unification: (1) Taiwan 

“secedes”; (2) “major incidents” entailing 

“secession” occur; or (3) 

possibilities of peaceful 

“reunification” are exhausted.

In effect, Article 8 establishes a domestic legal pretext for the PRC to use 

force against Taiwan 

should it be determined 

that any of these loosely 

articulated and subjective 

conditions are met. Given 

that the PRC may cite the 

Anti-Secession Law as its 

domestic legal basis to use 

force against Taiwan, the 

rhetoric surrounding the 

law will continue to be 

matter of concern for nations committed to upholding peace and security underpinned by the 

longstanding rules-based 

international order. 

Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) leaders and state 

media are amplifying rhetoric on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) AntiSecession Law. During a 

press conference on September 22, PRC Foreign 

Minister Wang Yi warned 

that the PRC would act if 

the Anti-Secession Law 

was “eventually violated.” Two days earlier, 

Xinhua reported that Wang 

Yi told Henry Kissinger 

that the PRC would take 

“all necessary measures” if 

the Anti-Secession Law 

was violated.

MFA Spokesperson Wang 

Wenbing echoed Wang 

Yi’s comments in a daily 

press briefing where he 

added that the PRC would 

“not hesitate to sacrifice 

thousands of troops” to 

defend “even an inch of 

land.”

At a September 21 Central 

Committee Propaganda 

Department press conference on Taiwan, Chinese 

Communist Party spokesperson Zhu Fenglian reiterated the Anti-Secession 

Law’s importance in 

providing a “legal guarantee” for the PRC to achieve 

“reunification.”

The AntiSecession Law 

and the rhetoric 

surrounding it 

are representative of the 

PRC’s use of 

domestic law as 

a tool to gain 

what PRC doctrine on legal 

warfare refers 

to as “legal principle superiority.” The PRC sees 

“legal principle superiority” as a way to legitimize 

its objectives on Taiwan. 

Those objectives are clearly 

spelled out in the AntiSecession Law. Enacted in 

2005, the Anti-Secession 

law consists of only nine 

short articles. It declares 

that China and Taiwan 

belong to “one sovereign 

territory”; establishes 

“reunification” as a “sacred 

duty”; embraces “one 

country-two systems” upon “reunification”; and 

states that “peaceful reunification” is “preferred.”

Most troubling, however, 

is Article 8 of the AntiSecession Law, which sets 

out the following three 

conditions under which the 

PRC “shall” use “nonpeaceful means” to force 

President Xi Jin Ping at a meeting of China’s 

National People's Congress. Photo Credit: NY 

The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law: What’s 

Behind the Rhetoric

I n s i d e t h i s i s s u e :

MILOPS 22 2

Legal Engagement

3

PRC’s Fishing 

Fleet

3

UNSCRs on 

North Korea

4

One China Policy 5

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

Legal Vigilance Dispatch

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

I s s u e 1 O c t o b e r 2 0 2 2

K e y p o i n t s :

 PRC uses domestic 

legislation to support 

military ambitions

 Senior legal advisors 

and operators strengthen 

partnerships at MILOPS 22 

to promote Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific

USINDOPACOM conducts 

multi-lateral legal engagements 

 PRC’s fishing fleet 

evades international law

 DPRK launches breach 

UNSCRs

 U.S. ‘One China Policy’ 

differs from PRC’s ‘OneChina Principle’
P a g e 2

“Your 

commitment to 

each other and to 

advancing the 

rule of law in this 

region has never 

been more 

important”

Senior lawyers meet from across 

the Indo-Pacific. 

Photo credit: PO1 James Downs

Commander USINDOPACOM Stresses Urgency

High Power IUU Fishing Panel

SPECIAL: MILOPS 22 

 

Strengthening Legal Partnerships

Senior legal advisors, military officers, 

government officials and academics from 

more than 20 allied and partner nations 

convened in Bangkok, in August 2022 to 

strengthen partnerships in the Indo-Pacific 

and to uphold the rule of law at the 33rd 

annual Military Law and Operations Conference (MILOPS).

Participating nations included Australia, 

Bangladesh, Canada, the Federated States 

of Micronesia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, 

Malaysia, the Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, 

Papua New Guinea, Palau, the Philippines, 

Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Kingdom and 

the United States. NATO and the International Committee of the Red Cross also 

sent delegates.

MILOPS built relationships and forged 

consensus around norms that support the 

rules-based international order. As the 

PRC and other authoritarian regimes seek 

to erode fundamental tenets such as freedom of the seas, MILOPS highlighted the 

importance of international law in maintaining regional peace and prosperity. 

U.S. Coast Guard’s 14th 

District, the panel reinforced the threat posed by 

IUU fishing to national 

sovereignty. IUU fishing 

is an affront to international law and merits robust legal cooperation to 

ensure both information 

sharing and enforcement 

Day 2 of MILOPS 22 featured a panel of experts 

discussing illegal unregulated and unreported (IUU) 

fishing. Comprising the 

Attorney-General of the 

Republic of Palau, a Distinguished Fellow of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 

and a Commander from the 

efforts. Of particular concern were small island nations that have large EEZs 

and limited capacity to patrol and enforce their legitimate rights against the increase in illegal fishing. 

Partnering with states to 

share resources and prosecute offenders is vital.

USINDOPACOM news 

release. 

“Strengthening our shared 

understanding and building consensus on key components of international 

law is necessary work, and 

I am grateful that you have 

assembled for this purpose.” 

Adm. John C. Aquilino, 

USINDOPACOM Commander, emphasized the urgency of the problem and the 

importance of a network of 

like-minded lawyers. “Your 

commitment to each other 

and to advancing the rule of 

law in this region has never 

been more important,” Aquilino said, according to a 

IUU fishing experts

Photo credit: PO1 James Downs

U S I N D O P A C O M O f f i c e o f t h e S t a f f 

Adm. John C. Aquilino

Commander,

USINDOPACOM
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Multi-lateral 

Legal Engagements

I s s u e 1 P a g e 3

Over the past year, the USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge 

Advocate (OSJA) conducted legal 

engagements with a wide array of 

ally and partner legal advisors from 

across the region. Together, 

USINDOPACOM OSJA and ally 

and partner legal advisors discussed 

shared commitments to upholding 

the rules-based order, including in 

the maritime environment under 

the law of the sea; acknowledged 

the mutual benefits the order 

provides to the community of

nations; and identified common 

threats to the order, such as 

excessive maritime claims, unlawful 

fishing bans, or using force or 

coercion to advance excessive 

maritime claims or impede

other lawful uses of the seas and 

airspace. They also identified

cooperative ways to uphold the 

rules-based order, such as 

through legal exchanges, cooperative legal papers, and other mechanisms to develop shared understanding on core legal issues. 

By bringing legal partners

together, these legal engagements 

are an example of legal vigilance 

focused on upholding rule of law 

against activities that undermine 

or threaten it. USINDOPACOM 

OSJA looks forward to future 

engagements with legal partners 

across the region. If you are

interested in participating in a 

legal engagement, please contact 

USINDOPACOM OSJA at the 

email address on the back of this 

dispatch. 

near their own waters.” It goes on 

to describe the economic impact 

of IUU fishing by the PRC, and 

how PRC fishing practices are 

linked to violations of international law, including infringement on 

resources rights within other 

countries’ EEZs, labor abuses, and 

catch of endangered species.

Chinese ship fishing for squid off the 

west coast of South America in Jul 21.

Photo Credit: New York Times 

Source: Steven Lee Myers et al, How China 

Targets the Global Fish Supply, N.Y. TIMES

(Sep. 26, 2022) 

With “worrisome signs of deplete d s t o c k s ” t h a t c o u l d 

“foreshadow a broader ecological 

collapse,” many countries are 

stepping up to counter IUU

fishing.

The New York Times report cites 

Argentina’s addition of four new 

patrol boats for enforcement in its 

coastal waters. Further, in July, 

President Biden issued a memorandum promising increased 

monitoring of IUUF. The

Administration also pledged to 

triple American assistance to help 

Pacific island nations patrol their 

waters, offering $60 million a 

year of financial support over the 

next decade.

According to a New York Times 

report, the PRC’s massive deepwater fishing fleet consists of as 

many as 3,000 ships that operate 

year-round off the coasts of South 

America and other resource-rich 

waters in the Indian Ocean and 

South Pacific. In 2020, nearly 300 

PRC vessels reportedly hugged the 

boundary of Ecuador’s EEZ, off the 

Galapagos Islands, causing considerable depletion of fish stocks and 

economic harm, prompting Ecuador 

to lodge a protest in Beijing. 

The industrial scale and tactics of 

the PRC’s fishing fleet raise concerns 

regarding international law and the 

effect of illegal, unregulated, and 

unreported fishing (IUU fishing). 

The New York Times report notes 

that, “China now fishes in any ocean 

in the world, and on a scale that 

dwarfs some countries’ entire fleets 

PRC’s Fishing Fleet: A Breeding Ground for 

Violations of International Law
P a g e 4

All Nations Must Uphold UN Security Council 

Resolutions on North Korea

The Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) 

has conducted over 40 unlawful ballistic

missile launches in 2022, more than in any 

year. Recently, a long-range ballistic missile 

launched from North Korea traveled over 

the sovereign territory of Japan, causing 

Japanese citizens to take shelter. Opensource reports also indicate that the DPRK 

may be preparing to conduct a nuclear test. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency has 

said that DPRK’s nuclear program is going 

“full steam ahead,” with work on plutonium 

separation, uranium enrichment and other 

activities. 

Statements by 

the UN, Japan, 

South Korea, 

the US and 

others reference UN Security Council 

R e s o l u t i o n s 

(UNSCR) in 

condemning 

D P R K

b a l l i s t i c

missile and 

n u c l e a r

a c t i v i t i e s .

In fact, from 2006-2018 the UNSC unanimously adopted 20 resolutions* related to 

these ballistic missile and nuclear programs. 

UNSCRs are binding international law pursuant to the UN Charter, which is the 

preeminent treaty in international relations 

ratified by all UN member states.

Collectively, the UNSCRs compel the DPRK 

to abandon its ballistic missile and nuclear 

programs and impose a range of 

requirements on UN member states to 

prevent the DPRK from acquiring resources 

needed to advance these programs. 

Upholding the force of international law 

inherent in UNSCRs is the responsibility of 

all nations that desire to maintain int. peace 

and security in accordance with the UN 

Charter, but as a senior State Department

official noted following the DPRK’s Oct 3 

launch, “the failure of the PRC and Russia to 

fully and completely fulfill their obligations 

... has only, we fear, emboldened the DPRK 

in undermining the UN Security Council, the 

international rules-based order and global 

non-proliferation regime.” 

The PRC and Russia vetoed a proposal for 

new UN sanctions in May 2022 following a 

series of DPRK missile launches, and

attempted to block the UNSCR from meeting 

publicly to discuss strengthening sanctions, 

following the DPRK’s October launch over 

the territory of Japan. The DPRK’s new

domestic legislation that purports to

formalize its nuclear status and permit 

preemptive use of nuclear weapons is yet 

another example of how DPRK’s disregard 

for international law – emboldened by the 

PRC and Russia’s failure to act – threatens 

security across the region.

Notwithstanding, USINDOPACOM is 

committed to the rule of law, and is working 

closely with legal partners across the region, 

including counterparts in Japan and the 

Republic of Korea on combined efforts to

uphold international law.

* Unanimously adopted UNSCRs: 1695, 1718, 1874, 

1887, 1928, 1985, 2050, 2087, 2094, 2141, 2207, 2270, 

2276, 2321, 2345, 2356, 2371, 2375, 2397, 2407

U S I N D O P A C O M O f f i c e o f t h e S t a f f 
Unlike the PRC’s “one-China principle“ 

which purports to represent a “universal 

consensus,“ the U.S. one China policy is 

guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, 

Three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques, and 

Six Assurances to Taiwan. It provides a 

framework for a diplomatic relations with 

the PRC, enables robust unofficial ties 

with Taiwan, and helps maintain peace 

and stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

The PRC’s “One-China principle” 

asserts that Taiwan is 

“indisputably“ part of China. 

A CCP white paper released on 

August 10, argues the “One-China 

principle“ reflects a “universal 

consensus of the international 

community“ that is “supported 

by history and the law.“ The PRC 

claims that UN General Assembly 

Resolution 2758 is based on the 

“one-China principle“ and that, 

through it, member states have 

determined that Taiwan is a part 

of China. The PRC’s constitution 

reinforces the “One-China 

principle“ by characterizing

Taiwan as “part of the sacred

territory of China.“ Various PRC 

domestic laws such as the AntiSecession Law (2005) and the law 

on the territorial sea and 

contiguous zone (1992) purport to 

exercise sovereignty over Taiwan. 

As documented in the communiques, the United States regards 

the PRC as the sole legal government of “China“ (which is not defined) and “acknowledges,” but 

does not endorse the PRC’s position 

that Taiwan is part of China. In addition, the United States does not 

recognize Taiwan as a state or its 

authorities as a national government, but also does not take a position on Taiwan’s ultimate status. 

UNGAR 2758 and most of the international community hold ambiguous positions regarding PRC’s 

claim over Taiwan. Many nations, 

including Japan and South Korea 

also use ambiguous language (e.g. 

“take note of“ or “respect“). As 

such, the PRC’s portrayal of its 

“one-China principle” as an 

“international consensus” is demonstrably inaccurate. 

Joint Operational Law Team

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Camp H.M. Smith

Hawaii, United States

Phone: (808) 477-6378

Email: j06.pacom@pacom.mil

What is Legal Vigilance?

‘Legal vigilance’ refers to monitoring and assessment of the 

legal environment. Maintaining legal vigilance ensures United 

States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and its allies and 

partners are able to identify threats (including “legal warfare” by 

the People’s Republic of China), integrate across the combined 

joint force, and implement action to uphold the rule of law. 

The Legal Vigilance Dispatch is an informal, noncomprehensive survey of open-source information on the legal 

environment. Unless otherwise noted, content is produced by 

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) and 

may not reflect official positions of the U.S. government.

In addition to identifying threats in the legal environment, the 

Legal Vigilance Dispatch highlights cooperative efforts by the 

United States and its allies and partners to uphold the rule of 

law. USINDOPACOM OSJA is committed to building legal

partnerships and working with allies on partners to preserve 

peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

If you have comments, feedback, or vignettes to share, please 

contact us.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

PRC “One-China Principle” vs U.S. “One China Policy”

Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific