Department of Health and Human Services 

OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

JUNE GIBBS BROWN 

Inspector General 

JULY 2000 

OEI-05-99-00390 

The Establishment of 

Child Support Orders for 

Low Income 

Non-custodial Parents 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG), as mandated by Public Law 95-452, is to 

protect the integrity of the Department of Health and Human Services programs as well as the 

health and welfare of beneficiaries served by them. This statutory mission is carried out through a 

nationwide program of audits, investigations, inspections, sanctions, and fraud alerts. The 

Inspector General informs the Secretary of program and management problems and recommends 

legislative, regulatory, and operational approaches to correct them. 

Office of Evaluation and Inspections 

The Office of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI) is one of several components of the Office of 

Inspector General. It conducts short-term management and program evaluations (called 

inspections) that focus on issues of concern to the Department, the Congress, and the public. The 

inspection reports provide findings and recommendations on the efficiency, vulnerability, and 

effectiveness of departmental programs. 

OEI's Chicago regional office prepared this report under the direction of William Moran, Regional 

Inspector General and Natalie Coen, Deputy Inspector General. Principal OEI staff included: 

REGION 

Victoria Dougherty, Project Leader

Ann Maxwell, Analyst

Marco Villagrana, Analyst

Madeline Carpinelli, Analyst

James Athos, Intern

Robert Gibbons, San Francisco Regional Office

Blaine Collins, Dallas Regional Office

Chaletta Clark, Boston Regional Office

Christi Macrina, New York Regional Office

Erika Q. Lang, Philadelphia Regional Office

HEADQUARTERS 

Linda Hall, Program Specialist

Joan Richardson, Program Specialist

To obtain copies of this report, please call the Chicago Regional Office at 312-353-9867. 

Reports are also available on the World Wide Web at our home page address: 

http://www.hhs.gov/oig/oei 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

PURPOSE 

To examine the policies and practices used to determine the amount of child support to be 

paid by low-income non-custodial parents and the relationship of these practices to the 

dollars collected on low-income cases. 

OVERVIEW 

This inspection focuses on the relationship between the payment of child support and 

order establishment practices for a subset of the non-custodial parent population — lowincome non-custodial parents. This subset constitutes about one-third of the total noncustodial parent population.1 The goal of this inspection is to understand current methods 

of setting support for these non-custodial parents and to determine possible alternative 

methods to improve their payment rates. 

Sources of Non-Payment of Child Support 

The non-custodial parent population can be divided into three income tiers: high, middle, 

and low. In each of these tiers, there are non-custodial parents who do not pay their child 

support. The percentage of obligors who do not pay child support is greatest in the lowincome tier. In this tier, obligors have family income below the poverty threshold for their 

family size or personal income below the poverty threshold for a single individual.2 

Some low-income obligors are delinquent in support payments because they are unwilling 

to pay support. However, one study estimates that 60 percent of non-custodial parents 

who do not pay child support, have a limited ability to pay support based on their income 

levels, education levels, high rates of institutionalization, and intermittent employment 

history.3 These non-custodial parents have come to be known in the child support 

community as “dead-broke” rather than “dead-beat.” 

While the increased use of enforcement mechanisms may positively affect the payment 

compliance of higher income obligors, tools such as asset seizure, passport denial and the 

criminal pursuit of non-support are not likely to generate payments from obligors who do 

not have the income to pay the support they owe, even if they are willing to pay. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

1 
Promoting Payment of Child Support 

In order to increase the payment of child support by low-income obligors, representatives 

of the child support community have begun to explore other avenues in addition to 

punitive enforcement. Congressional support for the proposed Fathers Count Act, the 

Department’s Fatherhood Initiative and the IV-D Community’s fatherhood activities 

demonstrate a growing effort to address payment inability in order to increase collections. 

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996 

(PRWORA) presented a package of temporary aid and opportunities to welfare mothers in 

return for the expectation that they would get a job and become self-sufficient. Child 

support payments are seen as a vital ingredient to this self sufficiency. In order to increase 

child support payments to former welfare families, the limited earnings capacity of the 

fathers of these families need to be addressed. Just as welfare mothers are expected to 

improve their personal responsibility in exchange for work opportunities, so should lowincome fathers. Congress expanded Welfare-to-Work funding with this intention. 

In recognition of the need to increase collections in low-income cases, we examined the 

methods used to determine the financial obligations owed by non-custodial parents and 

their relationship to payment collections in low-income cases. We conducted our 

inspection through case record reviews of 402 cases, representing 281 non-custodial 

parents, and through in-depth interviews in a 10 State sample. 

This report looks in depth at the practices used to determine financial obligations in 10 

States and the payment compliance associated with these practices. Our companion 

report, State Policies Used to Establish Child Support Orders for Low-income 

Non-custodial Parents, provides information on all States’ policies in this area. 

FINDINGS 

Methods Used to Determine Financial Obligations for Low-income Obligors 

Often Yield Poor Results 

States use tools such as retroactive support and income imputation to encourage noncustodial parents to cooperate with child support and to enforce accountability. It is 

understandable that States do not want to reward a non-custodial parent for delaying the 

award or for not earning income to pay support. However, it appears that these incentives 

to cooperate are not effective means of getting non-custodial parents to pay support. 

‚ RETROACTIVE SUPPORT: Most sampled States routinely charge noncustodial parents for retroactive support. The longer the period of retroactivity, 

the less likely it is that the parent will pay any support. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

2 
When non-custodial parents were not charged any retroactive support, 14 percent 

made no payments during the first 32 months of the child support obligation. 

When non-custodial parents were charged between 1 and 12 months of retroactive 

support, the percent which made no payments rose to 23 percent. The percentage 

of non-payers rose to 34 percent when the non-custodial parents were charged for 

more than 12 months of retroactive support. 

‚ INCOME IMPUTATION: Most sampled States impute income when the noncustodial parent is unemployed or income is unknown. Income imputation appears 

ineffective in generating payments. 

Where imputed income was used to calculate the amount of the child support 

obligation owed in cases established in 1996, almost half of the cases generated no 

payments toward the financial obligation over a 32 month period. In contrast, 

where cases were not based on imputed income, only 11 percent of cases received 

no payments during this time period. While it is possible that the parents for 

whom income was imputed were potentially less likely to pay anyway, imputing 

income does not appear to be an effective method of getting them to pay. 

‚ MINIMUM ORDERS: Six of the sampled States routinely establish minimum 

orders when the non-custodial parent has limited payment ability. Minimum order 

cases exhibit lower payment compliance than other cases. 

In 36 percent of cases established as a minimum order in 1996, the non-custodial 

parents made no payments in the first 32 months of the order. In contrast, 20 

percent of cases established as non minimum orders (i.e. all others) received no 

payments over this time. This non-payment could be a reflection of limited 

earnings and the fact that minimum awards are not based on actual income. 

‚ DEBT OWED TO THE STATE: Most sampled States will not reduce debt 

owed to the State by the non-custodial parent except in rare cases. Median debt 

on 1996 cases is over $3,000. 

Non-custodial parents can accrue an unlimited amount of debt owed to the State 

which remains on their account indefinitely, regardless of whether the debt is due 

to inability to pay or unwillingness to pay. Seventy-five percent of cases 

established in 1996 owed over $1,231 in child support debt 32 months after the 

financial order was established. 

‚ JOB PROGRAMS: Few sampled child support agencies formally link with job 

programs. Non-custodial parent participation in such programs is minimal. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

3 
Despite increasing attention to the limited earnings capacity of low-income noncustodial parents and increased funding for job services, most sampled States have 

only informal arrangements for referral to existing job services programs. These 

programs are largely external to the IV-D agencies with little to no participation by 

non-custodial parents. 

CONCLUSION 

As the facts in this report demonstrate, the policies reviewed do not usually generate child 

support payments by low-income non-custodial parents. Recognition of this fact presents 

opportunities to improve payment levels by modifying State policies that determine the 

amount that low-income absent parents must pay. Clearly, some systematic 

experimentation is warranted. 

The experiments should emphasize parental responsibility, while improving the ability of 

low-income non-custodial parents to meet their obligations. This requires a dual approach 

of setting realistic support obligations and providing employment support with work 

requirements. The goal of these approaches is to get non-custodial parents to take 

financial responsibility for their child, which is to the benefit of all of the parties involved 

— the custodial parent, the State and, ultimately, the child. 

States are in the best position to conduct such experiments. However, the Office of Child 

Support Enforcement can do much to encourage, facilitate, and evaluate such State 

experimentation. We offer suggestions for State research and experimentation 

corresponding to the four areas of analysis contained in this report: retroactive support, 

income imputation, debt owed to the States, and job programs. We present the following 

suggestions to OCSE: 

‚ Facilitate and support State experiments to test the payment effects of using 

various periods of retroactivity in determining the amount of support to be paid. 

‚ Facilitate and support State experiments to test negotiating the amount of debt 

owed to the State in exchange for improved payment compliance. 

‚ Encourage States to decrease the use of income imputation and to test alternative 

means of identifying income for low-income obligors. 

‚ Encourage States to formalize ties to local job services programs and to require 

unemployed non-custodial parents to participate in job programs. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

4 
AGENCY COMMENTS 

The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 

Evaluation (ASPE) provided formal comments to the draft report. Both offices concurred with 

the report’s findings and suggested approaches. The text of the ACF and ASPE comments can be 

found in Appendix F. 

In addition to existing initiatives, ACF described numerous actions that they will take to 

implement the suggested approaches with regard to retroactive support charges, compromising 

arrears, income imputation, and job programs. 

The ASPE commented that our findings are consistent with, and complementary to, other 

research on this subject. The ASPE also indicated that our suggested approaches would 

strengthen existing Administration efforts to improve the payment compliance and involvement of 

low-income non-custodial parents. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 7

FINDINGS

Retroactive Support .................................................. 12

Income Imputation .................................................... 15

Minimum Orders ..................................................... 17

Debt Owed to States .................................................. 18

Job Programs ........................................................ 20

CONCLUSION ........................................................... 22

AGENCY COMMENTS ................................................ 29

APPENDICES

A. Confidence Intervals ................................................ 30

B. Results of Hypothesis Testing ......................................... 31

C. Case Data ........................................................ 34

D. Related Office of Inspector General Reports .............................. 40

E. Bibliography ..................................................... 41

F. Agency Comments ................................................ 42

G. End-Notes ....................................................... 54

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

6 
INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

To examine the policies and practices used to determine the amount of child support to be 

paid by low-income non-custodial parents and the relationship of these practices to the 

dollars collected on low-income cases. 

BACKGROUND 

This report examines how a sample of 10 States determine the financial obligations owed 

by non-custodial parents and the relationship between these practices and payment 

compliance. While this report looks in depth at these practices in 10 States, a companion 

report, State Policies Used to Establish Child Support Orders for Low-income 

Non-custodial Parents (OEI-05-99-00391), provides information on all States’ policies in 

this area. A follow-up report will examine the degree to which child support orders are 

aligned with the actual earnings of low-income non-custodial parents and the relationship 

between order alignment and payment compliance. 

Low Payment Rates And Custodial Parent Poverty 

Although child support collections have increased significantly in recent years, overall 

rates of collection remain low. In fiscal year (FY) 1997, of the $17.6 billion due in 

current support, $8.1 billion, or 46 percent was not collected.4 

Low child support collections leave many single mothers and their children in poverty. In 

1995, 85 percent of custodial parents were women, 33 percent of whom lived below the 

Federal poverty line.5 The percentage of custodial parents receiving welfare declined 

significantly in the past few years, dropping from 47 percent in 1995 to 34 percent in 

1998.6 This decline in welfare receipt elevates the need for increased child support 

collections to help struggling single parents maintain self-sufficiency. The regular receipt 

of child support is often cited as a critical ingredient to welfare reform success. 

The Earnings of Non-Custodial Parents 

The non-custodial parent population can be divided into three income tiers: high, middle, 

and low. In each of these tiers, there are non-custodial parents who do not pay their child 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

7 
support. The percentage of obligors who do not pay child support is greatest in the lowincome tier. In this tier, obligors have family income below the poverty threshold for their 

family size or personal income below the poverty threshold for a single individual.7 

Some low-income obligors are delinquent in support payments because they are unwilling 

to pay support. However, it is estimated that 60 percent of non-custodial parents who do 

not pay child support, have a limited ability to pay support based on their income levels, 

employment history, education levels and rates of institutionalization.8 In one study of 

low-income obligors, 60 percent had no high school diploma or GED and 70 percent had 

been arrested.9 These non-custodial parents are known in the child support community as 

“dead-broke” rather than “dead-beat.” 

The Office of Inspector General and the Office of Child Support Enforcement have a joint 

enforcement effort targeted at higher income obligors with the most egregious arrears. 

The focus of this highly successful initiative is the criminal pursuit of non-support. While 

the increased use of enforcement mechanisms may positively affect the payment 

compliance of higher income obligors, tools such as asset seizure, passport denial and the 

criminal pursuit of non-support are not likely to generate payments from obligors who do 

not have the income to pay the support they owe. 

Increasing Attention to the Treatment of Low-income Non-custodial Parents 

In recent years, the research and policy community has devoted more attention to the 

treatment of low-income non-custodial parents in the child support system. Especially in 

the wake of welfare reform, more attention is being devoted to how to improve the family 

maintenance contributions of low-income fathers to parallel the welfare-to-work initiatives 

for low-income mothers. Three recent developments demonstrate this trend. 

C The Department of Health and Human Services has highlighted its Fatherhood 

Initiative as a priority. The Fatherhood Initiative strives to promote and support 

the involvement of fathers in their children’s lives. To this end, a portion of 

welfare-to-work funds in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was designated to help 

low-income fathers secure employment, pay child support and increase their 

involvement with their children. The Department has also provided funds for 

services targeting non-custodial parents through the Fatherhood Initiative and 

related OCSE demonstrations. Most recently, in March 2000, the Department 

announced $15 million in combined federal and private funding for demonstration 

projects serving non-custodial parents who do not have a child support order in 

place and may face obstacles to employment. 

C Amendments to the welfare-to-work law in the November 1999 Consolidated 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

8 
Appropriations Act broadened the eligibility requirements for non-custodial 

parents to participate in the services available through welfare-to-work programs. 

C Building upon these efforts to boost the financial and emotional contributions of 

non-custodial parents, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Fathers 

Count Act in November 1999. This proposed legislation includes grants for 

projects designed to promote successful parenting and encourage payment of child 

support. The bill is expected to be considered by the U.S. Senate in 2000. 

As researchers and policy-makers develop strategies to increase the cooperation of noncustodial parents, one primary area of concern is the order establishment process. 

Representatives of the child support enforcement community have raised questions about 

the effect of income imputation and arrearage policies on the non-custodial parent’s ability 

to comply with the support order obligation. 

The establishment of orders for child support enforcement cases (also known as IV-D 

cases, referring to the related title of the Social Security Act), occurs through either 

judicial or administrative processes. States are required to establish child support orders 

in accordance with State guidelines, outlining specific descriptive and numeric criteria. 

Any deviation from the presumptive guideline amount must be justified in writing. 

This report and its companions examine how States address the limited incomes of noncustodial parents in the determination of financial obligations for support and the 

relationship between these practices and payment compliance. Inability to pay is only one 

of several reasons for non-compliance with child support orders. Other reasons often 

cited as potential motivators of unwillingness to pay support include custody and visitation 

disputes and State retention of payments made on behalf of families on welfare. Future 

inspections will examine these other potential barriers to payment compliance. 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

In this inspection, we examined State policies used to determine the amount of support 

owed, the implementation of these policies in 10 States and the relationship between these 

policies and payment compliance on a random sample of cases in the 10 States. 

We selected a random sample of cases (and the 10 States associated with them) using a 

two-stage, stratified cluster sample. We stratified the continental United States (excluding 

Alaska) into three strata based on State policy regarding the establishment of minimum 

awards for low-income obligors. We then divided each State into a number of case 

clusters based on the estimated number of child support cases per State. From each 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

9 
stratum, we randomly selected three or four clusters. The States containing the randomly 

selected clusters became our sample States, shown below. 

Stratum Description 

Clusters 

Population Sample 

1 court’s 

Awards in 

discretion 

893 Clusters 

in 16 States 

3 Clusters in MS, OK, PA 

2 Presumptive 

awards 

614 Clusters in 

18 States 3 Clusters in TX, VA, WA 

3 minimum 

Mandatory 

awards 

652 Clusters in 

14 States plus 

District of 

Columbia 

4 Clusters in CO, MA, MD, NY 

For stratum 3, we randomly selected two replacement clusters because our first selections, 

Michigan and Indiana, declined to participate in the study. Because of this replacement, 

our statistics are projected to a population that excludes the clusters for Michigan (153 

clusters) and Indiana (35 clusters). 

We reviewed State documents to examine the order establishment policies of the 10 

sample States. To examine how these policies are implemented by local offices, we 

conducted site visits to two child support enforcement offices in each sampled State - one 

in proximity to the State capital and one within 150 miles distance of the capital. In each 

office, we interviewed a manager and a staff-person responsible for establishing support 

orders regarding the local practices used to establish orders for low-income non-custodial 

parents. 

We conducted our interviews between September and November 1999. All descriptions 

of local order establishment policies and practices are current as of this period. We 

conducted our interviews in Oklahoma just prior to the implementation of new State 

guidelines scheduled to take effect November 1st, 1999. The descriptions of order 

establishment policies and practices in Oklahoma are current as of October 1999. 

We also conducted case record reviews in each of the 10 States. From these States we 

obtained data on all child support cases in which (1) the child support order was 

established during 1996, (2) the custodial parent was on Aid to Families with Dependent 

Children (AFDC) or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) at the time the 

order was established, and (3) the case was still open. We chose cases in which the 

custodial parent was on AFDC or TANF because of the demonstrated correlation between 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

10 
custodial family welfare receipt and non-custodial parent low-income status. One analysis 

of compiled research on the incomes of non-custodial parents, using 1995 dollars, found 

that the mean annual income of fathers of children on welfare was between $10,000 and 

$15,000. The 1995 poverty level for an individual with one child was $10,504.10 

We randomly assigned the non-custodial parents for these cases to each State’s clusters. 

We then randomly selected one cluster per State for our sample. From these clusters, we 

randomly selected a sample (usually 35 per cluster) of non-custodial parents. We 

reviewed all child support cases for each non-custodial parent in our sample, including any 

cases the non-custodial parent had open for other children. This resulted in a sample of 

281 non-custodial parents with 402 child support cases, of which 298 cases had been 

established during 1996 in the sampled States. Data on the methods used to establish 

support orders and the subsequent payments generated is based on the cases established 

during 1996 in the sampled States. 

The payment period we examined on all cases is 32 months as this was the period of time 

for which all cases had the opportunity for payment. Thirty-two months is the minimum 

amount of time between the last month in which sampled orders were established, 

December 1996, and the last month for which we had access to payment information for 

all cases, August 1999. Except where specified, the statistics in this report are weighted 

to reflect all levels of clustering and stratification. All reported correlations are 

statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level or greater. 

Appendix C contains weighted projections from our sampled cases for all of the policies 

examined, with greater detail provided on some of the policies than what is covered in the 

text of the report. 

In this report we examined the interaction between some order establishment practices and 

inability to pay and the relationship of this interaction to low collections. We did not 

examine unwillingness to pay by the sampled non-custodial parents and its effect on 

collection rates. We plan to examine some of the factors contributing to unwillingness to 

pay, such as custody and visitation disputes and pass-through policies, in future 

inspections. We also did not examine all of the policies of the sampled States guidelines in 

detail, concentrating instead on the guideline policies covered in this report. 

Our review was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections 

issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

11 
FINDINGS 

RETROACTIVE SUPPORT: Most sampled States routinely 

charge non-custodial parents for retroactive support. The 

longer the period of retroactivity, the less likely it is that the 

parent will pay any support. 

All sampled States have a policy to charge non-custodial parents for retroactive support, 

payable to either the custodial parent or the State depending on welfare status, for the 

time prior to the establishment of the order. Eight of the 10 States routinely act on this 

policy with the commencement of financial responsibility ranging from the date of birth of 

the child to the date the request for support was filed. Respondents in Massachusetts and 

Mississippi indicated that it is not standard practice to charge non-custodial parents for 

retroactive support in their States. 

While Colorado and Texas charge the non-custodial parent for support back to the child’s 

date of birth regardless of the amount of time passed, Oklahoma limits the allowable 

duration to 60 months. Virginia charges for retroactive support to the date paternity was 

established. New York and Washington apply the retroactive charge as of the date the 

TANF case opened or the date of filing for support in non-TANF cases. Maryland and 

Pennsylvania limit retroactivity to the date of filing for support in all cases. 

Non-custodial parents were charged retroactive support in 58 percent of child support 

cases established in 1996. In 53 percent of the cases charged, charges were for 12 months 

or less. In 31 percent, charges were for 13 months to 36 months of retroactive child 

support. In 16 percent, charges were for more than 36 months of retroactive support. 

There are several reasons States charge retroactive support: 1) as a disincentive to noncustodial parents to delay the establishment of support; 2) to hold non-custodial parents 

accountable for supporting their children from birth; and 3) to recoup expenses incurred 

by the State or the custodial parent for caring for the child without the other parent’s help. 

While these are sound reasons for charging retroactive support, our analysis indicates that 

doing so may be counter-productive to getting support payments. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

12 
The longer the time for which non-custodial parents are charged retroactive 

support, the less likely they are to make any payment on their child support order 

once established 

A logistic regression shows that

the increase in the length of time

for which parents are charged

retroactive support is

significantly associated with an

increase in the probability that

the case will generate no

payments. As depicted, when

non-custodial parents were not

charged retroactive support, 

14 percent made no payments

during the first 32 months of the

child support obligation. When non-custodial parents were charged between 1 and 

12 months of retroactive support, the percent which made no payments rose to 23

percent. The percentage of non-payers rose to 34 percent when the non-custodial parents

were charged more than 12 months of retroactive support. 

Charges for retroactive support are based on the monthly support obligation and 

are often over $1,000 

In all of the sampled States, retroactive support is calculated by applying the State 

guidelines to the non-custodial parent’s income to determine the monthly support 

obligation, multiplied by the number of months they are obligated. Although retroactive 

support is often owed to the State to recover costs for welfare paid to support the child, 

the amount of welfare paid does not determine the amount owed. The sampled States 

charge the non-custodial parent for the guideline award amount for the period of 

retroactivity, retaining the portion equal to prior welfare payments provided and allocating 

the remainder, if any, to the custodial parent. 

Of cases established in 1996 with retroactive support charges, the median amount of 

retroactive support charged was just under $1,500. In States that charge for retroactive 

support preceding the date of filing for support, the median amount charged was $1,542, 

with 17 percent of the cases charged over $5,000. In States which limit retroactivity to 

the date of filing for support, the median amount of retroactive support charged was $383. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

13 
Other front-end charges used by our sampled States include court and attorney 

fees and recovery costs for paternity testing and birth-related medical costs 

According to the State policy in all of our sampled States, the non-custodial parent is 

charged for the costs of paternity testing if he does not voluntarily acknowledge paternity 

and is found to be the father. Respondents in Massachusetts indicated that non-custodial 

parents are rarely ever charged for paternity tests while respondents in the other States 

indicated that non-custodial parents are routinely held accountable for these costs, with 

the exception of minors in Pennsylvania. The reported costs of paternity tests in the 

sampled States range from $140 to $400. 

Three of the sampled States routinely charge non-custodial parents for service of process, 

court or attorney fees at the point of order establishment. In Pennsylvania and Colorado, 

the reported fees ranged from $15 to $30. In Mississippi, the reported fees are $32 if the 

parties stipulate to the proposed order and $117 if the case is heard in court. In three 

other sampled States, non-custodial parents are sometimes charged attorney fees in nonTANF cases, however this is not routine. 

While six States have a policy to charge non-custodial parents for birth-related costs, 

respondents in only two States indicated applying these charges in practice. Respondents 

in one local office in New York and both local offices in Pennsylvania stated that noncustodial parents are routinely charged for birth-related medical costs paid by the State. 

The charges of birth-related medical expenses were cited by these respondents as running 

between $2,000 and $4,000 on average. 

In 9 percent of child support cases established in 1996, non-custodial parents were 

charged for paternity testing with a median charge of $206. Court fees were charged in 

14 percent of the cases with a median charge of $243. Less than 1 percent of noncustodial parents were charged attorney fees or birth-related medical charges. Of the 

1996 cases which were charged these and other miscellaneous fees, an average (mean) of 

$257 in fees was added to the initial obligation. However, of all 1996 cases, only $63 on 

average was added to the cases by other fees. The bulk of front-end costs is clearly 

constituted by retroactive support charges. 

A greater percentage of the non-custodial parents who were charged front-end costs, 

including retroactive support, did not make any payments towards the monthly support 

obligation after order establishment than non-custodial parents who were not charged 

front-end costs. Twenty-three percent of all cases were not charged any front-end costs. 

Of these cases, 16 percent of the non-custodial parents made no payments towards the 

monthly support obligation during the first 32 months of the order, whereas 26 percent of 

the non-custodial parents charged up-front costs made no payments during this time. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

14 
Employer withholding fees and interest charges can add to ongoing financial 

obligations 

All of the sampled States, except New York, allow employers to charge non-custodial 

parents income withholding fees, ranging from $1 to $5 per transaction. Mississippi 

charges non-custodial parents $5/month payable to the State for income withholding 

processing in addition to the transaction fee charged by the employers. 

In 8 of the 10 States, it is State policy to charge interest on unpaid support. Four of these 

States routinely charge interest, with rates ranging from 9 to 18 percent annually. In a 

couple of States, the charges are only levied if the cases meet certain non-payment criteria. 

In Colorado, the county IV-D offices determine whether interest will be charged. In 

Denver, with a significant share of the Colorado caseload, interest is charged on unpaid 

support at a rate of 12 percent compounded monthly. However, in non-TANF cases, the 

custodial parent can waive the interest. In TANF cases, the Denver IV-D office uses 

interest as a negotiation tool to bring non-custodial parents into payment compliance. 

INCOME IMPUTATION: Most sampled States impute income 

when the non-custodial parent is unemployed or income is 

unknown. Income imputation appears ineffective in 

generating payments. 

Most of the sampled caseworkers said that they primarily use income documentation 

provided directly by the non-custodial parent, such as wage stubs or tax statements, to 

calculate support due. If the non-custodial parent fails to appear or provide this 

documentation, most of the caseworkers then search for income information through an 

automated interface with the State labor or tax record systems. Most of the caseworkers 

indicated that they do not yet obtain income information from the National Directory of 

New Hires. If income information is obtained through the State labor or tax systems, 

caseworkers typically verify this information with the indicated employer. 

In all sampled States except Mississippi, income is imputed to the non-custodial parent if 

no income information is available through the above means. Half of the States impute 

income when the non-custodial parent is unemployed. Most of the States also impute 

income if the parent is deemed to be “underemployed”. For example, if a non-custodial 

parent works 35 hours/week at a minimum wage job, minimum wage earnings for the 

additional 5 hours will be imputed to the parent in the support calculations. 

In the nine States that impute income, the most common reasons cited were that the nonLow-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

15 
custodial parent was unemployed or did not provide earnings information. In 37 percent 

of cases established in 1996 where income was imputed, it was due to unemployment or 

underemployment. In 46 percent of imputed cases, the non-custodial parent did not 

appear at the conference or court hearing or failed to provide income information. In their 

absence, orders were set by default using an imputed income. 

Respondents indicated that the primary source of information on which they base 

imputation is the non-custodial parent’s most recent work history. When a work history is 

unavailable, several States base earnings capacity on the non-custodial parent’s skills and 

education. In the absence of any information, most States base imputed income on 

minimum wage earnings for a 40 hour work week. In imputed cases established in 1996, 

child support agencies used minimum wage as the basis to impute in 65 percent of cases. 

Imputed cases exhibit lower payment compliance than non-imputed cases 

In all of the States, 33 percent of the

cases established using imputed

income generated no payments.

Based on the information available

in case files, we were only able to

universally determine whether

income was imputed in three States

(CO, MA & TX). In the other

seven States, files did not contain a

specified means to indicate

imputation. Therefore, we could

not be sure that cases not indicated

as imputed, were not in fact

imputed. To compare payments

generated by imputed vs. nonimputed cases, we limit our analysis

to these three States. 

In the three States, 45 percent of the

financial awards established in 1996

were based on imputed income. 

Forty-four percent of these imputed

cases generated no child support

payments over a 32 month period, commencing with the start of the order. In contrast,

only 11 percent of non-imputed income cases in these three States generated no payments

during this time. Despite the limitation of this analysis to three States, this difference is

statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

16 
A causal relationship between the use of income imputation and lack of payments can not 

be assumed. Non-custodial parents who fail to provide information or are unemployed at 

the time of order establishment are potentially less likely to pay support than those who 

appear in court or are employed. However, as demonstrated, imputing income to these 

parents to calculate their support, is not a very effective method of getting them to pay. 

MINIMUM ORDERS: Six of the sampled States routinely 

establish minimum orders when the non-custodial parent 

has limited payment ability. Minimum order cases exhibit 

lower payment compliance than other cases. 

According to State policy, eight States establish child support orders using a minimum 

monthly payment amount when the non-custodial parent’s income is below a specified 

threshold or earnings capacity is limited. The thresholds for low-income obligors in these 

eight States range from $400/month to $686/month. 

In two of these States with a minimum order policy, Colorado and Mississippi, 

respondents indicated that minimum orders are rarely established. In Mississippi, 

caseworkers rely on court discretion in cases where the earnings capacity of the noncustodial parent is limited. In Colorado, respondents indicated that they routinely impute 

income to be minimum wage to calculate the award in lieu of setting a minimum order. 

Respondents in the other two States without a minimum order policy, Oklahoma and 

Texas, indicated that they also routinely impute income to be minimum wage when the 

non-custodial parent is unemployed or income is unknown. In States imputing income as 

minimum wage, orders reportedly range from $125 to $185 per month for one child, 

depending on the income of the custodial parent. In the other six States, reported 

presumptive minimum monthly order 

modified once income is known. 

amounts range from $20 to $50 per month. 

Many States establish minimum orders for 

obligors without known income with the 

expectation that all parents, regardless of 

income, should make some financial 

contribution to their child. 

some staff argue that it is important to put a 

financial order in place which can then be 

Additionally, 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

17 
A higher percentage of minimum order cases made no payments towards their 

support obligation than non minimum order cases 

Minimum awards were set for 13 percent of the cases established in 1996 with a median 

charge of $55/month. In 36 percent of cases established as a minimum order in 1996, the 

non-custodial parents made no payments in the first 32 months of the order. In contrast, 

20 percent of cases established as non minimum orders (i.e. all others) received no 

payments over this time. This lack of payment on minimum orders could be a reflection of 

limited earnings capacity and the fact that minimum awards are not based on actual 

income. 

Minimum orders are often used to establish orders for incarcerated non-custodial 

parents 

Most sampled States do not have a uniform policy for setting support orders when the 

non-custodial parent is incarcerated at the time the order is established. Respondents in 

most of the local offices visited either set a minimum order amount or wait until the noncustodial parent is released to establish a financial obligation. In one local office visited in 

Texas and in both local offices in Oklahoma, the non-custodial parent is responsible for 

paying an award based on income imputed as minimum wage for 40 hours/week during 

incarceration. Offices that wait until the non-custodial parent is released establish 

paternity while the non-custodial parent is incarcerated and then establish the financial 

obligation upon release or at an interval shortly thereafter. 

In all sampled States, respondents indicated that arrears continue to accrue for noncustodial parents that become incarcerated after the order is established. The burden is on 

the non-custodial parent to request a modification of the order. All of the respondents 

indicated that incarcerated non-custodial parents rarely request a modification. In all but 

one of the local offices visited, accrued debt remains on the non-custodial parent’s child 

support account after release. In one county in Pennsylvania, the caseworker interviewed 

indicated that the non-custodial parent could, upon release, petition to have the arrears 

that accrued while incarcerated forgiven. 

DEBT OWED TO STATES: Most sampled States will not 

reduce debt owed to the State by the absent parent except in 

rare cases. Median debt on 1996 cases is over $3,000. 

Respondents in every sampled State indicated that debt owed to the State is almost never 

reduced, nor are arrears ever limited after the point of order establishment. Non-custodial 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

18 
parents can accrue an unlimited amount of debt owed to the State which remains on their 

account indefinitely. Respondents in most States indicated that judges may intervene to 

reduce the debt but this rarely happens. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Texas 

respondents said that the State can and has appealed a judge’s decision to reduce debt 

owed to the State by a non-custodial parent. 

In Colorado, the county child support office can negotiate the amount of debt owed by the 

non-custodial parent for un-reimbursed public assistance if any other county that is also 

owed un-reimbursed public assistance agrees to the negotiated amount. In Washington, 

the debt owed to the State by a non-custodial parent may be reduced administratively if 

hardship can be proven. Examples of hardship include if the non-custodial parent is on 

welfare or if paying the debt would harm other children for whom the non-custodial parent 

is responsible. However, this debt is not legally eliminated and could be pursued in the 

future in court. 

Respondents in every State, except Texas, indicated that debt owed to the custodial parent 

is forgiven if the custodial parent agrees to waive the arrears owed to her. In some 

States, the custodial parent must agree to this debt forgiveness in a legal court order. 

States are reluctant to reduce debt because they have expended public resources to 

support the child in the absence of the non-custodial parent fulfilling their responsibility. 

While this is understandable, large debt burdens may deter the non-custodial parent from 

making any support payments, thus resulting in a lower return on the public expenditures. 

The median amount of debt remaining on child support cases established in 1996 after 32 

months of expected payments was $3,278. The mean amount of debt after 32 months was 

$4,831, with some cases owing over $25,000. Seventy-five percent of cases established in 

1996 owed over $1,231 in child support debt 32 months after the financial order was 

established. 

Most Sampled States will modify the pay-back plan on arrears 

While debt is rarely reduced, all of the States allow modifications to the pay-back plan on 

arrears. In six States, modifications are made to reduce the rate of repayment when the 

non-custodial parent cannot afford the established rate. In the other four States, 

modifications usually involve increasing the scheduled amount due, condensing the period 

of time in which the arrears are to be paid. 

In four of the six States that reduce the repayment rate, the rates are linked to the monthly 

support obligation (MSO) at the point of order establishment. In three of these States 

(NY, VA, & WA), modifications to the rate of repayment are made administratively at a 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

19 
later point if the non-custodial parent cannot afford to pay. In Massachusetts, a change in 

the rate of arrears payments must be court ordered. Oklahoma and Colorado set 

repayment rates according to State policy to amortize the debt over a fixed time period, 

rather than base the rate on the MSO. Respondents said that they adjust the rates at the 

time the order is established if the non-custodial parent cannot afford to pay the rate in 

accordance with State policy. 

Modifications to the monthly obligation amount are dependent upon proof of a 

substantial change in circumstances 

All States inform non-custodial parents of their right to request a modification at the time 

the order is established. Respondents indicated that this is usually communicated verbally 

or in written form at the initial conference with the non-custodial parent. In all States, 

modifications to the monthly support obligation require a change to the formal court order 

and are made only when either the non-custodial parent’s income has changed by a 

specified amount or the obligation would change by a specified amount. A report issued 

by the Office of Inspector General in March 1999, “Review and Adjustment of Support 

Orders”, OEI-05-98-00100, found deficiencies in the methods States were using to notify 

parents of the right to request a review as well as a reluctance in some States to modify 

orders downward. 

JOB PROGRAMS: Few sampled child support agencies 

formally link with job programs. Non-custodial parent 

participation in such programs is minimal. 

Despite increasing attention by the research and policy community to the limited earnings 

capacity of low-income non-custodial parents and increased funding for job services, most 

sampled States have only informal arrangements for referral to existing job services 

programs. These programs are largely external to the IV-D agencies with little to no 

participation by non-custodial parents. Respondents in virtually all local offices were 

vaguely aware of job service programs. They often indicated that these programs were 

newly implemented and acknowledged having limited information about them. Some 

respondents reported referring non-custodial parents to these programs but with little 

information on what the program offers and whether the parent ever followed through. 

Reasons cited for lack of participation included program eligibility requirements, noncustodial parents not volunteering, and a lack of means to promote participation or to 

follow-up on referrals. Washington and Maryland have more structured referral processes 

to job services; however, participation is still reported to be minimal. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

20 
Greater participation is reported in “seek work” programs. Two States, Pennsylvania and 

Massachusetts, have structured IV-D “seek work” programs through which non-custodial 

parents are required to apply for employment and report back on their progress on a 

weekly or monthly basis. In some localities the Massachusetts program involves job 

services in addition to seek-work if the non-custodial parent is determined to be in need of 

such services to secure a job. 

Respondents in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania indicated that roughly 10 percent of their 

total non-custodial parent caseload participate in “seek work” programs. Participation is 

often mandated in the court order establishing a temporary minimum support obligation. 

The non-custodial parent must actively apply for jobs and report back on the search. 

Upon employment, the order is modified to reflect the non-custodial parent’s new income. 

If the parent does not obtain a job and is deemed to have not made a good faith effort, he 

may be held in contempt of court. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

21 
CONCLUSION 

States use a variety of tools to encourage non-custodial parents to cooperate with the 

child support enforcement system. Many of these tools are designed to hold non-custodial 

parents liable for child support payments regardless of behaviors which may inhibit order 

establishment or payment of the order. While these policies may discourage unwillingness 

to pay, if non-custodial parents are unable to pay the support owed, such policies are not 

likely to promote payment compliance. 

As the facts in this report demonstrate, the policies reviewed do not usually generate child 

support payments by low-income non-custodial parents. Recognition of this fact presents 

opportunities to improve payment levels by modifying State policies that determine the 

amount that low-income absent parents must pay. Clearly, some systematic 

experimentation is warranted. 

The experiments should emphasize parental responsibility, while improving the ability of 

low-income non-custodial parents to meet their obligations. This requires a dual approach 

of setting realistic support obligations and providing employment support with work 

requirements. The goal of these approaches is to get non-custodial parents to take 

financial responsibility for their child, which is to the benefit of all of the parties involved 

— the custodial parent, the State and, ultimately, the child. 

States are in the best position to conduct such experiments. However, the Office of Child 

Support Enforcement can do much to encourage, facilitate, and evaluate such State 

experimentation. We offer suggestions for State research and experimentation 

corresponding to the four areas of analysis contained in this report: retroactive support, 

income imputation, debt owed to the States, and job programs. We present the following 

suggestions to the OCSE to facilitate such experimentation: 

RETROACTIVE SUPPORT: Facilitate and support State experiments to test the 

payment effects of using various periods of retroactivity in determining support 

Our findings demonstrate that the longer period of time for which retroactive support is 

charged, the less likely the parent is to pay support. States could test and evaluate the 

payment effects of charging retroactive support for various time periods, including 

restricting retroactivity to the time the request for child support was initially filed. These 

demonstrations would indicate whether shorter periods of retroactivity are more effective 

in generating payments. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

22 
Most of the sampled States routinely charge non-custodial parents front-end arrears to 

recoup support for a period of time prior to the establishment of the child support order. 

One reason States may charge retroactive support without limits is the rationale that the 

non-custodial parent should be responsible for the child from the time the child is born. 

Some States may charge retroactive support as an incentive for non-custodial parents to 

cooperate with the IV-D agency as early as possible. 

Although it can be argued that these are justifiable reasons for charging retroactive 

support for longer periods of time, these policies does not appear effective in getting noncustodial parents to pay. Our findings show that the greater the length of time for which 

non-custodial parents are charged retroactive support, the less likely they are to make any 

payments on their child support order, once established. 

When a low-income non-custodial parent starts off an order nearly $2,000 in arrears, he or 

she may view compliance with the support order as hopeless in the face of what may be an 

insurmountable debt and may avoid contact with the system all together. Fathers 

interviewed by the Parents’ Fair Share program often cited overwhelming arrears as an 

obstacle to their payment compliance.11 In non-marital cases, the non-custodial parent 

may not have even known that the child existed during the time of retroactive support. 

When faced with charges for support dating back several years in some cases, the noncustodial parent is not likely to view the child support system as a fair and reasonable 

system with which they can work. In effect, cooperation may actually be discouraged. 

The OCSE could fund evaluations in several States to test various periods of retroactivity 

to determine whether non-custodial parents demonstrate a higher rate of payment 

compliance when retroactivity is restricted. Exceptions should be made in cases where a 

non-custodial parent makes clear efforts to delay the filing for support. For example, in 

Massachusetts, non-custodial parents are only charged retroactive support in egregious 

cases. State evaluations should also examine the effect of restricting retroactive support on 

non-custodial parent cooperation with the order establishment process. 

DEBT OWED TO STATES: Facilitate and support State experiments to test 

negotiating the amount of debt owed to the State in exchange for improved 

payment compliance 

Many low-income non-custodial parents face insurmountable arrears. Viewing the system 

as unreasonable and adversarial, many low-income obligors pay nothing rather than 

something. Debt negotiation as a method of improving payments has recently garnered a 

significant level of attention in the IV-D community. The OCSE could provide leadership 

in this area by facilitating State experimentation to test the payment effects of debt 

negotiation. Specifically, OCSE could fund State demonstration programs to test: 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

23 
< Reducing child support debt owed to the State if the non-custodial parent 

demonstrates a continued effort to pay the monthly obligation and the debt due 

exceeds a defined level of burden relative to the non-custodial parent’s income. 

< Reducing the debt owed to the State in cases where the non-custodial parent has 

reunited with the custodial parent and children and the reunited family’s income is 

below a certain threshold. 

The sampled States rarely reduce arrears owed to the State. Many respondents indicated 

that they are forbidden by law from doing so. While the Bradley Amendment (42 USC 

Section 666(a)(9)) states that child support orders are not retroactively modifiable, this 

does not preclude State reduction of child support arrears owed to the State. The Bradley 

Amendment requires States to make arrears a judgement by operation of law. As stated in 

the OCSE’s Policy Information Question (PIQ)-99-03, as a party to a judgement, States 

can agree to compromise or settle the judgement, pursuant to State law. Accordingly, 

States can accept less than the full payment of arrearages assigned to the State just as they 

can compromise and settle any other judgements in the State. 

In July 1999, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued regulations to allow tax debt 

forgiveness, rather than seizing assets, when a taxpayer can show that their assets are 

needed to pay for medical care or basic living expenses. The IRS Commissioner stated 

“For taxpayers caught in severe hardships, this gives the IRS a new tool to work with 

people and help settle their tax debt.” State public assistance agencies could follow the 

lead of the IRS by reducing the debt owed to the State in cases where the debtor does not 

have the income to pay the total debt to encourage and facilitate routine payments. 

Child support debt, especially in States which charge interest on unpaid support, can often 

amount to a substantial burden relative to the income of low-income non-custodial 

parents. The average amount of child support debt remaining on cases established in 1996 

is nearly $5,000 with 75 percent of cases owing over $1,200. 

The accumulation of such high arrears often triggers penalties such as license revocation 

and criminal pursuit. In some cases, this debt is due to the non-custodial parent’s failure to 

pay support which the non-custodial parent could have and should have paid. In other 

cases debt is due to front-end arrears which the non-custodial parent never had the income 

to pay or a decline in the non-custodial parent’s income once the order was established. 

In any of these circumstances, the high level of debt is likely to result in no payments. 

Low-income non-custodial parents faced with thousands of dollars in debt, often see 

attempts to comply with a support order as futile. The OCSE could provide research and 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

24 
demonstration grants to States to test the effects of intervening in these instances and 

reducing the debt to a feasible level in return for the non-custodial parent’s continued 

payment compliance on the monthly obligation. In cases where the non-custodial parent is 

reunited with the custodial parent and children, debt reduction could be tested as a tool to 

help support the newly reunited family to maintain self-sufficiency and remain intact. 

INCOME IMPUTATION: Encourage States to decrease the use of income 

imputation and to test alternative means of identifying income for low-income 

obligors. 

If a non-custodial parent does not respond to a summons to appear at a conference or 

court hearing, fails to submit income information and does not have recent income listed 

on the State tax or employment system, caseworkers tend to base the award on imputed 

income. The caseworkers interviewed indicated that they are not yet using the New Hires 

Directory to obtain information or are having difficulty using it for low-income cases. 

It is understandable that States do not want to reward non-custodial parents for failing to 

appear or submit information or for failure to work. An award should be established and 

to establish an award, income must be used. Child support agency staff are often faced 

with no other choice but to impute income. However, as the reviewed cases demonstrate, 

imputing income yields poor payment results. In order to increase payments, States must 

exercise every possible means to base awards on actual, rather than imputed income. 

OCSE could help States to base awards on actual income more often by: 

< Impressing upon States the importance of devoting time and resources to obtain 

income information as a priority in the order establishment process; 

< Ensuring States are effectively using the information supplied by the National 

Directory of New Hires, implemented in 1997; and 

< Funding demonstration projects to test alternative means of identifying income for 

low-income non-custodial parents, many of whom are self-employed, work as day 

laborers, are paid in cash, and change jobs frequently. 

If an award is not initially established in accordance with ability to pay, States should not 

assume that it will be appropriately modified down the road. Although parents are legally 

allowed to have their order reviewed at least once every three years, many non-custodial 

parents may not know of this right or may not have the means to exercise it. 

A report issued by the Office of Inspector General in March 1999, “Review and 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

25 
Adjustment of Support Orders”, OEI-05-98-00100, found deficiencies in State notification 

policies and different treatment for downward modifications, with several States requiring 

non-custodial parents to pursue such modifications on their own. The recommendations 

of that report, encouraging greater use of review and adjustments, would help to ensure 

that orders are more in line with ability to pay over time. Just as orders should be aligned 

with ability to pay at the point of order establishment, they should remain aligned over 

time in order to encourage payment compliance. 

JOB PROGRAMS: Encourage States to formalize links with job services 

programs and to require unemployed non-custodial parents to participate in 

these programs 

The OCSE could encourage States to take advantage of existing programs to increase the 

earnings capacity and payment abilities of low-income non-custodial parents. Specifically 

States could formalize referral relationships with outside agencies, court order 

unemployed non-custodial parent participation in these programs, and institute structured 

follow-up procedures. 

< IV-D agencies could establish linkages with programs offering both seek work and 

job training approaches, in order to refer non-custodial parents to the appropriate 

track depending upon their level of job readiness. 

< Unemployed, able-bodied non-custodial parents could be required in their court 

order to participate in job services or seek work or face contempt of court. 

< Financial obligations should be established based on the income level attained 

following program participation, rather than based on imputed income, in order to 

improve the potential for support collections. Award amounts should be aligned 

with any income earned through program participation or set as a minimum 

amount until a final award can be determined upon employment. 

< To facilitate IV-D efforts to require such participation, OCSE could recommend a 

change to related language in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 

Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) to expand State authority to require noncustodial parent participation in work activities. The PRWORA gives States 

authority to require any unemployed person owing past due support to participate 

in work activities. The OCSE could recommend this be amended to provide States 

the authority to also require any unemployed person at the point of order 

establishment to participate in work activities. 

< In addition to urging States to move ahead in this area independently, OCSE 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

26 
could recommend that any proposed fatherhood legislation include funding for 

projects which model this approach. Projects could test the effects of ordering 

non-custodial parent participation in seek work or job services and delaying the 

establishment of the final financial obligation until actual income can be used. 

< To enhance child support agency efforts to formally link with job programs, OCSE 

could propose that any fatherhood legislation require grant applicants to 

coordinate with IV-D agencies. Applicants could be required to delineate each 

agency’s responsibility in the referral arrangement, linkages between order 

establishment and service participation, and responsibility for follow-up efforts. 

State IV-D agencies should not provide the job services directly. Rather, they should take 

advantage of existing programs which are federally funded to serve the non-custodial 

parent population. Under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, welfare-to-work funds are 

available for States to provide employment and training services to low-income noncustodial parents of children receiving TANF. In September 1999, the Department of 

Labor awarded 64 welfare-to-work grants totaling $222 million, for projects targeting 

specific categories of recipients including non-custodial parents. The Department of 

Health and Human Services has also provided funds for services targeting non-custodial 

parents through the Fatherhood Initiative and related OCSE demonstrations. Most 

recently, in March 2000, the Department announced $15 million for demonstration 

projects serving non-custodial parents who do not have child support orders in place. 

Despite the multiple sources of funds available, our findings reveal that services for lowincome non-custodial parents are greatly underutilized. In most sampled States, referral 

relationships with local job service programs appeared to be very informal, devoid of any 

linkages between the establishment of an order and service participation, and lacking 

follow-up on referrals that are made. Few non-custodial parents volunteer for such 

services and most sampled States do not mandate participation. 

One reason cited by respondents for lack of participation was restrictions on program 

eligibility. The November 1999 Consolidated Appropriations Act included amendments to 

the welfare-to-work law to broaden the eligibility requirements for non-custodial parent 

participation in job services. Hence, restrictions should no longer be a barrier. 

Enforcement mechanisms alone have not appeared effective in improving child support 

payments from low-income non-custodial parents. For many of these parents it is not a 

matter of unwillingness to pay but inability to pay. In the wake of welfare reform, it is 

critical that greater efforts are made to boost the payment of support owed to low-income 

families. Just as low-income custodial parents are expected to go to work and contribute 

to the financial well-being of their family in return for limited transitional assistance, 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

27 
low-income non-custodial parents should be held to the same expectation. If they do not 

have the income to pay support, they should be allowed the opportunity to earn the 

income and then be expected to pay support. 

Requiring unemployed non-custodial parents to participate in job services at the time of 

order establishment can have the added benefit of uncovering unreported employment. 

Findings from the Parent’s Fair Share Demonstration revealed that part of the increase in 

child support payments produced by the project’s extra outreach services was due to 

parents informing the child support agency of previously unreported employment.12 

Our analysis demonstrates that imputing income and setting minimum awards are not 

effective methods of achieving payment compliance when a non-custodial parent is 

unemployed. Requiring unemployed non-custodial parents to engage in structured job 

services programs and then basing the child support order on actual income promises 

greater payment compliance. This combination of opportunities and enforcement can be 

seen as the parallel to the personal responsibility contract expected of custodial mothers. 

In accordance with the Fatherhood Initiative’s goals of promoting responsible fatherhood 

and family self-sufficiency, we encourage the OCSE to facilitate State efforts to take this 

next step in the evolution of the child support enforcement program. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

28 
AGENCY COMMENTS 

The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 

Evaluation (ASPE) provided formal comments to the draft report. Both offices concurred with 

the report’s findings and suggested approaches. The text of the ACF and ASPE comments can be 

found in Appendix F. 

In addition to existing initiatives, ACF described numerous actions that they will take to 

implement the suggested approaches with regard to retroactive support charges, compromising 

arrears, income imputation, and job programs. 

The ACF offered one technical comment on the report. In reference to our discussion of 

caseworkers’ use of the NDNH, the ACF asked us to clarify that the study was conducted using 

sample cases established during 1996 which was prior to the implementation of the National 

Directory of New Hires (NDNH). Although the case data was collected on cases established in 

1996, the process data collected through case worker interviews reflect local practices as of the 

time of data collection, September through November 1999. This distinction is explained in the 

Scope and Methodology section of the report. Therefore, the discussion of the lack of use of 

NDNH data by sampled caseworkers is relatively current. 

The ASPE commented that our findings are consistent with, and complementary to, other 

research on this subject. The ASPE also indicated that our suggested approaches would 

strengthen existing Administration efforts to improve the payment compliance and involvement of 

low-income non-custodial parents. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

29 
APPENDIX A 

Confidence Intervals for Selected Statistics

The following table shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for selected 

statistics, in the order that they appear in the report. These calculations account for all levels of 

clustering and stratification as described in the methodology. 

Statistic Point 

Estimate 

95 Percent 

Confidence Interval 

For cases that were established during 1996, average (mean) 

additional costs beyond the basic child support order $1,852 $508 - $3,195 

Of cases that were established during 1996, percent with 

retroactive support charges 57.9% 27.2% - 88.5% 

For cases that were established during 1996, average (mean) 

retroactive support charges $1,788 $473 - $3,104 

For cases that were established during 1996, average (mean) 

additional costs other than retroactive support charges $63 $13 - $114 

Of monthly-payment cases that were established during 1996, 

percent that were established using a minimum award 12.8% 2.6% - 23.0% 

For monthly-payment cases that were established during 1996, 

average (mean) debt remaining after 32 months $4,831 $3,099 - $6,564 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

30 
APPENDIX B 

Results of Hypothesis Testing

The following tables show the percent of cases in which the non-custodial parent did not make any 

payments during the first 32 months, broken out by category. We used t-tests to evaluate the 

confidence level that the difference between the categories was statistically significant. In the last 

table, we used logistic regression with one independent variable. 

FRONT-END COSTS 

Category payments during the first 

Percent of cases with zero 

32 months 

1996 monthly-payment cases 

Cases with front-end costs 25.7 percent 

Cases without front-end costs 15.7 percent 

Value of t 1.86 

Confidence level 93 percent 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

31 
INCOME IMPUTATION

Category payments during the first 

Percent of cases with zero 

32 months 

1996 monthly-payment 

cases in States where 

imputation data were 

available for all cases1 

Cases with imputed income 44.1 percent 

Cases without imputed 

income 10.9 percent 

Value of t 16.56 

Confidence level 99 percent 

MINIMUM ORDERS 

Category 32 months 

Percent of cases with zero 

payments during the first 

1996 monthly-payment cases 

Cases established as minimum 

orders 36.2 percent 

Cases established as 

non-minimum orders 20.1 percent 

Value of t 1.95 

Confidence level 94 percent 

1 Imputation data were available for all cases in three States: Colorado, Massachusetts, and Texas. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

32 
For the following table, we used logistic regression with one independent variable. The 

independent variable was the number of months charged for retroactive support, and the dependent 

variable was whether the non-custodial parent made any payments during the first 32 months. 

RETROACTIVE SUPPORT 

Degrees of freedom 1 

Wald F 17.93 

Confidence level 99 percent 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

33 
APPENDIX C 

Case Data

Descriptive Information on Sampled Cases Number 

Non-Custodial parents (NCPs) for whom child support cases were reviewed 281 

Reviewed child support cases established in 1996 in the sampled States 298 

Reviewed child support cases established in 1996 in sampled States with a nonzero monthly support obligation 293 

Reviewed cases including secondary cases for the sampled NCPs 402 

Sampled NCPs with more than 1 child support case 74 

Weighted Statistics Based on The Sampled Cases 

Except where specified, the following statistics are weighted projections from our sample, taking 

into account all levels of clustering and stratification. 

Initial Orders with Monthly Support Order (MSO) >0 Established in 1996 

Percent of 1996 cases that required monthly payments (MSO>0): 98.1% 

Sample minimum and maximum orders $22 to $853 

Mean order amount $179 

Quartiles: 25% $98 

50% (median) $145 

75% $222 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

34 
Arrears Due after 32 Months of Financial Obligations Established in 1996 

Percent of 1996 cases with arrears >0 92.4% 

Sample minimum and maximum arrears $1 to $57,838 

Mean arrears amount (of cases charged arrears) $5,230 

Quartiles: 25% $1,426 

50% (median) $3,591 

75% $6,791 

Income Used in Calculation of the Order 

Of 1996 monthly-payment cases, sample (un-weighted), percent of cases for 

which the income used to calculate the order was in the file and was greater 

than zero 

57.7% 

Sample minimum and maximum annual income used $310 to $37,440 

Mean annual income used $11,088 

Quartiles: 25% $7,759 

50% (median) $9,869 

75% $14,501 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

35 
Front-end Arrears Charged on 1996 Cases 

Retroactive Support 

Percent of 1996 cases charged retroactive support 57.9% 

Sample minimum and maximum retroactive support amounts $47 to $36,942 

Mean retroactive support amount (of cases charged retroactive support) $3,091 

Quartiles: 25% $641 

50% (median) $1,480 

75% $3,205 

Mean Duration of time (months) Non-custodial parents were charged 

retroactive support 

22.8 

Quartiles: 25% 4.4 

50% (median) 10.8 

75% 26.2 

Court Fees 

Percent of 1996 cases charged court fees 13.5% 

Sample minimum and maximum arrears $5 to $349 

Mean court fees amount (of cases charged court fees) $205 

Quartiles: 25% $101 

50% (median) $243 

75% $275 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

36
Birth Fees2 

Percent of 1996 cases charged birth fees <1% 

Sample minimum and maximum birth fees $124 to $2,293 

Mean birth fees amount $532 

Paternity Fees 

Percent of 1996 cases charged paternity fees 9.0% 

Sample minimum and maximum paternity fees $142 to $408 

Mean paternity fees amount $231 

Quartiles: 25% $188 

50% (median) $206 

75% $252 

Case Processing Fees3 

Percent of 1996 cases charged case processing fees 3.4% 

Sample minimum and maximum case processing fees $10 to $66 

Mean case processing fees amount $19 

1996 Cases Based on Imputed Income 

Percent of cases established in 1996 based on imputed Income4 45.5% 

Mean amount of income imputed (all States) $9,789 

Median amount of income imputed (all States) $8,600 

2 Only 4 cases were charged birth fees. 

3 Only 11 cases were charged case processing fees. 

4 We were only able to gather complete data on imputation in CO, MA, and TX, although we were 

able to gather some imputation data in other sampled States. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

37 
Reasons for Income Imputation (All States) 

NCP did not appear at the case conference or court hearing 31.5% 

NCP unemployed 27.2% 

No information was available on NCP income 14.5% 

NCP underemployed/perceived to be deliberately unemployed 10.0% 

False information provided 1.5% 

Factors on Which Imputation was Based (All States) 

Minimum wage 65.2% 

Court discretion 23.4% 

Income received in most recent employment period 12.1% 

Work history 11.8% 

Education level 10.8% 

Skills 4.5% 

Disability of NCP 2.0% 

1996 Cases Established as a Minimum Award 

Percent of 1996 cases established as a minimum award 12.8% 

Mean minimum award $74 

Median minimum award $55 

Modifications to Cases Established in 1996 

Percent of 1996 monthly-payment cases which had at least one modification to 

the monthly support obligation (MSO) 

13.3% 

Percent of 1996 monthly-payment cases in which the MSO was modified to zero 6.3% 

Percent of 1996 monthly-payment cases in which the MSO was modified 

downward (excluding modifications to zero) 

3.3% 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

38 
Percent of NCP by Age Category

Age <= 20 Age 21-30

Age 31-40 Age > 40

11 %

56 %

24 %

9 %

For these statistics, we defined “urban zip codes” and “urban counties” to be zip codes 5

and counties with more than 50 percent urban population based on 1990 census data.

Differences in payment compliance between urban and rural locations were statistically 6

significant. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents 

39

Percent of Cases in Each NCP Age Category with No Payments Made In First 32

Months of Support Order

Age 20 Years or Under 16.9%

Age 21 to 30 Years 22.0%

Age 31 to 40 Years 18.6%

Age 40 Years and Over 27.7%

Percent of NCPs Located in Urban and Rural Areas and Payment Compliance 5

Zip County

Urban Rural Urban Rural

NCP Location 77.8% 22.2% 79.2% 20.8%

Cases with No Payments6 24.6% 8.7% 22.4% 16.6%

OEI-05-99-00390
APPENDIX D 

Related Office of Inspector General Reports

Paternity Establishment: Notification of Rights And Responsibilities For Voluntary 

Paternity Acknowledgment (OEI-06-98-00051) 

Paternity Establishment: Use of Alternative Sites for Voluntary Paternity Acknowledgment 

(OEI-06-98-00052) 

Paternity Establishment: State Use of Genetic Testing (OEI-06-98-00054) 

Paternity Establishment: The Role of Vital Records Agencies (OEI-06-98-00055) 

Paternity Establishment: Payment to Vital Records (OEI-06-98-00056) 

Review and Adjustment of Support Orders (OEI-05-98-00100) 

Review and Adjustment of Support Orders, Experience in Ten States (OEI-05-98-00102) 

Unpaid Child Support and Income Tax Deductions (OEI-05-95-00070) 

Grantees and Providers Delinquent in Child Support (OEI-07-95-00390) 

Review and Adjustment of IV-D Child Support Orders (OEI-07-92-00990) 

Follow-Up on AFDC Absent Parents (OEI-05-89-01270; 8/91) 

Child Support Enforcement Collection for Non-AFDC Clients (OAI-05-88-00340; 7/89) 

Child Support Enforcement Collections on AFDC Cases: An Overview (OAI-05-86-00097) 

Child Support Enforcement Collections on AFDC Cases: Non-Pursuit (OAI-05-87-00033) 

Child Support Enforcement Collections on AFDC Cases: Arrearages (OAI-05-87-00034) 

Child Support Enforcement Collections on AFDC Cases: Modification of Court Orders 

(OAI-05-87-00035) 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

40 
APPENDIX E 

Bibliography 

1. “Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers: Who are They and What are States Doing to Assist Them in Their Efforts to Pay 

Child Support”, Elaine Sorenson, The Urban Institute, January, 1997. 

2. “Broke But Not Deadbeat, Reconnecting Low-Income Fathers and Children”, Dana Reichert, the National Conference 

of State Legislatures, July 1999 

3. “Income and Demographic Characteristics of Nonresident Fathers in 1993", Elaine Sorenson and Laura Wheaton, the 

Urban Institute, Forthcoming Report . 

4. 22nd Annual Report to Congress, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, FY 1997. 

5. “Building Opportunities, Enforcing Obligations: Implementation and Interim Impacts of Parents’ Fair Share.” 

Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. NY, NY, 1998. 

6. “Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers: 1995" Current Population Report, U.S. Census Bureau, March 1999. 

7. “Child Support Enforcement: Effects of Declining Welfare Caseloads are Beginning to Emerge”, GAO/HEHS-99-105, 

Draft Version May 17, 1999. 

8. Fathers’ Fair Share, A Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation Study, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 

1999. 

9. Fathers Under Fire: The Revolution in Child Support Enforcement, Edited by Irv Garfinkel, Sara Mclanahan, Daniel R. 

Meyer, and Judith A. Selzer, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1998. 

10. “Setting Support When the Noncustodial Parent is Low Income”, Policy Memorandum by Paula Roberts, Center for 

Law and Social Policy, February 8th, 1999. 

11. “Obligating Dads: Helping Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers do More for their Children”, Elaine Sorenson, The Urban 

Institute, 1999. 

12. “Low-Income, Non-Residential Fathers: Off-Balance in a Competitive Economy,” Kathryn Edin, Laura Lein, and 

Timothy Nelson, Draft, September 1998. 

13. “The Review and Adjustment of Support Orders”, OEI-05-98-00100, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services, March 1999. 

14. “Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation and Analysis”, Laura Morgan, Aspen Law & Business, Aspen Publishers, Inc. 

New York, New York, 1999. 

15. “Low-Income Fathers and Child Support Orders”, Daniel Meyer, Marcia Cancian, & Marygold S. Melli, Institute for 

Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin -Madison, June 1997. 

16. “Are there Really Deadbeat Dads? The Relationship between Ability to Pay, Enforcement, and Compliance in 

Nonmarital Child Support Cases.”, Judi Barfeld and Daniel Meyer, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of 

Wisconsin -Madison, March 1993. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

41 
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

42
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

43
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

44
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

45
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

46
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

47
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

48
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

49
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

50
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

51
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

52
APPENDIX F 

Agency Comments 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

53
APPENDIX G 

End-Notes

1. “Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers: Who are They and What are States Doing to Assist Them in Their 

Efforts to Pay Child Support”, Elaine Sorenson, The Urban Institute, January, 1997. And “Broke But Not 

Deadbeat, Reconnecting Low-Income Fathers and Children”, Dana Reichert, the National Conference of 

State Legislatures, July 1999 

2. “Income and Demographic Characteristics of Nonresident Fathers in 1993", Elaine Sorenson and Laura 

Wheaton, the Urban Institute, Forthcoming Report . 

3. Ibid. 

4. 22nd Annual Report to Congress, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for Children and 

Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FY 1997. 

5. “Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers: 1995" Current Population Report, U.S. Census 

Bureau, March 1999. 

6. “Child Support Enforcement: Effects of Declining Welfare Caseloads are Beginning to Emerge”, 

GAO/HEHS-99-105, Draft Version May 17, 1999. 

7. Op. cit., “Income and Demographic Characteristics of Nonresident Fathers in 1993". 

8. Ibid. 

9. Op. cit., “Broke But Not Deadbeat, Reconnecting Low-Income Fathers and Children”. 

10. Fathers Under Fire: The Revolution in Child Support Enforcement, Edited by Irv Garfinkel, Sara 

Mclanahan, Daniel R. Meyer, and Judith A. Selzer, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1998. 

11. Fathers’ Fair Share, A Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation Study, Russell Sage Foundation, 

New York, 1999. 

12. “Building Opportunities, Enforcing Obligations: Implementation and Interim Impacts of Parents’ Fair 

Share.” Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. NY, NY, 1998. 

Low-Income Non-Custodial Parents OEI-05-99-00390 

54