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92–592 2015

HEARING 2 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS 

SURROUNDING THE 2012 

TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, 

LIBYA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 10, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 

2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Libya 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

www.fdsys.gov 


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HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 

TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman 

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

MARTHA A. ROBY, Alabama 

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana 

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland 

Ranking Minority Member 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

PHIL KIKO, Staff Director 

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director 


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HEARING 2 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:23 a.m., in Room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Trey Gowdy [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gowdy, Brooks, Jordan, Roby, Roskam, 

Westmoreland, Cummings, Sa ́nchez, Schiff, and Smith [via speaker 

phone]. 

Staff Present: Phil Kiko, Staff Director and General Counsel; 

Chris Donesa, Deputy Staff Director; Dana Chipman, Chief Counsel; Luke Burke, Investigator; Carlton Davis, Counsel; Sharon 

Jackson, Deputy Chief Counsel; Sara Barrineau, Investigator; 

Craig Missakian, Deputy Chief Counsel; Yael Barash, Legislative 

Clerk; Paul Bell, Minority Press Secretary; Linda Cohen, Minority 

Senior Professional Staff; Ronak Desai, Minority Counsel; Shannon 

Green, Minority Counsel; Susanne Grooms, Minority Staff Director; 

Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Communications Director; Peter 

Kenny, Minority Counsel; Laura Rauch, Minority Senior Professional Staff; Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; Dan Rebnord, 

Minority Professional Staff; Kendal Robinson, Minority Professional Staff; Mone ́ Ross, Minority Staff Assistant; Heather Sawyer, 

Minority Chief Counsel; and Brent Woolfork, Minority Senior Professional Staff. 

Chairman GOWDY. I want to welcome everyone. I want to apologize to our two witnesses and to everyone else who has been waiting. Just blame me for the delay. That would be the quickest and 

easiest thing to do. But we apologize for it. And I will do my best 

to start on time henceforth. 

This is ‘‘Hearing Number Two: Reviewing Efforts to Secure U.S. 

Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel.’’ The committee will come to 

order. Chairman notes a quorum for taking testimony pursuant to 

the appropriate House Resolution number and House Rule number. 

I will now recognize myself for an opening statement and then 

the gentleman from Maryland. 

In September of 2012, four of our fellow Americans were killed 

and others were injured in an attack on our facility in Benghazi, 

Libya. Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, Glen Doherty, and Ambassador 

Chris Stevens died under circumstances most of us cannot fathom. 

Fire, violence, terror, the weaponry of war. 

I want to read something and I want to ask my colleagues to listen to what I read, not just to the words, but I want you to imagine 

having to live through or die through the experience: On September the 11th, 2012, at 9:45 p.m., 20 or more armed men assemVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:36 Jan 17, 2015 Jkt 092592 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A592.XXX A592

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bled outside the U.S. mission in Benghazi and breached the mission gate. Several Ansar al-Sharia members have been identified 

among this group. The initial attackers were armed with AK-47- 

type rifles, handguns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers. During 

this initial attack, buildings within the mission were set on fire. 

The fire set during the attack led to the deaths of Ambassador 

Christopher Stevens and Sean Smith. The remaining State Department personnel escaped to a nearby U.S. facility, known as the 

Annex, and also came under attack which continued throughout 

the early morning hours of September 12th, culminating in a mortar attack that killed Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. 

What I just read is the now official position of the U.S. Government filed in U.S. District Court by the Department of Justice in 

a motion to detain the one defendant who has been captured and 

will stand trial. 

Twenty or more men, the weapons of war, arson, sustained attacks, precision mortars, terrorist groups. 

It is interesting to note the use of the word ‘‘terrorist,’’ so rarely 

used in the days and weeks after Benghazi by people in positions 

of power is now the very word used in the very statute charging 

the very defendant accused of killing our four fellow Americans. 

‘‘Conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists resulting in death.’’ That’s the charge. That is the official 

charge, the official position of the United States Government. 

But in the days after the attack in Benghazi, the word ‘‘terrorist’’ 

was edited out and changed. Now the administration uses the word 

‘‘attack.’’ In the days after the attack in Benghazi, the administration edited out and changed the word ‘‘attack.’’ 

It is one thing to have it wrong initially and eventually get it 

right. It is another thing to have it right initially and then edit it 

and change it so that it is wrong. 

I remain keenly aware there are those on both sides of the aisle 

who have concluded that all questions have been answered, there 

is nothing left to do, no more witnesses to talk to, no more documents to review. It is worth noting that some of those very same 

folks did not think that Benghazi should have been looked at in the 

first place. 

But I disagree. I do not think we should move on until there is 

a complete understanding of how the security environment described by our own Government in court documents was allowed to 

exist. 

I don’t think we should move on until we understand why we 

were told special precautions have been taken prior to the anniversary of 9/11. What precautions were taken? Where? By whom? Why 

were we told the Benghazi facility was secure? Why were we told 

it was a strong security presence in Benghazi when we now know 

that was false? 

And it wasn’t true at the time it was said. 

We should not move on until there is a complete understanding 

of why requests for additional security were denied, by whom they 

were denied, and why an ambassador, trusted to represent us in 

a dangerous land, wasn’t trusted to know what security he needed 

to do his job. 


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It has been 2 years. And we know the requests for additional 

equipment and personnel were denied, but we don’t have a full understanding of why those requests were denied, and we should not 

move on until there is a complete understanding of that and why 

the official position of our Government is so different today than 

it was in the days and the weeks after Benghazi. 

The facts haven’t changed. The evidence hasn’t changed. But the 

way our Government characterizes Benghazi has changed a lot. 

This hearing will continue our committee’s efforts to ensure the 

recommendations made after the attacks on Benghazi are actually 

implemented. And I will pledge again a process worthy of the memory of the four who were killed and worthy of the respect of our 

fellow citizens. 

But I also pledge that we are going to keep asking questions 

until we have a complete understanding of what happened. And, to 

that end, we will have hearings in January and February and 

March and until. And that means access to all the documents and 

that means access to all the witnesses with knowledge. This committee will be the last best hope for answering the questions surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. And we may actually wind up 

answering some of the questions more than once. We may risk answering a question twice. That seems like a really small investment compared with what others have given and are currently giving to our country. 

With that, I would recognize the gentleman from Maryland. 

[Prepared statement of Chairman Gowdy follows:] 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing and as well as our previous hearing three 

months ago on this topic, which was proposed by Congressman 

Schiff. 

These two hearings demonstrate the continued commitment of 

both Democrats and Republicans to making our embassies safe. 

As I have often said, this is our watch. This is not about today 

or tomorrow. This is about generations yet unborn. And so we all 

take this assignment very seriously. 

Over the course of 18 months of exhaustive investigations—first 

by the independent Accountability Review Board and then by seven 

congressional committees—we have learned many answers to questions about what happened in Benghazi and what changes are 

needed to improve security at our diplomatic facilities overseas. 

But as we have also seen, when it comes to Benghazi, too many 

people are unaware that questions have been answered or are unwilling to accept the answers they hear. 

Our ‘‘Benghazi on the Record: Asked and Answered’’ Web site 

centralizes, in one place, these answers. 

Since we met last, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence publicly released its bipartisan, unanimously-adopted report. As our Intelligence Committee colleagues explained ‘‘This report and the nearly two years of intensive investigation it reflects 

is meant to serve as the definitive House statement on the Intelligence Community’s activities before, during, and after tragic 

events that caused the death of four brave Americans.’’ 


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These bipartisan findings join the previous conclusions of the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee about the military’s 

readiness and response on the night of the attacks. 

Our committee’s Democratic members have urged the chairman 

to review and accept these findings as we do not think that there 

is any reason for this Committee to reinvestigate these facts, repeat the work already completed by our Republican and Democratic colleagues, and squander millions of hardworking dollars 

that come from hardworking taxpayers. 

We appreciate that the Chairman has decided to use this hearing 

to focus on constructive reform instead of retreading the same 

ground that other committees have already investigated. Investigated in a way that perhaps one would investigate something if 

they were looking at it under a high-power microscope. 

We urge him to keep his focus on these constructive efforts and 

not be lured off this path by partisan politics. We are bigger than 

that, and we are better than that. 

And I appreciate you, Mr. Chairman, for our discussions where 

you have agreed by the end of the year to give us a scope as to 

exactly what we will be looking at. And hopefully we will be able 

to come to conclusions about what we do agree on so that we can 

focus on those things that we still need to investigate. 

I also appreciate the fact that you have agreed to meet with me 

and the Speaker tomorrow with regard to rules of the committee. 

I think you and I agree that it is nice to have structure because 

it helps us to deal with issues that may come up. And I do really 

appreciate that. 

Immediately after the Benghazi attacks, the independent Accountability Review Board conducted a blistering examination of 

what went wrong at the State Department and identified 29 recommendations for reform. 

Secretary Clinton accepted every single one of them. And the inspector general reported, ‘‘the Department wasted no time addressing the recommendations.’’ 

During our first hearing three months ago, Assistant Secretary 

Starr testified that the Department had closed 22 of the ARB’s 29 

recommendations. 

Since then, the Department has continued making steady 

progress. I am pleased to hear that. It has closed three more recommendations and continues to make progress on the remaining 

four. 

The Department has now delivered fire safety equipment to all 

but one high-threat post, and it has affirmed compliance with fire 

safety and equipment requirements in safe havens and in safe 

areas in overseas facilities. 

The ARB found that the lack of adequate fire safety equipment 

may have contributed to the tragic consequences that night, so I 

am heartened to hear that the Department has completed this recommendation since our last hearing. 

The Department has also closed a recommendation for increasing 

diplomatic security staffing to address the staffing shortcomings 

identified by the ARB. Mr. Starr’s testimony indicates that the new 

positions are fully funded and that the Department intends to complete all of the remaining new hires by early 2015. 


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The Department has also instituted mandatory threat training 

for high-risk posts and created a working group to develop joint 

risk management courses, further addressing shortcomings that 

the ARB identified with regard to the training and expertise of Department personnel. 

I look forward to hearing more from Mr. Starr on the work that 

remains to be done. 

We also are joined today by Inspector General Linick. In a September 2013 report, his office made seven security-related recommendations that overlapped to a large degree with the ARB’s 

recommendations. I was heartened to hear that six of these recommendations are now closed. 

Concerns remain, however, including lingering questions about 

whether the Department has made sufficient changes to ensure 

that Department bureaus are communicating effectively and decisionmaking authority is centralized and clear. 

Regarding the ARB process, the Inspector General’s Office examined the 12 ARBs convened following the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings through the 2012 Benghazi attacks. They concluded that the ARB process ‘‘operated as intended—independently 

and without bias—to identify vulnerabilities in the Department of 

State’s security programs.’’ 

The Inspector General nonetheless recommended adjustments to 

the process, and it is my understanding that the discussions on 

those recommendations are ongoing. 

As I close, one of these recommendations was for the Department 

to amend its Foreign Affairs Manual to institutionalize responsibility for ARB implementation. As the Inspector General’s report 

noted, ‘‘handling of the Benghazi ARB recommendations represented a significant departure from the previous norm in that 

Secretary Clinton took charge directly of oversight for the implementation process.’’ The Inspector General found that the highlevel attention devoted to this task, ‘‘establishes a model for how 

the department should handle future ARB recommendations.’’ 

I am interested in hearing from Mr. Starr as to whether the Department has made the recommended change. 

And to that end, I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank the gentleman from Maryland. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Cummings follows:] 

Chairman GOWDY. The committee will now receive testimony 

from today’s witness panel. First witness will be the Honorable 

Gregory B. Starr, the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security 

at the Department of State. The second witness will be Honorable 

Steve Linick, the inspector general for the Department of State. 

Welcome to both of you. Again, my apologies for you having to 

wait on me. 

You will each be recognized for your 5-minute opening. There are 

a series of lights that mean what they traditionally mean in life. 

With that, Secretary Starr. 


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STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY B. STARR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND THE HONORABLE STEVE LINICK, 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY B. STARR 

Mr. STARR. Thank you, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and distinguished committee Members. Thank you for 

inviting me again to update you on the State Department’s 

progress in implementing the recommendations made by the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, and I will refer to 

that in the future as the ARB. 

I would like to acknowledge my copanelist, inspector Steve 

Linick. Inspector Linick works closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security on many issues, some of which the committee has 

highlighted for discussion today. And although I am focused primarily on the Benghazi ARB implementation today, I hope to be 

able to provide some insights into how the Department works with 

the Inspector General’s Office to ultimately improve security 

around the world. 

The task of keeping U.S. personnel overseas safe is dynamic and 

an ever evolving process. We work constantly to improve our practices and protect our people. 

The ARB process is an important tool towards that goal, and 

today we are safer and more secure because of the recommendations of the Benghazi panel and other ARBs. 

Our progress on the Benghazi ARB is measurable and sustained. 

And, importantly, many of the lessons learned are further incorporated into policy. Of the 29 recommendations, we have now 

closed 25 of them. That includes three that we have closed since 

September, my last testimony, based on further work and analysis. 

We are committed to finishing the work yet to do on the final 

four recommendations and will not lose sight of continuing and 

building on the security and procedural improvements that have already been instituted. 

I would like to highlight just a few examples of what we have 

done to improve our security posture since the attacks in Benghazi. 

These are specific, tangible changes. 

We have more Diplomatic Security and Department of Defense 

personnel on the ground at our facilities today. 

We have increased the skills and competencies for Diplomatic Security agents by increasing the training time in the high-threat 

course. 

We have expanded the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course for 

our colleagues beyond high-threat posts because we recognize that 

the value of these skills extends to all foreign service personnel and 

other employees at our posts overseas. These are skills that people 

can take with them to make us safer and make them safer in every 

post that they are at. 

There are broader, more programatic changes. One which I discussed in September is the launch of the Vital Presence Validation 

Process, or our shorthand for that is VP2. Through VP2, the State 

Department asks itself hard questions to balance the risks and the 

benefits at our highest threat posts. The end result is a clear-eyed 


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risk assessment of whether the U.S. should operate in those dangerous locations and, if so, how do we operate. 

Where the process determines that U.S. national interests require us to operate at dangerous posts, the Department undertakes 

measures to mitigate identified risks and prioritizes resources to do 

so. 

The steps we have taken to implement the Benghazi ARB recommendations underscore an important point. We live in a world 

with more unstable and dangerous locations. Our foreign policy 

often demands that we send our people to work in those very 

places that are increasingly perilous. 

We cannot eliminate risk. The threats evolve. As a result, the 

work of securing our facilities and safeguarding our people is never 

complete. We are committed to implementing the ARB’s recommendations, but we are also committed to looking forward to 

meeting the new challenges and threats as they develop. 

Our best assets in this effort are our people. Our highly trained 

foreign service officers and security personnel are out in the field 

every day executing U.S. foreign policy. They deserve the credit 

and thanks for the work that they do on our behalf. 

It is our job to do everything we can to reduce the risks they 

face. As the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, I am committed to keeping our people as safe as possible. 

I know that the committee as well as the Inspector General’s Office shares our commitment in making that true, keeping our people as safe as possible. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer questions 

from the committee about the implementation of the ARB. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Starr. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:] 


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Chairman GOWDY. Mr. Linick. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVE LINICK 

Mr. LINICK. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and 

Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding our review of the ARB process and associated work 

we have conducted in recent years on security-related matters. 

Since the September 2012 attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities 

and personnel in Benghazi, the OIG has redoubled its oversight related to security, issuing inspection and audit reports specifically 

targeting security matters. In addition to that work, we inspect 

posts across the globe, and we review security-related matters at 

each one. 

In my comments today, I will address the ARB process and discuss findings based on our other security-related work. 

In September 2013, OIG published its report on the special review of the Accountability Review Board process, the process by 

which the Department’s ARBs are established, supported, staffed to 

conduct it. 

The special review also examined the manner in which the Department tracks the implementation of ARB recommendations. 

We found that follow through on long-term security program improvements involving physical security, training, and intelligence 

sharing lacked sustained oversight by the Department’s principals. 

The lack of follow through explains in part why a number of 

Benghazi ARB recommendations mirror previous ARB recommendations. We concluded that the implementation of ARB recommendations works best when the Secretary of State and other 

Department principals take full ownership of the implementation 

process. 

OIG’s special review made 20 formal recommendations. In May 

of 2014, I notified the Deputy Secretary of State for Management 

and Resources of the status of those recommendations, and I provided additional suggestions and intended to enhance the effectiveness of the ARB process. 

Although some of our recommendations related to the special review and my later suggestions remain unresolved at this time, OIG 

has found evidence that the Department has made progress in addressing some of the security concerns. 

During fiscal year 2015, we will be conducting a formal followup review on compliance with our own recommendations and with 

the Benghazi ARB recommendations. 

In addition to the ARB review process, OIG has issued a variety 

of reports covering significant security matters. I take this opportunity to highlight four areas of concern. 

The first relates to physical security deficiencies. OIG reports 

demonstrate that the Department is at increased risk because it 

lacks sufficient processes and planning to ensure that the Department fully understands the security needs and priorities at posts 

around the world. If the Department cannot identify security 

vulnerabilities, it cannot adequately plan, budget for, or implement 

solutions. 

In 2012, OIG conducted a series of audits of posts located in Europe, Latin America, and Africa, which identified physical security 


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deficiencies at nine embassies and one consulate that required immediate attention. A number of these posts were designated highthreat. OIG auditors found that the posts were generally not in 

compliance with the Department’s physical and procedural security 

standards. 

Security deficiencies common among the posts included, among 

others, the failure to meet minimum compound perimeter requirements and to properly conduct inspections of vehicles before entering posts. 

The most egregious problem that we found in these audits and 

have identified in recent inspections is the use of warehouse space 

or other remote facilities for offices which do not comply with 

standards and places personnel at great risk. 

The second area of concern involves exceptions and waivers 

granted from compliance and security standards. OIG has found 

that a number of overseas posts had not maintained accurate exception and waiver records. In addition, OIG found that the Bureau 

of Diplomatic Security was not monitoring posts to determine 

whether they were obtaining waivers and exceptions for deviations 

from standards. 

The Department has reported that it has remediated that condition at this time. 

The third area of concern involves stovepiping of security issues. 

Although the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and the Overseas 

Building Operations share responsibility for ensuring posts’ physical security needs, they don’t adequately coordinate. 

The fourth issue of concern relates to vetting of local guards. DS 

oversees local guard forces that are a critical part of security at Department missions overseas. They typically are posted outside or 

just inside the perimeter of the embassy compound and are often 

responsible for searching vehicles, et cetera. 

We conducted an audit of the DS local guard and noted in June 

20 of 2014 that none of the six security contractors reviewed by 

OIG fully performed the vetting procedures specified. One bad 

actor with the right position and access can seriously endanger the 

safety and security of personnel overseas. 

In conclusion, security issues have been and continue to be a top 

priority for my office. I want to thank my staff for their professionalism and commitment to this effort. I look forward to continuing to engage with the Department and Congress over these 

matters in the coming months in an effort to mitigate risks and 

avoid future incidents like the attacks that occurred in Benghazi. 

Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of 

the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify 

today. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Linick. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Linick follows:] 


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Chairman GOWDY. The chair will now recognize the gentlelady 

from Indiana, Mrs. Brooks. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for appearing here today and for your service to our country. 

As the inspector general, Mr. Linick, and all inspector generals 

for all agencies, would it be correct to say that generally you are 

charged with ensuring that in this case that the State Department 

is effectively managed and accountable for its decisions? Is that 

what inspector generals do? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And you conduct audits. We have heard you talk 

about audits, evaluations. The way inspector generals do that is 

they conduct audits, evaluations, inspections. And you have just 

mentioned some of those. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. And we look at programs and operations as 

well. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And so you are like the internal watchdog or internal police department for an agency and for the State Department 

specifically. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. 

Mrs. BROOKS. But you are not appointed by the Secretary of 

State. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. No. I was appointed by the President and confirmed 

by the Senate. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And when were you appointed? 

Mr. LINICK. I was appointed in September of 2013. 

Mrs. BROOKS. So that means that actually you have complete 

independence, don’t you, from the State Department and the decisions that they make? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, we are independent. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And before that, you actually, as I understand, like 

myself, were Federal prosecutor, focused on fraud types of matters. 

Mr. LINICK. I was for 16 years. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And, in your finding that you undertook of the 

ARB, it is my understanding that you felt—and this is quoting— 

your most important finding was that the oversight of the ARB recommendations must be at the highest levels within the Department. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. That’s correct. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And what highest level were you referring to? 

Mr. LINICK. At least at the Deputy Secretary level. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And, in your opinion, is that where the implementation of the ARB recommendation stands at this point? 

Mr. LINICK. That remains an unresolved recommendation. We 

did receive revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual yesterday, and 

we are looking at them now. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And so the recommendation—and that recommendation was made by the IG that, in fact, the Foreign Affairs 

Manual should specifically state to other employees of the Department that these recommendations would be undertaken by the, at 

a minimum, Secretary of State or the highest levels, the principals 

like the Deputy Secretary. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 


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Mrs. BROOKS. And so you have stated that, in fact, they have 

provided that to you yesterday. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. We did receive a revision to the Foreign Affairs 

Manual, but we have not analyzed it yet. So the recommendation 

remains unresolved. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And so let’s talk about unresolved or closed and 

findings. When the inspector general makes recommendations and 

brings forth their findings, they are in several different categories. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Unresolved, closed, resolved. 

Mr. LINICK. Exactly, yes. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Can you share with us what ‘‘unresolved’’ means? 

Mr. LINICK. So there are really two buckets. There are open recommendations and closed recommendations. Open recommendations can either come in two forms: They can be resolved or unresolved. So if the Department agrees in principle with a recommendation, that will be open and resolved. It will not be closed 

until the Department proves to us—because we are in the trust but 

verify business—you know, that it, in fact, has been implemented. 

An open recommendation which is unresolved means generally 

the Department disagrees with the OIG. And we don’t have resolution on that. So it remains open as well. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Can I just ask—and sorry to interrupt—approximately how many open and unresolved recommendations are 

there? 

Mr. LINICK. In the ARB report? 

Mrs. BROOKS. Yes. 

Mr. LINICK. At this time, there are seven unresolved recommendations. Like I said, a couple of them that—that might 

change. We are also doing a compliance follow-up review, which 

means we are actually going and doing another inspection to see 

whether or not our recommendations actually have been complied 

with. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Is that common practice, that you always do that— 

compliance reviews of your recommendations? 

Mr. LINICK. We don’t always do that. It is very resource-intensive. Typically what would happen is the Department would come 

back and say, here is documentation showing that we have implemented your recommendation and we would close it. 

The compliance follow-up review is really a different animal because we actually do a completely separate inspection or audit to— 

and actually do interviews and test whether or not implementation 

has occurred. It is not something we do frequently. We do it in 

cases where we believe the recommendations are significant or 

where we felt that compliance was lacking. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And do you also, when you go back and do the 

compliance review, do you also look into recommendations that 

have been closed? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes. We look at all of the recommendations from 

soup to nuts to see where they stand. So just because we have 

closed them because we have documentation we are going to go behind that documentation and verify whether, in fact, it has been 

implemented. 


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Mrs. BROOKS. Are you aware as to whether or not prior inspector 

generals actually ever did what you are doing with respect to compliance reviews when it comes to physical security of our Embassies? 

Mr. LINICK. I believe our office has done some compliance followup reviews. 

Mrs. BROOKS. But is it fair to say that a number of the recommendations that were in the Benghazi ARB were also in the 

Nairobi ARB? 

Mr. LINICK. Oh, absolutely. We did see a number of repeat recommendations, from enhancing training to enhancing the Marine 

Security Guard program, to enhancing interagency sharing and so 

forth. 

Mrs. BROOKS. So there have, obviously, been previous ARBs 

where recommendations were made where the State Department 

closed or agreed with the recommendations but yet we still had the 

same problem. 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 

Mrs. BROOKS. In 2012. 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 

Mrs. BROOKS. So, with respect to the closed—and there are a 

number of closed recommendations—what do you expect to happen—what does ‘‘closed’’ mean? You have talked about open and 

unresolved. What do closed recommendations mean? 

Mr. LINICK. Closed recommendations mean they provided documentation to us to prove that they’ve complied with the recommendation. In the compliance follow-up review, we will interview and look more closely and drill down to see whether or not 

it is, in fact, closed. 

So closed is a preliminary conclusion, if you will, about the status 

of the recommendation. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And, in fact, when would you have received the— 

when you have made the decision that something was closed or not 

closed? 

Mr. LINICK. We would make that decision after our compliance 

follow-up team, we have a special team that does this, reviews the 

documentation and then determines whether that documentation, 

in fact, meets the intent of our recommendation. 

Mrs. BROOKS. But, in fact, as late as June of 2014, in fact, you 

just mentioned physical security deficiencies, exceptions in waivers, 

stovepiping, and vetting of local guards are still unresolved and so 

are not closed. 

Mr. LINICK. Those—those were recommendations from other reports. In other words—so we have done—we have done the ARB review, and we have focused on process and we have focused on how 

they implemented the ARB recommendations. We have issued a 

number of other reports which identify, among other things, lack 

of compliance with standards, and inadequate vetting of local 

guards. And we made a whole bunch more recommendations in 

connection with those reports, and they are at various stages of closure, et cetera. 

Mrs. BROOKS. The Best Practices Panel’s most important recommendation—you are familiar with the Best Practices Panel, 

which happened after the ARB, are you not? 


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Mr. LINICK. I am indeed. 

Mrs. BROOKS. In fact, it, too, indicated that elevating the importance of security and making diplomatic security an equal partner 

was its most important recommendation. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. I believe that was recommendation number one. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And yet we learned at that time at our last hearing that the State Department rejected that recommendation. Has 

there been a change from our last hearing to today? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, we are not monitoring compliance with that 

recommendation, so I don’t know the answer to that question. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Do you know with respect to this exact recommendation, and that is the fact that we believe—and that panels 

have made the recommendation that, in fact, all of the implementation of the various recommendations of the ARB should be made 

at one of the highest levels. These are the principals. Is that correct? The principals under the Secretary of State? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, that is correct. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And, in fact, the oversight right now in the implementation is being made in the Office of Management Policy and 

Rightsizing. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. I believe they are tracking the implementation of it, 

yes. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And that is actually what Mr. Starr said. And 

‘‘tracking’’ just means, is it being done? Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. We think that the Deputy Secretary ought to take 

responsibility for oversight of the implementation, that she take responsibility for making sure that those recommendations are followed through, that there is sufficient funding to ensure that they 

are completed and that they are adequately shared among the 

State Department community so everybody knows what they are, 

why they are important. That is what we are seeking with our particular recommendation. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Do you know who at the State Department, at the 

time that they rejected that recommendation, and that recommendation was rejected, do you know who at the State Department made that decision to reject that recommendation? 

Mr. LINICK. The Sullivan recommendation or our recommendation? 

Mrs. BROOKS. Both. The recommendation to reject that the Deputy Secretary should be the level responsible for implementing all 

of these recommendations. 

Mr. LINICK. As to the Sullivan recommendation, I don’t know 

who—who, if anyone, rejected that. I know the Deputy Secretary 

is considering our recommendation. And, in fact, I believe, like I 

said, there is a revision to the Foreign Affairs Manual which apparently does embody that. But we haven’t closed that yet because we 

haven’t had the opportunity to analyze it and assess it. 

Mrs. BROOKS. And, Mr. Starr, do you know who made that decision at that time? 

Mr. STARR. I don’t believe that there was a decision not to comply with that recommendation. 

Two things, Congresswoman. One, it was the Secretary himself 

who ultimately decided that we did not need an Under Secretary 

after consideration through various levels of the Department. 


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In terms of the implementation of the ARB, the paperwork that 

we have put forward to modify the FAM does show that it is the 

Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources who will be the 

oversight officer for ARBs. 

And if you would permit me, just for a second. While this is a 

change to the FAMs, I have been in multiple meetings since the 

arrival of Deputy Secretary Higginbottom, and I was in multiple 

meetings beforehand while Tom Nides was still the Deputy Secretary, where the Deputy was taking direct charge of the oversight 

of the implementation of the ARB recommendations. 

The MPRI group is the staff that is tracking them and then 

bringing these up and presenting them to the Deputy Secretary. 

And then we have had multiple meetings where myself, major officers from all the regional bureaus, the Deputy Secretary heading 

the meeting, plus MPRI, plus CT, plus the other bureaus have been 

in these. 

So I think it is very clear that the Deputy Secretary and our 

highest levels have been involved in the implementation of the 

ARB. What we are doing now is making sure that it is codified in 

the FAMs. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back, but I would like to add, it is about time. Thank you. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank the gentlelady from Indiana. 

The chair will now recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Sa ́nchez. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome and thank both witnesses for being here 

today. 

And I want to follow up on this line of questioning with respect 

to the physical security of Embassies and mission facilities. 

Two of the past ARB recommendations that remain open, if I am 

not mistaken, are from the 1999 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs. 

And in those ARBs, they recommended that physical security upgrades be made immediately and that State work to obtain sufficient funding for building programs because that was a need that 

was identified. 

And as a result of those recommendations, the Capital Security 

Cost Sharing Program was initiated to pay for the costs of building 

new Embassies and consulates. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. That is correct. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. With funding constraints and other challenges delaying efforts to better secure its facilities, how is the State Department addressing the need to provide necessary security at this 

point? 

Mr. STARR. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. 

Congress has been extraordinarily generous with the Department. Since the Nairobi bombings in 1998, we have constructed 

nearly 100 new facilities around the world. 

We have done major security upgrades to our facilities around 

the world that we could not replace right at that moment. 

There is not a post out there that doesn’t have anti-ram walls 

and vehicle bars and gates, does not have guard programs, police 

protecting it, forced entry doors and windows, shatter-resistant 


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window film. Now, after Benghazi, additional Marines, additional 

RSOs. 

We have been committed since, quite frankly, since 1985 in increasing the programs. 

I think the funding that we originally got under the Capital Cost 

Sharing Program was about $1.3 billion a year. And by 2012, 2013, 

instead of the original six or eight facilities that we were able to 

build a year, we were building perhaps one or two, perhaps three 

because of inflation costs. 

After Benghazi, Congress was again very generous with the Department and has authorized almost another billion dollars. And 

we are now, again, on an enhanced building program, building 

about six or seven new facilities a year. 

So I would say that while that recommendation remained open, 

technically, the Department, with the help of Congress, has done 

an amazing job enhancing the safety and security of our people 

through the years. 

I will not say that it is perfect. Clearly, I am here, and my job 

is to implement reforms after Benghazi and lessons that we have 

learned. We made mistakes there. But for the vast majority of 

places, I would tell you that the recommendations that came out 

of the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi bombings and those ARBs, we 

have assiduously been trying to implement those, and Congress has 

been very helpful. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Could you give me an idea, Mr. Starr, because it 

is a big job to try to go back and renovate facilities and bring them 

up to modern security standards. 

Could you estimate how many facilities you are talking about 

that you have to deal with in terms of assessing the physical security of those buildings? Ballpark figure. 

Mr. STARR. There are 275 U.S. Embassies, consulates, and consulate generals. There are approximately 10 other special missions. 

The facilities that make up those missions number over 1,000 different buildings. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. It is quite an undertaking, then, to consistently be 

upgrading their security. Would that be a fair statement? 

Mr. STARR. I think that is a fair statement. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Now, the Benghazi ARB found that the State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security 

Cost Sharing Program at its full capacity. 

Can you talk a little bit about the history of the funding and why 

Congress needed to restore to the full level the Capital Security 

Cost Sharing Program? 

Mr. STARR. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

As I alluded to just a moment ago, the original costs coming out 

of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs were approximately $1.3 

billion a year. 

In 1999 and 2000 and 2001, as we geared up the program, that 

gave us the ability to replace six, seven, eight, sometimes nine facilities a year—or individual buildings at least—and do some major 

security upgrades. 

But that funding level was constant from about 2000 until about 

2012. 


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Increased building costs, inflation and other things had reduced what we could do with that $1.3 billion. So we were hopeful, and, 

as I say, Congress was very generous in recognizing that that number had been eroded by inflation, and after Benghazi and I think 

in line with the ARB recommendation, worked with the Department and added nearly another billion dollars to that. So we are currently at approximately $2.3 billion under the Capital Cost Sharing Program per year, which has allowed us to do 

more security enhancements and build and replace more unsecure 

facilities. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. It is important to note that Congress 

does play a role in making sure that these facilities are physically 

secure. 

Mr. Starr, I would also like to ask you about temporary facilities. 

During our previous hearing, a number of members had questions about the diplomatic facility in Benghazi—whether it was a 

special mission compound or a temporary mission facility and 

whether the term used meant less stringent physical security 

standards applied to that facility. 

That issue was investigated by the ARB and numerous congressional committees over the past two years. At our last hearing, you 

addressed this concern, explaining, and I am going to quote from 

your testimony, ‘‘whether it is temporary or interim or permanent, 

that we should be applying the same security standards that the 

OSPB has put in place.’’ 

Is that still your understanding of how the Department is applying these standards today? 

Mr. STARR. Yes. That is a very hard lesson that we learned after 

Benghazi. I can tell you that in one particular location in the 

world—I won’t say it—where we have had to have operations 

where we were under great pressure to put people in and establish 

a temporary facility, I turned that down and said that we will continue to operate solely on a TDY basis until such time as we can 

identify a facility and bring it up to the necessary level of security 

in order to declare it a facility, i.e., meeting the OSPB standards 

for that type of facility. 

I got no pushback from the Department and, in fact, got a tremendous amount of support for this. 

I think you have correctly identified that the Benghazi—whatever you call it, the temporary facility or the special mission facility—despite efforts to do security upgrades to it, we know that it 

did not meet all of the standards. And we want to avoid a situation 

like that going forward. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I just want to point out that Mr. Linick, in his 

written testimony, noted in a March 2014 audit on physical security funding that diplomatic security and the Overseas Building 

Operations Bureau have differing interpretations of what the required physical security standards are for those overseas facilities. 

And the same IG report notes that in January 2013, the Department clarified that a single standard applies to all facilities. 

In June 2013, the Department further clarified that the OSPB 

standard set forth the minimum requirements. 

Has there been better communication now between the Department and the Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building OperVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:36 Jan 17, 2015 Jkt 092592 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A592.XXX A592

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ations and an agreed-upon standard for what those physical standards should be? 

Mr. STARR. There is no disagreement on what the physical security standards should be. Those standards are in our foreign affairs 

manuals and foreign affairs handbooks. They are approved by the 

Overseas Security Policy Board. And there is no disagreement on 

the standards. 

We do have different standards for a, let’s say a standalone 

building or an office that is in tenent commercial office space. 

But OBO, Overseas Buildings Operations, is very clear and understands what those standards are. There is no misunderstanding 

what the standards are and that they are there. 

I do think that the Inspector General’s inspections have been 

very helpful to us in many ways. Although sometimes I will disagree with some of the recommendations, and as Steve alluded to, 

we have some open recommendations where we may disagree. Ultimately, we come to resolution on the vast majority of them. 

In terms of what the inspectors found in some of their reports, 

it is my job as the head of security when we find security deficiencies that the IG may find to make sure that we are addressing 

them as fast as possible. 

And Steve’s inspectors in one instance did find that we had some 

significant differences between OBO and DS at a post overseas. I 

met 2 days after the inspectors came back with the head of OBO, 

we resolved those differences, and we have moved on and settled 

the differences and made the decisions on where we have to go. 

I meet virtually every week with the head of OBO. My staff 

meets at lower levels with OBO, and we have taken that recommendation very seriously. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Appreciate your testimony. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank the gentlelady from California. 

The chair would now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Westmoreland. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here. 

Mr. Starr, just a point of clarification.kv When they use the term 

‘‘closed’’ on the recommendations, that does not mean they are completed. Correct? 

I didn’t know it was that hard a question. 

Mr. STARR. As Steve alluded to, there is resolved; there is closed. 

We do our best when we get a recommendation to look at it and 

determine—— 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. But ‘‘closed’’ does not mean the recommendation has fully been implemented. Right? 

Mr. STARR. Closed—in most cases, it does. It means that we 

have, in fact, effected the change that was necessary to meet that 

recommendation. 

There are some recommendations that I would say, sir, are evergreen recommendations. If we put the policies and procedures in 

place and have to go through it, they may go on for a longer period 

of time. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you. 


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You were in diplomatic security at the State Department from 

1980 through your retirement in 2009. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. I was an agent. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. And from then, you went to head of the security for the United Nations? 

Mr. STARR. Correct, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. And, at the U.N., you were the Under Secretary to Safety and Security. Correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Is it true your Office of Diplomatic Security, 

or the DS, and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, or 

the OBO, are the two offices within the State Department that 

have the primary duty to ensure the safety and security of these 

overseas facilities? 

Mr. STARR. That is an accurate statement, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. According for the Foreign Affairs Manual, 

your office is expressly charged with the responsibility for ensuring 

that all new construction and major renovations comply with physical security standards even though the OBO does the actual construction. Is that true? 

Mr. STARR. Correct. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. And under—which Under Secretary is the 

DS? 

Mr. STARR. I serve—I am under Under Secretary Kennedy, the 

Under Secretary for Management—— 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. And who is the Under Secretary? OBO? 

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Also. 

And the Under Secretary for Management, Mr. Kennedy, has 

been in a position since November of 2007, I believe? Is that correct? You don’t know. 

Mr. STARR. I believe so, sir, but I am not certain of the date. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. Has Mr. Kennedy been with the 

State Department, as far as you know, from the early 1970s? 

Mr. STARR. I think Pat came in in about 1975. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. In fact, when the East African Embassies were bombed in 1998, Mr. Kennedy was in your position. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. At the time of the bombing, sir, my recollection is 

that we had a vacancy in the position and Under Secretary. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. He was the acting. 

Mr. STARR. He was the acting. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. And although you returned to the 

State Department after the Benghazi attacks, you are aware that 

virtually each and every finding and resulting recommendation in 

the Benghazi ARB centered on the special mission compound or facility being a high-threat post sorely lacking in personnel and physical security. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. I am aware of those recommendations in the ARB, 

sir, yes. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Are you aware that your own inspector general, Mr. Linick, since Benghazi, has conducted three reviews or 

audits in physical security issues at overseas posts particularly in 

these high-threat posts? 


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Mr. STARR. Yes, I am, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Are you also aware that the IG issued two 

other reports, one that looked at how you manage your local guard 

program and another that looks at how you manage your Marine 

security? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Let’s take a look at the IG report issued in 

June of 2013 that looked at how you comply with the physical security standards at five specific overseas posts that are considered 

high threat. Do you recall that report? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. As I understand it, that report only looked 

at Embassies or consulates that were constructed after the year 

2000. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. I believe so, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So all built after the East African Embassy 

bombings in 1998, where an ARB was sharply critical of the thenexisting physical security standards. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. I would say the Inspector General pointed out that 

there were some deficiencies in not meeting some of the standards. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. That means that they were all built after 

Congress passed the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act, as it is known, and gave the State Department a whole 

lot of money to improve those physical security overseas. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. STARR. Correct. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So, in this report, the IG team looked at 

physical security at the five posts that had a high-threat level and 

the audit team looked at such things as the height of the perimeter 

walls, the outside boundary, how far the buildings were from those 

outside walls, looked at the anti-ram barriers, the procedural— 

other barriers or resistant doors. 

Whether the local guards, which we have talked about prior, 

were properly inspecting, whether there were safe havens inside 

the building, and the like. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So let me ask you how the five Embassies 

or consulates did. Did any of them comply with all of the security 

standards that were reviewed? 

Mr. STARR. No, sir. None of them are perfect. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay—— 

Mr. STARR. If I may, sir. Every one of those facilities has police 

and guards on the outside. Every one of those facilities—— 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. I understand. I know. But my question was, 

had all of them been met? And your answer was no. 

Mr. STARR. No, sir. I want to make it clear, though, that most 

of the things that the Inspector General found were minor, do not 

present major vulnerabilities to us. Our philosophy of concentric 

rings of security—— 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. I have got some more questions. 

Mr. STARR [continuing]. I don’t expect that any Inspector General 

going out, any teams, is not going to find some things that can be 

improved. 


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Mr. WESTMORELAND. I understand. But your answer was no. Correct? 

Mr. STARR. Correct, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Now, the overseas post in question, once 

the problems were identified, took some sort of action to correct all 

the deficiencies. But you said they were very small deficiencies. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. STARR. In relation to what vulnerabilities they posed, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So at least at some of these posts, those 

problems have been fixed. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. It is my job to make sure that any time we see one 

of these vulnerabilities—— 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Are they fixed? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, they are. They are resolved. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Did the inspector general ask that you 

issue a directive to all your posts worldwide to see whether other 

posts have the same problems? 

Mr. STARR. For some things, yes. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. Did you agree to do this? 

Mr. STARR. No, I did not. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Oh, okay. 

Mr. Linick, I want to follow up on another review of the physical 

security related posts overseas. I understand that your office hired 

an outside company to review how the State Department processes 

these requests and prioritizes requests for these physical security 

upgrades. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. When the auditors looked at this, did they 

find a comprehensive list of all these reports or the deficiencies? 

Mr. LINICK. They didn’t find a comprehensive list of security 

needs and requests for security needs at posts around the world. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So they didn’t find a list of what may have 

been called in or asked for? 

Mr. LINICK. They did not—they did not find a list. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. Were the auditors able to review a 

list of these funding requests or a list of which requests were denied or granted? 

Mr. LINICK. There wasn’t a list. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So there wasn’t a list. 

Mr. LINICK. No. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. From DS, no list? 

Mr. LINICK. We did not find a comprehensive list of—— 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. OBO, no list? 

Mr. LINICK. No. But I understand they are working on that right 

now. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Okay. Is it true that the auditors found 

that the DS and OBO do not coordinate with each other to determine which requests should be given a priority? 

Mr. LINICK. They did find that in two respects. One, there were 

disagreements about the standards, which have since been remediated, which Mr. Starr had mentioned. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So the fact that Mr. Starr and the OBO get 

together once a week or once a month or whatever it is, they still 


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not come up with any of these lists that could be combined to be 

looked at? 

Mr. LINICK. I don’t believe we have seen a comprehensive list. 

But I am not entirely sure of that so I would have to get back to 

you. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Do you know of any comprehensive lists 

that may have been put into long-term planning for the future security of the request that has been made from these posts? 

Mr. LINICK. I know the Department has agreed to do it and so 

that recommendation has been resolved. But it still is open. 

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. We are 

now going to try to go to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. 

Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can everybody hear me? 

Chairman GOWDY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And I really appreciate your flexibility for 

this [Sound difficulties.] 

Chairman GOWDY. Adam, I may get you to act like you are mad 

and yell a little bit. I think the witnesses—we can hear you pretty 

good but not great. So if you could act like we are talking and you 

are yelling at me. 

Mr. SMITH. Trey, do you need me to repeat that? Do you need 

me to repeat what I just asked? 

Chairman GOWDY. Yes, sir. The witnesses are kind of leaning 

forward. If you could yell it as loud as you are willing to do it, 

Adam. 

Mr. SMITH. I will do that. I will repeat the question. My question 

was, there have been attacks before, and one of the allegations of 

the Benghazi ARB is that after those attacks, like the Embassy 

bombing in Africa, we issued a report, and we just sort of Groundhog’s Day. We don’t make improvements. We don’t respond. In my 

reading of what has happened since some of those previous attacks, 

I don’t believe that that is accurate. I was just wondering if you 

gentlemen could outline—as one example, the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa—what improvements were made as a result of the 

study of that problem? How much more money was spent? How 

were facilities upgraded? What has been done prior to Benghazi, to 

actually improve security at our overseas facilities? 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, thank you for the question. This is 

Greg Starr. I recognize that there are some similarities in the types 

of recommendations that were made going back through the years 

on ARBs, but I, like you, find it difficult to accept the premise that 

it is Groundhog Day, that we are just revisiting the same things. 

As I said before, a tremendous amount of progress was made 

through the years in building new facilities, in training different 

personnel, in adding local guard programs. Much of this work was 

done in concert with Congress. Congress has been very helpful in 

many ways in terms of funding and oversight. From 1988 to 1992, 

after the original Inman Commission, we built 22 new facilities. 

But then, after the end of the Cold War, the money sort of dried 

up and ran out, even though we wanted to build nearly 100. After 

the bombings in 1998, the money flow for building new Embassies 


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was given to us by Congress very generously, and we have replaced 

a tremendous amount of facilities. We have never had to give up 

one of those new facilities that we have built yet. 

I think the increases that we have done in training for our personnel, additional Marine detachments, things like more armored 

cars, and the things that we have done after Benghazi, the better, 

much closer relationships with the intelligence community and 

DOD, I think some of those things you can say, Well, weren’t you 

doing those things, you know, after Nairobi? Weren’t some of those 

things said in the ARBs? And there are some similarities, but I 

think the types of things we are facing are similar as well. I think 

we are going to see similar types of attacks. You may get, even in 

the future, the need for more training than we are even doing now. 

So I appreciate the comments because I believe, like you do, that 

while there may be some similarities, this is not Groundhog Day. 

We have made significant progress since Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. There are very few ARB recommendations through all of the 

ARBs that have been left open, and those few that are open we are 

still working to close. So thank you for the question, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. One of the big issues about Benghazi, not all State 

Department facilities are the same. I mean, when we think of our 

State Department presence overseas, I think most people typically 

imagine our embassy, the main facility. But as everybody knows, 

we have a number of different facilities where people are located 

throughout the world. One of the most dangerous places that I 

went to was Peshawar, where we have a consulate in Pakistan, a 

few years back—very dangerous place, very high security. 

Now, when you are determining what security to provide when 

you go to these temporary mission facilities or to the annexes or 

consulates and—specific to Libya, specific to the two facilities that 

were attacked—how would they have fallen under the new rules 

implemented after some of these other attacks, in understanding 

how to properly provide security for two facilities like the ones that 

were in Benghazi, which were not traditional Embassies or even 

consulates for that matter? Is this something that had been contemplated previously, and if so, what was the discussion about how 

to properly provide security for these different types of facilities? 

Mr. STARR. Unfortunately, sir, I am at a little bit of a loss. As 

one of the Congressmen has pointed out that while those discussions were taking place on what was going to happen for Benghazi, 

I was at the United Nations. I do know that we have all accepted 

the recommendations from the ARB, that perhaps there was a little 

too much confidence in the chief of mission and what he was saying, that we know that we did not meet all of the OSPB standards 

for either of those two locations, either the special annex or the 

special mission. I know that we are concentrating on learning the 

lessons from that. We have no temporary facilities today, no temporary facilities at all. And should we have to have those types of 

facilities, we will have a very long, hard discussion about what 

needs to go into them and make sure that they are as safe and secure as possible before we would let them be occupied. I am just 

at a little bit of a loss. I can’t comment on things that happened 

when I wasn’t here, sir. 


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Mr. SMITH. We talked about two other, I think, huge issues when 

it comes to providing security at our overseas facilities. Number 

one is money, particularly at this point, and I might also add particularly at the moment that Benghazi was attacked. I don’t imagine that there have been too many times in the history of our country when we had as many facilities throughout the globe that could 

not have been perceived to be at a high-threat level. First of all, 

it was the anniversary of 9/11. Second of all, we had already in the 

days prior, had riots and attacks on Embassies in I forget how 

many different countries. I certainly know in Cairo why the Embassy was attacked, and I think in somewhere close to a dozen others, we had that. The number one issue, and I will let you—well, 

I will mention them both. 

The number one issue is simple resources. In a world full of incredibly dangerous places, how do you decide how to properly allocate resources between a Benghazi and a Cairo and a Peshawar 

and Sana’a, and Yemen, and all those different places? What role— 

Congress, as you said, has been generous after some of these previous attacks, but there is still finite resources, number one. How 

do you make those decisions when there are so many places to protect? 

And then the second issue that I have encountered is, quite frequently, the chief of mission will disagree. The chief of mission will 

go to places where maybe the folks back in Washington, D.C., have 

said that he or she should not. There are many, many members of 

the State Department out in other countries who feel that their 

hands are being tied. In fact, I have heard this complaint now from 

a large number of State Department people referring to it as the 

‘‘Benghazi effect’’, that they can no longer do their job because we 

have gone back the other way and tried to be too cautious. Those 

are two very difficult issues, resources and then the conflict between a member of the State Department out in a foreign country 

in a dangerous place trying to do his or her job versus meeting the 

security. How do those two things get balanced throughout the 

State Department and throughout all of your security team? 

Chairman GOWDY. Adam, before they answer, this is Trey. There 

is less than a minute on the clock, but given the technical difficulties, I am going to let them answer this question in full and give 

you another question, given the difficulties we had on the front 

end, but I wanted to let you know where we were in terms of time. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. That is my last question. 

Chairman GOWDY. Okay. Answer as long as you need to, Mr. 

Starr and Mr. Linick. 

Mr. STARR. Thank you, Congressman. On the question of resources, you are correct, while Congress has been very generous 

with us, I am not going to sit here and say that it is solely a question of resources. Every year we look at every post in the world in 

concert with the Emergency Action Committee, in concert with the 

intelligence community, in concert with my threat analysis, and in 

concert with the regional bureaus; and we rate those threats for 

civil disorder, for terrorism, for crime, and for a couple of other 

things, and we rate them critical, high, medium, or low threats. 

Those ratings help us determine how to best allocate resources. We 

start with a base position that every one of our facilities should 


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meet the minimum OSPB standards, and as Steve has pointed out, 

there are some times where we have problems even doing that. 

When we find it, we upgrade them as fast as we can and make 

sure that they are there. There are many posts that we have to go 

very far above the minimum standards because of the specific nature of the threats, and the threats can differ. 

At a place where it is a threat of a car bomb, we are looking for 

additional setback. We are looking for additional barriers. When it 

is mob attacks, we may be looking at additional reinforcements in 

terms of the military on the ground. But we look at those threats 

at least for every single post in a formalized manner every single 

year, and I start my day every single morning with a threat roundup and looking at what is out there and make determinations 

whether or not we need to reinforce or do something at our Embassies. As you correctly pointed out, that does translate into problems 

sometimes where we have officers that feel that they can’t get out. 

We often have places where we have to balance getting the job 

done with an officer’s individual security and what the threats are. 

I think that is a healthy tension. I want Foreign Service officers 

that want to get out and want to get the job done. And I want posts 

that are looking closely at what the threats are and whether they 

should get out. Now, at our highest threat level posts, I think you 

will that find some of our officers may be frustrated sometimes because the security has to be overwhelming in many ways, has to 

be very strong. And the rest of our posts around the world, our people are getting out. Our people are engaging. Foreign Service officers are building democracy. There are rule-of-law programs, justice programs, USAID programs, humanitarian programs, and they 

are fulfilling those requirements. It is a balance, and it is a dance, 

I agree, but it is an important one, and the tension is good. 

Mr. LINICK. Congressman, this is Steve Linick. 

Just a couple of comments to add on to that. We haven’t looked 

at the sufficiency of resources, but our work in the resource area 

concerns how resources are prioritized. In other words, does the 

Department know what its resources are? Does the Department 

know what requests are made? Do they know how to prioritize 

across the board? That is really the point of the report that we 

issued on the topic of resources, which has been referenced already. 

And if the Department cannot make a determination as to which 

projects are high priority, then it is going to be difficult to solve 

problems and develop budgets. 

As to the second question on the Benghazi effect, I think ultimately this comes down to good risk management, and the ARB’s 

first recommendation discussed the need for the Department to 

make sure there is a mechanism in place to weigh policy concerns 

against risks. One of our recommendations was that this is so important that this should be elevated to the highest levels of the Department so that someone who is in a position of weighing policy 

considerations, namely whether we maintain presence in certain 

very dangerous areas, can make that determination and also be responsible when they have to sign on the dotted line and put people 

at temporary facilities or wherever in high-threat posts. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I just quickly follow up on that last point, and 

then I will be done. I think the problem and the issue when you 


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say take it up to that higher level, but once you have taken it up 

to that higher level, isn’t that person further away from the specific 

understanding of a given country or a given area? In some ways 

if you are going up to someone who’s at that deputy level, they are 

more distant from the problem and in some ways probably less 

qualified to make the call on whether or not a given action is proper for the security environment. Isn’t that one of the reasons why 

the State Department has been reluctant to implement that specific recommendation? 

Mr. LINICK. I am not sure whether or not they have been reluctant to adopt that recommendation. I know they have their VP2 

risk management system, and I don’t know to what extent that answers the question of raising risk management at a higher level. 

I guess I would say that we know that some of these decisions involve competing interests. At the lower levels, you have got your 

policy folks and then your security folks. Somebody has to be in 

charge of reconciling some of these competing interests because we 

know our policy folks want us to be in places. They want us to be 

out doing diplomacy. And our security folks want to minimize risk. 

So what we are saying is there needs to be somebody who is managing those competing interests and then taking responsibility for 

those decisions. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. Thank you very much, Trey. And thanks 

to the committee for the flexibility for allowing me to participate 

by phone. 

Chairman GOWDY. Adam, thanks for participating. Take care of 

yourself, and we will see you in January. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Chairman GOWDY. With that, the chair would now recognize the 

gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the chairman. 

Mr. Starr, safety is critically important, and I appreciate what 

you said in your written testimony. You said we want to keep our 

people safe. We will continue doing everything we can to support 

and protect them. It shouldn’t be a partisan issue, should it? Republican, Democrat, shouldn’t matter? 

Mr. STARR. I don’t think that is a partisan issue, sir. I have 

never had a problem up on the Hill where that is an issue. 

Mr. JORDAN. No. I wasn’t insinuating that. I am just saying that 

these people put their lives on the line. It doesn’t matter whether 

you are Republican, Democrat, who you are, what side you come 

from, the simple test should be, are the policies and actions we are 

putting in place making people safe. You would agree? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. From Secretary of State Madeleine Albright this 

after—it was a cyber security breach, but my guess is she would 

refer to any security breach. She said this, and I quote, ‘‘Even a 

score of 99 out of 100 is a failing grade.’’ That is a pretty strong 

statement, and I understand we don’t live in a perfect world. You 

have talked about that. We live in a dangerous world, and you 

have got to balance diplomacy with security and safety concerns, 

but I think the tenor of her statement was what we just talked 

about. Safety is critical, and we should do everything we can. It is 

of paramount importance. We should do all we can to make sure 


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our people are safe. You would agree with that, wouldn’t you, Mr. 

Starr? 

Mr. STARR. I need to try to do that, sir, but I will just add one 

inflection on this and that our primary and most important goal is 

to carry out the foreign policy of the United States Government. 

Mr. JORDAN. I understand. I understand the balance. 

Mr. STARR. And then while doing that, we have to do everything 

we can to safeguard our people. 

Mr. JORDAN. I get it. I get it. Mr. Starr, the number one question 

I get back home about Benghazi, the number one question I get, 

why were we there? Why were we there? It seems to me it is a fundamental question, especially in light of the very dangerous security situation that existed in Benghazi and, frankly, some other key 

facts. We have talked about this before, but Mr. Starr, the State 

Department has its own standards for physical security, the Overseas Security Policy Board standards. Were those followed with the 

Benghazi facility? 

Mr. STARR. No, sir, they were not met. 

Mr. JORDAN. And when you deviate from the standards, there is 

a waiver process that you are supposed to adhere to. Was the waiver process followed? 

Mr. STARR. I do not believe so, sir, no. 

Mr. JORDAN. No. Mr. Keil was here just a few months ago, and 

he said neither the standards or the waiver process was followed. 

And the State Department had a special designation for the 

Benghazi facility. Isn’t that correct, Mr. Starr. Didn’t you guys call 

it the temporary mission facility or the special mission—— 

Mr. STARR. I think it was the temporary mission facility or special mission facility. 

Mr. JORDAN. And was this a term created solely to do an end run 

around the standards and the waiver process? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I don’t believe anybody intentionally tried to run 

around the waiver or the standards process. I think it was a question that it was neither an Embassy or a consulate. I think they 

were trying to find—— 

Mr. JORDAN. If I could Mr. Starr, when Mr. Kyle testified here 

just 3 months, sat right there beside you, a gentleman that served 

23 years at the State Department, he said, in talking with people 

and based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the 

standards. Let me ask it this way. 

Mr. STARR. Well, I would disagree with Mr. Kyle. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. He has got a pretty good record, like you do 

as well, Mr. Starr. How many facilities does the State Department—diplomatic facilities—does the State Department currently 

have around the world? 

Mr. STARR. 275 Embassies, consulates and consulate generals, 

composing approximately 1,000 buildings. 

Mr. JORDAN. Your Web site says you have 285 U.S. diplomatic 

facilities worldwide. Is that accurate? 

Mr. STARR. 275 consulates, Embassies, consulate generals, and 

there are approximately 10 special missions, such as—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. Of the 275 or the 285, whatever number you 

want to use, are any of those today designated temporary mission 

facility or special mission compound? 


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Mr. STARR. No. 

Mr. JORDAN. None of them? 

Mr. STARR. None. 

Mr. JORDAN. Which sort of brings me back to my question, Mr. 

Starr. What was so important about Benghazi that we didn’t follow 

our own standards; we didn’t follow the waiver process; we created 

a term that is not used at any of our facilities, any of the 285 

today, special mission compound or temporary mission facility, a 

designation not used anywhere else today? What was so important 

that we do all that to be in Benghazi; we do all that to be in a 

place where four Americans were killed? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I would have to refer you to the results of the 

ARB, which I think address that. 

Mr. JORDAN. No, no. You are the witness from the State Department. I am asking you. 

Mr. STARR. I was not there when those determinations were 

made, and today we do not have facilities like that. 

Mr. JORDAN. No, no, no. I am asking you as the representative 

from the State Department to tell me what was so important that 

we don’t follow the standards; we don’t follow the waiver process; 

we create a new term out of thin air, and none of the facilities 

today—we are the United States of America. We have got more facilities probably than any other country in the world, 285, and none 

of them use that designation today. 

Mr. STARR. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. Tell me what was—why—we were in Tripoli. Why 

did we have to be in Benghazi? 

Mr. STARR. I would have to refer you to the ARB, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. Well, let me add to it. Maybe this will help you 

think about giving us an answer. In the 13 months prior to the attack on 9/11/2012, there were 200 security incidents in Libya, IED, 

RPG, assassination attempt on the British Ambassador. I mean, 

this was the Wild West. Repeated requests—here is the thing—repeated requests from our security personnel at the facility, repeated requests for additional security. They said we need more 

help. We need more good guys here. You guys said, Nope, we are 

not sending. In fact, what, they had you reduced. So again I ask, 

that situation, probably the most chaotic situation that we have 

around any of our facilities, a whole new term, don’t follow the 

standards, don’t adhere to the waiver process, why were we there? 

Mr. STARR. Sir, I think the ARB points out that there were mistakes made. I think it is very obvious that we had a tragedy that 

occurred, and I am not denying that a tragedy occurred. 

Mr. JORDAN. None of us are saying that. I am trying to get answers from you. 

Mr. STARR. What I am saying is that I think we have to learn 

from that lesson. I am not the witness to tell you what happened—— 

Mr. JORDAN. You are the State Department representative here 

at the hearing on the select committee to find out what happened. 

The most fundamental question is, why were we there in the first 

place? 


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Mr. STARR. I am here to discuss the things that we have put in 

place since the ARB and what we are doing to protect our people 

now. 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me ask you one other thing. Let me ask you another thing here. Do you happen to know the name of the government that was in place when we had those 200 security incidents 

in the 13 months leading up to this tragedy? Do you happen to 

know the name of the government that was in place when we had 

the IED attacks, the RPG attacks, the assassination attempt on the 

British Ambassador, what was the name of the Libyan Government 

at the time, Mr. Starr. Do you know? 

Mr. STARR. No, I don’t offhand. 

Mr. JORDAN. I will tell you. The Transitional National Council, 

Transitional National Council. Not exactly a title that inspires confidence, screams stability, does it, Mr. Starr? And yet we had to be 

there. We just had to be there. Now this committee, this committee 

is going to try to find out the answer. Since won’t give it to us, 

since you won’t hazard a guess, this committee is going to try to 

find out the answer. But, in the meantime, we are going to make 

sure we keep focused on what we started our conversation here 

about, Mr. Starr, and that is the safety of our people who serve 

abroad. 

Now, there was one good thing that came out of the ARB, one 

good thing. They said we are going to have a best practices panel, 

and that best practices panel made 40 recommendations, and the 

most important one is the one that Mr. Linick talked about earlier. 

The number one recommendation—frankly, the one that many of 

the other 39 hinge upon—says we need to create at the Under Secretary level, an Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Is the 

State Department going to do that, Mr. Starr, at the Under Secretary level? 

Mr. STARR. A decision has been made not to implement that recommendation. 

Mr. JORDAN. You are not going to do it. How many Under Secretaries are there at the State Department, Mr. Starr? 

Mr. STARR. I believe there is seven. 

Mr. JORDAN. I think there is six, based on the chart you just 

gave us: Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Under Secretary for 

Economic Growth and Energy and Environment; Under Secretary 

for Arms Control and International Security Affairs; Under Secretary for Management; Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; and the Under Secretary For Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 

And yet we can’t have an Under Secretary for the security of our 

people who risk their lives every day around this planet. You know 

the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, do 

you know what part of the job description of that Under Secretary? 

To foster cultural exchange in international broadcasting. Now I 

am not saying cultural exchange in international broadcasting isn’t 

important. All I am saying is the safety of the people who serve at 

these 285 facilities should be just as important. And you guys say, 

Nope, we are going to keep you way down here, Mr. Starr. In fact, 

you are the one—diplomatic security, Assistant Secretary, as Ms. 

Brooks pointed out, you are way down the chart. Why don’t you 


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want to move from the kids table to the adult table, Mr. Starr? 

Why don’t you want to move on up to the Under Secretary level? 

Did you make that case to Secretary Kerry and say, I think security is important enough I should be at the Under Secretary level? 

Did you make that case? 

Mr. STARR. The case that I made to the Secretary was that in 

any instance that I needed to get to the Secretary and the access 

that I needed with him, the Deputy Secretaries or the Assistant 

Secretaries, I had to have the access necessary to do my job. 

Today I have that access. Whether I am an Under Secretary or 

an Assistant Secretary—and I have been the Under Secretary General For Safety and Security at the United Nations, and that is a 

different organization—I can tell you that, regardless of whether I 

am the Under Secretary Or the Assistant Secretary, I have the control and the access that I need to fulfill my responsibilities. 

Mr. JORDAN. I will tell you this, Mr. Chairman, if I could. I will 

tell you this. I remember at Thanksgiving, it was a lot easier to 

make the argument at the adult table than it was to try to do it 

from the kids table. I would rather be there. In fact, I am not the 

one who thinks it is the greatest idea in the world. I think it is 

a great idea, but I am not alone. Clear back in 1999, Secretary 

Albright said the same thing. She thought we should have this at 

the Under Secretary level. Todd Kyle and the Best Practices Panel 

thought we should have it at the Under Secretary level, and the 

guy sitting beside you thinks we need to elevate this to the highest 

level. 

So I guess we got two big questions that this committee needs 

to answer. Why in the world won’t the State Department do what 

everyone knows needs to be done, elevate this position to the highest level that we can, make it equal with cultural exchange in 

international broadcasting? And then the big question, again, that 

I hope we get an answer to in this committee, why were we there? 

Why were we there with these facts and these circumstances? That 

is a fundamental question that the American people want to know 

and the families of these four individuals who gave their lives 

would like to know as well. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Ohio. 

The chair recognize the gentleman from Maryland, the Ranking 

Member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here 

today. 

In particular, I want to thank you, Secretary Starr. 

I listened to what was just stated and asked, but my concern— 

and I am sure it is the concern of this entire committee—is that 

when all the dust settles, that the request of every single family 

member that we met—when the dust settles, I hope it is carried 

out, and that is—that our facilities are safer so that things like this 

unfortunate incident does not happen again. 

The Department’s update shows continued strong progress towards full implementation of the ARB’s recommendations. As the 

Benghazi ARB reminded all of us, ‘‘The total elimination of risks 

is a nonstarter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the United 


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States Government to be present in places where stability and security are often most profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent.’’ 

Nonetheless, we owe Americans serving overseas our best efforts 

to keep them as safe as possible. Mr. Starr, I want to commend you 

for dedicating your career to achieving that goal. I have no doubt 

that you are committed and determined to see the implementation 

of these recommendations through. According to your testimony, 

since September 17, that hearing we held that day, the Department has closed three more Benghazi ARB recommendations. One 

of the three that you closed involves the hiring of additional diplomatic security personnel. Is that right? I think that was recommendation No. 12. 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And your October letter said that you had filled 

120 of those 151 newly created slots. Do you still expect to complete your hiring by early 2015? 

Mr. STARR. We are on track to do that, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what is entailed in that? Is it hard to find 

people? 

Mr. STARR. In some cases, actually, because we have very high 

standards and some of these positions are very technical, we have 

had some difficulties. 

But, sir, I would like to point something out. The recommendation was to get increased diplomatic security personnel for high 

and critical threat posts and for additional mobile security deployment teams. The 151 positions asked for additional people for positions beyond those two things. We have already created every one 

of the positions in MSD for the mobile security teams and at our 

posts overseas, taken agents that were already on board, filled 

those positions in those locations. And what we do is back hire now 

to fill the positions that we took those more experienced agents out 

of and put the new ones there. So we have fulfilled the recommendation of what it is, even though we continue to hire some 

additional personnel. I think we have more than fulfilled that recommendation. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you are still missing some people, though, because you are moving people? 

Mr. STARR. Right. We are still hiring to fill the people that we 

put in behind there. Although the agents have all been hired, it is 

a couple technical specialities that we are filling in behind. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. You also closed the recommendation related to risk management courses and enhanced threat training for 

personnel at these high-risk posts. How will this training better 

prepare our diplomats in high-threat regions? 

Mr. STARR. We have increased the Foreign Affairs Counterthreat 

Training that we offer to our Foreign Service personnel now, not 

just people going to our high-threat, high-risk posts. Every one of 

them has to go through that training, and prior to this, we did not 

quite have the capacity to do that. We are now increasing that 

training to everyone in the entire Foreign Service over the next 4 

years. Additionally, the Foreign Service Institute has put courses 

in that are complementing our skills-based training, courses like 

‘‘How to Conduct Diplomacy in a High-Threat Environment,’’ which 


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brings back officers from some of these tough places and shows 

best practices on how you accomplish your job when you are faced 

with things like sometimes you can’t travel to the ministry; sometimes there is different types of security requirements. So I think 

we are addressing it both through skills-based training on security 

and in the Foreign Service Institute on training our people before 

they go into these high-threat environments, how do we best do our 

jobs. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So the third closed recommendation was to procure fire safety equipment at high-threat posts. Mr. Starr, is that 

complete? 

Mr. STARR. It is complete with one exception, sir. I have one post 

where the equipment is sitting, a specific type of respirator mask 

is sitting one country away, and I am trying to get it in today and 

tomorrow to that post, and we have had some customs issues, but 

we have delivered the types of equipment and the training in conjunction after talking with the New York City Fire Department and 

others to all of our high-threat posts around the world. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would you get us a notification when you have 

completed that one thing you just said? 

Mr. STARR. I will, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So they are receiving the training? Everybody 

has received the training on this equipment? 

Mr. STARR. We have worked closely with the fire department to 

identify the equipment, and then when we ship the equipment out, 

there are training programs on the equipment. And then there are 

other things that OBO has done in terms of fire safety as well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. With the closure of those three recommendations, that leaves four recommendations still open. Is that right? 

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Your October letter shared with us target dates 

to complete implementation of those final four recommendations. 

Are you on track to complete those recommendations? 

Mr. STARR. We are on track, sir. The one that will stretch the 

longest is the implementation of a new type of CCTV camera at our 

posts overseas. The technical requirements associated with that 

have been more difficult than we first envisioned. We have a schedule to do it. I hope to have it done by fall of 2015. I am leery that 

it might go longer than that, so one of the things we are saying 

is that it will absolutely be done by the summer of 2016, but we 

are pushing to get it done earlier than that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And the other three, when will they be complete? 

Mr. STARR. I believe that the recommendation concerning co-location waivers will be done within probably 2 months. The recommendation concerning assignment durations for high-threat 

posts, we have essentially fulfilled that recommendation. We are 

working with Congress to look at something called a dual-compensation issue so that, if necessary, we can bring back highly talented officers. I believe that we can close that recommendation regardless of whether or not we get approval for the dual-compensation waiver, so I think we will have an answer in terms of closing 

that recommendation within 2 months as well. And there is one 

further classified recommendation that we are on track to close, 

but I would prefer not to discuss it in this hearing. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. As I said in our previous hearing, I want to 

make sure again things get done, and so I want you to get back 

to us exactly when you expect—I would like to have that in writing—when you expect these things to be done, and provide the 

committee with that information because we want to hold you to 

that. All right? 

Mr. STARR. As the inspector general has said, there is also going 

to be a review of our compliance as well, so it is not only you, sir, 

the Inspector General—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We will call it double coverage. 

Mr. STARR. Exactly, and I will get back to you on that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Now, Mr. Starr, Representative Westmoreland discussed with you and the Inspector General the June 

2013 audit that took place before creation of the High Threat Programs Directorate. The audit found some security deficiencies at 

posts it examined. Is that correct? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Starr, and I will ask you when the Inspector 

General’s Office released its 2014 report on High Threat Programs 

Directorate, one of the Inspector General’s key findings in that report is that this newly created body, ‘‘helped create a culture of 

shared responsibility for security within the Department and has 

forged strong partnerships with regional security officers and counterparts in regional and functional bureaus as well as within the 

interagency community.’’ I think that is an extremely positive finding, given the fact that the Accountability Review Board considered 

the lack of shared responsibility around security issues to be systemic failure just two years ago. 

Mr. Starr, could you discuss how you think the creation of the 

high-threat program has created a culture of shared responsibility 

in the State Department? And then my final question, to tell us 

how does this culture of shared responsibility that the IG praises 

improve the safety and security at our Embassies abroad? 

Mr. STARR. Thanks for the question, Congressman. We have addressed this in many different ways. The High Threat Directorate 

itself, just by the fact that we concentrate on looking every single 

year at our top 30 posts, the ones that we worry about the most, 

the VP2 process that we are in the process of conducting for those 

30 posts, the fact that we have written into every senior officer’s 

job description and every officer in the State Department their individual responsibilities for security, the fact that I have officers 

that are attending the meetings of the regional bureaus every single week, in some cases every single day, and when we are looking 

at the programs, we are also talking about the security implications therefore, I think have highlighted the fact that none of us 

can operate independently of considerations of security at this 

point. 

I think there has been a culture change in the Department. I 

think having to weigh the importance of our programs and why we 

are in very dangerous places under the VP2 process has brought 

a laser-like focus on why we are there, what the real threats are, 

and have a clear understanding of the threats, not ignoring the 

threats, what we have done to mitigate those threats, and then a 

decision at the end of that—is our presence still adequate, and is 


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our presence warranted despite all these things—I think has 

brought a new culture to the Department in many ways. 

I think that I have never seen security taken as seriously as it 

has been in the last 2 years, and I say that not lightly because I 

have been here a long time, and security has been taken seriously 

for many, many years in the Department. But I think some of 

these processes that we have put in place at this time are new to 

the Department and are doing exactly what the ARB wanted and 

what you are talking about. Is it working itself into the culture? 

And the answer is yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Right. And the culture is very significant. It is 

one thing when you have got an aberration. It is another thing 

when you actually believe in something, you are doing it every day, 

and it becomes a part of your DNA, that is the DNA of the State 

Department. 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. I would add one other thing, sir. The officers 

that are reaching the senior ranks of the Department today in 

many cases have spent significant amounts of time over the last 

decade in places like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sana’a, Yemen, 

Cairo, other places where we have true security problems. The officers that I work with today, every single day at my level and 

above, are keenly aware that security must be balanced with our 

program implementation. They have lived it. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank the gentleman from Maryland. 

The chair will now recognize the gentlelady from Alabama, Ms. 

Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Chairman Gowdy. 

Mr. Linick, are you familiar with the 1997 OIG recommendation 

regarding the need to prioritize MSG detachments at diplomatic 

posts using a methodology based on the OSPB security standards? 

Mr. LINICK. I am vaguely familiar. I wasn’t here in 1997. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. Are you aware that it was closed in 1998? 

Mr. LINICK. I think that is right. I think that is right. 

Mrs. ROBY. And to the extent you can answer this, it was closed 

because the Department amended its memorandum of agreement 

with the Marine Corps to include procedures for establishing the 

size of existing detachments and procedures for activations and deactivations. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. I don’t recall why it was closed without looking at 

the documents. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, in 2014, your office again looked at whether— 

at where and how Marine Security Guard detachments were being 

utilized at the State Department posts overseas. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 

Mrs. ROBY. And were you able to determine whether there is a 

methodology for prioritizing and assigning new MSG attachments 

to overseas posts and whether that methodology was effective? 

Mr. LINICK. Our auditors found in that report that there were no 

formal procedures to select or identify posts. They couldn’t show 

how the Marine Security Guard units compared with other posts. 

There was no formal plan for expansion. They simply just didn’t 

have the processes and procedures that one would normally think 

you would have. 


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Mrs. ROBY. So you weren’t able to figure out how DS makes the 

determination of where these Marines go? 

Mr. LINICK. We were not. 

Mrs. ROBY. And is it the same or similar issue to your knowledge—I know you don’t seem as familiar with the 1997—but the 

Inspector General then told DS to create a process or methodology 

to select posts, so this is a similar situation. Correct? 

Mr. LINICK. I will accept that premise. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. So how can we on this committee have confidence that recommendation 11 from the Benghazi ARB made just 

2 years ago, that the Department and DOD will provide more capabilities at higher-risk posts? How can we have the confidence that 

that will be fully implemented? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, that is the challenge of closing recommendations. We have a compliance follow-up group that I can tell you 

what they do now, and they do look very closely at the actions that 

the Department takes to close recommendations. They wouldn’t 

close it unless they felt that there was significant progress. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Starr, I am going to follow up with you on this 

point. According to the OIG, only 40 percent of the new MSG detachments have been assigned to posts with high or critical rating 

for political violence terrorism. In light of your last statement in 

the previous questions, you said you have never seen security 

taken so seriously in the past 2 years. Well, how does the fact that 

only 40 percent of the high-risk, high-threat posts have these Marine security guard detachments, how does this satisfy the ARB 

recommendation 11 to expand that program to provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts? 

Mr. STARR. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. There 

is actually a very clear, very simple answer for this. Most of the 

posts that are high threat, high risk already had Marine Security 

Guard detachments at them. That is why the 40 percent number 

is there. Of the 30 posts that we ranked as our highest threat, 

highest vulnerability, 19 of them already had Marine Security 

Guard detachments. We have added two to those. Of the remaining 

nine posts, five of those posts, there is no one there. The post is 

in name only. We don’t have people on the ground, Mogadishu, 

Herat—— 

Mrs. ROBY. Let me interrupt you for just a second. 

Mr. Linick, do you agree with those numbers? 

Mr. LINICK. I haven’t confirmed those numbers, so I don’t know. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. 

Mr. STARR. And there are several other posts. There is about four 

posts in that high-threat list where we would like to put Marine 

Security Guard detachments; the host government has not allowed 

us to do that. But the reason that that figure seems very strange 

is that in the vast majority of cases, we have already got Marine 

detachments at those places that are high threat. 

Mrs. ROBY. Let’s be very clear about this, Mr. Starr. How many 

current high-risk threat posts do not have MSG detachments? 

Mr. STARR. Of the 30 highest-risk, highest-threat-level posts, 

nine do not, but five of those nine are not functioning posts. They 

are closed. So four. 


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Mrs. ROBY. Do you agree with that, Mr. Linick, or do you not 

know? 

Mr. LINICK. I don’t know. 

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. Is there a timetable, Mr. Starr, in place for assigning the MSG detachments to the, you say four posts? Is there 

a timetable? 

Mr. STARR. I would like to do it tomorrow, but I will tell you I 

find it unlikely that I am going to be able to assign Marine detachments to those posts. 

Mrs. ROBY. And you say it is because host nation problems. 

Mr. STARR. Host nation problems. 

Mrs. ROBY. When I talked to you last time, 3 months ago, it 

doesn’t seem like we have made much progress, but I asked you, 

you know, what is your plan with the ones that you don’t? If you 

have got host nation problems, are there other ways to get security 

there? And you said in your testimony, if we find that we don’t 

have those types of protections—you listed adding DS agents, several other mitigating things—but you said if we don’t find that we 

don’t have those types of protections or that we think that those 

risks are too high, then we won’t be there. So why have we not 

made progression on those four posts that you are stating now we 

still do not have those protections in place? 

Mr. STARR. In some cases, we have other types of protection. The 

host nation has stood up and given us high levels of protection. In 

some cases, I have a tremendous amount of other resources there, 

including Diplomatic Security agents and armed contractors that 

meet the threat. In some cases, we have made a determination that 

the host government is standing up and fulfilling its responsibilities, and while we would still like to have Marines there, the fact 

that we don’t does not mean that we cannot continue. This is some 

of the things that we are looking at as we do this VP2 process, 

when we weigh why we are at a post, what the threats are, what 

resources we have overall, and as I say Marines are one tool in our 

tool kit. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Linick, I want to take Mr. Starr’s answer and follow up with you. Do you think that is sufficient? 

Mr. LINICK. My question is along the lines of the report, what are 

the plans? Where are the plans? Where is the methodology? What 

plans out there are there to negotiate with host governments that 

are unwilling to take us, those kinds of things? 

Mrs. ROBY. And you have not gotten a clear answer from DS on 

exactly how this is going to be handled. Correct? 

Mr. LINICK. All the recommendations are open at this time. 

Mrs. ROBY. All the recommendations are open. And based on the 

questions from Ms. Brooks earlier, ‘‘open’’ means they are unresolved and there is no evidence there that they are doing anything 

to make it better? 

Mr. LINICK. Well, actually, there are a number of open resolved 

recommendations. In other words, the Department has agreed in 

principle to comply, but there are two recommendations which are 

unresolved, which means we just disagree. 

Mrs. ROBY. Of the six, there are four unresolved—excuse me, 

four resolved and two unresolved? 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 


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Mrs. ROBY. But even the resolved, you have just gotten them to 

say that they want to do something, but you have no actions to 

back up their words? 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 

Mrs. ROBY. So we still have, according to Mr. Starr’s testimony, 

we have four places, very dangerous places of the world where 

American lives are at stake because we don’t have the proper security in place? 

Mr. STARR. Congresswoman—— 

Mrs. ROBY. This is for Mr. Linick. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINICK. I have to accept those facts because I don’t know 

independently whether that is true. 

Mrs. ROBY. Recommendation six of your report recommends that 

DS Marine security guard programs conduct a staffing and resource assessment and judiciously allocate appropriate resources to 

facilitate compliance with the Benghazi Accountability Review 

Board Report to upgrade security for personnel at high-threat 

posts. Has this been done? 

Mr. LINICK. Not according to the facts that I have heard. 

Mrs. ROBY. So, in fact, the Department has yet to comply with 

Benghazi’s ARB recommendation 11. Correct? 

Mr. LINICK. We believe Benghazi ARB recommendation 11 intended for there to be Marine Security Guards at all high-threat 

posts. 

Mrs. ROBY. And so I want to hear you say that is correct. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, that is correct. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you very much. I have got 22 seconds left. I 

did want to touch a little bit on the local guard force, and let’s see, 

real quick, Mr. Linick, if I can just get to the point with you, you 

had two findings in your report: A, security contractors did not 

fully comply with the vetting requirements called for in the contracts; and, B, the regional security officers at overseas posts took 

it upon themselves to vary the vetting and approval process and 

failed to ensure that the security contractors provided all the required documentation. That is correct? 

Mr. LINICK. That is correct. 

Mrs. ROBY. So did any of the security companies that had contracts fully perform all vetting required in their contracts? 

Mr. LINICK. No. We looked at 87 personnel files, and none of 

them—none of the security contractors performed all of the vetting 

requirements contained in the contracts. 

Mrs. ROBY. And of the six Embassies reviewed, did any of them 

allow guards to work before being fully vetted? 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, a number of them allowed them to work without 

vetting. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Chairman, I just do not understand how this can 

be just 2 years after four Americans were killed in Benghazi, we 

have local guards that are not fully vetted that, clearly, Mr. Chairman, show that we have a severe security threat in very dangerous 

places where American lives are at stake today. Thank you so 

much. Thank you for being here. 

I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. I thank the gentlelady from Alabama. 


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And the chair will now recognize the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank the gentlemen for being here. I appreciate your service 

very much. Mr. Starr, I wanted to ask you, just for some historical 

perspective, because I think many Americans may be under the impression that what took place in Benghazi was extraordinary in the 

sense that we have never had attacks on our diplomatic facilities 

or tragedies like this in the past. 

Tragically, we have had a great many over the years, and I wonder if you could shed a little light on maybe the last 20 years. How 

many times have our facilities been attacked? How many times has 

that resulted in injuries or fatalities? Is the problem getting worse 

because the world is now more unstable? It seems like there are 

more high-threat posts now than ever. Is that just an impression, 

or is that the reality? And what does that mean in terms of the 

prioritization you mentioned at the outset? And that is—the priority is for a diplomatic post to implement the policy of the United 

States—that has to be done in a way where we can protect our people, but they are there for a reason. 

And there are many posts where we are where we could ask the 

same questions. Why are we in Yemen? Why are we in Iraq? Why 

are we in any of these places that are inherently dangerous? There 

are foreign policy objectives in each of these places, as there was 

in Libya. We have increasingly difficult calls to make about where 

we post our people, what risks we are willing to undertake in furtherance of our policy, and it is one of the reasons I have such 

great respect for our people that are in the diplomatic corps, because they are at risk. There is just no avoiding it these days. Can 

you set a little of the historic trend for us? What has been our experience with violence at our facilities? To what degree is that phenomenon changing, and is it changing for the worst? 

Mr. STARR. We have more posts today categorized at high or critical threat for civil disorder or terrorism than at any time in my 

service in the Department. I think we are seeing a lot of different 

threats emerging. I don’t think that is a surprise to anyone. We are 

challenged in many ways, but, again, going back to what we have 

been doing since Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which was when Al 

Qaeda first came in our view full face, that we had to recognize 

that we had a determined nonstate enemy against us, a lot of the 

programs that we put in place and the buildings that we have built 

have helped make us safer and balanced that security. 

But, Congressman, as you say, over the last 10 or more years, 

we have had multiple, multiple attacks on our facilities and our 

people in Iraq, many, many attacks in Afghanistan. In Herat last 

year, we had a horrific attack with two truck bombs, eight suicide 

bombers trying to kill our people at the consulate in Herat. Our security systems worked. We killed all of them. We lost, tragically, 

some third-country national security guards and some Afghan police officers, but no Americans were killed in that. 

As has been alluded to here, at the same time as the Benghazi 

attack, we had huge crowds and mobs that were coming over our 

facilities and attacking our facilities in Cairo, in Tunisia, and in 

Sudan. And in the last two posts, 8 and half hours before the host 


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country came to our support, our facilities held, and no Americans 

were injured. We have had and lost certain Foreign Service officers 

and one-off attacks, lone-wolf types of attacks, including John 

Granville in Sudan not too many years ago. We have had RPG attacks, truck bomb attacks, car bomb attacks, car bomb attacks on 

our motorcades. We have had aircraft that have been shot at. 

We have had almost innumerable attacks on our facilities over 

the last 20 years. And you are right; they are going up. It is a challenge. I would first say that it is a testament to the Foreign Service 

that our officers still want to get out and implement the important 

Foreign Service goals that we have to. It is a testament to their 

willingness to take new types of training and for the Department 

to take on these security risks. 

Congress has been a very important partner in how we have met 

these risks, particularly since the 1998 bombings in Dar es Salaam 

and Nairobi, and we appreciate that. 

We will continue to work on these things, but I don’t think it is 

a surprise to anybody that we are living in a world that has a high 

degree of instability in many countries. There is a lot of open discussion about how extremism is drawing in new youth, disaffected 

personnel, and has a calling that is being heard by certain people. 

So we have our challenges cut out for us, and we are going to do 

the best we can to meet those challenges while still implementing 

the foreign policy of the United States government. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. Mr. Starr, let me drill down on a couple 

specifics that I think have manifested themselves in light of this 

increasing threat environment and increasing number of high-risk 

posts, and that is more people that are on temporary assignment 

and people that are of short duration in some of these high security 

threats. Many of us that have visited our diplomatic facilities overseas meet people that are there for short tours. You talked about 

one way of trying to fill the gap with retirees. It may be desirable 

to bring in the retirees who have great experience, but why is that 

necessary? Are we having trouble attracting enough personnel to go 

to these high-threat posts? Is there a mutually reinforcing cycle 

where people who go to a high-threat post therefore get recommendations from people in those posts for future assignments 

and are kind of locked into high-threat posts? What is the impact 

on our personnel of the proliferation of dangerous places where 

they work? 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, the situation that we face is that most 

of these high-threat posts are unaccompanied. We are asking more 

and more of our personnel to take unaccompanied tours away from 

their families for longer periods of time. Generally, these have been 

1-year tours, but we are now at a point where we are asking more 

of our officers to serve 2-year unaccompanied tours overseas without their families. We have rotated many of our Foreign Service officers and many of my security agents and my security personnel 

through multiple hardship tours without their families at these 

high-threat posts at this point. 

The Foreign Service has a certain amount of personnel. We have 

not had to rely particularly on very many TDY personnel. Some of 

the other agencies that are present at our posts overseas have 

greatly relied on temporary duty personnel, not so much the DeVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:36 Jan 17, 2015 Jkt 092592 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A592.XXX A592

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partment. We have had officers that stood up and continue to stand 

up and serve at these places. But it is not without cost. It is not 

without, in some cases, fracturing families, or are we asking them 

to serve tour after tour in high-threat posts multiple times at these 

places? Do we have behavorial problems and other things that are 

coming out of this? And the answer in some cases is yes. 

In many cases, where we have a need to put our best people in 

some tough places where we are asking sometimes for temporary 

personnel but sometimes for longer periods of time, the Department is asking to bring back some of the retired people. Somebody 

is going to use that vast experience that they have got, and they 

are going to pay them for it. We would like to be able to avail ourselves of that as well if possible. 

Mr. STARR. But I do think that the State Department has been 

at the forefront of filling our positions with mostly full-time assigned personnel. Although we, too, rely on TDYs occasionally. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Just one last question, because I only have a minute 

left, I wanted to follow up on. I think we all recognize the importance of having high-level attention paid to the ARB recommendations by the top principals in the State Department. And I fully 

concur that Secretaries Clinton and Kerry have embraced and even 

established this as a best practice. 

You had mentioned that it was codified in the Foreign Affairs 

Manual very recently. But the embrace of that by those top principals, that was from the very beginning. In fact, that was a standard that they set, was it not? 

Mr. STARR. I think it was very evident from the statements of 

Secretary Kerry and our principals that we were in this together. 

And everybody had to get on board. 

What we are now doing is bringing it around to the fact of putting it in the policy. And Steve has pointed out that is important. 

We need to make those changes. We need to codify this going forward. And we are doing that. But I agree with you that I have 

spent many hours and many meetings with the Deputy Secretaries 

and many others. And I have had discussion with the Secretary 

about what security means to us. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank the gentleman from California. 

The chair would now recognize gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Roskam. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Starr and Mr. Linick, thanks for your time. 

Secretary, I find your argument inconsistent in this sense. And 

I just want to bring to your attention a couple of statements that 

you have made to my colleagues, some of the realities that I perceive, and walk you through my thinking. 

A couple of minutes ago, you told Ranking Member Cummings 

that there has been a culture change in the Department. And if 

there has been a culture change in the Department, that presupposes that you basically offer everything up that is an obstacle 

and to recognize and to reflect, look, this is a problem, and we are 

going to rid ourselves of every single problem that was an obstacle 

to a remedy. 


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Couple of minutes ago, you made the argument to Mr. Schiff— 

not an argument, but you made the point, increasingly dangerous 

world. Nobody here disagrees with that. It was compelling you used 

words like ‘‘extremism,’’ ‘‘disaffected youth,’’ and these posts that 

are unaccompanied because they are miserable places to go, presumably. 

And yet one of the things that is the remedy to that is the waiver 

authority in recommendation No. 13 that the department continues 

to cling to. 

So the recommendation of the Best Practices Panel in No. 3, it 

says this, it says, Waivers to establish security standards should 

only be pursued subsequent to the implementation of mitigating 

measures as agreed by Regional Bureau or other program managers advised by D.S. and as informed by the Department risk 

management model. 

That is a great idea. 

Now, here is the problem. The Department—and I don’t know 

where you were in the discussion. But the Department has said, 

We don’t think that is a great idea. In fact, we think this: In certain cases involving national security—I am going to come back to 

that because that is such an ambiguous term—an exception can be 

approved based on the mitigating measures already in place—presuming that there are mitigating measures, I might add—even 

though future mitigating measures may be planned to bring the facility even closer to or in conformance with the OSPB physical security standards. In such cases when time is of the essence to further U.S. national security interests, the Department requires flexibility to grant an exception prior to the implementation of planned 

mitigating measures. 

So here is my point. That is a gaping exception. That is an exception, Mr. Secretary, that anything can get through. And I mean 

anything. 

So if it is simply, look, this is national security, all of a sudden, 

that becomes a laminated hall pass for somebody at the Department of State to say we are declaring this a national security emergency. Yeah, we have gone through to the whole process, the process that you described that is identifying the high risk—highthreat, high-risk posts, going through VP2. So far, there is no restraining influence. 

Then there are two choices, either recharacterize something as a 

special mission compound or something else or go through another 

process. 

And even within the other formalized process, there is still this 

waiver authority. And people around you, Mr. Secretary, are saying, Give it up. 

And by your own argument, I might add, you are making the argument that you should give it up, that there is a culture change 

that is so big that you are describing it to Ranking Member Cummings and a world that is so dangerous that you are using all 

kinds of words that we all agree with. So why in the world hang 

on to this thing? 

Mr. STARR. For a very specific technical reason, sir. We pick a 

place. Sometimes the best that we can get in a short duration if 


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we are going to go back in. We have to make decisions on what 

needs to be done and what levels of things we can’t possibly do. 

I can’t create 100 feet of setback when there isn’t 100 feet of setback. We may have to accept that. 

And at a certain point we have to make decisions: Are we going 

to accept that, do the rest of the things that we need to do, or are 

we just going to say, no, we are not going to accept that? And then 

continue looking until we find a place. 

By the way, I have never found a place to lease in 30 years in 

the Department that actually had a hundred feet of setback that 

was available. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Secretary Starr, what is different than the reasoning that you just articulated to me just now from the reasoning 

that put us in Benghazi and that allowed four people to be killed? 

What is different? 

Mr. STARR. There is—I will admit that there is some measure of 

risk in what I am saying. But—— 

Mr. ROSKAM. Huge risk, based on what you told Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. STARR. No, I don’t agree that it is huge risk. I think that we 

have to—— 

Mr. ROSKAM. You told him it was a dangerous world filled with 

extremists and disaffected youth. That was 5 minutes ago. 

Mr. STARR. True. 

But I think that we have to be able to make decisions to 

progress. In some cases, if we are going to lease a new facility, we 

are going to have to admit that we are going to have to give waivers to certain things in order to fulfill that. 

Mr. ROSKAM. So what is different about what you just articulated. 

Mr. STARR. The difference is that we have to do the waivers, that 

there has to be a decision process. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Yeah. But then why don’t you agree to the mitigation? That was the key finding of the Best Practices. 

Mr. STARR. Because in some places, we can’t get the mitigation. 

Mr. ROSKAM. If you can’t get the—— 

Mr. STARR. I can’t rare—— 

Mr. ROSKAM. Look. 

Mr. STARR. I cannot get a blast-proof building unless I build it. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Then why do we ask people to go to these places? 

Mr. STARR. Because in some cases, the foreign policy imperatives 

of why we need to be there mean that we are going to take reasonable levels of risk. 

Now, what we have to be careful is that we don’t take unreasonable levels of risk. There has to be an open and fulsome discussion 

about why we need to be there. What risks are we really running? 

Do you really understand the threats? If you put people—— 

Mr. ROSKAM. Look, Best Practice Panel recommendation is trying 

to codify that risk discussion. 

And if you rewind the tape today and you listen to the answers 

that you gave—and I was carefully listening to this. Earlier in the 

last—in our last discussion time, the last hearing, Mrs. Roby asked 

you a question, and you and I had an exchange about your answer. 

But just to refresh your memory, she asked, Is it possible for the 

State Department to open a temporary residential facility? And you 


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said, We don’t have any at the moment; I can’t imagine that we 

would or that I would approve it. You, singularly, Mr. Starr. 

Earlier today, in part of the exchange, you said, I am committed 

to keeping our people as safe as possible. 

Now, I get it. That is opening statement language, and there is 

nothing wrong with that. 

You then told Ms. Sa ́nchez, I turned that down. 

You then told Mr. Jordan, I have access. 

And your bristle was up a little bit because he was pushing you 

around. But you were saying, I have access to the Secretary of 

State. 

Now, here is the problem: When you are gone, that next person 

will be confronted with the same discussion that you admitted is 

basically that there is nothing really different about the thinking 

that went in on Benghazi, to your knowledge, because you told us 

you weren’t there. 

I am telling you that I think it is very similar, that line of thinking that says, yes, it is dangerous, got to get ’em, we gotta go, and, 

yeah, there is no time. We got to check these boxes and yeah, yeah, 

yeah. 

And you have got this national security exception that the exception like I have described is this big. And we are right back into 

this situation. 

Notwithstanding the culture change that you have offered up. Do 

you see where this is going? Which is why people around you are 

saying Give it up. Offer it up. You don’t need it. 

Mr. STARR. I think that that relying on one recommendation—— 

Mr. ROSKAM. This is not one recommendation. 

Mr. STARR. No, that is one particular recommendation that we 

don’t agree with because of a technical reason that we have to be 

able to say in advance and write the waivers and say, We are going 

to accept waiving that security standard, gives us the ability to do 

these things. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Look, in your answer, though—— 

Mr. STARR. The larger issue, though, is things like VP2 and having processes in place. 

And I recognize that this one particular one is confusing in terms 

of it seems like we don’t want a process. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Oh, it is not confusing to me. 

Mr. STARR. It seems like we don’t want a process there. But the 

fact is there is a process there. 

Mr. ROSKAM. I don’t think there is anything confusing about this. 

You are basically saying, we are not going to mitigate—you are not 

basically saying. You are saying we are not going to mitigate. And 

these answers that the State Department has offered, it presupposes mitigation that is already in place. And it is relying on 

a speculation of possible mitigation. 

In fact, it says it may be planned. May be planned. 

That is speculation beyond speculation. This is speculation upon 

speculation. Do you see how it is that people are coming to the conclusion that in a post-Starr era, that, like it or not, is coming, in 

a post-Starr era, when special committees are not around, there is 

going to be every bit of possibility and pressure based on the national security exemption, which as I have described it is this big. 


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All of a sudden we are right back into this situation and we are 

grieving the loss of life. 

I ask you to revisit this. I ask you to reconsider this. This is 

something that you are clinging to. And that you ought not. 

I yield back. 

Chairman GOWDY. Thank the gentleman from Illinois. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, Mr. Starr, Mrs. Roby asked Mr. 

Linick about the vetting of local security guards. I am really—and 

I thought she had an excellent line of questioning. 

I want to make sure I understand what is going on here, because 

when the dust settles, again, I want to make sure our people are 

safe. 

When we talk about the vetting, can you tell me why there is no 

vetting in those—I think it was four countries, Mr. Linick. 

Mr. LINICK. It was six countries. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Six. 

Mr. LINICK. Six contractors. 

Mr. STARR. Congressman, the answer is that it is not true there 

was no vetting. What the report points out is that they didn’t fully 

comply with the vetting requirements. 

There are places around the world where we work that our normal vetting requirements, things like requiring a police check, can’t 

be accomplished. There are places where we are or the contractor 

is not allowed to perform a background investigation. This is, of all 

places, in one place is Italy. We cannot vet contractors in Italy because of personal rights and statements that they have in law. It 

does not mean that we don’t do our best job to vet the people that 

we bring on board. 

Now, I want to say one thing clearly. When Steve and his inspectors go out and they find a circumstance where they say, Hey, we 

don’t think the contractor is living up to the vetting requirements, 

I want to know that and we take that seriously and we go back 

and say, Okay, what is happening here? 

And, in some cases, we may find that there is a reason that the 

contractor isn’t fully vetting the people. He may have to use alternate methods. But there may be cases and Steve’s people may find 

out that he is trying to put some shortcuts in place. He doesn’t 

want to pay for the vetting. And we need to know those things. 

And that is valuable guidance that Inspector Generals’ teams are 

bringing back to us. 

So I think it is a dual answer. One, I want to know what they 

are finding because these inspections are part of our backstop, and 

they are important to us. 

Second, there may be reasons in some cases that there may not 

be a full vetting. Cases that we can’t do it. 

There are different types of workarounds. And certain places because we can’t do police checks or they don’t make any—you just 

buy a police check, essentially. We are looking at family ties. You 

know, does everybody know this person? Does this person really 

want to work at the Embassy? And people have known his character for a long time. So there may be workarounds. 

And, finally, there are places where we know that we have significant issues hiring local employees to be guards. And, in some 


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of those places, we made the decision that we bring in third-country contractors at tremendous expense because there is no other 

way to get the vetting done, and we don’t trust the people. 

So it is a holistic answer. I don’t want to say that we don’t value, 

and I necessarily disagree with the IG on some of these things. 

They play a really important role. The inspection process is important to us. And when Steve’s people come back and say, Hey, something is not right here, we look at it. We try to correct it as fast 

as possible. Or we have an understanding that maybe it doesn’t 

quite meet the needs, and then we will have an open recommendation and we will go back and forth with the inspector on that. 

I would note, sir, that our guards have stood by us through thick 

and thin. Some of them have stayed years after we have closed our 

facilities and protected them. 

We have never had a green-on-blue incident with any of our 

guards. In many cases, they have showed loyalty to us far beyond 

what we could ever do. 

Are our guard programs perfect? No. And we strive to keep them 

up to snuff every single day, try to require the highest possible 

compliance with the rules and regulations that we put in place. 

And Steve’s people play an important role in keeping us there. 

So it is, all told, I need those guards, and we are going to continue 

doing that. And I think we are doing overwhelmingly a good job. 

Are there some things we need to work on, yes, and when we find 

them, we are going to work on them. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Are you familiar with the June 2014 Inspector 

General’s report with regard to an audit of the Department’s oversight of the vetting process used for local security guards? You are 

familiar with that audit? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And he reported and explained that contractors 

are challenged in vetting local security forces because of local privacy laws, lack of credit reporting services, and difficulty in obtaining official records in the host country. 

And how do you operate within those kind of constraints? You go 

for—you do as much as you can and then you—I mean, how do 

you—you want to vet. And so is there a certain point where you 

say, well, there is just not enough vetting that we can do that we 

can hire these folks? How does that work? 

Mr. STARR. When we make a determination that we really can’t 

do any vetting, and we have no confidence in the guard force, that 

is when we may turn to this other alternative, third-country nationals, that we bring in from another country that we can vet if 

we can get permission from the host country to do that. 

In many cases, it is more subtle than that, sir. As I say, when 

the police check, it may not be worth the piece of paper that it is 

printed on or where there are privacy laws that we can’t do things, 

in many cases we look at who knows this person? What recommendations have they got? Are they family? Are they tied to the 

Embassy in some place? 

We have got to have guards. We have got to have people manning those posts. We have got to have people that are, you know, 

checking the people when they come in and checking their packages and inspecting the cars. 


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And even when some of those vetting procedures may not comport with what we do in terms of a security clearance back here 

in the United States, we have a great deal of faith and confidence 

in them, even though, in some cases, we may not meet every requirement. We may not be able to cross every T and dot every I. 

We have to take at a certain point some levels of risk. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one other thing, Mr. Starr. We have spoken 

extensively about risk management. During our last hearing, you 

spoke about how important it is to assess both the willingness and 

the capability of the host country forces to provide local security. 

How does the State Department consider the potential issues 

with local guards today when considering whether to operate in a 

certain country? And how has that changed since Benghazi? 

Mr. STARR. I don’t know that that has actually changed since 

Benghazi, sir. I would say that it has been an ongoing issue for us. 

There are some countries that will not allow us to have guard contractors. In some cases, we can hire them directly. There are some 

countries where we have made that determination that because of 

counterintelligence issues or because we may think that the guard 

force could be infiltrated, and we don’t have faith and confidence 

that we may use third-country contractors, this has been an ongoing issue since 2002. 

We look at every country very carefully. We make a determination how we can best fulfill the security requirements in that country, whether it is a contract, whether it is a PSA, direct-hire guard 

force, whether it is a third-country national guard force. 

We rely in great part on the experience of the RSOs in the field 

and the contracting officers and the general services officers to give 

us advice here in Washington and listen to them and then make 

recommendations and decisions based on the best knowledge that 

we have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me say this. I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today. We really do appreciate it. 

And we appreciate your willingness to work hard every day to 

make our people safer. I know, Mr. Starr, that we have—I know 

we pressed you hard today. Please recognize and understand that 

we do so to ensure the Department’s feet are held to the fire because it is important for all of us that we do this right. And I remind you again it is our watch. Your testimony in September and 

October update you have provided us, we appreciate. And your testimony today shows continued progress. And we appreciate your 

willingness to work with us and anyone else who helps to make our 

Embassies safer. So I want to thank you for that. 

And I want to thank you, Mr. Linick, for all that you are doing 

because you, too, help us keep these feet to the fire. 

With regard to the ARB, I think we are making good progress. 

But I want to make sure everything is done. And I know that there 

are some ARB recommendations, quite a few of them, from past 

ARBs. I think we need to take these opportunities and try to address as much as we possibly can, even back then, because those 

things are still ongoing. Right, Mr. Linick There are still problems. 

Mr. LINICK. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So, again, I want to thank both of you again. 


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Mr. Starr, don’t forget that we want to know when those other 

recommendations of the ARB will be completed and to let us know 

when they are, in fact, completed. All right? Okay? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. We will get those answers to you. 

And, sir, I expect to be pressed pretty hard. This is tough business, and it is important business. And you can press as hard as 

you want. Myself and Steve, we are both pretty tough guys. And 

we appreciate even the tough questioning. 

The opportunity to put those things on the table with you in an 

important committee like this is important to me, too. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Maryland. 

Secretary Starr, I was going to pursue a line of questioning. And 

I will get to that at some point. 

But when Jimmy Jordan asked you why were we in Libya—and 

I am not going to ask you the same question because you made it 

clear you are not the right person for us to ask. And I am going 

to respect that. But I want to make sure you understand why 

Jimmy would ask you that question and why all of us are asked 

that question with alarming frequency in our districts. 

The last hearing we had, you did a very good job of explaining 

to those of us who are not in diplomacy that you have to weigh and 

balance. I think you said you have to weigh and balance the policy 

with the risk to determine whether or not you should have a presence. 

And it just struck me that there is no way you could possibly 

weigh and balance policy versus risk if you don’t understand what 

the policy is. 

And then I started thinking, when Jimmy was talking, I wonder 

where the question came from. 

And I knew I had seen this somewhere. Do you know someone 

by the name of Ben Rhodes? 

Mr. STARR. I don’t know Ben Rhodes personally; I know the position that he was filling. 

Chairman GOWDY. I don’t know him either. But there was a 

memo 3 days after four of our fellow Americans were killed in 

Benghazi. And I will skip over goal number one of his communications memo. Actually, I won’t. Because it says to convey that the 

U.S. is doing everything we can to protect our people and our facilities. 

And it just struck me, if you really were doing everything you 

could, we would not have had 50 separate recommendations after 

he wrote that memo and this now the second hearing to make sure 

that those recommendations were implemented. 

But I am going to skip over that goal to get to the second goal. 

The second goal, Secretary Starr, was to underscore that these 

protests are rooted in an Internet video and not a broader failure 

of policy. 

So I am going to skip over the video part of that for now and get 

to the second clause, the dependent clause in that sentence, ‘‘not 

a broader failure of policy.’’ 

How can we judge whether or not a policy has failed or succeeded 

if no one tells us what the policy objectives were? 

How can we do that? 


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How can you weigh and balance the risk? 

Jimmy’s gone through the risk, members on the other side have 

gone through all the escalating episodes of violence in Benghazi. 

And it may well be that the reason for us to have been there supersedes all of those episodes of violence. But how? How can a committee of Congress know that if no one tells us why we were there? 

So you are not the right person to ask. Who would you ask if you 

were us? Who should we bring to explain why were we in Libya? 

Mr. STARR. The policy questions I think should more properly be 

directed to the NEA Bureau, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau that had 

responsibility for that. 

Chairman GOWDY. I am looking for a name, preferably. Who 

would be able to tell us what policy we were pursuing in Libya was 

so important to skip over all the things that Mr. Roskam pointed 

out and to weigh and balance the episodes of violence in such a 

way that the presence outweighed the violence. 

Mr. STARR. At the risk of having her never talk to me again, the 

Assistant Secretary for NEA Anne Patterson, I think, is the highest-ranking person in the NEA Bureau, and at the time of the attack was the U.S. Ambassador in Egypt. And I think Anne or one 

of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the NEA Bureau could give 

you the best answer on that. 

Chairman GOWDY. All right. Well, I thank you for that name. 

And I want to make sure you and I are on the same sheet of 

music. 

Do you understand why we would have that question? I mean, 

do you think that that is a fair and legitimate question for us to 

ask, what the policy was, so we can then weigh and balance it, as 

you instructed us to do? 

Mr. STARR. I think that is a reasonable question, sir. 

Chairman GOWDY. Okay, well, thank you. 

Now, Secretary Starr, last time you were with us we not only discussed the most recent ARB recommendations, but we went back 

and highlighted some from the past. And one in particular from 

1999 caught my attention: The Secretary of State should take a 

personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility for ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. It is essential to convey to the entire Department that security is one of the 

highest priorities. 

And Secretary Starr, just in case somebody missed that part of 

the 1999 ARB, the authors reiterated that point with this: The Secretary of State should personally review the security situation of 

Embassies and other official premises, closing those which are 

highly vulnerable and threatened. 

Two previous ARB recommendations that you could essentially 

lay on top of one another. They are identical. 

And I don’t think they are identical because they forgot that they 

put the first one. I think they are identical because they were trying to send a message to us. This is really important. And it is deserving of the attention at the highest levels of the Department. 

So here is what I want to do. I want to ask you, I want to know, 

specifically with respect to Benghazi, in October of 2011, there was 

a specific request for a machine gun to defend our facility in 

Benghazi. And, in August of 2012, just a month before the attack 


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on our facility, a document again lists a machine gun as equipment 

needed and requested. 

Do you know who denied the requests for those machine guns 

and why? 

Mr. STARR. No, sir, I do not. 

Chairman GOWDY. Who should I ask and find out? 

Mr. STARR. You can ask me, sir, and I will go back and research 

that. 

Chairman GOWDY. Would you do that for me? 

Mr. STARR. Yes, I will. 

Chairman GOWDY. Have you watched the video surveillance from 

the night of the attack? 

Mr. STARR. I have. 

Chairman GOWDY. Without going into great detail, would you 

agree with me, or do you at least see why somebody on the ground 

might have asked for that piece of equipment, given what you and 

I have seen in the surveillance video? I mean, thinking back to the 

video, can you see how that might possibly have come in handy 

that night? 

Mr. STARR. In my review of what happened and looking at that, 

I think the agents made the right decisions at that point not to engage. I think that they were equipped with fully automatic weapons, not quite the rate of fire power of a machine gun. I agree that, 

you know, machine guns can be very menacing and have a tremendous effect. But, in this circumstance, I’m not sure—— 

Chairman GOWDY. They wanted them for the rooftop. They wanted them for the rooftops. 

I want you to go back if you would and watch the video and see 

whether or not you conclude the same way that I concluded or not. 

And I appreciate if you could go back and, with specificity, I want 

to know who reviewed that request, who denied that request, and 

is there an appeals process within the State Department in light 

of these two previous ARB recommendations that the Secretary of 

State should take a personal and active review that the Secretary 

of State should personally review the security situation. Is there an 

appeals process where someone hypothetically could say, you know 

what? You are giving me a no, but I’m going to take this up the 

food chain. Does that exist? 

Mr. STARR. Yes. 

Chairman GOWDY. All the way up to the highest levels of the 

State Department? 

Mr. STARR. I will tell you that the one thing the Department has 

that very few other agencies has is something called the dissent 

channel. And it is a channel that we highly prize and that if you 

disagree with policy or you disagree with a decision, that officers 

in the Department of State at all ranks and all locations have the 

ability to send something directly in at the highest levels through 

a dissent channel cable and say, I disagree with something, and it 

goes to the highest level. 

Chairman GOWDY. In June and July of 2012, mere months before 

the attack in Benghazi, the Ambassador himself requested a security team be extended to stay longer. 

Mr. STARR. Security team in Tripoli, sir, not Benghazi. 


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Chairman GOWDY. In Tripoli, yes. But it doesn’t take much to 

imagine him traveling from Tripoli to Benghazi with an increased 

security presence, does it? If there were more security folks in Tripoli, and he is traveling to Benghazi, it is not that much of a stretch 

to surmise that some of them may have actually traveled with him. 

Mr. STARR. When he traveled to Benghazi in that trip, sir, he 

took additional RSOs with him. There were additional RSOs that 

could have gone as well but they made the determination—— 

Chairman GOWDY. For a grand total of how many? 

Mr. STARR. Five at post. 

Chairman GOWDY. All right. And how many were there before 

the foot print was reduced? 

Mr. STARR. Three. 

Chairman GOWDY. No, no, no. How many were there before their 

deployment ended? 

Mr. STARR. I don’t think there was ever more than five at that 

post, sir. 

Chairman GOWDY. In Tripoli? 

Mr. STARR. No, I am sorry. In Benghazi, I am sorry. 

Chairman GOWDY. I am talking about—I am talking about that 

the Ambassador would have had access to. 

Because you and I agree the number that he had access to was 

reduced, despite the fact that he asked for more. 

Mr. STARR. The military team, the SST team had departed. Additional DS agents were put into post. 

Chairman GOWDY. What I want you to find out for me is this, 

because this is a Presidentially-appointed Ambassador who made a 

pretty plaintiff pleading. In fact, I will quote it to you: ‘‘Our efforts 

to normalize security operations have been hindered by a lack of 

host nation security support, an increase in violence on foreign targets, and neither compound meets OSPB standards.’’ 

Do you know would said that? 

Mr. STARR. From your context, I would think it would be the Ambassador. 

Chairman GOWDY. It was the Ambassador himself in a—what I 

would describe as a pretty plaintiff pleading for some help. And 

this is the response he got: No. I do not not want them to ask for 

the team to stay. 

Do you know who said that to the Ambassador, the Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Ambassador? 

Mr. STARR. It was referring to the SST and that might have been 

Ambassador Kennedy. 

Chairman GOWDY. It could have been. But it was actually 

Charlene Lamb. And Charlene Lamb is not, has not been, and is 

not likely to ever be the Secretary of State for this country. 

And so when I see her responding to a Presidentially-appointed, 

Senate-confirmed Ambassador who is making a pretty plaintiff 

pleading for some extra help and she says, ‘‘Do not not make that 

request,’’ I want to know whether the Ambassador had the ability 

to go above her head and go straight to the top. And if not, why 

not? 

Mr. STARR. The Ambassador certainly did have the ability to go 

over her head. 


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Sir, I do think that the one salient point that must be discussed 

is that there was quite a bit of discussion about relieving the SST, 

the military team that was there and only provided static security 

at the compound, with additional diplomatic security agents who 

could provide static security and mobile security. I think that was 

why the decision was made to release the SST. We were replacing 

it with personnel that actually had more capabilities. 

Chairman GOWDY. Well, Secretary Starr, my time is up. But 

sometimes when everyone is to blame, no one is to blame. And part 

of the frustration that Mr. Roskam I believe so eloquently remarked on today was the designation of the facility itself. And then 

you have our heretofore failure to understand what policy would 

have been so important—— 

You testified that we have how many un-personed posts right 

now? Five? Did I hear you correctly? Five? You were going through 

a series of numbers. And you said, Well, five of those you can discard because actually there is no one there. 

Mr. STARR. Correct. 

Chairman GOWDY. So we do close facilities. 

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman GOWDY. And I am assuming that someone did the 

weighing and balancing on those five and decided, you know what? 

Through the miracles of technology, or whatever, we don’t have to 

have a physical presence there. 

So you can understand why we would like to know what weighing and balancing went on with respect to Libya. And I want to 

know who saw these requests for extra equipment and personnel, 

who denied them, and whether or not you believe—and, inspector 

general, you can help here, too—whether or not you believe that 

there is a culture in the State Department where there would be 

any consequences for following the dissent channel, because some 

companies do say, ‘‘Sure, I have an open door policy,’’ but sometimes when you walk through that open door, your career takes a 

hit. 

With that, I want to thank the ranking member and all the other 

members. 

Thank both of you. 

You and I get together privately. You discuss a reasonable timetable for getting answers to those questions. 

And, with that, the members would have five additional days to 

put whatever they want, any questions, in the record. 

Thank both of you for your time. 

Mr. Starr, in your case, twice. And if you would convey to the 

men and women who work for the State Department how grateful 

all of us, irrespective of politics, are for their service. 

And, with that, we would be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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