Overview of the Neutrality Act

Overview of the Neutrality Act, focusing on explanations of certain key provisions, and summarizing various judicial and Attorney General opinions interpreting those provisions.

September 20, 1984

M e m o r a n d u m O p in io n f o r t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l

This memorandum is intended to provide you with a broad overview of the 

Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 956 et seq., its scope and applicability, and 

previous constructions of the various provisions of the Act by the courts, 

Attorneys General, and this Office.

Earlier this year, we provided you with our views regarding the applicability 

of the Act to official Government activities. “Application of the Neutrality Act 

to Official Government Activities,” 8 Op. O.L.C. 58 (1984). That memorandum contains an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the various 

provisions of the Act, from 1794 when it was first enacted, through the several 

amendments to the Act, particularly those enacted in the nineteenth century. It 

also examines in significant detail several major judicial decisions construing 

the Act, as well as the opinions of various Attorneys General regarding the Act. 

In our earlier memorandum, we concluded that “the Act does not proscribe 

activities conducted by Government officials acting within the course and 

scope of their duties as officers of the United States but, rather, was intended 

solely to prohibit actions by individuals acting in a private capacity that might 

interfere with the foreign policy and relations of the United States.” 8 Op. 

O.L.C. at 58.1

1 However, as you are aware, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California 

recently held that the C IA 's alleged covert “aid[ingj, funding] and participation] in a m ilitary expedition 

and enterprises utilizing Nicaraguan exiles for the purpose of attacking and overthrowing the government of 

Nicaragua" could constitute a violation of 18 U.S C. §§ 956 and 960, for purposes of triggering the 

investigation provisions o f the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591, et seq. See Dellums v. Smith, 573 

F. Supp. 1489, 1492 (N.D. Cal. 1983); see also 577 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 577 F. Supp. 1456 (N D. 

Cal. 1984). The Department appealed the district court's decision earlier this year, and is presently awaiting 

a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The only other current litigation of which we are aware in which the issue of the applicability of the 

Neutrality Act to G overnment officials is raised is m Sanchez Espinoza v Reagan, 568 F Supp. 596 (D.D C. 

1983), appeal pending, No 83-1997 (D.C. Cir argued May 24,1984). However, the District C ourt dismissed 

the plaintiffs' claims that the President, through his officers and appointees, had violated, inter aha, the 

Neutrality Act, the W ar Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548, and the Boland Amendment to the 

Department o f Defense Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982), by 

waging an undeclared war against the Nicaraguan Government, on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims presented nonjusticiable political questions.

* NOTE: After this opinion was issued by the Office of Legal Counsel, the United States C ourt of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in Dellums v. Smith on the ground that the plaintiffs 

lacked standing to bring the action. See Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th C ir 1986).

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I. The N eutrality Act

The provisions of the Neutrality Act, presently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 956 

et seq., remain substantially similar to the provisions originally enacted in 

1794. See 1 Stat. 381.2

Section 958 makes it unlawful for any United States citizen to accept, within 

the jurisdiction of the United States, a commission to serve a foreign nation in 

a war against a country with which the United States is at peace.3

Section 959 prohibits anyone within the United States from enlisting or 

paying someone else to enlist him in the military service of a foreign state.4

Section 960 prohibits the knowing participation in, preparation for, or financing of a hostile expedition from within the United States against a nation 

with which the United States is at peace.5

Section 961 prohibits the outfitting of military vessels within the United 

States which are in the naval service of a foreign country engaged in war with a 

country with which the United States is at peace.6 Finally, § 962 prohibits the

2 There are several additional provisions o f the neutrality laws which were not enacted until 1917. One 

provision, presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 956, prohibits conspiring to injure the property of a foreign 

governm ent with which the United States is at peace Section 956 provides in pertinent part:

If tw o or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United States conspire to injure or destroy 

specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to 

any political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, 

bridge, or other public utility so situated, and if one or more such persons commits an act within 

the jurisdiction o f the United States to effect the object of the conspiracy, each o f the parties to 

the conspiracy shall be fined not m ore than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

The other provisions, enacted in 1917, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 963-967, deal with the detention in United 

States ports o f arm ed vessels or vessels bound for belligerent nations until the owners certify to United States 

custom s officials that the vessels will not be used in the m ilitary service o f belligerent nations after departure 

from the U nited States.

3 Section 958 provides:

Any citizen of the United States who, within the jurisdiction thereof, accepts and exercises a 

com m ission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, in war, against any prince, 

state, colony, district, or people, w ith whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more 

than $2,000 or imprisoned not m ore than three years, or both.

4 Section 959 provides in pertinent part:

W hoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another to enlist 

or enter him self, or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United S tates with intent to be enlisted or 

entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a 

m arine or seaman on board any vessel o f war, letter o f marque, or privateer, shall be fined not 

m ore than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

5 Section 960 provides:

W hoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a 

means for or furnishes the m oney for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or 

enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or 

state, or o f any colony, district, o r people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined 

not m ore than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

6 Section 961 provides in pertinent part:

W hoever, within the United States, increases or augments the force of any ship o f war . . . 

which, at the tim e o f her arrival w ithin the United States, was a ship of war . . . in the service of 

any foreign prince or state, or o f any colony, d istnct, or people, or belonging to the subjects or 

citizens o f any such prince or state, colony, district, or people, the same being at war with any 

foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States is at peace, by 

adding to the number of the guns o f such vessel . . . or by adding thereto any equipment solely 

applicable to war, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

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outfitting or furnishing of any vessel within the United States with the intent 

that such vessel be used in the service of a foreign nation against a country with 

which the United States is at peace.7

II. Judicial Decisions

The earliest judicial decisions construing the Neutrality Act involved the 

predecessors to §§ 961 and 962, which generally prohibit the arming of vessels 

in United States ports to be used in the service of foreign nations against 

nations with which the United States is at peace. The earliest cases generally 

were brought against private individuals who “outfitted” French ships engaged 

in hostilities with the British Navy. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 

Dali.) 121 (1795); United States v. Guinet, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 321 (1795). See also

United States v. Skinner, 27 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1818) (No. 16309); The

Betty Carthcart, 17 F. Cas. 651 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 9742); The Nancy, 4 F. Cas. 

171 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1898). These early cases focused on what constituted 

the “arming” of a vessel, the distinction between “commercial” and “hostile” 

intent, and upheld the authority of the United States Government to define, as a 

matter of national policy, the political bodies in whose service, and against 

which, the prohibited acts had been committed. See generally United States v. 

The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897). Moreover, these cases established that 

§§ 961 and 962 of the Act do not prohibit armed vessels belonging to citizens 

of the United States from sailing out of United States ports; rather the provisions require only that the owners of such vessels certify that the vessels will 

not be used to commit hostilities against foreign nations at peace with the 

United States. See United States v. Quincy, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 445 (1832). Finally, 

these cases recognized, with regard to §§ 961 and 962, the principle generally 

applicable to all of the neutrality provisions, that the preparations prohibited by 

the Act must have been made within the United States, and that the intention 

with respect to the hostile deployment of the vessel must have been formed 

before leaving the United States. Id.

The early decisions construing the Act, as well as subsequent judicial decisions, make clear that, in view of its purpose to prevent private citizens from 

interfering with the conduct of foreign policy by duly authorized Government 

officials, the Neutrality Act, particularly § 960, prohibits only “the use of the 

soil or waters of the United States as a base from which unauthorized military 

expeditions or military enterprises shall be carried on against foreign powers

7 Section 962 provides in pertinent part:

Whoever, within the United States, furnishes, fits out, arms, or attempts to furnish, fit out or 

arm, any vessel, with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service o f any foreign 

prince, or state, or of any colony, district, or people, to cruise, or commit hostilities against the 

subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people 

with whom the United States is at peace; or 

W hoever issues or delivers a commission within the United States for any vessel, to the intent 

that she may be so employed shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 

three years, or both.

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with which the United States is at peace.” United States v. Murphy, 84 F. 609, 

612 (D. Del. 1898). See also Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896); 

United States v. O ’Sullivan, 27 F. Cas. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 15974); 

United States v. Smith, 27F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16342). The 

jury instructions in the Murphy case, which provide an extensive discussion of 

the elements of the “military expedition” offense under § 960, are illustrative 

of this point:

Providing the means of transportation for a military enterprise 

to be carried on from the United States against Spanish rule in 

Cuba is, within the meaning of [§ 960],. . . preparing the means 

for such military enterprise to be so carried on, and, if done with 

knowledge, on the part of the person so providing the means of 

transportation, of the character and purpose of such enterprise, 

is denounced by the statute.. . . The broad purpose of [§ 960] is 

to prevent complications between this government and foreign 

powers. . . . What it prohibits is a military expedition or a 

military enterprise from this country against any foreign power 

at peace with the United States.

* * *

Where a number of men, whether few or many, combine and 

band themselves together, and thereby organize themselves into 

a body, within the limits of the United States, with a common 

intent or purpose on their part at the time to proceed in a body to 

foreign territory, there to engage in carrying on armed hostilities, either by themselves or in co operation with other forces, 

against the territory or dominions of any foreign power with 

which the United States is at peace, and with such intent or 

purpose proceed from the limits of the United States on their 

way to such territory, either provided with arms or implements 

of war, or intending and expecting . . . to secure them during 

transit, . . . in such case all the essential elements of a military 

enterprise exist. ... It is sufficient that the military enterprise 

shall be begun or set on foot within the United States; and it is 

not necessary that the organization of the body as a military 

enterprise shall be completed or perfected within the United 

States. Nor is it necessary that all the persons composing the 

military enterprise should be brought in personal contact with 

each other within the limits of the United States; nor that they 

should all leave those limits at the same point. It is sufficient that 

by previous arrangement or agreement, whether by conversation, correspondence or otherwise, they become combined and 

organized for the purposes mentioned, and that by concerted 

action, though proceeding from different portions of this country, they meet at a designated point either on the high seas or

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within the limits of the United States. Under such circumstances 

a military enterprise to be carried on from the United States 

exists within the meaning of the law.

84 F. Cas. at 612-14.

III. Attorney General Opinions

As is the case with judicial decisions on the subject, the earliest opinions of 

Attorneys General construing the Neutrality Act distinguished between “commercial” and “hostile” intent for purposes of the prohibition, by the predecessors to §§ 961 and 962, on “outfitting vessels of war.” See, e.g., 2 Op. Att’y 

Gen. 86 (1828); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 231 (1818); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 190 (1816). 

Attorneys General have opined that the Act forbids furnishing ships of war in 

American ports with guns and other military equipment to be used by nations 

against nations with which the United States is at peace. See, e.g., 5 Op. Att’y 

Gen. 92 (1849); 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 336 (1844); 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 739 (1841).

The predecessor to § 959 was construed by early Attorneys General to 

prohibit the recruitment or enlistment of persons for service on foreign vessels 

of war in American ports. See 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 336 (1844). This latter 

prohibition on enlistment was construed by Attorney General Cushing to 

prohibit the undertaking by belligerent nations to enlist troops in the United 

States, on the ground that such action constitutes a “gross national aggression 

on the United States and insults our national sovereignty,” for which all, except 

those protected by diplomatic immunity, are punishable. 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 367, 

382 (1855). Attorney General Cushing’s lengthy opinion on foreign enlistment 

premises the statutory prohibition in § 959 on the notion that while a neutral 

state may permit a belligerent nation to raise troops on its soil, it should not 

grant such a concession to one belligerent and not to all. Id.

As early as 1795, Attorney General Bradford opined that the Neutrality Act 

did not preclude the commission of hostile acts by American citizens against 

Nations with which the United States is at peace as long as the potential 

defendants did not set foot from American soil. Regarding American citizens 

who, while trading on the coast of Africa, “voluntarily joined, conducted, 

aided, and abetted a French fleet in attacking” a British settlement on that coast, 

the Attorney General stated:

[AJcts of hostility committed by American citizens against such 

as are in amity with us, being in violation of a treaty, and against 

the public peace, are offences against the United States, so far as 

they were committed within the territory or jurisdiction thereof; 

and, as such, are punishable by indictment in the district or 

circuit courts.

* * *

So far... as the transactions complained of originated or took 

place in a foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of

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our courts; nor can the actors be legally prosecuted or punished 

for them by the United States.

1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57,58 (1794). Pointing out that the Government’s inability to 

prosecute under the Act resulted solely from § 960’s requirement that the 

defendant have “set foot” from “within the United States,” Attorney General 

Bradford noted that those “who have been injured by these acts of hostility 

have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States.” Id. at 59.

In 1856, Attorney General Cushing distinguished between the mere “organization, in one country or state, of combinations to aid or abet rebellion in 

another, or in any other way to act on its political institutions,” which is not

prohibited by the Act, from overt “attempts to interfere in the affairs of foreign 

countries by force,” which is unlawful. 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 216 (1856). See also 8 

Op. Att’y Gen. 472 (1855). The activities of the former, which the Attorney 

General referred to as “Revolutionary Aid Societies,” while “a violation of 

national amity and comity,” are limited to “inflammatory agitation” and discussion, falling short of the unlawful enlistment and military expeditions 

prohibited by the Act. Id.

In 1869, Attorney General Hoar opined that the Neutrality Act was properly 

applicable only with respect to political entities recognized by the United 

States as an “independent government, entitled to admission into the family of 

nations”;

The statute of 1818 is sometimes spoken of as the Neutrality

Acf, and undoubtedly its principal object is to secure the performance of the duty of the United States, under the law of nations, 

as a neutral nation in respect to foreign powers .... The United 

States have not recognized the independent national existence of 

the island of Cuba, or any part thereof, and no sufficient reason 

has yet been shown to justify such a recognition. In the view of 

the Government of the United States, as a matter of fact, which 

must govern our conduct as a nation, the island of Cuba is 

territory under the government of Spain, and belonging to that 

nation.

If ever the time shall come when it shall seem fitting to the 

political department of the Government of the United States to 

recognize Cuba as an independent government, entitled to admission into the family of nations, or, without recognizing its 

independence, to find that an organized government capable of 

carrying on war, and to be held responsible to other nations for 

the manner in which it carries it on, exists in that island, it will 

be the duty of that department to declare and act upon those facts.

* * *

But, on the other hand, when a nation with which we are at 

peace, or the recognized government thereof, undertakes to

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procure armed vessels for the purpose of enforcing its own 

recognized authority within its own dominions, although there 

may be evidence satisfactory to show that they will aid the 

government in the suppression of insurrection or rebellion, in a 

legal view this does not involve a design to commit hostilities 

against anybody.

* * *

The concession of belligerent rights to a “colony, district, or 

people” in a state of insurrection or revolution, necessarily 

involves serious restrictions upon the ordinary rights of the 

people of this country to carry on branches of manufacture and 

trade which are unrestricted in time of peace. To prevent our 

mechanics and merchants from building ships of war and selling 

them in the markets of the world, is an interference with their 

private rights which can only be justified on the ground of a 

paramount duty in our international relations; and however much 

we may sympathize with the efforts of any portion of the people 

of another country to resist what they consider oppression or to 

achieve independence, our duties are necessarily dependent upon 

the actual progress which they have made in reaching these 

objects.

13 Op. Att’y Gen. 177, 178, 180 (1869). Thus, he concluded, the Act did not 

prohibit the building of gunboats in New York to be sold to the Spanish 

government for possible use by that Government against the Cuban insurrectionists. Nor would § 962 of the Act prohibit the supplying of Cuban insurgents 

with men, arms and munitions of war. 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 541 (1841).8 In 1895, 

Attorney General Harmon, having declared that “neither Spain nor any other 

country had recognized the Cuban insurgents as belligerents,” 21 Op. Att’y 

Gen. 267, 269, opined:

The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of war by 

persons in the United States to persons in Cuba is not a violation 

of international law [nor of the neutrality laws], however strong 

a suspicion there may be that they are to be used in an insurrection against the Spanish government. The right of individuals in 

the United States to sell such articles and ship them to whoever 

may choose to buy has always been maintained.

8 In a very succinct opinion. Attorney General Akerman emphasized that his opinion addressed only the 

predecessor to § 962, adding that the allegations “might be material in connection with other proof/' 13 Op. 

A tt'y Gen. 541. Depending upon the allegations, and whether the United States Government recognized the 

Cuban insurrectionists as a sufficiently distinct political body to constitute more than a domestic irritant to 

Spain's internal affairs, a colorable claim under § 960 could be made. See, e g., 21 Op. A tt’y Gen. 267, 269 

(1896) (“International law takes no account of a mere insurrection, confined within the limits o f a country, 

which has not been protracted or successful enough to secure for those engaged in it recognition as 

belligerents by their own government or by foreign governments.”).

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*

If, however, the persons supplying or carrying arms and munitions from a place in the United States are in any wise parties 

to a design that force shall be employed against the Spanish 

authorities, or that, either in the United Sates or elsewhere, 

before final delivery of such arms and munitions, men with 

hostile purposes toward the Spanish Government shall also be 

taken on board and transported in furtherance of such purposes, 

the enterprise is not commercial, but military, and is in violation 

of international law and of our own statutes.

Id. at 270, 271 (emphasis added).

Further attempts to distinguish between “commercial” and “hostile” intent in 

trading with belligerents were made by Attorney General Knox in 1902. 

Responding to the Secretary of State’s inquiry regarding the legality of shipping horses from New Orleans to South Africa, a belligerent, Attorney General 

Knox opined that although a neutral nation is prohibited by the general principles of international law from giving aid to one of the belligerents during a 

war, “carrying on commerce with the belligerent nation in the manner usual 

before the war is . . . agreed not to be in itself giving such aid.” 24 Op. Att’y 

Gen. 15, 18 (1902). He added, however, that “the fact that neutral individuals

instead of their government give aid to the belligerent does not relieve the 

neutral government from guilt,” unless the acts are, by their nature, “impracticable or excessively burdensome for the government to watch or prevent.” Id.

Several days later, Attorney General Knox referred to this opinion and that of 

his predecessor, Attorney General Harmon, 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 267 (1895), in 

advising the Secretary of State that the shipping of arms to China, notwithstanding the presence of insurrectionary movements, would constitute a commercial venture and therefore not a violation of the Neutrality Act. 24 Op. Att’y 

Gen. 25 (1902).

Prior to the United State’s engagement in World War II, Attorney General 

Murphy construed the Act to prohibit the transporting of any articles or 

materials from a United States port to a port of a belligerent nation, until all 

goods of United States citizens on board had been transferred to foreign 

ownership. See 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 391 (1939). Later that year, Attorney 

General Murphy opined that American trawlers and tugs which had been sold 

to French concerns could lawfully depart United States ports after assurances 

by the French government that the vessels were not intended to be employed to 

commit hostilities against another belligerent. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 403 (1939).

Finally, Attorney General Jackson opined in 1940 that, while the United 

States Government could sell certain outdated American destroyers to the 

British Government during World War II, it was precluded by the predecessor 

to § 964 from selling to the British Government “mosquito boats” which were 

under construction by the United States Navy, “since . . . [the latter] would 

have been built, armed or equipped with the intent, or with reasonable cause to

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believe, that they would enter the service of a belligerent after being sent out of 

the jurisdiction of the United States.” 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 496 (1940).9 In 

distinguishing between the over age destroyers and the “mosquito boats” which 

were, at that time, under construction, Attorney General Jackson referred to the 

“traditional” rules of international law,” which distinguish between the selling 

of previously armed and outfitted vessels to a belligerent, and the building of 

armed vessels ‘“to the order o f a belligerent.”' Id. at 495 (quoting 2 Oppenheim, 

International Law 574-76).

This distinction, regarding which Jackson cites Oppenheim’s characterization as 

‘“hair splitting,”’ although “‘logically correct,’” is premised upon the view that by 

“carrying out the order of a belligerent, [a neutral nation permits its] territory [to be] 

made the base of naval operations,” in violation of a neutral ’ s “duty of impartiality.” 

Id. Because of the potential importance of this distinction and its subtleties, we set 

out below the text of Attorney General Jackson’s lengthy quote from Oppenheim’s 

treatise which explains the rationale of this view in greater detail.10

9 We noted in our earlier memorandum that §§ 963 and 964, first enacted as part o f the Espionage Act of 

1917, 40 Stat. 221 22, codified the substantive rules of international law forbidding the delivery of armed 

vessels to belligerent powers by neutral nations. Regarding these provisions and Attorney General Jackson’s 

opinion, we concluded that:

Although some commentators have suggested that Attorney General Jackson’s opinion supports 

the view that all of the Neutrality Act provisions were intended to apply to Government 

activities, we believe that § 964 by its terms is limited to circumstances involving a declared war, 

unlike the other neutrality laws, and was proposed to Congress by Attorney General Gregory in 

1917 for the purpose of providing “for the observance of obligations imperatively imposed by 

international law upon the United States.” H R Rep. No. 3 0 ,65th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1917).

8 Op. O.L.C. at 77 n.21. In 1941, however, Congress enacted the Lend Lease Act, 55 Stat. 31, which 

authorized the President to supply, with certain limitations, military equipment to the government of any 

nation the defense of which he deems vita) to the defense of the United States. This Act, which granted 

temporary emergency powers to the President, effectively suspended the operation of the predecessor to 

§ 964 until June 30, 1943 See S. Rep. No. 45, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. Rep. No 18, 77th Cong., 1st 

Sess. (1941). See generally 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58 (1941).

10 Attorney General Jackson quoted the following from 2 Oppenheim, International Law 574-76:

Whereas a neutral is in no wise obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects from 

selling armed vessels to the belligerents, such armed vessels being merely contraband of war, a 

neutral is bound to employ the means at his disposal to prevent his subjects from building, fitting 

out, or arming, to the order o f either belligerent, vessels intended to be used as men o f war, and to 

prevent the departure from his jurisdiction o f any vessel which, by order of either belligerent, has 

been adopted to warlike use. The difference between selling armed vessels to belligerents and 

building them to order is usually defined in the following way.

An armed ship, being contraband o f war, is in no wise different from other kinds o f contraband, 

provided that she is not manned in a neutral port, so that she can commit hostilities at once after 

having reached the open sea. A subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship, or arms a 

merchantmen, not to the order of a belligerent, but intending to sell her to a belligerent, does not 

differ from a manufacturer of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent. There is nothing to 

prevent a neutral from allowing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and to deliver them to 

belligerents, either in a neutral port or in a belligerent port.

* * *

On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral builds armed ships to the order of a belligerent, he 

prepares the means of naval operations, since the ships, on sailing outside the neutral territorial 

waters and taking in a crew and ammunition, can at once commit hostilities. Thus, through the 

carrying out o f the order o f the belligerent, the neutral territory has been made the base o f naval 

operations; and as the duty of impartiality includes an obligation to prevent either belligerent

Continued

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A more recent statement by an Attorney General construing the Neutrality 

Act is found in a press conference held on April 20,1961, by Attorney General 

Kennedy, following the Bay of Pigs invasion. Although Attorney General 

Kennedy did not formally opine on this matter, the views presented in this press 

conference have been widely quoted as the views of the Kennedy Administration on the Act:

F irst. . . the neutrality laws are among the oldest laws in our 

statute books. Most of the provisions date from the first years of 

our independence and, with only minor revisions, have continued in force since the 18th Century. Clearly they were not 

designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world 

today.

Second, the neutrality laws were never designed to prevent 

individuals from leaving the United States to fight for a cause in 

which they believed. There is nothing in the neutrality laws 

which prevents refugees from Cuba from returning to that country to engage in the fight for freedom. Nor is an individual 

prohibited from departing from the United States, with others of 

like belief, to join still others in a second country for an expedition against a third country.

There is nothing criminal in an individual leaving the United 

States with the intent of joining an insurgent group. There is 

nothing criminal in his urging others to do so. There is nothing 

criminal in several persons departing at the same time. What the 

law does prohibit is a group organized as a military expedition 

from departing from the United States to take action as a military force against a nation with whom the United States is at 

peace.

There are also provisions of early origin forbidding foreign 

states to recruit mercenaries in this country. It is doubtful whether 

any of the activities presently engaged in by Cuban patriots 

would fall within the provisions of this law.

11 M. Whiteman, Digest o f International Law 231 (1968). See also Lobel, The

Rise and Decline o f the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War

Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 Harv. Int. L.J. 1,4 & n.16 (1983); 

N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,1961, § 1 at 6.

10 (... continued)

from m aking neutral territory the base o f military or naval operations, a neutral violates his 

neutrality by not preventing his subjects from carrying out an order of a belligerent for the 

building and fitting out of men o f war. This distinction, although of course logically correct, is 

hair splitting. B ut as, according to the present law, neutral States need not prevent their subjects

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Conclusion

We have attempted to provide a broad overview of the Neutrality Act, its 

various provisions, their scope, and their application, by courts and Attorneys 

General throughout their history since their original enactment in 1794. Together with our recent memorandum to you, this memorandum should provide 

you with a survey of the most prominent authorities relative to these provisions 

of criminal law. However, herein we have not attempted to provide a definitive 

analysis of the applicability of these provisions to any specific set of facts, and 

this memorandum should not be construed as such.

T h e o d o r e B. O l s o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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