Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

“We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There”

The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan 1979–1989

Matt M. Matthews

Occasional Paper 36

IRAN

INDIA

CHINA USSR
Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Matt M. Matthews

Occasional Paper 36

“We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There” 

The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan 1979–1989
First Printing: July 2011

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Matthews, Matt M, 1959-

 We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There: The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan 1979–1989 / Matt M. Matthews.

 p. cm. -- (Occasional paper ; 36)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 ISBN 978-0-9841901-9-5 (alk. paper)

 1. Afghanistan--History--Soviet occupation, 1979-1989. 2. Counterinsurgency-

-Soviet Union--History. 3. Counterinsurgency--Afghanistan--History--20th century. 4. Afghanistan--History, Military--20th century. 5. Soviet Union--History, 

Military. I. Title. II. Title: Soviet approach in Afghanistan 1979-1989. 

 DS371.2.M394 2011

 958.104’5--dc23

 2011019277
Contents

Page

Introduction............................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1. Is There Still Anyone on Your Side? Invasion and 

Consolidation December 1979–February 1980.............. 5

Chapter 2. A Deviation from the Original Plans: The Search for 

Victory 1980–1984 ....................................................... 23

Chapter 3. Are We Going to Be Stuck There Indefinitely? The 

Search for a Way Out 1985–1989................................. 45

Conclusions............................................................................................. 63

Bibliography ........................................................................................... 71

About the Author..................................................................................... 77

Maps

1. Soviet Invasion.................................................................................... 12

2. Panjshir, 7 April–May 1984................................................................ 38

3. Second Eastern Offensive of 1985...................................................... 52

4. Zhawar Campaign, 1986..................................................................... 55

Foreword

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest publication in the Occasional Paper Series, “We Have Not Learned How to 

Wage War There” The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr. 

Matt Matthews. For this work, Mr. Matthews collected a wide variety of 

sources on the subject, many of them of primary accounts, and used these 

materials to provide an overview of the evolution of the Soviet operational 

approach in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. This Soviet experience 

offers a number of useful insights for American military professionals who 

are, as of this writing, conducting operations in Afghanistan.

Mr. Matthews begins his study by examining the Soviets’ planning for 

its invasion of Afghanistan and initial goals for that campaign. The author 

then looks closely at how the Soviets adapted their tactics and organization to meet the committed and resilient insurgent threat that emerged to 

do battle against Soviet forces. Despite conventional interpretations of this 

campaign in Afghanistan which emphasize the rigidity of Soviet methods, 

Matthews’ study suggests that the Soviets were flexible in their overall 

approach. The Soviet government did, for example, launch nation-building initiatives that would look familiar to American military officers who 

served in Afghanistan in the first decade of the 21st century. These efforts, 

however, were seriously hindered by a Soviet military culture that opposed 

a more comprehensive campaign to foster a popular central Afghan government. Matthews concludes his study by examining Soviet operations to 

extract their forces from Afghanistan while nonetheless leaving a viable, if 

not popular, Afghan government in place.

We at the Combat Studies Institute believe in our mission to support the 

warfighter with historical research relevant to their current tasks. Achieving a better understanding of the past can only assist in the execution of 

present and future missions. CSI – the past is prologue!

 

Dr. William G. Robertson

Director, Combat Studies Institute

Introduction

We have been fighting in Afghanistan for already six years. 

If the approach is not changed, we will continue to fight 

for another 20-30 years . . . . Our military should be told 

that they are learning badly from this war. What can it be 

that there is no room for our General Staff to maneuver? 

In general, we have not selected the keys to resolving this 

problem. What, are we going to fight endlessly, as a testimony that our troops are not able to deal with the situation? We need to finish this process as soon as possible.

 Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet Politburo, 

CPSU CC Politburo Transcript, 13 November 1986

Over the course of the last eight years, a plethora of new primary 

research material related to the Soviet war in Afghanistan has emerged. 

With Lester W. Grau and Michael A Gress’s important translation and 

editing of the Russian General Staff history, titled The Soviet-Afghan War: 

How a Superpower Fought and Lost, in 2002 to the recent work of the 

Woodrow Wilson International Center Cold War International History 

Project and The National Security Archive, the conflict has now come into 

sharper historical focus. Recent secondary sources such as Gregory Feifer’s 

The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan, and David Loyn’s 

In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American 

Occupation, have also helped shed new light on the war. Additionally, 

Stephen Tanner’s revised edition of Afghanistan: A Military History from 

Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban has examined the long 

history of the many conflicts in Afghanistan. 

It is interesting, however, that many Western military analysts have 

viewed the Soviet experience as a failure, an episode from which few 

lessons can be gleaned.1

 In fact, there is not a single reference to the 

Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the US Army and Marine Corps 

Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 published in 2006. A military 

analyst who suggested including the Soviet conflict in the manual 

concluded that, “Pentagon officials seemed to have little awareness about 

what Moscow had been trying to do there or for how long.”2

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, senior 

Soviet political leaders sincerely believed that it would be a short 

1
campaign. Indeed, initial Soviet designs in Afghanistan were exceedingly 

limited, calculated only to construct a viable Afghan central government 

that could withstand the attacks of its internal enemies. “They hoped,” 

wrote historian Artemy Kalinovsky, “that while Soviet troops provided 

training and logistical support to the military of the Democratic Republic 

of Afghanistan, [DRA] economic aid and a massive advising effort would 

help build up the governing ability of the main political party. The Kabul 

government would then have the legitimacy and the defense capability to 

stand on its own two legs without Soviet troops.”3 However, like other 

great powers before them, the Soviets failed to grasp the peculiarities of 

Afghanistan, causing their original plans to go terribly awry. Within weeks 

of the invasion, the Soviet military found itself engulfed in a rapidly 

escalating war. It would prove a costly 10-year struggle that would take the 

lives of approximately 13,833 Soviet soldiers and roughly 9 percent of the 

Afghan population.4

Over the course of this decade-long conflict, the Soviet military 

establishment frequently altered its approach as it sought to achieve victory 

over the Mujahideen, as the Afghan anti-government insurgents were 

known, and strengthen the Afghan government and armed forces.5

 Early 

in the war, the Soviet army was hindered by a paucity of tactical expertise, 

over-centralization, and the lack of a counter-insurgency doctrine. It was 

also encumbered with a heavily mechanized force unsuitable for the 

Afghan terrain, an unreliable Afghan army, and an almost complete lack 

of cultural and historical insight. More important, while the initial Soviet 

force that intervened in 1979 was arguably large and capable enough to 

achieve the original aims of the campaign, as those aims increased in scope 

and complexity, it became clear that the Soviet Union had neither the will 

nor the capacity to commit the number of troops needed for success.6

The Soviets certainly underestimated their opposition and continually 

struggled to find a formula for victory over anti-government forces, yet 

when they finally withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, they left 

in place a viable government that managed to outlive the Soviet Union. 

The Soviets also left behind a fairly competent Afghan military. According 

to historian Mark Galeotti, “The success of the operation to withdraw and 

the longevity of the Soviet-retrained government forces they left behind 

attest to the fact that the [Soviet] General Staff was beginning to master 

this new style of war, for all the problems associated with getting a modern 

bureaucratic military machine to reform itself.”7

 This Long War Occasional 

Paper will examine the shifting approaches to the Soviet military effort in 

Afghanistan and its attempts to transform units that were designed and 

2
trained for large-scale conventional combat operations into a tactically 

proficient and successful counterinsurgent force.

Chapter 1 of this study provides a concise history of Soviet involvement 

in Afghanistan. The rationale behind the Soviet foray into Afghanistan is 

examined as well as the planning concept for the military occupation. This 

chapter will also address the initial problems encountered by the Soviet 

army as anti-government forces began to conduct guerrilla operations 

against it. 

Chapter 2 focuses on the beginning of active operations against the 

Mujahideen, as well as the Soviet recognition of initial problems related to 

the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The chapter further includes 

an overview of operations from 1980 to 1984 and Soviet army modifications 

to its tactical doctrine, as well as its flawed counterinsurgency operations 

(COIN) approach.

Chapter 3 of this study explores the Soviet quest for a way out of the 

quagmire. This discussion also considers Soviet military operations under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and his decision to give the 

Soviet army one year of free rein in carrying out the war. Additionally, 

Gorbachev’s exceedingly successful withdrawal from Afghanistan will be 

addressed, as will the failure of the Soviet military to respond to national 

reconciliation efforts and the challenges of COIN. 

The Soviets experienced innumerable tribulations during their decade 

long struggle in Afghanistan, and while they almost certainly never truly 

grasped the complexities of the situation, they did achieve a few striking successes.8

 They managed to leave behind an Afghan government and 

army capable of withstanding the Soviet withdrawal. As historian Lester 

W. Grau recently noted, “The withdrawal was based on a coordinated diplomatic, economic and military plan permitting Soviet forces to withdraw 

in good order and the Afghan government to survive.”9

 This serves as an 

important lesson, which should not be overlooked by Coalition forces currently involved in Afghanistan. 

3
Notes

1. Victor Sebestyen wrote, “Few strategists from Russia or the West seem to 

think anything can be learnt from it.” Victor Sebestyen, “West ignores lessons of 

Soviet humiliation in Afghanistan,” TimesOnline, 19 July 2009, 2, http://www.

timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6719240.ece (accessed 1 March 

2010).

2. Artemy Kalinovsky, “Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 

4 September 2009, 1–2, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/

afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan (accessed 1 March 2010).

3. Artemy Kalinovsky, “Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan,” Foreign 

Policy, 4 September 2009, 1, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/

afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan (accessed 1 March 2010); Artemy 

Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency 

and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 60 (January 

2010), 2, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.

publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 2010).

4. Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), xix; Robert F. Baumann, 

Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 

Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 136.

5. Throughout this text, the terms Mujahideen, Mujahidin and Mujahadeen, 

the transliterated Arabic word for “those who struggle or fight,” are used 

interchangeably in various quotations. The author will use Mujahideen, the more 

common transliteration.

6. Scott R. McMichael pointed out that, “Perhaps 500,000 troops would have 

been required. The political, economic, and ideological costs of such an approach 

were unacceptable.” Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military 

Performance in Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 52.

7. Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London, UK: 

Frank Cass, 1995), 19.

8. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress wrote that, “Despite the passage 

of time and the authors’ unprecedented access to materials about the war, there 

is ample evidence that the Soviets never really understood their enemy or the 

neighboring country in which they were fighting.” The Russian General Staff, The 

Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. 

Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 

310.

9. Lester W. Grau, “Soviet COIN in Afghanistan,” slide presentation at the 

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 May 2010.

4
5

Chapter 1

Is There Still Anyone on Your Side?

Invasion and Consolidation December 1979–February 1980

When the highest political leaders of the USSR sent its 

forces into this war, they did not consider the historic, religious, and national particularities of Afghanistan.

 The Russian General Staff

Background

Soviet interest in Afghanistan began in 1919, when Lenin’s fledgling 

Marxist government became the first country to acknowledge the new 

Afghan regime. Afghanistan promptly returned the goodwill, becoming 

the first country bordering the Soviet Union to recognize the new state. 

By the early 1920s, the Soviets were assisting Afghanistan with various 

infrastructure projects, as well as supplying military aircraft and trainers for 

the country’s new air force.1

 The two countries maintained good relations 

over the next three decades and, by the 1950s, the Soviet Union was pouring 

massive amounts of money into Afghanistan. As military historian Stephen 

Tanner pointed out, they “invested in Afghanistan by building dams, roads, 

airfields, schools, and irrigation systems, as well as by searching for natural 

resources.”2 While the United States also contributed hundreds of millions 

of dollars to Afghan infrastructure projects during this timeframe, the 

Americans turned down requests for military aid. According to Tanner, the 

United States deemed Afghanistan “indefensible against a potential Red 

Army attack, and just plain strategically unimportant.”3

Deprived of armaments from the United States, Prime Minister of 

Afghanistan Mohammed Daoud turned to the Soviet Union. The Soviets 

were more than happy to assist. By the early 1960s, historian J. Bruce 

Amstutz wrote, “Soviet military instructors had completely replaced the 

longstanding contingent of Turkish officers, traditionally the military 

advisers to the Afghan army. Of the almost 4,000 Afghan military officers 

who went to the USSR for training, all were obliged to take one or more 

courses in communism.”4

 Afghan officers who showed interest in Marxist 

philosophy were often enticed into the ranks of the budding Afghan 

Communist Party, known as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 

(PDPA).5

 By the 1970s, the Afghan military was totally reliant on the 
6

Soviets for day-to-day operations. As Amstutz acknowledged, “One effect 

of almost total Afghan dependence on Soviet logistical arms support, 

including spare parts, ammunition, and gasoline, was that Afghanistan 

implicitly could never act militarily against any foreign country without 

Moscow’s approval.”6

 Conversely, this state of affairs doomed any chance 

of a significant military response to a Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.

In 1973, with the assistance of the PDPA, Prime Minister Daoud 

ousted his cousin, King Zahir, in a coup and seized the reins of power in 

Afghanistan.7

 While he had used the PDPA to help overthrow Zahir, Daoud 

quickly removed PDPA ministers from the government and began to slash 

the number of Soviet military advisors within the ranks of the Afghan 

Army. He imprisoned many of his opponents and outraged Islamists by his 

heavy-handed tactics. Daoud also sought to reach out to other countries and 

maintain a middle-of-the-road policy in his dealings with both the Soviets 

and the West. After a combative meeting with Soviet General Secretary 

Leonid Brezhnev in 1977, Daoud’s days were numbered.8

In April 1978, PDPA officers deposed Daoud in a bloody coup. Daoud 

was executed along with 18 members of his family.9

 The new communist 

regime wasted little time in implementing sweeping radical reforms within 

Afghanistan. “The communists changed the national flag, painted schools 

red, encouraged education for girls and rights for women, canceled all rural debt and started to impose land redistribution measures that upset the 

clan and tribal system of the Afghan countryside,” wrote journalist David 

Loyn.10 Indeed, the new revolutionary alterations created a firestorm of rebellion against the new communist government of Nur Mohammed Taraki. 

Reciprocal violence spread rapidly as Taraki’s regime found itself locked 

in a battle with various elements of Afghan society opposed to radical reform. The greatest challenge came from Islamist guerrillas trained by the 

Pakistani government. “To them,” declared Loyn, “both Daoud’s gradualist approach to democracy and the shock tactics of the communists came 

to the same thing: a threat to their way of life. They went to war to defend 

traditional Afghan rural conservative values against democracy, progress, 

the education of girls and godless communism.”11

In 1979, Islamist guerrillas dubbed “mujahideen,” a term that roughly 

translated to “Holy Warriors,” managed to capture the government 

stronghold at Asadabad near the Khyber Pass. It was an easy victory, as 

the Afghan commander joined forces with the rebels.12 In March, the 17th 

Division was sent into the city of Herat, in western Afghanistan, to quell 

anti-government rioting. Once again, sizable elements of the Afghan army 

mutinied, with the soldiers of the 17th Division joining the rioters. Taraki 
7

quickly surrounded the city with forces still loyal to his government and 

with the help of Soviet supplied IL-28 bombers managed to retake Herat. 

According to former diplomatic officer Martin Ewans, the aircraft were 

“possibly piloted by Russians.”13 By the time the insurrection ended, 

approximately 5,000 Afghans were dead along with 100 Soviet advisers 

and family members. According to one historian, during the brief time the 

rebels held the city, “decapitated Soviet heads had been paraded around the 

city on poles.”14

Taraki’s new Marxist regime was rapidly unraveling. Following 

the Herat uprising, the Afghan president made at least 20 appeals to the 

Soviets for troops and also an increase in military aid for his embattled 

government.15 Well into the spring of 1979, the Soviets refused Taraki’s 

request. According to Afghan specialist Gilles Dorronsoro, “the prospect 

of a massive direct intervention continued to be rejected by all the Soviet 

officials responsible for Afghan affairs, highly aware as they were of 

the diplomatic costs and the risk of becoming bogged down.”16 In his 

recent work The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan, Gregory 

Feifer described a telephone conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei 

Kosygin and Taraki that took place in March 1979. The exchange reveals 

the absolute desperation of Taraki’s government and provides an early 

glimpse into the problems the Soviet military would face after its invasion 

of Afghanistan. “Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, 

the petty bourgeoisie, and the white-collar workers in Herat?” Kosygin 

asked. “Is there still anyone on your side?” “There’s no active support 

on the part of the population,” Taraki replied. “It’s almost wholly under 

the influence of Shiite slogans—follow not the heathens, but follow us. 

That’s what underpins the propaganda.” Kosygin went on to ask Taraki, 

“Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union, where 

are they all now?” Taraki told Kosygin that, “Most of them are Muslim 

reactionaries. We’re unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in 

them.”17 Afterward, Taraki flew to Moscow for further discussions with 

the Soviet leadership. In Moscow, Kosygin informed the Afghan president 

that, “If our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would 

get worse.” Kosygin told Taraki a Soviet troop commitment, “would 

immediately arouse the international community, and would invite sharply 

unfavourable many-faceted consequences.”18

On returning to Kabul from a trip to Cuba and Moscow in September 

1979, Taraki found himself challenged by competing members within the 

PDPA. After an erratic series of shootouts and ambushes, Taraki’s life came 

to a swift end when Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin took control of the 
8

government and ordered Taraki to be smothered to death with a pillow.19

While Amin endeavored to scale back many of Taraki’s revolutionary 

reforms, the insurrection against the government continued unabated.20

The Soviet leadership was shocked by the whole affair. A report by the 

Politburo painted Amin as, “an ambitious, cruel, treacherous person . . . 

insincere and two-faced.” When the new Afghan President began to reach 

out to Pakistan, the Soviets grew even more alarmed. According to David 

Loyn, “Amin had spent time in the West, and Soviet intelligence reports 

suggested he was a Central Intelligence Agency stooge. The suspicion 

alone was a death sentence.”21

The Soviet political leadership’s attitude toward intervention changed 

markedly after the assassination of Taraki. While the Soviet Union certainly wanted to salvage its client state from complete disintegration, there 

were far larger issues that concerned the inner circle of the Soviet politburo.22 According to former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy M. 

Kornienko, the Soviet political bosses were seriously concerned about “the 

stationing of American military ships in the Persian Gulf in the fall of 1979, 

and the incoming information about preparations for a possible invasion of 

Iran, which threatened to cardinally change the military-strategic situation 

in the region to the detriment of the interests of the Soviet Union.”23 Kornienko noted that, the KGB added fuel to the flame, by portraying Amin “as 

an American agent” and “exaggerated the power of the USSR to change 

the situation.”24

As the political leadership careened closer to the brink of intervention, 

senior Soviet military commanders remained one of the last bulwarks of 

reason. Kornienko revealed that among the higher military leadership, “the 

idea of sending troops to Afghanistan did not inspire any enthusiasm . . . . 

For understandable reasons, they justified their objections against it by professional rather than political considerations, supporting them by [referring 

to] the American experience in Vietnam: the impossibility to cope with 

Afghanistan with the forces that could be used [for it] without substantially 

weakening the Soviet groups of forces in Europe and along the border with 

China, which was not acceptable in those years.”25

“The Measures”

On 10 December 1979, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal 

Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov, was summoned to the office of the Soviet 

Defense Minister, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov. The Defense Minister informed 

Ogarkov that a decision had been reached by the Politburo to temporarily 

commit Soviet troops to Afghanistan. Ustinov instructed his Chief of Staff 

to begin planning for the commitment of 75,000 to 80,000 soldiers. The 
9

pronouncement by the Defense Minister shocked and dismayed Ogarkov. 

Displaying a firm grasp of military history and of the current situation in 

Afghanistan, Ogarkov called the idea “reckless” and stated that “he was 

against the introduction of troops.”26 He also informed Ustinov that 75,000 

soldiers “would not be able to stabilize the situation.”27 As Ogarkov continued to elucidate his opposition to the plan, Ustinov quashed his objections. 

“Are you going to teach the Politburo? Your only duty is to carry out the 

orders,” Ustinov informed the marshal.28

Later in the day, another meeting was held in the office of General 

Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist 

Party and overall leader of the Soviet Union. Key members of the Soviet 

political leadership, known as the “small Politburo,” attended this gathering. Once more, Ogarkov tried to persuade the political chiefs and the 

head of the KGB against invasion. Alexander Lyakhovsky, a former highranking Soviet Army officer wrote, “He cited the traditions of the Afghan 

people, who never tolerated foreigners on their soil, warned them about the 

possible involvement of our troops in military operations—but everything 

was in vain.”29 Lyakhovsky noted that the ultimate decision was made by 

the “small politburo” on 12 December. “The final decision,” he pointed 

out, “was made unanimously—to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan, although in the interest of secrecy, it was called ‘the measures.’ The 

Soviet leaders believed that that step was intended to promote the interest 

of strengthening the state, and pursued no other goals.”30

The available Soviet documents suggest that, contrary to Cold War 

mythology, the decision to invade had almost nothing to do with advancing communism in the Middle East. The Soviets believed they had only 

one alternative: to salvage and bolster the friendly communist government 

in Afghanistan.31 “When the Soviet leaders made the decision to invade 

Afghanistan in December 1979,” Artemy Kalinovsky recently observed, 

“they did so for reasons that had little [to] do with the desire to spread 

communism or economic modernity. Rather, they were motivated by a desire to stop the deteriorating situation in that country and establish a more 

stable government there. Soviet leaders believed that without an intervention, Afghanistan might turn toward the US and even become a base for 

short-range missiles targeted at the USSR.”32 Senior Soviet political leaders appear to have believed the military undertaking would be quick and 

decisive and that their soldiers would be able to return to the Soviet Union 

within several months.33

On 24 December, Ustinov and Ogarkov signed and released a directive 

approving the commitment of Soviet forces. “Considering the military-
10

political situation in the Middle East,” the directive read, “the latest 

appeal of the government of Afghanistan has been favorably considered. 

The decision has been made to introduce several contingents of Soviet 

troops deployed in southern regions of the country to the territory of the 

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to [give] international aid 

to the friendly Afghan people and also to create favorable conditions to 

interdict possible anti-Afghan actions from neighboring countries.”34

Not mentioned in the new directive was the Soviet plan to kill Amin and 

replace him with one of Afghanistan’s most zealous communists, Babrak 

Karmal.35

 Although forewarned by his senior military commanders, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov remained confident that Soviet troops would be 

out of Afghanistan within a year. “He believed,” wrote David Loyn, “that 

the mujahidin would throw down their weapons when faced by the Soviet 

Army, although he was warned by the Soviet General Staff that it was 

more likely that the rebellion would worsen.”36 Ustinov anticipated that 

most Soviet soldiers could remain in garrison after the invasion, and for the 

most part, avoid direct combat. It was hoped that the Soviet military could 

provide support to Afghan government forces that in turn would take the 

fight to the Mujahideen.37 Until this point, the Soviet military approach had 

been to give their political leaders a blunt assessment of the situation, as 

well as a valid appraisal of the risk involved in committing Soviet soldiers 

to Afghanistan. It was a message that the Soviet political leadership chose 

to disregard.

The Invasion

While senior Soviet military commanders opposed the intervention, 

planning was well under way by the time Ustinov and Ogarkov issued their 

directive. Senior Soviet leaders decided the best blueprint for the overthrow 

of Amin’s government and the occupation of Afghanistan was their highly 

successful interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 

According to Stephen Tanner, “both operations had succeeded in restoring a 

regime against public unrest, in the process precluding further rebellions or 

any possible chain reaction in neighboring states.”38 However, Afghanistan 

was nothing like Hungary or Czechoslovakia. As the Russian General Staff 

history would later make clear, Soviet political leaders “did not consider 

the historic, religious, and national particularities of Afghanistan. After 

the entry, these particularities proved the most important factors as they 

foreordained the long and very difficult nature of the armed conflict.”39

On the eve of the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet military 

operational approach was exceedingly limited. According to Soviet 
11

military expert Lester Grau, the concept was based on the following 

goals and tasks: stabilizing the country by garrisoning the main routes, 

major cities, airbases and logistics sites; relieving the Afghan government 

forces of garrison duties and pushing them into the countryside to battle 

the resistance; providing logistic, air, artillery, and intelligence support 

to the Afghan forces; providing minimum interface between the Soviet 

occupation forces and the local populace; accepting minimal Soviet 

casualties; and, strengthening the Afghan forces, so that once the resistance 

was defeated, the Soviet Army could be withdrawn.40

Colonel General Yuri Vladimirovich Tukharinov’s 40th Army would 

lead the assault. The Russian General Staff history noted that, “The concept of the operation was to commit the LCOSF [Limited Contingent of 

Soviet Forces] into Afghanistan along two ground approaches and an air 

corridor. The LCOSF would quickly seize all the important population 

centers and support the planned coup de main to seize the government.”41

For months, Tukharinov had been assembling his forces in the Turkestan Military District (TMD) north of Afghanistan. The 40th Army would 

serve as the operational headquarters for ground forces.42 “The 40th Army 

received the operational plans for entering Afghanistan on 12 or 13 December,” wrote Dr. Robert F. Baumann. “The plan called for Soviet forces 

to garrison the major centers along the two major routes, which would 

serve as lines of communications throughout the war: Termez-KhairatonPul-e-khumri-Kabul and Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar.”43 Historian 

Scott R. McMichael pointed out that “it was imperative that the Soviet 

invasion force should immediately obtain control of the main highway arc 

[Ring Road] encircling the country and the other major airbases. Accordingly, they planned to conduct the ground invasion from two directions, 

the points of origin being Termez and Kushka. The western arm would 

proceed via the main highway to occupy Herat, Shindand, Farah, and Kandahar in sequence. The eastern strike force would move from Termez to 

Kabul, again along the main highway.”44 While these ground movements 

were underway, Soviet airborne troops would capture the key airbases at 

Herat, Shindand, Kandahar, and Jalalabad.45

The Soviets launched their invasion on 27 December 1979. Hundreds 

of transport planes carrying paratroopers landed at airfields in Kabul and 

Bagram. Soviet troops quickly secured the capital while others rushed 

to capture the strategically important Salang tunnel that ran through 

the Hindu Kush. Soviet advisors with the Afghan Army resorted to all 

manner of subterfuge to disarm and dislocate Afghan government forces. 

These clever stratagems succeeded in keeping Afghan Army resistance 
12

Map 1. Soviet Invasion, 1979

Kandahar

Jalalabad

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA



 Peshawar



Islamabad 



Mazar-e Sharif



Konduz

Ghazni

U.S.S.R.

CHINA

Falzabad



Bagram

Herat



Farah 

Khost







Kabul



0 250 m

0 250 km

Territory Controlled by Soviet Forces

Soviet Invasion Routes

Kandahar

Jalalabad

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA



 Peshawar



Islamabad 



Mazar-e Sharif



Konduz

Ghazni

U.S.S.R.

CHINA

Falzabad



Bagram

Herat



Farah 

Khost







Kabul



0 250 m

0 250 km

Territory Controlled by Soviet Forces Territory Controlled by Soviet Forces

Soviet Invasion Routes Soviet Invasion Routes
13

to a minimum. “In one case,” wrote Stephen Tanner, “Soviet advisers 

requested an inventory of faulty ammunition, which meant unloading 

tanks of their shells; in another, 200 vehicles were immobilized by ordering 

their batteries to be removed for ‘winterization.’ ”46 Within days, Soviet 

Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs) were slicing south out of Kushka and 

Termez, while Soviet Airborne troops descended on Shindand airbase in 

the west and occupied Kandahar and Jalalabad.47 In Kabul, Amin managed 

to survive a botched KGB poisoning attempt, but was later shot down 

by a Soviet Spetsnaz (Special Forces) soldier who also tossed a grenade 

at the president’s head that killed him and his five-year-old son.48 With 

Kabul secured and Amin eliminated, Babrak Karmal became the new 

prime minister and general secretary of the People’s Democratic Party of 

Afghanistan. 

By any measure, the invasion and coup proved highly successful and 

although the occupation had produced a firestorm among the Afghan population, the Soviets, at least initially, were optimistic about the future of the 

operation. According to the Russian General Staff history, “By mid January 1980, the main body of the 40th Army was located in Afghanistan. The 

40th Army consisted of two motorized rifle divisions, an airborne division, 

an air assault brigade, and two separate motorized rifle regiments. In all, 

there were some 52,000 personnel. This was considered sufficient to guarantee the viability of Afghanistan. It was thought that Soviet forces would 

not have to fight during the invasion and subsequent stationing of Soviet 

forces. It was felt that the mere presence of Soviet forces would serve to 

‘sober up’ the Mujahideen. Soviet military assistance would primarily be 

moral support to the DRA.”49

In Moscow, high-ranking Politburo members also remained confident. 

Many of their initial objectives in Afghanistan were surprisingly similar 

to a number of objectives established by Coalition forces after they arrived in Afghanistan in 2001. At a Politburo session on 28 January 1980, 

for example, Ustinov and several other senior members recommended, 

“the creation of opportunities for representatives of tribes and national minorities to participate with full rights in the work of the [jirgas] and local 

councils.”50 They also suggested, “The establishment of contacts and the 

conducting of negotiations with the leaders and elders of the most warlike 

tribes in the DRA and the search for ways to achieve the quickest compromise on conditions for their ceasing the anti-government struggle.”51 The 

Politburo went on to recommend the “realization of a line on a gradual attack on the position of the tribal reaction, the showing of flexibility and a 

differentiated approach to the various tribes and socio-economic strata.”52
14

The members proposed “the working out of a long-term plan of work with 

the Moslem clergy which envisions attracting moderate Moslem leaders to 

cooperate with the authorities, the isolation of representatives of reactionary clerical circles, the establishment of contacts with the Shiite clergy, 

[and] the inadmissibility of any form (including economic) of discrimination against the Shiites.”53 The members realized that spring could bring 

with it “a further activation of the insurgent movement” and wanted to 

reach agreements with the new Afghan government “which defined the 

status and legal position of the Soviet military contingents.”54 More importantly, the leadership wanted “the quickest creation of a militarily prepared, 

organized and equipped people’s army.”55 The members also proposed the 

“consolidation of the PDPA’s position among the command staff, and also 

the intensification of training of the army in the spirit of devotion to the 

people’s power of Afghanistan.”56

Clearly, in articulating their plans for Afghanistan, the Soviets 

considered actions and measures that today could be categorized as key 

elements of counter-insurgency (COIN) and nation-building. As Artemy 

Kalinovsky wrote, “the Soviet intervention was never a strictly military 

operation.”57 Accordingly, the Soviet leadership “realized fairly early on 

that the situation could not be resolved through military means alone. They 

hoped that economic aid and improved governance would help give the 

Kabul government greater legitimacy. Thus parallel to the military effort of 

the 40th Army, there was also a smaller ‘army’ of Soviet advisors working 

to rebuild state institutions, improve the party’s internal cohesiveness and 

relationship with the population, and carry out agricultural reforms.”58

Unfortunately, this parallel effort between the 40th Army and Soviet 

advisors attempting to carry out nation-building projects, would prove 

disastrous, as many combat officers did not comprehend or were reluctant 

to adjust to this approach.59 Interestingly, Soviet political leaders did not 

think Afghanistan was prepared for a collectivist type of government and 

endeavored to steer the PDPA away from many of its Marxist programs. 

Instead, the main goal for the Soviets was to stabilize and legitimize the 

Afghan government.60

Throughout January and February 1980, Babrak Karmal’s newly 

installed government continued to battle anti-government forces. As his 

shaky Afghan army floundered against the Mujahideen, Karmal constantly 

pressured the Soviet military for direct support. However, as Alexander 

Lyakhovsky stressed, “the USSR leadership and our military command 

tried to avoid responding to Babrak Karmal’s request for help in fighting 

with the military formations of the opposition. Leaders of the operative 
15

group of the USSR Defense Ministry Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. 

Sokolov and General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev argued that they did 

not envision participation of the units and formations introduced into 

Afghanistan in combat activities in the DRA territory. They [the troops] 

could only respond if forced to do so under immediate fire impact on the 

part of the rebels, or undertake operations for the liberation of our military 

advisers.”61

Indeed, one of the major goals of the Soviet military during these first 

few months was for the Afghan army to carry the fight to the enemy. “The 

hope,” noted the Russian General Staff history, “was that the principal mission of armed combat with the opposition would be accomplished by the 

Afghan army, but this did not occur. Measures to raise the combat potential 

of the government forces were weak and ineffective.”62 The Afghan army 

was poorly trained and to make matters even worse, almost all of its combat units were far below full strength. Not surprisingly, the Soviet military 

found early on that they could not depend on the Afghan army. Thus, its 

plan to push government forces into the countryside to destroy the Mujahideen was clearly unworkable.63

During this early period, the Soviet Army did achieve some initial success against the Mujahideen. At first, the anti-government forces attempted 

to grapple with Soviet combat units in large formations, and despite taking 

grievous casualties, refused to break contact with their more powerfully 

armed opponent.64 The Russian General Staff history noted that this approach by the Mujahideen, “allowed the Soviet forces to destroy strong 

antirevolutionary groupings near Faizabad, Taleqan, Takhar, Baghlan, 

Jalalabad, and other cities.”65 Before long, however, “The leadership of the 

Afghan opposition, having clashed with a mighty military power, quickly 

realized that if they maintained their large fairly conventional forces, they 

would be destroyed. They abandoned their large-scale tactics and divided 

their formations into guerrilla groups and detachments of 20 to 100 men 

that began to conduct guerrilla warfare.”66

These new tactical adjustments certainly saved the Mujahideen from 

complete destruction and greatly enhanced its chance for victory. At the 

same time, the new adaptive approach exposed the Soviet military’s absolute 

lack of knowledge in combating guerrilla forces. The Soviet Army soon 

realized that it could not hunt down and destroy these small guerilla units 

with large mechanized forces. As the Russian General Staff history made 

clear, “Attempts by the senior leadership to deploy large, combined-arms 

formations to conduct a classic offensive and pursuit against Mujahideen 

detachments did not work.”67 Two former Soviet officers would point out 
16

after the war that during this early period, their soldiers were well trained on 

their equipment. However, they wrote, “this was only true while operating 

on flat terrain. Massive employment of armored vehicles was hindered by 

the mountainous nature of much of the country, where steep slopes as well 

as narrow ravines limited their movement, preventing tanks and infantry 

fighting vehicles from being fully deployed.”68

The Russian General Staff history recorded an example of problems 

encountered by a mechanized battalion in February 1980. The battalion, 

moving on a road march through mountainous terrain, failed to post flank 

security and was hit by 60 to 80 insurgent fighters in a deadly ambush. According to the Russian General Staff, “the enemy action was so unexpected 

that the commanders at all levels were confused and dumbfounded and not 

a single commander gave the order to return fire.”69 By the time the Soviets 

soldiers regained their composure, the enemy had fled, “unimpeded and 

unhurt.”70

While certainly involved in vicious combat, during this opening phase 

of the war, the bulk of the Soviet Army was occupied in protecting government buildings and lines of communication. “Up to 35 percent of the 

force was committed to this mission,” stated Russian military historians.71

They also pointed out that, “There were additional security missions that 

involved security and defense of airfields, military installations, and Soviet-Afghan economic cooperative projects. Convoy escort demanded still 

more security forces.”72 Having trained and prepared for decades to fight 

large conventional wars, the myriad special tasks involved in conducting 

a counter-insurgency campaign was something for which the Soviets were 

totally unprepared. As the Russian General Staff history pointed out, “The 

Soviet forces did not have the experience or knowledge to carry out these 

missions, and the hierarchy had not foreseen the need to train officers to 

fulfill these tasks. There were no answers in the regulations and manuals, 

so these missions had to be conducted by trial and error.”73 As Karmal’s 

government faced growing opposition and as Soviet forces came under 

increased attacks from anti-government forces, the Kremlin scrambled to 

change its approach.
17

Notes

1. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great 

to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 221.

2. Tanner, 225.

3. Tanner, 226.

4. J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation

(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1986), 22.

5. Amstutz, 22–23.

6. Amstutz, 22.

7. M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan 

Response, 1979–1982 (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 306–

307.

8. According to foreign correspondent David Loyn, Daoud informed Brezhnev, 

“We will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to 

employ in Afghanistan.” Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from 

Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, 

MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 229–230; David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred 

Years of British, Russian and American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2009), 138. 

9. M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan 

Response, 1979–1982 (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 307.

10. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 138.

11. Loyn, 139.

12. Loyn, 139.

13. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics

(New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2002), 143.

14. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 232.

15. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 139.

16. Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present, 

trans. John King (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 91.

17. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 31–32.

18. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 140.

19. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da 

Capo Press, 2009), 233; Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in 

Afghanistan (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 47–48. 

20. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 
18

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 233.

21. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 140–141.

22. According to Robert F. Baumann, “A third and more satisfying explanation 

of the Soviet decision is that Moscow acted to rescue a neighboring client 

regime on which it had lavished considerable resources and attention.” Robert F. 

Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, 

and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 133.

23. Georgy M. Kornienko, “Georgy Kornienko’s Account of the Politburo 

Decision to Send Soviet Troops” in Afghanistan in The Cold War: Testimony 

of a Participant, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive, 

Document 10 (Moscow, Russia: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), 193–195.

24. Kornienko, 1–2. 

25. Kornienko, 2.

26. Alexander Lyakhovsky, “Alexander Lyakhovsky’s Account of the Decision 

of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan” in The Tragedy and 

Valor of Afghanistan, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya The National Security Archive, 

Document 8 (Moscow, Russia: Nord, 1995), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs.

27. Lyakhovsky, Document 8.

28. Lyakhovsky, Document 8.

29. Lyakhovsky, Document 8.

30. Lyakhovsky, Document 8.

31. Stephen Tanner wrote, “At this point, the Soviet Union had been reduced 

to only one option: the military rescue of a beleaguered fellow regime; or as the 

rest of the world called it, invasion.” Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military 

History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) 

(Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 235.

32. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, 

Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 2, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

33. Artemy Kalinovsky, “Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan,” Foreign 

Policy, 4 September 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/

afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan.

34. Alexander Lyakhovsky, “Plamya Afgana” (“Flame of the Afghanistan 

Veteran”), trans. Gary Goldberg, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Cold War International History Project, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/

index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034E02C96B6-175C-944CF54E250A1889&sort=Collection&item=Soviet%20

Invasion%20of%20Afghanistan (accessed 5 March 2010).

35. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian 
19

and American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 141; see 

also Alexander Lyakhovsky, “Alexander Lyakhovsky’s Account of the Decision 

of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan” in The Tragedy and 

Valor of Afghanistan, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya The National Security Archive, 

Document 8 (Moscow, Russia: Nord, 1995), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs. 

36. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 143.

37. Loyn, xviii–xix.

38. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 233–234.

39. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 304.

40. Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), xviii–xix. For these 

concepts, Grau cites Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military 

Performance in Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 10; Boris Gromov, 

Ogranichennyy contingent [Limited contingent] (Moscow, Russia: Progress, 

1994), 172.

41. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 15.

42. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 4.

43. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

1993), 138.

44. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 5.

45. McMichael, 5.

46. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 235.

47. Tanner, 235–236.

48. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 78.

49. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 17–18.

50. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989: Documents from the 

Russian and East German Archives,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, Cold War International History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996), 

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.
publications&group_id=14051.

51. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989,” Cold War International 

History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996). 

52.“The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989,” Cold War International 

History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996).

53. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989,” Cold War International 

History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996) .

54. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989,” Cold War International 

History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996) .

55. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989,” Cold War International 

History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996) .

56. “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978–1989,” Cold War International 

History Project, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996) .

57. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, 

Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 2, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

58. Kalinovsky, Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010).

59. Kalinovsky, Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010).

60. Kalinovsky, Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010).

61. Alexander Lyakhovsky, “On the Changing Mission of the Soviet Forces 

in Afghanistan” in The Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan, trans. Svetlana 

Savranskaya. Moscow, Russia: Nord, 2004, The National Security Archive, 

Document 14, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html.

62. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 18–19.

63. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 51; Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over 

the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (London, UK: Frank Cass, 

1998), xviii–xix. For these concepts Grau cites Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling 

Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 

10; Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy contingent [Limited contingent] (Moscow, 

Russia: Progress, 1994), 172.

64. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 19.

65. The Russian General Staff, 19.

66. The Russian General Staff, 19.

67. The Russian General Staff, 19.

68. Major General Oleg Sarin and Colonel Lev Dvoretsky, The Afghan 

Syndrome: The Soviet Union’s Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 92.

20
69. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 19.

70. The Russian General Staff, 19.

71. The Russian General Staff, 19.

72. The Russian General Staff, 19.

73. The Russian General Staff, 20.

21

23

Chapter 2

A Deviation from the Original Plans

The Search for Victory 1980–1984

Yet, from the very first days of its invasion of Afghanistan, 

the Soviet Army was hobbled by a serious doctrinal shortfall—it had no counter-insurgency (CI) doctrine to guide 

and organize its activity.

Scott R. McMichael 

Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan

There is barely an important piece of land in Afghanistan 

that has not been occupied by one of our soldiers. 

Nevertheless, much of the territory stays in the hands of 

the terrorists. We control the provincial [centers], but we 

cannot maintain political control over the territory that 

we seize.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Commander of the Soviet 

Armed Forces

The operations have become of a police character, with 

punitive measures, and as a result we have been pulled in 

to a war with the people with no prospects of a positive 

outcome.

Soviet Political Officer to Politburo Chairman, 1984

The Beginning of Active Operations 

By March 1980, the Soviet invasion and occupation had ignited a conflagration inside Afghanistan. Many Afghan tribes, who had not openly 

opposed Amin’s government, now declared war on Karmal’s Soviet sponsored regime. The Afghan population grew increasingly inflamed as Soviet 

forces became involved in quelling riots in Kabul and Herat. Soon, Soviet 

convoys found themselves under attack from newly formed anti-government forces that proudly announced a jihad against the foreign invaders. 

Money and supplies quickly began to flow into the Mujahideen from various countries around the world. Afghan army units continued to desert en 

masse to the anti-government forces, making matters even worse for the 
24

Soviets. Karmal became increasing alarmed and continued to plead with 

the Soviets for immediate combat support.1

On the last day of February 1980, the initial Soviet strategy for 

Afghanistan changed dramatically when senior commanders received 

a categorical order from Moscow to “begin active operations for the 

destruction of the formations of the armed opposition together with the DRA 

Army.”2

 General Alexander Lyakhovsky, a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan 

War, asserted, “Of course, this was a deviation from the original plans, 

but the order came from the government, and the troops were obligated to 

carry it out. From the beginning of March 1980, the formations and units of 

the LCST [Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops] began their operations in 

the Kunar Province. They found themselves pulled into the internecine war 

in Afghanistan and began to fulfill tasks related to the suppression of the 

rebel movement, which initially did not figure in the USSR plans at all.”3

Initial Problems Recognized

In March, the Soviet army began its first large-scale counterinsurgency 

operation against the Mujahideen in the Kunar Valley in eastern 

Afghanistan. The Soviet army however, was wholly untrained and ill 

equipped for this type of warfare.4

 Interestingly, Afghan specialist Olivier 

Roy suggested that, “The [Soviet] army’s failure in this regard seems to 

have been acknowledged from the beginning by the Soviets themselves. 

They probably knew that the army would not perform well, but mistakenly 

assumed that they would never be involved in direct combat, much less a 

protracted guerrilla war.”5 A 40th Army order of battle for 1980 to 1981, 

compiled by Lester W. Grau, identified the major ground combat units 

and revealed a force dominated by heavy mechanized forces. The 40th 

Army in this period included the 5th, 108th and the 201st Motorized Rifle 

Divisions; 103d Airborne Division; 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle 

Brigades; 56th Air Assault Brigade; 191st and 860th Separate Motorized 

Rifle Regiments; 345th Parachute Regiment; 28th Separate Multiple 

Rocket Launcher Regiment and the 45th Engineer (Sapper) Regiment. 

These units were supported by major 40th Army air assets, which included 

fighter and fighter bomber regiments, as well as helicopter regiments and 

separate squadrons.6

 The major problems encountered by the 40th Army 

as it began offensive operations included an exceedingly heavy force 

structure, a lack of tactical expertise, over-centralization, a nonexistent 

counterinsurgency doctrine, an unreliable Afghan Army and an ethnically 

flawed force structure. 

As the Mujahideen broke down into smaller guerrilla units, the large, 

cumbersome, highly mechanized Soviet Army that was designed to fight 
25

“operationally” and not tactically, proved ineffective against the antigovernment forces.7

 As Lester W. Grau pointed out in the chronology of 

his celebrated work, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan, “Modern armies think in terms of tactics supporting 

operations and operations building campaigns. This theoretical framework 

failed in the Soviet Army in Afghanistan as large-scale operations proved 

ineffective and were practically a hindrance . . . Historic Soviet victories 

were operational and Soviet war-fighting was operationally oriented 

(compared to Western armies which had a more tactical orientation). 

Afghanistan, however, was a tactical war and Soviet tactics were initially 

inadequate for fighting guerrillas.”8 In other words, this would be a “platoon 

leaders’ war,” a struggle that would require strong small unit leadership 

skills. Regrettably, for the Soviet army, these capabilities were in short 

supply early in the war.9

Over-centralization of command was also a key source of tactical tribulations for the Soviet army. “Its operations against the guerrillas had to 

be carried out at the battalion and regimental level or very occasionally at 

the divisional level,” reported defense correspondent Mark Urban. “The 

formations that entered Afghanistan had most of their combat support resources (like artillery, engineers, and signals) organized at the divisional 

level. Other support elements (including aviation) were grouped at an even 

higher level or organization—the 40th Army. It was entirely unsuitable for 

a guerrilla war where battalion commanders need instant, dedicated support rather than having to go through regimental, divisional and even army 

HQs to get it.”10

The 40th Army also faced another disquieting dilemma. The Soviet 

army lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine. “From the very first days of its 

invasion of Afghanistan,” wrote Scott R. McMichael, “the Soviet Army 

was hobbled by a serious doctrinal shortfall—it had no counter-insurgency 

(CI) doctrine to guide and organize its activity.”11 The Russian General 

Staff history concluded that the Soviets had been poorly prepared to confront an Afghan guerrilla force. “The massive experience that Soviet forces 

gained in their fight with the Basmachi movement was simply forgotten.12

The more recent experience of Fascist Germany during the Second World 

War and the experience of other armies that conducted counter-guerrilla 

actions in local wars were practically ignored. Therefore, the Soviet forces 

in Afghanistan had to use trial and error to formulate a new military art to 

combat their unaccustomed foe. This decreased the effectiveness of their 

combat actions and resulted in unwarranted casualties.”13 Olivier Roy underscored this assessment when he concluded that, “As early as 1980 they 
26

[The Soviet army] correctly identified the main problems—lack of adequate training, excessive centralization, lack of initiative and mobility and 

the irrelevancy of the military doctrine.”14

Another major problem confronting the Soviets was the unreliability 

of the Afghan army. “No dilemma confronting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan proved more politically complex or morally enervating than that 

of trying to forge a reliable and self-sustaining army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” wrote Dr. Baumann.15 Clearly, desertions and draft 

evasions had devastated the force. By 1980, the strength of the Afghan 

army had fallen to perhaps 25,000 soldiers.16 According to David Loyn, 

“The Afghan army was an unreliable ally. It faced constant defections from 

the start as not only individuals and units but also whole divisions went 

over to the mujahidin, taking their personal kit and rifles as well as tanks 

and armored vehicles. When units were ordered to go on operations, there 

was always the risk that they might defect.”17 The original Soviet plan to 

push the Afghan army into the field to combat the Mujahideen fell by the 

wayside. The Afghan army’s limited numbers, lack of training and questionable loyalties made this project too risky to implement. Fighting the 

Mujahideen would be a joint effort until the Afghan army could be appropriately structured and trained to carry out operations on its own. 

Another unsettling difficulty facing the 40th Army was its use of large 

numbers of reserve soldiers from Central Asian countries, mainly Uzbeks, 

Tajiks and Turkmen as part of the initial invasion force. As Russian military historians have pointed out, “These Central Asian peoples were also 

national minorities in Afghanistan. The High Command’s hopes that Soviet 

soldiers of these nationalities would have a greater understanding of their 

kinsmen in Afghanistan were not realized. The [Pashtun] tribes, which had 

composed the most active part of the antigovernment movement, had historically always fought with the national minorities in the north, and the 

appearance of Uzbeks and Turkmen from a foreign land only strengthened 

the nationalities’ discords and fanned the flames of a war into which thousands of Soviet citizens were being drawn along with the Afghans.”18 The 

decision to use these Central Asian soldiers clearly underscores the lack of 

cultural and historical awareness on the part of the Soviet leadership and 

serves as an additional example of an army inexperienced in planning for 

and conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Into the Breach 1980-1982

Consequently, as the orders arrived from Moscow to “Begin active 

operations,” the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (LCOSF) found itself limited in both tactical proficiency and counterinsurgency skills. Their 
27

heavy mechanized equipment would prove no match for the terrain or the 

Mujahideen. Furthermore, a relative shortage of combat troops severely 

limited their ability to hold key terrain once it was captured. The Soviets 

also found that they could not rely on Afghan government forces. At the 

same time, the ethnic composition of the 40th Army continued to inflame 

the Pashtun tribes. Once again the Soviet army would find itself searching 

for a new approach. It was a quest that would prove daunting.

In March 1980, the 40th Army resolved one of its major problems 

by withdrawing the Central Asian reserve soldiers from Afghanistan.19 It 

proved an easy fix. Their inclusion in the initial invasion force, however, 

had already caused enormous problems by driving more Pashtuns into the 

ranks of the anti-government forces. As the 40th Army began its offensive 

operations, the Mujahideen moved into the mountains or blended in with 

the local inhabitants. Unfortunately for the Soviets, their heavy combat 

equipment was rendered nearly useless in the rugged, mountainous terrain. The Russian General Staff history recorded that it was “practically 

impossible to use modern combat equipment” in these areas.20 According 

to David Loyn, the Mujahideen now “had textbook conditions to mount an 

insurgency: support in the Afghan villages, a safe haven across the mountains [in Pakistan] with access by narrow tracks that suited them but were 

impassable for the Soviet forces, and a ready supply of young men willing 

to die.”21

The anti-government forces had adapted quickly to guerilla warfare 

and their expertise increased daily. According to one expert in the field, 

the Mujahideen established three major objectives during this timeframe. 

The first was “to deny the legitimacy of the Kabul regime and maintain 

opposition to it among the population.”22 The second and third goals were 

to “establish a guerrilla infrastructure and set up parallel administrative 

control in liberated areas” and to “maintain a military stalemate through 

a war of attrition making the Soviet effort too costly to continue.”23 The 

similarity between Mujahideen objectives and those of the Taliban in the 

first decade of the twenty-first century are evident. 

Anti-government forces also made enormous progress in the tactical 

arena. “The Mujahideen were able to employ various tactical techniques,” 

wrote the authors of the Russian General Staff history: 

Thus, when they would encounter a superior Soviet force, 

they, as a rule, would withdraw from battle. At the same 

time, the Mujahideen would never miss an opportunity to 

launch a surprise strike, usually with a small force. As a 

rule, during this phase, the armed opposition forces aban-
28

doned positional warfare and widely employed maneuver. The Mujahideen could only be forced to accept battle 

under compelling circumstances. These circumstances 

included defense of a base or base region or when the Mujahideen were encircled and had no other options. In this 

case, the blocked Mujahideen detachments moved into 

close combat, where it was practically impossible for the 

Soviets to use their aviation and which sharply restricted 

their possibility of using artillery, especially from indirect 

firing positions.”24

The Soviet Decision to “Drain the Sea”

Throughout 1980, the 40th Army conducted large-scale operations in 

the Panjshir and Kunar Valleys in the northeast portion of Afghanistan. Offensive operations conducted by the 201st Motorized Rifle Division near 

Jalalabad were marked by the heavy use of tanks and artillery and the destruction of Afghan villages. The obliteration of these villages was part of 

the Soviet army’s master plan to drive the population out of the countryside so they could not support the anti-government forces. Evidently, the 

Soviets had recognized Mao Zedong’s maxim that the victorious guerrilla 

should move through the people like a fish through the water. The Soviets 

therefore would work to drain the sea of the people who supported the 

Mujahideen by depopulating the countryside. The editors of the Russian 

General Staff history concluded that the “Soviet leadership determined that 

the strength of the Mujahideen was greatly enhanced by the popular support they enjoy among the local populace . . . Subsequently, the Soviets 

decided to break the link between the people and Mujahideen by driving 

the population from the countryside. Soviet aircraft bombed and strafed 

the countryside while helicopter gunships shot up herds of sheep, goats, 

and camels. Soviet artillery pummeled the countryside. The countryside 

was blanketed with scatterable mines, particularly on paths, pastures, and 

farm land.”25

While this undertaking did in fact greatly affect the Mujahideen’s logistical capability, forcing them to carry more and more or their supplies over 

the rugged mountains from Pakistan, it was certainly not the way to win 

the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. It undoubtedly thwarted Soviet 

attempts at nation-building and establishing a more stable government. Indeed, there was a major disconnect between the proposed nation-building 

efforts of the Soviet government and the Soviet military’s approach. A letter to a member of the Politburo, written by a military political officer in 

1984, revealed a great deal about the problem. The political officer wrote 
29

that, “The operations have become of a police character, with punitive 

measures, and as a result we have been pulled in to a war with the people 

with no prospects of a positive outcome. Inhumane acts by Soviet troops 

with regard to the peaceful population are widespread and systematic and 

manifest themselves in the form of robbery, unjustified and unfounded use 

of firearms, destruction of villages, [and] dishonoring mosques.”26

Artemy Kalinovsky in his recent paper, “The Blind Leading the 

Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in 

Afghanistan,” described the dilemma. “Economic aid in such situations 

tends to be undermined by the massive destructive power of modern 

weapons unleashed on behalf of the government,” he wrote. “The problem 

was exacerbated in the Afghan case because the Soviet military adjusted 

slowly to the demands of counter-insurgency warfare in the Afghan terrain 

and relied heavily on aerial bombardment. At the same time, military 

leaders may have pointed out to Moscow that the Afghan problem could not 

be solved by military means alone, but they either did not realize that their 

actions often made the situation worse or were unable to find a different 

approach.”27 One Soviet officer’s rationale for such conduct, Kalinovsky 

explained, was that “warriors receive medals on their chest and stars on 

their epaulettes and money not for reconciliation, but for conducting 

combat operations.”28 These heavy-handed methods only served to produce 

greater numbers of anti-government fighters and undermine the Soviet 

government’s nation-building projects. In the end, seven million Afghans 

would become refugees.29

While the Soviets pounded the countryside, the Mujahideen continued 

to fight back. An early operation in March 1980 in Paktia Province in the 

eastern part of the country destroyed an entire Soviet battalion.30 After 

taking out the officers and radio operators in the battalion, the Mujahideen 

swept in for the kill.31 According to Mark Urban, “The Soviet conscripts 

apparently stayed inside their personnel carriers, firing inaccurately until 

their ammunition ran out and they were overcome by the guerrillas.”32

This incident clearly illustrated the tactical ineptitude of the Soviet soldier 

and the shortcomings of the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) early in 

the war. Urban highlighted the problem with Soviet NCOs, writing that, 

“In the Soviet army, corporals and sergeants are conscripts with no more 

experience than the men they are supposed to lead.”33 As the Soviets 

quickly found, their military was simply not designed to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The large, clumsy, sweeping operations could only 

temporarily clear out the Mujahideen. The Soviets could remove the threat, 

but they could not hold key terrain in the countryside. By the summer 
30

of 1980, it was obvious to the Soviet high command that changes were 

needed in both the composition of their forces and the manner of their 

employment.34

The 40th Army Adapts

Some of the adjustments made by the 40th Army in 1980 included 

replacing poorly performing Soviet reservists with conscripts and sending 

large artillery formations, anti-aircraft units and hundreds of tanks back 

to the Soviet Union. The Soviets also began to increase the size of their 

helicopter fleet. By the end of 1980, this force would grow from 60 to 300 

helicopters. The 40th Army also increased the number of fighter jets.35 At 

the ground level attempts were also made to decentralize the force structure 

by forming seven new military districts, each with its own brigade or 

division-level headquarters and dedicated air support. According to Scott 

R. McMichael, “It is quite likely that the establishment of these regional 

districts meant that the regional headquarters assumed a greater, more 

detailed role in the actual planning of operations, the 40th Army giving 

up some of its responsibility in this regard.”36 Bulky, heavy divisions were 

also made more flexible by sending number of division headquarters back 

to the Soviet Union and replacing them with independent regiments and 

brigades. Engineers and rocket artillery were attached to these independent 

formations in an attempt to improve their combined arms capacity.37

Although the Soviets were once again willing to alter their approach, 

they would soon find that these adjustments were insufficient to defeat 

anti-government forces. Furthermore, large offensive sweeps against the 

Mujahideen, which the 40th Army continued to mount, would remain an 

enormous impediment to success.

Throughout 1981, the 40th Army continued to conduct large-scale 

operations primarily along the major highway networks or lines of communications (LOC) as well as in eastern Afghanistan. All of these actions 

were carried out at the operational level. As the units were heavily committed to other missions, such as securing LOCs and government facilities, 

units from several different divisions were often used to form what Russian military historians called an “operational command.”38 According to 

these military historians, “In Afghanistan, the understanding of the term 

operation included several different possibilities and forms in the action of 

forces. The required size of operational formations and the issue of who 

would direct the combat actions saw operations devolve down to armies, 

divisions, and even regiments. As a rule, the conduct of army operations 

called for a force of one or two rifle units, as well as airborne, artillery, and 

engineer units and subunits—a total of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel. These 
31

operations were planned by the army staff and directed by the army commander. Division and regimental operations were conducted by the forces 

of the division and regiment and directed by their commanders.”39

This approach created large, unwieldy operations that proved costly 

and ineffective as the Mujahideen could at anytime simply slip away.40 In 

one operation alone, the Soviets and their dubious DRA allies suffered a 

staggering 3,000 casualties.41 One of the key reasons for the anti-government forces’ success was the fact that the Soviets still lacked basic tactical 

skills. A Mujahideen commander maintained that, “Soviet soldiers are not 

trained very efficiently for mountainous conditions.”42 Although he praised 

the behavior of the air assault troops, he concluded, “Their weakness was 

that they had not seen war. As soon as they came down and took losses, 

they evacuated.”43

The 40th Army only managed to inflict limited damage on the 

Mujahideen and ended each operation by withdrawing from areas for which 

they had strenuously fought. Once gone, anti-government forces easily 

filtered back in. “By this time,” wrote Baumann, “a persistent pattern, quite 

congruent with past Russian experience, was already emerging: Soviet 

command of an area lasted only so long as its forces remained in physical 

occupation of the ground. As soon as Soviet forces departed, control 

reverted to the resistance.”44

Soviet military historian Scott R. McMichael highlighted these issues 

in his book, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. 

He concluded that there were numerous causes for the lack of success in 

this period. “First,” he wrote, “the small size of the Soviet contingent and 

the ineffectiveness of the DRA army and militia excluded the possibility of 

maintaining strong garrisons in all the locations where they were needed. 

Second, the nature of the offensives and the general Soviet approach to 

operations failed to take into account fully the problems presented by the 

terrain and climate. Third, the Soviets also were unable to solve the riddle 

of how to neutralize the special capabilities of the mujahedin. Fourth, the 

Soviets were hampered by an ideological and military blind-spot, that is, 

a complete lack of counter-insurgency doctrine, which might have better 

guided these initial efforts.”45

A Flawed COIN Approach

While it took some time to put into action, the Soviets did, in fact, 

establish a counterinsurgency methodology. By 1983, the Soviet military 

clearly understood the significance of terrain and climate, decentralization, 

night operations and the value and importance of light infantry in
32

Afghanistan. To implement this new approach the 40th Army turned to its 

airborne, air assault, special reconnaissance and Spetsnaz units. According 

to Scott R. McMichael, these elite units built “what amounted to a directaction, counter-insurgency (CI) force.”46 The units, whose numbers 

would never exceed 23,000, would conduct the majority of the fighting in 

Afghanistan and sustain the greatest amount of casualties.47

While the units quickly developed new counterinsurgency tactics 

and techniques, including enveloping detachments, ambushes and 

reconnaissance skills, the mindset was purely combat-oriented.48 The 

Soviet military’s counterinsurgency approach was solely a tactical 

solution, utterly disengaged from political attempts at nation-building. The 

Soviet military’s counterinsurgency process was completely at odds with 

transforming the DRA government and helping it gain legitimacy. In the 

end, as Robert F. Baumann concluded, “the very Soviet offensive actions 

aimed at neutralizing the resistance often had the effect of strengthening 

it.”49

While vast amounts of money and energy went into Soviet nationbuilding projects in Afghanistan, “the water was already poisoned before it 

started to arrive,” wrote Lester Grau.50 “When the aid arrived, it seldom got 

to where it was supposed to go. DRA officials siphoned it off. The military 

had its hands full fighting the guerrillas and securing the LOCs, cities and 

airfields. The last thing they wanted was to have a CA [Civil Affairs] effort 

loaded on top of their mission load.”51 The Politburo seems to have had little 

say in the matter, for as Baumann pointed out, “In terms of the behavior of 

the military, the Army had always operated with considerable autonomy.”52

Soviet military advisers and civilian technicians were also often thrown 

into the breach and were required, according to Artemy Kalinovsky, “to 

help with un-planned and often improvised counter-insurgency by carrying 

out a similarly un-planned and improvised nation-building project.”53

Baumann maintained the approach reflected “the usual inefficiencies that 

pervaded the Soviet system.”54

Adviser missions included rejuvenating Afghan government 

institutions that attempted to help enhance government solidity and 

improve the relationship with the people. Soviet advisers also assisted 

in training and supporting the Afghan military. Furthermore, advisers 

aided the government by building or repairing the industrial base and 

providing their agricultural expertise. The training of the vast majority of 

Soviet advisers, however, left much to be desired. “What is clear,” wrote 

Kalinovsky, “is that most did not have any sort of specialized training 

for the work they were about to undertake. In fact, ‘training’ for a party 
33

adviser about to be sent to Afghanistan was a one week course regarding 

the ‘political, military, and economic situation in the country,’ plus 

whatever additional reading on Afghan history or politics the soon-to-be 

adviser might pick up on his own.”55 Some of the best-trained advisers 

came from the ranks of the KGB and GRU, having undergone extensive 

training, including two years of Dari or Farsi. Most advisers however, were 

ill prepared for the challenging demands of Afghanistan. As Kalinovsky 

made clear, “such well-trained advisers were hard to come by. The scale of 

the Soviet involvement meant that there was not enough time to prepare a 

well-trained cadre. Corners had to be cut and thousands of advisers were 

sent virtually without preparation.”56

In the end, the 40th Army made tactical adjustments and continued to 

carry out conventional operations. However, it wanted little to do with state 

building. The Soviet advisers and technicians tasked with conducting the 

nation-building effort also faced a difficult dilemma. “The main problem,” 

wrote Grau, “was that most efforts to provide nation-building and assistance 

were aimed at the more liberal urban population (who already acquiesced 

to DRA control, mostly). Yet it was primarily a rural, conservative guerrilla 

war and the DRA was hard-pressed to maintain a presence at district level 

or below, let alone provide security and the goods and services a competent 

government provides.”57 Clearly, the Soviet COIN effort was highly flawed 

and disjointed and with the 40th Army disinclined to play its part in nationbuilding efforts, the war would remain deadlocked.

Tactical Modifications

In late 1981, the Soviets made more adjustments to their offensive 

operations against the Mujahideen. Recognizing the limited capability of 

their tanks and motor-rifle units, the 40th Army started to incorporate light 

infantry from their airborne and air assault units and began dismounting 

limited numbers of motor-rifle infantry. Helicopters now played an important role in moving these “enveloping detachments” of light infantry in an 

effort to capture key terrain, occupy the high ground and conduct blocking 

missions against anti-government forces.58 The Russian General Staff history stated that, “By 1982, the operational base element for a raid operation 

had become the reinforced battalion. The wide variety of possible battalion 

maneuvers included flanking and enveloping attacks as well as air assaults 

by air assault forces landing from helicopters.”59 Colonel Ali Jalali, a former Mujahideen commander, described the new Soviet technique at a light 

infantry conference in 1985:

with the increased use of heliborne units and teams, a 

new form of combined arms operations has been devel-
34

oped featuring a heavy infantry advance along the major 

ground axis supported by local militias and permanent 

military outpost, and heliborne detachments landed deep 

in the rear and flanks of the mujahedin strongholds with 

the tactical mission of isolating the resistance strongholds, 

destroying mujahedin bases, and cutting their supply and 

infiltration routes.

The heliborne action phase normally involves 50–60 

and sometimes even more helicopters (in groups), 

landing commandos, militias, air assault units or infantry 

troops at keypoints in the rear and flanks of mujahedin 

concentrations and passes in combined operations. The 

action normally starts when mechanized and tank columns 

charged with the mission to destroy the resistance forces 

in the areas are in position to link up with the heliborne 

elements at the appropriate time suitable for tactical 

interaction of both elements. At the tactical level, it is 

apparently 15–20 kilometres since the land forces have to 

support the heliborne teams by their artillery. However, 

on more than one occasion, the Soviets have been forced 

to withdraw the airborne elements by air where a timely 

link up was not possible and the heliborne troops were in 

danger of being destroyed by mujahedin forces.60

While the Soviets did show some imagination, in general, these types 

of operations proved unproductive. The 40th Army had some success in 

combining mechanized units with heliborne assaults at the battalion and 

brigade level, however, as Retired Afghan General Mohammad Yahya 

Nawroz and Lester W. Grau explained, “the Soviet preference for largescale operations often got in the way of tactical efficiency.”61 The Soviets 

were forced to conduct the same operations time and time again in the 

same locations. In the Panjshir Valley alone, the Soviets conducted 10 large 

offensives, but the Mujahideen always returned. The Soviets could clear, 

but they could not hold. The limited number of troops and the incapability 

of DRA soldiers precluded the occupation of all vital areas.62 As Russian 

military historians candidly if obliquely pointed out, these operations “did 

not always result in the desired outcome.”63

Chernenko’s Quest for Victory

In November 1982, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet 

leader, died. He was replaced by Yuri Andropov, a communist party leader 

who was also advanced in age. Due to health concerns and “succession” 
35

issues, the war in Afghanistan was not Andropov’s top priority and the 

new leader made no major changes in the Soviet approach in the conflict.64

Throughout 1983, Soviet military forces in Afghanistan continued to conduct offensive operations, with especially large operations near Herat and 

Ghazni and in Paktia province. A cease-fire arrangement in January 1983 

with Mujahideen commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, the commander 

of anti-government forces in the Panjshir Valley, allowed the Soviets to 

launch a major offensive in the Shomali valley near Kabul.65 While the 

cease-fire stopped Massoud’s attacks on the Salang highway and improved 

the Soviets line-of-communications with Kabul, the war remained a stalemate throughout 1983.66 Massoud rejected a Soviet offer for an extended 

ceasefire in the spring of 1984, and on 1 April, launched new attacks on the 

Salang highway. By this time Andropov was dead, replaced by Constantine 

Chernenko. Unlike Andropov, Chernenko took an active interest in the war 

and was determined to produce a military victory in Afghanistan.67

With Chernenko at the helm, the Soviet military unleashed a torrent of 

brutality and carnage on the Afghan population. Massive aerial bombardments combined with mines dropped from Soviet aircraft quickened the 

pace of depopulating the countryside.68 Nation-building efforts were weakened and once again fell by the wayside as the bombs and mines rained 

down on the Afghan population. The “conduct of the war did much to undermine government programs,” wrote Dr. Robert F. Baumann. “Military 

operations too often proceeded with little regard for the civilian populace 

or its good will.”69 Large ground offensives also increased as Chernenko 

and the Soviet high command sought a quick and decisive military victory.

Panjshir 7

The Soviet military struck back at Massoud’s new attacks with one of 

the largest offensives of the war. Named Panjshir 7 it was the seventh major offensive into the Panjshir Valley. Unlike past offensives, the Soviets 

made a number of tactical improvements before initiating Panjshir 7. According to Mark Urban, “The experience of the previous offensives, that 

[Massoud’s] men could take to the side valley and if necessary leave the 

[Panjshir] altogether through high passes, had been learnt [by the Soviets]. 

The new plan involved widening the area of operations considerably.”70

Badger Tu-16 bombers were positioned inside Soviet territory in the nearby Turkestan Military District while the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, 

the 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment and battalions from the 66th Motorized Rifle Division and the 191st Independent Motorized Rifle Regiment, 

as well as 5,000 Afghan government soldiers assembled for the assault 

into the valley. Soviet air assault troops were also assembled at Bagram 
36

air base. The entire ground force would consist of about 15,000 soldiers.71

Massoud was well prepared for the coming Soviet offensive. During 

the ceasefire the Mujahideen commander had managed to collect 5,000 

fighters and a large assortment of anti-aircraft heavy machine guns, as well 

as a few tanks and three D-30 122mm gun-howitzers. Massoud was the 

first to strike, launching a series of destructive attacks on bridges and convoys along the Salang highway between 16 and 19 April. On 21 April, as 

his forces launched an attack on Bagram air base, the Soviets began their 

offensive. While Massoud knew the offensive was coming, as Mark Urban 

pointed out, “the actual timing and the form of it seem to have surprised 

him.”72

Flying from the Soviet Union at high-altitude, the Soviet Tu-16s 

stunned Massoud and killed a number of his fighters who were caught 

unaware by the bombers. The Mujahideen commander quickly ordered the 

remaining civilians out of the valley and began laying mines to thwart the 

Soviet motorized forces moving up the Panjshir. These did little to impede 

the Soviet advance. Before long, motorized units covered by a rolling barrage of artillery reached the town of Khanj. Here, the Soviet units found 

their advance up the valley hindered by snow. Unlike past offensives into 

the valley, the Soviets made no effort to pursue the Mujahideen fighters 

down the many tributaries of the Panjshir. As he had done previously, Massoud moved his forces off into the tributaries and waited to strike Soviet 

advances from ambush positions. Having learned much from their earlier 

forays into the Panjshir, the Soviets stunned Massoud and his anti-government fighters with their next move.

In early May, the motorized units occupying the floor of the Panjshir 

began attacking up the tributaries. Unlike past offensives, however, this 

time a number of elite air assault battalions began landing at strategic passes out of the Panjshir. Large heliborne forces landed at Dasht-e-Rawat and 

in the Alsihang Valley. Stephen Tanner wrote that, “While these Soviet 

battalions plugged up mujahideen escape routes, main force units began 

splitting off from the Panjshir to hammer the enemy onto multiple anvils. 

Tagging behind the airborne assaults were Hind gunships, hovering above 

the savage firefights on the ground to pounce on Afghan resistance fighters who had been flushed out.”73 Taking increasing losses, the Mujahideen 

fighters climbed higher into the mountains, repulsed but by no means defeated. Both the Soviets and Babrak Karmal’s government were convinced 

they had defeated Massoud and proudly announced over Kabul radio that 

his “criminal band . . . no longer exists.”74 The Soviets were so certain that 

they had destroyed Massoud’s forces in the Panjshir that they established 
37

outposts in the valley for the first time to secure the newly won territory 

and protect the Salang highway.75

The Soviets would continue to have tactical military success with 

large-scale and smaller- scale operations throughout 1984. New upgrades 

in weapons systems, such as the BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and increased elevation of main tank guns, as well as the introduction of the 

AK-74 assault rifle, greatly enhanced both the firepower and protection of 

Soviet soldiers. Highly trained Special Forces units called Spetznaz were 

also proving valuable. These battalion-sized units spread terror among 

the Mujahideen with a spate of ambushes and raids. The Spetznaz also 

attacked villages dressed as Mujahideen warriors in an attempt to spread 

suspicion and mistrust within the ranks of anti-government fighters.76 The 

Soviets had made strides in improving the capabilities of the Afghan army. 

Their increased participation in operations in 1984 clearly represented at 

least a step in the right direction.77 However, factionalism within the ranks 

of the Afghan army and the mistreatment of Afghan conscripts remained a 

major concern.78

While Panjshir 7 certainly demonstrated that the 40th Army had improved its combat skills, the war was far from over. Although the Soviets 

would enjoy continued tactical success in 1984, the Mujahideen were still 

a force to be reckoned with. In September 1984, for example, Massoud’s 

reconstituted forces began attacking the newly established outposts in the 

Panjshir Valley, forcing the Soviets to launch a new offensive, Panjshir 8. 

As Gregory Feifer pointed out, Massoud’s fighters also, “drew solace from 

the knowledge that the concentration of so much Soviet force in the valley 

prevented the enemy from operating elsewhere.”79 It was indeed a serious 

dilemma for the Soviets. There were simply not enough Soviet or Afghan 

soldiers to accomplish the mission. By 1985, the total number of Soviet 

troops in Afghanistan would reach a meager 81,800.80 Scott R. McMichael 

observed, “a quick, decisive victory was out of reach. The Soviet Union 

did not have sufficient military force at its disposal to impose its will and it 

was unwilling to deploy the number of troops necessary to achieve a military decision within a reasonable period of time. Perhaps 500,000 troops 

would have been required. The political, economic, and ideological costs 

of such an approach were unacceptable.”81

Not surprisingly, senior Soviet military commanders continued to recommend to their political leadership a withdrawal from Afghanistan.82 In 

the end, as historian Mark Galeotti pointed out, “Chernenko’s iron fist did 

not lead to a convincing military success, just temporary victories which, 

in turn, sparked a more assertive response from the USA and other back-
ers of the rebels.”83 Indeed, by the end of the year the United States would 

provide $400 million to the anti-government forces while new and more 

sophisticated weapons systems made their way into the hands of Mujahideen fighters. By 1985, the war was increasing in intensity. By this time, 

nearly 3,900 Soviet soldiers had been killed, and, although the Mujahideen 

suffered considerable losses and continued to experience infighting within its ranks, their numbers continued to swell.84 At this point, the conflict 

appeared to be stalemated. However, new Soviet political leadership was 

emerging that would soon alter the course of the war.

38

Map 2. Panjshir 7 April–May 1984

Salang Pass

] [

Kantiwar Pass ] [

Dasht-e Ravat

Khenj







 





Anjuman

Bagram

Kabul Jalalabad

Sarobi

Aishang

Anawa

Andarab River

Tu-16 sorties from

southern U.S.S.R.

22–30 April 1984

1–70 May 1984

0 10 m

0 10 km



Salang Pass

] [

Kantiwar Pass ] [

Dasht-e Ravat

Khenj







 





Anjuman

Bagram

Kabul Jalalabad

Sarobi

Aishang

Anawa

Andarab River

Tu-16 sorties from

southern U.S.S.R.

22–30 April 1984

1–70 May 1984

0 10 m

0 10 km


Notes

1. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 98.

2. Alexander Lyakhovsky, “On the Changing Mission of the Soviet Forces 

in Afghanistan” in The Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan, trans. Svetlana 

Savranskaya. Moscow, Russia: Nord, 2004, The National Security Archive, 

Document 14, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html.

3. Lyakhovsky, Document 14.

4. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 99.

5. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, The 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 51.

6. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 315.

7. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

1993), 139; Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), xxix.

8. Grau, xxix.

9. Grau, xxviii.

10. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 65.

11. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 38.

12. The Basmachi were resistance fighters in Central Asia who resisted the 

imposition of Red rule from 1918 to 1933. The Bolsheviks’ attempt to extend 

their revolutionary order into Muslim Asia was resisted by hit-and-run raids and 

ambushes. A good English-language account of the Basmachi resistance is in 

Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central 

Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993); 

see also the Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 330. 

13. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 19.

14. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, 

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 51.

15. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

1993), 165–166.

16. Baumann, 166.

17. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 152.

39
18. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 305.

19. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 105.

20. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 20.

21. David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and 

American Occupation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 147.

22. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 248.

23. Tanner, 248.

24. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 20.

25. The Russian General Staff, 29.

26. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, 

Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 2, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

27. Kalinovsky, 2.

28. Kalinovsky, 2.

29. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 29.

30. The Russian General Staff, 106.

31. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 106.

32. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 63.

33. Urban, 65.

34. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 38.

35. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009). 

36. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 13.

37. McMichael, 13.

38. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 21.

40
39. The Russian General Staff, 21.

40. Mark Urban wrote, “Like so many mechanized armies before them, the 

Soviet army found that the insurgents were able to escape their ponderous thrust 

across country.” Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s 

Press, 1988), 65.

41. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

1993), 141.

42. Baumann, 156.

43. Baumann, 156.

44. Baumann, 142.

45. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 17.

46. McMichael, 66.

47. McMichael, 63–66.

48. McMichael, 68–75.

49. Robert F. Baumann, “Compound War Case Study: The Soviets in 

Afghanistan” in Compound Warfare That Fatal Knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US 

Army Command and General Staff College Press, n.d.), 296.

50. Lester Grau, interview by author, email correspondence, 24 May 2010.

51. Lester Grau, interview by author, email correspondence, 24 May 2010.

52. Robert F. Baumann, interview by author, email correspondence, 19 May 

2010.

53. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, 

Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 2, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

54. Robert F. Baumann, interview by author, email correspondence, 19 May 

2010.

55. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, 

Working Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 2, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

56. Kalinovsky, 2.

57. Lester Grau, interview by author, email correspondence, 24 May 2010.

58. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 16.

59. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 21.

60. Ali Jalali, “The Soviet Military Operations in Afghanistan and the Role of 

41
Light and Heavy Forces at Tactical and Operational Level,” Report of Proceedings: 

Light Infantry Conference (Seattle, WA: Boeing Corporation, 1985), 174.

61. Mohammad Y. Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet War in 

Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War,” Military Review (SeptemberOctober 1995), http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/lessonslearned/

afghanistan/waraf%5B1%5D.asp.

62. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 16–17.

63. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 21.

64. Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London, UK: 

Frank Cass, 1995), 17.

65. Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), xxxii; Stephen Tanner, 

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the 

Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 259.

66. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 258.

67. Tanner, 257; Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War

(London, UK: Frank Cass, 1995), 17.

68. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 257.

69. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

1993), 170.

70. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 144.

71. Urban, 144–145; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from 

Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, 

MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 259.

72. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 145; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 259.

73. Tanner, 260–261.

74. Tanner, 261.

75. Tanner, 261; Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in 

Afghanistan (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 175.

76. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 262; Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s 

Press, 1988), 150.

42
77. Urban, 159.

78. Urban, 142.

79. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 176.

80. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 20.

81. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 52.

82. Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), xxviii–xxix.

83. Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London, UK: 

Frank Cass, 1995), 18.

84. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 44.

43

45

Chapter 3

Are We Going to Be Stuck There Indefinitely?

The Search for a Way Out 1985–1989

People are asking themselves: what, are we going to be 

stuck there indefinitely? Or maybe we should just end the 

war? Otherwise we’re going to be ashamed of ourselves 

in all respects.

 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Politburo Session 

13 November 1986

Who would have guessed at the time that the Communist 

regime in Afghanistan would outlast the Soviet Union 

itself?

Stephen Tanner

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban

Gorbachev Gives the Soviet Military Free Reign

In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet General 

Secretary. He had made it quite clear to the Politburo before taking power 

that, in his opinion, “Soviet troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan.”1

However, as the new General Secretary sought to enact new reforms within 

his own country, he could ill afford upsetting the defense establishment 

during his first year in power. As Gregory Feifer pointed out, “Opposition 

by many Party leaders forced him to seek support where he could find it, 

including the military. Partly to cultivate it, he decided to give the Red 

Army a year of full freedom to carry out the war in Afghanistan as it saw 

fit, before winding down.”2 While the Soviet high command was more than 

willing to carry out the mission, it still faced a host of obstacles.

During this time frame (April 1985–April 1986), the 40th Army would 

grow to its highest strength levels. The Russian General Staff history recorded that in this period, Soviet forces boasted “29,000 major pieces of 

equipment . . . 6,000 of which were tanks, BTRs [armored personnel carrier] and BMPs [amphibious infantry fighting vehicle].”3

 Soviet units included the 5th, 108th, and the 201st Motorized Rifle Divisions; as well as 

the 103d Airborne Division; the 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle 
46

Brigades; the 56th Air Assault Brigade and the 15th and 22d Spetsnaz Brigades; the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment and the 191st and 860th 

Separate Motorized Rifle Regiments.4

 In total, there were 108,000 soldiers 

of which 73,000 were assigned to combat units.5

 While the total number of 

soldiers had increased from approximately 81,000 at the beginning of the 

conflict, the additional forces were still nowhere near enough to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan.6

The 40th Army also faced another vexing problem. For the duration 

of the war, the airborne, air assault, Spetsnaz soldiers and the two separate 

motorized rifle brigades carried out the vast majority of combat operations. The other motorized forces were, for the most part, used in security 

missions such as guarding lines of communication, airfields and major cities.7

 Incredibly, over 85 percent of all Soviet forces in Afghanistan were 

committed to these protection missions.8

 One of the primary reasons the 

other motorized rifle forces were not used more aggressively was because 

of their inability to adapt to the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare. 

According to Scott R. McMichael:

Tactically, the Soviet command properly [analyzed] the 

requirements of combat operations against the mujahedin only to discover that the Soviet motorized rifle troops 

were entirely unsuited for this role. Although Soviet tactical doctrine describes the (light infantry) functions needed 

for the Afghan War as legitimate functions for mechanized 

troops, the conventional orientation, tactical rigidity, and 

generally poor quality of the MR [motorized rifle] units 

and their commanders prevented them from acquiring the 

necessary skills. The continuing poor tactical performance 

of the MR [motorized rifle] force throughout the course of 

the war severely limited the tactical utility of the force.”9

For the already undersized 40th Army, this problem served to further reduce 

the number of soldiers that could be employed in large combat operations. 

As the number of combat support soldiers remained diminutive, the 

Soviets faced severe logistical hindrances that helped exacerbate rampant 

cases of typhus, dysentery, and other diseases among Soviet troops.10

Indeed, the editors of the Russian General Staff history concluded that, 

“The Soviet 40th Army lacked sufficient logistics personnel and transport 

throughout the entire war.”11 What wheeled logistical transport they did 

have came under almost constant attack by anti-government forces. By 

1985, general larceny of supplies and drug and alcohol abuse by Soviet 

soldiers served to further compound the problems. A lack of uniforms, 
47

equipment, and decent food for combat soldiers in the field also lowered 

morale and combat efficiency.12 The editors of the Russian General Staff 

history also pointed out that, “The conscript’s morale was not great when 

he was drafted. At the training centers, conscripts were told they were going 

to fight Chinese and American mercenaries. When they got to Afghanistan, 

they soon discovered that they were unwelcome occupiers in a hostile land. 

Morale further plummeted at this realization.”13

Although the 40th Army greatly increased the number of helicopters in 

Afghanistan, they were still nowhere near the number needed to accomplish 

the mission.14 By 1985 there were four aviation and three helicopter 

regiments. While the airborne and air assault soldiers assigned to use the 

helicopters were certainly better trained and more highly motivated than the 

vast majority of the motorized rifle troops, there were simply not enough of 

these forces to conduct counter-guerilla operations across Afghanistan. As 

retired General Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and Lester W. Grau observed: 

Air assault tactics and helicopter gunship tactics changed 

and improved steadily throughout the war. However, the 

Soviets never brought in enough helicopters and air assault 

forces to perform all the necessary missions and often 

squandered these resources on unnecessary missions. 

Helicopter support should have been part of every convoy 

escort, but this was not always the case. Dominant terrain 

along convoy routes should have been routinely seized 

and held by air assault forces, yet this seldom occurred. 

Soviet airborne and air assault forces were often the most 

successful Soviet forces in closing with the resistance, 

yet airborne and air assault forces were usually under 

strength . . . And although the combination of heliborne 

and mechanized forces worked well at the battalion 

and brigade level, the Soviet preference for large-scale 

operations often got in the way of tactical efficiency. Ten, 

large, conventional offensives involving heliborne and 

mechanized forces swept the Pandshir [Panjshir] Valley 

with no lasting result.15

One of the few bright spots for the Soviets was the improved 

capabilities of the Afghan Army. By 1985, they were heavily involved in 

supporting and sometimes even directing offensive operations against antigovernment forces.16 As the Russian General Staff history concluded, the 

Afghan government “adapted measures to strengthen military discipline 

[and] began a decisive battle against desertion, and proclaimed complete 
48

freedom of religion. TO&E slots for mullahs were created in military 

organizations and steps were taken to implement their incorporation.”17

By January 1985, the Afghan Army consisted of three Corps Headquarters, 

11 divisions and a host of non-divisional units. These non-divisional units 

consisted of commandos, paratroopers, separate armored, mechanized 

and artillery brigades, as well as independent reconnaissance, engineer, 

transport and signals regiments. While information related to the training 

of the Afghan Army remains sketchy to non-existent, one factor is certain: 

by 1985 the Afghan Army had been revitalized.18

While the Afghan army had made some solid strides forward, the political picture still remained bleak. Gorbachev sought to quickly stabilize 

Afghanistan and bring nation-building programs back to the forefront. He 

was determined to withdraw at some point and he wanted to do so without 

the client government collapsing. President Karmal, however, had become 

a major liability. Gorbachev and his senior advisors had been pushing the 

idea of “national reconciliation” and making the following recommendations to the Afghan leadership: “Widen your social base. Learn, at last, to 

lead a dialogue with the tribes, to use the particularities [of the situation]. 

Try to get the support of the clergy. Give up the leftist bend in economics. Learn to organize the support of the private sector.”19 His entreaties to 

the Afghan president, however, proved unsuccessful and Karmal’s government made little gains towards legitimacy.20 Senior Soviet military officials 

were also displeased with the Afghan president. According to one source, 

many were “fed up with what was seen as Babrak Karmal’s weak authority, counter-productive policies, and fondness for drink.”21 It was against 

this backdrop that the Soviet military continued its campaign against the 

Mujahideen in the spring of 1985.

New Operations and the Return of Massoud

In January 1985, the 40th Army launched a number of search and destroy missions in the center and eastern parts of Afghanistan. The intent 

of these missions was to demolish anti-government bases.22 While not 

entirely successful, Gregory Feifer wrote that, “the Soviets and their Afghan government allies were gaining the upper hand in severe fighting that 

caused heavy casualties on both sides . . . The Afghan Army, its numbers 

growing and the troops better trained, took a prominent part in many of 

these attacks.”23

The 40th Army was given free reign by Gorbachev to launch several 

major actions in the spring of 1985. In April, they commenced operations 

in the Maidan Valley south of Kabul, unleashing the Frog-7 artillery rockets that delivered a package of 60 extremely deadly cluster bombs. In May, 
49

the Soviets launched another major offensive in the Kunar Valley north of 

Jalalabad. The force involved included two air assault regiments and a sizable Afghan force drawn from two divisions totaling about 10,000 soldiers. 

The objective of the operation was to relieve a besieged garrison at Barikot 

and to disrupt the infrastructure of anti-government forces. The mission 

succeeded in bringing in supplies and reinforcements to Barikot, but the 

task force withdrew from the area within 24 hours.24

Shortly after these operations, the new commander of military forces 

in Afghanistan, General Valentin Varennikov, sidestepped Karmal’s government and successfully bargained with Afghan elders near Barikot. The 

villagers agreed not to support the Mujahideen if the Soviets agreed to 

stop bombing their villages. According to Gregory Feifer, Varennikov was 

“struck by the simplicity of the proposition.”25 Varennikov was convinced 

that Karmal’s continued appointments of unknown bureaucrats to these 

areas, “only fed distrust of the government. His meeting with elders further 

convinced him that his forces would be much better off if locals were allowed to run their own affairs.”26 The episode clearly illustrates the Soviet 

commander’s misgivings about the capacity of Karmal’s government to 

govern outside of Kabul and his willingness to seek some sort of effective dialogue at the local level. While Varennikov continued to haggle, his 

forces, however, continued their large-scale military operations.

In combination with these sizeable offensive operations, the Soviets 

also continued to use their helicopters and highly trained Spetsnaz units to 

conduct raids on anti-government forces, sometimes even crossing the border into Pakistan. “The outcome however,” wrote British diplomat Martin 

Ewans, “was little different from that of previous years. Both the mujahidin and the Russian and Afghan forces took casualties, but the latter were 

still unable to interdict the mujahidin supply routes or dominate the countryside.”27 Indeed, little had changed. The Soviets and the Afghan army 

could not be everywhere and these large offensive operations pulled soldiers away from other important duties. Not surprisingly, anti-government 

attacks continued on the Soviet lines of communications and other locations. Mujahideen rockets continued to fall on Kabul and anti-government 

forces continued to infiltrate into the city.28

In June, Ahmad Shah Massoud unleashed a major offensive operation in the Panjshir Valley. In a masterful plan of subterfuge, his forces 

attacked a base at the town of Rokka, setting an ammunition dump on fire. 

When Soviet and Afghan government forces turned their attention toward 

Rokka, Massoud struck a fort located near Pechgur that was garrisoned by 

500 soldiers as well as two T-55 tanks, four 76mm guns and five BTR-60 
50

Armored Personnel Carriers. A ring of minefields, sandbags, and barbed 

wire served as the outpost’s protection. The size of Massoud’s force was 

estimated as no larger than that of the government soldiers inside the fort. 

While a small contingent of Mujahideen fighters forged a path through the 

minefield, others launched artillery and rocket fire into the fort. The party removing the mines was covered by small arms suppressive fire. With 

lanes created through the minefield, Massoud’s men launched their assault 

on Pechgur. “Such was the measure of surprise,” reported Mark Urban, 

“that they found a senior Afghan army delegation inside the base.”29 In all, 

the Mujahideen captured 110 officers and 350 enlisted personnel.30

In response to this setback, the Soviets launched Panjshir 9. The aim 

of this operation was to capture Massoud and free his captives. The operation was smaller than previous offensives in the area, involving only one 

motorized rifle regiment, two battalions of Afghan soldiers and a sizable 

contingent of heliborne air assault troops. The Soviets easily retook Pechgur as Massoud simply chose to move back into the mountains. However, 

the attempted rescue of the prisoners by air assault forces went terribly 

wrong. As the Soviets approached, the Mujahideen allegedly killed the 130 

remaining captives.31

Reliance on Large Offensive Operations: Summer 1985 to Spring 1986

Determined to make the most of the leeway offered by Gorbachev, 

the Soviet military prepared to launch additional, larger operations. 

Unfortunately for the 40th Army, the futility of these types of operations 

had still not registered with the high command. In late August 1985, in 

response to Mujahideen attacks on the city of Khost, the Soviets and 

elements of the Afghan Army launched a major offensive involving 

20,000 soldiers. It was a three-pronged attack with motorized rifle forces 

moving from Kabul into the Logar Valley and another mechanized column 

moving southwest from Jalalabad. Another taskforce would attack out of 

Khost into the surrounding mountains in the direction of Jaji and then turn 

south to deal with anti-government forces in Zhawar. The battle groups 

from Kabul and Jalalabad were to link up at a location known as the 

“parrot’s beak.” This landmark, according to Mark Urban, was “the closest 

guerrilla infiltration point to Kabul.”32 The surrounding area also contained 

significant amounts of Mujahideen food and other supplies. Soviet forces 

involved in the offensive included a motorized rifle regiment from the 108th 

Motorized Rifle Division, most of the 103d Airborne Division and the 66th 

Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. Afghan government forces came from 

four different divisions, as well as elements from a commando brigade, a 
51

commando battalion and several border brigades.33 According to historian 

Scott R. McMichael, “the commandos and paratroops were considered 

to be the best and most reliable . . . These units received priority issue 

of the best available equipment and weapons and they were often trained 

by Russian instructors, including training in air assault and independent 

reconnaissance . . . They were also used as an urban police/security force 

and in forced recruitment.”34 Even though they were considered elite troops, 

McMichael noted that, “Morale, generally, was low, just as it was in the 

regular units; many commando soldiers deserted at the first opportunity.”35

The offensive was launched on 21 August, and after two days of fighting Soviet and Afghan units reached the Logar region. As the motorized 

forces closed in on the Mujahideen, an entire regiment of air assault troops 

landed at nine separate locations setting up a ring around several Mujahideen base camps. In five days of fighting, the Soviets managed to kill 100 

anti-government fighters and wound 41 others.36 On 28 August, the Soviet 

and Afghan forces that had attacked out of Khost toward Jaji turned south 

toward Tani in an attempt to capture the Mujahideen stronghold at Zhawar. 

Anti-government forces, however, put up a stiff resistance to the advance. 

By 11 September, Soviet and Afghan forces were within a few kilometers 

of Zhawar where they were met by massive Mujahideen reinforcements 

from Pakistan that had rushed to the defense of the base. Long time Mujahideen adversaries set aside their hostilities toward one another in the 

face of their common enemy. In the end, even with their superiority in 

mechanized firepower and air support, the Soviet and Afghan forces could 

not take Zhawar.37

By mid-September, the offensives had ended. The Soviets and the 

Afghans had been somewhat successful in the area around the parrot’s 

beak, managing to capture and destroy many Mujahideen bases. In fact, 

Pakistani Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, the former head of the Afghan 

Bureau from 1983 to 1987, stated that “The Soviet/Afghan forces had 

shown that their tactics and techniques were improving,” by the fact that, 

“they had been able to penetrate into areas long held to be inaccessible.”38

While there is no doubt that both the Soviets and Afghan army had made 

enormous tactical improvements, their bold and innovative offensives 

around the parrot’s beak and Zhawar accomplished little at the strategic 

level. As Brigadier Yousaf pointed out, “the Soviets had not inflicted any 

serious defeat on the battlefield; in fact the border engagements although 

intense, had been indecisive.”39 Not surprisingly, the Mujahideen continued 

to attack government installations and ambush Soviet supply columns 

throughout Afghanistan.40
52

The Pashtun Jirga and the National Reconciliation Campaign

One small glimpse of hope for the Soviets and Afghan government 

emerged in 1985. In this new initiative, led by the chief of the KhAD (Khedamati-i-Etal’at-i-Dolati) or Afghan secret police, Mohammed Najibullah 

was to win over support from the Pashtun ethnic group whose members 

dominated the insurgency.41 When the Pakistani government cracked down 

on Pashtun tribes in Pakistan’s North West Frontier province, Najibullah 

took full advantage of the situation. Many Pashtuns in Pakistan’s North 

West Frontier resented the Afghan refugees who were now occupying 

Map 3. Second Eastern Offensive of 1985



Jalalabad

Kabul

 Parachnar

 Gardez

Jaji

 Azrow



Bagram

White Mountains

Nawa River

“Parrot’s Beak”

Logar Valley

Hessarak River

Khost

Zhawar

Jani

Major Heliborne Encirclement Area

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

20–21 August 1985

22–26 August 1985

27 August–5 September 1985

0 10 m

0 10 km



Jalalabad

Kabul

 Parachnar

 Gardez

Jaji

 Azrow



Bagram

White Mountains

Nawa River

“Parrot’s Beak”

Logar Valley

Hessarak River

Khost

Zhawar

Jani

Major Heliborne Encirclement Area

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

20–21 August 1985

22–26 August 1985

27 August–5 September 1985

0 10 m

0 10 km
53

much of their territory and taking away a great deal of the lucrative arms 

and drug business from local tribesmen. When the Pakistani government 

refused to help them, some tribesmen turned to Najibullah and the Afghan 

government. In September 1985, 3,700 Pashtun tribal leaders from both 

sides of the border conducted a jirga with Najibullah in Kabul. According 

to Mark Urban, they “endorsed a plan to prevent mujahedeen infiltration” in 

return for guns and cash.42 “The DRA government had its greatest political 

success in establishing peace with the Pushtun [sic] tribes located on the 

Pakistan border,” concluded the Russian General Staff history. “These talks 

with local leaders and religious authorities had positive results in various 

regions of the country—especially in the north.”43

In truth, however, these inroads with the Pashtuns would produce 

only limited results. While two of the tribes on the North West Frontier 

did in fact fight against the Mujahideen and another tribe near the Khyber 

Pass endeavored to stop new road construction, these episodes produced 

extremely limited results. As Olivier Roy pointed out in his paper for The 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, “the Pakistani military’s ability 

to handle these tribes exceeded that of the Soviets and such disturbances 

were kept under control.”44

While Najibullah reached out to the Pashtuns, the Soviets pressed 

President Karmal to reach out to the Afghan population and to cast off the 

doctrinaire socialist agenda. In an effort to broaden its appeal, the DRA 

instituted the National Reconciliation Campaign. According to Robert 

F. Baumann, “the campaign offered for the first time a comprehensive 

program of concessions and inducements to demonstrate the benefits of 

cooperation and the good will of the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party 

of Afghanistan].”45 Once again, the Soviets were attempting to cobble 

together some sort of nation-building effort, but it was simply a case of 

too little too late. As Baumann pointed out, the “conduct of the war did 

much to undermine government programs. Military operations too often 

proceeded with little regard for the civilian populace or its good will.”45

In simple terms, Karmal could not make National Reconciliation work as 

long as the Soviet military continued its “counterproductive” tactics.46 One 

of the central problems according to Artemy Kalinovsky was the fact that 

the Soviet “military seemed reluctant to do its part in political work.”48

The 1986 Zhawar Campaign

According to recently released sources, by the summer of 1985, 

Gorbachev and other high-ranking politicians became convinced that the 

Soviet effort at nation-building in Afghanistan was floundering. “They 

realized,” Artemy Kalinovsky summarized, “that Karmal had made little 
54

progress in reaching out to the population, that economic aid was not 

reaching its intended destination, and that the mujahedeen as a whole still 

had the widespread support of the population. The Kabul government had 

not made major gains in legitimacy.”49 As Gorbachev attempted to devise 

a solution and consolidate his political power inside the Soviet Union, the 

war dragged on.

The Russian General Staff history recorded that during this phase of 

the war, “the approach to the employment of the 40th Army changed.”50

The war, they wrote “was being depicted as a harmful phenomena imposed on the country and the people by a small group of old politicians. 

In conjunction with this discussion, there was a tendency to continually 

withdraw Soviet forces from active combat, to lessen the frequency and 

scale of operations and combat, and to shrink the boundaries of guarded 

regions . . . The Soviet high command undertook large-scale operations 

only in extraordinary situations.”51 Whether or not it could be classified 

as an “extraordinary situation” could be debated, but, in April 1986, the 

Soviets returned to Zhawar, intent on settling old scores. This time, however, the Afghan army would have tactical control of the operation and its 

soldiers would make up the bulk of the combat forces.52 Certainly this was 

a new approach and clearly demonstrated that the Afghan army had greatly 

improved since 1980. 

By this time, the Mujahideen had more heavily fortified Zhawar. 

The base had become a showplace for visiting journalists. A system of 

trenches guarded by anti-aircraft guns, a few tanks and heavy machine 

guns, protected a series of cavernous workshops.53 In the vicinity of 

Zhawar, Mujahideen commanders controlled approximately 10,000 

fighters, however only 400 insurgents actually defended the Zhawar base 

camp itself.54 Recent anti-government proclamations declaring the area as 

“liberated” had riled both the Soviets and the Afghan government and they 

were determined to capture Zhawar.55 While the 40th Army planned the 

operation, tactical control would fall to Afghan Major General Shahnawaz 

Tanai and his deputy, Brigadier Abdol Gafur.56

In March, units from six Afghan divisions began to assemble around 

Khost. Other Afghan combat forces included the 37th Commando Brigade 

and the 466th Commando Battalion. The sole Soviet ground combat unit, 

an air assault regiment from the 103d Air Assault Division, was also moved 

to Khost during this time frame. 

The attack began in the first week of April with the commandos leading the assault toward Tani. Within days, Tani was captured and occupied 

by Afghan government forces. As the offensive continued south toward 
55

Zhawar, the Mujahideen fought back aggressively, even managing to fire 

rockets onto the airfield in Khost in an effort to interrupt helicopter operations. As his forces advanced toward Zhawar, Afghan Brigadier Gafur 

employed what he called “’hammer and anvil’ tactics.”57 The maneuver 

aimed at pushing the Mujahideen against the mountains and destroying 

them. According to Urban, “His usual device for doing this was the battalion heliborne landing.”58 After 10 days of bloody fighting, Afghan and 

Soviet forces reached the outskirts of Zhawar. At one point, an Afghan 

commando battalion descended by helicopters into the middle of a wellMap 4. Zhawar Campaign, 1986



Jalalabad

Kabul

 Parachnar

Jaji

Azrow

 Bagram

White Mountains

Nawa River

“Parrot’s Beak”

Logar Valley

Hessarak River

Khost

Zhawar 

Jani 

March–Early April

Men Flown into Khost

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

2–10 April 1986

11–20 April 1986

0 10 m

0 10 km

Mujahadeen

Rocket Airfield

Heliborne

Blocking

 Forces

Nadershah Kot



Jalalabad

Kabul

 Parachnar

Jaji

Azrow

 Bagram

White Mountains

Nawa River

“Parrot’s Beak”

Logar Valley

Hessarak River

Khost

Zhawar 

Jani 

March–Early April

Men Flown into Khost

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

2–10 April 1986

11–20 April 1986

0 10 m

0 10 km

Mujahadeen

Rocket Airfield

Heliborne

Blocking

 Forces

Nadershah Kot
56

laid Mujahideen “kill zone.” The anti-government forces killed 320 of the 

400 men in the battalion. However, as Su-25 bombers blasted Mujahideen 

caves and defensive positions around Zhawar, Gafur’s forces moved in for 

the kill. After four days of violent close combat, the Afghan government 

forces finally captured the base. Estimates suggest that anti-government 

forces lost somewhere between 300 and 1,000 fighters.59

The capture of Zhawar was a tactical victory for the Soviets and Afghan 

government forces. The battle clearly demonstrated that the Afghan army 

was in fact trainable. “The performance of the Afghan army in the battle 

for Zhawar is remarkable when compared to its dismal efforts in 1980–

81,” wrote Urban.60 Indeed, less than 300 of Gafur’s men deserted and 

they had stood toe-to-toe with a formidable adversary. Nevertheless, in the 

end, the battle had little effect on the overall war effort. Pakistani Brigadier 

Mohammad Yousaf, who was closely involved in the defense of Zhawar, 

recalled that, “Although Zhawar base fell, other nearby strong points did 

not, and within a few hours the enemy [Soviet/Afghan government forces] 

pulled back to Khost, making no attempt to hold the ground they had won.”61

As they had found many times before, the Soviets could clear, but they 

could not hold, and Zhawar once again highlighted the inconsequentiality 

of large-scale offensives operations.

Gorbachev Takes Command

On the heels of the Zhawar campaign, Mujahideen attacks continued 

across Afghanistan, supported by its supply line that reached into Pakistan. 

Gorbachev announced to the Politburo that the war had become a “bleeding wound” for the Soviet Union, and he was determined to end it.62 After 

giving his generals free reign for over a year and with no end still in sight, 

Gorbachev stepped more boldly into the fray. In May 1986, Babrak Karmal 

was removed and replaced with Mohammad Najibullah, the former head of 

the KhAD security forces.63

With renewed energy, Najibullah pushed forward with the national 

reconciliation policy, but, as Stephen Tanner observed, “after such a long 

and bitter war found that popular support for both him and the regime was 

scarce.”64 Much of this bitterness was a direct result of the Soviet military’s 

brutal behavior toward the Afghan population and their wholly combatoriented approach. They simply would not or could not modify their tactics 

to meet the challenging demands of counterinsurgency warfare.65

Gorbachev vented his frustration with his generals at a Politburo session on 13 November 1986, where he discussed the Soviet Army’s flawed 

approach in Afghanistan. “Our generals are not learning their lessons,” 
57

Gorbachev told the members of the Politburo. “It could be that they cannot apply themselves fully there! But we do have the past experience from 

Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. There must be a learning curve. They 

took lessons from Vietnam . . . Here you cannot move large formations or 

tank armies. We need to find the keys to this war.”66 Evidently Gorbachev 

was alluding to the 40th Army’s obsession with large-scale operations and 

its failure to apply any lessons from the Soviet experience in Africa. At 

this meeting, Gorbachev also made his intentions clear: the Soviets would 

withdraw from Afghanistan. “Our strategic goal,” he told the Politburo, 

“is to complete this war and pull our forces out in one or, at the most, two 

years . . . our goal is set clearly: to speed up the measures that would ensure 

that we have a friendly nation there and leave.”67

While the Soviets searched for a diplomatic arrangement to help facilitate their withdrawal, the Soviet military continued efforts to win some 

sort of compromise with Pakistan. “To compensate for their inability to 

seal the borders,” wrote Olivier Roy, “the Soviets applied heavy pressure 

on Pakistan to end its support for the Mujaheddin.”68 This involved the 

bombing of refugee camps in Pakistan as well as terrorist attacks aimed at 

the Pakistani population.69 However, these measures had little effect. Massive amounts of ammunition and other vital supplies continued to flood 

into Afghanistan.70

According to the Russian General Staff history, from January 1987 

on, “the Soviet forces for all practical purposes, ceased offensive combat 

and fought only when attacked by the Mujahideen.”71 The introduction of 

the CIA supplied Stinger missile to the Mujahideen played a key role in 

the cessation of offensive operations, particularly airmobile operations.72

As Roy pointed out, “Soviet air superiority was over; by the summer [of 

1987], half of Afghan airspace was free of Soviet aircraft. Afghan resistance 

forces secured areas of sanctuary in which their main bases and ordnance 

were safe from Soviet troops and air forces.”73 In July 1987, the Soviets 

launched one last massive offensive operation to relieve the garrison in 

the town of Khost in eastern Afghanistan. “Operation Magistral” as the 

operation was named, was the largest of the war involving a total of 24,000 

Soviet and Afghan soldiers. In the end, the offensive opened up the roads 

to Khost, but, as with other large-scale offensives, did nothing to neutralize 

the power of the Mujahideen.74

By April 1988, negotiations in Geneva were concluded, which forecast an almost complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 1989. On 15 February 1989, the last soldier of the 40th Army crossed 

the border back into the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets left behind 
58

hundreds of advisors, the war was now Najibullah’s to win or lose. His 

government would in fact outlive the Soviet Union, a testament perhaps 

to the one Soviet success in a decade otherwise marked by frustration and 

missed opportunities. 
59

Notes

1. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 185.

2. Feifer, 186. In his book Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and 

Politics, Martin Ewans also writes that Gorbachev “had a full and pressing agenda 

for reform and modernization of the Soviet Union. It is unlikely, therefore, that he 

could afford to challenge the military and security establishments whose prestige 

was very much at stake in Afghanistan.” Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short 

History of Its People and Politics (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2002), 163.

3. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 26.

4. The Russian General Staff, 331.

5. The Russian General Staff, 26.

6. The Russian General Staff, 20.

7. The Russian General Staff, 208.

8. Lester W. Grau, “Soviet COIN in Afghanistan,” slide presentation at the 

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 May 2010.

9. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 127.

10. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics

(New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2002), 162.

11. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 291.

12. The Russian General Staff, 291–292.

13. The Russian General Staff, 313.

14. The Russian General Staff, 26.

15. Mohammad Y. Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet War in 

Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War,” Military Review (SeptemberOctober 1995), 8, http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/lessonslearned/

afghanistan/waraf%5B1%5D.asp.

16. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 263.

17. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 27.

18. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 221, 223–224.

19. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working 

Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 23, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_
id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

20.Kalinovsky, 23.

21. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 188–189.

22. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 163.

23. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 186.

24. Feifer, 186; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from 

Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, 

MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 263–264; Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 168.

25. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 186.

26. Feifer, 187.

27. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics

(New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2002), 164.

28. Ewans, 164.

29. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 173.

30. Urban, 172–173; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from 

Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, 

MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 264; Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet 

War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 187.

31. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 

173–174; Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New 

York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009), 187; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military 

History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) 

(Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 264.

32. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 176–177.

33. Urban, 177; The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a 

Superpower Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress 

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 319.

34. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan, (London, Brassey’s, 1991), 48.

35. McMichael, 48.

36. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 177, 179.

37. Urban, 179.

38. Mohammed Yousef and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The 

Defeat of a Superpower, (Havertown, PA, Casemate, 2001), 164.

39. Yousef and Adkin, 164.

40. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

60
Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 264.

41. J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation

(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1986), 264.

42. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 180–181.

43. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 27.

44. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, 

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 22.

45. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

1993), 169–170.

46. Baumann, 170.

47. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working 

Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 26, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

48. Kalinovsky, 26.

49. Kalinovsky, 23. 

50. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 26.

51. The Russian General Staff, 26–27.

52. Mohammed Yousef and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The 

Defeat of a Superpower, (Havertown, PA, Casemate, 2001), 167.

53. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 190; Mohammed Yousef and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: 

The Defeat of a Superpower, (Havertown, PA, Casemate, 2001), 167.

54. Yousef and Adkin, 167.

55. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 191.

56. Mohammed Yousef and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The 

Defeat of a Superpower, (Havertown, PA, Casemate, 2001), 167.

57. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 193.

58. Urban, 193.

59. Urban, 193–194; Mohammed Yousef and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The 

Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower, (Havertown, PA, Casemate, 2001), 172.

60. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 

1988), 194.

61. Mohammed Yousef and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The 

61
Defeat of a Superpower, (Havertown, PA, Casemate, 2001), 172.

62. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 

Press, 2009), 265.

63. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics

(New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2002), 167; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A 

Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Revised 

Edition) (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 265.

64. Ibid.

65. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working 

Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 22, 26, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

66. “Notes of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, Politburo Session, 13 November 

1986.” The Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Fond 1, Opis 2, Moscow, Russia. 

The National Security Archive, trans. Jayson Stoinski and Svetlana Savranskaya. 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html (accessed 1 

May 2010). 

67. Ibid.

68. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, 

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 22.

69. Ibid.

70. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, 

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 23.

71. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 28.

72. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 62.

73. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, 

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 23.

74. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1991), 62.

62
63

Conclusions

As important as they are in achieving security, military 

actions by themselves cannot achieve success in COIN. 

Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat 

still may achieve their strategic objectives.

 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 2006

One has to admit that essentially we put our bets on the 

military solution, on suppressing the counterrevolution 

with force. We did not even fully use the existing 

opportunities for neutralization of the hostile attitudes of 

the local population towards us.

 Document 21, CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, 

10 May 1988, Alexander Lyakhovsky, 

Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan

While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling of President 

Amin’s government in December 1979, proved swift and decisive, the 

40th Army soon found itself locked in nightmarish circumstances. After 

installing Babrak Karmal, the Soviets expected to temporarily garrison key 

sites, train the Afghan army to battle anti-government forces and provide 

economic aid to the new government. It would appear that senior Soviet 

political leaders assumed this mission could be accomplished within a 

matter of months.1

 The Soviet military however, found itself engulfed in 

a bloody domestic insurgency, a struggle it was inadequately prepared to 

fight. Some Soviet generals knew that their forces were unprepared and 

ill equipped to battle an insurgency, but like the politicians, believed they 

would not face such a scenario.2

 Once the Soviet military came to grips 

with the reality of the situation however, they sought to correct the initial 

problems. These major difficulties included a culturally insensitive force, 

the lack of tactical proficiency, over-centralization, an extremely heavy 

force structure, a shortage of logistical support, no counterinsurgency 

doctrine and a poorly trained and unreliable Afghan army. As the war 

progressed, two other impediments to success would emerge: a prolonged 

reliance on large-scale operations and the inability to adjust to nationbuilding and COIN.

To their credit, the Soviets dealt quickly and efficiently with some of 

these problems. When they realized that their Central Asian reserve soldiers were further aggravating the Pashtun tribes and broadening the flames 

of discord, they were sent back to the Soviet Union. Additionally, the 40th 
64

Army was also able to overcome some of its difficulties with tactical proficiency and over-centralization. While much of the Soviet mechanized 

force was never able to adjust to the rigors of counterinsurgency warfare in 

Afghanistan, the airborne and air assault units made great strides in tactical know-how and soon mastered the art of both closing with the enemy 

and working successfully with mechanized ground assaults.3

 As the war 

proceeded, the Soviets were also able to decentralize their force structure 

by forming new military districts and assigning air, artillery and engineer 

assets down to the brigade and regimental level.4

By 1982, the Soviets recognized the limited value of their heavy forces 

and sent hundreds of tanks, anti-aircraft units, and large artillery formations 

back home. The 40th Army also increased the number of helicopters and 

incorporated air assault and airborne light infantry into its force structure. 

Although these measures helped improve the tactical situation, they still 

fell far short of what was required for success. For the duration of the 

war, the 40th Army would remain too heavily mechanized and suffer from 

a paucity of helicopters and light infantry necessary to perform all the 

required missions. Whatever the force make up, in the end, the Soviets 

never possessed enough soldiers or equipment to successfully accomplish 

their objectives given the breadth and depth of the Afghan insurgency.5

 As 

Coalition forces continue their prolonged efforts in Afghanistan, the Soviet 

struggle to promote the proper force structure and troop levels should not 

be disregarded.

In the logistical arena, the 40th Army faced a daunting challenge, one 

they were never able to overcome.6

 Anti-government forces constantly 

attacked the Soviet army’s lines of communication. The Mujahideen 

persistently assailed Soviet convoys. And, as retired General Mohammad 

Nawroz and Lester Grau observed, “The guerrilla mastery of the roads 

strangled the Soviet efforts.”7

 Indeed, the 40th Army lost 11,369 trucks 

during the course of the war.8

 Lack of supplies and equipment for the 

soldiers in the field served to further reduce the morale of an army already 

plagued by severe drug and alcohol problems. The magnitude of Soviet 

logistical problems can be gauged by the fact that 67 percent of soldiers 

serving in Afghanistan were hospitalized with dangerous diseases.9

The 40th Army entered Afghanistan with no counterinsurgency 

doctrine. The initial forces committed to the country were trained to fight 

conventional wars in Europe or China. The army was designed and trained 

to fight large complex campaigns with vast mechanized and armored 

columns, supported by massive air and artillery strikes, piercing the 

frontlines and moving rapidly into the rear of the enemy. As the editors 

of the Russian General Staff history pointed out, “In this type of war, 
65

tactical predictability was preferred to tactical agility. The war would be 

won on the operational level. Soviet force structure, weaponry, tactics, 

and support infrastructure were all designed to support this operational 

vision. These were all inappropriate for a long counterinsurgency effort in 

Afghanistan.”10 The Soviets, therefore, were forced to learn by “trial and 

error” how to conduct tactical missions, such as raids, blocking operations, 

ambushes, sweeps and convoy protection. It would prove a bloody and 

frustrating ordeal for the Soviet army.11

The improvement of the Afghan army is perhaps one of the most 

noteworthy achievements for the Soviets in Afghanistan. At the beginning 

of the war, the Afghan army was far below strength, badly trained and 

plagued by mass desertions. By 1986, however, the Soviets had managed 

to train and equip the government soldiers well enough to conduct their 

own large-scale operations. In 1989, when the Soviet army finally left 

Afghanistan for good, the Afghan army proved strong enough to defend 

Mohammad Najibullah’s government. When the Mujahideen launched allout assaults on Jalalabad in March 1989, the Afghan army beat back the 

attacks. According to Nikolas K. Gvosdev, the victory “rocked the alliance 

of anti-Najibullah forces; meanwhile, morale inside the government 

skyrocketed, and Najibullah’s efforts to convince local leaders to back his 

rule began to bear greater fruit.”12 Najibullah’s regime would outlive the 

Soviet Union. However, once the Soviet Union collapsed and military and 

economic aid was cut off, Najibullah’s days were numbered. The Taliban 

eventually killed him in 1996. “Had the Soviet Union not collapsed,” wrote 

Artemy Kalinovsky, “the regime in Kabul might have grown and survived 

indefinitely.”13

The Soviet army’s fixation with large-scale military operations during 

the war proved completely unproductive and did little to further Soviet war 

aims. Rarely did the 40th Army or the Afghan army hold terrain after clearing it of anti-government forces. In 1986, the commander of the Soviet 

armed forces told the Politburo that, “There is no single piece of land in 

this country which has not been occupied by a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, 

the majority of the territory remains in the hands of the rebels . . . There is 

no single military problem that has arisen and that has not been solved, and 

yet there is still no result. The whole problem is in the fact that the military 

results are not followed up by political [actions]. We control Kabul and 

the provincial centers, but on occupied territory we cannot establish authority. We have lost the battle for the Afghan people.”14 This observation 

clearly shows the major defect in Soviet COIN operations. For the Soviet 

military there was “no single military problem” they could not work out.15 

There was no political follow-through because the Soviet Army was not 
66

in the business of nation-building. Added to this, was the ruthless, relentless campaign to drive the Afghan population from the countryside. It is 

therefore not surprising that the 40th Army lost its “battle for the Afghan 

people.”16

While the Soviets and their Afghan allies could successfully attack 

Mujahideen fighters and inflicted serious losses on them, once they left the 

captured area anti-government forces would quickly reoccupy their previous base of operations. Due to a lack of soldiers, the Soviets could clear, 

but they could not hold key terrain outside the cities and their lines of communications. While the problems associated with Soviet large-scale operations were recorded by military historians, the US Army and coalition 

forces in Afghanistan launched operations that were in some ways similar 

in approach. Especially in the first six years of the coalition campaign in 

Afghanistan (2001-2007) military forces conducted missions not designed 

to clear, hold and build, but rather to dislocate and defeat the Taliban and 

then move on. As with the Soviet experience, once soldiers relinquished 

the ground anti-government forces quickly returned.

Large Soviet offensive operations also hindered COIN and nationbuilding efforts. As previously discussed, Soviet combat forces terrorized 

the Afghan population, and, as the editors of the Russian General Staff 

history concluded, “did little to win them over to the government’s side.”17

Soviet combat officers were unwilling or unable to support nation-building 

programs such as national reconciliation. In 1987 when a Soviet political 

officer tried to explain to a colonel-general that combat assaults in one of 

the provinces were not conducive to the new program, the commander 

responded, “To hell with national reconciliation.”18 The lack of military 

support for what they deemed “political work” almost certainly played 

a role in the rejection of the nation-building approach by the Soviets in 

1987.19

In the end, the Soviets were not defeated in Afghanistan. Their decision 

to extricate themselves was a political decision and the withdrawal was 

accomplished in good order. The Soviets left behind a viable Afghan 

government and army supported by advisers in addition to massive 

amounts of economic aid. Inasmuch as the Soviets were unwilling to 

commit their full resources to the conflict and the 40th Army was unwilling 

to fully support nation-building efforts, this arrangement was perhaps 

the best solution after the decade long conflict. The Soviet experience 

demonstrated that a purely military solution to counter-insurgency in 

Afghanistan did not work. “One has to admit,” affirmed a communiqué 

from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 

on 10 May 1988, “that essentially we put our bets on the military solution, 
67

on suppressing the counterrevolution with force. We did not even fully use 

the existing opportunities for neutralization of the hostile attitudes of the 

local population towards us.”20 Clearly, it was the wrong approach.
68

Notes

1. Artemy Kalinovsky, “Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan,” Foreign 

Policy, 4 September 2009, 1, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/

afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan.

2. Olivier Roy, “The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War,” Adelphi Papers, The 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 259 (Summer 1991), 51.

3. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in 

Afghanistan, (London, Brassey’s, 1991), 66; General (Ret) Mohammad Yahya 

Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and 

Harbinger of Future War?” Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, June 1996, 8.

4. McMichael, 13.

5. Mohammad Y. Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan: 

History and Harbinger of Future War,” Military Review (September-October 

1995), 7–8, http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/lessonslearned/

afghanistan/waraf%5B1%5D.asp.

6. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 291.

7. Mohammad Y. Nawroz and Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet War in 

Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War,” Military Review (SeptemberOctober 1995),7, http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/lessonslearned/

afghanistan/waraf%5B1%5D.asp.

8. Nawroz and Grau, 7.

9. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 302.

10. The Russian General Staff, 310.

11. The Russian General Staff, 20, 306.

12. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “The Soviet Victory That Never Was,” Foreign 

Affairs (10 December 2009), 2, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65713/

nikolas-k-gvosdev/the-soviet-victory-that-never-was (accessed 15 April 2010).

13. Artemy Kalinovsky, “Afghanistan Is the New Afghanistan,” Foreign 

Policy, 4 September 2009, 2, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/

afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan.

14. Odd Arne Westad, “Concerning the situation in ‘A:’ New Russian 

Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, CWIHP 

Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=14051.

15. Westad, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996).

16. Westad, CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996).

17. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence, 
69

KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 313.

18. Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, 

Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working 

Paper No. 60 (January 2010), 26, http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_

id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&group_id=11901 (accessed 1 March 

2010).

19. Kalinovsky, 29.

20. Alexander Lyakhovsky, “Alexander Lyakhovsky’s Account of the Decision 

of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan” in The Tragedy and 

Valor of Afghanistan, trans. Svetlana Savranskaya The National Security Archive, 

Document 8 (Moscow, Russia: Nord, 1995), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs.

71

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About the Author

Matt M. Matthews joined the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) in July 

2005. For 16 years he was a member of the World Class Opposing Forces 

(OPFOR) of the Battle Command Training Program (BCPT) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Enlisting in the Army at age 17, he served in the light 

infantry from 1977 to 1981. Mr. Matthews also served as a Cavalry officer 

in the US Army Reserve from 1983 to 1986, and as an Armor Officer in the 

Kansas Army National Guard from 1986 to 1991. He graduated from Kansas State University in 1986 with a BS in History and continued his graduate studies there. Mr. Matthews is the author of several CSI Press publications including The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A 

Historical Perspective, Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine 

Corps Joint Operations, The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective, and We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 HezbollahIsraeli War. He also contributed the chapter titled “Hard Lessons Learned 

A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST 

LEAD: A Historical Overview” in the CSI publication Back To Basics: A 

Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD. 

Mr. Matthews has coauthored numerous scholarly articles on the Civil 

War in the Trans-Mississippi with Kip Lindberg, including “Shot All to 

Pieces: The Battle of Lone Jack,” “To Play a Bold Game: The Battle of 

Honey Springs,” “Better Off in Hell: The Evolution of the Kansas Red 

Legs” as well as, “It Haunts Me Night and Day: The Baxter Springs Massacre.” Mr. Matthews is a frequent speaker at Civil War Roundtables, and 

recently appeared on the History Channel as a historian for Bill Kurtis’ 

Investigating History. Mr. Matthews is a former mayor of Ottawa, Kansas. 

He is currently writing a biography of Kansas Civil War general James G. 

Blunt and a book on the Kansas Red Legs.

77

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