Motion for Rehearing Denied; Memorandum Opinion of April 19, 2022

Withdrawn ; Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted; and Substitute Memorandum Opinion filed July 26 , 2022.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 21

- 00337

- CV

IN RE BREITBURN OPER ATING LP, SUCESSOR

- I N

- INTEREST TO QRE OPERATING, LLC , BREITBURN MANAGEMEN T COMPANY, LLC , BREITBURN ENERGY PA RTNERS, LP , QR ENERGY, LP , AND MAVERICK NATURAL RES OURCES, LLC , Relator s

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 133rd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2015

- 47031



### S UBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM OPINION2

On June 18, 2021 , relator s Breitburn Operating LP, sucessor

- in

- interest to QRE Operating, LLC
, Breitburn Management Company, LLC
, Breitburn Energy Partners, LP , QR Energy, LP , and Maverick Natural Resources, LLC (collectively, “Breitburn”) filed a petition for writ of m andamus in this court

. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Jaclanel McFarland, presiding judge of the 133rd District
Court of Harris County , to set aside her May 20, 2021 order directing Bre i tburn to deposit over $13.4 million dollars into the registry of the court. We conditionally grant the petition. 1

B ACKGROUND In June 1983, the Louisiana Land and Exploration Company (“LLEC”) created the LL&E Trust (the “Trust”). LLEC and the Trust then created the LL&E Royalty Partnership (the “Partnership”). The Trust had a 99% interest in the Partnership and LLEC had a 1% in terest and was the managing general partner. The Partnership was formed for the purpose of receiving and holding the overriding royalty interests, receiving proceeds from the overriding royalty interests, paying the liabilities and expenses of the Partner ship, and disbursing remaining revenues to the Trust and managing general partner. On June 28, 1983, LLEC entered into substantially identical agreements known as “Conveyance Overriding Royalty Interests” (collectively, the

1 We deny the motion for rehearing filed by real party in interest Roger D. Parsons, in his Capacity as Trust of the LL&E Royalty Trust, withdraw our memorandum dated April 19, 2022, and issue this substitute opinion

.3

“Conveyance”), which varied on ly in the interests covered, with the Partnership. One of the oil and gas properties in which LLEC owned mineral interests at the time of the Conveyance was the Jay Field, which is located in Alabama and Florida. The assignor that owns the working intere st in the Jay Field, is responsible for overseeing the operation of the Jay Field, and sells oil and gas from the Jay Field. LLEC, as assignor, conveyed to the Partnership, as assignee, the right to receive “Net Proceeds,” as defined in the Conveyance ass ociated with LLEC’s mineral interests. Net Proceeds are the proceeds net of Production Costs, which are associated with maintaining the Jay Field. Production Costs are deducted from the Gross Proceeds. Through a series of acquisitions, ConocoPhillips Com pany became LLEC’s successor as managing general partner of the Partnership. Quantum Resources Management, LLC purchased the working interests in the Jay Field in December 2006 and became the operator of the Jay Field in April 2007. In 2012, Quantum
Reso urces transferred its working interests operations in the Jay Field to QRE Operating, LLC, the subsidiary of QR Energy, LLC. Thereafter, on November 19, 2014, QR Energy merged into and became a subsidiary of Bre i tburn Energy Partners, LLP. Thus, Breitbur n Operating LP (“Bre i tburn”) became the assignor and the operator of the Jay Field and acquired a working interest in the Jay Field. From 1983 to 2006, LLEC paid the Partnership over $300,000,000 in Net Proceeds from the Jay Field, which averaged a littl e over $13,000,000 a year. The Partnership has not received any payments under the Conveyance nor has the assignor paid any money to the Partnership since 2008.4

The Conveyance allows the assignor to set aside funds for future costs or “Special Costs,” w hich include such as items as the estimated costs of plugging and abandoning wells on the property and estimated future capital expenditures on the property. Such Special Costs are not born by the Partnership, but by Breitburn, the assignor. The assignor may put the funds to cover the Special Costs into a Special Cost Escrow Account pursuant to the Conveyance

. The Conveyance provides that “Assignor may, in its sole discretion, elect to refrain from actually placing funds in
escrow but nevertheless calcul ate and pay amounts attributable to the Overriding Royalty Interest as if funds had been placed in escrow . . . .”
On April 14, 2014, counsel for the Trust wrote Quantum Resources Management and QR Energy (collectively, “Quantum”). 2 The Trust questioned Quantum’s failure to pay the Trust “tens of millions of dollars in royalties due to the Trust under the terms of the parties’ written agreements,” noting that the last recurring overriding royalty interest payment occurred prior to April 2007 and a single nonrecurring payment was made in September 2008. The Trust alleged that Quantum was making payments to the Special Cost Escrow Account instead of making its contractually obligated royalty payments to the Trust. The Trust alleged that Quantum had breach ed the Conveyance by (1) refusing to make the overriding royalty interest payments to the Trust for over seven years, (2) increasing the amount of the Special Cost Escrow Account by approximately $40 million in the previous three years, while refusing to m ake any royalty payments to

2 In the correspondence, counsel does not refer to the Trustee but the Trust instead.5

the Trust, and (3) holding the Special Cost Escrow Account funds in an internal Quantum account rather than with an independent escrow agent. The Trust demanded that Quantum (1) pay the Trust its portion of the Special Cost Esc row account (50% of the total balance), (2) begin making monthly overriding royalty interest payments to the Trust, and (3) transfer the entirety of the balance of the Special Cost Escrow account from the internal Quantum account to an account
controlled b y an independent escrow agent. The Trust concluded by suggesting that the parties meet to discuss the issues raised in the letter, or it would pursue its legal rights. Quantum’s counsel responded to the Trust’s April 14, 2014 correspondence
and asserted t hat Quantum had complied with each of the provisions of the Conveyance. Quantum stated that the Jay Field, as recognized in the Trust’s correspondence, was shut down in the latter part of 2008 and through 2009. Quantum averred that the shutdown was not b ecause of an intent to avoid its obligations to the Trust under the Conveyance but instead was necessitated due to crude oil prices being significantly below the operating cost of the Jay Field on a per
barrel basis.
Moreover, according to Quantum, capit al improvements were made in 2009
so that t he Jay Field would again operate profitably. Quantum asserted that the success of such improvements was evidenced by the continu ed increase in production and revenue. Quantum stated t he Trust’s portion of capital improvement was contributed by Quantum . This created an Excess Production Cost balance and the Trust would begin receiving royalty payments once the Excess Production Cost6

balance was paid down. Quantum agreed that an independent escrow agent sho uld be used to steward the Special Cost Escrow account and, therefore, established an account at Wells Fargo Bank with a deposit of $18,051,909.
In October 2014, the Trust filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan against Quantum, alleging breach of the
C onveyance , fraud, statutory conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, seeking injunctive relief, and the appointment of a receiver over t he financial operations of the Jay Field. On July 15, 2014, the federal court dismissed the Trust ’ s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

. On August 12, 2015, Quantum filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Roger D. Parsons, in his capacity as Trustee of the Trust. The purpose of the declaratory judgment action is to determine the rights and obligations arising from the Conveyance to which Quantum and “the LL&E Royalty Trust (the “Texas
Trust ” ) are parties.”

About six months late r, o n February 16, 2016, Parsons filed an original
counterclaim and third

- party petition, alleging that Quantum and its successor
, Breitburn
, had breached the Conveyance for failure to properly calculate and pay net proceeds

. Quantum and Breitburn filed fo r Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York o n May 15, 2016 . Parsons requested that the bankruptcy court lift the automatic bankruptcy stay to pursue the7

underlying case. On April 14, 2017, the bank ruptcy court granted relief from the stay to allow the Texas courts to determine the rights of the parties under the Conveyance.
On September 13, 2019, Parsons filed a third amended answer, amended
counterclaim and amended third

- party petition against Qu antum, adding ConocoPhillips as a party. Parsons allege d that ConocoPhillips, as general partner of the Partnership, had not taken any steps to protect the royalty interests or ensure compliance with the contractual terms of the Conveyance. On December 20, 2019,
Breitburn filed a second verified amended answer , asserting that “The Trust is not entitled to recover in the capacity in which it sues.”
On April 12, 2021, Breitburn notified the Partnership that it intended to withdraw the funds in the Wells Fargo account and close the account effective April 15, 2021. Breitburn explained that t he amount in the Wells Fargo account was
funded to an amount of money that equaled 50% of the Special Costs Escrow Account at the time it was created. The account balance, which was $19,085,585.38, exceeded the 50% amount of the Special Costs Escrow Account of $14,811,984.78. Therefore, Breitburn was withdrawing f unds from the Wells Fargo account to reimburse itself for Special Costs it previously had incurred and to reconcile the balance in the Wells Fargo account to an amount equal to 50% of the Special Costs
Escrow Account balance.
Parsons filed an emergency a pplication for an order compelling the deposit of the Wells Fargo account into the court’s registry or, alternatively, for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Breitburn from liquidating or drawing down the8

account. After a hearing on April 29, 2021, at which counsel for Parsons and counsel for Breitburn were present, the trial court signed a temporary restraining order and show cause order, prohibiting Breitburn from liquidating or drawing down the Wells Fargo account.
On May 12, 2021, Parsons filed an application for an order compelling the deposit of the Special Cost Escrow into the court’s registry or, alternatively, for a temporary injunction prohibiting Breitburn from liquidating or drawing down the account. The trial court held a hearing on the application on May 14, 2021, and orally announced that it was ordering Breitburn to deposit $13,400,000 into the court’s registry and granting the temporary injunction , The trial court signed the
order o n May 20, 2021. 3 Bre i tburn deposited the $13,400,0 00 into the registry of the court of May 27, 2021. In this mandamus proceeding, Breitburn asks this court to compel the trial court to vacate its May 20, 2021 order for deposit into the registry of the court

. Breitburn brings three issues: (1) the Trus t does not have the capacity to recover the funds in the court’s registry; (2) none of the disputed funds were proceeds from the sale of oil and gas; (3) the trial court did not satisfy the requirements for ordering a pretrial deposit. Because the first i ssue is dispositive, we do not address the second
or third issues.

3 In the same orde r, the trial court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting Breitburn from closing, liquidating, or depleting the Wells Fargo account. The temporary injunction is not part of the mandamus proceeding but is pending in an appeal in case number 14

- 21

- 00310

- CV

.9 S TANDARD OF R EVIEW To obtain mandamus relief, a relator generally must show both that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Dawson , 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Pr udential Ins. Co. of Am ., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135‒36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to analyze the law correctly or apply the law correctly to the facts. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P. , 492 S.W.3d 300, 302‒03 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt. L.P ., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding ) (per curiam). Orders compelling a prejudgment deposit into the registry of the court are properly reviewed on mandamus because a relator does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. , 509 S.W.3d 110, 118‒19 (Tex. App.

— 14 th Dist.] 2020, orig. proceeding).

A NALYSIS

Abuse of Discretion When all the dust settles from all the various acquisitions, transfers, assignments, and mergers, we are left with a relatively simple business structure. The LL&E Royalty Partnership has tw o partners: (1) the LL&E Royalty Trust, a

non

- managing general partner; and (2) ConocoPhillips, the managing general partner. Parsons is the trustee of the LL&E Royalty Trust.10

Breitburn contends that Parsons lacks capacity to pursue the Special Account
Escrow funds. Instead, without conceding that any party other than Bre i tburn is entitled to the funds, Bre i tburn asserts that only the Partnership , which is the assignee under the Conveyance, has capacity to sue for the funds. A party ha s capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist. , 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996). The issue of capacity “is conceived as a procedu ral issue dealing with the personal qualifications of a party to litigate.” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato , 171 S .W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The Partnership is not a party to the case. Parsons’s counte rclaim made clear that he was the party seeking damages. Parsons listed himself as “Defendant/Counter

- Plaintiff/Third Party Plaintiff” in his counterclaim and third

party petition and repeatedly referred to himself as the party bringing claims against
Bre itburn, among others, and seeking damages. Parsons alleged the following, in part:

3.13

. This case involves the breach of certain contractual and fiduciary duties owed to the LL&E Trust with respect to the LL&E Trust’s real property interests. The Count er

- Defendant and Third

- Party Defendants conspired to, among other things, refuse to pay certain oil and gas royalties owed to the LL&E Trust, refuse to give a proper accounting of amounts due and owing to the LL&E Trust, and manipulated charges and estimat es to devalue and defund the LL&E Trust’s royalty interests.

* * *11 3.27

. LL&E Trust holds an enforceable property interest in the Escrowed Funds and other ongoing royalties payable to LL&E Trust under the Conveyance as proceeds of the Conveya nce, and/or the Debtor Defendants are holding the Escrowed Funds and other ongoing royalties payable to LL&E Trust under the Conveyance in an express, constructive, or resulting trust, or otherwise for the benefit of LL&E Trust. . . .

* * *

3 .51

. LL&E Trust, Breitburn and Quantum dispute their respective rights and obligations under the Conveyance Agreement, and as to the Escrowed Funds and other ongoing royalties payable to LL&E Trust for its property interests as transferred in the Conveyanc e Agreement. LL&E Trust seeks a declaratory judgment that LL&E Trust’s rights are as set forth in the pleading above, based on the facts of this case, applicable law as applied to those facts, and/or equitable principles (including but not necessarily lim ited to principles of estoppel).

3.52. Specifically, and without limiting the foregoing, LL&E Trust requests that this Court find: 1) by conveying to LL&E Trust the net overriding royalty interests, the Conveyance Agreement conveyed real property interests to LL&E Trust while also providing for contractual rights and duties as to the management of those property interests; 2) the Escrowed Funds are LL&E Trust’s property and properly payable to LL&E Trust as the property interest holder and not

as an unsecur ed creditor; and 3) that other ongoing royalties payable to LL&E Trust for its property interests under the Conveyance are LL&E Trust’s property and properly payable to it as the property interest holder and not as an unsecured creditor.

* * *

3.5. As a result of Quantum and Breitburn’s breach of their contractual obligations with respect to LL&E Trust’s real property12

interests, LL&E Trust sustained injuries and damages that were the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence of the breac hes. LL&E Trust hereby seeks its actual damages, attorneys’ fees and expenses, court costs, and pre

-

judgment and post

-

judgment interest. In his application for deposit into the court’s registry and temporary injunction Parsons asserted that he was bringing the application in his capacity as trustee of the
Trust:

Defendant RO G ER D. PARSONS, solely in his capacity as trustee of the LL&E ROYALTY TRUST (“Parsons” or the “LL&E Trust”), submits this application for an order compelling deposit of the Special Esc row into the Court’s registry . . . . In joint stipulations, Parsons and Breitburn agreed that the parties would not “dispute the factual statements” listed in the stipulations for purposes of the application for a temporary injunction and for deposit into the court’s registry. Significantly, Parsons agreed to the following as to the Partnership:

9. On June 28, 1983, LLEC entered into substantially identical agreements with the LL&E Royalty Partnership, each entitled “Conveyance of Overriding R oyalty Interests,” with each Conveyance varying only by the interests covered, but not by any material terms (the “Conveyances”).

10

. Under the terms of the Conveyances, LLEC, as Assignor, conveyed to the LL&E Royalty Partnership, as Assignee, the right to receive “Net Proceeds” (as defined in the Conveyance) associated with LLEC’s mineral interests.

* * *13 12. From 1983 to 2006, the Assignor paid the LL&E Royalty Partnership over $300,000,000 in Net Proceeds from the Jay Field at an

av erage of a little over $13,000,000 a year.

* * * 16. Since 2008, the Assignor has not paid any money to the LL&E Royalty Partnership.

* * * 18. The LL&E Royalty Partnership has not received any payments under the Conveyances sin ce 2008. As an initial matter, Parsons argues that Breitburn did not properly verify that
he lacks capacity to recover the funds in the court’s registry. Specifically, Parsons asserts that the affidavit attached in support of Bre i tburn’s verified answer i s not sufficient because it does not verify any of the facts alleged as to Parsons and the
Trust as true and correct and it is not based on personal knowledge. Therefore, according to Parsons, Breitburn has waived its capacity defense.
Rule 93 requires that a pleading, which alleges that the plaintiff does not have the legal capacity to sue or is not entitled to recover in the capacity in which it sues, must be verified unless the truth of such matters appear of record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 93; Sixth RMA Par tners, L.P. v. Sibley , 111 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tex. 2003); Pledger v. Schoellkopf

, 762 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) . A party who fails to raise the issue of capacity in the trial court may not raise it for the first time on appeal. Ray Malooly Tru st v. Juhl , 186 S.W.3d 568, 571 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) ; Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. , 111 S.W.3d at 56; Nootsie, Ltd. , 925 S.W.2d at 662;14

Harrison v. Reiner , 607 S.W.3d 450, 459 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
Breitburn responds that it properly verified its capacity

- defense. Bre i tburn
further contends that, if its capacity

- defense had not been verified, the issue was tried by consent. Issues subject to pleading requirements
, such as verified denials
, may be tried by consent. Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. v. U BS AG , 451 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tex. App

— Dallas 2014, no pet.); 1 Lincoln Fin. Co. v. Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus , No. 02

- 12

- 00516

- CV, 2014 WL 4938001 , at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2014, no pet.) (m e m. o p.) (citing Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc. , 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991); Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex
Com. , Inc. , 348 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. 2011)). Unpleaded claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of the parties are t reated as if they had been raised by the pleadings. Roark , 813 S.W.2d at 495. The party who allows an issue to be tried by consent and fails to raise the lack of pleading before submission of the case cannot later raise the pleading deficiency for the fi rst time on appeal. Id. At the hearing, Parson’s counsel stated with respect to capacity:
And to address the capacity argument, you will hear and there is evidence that the Trustee asked the managing partner, Conoco, to take care of this. And they did nothing. But it is a general partnership. And a general partner, any general partner, can sue on behalf of the partnership if it is necessary. And that is exactly what’s in this case and that dispenses basically with the standing argument.

Parsons never objected to any lack of pleadings by Breitburn on its capacity argument. Parsons had an opportunity to object to the any lack of pleading of15

capacity, but instead, addressed the merits of the defense. Cf. Basic Capital Mgmt.,
Inc. , 348 S.W.3d at 899 (ho lding where capacity was raised in cross

- motions for summary judgment, there was no longer any need for verified pleading); Via Net v.
TIG Ins. Co. , 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (holding where non

movant raised discovery rule for first time in response to motion for summary judgment that was based on statute of limitations, movant could object to failure to plead discovery rule or respond on merits and try issue by consent); Edwards v. Fed. Nat’l M ort g. Ass’n , 545 S.W.3d 169 , 177‒78 (Tex. Ap p.

— El Paso 2017, pet. denied) (holding that defendant’s challenge to execution of document was tried by consent where plaintiff did not complain about defendant’s failure to challenge execution of document in verified answer, but instead raised defense in response to motion for summary judgment). Therefore, here, the issue of capacity was tried by consent. A Texas Partnership is “an entity distinct from its partners. Am. Star Energy & Minerals Corp. v. Stower s , 457 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 152.056). “As an independent entity, a partnership may enter into contracts in its own name, may own its own property, and may sue and be sued in its own name.” Id. (citing Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 152.101; Tex. R. Civ. P. 28). “Partnership property is not property of the partners.” Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 152.101; see also Siller v. L P P M or tg

. , Ltd. , 264 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (“[I]f the property was, in fact, partnership property, it could not be considered property of the individual partners.”). “A ‘partnership’ is not an interest in any specific partnership property. Instead, it is the partner’s right to receive his distributive share of the profits and su rpluses of the partnership.”16

Stanley v. Reef Secs., Inc. , 314 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2010, no pet.). In Texas, a cause of action accruing to the partnership is partnership property and a partner may not bring suit on such cause of action. See Cates v. Int’l Tel. & Tex. Corp. , 756 F.2d 1161, 1173, 1176 (5 th Circ. 1985) (applying rule to general partnership). Parsons acknowledges that a general partnership in Texas may file a claim on its own behalf under the Texas Business Organizations Code, but argues that there is no statute or common law rule holding that only the partnership, and not the partners, may pursue the rights of the partnership. Instead, according to Parsons, the common law rule in Texas is that general partners are proper part ies to pursue the rights of a general partnership. See, e.g. , Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Texas Commerce
Bank , No. 08

- 00

- 00118

- CV, 2000 WL 1268185, *1 (Tex. App.

— El Paso Sept. 7, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that “[a] partner may bring suit on behalf of a partnership”).
Parsons argues that, as long as all of the general par tners are parties to a lawsuit, then any of the partners may pursue a claim for the general partnership. See
Allied Chem. Co. v. DeHaven , 824 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). In Allied Chemical Company , DeHaven, Novak, Phillips, and Reams were partners of Maglon Partnership. Id. at 260. DeHaven sued Maglon, Novak, Phillips, Reams, Allied, Gambrell, and others for fraud and conspiracy in the breach
of a contract. Id. Allied asserted that DeHaven lacked standing “ to sue on beha lf of Maglon ,” the partnership. Id. at 264 (emphasis added). The court observed that DeHaven was a Maglon partner at all relevant times relating to the transaction that17

formed the basis of the lawsuit. Id. The court stated that “[a]lthough a partnershi p has standing to file suit in its own name, Tex. R. Civ. P. 28, the common law rule that all partners can bring suit themselves on behalf of the partnership is still in force.” Id. (emphasis added). The court explained that the purpose for the common
la w rule was to protect third parties from multiple lawsuits and judgments. Id. Therefore, th e facts that DeHaven was the plaintiff and Reams, Phillips, Novak, and Maglon were defendants w ere irrelevant and the common law rule was satisfied because all par tners were parties to the suit. Id. Parsons argues that nothing in the Texas Business Organizations Code limits
or restricts Allied’s holding that any general partner may pursue a claims for a general partnership if all partners are parties to the suit. Breitburn argues that the legislature’s statutory scheme has replaced the common law rule.

Parsons’s reliance on Allied is misplaced and it is not necessary to decide whether the common law rule has been abrogated by statutes enacted subsequent to
the Allied decision. 4 In Allied , the court specifically explained that the common law
rule was “that all partners can bring suit themselves on behalf of the partnership is still in force.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, Parsons never pleaded that he, as truste e of the Trust, which was a partner in the Partnership
, was bringing any claims on
behalf of the P artnership.

4 Allied was decided in 1992; in 1993, the L egislature enacted the Texas Revised Uniform Partnership Act ( “ TRPA ” ). The Texas Supreme Court in In re Allcat Claims Serv ice , L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding), noted that the TRPA “unequivocally embrace[d] the entity theory of partnership by specifically stating .

. .that a part ner ship is an entity distinct from its partners.” Id. at 464. Although there is a quest ion of whether Allied is still good law, it is not necessary to reach that decision.18

We conclude that Breitburn established the affirmative defense of capacity and, therefore, t he trial court abused its discretion by ordering Breitburn to deposit the disputed funds into the court’s registry.
No Adequate Remedy by Appeal Having concluded that Breitburn established the trial court’s abuse of discretion, we must determine whether Breitburn has an adequate remedy by appeal.
Courts are to assess the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the
benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Team Rocket, L.P. , 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Because this balancing depends in large measure on the circumstances presented, courts look to principles rather than simple rules that treat cases as c ategories. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. , 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Whether an appeal amounts to an adequate remedy depends heavily on the circumstances. In re Garza , 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curi am). Mandamus review may be necessary to prevent the loss of substantive or procedural rights. In re Reece , 341 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). Interlocutory review of a prejudgment order to deposit funds into the court’s registry is no t available, and the order itself will cease to be of effect once a judgment
is rendered. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp. , 599 S.W.3d at 118‒19. A ny appeal of such an order after judgment would become moot. Id. at 119. Therefore, “ [ a ] party ordered to deposit funds during the pendency of the lawsuit would not only be deprived of the use of its funds, but would be precluded from challenging the tri al19

court’s order by appeal. ” Id. (quoting In re G

- M Water Supply Corp. , No. 12

- 16

- 00223

- CV, 2016 WL 6873181, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Nov. 22, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)). Bre i tburn would lose a substantial right

— the right of the
use of its funds

—

i f it could not challenge the deposit order until after a decision in

an appeal from a final judgment . We conclude that Bre i tburn does not have an adequate remedy by appeal.

C ONCLUSION We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bre i tburn to deposit the $13.4 million into the registry of the court and Breitburn does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Breitburn’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct the court to vacate its May 2 0, 2021 order. We are confident the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion. The writ of mandamus shall issue only if the court fails to do so.

PER CURIAM

Panel c onsists of Justic es Bourliot, Poissant, and Wilson.