[Cite as State v. Barrie, 2016-Ohio-5640.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 15AP-848 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 14CR-2289) 

Alimu Barrie, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 1, 2016 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Valerie 

Swanson, for appellee. 

On brief: Thompson Steward Flecha, LLC, and Lisa F. 

Thompson, for appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

DORRIAN, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Alimu Barrie, appeals the judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas convicting him and imposing sentence following a jury 

trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On November 7, 2013, A.R. was working as a housekeeper at the 

Renaissance Hotel in Columbus. The hotel assigned two housekeepers to each floor, who 

worked independently to clean rooms in different parts of the floor. Furthermore, it was 

customary for the hotel to assign a person, whom A.R. described as a "houseman," to 

remove the used linens before a housekeeper arrived to clean the room and make the bed. 

(Tr. Vol. III at 46.) 

{¶ 3} According to A.R., on November 7, 2013, at approximately 10:00 a.m., she 

entered room 927 and found that a houseman had not removed the linens from the bed. 
No. 15AP-848 2 

As she prepared to clean the room, appellant, who was working as a houseman at the 

hotel, entered the room. A.R. asked appellant to strip the bed, but instead he began to 

inappropriately touch her. 

{¶ 4} Specifically, A.R. stated that appellant approached her from behind while 

she was at the bed and grabbed her buttocks with both hands. A.R. stated that appellant's 

actions made her feel "uncomfortable" because she "didn't know what he was going to do. 

I didn't know if he was going to rape me or pull my pants down or anything like that." (Tr. 

Vol. III at 49.) A.R. pushed appellant away, but he continued to force himself on her. 

A.R. stated that appellant rubbed his genitals against her buttocks, grabbed her neck with 

his right arm, and then grabbed her breasts with both hands. Additionally, appellant told 

A.R. to "[s]uck his dick" and that "he wanted to fuck [her]." (Tr. Vol. III at 48.) 

{¶ 5} After appellant touched her breasts, A.R. turned around, pushed appellant 

away, and told him to leave her alone. Appellant then left the room. A.R. stated that she 

did not scream for help because she was afraid that "[i]f I yelled * * * he was going to do 

something." (Tr. Vol. III at 52.) A.R. clarified that she was afraid appellant would rape 

her. Once appellant exited the room, A.R. stated she did not report the incident because 

she was "still scared"; instead, she resumed cleaning the room. (Tr. Vol. III at 53.) A.R. 

stated that she resumed cleaning because she "wanted to try to get my mind off of it and 

try to go on in my day." (Tr. Vol. III at 55.) 

{¶ 6} Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, appellant re-entered the room and 

resumed inappropriately touching A.R. According to A.R., this second incident lasted 

between 5 to 10 minutes. A.R. explained that the incident lasted for that period of time 

because appellant "kept on touching me and wouldn't leave me alone. And I had to keep 

on pushing him away and he kept on forcing his self on me." (Tr. Vol. III at 67.) A.R. 

agreed that appellant's attempts to touch her were "persistent" and "went on and on for a 

while." (Tr. Vol. III at 67.) Appellant attempted to touch her "front private part" with his 

hands and stated that he "wanted to fuck [her] pussy," but she pushed him away and told 

him to leave her alone. (Tr. Vol. III at 55, 56.) Appellant then exited the room. 

{¶ 7} Once appellant left the room for the second time, A.R. told the other 

housekeeper on the floor what had happened. A.R. then told her immediate supervisor, 

who reported the incident to Teri Fornshell, a manager of the laundry and housekeeping 

operations. After she reported the incident to her supervisors, A.R. resumed working for 

the remainder of her shift. When asked why she did not leave for the day, A.R. stated that 
No. 15AP-848 3 

she "wanted to finish my work [in order to] [t]ry to get my mind off of things on what had 

happened. I didn't want to give up." (Tr. Vol. III at 59.) 

{¶ 8} On November 7, 2013, Fornshell was in a meeting when she received a call 

from a housekeeping supervisor indicating that there was an emergency requiring her 

attention. Fornshell exited the meeting and went to the housekeeping offices where she 

found A.R., who was visibly upset. A.R. told Fornshell that appellant had inappropriately 

touched her buttocks and "showed her his male parts through his pants." (Tr. Vol. III at 

80.) Fornshell later met with appellant, who was cooperative and denied that the incident 

occurred. After talking to A.R., Fornshell reported the incident to the hotel's human 

resources department. 

{¶ 9} On May 1, 2014, a Franklin County Grand Jury filed an indictment charging 

appellant with two counts of gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05, both 

felonies of the fourth degree. 

{¶ 10} On July 13, 2015, the case proceeded to trial. On the same date, the trial 

court filed an entry appointing Fatim Dabo as foreign language interpreter in the 

proceedings; the court also filed a second document signed by Dabo reflecting the oath 

she swore regarding her duties before the court. On July 14, 2015, the jury returned a 

verdict of guilty on both counts of the indictment. 

{¶ 11} On September 3, 2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. On the 

same date, the trial court filed an entry appointing Fatmata Berete as foreign language 

interpreter in the proceedings; the court also filed a second document signed by Berete 

reflecting the oath that was sworn regarding the interpreter's duties before the court. At 

the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 16 months on each count of 

gross sexual imposition, to be served concurrently. The trial court also imposed a 5-year 

period of postrelease control and classified appellant as a Tier I sexual offender. On 

October 6, 2015, the trial court filed a judgment entry reflecting appellant's conviction and 

sentence. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 12} Appellant appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for 

our review: 

[I.] The trial court violated Alimu Barrie's rights to due 

process and a fair trial when it entered a judgment of guilt 

against him, when that finding was not supported by 

sufficient evidence. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
No. 15AP-848 4 

United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the 

Ohio Constitution. 

[II.] The trial court violated Alimu Barrie's rights to due 

process and a fair trial when it entered a judgment of guilt 

against him, when that finding was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the 

Ohio Constitution. 

[III.] The trial court violated Alimu Barrie's rights to due 

process, confrontation of witnesses, and a fair trial when it 

permitted uncertified and unqualified interpreter to 

interpret for Mr. Barrie during the legal proceedings against 

him. Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution; Sections 10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution; Evid.R. 604 and 702. 

[IV.] Alimu Barrie's attorney provided him with the 

ineffective assistance of counsel and violated his rights to 

due process and a fair trial where defense counsel failed to 

object to the court's appointment of uncertified and 

unqualified interpreters. Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 

10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 

As appellant's first and second assignments of error are interrelated, we address them 

together. 

III. Discussion 

A. First and Second Assignments of Error—Manifest Weight and Sufficiency 

{¶ 13} In his first and second assignments of error, appellant asserts that his 

conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

{¶ 14} Sufficiency of evidence is a "legal standard that tests whether the evidence 

introduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a verdict." State v. Cassell, 10th Dist. No. 

08AP-1093, 2010-Ohio-1881, ¶ 36, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 

(1997). When judging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, an 

appellate court must decide if, "after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. Where the evidence, "if believed, would convince the average mind of 
No. 15AP-848 5 

the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," it is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 

Id.

{¶ 15} "While sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy regarding whether 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law, the criminal 

manifest weight of the evidence standard addresses the evidence's effect of inducing 

belief." Cassell at ¶ 38, citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25. 

See also Thompkins at 387 ("Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment 

of a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude 

that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence."). An appellate court must review 

the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Id., citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio 

App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). This authority " 'should be exercised only in the 

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.' " Id., 

quoting Martin at 175. Thus, although an appellate court acts as a "thirteenth juror" in 

considering the weight of the evidence, it must give great deference to the factfinder's 

determination of witness credibility. State v. Spires, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-861, 2011-Ohio3312, ¶ 18, citing State v. Covington, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-245, 2002-Ohio-7037, ¶ 22. 

{¶ 16} We first consider whether appellant's convictions were supported by 

sufficient evidence. R.C. 2907.05 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall have 

sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender * * * when any of the following 

applies: (1) The offender purposely compels the other person * * * to submit by force or 

threat of force." "Sexual contact" is defined as "any touching of an erogenous zone of 

another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the 

person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either 

person." R.C. 2907.01(B). R.C. 2901.22(A) defines the mens rea of purpose: "A person 

acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when 

the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of 

what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to 

engage in conduct of that nature." 

{¶ 17} Appellant contends that plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, failed to establish 

an essential element of the crimes of which he was convicted. Specifically, appellant 
No. 15AP-848 6 

contends that "the evidence presented was inadequate to prove that Appellant touched 

[A.R.'s] erogenous zones for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person." 

(Appellant's Brief at 8.) 

{¶ 18} "[P]roof of sexual gratification generally must be accomplished by inference 

rather than by direct evidence." State v. West, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-111, 2006-Ohio-6259, 

¶ 17. See also State v. Kring, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-610, 2008-Ohio-3290, ¶ 37 ("While 

there must be some evidence of sexual gratification as the purpose for touching a 

described area, there is no requirement that there be direct testimony as to sexual arousal 

or gratification."). The trier of fact may infer a purpose of sexual arousal or gratification 

from the type, nature, and circumstances of the contact, among other relevant factors. 

State v. Crosky, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-655, 2008-Ohio-145, ¶ 47, citing West at ¶ 17; Kring 

at ¶ 35. 

{¶ 19} Here, A.R. testified that appellant touched her buttocks and breasts, both of 

which are included in the list of erogenous zones under R.C. 2907.01, thereby supporting 

the two counts of gross sexual imposition as charged. Both the manner in which appellant 

touched A.R. and his comments to her demonstrate that appellant touched A.R. for the 

purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Crosky at ¶ 47; West at ¶ 17; Kring at ¶ 37. 

Therefore, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we find that a 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of appellant's crimes proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶ 20} We next examine appellant's contentions with regard to the manifest weight 

of the evidence. Specifically, appellant contends that A.R. was not credible or that her 

account was inconsistent because: (1) the other housekeeper on the floor did not testify 

and Fornshell did not witness the incidents in question; (2) A.R. resumed cleaning the 

room after the first incident in which appellant touched her; (3) A.R. did not tell the other 

housekeeper on the floor after the first incident; and (4) it was implausible that the 

second incident lasted five to ten minutes, as A.R. stated, because that "is an extremely 

long time to fight off an attacker in a hotel room with an open door." (Appellant's Brief at 

12-13.) 

{¶ 21} First, it is immaterial that A.R. was the only witness to the incidents in 

question. "The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the finder of fact, is sufficient 

to support a criminal conviction." State v. Booker, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-42, 2015-Ohio5118, ¶ 18, citing State v. Elqatto, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-914, 2012-Ohio-4303, ¶ 20. 
No. 15AP-848 7 

{¶ 22} Next, we disagree that A.R.'s testimony was inherently incredible or 

otherwise unworthy of belief. However, even if we found that portions of A.R.'s testimony 

were inconsistent, " '[a] defendant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds 

merely because inconsistent evidence was presented at trial.' " State v. Jackson, 10th 

Dist. No. 14AP-670, 2015-Ohio-3322, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 

05AP-415, 2006-Ohio-2070, ¶ 9, citing State v. Raver, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-604, 2003-

Ohio-958, ¶ 21. See also State v. Taylor, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-254, 2015-Ohio-2490, ¶ 34, 

citing State v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1118, 2011-Ohio-5131, ¶ 29. A jury may take 

into consideration a witness's conflicting testimony in determining his or her credibility 

and the persuasiveness of his or her account by either discounting or resolving the 

discrepancies. Jackson at ¶ 17, citing Taylor at ¶ 34. "A jury, as finder of fact, may believe 

all, part, or none of a witness's testimony." Taylor at ¶ 34. See also Booker at ¶ 18, citing 

State v. Sullivan, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-414, 2012-Ohio-2737, ¶ 37. Furthermore, not all 

inconsistent testimony raises serious questions about credibility. Jackson at ¶ 17, citing 

Taylor at ¶ 34. 

{¶ 23} Here, nothing in A.R.'s account raises serious questions regarding her 

credibility. Appellant, through his trial counsel, had the opportunity to cross-examine 

A.R. regarding her account of the incidents. A.R. addressed why she resumed cleaning 

and did not immediately report the first incident to the other housekeeper or her 

supervisor; she also explained how the second incident could have lasted for the amount 

of time she claimed. It was within the province of the jury, as trier of fact, to determine 

whether or not to believe A.R.'s testimony. Therefore, weighing the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot find 

that the jury, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. 

{¶ 24} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first and second assignments of error. 

B. Third Assignment of Error—Interpreter 

{¶ 25} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by 

appointing unqualified interpreters both at trial and sentencing. 

1. Applicable Law and Rules

{¶ 26} R.C. 2311.14(A) provides that "[w]henever because of a hearing, speech, or 

other impairment a party to or witness in a legal proceeding cannot readily understand or 
No. 15AP-848 8 

communicate, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to assist such person." R.C. 

2311.14(B) provides in pertinent part that "[b]efore entering upon official duties, the 

interpreter shall take an oath that the interpreter will make a true interpretation of the 

proceedings to the party or witness, and that the interpreter will truly repeat the 

statements made by such party or witness to the court, to the best of the interpreter's 

ability." 

{¶ 27} Evid.R. 604, pertaining to interpreters, states that "[a]n interpreter is 

subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an expert and the 

administration of an oath or affirmation to make a true translation." With respect to the 

oath or affirmation, Evid.R. 603 provides that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be 

required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation 

administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the 

witness' mind with the duty to do so." Evid.R. 702, relating to the qualification of experts, 

provides in relevant part as follows: 

A witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply: 

(A) The witness' testimony either relates to matters beyond 

the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or 

dispels a misconception common among lay persons; 

(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding 

the subject matter of the testimony[.] 

{¶ 28} The Supreme Court of Ohio Rules of Superintendence contain provisions 

related to the appointment of a foreign language interpreter. Sup.R. 88(A) provides: 

A court shall appoint a foreign language interpreter in a case 

or court function in either of the following situations: 

(1) A party or witness who is limited English proficient or 

non-English speaking requests a foreign language interpreter 

and the court determines the services of the interpreter are 

necessary for the meaningful participation of the party or 

witness; 

(2) Absent a request from a party or witness for a foreign 

language interpreter, the court concludes the party or witness 

is limited English proficient or non-English speaking and 

determines the services of the interpreter are necessary for the 

meaningful participation of the party or witness. 
No. 15AP-848 9 

{¶ 29} When appointing an interpreter as required by Sup.R. 88(A), a court is 

required to appoint an interpreter in accordance with the requirements of Sup.R. 88(D). 

Sup.R. 88(D) provides in declining order of requirements a list of the types of interpreters 

that a court shall appoint. First, Sup.R. 88(D)(1) provides that "a court shall appoint a 

Supreme Court certified foreign language interpreter to participate in-person at the case 

or court function" subject to the exceptions in Sup.R. 88(D)(2) through (4). (Emphasis 

added.) Second, if a certified foreign language interpreter "does not exist or is not 

reasonably available to participate in-person at the case or court function and after 

considering the gravity of the proceedings and whether the matter could be rescheduled 

to obtain a Supreme Court certified foreign language interpreter * * *, a court may appoint 

a provisionally qualified foreign language interpreter." (Emphasis added.) Sup.R. 

88(D)(2). Third, if a certified or provisionally qualified foreign language interpreter does 

not exist or is not reasonably available to participate in-person, "after considering the 

gravity of the proceedings and whether the matter could be rescheduled to obtain" a 

certified or provisionally qualified foreign language interpreter, "a court may appoint a 

foreign language interpreter who demonstrates to the court proficiency in the target 

language and sufficient preparation to properly interpret the proceedings." Sup.R. 

88(D)(3). An interpreter appointed by the court under Sup.R. 88(D)(3) "shall be styled a 

'language-skilled foreign language interpreter.' " (Emphasis added.) Sup.R. 88(D)(3). 

Finally, if a certified, provisionally qualified, or language-skilled foreign language 

interpreter does not exist or is not reasonably available to participate in-person, a court 

may appoint an interpreter to participate in the case through telephonic interpretation. 

Sup.R. 88(D)(4). 

{¶ 30} This court has previously provided guidance regarding interpretation in a 

court proceeding. State v. Newcomb, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-404, 2004-Ohio-4099, ¶ 29. 

First, we have stated that "[i]n addition to the execution of a written oath by the 

interpreter, which should occur prior to the hearing, and subsequent filing with the trial 

court, the administration of the oath by the trial court to the interpreter should be 

reflected in the transcript prior to the commencement of the hearing." Id. Second, a "trial 

court should confirm the interpreter's qualifications and, if necessary, qualify the 

interpreter as an expert witness." Id. Finally, "the transcript should reflect when the 

interpreter is interpreting to the defendant and when the defendant is conversing with the 

interpreter. The record should reflect [that] all statements made during the hearing were 
No. 15AP-848 10 

properly conveyed to the defendant by the interpreter and that the defendant's responses 

to the interpreter were conveyed to the court." Id. 

2. Standard of Review 

{¶ 31} Both at trial and the sentencing hearing, no objection was raised as to the 

qualifications of the interpreter, the usage of a language-skilled interpreter instead of a 

certified or provisionally qualified interpreter, or to the ability of the interpreter to 

effectively interact with appellant. Accordingly, we apply a plain error standard of review. 

State v. Noor, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-165, 2014-Ohio-3397, ¶ 72, citing State v. McDowall, 

10th Dist. No. 09AP-443, 2009-Ohio-6902, ¶ 26. 

{¶ 32} Plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) consists of an obvious error or defect in the 

trial proceedings that affects a substantial right. State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 482 

(2000). In order to demonstrate plain error, the defendant must show: (1) an error that is 

plain on the record, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule that constitutes an obvious defect in 

the trial proceedings; and (2) that such error affected substantial rights, i.e., there was a 

reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. State v. J.M., 10th 

Dist. No. 14AP-621, 2015-Ohio-5574, ¶ 27, citing State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 

2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. However, even if a defendant meets the requirements for 

demonstrating plain error, "an appellate court is not required to correct it," because 

courts are to "notice plain error with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances 

and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." (Emphasis omitted; internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Rogers at ¶ 23. See also State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 

(2002). 

3. Foreign Language Interpretation at Trial

{¶ 33} We first examine appellant's contentions with regard to the interpreter at 

trial. It is undisputed that, at trial, the trial court did not appoint a certified or 

provisionally qualified interpreter, but, rather, appointed a language-skilled interpreter. 

Pursuant to Sup.R. 88(D)(3), when appointing a language-skilled interpreter, the court is 

required to "summarize on the record" its efforts to obtain a certified or provisionally 

qualified foreign language interpreter, in addition to "the reasons for using a languageskilled foreign language interpreter." Furthermore, "[t]he language-skilled foreign 

language interpreter's experience, knowledge, and training should be stated on the 

record" and "[e]ach language-skilled foreign language interpreter shall take an oath or 

affirmation under which the interpreter affirms to know, understand, and act according to 
No. 15AP-848 11 

the 'Code of Professional Conduct for Court Interpreters and Translators' as set forth in 

Appendix H to [the Rules of Superintendence]." Sup.R. 88(D)(3). 

{¶ 34} On July 13, 2015, the first day of trial, the trial court addressed the 

interpreter's qualifications and detailed the process utilized to obtain the interpreter: 

Interpreter, Fatima Dabo, having been heretofore duly sworn, 

translated the proceedings on behalf of the Court. 

* * * 

[Appellant's Counsel]: Your Honor, I would like to have the 

translator explain to my client that she took the oath, which 

means to accurately interpret. 

[The Court]: Ms. Dabo, it's important that you repeat 

everything that's being said in the courtroom. 

* * * 

[The Court]: All right. Ms. Dabo, okay, it's extremely 

important, okay, that everything that's being said in the 

courtroom, whether it's by me, whether it's by the attorneys 

and ultimately when we get to the jurors talking, okay, that 

you repeat everything that's being said in the mic so that 

[appellant] can hear. Because there were periods of time that I 

was talking and I didn't hear you. 

If you're having difficulty hearing me in any way or if I'm 

saying something that you don't understand, please, get my 

attention. 

[Ms. Dabo]: Okay. 

[The Court]: I'll stop, I'll repeat it, I'll rephrase it. If anyone 

else in the courtroom is talking and you're having difficulty 

hearing them, it's important that you let me know as well, 

and, again, I'll ask that person to talk up so that you can hear. 

But the only way that you can interpret accurately is 

interpreting at the time that someone is talking. Because if 

you're waiting until that person gets finished and then you try 

to, what you're going to end up doing is summarizing what 

was being said as opposed to interpreting directly what's 

being said at the time that it's being said. 

Okay. If you have any questions, please, just stop me and let 

me know. If there's any confusion it's important that you let 

me know as well. Okay. But everything that's being said in the 

courtroom must be interpreted. 
No. 15AP-848 12 

So I want you to ask, [appellant], sir, if you have any difficulty 

understanding what's going on, okay, please get the attention 

of your attorney * * *. 

Do you understand, sir? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes, he does. 

[The Court]: Now, it's important that everything I say, it's 

important that everything that I say is repeated to [appellant]. 

Even that. Okay? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Okay. Yes. 

[The Court]: We are scheduled for trial today. The Court 

became aware of the need for an interpreter, I believe, it was 

November -- October, November, 2014. 

At that time, the Court worked through the administrative 

assistant to the court administrator, Sheila Brown, in an effort 

to obtain an interpreter. First, we had attempted to get an 

interpreter through, I believe, it was Language Line. Language 

Line had indicated to the Court that they were not servicing 

Krio at this time. And there's an email from * * * Language 

Line on December 10, 2014. 

Not being able to obtain an interpreter through Language 

Line, Sheila Brown contacted Bruno Romero at the Supreme 

Court. Mr. Romero was able to get us in contact with someone 

that we could use through a phone conference. And as counsel 

recalls, we had used an interpreter by the name of John Abeh 

Fontengwan * * * and we used him for a phone conference. He 

was with an agency called Cross Thread Solutions. It's either 

out of Solon, Ohio; but their main office may have been in 

Baltimore, Maryland. But we used his services for one of the 

hearings. 

Realizing that using the interpreter through a phone 

conference, while adequate for court hearing, would not be 

adequate either for a plea hearing or a trial. 

So I again got into contact with Sheila Brown who then got 

into contact with Bruno Romero with the Supreme Court. Mr. 

Romero checked once again to see if there were any 

interpreters for Krio, and he checked his sources. 

So January 21st, he had provided us names of interpreters, 

[an interpreter] out of Maryland; [an interpreter] out of 

Colorado Springs, Colorado; [an interpreter] out of New York; 
No. 15AP-848 13 

[an interpreter] out of St. Paul, Minnesota; and [an 

interpreter] out of New York, New York. 

So the Court was trying to figure out at that time what cost 

potentially would be involved in having to bring someone out 

for trial. 

Bruno Romero with the Supreme Court then got back in 

contact with the Court indicating that he had made contact 

with a company out of Cincinnati and the owner was Mr. 

Ibrahim Amidou. 

Mr. Amidou was one of their certification candidates through 

the Supreme Court. Mr. Amidou provided the interpreters 

that we have been using. 

Now, the interpreters, Ms. Dabo is not a certified interpreter. 

The Court has had an opportunity to talk with her this 

morning, had her review the training video from the Supreme 

Court on expectations for interpreting and we discussed 

matters such as the confidential nature of conversations 

between the attorney and client, discussed the importance of 

her not interjecting her opinion, talked about the importance 

of not summarizing, and not providing advice; that her role is 

simply to repeat everything that's being said in court. 

The Court does have some concerns, obviously with Ms. 

Dabo's lack of experience with the legal aspects of 

interpreting. But based upon the efforts that the Court has 

made trying to obtain an interpreter that's available to be here 

for trial, the Court is, at least at this point, willing to move 

forward with trial using the services of Ms. Dabo. 

But the Court will be vigilant and ask that counsel, likewise, if 

they have any issues or concerns to stop the proceedings so 

that we can address those concerns. 

* * * 

[Prosecutor]: Thank you, Judge. Are you saying that there is 

not a reasonably available certified foreign language 

interpreter nor a reasonably available provisionally qualified 

foreign language interpreter; but that Ms. Dabo is a language 

skilled foreign language interpreter? 

[The Court]: Correct. 

* * * 

[Prosecutor]: Judge, do we need to qualify this interpreter? 
No. 15AP-848 14 

The state's willing to stipulate that she is qualified. I don't 

know what [appellant's counsel's] thoughts are. I think that's a 

formality that we have to address. 

[The Court]: All right. Ms. Dabo, I mean, we did talk briefly in 

the back. And is it correct this is your first time doing legal 

interpretation? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes. 

[The Court]: What is your native language? 

[Ms. Dabo]: I was born in Sierra Leone. Krio is the native 

language everybody speaks growing up. 

* * * 

[The Court]: Okay. And so that's where you learned to speak 

Krio then? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes. 

[The Court]: Then how did you learn English? 

[Ms. Dabo]: It's an English school and when outside of school 

you can either speak English or Krio. My native background, 

educational background is in English. 

[The Court]: Okay. So what is your educational background? 

[Ms. Dabo]: My educational background, I've been to a few 

colleges. I haven't graduated yet. I want to do business 

administration and I did some computer networking and 

human resources classes. 

[The Court]: In what settings have you interpreted in the 

past? 

[Ms. Dabo]: In business settings, like in purchasing something 

from the school. 

[The Court]: Okay. Now, are you related in any way with any 

of the participants in this case? 

[Ms. Dabo]: No. 

[The Court]: Do you know [appellant] at all? 

[Ms. Dabo]: No. Today is the first day I saw him. 
No. 15AP-848 15 

[The Court]: Okay. And at least based upon what you know, 

not familiar with any of his relatives or anything like that? 

[Ms. Dabo]: No. 

* * * 

[The Court]: All right. As we are moving through the trial and 

if it appears that you are familiar with any of the participants, 

please, let me know. 

Now, do you understand that you are to be a neutral party 

here to facilitate communication? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes. 

[The Court]: And that you should not offer advice or interject 

your opinion into these proceedings? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes. 

[The Court]: You understand that? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yeah. 

[The Court]: What training have you done, if any, with regard 

to interpreting in the past? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Nothing. 

[The Court]: How have you worked with Mr. Amidou? 

[Ms. Dabo]: I just came to introduce myself that I would be 

taking over for the person and then I came in and talked. 

[The Court]: You're familiar with Mr. Amidou's company or 

was it just -- 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yeah. I am familiar with the company Language 

International as far as what they do. 

[The Court]: Okay. All right. I'm going to qualify you as an 

interpreter. I mean, we understand, again, some of the 

limitations that we have in these proceedings. But I think it's 

very important that you stop us if there's something that you 

do not understand; that you'd be willing to ask us questions if 

you need something restated or repeated; and then, again, just 

making sure that you're interpreting everything that's being 

said without interjecting your opinion without summarizing 

or without providing advice. 
No. 15AP-848 16 

[Ms. Dabo]: Correct. 

[The Court]: Okay. So on behalf of the State then? 

[Prosecutor]: Does [appellant's counsel] have any objections 

to this interpreter being qualified? 

[Appellant's counsel]: No, Your Honor. 

What I'd like to do, just briefly, since we are on the record is 

ask my client, are you able to understand the translator, the 

interpreter? 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes. 

[Appellant's Counsel]: Do you have any difficulties today? 

[The Court]: You have to say yes or no. 

[Ms. Dabo]: You can say yes or no. 

[Appellant]: Yes. Yes. 

[Ms. Dabo]: Do you have any difficulty right now? 

[Appellant]: No. No. 

[The Court]: It's my understand, at least having a 

conversation this morning, is that there is some, I guess, part 

of Krio that is English as well. 

[Ms. Dabo]: Yes. It's like a broken English. 

[The Court]: Okay. All right. So with regard to the interpreter, 

anything else that we need to place on the record on behalf of 

either party? 

[Prosecutor]: No. 

[Appellant's counsel]: No. 

(July 13, 2015 Tr. at 3-16.) 

{¶ 35} On July 13, 2015, the trial court filed a document titled "Oath" which was 

signed by the interpreter and stated: "I do solemnly swear that I will make a true 

interpretation of the proceedings to the party or witness, and that I will truly repeat the 

statements made by such party or witness to the Court, to the best of my ability." 

Additionally, the transcript reflects that the interpreter was sworn before the court. Here, 

both the signed statement by the interpreter and the transcript of proceedings before the 
No. 15AP-848 17 

court reflect that Dabo was sworn as an interpreter. Additionally, appellant's counsel 

asked the court to instruct the interpreter to explain to appellant that "she took the oath, 

which means to accurately interpret." (July 13, 2015 Tr. at 3.) 

{¶ 36} Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in appointing Dabo as his 

interpreter because the trial court did not qualify her as an expert witness in 

contravention of this court's holding in Newcomb. However, in Newcomb, we stated that 

"[t]he failure to object in the trial court results in a waiver of the requirements to 

administer an oath to the interpreter and to qualify the interpreter as an expert witness." 

Id. at ¶ 22. Furthermore, we stated that "the alleged failure to qualify the interpreter as an 

expert witness does not constitute plain error" because "[t]here is no evidence which 

indicates the interpreter was not qualified to interpret." Id. at ¶ 25. Therefore, we 

concluded that "the fact the interpreter was not qualified as an expert witness does not 

undermine or call into question the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of appellant's 

plea." Id. 

{¶ 37} Here, as in Newcomb, there is no evidence that the interpreter was not 

qualified to interpret. Although appellant notes the trial court "had to instruct [the 

interpreter] several times before the trial began to interpret literally and not to 

summarize," appellant fails to demonstrate with reference to the record that the 

interpreter was not qualified to interpret or was inaccurately interpreting. (Appellant's 

Brief at 18.) Furthermore, the trial court conducted a lengthy colloquy with the 

interpreter on the record, inquiring into subjects including the interpreter's educational 

background, familiarity with the subject language, and experience interpreting, among 

others. Thereafter, the trial court qualified Dabo as an interpreter. The trial court 

cautioned the interpreter that "it's very important that you stop us if there's something 

that you do not understand; that you'd be willing to ask us questions if you need 

something restated or repeated; and then, again, just making sure that you're interpreting 

everything that's being said without interjecting your opinion without summarizing or 

without providing advice." (July 13, 2015 Tr. at 14.) 

{¶ 38} The trial court specifically asked appellant's counsel whether there was any 

objection to the qualification of the interpreter. Appellant's counsel did not object at that 

time or at any other time during the proceedings. We do not find any error. However, 

assuming, arguendo, there was error, appellant cannot show that any alleged error related 
No. 15AP-848 18 

to the trial court's qualification of the interpreter affected the outcome of the trial. 

Appellant fails to demonstrate plain error. 

{¶ 39} Next, appellant contends that the trial court should have delayed appellant's 

trial "until a certified translator could be found." (Appellant's Brief at 22.) However, 

neither R.C. 2311.14 nor the Rules of Superintendence require that a court continue a trial 

until a certified interpreter can be appointed. Indeed, as we have previously stated, the 

Rules of Superintendence specifically allow for the appointment of a language skilled 

interpreter when the trial court ascertains that a certified or provisionally qualified 

foreign language interpreter is "not reasonably available to participate in person." Sup.R. 

88(D)(3). Here, the trial court detailed its efforts to obtain a certified interpreter, 

including seeking the assistance of the Supreme Court. Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate plain error resulting from the trial court's usage of a language-skilled 

interpreter. 

{¶ 40} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in appointing Dabo as a 

language-skilled foreign language interpreter at appellant's trial. 

4. Foreign Language Interpretation at Sentencing Hearing

{¶ 41} Finally, we consider appellant's contentions with regard to the foreign 

language interpreter at the sentencing hearing on September 3, 2015. The record reflects 

that on the day of the hearing, the trial court filed an entry stating: "Pursuant to section 

2311.14, Ohio Revised Code, Fatmata Berete is hereby appointed interpreter in this 

action." Additionally, the trial court filed a document titled "Oath" which was signed by 

the interpreter and stated: "I do solemnly swear that I will make a true interpretation of 

the proceedings to the party or witness, and that I will truly repeat the statements made 

by such party or witness to the Court, to the best of my ability." However, the record does 

not reflect whether the interpreter was a certified, provisionally qualified, or language 

skilled interpreter. The record also does not reflect that the trial court inquired as to the 

qualifications of the interpreter. 

{¶ 42} Here, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate plain error for several 

reasons. First, in a plain error analysis, the sentencing hearing is procedurally distinct 

from the trial phase of the proceedings since concerns related to the adversarial process 

are not present at sentencing. See State v. Dunbar, 3d Dist. No. 1-92-12 (Nov. 5, 1992). 

Additionally, there is no indication, and appellant does not contend, that a more qualified 

interpreter was reasonably available at the time of sentencing, especially considering the 
No. 15AP-848 19 

lack of a reasonably available certified or provisionally qualified interpreter at trial. 

Therefore, under these circumstances, appellant is unable to establish that the outcome of 

the proceedings would have been different absent the alleged error. 

{¶ 43} Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, we find that better practices could 

be employed at the sentencing hearing, as in other phases of the proceedings. Although 

not outcome determinative, the sentencing proceeding entails the communication of 

important obligations and responsibilities for the convicted defendant. See generally 

State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238. Here, the trial court informed the 

defendant of community control notification and registration obligations imposed as a 

result of his classification as a Tier I sexual offender. In light of these considerations, it is 

important for a trial court to comply with Sup.R. 88 at the sentencing hearing, as in other 

phases of the proceedings. Thus, where, as here, if an interpreter at sentencing is 

different from the interpreter who was qualified at trial, the trial court should inquire on 

the record of sentencing as to the qualifications of the interpreter. 

{¶ 44} In conclusion, we find appellant has failed to demonstrate plain error with 

regard to the trial court's appointment of interpreters at trial and the sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 45} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's third assignment of error. 

C. Fourth Assignment of Error—Effective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 46} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the interpreters provided 

during the trial and sentencing proceedings. 

{¶ 47} A convicted defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 

demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel's performance was so deficient that he or she was 

not functioning as the counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution; and (2) defense counsel's errors prejudiced defendant, depriving him 

or her of a trial whose result is reliable. State v. Campbell, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-147, 

2003-Ohio-6305, ¶ 24, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. 

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 48} "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential * * * 

[and a] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland at 689; Bradley at 141. In 

Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Davis, 10th Dist. No. 

13AP-98, 2014-Ohio-90, ¶ 20, citing Vaughn v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 301 (1965). 
No. 15AP-848 20 

Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998). 

" 'To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the 

defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for 

counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.' " State v. Griffin, 10th 

Dist. No. 10AP-902, 2011-Ohio-4250, ¶ 42, quoting Bradley at paragraph three of the 

syllabus. 

{¶ 49} Here, appellant recasts his fourth assignment of error as an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. State v. Carse, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-932, 2010-Ohio-4513, 

¶ 78, citing State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 233. However, appellant 

fails to demonstrate that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's 

failure to object, the result of the trial would have been different. Hale at ¶ 233, quoting 

State v. Holloway, 33 Ohio St.3d 239, 244 (1988) (finding that " '[t]he failure to object to 

error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel' "). 

Appellant fails to point to evidence in the record demonstrating that he was unable to 

understand his interpreters. Furthermore, appellant's trial counsel specifically asked 

appellant whether he was able to understand the interpreter at trial, and appellant agreed 

that he had no difficulties understanding the interpreter. Therefore, based on our review 

of the record, we cannot find that appellant's trial counsel's failure to object rendered his 

performance so deficient that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed under the 

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or that such performance prejudiced 

appellant. 

{¶ 50} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's fourth assignment of error. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 51} Having overruled appellant's four assignments of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and SADLER, JJ., concur.