Air University

Allen G. Peck, Lt Gen, Commander

Air Command and Staff College

Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., Brig Gen, Commandant

Zoë M. Hale, Col, PhD, Dean

Brett E. Morris, Col, PhD, Director of Research

Brett E. Morris, Col, PhD, and John L. Mansuy, Maj, Series Editors

William Dean, PhD, Essay Advisor

Air University Press

John A. Shaud, General, USAF, Retired, PhD

Director, Air Force Research Institute

Bessie E. Varner, Director

Belinda Bazinet, Content Editor

Carolyn Burns, Copy Editor

Nedra O. Looney, Prepress Production

L. Susan Fair, Cover Design

Please send inquiries or comments to

Editor

The Wright Flyer Papers

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC/DEI)

225 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1402

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6426

Tel: (334) 953-6810

Fax: (334) 953-2269

E-mail: ACSC@maxwell.af.mil

00-Inside.indd 1 10/19/09 1:48:47 
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Counterinsurgency Aircraft

Procurement Options

Processes, Methods, Alternatives, and 

Estimates

David L. Peeler, Jr. Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 40

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2009

01-Frontmatter.indd 1 8/5/09 10:54:16 
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US Government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

01-Frontmatter.indd 2 8/5/09 10:54:16 
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best 

student research projects from the prior academic year. 

The ACSC research program encourages our students to 

move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own 

professional development and in “advancing air and space 

power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the 

pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. 

Projects selected for publication combine solid research, 

innovative thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war 

at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the 

Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, 

technological, organizational, and operational questions. 

Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind 

in pursuing new possibilities. By making these research 

studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes 

to encourage critical examination of the findings and to 

stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

01-Frontmatter.indd 3 8/5/09 10:54:17 
01-Frontmatter.indd 4 8/5/09 10:54:17 


Abstract

A call is being made for an aircraft dedicated to the 

counterinsurgency (COIN) mission within military academic 

circles and the special operations community. Support for 

a COIN aircraft needs hard numbers, given the Air Force’s 

budget constraints brought on by the dedication to the F22A. Building on Arthur Davis’s COIN aircraft advocacy 

paper, this research doesn’t focus on further advocacy, but 

on a process and method for COIN aircraft procurement. 

The acquisition focus is on United States Special Operations 

Command’s (USSOCOM) acquisition authority to couple its 

global war on terrorism (GWOT) mission responsibility with 

commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft procurement to specifically 

address the need for an airborne COIN capability.

The performance, schedule, and cost information 

associated with Raytheon’s T-6A NTA and Stavatti’s SM-27 

are reviewed and compared beyond the acquisition process. 

Additionally, acquisition and operations, maintenance, 

and support cost estimates are produced for both 

alternatives. The estimates reflect respective acquisition 

costs of approximately $211 million and $426 million; and 

maintenance, and support costs of $38 million and $47 

million, respectively. The latter two costs are stated in fiscal 

year (FY) 2007 dollars.

The analysis of alternatives yields a recommendation 

based on the three key acquisition areas of performance, 

schedule, and cost. The T-6A NTA platform possesses 

demonstrated performance, immediate availability, and 

lower costs, and is recommended by this analysis.

01-Frontmatter.indd 5 8/5/09 10:54:17 
01-Frontmatter.indd 6 8/5/09 10:54:17 
vii

Acknowledgments

Dr. William Dean was instrumental in introducing me 

to this topic. During an early course at Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC), and later in his Small Wars seminar, 

officially entitled “Small Wars and Counter-insurgencies: 

From Algeria to Afghanistan,” I became interested in 

determining the costs of procuring a COIN aircraft. 

The topic was of interest to many in the academic and 

special operations fields. Whenever airpower in small wars 

was mentioned, someone inevitably stated that prop aircraft 

were sufficient—even an advantage for loiter and escort—

and an inexpensive alternative.

A paper by a former ACSC student, Arthur Davis, outlined 

the argument for buying a COIN aircraft. Advancing his 

study involved looking at a method to actually procure the 

type of aircraft Davis and others advocated. I have tried to 

do just that . . . provide an understanding of the processes 

involved; identify a purchase method; present detailed 

aircraft alternatives; and finally generate cost estimates for 

such a procurement.

Production of the estimates found in the appendices would 

have been far more difficult without the kind assistance of 

Tecolote Research, Inc., Montgomery, AL. They granted me 

free access to their sophisticated cost estimating software 

package, which I refer to as a cost engine. Without their 

assistance, far more time would have been spent on the 

meticulous aspects of inflation adjustments and basic 

math applications. Permission to use their Automated Cost 

Estimator Integrated Tools package clearly improved the 

quality of my work.

Additionally, I would like to thank Chris Beskar, president 

and CEO [chief executive officer], Stavatti Aerospace, and 

Doug Scott, director, Strategy and Business Development, 

Raytheon Aircraft Company. The men provided written product 

information and granted interviews that aided my research.

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01-Frontmatter.indd 8 8/5/09 10:54:18 


Introduction

Aircraft have shown to be effective in small wars, particularly 

comparatively slower, lower technology platforms. The United 

States Air Force (USAF) currently possesses no counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft of the type advocated by many students of small wars. Given the Air Force’s preoccupation with 

the F-22A advanced fighter aircraft procurement, little attention is placed on obtaining a COIN operations platform. However, within academic circles and the special operations community, the need for a “low-tech” airborne participant in COIN 

operations is gaining traction.

Acquiring a weapons system platform is serious business, 

with meticulously defined processes and authorities. By examining opportunities to turn ideas into aircraft, this analysis identifies specific authorities, processes, requirements, 

and methodologies for quickly procuring an aircraft for COIN 

operations. In addition to discussing some of the specifics of 

the Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems acquisition business, an alternative method for COIN aircraft platform procurement will be discussed, as will the specific performance attributes, schedule details, and costs associated 

with two airborne platform options.

Backdrop . . . or Basis for this Analysis

In his Air Command and Staff College thesis, Maj Arthur 

D. Davis proposed an aircraft solution specifically for COIN.1

His paper serves as the backdrop for the current analysis, 

and sets the initial conditions for this appraisal of COIN 

aircraft purchase options. Davis’s study forms the stepping 

off point for investigating a possible avenue and estimating 

the cost of procuring an aircraft platform specifically for the 

modern COIN and/or counterterrorism mission. By delving 

into the specifics of procuring a COIN aircraft, this analysis 

serves to advance Davis’s work.

Davis provided a recommendation on the type and specifications of a COIN aircraft. He looked at the nature of insurgency, how aircraft were used to suppress insurgents, the 

Iraqi situation, and specifically the aircraft in use today.

To add credence to his call for a different type of aircraft, 

Davis presented two case studies in COIN, where the T-6 

02-Article.indd 1 10/19/09 1:49:13 
Texan and A-1 Skyraider aircraft had validated successes 

in thwarting insurgents in the Algerian and the Vietnamese 

experiences.2 Davis used this examination of the types and 

roles of the aircraft to address airpower and countering 

modern insurgent and terrorist groups.

From his examination, Davis proposed a low-tech solution 

—abdicating the desire to have all the latest technological 

advances, and retaining the advantages of slower, proven 

aspects of good COIN platforms. “Instead of fast, expensive turbojets, we need reliable, propeller-driven aircraft 

designed to work in the environment favored by the insurgent.”3 To this end, Davis proposed:

Such an aircraft should have the following characteristics: (1) off-theshelf technology; (2) long range and loiter capability; (3) short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability; (4) ability to operate from austere 

airfields; (5) diverse weapons-carrying capability; (6) good navigation 

and fire-control systems; (7) good pilot visibility; (8) speed and maneuverability at low-to-medium altitudes; and (9) ability to absorb 

ground fire with a high degree of survivability. Of special importance, 

the aircraft should be inexpensive and suited to the type of support 

expected of it. As a corollary, it should lend itself well to training pilots 

from “lesser-developed” nations that will eventually assume responsibility for internal security against insurgent factions.4

Based on an examination of both historical and current 

COIN demands, Davis recommended the T-6A Texan II as a 

possible replacement for the Skyraider’s role.5 Taking Davis’s 

recommendation and looking beyond, this analysis explores 

the best avenue for COIN aircraft procurement, and then estimates the costs of buying and maintaining such a platform.

United States Special Operations Command

The most likely opportunity to quickly procure an inexpensive6 aircraft platform, meeting the characteristics identified 

by Davis, is through the United States Special Operations 

Command’s (USSOCOM) acquisition agility. Acquisition agility means it has Title 10 procurement authority (the only 

unified command empowered therewith), its own budget line 

from Congress in the appropriation process, and it is chartered to purchase non-mainstream military equipment.7

The acquisition flexibility provided by USSOCOM is associated with its role in the global war on terror (GWOT). The 

mission of USSOCOM includes leading the GWOT,8 which 

involves “the planning and synchronization of DOD activities 

02-Article.indd 2 10/19/09 1:49:13 
in support of the GWOT.”9 The extent to which USSOCOM 

has embraced its role in the GWOT is evidenced by the emphasis placed on this role in both its mission and vision 

statements. The command’s mission statement reads:

USSOCOM leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes 

global operations against terrorist networks. USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips and deploys combat ready special operations forces 

to combatant commands.10

The command’s vision is:

To be the premier team of special warriors, thoroughly prepared, 

properly equipped, and highly motivated: at the right place, at the 

right time, facing the right adversary, leading the Global War on 

Terrorism, accomplishing the strategic objectives of the United 

States.11

Further, the command’s annual report states, “In order 

to remain decisive on the battlefield of today and posture for 

success in the future, our priorities remain (1) the Global 

War on Terrorism, (2) Readiness, and (3) Future Special 

Operations Forces (SOF).”12 Leveraging the assigned mission 

and number-one priority of USSOCOM, one could argue that 

a COIN aircraft would add significant capability to address 

all three priorities.

The GWOT is a war against insurgency, as the global 

terrorists’ networks will not meet US forces on a traditional 

field of battle. USSOCOM, as the “nation’s lead command for 

planning and executing the GWOT,”13 focuses on the GWOT 

and the special operations-peculiar equipment necessary to 

confront the enemy. 

To buy such equipment, USSOCOM possesses its own 

budget authority. The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 

DOD Authorization Act of 1987, amending the GoldwaterNichols Reorganization Act of 1986, created USSOCOM as 

a unified combatant command for all special operations 

forces, and vested it with its own budget. This budget, 

identified as a major force program 11 (MFP-11), is specifically for special operations forces. Use of MFP-11 is limited 

to special operations–peculiar equipment and operations, 

not to augment the budgets of the military services. The 

role of the service’s responsibilities is clearly specified, 

with support arrangements and categories for common 

support to all forces and bases.14

The law requires the secretary of defense to submit a 

separate request in the budget for special operations forces 

02-Article.indd 3 10/19/09 1:49:14 
training with foreign forces.15 Additionally, the legislative 

intent calls for the special operations command budget proposal to “include requests for funding for—(1) development 

and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment; 

and (2) acquisition of other material, supplies, or services 

that are peculiar to special operations activities.”16

Special operations–peculiar items and materials are the 

only things authorized for purchase with MFP-11 funding.

Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations mission support for which there is no broad conventional 

force requirement. This includes standard items used by other . . . 

Department of Defense (DOD) forces but modified for special operations 

forces (SOF); items initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adapted 

for use as Service-common by other DOD forces; and items approved by the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) [sic] as critically urgent for the immediate 

accomplishment of a special operations mission but not normally 

procured by USCINCSOC [sic].17 

USSOCOM’s budget authority would logically apply to an 

aircraft designed specifically for COIN operations and/or to 

enhance foreign internal defense (FID) training with allies 

and partners in the GWOT.

In addition to straight procurement authority—funds authorized in an annual budget to buy things—recent defense 

budget supplementals have included “temporary authority 

to use O&M [operations and maintenance] funds for combat or contingency construction projects outside the United 

States, subject to certification of certain requirements and 

notification to Congress.”18 USSOCOM could request such 

authority for COIN aircraft procurement if such an aircraft 

was immediately necessary in the GWOT. This avenue for 

requesting funds would be much faster than the normal 

budget process. If approved by Congress, supplemental 

funds could be used to purchase a COIN aircraft, thus 

speeding the asset into the inventory and saving procurement dollars.19

If USSOCOM chooses not to request such temporary 

procurement authority via an O&M supplemental funding request, or if Congress refuses to grant such authority, 

the normal acquisition and budget processes remain available. While the established acquisition processes take time, 

USSOCOM does possess special agility that can expedite 

critical acquisition requirements. However, before one can 

02-Article.indd 4 10/19/09 1:49:14 
appreciate USSOCOM’s special acquisition position, a perfunctory understanding of the formal process is beneficial.

Acquisition Process Requirements

Three principles about the acquisition process should 

be understood before discussing the specific requirements associated with a platform. First, the total cost of 

the procurement—research, development, test, evaluation, 

and production costs—determines the acquisition category 

assigned to the project; and sometimes merely interest in a 

program will garner it acquisition category status. Second, 

the level of acquisition category designation also determines 

the requirement and approval levels for a single acquisition 

management plan (SAMP). Finally, the milestone decision 

authority (MDA) is determined by the program’s acquisition 

category (ACAT). Table 1 summarizes the fiscal thresholds for ACAT designation and the associated decision 

authority. Adjusted for inflation, the ACAT I thresholds 

are about $441.5 million for research, development, test, 

and evaluation (RDT&E) and over $2.408 billion for production in fiscal year (FY) 2006. The FY 2006 equivalents 

for RDT&E and production are over $153.9 million and 

$725.8 million, respectively, for the ACAT II thresholds.

The USSOCOM acquisition program office is too small 

to handle large programs, so the services currently execute 

ACAT I programs for USSOCOM.20 If USSOCOM pursues the 

purchase of a COIN aircraft platform, the command would 

have to keep the total procurement costs below the ACAT I 

threshold or face turning it over to Air Combat Command 

(ACC) for program execution. USSOCOM could manage the 

program execution, as the general consensus is that ACC 

would oppose the introduction of a non-jet platform for the 

COIN mission.

The ACAT level determines the need for a SAMP. “A SAMP is 

required for all non-space ACAT I and ACAT II acquisition programs. For non-space ACAT III programs, SAMPs may be prepared at the discretion of the MDA.”21 Figure 1 illustrates the 

operational structure for SAMP development,22 while its development process is shown in figure 2.23 “The SAMP results from 

the collaborative efforts of a multifunctional team. In many respects, the process used to develop the SAMP is as important 

02-Article.indd 5 10/19/09 1:49:14 
as the document itself. All stakeholders must be active participants in this process.”24

Table 1. Description and decision authority for ACAT I–III programs

Acquisition 

Category

Reason for 

ACAT Designation Decision Authority

ACAT I •  Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) (10 United States

Code [USC] 2430, reference [n])

o Dollar value: estimated

by the Undersecretary

of Defense (Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics

[USD[AT&L]) to require an

eventual total expenditure

for RDT&E of more than

$365 million in FY 2000

constant dollars or, for

procurement of more than

$2.190 billion in FY 2000

constant dollars

o MDA designation

• MDA designation as special

interest

ACAT ID: USD(AT&L)

ACAT IC: Head of the

DOD Component or,

if delegated, the DOD

component acquisition

executive (CAE)

ACAT II • Does not meet criteria for ACAT I

• Major system

o Dollar value: estimated

by the DOD Component Head to require an

eventual total expenditure

for RDT&E of more than

$140 million in FY 2000

constant dollars, or for

procurement of more than

$660 million in FY 2000

constant dollars (10 USC

2302d, reference [o])

o MDA designation (10 USC

2302[5], reference [p])

• MDA designation as special

interest

DOD CAE or the individual designated by

the CAE

ACAT III • Does not meet criteria for ACAT

II or above

Designated by DOD

CAE at the lowest level

appropriate

Adapted from DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 21.

02-Article.indd 6 10/19/09 1:49:15 
Developing an executable acquisition plan is critical to a 

program’s success. “The nature of the stakeholders’ involvement in the SAMP process depends primarily on the size and 

complexity of the program.”25

Each of the program’s stakeholders must be involved in the SAMP 

preparation process. This includes representation from all staff levels 

(Secretariat, Air Staff, AFOTEC [Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center], and OSD) as well as the local Center staff. In addition, 

representation from other participating service agencies should be involved for joint programs. [Single Managers] SMs should contact the 

Figure 1. DOD IPT Operational Structure. Reprinted from the Air Force

Single Acquisition Management Plan Guide, 3.

Figure 2. SAMP Development Process. Reprinted from Air Force Single

Acquisition Management Plan Guide, 5.

02-Article.indd 7 10/19/09 1:49:16 
cognizant Program Element Monitor (PEM) to identify which agencies 

from Headquarters Air Force, OSD, and AFOTEC should participate. 

Representatives from these organizations should be identified according to the appropriate ACAT level of the program. Additionally, since 

industry also plays to a great extent an equally important role in managing and executing program requirements, SMs may find it beneficial 

to engage them in the SAMP development process. Early and continuous involvement with industry has proven to enhance a cooperative 

relationship and maximize the opportunity for a successful program.26

This structure and process lays out the basics for good program management. Due to the size and complexity of large 

acquisition projects, this oversight is typically needed, but 

does slow down decisions with its inherently bureaucratic 

nature. An approval process accompanies the structure. 

For ACAT I and II designated programs, the SAMP must be 

processed as shown in figure 3.27

Figure 3. Air Force SAMP Processing. Reprinted from Air Force Single

Acquisition Management Plan Guide, 6.

The final aspect of the acquisition process involves MDA 

and timing. If programs are sufficiently large enough to fall 

into the ACAT I category, a great deal of MDA is lost to the 

secretary of the Air Force for acquisition (SAF/AQ) and the 

office of the secretary of defense (OSD). If kept below the 

ACAT I and II thresholds, the acquisition can be managed 

at lower levels, even the acquisition center level.28

USSOCOM manages its ACAT II and below programs 

within the combatant command, with less outside scrutiny 

than with the ACAT I programs. Additionally, the command’s 

location, outside the Washington, DC, area, translates into 

02-Article.indd 8 10/19/09 1:49:17 
less oversight from OSD. USSOCOM’s separate budget and 

acquisition authorities—the only unified command with 

acquisition authority—enable it to move faster on development and equipment purchases. Reduced external oversight fits in with the rapid acquisition concept that permits 

the command to quickly meet the needs of the troops engaged in operations.29

With regard to the SAMP process, USSOCOM Directive 

70-1, USSOCOM Acquisition Management Procedures, is the 

command’s tailored process guide for streamlined acquisition. Collocation of approval authorities precludes the long 

timeframes typically associated with attaining higher headquarters signatures, and serves to streamline USSOCOM 

acquisition efforts.30

USSOCOM’s acquisition authority was granted specifically to overcome the cumbersome acquisition processes.31

In this regard, the processes at USSOCOM predate and 

fuse nicely with the Air Force’s Air Force Smart Operations 

(AFSO) 21 effort to “seek to constantly give value to our 

‘customers.’ ”32 In keeping with the spirit of AFSO 21, if the 

special operations or other community within the services 

values a COIN aircraft, the Air Force should work with this 

customer community to see that it receives what it values.

Acquisition Alternatives

Several alternatives exist in procuring an aircraft especially for the COIN mission. Four alternatives, of which 

numbers one and four are somewhat interrelated, are readily apparent: (1) do nothing; (2) stand up an organic systems 

program office, and develop a COIN platform from scratch; 

(3) buy a commercially developed airframe suited for the 

counterterrorist and COIN missions; or (4) continue to fill 

the COIN mission with ad hoc platforms.

If nothing specific is done, either no COIN platform will 

be available, or a grouping of mixed and ill-suited platforms 

will serve in the role. Either way, the requirement to provide 

COIN aircraft for the missions associated with the GWOT 

is under-equipped at best and at worst, the requirement is 

simply not met. 

Choice two seems unlikely since the people and dollars 

required to staff and fund such an effort simply do not exist. 

02-Article.indd 9 10/19/09 1:49:17 
10

Choice three provides the ideal option for COIN aircraft procurement. This choice offers the opportunity to acquire the 

performance characteristics desired for a COIN aircraft, with 

a schedule much shorter than organic development, and at a 

cost far lower than anticipated in an organic effort.33

Five different airframe possibilities—the EMB-314, Super 

Tucano/A-29 ALX by Embraer, the PC-21/PC-9M Turbo 

Trainer by Pilatus, the T-6A/T-6B Texan II by Raytheon, 

the KT-1/KO-1 Woongbee by Korea Aerospace Industries, 

and the SM-27S/SM-27T by Stavatti—were looked at as a 

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)34 alternative for an effective COIN aircraft. Two platforms, the T-6A NTA Raytheon 

variant and the Stavatti Machete, were chosen for their respective distinctions of ready availability and specific design as a COIN/close air support (CAS) aircraft.

The T-6A NTA is a weaponized T-6A, the latter currently 

in production as the USAF’s trainer of choice. This weaponized variant was previously built and sold to Greece for 

use by the Hellenic air force. “The T-6A NTA was originally 

developed for the Hellenic air force to serve in a dual role 

as pilot trainer and inexpensive counter-insurgency aircraft.”35 Greece demonstrated the platform’s effectiveness 

by conducting 24-hour airborne security over Athens during the 2004 Olympic games.36 Given that the aircraft is 

in production, its performance characteristics are well defined, as are its production schedule and costs. 

The T-6A NTA two-seater aircraft has been produced 

and flown, and its weapon stores qualified in five configurations.37 The platform is not a design on paper, but a physical finished product with demonstrated performance characteristics. Providing the COIN characteristics that many 

experts desire, the platform is sufficiently armed to protect 

ground troops, promote deterrence missions, or engage in 

punitive strikes. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, the aircraft provides “long endurance for extended loiters”38 over areas of interest or concern. The five weapon 

stores configurations currently tested and approved for 

the T-6A NTA are shown in figure 4. Weapons employment 

qualification from these store configurations was done at 

Eglin AFB’s Air Armament Center.39

In order for an aircraft to provide the traits for good COIN 

operations, a balance must be achieved between weaponry, 

02-Article.indd 10 10/19/09 1:49:17 
11

weight, and fuel consumption. The T-6A trainer possesses 

an approximate range of 900 nautical miles (nm). The T-6A 

NTA weaponized version has a range of about 450 nm, with 

a much longer reach with the use of external tanks (see 

figure 5). However, external tanks do reduce the number of 

pylon hard points available for weapons.

Depending on the ingress and egress times, and the extent to which the T-6A NTA is weaponized, it must possess 

the capability to loiter for over four and one half hours at 

25,000 feet. Loiter time falls significantly with weapons load 

coupled with activity at lower altitudes.40 Without weapons, 

or minimally armed—possibly machine gun only—the T-6A 

NTA becomes an observation platform with an over 1,100-

mile range and nine hours of loiter time. Figure 5 depicts 

the range and altitude tradeoffs for both the unarmed and 

weaponized T-6A NTA.41

An additional positive performance trait is the T-6A’s ability to operate out of short, austere airfields or even off roadways. The aircraft’s takeoff requirement is 1,775 feet and it 

Figure 4. Typical T-SA NTA Stores Configuration. Courtesy of the

Raytheon Aircraft Company, Response to Request for Information Fixed

Wing Plaform Procurement for the Iraqi Air Force, 8.

02-Article.indd 11 10/19/09 1:49:17 
12

can land in as little as 1,900 feet, making it ideal for use in 

small base operations or for contact with ground troops via 

primitive roads or open fields. Further performance specification and capabilities can be found in table 4.

The fact that the T-6A NTA is a production aircraft with 

qualified weapons stores and tested performance should bode 

well for its consideration as a COIN platform. The demonstrated performance characteristics of long loiter capability, 

in conjunction with the ability to carry weapons, provide a 

positive effect on production schedules.

In terms of production timelines and delivery schedules, 

the T-6A NTA provides an almost immediate response to the 

need for a COIN aircraft. Since this variant has been produced for the Hellenic air force, spin-up and production time 

are minimal. Currently, the T-6A production line is 40 aircraft ahead of schedule for the USAF’s trainer replacement 

program, so schedule capacity exists for this platform, and 

the production design is mature.

Figure 5. T-6A NTA Range versus Altitude Comparison of Clean, 

EFT, and HMP/LAU-68/BDU Configurations. Courtesy of the Raytheon

Aircraft Company, Response to Request for Informatio Fixed Wing Platform Procurement for the Iraqi Air Force, 7.

02-Article.indd 12 10/19/09 1:49:18 
13

Based on Raytheon’s demonstrated production performance and experience in actually building T-6A NTAs, the 

production facilities can produce five T-6A NTA aircraft per 

month.42 In this analysis, three aircraft per month was the 

fastest production schedule examined, under the assumption 

of USSOCOM standing up a squadron of 36 COIN aircraft. 

Additionally, a yearly buy schedule of 36 of these aircraft 

leaves excess production capacity for US allies and partners 

to simultaneously purchase the same aircraft.

In addition to its highly definitized schedule, the T-6A 

NTA alternative offers its known purchase costs as another advantage. The commercial cost, known from the 

Greek production line, is $5,500,000.43 The total cost, in 

FY 2007 dollars, to buy 36 of these platforms would be approximately $211.2 million (see table A-1 in appendix A). 

The low purchase price makes the T-6A NTA an attractive 

alternative for COIN.

The price for a squadron of 36 T-6A NTAs is far below 

the ACAT I or II limits, and thus easily within the purview 

of USSOCOM’s acquisition authority and ability to manage. 

Given that the operations and support costs for 36 aircraft 

eclipse their purchase price within five years, a good deal of 

time went into estimating these annual sustainment costs.

The operating costs of the USAF T-6A trainer was used 

as an analogous system to estimate the total costs of the 

T-6A NTA to the US military. Using data contained in the 

Air Force total ownership cost (AFTOC) database, table 2 

shows the total FY 2005 costs for the T-6A platform. The T6A fleet’s total cost of $132,673,358 can be divided into the 

total inventory of 192 T-6A’s at the end of FY 2005 for an 

individual aircraft average cost of $691,007 per year. These 

costs, displayed in the format required by the cost analysis 

improvement group (CAIG), show costs associated with unit 

personnel, unit operations, maintenance, sustaining support, continuing system improvements, and indirect support. Blank cells associated with a CAIG element indicate 

that no costs were incurred in that area for the platform in 

FY 2005. However, one must note that with significant contractor logistics support, some elements are aggregated as 

contract costs and not disaggregated into the level of detail 

intended by the CAIG structure. For example, under CAIG 

element 3.1, the contractor provides maintenance under 

02-Article.indd 13 10/19/09 1:49:18 
Table 2. T-6A Operations and Maintenance Costs (FY05)

Level 2 CAIG Data for the T-6A Texan II

CAIG 

Element CAIG Description Total

1 Unit Personnel $31,315,166

1.1 Operations Personnel $28,935,735

1.2 Maintenance Personnel $1,432,861

1.3 Other Direct Support Personnel $946,571

2 Unit Operations $4,131,662

2.1 Operating Material $4,131,662

2.2 Support Services

2.3 TDY

3 Maintenance (Mx) $54,652,564

3.1 Organizational Mx and Support $54,652,564

3.2 Intermediate Mx

3.3 Depot Mx

4 Sustaining Support $26,592,227

4.1 System Specific Training $26,481,565

4.2 Support Equipment Replacement

4.3 Operating Equipment Replacement

4.4 Sustaining Engineering and PM $110,662

4.5 Other Sustaining Support

5 Continuing System Improvements

5.1 Hardware Modifications

5.2 Software Mx and Modifications

6 Indirect Support $15,981,738

6.1 Installation Support $15,886,580

6.2 Personnel Support $86,721

6.3 General Training and Education $8,437

Total Total Expenditures $132,673,358

Notes:

a. In Then Years Dollars

b. Slight addition errors may occur in totals due to rounding.

02-Article.indd 14 10/19/09 1:49:18 
15

one all-encompassing contract; thus the intermediate and 

depot maintenance distinction is lost to the database and 

estimators trying to delineate costs at such a level.44

The costs of operating, maintaining, and supporting 

the munitions must be included to arrive at an adequate, 

rough order-of-magnitude estimate for the weaponized T6A costs. For the purposes of this analysis, the munitions 

costs associated with the 23d Fighter Group, a stand-alone 

group of A-10s with their own munitions storage area, were 

deemed analogous to the munitions costs expected of the 

weaponized T-6A (see table 3). The $4,340,466 total munitions associated costs amounted to an average of $104,590 

per A-10 aircraft in FY 2005.

Table 3. Training munitions and expendable stores costs (FY05)

Level 3 CAIG Data for the A-10 Thunderbolt II at Pope AFB

CAIG 

Element CAIG Description 23d Fighter Group

2.1.2 Training Munitions and Expendable 

Stores $4,340,466

2.1.2.1 Ammunition $2,613,084

2.1.2.2 Bombs $799,657

2.1.2.3 Rockets $395,679

2.1.2.4 Training Missiles

2.1.2.5 Sonobuoys

2.1.2.6 Pyrotechnics $532,046

In the cost estimates for a weaponized Raytheon platform, 

the level three CAIG elements for 23d Fighter Group munitions and stores were incorporated into the T-6A AFTOC 

data reflected in table 2. Both data sets were normalized for 

number of aircraft, adjusting the T-6A data from 192 primary aircraft authorization (PAA) and the A-10 data from 

41.5 PAA to the 36 COIN aircraft inventory assumption used 

in this analysis. Data normalization took place simultaneously with the embedding of the munitions costs into the 

overall estimate for the T-6A NTA.45 Table A-1 in appendix A 

(rows 18 through 24) shows the embedding of the munitions 

and stores costs into the T-6A platform’s total costs.46

02-Article.indd 15 10/19/09 1:49:19 
16

The Machete SM-27, a design aimed at building a platform 

specifically for CAS and COIN missions, is a proposed product 

of Stavatti Aerospace. The research and development phase 

remains incomplete, and no SM-27s are in production.47

The SM-27 design calls for a large weapons store, with 

multiple configurations (see figure 6). None of these configurations have been qualified, and some configurations 

could be eliminated as a result of weapons qualification testing.

Figure 6. SM-27 Stores Configuration. Courtesy of Stavatti Aerospace,

SM-27S/T Turboprop Machete.

02-Article.indd 16 10/19/09 1:49:19 
17

The design of the SM-27 is well suited for CAS and COIN, 

with a balance between weaponry, weight, and fuel consumption, and will provide a tactical radius of 700 nm and 

an over 1,500 nm ferrying range. However, external tanks 

do reduce the number of stations available for weapons. 

A long loiter time is expected, but the large weapons store 

might significantly reduce loiter capability. Loiter time falls 

significantly with weapons load at lower altitudes, but the 

specifications data for the SM-27 would indicate impressively 

long loiter times when armed solely with its built-in cannon. The tactical radius and weapons payload tradeoffs are 

illustrated in figure 7.

Figure 7. Payload/Combat Radius. Courtesy of Stavatti Aerospace,

SM-27S/T Machete, 7.

02-Article.indd 17 10/19/09 1:49:19 
18

The SM-27s short takeoff and landing capability is one other 

performance characteristic. The Machete’s capability to take 

off in a distance of only 1,678 feet, and land in 2,081 feet, 

enables the airplane to operate in austere environments, 

under less than optimal conditions—possibly without the 

necessity of a landing strip—depending on the particular 

circumstances.

The SM-27 version drives the planned production schedule, with plans to produce 17 two-seater SM-27Ts and 33 

one-seat SM-27Ss annually.48 Due to the long lead time in 

beginning production, these production plans are assumed 

to be adjustable.

Any attempt by USSOCOM to quickly obtain 36 aircraft 

effectively crowds out any allied purchase for the first two 

years of production. If USSOCOM tries to build a squadron, while encouraging other countries to join in purchasing these aircraft for compatibility of training, there simply 

will not be enough to go around in the near term—2010 

through 2014. Production rates of 12 SM-27Ts, and 18 and 

12 SM-27Ss, respectively, are shown in tables B-3, C-2, 

and C-3 in appendices B and C. 

The respective costs of both the T and S variants of the 

SM-27 are approximately $10,300,000 and $9,500,000. 

Thus, the total purchase price for the SM-27T is over 

$426.1 million, and the SM-27S amounts to a little more 

than $388.9 million (see tables A-2 and A-3 in appendix A). 

The schedule constraints of 17 SM-27Ts and 33 SM-27Ss 

each year contribute to cost growth beyond the mere price 

difference between the variants. Spreading the production 

runs over two years for the SM-27S and three years for 

the SM-27T incurs an inflation cost increase of $46.9 million and $55.3 million, respectively. These inflation costs 

worsen if production is further extended to allow for allied 

purchases (see appendices B and C).

The SM-27s acquisition costs for 36 aircraft come in 

significantly under the ACAT II threshold. In order to trigger the requirement for a SAMP, nearly double the number 

of SM-27s is required.

The costs associated with airframe purchase are the most 

problematic, with the operating and support costs more 

manageable. To generate the operations and maintenance 

costs for the SM-27, several assumptions—the nature of 

02-Article.indd 18 10/19/09 1:49:19 
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overall operations and support costs; and that the variants 

incur the same maintenance costs—were required, as the 

Machete program office at Stavatti has not yet delved into 

these costs.49

For this analysis, the SM-27s operations and support 

costs were derived from the T-6A operating and support 

costs documented in the AFTOC database. This assumption was made based on the reality that commercial aircraft design and production utilize common materials and 

processes. Therefore, specific adjustments in the estimates 

for fuel consumption and maintenance requirements were 

used.50 All other costs remain the same as for the T-6A 

(see appendix A, table A-2, rows 68 and 84, for the estimated costs associated with SM-27 fuel consumption and 

maintenance).

Evaluation/Analysis of Alternatives

Performance is in the eye of the beholder. The T-6A NTA 

and the SM-27 provide long loiter and/or extended range. 

However, the SM-27 is designed to carry a heavier weapons 

load. Table 4 contains a detailed look at the specifications 

and capabilities of the two aircraft profiled, as well as the 

often referenced A-1 Skyraider and the Air Force’s current 

CAS airframe, the A-10 Thunderbolt II.51

The T-6A NTA is a single-engine, front-mounted, propellerdriven aircraft; while the SM-27, a single-engine, propellerdriven aircraft, is powered by a rear-mounted turboprop that 

pushes the plane, much like a swamp boat. The SM-27s sixblade propeller system is a Pratt and Whitney design made of 

modern composites. While the propulsion system on the T-6A 

NTA is of a proven design, the SM-27 propulsion method is 

new. The design serves to make the Machete’s appearance 

more “jet-like.”

Overall, the SM-27 is more capable than the T-6 NTA, 

but its weight disadvantages it. The T-6A NTA has a better thrust-to-weight ratio and a shorter landing distance. 

Both platforms have some advantages over the A-10, which 

is not particularly suited for the COIN mission. In keeping 

with Davis’ nine characteristics for a COIN aircraft,52 the 

T-6A NTA and the SM-27 measure up. Both alternatives 

(1) are COTS; (2) provide long range and loiter; (3) possess 

02-Article.indd 19 10/19/09 1:49:20 
Table 4. Platform specifications/Capabilities

MANUFACTURER

AIRCRAFT PROFILED

STAVATTI

SM-27

MACHETETM

RAYTHEON

T-6A

TEXAN II

DOUGLAS

A-1E

SKYRAIDER

FAIRCHILD

A-10A

THUNDERBOLTII

Crew 1 to 2 2 1 1

Powerplant(s) 1 x

PW127G PT6A-68 1 x R-3350-

26WB

2 x TF34-GE

-100

Max Power (SHP)/Thrust

(lbs.) 2,920 SHP 1,100 SHP 3,050 HP 18,130lbs

Span (ft) 43.0 33.4 50.8 57.5

Length (ft) 34.0 33.3 38.8 53.3

Height (ft) 12.0 10.7 15.8 14.7

Wing Area (sq ft) 194 175.3 400 506

MTOW (lbs.) 15,500 6,500 25,000 50,000

Empty Weight (lbs.) 7,120 4,709 12,313 24,959

External/War Load (lbs.) 5,250 2,300 8,000 16,000

Internal Fuel (lbs.) 6,600 1,163 NO DATA 10,700

Internal Fuel (USG) 400 164 NO DATA 1,646

Stores Stations (No.) 7 6 15 11

Internal Gun 1x30mmKCA None 4 x 20 mm 1 x 30mm G-8

Maximum Speed @ SL (Kts) 350 316 276 381

Maximum Speed @ ALT Kts) 403 316 297 380

Maximum Cruise @ALT (Kts) 360 230 164 336

Stall Speed @SL (Kts) 97 74 NO DATA NA

Max Climb Rate@SL (ft/min) 7,050 4,500 2,300 6,000

Service Ceiling (ft) 44,000 35,000 31,168 45,000

Tactical Radius, Internal

Fuel (nm) 700 400+ NO DATA 540

Ferry Range, InternalFuel(nm) 1,530 900 1,300 2,130

MaxRange,ExternalTanks(nm) 3,600 1,125 NO DATA 2,454

Wing Loading (lbs/sq ft) 75 37.1 62.5 99

Power/Weight orThrust/Weight 5 lbs/SHP 5.9 lbs/SHP 8.1 lbs/HP 0.37 to 1

Load Limits (g) 7.5 7.5 NO DATA 7.33

Takeoff Distance (ft) 1,678 1,775 NO DATA 4,000

Landing Distance (ft) 2,081 1,900 NO DATA 2,000

Flyaway Cost (Millions USD) 6 to 9 4 to 7 NO DATA 18

02-Article.indd 20 10/19/09 1:49:20 
21

STOL capability; (4) advertise austere airfield ability; (5) 

provide diverse weapons loads—albeit the Machete touts 

more; (6) are designed for navigation and fire-control; (7) 

provide great visibility, with a second seat for an observer; 

(8) possess sufficient speed; and (9) lack ground–fire absorption capability.53

As for the corollary requirement to “lend itself well to 

training pilots from ‘lesser developed’ nations,”54 the costs 

of both aircraft fit well into USSOCOM’s FID mission. However, the T-6A NTA costs approximately 45 percent less 

than the SM-27, likely making it the more attractive alternative to cash-strapped nations. Having a common aircraft 

in the United States and foreign inventories facilitates joint 

training; and politically, the United States looks better in 

the eyes of its allies when flying in identical platforms.

The political element is important in the FID role. USSOCOM 

benefits by possessing aircraft identical to what the ally can 

afford. USSOCOM and allied COIN pilots would be in a 

better position to collaborate and fight as integrated units 

in GWOT engagements. To ensure allied access to common 

COIN aircraft, the production schedules of the alternatives 

become relevant to the decision.

Delivery dates and quantities provide the T-6A NTA with 

a decided advantage over the SM-27. The old adage “a bird 

in the hand is worth two in the bush” applies. Raytheon 

could have put their COIN design in the hands of USSOCOM pilots in 2007. The earliest realistic date for SM-27 

delivery is 2010. The T-6A NTA provides COIN aircraft capability three to four years in advance of the SM-27.

Beyond delivery dates, and serving to further eclipse the 

SM-27, Raytheon can produce almost twice the number of 

aircraft per year—60 versus 50—for both Stavatti variants. 

This production capability would allow allied nations to 

concurrently purchase the same platform. Before Stavatti 

produced its first SM-27, Raytheon could manufacture 

approximately 180 of its T-6A NTA aircraft—a deficiency 

Stavatti has no plans to overcome.

The purchase price of both options is well below ACAT I 

and II thresholds for high-level oversight; and equally important, within the acquisition authority and management 

ability of USSOCOM. Although there is an approximately 

$200 million difference between the Raytheon and Stavatti 

02-Article.indd 21 10/19/09 1:49:21 
22

alternatives, the cost considerations in this analysis address the cost-per-flying-hour differences, based on an 

annual total of 18,000 flying hours.

The operation, maintenance, and support cost estimates associated with each alternative aircraft—the T-6A 

NTA and the SM-27—are based on the costs of the T-6A 

Texan II airframe and the munitions costs associated with 

the 23d Fighter Group’s A-10s. The incremental costs of 

transforming a T-6A into a T-6A NTA are the increase in 

fuel consumption and some added maintenance. The SM27 estimate was adjusted for the Stavatti projected fuel and 

maintenance costs not already in the T-6A data.

Table 5 shows the resulting total costs and cost per flying 

hour. The fiscal years differ, but they do not work contrary 

to first impressions when viewing the data. As expected, 

the weaponized T-6A NTA and the SM-27 are more expensive per flying hour to operate and maintain than the T-6A. 

Although the T-6A NTA and SM-27 costs are in FY 2013 

dollars, they remain far lower than the FY 2005 amount for 

the 23d Fighter Group’s A-10s at Pope AFB.55

Little difference exists in comparing the costs per flying hour for the T-6A NTA and the SM-27—$340 per flying hour. Analysis of the cost input data supports that 

the T-6A NTA possesses the lower operating costs, in that 

the incremental costs of fuel and maintenance for the 

SM-27 are greater than that for the T-6A NTA. Therefore, 

when adding allowances for these two incremental costs 

within the analogous system, the SM-27 with the higher 

incremental costs remains the more expensive airframe 

to operate, support, and maintain.

Using the data in table 5 and the cost estimate provided in table A-1 of appendix A, the cost of quickly 

standing up a squadron of 36 T-6A NTAs involved an 

initial procurement investment of $211.2 million in FY 

2007. The associated annual operations costs run approximately $38 million. The procurement costs to set 

up an SM-27 squadron run $426.2 million for the SM27T and $388.9 million for the SM-27S. These costs are 

spread over the FYs 2010–13, and have associated annual operations costs of approximately $50 million beginning in FY 2013.

02-Article.indd 22 10/19/09 1:49:21 
23

Recommendation

Bringing together the performance, schedule, and cost aspects of each alternative, which alternative best provides a 

COIN aircraft solution? While the SM-27 Machete has selection advantages in performance, it falls far short of the T-6A 

NTA in the areas of cost and schedule. The Machete is a more 

powerful aircraft, and arguably more aesthetically pleasing—

looking more “jet-like.” However, the performance characteristics exist only on paper. Therefore, the perhaps less appealing, but demonstrated capability of the T-6A NTA should not 

be discounted vis-à-vis the SM-27’s concept design. 

Moving from performance to schedule, the T-6A NTA is 

far ahead of the SM-27. The T-6A NTA is in production, and 

60 aircraft per year will be produced. The SM-27 is at least 

three years from first production and will only produce 50 

aircraft per year, beginning in 2010. This discrepancy in production disadvantages the United States to quickly address 

the need for a COIN aircraft platform. Further, the difference 

in production start and annual totals creates a problem for 

encouraging allies to operate the same aircraft.

As with a USSOCOM purchase decision, allied participation is also tied to aircraft costs. The $5,500,000 per copy 

T-6A NTA costs about half of the SM-27. Coupled with the 

$340 cost-per-flying-hour differential, the T-6A NTA is significantly less expensive to purchase and operate. These savings alone should not be the decisive factor in USSOCOM 

choosing to purchase the T-6A NTA rather than the SM-27. 

On a side note, the T-6A NTA is an affordable option for less 

wealthy, allied nations as they engage with the United States 

Table 5. Operation and support costs comparison

T-6A

Texan II

T-6A NTA

Texan II

SM-27

Machete

A-10/OA-10 

(Pope) 

Thunderbolt II

A-10/OA-10 (Fleet)

Thunderbolt II

Total

costs $132,673,358 $44,038,200 $50,158,800 $126,201,549 $1,303,169,482

Flying

hours 83,919 18,000 18,000 21,305 111,825

Cost per

flying

hour

$1,581 $2,447 $2,787 $5,924 $11,654

02-Article.indd 23 10/19/09 1:49:21 
24

in the GWOT. Any decision to purchase aircraft should focus 

on value, not solely on price.

The performance characteristics, delivery schedules, 

and costs differences clearly indicate which alternative 

to choose. The T-6A NTA is similar to the SM-27 in performance capability, while it completely outclasses the 

SM-27 in both schedule and cost considerations. Therefore, USSOCOM should select the T-6A NTA as the United 

States’ COIN aircraft. The schedule advantages and cost 

savings of the T-6A NTA far outweigh the minor performance benefits of the SM-27. The T-6A NTA provides immediate availability of a demonstrated capability at a cost 

clearly within the budget.

Conclusion

Analysis of the cost estimates, schedule analyses, and 

performance evaluations indicates the T-6A NTA is the 

best aircraft option for COIN air operations. The decision 

resulted from a detailed evaluation of the two alternatives, 

involving each aircraft’s performance, schedule, and cost 

variables. The acquisition alternatives available to USSOCOM, with regard to the call for a COIN aircraft, were investigated; as were the requirements of the formal acquisition process. Additionally, the streamlined nature of the 

USSOCOM acquisition process was generally presented, 

with close attention paid to the ACAT thresholds. The quick 

tour of acquisition requirements and peculiarities served to 

educate the reader on the responsibilities inherent in any 

USSOCOM decision to pursue COIN aircraft procurement. 

Some discussion was dedicated to USSOCOM’s missions 

as codified in Title 10 and embraced by the command, as 

well as the command’s unique acquisition agility. This agility offers an opportunity to provide an aircraft particularly 

suited for the COIN/counterterrorism role associated with 

the GWOT.

Increasingly, advocates within the traditional military services and the special operations community believe that an airborne participant in COIN operations is 

needed. Historically, aircraft have certainly proven effective in small wars.

02-Article.indd 24 10/19/09 1:49:21 
25

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Davis, Back to the Basics.

2. Ibid., 8–14.

3. Ibid., 2.

4. Ibid., 17.

5. Ibid., 19.

6. The use of inexpensive is relative. The cost of buying a propeller-driven 

aircraft is inexpensive relative to the cost of modern, fourth-generation jet 

aircraft. In fact, there is an order–of–magnitude difference—$20 million vis-àvis $200 million.

7. Register, former United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

contracting officer, e-mail to author, 14 February 2006.

8. Brown, Statement of General Bryan D. Brown, 22 April 2005.

9. Ibid.

10. USSOCOM mission statement.

11. USSOCOM vision statement.

12. USSOCOM Annual Report 2005, 3.

13. Ibid.

14. DOD Instruction (DODI) 4000.19, Interservice and Intragovernmental 

Support; DOD Directives 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and 

Its Major Components, and 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant 

and Subordinate Joint Commands.

15. Title 10, United States Code (USC), subsection 166(c).

16. Ibid., subsection 167(f).

17. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 

and Associated Terms, 397.

18. Hughes, “Uses and Abuses of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 

Funded Construction,”14–15.

19. Title 10, USC, subsection 2805(c); Thomas, Air Force Readiness and 

Emergency Management; and Hughes, “Uses and Abuses of O&M Funded 

Construction,” 14–15.

20. Johnson, “Program Manager Interviews Gary Smith,” 6.

21. Assistant secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), “Air 

Force Single Acquisition Management Plan Guide,” 1.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 5.

24. Ibid., 3.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., 4.

27. Ibid., 6.

28. Ibid.

29. Johnson, “Program Manager Interviews Gary Smith,” 6.

30. Register, e-mail, 13 and 16 February 2006.

31. Johnson, “Program Manager Interviews Gary Smith,” 62.

32. Wynne, Air Force Smart Operations 21, 8 March 2006.

33. The commercial route precludes “gold plating,” which typically accompanies organic development, and the tendency to alter the design every 

02-Article.indd 25 10/19/09 1:49:21 
26

time a new capability becomes available. Additionally, commercial purchase 

prevents redesign for every recognized threat manifestation. Thus commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) protects schedule and costs and will also guard 

against performance degradation due to initial design overload. 

34. If contracting to this extent, give serious consideration to turning over 

total system performance responsibility (TSPR) to the contractor. Just as the 

COTS purchase can eliminate the need for an Air Force standing systems program office, TSPR can remove the requirement for an organic Air Logistics 

Center function. COTS with TSPR allows the private sector marketplace to 

provide an end-to-end solution for a COIN aircraft. Such simple solutions, supportable in the marketplace, can provide critical capability, an affordable cost, 

and are ideally suited for the situation at hand.

35. Raytheon Aircraft Company, “Response to Request for Information,” 11.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 20.

38. Downs, “Unconventional Airpower,” 23.

39. Raytheon Aircraft Company, “Response to Request for Information,” 20.

40. Scott, interview, 26 February 2006.

41. Raytheon Aircraft Company, “Response to Request for Information,” 7.

42. Ibid., 2.

43. Ibid., 43.

44. This would be the case for either aircraft alternative examined in this 

study, if TSPR is sought and approved.

45. This study used the Automated Cost Estimator–Integrated Tools 

(ACE-IT) cost engine, a product of Tecolote Research, Inc.

46. Each of the estimates generated for the T-6A NTA and SM-27 alternatives 

uses the T-6A and 23d Fighter Group A-10 costs as an analogy. See appendices 

A through C.

47. Beskar, interview with author, 27 February 2006.

48. Stavatti Military Aerospace, “Machete RDT and E,” 28 June 2005. 

49. Sugarman, interview, 24 February 2006.

50. Stavatti Military Aerospace, Cost per Flying Hour Datasheet, SM-27T, 1.

51. Air Force Fact Sheet, http://www.af.mil/library/factsheets/; Military 

Factory, http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft_comparison.asp; Raytheon 

Aircraft Company, “Response to Request for Information;” and Stavatti Military Aerospace, “Machete RDT and E.”

52. Davis, Back to the Basics,17.

53. Raytheon Aircraft Company, “Response to Request for Information;” 

and Stavatti Military Aerospace, “Machete RDT and E.”

54. Davis, Back to the Basics,17.

55. Interesting to note is the large O&M cost difference between the A-10 

and the alternatives presented. If one of the alternatives was considered as an 

A-10 replacement, the Air Force could fulfill two desires simultaneously–

acquire a COIN aircraft and decommission on the A-10, while reducing its 

total ownership costs.

02-Article.indd 26 10/19/09 1:49:22 
Appendix A

Estimates

03-App-A.indd 27 10/19/09 1:49:47 
28

Table A-1

03-App-A.indd 28 10/19/09 1:49:48 
29

03-App-A.indd 29 10/19/09 1:49:49 
30

03-App-A.indd 30 10/19/09 1:49:49 
Appendix B

Estimates

04-App-B.indd 31 10/19/09 1:50:26 
32

Table B-1

04-App-B.indd 32 10/19/09 1:50:27 
33

04-App-B.indd 33 10/19/09 1:50:27 
34

04-App-B.indd 34 10/19/09 1:50:28 
Appendix C

Estimates

05-App-C.indd 35 10/19/09 1:50:53 
36

Table C-1

05-App-C.indd 36 10/19/09 1:50:54 
37

05-App-C.indd 37 10/19/09 1:50:55 
38

05-App-C.indd 38 10/19/09 1:50:55 
Appendix D

2005 actuals adjusted for inflation

06-App-D.indd 39 10/19/09 1:51:13 
40

06-App-D.indd 40 10/19/09 1:51:14 
41

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