This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0754

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Donalonte Jamar Wade,

Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,

Appellant.

Filed February 8, 2016

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CR-14-1410

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. 

Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda & McGeeney, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Rodenberg, Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

Appellant bonding company argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying its petition to reinstate and discharge a forfeited bail bond. We affirm. 

FACTS

On February 28, 2014, after defendant Donalonte Jamar Wade’s initial appearance 

on a charge of violating a domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO), appellant Midwest 

Bonding, LLC (Midwest) posted a $60,000 bond for Wade. On September 29, 2014, Wade 

pleaded guilty. Wade failed to appear for sentencing on November 7, 2014, and the district 

court forfeited the bond and issued a bench warrant for Wade’s arrest. 

Upon learning that Wade failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, Midwest began 

efforts to locate him, including trying to call Wade and the indemnitor, running an 

electronic search of jails in Minnesota, and hiring a fugitive recovery agent. On November 

29, 2014, Wade was arrested by law enforcement for a separate crime. When he was 

arrested, Wade admitted that he had not opened the door to police when ordered to because 

he knew there were active warrants for his arrest. Wade’s warrant was cleared on 

December 2, 2014, and he was sentenced on the DANCO violation charge on December 

19, 2014. 

Midwest filed a petition to reinstate and discharge the bond on December 30, 2014. 

In the petition and in the affidavit attached to the petition, Midwest represented that Wade 

was apprehended “as a result of intelligence provided by [Midwest’s recovery agent.]” On 

December 19, 2014, the state informed the district court that the statement in Midwest’s 
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affidavit that Wade was apprehended as a result of information provided by Midwest’s 

recovery agent was false. 

At the contested hearing on the petition to reinstate and discharge the bond, Midwest 

conceded that its recovery agent had misrepresented the facts of the case to Midwest and 

that those false facts were then represented to the district court in its petition and 

accompanying affidavit. The state recommended a 17% penalty for passing on the 

recovery agent’s misrepresentation in the petition and affidavit. The district court denied 

Midwest’s petition to reinstate and discharge the bond and ordered that it remain forfeited 

in its entirety. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

If a defendant released on bail fails to appear and the bond goes into default, “the 

[district] court may forgive or reduce the penalty according to the circumstances of the case 

and the situation of the party on any terms and conditions it considers just and reasonable.” 

Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2014). We review a district court’s decision on a petition to reinstate 

a forfeited bond for an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland, 784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 

2010). When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we consider the 

following factors:

(1) the purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and 

the cause, purpose and length of a defendant’s absence; (2) the 

good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault or

willfulness of the defendant; (3) the good-faith efforts of the 

bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant; and 

(4) any prejudice to the [s]tate in its administration of justice.
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Id. (citing In re Application of Shetsky, 239 Minn. 463, 471, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (1953)). 

Midwest bears the burden of establishing that the first three factors weigh in favor of 

reinstatement, but the state bears the burden of proving any claimed prejudice. Id. 

The purpose of bail, the civil nature of the proceedings, and the cause, purpose, and 

length of a defendant’s absence

The purpose of allowing third parties to act as sureties and post bonds “is to relieve 

the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of detaining him pending the trial 

and at the same time, by placing him in the protective custody of a surety . . . , to insure his 

presence for trial” without impairing the administration of justice. Shetsky, 239 Minn. at 

471, 60 N.W.2d at 46. “Another [purpose] is to encourage sureties to locate, arrest, and 

return defaulting defendants to the authorities to facilitate the timely administration of 

justice.” State v. Vang, 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. App. 2009). 

Midwest received notice of Wade’s failure to appear and of the forfeiture and made 

some efforts to locate him, including hiring a recovery agent. A little more than three 

weeks after failing to appear, Wade was arrested for an unrelated crime in another county

with no assistance from Midwest. While Wade’s absence was not prolonged, the purpose 

of bail was not achieved here because not only did Midwest not apprehend Wade, but its 

minimal efforts in no way contributed to Wade’s apprehension. 

The good faith of the bond company as measured by the fault or willfulness of the 

defendant

“[A] [d]efendant’s willfulness or bad faith is attributable to the surety” and weighs 

against reinstatement. Id. It is clear that Wade willfully failed to appear in court, as he 
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admitted that he was trying to avoid contact with law enforcement because he had active 

warrants. Furthermore, Midwest concedes that this factor weighs against reinstatement.

The good faith efforts of the bond company to apprehend and produce the defendant

Midwest took some steps to investigate Wade’s whereabouts, including hiring a 

recovery agent at the cost of $6,000. But, as the district court noted, there is no indication 

in the record that any of the money Midwest spent in hiring the recovery agent went to any 

efforts to locate or apprehend Wade. And, despite his apparent lack of investigative effort, 

Midwest’s agent falsely represented that it had provided the intelligence that led to Wade’s 

arrest. Relying on its recovery agent, Midwest falsely represented to the district court that 

Wade was apprehended “as a result of intelligence provided by the [r]ecovery [a]gent.” As 

the district court noted, “the fact that [Midwest’s] affidavit does not identify the claimed 

intelligence provided to law enforcement suggests . . . that [Midwest] did little or no 

investigation or verification of its [a]gent’s claim before providing the affidavit to the 

court.” While Midwest may not have knowingly misrepresented its agent’s involvement 

in the apprehension of Wade, its seemingly blind reliance on the agent’s representation 

indicates that Midwest lacked good faith in attempting to apprehend Wade and in claiming 

credit for his apprehension. 

Any prejudice to the state in its administration of justice

“[T]he prejudice-to-the-[s]tate factor in the Shetsky analysis is concerned solely 

with prejudice to the [s]tate in prosecuting the defendant.” Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 63. 

Prejudice to the state includes the delay or thwarting of the administration of justice and 
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the expense incurred by the state in apprehending the defendant. See Shetsky, 239 Minn. 

at 474, 60 N.W.2d at 48. 

Midwest asserts that there was simply no claim of prejudice by the state and that 

this factor weighs in favor of reinstatement. Although the state recommended only a 17% 

forfeiture and did not specifically argue that it was prejudiced, the district court considered 

the six-week delay in the administration of justice and the costs incurred by the state in 

arresting Wade, holding him in custody, and transporting him to Ramsey County for 

sentencing in denying Midwest’s petition. The administration of justice in this case was 

only briefly delayed, but sentencing was nonetheless delayed, and law enforcement 

apprehended Wade on unrelated charges in a neighboring county. Although the prejudice 

to the state is not severe in this case, the state had to take additional steps to ensure Wade’s 

appearance at his sentencing hearing. 

Other Circumstances

Lastly, Midwest argues that the district court erroneously considered “other 

circumstances” in making its bond reinstatement determination. The other circumstances 

considered by the district court primarily relate to the fact that Midwest’s fugitive recovery 

agent misrepresented his role in the apprehension of Wade and that Midwest passed on this 

misrepresentation to the district court. In considering the misrepresentation, the district 

court stated: 

The passed-on misrepresentation is also quite troublesome to 

the court because in deciding whether to reinstate a bail bond, 

the court relies heavily on petitioners’ affidavits and assumes 

the information in them to be true. Had the [s]tate never 

bothered to check the accuracy of [Midwest’s] affidavit to the 
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court, the court would have credited the [a]gent and [Midwest] 

with providing a valuable service to the [s]tate. As things 

stand, the service [Midwest] provided was of no value, not only 

because its [a]gent did nothing to locate [Wade], but also 

because the false affidavit calls into question whether the court 

can rely on [Midwest] to fairly and honestly perform its role as 

a surety. 

Midwest argues that the other circumstances that the district court considered were 

irrelevant to the bond reinstatement decision. But, the acts of the recovery agent and 

Midwest’s reliance on his representation relate to the Shetsky factors, most directly to the 

purpose of bail and the good faith of the bond company. 

The district court determined that each of the Shetsky factors weighed against 

reinstatement of the bond. Based on the unique facts of this case, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Midwest’s petition for reinstatement 

and discharge of the bond. 

Affirmed.