In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 04-1006

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RICARDO U. GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:03-CR-23-TS—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

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ARGUED JULY 6, 2004—DECIDED JULY 15, 2004

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Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and KANNE, Circuit

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An officer on routine patrol

in Ft. Wayne, Indiana, at 2:30 A.M. saw a car driving

unusually slowly on a residential street. Out of curiosity he

checked its license plate using a computer terminal in the

patrol car and learned that it matched a different auto.

That violation of the vehicular code justified a stop, independent of any suspicion that a valid plate had been attached to a stolen car to avoid detection. The driver claimed

not to be carrying a license or any other identification; he

gave his name as Hector Bazan. After smelling alcohol on
2 No. 04-1006

the driver’s breath, the officer administered a breathalyzer

test; the results implied that the driver was intoxicated. A

quick check on the patrol car’s terminal showed that no

“Hector Bazan” was licensed to drive in Indiana. At this

point the officer had probable cause to believe that “Bazan”

had committed at least one traffic infraction (driving a car

that that lacked proper license plates) and two crimes

(driving without a license and driving under the influence

of alcohol).

Fort Wayne’s police department discourages “John Doe”

bookings, so the officer was anxious to pin down the driver’s

name. He told the driver that if he could prove his identity,

then he would receive citations and summonses; otherwise

he would be fingerprinted and booked at the stationhouse.

“Bazan” said that he had identification at home and offered

to show the officer where he lived. The officer handcuffed

“Bazan” and put him in the back of the squad car for the

drive. Once at home, “Bazan,” still in handcuffs, unlocked

the front door and entered; the officer followed. (By then a

second officer had joined the first; we ignore this detail.)

The district court found that the driver “did not tell the officers to stay outside, nor did he invite them in.” “Bazan”

walked through several rooms, trying in vain to find the

identification he was seeking. Tagging along, the officer saw

evidence that the house was a bogus-ID mill. Instead of

allowing “Bazan” to keep searching, the officer told him to

sit down while the police obtained a search warrant—

which they did, by telephone. Executing the warrant, the

police seized evidence that the occupants of the house were

making fraudulent documents. They also discovered who

the driver really is. Apparently he lacked enough confidence

in his handiwork to carry one of the fakes himself, but he

had strong reason not to tote anything bearing his real

name. An open shoebox contained court papers with the

name Ricardo Garcia in the caption. Using the squad car’s

terminal a third time, the police found that Garcia was

evading two warrants for his arrest. The crime: forgery.
No. 04-1006 3

A federal indictment charged Garcia with possessing

document-making implements with the intent to produce

false identification. See 18 U.S.C. §1028(a)(5). The district

court granted his motion to suppress the evidence seized

from his home, ruling that the warrant depends on information that the fourth amendment barred the police from

learning. As the district judge understood the situation,

Garcia had not been arrested but instead had been detained

on reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968). Although the judge recognized that police may

follow an arrested suspect wherever he goes, even inside a

residence, see Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1982), she held that they are forbidden to do the same with

persons stopped under Terry. The United States has taken

an interlocutory appeal, which the Criminal Appeals Act

authorizes. See 18 U.S.C. §3731 ¶2.

The district court’s premise is false, and the bad premise

spoiled the conclusion. Garcia had been arrested. His traffic

stop was itself an arrest on probable cause. See Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). That is why, we have

held, it is inappropriate to treat investigations following

traffic stops as governed by Terry, when the stop rests on

probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th

Cir. 2002) (en banc). This stop was supported by probable

cause, and soon probable cause to believe that Garcia had

committed two more offenses turned up. Custody had ample

support.

To call particular custody an “arrest” does not necessarily

mean that a given search or seizure is reasonable. No

matter how much custody may be permissible—Atwater v.

Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), holds that police may make

full custodial arrests for fine-only offenses, so there is no

doubt that the officer could have taken Garcia to the

stationhouse without ado—the reasonableness of a search

or seizure depends on what actually happens rather than
4 No. 04-1006

what could have happened. See Childs, 277 F.3d at 953.

That is why police may not conduct full searches of drivers,

passengers, and vehicles in all routine traffic stops. See

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). Most drivers are given citations and sent on their way. Because the principal

justifications for full searches are the need to detect risks to

the arresting officers and to preserve evidence that suspects

could destroy on the way to the lockup, there is slight

warrant for intrusive steps when detention is brief and the

drivers (and most evidence) will soon depart. Compare

Knowles with Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

Garcia was not among those covered by a catch-andrelease regimen, however. He could not produce a driver’s

license, and Gustafson holds that a driver who lacks a

license is subject to full custodial arrest and thorough

search. Moreover, Garcia was inebriated; the police could

not let him drive away and endanger others on the road. So

they took him into custody. Both in the squad car and

during the tour of his home Garcia was in handcuffs. It

would have been folly for the police to let him enter the

home and root about unobserved. What if Garcia set out to

look for weapons rather than identification? So it was reasonable to go with him if he entered at all—no less reasonable than in Chrisman itself. A police officer stopped

Overdahl, a university student, carrying a bottle of gin.

As Overdahl was under 21 and not entitled to possess or

drink liquor, he had committed an offense. The officer asked

for identification; Overdahl volunteered to retrieve it from

his dormitory room. Standing in the door and observing

while Overdahl searched for ID, the officer saw Chrisman,

Overdahl’s roommate, committing a drug offense. The Court

held that the officer had acted reasonably, so Chrisman

could be prosecuted based on what the officer had seen. If

it was reasonable for the officer to keep Overdahl in view,

it was no less reasonable to keep Garcia in view—for
No. 04-1006 5

Garcia’s offenses were more serious, and the risk that he

would retrieve a weapon or take an opportunity to flee was

appreciably greater. (Note, too, that the Court treated

Overdahl as under arrest, not as the target of a Terry stop.

The police had probable cause to think that Overdahl had

committed a crime; just so with Garcia.)

That leaves only the question whether it was unreasonable to give Garcia the choice of looking for identification.

Yet increasing a suspect’s options cannot harm him; additional options provide benefits, and as long as suspects

are free to refuse they cannot be made better off by a rule

forbidding the offer. Many persons situated similarly to

Garcia (but not having evidence of crime in plain view at

home) welcome the opportunity to find their drivers’ licenses and thus avoid full custodial arrests. Perhaps drink

prevented Garcia from appreciating that the police would

keep their eyes open, and that his situation would go from

bad to worse, but when making the offer and tagging along

the police did not know this; a suspect’s poor choice does not

render unconstitutional an officer’s objectively reasonable

offer.

The district judge was led astray by the language the

police used at the hearing. Officer Bonar, who stopped

Garcia’s car, testified that he did not plan to arrest the

driver unless he was unable to provide positive identification, and that even while in handcuffs Garcia was “detained”

rather than “under arrest.” From this the district judge

concluded that it must have been a Terry stop; there is no

other alternative to “arrest.” Fourth amendment jurisprudence, however, is objective. See Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at

811-16. See also, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795,

800 (2003); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1996);

Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985); Scott v.

United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978). It does not matter

what Bonar was thinking or planning. Reasonableness

depends on facts, not labels. Officer Bonar evidently uses
6 No. 04-1006

the word “arrest” to mean what the Supreme Court calls

a “full custodial arrest”—a trip to the stationhouse for

booking and incarceration. He uses the word “detention”

to mean what the Supreme Court calls an arrest. Police

officers’ diction does not affect the constitutional inquiry.

Definitions do not matter either. The fourth amendment

asks whether a particular search was “reasonable” rather

than whether a suspect was “under arrest.” If a person in

custody on probable cause elects to hunt for identification

at home in order to reduce the custody’s duration, it is

reasonable for police to keep him in view to ensure that

credentials are the only object of the expedition. Thus the

police were entitled to be in a place where evidence of crime

was in plain view; their observations were lawful; and as

they did not seize that evidence until a warrant had issued,

the exclusionary rule has no role to play.

REVERSED

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-15-04