy’s planned approach for design and construction, and (3) 

whether expected funding levels for the Columbia class will be adequate 

moving forward.

To assess the status of key Columbia class technologies, we reviewed 

the Navy’s technology development plan and the planned technical 

approach and the status of key prototyping efforts to all of the systems 

that comprise the program, focusing on the technology readiness level of 

the major components that are key to enabling program success and that 

are key cost and schedule drivers. We also compared technology 

development efforts with program requirements and with GAO’s identified 

best practices for shipbuilding programs. We also evaluated the 

program’s Technology Readiness Assessment, which included applying 

the GAO-developed criteria documented in GAO’s Technology 

Assessment Guide. GAO’s guide draws heavily from the Department of 

Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) best practices, and establishes a methodology

based on those best practices that can be used across the federal 

government for evaluating technology maturity, particularly as it relates to 

determining a program or project’s readiness to move past key decision 

points that typically coincide with major commitments of resources. We 

also interviewed relevant officials from the Navy’s Columbia class 

submarine program office; the Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsUndersea Warfare; Naval Sea Systems Command Naval Nuclear 

Propulsion Program; Navy Strategic Systems Program; Naval Undersea 

Warfare Center Newport; Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock 

Division; Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Director Operational 

Test and Evaluation; OSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L); 

OSD Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE); and the prime 

contractor shipyard General Dynamics Electric Boat and their subcontractor Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding. To 

determine the congressional reporting requirements on this status we 

reviewed relevant DOD acquisition instructions and statute.

To assess the risks, if any, with the Navy’s planned approach for design 

and construction, we compared the status of design maturity with Navy 

and shipyard plans to identify any delays, and compared planned design 

maturity and schedule projections with those of prior U.S. submarine 

efforts (the Virginia, Seawolf, and Ohio classes) to assess realism of 

Columbia class estimates. We also interviewed and analyzed available 

documentation from Naval Reactors (NAVSEA 08) related to nuclear 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 51 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

reactor and Integrated Power System status. We also interviewed 

relevant officials from the Navy’s Columbia class submarine program 

office; Naval Sea Systems Command Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program; 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, and the prime 

contractor shipyard General Dynamics Electric Boat and their subcontractor Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding. We 

also assessed the Navy’s acquisition strategy and the Integrated 

Enterprise Plan that tracks shipyard workload across the Columbia and 

Virginia class submarines and the Ford class aircraft carrier to identify 

any factors related to potential schedule challenges.

To assess whether expected funding levels for the Columbia class will be 

adequate moving forward, we compared program cost estimates 

prepared at Milestone B to historical data on lead ships and submarine 

estimates and actuals to assess the realism of these requirements. We 

also analyzed program documentation to identify risk factors, if any, 

related to cost projections, including the program’s Independent Cost 

Estimate created by the OSD Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, and 

the Navy’s Service Cost Position and Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate. 

This evaluation leverages, among other things, prior GAO work on cost 

estimating and the Navy’s acquisition of lead ships.

We also interviewed relevant officials from the Navy’s Columbia class 

submarine program office; the Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsUndersea Warfare; Naval Sea Systems Command Naval Nuclear 

Propulsion Program; Naval Undersea Warfare Center; Naval Surface 

Warfare Center Carderock Division; OSD Director Operational Test and 

Evaluation; OSD AT&L; CAPE; and the prime contractor shipyard 

General Dynamics Electric Boat and their sub-contractor Huntington 

Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2016 to December 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Department of Defense 

Technology Readiness Levels

Page 52 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Table 4: Department of Defense Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)

TRL Definition Description

1. Basic principles observed and 

reported

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into 

applied research and development (R&D). Examples might include paper studies of a 

technology’s basic properties.

2. Technology concept and/or 

applications formulated

Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be 

invented. Applications are speculative and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to 

support the assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies.

3. Analytical and experimental 

function and/or characteristic proof 

of concept

Active R&D is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to 

physically validate the analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 

Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative.

4. Component and/or breadboard 

validation in a laboratory 

environment

Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will work together. 

This is relatively “low fidelity” compared with the eventual system. Examples include 

integration of “ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory.

5. Component and/or breadboard 

validation in a relevant 

environment

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological 

components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so they can be 

tested in a simulated environment. Examples include “high-fidelity” laboratory 

integration of components.

6. System/subsystem model or 

prototype demonstration in a 

relevant environment

Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of TRL 5, is tested 

in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated 

readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory 

environment or in a simulated operational environment.

7. System prototype demonstrated in 

an operational environment

Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 

6 by requiring the demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational 

environment (e.g., in an aircraft, in a vehicle, or in space.

8. Actual system completed and 

qualified through test and 

demonstration.

Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In 

almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of the true system development. 

Examples include developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended 

weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications.

9. Actual system proven through 

successful mission operations.

Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such 

as those encountered in operational test and evaluations. Examples include using the 

system under operational conditions.

Source: GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-17-333SP (Washington, D.C., Mar 30, 2017) | GAO-18-158

Appendix II: Department of Defense

Technology Readiness Levels
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 53 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 54 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 55 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 56 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

DOD also provided the above table of Columbia class practices. These 

practices align with GAO’s identified best practices in shipbuilding—stable 

requirements, design maturity at construction start, and manufacturing 

readiness. However, we have several observations on the DOD’s 

statements:

Stable Operational and Technical Requirements:

• We have previously identified maintaining stable requirements as a 

best practice; in this report we note that the Navy has provided a 

stable basis for the Columbia class program by adhering to this 

practice.

High Design Maturity at Construction Start:

• While we give credit to the program for striving for a high level of 

design maturity at construction start for the Columbia class program, 

we identify in this report that we have concerns about the Navy’s 

ability to stabilize design drawings while technology development 

continues.

• As we point out in this report, we are concerned with the maturity of 

the Columbia class design due to the unknowns with key 

technologies. In this table the Department identifies that the program 

is leveraging proven Virginia class technology for the propulsor, which 

it identifies as a TRL 9. Although this technology is indeed mature in 

the context of Virginia class submarines (i.e., not new or novel), it is 

nevertheless novel in the context of Columbia class submarines and 

should thus be considered a CTE to be evaluated and risk managed. 

As such, we dispute the Navy’s assertion that the Virginia class 

propulsor is TRL 9 in the context of the Columbia class program, 

since the Navy has yet to complete a design for the propulsor nor has 

it tested a production representative prototype, which would achieve a 

TRL 6 or 7 (depending on the test environment).

Manufacturing and Construction Readiness:

• We have not conducted adequate work in this area to comment on 

DOD’s statements of manufacturing and construction readiness; we 

plan to address this in future work.

Aggressive Action to Reduce Costs:

• While the Navy has made significant progress in reducing potential 

costs for the Columbia class program, we believe that the risks 

identified in this report, coupled with the optimistic cost estimate and 

GAO Comments
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 57 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

aggressive schedule, could result in cost growth that reduces the 

actual savings identified by the program.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 58 GAO-18-158 Columbia Class Submarine

Shelby S. Oakley, (202) 512-4841 or oakleys@gao.gov

In addition the contact name above, the following staff members made 

key contributions to this report: Diana Moldafsky, Assistant Director; C. 

James Madar; Jacob Leon Beier; Brian Bothwell; Herb Bowsher; Kurt 

Gurka; Stephanie Gustafson; Tim Persons; and Robin Wilson.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100841)
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