Assessment of PL 111

- 216

An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Public Law 111

- 216 in Reducing Accident Risk

Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention Federal Aviation Administration November 22, 2010Assessment of PL 111

- 216

This document presents the results of a safety analysis of propo sed rulemaking by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations, pursuant to Public Law 111

- 216, The Fiscal Year 2010 Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act . Section 209(b ) of the Act mandates that FAA convene a panel of experts to establi sh the best methods and required training time, plus recurrent training requirements, to ensure that flight crewmembers of Part 1 21 air carriers and Part 1 35 air carriers

“ master aircraft systems, maneuvers, procedures, takeoffs and landings, and crew coordination .“

Section 216 of the Act directs FAA to undertake rulemaking to ensure that Part 1 21 air carriers

“ develop and implement means and methods for ensuring that flight crewmembers ha ve proper qualifications and experience. ” Section 216 a lso requires the rulemaking to ensure at least the following.

Comprehensive pre

- employment screening of prospective flight crewmembers
, “including an assessment of the skills, aptitudes, airmanship, and suitability of each applicant” to function effectively in an air carr ier environme nt.
All flight crewmembers must obtain an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate and have “appropriate multi

- engine aircraft experience.”

Section 217 of the Act re quires rulemaking to amend minimal requirements under P art 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations for obtaining an ATP to ensure that a pilot can “function effectively in an air carrier operational environment. Amendments to Part 61 must ensure that appli cants for an ATP have received flight training, academic training, or operational experience that effectively prepares them for a multi

- pilot environment, adverse weather conditions, including icing conditions, high altitude operations, and adherence “to t he highest professional standards.” Finally, Section 217 retains the required minimum of 1,500 hours before a pilot can qualify for an ATP, including “sufficient flight hours” in difficult operating conditions.

Based on a detailed review of 417 accident s over 10 years, the analysis found that the rulemaking would be most effective against accidents involving turbojets in on

- demand Part 1 35 operations and against twin

- engine aircraft accidents in Part 1 35 commuter operations. The rulemaking would have si gnificant effect against Part 1 21 accidents, but less so than against Part 1 35 accidents, and the rulemaking would have little to effect on the small number of Part 1 25 accidents that occurred over the 10

- year study period.


### Anticipated Rulemaking

An ATP license is currently required to operate as a pilot

- in

- command (PIC) during Part 121 operations. The Act and the rulemaking would retain the minimum of 1,500 hours to qualify for an ATP. In addition, a s directed by the Act , the rulemaking will requir e an ATP and an aircraft type rating for all pilots in Part 1 21 operations, and will require that at least 50 of the minimum 1,500 hours to qualify for an ATP be in multi

- engine aircraft. The rulemaking also will include a restricted

- privileges ATP which allows credit for appropriate academic and classroom training and credit for military flight experience. For example, the rule may require 1,000 hours total time as a pilot for a graduate of an accredited aviation degree program, or a minimum of 750Assessment of PL 111

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hours total time for a military pilot. The restricted

- privileges ATP also would have to be a minimum age o f 21.

The rule also will require time in a flight simulation training device to obtain an ATP as part of the effort to ensure “sufficient flight hours” in difficult operati ng conditions and to incorporate the additional experience requirements defined in Section 217 of the Act.

In addition, the proposed rule will require either a straightforward minimum of 2,500 hours of pilot experience to qualify as a PIC in Part 1 21 operations, or the rule may alter that by requiring that a prospective PIC has at least 1,000 hours of experience in air carrier operations , plus the 1,500

- hour minimum to qualify for an ATP

. Though the net effect of these 2 variations o n PIC eligibility is not exactly synonymous, the effect on accident reduction is essentially the same.


### Safety Analysis

Analytical Approach

The analysis assesses the likely capacity of the proposed rules to reduce the number of accidents and fatal accide nts in the future. It will address all operations in which the PIC must have an ATP or in which the rulemak ing will require an ATP of the f irst officer (FO) . Therefore the analysis will address all Part 1 21 and Part 1 25 operations; all operations involvi ng twin

- engine aircraft as Part 1 35 commuters; and all on

- demand Part 1 35 or Part 91K operations involving turbojets or other airplanes configured with 10 or more seats. The analy sis i s based on a ll accidents that meet the above criteria from fiscal year (FY) 2001 through and including FY 2010, as follows:

Part 1 21 Operations 354 accidents and 370 aircraft; Part 1 25 Operations 5 accidents and 5 aircraft Part 1 35 Commuter 1 4 accidents and 1 4 aircraft Part 1 35 On

- Demand 44 accidents and 44 aircraft

The preferred approach would be to assess each element of a ny rulemaking as a discrete item. However, the statutory directions include elements that are difficult to isolate. Where possible the elements are addressed separately, but they are not assign ed discrete scores. Instead score s are assigned for the entire rulemaking as a single proposal.

Scores represent the likelihood that the propos ed rules could have prevented the accident had the rules been in place at time of each accident due either to the rule’s capacity to have precluded or corrected a contributing condition. The rule was first scored against each accident qualitatively with the following categories of effectiveness; low; moderate; moderate

- to

- high; high; and very high. Those catego ries then were converted to values in the following order : 15%; 35%; 55%; 75%; and 90% . The end result was a quantified set of benefits in which, for example, a score of 35% against an accident involving 100 fatalities would have reduced risk by a theoret ical 0.35 fatal accidents and a theoretical 35 fatalities. All scores were reviewed by a 3

- person panel.Assessment of PL 111

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Note that the mere presence of some c ondition such as a pilot with less than the proposed flight hours did not necessarily mean that the rulemaking w ould have been effective against a particular accident scenario. Many accidents simply d o not reflect at all on pilot performance

. Where a pertinent issue was influential in an accident, its score depended on an assessment both of the degree to which the factor influenced the accident and the degree to which a new rule realistically could be expected to have changed the outcome of a particular accident, based on the details of each accident flight. Finally, as a matter of analytical principle, no acciden t r eceived a score higher than 0.9 based on the assumption that we can never be certain that any intervention would eliminate all risk in a particular scenario . With these caveats, the analysis focused on the following factors:

Part 1 21 PIC with less tha n 2
, 500 hours ; Part 1 21 FO with less than 1
, 500 h ours, 1
, 000 hours, and 750 hours; Part 1 21 FO operating without an ATP; Part 1 21 FO operating without a rating in the aircraft being flown; Crew Resource Management; Sterile Cockpit Procedures; Professional ism; Weather (thunderstorm, icing, turbulence, gusty crosswinds etc.); and Stall

- upset or unusual attitude.

Part 1 21 operators had 354 accidents involving 370 Part 1 21 aircraft in the 10

- year study period. The majority of the 354 Part 1 21 accidents invol ved low

- level outcomes or isolated risk that did not a ffect most aircraft occupants. For example, turbulence accounted for 102 of the 354 accidents, all but a few of which involved single injuries, while gate

- ramp accidents accounted for 88 accidents. M o st of those accidents did not reflect on crew performance. Similarly,

m iscellaneous on

- board events and deer strikes on runways accounted for another 10 accidents, and 12 more events qualified as accidents only because an injury oc curred during a precauti onary evacuation. These types of events account for 60 percent of the total accident set for Part 1 21 operators, while still others involved maintenance and other issues not related to crew performan ce. Many of the remainder involved relatively low

- level outcomes, though with varying levels of risk , while others involved high

- time PICs with high

- time FOs with ATP ratings who likely would not be reached by this rulemaking. The point here is not to dismiss these events but to suggest that benefits, as meas ured by avoided accidents, fatalities, and serious injuries, often will be more modest than advocates might a nticipate

. Data Sources and Data Quality

Accident reports and structured accident data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) w ere the primary data source, supplemented where necessary and possible with data from FAA. Accident data will be limited to 10 years due to the poor quality of data available in either NTSB o r FAA reports on pilot experience for earlier accidents . FY 2001 wa s selected as the starting point because that was the point at which NTSB data on pilot flight hours began to capture co

- pilots at least somewhat systematically.Assessment of PL 111

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However, several issues limit the applicability of some accidents even within this 10

- year dataset. First, NTSB records for accidents involving U.S. operators in foreign countries rarely report data on pilots. Pilot data also is limited for domestic accidents that ha ve relatively low

level outcomes, such as turbulence or ramp

- gate accidents. In addition, other records randomly involve blank data cells for PIC or FO flight hours, and FO certificates and type ratings

. Where any of these problems existed, the text of each NTSB accident report w as reviewed, as

were files in the FAA’s Office of Accident Investiga tion and Prevention. That exercise added or corrected data for some or all pertinent fields for more than 2 0 0 pilots , but some or all pertinent data on some pilots simply i s not available.

U seful flight

- hour data was identified for 33 2 PICs among the 370 acc ident aircraft. All but 4 of the 33 2 PICs had more than 2,500 hours. Of the other 38 PICs, damage to 2 aircraft was found during maintenance, and the respective air carriers could not associate either accident with specific crews

. Consistent with comments above about the frequent absence of flight

- hour data in certain categories of accidents, 24 of the remaining 3 6 accidents for which PIC flight

- hour data was not available did not reflect on pilot performance. Those 24 accidents i nvolved maintenance issues, ramp events caused by ground staff, and turbulence injuries in clear air turbulence or after adequate warnings were ignored. Eight other 12 accidents involved large jets operating international flights and 3 involved large jets on domestic flights by major air carriers. Most or all of those captains would have had significant flight experience. Consequently, the absence of data on those PICs does not affect the findings in this report.

Useful d ata on flight hours or ratings w as available for 326 FOs (8 8 %) . The 45 cases for which no data was available included the s ame 38 cases noted above. Consequently, again, the absence of data in the 45 records will not affect the findings of this report.


### Results of the Analysis, Part 1 2 1 Operations

All but 4 PICs exceeded the straightforward 2,500

- hour minimum. The alternate approach of requiring an ATP plus at least 1,000 hours of experience in air carrier operations likely would have affected the eligibility of a fifth PIC , whose tot al flight time marginally exceeded 2,500 hours. All 5 of those PICs operated with FOs who had commercial ratings rather than ATPs. Crew performance was a primary issue in 4 of those 5 accidents. The fifth accident was caused by a tug operator who struck a stationary regional jet at the gate. Though the rule would have affected the eligibility of both pilots to operate that flight, the rule would not have influenced the accident.

The proposed PIC minimal hours and the required ATP to operate as an FO in Part 121 operations would have affected the eligibility of 83 accident crews in the 10

- year accident set. However, crew performance was an issue in just 34 of those cases, and some of those 34 would not be reached by this rulemaking. For example, 2 fa tal accidents in which FOs did not have ATP ratings illustrate how the rule could have affected the eligibility of the FOs without influencing the outcome: Air Midwest at Charlotte (21 fatal) crashed immediately after lift off due to an improperly

- rigged e levator; and Chalks (20 fatal) crashed into the Atlantic Ocean when the wing failed in normal flight. Though both FO s would have been affected by the requirementAssessment of PL 111

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to have an ATP, the rule would have been irrelevant to both accidents and would score zero ag ainst these accidents.

Conversely, some of the other elements in the rulemaking , such as screening pilot applicants and preparing pilots better for the complex environment of air carrier operations, better training in stall recognition, and the importan ce of professionalism, w ould have had some minimal chance of influencing additional accident outcomes.

On net, the rulemaking was found to be effective at least to some degree against just 31 acciden ts , and in most cases the scores were “low” or “low

- to

- moderate.” No accidents received scores of “very high. Appendix 1 shows the scoring for each of the 3 1 Part 121 accidents against which the rulemaking received positive scores, while Table 1, below, summarizes the scoring of the complete rulemaking agai nst all 354 Part 121 accidents from FY 2001 through FY 2010.

Table 1: Scoring Summary in Part 1 21 Operations FY 2001 Through FY 2010

Qualitative Effectiveness Score Quantified Score Number of Accidents Accidents Avoided None 0 323 0 Low 0.15 17 2.55 Moderate 0.35 6 2.1 Moderate

- to

- High 0.55 5 2.75 High 0.75 3 2.25 Very High 0.90 0 0

Total 354 9.65

In a ll 3 accident s that received “high” scores (75% reduction in the likelihood of the accident), crew performance essentially explained the acciden ts and the rule would have affected the eligibility of both pilots, as neither the PIC nor the FO met the proposed minimum experience for their respective positions. The 3 accidents are outlined below.

1

. On June 20, 2007 a t 1620 , a Beech 1900D operated by Great Lakes Aviation l anded long and bounced in VMC at Laramie . The crew tried to slow the aircraft but turned onto

a taxiway at high speed , where the right prop struck electrical an electrical box . A p rop blade then broke off and struck the right si de of the fuselage. The PIC later noted that the approach was about 14 knots above the targeted speed and the airplane was one dot high on the glide slope. No injuries occurred to the 2 pilots and 9 passengers, but the aircraft was substantially damaged. NTSB determined the probable cause to be t he PIC’s improper decision making
, his misjudgment of speed and distance, and his failure to go around during an unstable approach. Factors in the accident were improper CRM and the FO 's failure to intervene

.

T he PIC had 2,250 hours of pilot experience and the commercially

- rated FO had 774 hours. The rule would have required more experience and seasoning for both pilots. Th eAssessment of PL 111

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extra experience and seasoning in an air carrier environment may well have led the PIC to go around upon recognizing an unstable approach or could have led the FO to intervene. The ru le received a score of “high” ( 75 % ) against this accident.

2 . On August 13, 2004, at 0049 , a Convair 580 on a cargo flight operated by Air Tahoma crashed on approach to Cincinnati

. The PIC was killed and the FO was seriously injured. The airplane was destroyed. The PIC had exactly 2,500 hours and the commercially rated FO had 924 hours as a pilot, the majority of which had been in single

- engine airplanes. H e had just 3 months of experience as a line air carrier pilot.

The FO was flying and about 20 minutes before the accident, he commented multiple times that the aircraft was pulling to the right and stated “ I don't know why...

. I don't know what's going on

. ” With the runway in sight, the FO again noted “What is wrong with this plane? It ’ s really funny. I got something all messed up here." The PIC eventually advised the FO that they had a fuel imbalance because the PIC as the pilot not flying had erroneousl y left the cross

- feed open
, which ca used a prohibited fuel transfer

. The FO then stated that "we're going to flame out " but the PIC responded, "I got the

cross

- feed open. Just keep the power on." Ultimately the aircraft lost power due to fuel starvation
, despite adequate total fuel, and crashed one mile short of the runway.

The rule would have required more experience and seasoning for both pilots, especially for the FO . That extra experience and seasoning may have enabled the FO to identify a lateral C /G problem caused by a fuel imbalance . It also may have led the PIC to respond with some urgency when he finally recognized a fuel imbalance and the possibility of fuel starvation due to his having left the cross

- feed open.

3. On October 16, 2001 a t 211 4, an ERJ

- 145 operated by Mesa Airlines landed hard at Roanoke. The PIC had briefed the visual approach to runway 33 for which go

- around

was not an option due to hills. The crew n oted a quartering cross wind at 15 mph gusting 21 . The FO said the approach w as normal until 300 AGL, whe re he called "one dot high" and Ref +5. Airspeed dropped abruptly, the stick shaker activated and the PIC added power but the aircraft landed hard before engines could spool up. Damage included broken and cracked frames and str ingers, popped rivets, and skin worn through in the lower aft pressure vessel, plus scraped skin on the lower aft fuselage. NTSB identified the probable cause as the PIC 's failure to maintain airspeed. Factors included the failure of both pilots to follow company CRM and flight manual procedures, and the PIC's improper approach briefing.

Both pilots were hired during a period of rapid expansion for the carrier and moved through what the NTSB report described as a “rushed ’ upgrade program. The PIC had 2
, 5 48 hours with 200 in make

- model. The commercially

- rated FO had 1, 850 hours with 90 hours in make

- model

. The PIC had been instructing when the carrier hired her 21 months before the accident. She had accrued 600 hours as an FO in the BE

- 1900 and qualifie d for upgrade to PIC in the ERJ based on seniority. The FO was hired with 400 hours, flew as FO on the Beech 1900 then upgraded to the ERJ as an FO based o n seniorit y. Neither pilot had any prior experience in swept

- wing aircraft nor had the carrierAssessment of PL 111

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provid ed any jet indoctrination or training on swept wing aerodynamics. The rule’s emphasis on screening pilot applicants, professionalism, preparing pilots better for Part 121 operating environments, and more training in stall recognition would have directly

a ffected this accident scenario

. The most signi ficant accident to receive a “moderate’ score (55% reduction in likelihood) involved a DC

- 9, operated by USA Jet on a cargo flight, which crashed in heavy fog while on approach in mountainous terrain to Saltil lo, Mexico (1 fatal and 1 serious). In that accident, the flight data recorder shows the aircraft alternating above and below th e glide slope and left and righ t of the localizer throughout the approach , with the PIC flying. The aircraft ultimately stalle d and crashed 1,000 feet short and 500 feet right of the runway.

The FO on that flight was an experienced flight engineer but had just 830 hours as a pilot and 75 hours as a P art 121 pilot. A more experienced FO likely would have called for a go

- around or may have been willing to intervene and push the power up, either of which would have averted this accident. The other 4 accidents with “moderate” scores resulted in 1 serious injury in a turbulence accident (no damage) and substantial damage to a turb oprop and two regional jets.

The remaining 23 accidents in the 10

- year accident set against which the rulemaking scored positively were limited to “low” and “low

- to

- moderate” scores. They included 2 fatal accidents (Colgan at Buffalo and Corporate Airl ines at Kirksville), plus 3 seriou s injuries and hull losses to 3 turboprops and 1 cargo jet.

In sum, the rulemaking would require a minimum of 2 ,500 hours for Part 1 21 captains , an ATP for Part 121 FOs, and an emphasis on screening pilot applicants, prep aring pilots better for Part 121 operating environments, professionalism, and more training in stall recognition. These provisions would have had some degree of influence on 31 of the 354 accidents in the Part 121 data set (8.8%), but likely would have re duced the risk of accidents by a theoretical score of just 9.65 accidents among 354 accidents over 10 years (2.7%). The rulemaking also would have averted a theoretical 23.4 fatalities (5.4%), 3.9 serious injuries (2.1%), and 11 minor injuries ( 2.9%) over the 10

- year accident set.

Part 1 2 5 Operations

.

A PIC on a Part 1 25 flight must have an ATP. The rulemaking would not require FO s to have an ATP. Therefore, the net effect of the rulemaking would be limited to the various emphasis areas that the rule s pecifies.

Part 1 25 operators had 5 accidents in the 10

- year study period. They resulted in 4 hull losses, 1 fatality and 1 serious injury. All 5 captains had total flight time in excess of the proposed 1 ,500

- hour minimum to obtain an ATP. Fo u r of the 5 captains had more than 9,000 hours.

T wo of the four hull losses were caused by uncontrollable engine fires in flight , and a third was caused by an engine failure that prevented the prop from feathering. One of these accidents led to an emergency landing and post

- crash fire on snow

- covered tundra in Alaska, while the other two led to int entional ditching. In the fourth hull

- loss accident, the crew undershot the runwayAssessment of PL 111

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while landing to deliver fuel at a remote mining site in Alaska. The DC

- 4 had been mod ified with a raised cockpit above fuselage to accommodate an upward swinging , modified nose door
, which “presented a different sight picture” than a normal DC

- 4. The FO had only a commercial certificate but the captain, who was the pilot flying, had nearly 22,000 hours and 13,600 in make

model. T he rulemaking would no t have influenced these scenario s

.
The fifth accident involved wing

- to

- wing contact with a parked aircraft on a general aviation ramp at Newark . The NTSB cited the Part 1 25 crew’s visual mis judgment of clearing distance between aircraft. The accident report does not identify which pilot was flying the Part 25 Boeing 737

- 700, but t he PIC had nearly 13,000 hours and 1,245 in type, while the FO held an ATP. The rulemaking is unlikely to affect visual perception of wing clearance. In sum, the proposed rulemaking would have had no effect on the 5 Part 1 25 accidents over the past 10 years.

Part 1 35 Commuters.

For Part 1 35 commuters, the rulemaking would affect only the requirements to obtain an ATP for pilots

- in

- command of multi

- engine airplanes. Part 1 35 commuters had 1 4 accidents involving multi

- engine airplanes over the 10

- year study period. They resulted in 1 fatal accident with 2 fatalities, plus 4 hull losses. Just 2 of the 1 4 crews inc luded FO ’ s, 1 of whom was an ATP. Total flight hours for these PIC s ranged from 2,942 to nearly 25,000 hours.

Of the 14 accidents in the past 10

- year dataset involving multi

- engine commuter aircraft , 3 were caused by faulty maintenance and a fourth accid ent was caused by unforecast and unexpected turbulence, which was the only accident in which an FO was flying. Among the remaining 1 0 accidents, the broader elements in the rulemaking may have influenced 8 accidents, which included 1 hull loss and 7 aircr aft with substantial damage. However, the rule scored highly against just one accident. The emphasis on professionalism, particularly the need to complete checklists and to follow procedures, plus the emphasis on weather were the primary sources of effec tiveness in these accidents.

Overall, the rulemaking would have averted a theoretical 2.2 of the 14 accidents in 10 years. It also would have avoided a theoretical 0.35 fatali ties and 0.45 serious injuries. Appendix 2 shows the scoring for the 8 commute r accidents against which the rulemaking received a positive score.

Part 1 35 On

- Demand
In principle, the rulemaking would affect all pilots in command operating on

- demand Part 135 services involving either turbojet airplanes or airplanes configured with 10 or more passenger seats. However, the latter category was not involved in any on

- demand Part 1 35 accidents in the 10

- year study period. Consequently, the on

- demand accident set was limited to 44 accidents involving turbojet airplanes. Useful da ta was available on 4 1 of the 44 PIC s 40 of 44 FOs.

As with other segments of commercial aviation outlined above, many a ccidents did not reflect on crews. The rulemaking received positive scores against half of the 44 accidents

. The highest

score was a single “moderate” (55%) in a non

- fatal accident in which the PIC entered an intentional aileron roll maneuver during cruise and temporarily lost control, causing substantialAssessment of PL 111

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structural damage to the left wing and elevator assembly. The proposed emphasis o n professionalism as part of ATP requirements, plus i mproved screening or monitoring all had some chance of influencing this accident.

For the other 21 accidents against which the rulemaking received positive scores, 11 received a “low

- to

- moderate” score (35%) and 10 received “low” (15%). S cores were mostly a result of the targeted emphasis on professionalism, weather, and the value of recognizing go

- around gates during unstable approaches (airmanship).

In sum, the rulemaking would have avoided a theore tical 5.9 accidents (1 3.4 % ), plus 1 2.4 of a total of 48 fatalities ( 35.8 % ), and 3.05 of 19 serious injuries ( 10.8 % ). Appendix 3 shows the scoring for the 22 on

- demand accidents against which the rulemaking received a positive score.


### Summary

Based on a de tailed review of 417 accidents over 10 years, the analysis found that the rulemaking would be most effective against accidents involving turbojets in on

- demand Part 1 35 operations and against twin

- engine aircraft accidents in Part 1 35 commuter operations. However the rulemaking would have significant effect against only a small number of Part 1 21 accidents, and the rulemaking would have had no effect against the small number of Part 1 25 accidents that occurred over the 10

- year study period.

T he analys is also noted that a large percentage of accidents had no reflection on crew performance , due to the prevalence of ramp accidents caused by others, turbulence accidents that involve either passenger behavior or conditions that could not be anticipated, and several types of miscellaneous events

. Nevertheless, the rulemaking could save a total of about 1.8 accidents per year, plus 3.6 fatalities and 0.7 serious injuries per year in Part 121 and Part 135 operations

.Assessment of PL 111

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Appendix 1: Scoring Against 31 Part 121 Accidents in Which t he Rulemaking Received Positive Scores, FY 2001

– FY 2010

NTSB # Damage High Injury DATE CARRIER LOCATION Aircraft Service Fatal Prime Scenario Score
DEN07LA101 S Mnr/None 6/20/2007 Great Lakes Laramie, Wyo BE-1900D Pax 0 LOC Taxi 0.75 DCA04MA068 D Fatal 8/13/2004 Air Tahoma Florence, KY CV-580 Cargo 1 USOS 0.75 NYC02LA013 S Mnr/None 10/16/2001 Mesa Roanoke, Va ERJ-145 Pax 0 Landed Hard 0.75

CHI01FA084 S Mnr/None 2/10/2001 Great Lakes ORD BE-1900 Pax 0 ARC-Gear Landing 0.55 NYC03FA035 S Mnr/None 1/6/2003 ExpressJet Cleveland, OH ERJ-145LR Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.55 MIA01LA030 N Serious 11/20/2000 Atl So East Ashville, NC ATR-72 Pax 0 Turb 0.55 DCA08RA077 D Fatal 7/6/2008 USA Jet Saltillo, Mex DC-9-15F Cargo 1 USOS 0.55

DFW08CA215 S Mnr/None 8/14/2008 Trans States STL ERJ-145LR Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.55

FTW04LA225 S Mnr/None 8/30/2004 Custom Air Transport El Paso B727 Cargo 0 ARC-Wing Tip 0.35 DCA04MA045 S Mnr/None 5/9/2004 Amer. Eagle SJU ATR-72 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.35

ANC01FA011 S Mnr/None 10/22/2000 Frontier Flying Serv Bethel, Ak BE-1900 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.35

DCA08WA071 S Mnr/None 5/16/2008 Asia Pacific Airlines Phonpei, Micronesia B727-200F Cargo 0 Runway Exc. 0.35 DCA09MA027 D Fatal 2/12/2009 Colgan Air BUF DHC-Q400 Pax 50 App & Landing 0.35

DCA05MA004 D Fatal 10/19/2004 Corporate Airlines Kirksville, MO BAE-32 Pax 13 CFIT LOW 0.35 DCA07FA037 S Mnr/None 4/12/2007 Pinnacle Traverse City, MI CL-600-2B19 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.15 NYC06LA191 S Mnr/None 7/24/2006 Amer. Eagle Newark ERJ-135LR Pax 0 Ramp-Gate 0.15 DCA05MA099 S Mnr/None 9/18/2005 Spirit Fort Lauderdale A321-231 Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.15 NYC05FA094 S Mnr/None 6/7/2005 UPS Louisville MD-11F Cargo 0 Landed Hard 0.15 DCA08FA018 S Mnr/None 12/16/2007 Air Wisc. Providence CL600-2B19 Pax 0 Landed Hard 0.15 DCA04MA082 S Mnr/None 9/19/2004 FedEx MEM MD-11 Cargo 0 Tailstrike 0.15 DCA09FA048 S Serious 5/6/2009 World Awys BWI DC-10-30 Pax 0 Landed Hard 0.15 FTW03MA160 S Mnr/None 5/24/2003 Southwest Amarillo, TX B737-300 Pax 0 Runway Exc. 0.15 CHI02LA170 S Mnr/None 6/16/2002 Vanguard KCI MD-82 Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.15 LAX04LA050 S Mnr/None 11/14/2003 United SFO B747-400 Pax 0 Tailstrike 0.15 CEN10LA363 N Serious 6/28/2010 Amer. Eagle Longview, TX ERJ-145LR Pax 0 Turb 0.15 DCA05MA071 N Serious 5/31/2005 Air Wisc. ORD CL-600-2B19 Pax 0 Ramp-Gate 0.15 DFW05LA112 N Serious 4/29/2005 Southwest LITTLE ROCK B737-700 Pax 0 Turb 0.15 ERA09LA488 N Serious 8/27/2009 Airtran Inverness, FL B717-200 Pax 0 Turb 0.15 CHI02LA111 N Serious 4/18/2002 ATA Springfield, Mo B757 Pax 0 Turb 0.15 CEN09MA142 D Serious 1/27/2009 Empire Lubbock, TX ATR-42-300 Cargo 0 App & Landing 0.15

DCA04WA043 D Mnr/None 4/28/2004 Centurion Air Cargo Bogota, Colombia DC-10-30F Cargo 0 Runway Exc. 0.15Assessment of PL 111

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Appendix 2 : Effectiveness of the Rulemaking Against 8 Part 135 Commuter Accidents in Which the Rulemaking Received Positive Scores, FY 2001

– FY 2010

Date Operator Damage Fatal Serious LOC Aircraft Service Event Score

3/13/2002 Warbelows Air Ventures SUBS 0 0 Fairbanks, AK PA-31 Comm Landed Gear Up 0.15

8/24/2002 Cape Smythe Air Service SUBS 0 0 Nuiqsut, AK PA-31 Comm Landed Gear Up 0.15

7/13/2003 Air Sunshine SUBS 2 0 Treasure Cay, Bahamas CE-402C Comm Ditched; Engine & Pilot Response 0.35

4/4/2004 Peninsula Airways SUBS 0 0 Unalaska, ak G-21 Comm Lost Control on Landing 0.75

9/17/2004 Everts Air Alaska SUBS 0 0 Telida, ak PA-31-350 Comm Landed Gear Up 0.15

2/19/2009 Frontier Flying Service SUBS 0 1 Nome, ak PA-31-350 Comm CFIT, Flat Terrain 0.15

2/1/2010 Cape Air SUBS 0 0 Watertown, ny CE-402C Comm Overran on Landing 0.35

3/15/2010 Servant Air DEST 0 2 Kodiak, ak BN-21-21 Comm LOC on Climbout 0.15

Appendix 3 : Eff ectiveness of the Rulemaking Against 22 Part 135 On

- Demand Accidents in Which the Rulemaking Received Positive Scores, FY 2001

– FY 2010

NTSB # DamAge Date Hi Inj City Operator Aircraft Serv. Fatal Prime Scenario Score DEN01FA030 S 12/20/2000 Mnr/None Jackson, WY Million Air Dallas HS-125-700 Pax 0 App & Landing 0.35 DCA01MA034 D 3/29/2001 Fatal Aspen, CO Avjet G-III Pax 18 CFIT 0.35 CHI01LA296 S 8/28/2001 Mnr/None Detroit Grand Aire Express Falcon Cargo 0 ARC 0.15

WAS02WA004 S 10/26/2001 Mnr/None Ciudad Victoria, Mex American Jets International Lear 25B MED 0 Gear Collapse 0.35

CHI02FA097 S 3/25/2002 Mnr/None Anderson, IN Corporate Flight Management MU-300 Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.35

LAX02LA252 D 8/13/2002 Mnr/None Big Bear City, CA Corporate Flight International CE-S550 Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.15 NYC02FA177 D 8/30/2002 Fatal Lexington, KY Care Flight International Lear 25C Med 1 RE-Landing 0.35 CHI03FA099 D 4/8/2003 Serious St Louis, MO Grand Aire Express Falcon Cargo 0 Ditched (Fuel) 0.15 CHI04FA031 S 11/11/2003 Mnr/None Wheeling, IL West Coast Charters CE-560XL Pax 0 RTO & Rwy Exc 0.35 ANC04FA026 S 2/20/2004 Serious Ft. Lauderdale Aztec Captital Corporation Lear 25B Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.15 NYC04LA088 S 3/19/2004 Mnr/None Utica, NY Airnet Systems Lear 35A Pax 0 App & Landing 0.35 NYC04RA153 D 7/2/2004 Fatal Tocumen, Panama Air Trek AIA-1124 Med 6 LOC T/O-Climbout 0.35 DEN05MA029 D 11/28/2004 Fatal Montrose, CO Air Castle Corporation CL-600 Pax 3 LOC T/O-Climbout 0.35 DEN05LA111 S 7/15/2005 Serious Eagle, CO Aspen Base Operations Lear 35A Pax 0 Landed hard 0.15 CHI06LA058 S 1/5/2006 Mnr/None Woodruff, WI Netjets as Executive CE-560 Pax 0 RE-Landing 0.15 NYC06FA137 D 6/2/2006 Fatal Groton, CT International Jet Charter Lear 35A Pax 2 App & Landing 0.35 MIA07RA034 D 1/9/2007 Fatal Guadalajara, Mex Ameristar Jet Charter Lear 24F Cargo 2 CFIT 0.35 CHI07CA058 S 1/10/2007 Mnr/None Columbus, OH Airnet Systems Lear 35 Cargo 0 LOC In Flight 0.55 NYC07LA081 S 3/17/2007 Mnr/None Beverly, MA Air Trek CE-500 Med 0 App & Landing 0.15 NYC07LA202 S 8/23/2007 Mnr/None Westhampton, NY Jet Share US Lear 60 Pax 0 App & Landing 0.15 DCA08MA085 D 7/31/2008 Fatal Owatonna, MN East Coast Jets HS-125-800 Pax 8 App & Landing 0.15 CEN09CA175 S 2/24/2009 Mnr/None KC, MO Bankair Lear 35A Cargo 0 App & Landing 0.15