U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

23–763 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–145] 

OVERSIGHT REVIEW OF THE U.S. NAVY’S 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

KATY QUINN, Professional Staff Member 

ANNA WATERFIELD, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ............................................................. 1 

Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 12 

Mackin, Michele, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 9 

O’Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service .......................................................................................................................... 14 

Rowden, VADM Thomas S., USN, Commander, Naval Surface Forces .............. 10 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Department of the Navy ........................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael .................................................................................... 101 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky ........................................................................................ 45 

Mackin, Michele ................................................................................................ 74 

O’Rourke, Ronald .............................................................................................. 133 

Speier, Hon. Jackie ........................................................................................... 47 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Thomas S. Rowden ..................... 50 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Two charts displayed by Ms. Speier ............................................................... 159 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Byrne .......................................................................................................... 163 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 163 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 167 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 168 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT REVIEW OF THE U.S. NAVY’S LITTORAL 

COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Thursday, December 8, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good morning. I would like to extend a warm 

thank you to our witnesses testifying before us today and welcome 

them to our subcommittee’s last hearing event for the 114th Congress. 

I thank the subcommittee members for your contributions and 

dedication during this Congress. I wanted to especially express 

gratitude to those members who are not going to be returning next 

year. 

Certainly, Representative Graham, you have been a wonderful 

member on this committee and on Armed Services and just here in 

Congress as well. I have enjoyed getting to know you and appreciate your work, your dedication. Representative Graham is—comes 

to the hearings. I don’t think she missed hardly any, so responsible 

and cares so deeply about the military, so we are going to miss you, 

but thank you. Thank you. 

And we also have subcommittee member Representative Heck 

and Representative Miller who may be joining us, but we appreciate their service as well. 

So in connection with today’s hearing, I welcome the members 

also of the full committee who are not permanent members of the 

subcommittee, who are or who will be attending. And I ask unanimous consent that these committee members be permitted to participate in this hearing, with the understanding that all sitting 

subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to 

those not assigned to the subcommittee. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

So today, we take testimony of the littoral combat ship [LCS] 

program. We seek to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges 

that this program has presented us in the past and the opportunities that exist as the program moves forward. We need to grow the 

size of this Navy’s surface fleet. The LCS could have an important 

role in increasing our capabilities and our flexibility. I know that 
2 

there is a critical need to replace our less capable and decommissioned mine countermeasure ships, patrol craft, and all of our Hazard Perry-class frigates. 

I believe the littoral combat ship and the eventual upgrade to the 

frigate design has great potential to fulfill the roles for the platforms it replaces. This is why the LCS has garnered bipartisan 

support in the Seapower Subcommittee. The concept of the LCS 

and the decision to begin the program came at a time in the Department of Defense’s acquisition history in which senior leaders of 

the Department thought it was necessary and possible to disregard 

the natural evolution of technology by skipping a generation of development. It was good theory but proved costly and cumbersome 

to implement. 

We have learned many lessons from this period. For example, introducing immature technologies into acquisition programs will 

lead to cost and schedule growth. Awarding contracts without a 

stable design and directing prescriptive government specifications 

also increases cost and schedule. It is only with unleashing the 

power of best buying practices that we can realize acquisition efficiencies. These lessons have been hard learned in a multitude of 

acquisition contracts. 

For example, stable government funding is essential to providing 

material ordering and labor efficiencies. Additionally, innovative 

multiyear procurements or block buys save money because longterm agreements with subcontractors and vendors provides contracting stability. Dangerous reductions below minimum order 

quantities only serve to exacerbate our industrial base and increase 

the cost of the taxpayer. That is why the House has advocated adding a third LCS in fiscal year 2017, and has expressed reservations 

about the Navy’s acquisition strategy, which involves procuring one 

LCS frigate every year during fiscal year 2018, 2019, and 2020. 

I also want to discuss the Navy’s force structure requirements of 

52 small surface combatants. The Navy’s force structure is based 

on their ability to meet combatant commander requirements both 

in peace and in war. That is why I am perplexed with Secretary 

Carter’s determination that we only need 40 LCS frigates. I believe 

the Secretary’s decision lacks analytical rigor. I am hoping that the 

next administration will review this issue. 

We must absolutely integrate the program’s acquisition lessons 

learned as we evaluate, with prudent scrutiny, the opportunity to 

invest an additional $14 billion to complete the purchase of LCS 

and transition its hull form into a frigate design. We must also ensure that the mission modules which are integral to the first LCS 

designs are successfully completed, tested, and fielded at the lowest 

possible price. 

So I look forward to discussing this program with our distinguished panel of witnesses we have here before us. But before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to the Oversight Investigation Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that she 

would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

We are here today to examine a case study in gross mismanagement on the part of the Navy. At virtually every decision point— 

from conceiving the initial flawed concept, to the concurrent acquisition process, to the huge cost overruns, to the huge fundamental 

flaws in the ships themselves, and to the feeble attempts by the 

Navy and DOD [Department of Defense] to correct course—the 

Navy has wasted billions in taxpayer dollars and failed to produce 

a ship that meets its objectives. 

What we examine today is: Has the Navy learned its lesson, have 

they corrected course, and are they moving forward with a stable 

ship design based on a sound analytical foundation? From the testimony of witnesses today, I fear the answer is a resounding no. 

I would especially like to know who certified that LCS would cost 

$220 million each. We know it now costs more than double per 

ship, at $478 million. Who briefed this to Congress, and who signed 

off on this gross escalation in cost? 

While cost overruns are by no means acceptable, perhaps they 

can be explained if they resulted in a functional ship. But the LCS 

isn’t just outrageously expensive, it is also outrageously bad at 

doing its job. In simple terms, it is a dud. 

Just look at how many issues six out of eight ships in service 

have had, and I point to this chart, which you can see. Every one 

of these six ships, and there have only been eight that have been 

in the water, six out of the eight ships have had serious problems 

in which the engines have flooded, the couplings cracked, and the 

ships broke down in transit. 

[The chart displayed can be found in the Appendix on page 159.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Now, the USS Montgomery was commissioned in 

September of this year, and it has already had two engine failures 

and two collisions that resulted in major damage. What is even 

worse is that because of the way the Navy structured the contracts, 

taxpayers are still responsible for most of the repair costs, even 

when the shipbuilders are at fault. These contracts mean that, in 

some cases, the shipbuilders aren’t responsible for even one cent of 

potential defects. 

In other words, you take delivery of an LCS, it immediately 

breaks down, and there is no warranty, there is no lemon law. So 

there is no compunction on the part of the shipbuilder to make 

sure that this product is indeed worthy to be afloat, because if it 

breaks down, it is the taxpayers that will pick up the tab. Why is 

it that the Coast Guard can hold its shipbuilders responsible for 

defects, but the Navy puts the burden on the taxpayers? 

If that is not enough, there is more bad news. The Secretary of 

Defense has admitted that continuing to produce two versions of 

the ship makes no sense, and he has ordered a down-select. The 

Navy has admitted that its transformative interchangeable mission 

module will likely never be interchanged as originally envisioned. 

The Navy has also admitted that its transformative crewing concept won’t work and has essentially scrapped it. 
4 

Look at how much the program has changed from the Navy’s 

early pie-in-the-sky promises. Cost overruns, delayed schedule, design changes, cannot survive combat. In part, the reason why we 

are changing the name of LCS is because the word ‘‘combat’’ is in 

its name and we now know it is not survivable in a combat setting. 

Poor mission capabilities. 

[The chart displayed can be found in the Appendix on page 160.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Now, in all of the Navy’s wisdom, they have decided 

to change the name of the LCS to a frigate, and plan to purchase 

more of what is essentially still an LCS but whose modifications 

are unproven, lack critical capabilities, and can’t pass original survivability tests. Why? Because they have determined it will meet 

their multi-mission requirements. Yet once again, we don’t have a 

ship design, we don’t know what it will cost, or whether the ship 

can survive in combat. Instead, as I have joked many times, we 

have a ship that even the Chinese don’t want to copy. 

You would think all this uncertainty would prompt calls for a 

pause to get the LCS conceptual house in order before the Navy 

does a binge buy for more. But if you think that, you don’t know 

the LCS program. Instead, in an act of astonishing arrogance and 

disregard of taxpayers’ money, reports indicate that the Department of Navy is gearing up to ask Congress for a block buy of 12 

of these ships. This would give us all leverage—this would give us 

all our leverage away with a contractor to ensure the ships are 

tested and fixed. 

What are they thinking? Does anyone honestly believe that the 

taxpayers, the Tea Party, or President-elect Donald Trump would 

approve this buy if they were in charge of doing so? 

From the beginning, the Navy has regularly submitted LCS 

budget requests that are not consistent with shipbuilding programs, making it nearly impossible for Congress to exercise oversight. It did this in 2003 when it funded the first ships with research and development funding and in 2010 when it wanted to 

switch to a plan of buying two parallel LCS designs inside of a 20- 

ship block buy. 

When issues continued to occur throughout construction and 

fielding, the block buy was always cited as the reason why Congress shouldn’t slow the program down. Yet again, as the Navy 

moves towards a different design that they claim will address 

many of the LCS shortcomings, they are looking for a block buy authority before the design is even completed. This is a strategy that 

even the shipyards criticized, since it doesn’t give them time to 

complete the frigate design before beginning construction. The single greatest contributor to cost inflation on the LCS was an incomplete design when construction began. The Navy still hasn’t 

learned their lesson. 

I am glad that the Navy has acknowledged reality and changed 

some of its operational concepts, but in many respects, I am concerned they are still hiding the ball. The next time LCS flaws become apparent, it could be in the heat of battle and, frankly, get 

our sailors killed. 

Furthermore, if the Navy’s plan for a block buy moves forward, 

Congress and the Navy’s hands will be tied. I realize what this is 

really about. We know the LCS is the Ford Edsel of the sea, and 
5 

yet certain of my colleagues say we can’t afford to pause production 

and get it right because of, quote, ‘‘industrial base concerns,’’ unquote, even though, and I want to emphasize this, even though the 

shipyards will be building the existing buy until 2021 even if we 

canceled funding for the program today. 

Let’s be real. This is about getting pork back to their districts. The LCS is a $120 billion pork ship, and they are putting pork barrel politics above the safety of our service members. 

The Navy has shown a callous disregard for the taxpayer, and 

frankly, the Congress has been derelict in doing its job. We think 

no one will notice. We think our obligation is to the shipbuilders 

to keep building a defective ship just because we want to retain 

jobs. 

Today, we need the guts to say that the LCS was a mistake. To 

protect the United States interests and to do what is best for our 

service men and women, we need a ship that is capable of fulfilling 

its intended mission. The taxpayers deserve to know if what they 

are paying for is actually effective. That is why Congress needs to 

find out if the most recent changes will really make the LCS better 

or if we are just trying to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. 

I look forward to your insights and about how we got here and 

how we should go forward and who is to blame. 

And with that, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

I am pleased today to recognize our witnesses. I want to thank 

them for taking the time to be with us. We have the Honorable 

Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. We have Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, director of tests—Operational Test and Evaluation for the Department 

of Defense. We have Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, commander of 

the Naval Surface Forces for the United States Navy. We have Ms. 

Michele Mackin, director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

for the Government Accountability Office; and Mr. Ron O’Rourke, 

specialist in naval affairs at the Congressional Research Service. 

So thank you all for being here today. Really, really appreciate 

it, and we look forward to hearing your comments. And now we 

turn to Mr. Stackley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 

ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member 

Speier, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the littoral combat 

ship program. With your permission, I would like to make a brief 

opening statement and have my full testimony entered into the 

record. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Without objection. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The littoral combat ship, or LCS, is designed to fill critical warfighting gaps in anti-surface, anti-submarine, and mine countermeasures warfare mission areas. And as 

a replacement for three legacy small surface combatant ships, she 
6 

is about one-third the size of a DDG–51-class destroyer, is designed 

to perform missions the DDG [guided-missile destroyer] is not 

equipped to do or that could otherwise be better performed, at least 

well performed by a small surface combatant, and thus freeing the 

destroyer for missions tailored for its higher end capabilities. 

LCS’s reduced size results in greatly reduced procurement and 

operating and support cost. In fact, the procurement unit cost for 

LCS is about one-third of that of a DDG–51, and likewise, the manpower requirements for the ship. 

The LCS hull is designed and built to provide the ship with its 

high-speed, mobility, damage control, survivability, aviation, and 

combat systems, including its 57-millimeter gun, surface-to-air missiles, and an over-the-horizon missile that the Navy is currently 

adding for offensive firepower against long-range threats. 

In addition to this core capability, the ship carries modular mission packages tailored for the mission’s planned deployments. The 

surface warfare mission package adds 30-millimeter guns, an 

armed helicopter, an unmanned aerial vehicle for extended surveillance, and surface-to-surface missiles. The anti-submarine warfare, 

ASW, mission package adds a variable depth sonar that operates 

in tandem with a multifunction towed array, an ASW helicopter 

with dipping sonar sonobuoys and airdrop torpedoes and a towed 

decoy. 

The mine countermeasure mission package has air unmanned 

surface and unmanned underwater vehicles with associated sensors 

and systems to detect and neutralize mines. 

And there are four cornerstones of the program I would like to 

briefly summarize. First, the shipbuilding program. As the committee is well aware, the LCS program was initiated with unrealistic cost and schedule estimates and with highly incomplete design, resulting in extraordinary budget overruns and schedule 

growth. The program was subsequently restructured in 2009. Production was placed on hold pending the insertion of production 

readiness reviews to verify design quality and completeness; authorization to approve design and requirements changes was raised 

to the four-star level, specifically the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and myself; Navy oversight of the shipyards was greatly increased; the acquisition strategy was restructured to compete longterm contracts under fixed-price terms and conditions. And in response to this strategy, industry made significant investments in 

terms of skilled labor and facilities to improve productivity and 

quality. 

As a result, cost, schedule, and quality have greatly improved 

such that current ships under construction are delivering at less 

than half the constant year dollar cost of the lead ships. Performance has stayed reliably within the budget throughout this time, 

and the quality of each ship has successively improved, as measured by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey. Bottom line, 

the block buy strategy approved by Congress in 2010 has delivered 

on its promise. LCS construction is stable, and performance continues to improve on a healthy learning curve. 

Second, mission packages. The program’s acquisition strategy is 

that we will incrementally introduce weapons systems as a part of 

a mission package when they are mature and ready for deploy-
7 

ment. The strategy provides tremendous flexibility, affordability, 

and speed for introducing new capabilities to the ship when those 

capabilities are ready to deploy. 

Consistent with this approach, the LCS has been highly successful integrating mature weapons systems. The MH–60 helicopter, 

the Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle, the 11-meter rigid hull inflatable boat, the Mark 50 30-millimeter gun system, and most recently, the Harpoon Block II over-the-horizon missile, the Airborne 

Laser Mine Detection System, the Airborne Mine Neutralization 

System, and we are currently integrating the Hellfire Longbow 

missile in support of testing in 2017. 

As a result, we have successfully fielded the first increments of 

the surface warfare mission package. They are deployed today and 

are on track to complete the next increment in 2018. 

The next mission package we will field is the anti-submarine 

warfare, or ASW, mission package. The performance of this system, 

as demonstrated by its prototype in 2014, greatly exceeds that of 

any other ASW sensor system afloat. And we are currently in the 

process of awarding the contract to build the developmental model, 

which will be put to sea for shipboard testing on LCS in 2018. 

These mission packages are late to their original schedules in 

part due to technical challenges and in part due to budget challenges. They do, however, demonstrate the benefit provided by the 

LCS modular design. And as the Navy develops or acquires new 

systems appropriate to the LCS mission, we will leverage the ship’s 

design and flow these new weapons to the ship in rapid fashion 

once they are mature. 

We have run headlong, however, into challenges with developing 

those capabilities that are central to filling one of the critical shortfalls in terms of warfighting, and that is the mine countermeasures, or MCM, mission package. 

The Navy’s requirements for the LCS MCM mission package are 

to locate, identify, and clear mines at a rate that significantly exceeds our current capability and to do so without putting the ship 

or the crew into the minefield. 

The MCM mission package airborne capability and MH–60 helicopter carrying the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System and the 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System has completed testing and is 

ready to deploy. Additionally, an unmanned aerial vehicle carrying 

a sensor capable of detecting mines close to shore is on track to 

complete testing in 2017. 

The workhorse of the mission package is the high-endurance unmanned vehicle that tows a sonar for mine detection. The Navy is 

satisfied with the performance of the towed sonar system and its 

ability to detect mines, but we are halting development of the unmanned vehicle—we refer to it as the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle [RMMV]—due to poor reliability. And we are revising the MCM 

mission package to employ an alternative unmanned surface vessel, specifically one that is currently being built to tow the minesweeping system to likewise tow the mine detection system. 

Testing with this vehicle is to commence in 2019. This puts the 

MCM mission package back to 2021 timeframe, a significant delay 

to that capability. The likely long-term solution will be to eliminate 

the tow vehicle altogether and operate with an unmanned under-
8 

water vehicle with an embedded sonar when technology can support it. 

The third cornerstone is performance of in-service ships. In total, 

LCS material readiness, as reflected in operational availability and 

casualty report metrics, is consistent with other combatant ship 

classes and meets the Navy’s threshold requirements. However, I 

would like to address five engineering casualties of concern that 

have occurred over the past year. The Navy has conducted formal 

engineering reviews and command investigations to assess the root 

causes, and corrective action for each of these casualties are in action. 

One was design related. A deficiency with a new propulsion gear 

on the Freedom variant resulted in the gear’s clutch failure. The 

shipbuilder has been responsive with the manufacturer to correct 

the design, and we are currently testing this correction. The shipbuilder and manufacturer are being held accountable for these corrective actions. 

Two of the five engineering casualties were due to Navy crews 

departing from established operating procedures. The type commander, Vice Admiral Rowden, has taken appropriate corrective action, including revising the LCS training program and conducting 

an engineering standdown for all LCS class crews to review, evaluate, and renew their commitment to safe ship operation and good 

engineering practices. 

The remaining two engineering casualties trace to deficiencies in 

ship construction and repair procedures. One involves the waterborne alignment of the propulsion train, which is being addressed 

by the Naval Sea Systems Command with industry, equipment 

manufacturers, shipbuilders, and ship repair yards. 

The second involves contamination of a hydraulic system on a 

newly delivered ship, requiring the ship to reflush the system and 

the shipyard to make corrections to its flushing procedures. This 

was corrected under warranty provisions by the shipbuilder in accordance with the contract. 

Across the board, we are raising the level of engineering and design discipline on this new ship class to that of zero tolerance for 

departure from standards. In this vein, the Naval Sea Systems 

Command has initiated a comprehensive engineering review of 

LCS propulsion systems and will make their findings available to 

the subcommittee upon their completion. 

The fourth cornerstone is transition to the frigate. Following an 

intense period reviewing alternative designs, which was ultimately 

approved by the Secretary of Defense, we are proceeding with modifications to the design of the LCS to incorporate the combined features of the LCS core capabilities, surface warfare mission package, 

anti-submarine warfare mission package, plus enhancements to the 

ship’s combat systems and survivability features. 

Industry is currently working on this new design, which trades 

the modularity of the LCS for a highly capable multi-mission frigate, and is on track to award in late 2018. The estimated cost for 

the 12 frigates outlined in the Navy’s budget and report to Congress is approximately $8.1 billion. 

I want to make clear to the subcommittee that unlike the experience at the outset of the LCS program, we will not proceed with 
9 

frigate construction before design is complete and of high quality 

and that cost estimates are validated. And to enable this committee 

to conduct its new oversight, we will provide your staff with full insight to our design review process, products, and criteria. 

Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss 

this important program, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley and Admiral 

Rowden can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Mackin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELE MACKIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION 

AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. MACKIN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Good morning, Ranking Member Speier and members of the subcommittee and committee. Thank you for having me here today to 

discuss the littoral combat ship and frigate programs. 

We have been reporting to Congress on LCS for over 10 years 

now. Our concerns have been and continue to be the Navy’s decisions to prioritize seaframe and mission package procurements 

ahead of needed testing. 

Testing is critical to ensure that expected capabilities and operational concepts can be proven out. Over the past few years, we 

have recommended the LCS program be halted or slowed down 

while important knowledge was gained through testing. But DOD 

has generally not taken any actions that would impact the production piece of the program, even in light of some serious concerns. 

Instead, it has warned that the prices under the two LCS block buy 

contracts would increase if the program were disrupted. 

Almost 3 years ago, the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy 

to assess options for its small surface combatant that would be 

more survivable and have more combat capability than the LCS. 

The resulting study found that a minor modified LCS, which is now 

the frigate program, was the least capable option considered. Nevertheless, that option was ultimately chosen. In addition to affordability, which was a very important consideration, a key factor was 

the determination not to have a gap in production at the two LCS 

shipyards. 

We all know that the initial promises of LCS have not come to 

fruition in terms of cost, schedule, or capabilities. As the Navy pivots now from the LCS to the frigate, there are key questions yet 

to be answered. 

First, what will the frigate cost? This is unknown. A rough estimate is about $9 billion for 12 ships, but the Navy won’t develop 

a more robust estimate until the middle of next year, and not until 

fiscal year 2018 will DOD prepare an independent cost assessment—cost estimate. Independent cost estimates are very important because they provide an unbiased assessment as to whether 

the program’s cost estimate is reasonable. 

Second, what will the frigate design look like? This is also unknown. While the frigate design will be based on the same LCS 
10 

seaframes we have today, those seaframes have significant weight 

issues that will need to be addressed, among other considerations. 

The Navy plans to award a frigate contract to one of the shipyards in 2018 and start construction as early as 2019, but specific 

contractor design proposals won’t be received until a year from 

now. Until the detailed design is understood, exactly what the 

Navy is buying isn’t known. 

I want to stop here and address the industrial base issue. Our 

work has shown that both LCS shipyards are running quite a bit 

behind in delivering the ships already under contract. Backlogs are 

many months long and up to a year or more in some cases. So the 

bottom line here is that both shipyards will be building LCSes for 

years to come, at least into 2021 at this point. So there is no schedule imperative to add frigates to the pipeline right now. 

And finally, what is Congress being asked to do? With its fiscal 

year 2018 budget request, the Navy plans to ask Congress to approve a 12-ship frigate block buy strategy and also to approve procurement of the lead ship based only on a rough cost estimate. 

From a contracting standpoint, the initial block buy prices will be 

for 12 LCS, that is 12 regular LCS. If past is prologue, the Navy 

might get great pricing for those ships, but only later will the price 

of adding the frigate capabilities be known. 

At that point, under a block buy contract, there is a risk that the 

program will be considered locked in, as has been the case with 

LCS, and any inclination to make needed changes may be foregone. 

There is an opportunity here to not repeat the mistakes of the 

past. Continued concerns about the capabilities of LCS, testing that 

is years away from being completed, unknowns about the frigate, 

and the production backlog at the shipyards are all factors that 

need to be taken into account. This potentially $9 billion investment can wait until more is known about what the taxpayers are 

being asked to fund. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Mackin can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Admiral Rowden. 

STATEMENT OF VADM THOMAS S. ROWDEN, USN, 

COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCES 

Admiral ROWDEN. Good morning, Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking 

Member Speier, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am 

honored for the opportunity to testify about the littoral combat 

ship. 

As the commander of our Naval Surface Forces, I am responsible 

for leading the 58,000 sailors that man and support our surface 

ships, and I am responsible for manning, training, and equipping 

those same ships. To execute these responsibilities, I rely on a staff 

of dedicated officers, enlisted, and civilian professionals. I rely on 

the experience I have gained over my 34 years of service to our Nation. I rely on almost 14 years to over 40 percent of my professional 

life serving on ships at sea, ships that range from our Coast Guard 

cutters all the way to tours on our aircraft carriers. I rely on the 

experiences I have operating on every ocean and sea from the Gulf 

of Guinea to the Sea of Japan. I rely on experiences I have gained 
11 

through port calls in 52 different cities in 36 different countries 

around the world. 

When it comes to driving, fighting, and steaming our ships, I 

have experienced firsthand what our Nation can produce, both in 

terms of sailors with magnificent talent, determination, professionalism, and sheer grit, and in terms of the superb technical capability our phenomenal military industrial complex can produce. 

Time and again, in real-world situations I have seen our talent, 

training, tools, and tactics come together to produce a maritime 

fighting force that, on the whole, is significantly greater than the 

sum of its parts. 

Time and again, the value of our Navy to our Nation manifests 

itself through engagement and through partnership building on a 

gray ship with a white number and Old Glory flying atop the mast, 

tied to the pier or at anchor in the harbor. I have experienced the 

palpable sense of relief when by our very presence the level of 

angst in a potentially volatile situation is erased. 

To execute our missions, we rely on our ships and aircraft and 

the sailors who man them. The ships and aircraft are the tools we 

use. Our sailors round out our fleet’s capability by providing the 

talent, the training, and tactics we need to win and win decisively. 

One of the tools we have coming online is the littoral combat 

ship. So far, eight of these tools have been delivered. Many more 

are on the way, and to be quite honest, I cannot wait to have them 

in the fleet and cannot get them there fast enough. This tool, this 

ship will be—will soon be deployed in numbers to our forward fleet 

commanders and will provide them with a highly valued and absolutely necessary capability. For in addition to the anti-mine, antisubmarine, and anti-ship capabilities it will carry, it brings the 

ability to enter ports we have rarely or never been able to visit because of draft limitations. It brings the ability to build partnerships 

and partnership capacity that we have been able to—that we have 

only been able to execute in very limited ways. In the day-to-day 

shaping and stabilizing operations our Navy executes daily, these 

ships will be invaluable and are needed right now. 

Beyond the shaping and stabilizing operations that dominate our 

operations today, I see a vital role for our littoral combat ships 

should our adversaries take an aggressive stand towards our maritime forces. And this is where the talent, tactics, and training really come into play. 

We understand well the requirements these ships are built to, 

and we understand the testing and evaluation has proven they are 

built to the approved requirement. In short, we understand the 

tool. We understand the ship. We also understand well our talent, 

tactics, and our training. We can and must take all of these into 

account when planning for combat operations. As such, we will employ all of our ships and our talent, training, and tactics to maximize their value to the combatant commander while continually assessing the risk to the force. 

All risk can never be eliminated, not to our littoral combat ships 

or any other ship in the inventory, for that matter. However, in 

planning for any mission, we are constantly evaluating our ability 

to achieve the objective while limiting the risk to the fleet. In other 

words, we will never lean into a punch if it can be avoided. 
12 

While all this is well and good, there have been challenges in 

fielding these ships, which is why earlier this year I was tasked to 

lead, along with Vice Admiral Dave Johnson, the principal military 

assistant to Secretary Stackley, and Mr. Brian Persons from the 

CNO staff, a review of the LCS program and to come up with recommendations on how to address and overcome the challenges to 

providing robust operational capability for our littoral combat 

ships. 

In truth, I was thrilled with the opportunity. Our team looked 

at the ships and their challenges through three lenses, these lenses 

being simplicity, stability, and ownership. We looked at all aspects 

of LCS through these three lenses and came up with what I know 

to be reasonable, prudent, and appropriate recommendations to 

start to accelerate the value of these ships to the forward fleet commanders. We are moving out on these recommendations, and I am 

already seeing the benefits of our new approach on the waterfront. 

And we will continue to evaluate, assess, and adjust as we move 

forward. 

Beyond this, we have already deployed twice and are in the leading edge of a third LCS deployment. In addition to learning a heck 

of a lot about how to support these ships forward, I believe the 

facts speak for themselves: Over 500 days at sea; helicopter landing 

qualifications with eight nations; boarding operations with seven 

nations; fleet operations with diverse ships ranging from aircraft 

carriers down to coastal patrol ships; special operations force operations with the Republic of Korea; humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response during Typhoon Haiyan, relief operations in the 

Philippines, and the search for AirAsia Flight 8501 in the Java 

Sea; regional partners who welcome and want LCS with a high demand signal, having visited 15 cities in 8 countries around the 

Western Pacific. 

There is still much work to be done to fully unlock the significant 

potential of these ships. I am 100 percent confident that with the 

talent, training, and tactics our U.S. Navy sailors possess, the 

promise of our littoral combat ships will be fully realized, and I 

look forward to being part of this valuable effort. 

Thank you very much, ma’am, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Rowden and Secretary 

Stackley can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, 

members of the committee and subcommittee, I will try to briefly 

summarize my written testimony. 

The Increment 2 surface warfare mission package is the only 

fielded system on LCS seaframes, and it has demonstrated a modest ability to aid the ship in defending itself against small swarms 

of fast inshore attack craft, though not against threat-representative numbers and tactics, and the ability to support maritime secu-
13 

rity operations such as launching and recovering boats and conducting pirate interdiction operations. When the Hellfire missile is 

fielded in the next increment, the surface warfare package capability has the potential to improve significantly, provided targeting 

and other challenges can be surmounted. 

In a June 2016 report, based on this testing conducted before 

2016, I concluded that an LCS employing the current mine countermeasures package would not be operationally effective or suitable 

if called upon to conduct mine countermeasure missions. The testing that was done demonstrates the LCS mine countermeasure 

mission package did not achieve the sustained area mine clearance 

rate of the Navy’s legacy systems, nor can the package be used 

even under ideal benign conditions to meet the Navy’s reduced Increment 1 mine countermeasures requirements for mine area clearance rate, achieving, at best, one-half those requirements, which 

are a fraction of the Navy’s full requirements. And by the way, my 

assessment is the same as the Navy’s commander of operational 

test force. 

The ships as well as many of the mine countermeasure systems 

are not reliable, and all the MCM systems, not just the Remote 

Minehunting System and the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle, had 

significant shortfalls or limitations in performance. For example, 

limitations in the Airborne Mine Neutralization System depth for 

neutralizing mines means that it cannot be used to neutralize the 

majority of the mines in the Navy’s own scenarios. 

Based on those results, after more than 15 years of development, 

the Navy decided this past year to cancel the Remote Minehunting 

System, which is a hard decision for the Navy, halted further procurement of the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle, abandoned plans to 

conduct operational testing of individual MCM mission package increments, and delayed the start of full integrated LCS mine countermeasure mission package operational testing until at least fiscal 

year 2020. 

As the Navy attempts to fill capability gaps and correct the 

shortfalls in performance of these canceled and restructured elements of the mine countermeasures package, it is likely operational 

testing of either LCS variant equipped with the final fully capable 

mine countermeasures, MCM, package will not be completed until 

at least 2023, more than a decade after the schedule set in the 

Navy’s original requirements. 

All of the LCSes have suffered from significant repeated reliability problems with both seaframe and mission package equipment. No matter what mission equipment is loaded on either of the 

LCS variants, the low reliability and availability of seaframe components, coupled with the small crew size, imposed significant constraints on mission capability. 

When averaged over time, LCS 4, which was used in the testing 

last year, was fully mission-capable for surface warfare missions 

just 24 percent of the 2015 test period. Both variants fall substantially short of the Navy’s reliability requirements, and have a nearzero chance of completing a 30-day mission, the Navy’s requirement, without a critical failure of one or more seaframe subsystems 

essential for wartime operations. 
14 

The Navy’s most recent reliability reports show upward trends 

for a few LCS systems, so that is good news, but the majority of 

the ship’s systems demonstrate flat or declining reliability well 

below the Navy’s objectives, and that is the Navy’s data. 

It was only through testing of the full mission packages at sea 

and aboard the ship with sailors from the fleet that the significant 

problems and shortfalls I have described, both in system performance and sailor training, were clearly revealed. In fact, the Navy’s 

independent mine countermeasures review team emphasized that a 

reliance on unrealistic, segmented, shore-based testing, quote, ‘‘provided a false sense of maturity,’’ unquote. 

As in all operational testing, we interacted extensively with the 

ships’ sailors and surveyed them to capture their views of the 

ships’ capabilities. These sailors are proud of their ships and determined to make the best use of them. The sailors are also straightforward in identifying the many problems they have encountered. 

We—I have a long list of the comments from the surveys that were 

done during the testing, and I am going to read just a couple, but 

there is a long list that are consistent with these, so I am not just 

cherry-picking. 

‘‘Well, 130 duty days to complete technical evaluation, which 

should have only taken 45 days. That should tell you something 

about the reliability of the RMMVs.’’ 

‘‘The tasking would be easier to complete if the equipment didn’t 

constantly break.’’ 

‘‘As equipment breaks, we are required to fix it without any 

training.’’ 

Those are not my words. Those are the words of the sailors who 

were doing the best they could to try and accomplish the missions 

we gave them in the testing. 

So to provide the sailors with what they need to accomplish their 

missions, it is my hope that the Navy will be provided the resources, meaning the time and money it needs to fix these problems, which we should acknowledge, because if we don’t acknowledge them, we can’t fix them. And the Congress, obviously, has a 

key role to play in providing those resources. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 101.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Dr. Gilmore. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD O’ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL 

AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss oversight issues relating to the LCS program. With your permission, I would like to 

submit my written statement for the record and summarize it here 

briefly. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Without objection. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I have been tracking the LCS program since its 

inception 15 years ago. In my 32 years as a naval issues analyst 

for CRS, no program has been more complex to track or has posed 
15 

more potential oversight issues for Congress than this program. 

The LCS program is at a crossroads not only because of the Navy’s 

proposal to shift to production of the frigate variant, but also because of three additional factors. These are the rapidly shifting 

international security environment, the possibility that the incoming Trump administration might make significant changes in U.S. 

foreign and security policy, and the Trump campaign organization’s 

announced objective of building the Navy toward a goal of 350 

ships. 

A key oversight issue for the Navy’s proposal for procuring the 

frigate variant concerns its analytical foundation as a result of how 

the program was restructured twice in less than 2 years at the direction of two Secretaries of Defense. The Navy’s proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS appears to have three potential weaknesses in its analytical foundation. These potential weaknesses are now compounded by the shifting international security 

environment and the possibility that the incoming Trump administration might make significant changes in U.S. foreign and security 

policy. 

This situation doesn’t prove that the Navy’s proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS isn’t the most cost-effective 

approach for meeting the Navy’s future needs. It might very well 

be the most cost-effective approach. But as a result of this situation, the Navy now has less of a basis for being certain of that and 

less ability to demonstrate this compellingly to others. 

This situation also, however, creates a fresh opportunity for the 

Navy to create a new analytical foundation for the effort that is 

both rigorous and fully up to date. Doing that would take some 

time, but it wouldn’t prevent some variant of the LCS from being 

procured in fiscal year 2017 or 2018. 

Another oversight question concerns the plan to total quantity of 

40 ships. This is 12 less than the 52 small surface combatants 

called for in the Navy’s current 308-ship force structure objective, 

and the 52 number itself could change again as a result of a decision to build the Navy toward a fleet of about 350 ships. 

Building up to a force of 52 or more small surface combatants 

over the next several years could involve increasing the small surface combatant procurement rate to 3 or 4 ships per year. In terms 

of industrial base capacity, it might be easier to execute such a procurement rate with two LCS builders rather than one. If the ships 

are acquired with annual contracting, then depending on the annual procurement rate, maintaining two LCS builders might enhance the Navy’s ability to use competition effectively in procurement of these ships. 

Another oversight question concerns whether to use annual contracting or block buy contracting for procuring the frigate variant. 

Annual contracting preserves flexibility for Congress regarding 

whether and when to procure follow-on units in an ongoing procurement program, while multiyear contracting in the form of block 

buy contracting or multiyear procurement reduces that flexibility 

in return for reducing the cost of the units being procured. 

My written statement discusses some of the considerations that 

come into play in considering annual versus block buy contracting. 

My statement also discusses two other oversight issues, the surviv-
16 

ability of the frigate variant and the mine countermeasures module. It then presents some potential oversight questions for Congress relating to two additional oversight matters, the recent propulsion equipment casualties and the Navy’s new plan for crewing 

and operating the ships. 

Now that we are 15 years into the program and with the Navy’s 

proposal to shift to procurement of the frigate variant now being 

considered, there is a question about the acquisition lessons 

learned from the LCS program. My written statement concludes 

with some comments on that question, particularly in terms of the 

rapid acquisition strategy that the Navy originally pursued for the 

LCS program which aimed at reducing acquisition cycle time. 

Chairwoman Hartzler, this concludes my statement. Thank you 

again for the opportunity to testify, and I will be pleased to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Rourke can be found in the Appendix on page 133.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. Very good comments. I 

think very clearly laid out some of the challenges and the opportunities. I would like to start with Admiral Rowden. 

What specific combatant commanders’ requirements have 

changed over the past 10 years that necessitates converting the 

LCS platform into a more capable and survivable frigate? 

Admiral ROWDEN. The requirement for the littoral combat ships 

and the frigates, the 52 number, is a number that provides them 

with the capability to address not only the day-to-day operations 

that we are executing during the shaping and stabilizing operations that we are executing now, but also as we transition to the 

high end. 

Clearly, as we look at—reflect on the last 10 years and we see 

a potential adversary’s growing numbers of ships and aircraft and 

submarines that are being fielded, in order to be able to address 

those threats, those potential threats, we need a Navy that can do 

that. And they—and the littoral combat ships and the frigates with 

either the ASW package installed or the ASUW [anti-surface warfare] package installed, and the frigates with both of those capabilities installed will certainly give capability to the combatant commanders that they need as they look at the ever-changing threat 

and to be able to address that. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So you would say that the need to change to the 

frigate is because of the threats and the increased capabilities that 

the frigate would have over the LCS? Because that was what the 

question was. Why—what are the changes that would necessitate 

moving to a frigate from an LCS? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, ma’am. Given the wider range of operations that the frigate will be able to execute against the growing 

threat, that certainly would drive us towards building the frigate 

over the littoral combat ship. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So bottom line is because they have more mission capability. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Multiple rather than just singular, correct? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, ma’am. 
17 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Secretary of Defense’s December 2014, 

2015 memorandum that directed the Secretary of Navy to reduce 

the total procurement quantity of littoral combat ships and frigates 

from 52 to 40 states, and I quote, ‘‘40 littoral combat ships and frigates, the number that the Navy’s own warfighting analysis says it 

is sufficient to need,’’ end quote. 

So it appears to be the rationale as to why the Secretary of Defense reduced the program’s quantity. So does the Navy have warfighting analysis that demonstrates that 40 littoral combat ships 

and frigates are sufficient to meet warfighting requirements? And 

if so, what is the Navy’s number of 52 total small surface combatants based on? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes ma’am. I think that is a good question to 

be addressed by Secretary Stackley, but what I can tell you about 

the conversations that I have with our forward deployed fleet commanders now, the commander of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the commander of the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific 

and the commander of the 5th Fleet in the Arabian Gulf and even 

the commander of the 4th Fleet down in Southern Command is, in 

my conversations with them, that one of the questions that always 

comes up is how many LCS can I get and how fast can you get 

them to me. So the demand is there. With respect to the—and the 

requirement remains 50. 

With respect to the reduction from 52 to 40, Secretary Stackley. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Let me start by the document 

of requirement which goes to the Force Structure Assessment that 

the CNO has conducted. 2012 Force Structure Assessment updated 

in 2014 continues to emphasize the need for no less than 52 small 

surface combatants to address the full mission requirements across 

the balanced fleet. And the CNO, since then, has been clear about 

a couple of things. 

One, all pressure on our fleet points towards the need for a larger fleet to continue to perform the missions at the level that the 

Nation requires. And so there is not a requirement that is going 

to come through, and this—the 2014 update is going to be updated 

again this year, will be delivered with the budget. But I can tell 

you that that requirement will not go down in terms of the number 

of small surface combatants. 

The decision to go from 52 to 40, that was a decision that did 

not come from the requirements community. It, frankly, didn’t 

come from the Navy. This was driven in a budget environment 

where the determination was made that we have to take risk somewhere. This is a place where we will take risk in terms of the size 

of our force. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. And I know a lot of our members want to 

ask questions, so I will come back to some others. But I do want 

to ask—something you said, Secretary Stackley, caught my attention. Where you said the shipbuilders are being held accountable. 

I know that as contracting goes forward, there is a warranty type 

of a provision added. But is there—how are they being held accountable now? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Let me start by describing that 

I have been doing shipbuilding for over 30 years. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Right. 
18 

Secretary STACKLEY. In our contracts, we do have explicit warranty provisions. When the ship is delivered, we first bring the 

Board of Inspection—well, first, our supervisors of shipbuilding are 

monitoring the construction of the ship as it goes to ensure compliance with process and procedures. And in terms of the delivered 

ship, the Board of Inspection and Survey comes on board and conducts a pretty extensive full-week inspection of the ship, including 

underway periods. Deficiencies are documented. 

When the ship is delivered, it is still within a warranty period 

so that if other deficiencies emerge during the warranty period, 

then we first—we evaluate who is responsible for the deficiency. If 

it is a government responsibility, if it is a government system, then 

we own it. But if it is a contractor responsibility, we take it back 

to the contractor to fulfill his requirements under the contract 

within that warranty provision. And then at the end of this period, 

we have what is referred to as a final contract trial to shake out 

any last remnants before we go into a post-shakedown availability, 

at which point in time the government and the contractor are both 

on board the ship correcting our response—our respective deficiencies. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. What is the time period for these—has 

been for the warranty period? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Notionally, it is 12 months. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So of the—you outlined in your testimony five 

engineering—five concerns, and a couple of them dealt with crews, 

dealt with training. That is why you are changing, Vice Admiral—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER [continuing]. The training, which makes perfect 

sense. So you are saying that those were—those costs were incurred by the Navy because it was basically the crew’s fault that 

the structural problem occurred. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. But with the design, like on the propulsion and 

those others, who ate those costs—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me walk through that. 

Mrs. HARTZLER [continuing]. To fix that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. First the gear. This was a new gear manufacturer brought to the ship. The prior gear manufacturer ceased 

its business. And specifications went out to the gear manufacturer. 

When that gear was coupled with the rest of the propulsion plant, 

there was a, I will call it a mistiming in terms of software controlling the system. That was not discovered until the USS Milwaukee 

was en route to her home port, and we tripped over this failure and 

the clutch—the clutch burnt out. 

That—the shipbuilder in this case and the gear manufacturer are 

paying for the correction of the design, and we are withholding 

payments on subsequent ships until that is corrected on the subsequent ships. And then the USS Milwaukee itself, that final correction is waiting for the design, verification, and validation. And 

prior ships, the LCS 1 and LCS 3, are not affected because they 

are under a different gear design. So that is being covered today 

with withholdings, with fee—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 
19 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. And cost under the contract. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good. That makes sense. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Can I hit the other one, because the other 

one is important? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, I think we need to—we are going to have 

votes coming up. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. And we want to get to some other questions, but 

thank you for that. 

Ranking Member Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Before beginning my 

questioning, I just want to compliment Congresswoman Graham 

for an outstanding service to this committee and to Congress, and 

I am really very disappointed that you are leaving because you 

really are the kind of member we need that is always going to be 

responsive to the needs of their constituents and to their responsibilities as members of the committee. So thank you very much for 

your leadership. 

Mr. Stackley, I am so disappointed in your testimony I can’t 

begin to tell you. You just answered a question for the chair that 

I thought was very deceptive. Let me just read from a GAO [Government Accountability Office] report: ‘‘Our past work has found 

that by virtue of using guaranty provisions as opposed to warranties (such as the U.S. Coast Guard generally uses), the Navy is responsible for paying the vast majority of defects. 

‘‘Specifically regarding the LCS, we found that for LCS 4, the 

Navy’s guaranty provisions were structured such that the Navy 

paid all of the costs to correct the defects. For LCS 3, the shipbuilder was responsible for 30 percent of the costs of the first 

$100,000 of defects, a number the Navy surpassed just days after 

delivery. Thus, the Navy was 100 percent responsible for the costs 

of all remaining defects, for LCS 5–8, the shipbuilder is responsible 

for some portion of the first $1 million in defects for each ship.’’ 

Now, I don’t think you were very responsive. I am not going to 

ask you to respond. I am going to ask Ms. Mackin to clarify what 

the warranty versus guaranty provisions, how the Coast Guard is 

so different, and how for the vast majority of defects, it is the taxpayer picking up the tab. 

Ms. MACKIN. Yes. We looked into this issue for Coast Guard and 

Navy ships. It was a pretty comprehensive review. Not just LCS, 

but other Navy ships as well, and what we found is the Navy does 

not use warranty provisions as outlined in the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation warranty the way we would think of a warranty. They 

use a guaranty clause in the contract, and it is subject to a limitation of liability. Those are the numbers you were citing. So it is negotiated in the contract. The limitation was zero on LCS 4. The 

more recent ships it is a million dollars. The way these contracts 

are structured, however, the government and shipbuilder, even for 

shipbuilder-responsible defects, would split the cost in essence of 

paying for the fixes, up to a million dollars. After a million dollars, 

it is all on the government. 

The Coast Guard, on the other hand, for their more recent cutters has a pretty stringent warranty provision, kind of the way we 
20 

would think of it, that they negotiate at the outset and hold their 

shipbuilders more accountable to fix problems. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. So, Mr. Stackley, why is it the Coast 

Guard can get it right and the Navy can’t? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will review the Coast Guard warranty provisions, but our contract—— 

Ms. SPEIER. You have been doing this for 30 years. Why haven’t 

you looked at it before—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. I don’t look at the Coast Guard contracts 

unless it comes under my purview. The provisions that we have on 

our contract, they hold the contractor responsible, for what he—he 

is responsible regarding specifications, regarding performance of 

the systems that they deliver. And if, in fact, there is a deficiency, 

the costs go back to that contractor during the warranty period. 

Ms. SPEIER. I think that we are talking around some realities. 

The reality is the Coast Guard has figured out a way to do it appropriately. The Navy has basically taken the position that we will 

pay for most of the costs. And that was reflected in the GAO report. 

Secretary Stackley, let me ask you a question. Last week a similar hearing was held by our colleagues in the Senate. You were 

asked who was responsible for briefing Congress that the ship 

would cost $220 million. As we see from the chart, it is now costing 

$470 million per frame. You said you had to check your records. So 

you have had about a week. Who was responsible for that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Let me go back to, that was 

the 2003, 2004 timeframe. I have got to be careful about the term 

briefing because that number was briefed by everybody from the 

Chief of Naval Operations to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

to the program executive officer to the program manager. 

Ms. SPEIER. So who is it? Who was it? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would start at the top of the chain of command. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, evidently, I have a tweet from a reporter that 

suggests that it was Vern Clark. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I said I would start at the top of the chain 

of command, and Vern Clark was the Chief of Naval Operations at 

the time. His counterpart in terms of acquisition was Assistant 

Secretary Young. They carried forward the program based on what 

they had for affordability targets at the time. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. But I guess my point is, in your statement 

you made the case that, you know, we are really moving along appropriately. They are costing about the right amount. We are saving money. We are not saving money. They are costing over twice 

as much as they were originally intended to cost. 

Now, Dr. Gilmore, do you think the LCS is survivable? 

Dr. GILMORE. The admiral noted that the ship meets its requirements for survivability, which it does. The testing that we have 

done and that we will continue to do is indicating that is true. And 

here are what its requirements are. Its requirements against very 

modest threats, and the details are classified, are to exit the area, 

not to continue in combat, but to exit the area if they are attacked 

by modest threats. If they are attacked by, and hit by, more stressing threats, and unfortunately these threats are proliferating 
21 

throughout the world and they are quite stressing—they are stressing for any ship to deal with—but if the ships are hit by these more 

stressing threats, the requirement is for an orderly abandon ship. 

And the testing that we have done and will continue to do is probably going to indicate that those requirements have been met. 

That means that the ship is not going to be able to stay in the 

battle area and conduct operations. Now, it is a challenge for any 

ship to do that, if hit by some of these threats, but all the other 

surface combatants that we have are built with compartmentalization, redundancy, and other features that at least give them much 

more of a chance to survive hits by some of these stressing threats. 

So that is the basis of my evaluation. 

The requirements were set when the vision for using these ships 

actually as articulated first by Admiral Clark—I have looked at his 

testimony before the Congress in March of 2004—the requirements 

were set consistent with the vision that the ship would have many 

off-board systems that could go potentially over the horizon, attack 

targets, which would mean the ship could stay out of harm’s way, 

and I am paraphrasing what Admiral Clark said. Unfortunately, 

those capabilities have not materialized. They may in the future. 

The Navy is getting ready to deploy with some unmanned aerial 

vehicles that will have reconnaissance capabilities. But in terms of 

long-range attack, those systems are probably a number of years 

away. 

In fact, many of the upgrades that the Navy has talked about in 

the past as being available either in the last decade or this decade 

are probably slipping into the middle of the next decade at best. 

So that is the basis of my assessment. If in the future the Navy 

is able to develop and deploy systems that enable the ship to stay 

out of the range of some of these threats, then the survivability 

assessment would change. 

Ms. SPEIER. So if an LCS is hit by a torpedo, what is survivability, that the sailors can get overboard or that they can exit the 

area? 

Dr. GILMORE. Actually I am going to have to not answer that directly because the details are classified. Talking about specific 

threats makes the discussion classified, so I would be happy to discuss that with you in the—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would like to answer that. I would like to 

answer that, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, if it is classified, why should you be discussing 

it? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I can get into some generic discussion regarding survivability that might be helpful. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Okay. First, Dr. Gilmore’s assessment regarding the ship’s meeting its survivability requirements is correct. 

The ship was not designed for what you call fight-through survivability. If it takes a devastating blow, the key is to exit the area 

and ensure the crew survives. But since the mission is built around 

these mission packages that work off-board, then it is not envisioned that the ship’s ability to continue to operate the off-board 

mission packages is critical at that point. 
22 

In the case of a torpedo striking the ship, the comment regarding 

compartmentalization of the ship, this ship is designed to the same 

compartmentalization standards as the rest of the United States 

Navy, and that is to be able to survive a blow that covers 15 percent of what is referred to as floodable length of the ship to provide 

three-compartment flooding. So whether it is an LCS, or whether 

it is a DDG–51, or whether it is a carrier, that compartmentalization standard is the same. The fact that it is smaller, it has a bigger impact on a smaller ship. But a compartmentation requirement 

in the event that a torpedo, if it breaches more than three compartments, then that crew is going to have to abandon that ship. 

Ms. SPEIER. When I was on the—— 

Dr. GILMORE. Could I say something—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Yes, Dr. Gilmore. 

Dr. GILMORE. The ship still doesn’t have all of the redundancy—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Excuse me, Dr. Gilmore. I just want to let everyone know we are voting. There is 9 minutes to go. So if we could 

wrap up this question, then what I would like to do is just to pause 

our hearing, let us go vote. It should be about a half hour in voting, 

and then reconvene, because we have a second vote series later on. 

So if that would be good. So if you would finish the question. 

Dr. GILMORE. I will just very briefly say—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. 

Dr. GILMORE. The ship doesn’t have the redundancy of the other 

combatants. That is because it is a small ship. It also has a very 

small crew, which is very important to recoverability. So the other 

ships have a larger crew and more redundancy, and if they are hit, 

that means they have a better opportunity to survive. There is no 

guarantee of survival when hit by any of these threats. So there 

is in my view, as I have explained in multiple reports in detail, a 

significant difference in survivability between these ships and all 

the other surface combatants. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. Thank you very much. So, we will stand 

in recess and reconvene as soon as possible. 

[Recess.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. This hearing will now reconvene. Thank you for 

your patience while we voted. I appreciate that very much. I would 

like to go to Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. One of the questions I had 

has already been answered, and that was for Mr. Stackley, and 

that is if the Coast Guard is doing a better job or has better provisions in their contracts, we should at least look at that and see if 

that is something that we can incorporate. I know you have said 

that you all would do that, and I appreciate that. 

I guess as I listen to this, I think back to the quote that nothing 

will ever be attempted if all possible objections must first be overcome. And regardless of the weapons system or the branch, if we 

are talking about the Army, there is a reason we have Strykers, 

and there is a reason we have M1 Abrams, and the Stryker cannot 

handle the same type of strike from another weapons system that 

the Abrams can. But the Abrams can’t do all of the things that the 

Stryker can. And if we are looking for a light, nimble craft, then 

we have just got to accept the fact that you can’t build it as thick 
23 

as you are going to build some of our other weapons systems. It is 

just part of the tradeoff. We have this tradeoff with every weapons 

system that we have. And so I just, nimble and fast, in and of 

itself, and quantity in and of itself, I believe are important in winning the battle. 

I do have a question, Ms. Mackin. As you talk about the cost per 

ship, do you consider the development cost a variable cost or a 

fixed cost? 

Ms. MACKIN. When we look at the cost per ship, there is several 

different ways to look at it. So there is a cost cap for this program, 

which is somewhat generous. We usually look at the selected acquisition report, the unit cost as reported by DOD—— 

Mr. SCOTT. But do you consider the research and development 

[R&D] of the system a fixed cost or a variable cost? 

Ms. MACKIN. I think that would depend on the system. Maybe 

somebody else can weigh in with more detail on that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, research and development is a fixed cost. It 

doesn’t matter if you build 1 or 50—— 

Ms. MACKIN. I think one issue for this program and other programs is that some of the systems on this ship may be R&D funded 

but not by the Navy. Maybe another part of the Navy that is funding the system that will eventually go on the ship. So it is hard 

sometimes to totally capture the entire cost of the ship. But, again, 

we go with what is reported to Congress. 

Mr. SCOTT. But the same type of analysis is what led to the cancellation of the F–22, when the per unit cost of the F–22, when the 

project was cancelled, was significantly lower than the cost per unit 

that was being reported in reports like this. Because the research 

and development costs are already sunk. It doesn’t matter if you 

build 1 or if you build 1,001. 

Ms. MACKIN. Quite frankly, cost is not our main concern with 

this program right now. After the rebaseline, I do think they have 

gotten costs more or less under control. The key concern we have 

is the testing, the lack of completed testing, while they have continued to buy the seaframes and the mission packages. There are still 

significant concerns. And, again, the frigate is going to be based on 

these same seaframes that have reliability issues. So I would characterize that as our main concern at this point. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, a lot is said about cost from the people who 

want to cancel the program. So you are telling me the cost is not 

the primary concern—— 

Ms. MACKIN. The cost has doubled since the initial estimate, as 

was discussed earlier. But let’s look at what is happening right 

now. After the restructuring, I think they have gotten costs more 

or less under control. That is not our main concern. Schedules are 

late, and the capabilities aren’t there, and the testing hasn’t been 

completed, would be how I would characterize our main concerns 

at this point. 

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, what are we giving up? What are we accepting in additional risk, as a nation, when we move from 52 ships 

to 40 ships? And what is your understanding of any studies that 

were done with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to form 

any type of analysis foundation for the quantity reduction to the 

LCS program? 
24 

Admiral ROWDEN. Thank you, sir. I will let Secretary Stackley 

discuss the analysis. But, I mean, clearly when we reduce the number of ships from 52 to 40, we are taking risk in the capacity that 

we want to have forward. And so that will result in more water 

under the keels of the ships that we have. It will result in more 

wear and tear on those ships. It will result in more wear and tear 

on the crew and a greater time deployed for the same amount of 

availability forward. And so that is risk that has to be weighed and 

has to be accepted as we attempt to fulfill the requirements of the 

combatant commanders. 

Mr. SCOTT. My time is expired, but as I understand it there was 

no analytical foundation for the reduction. That this was simply a 

budget-driven decision. Is that correct? 

Admiral ROWDEN. That is my understanding. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I really appreciate your kind remarks earlier, thank you so much, and Jackie, 

thank you as well. 

As a representative of a State with nearly 100 vendors that 

undergird the LCS program, I am very grateful to have an opportunity to talk with you all today. This is my actual last day here 

on the Hill, so it is very special to be able to be with you all. I 

would first like to thank the House Armed Services Committee for 

fighting for the Graham amendment in this year’s NDAA [National 

Defense Authorization Act], which would express the sense of Congress on the role of Panama City, Florida, to the Armed Forces of 

the United States. 

I would also like to thank the conferees who noted that Panama 

City has played a long role and an important role in the development and support of the United States Armed Forces. This, I hope, 

is just the first step in recognizing Panama City with the ultimate 

hope, and I have talked to the Secretary of the Navy about this— 

that the Navy will name a future LCS after Panama City, a much 

deserving community. 

So now I would like to direct a question to Secretary Stackley. 

As you know, the United States shipbuilding capacity had been in 

steady decline for years. As many have noted, shipbuilding is not 

a faucet that can be turned on and off. Indeed, once lost, it can 

take years to recapitalize a vendor base and labor force necessary 

to build our Navy’s warships. So, Secretary Stackley, you have suggested that a block buy strategy enables a shipbuilder to go out to 

its vendor base and secure long-term agreements to achieve the 

best pricing. Can you please expand on this and comment on how 

such a strategy may contribute to maximum efficiency and capacity 

in our industrial base as well as best price for the taxpayers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Thanks for the question. First, 

you described the level of ship production that we have going on 

in the country, and it is below capacity, and it is, frankly, below 

where we need it to be in the long-term in terms of being able to 

sustain the force structure that the Navy needs. And there are 

three critical elements to that. First is the shipbuilders themselves, 

and shipyards are capital-intensive and require significant investment in order to be able to produce these extraordinarily complex, 
25 

large warships. And so in order to support the investment that is 

required, you have to have throughput in terms of ships. I mean, 

it is just fundamental. 

And so if production drops to an unsustainable level—unsustainable meaning they can’t invest in those facilities—then those facilities are going to ultimately shutter. That is one part. 

The second part is skilled labor. Shipbuilding requires unique 

skills in terms of shipfitters, pipefitters. We have nuclear-trained 

mechanics, production control in the shipyard, very skilled set of 

labor. And what we can’t afford to have happen is a sawtooth effect 

in terms of hiring and firing at our shipyards. 

One, we will be continually dealing with learning in terms of the 

labor themselves. And, two, we will lose the skilled labor. They will 

go to other areas where there is more stable employment, and that 

will come back to us in terms of cost and quality. So we have to 

maintain those two key elements in our industrial base, and it is 

particularly fragile at a time when your shipbuilding rates are 

below where you believe they need to be. 

And then the third is the vendor base itself. We can’t lose sight 

of the vendors that support our shipyards because at low rates, 

quite often those vendors are uniquely supporting our shipbuilding, 

and at lower rates, they are fragile. So we have to be careful that 

we don’t break the vendor base and have that come back to us 

again in terms of cost and quality. That is all on the industrial 

base side. 

On the requirement side, we have to make sure that we are 

building our ships at a rate to support the force structure that we 

have laid out in terms of our 30-year plan which is backed up by 

the maritime strategy in support of the national military strategy. 

And so if you look at our long-term plan, we are below where we 

need to be. If you look at what we have done over the last 8 years, 

it has been to try to increase our shipbuilding rates to support that 

long-term plan. And if you are going to do that when you are starting at a fragile base, those long-term agreements with the shipbuilders to incentivize them to invest and with the vendor base to 

incentivize them to basically support the shipbuilders through the 

material flow are absolutely critical. 

So in the Department of the Navy—I will stand by the record 

over the last 8 years—whether it is the LCS program across two 

shipbuilders, the Virginia program across two shipbuilders, the 

DDG–51 program across two shipbuilders, the T–AO(X) program 

that we just awarded, with one shipbuilder—program by program 

we have done our best to be able to line up, whether it is a multiyear or a block buy, a long-term run of production to stabilize performance, to attract, retain the skilled workforce that we need, and 

to reduce cost from the vendor base right to the shipbuilder because that comes back to us in terms of the government and the 

taxpayer. And that allows us to, in fact, plow those funds back into 

whether it is shipbuilding or aviation or whatever it is that is the 

priority at the time to support our national security strategy. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you for that very thorough answer. I really 

appreciate it, and I am out of time. I want to end with this. Please 

continue to feel my spirit and my commitment and my thanks for 
26 

all that you all do. And I hope that spirit will one day result in 

an LCS being named after Panama City. 

And I will let that be my final comment, and I yield back to the 

chairwoman. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Representative Graham. Representative Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. As a member of the Seapower Subcommittee, I am particularly glad to be here today. 

Admiral, Mr. Stackley, thank you for your years of experience, 

for the expertise and professionalism you bring to your jobs. It 

helps us do our jobs to have you do what you do and give us such 

great information. Admiral, you stated your years of experience. 

You can never replace that. We can sit here and read pieces of 

paper and listen to you, but your experience really speaks volumes 

to us, so thank you for that. 

Admiral, you said that there is a significant need in the Western 

Pacific and the Mediterranean for the LCS. You said that the fleet 

commanders are asking for more LCSes and to get them there 

more quickly, which I heard from Admiral Harris when I was out 

in Hawaii at the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] exercise. I asked 

him, what is the message, Admiral? He said get more of them to 

me. Get them to me as quickly as you possibly can. You also stated 

that you are 100 percent confident in the LCS and that you have 

seen the need for the capability it currently has and that you are 

optimistic of the added capabilities as the program continues to 

mature. And you stated that there is growing threats in the world 

and a demonstrated need for both the LCS and its transition to the 

frigate. 

I want to make sure I have summarized what you have told us 

today. Did I get that right? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, I think you nailed it. 

Mr. BYRNE. Good. Mr. Stackley, you said that the LCS acquisition program has been steady since 2008, and since then has been 

under the cost cap. You also explained that the casualties of the 

LCS have been addressed and that there are no systemic or recurring issues with these casualties. You also said the Navy continues 

to have a need for 52 small surface combatants, and, in fact, that 

number may increase. And the reason to go down to 40 LCSes was 

driven by the budget and not by any sort of operational study. 

So I want to make sure that you continue to believe, and the 

Navy continues to believe, you need 52 of these small surface combatants, these LCSes to frigates? 

Have I summarized your statements correctly? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. As I described earlier, the 52 number, I don’t anticipate any downward change to that number when 

the updated Force Structure Assessment comes back from the CNO 

with the next budget. 

I want to make a minor correction, but an important correction. 

In terms of stabilizing the program, I would tag that to the 2010 

timeframe, and that is when we basically came over to Congress 

with the block buy approach, and that is the environment that we 

are executing in today. 

The other comment regarding the casualties, those specific casualties that were identified that we are tackling, those by them-
27 

selves, not systemic, we are correcting those and we are going beyond that though. Naval Sea Systems Command is doing a comprehensive review of propulsion systems for both ship types to ensure 

that we don’t run into further unanticipated casualties that could 

have been corrected ahead of time. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. I have been on, I think, three of these 

ships at dock and one at sea. And when I go on them, Admiral, I 

talk to not just to the officers on the ships, I talk to the sailors, 

because if you want to know what is really happening, you talk to 

the sailors. You know that better than I do. And what I have heard 

uniformly from the officers and sailors on these LCSes, is that they 

love them. They are proud to be serving on them, and they are having fun operating the ships. I know you have been on them. I know 

you have talked to a lot of these officers and sailors. What are you 

hearing from the officers and sailors that are actually serving on 

the LCSes? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Sir, I hear a lot of things, clearly, and I think 

that there are some things that we need to work on, but those comments—and we take those onboard, and we go and we attack them. 

From my experiences, not only on the LCSes both on the East and 

West Coast, whether it is the Freedom variant or the Independence 

variant, the young men and women that are serving on these ships, 

they are excited for the mission. They are excited for the mission. 

They are excited for the opportunities that these ships present. 

When I talk to the young men and women that have come back 

from deployment, the varied missions that they are able to accomplish, the engagement that they are allowed to execute, it gives 

them a tremendous sense of pride. They also are monumentally innovative, and so they are constantly coming up with new ideas and 

new ways as we think about the future of these ships in order to 

be able to fully utilize and fully get the value out of these ships. 

They talk about the modularity. You know, one of the things that 

I think is important is that when we go to modernize a guidedmissile destroyer, we have to take that ship offline for a significant 

period of time; but they understand that we can modernize the 

module ashore and in a very short period of time have a fully modernized combat system in order to be able to go put it back out to 

sea, get the crew trained up, and away we go. 

And so the capacity and the capability that these ships bring, the 

opportunities that they bring to contribute to three very important 

missions, and the opportunities to provide the presence that sometimes we just can’t get because the guided-missile destroyers, the 

cruisers, the submarines, and carriers, are off doing other things. 

That is what really gets them fired up. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you for that, and thank you for your 

service, sir. And I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. A few more questions here. Dr. Gilmore, what specific LCS platform characteristics and design do you 

believe that the Navy will need to address in its design for the frigate in order for your office to deem the frigate operationally suitable and effective? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, the most important problem, set of problems, 

that will have to be addressed, are associated with the continuing 

reliability problems of many of the ships’ systems, and many of 
28 

those may end up being the same on the frigate, although Mr. 

Stackley will know more about that than I do because he is the one 

who is involved in developing the detailed design, but the initial assumption was that many of those would be the same. And there 

are continuing reliability problems with those systems. And if those 

problems are not fixed and addressed, it will be hard to, in fact, 

probably impossible to say that the frigate would be suitable, but 

I assume the Navy is looking at that. 

And then, of course, in the testing that we have done so far, 

there are problems with the guns, and some of the guns may end 

up being the same in terms of the ability of the crews to use them 

consistently to accomplish the missions that they are supposed to 

accomplish. They can in some instances accomplish those missions, 

but it turns out to be very difficult. 

But the other thing I have to say about combat missions is that 

we have only done a very limited amount of testing so far in that 

regard, very limited testing of the surface warfare package, and 

then truncated testing of the mine countermeasures package. Of 

course, the mine countermeasures package isn’t at issue for the 

frigate. 

So at this point what I would say is with regard to the problems 

that might be encountered with the combat systems, the anti-submarine warfare systems, and the augmented surface warfare package on the frigate, we will have to see how that goes. The Navy 

is in development of those systems, but the Navy should devote a 

lot of attention, and I think Mr. Stackley has indicated they are devoting a lot of attention to the continuing reliability problems with 

the systems on the ships. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. Mr. Stackley, I wanted to ask you 

about that because in your testimony you talked about the packages that they include, and you said they will deliver when available, and they are ready to deploy. They have successfully fielded 

the surface warfare. They were late due to budget and technological challenges. I know you went in depth and explained about 

the mine countermeasures challenges and what you are doing with 

that regard. But I was a little surprised to hear you talk about how 

these other packages are ready. 

Can you give a little further assessment on that? Are they ready? 

And it sounds like you are putting old systems on them and bringing on new ones as they come about, or what is the status of the 

packages? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Thanks for the question. I will 

try to be real clear here. We launched the program with three mission packages as the targeted initial round of capabilities as we delivered the ship. Across those mission packages, certain subsystems 

were mature and certain subsystems were going through development. And as I indicated in my opening statement, we are delivering mission package capability late. And the lateness ties to the 

extended development of certain of those subsystems. However, 

when one is ready, when it is mature, we are bringing it to the 

ship, so that as those capabilities mature and as these ships deploy, you are seeing increasing capability on board. 

And, in fact, I would argue that the approach that we are taking 

with the LCS regarding bringing mature capability to the ship in 
29 

an incremental fashion is exactly what you all have outlined for the 

Department of Defense to do in the 2017 NDAA. I think if you take 

that, what you have outlined in terms of practice for the Department, and you line that up with the LCS program, that is the approach that we are taking here. The reason that we are having this 

hearing frankly is, one of the reasons, is the time that it has taken 

to complete the development and testing for some of these subsystems. We spend a lot of time talking about the RMMV, for example, but there are other examples where we have had to actually 

cancel parts of the mission packages because the development was 

not getting there and then find an alternative. 

The beauty is that when that decision is made, we don’t have to 

go in and do a significant redesign to the ship because the ship was 

designed in a modular fashion, and we can bring these alternatives 

to the ship with a far less intrusive integration onboard. And I can 

walk through some of those examples, but I think it is instructive 

in terms of the benefit of the modular approach. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I think that is a good point because we have 

talked about open architecture and some of those things in acquisition reform. 

Just a question. Curious about the contracting, the subcontractors, so I got a list of them and looked at them because this has 

been problematic as far as the delay. Are they penalized for not delivering on time, or how is a contract set up initially in that regard? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Bottom line, most of these developmental systems are under a cost-plus R&D contract where the 

terms and conditions of the contract are we take on responsibility 

for cost in a cost-plus environment, recognizing that in many cases 

we are looking for new invention and discovery. And so we assume 

the responsibility in a cost-plus environment for the cost, but the 

contractor loses if it is a cost overrun or delays, they are going to 

lose the fee that goes with the work. And ultimately they will lose 

the contract. 

I mean, RMMV was under development with Lockheed Martin. 

They had their eyes on the production contract and when we cancelled, they didn’t just lose the fee on the RMMV development, but 

they lost the production that was going to come with it. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. And I want to go to other members 

too, but I do want to ask Mr. O’Rourke a question. You have waited 

patiently, and you are a known expert on these issues on the Hill. 

So GAO has previously indicated that Congress limits their oversight by authorizing a block buy. A few questions. How has the previous block buy been used to manage cost growth, and is Congress 

able to perform oversight during the block buy? And, third, what 

are the implications of Congress not approving the next block buy 

for LCS? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In terms of conducting oversight during the period of a block buy, we have actually been through a test of that 

over the last several years as we have executed the current block 

buy contracts. There are many aspects to congressional oversight. 

One is what we are doing right now, which is asking questions during hearings. And there has been quite a lot of that over the past 

several years. The LCS has been a recurrent topic of questioning, 
30 

sometimes quite intensive or extensive, at the annual Navy budget 

review hearings. 

I would venture that most of the annual Navy posture and budget review hearings have at one point or another discussed the LCS, 

so there has been a lot of Q&A at the hearings. Another aspect of 

oversight are legislative provisions and there have been a lot of—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. If I could ask you, I think maybe you didn’t hear 

the question. What I am looking for, how has a block buy been 

used to manage cost growth not oversight? So how has a block buy 

managed cost growth, and what are the implications for us as Congress if we don’t approve a block buy? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Right I was going to the—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is what we are looking at so—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Right. I had picked out the middle part of your 

question first. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yeah there was a question—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. But let me return to the first part, which is, if 

you would say that again, I want to make sure? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. How has a previous block buy been used 

to manage cost growth? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Okay. I think it is important to get into the 

record that most of the cost growth on the procurement cost of the 

seaframes occurred prior to the block buys. Once the program was 

put under the block buy contracts, there has been only minor 

growth within that contract, some of which has been paid by the 

Navy. But the majority of the increase in the cost of the ships occurred during the period of annual contracting on the first four 

ships. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So you would say block buy locks in the price 

and helps save money? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. It stabilized the costs and put the program into 

an environment where the costs have been not one that assembled 

a record of cost growth of anything like what we saw on the first 

four ships. Furthermore, by doing a block buy contract, you are getting the kinds of savings that are possible under a block buy contract compared to annual contracting. And those savings for the 

kind of block buy contract we are looking at here, which did not 

include upfront batch orders of components, could be upwards of 5 

percent, so if we had been in an annual contracting environment, 

the ships might have been that much more expensive as well. A 

third point on this is that—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very quickly. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. These block buy contracts are fixed price incentive contracts, and so that tends to limit the government’s exposure 

to the amount of cost growth that does occur during the contract. 

That was the first part of your question. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Makes sense. Thank you very much. Representative Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. Let’s talk more about block buys, because my understanding is that, Secretary Stackley, you have already put out an RFP [request for proposal] that presupposes a 

block buy, even though you don’t have authorization yet from Congress. Is that correct? 
31 

Secretary STACKLEY. What we have put out an RFP for is the 

2017 ships with an option for a block buy where we will be coming 

back to the Congress with the 2018 budget for authorization for the 

block buy. 

Ms. SPEIER. But the shipbuilders are even saying that a block 

buy at this time won’t afford them the necessary time for the completion of design. 

Secretary STACKLEY. We are doing the design today with the 

shipbuilder. We won’t award the contract until we have completed 

a design review so that we, the government, are satisfied based on 

their presentation of the design information that will inform their 

proposal for the frigate. 

Ms. SPEIER. Ms. Mackin, what are the downsides of a block buy? 

Ms. MACKIN. You know, it could have advantages for cost control, 

number one. 

Ms. SPEIER. Which Mr. O’Rourke has talked about. 

Ms. MACKIN. Right. The disadvantages in our view, is that, as I 

mentioned in my opening remarks, the program can be considered, 

quote-unquote, ‘‘locked in,’’ so that any attempt to adjust the procurement pace, if Congress has concerns about the program, they 

want to make some changes, DOD has consistently come back and 

said, well, the pricing will increase then. 

So you are not locked in. I mean, you can make changes, but 

there is that risk that, oh, well, the contractors, we had this deal, 

and now they are going to raise their prices. So, I think it needs 

to be carefully considered if the block buy proposal for the frigate 

right now, which will be based initially on LCS prices, is the best 

strategy. 

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Stackley, and you can provide this for the 

record if you don’t have it off the top of your head, I want to 

know—and I would like for you to send it to the committee and 

also to my personal office—how much money we have spent on repairs to the LCS fleet to date, how much has the government 

spent, and how much has the shipbuilder spent. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. I will submit that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Secretary STACKLEY. Now, I am going to ask for clarification because, for example, the LCS 1 has been in the fleet for about 8 

years, the LCS 2 for about 7 years; and so when you say how much 

money for repairs, we will come back with a—it will probably be 

a large dollar amount for repairs, but you understand that most repair, the predominance of the repair that we do in operations is because of the wear and tear that we put on the ships by operating 

them. For clarification, are you looking for contractor-responsible 

deficiencies? 

Ms. SPEIER. I want all repairs, and you can give it to us by date 

so we can look at the date the ship was commissioned and the date 

of the repairs so we can make that kind of assessment as to whether it is just wear and tear on the ship or whether it is something 

relative to a newly commissioned ship that has a series of problems, as many of these have already had. 
32 

We will make that determination. If you just provide to us the 

dates of the repairs and how much they cost and who paid for 

them, that would be sufficient. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. And then I was on the LCS 4 on its very first trip, 

and I talked to the commander at the time who said they were having trouble with the design of the ship because they couldn’t see 

over the hull. Now they left Cartagena and came back to Coronado 

to be christened. And as they went through the Panama Canal, the 

hull got damaged when pieces of the lock penetrated the hull. I 

would like again, if you don’t have that figure off the top of your 

head, to provide it to me and the committee how much that cost 

to repair. 

Because in my conversations with the commander, I said this 

seems like a serious problem, and it seems like you need cameras 

or mirrors or something to be able to see over the hull. And he 

said, well, we won’t be able to get that until it goes back into dry 

dock in 2 years. And literally within weeks, they had damaged the 

hull. So if you would provide that to me, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred can be found in the Appendix on page 

163.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Back to you, Dr. Gilmore, the testing of the modules 

for the LCS, can you go over that? How many of them—according 

to the Secretary there is three now. How many of them have been 

fully tested? 

Dr. GILMORE. The only mission module that has been partially 

tested consistent with the—you know, there is a series of incremental requirements associated with the increments of each package, so we have tested the Increment 2 surface warfare package 

against its requirements, which are reduced relative to the requirements for surface warfare that the Navy ultimately hopes to meet 

with the fully capable surface warfare package which will come in 

the next several years, probably middle of the next decade, perhaps 

a little sooner. 

So what we have done so far in terms of operational testing is 

to test both LCS variants equipped with the Increment 2 surface 

warfare package against the Navy’s requirements for surface warfare for the Increment 2 package. We had initiated what is called 

the technical evaluation last year, which was of the mine countermeasures package, which was the lead-up to what was supposed to 

have happened in operational testing. But given what happened in 

the technical evaluation testing, the Navy made the decision not to 

go to operational testing, commissioned an independent review 

team, and ultimately decided to cancel the RMS [Remote Minehunting System] program and make other changes to the mine 

countermeasures program. And we now have in place a plan for 

testing that future mine countermeasures package, which will be 

different from what the Navy had been thinking, at least in some 

respects, but that won’t take place for several years. 

So just to sum up, what we have done so far in terms of operational testing is operational testing of the Increment 2 surface 

warfare package. There has been a lot of developmental testing 

done on elements of the other packages. For example, there has 
33 

been developmental testing done of a variable depth sonar, not the 

one that the Navy has recently contracted for, but it was a foreign 

source variable depth sonar. There was developmental testing done 

of that. I forget exactly when that was, a year or two ago, and that 

was very promising. But it was done under conditions that weren’t 

operationally realistic because, you know, the crews doing the testing actually were engineers, and the submarine that they were 

using the sonar to look for, the operators knew where it was, and 

the submarine wasn’t evading. 

Now having said all of that, the test results were nevertheless 

very promising, and there have been lots of other developmental 

testing that has been done and that the Navy continues to do. But 

I am the operational test guy, and what we have done is what I 

said. 

Ms. SPEIER. So if I understand you correctly, this whole concept 

of having modules that you could interchange on the ship, making 

it more flexible, has been tabled, and we are now doing single modules for the ships, and only one has been operationally tested? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, the original concept was that different modules could be interchanged among different ships, and that the ship 

crews and the module crews could be separate and interchangeable. 

My understanding is that the Navy as a result of another review 

in which Admiral Rowden was involved, has decided that they are 

going to merge the ship crews and the module crews on LCS and 

pretty much dedicate given modules to given ships and crews. And 

based on what we have seen, we think that is a good decision, so 

the Navy is giving up on some of the original vision based on what 

it has learned as we have done operational and developmental testing. 

Now, you still will be able to pull a module off a ship. The points 

have been made about, well, you can modernize the module and not 

take the entire ship down. So suppose you want to implement Increment 4 of the surface warfare package, you can take those modules off the ships. You can take the existing surface warfare modules off the ships and replace them with another module for another warfare area, and the ships aren’t completely down and going 

through a lot of construction and changes in a dry dock. 

So that part of the concept is still alive, but the Navy has modified its thinking about how it is going to implement modularity on 

these ships going forward. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Ma’am, if I may provide some clarification. 

Ms. SPEIER. Sure. 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes ma’am. So, I led the review team that 

came up with the recommendation to think differently about the 

modularity of these ships, and in the execution of the review, we 

were concentrating on three things really: simplification, stabilization, and ownership. My experience in going to sea is that the crew 

has to own the mission, and my concern was as we were looking 

at the modularity and shifting the mission over perhaps the course 

of a weekend, you are taking the vast majority of the crew and you 

are trying to shift them from hunting submarines on Thursday to 

hunting mines on Tuesday, and that just didn’t make sense to me 

from the operational perspective. I still value and wanted to fully 

utilize the modularity of the ships for the reasons that Dr. Gilmore 
34 

points out. We can modernize it much more effectively and much 

more rapidly. 

But I think it is important to understand that while we will single up crews and we will single up ships dedicated to a specific 

mission, if the need arises, we also have those crews given the similarity between the ships, or the identical between the ships, if we 

need to shift ships from hunting mines to hunting submarines, we 

have crews available, and we have modules available to do that if 

we have to expand that capacity. 

So we will have divisions dedicated to specific missions, and we 

will have crews dedicated to specific missions, but we can still utilize the modularity to expand our capacity should we have to do 

that in a time of crisis. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. But we started off with a concept. We built 

eight ships under that concept. We have got another 12 ships in 

development, and we keep changing our design expectations or assessments. And it just seems to me that we should design and then 

build because then we built things that aren’t adequate to do what 

we want them to do. 

Let me ask you this, Secretary Stackley, and just one more question after that, Madam Chair. It is my understanding that because 

we didn’t have a U.S.-based or U.S. Navy capability, a repair technician was flown to Florida from Australia in 2015 to make a 90- 

minute repair but essentially delaying operations by 4 days. How 

many other pieces of equipment could require similar repairs and/ 

or delays, and has this happened more than once? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will have to get back to you on the record 

in that specific instance and see if there are other instances. But 

I will describe that for every ship in our Navy, if we have to, and 

we do, we reach around the world to get the right tech rep there 

to the ship to provide the technical support that it will need in 

timely manner. And when we have original equipment manufacturers that are located overseas, then in fact we do on occasion have 

to go overseas to get that repair assist. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. So if you would just provide to us how 

many times have we had to utilize resources that were not available within the Navy on these specific ships? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. And then finally one last question. If we are 

now taking the LCS and turning it into a frigate, wouldn’t we be 

better served to design a frigate that meets what our needs are? 

We have always had problems with the LCS because we were 

bumping up against the weight restriction. We have always had 

problems with the fact that there is not adequate number of crew 

on the ship, and we have a hull that is made out of aluminum that 

gets pierced easily and has been damaged in a number of settings. 

It seems to me that maybe we should go back to the drawing board 

and build a frigate that we want as opposed to just superimposing 

it on an LCS frame that appears to have many problems. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Thanks for the question. Back 

in the 2014 timeframe, we spent a year reviewing design alternatives for this frigate, and we worked with the fleet. We worked 
35 

across the design community. We worked with the Joint Staff. We 

worked with the CNO staff. And we reviewed existing designs, U.S. 

and foreign frigate designs, as well as considered a clean sheet. So, 

in fact, we did consider a clean sheet. 

We considered other existing designs, other existing designs as 

parent designs that could be modified, and included in that was the 

LCS itself. Reviewed all those alternatives, looked at the range of 

capabilities. The fleet weighed in in terms of their priorities in 

terms of the capabilities. Had to consider the missions that the 

ship would perform in, and had to consider things like cost and maturity and risk. 

And out of all that and that review that was conducted with 

OSD, with the Joint Staff, and we invited review by committee 

staffs as well, out of all of that, we landed on the proposal that 

came across to Congress last year and which we are continuing to 

discuss, which is the modified LCS, using the existing ASW and 

surface warfare capabilities that we either have or are developing 

to reduce the risk to first and foremost provide the capability that 

the fleet has prioritized, reduce the risk in terms of technical time 

and cost, and ensure that when we make a commitment to the 

Congress in terms of this frigate, this capability, this cost, that we 

are not bringing a lot of risk to the table and have a repeat of what 

we just experienced on the LCS at the beginning of this program. 

We are trying to leverage. It goes back to my comment regarding 

the 2017 NDAA—— 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Ms. Mackin, could you just respond to that 

as well? 

Ms. MACKIN. We also looked at the study. We looked at how the 

study was done. The study team did a pretty good job given a very 

limited time that they had. They did consider existing design, 

modification of existing new designs, and a major and minor modified LCS. As I mentioned earlier, the minor modified LCS, which 

is now the frigate, was the least capable option that the study team 

assessed. It did not meet all the fleet’s needs, everything that they 

wanted. 

Cost was a big driver in deciding to go with the minor modified 

LCS, but another big driver was that they didn’t want to disrupt 

the workload at the two existing LCS shipyards, so that was also 

a factor in addition to cost, and what we have now is the frigate. 

Ms. SPEIER. But the actual production is not jeopardized until 

2021? 

Ms. MACKIN. That is right. And even the study team noted that 

the current workload, even at that time they were doing their 

work, was taking both yards into 2021. So as I mentioned, there 

is no schedule imperative right now to get the frigate into the pipeline for industrial base concerns. 

Ms. SPEIER. So for the record, of everything that was studied, 

this was the least attractive alternative that was, indeed, selected? 

Is that what you just said? 

Ms. MACKIN. It was the least capable option. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would not agree with that, for the record, 

ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Now—— 
36 

Secretary STACKLEY. For the record, and I would, rather than 

have this be a debate at this hearing, that you invite your staff or 

the members to review, we will brief, we will go through the extensive review that was done of the alternatives. 

And for the record, the disruption to the shipbuilders, that is important, but the decisionmakers, and that included the CNO first 

and foremost, and the CNO first and foremost is less concerned 

about disruption to the shipbuilders and more concerned about delivering capabilities to the fleet. And that was the priority that he 

placed in terms of the ultimate recommendation that went forth to 

the Secretary. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well Mr. Stackley, I do not want to engage in a discussion on this right now, but I think in the end, for all of us, what 

is most important is, one, that our seamen are safe and secure at 

sea and that they can survive and that the ship can survive. 

And, two, that we build competent, capable ships, and, three, 

that the costs be known and that we are prudent in making sure 

that we are not paying for pigs in the poke. And that we are not 

providing sweetheart deals to the shipbuilders for not providing us 

ships at the outset that are capable of doing the job that we contracted for, and that is why that warranty/guaranty issue must be 

addressed. 

With that, I yield back. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I 100 percent concur, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. A couple of follow-up questions. Have we had other 

classes of ships that have moved through the Panama Canal that 

have had some sort of damage as they have gone through? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Sir, I can’t think of any specific instances at 

this time. However, I will take that for the record; and if that, in 

fact, has occurred, I will get that back to you, sir. 

[The information referred can be found in the Appendix on page 

163.] 

Mr. BYRNE. When the ship is going through the Panama Canal— 

I have watched commercial ships go through the canal, and the 

crew is still on board the ship, but the Panama Canal personnel 

are actually operating the transit through the locks. Is that true 

with U.S. Navy ships? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, sir, that is. 

Mr. BYRNE. So if there has been damage as it is going through 

the locks, it is really not our personnel that has caused it. It has 

been caused by the people that work for the Panama Canal? 

Admiral ROWDEN. That is correct, sir. And specifically with the 

latest damage that occurred on the ship, when we took the first 

ship through and there was some damage associated with it, we 

sent a team down to the Panama Canal to talk to them about how 

we needed to take these ships through the canal, the modifications 

that needed to be made to the way they hook the lines up and pull 

the ship through the canal. 

Unfortunately, and we discussed this at length with how they 

were going to do it, unfortunately in the most recent transit, that 

was not executed. We have gone back to them, and we are going 

to get it squared away in the future, but we know how to get the 

ships through the canal safely, and if we execute the procedures as 
37 

we have outlined them, I don’t think we will have any problems 

with that in the future. 

Secretary STACKLEY. If I can add to that? 

Mr. BYRNE. Sure. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The LCS 2 variant is what we would refer 

to as Panamax. In other words, the ship design maximizes the 

beam width of the ship up to the limits of the Panama Canal, so 

it is going to be tight. And it is also a very unique design in terms 

of the sides of the ship, and you are well familiar with this. 

So the first couple of instances of transiting the canal, the damage has occurred because we are pressing up against the full width 

of the canal with this unique design, and the system that is used, 

what’s referred to as a fendering system, for all ships—all ships 

have a fendering system to minimize the damage—just was not 

prepared for that situation. 

So as Admiral Rowden indicated, it is both handling, but it is 

also the fendering system that we are putting in place to deal with 

those type constraints. 

Mr. BYRNE. And with the casualties that we have experienced 

with this class of ships, the LCS class, are they on par with other 

classes of ships when they are new? Is this what you get when you 

get a new class of ship, that you have a certain level of casualties, 

any worse or any better? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The answer is absolutely yes, but we are 

not satisfied. And so I reviewed what we refer to as casualty—— 

Mr. BYRNE. Absolutely yes, that it is on par? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely yes, that it is on par, but we are 

not satisfied. I reviewed the history of the last 4 years’ worth of 

casualty reports, and LCS is in the mix for combatants in terms 

of casualty reports status 2, 3 and 4, which are different degrees 

of severity. So that is in the mix. 

However, Dr. Gilmore’s comments regarding reliability are absolutely on. This is a relatively new ship class. We do have new ship 

systems. We are going through what is referred to as reliability 

growth. And what we have got to do is get there faster on a system-by-system basis so that the concerns that he raises and that 

we share with regards to reliability, we can retire more quickly, 

and we will just as we have with every prior ship class that we 

have introduced to the Navy. 

Mr. BYRNE. And, Admiral, one final question for you. We have 

heard a lot about distributed lethality. I hope I said that right. It 

is a lot of syllables in a couple words for somebody from Alabama 

to say. When we added the missile capability to these ships, what 

did it do to these ships’ distributed lethality? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Sir, thank you for the question. It is interesting because our first thoughts of how to distribute the lethality 

of the fleet, distribute the lethality of the force, came when we 

were up at the Naval War College actually conducting a war game 

utilizing the littoral combat ship. And in this specific war game, we 

were playing in the mid 2020s timeframe, and one of the capabilities that we indicated would be available and on the ship at that 

time was an extended-range over-the-horizon missile. 

And this was a war game in that we set up live players, playing 

live players as we executed the moves. And I was just, I was quite 
38 

pleased with the effectiveness that we had out of the littoral combat ships that had been discounted by the adversary given the capability that we had built on to the ship, and they had full understanding of what was happening there. 

And so as we have looked back and as we conducted the afteraction reports, one of the things that I realized as we were looking 

at the requirements that we built into our ships is this migration 

towards pretty defensive ships. Defend the aircraft carrier. Defend 

the logistics train. Defend the amphibious readiness groups. And 

what we have found in subsequent war games is that if we increased the offensive capability of the ship, if we increased the 

range at which we could go out and attack our adversary, it caused 

a couple problems. 

One, they had to think very differently about all of the different 

aspects of the fight. They had to pay less attention to the undersea 

domain. They had to pay less attention to the space of the domain 

because they had to pay much more attention to the surface ships 

and the lethality of those surface ships. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I noted when I was at the RIMPAC exercise, 

that the Chinese ships that were participating were all closest to 

the Coronado, the littoral combat ship, and watching it very carefully. And so I think the Chinese are very interested in what this 

new capability has been added to that ship and what it would do 

in that theater. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. We have had a very thorough and, 

I think, helpful hearing today discussing this very important platform for our sailors and for our Nation. 

Before we conclude the hearing, I was wondering if any of the 

witnesses have any closing remarks that they want to make or 

anything they want to say to put on the record that they haven’t 

gotten to say yet. 

So I will just go through Mr. Stackley, if there is anything you 

want to add. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Ma’am, I would be at risk of repeating my 

opening statement. But just to synopsize, the ship works. We have 

reliability issues. We will get through those. But the ship works. 

Concerns with things like redundancy, I agree with Dr. Gilmore’s 

assessment that we need to increase redundancy, particularly for 

critical systems, and we are going about that, first with the frigate 

design and then looking at backfitting that to the earlier hulls. The 

ship works. 

The mission packages are correctly selected in terms of warfighting gaps. We have got to deliver that capability regardless of what 

the platform is, and we have selected the LCS platform to deliver 

those capabilities. We are late. We understand that, but we are 

bringing that capability forward in an incremental fashion when it 

is ready so every deployment, every deployment, littoral combat 

ships are deploying with increased capability. And yes, we have 

changed the program as we go. That is because we are learning. 

This is a new concept. And concepts that were struck back in the 

2001, 2002 timeframe, now that we are out there operating and deploying, we are learning and we are improving. 
39 

So I thank you for the hearing, and we will follow up on all the 

requested actions. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. And you are—each of you can submit 

comments for the record in addition. 

Vice Admiral Rowden, any closing comments? 

Admiral ROWDEN. Yes, ma’am. I too sincerely appreciate the opportunity to be here on behalf of the littoral combat ship. 

It is an exciting time in our Navy, and it is an exciting time 

bringing this capability into the fleet. The capabilities that it is 

going to deliver and understanding that we have a team focused on 

the issues, we are learning about the issues, we are learning about 

how to maintain it, and going forward, I am 100 percent confident 

that we will tackle those issues and we will defeat them. 

And as we deliver that capability forward, as we—and in my 

mind, it is all about the center of the universe, and I think the center of the universe, at least from the professional perspective, are 

the ships and the men and women that serve on those ships. They 

are excited about the capability that these ships bring, and I know 

that they will deliver to the forward forces. And we are going to 

continue to work hard and make sure that we maximize the value 

of these ships to our fleet commanders. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 

Ms. Mackin. 

Ms. MACKIN. I just would reiterate the need for prudence in pursuing a block buy strategy at this point in time, which will be initially 12 LCS prices, with the frigate upgrades to be added in later. 

There are a lot of unknowns about the basic ship right now that 

is going to be modified, what will the design look like, what will 

the cost be. So I will just reiterate that caution. 

And then just for the record, I did want to mention on the warranty issue, we recommended that the Navy take a look and see 

if it would be possible to move more toward a warranty approach, 

as the Coast Guard does, and they agreed to do so. That study is 

supposed to be provided to us this month. So we haven’t seen it 

yet, but we will look forward to taking a look at the results. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. 

Dr. Gilmore. 

Dr. GILMORE. I just emphasize what I said in my opening comments, which is we need to acknowledge the many problems that 

exist and fix them. And I am glad the Navy is now acknowledging 

many of these problems, but in the past, that always hasn’t been 

true. 

For example, in 2014 testimony from senior Navy officials, they 

said the Remote Minehunting System completed its reliability 

growth program this past year and continues to test well. At that 

time, that simply wasn’t the case. It was testing poorly. 

So I hope that the Navy, as it is now doing and as it did with 

its mine countermeasures independent review team, thoroughly reviews all of the test results that are available, takes those onboard, 

and provides the resources, with your help, to fix these problems. 

And it seems that Mr. Stackley and Admiral Rowden are committed to doing that, and I hope they continue to do that in the 

future. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Thank you. 
40 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thanks for having me at the hearing today. Just 

to close the loop on your earlier question about block buys and 

oversight. There is a lot of aspects of oversight. We talked about 

Q&A [question and answer] at the hearings. There is legislative 

provisions, there have been many of those over the years, lots of 

report language in the committee reports, a lot of GAO reports 

also, as well as—as well as my tracking report and CBO [Congressional Budget Office] report. So those are all other aspects of oversight that have taken place during the block buy contracts that we 

have executed. 

There is one additional aspect of conducting oversight, and that 

is the ability to terminate the program if you are just dissatisfied 

with it. Congress does retain the ability to terminate a block buy 

contract, and a block buy contract can be written without a cancellation penalty. Furthermore, a block buy contract can be implemented without upfront batch buys of components that might add 

to your reluctance to cancel the contract, and in fact, that is how 

the Navy has done the LCS block buy contracts, without any upfront batch buys. 

The block buy contract does add to your reluctance to cancel the 

program, but it might also be argued that most of the reluctance 

for terminating a program arises from the mere fact that the program has begun procurement. There have been relatively few defense acquisition program cancellations over the years, and the 

vast majority of those programs that have not been canceled were 

done under annual contracting. 

One final note. If we were to do a down-select as currently 

planned and then use annual contracting, we could be getting ourselves into a situation of limiting the Navy’s ability to use leverage 

in its negotiation with the contractor. When you down select to a 

single builder, you are creating a monopoly supplier at that point. 

And if the Navy then has to go back to that sole builder and contract on an annual basis and get into an annual negotiation with 

that builder, the Navy’s leverage in that situation might be reduced. 

That is a situation we are in, for example, with aircraft carriers, 

and people have expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that we 

have only one builder of aircraft carriers and we have to then negotiate with them every time we build a carrier. If you were to do 

a down-select on the LCS program and then also use annual contracting rather than block buy, you are creating a situation not too 

unlike that one that people have expressed dissatisfaction with. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. Thank you all for your service to this Nation. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

(45) 

Opening Remarks of Chairwoman Vicky Hartzler 

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation Hearing 

"Oversight Review of the U.S. Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Program" 

December 8, 2016 

Today we take testimony on the Littoral Combat Ship program. We 

seek to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges that this program has 

presented us in the past, and the opportunities that exist as the program moves 

forward. 

We need to grow the size of this nation's surface fleet. The LCS 

[Littoral Combat Ship] could have an important role in increasing our 

capabilities and flexibility. I know that there is a critical need to replace our 

less capable and decommissioned mine-countermeasures ships, patrol craft, 

and Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigates. I believe that the Littoral Combat 

Ship, and the eventual upgrade to the Frigate design, has great potential to 

fulfill the roles for the platforms it replaces. This is why the LCS enjoys 

bipartisan support in the Seapower subcommittee. 

The concept of LCS and the decision to begin the program came at a 

time in the department of defense's acquisition history in which senior leaders 

of the department thought it was necessary (and possible) to disregard the 

natural evolution of technology by skipping a generation of development. It 

was good theory, but proved costly and cumbersome to implement. We have 

learned many lessons from this period. For example, introducing immature 

technologies into acquisition programs will lead to cost and schedule growth. 

A warding contracts without a stable design and directing prescriptive 

government specifications also increases costs and schedule. 

It is only with unleashing the power of best buying practices that we 

can realize acquisition efficiencies. These lessons have been hard learned in a 

multitude of acquisition contracts. For example, stable government funding is 

essential to providing material ordering and labor efficiencies. Additionally, 

innovative multi-year procurements or block buys save money because long 

term agreements with subcontractors and vendors provides contracting 

stability. Dangerous reductions below minimum order quantities only serve to 

exacerbate our industrial base and increase the cost to the taxpayer. That is 

why the House has advocated adding a third LCS in FY 2017 and has 

expressed reservations about the Navy's acquisition strategy which involves 

procuring one LCS frigate every year during fiscal years 20 18, 2019 and 

2020. 

I also want to discuss the Navy's force structure requirement of 52 

small surface combatants. The Navy's force structure is based on their ability 

meet combatant commander requirements, both in peace and in war. That is 

why I am perplexed with Secretary Carter's determination that we only need 
46 

40 LCS frigates. 

1 believe the secretary's decision lacks analytical rigor. l am hoping 

that the next administration will review this issue. We must absolutely 

integrate the program's acquisition lessons learned as we evaluate with 

prudent scrutiny the opportunity to invest an additional $14 billion dollars to 

complete the purchase of LCS and transition its hull-form into a frigate 

design. We must also ensure that the "mission modules" which are integral to 

the first LCS designs are successfully completed, tested, and fielded at the 

lowest possible price. 

I look forward to discussing this program with our distinguished panel 

of witnesses we have before us today. 
47 

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Jackie Speier 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on 

"Oversight Review of the U.S. Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

Program" 

December 8, 2016 

We are here today to examine a case study in gross mismanagement on 

the part of the Navy. At virtually every decision point-from conceiving the 

initial flawed concept, to the concurrent acquisition process, to the huge cost 

overruns, to the huge fundamental flaws in the ships themselves, and to the 

feeble attempts by the Navy and DOD to correct course-the Navy has 

wasted billions in taxpayer dollars and failed to produce a ship that meets its 

objectives. 

What I hope to examine today is: Has the Navy learned its lesson? 

Have they corrected course and are they moving forward with a stable ship 

design based on a sound analytical foundation? 

From the testimony of the witnesses today, I fear the answer is a 

resounding no. 

I'd especially like to know who certified the LCS would cost $220 

million each, but now costs more than double per ship at $478 million. Who 

briefed this to Congress and who signed off on this assertion? While cost 

overruns are by no means acceptable, perhaps they could be explained if they 

resulted in a functional ship. But the LCS isn'tjust outrageously expensiveit's also outrageously bad at doing its job. 

Just look at how many issues six of the eight ships in service have had. 

Just over the past year, the LCS has experienced six "engineering casualties," 

in which engines flooded, couplings cracked, and ships broke down in transit. 

The USS Montgomery, which was commissioned mere months ago, has 

already had two engine failures and two collisions that resulted in major 

damage. What's even worse is that because of the way the Navy structured 

the contracts, taxpayers are still responsible for most of these repair costs, 

even when the shipbuilders are at fault. These contracts mean that in some 

cases, the shipbuilders aren't responsible for even one cent of potential 

defects. Why is it that the Coast Guard can hold its shipbuilders responsible 

for defects, but the Navy puts the burden on taxpayers? 

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense has admitted that continuing to 

produce two versions of the ship makes no sense, and has ordered a downselect. The Navy has admitted that its "transformative" interchangeable 

mission module will likely never be interchanged as originally envisioned. 

The Navy has also admitted that its "transformative" crewing concept won't 

work, and essentially scrapped it. Look at how much the program has 

changed from the Navy's early pie-in-the-sky promises. 
48 

Now, in all of the Navy's wisdom, they have decided to change the 

name ofthe LCS to a "Frigate" and plan to purchase more of what is 

essentially still an LCS but whose modifications are unproven, lack critical 

capabilities and can't pass original survivability tests. Why? Because they've 

determined it will meet their multi-mission requirements. Yet, once again, we 

don't have a ship design, don't know what it will cost, or whether the ship can 

survive in combat. Instead, as I've joked many times, we have a ship that 

even the Chinese don't want to copy. 

You'd think all this uncertainty would prompt calls for a pause to get 

the LCS's conceptual house in order before the Navy does a binge-buy for 

more-but if you think that, you don't know the LCS program. Instead, in an 

act of astonishing arrogance and disregard of the taxpayers' money, reports 

indicate that the Department of the Navy is gearing up to ask Congress for a 

"block buy" of 12 of these new ships. This would give up all our leverage 

with the contractor to ensure the ships are tested and fixed. What are they 

thinking? Does anyone honestly believe that the taxpayers, the tea party, or 

President-elect Donald Trump would approve this buy? 

From the beginning, the Navy has regularly submitted LCS budget 

requests that are not consistent with shipbuilding programs, making it nearly 

impossible for Congress to exercise oversight. It did this in 2003 when it 

funded the first ships with research & development funding and in 2010 when 

it wanted to switch to a plan of buying 2 parallel LCS designs inside of a 20 

ship block buy. When issues continued to occur throughout construction and 

fielding, the block buy was always cited as the reason why Congress 

shouldn't slow the program down. 

Yet again, as the Navy moves toward a different design that they claim 

will address many of the LCS shortcomings, they are looking for block buy 

authority before the design has even been completed. This is a strategy that 

even the shipyards criticized, since it doesn't give them time to complete the 

Frigate design before beginning construction. The single greatest contributor 

to the cost inflation on LCS was an incomplete design when construction 

began. The Navy still hasn't learned their lesson. 

I am glad that the Navy has acknowledged reality and changed some of 

its operational concepts. But in many respects I am concerned they are still 

hiding the ball. The next time LCS flaws become apparent; it could be in the 

heat of battle and get our sailors killed. Furthermore, if the Navy's plan for a 

"block-buy" moves forward, Congress and the Navy's hands will be tied. 

I realize what this is really about. We know the LCS is the Ford Edsel 

of the sea. And yet certain of my colleagues say we can't afford to pause 

production and get it right because of"industrial base concerns" even though 

the shipyards will be building these ships until 202 I even if we canceled 

funding towards the program today. 
49 

Let's be real. This is about getting pork back to their districts. The LCS 

is a $120 billion pork ship, and they are putting pork-barrel politics above the 

safety of our service members. 

The Navy has shown a callous disregard for the taxpayer and frankly 

the Congress has been derelict in doing its job. We think no one will notice. 

We think our obligation is to the ship builder to keep building a defective ship 

just because we want to retain jobs. 

Today, we need the guts to say that the LCS was a mistake. To protect 

the United States' interests and to do what's best for our service men and 

women, we need a ship that is capable of fulfilling its intended mission. The 

taxpayers deserve to know if what they are paying for is actually effective. 

That's why Congress needs to find out if the most recent changes will really 

make the LCS better, or if we are just trying to make a silk purse out of a 

pig's ear. 

I look forward to your insights about how we got here, how we should 

go forward, and who is to blame. 
50 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

STATEMENT 

OF 

THE HONORABLE SEAN J. STACKLEY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TilE NAVY 

(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION) 

AND 

VADM THOMAS S. ROWDEN 

COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCES 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

ON 

THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 
51 

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the current status 

of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, specifically to discuss the outcomes and 

implementation of the LCS Review, status of the delivered ships and the mission packages, and 

the current status of the transition from LCS to Frigate (FF). We appreciate the opportunity to 

provide the Navy's assessment of the various issues raised of late as well as provide an update on 

the significant progress we have made in the program over the last few years. 

Introduction 

The LCS program is of critical importance to our Navy. It consists of a modular, 

reconfit,rurable Seaframe, designed to meet validated Fleet requirements for Surface Warfare 

(SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Mine Countenneasures (MCM) missions in the 

littoral region through the use of modular mission packages (MPs). LCS was designed as a 

focused-mission surface combatant to replace our legacy small surface combatants; Oliver 

Hazard Perry-class Frigates, Avenger Class MCMs, and Patrol Craft. The ship, independent of 

an embarked mission, package provides air warfare self-defense capability with anti-air missiles, 

a high rate of fire 57mm gun, 3D air search radar, electronic warfare systems, and decoys for 

electronic warfare. The Navy is currently adding a capability improvement that outfits each 

deployed LCS with an Over the Horizon (OTH) Missile system. LCS ships will embark an 

aviation detachment and helicopter along with a vertical take-off unmanned air vehicle (referred 

to as Fire Scout). With its shallow draft, great speed, and interchangeable modules, LCS will 

provide increased warfighting flexibility to our Fleet and close critical war fighting gaps in mine 

warfare, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare. The modular, open systems architecture 

inherent in LCS allows for rapid, affordable integration of new warfighting capabilities as 

technology evolves. This approach is consistent with the objectives of Defense Strategic 

Guidance directive to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve 

our security objectives. LCS complements our surface fleet and brings unique strengths and 

capabilities to the Fleet's mission. She will be our predominant MCM capability, and will 

deliver game changing ASW capability at an affordable cost while freeing up the higher end 

2 
52 

multi-mission large surface combatants to focus on their primary missions such as area air 

defense, land strike, and ballistic missile defense. With 67 percent of Surface Combatant Total 

Life Cycle Cost being driven by operations and sustainment (O&S) costs, the LCS and Frigate 

(deployed more than half of their lifecycle and costing less than one third the O&S of a DDG per 

deployed year) provide Fleet Commanders with the quantity of ships needed that are capable of 

accomplishing critical missions within a challenging budget environment. 

The LCS is capable of operating in a wide range of environments, from the open ocean to 

coastal, shallow water regions known as the littorals. LCS uses an open architecture design, 

modular weapons and sensor systems, and a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles to help 

gain and sustain maritime supremacy in the littorals, assuring access to critical areas of 

operation. LCS will be an integral component in countering adversary anti-access/area denial 

operations: clearing mines: neutralizing enemy submarines: and defeating hostile swmming 

surface crail. ·rhe Navy plans for LCS to be used in rotational deployments in support of our 

nation's rebalance efforts to the Western Pacific. As LCS forward presence increases, these 

ships will play a significant role in defense cooperation and naval engagements that contribute to 

maintaining freedom of the seas while deten·ing conflict and coercion. 

The 2013 deployment ofUSS FREEDOM (LCS 1) to the Asia-Pacific region 

demonstrated the ability of LCS to conduct several of the core missions of the Cooperative 

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. FREEDOM and her crews conducted operations and 

exercises, ranging from demonstrating forward presence while executing operational tasking in 

the South China Sea to providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief support in the 

Philippines following Super Typhoon Haiyan. USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3) deployed to the 

Asia Pacific Region in November 2014 and assisted in the Air Asia plane recovery search efforts 

and multiple international exercises. Most recently, USS CORONADO (LCS 4) deployed to 

Singapore which marks the first overseas deployment of the INDEPENDENCE variant in which 

she will participate in a full range of LCS missions to include opportunities to operate with 

partner nations. 

3 
53 

Currently, there are eight LCS in the Fleet, with another eighteen on contract. By 2018, 

LCS will be the second largest surface ship class in the Navy. The designs are stable, new yard 

facilities are in place, with a right-sized, qualified work force, and both shipyards and industry 

teams are in full serial production in order to ensure each can deliver two ships per year. Today, 

the LCS program is on budget and below the Congressional cost cap. The block buy contracts 

for the Fiscal Year (FY) 20 I 0 through FY 2016 ships resulted in continued reductions in the LCS 

shipbuilding program's production unit costs, and both shipyards are building these ships in an 

affordable manner. 

With a stable design and a mature production line, we have been able to make significant 

progress in completing both ship and mission package testing requirements. Both variants have 

completed initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) and have achieved Initial Operational 

Capability (IOC). This year both variants conducted Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E) approved Live Fire Test and Evaluation Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST) events. Our 

detailed analysis of the shock trial's results is in progress but all test objectives were met. Both 

the FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE variant ships demonstrated the ability to survive the 

degrading effects of the underwater shock event associated with the close-proximity detonation 

of a I 0,000 pound charge. We have now completed all required testing for the ships themselves 

and are incorporating lessons learned from that testing into future LCS and FF ships. 

Additionally, we continue testing and making progress for all three mission packages on 

both variants, incrementally bringing new capability to the Fleet. 

• Surface Warfare Mission Package (SUW MP): The SUW MP will make LCS the 

most capable ship in the Navy in countering the Fast Inshore Attack CraftJFast Attack 

Craft (FIAC/FAC) threat. The Navy is delivering this capability in three increments 

with full MP IOC anticipated in FY 2020: 

o Increments I and 2 consist of an Aviation Module (MH-60R with Hellfire 

Missiles), a Maritime Security Module (two 11-meter manned rigid-hull 

inflatable boats (RHIBs), and two 30mm guns. Increments 1 and 2 for the 

SUW MP, achieved lOC in 2014. This has allowed the Fleet to deploy LCS 

4 
54 

with enhanced SUW capability, most recently with the cuJTent deployment of 

USS CORONADO to the Western Pacific. 

o Increment 3 consists of the V crtical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) 

armed with the Longbow Hellfire Missile. 

o USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3), with an embarked SUW MP, conducted an 

extended operational deployment based out of Singapore. This SUW MP 

included a composite aviation detachment of one MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUA V 

and one MH-60R helicopter. This was the first time that such a combination 

had been deployed. The SUW MP, through its Maritime Security Module and 

aviation components, was extensively employed during the ship's search and 

rescue etTorts for Air Asia tlight 8501 in January 2015. 

• Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package (ASW MP): The ASW MP will 

significantly increase the Navy's ASW capability and capacity. ft consists of three 

modules netted together to continuously exploit real-time undersea data: a Torpedo 

Defense and Countermeasures Module (Light Weight Tow); an ASW Escort Module 

(Multi-Function Towed AtTay Acoustic Receiver (MFTA) and Variable Depth Sonar 

(VDS)); and an Aviation Module (MH-60R Helicopter and VTUAV). The ASW MP 

had a successtul at-sea demo in 2014. ASW Escort Mission Module testing will 

commence in FY 2018 in support oflOC in FY 2019. 

• Mine Countem1easure Mission Package (MCM MP): The MCM MP will replace 

aging legacy MCM equipment, significantly reducing the time line for access to the 

contested littorals and removing the ship and crew from the minefield. The Navy is 

delivering this capability in four increments, with full MP IOC in FY 2021: 

o Increment 1 consists of a Minehunting Vehicle towing a Sonar Mine 

Detecting Set, an Airbome Laser Mine Detection Set (ALMDS), an Airbome 

Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), and the MH-60S Helicopter. This 

increment provides the capability to detect waterborne mine threats 

5 
55 

throughout the water column and on the sea tloor. IOC was declared in 

November 2016 for ALMDS and AMNS. 

o Increment 2 consists of Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis 

(COBRA) and VTUA V which provides the capability to detect mine threats 

and obstacles on the beach and in the surf zone. 

o Increment 3 consists of an Unmanned lntluence Sweep System and an 

Unmanned Surface Vehicle which provides the capability to sweep acoustic 

and magnetic mine threats throughout the water column and on the sea tloor. 

o Increment 4 consists of the Surface MCM Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 

(UUV) (Knifefish) which provides the capability to detect, classify and 

identify bottom and volume mines, including buried mines and stealthy mines. 

As you are aware, the Navy is in the midst of a transition from focused mission LCS 

platforms with modular Mission Packages to a multi-mission FF capable of conducting 

simultaneous anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missions as well 

as providing effective air, surface and underwater self-defense capabilities. It will be equipped 

with OTH surface-to-surface missiles in addition to LCS baseline SUW and ASW MP 

capabilities, and have additional upgrades to combat systems, electronic warlare systems, and 

ship survivability features. The FF will complement our inherent blue water capability and fill 

warfighting gaps in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world. 

Status of Delivered Ships 

Each of the eight LCS that are in service was delivered at a successively lower cost, and 

with improved reliability as compared to their predecessors. We continue to capture lessons 

learned and retine the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for operating these ships forward, as 

demonstrated, for example, by the development and execution of the Expeditionary Maintenance 

Capability (EMC). During USS FORT WORTH's (LCS 3) deployment to the South China Sea 

from November 2014 through January 2016, she followed the LCS maintenance and sustainment 

model, pulling into port every 4-6 weeks for a week-long preventative maintenance availability 

and every 4-6 months for a two-week corrective maintenance availability and core crew 

6 
56 

turnover. Although this maintenance was typically conducted in the LCS Forward Operating 

Station (FOS) in Singapore, the EMC concept also allowed this maintenance to be conducted in 

Sasebo, Japan, to better support USS FORT WORTH's tasking in the N01thwest Pacific. This 

EMC approach has significantly expanded the operational employment of the LCS in theater, 

allowing the ships to operate for extended periods far removed from the FOS. The same 

capability was delivered to Singapore in advance ofUSS CORONADO's mTival to support the 

execution of planned maintenance in remote locations for the INDEPENDENCE variant as well. 

This model was proven effective at supporting sustained forward deployed operations. 

During her deployment, USS FORT WORTH conducted U.S. and multinational 

operations from India to Japan and also successfully demonstrated the ability to perform in hightempo environments just days alter entering theater. USS FORT WORTH's lirst 12 months 

forward offer significant insight into the potential of these ships: 

• Operated side-by-side and hull-to-hull with valued Southeast and South Asia partners 

during seven theater security cooperation (CARAT) exercises, MALABAR with India 

and with Northeast Asian allies during OPLAN training operations (FOAL EAGLE); 

• Contributed to theater CONOPs by executing freedom of navigation and presence 

operations in the South China Sea; 

• Supported multi-nationalllumanitarian Assistance Disaster Response missions, such as 

the search and recovery mission for AirAsia flight 8501 on 96-hours' notice less than one 

week after arriving in Singapore; and 

• Executed an expeditionary maintenance period in Sasebo, Japan and leveraged fueling 

resources in Subic Bay, Philippines, thus extending LCS's operational range and bringing 

the logistical hub-and-spoke model to life. 

USS FREEDOM completed a 1 0-month (pre-lOC) deployment in 2013, conducting 

similar operations in the same locations as USS FORT WORTH. Comparing the reliability and 

7 
57 

maintenance records of these two deployments, only a year apart, demonstrates how effectively 

the LCS Fleet has incorporated lessons learned and best practices to improve operational 

availability. During an equivalent 10-month period, USS FORT WORTH was underway 33 

percent more, spent less time pierside conducting maintenance, conducted maintenance away 

from Singapore, and experienced fewer casualties. These initial deployments of the USS FORT 

WORTH and USS FREEDOM demonstrate the increasing capabilities that LCS will continue to 

bring to the Navy as the program matures. 

As we increase our operational experience with LCS, we arc closely monitoring material 

readiness and making changes, as warranted to improve operational availability. In total, LCS 

readiness as reflected in operational availability and casualty report metrics is consistent with 

other combatant ship classes. However, we are quickly and strongly addressing issues as they 

emerge to raise the system reliability to yet higher levels sooner in this new class. Of particular 

concern, five LCS class ships have been operationally impacted by propulsion casualties in the 

past year. The Navy has conducted formal engineering reviews and command investigations to 

assess the root cause and corrective action for each of the casualties. In general, the root causes 

can be broken into three separate categories: procedural non-compliance (failure to follow 

approved engineering procedures); design related deficiencies; or production-related 

deficiencies. 

Two of the five engineering casualties were related to procedural (non-) compliance: 

The Erst such casualty occurred onboard USS FORT WORTH while inport Singapore, 

after 12 months of her 14 month maiden deployment. As a result of improper alignment of the 

lube oil service system (as outlined by the ship's Engineering Operating Procedures), three of the 

five bearings in the Combining Gear were damaged and USS FORT WORTH was unable to 

continue her mission in the western Paci1ic. Upon completion of repairs, the ship departed 

Singapore and returned to San Diego in early October 2016. 

The second casualty related to procedural (non-) compliance occurred onboard USS 

FREEDOM while inport San Diego. Improper corrective action following the routine failure of 

8 
58 

FREEDOM's Main Propulsion Diesel Engine (MPDE) attached seawater pump mechanical seal 

resulted in seawater contamination of the engine. Upon subsequent inspection, significant 

corrosion and damage was discovered inside the MPDE. The affected engine is planned for 

replacement commencing December 2016. 

In response to these procedural compliance issues, the Type Commander has conducted a 

formal investigation and root cause analysis on both casualties. The Commander, Naval Surface 

Forces directed an engineering stand down for all LCS Class crews to review, evaluate, and 

renew their commitment to safe ship operation, procedural compliance, and good engineering 

practices. Additionally, the Navy's Surface Warfare Officer's School Command is revising the 

current LCS training program, to include LCS specific engineering training and related 

proficiency examinations. In parallel, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is 

reviewing design details for potential design enhancements that may mitigate the possibility of 

such operator errors. 

One of the five engineering casualties was specifically design-related: 

While operating USS MILWAUKEE (LCS 5) on all four engines at full power during 

transit in the Atlantic, an emergency stop of the gas turbine engines led to excessive wear of the 

high speed clutch causing damage to the high speed clutch and combining gear. Root cause 

analysis is in progress, but the combining gear on LCS 5 and follow is a new design (prior 

manufacturer ceased operations), and changes to the control logic for the de-clutch sequence and 

clutch piston release speed associated with the new design are apparent causes. Design 

modifications based on root causes have been developed and are being tested by Lockheed 

Martin and RENK (the gear manufacturer), in parallel with ongoing root cause analysis efforts. 

Pending satisfactory testing this month (December 20 I 6), the associated high speed clutch 

modifications and machinery control software updates will be applied to LCS 9 and follow prior 

to delivery and LCS 5 and 7 during their Post Shakedown Availabilities (PSAs). LCS 1 and LCS 

3 gear sets are not atTected. 

9 
59 

The remaining two engineering casualties trace to deficiencies in the ship construction 

process: 

USS CORONADO (LCS 4) experienced a failure of the flexible shaft coupling between 

the starboard MPDE reduction gear and stem tube during transit from Hawaii to Singapore. A 

failure review board was convened, and while material testing of the failed coupling is still in 

progress, shaft misalignment has been identified as a contributing factor in the root cause 

analysis. An alignment summit with the shipbuilder, NA VSEA design engineers, the Original 

Equipment Manufacturer, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, and the Program Office has since been 

conducted to review, validate, and better document waterborne alignment procedures. The 

coupling in LCS 4 was replaced with a new coupling design in Hawaii. USS CORONADO is 

now on station in Singapore on her maiden deployment. This new coupling design has already 

been installed on LCS 6 and follow ships. 

USS MONTGOMERY (LCS 8) experienced a production deficiency related propulsion 

casualty shortly after sail away from the new construction shipyard. Prior to getting underway, 

the crew discovered seawater contamination in the steering hydraulic system for one of the four 

waterjets. The shipbuilder drained the system, replaced the system's seawater cooler, and 

flushed the system restoring full waterjet functionality. The root cause assessment determined 

that the cooler had not failed, but rather contamination was introduced into the system most 

likely in conjunction with the repair of a component external to the hull in the period between 

delivery and sailaway from the building yard. The shipbuilder has since implemented an 

improved procedure for waterborne waterjet hydraulic work. 

The Navy has taken a consistent and rigorous approach in assessing and addressing root 

causes of equipment casualties in LCS. Early deficiencies in the designs of each variant have 

been addressed in follow ships, but there is still work to be done in increasing the operational 

availability of the ships in-service. In response, NAVSEA has initiated a comprehensive 

engineering review of both propulsion trains, to include logistics and training, and will report 

their findings upon completion of the review. 

10 
60 

LCS Review 

In February of this year, the Navy initiated a review ofthe LCS program to assess the 

concept of operations based on lessons learned from Fleet operations and the early operational 

deployments of the ships. The review focused on LCS crewing, training, and maintenance based 

on experience gained and lessons learned by the program and Fleet during operations and ship 

deployments. The review noted that USS FORT WORTH's deployment many successes must 

be replicated on a larger scale and setting conditions for crews to excel forward is the Navy's 

first priority. With this in mind, the Review Team identified challenges with regard to manning, 

crew training, maintenance, and operational testing, identifying immediate and longer term 

recommendations to address those challenges, reduce risk, and strengthen the program. 

Immediate recommendations and enabling actions include the following: 

• Single crew Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) hulls- As more hulls are delivered, pairing 

a single crew to a ship in construction for approximately 18 months allows the precommissioning crew to "grow with their ship" and places experienced crews where they 

matter most: on ships deployed forward. 

• Forward Deploy all LCS in Blue/Gold Crewing Construct- Implementing a Blue/Gold 

crew rotation approach will result in two crews rotating to the same hull every 4-5 

months, forging a "cycle of virtue" between the two crews who will consistently turn the 

same ship over to each other. 

• Fuse the Core Crew and Mission Modules Detachments Although the overall number 

of personnel remains the same, merging core crews and mission module detachments into 

a single fused crew dedicated to a single mission will improve enlisted rating utilization, 

create crew stability, and reduce complexity. 

• Stand up of a Maintenance Execution Team (MET) -Due to a LCS' small crew size, 

maintenance that would traditionally be performed by the crew on other vessels is 

outsourced to contractors for LCS. The LCS review recommended standing up a MET 

11 
61 

comprised of support from otT-hull, active and reserve duty, and LCS Squadron Sailors to 

conduct preventive maintenance. The review found that minimally manned ships require 

a pool of trained personnel to fill watchbill and specialty qualification gaps. The MET 

would also serve to relieve the unforeseen tasking of"shadow hours" whereby crew 

members merely shadow contractors for force protection, security and safety purposes. 

The MET will conduct preventive maintenance while learning the operation and 

maintenance of their equipment, thereby reducing wasted manhours and increasing crew 

ownership. Additionally, a forward-deployed team (Destroyer Squadron 7) will 

complement MET functions overseas while also performing material assessments. 

• Lengthen LCS Crew Turnover in Theatre to Include an 0-6 Assessment- As 

recommended in the recent USS FORT WORTH Command Investigation, this longer 

time period will enhance the oncoming crew's situational awareness and allow the 

combined crews to perform critical maintenance tasks together if needed. Broadly 

resembling an approach used in SSGN turnovers, 0-6 assessments during turnovers will 

provide leadership greater awareness of crew readiness. 

In addition to the immediate recommendations listed above, the review team identified 

the following longer-term recommendations: 

• Establish Testing Ships- Assign the first four LCS ships (LCS I 4) as dedicated 

CONUS-based testing, training, and surge platforms through Mission Package IOC, to be 

manned by a single crew and commanded by a post command LCS 0-5 commander to 

insulate deploying ships from broader testing requirements. The ships will be maintained 

at deployable configurations and upgraded, as planned, to support the myriad of 

operational functions and integration intricacies of the associated mission packages to 

fully support testing. We will evaluate the effectiveness of these assets for this purpose 

in the near term, and if it becomes evident that a dedicated land-based facility would 

prove more efficient and effective, adjust accordingly. 

12 
62 

• Establish Training Ships- Beyond the four test ships, divide the remaining 24 ships into 

six four-ship divisions of the same variant including a dedicated training ship in each 

division. Of the four ships, retain one training ship in CONUS to certify the Blue/Gold 

crews that will man the three forward deployed ships of each division. This approach 

provides a surge-ready LCS Fleet with more operational availability forward and an 

improved blend of ownership and stability. To support this concept, we will also 

homeport all INDEPENDENCE variant ships in San Diego, CA and all FREEDOM 

variant ships in Mayport, FL over time. 

• Steady State: Establish Blue/Gold Crl?lving Construct with Training Ships- A Blue/Gold 

deployment approach is projected to present a more optimal rotational posture. This 

concept creates six four-ship divisions of the same variant including a dedicated training 

ship in each division. Of the four ships, one training ship will remain in CONUS to 

certify the Blue/Gold crews that will man the three forward deployed ships of each 

division. Also referred to as 7:4:3 (seven crews, four hulls, three ships forward), this 

approach provides a surge-ready LCS Fleet with more operational availability forward 

and an improved blend of ownership and stability beyond the legacy LCS operational 

3:2:1 concept. 

In the course of this study, it became clear that the LCS crcwing construct is the critical 

variable that most impacts other factors such as manning, training, maintenance, and -most 

importantly operations. The LCS Review Team assessed manpower requirements in detail and 

implementation ofthese recommendations are underway. Changing to a Blue/Gold crew 

rotation (a tried-and-true model proven by the submarine Fleet) will increase LCS Sailors' 

familiarity with specific ship systems, enabling the crew to have a greater sense of ownership in 

their ships. 

Our assessment is that the recommended solutions from the Navy's recent review ofLCS 

will yield the results needed to increase forward presence and provide a proven capability to our 

Fleet Commanders. 

13 
63 

Full Ship Shock Trials (FSST) 

As part of the DOT &E approved Live Fire Test and Evaluation Plan for the LCS 

program, Full Ship Shock Trials were conducted on USS JACKSON (INDEPENDENCE 

variant) and USS MILWAUKEE (FREEDOM variant) this summer. The unprecedented 

achievement of completing FSST on two different ships in a single test was the positive result of 

eJT!cient test execution and effective ship performance under shock loading. Data collected 

during FSST is used to validate the models used to predict how a ship reacts to an underwater 

shock event. The results of the FSST, as well as other testing and modeling efforts, are then used 

to detennine the overall survivability of the ship against the specified set of threats that the ship 

is required to meet. 

The LCS Program Office accomplished all FSST test objectives within budget, for both 

ship variants, demonstrating that the ships and ships' systems are able to survive the degrading 

effects of an underwater shock event. Initial results indicate that ship performance was 

consistent with requirements and the data collected shows a strong correlation to the modeling 

and simulations done before the trials. Data analysis is ongoing with final test reports expected 

in the third quarter of FY 20 17. 

In advance of the final report, the significant findings have been analyzed and 

recommended design changes are being assessed for incorporation into follow on hulls. In the 

INDEPENDENCE variant, modifications to some structural details in specific forward 1uel tanks 

and bulkheads arc being assessed and planned. The design work is complete and associated 

modifications will be accomplished in LCS 6 during her upcoming PSA. In the FREEDOM 

variant, there is need for modification to reduction gear lube oil bellows to allow for greater 

travel and improved bracing oflube oil piping in the vicinity of the bellows. The majority of the 

required changes were implemented in LCS 5 during the FSST period with the outstanding work 

to be completed in her PSA. For all follow ships of both variants, these relatively minor 

modifications will be accomplished at the most cost effective opportunity in the new 

construction window. 

14 
64 

The trials also highlighted the value of planned survivability improvements, beyond LCS 

threshold requirements, for both the LCS and FF ships. These improvements, which include 

hardening of potable water systems, chill water systems, and the ship's Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 

system, arc part of the FY 2017 LCS solicitation and are integral to the FF design. 

Mission Package (MP) Status 

Modular mission packages are a central feature of the LCS concept and provide the ship's 

main combat systems capability. The MP embarked is determined based on planned 

employment of the ship on a specific deployment or mission, optimized as needed for MCM, 

SUW, or ASW. The LCS Mission Module program is integrating, testing, and fielding mission 

packages in accordance with Fleet needs coupled with cost, schedule, and performance 

requirements. Rigorous and thorough testing in realistic environments continues to validate the 

mission modules concept and the mature capabilities in each increment. Stable funding is key to 

ensuring the MPs continue successful procurement, development, and testing. 

Surface Warfare (SUW) MP- The SUW MP provides a flexible capability to rapidly 

detect, track and prosecute small-boat threats, giving the Joint Force Commander the capability 

to protect the Sea Base and move a force quickly through a choke point or other strategic 

waterway. The ship uses its speed and the SUW MP capabilities, including manned and 

unmanned aviation assets, to extend the ship's surveillance and attack potential. LCS configured 

with the SUW MP can also conduct maritime security operations, including those involving 

Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) and Expanded MlO for compliant and non-compliant 

VBSS. When augmented with the SUW MP, the LCS has enhanced detection and engagement 

capability against FIAC/F AC and similar littoral surface threats. The full SUW MP, when 

fielded and deployed, will make LCS the most capable ship in the Navy in countering the 

FlAC/F AC threat. 

IOC was declared for the SUW MP (Increment I and 2) aboard a FREEDOM variant 

LCS on November 25,2014, and aboard an INDEPENDENCE variant LCS on December 24, 

2015. It was embarked aboard USS FORT WORTH during her deployment to Singapore, the 

15 
65 

first time that such a combination has been deployed. The SUW MP, through its Maritime 

Security Module and aviation components, was extensively employed during the ship's search 

and rescue efTorts for Air Asia flight 850 I in January 2015, highlighting the versatility of the LCS 

modular mission package concept. 

The Surface-to-Surface Mission Module (SSMM) is the next capability to be added to the 

SUW MP. Beginning in 2015, the Navy completed a series of Guided Test Vehicle (GTV) test 

launches of the Longbow Hellfire missile to evaluate performance of the SSMM launcher and 

missile system in a littoral environment. The GTV -1 testing successfully conducted against 

multiple threat-representative targets in a relevant environment was completed in.lune 2015, 

achieving success in seven of eight missile engagements. The demonstration proved that the 

vertically-launched missiles could acquire the representative targets, discriminate among the 

targets and the surrounding environment, and engage the targets. The GTV -2A testing, the first 

tests of the Engineering Development Model (EDM) missile integrated with the LCS module 

prototype, was completed in December 2015, achieving success in three of four missile 

engagements. 

The program conducted a restrained firing test that validated the structural design of the 

SSMM Missile Exhaust Containment Structure in August 2016. The program also successfully 

completed the GTV -2B testing, achieving success in six of eight missile engagements, 

demonstrating the system's ability to engage high speed, maneuvering targets and complete 

quick succession launches while withstanding the associated harsh environment caused from the 

rocket exhaust. Six successf\.11 engagements in eight missile tests were accomplished. SSMM 

Longbow Hellfire testing to date has resulted in 16 successful engagements out of 20 total tests, 

representing a success rate of 80 percent to date, with one of the unsuccessful engagements 

occurring during GTV -1 due to target failure. The program plans to complete the development 

of the first SSMM and then conduct a Tracking Exercise (TRACKEX), Structural Test Fire, and 

formal Developmental Test in FY 2017 on the FREEDOM variant and a TRACKEX on the 

INDEPENDENCE variant in FY 2017. The program is on track to operationally test the SSMM 

in FY 2018 in support ofiOC in the second quarter ofFY 2018. 

16 
66 

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) MP- The ASW MP systems will provide the Joint Force 

Commander with both an in-stride and rapid ASW escort and large area search capability against 

modem diesel-electric and nuclear submarines. Through studies and testing, an LCS with an 

ASW MP embarked has consistently shown the ability to significantly increase detection range 

and overall ASW performance as compared to existing fleet systems in use on large surface 

combatants. The addition of this capability will significantly increase Fleet ASW capability and 

capacity. 

The ASW MP completed its initial integration test onboard USS FREEDOM on 

September 30, 2014. All primary test objectives were completed successfully, including: 

verifying fonn, fit, and function of the ASW Escort Mission Module on the FREEDOM variant; 

evaluating mechanical and hydrodynamic characteristics, including maneuvering characteristics 

at up to 12 knots; deploying and retrieving the Variable Depth Sonar; verifying safe dual tow and 

measured dual hydrodynamic tow characteristics; and evaluating deep water (convergence zone) 

search performance. 

The Navy released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the ASW Escort Mission Module 

EDMon August 14, 2014. After evaluating proposals, three vendors were awarded base 

contracts on July 20, 2015. The base contract awards f\mded a study by each selected contractor 

to address ship integration issues, at-sea testing at the sub-system and mission module level, and 

the development of production/delivery schedules. 

In August 2016, the Navy modified all three vendor contracts to minimize and/or retire 

these technical and programmatic risk areas. Based on the results ofthe more detailed transition 

studies and risk reduction efforts, the Navy is in the process of exercising the contract option for 

one vendor to build the ASW Escort Mission Module EDM (pre-production test article). 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) MP- When augmented with the MCM MP, the LCS is 

capable of conducting detect-to-engage operations (mine hunting, sweeping, and neutralization) 

against sea mine threats. LCS outfitted with the MCM MP provides the Joint Force Commander 

with the capability to conduct organic mine countermeasure operations ranging from intelligence 

17 
67 

preparation of the environment to first response mine countermeasures enabling joint operations 

to be conducted ahead of power projection forces. With the MCM MP a broader range of 

options will be available to the Joint Force Commander, and we will remove the ship and crew 

from the minefield. 

The MCM MP provides these capabilities through the use of sensors and weapons 

deployed fi·om organic unmanned vehicles and the MH-60S multi-mission helicopter. The 

unmanned vehicles include the Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), unmanned aerial 

vehicles, and the Knifefish UUV. 

TECI-!EV AL of the initial MCM MP capabilities was completed in August 2015, aboard 

USS INDEPENDENCE (LCS 2). The mission package met the majority of its sustained area 

coverage rate test requirements, but significant reliability issues were noted with the Remote 

Multi-Mission V chicle (RMMV). Based on TECHEV AL results, the Navy delayed MCM 

JOT &E and initiated an Independent Review Team (IRT) to assess the system. 

The IRT submitted their findings and recommendations in February 2016, following 

which Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 

Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)) directed OPNA V (N9) and PEO LCS to develop 

an implementation plan to execute fhe RMS IRT recommendations. The implementation plan 

was to coordinate experimentation, technology maturation, Concept of Employment 

development, and industry and Fleet engagement to ensure a supportable MCM capability, 

tested, and delivered to the Fleet before legacy systems reach the end of their service life, 

including: 

• OPNA V and PEO alignment of responsibility and authority with clear lines of 

accountability for delivery ofMCM capability; 

• Concept development and testing for both LCS and non-LCS based systems; 

18 
68 

• Employment of expeditionary mine warfare capability fi·om LCS and other Navy 

platforms; 

• Deployment ofMCM MP initial increment on INDEPENDENCE variant ships using 

upgraded low rate initial production RMMVs to gain operational experience. 

• Cost and recommended budgetary actions. 

Subsequently, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum cancelling further development of the RMMV and 

separately establishing the associated towed mine-detection sonar, the AN/AQS-20A, as an 

independent acquisition program. 

The CNO and ASN(RD&A) approved the IRT Implementation Plan on June 28, 2016. 

Execution ofthe plan is based on a three-phase approach. The first "deploy" phase of the plan 

focuses on exercising MCM capability from LCS or other platforms of opportunity in FY 2018 

through FY 2019. The second "assess and decide" phase will evaluate data from the FY 2018-

2019 deployment with the MCM MP initial increment and Fleet assessments of CUSV 

minehunting capability and Knifefish UUV, culminating in an MCM minehunting platform 

decision in FY 2019. The final "re-baselining" phase efforts focus on the long-term plan to 

deliver MCM capability to support IOC in FY 2021 to address legacy surface and airborne mine 

countermeasures systems end of service life. 

To execute the IRT implementation plan, the Navy submitted an FY 2016 Above 

Threshold Reprogramming (A TR). This A TR was not supported, resulting in the Navy 

developing a revised implementation plan which was briefed to professional staff members of 

the congressional defense committees in September 2016. The revised plan focuses on CUSV as 

the tow vehicle for the AQS-20A mine hunting sonar. In the interim, two RMMVs will be 

groomed and one will be overhauled, and these RMMVs will then be used to continue AN/AQS20 sonar testing, conduct data collection, and support user operational evaluation until the CUSV 

is available in late FY 2018, at which point the RMMV s will be replaced. 

19 
69 

Transition to Frigate 

On February 24, 2014, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed that the Navy limit 

the number ofF1ight 0+ LCS ships to no more than 32 and that the Navy submit alternatives for 

a more capable and lethal Small Surface Combatant (SSC) with capabilities generally consistent 

with a FF. In response, the Navy formed a Small Surface Combatant Task Force (SSCTF). The 

SSCTF's e!Torts informed the Navy's recommendation and SECDEF's decision memorandum of 

December 10,2014, approved the Navy's plan to procme a SSC based on an upgraded LCS 

Flight 0+ hull form. 

The SSCTF approach entailed five key activities. First, establish and co-locate a team of 

operational, technical, and acquisition experts with experience in surface combatant operations, 

design, and program execution. Second, develop a process that integrates capability concept 

development, requirements analysis, engineering and design, cost analysis, and program 

planning to characterize a rich trade space. Third, obtain and consider the Fleet's views and 

perspectives on SSe capability needs in the 2025+ timeframe. Fourth, seek and consider 

industry's ideas regarding existing ship designs and ship systems including hull, mechanical, and 

electrical and combat system components. Fifth, ensure the analysis and findings represent 

technically feasible and operationally credible sse alternatives for consideration by Navy 

leadership. 

The SSCTF proposed to Navy leadership that a modified LCS fulfilled the requirement of 

"a capable and lethal small smface combatant" providing the multi-mission SUW and ASW 

capability consistent with the Fleet's view on the most valued capabilities delivered by a SSC at 

the most affordable cost. Further, the study concluded that this approach would provide the 

shortest time line to first ship delivery (FY 2023) and last ship delivery (FY 2028) with no gap in 

production; and could support a subset of capability and survivability upgrades on LeS 

production ships as early as FY 2017. Navy leadership accepted this recommendation and 

proposed for SEeDEF's decision that the upgraded LeS Flight 0+ hull form be used as the basis 

for the new SSe (termed a Frigate). 

20 
70 

The FF's design continues to mature in preparation for a RFP release to both LCS 

shipbuilders in 2017, which could support contract award in late FY 2018. The FF will bring 

multi-mission capability to a modified LCS hull form, incorporating MP components from both 

the SUW and ASW mission modules. The FF does not change the fundamental LCS mission 

sets, but rather provides additional lethality and survivability capabilities that support executing 

independent, integrated, high-value unit escort, and both offensive and defensive SUW and ASW 

operations. 

In December 2015, SECDEF directed that the total LCS/FF procurement be truncated to 

40 ships. This programmatic decision, reflected in the President's Budget 2017 submission, is 

not indicative of a change in the overall2012 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) interim update 

conducted in FY 2014. The FSA interim update determined a post-2020 requirement of308 

ships in the battle force, corresponding with a 52 SSC requirement necessary to fulfill the Navy's 

essential combat missions. 

The December 2015 SECDEF memorandum also directed that the LCS program downselect to a single variant and transition to the FF no later than FY 2019. In response to the 

SECDEF direction, the Navy has outlined a path to down select to one shipbuilder (one variant) 

as early as FY 2018, but no later than FY 2019, tor the last twelve ships of the program based on 

the FF design. The Navy intends to make a down select decision based on best value criteria 

based on cost and warfighting capability. This acquisition strategy sustains the two shipbuilders 

competing for the single ship awards in FY 2017 while enabling competitors to align long term 

options with their vendor base in support of the subsequent down-select, and accelerates delivery 

of the desired FF capability to the Fleet. Additionally, the plan preserves the viability of the 

industrial base in the near term in support of potential opportunities for Foreign Military Sales 

opportunities. 

Conclusion 

The LCS and FF Classes close critical warfighting gaps for our Fleet Commanders. LCS 

will provide much-needed MCM, ASW, and SUW capability at an affordable cost, freeing up the 

21 
71 

higher end multi-mission large surface combatants to focus on their primary missions such as 

area air defense, land strike, and ballistic missile defense. 

Looking ahead, the Navy is planning for the next generation Fleet, including SSCs, using 

the established requirements generation process to detennine what warfighting gaps will be 

present and what capabilities the future SSC will require in order to fill those gaps. When 

completed, we look forward to briefing you on the outcome of this analysis and the composition 

of the future Fleet. 

The Navy's role in providing for our national security strategy includes ensuring freedom 

of navigation for all maritime traffic, providing reassurance to our partner nations, and deterring 

those who would challenge us. As more LCS ships are deployed forward, these innovative ships 

will deliver the persistent presence our allies and partners desire and our nation's security 

demands consistent with this role. 

We are committed to working with Congress as we continue to make adjustments to how 

these ships are employed. We thank you for your past support and urge your continued support. 

We welcome your oversight, and we look forward to answering your questions. 

22 
72 

The Honorable Sean J. Stackley 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development and Acquisition) 

7/28/2008- Present 

Sean J. Stackley assumed the duties of assistant secretary of the Navy (ASN) (Research, 

Development & Acquisition (RDA)) following his confirmation by the Senate in July 

2008. As the Navy's acquisition executive, Mr. Stackley is responsible for the research, 

development and acquisition of Navy and Marine Corps platforms and warfare systems 

which includes oversight of more than I 00,000 people and an annual budget in excess of 

$50 billion. 

Prior to his appointment to ASN (RDA), Mr. Stackley served as a professional staff 

member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During his tenure with the Committee, 

he was responsible for overseeing Navy and Marine Corps programs, U.S. Transportation 

Command matters and related policy for the Seapower Subcommittee. He also advised on 

Navy and Marine Corps operations & maintenance, science & technology and acquisition 

policy. 

Mr. Stackley began his career as a Navy surface warfare officer, serving in engineering and 

combat systems assignments aboard USS John Young (DD 973). Upon completing his 

warfare qualifications, he was designated as an engineering duty officer and served in a 

series of industrial, fleet, program office and headquarters assignments in ship design and 

construction, maintenance, logistics and acquisition policy. 

From 200 I to 2005, Mr. Stackley served as the Navy's LPD 17 program manager, with 

responsibility for all aspects of procurement for this major ship program. Having served 

earlier in his career as production officer for the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and project 

Naval architect overseeing structural design for the Canadian Patrol Frigate, HMCS 

Halifax (FFH 330), he had the unique experience of having performed a principal role in 

the design, construction, test and delivery of three first-of-class warships. 

Mr. Stackley was commissioned and graduated with distinction from the United States 

Naval Academy in 1979, with a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering. He holds 

the degrees of Ocean Engineer and Master of Science, Mechanical Engineering from the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr. Stackley earned certification as professional 

engineer, Commonwealth of Virginia, in 1994. 
73 

Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden 

Commander, Naval Snrface Forces 

A native of Washington, D.C. and a 1982 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, 

Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden has served in a diverse range of sea and shore assignments. 

Rowden's sea duty assignments include duty in cruisers, destroyers and aircraft carriers in 

both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. During these tours, he deployed to the Arabian Gulf, 

Western Pacific, Sea of Japan, South China Sea, East China Sea, Philippine Sea, 

Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Black Sea and Gulf of Guinea/West Africa areas of 

operation. He commanded USS Milius (DOG 69), served as reactor officer on USS George 

Washington (CVN 73); commander, Destroyer Squadron 60; commander, Carrier Strike 

Group 7; commander, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) Strike Group; commander Carrier 

Strike Group 11, and commander, USS Nimitz (CVN 68) Strike Group. 

Ashore, he has served on the Joint Staff as an action officer in the Defense and Space 

Operations Division (J38); on the chief of naval operations staff as the theater missile and 

air defense branch head for the director, Navy Missile Defense (N71 ), and as the executive 

assistant to the director of Surface Warfare (N76). He completed a tour as Surface Warfare 

Officer (nuclear) assignment officer at the Bureau ofNaval Personnel Command, and 

served as commanding officer of Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Newport, 

Rhode Island, where he oversaw the training of every officer en route to duty on ships at 

sea. 

His first flag assignment was commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea. His most recent 

assignment was on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff as director, Surface Warfare 

Division. Rowden earned his Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies 

from the U.S. Naval War College. 

His current assignment is Commander Naval Surface Forces/Naval Surface Force, U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. 

Rowden's decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the 

Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy and 

Marine Corps Achievement Medal and other personal, unit and campaign awards. 

Updated: 20 November 2014 
74 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00a.m. ET 

Thursday, December 8, 2016 

GA0-17-279T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 

AND FRIGATE 

Slowing Planned Frigate 

Acquisition Would Enable 

Better-Informed Decisions 

Statement of Michele Mackin, Director, Acquisition 

and Sourcing Management 
75 

' ' 

HJghllghts bfGA0\~,7-2-z'Sr, ,a \estirnOrty before the Subcommij:t~e on9Vef$ight'and 

ttive_stlgatlc:.ths, ~Q.mrnjtt~ oo ,Arm~ Services, Halls~ of Re)':lresetttatfVe$ 

Wily GAO Did TJlis Study 

, Tl;le N?ivY env~io:ne~ ~ r~valtJtit?n?ry approach for I~ LCS progra!tj: i!ual . 

ship <l~ijl115 wfth interchangeable 

mjS$ion pac~ages intended to provide 

mission flexibili!y at a lower cost This 

approach h;i~ fallen sho~,with . . · signif<cant:cosUncreases <l(ld reduced. 

< e~pectations about missioh flexibility 

· aM pertorJ11an<;e .. The 1\!•"Y has 

cj\aQgedaequlsl!ion approaches 

s~veral'times .. Tjle .latest ch)lrige 

·invotv~ minor upgrades to an t.CS 

deslgn'""referrep to now as a frigate. 

Yet, questions persist about: bpth the 

LCS ahd the frigate. · 

GAO has raported·~n tlw ~C!{Uisitior\ strmles. facing k¢S and now the 

frigate. This st~tern~ntdis uss~s: (1) the elli>Midn of the tcs acquisition 

strategy and vihereit.stalldstbd!\y; {2) 

key risks In the Navts.i\lans for Ill¢ 

frigate )>ased on the LCSJ>rogtam; and 

(3) tl!maining QverSigN .Oflpo~unities 

· tor the cC$ and frigate prog!'lms. :this sjateme~t is largely base~ .on GAO's. 

prior reports anct latger work Qn 

shiJ>b'ullctinll and aq~Oisitionbest 

practiC<ls, lt!ncorporatesnmited 

upda!!'d audit work where aj;ljlropriata, ' ' ' . .. . . What ~AO Recomme~(ls ... · " . GAO iS. nof making an~ neil !ecom~end$tiO:r~ if! 'thts ':st~~ern~':~~~t has made·tlumerOus recommendations· 

lo•ciol) in the past on LCS an\'! frig:Ote 

· aeq\listtion, lnclu~in!j str!lflglher1ing the' 

program's ~ustness case bejore · · 

PfP'~~ii:rg with acqi.l:is~ticirr~~cisf~ci~. 

\i)fhllePOO has, attimes, a!lreed W\lh 

GAO's recommenclations, it has taken 

ljt(li,ed action t¢ lmp!em,ent them. GAO 

1\as also sugge$tectthafCongtess take 

~E)rtain action'!' tp supp&~~>~tter t.CS 

.a!ld frigat~ oU1comes, · 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP AND FRIGATE 

Slowing Planned Frigate Acquisition Would Enable 

Better-Informed Decisions 

What GAO Found 

The Navy's vision for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has evolved 

significantly over the last 15 years, reflecting degradations of the underlying 

business case. Initial plans to experiment with two different prototype ships 

adapted from commercial designs were abandoned early in favor of an 

acquisition approach that committed to numerous ships before proving their 

capabilities. Cost, schedule, and capability expectations have eroded over time, 

as shown in the table below. More recently, the Navy attributed a series of 

engineering casualties on delivered LCS to shortfalls in crew training, seaframe 

design, and construction quality. 

____________ E~r_!y_~~f!l-------------~~~~P!_Qg_~_m __________ _ Quantity 55 seaframes@ $220 mi!hon each 40 seaframes@ $478 million each 

and cost 

Schedule Ship Initial operational capability Shtp IOC with partial capability in 2013 

-oesign · -~ - ·-·~ ~~~~~~~~~Jswng··des;gn-s-fOr --c-onsiderab·~e--cres;gnchanges:-under- -- - .. __ _ E~q~~~<!_£<?.~~. --~~P.i~ ~~~~in_g_ -~~Y.!?~rl.!.f:lf2!-!Jt~oy_t ~?~Y £O.f!_st.~~~t!sJ!:l. 

Seaframe Sprint speed: 40-50 knots; range Neither seaframe meets combined original 

MiS-s-io-n --k~1o~~~~~~~~k~~~:-by--f{!v~!~~~ti!?~n:x~=~~~ci~nt:-n 2'"o"'1s'. "'tw::co-

£~~9~ ___ ~Q10 ___ f!ll?i_~_Q!.!!Q!'I~_QL~Q?_Q_ ____ _ Crowing LCS would be mm1mally manned Crew SJZe has tncreased over ttme to 70 

(55-60 crew) 

Source GAO analysis of Navy documentatlon 1 GA0-17-279T 

Concerned about the LCS's survivability and lethality, in 2014 the Secretary of 

Defense directed the Navy to evaluate alternatives. After rejecting more capable 

ships based partly on cost schedule, and industrial base considerations, the 

Navy chose the existing LCS designs with minor modifications and re-designated 

the ship as a frigate. Many of the LCS's capabilities are yet to be demonstrated 

and the frigate's design, cost and capabilities are not well-defined. The Navy 

proposes to commit quickly to the frigate in what it calls a block buy of 12 ships. 

Soon, Congress will be asked to make key decisions that have significant 

funding and oversight implications, but without having important information. The 

Navy plans to request fiscal year 2018 authorization for its frigate block buy 

approach. Of note, the pricing the Navy intends to seek from the shipyards will 

be for 12 basic LCS. Only later will the shipyards submit their proposals for 

adding frigate capabilities to the LCS hulls. Congress will be asked to authorize 

this approach many months before the Department of Defense (DOD) prepares 

an independent cost estimate. Further, there is no industrial base imperative to 

continue with the Navy's planned pace for the frigate acquisition. LCS workload 

backlogs, when combined with 2 LCS awarded earlier in 2016 and 2 more 

planned for award in fiscal year 2017, will take construction at both shipyards 

into 2021. 

-------------United States Government Accountability Office 
76 

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy's 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and frigate programs. The Navy envisioned a 

revolutionary approach to the LCS program. Unlike other surface 

combatant programs, LCS consists of two different ship design variants 

(called seaframes) with interchangeable mission packages carrying 

equipment for three mission areas-surface warfare, anti-submarine 

warfare, and mine countermeasures-intended to give the Navy flexibility 

to rapidly deploy equipment and incorporate new systems. Coupled with 

this approach, the LCS would have a smaller crew that would rely on 

shore-based support for its maintenance needs in an effort to reduce lifecycle costs. 

To execute the program, the Navy deviated from traditional shipbuilding 

acquisition in hopes of rapidly delivering ships to the fleet. The 

consequences of this approach are well known today-costs to construct 

the ships have more than doubled from initial expectations, with promised 

levels of capability unfulfilled and deliveries significantly delayed. 

Acknowledging capability and affordability concerns, the Navy-with the 

Secretary of Defense's approval-changed course in late 2014 to pursue 

a more capable frigate based on the LCS concept. 1 The current Secretary 

of Defense also directed that the total seaframe buy be reduced from 52 

to40. 

Today, with 26 ships delivered or under contract, the LCS program again 

stands at a crossroads. The Navy's fiscal year 2017 budget request 

asked Congress to fund the last two planned LCS. Further, early next 

year Congress will need to decide whether to authorize the Navy's plans 

to procure the remaining 12 ships, including funding the lead frigate. With 

that context in mind, I will discuss today: (1) how the LCS program has 

evolved over time to where it stands today: (2) LCS program cost, 

schedule, and performance, including several recent engineering 

casualties on delivered ships; (3) key risks in the Navy's plans for the 

frigate based on the LCS program; and (4) remaining oversight 

opportunities for the LCS and frigate programs. 

1

The term "frigate" can be applied to ships of different sizes and capability. The nowretired Oliver Hazzard Perry-class frigate (FFG 7) was the last U.S. Navy frigate. 

Frigates-including the FFG 7-have been identified as typically being open-ocean, multirole ships capable of performing surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare. 

Page 1 GA0-17 -279T 
77 

The LCS Program 

Has Changed 

Significantly over 

Time 

This testimony largely leverages our past reports on the LCS program 

from 2005 to 2016. 2 We also draw on some conclusions from our broader 

work on Navy shipbuilding and acquisition reform initiatives. More 

detailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology for that 

work can be found in the issued reports. We conducted the work on which 

this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This 

statement also includes updates to information, as appropriate, based on 

program documentation and discussion with Department of Defense 

(DOD) officials, work that also was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

When the Navy first conceived the LCS in the early 2000s, the concept 

was that two shipbuilders would build prototypes based on commercial 

designs-Lockheed Martin's Freedom variant and Austal USA's 

Independence variant. 3 The Navy planned to experiment with these ships 

to determine its preferred design variant. However, in relatively short 

order, this experimentation strategy was abandoned in favor of a more 

traditional acquisition of over 50 ships. More recently, the Secretary of 

Defense questioned the appropriate capability and quantity of the LCS 

and directed a re-evaluation of the small surface combatant needs 

consistent with frigate-like capabilities. Thus, the program has evolved 

from concept experimentation, to LCS, and more recently, to an LCS that 

will be upgraded to a frigate. The strategy for contracting and competing 

2GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and 

Frigate Acquisition Strategies, GA0~16-356, (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2016); Navy 

Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid 

Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost, GA0-13-530, (Washington, 

D.C.: July 22, 2013); and Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to 

Demonstrate Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships, GA0-05-255, (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 1, 2005). A list of additional related GAO products can be found at the end of this 

statement. 

3Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for LCS 1 and the odd-numbered seaframes. For 

LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics was the prime contractor for the Austal USA-built 

ships. General Dynamics and Austal USA ended their teaming arrangement in 2010. 

Austal USA is the prime contractor for the remaining even~numbered seaframes. 

Page 2 GA0-17-279T 
78 

for ship construction has also changed. This evolution is captured in 

figure 1. 

Figure 1: A Persistent Pattern of Change to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Acquisition Strategy 

• Two shipyards would each build an LCS "Flight 0" prototype, which would be tested by 

experimentation in the fleet and inform design changes or a decision to downse!ect to one design 

vanant 

• The Navy continues procurement of both Flight 0 seaframe designs, and experimentation will now 

occur concurrently with buying more seaframes, 

• The Navy decides to incorporate design changes and lessons !earned into what it terms a "Flight 0+" 

configuration and continues purchasing both LCS variants-with no plans to downselect 

• The Navy approves plans to downselect to a single design in fiscal year 2010 that will be procured in 

a block buy of up to 10 ships over 5 years. Plans include a requirement for a second shipbuilder to build 

5 ships of the winning design 

• The Navy subsequently decides to continue buying both variants and awards a 1 o~ship block buy 

contract to each contractor after receiving competitive pricing from both 

• The Navy reassesses LCS in response to direction from the Secretary of Defense based on capabllity 

concerns and recommends pursuing an LCS with minor modifications starting in fiscal year 2019. The 

Secretary of Defense endorses th1s recommendation 

• The new Secretary of Defense announces a reduction of LCS and frigate procurement from 52 total 

ships to 40, citmg the need for the department to reprioritize capability over quantity of ships when 

making acquisition decisions. - ··-· --

• The fiscal year 2017 budget submission indicates the Navy will buy 2 LCS in 2017 and downselect to 

a single design for 11 frigates in fiscal year 2019. 

• The subsequent March 2016 acquisition strategy includes plans to award 2 LCS in 2017 and receive 

block buy pricing for 12 additiona!LCS options. The to request proposals for frigate-specific 

modifications later in 2017 and evaluate LCS block bids for frigate design changes in 

to one summer 2018 

Page 3 GA0-17-279T 
79 

LCS Cost, Schedule, 

and Performance 

Expectations Have 

Eroded 

While one could argue that a new concept could be expected to evolve 

over time, the LCS evolution has been complicated by the fact that major 

commitments have been made to build large numbers of ships before 

proving their capabilities. Whereas acquisition best practices embrace a 

"fly before you buy" approach, the Navy has subscribed to a buy before 

you fly approach for LCS. Consequently, budgets were requested and 

approved, contracts were awarded, and ship construction was undertaken 

at two shipyards. This all happened without adherence to the principles 

that lead to sound shipbuilding outcomes-namely, ensuring the maturity 

of technologies, requirements, and design before construction begins, 

and delaying commitments until testing can prove that needed capabilities 

will be delivered. 

As a result, taxpayers have paid for 8 delivered LCS, with 14 more in 

some stage of the construction process (including LCS 21, with a planned 

December 2016 construction start) without an understanding of the 

capability that the ships will ultimately provide and with notable 

performance issues discovered among the few ships that have already 

been delivered. I will outline these issues in more detail below. 

In addition to significant changes to the acquisition strategy for LCS, the 

program has also deviated substantially from expectations about its cost, 

schedule, and the capabilities the ship would provide with the seaframes 

as well as with the modular mission packages. All the while, the Navy has 

continued to request funding to buy more ships and mission packages, 

and Congress has appropriated funds. Table 1 compares the Navy's 

initial expectations of the LCS cost, schedule, capabilities, and crewing 

concepts with the present version of the program. 

Page4 GA0-17-279T 
80 

Table 1: Evolution of Expectations for the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program 

Quantity and cost 

Schedule 

Mission packages 

capability 

Crewing and 

logistics 

constructs 

Early program 

55 seaframes 

$220 million per seaframe 

64 mission packages, $2.3 billion total cost 

Ships rapidly fielded, with initial operational 

capability (IOC) in 2007, 3 years after program 

initiation 

New capabilities would be rapidly fielded as the 

Navy would integrate existing technologies on to 

the three types of mission packages-mine 

countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare 

LCS would be minimally manned (55-60 crew), 

with many support functions transferred to shore 

facl!!ties 

LCS was initially intended to have a 3-2-1 

crewing construct, where 3 crews would support 

2 LCS, and 1 LCS would remain forward 

deployed 

Updated program 

40 seaframes (tncludes 12 frigates) 

$478 million per seaframe 

64 mission packages, $5.8 billion 

!OC achieved with partial capability in 2013~-9 years 

after program initiation 

1) can meet speed requirements, but 

Independence variant (even-numbered ships, e.g., 

LCS 2) did not meet speed requirements; frigate will 

have reduced speed 

Range: !n 2009, endurance requirement reduced to 

3,500-nautical-mile range at a speed of 14 knots. 

Freedom variant cannot meet these reduced 

requirements-with a 2,138- nautical-mile range at a 

speed of 14 knots and 855 nautical miles at 43.6 

knots; Independence variant can meet range 

requirements 

Some technologies were ultimately less mature than 

envisioned, leading to significant difficulty developing 

mission capabilities 

Only one of three packages (surface warfare) has 

demonstrated required performance. However, initial 

operational capability was achieved at a temporarily 

reduced minimum capability requirement 

Crew size has increased over time to 70 

Reliance on shore-based maintenance remains 

challenging. Despite manning increases, crew has 

been unable to adequately address maintenance 

The Navy is transitioning to a blue/gold crew concept 

for LCS, where two crews will rotate on and off the 

same hull 

Source GAO analysis olpnor GAO reports and Navy documentatiOil i GA0-17-279T 

Note: Costs are in fiscal year 2005 dollars 

We reported in July 2014 on issues with LCS training, manning, and 

maintenance constructs during the 2013 deployment of USS Freedom. 

We found that the seaframe crew experienced high workload even though 

Page 5 GA0-17~279T 
81 

they were augmented by mission module crew and contractor ship riders, 

and that gaps remained in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment• 

The Navy has attributed a series of recent engineering casualties on 

delivered LCS to shorttalls in crew training, seaframe design, and 

construction quality. According to the Navy, these failures have resulted 

in substantial downtime and costs for repairs or replacements. Table 2 

describes the recent major failures at sea. 

However, these types of major incidents are not limited to the past 12 

months. For example, LCS 4 also rubbed against the sides of the 

Panama Canal locks and experienced hull damage in February 2014 

when pieces of the lock penetrated the hull. 

The question may be asked: who pays for these types of damage and 

deficiencies? Our past work has found that, by virtue of using guaranty 

provisions as opposed to warranties (such as the U.S. Coast Guard 

generally uses), the Navy is responsible for paying for the vast majority of 

4GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, GA0-14-447 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 8, 2014). 

Page6 GA0-17 -279T 
82 

defectss Specifically regarding LCS, we found that for LCS 4, the Navy's 

guaranty provisions were structured such that the Navy paid all of the 

costs to correct all defects. For LCS 3, the shipbuilder was responsible for 

30 percent of the cost of the first $100,000 in defects-a number the 

Navy surpassed just days after delivery. Thus, the Navy was 100 percent 

responsible for the costs of all remaining defects. For LCS 5-8, the 

shipbuilder is responsible for some portion of the first $1 million in defects 

for each ship. Time will tell whether this amount is sufficient to account for 

discovered defects. 6 

Turning to cost and schedule, our recent work has shown that LCS under 

construction have exceeded contract cost targets, with the government 

responsible for paying for a portion of the cost growth. This growth has 

prompted the Navy to request $246 million in additional funding for fiscal 

years 2015-2017, largely to address cost overruns on 12 LCS seaframes. 

Similarly, deliveries of almost all LCS under contract at both shipyards 

(LCS 5-26) have been delayed by several months, and, in some cases, 

close to a year or longer. Navy officials recently reported that, despite 

having had 5 years of LCS construction to help stabilize ship delivery 

expectations, the program would not deliver four LCS in fiscal year 2016 

as planned. 

The LCS mission packages have also lagged behind expectations. The 

Navy has fallen short of demonstrating that the LCS with its mission 

packages can meet the minimum level of capability defined at the 

beginning of the program. As figure 2 shows, 24 LCS seaframes will 

already be delivered by the time all three mission packages achieve only 

a minimum level of capability. 

5Warranty provisions, as are outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 

normally provide that the government may direct the contractor to repair or replace 

defective items at the contractor's expense. Guarantees are Navy-specific contractual 

mechanisms that provide for the correction of defects but the responsibility for paying for 

these corrections varies depending upon contract terms. GAO, Navy and Coast Guard 

Shipbuilding: Navy Should Reconsider Approach to Warranties for Correcting 

Constroction Defects, GA0-16-71 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2016). 

6We are currently reviewing the Navy's post-delivery policies and practices, including the 

condition of Navy vessels at the time they are delivered from the shipyard and passed to 

the fleet LCS is in our scope of work and we expect to issue our report in the spring of 

2017. 

Page7 GA0-17-279T 
83 

Figure 2: Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Operational Capability Delays Since 2007 

Original 

Planned Ship Deliveries 

and Capability Milestones 

51 

Mine Countermeasures Initial Operational Capability 

I} Surface Warfare !mt1al Operational Capability 

• Ant1-Subm.anne Initial Operational Capabil!ty 

• Surface to Surface MISSile Capability 

2008 il 

I 1 

2009!1 i 1 

201oil I 3 

2011!1 I 3 

2012[1 I 3 

2od. I 4 

2014!. i 4 

2015i'P 11!!1!1115 

2016[- i 8 2017! 

2020! 

'20211 

13 

17 

Current 

Planned Ship Deliveries and 

Capability Milestones 

Source GAO a'lalyms of Department of Delrmse data. I GA0-17·279T 

Since 2007, delivery of the total initial mission package operational 

capability has been delayed by about 9 years (from 2011 to 2020) and the 

Navy has lowered the level of performance needed to achieve the initial 

capability for two packages-surface warfare and mine countermeasures. 

As the Navy continues to concurrently deliver seaframes and develop 

mission packages, it has become clear that the seaframes and mission 

package technologies were not mature and remain largely unproven. 

Another area of concern is changes to the LCS concept of operations as 

a consequence of less than expected lethality and survivability. LCS was 

Page 8 GA0-17-279T 
84 

designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface 

combatants, and over time the Navy has lowered several survivability and 

lethality requirements further and removed some design featuresmaking the ships less survivable in their expected threat environments 

and less lethal than initially planned. This has forced the Navy to redefine 

how it plans to operate the ships. Our previous work highlighted the 

changes in the LCS's expected capability, as shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Evolution of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Capability 

Concept 

LCS's capability 

against adversaries 

How LCS will deploy 

How mission 

packages swaps will 

be utilized 

Initial 

LCS was primarily planned to be used in major 

combat operations, enter contested spaces, and be 

employable and sustainable throughout the 

battlespace regardless of anti-access or area denial 

environments. 

LCS will be a self-sufficient combatant designed to 

fight and win in shallow water and near-land 

environments without risking larger combatants in 

constricted areas. 

Current 

The Navy acknowledges current LCS weapon systems 

are under-performing and offer little chance of survival in 

a combat scenario. 

LCS lacks the ability to operate independently in combat 

and should not be employed outside a benign, lowthreat environment unless escorted by a multi-mission 

combatant providing credible anti-air, anti-surface, and 

anti-submarine protection. 

LCS's dependencies in combat require it to be wellprotected by multi-mission combatants. Multiple LCS will 

likely have to operate in a coordinated strike attack 

group fashion for mutual support. 

Mission packages wm be quickly swapped out in an Mission packages can be swapped within 72 hours only 

expeditionary theater in a matter of days. if aU the equipment and personnel are in theater. An 

LCS executing a package swap could be unavailable for 

between 12-29 days. The Navy now expects mission 

package swaps will be more infrequent than initially 

envisioned. 

Source GAO analysts of Navy documenta!Km i GA0-17-279T 

Further capability changes may be necessary as the Navy continues to 

test the seaframes and mission packages, as well as gain greater 

operational experience. For example, the Navy has not yet demonstrated 

that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements and does not plan to 

complete survivability assessments until 2018-after more than 24 ships 

are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified 

unknowns related to the Independence variant's aluminum hull, and 

conducted underwater explosion testing in 2016, but the Navy has yet to 

compile and report the results. Both variants also sustained some 

damage in trials in rough sea conditions, but the Navy has not completed 

its analytical reports of these events. Results from air defense and 

cybersecurity testing also indicate capability concerns, and both seaframe 

variants were found to have significant reliability and maintainability 

issues during several tests and trials. 

Page 9 GA0-17-279T 
85 

Frigate Acquisition 

Strategy Rushes 

Procurement in Light 

of Continued 

Unknowns 

A final issue I will comment on regarding testing is that the Navy's Chief 

of Naval Operations recently determined that LCS 1-4 will be test ships. 

This decision supports an aggressive testing schedule between fiscal 

years 2017 and 2022. The Navy noted that testing requirements have 

contributed to limited operational availability for delivered LCS. Because 

operational testing was not conducted in a timely manner to inform any 

needed design changes to seaframes, additional deficiencies discovered 

during upcoming tests could require expensive changes to the seaframes 

and mission packages that have already been delivered. 

The Navy has elected to pursue an acquisition strategy that starts with 

getting what it calls block buy pricing from both shipyards for 12 LCS. 7 

These basic LCS will then be converted to frigates at a later point in time. 

The frigate, as planned, will provide multi-mission capability-which is an 

improvement over LCS-and offers modest improvements to some other 

capabilities, such as the air search radar. Still, many questions remain to 

be settled about the frigate's design, cost, schedule, and capabilities. 

Despite these uncertainties, the Navy's current acquisition strategy 

indicates it intends to request authorization from Congress for all of the 

planned frigates-12 in total-and for funding the lead frigate before 

establishing realistic cost, schedule, and technical parameters. Further, 

the frigate will inherit many of the shortcomings or uncertainties of the 

LCS and does not address all of the priorities that the Navy had identified 

for its future frigate. 

7The Navy plans to request authorization to use what it calls a block buy contract to 

purchase the frigate---the same contracting approach used for LCS-and funding in the 

fiscal year 2018 budget request for the lead frigate. Our past analysis of the LCS contracts 

found that a block buy approach could affect Congress's funding flexibility. For example, 

the LCS block buy contracts provide that a failure to fully fund a purchase in a given year 

would make the contract subject to renegotiation. which provides a disincentive to the 

Navy or Congress to take any action that might disrupt the program because of the 

potential for the government to have to pay more for ships. If similar terms are included in 

the frigate contract, the same potentia! effect may apply. 

Page 10 GA0-17-279T 
86 

Gaps in Program 

Knowledge 

The costs for the frigate are still uncertain. Navy officials have stated that 

the frigate is expected to cost no more than 20 percent-approximately 

$100 million-more per ship than the average LCS seaframes, though 

this is still just an initial estimate. In addition to the continued cost 

uncertainty, the schedule and approach for the frigate acquisition have 

undergone substantial changes in the last year, as shown in table 4. 

According to frigate program officials, under the current acquisition 

approach, the Navy will award contracts in fiscal year 2017 to each of the 

current LCS contractors to construct one LCS with a block buy option for 

12 additional LCS-not frigates. Then, the Navy plans to obtain proposals 

from both LCS contractors in late 2017 that would upgrade the block buy 

option of LCS to frigates using frigate-specific design changes and 

modifications. The Navy will evaluate the frigate upgrade packages and 

then exercise the option-now for frigates-on the contract that provides 

the best value based on tradeoffs between price and technical factors. 

This downselect to one shipyard is planned to occur in summer 2018. 

Figure 3 illustrates how the Navy plans to modify the fiscal year 2017 LCS 

contract to convert the ships in the block buy options to frigates. 

Page 11 GA0-17-279T 
87 

Figure 3: Navy Block Buy Option Contract Modification Process for Frigate Procurement 

Littoral Combat 

Ship (LCS) 

Spring 2017 

Early fall 2017 

Late2017············ ~ 

··········'································· ............ ······················ Summer 2018 

The Navy's current plan, which moves the frigate award forward from 

fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2018, is an acceleration that continues a 

pattern of committing to buy ships in advance of adequate knowledge. 

Specifically, the Navy has planned for its downselect award of the frigate 

to occur before detail design of the ship begins. As we previously 

reported, awarding a contract before detail design is completed-though 

common in Navy ship acquisitions-has resulted in increased ship 

prices. 8 Further, without a year of frigate detail design that had been 

previously planned before the contract award, the Navy plans to rely on a 

GAO~ 16~356 and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could 

Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GA0-05-183 (Washlngton, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005). 

Page 12 GA0-17-279T 
88 

Frigate Does Not Address 

All Navy Priorities and Will 

Likely Carry Forward 

Some LCS Design 

Limitations 

contractor-driven design process that is less prescriptive than a 

government-driven design process. This approach is similar to what the 

Navy used for the original LCS program, whereby the shipyards were 

given performance specifications and requirements, selecting the design 

and systems that they determined were best suited to fit their designs in a 

producible manner. Program officials told us that this new approach 

should yield efficiencies; however, history from LCS raises concern that 

this approach for the frigate similarly could lead to the ships having nonstandard equipment, with less commonality with the other design and the 

rest of the Navy. 

As LCS costs grew and capabilities diluted, the Secretary of Defense 

directed the Navy in February 2014to explore alternatives to the LCS to 

address key deficiencies. In response, the Navy created the Small 

Surface Combatant Task Force and directed it to consider new and 

existing frigate design options, including different types of modified LCS 

designs. As we reported in June 2016, the task force concluded that the 

Navy's desired capability requirements could not be met without major 

modifications to an LCS design or utilizing other non-LCS designs. 9 When 

presented with this conclusion, senior Navy leadership directed the task 

force to explore what capabilities might be more feasible on a minor 

modified LCS. This direction led the task force to develop options with 

diminished capabilities, such as reduced speed or range, resulting in 

some capabilities becoming equal to or below expected capabilities of the 

current LCS. Ultimately, the department chose a frigate concept based on 

a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable-and more expensivesmall surface combatant options. Navy leadership indicated this decision 

was based on LCS's relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as 

well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS and maintain stability in the 

industrial base and vendor supply chain. 

Table 5 presents an analysis from our June 2016 report, which found that 

the Navy's proposed frigate will offer some improvements over LCS. For 

example, the Navy plans to equip the frigates with the mission systems 

from both the surface and anti-submarine warfare mission packages 

simultaneously instead of just one at a lime (e.g., in a modular fashion) 

like LCS. However, the Navy's planned frigate upgrades will not result in 

significant improvements in survivability areas related to vulnerability-the 

9GA0-16-356. 

Page 13 GA0-17 -279T 
89 

ability to withstand initial damage effects from threat weapons-or 

recoverability- the ability of the crew to take emergency action to contain 

and control damage. 

Table 5: Proposed Frigate Capability Changes 

Proposed change Description Significance 

Switch from single to Frigate wm be ab!e to embark surface and anti- A multi-mission capability was recognized in Navy 

analysis as a key characteristic of a frigate. A frigate will 

be able to engage different types of threats at all times, 

unlike LCS which depends on the mission package 

embarked. 

multi-mission capability submarine warfare mission packages at one time 

instead of just a single mission package, like 

LCS. 

Improve air warfare 

systems 

Frigate will be equipped with an improved air 

search radar and defensive countermeasures. 

This reduces susceptibility to attacks from air-based 

threats (e.g., aircraft or missiles). The Navy also is 

Add armor to vital Armor reduces vU!nerabilit-y;-cin-ct-en-d;-e-cd"C"to-:1-es-s-en--;-~~;;:~ocs_i:!;-;:-i:~yt~::es:~o::,:~~~st~:s~Ca~~as; shock 

spaces and magazines. risk of magazine detonation. hardening is limited to anti-air missile system. The Navy 

Improve shock Shock hardening reduces vulnerability of missile believes adjusting the concept of operations for the 

hardening in anti-air system. frigate is more cost-effective and feasible than a further 

missile system increase in armor and shock hardening. 

Source GAO analysts of Navy documentatiOn 1 GA0·17·279T 

Further, the Navy sacrificed capabilities that were prioritized by fleet 

operators. For example, fleet operators consistently prioritized a range of 

4,000 nautical miles, but the selected frigate concept is as much as 30 

percent short of achieving such a range. 

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has noted that the Navy's 

proposed frigate design is not substantially different from LCS and does 

not add much more redundancy or greater separation of critical 

equipment or additional compartmentation, making the frigate likely to be 

less survivable than the Navy's previous frigate class. Further, the Navy 

plans to make some similar capability improvements to existing and future 

LCS, narrowing the difference between LCS and the frigate. We found 

that the proposed frigate does not add any new offensive anti-submarine 

or surface warfare capabilities that are not already part of one of the LCS 

mission packages, so while the frigate will be able to carry what equates 

to two mission packages at once. the capabilities in each mission area 

will be the same as LCS. While specific details are classified, there are 

only a few areas where there are differences in frigate warfighting 

capability compared to the LCS. 

Since it will be based on the LCS designs, the frigate will likely carry 

forward some of the limitations of those designs. For example, LCS was 

designed to carry a minimally-sized crew of approximately 50. The Navy 

Page 14 GA0-17-279T 
90 

has found in various studies that the crew is undersized and made some 

modest increases in crew size. A frigate design based on LCS may not be 

able to support a significant increase in crew size due to limited space for 

berthing and other facilities. Additionally, barring Navy-directed changes 

to key mechanical systems, the frigate will carry some of the more failureprone LCS equipment, such as some propulsion equipment, and will likely 

carry some of the non-fleet-standard, LCS-unique equipment that has 

challenged the Navy's support and logistics chain. Uncertainties or needs 

that remain with the surface and anti-submarine warfare mission 

packages, such as demonstrating operational performance of the surfaceto-surface missile and the anti-submarine warfare package, also pose risk 

for the frigate based on the Navy's planned timeframes. 

Limited Opportunities 

Remain to Shape 

LCS and Frigate 

Programs 

Over the past 10 years, we have made recommendations to DOD on a 

number of issues with the LCS program. We have also suggested actions 

for Congress to consider. Now, with the fiscal year 2018 budget request 

imminent, opportunities for Congress to affect the way forward for this 

program are becoming limited. This upcoming request, which will include 

the start of frigate acquisition, presents Congress with an opportunity to 

ensure the Navy possesses sufficient knowledge before making a 

substantial commitment to the frigate. 

Our recommendations to DOD since 2005 have largely focused on LCS 

combat capability shortfalls and the Navy's acquisition strategy. While 

DOD agreed, at times, with these recommendations, it seldom took action 

if a consequence would be to slow LCS procurement, even when doing 

so would enable the Navy to build and demonstrate sufficient knowledge 

in critical areas. Table 6 highlights some of our past recommendations 

and the department's response. 

Table 6: Department of Defense (DOD) Responses to Selected GAO Recommendations for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and 

Frigate Programs 

Year 

2005 

GAO recommendation 

Revise LCS acquisition strategy to ensure that the 

Navy has sufficiently experimented with both ship 

designs, captured lessons learned, and mitigated 

operational and technology risks before award of a 

detail design and construction contract. 

Page 15 

DOD response 

DOD partially agreed with this recommendation stating 

that it would review the acquisition strategy before award 

of contracts for additional ships. DOD noted, however, 

that the LCS program entailed risk by design, and that 

DOD seeks to balance the program's acquisition risks 

with the risk of delaying closure of the warfighting gaps 

that LCS will filL 

GAOa17-279T 
91 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Update the LCS acquisition strategy to account for 

operational testing delays in the program and resequence planned purchases of ships and mission 

packages, as appropriate. 

Procure the minimum quantity and rate of ships 

required to preserve the mobilization of the production 

base until the successful completion of the full-rate 

production decision review. 

Report to Congress on the relative advantages of 

each seaframe variant for each of the three mission 

areas. 

Before approving the release of the request for 

proposals for future contracts for either seaframe 

variant, require both variants to, among other things, 

deploy to a forward overseas location and complete 

rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability 

testing. 

Ensure that the Navy's acquisition strategy for the 

modified LCS does not place industrial base concerns 

ahead of demonstrating the ship's lethality, 

survivability, and affordability 

Before a downselect decision for the frigate, require 

the program to submit milestone documentation, 

which could include an independent cost estimate, an 

acquisition program baseline, and a plan to 

incorporate the frigate into DOD's Selected 

Acquisition Reports to Congress. 

response 

DOD agreed with this recommendation: however, since 

issuance of the report, the Navy significantly altered its 

acquisition strategy resulting in the award of block buy 

contracts in 2010 without demonstrating knowledge 

related to, among other things, operational testing of at 

least one of the mission packages on each variant. 

DOD did not agree with our recommendation regarding 

the quantity and rate of ships to be purchased. stating 

that it would unnecessarily decrease production and 

result in higher pricing for individual seaframes with no 

value added to the program. 

DOD agreed with this recommendation, and Congress 

directed the Navy to provide additional information on 

some of the risk areas GAO identified, but the Navy 

essentially suggested that since the two variants are built 

to the same requirements they perform the same way. 

DOD partially agreed with this recommendation, stating 

its intention to complete as many of the tests and 

demonstrations as possible before releasing the request 

for proposals. The department, however, maintained that 

the release of the request for proposals should not hinge 

on these actions. 

DOD agreed with this recommendation. stating that the 

Secretary will ensure that industrial base concerns are 

balanced against cost, schedule and fleet requirements. 

In March 2016, however, the department approved the 

Navy's strategy to acquire a minor modified LCS, or 

frigate-a ship concept it had previously recommended to 

the department based in large part on industrial base 

considerations. 

DOD partially agreed, stating that the Navy views the 

LCS transition to the frigate as an incremental upgrade. 

DOD stated that the Navy would be required to provide 

key documentation, including an independent cost 

estimate and an updated acquisition program baseline. 

The response did not address our concerns about 

transparency in the Selected Acquisition Reports. 

Source GAO anslys1s ofpnor GAO reports and DODachons taken or planned 1 GAO-i7-279T 

In addition to these recommendations to DOD, our past reports have 

made suggestions to Congress on actions to support better LCS program 

outcomes. For instance, in 2013, we asked Congress to consider 

restricting construction funding for additional LCS seaframes until the 

Navy had adequate knowledge to mitigate substantial unknowns about 

LCS capabilities, use, and costs. Congress responded to our suggestion 

in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, restricting 

the use of funds for LCS seaframes until the Navy submitted information 

to the defense committees on LCS requirements, maturity, testing, and 

concept of operations. In other cases, however, Congress has opted to 

Page 16 GA0-17-279T 
92 

take alternative routes. For example, we suggested in June 2016 that the 

Congress consider a pause in LCS procurement funding for fiscal year 

2017. In doing so, we noted such a pause would provide the Navy with an 

opportunity to address unresolved LCS performance concerns without 

creating production problems at the shipyards. However, the Conference 

Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2017 reflects funding for two more LCS, suggesting that LCS 

procurement will continue as planned. 

The Navy's plans for fiscal year 2018 involve significant decisions for 

Congress in terms of the way forward in the immediate future the frigate 

program, including potential future commitments of about $9 billion based 

on early budget estimates. On the heels of the decision to fund two LCS 

in fiscal year 2017 is a decision on whether to authorize the frigate 

contracting approach and fund the lead frigate. 

As I noted above, the current acquisition plans for the frigate have been 

accelerated during the past year. If these plans hold, the Navy will ask 

Congress in a few months to consider authorizing a block buy of 12 

frigates and funding the lead frigate when the fiscal year 2018 budget is 

proposed. This request appears premature, as it requires Congress to 

make a decision on the frigate before detail design has begun and before 

the scope and cost of the design changes needed to turn an LCS into a 

frigate are well understood. The Navy will not establish its cost estimate 

until May 2017-months after requesting authorization from Congress for 

the block buy contracting approach for 12 frigates. Further, DOD's Office 

of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation is not expected to complete 

an independent cost estimate on the frigate until fiscal year 2018. This 

means that the upcoming budget request is unlikely to reflect the most 

current costs for the program moving forward. 

Similar to what we previously have advised about LCS block buy 

contracting, a frigate block buy approach also could reduce funding 

flexibility. For example, the LCS block buy contracts provide that a failure 

to fully fund the purchase of a ship in a given year would make the 

contract subject to renegotiation. DOD has pointed to this as a risk that 

the contractors would supersede the block buy pricing with higher prices. 

Thus, DOD and Congress have had a notable disincentive to take any 

action that might delay procurement, even when a program is 

underperforming as has been the case with LCS. 

Also, the shipyards' existing LCS construction workload suggests that a 

request to authorize the frigate in early 2017 (with the fiscal year 2018 

Page 17 GA0-17 -279T 
93 

budget request) may not only be premature, but also unnecessary. 

Although the Navy has argued that pausing LCS production would result 

in loss of production work and start-up delays to the frigate program, the 

schedule suggests that both shipyards have sufficient workload remaining 

from prior LCS contract awards that could offset the need to award the 

frigate in 2018 as planned. The Navy's concern also does not account for 

any other work that the shipyards may have from other Navy or 

commercial contracts and the possibility of continued delays in the 

delivery of LCS. As figure 4 depicts, delays that have occurred for 

previously funded ships have resulted in a construction workload that 

extends into fiscal year 2020. This prolonged workload, when combined 

with the two LCS awarded earlier in 2016 and the two LCS planned to be 

awarded in fiscal year 2017, takes construction at both shipyards into 

2021. 

Page 18 GA0-17-279T 
94 

Figure 4: Construction Demands for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Shipyards 

[>--- Current start construcl!on -date 

-®- Origma! delivery date 

~ Modified delivery date 

LCS "' Littoral Combat Ship 

Source GAO analysis of Navy contract <lata and budget documents I GA0-17-279"[ 

aThe delivery dates for LCS 25 and 26-awarded in March 2016-have not been modified_ 

bThe Navy has not awarded contracts for construction of LCS 27 or 28, so start and delivery dates 

represent current plans 

With 14 LCS in various phases of construction (LCS 9-22) and 3 more 

(LCS 23, 24, and 26) set to begin construction later in fiscal year 2017, 

delaying a decision on the frigate until fiscal year 2019 would enable the 

Navy and the shipbuilders to improve design and cost knowledge. This, in 

Page 19 GA0-17-279T 
95 

Summary 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

turn, would offer Congress an opportunity to be better informed on the 

expectations for the frigate before making a decision on the program. 

Congress is faced at this point in time with a basic oversight question: 

does it want to authorize an investment of a potential $9 billion for a 

program that has no independent cost estimate, capabilities that are 

uncertain, and a compressed contract award schedule when there is no 

industrial base or other imperative to do so? 

I will reiterate that the block buy pricing the Navy intends to seek from the 

LCS contractors in 2017 will be for the basic LCS seaframes that the 

Navy has acknowledged do not meet its needs. In 2010, the 

shipbuilders-when faced with the prospect of a downselect-provided 

the Navy with competitive pricing that propelled it to continue production 

at both shipyards. Subsequent history shows those prices have not been 

achievable. Even if LCS prices offered once again appear favorable, the 

ships ultimately are intended to be frigates, and the upgrade cost-to be 

proposed by the shipyards later-is a significant unknown. 

A decision by Congress to authorize the block buy of 12 frigates is 

effectively the final decision for the entire buy of 40 LCS and frigates. 

While, according to the Navy's approved acquisition strategy, the frigates 

would still require annual appropriations and Congress could thus 

conduct oversight of the program through that process, it could be more 

difficult to make decisions to reduce or delay the program should that 

become warranted, as the Navy may point to losses in favorable block 

buy prices such as it has done previously with LCS. 

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this statement, please contact 

Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Diana Moldafsky (Assistant Director), 

Pete Anderson, Jacob Leon Beier, Laurier Fish, Laura Greifner, Kristine 

Hassinger, C. James Madar, Sean Merrill, LeAnna Parkey, Anne 

Stevens, Roxanna Sun, Abby Volk, and Robin Wilson. 

Page 20 GA0-17-279T 
96 

Related GAO Products 

Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Congress Faced with Critical 

Acquisition Decisions. GA0-17-262T. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 

2016. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS 

and Frigate Acquisition Strategies. GA0-16-356. Washington, D.C.: June 

9, 2016. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions. GA0-16-201. 

Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2015. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two 

Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery. GA0-14-827. 

Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2014. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight 

Management Needed Prior to Further Investments. GA0-14-749. 

Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2014. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed Risks in 

Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs. GA0-14-447. 

Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2014. 

Navy Shipbuilding: Opportunities Exist to Improve Practices Affecting 

Quality. GA0-14-122. Washington, D.C.: November 19,2013. 

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost. 

GA0-13-738T. Washington, D.C.: July 25,2013. 

Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship 

Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost. 

GA0-13-530. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013. 

Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat 

Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of 

Risks. GA0-11-277T. Washington, D.C .. December 14,2010. 

National Defense: Navy's Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for 

the Littoral Combat Ship Program. GA0-11-249R. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 2010. 

Page 21 GA0-17-279T 
97 

{101269) 

Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Navy's Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 

Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities. GA0-1 0-523. 

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2010. 

Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost 

Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts. 

GA0-10-257. Washington, D.C .. February 2, 2010. 

Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate 

Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. GA0-09-322. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on 

Mine Countermeasures Capabilities. GA0-08-13. Washington, D.C.: 

October 12, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Plans Need to Allow Enough Time to Demonstrate 

Capability of First Littoral Combat Ships. GA0-05-255. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2005. 

Page 22 GA0-17-279T 
98 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
99 

GAO's Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone 

Connect with GAO 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

Strategic Planning and 

External Liaison 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative 

arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the 

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through GAO's website (http:/iwww.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO 

posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to http:iiwww.gao.gov 

and select "E-mail Updates." 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of production and 

distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether 

the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and 

information is posted on GAO's website, httrJ:I/INWw.crao.ooviorde:rin,a. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard, 

Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Fhckr, Twitter, and You Tube 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

James-Christian Blackwood, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814, 

Washington, DC 20548 

(j Please Print on Recycled Paper. 
100 

Michele Mackin 

Ms. Mackin is a Director at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, in the Acquisition 

and Sourcing Management team. In this capacity, she provides direct support to 

congressional committees and members. Ms. Mackin joined GAO in 1988 as an 

evaluator in the National Security and International Affairs Division, focusing largely on 

military airlift issues. Prior to her appointment to the Senior Executive Service, Ms. 

Mackin led complex reviews of federal contracting issues including such topics as tribal 

8(a) contracts, interagency contracting for interrogator services in the early days of the 

Iraq war, and numerous reviews of contract types and competition. She has also led a 

body of work on the Coast Guard's Deepwater recapitalization project and other reviews 

of acquisition and contracting issues across federal agencies. As a Director, Ms. Mackin 

is leading reviews of Navy shipbuilding programs, Department of Homeland Security 

acquisition management, and government- wide contracting issues. 

Prior to GAO, Ms. Mackin served for two years as a Peace Corps volunteer in the 

former Republic of Zaire. She also worked for private, non-profit organizations in New 

Orleans and Washington, D.C. Ms. Mackin has received, among other recognitions, 

GAO's meritorious service, client service, and mentoring awards. She has a bachelor's 

degree in English literature from Louisiana State University and a master's degree in 

public administration from George Washington University. 
101 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

UNTIL APPROVED BY THE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

STATEMENT 

BY 

J. MICHAEL GILMORE 

DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

ON 

THE NAVY'S LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM 

NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

UNTIL APPROVED BY THE 

COMMITEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

HASC DECEMBER 8, 2016 
102 

J. Michael Gilmore 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT &E) 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss my assessment of the Littoral Combat Ship 

(LCS) program. The first LCS was commissioned in 2008, and the Navy now has in commission 

a total of eight ships, with two more anticipated in the coming months. The Navy has also 

deployed three LCSs in the past three years, with each of the three ships conducting freedom of 

navigation and forward presence missions in the western Paci fie. Despite the success of 

delivering ships to the Navy, and recent peacetime operations during deployments, the LCS 

program has not yet demonstrated effective warfighting capability in any of its originallyenvisioned missions: surface warfare (SUW), mine countenneasures (MCM), and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The effectiveness of the ship is closely tied to the capabilities of the 

installed mission packages; yet, the Navy has not yet delivered effective mission packages that 

meet the Navy's own requirements for any of these missions. Furthermore, all of the ships have 

suffered Jrom significant and repeated reliability problems with both seatrame and mission 

package equipment. No matter what mission equipment is loaded on either of the ship variants, 

the low reliability and availability ofscaframc components coupled with the small crew size 

imposed significant constraints on mission capability. Unless corrected, the critical problems 

that I have highlighted in multiple DOT&E reports and multiple formal memoranda over the last 

seven years will continue to prevent the ship and mission packages from being operationally 

effective or operationally suitable in war. 

With respect to survivability, neither LCS variant is expected to be survivable in 

high-intensity combat because the Navy's requirements accept the risk of abandoning the ship 

under circumstances that would not require such an action on other surface combatants. As 

designed, the LCS lacks the shock hardening, redundancy, and the vertical and longitudinal 

separation of equipment found in other combatants. Such features are required to reduce the 

likelihood that a single hit will result in Joss of propulsion, combat capability, and the ability to 

control damage and restore system operation. Thus far, the results of the LCS Live Fire Test and 

Evaluation (LFT &E) program confirm this assessment. While there is still much work to be 
103 

done, the LFT&E program has already identified over 100 technical improvements that could be 

applied to improve LCS's performance against threat weapons, although, given the ships' 

fundamental limitations, none of these improvements will make the ships' survivability 

comparable to that of the Navy's other surface combatants. Once I have all the shock trial data 

in hand and have analyzed it in conjunction with the data from the Total Ship Survivability Trials 

(TSST) and the Navy's Survivability Assessment Reports, I will issue a more comprehensive 

assessment of both seaframes' survivability. 

Understandably, the Navy's concept of employment and concept of operations 

(CONOPS) for these ships has changed over time. The original vision for the class was to rely 

heavily on off-board and largely unmanned systems, which would allow engagement of the 

threats well away from the seafrarne, thus enabling the ship to remain out of harm's way and 

survivable. Second, the Navy championed the idea of interchangeable mission packages through 

modularity in order to add to LCS's flexibility and contribution to a dynamic war effort. As the 

Navy stated several years ago, "By having the flexibility to swap out mission packages, Navy 

has a ship that can adapt to meet the ever-changing spectmm of mission requirements." 1 

Notably, both of these cornerstones of the program have been either abandoned or not yet 

realized, as the limitations of the mission packages and seaframes have become clear through 

testing and experimentation. 

The Navy has most recently decided, following a program review, to employ a "semipermanent" installation of specific mission packages, making any given ship dedicated to a 

single mission, a sharp and limiting contrast from the Navy's original concept, as well as from 

the traditional multi-mission frigates that LCS is now envisioned to replace. Moreover, the offboard, unmanned systems that would have enabled the seaframes to stay far from danger have 

not yet been developed: neither the SUW or ASW mission packages plan to use unmanned 

undersea or unmanned surface vehicles to accomplish those missions, and the MCM mission 

package's off-board vehicles have encountered significant developmental delays or cancelation, 

the primary MCM system, the Remote Minehunting System (RMS), being recently canceled 

after more than 15 years of development. Although all the mission packages will employ a 

helicopter or an unmanned aerial vehicle, those assets will not obviate the need for the ship itself 

Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stack ley. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research. Development, and 

Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Richard Hunt, Director. Navy Staff before the Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee, July 25,2013. 

2 
104 

to be engaged in high-intensity battle where the crews will lilce threats like small boats, 

submarines, naval combatants, and shore defenses that are likely to employ weapons like antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), torpedoes, and mines. Therefore, the use ofLCS as a forwarddeployed combatant, where it will be involved in intense naval conflict, is inconsistent with the 

ships' inherent survivability in those same environments. 

One of the primary design features and selling points of the LCS seaframe was its speed. 

With the ability to sprint at 40 knots, the ship enjoys some enhanced ability to defeat fast small 

boats (albeit not the ever growing numbers that are faster) and some lightweight torpedoes, 

thereby protecting itself in some scenarios. However, such speed capabilities provide no benefit 

in conducting ASW or MCM; furthermore, the Navy's CONOPS require LCS, in some 

scenarios, to remain stationed near much slower units who are providing the LCS with dedicated 

air defense support to have any reasonable chance of surviving attacks using ASCMs launched in 

the littorals also obviates the need for the high speed. Moreover, this CONOPS implies that 

destroyers and cruisers will be required to provide this protection to LCSs, which is contrary to 

the concept that independently operated LCSs will free up the Navy's destroyers and cruiser and 

"allow [them] to focus on the high-end missions," which is what the Navy has touted in the past. 

The realities of intense Naval conflict and the multitude of threats in the littoral environment 

paired with the evolved CONOPS has therefore also called into question the need for high speed 

as one of the primary design considerations for this class of ship. Indeed the Navy plans to 

modify future LCSs (the so-called frigate design) by eliminating the high top speed requirement. 

I want to correct one misconception about LCS and my assessments. LCS was bought to 

"punch below its weight class," to specifically counter asymmetric threats in the littorals. LCS 

was not designed to be a destroyer, which has survivability and lethality capabilities to counter 

peer threats. No evaluation should hold LCS to that standard with respect to survivability or 

mission capabilities. Nevertheless, I have found no evidence to date that LCS will be effective 

or survivable even in the scenarios and missions in which it was designed to be successful. 

Those capabilities may yet appear as the Navy progresses in the development of the Increment 3 

SUW mission package, the incorporation of an over-the-horizon missile onto the seaframes, a 

restructuring of the MCM mission package, and the long-awaited ASW mission package, which 

showed some promise in early developmental testing. To date, however, LCS does not provide a 

3 
105 

lethal capability in the primary missions it was built for, and given the change in CONOPS, its 

design is not survivable in those missions either. 

Seaframe Suitability 

After operational testing of the Freedom variant equipped with the Increment 2 SUW 

mission package in 2014, and recent operational testing in 2015 2016 of the Independence 

variant equipped with the same mission package, DOT &E has sufficient data to conclude that 

both seaframe variants are not operationally suitable because many of their critical systems are 

unreliable, and their crews do not have adequate training, tools, and documentation to correct 

failures when they occur. No matter what mission equipment is loaded on either of the ship 

variants, the low reliability and availability of seaframe components coupled with the small crew 

size imposed significant constraints on mission capability. During this last year, problems with 

main engines, waterjets, communications, air defense systems, and cooling for the combat 

system occurred regularly and required test schedules to be revised or operations to be conducted 

with reduced capability (e.g., conducting MCM missions without operational air defense 

systems). These reliability problems are often exacerbated because, by design, the ship's force is 

not equipped to conduct extensive repairs; problems cannot be corrected quickly due to the need 

to obtain vendor support, pmiicularly when several vendor home bases m·e at dispm·ate overseas 

locations. The inability of the ship to be ready at all times to reach maximum speed, keep its 

main air defense system in operation, and to cool its computer servers are substantially 

detrimental to the ships' ability to defend themselves in time ofwm·, much less conduct their 

assigned missions in a lengthy, sustained manner. As an example, when averaged over time, and 

accounting f(Jr both planned and unplanned maintenance downtimes, LCS 4 was fully mission 

capable for SUW missions just 24 percent of the 2015 test period. Failures of the propulsion and 

maneuvering subsystems and the ship's computing network, which are fundamental to ship 

operations, caused LCS 3 to return to port for repairs or reduced readiness while at sea for weeks 

at a time during its 2014 operational test period. Both variants fall severely short of the Navy's 

reliability requirements, and have a near-zero chance of completing a 30-day mission (the 

Navy's requirement) without a critical failure of one or more seaframe subsystems essential for 

wartime operations. The trend of poor reliability of critical seaframe systems has also atTected 

the deployments ofLCS l and 3, and most recently LCS 4, and these deployments did not 

4 
106 

exercise the ships in stressing wartime operational tempo. The poor suitability demonstrated 

during the operational test periods are therefore, not anomalous, but in fact, a clear indication 

that these ships will not be operationally available nor fully mission capable more than a fraction 

of the time in wartime conditions. The recent problems observed during peacetime are likely 

only the tip of the iceberg for the problems crews might deal with when in more severe combat. 

Such results also have grave implications for operations and sustainment costs, which will plague 

the Navy for years to come if these inherent engineering problems arc not corrected. 

The intentionally small crew size has limited the mission capabilities, combat endurance, 

maintenance capacity, and recovcrability of the ships. For example, the small crew size has 

limited the independence variant rrom operating with sufficient watchstanders to maintain an 

alert posture for extended periods oftime. By design, the ship's small crew does not have the 

capacity to effect major repairs. Instead, the Navy's support concept depends on the use of 

remote assistance in troubleshooting problems and the use of Navy repair organizations and 

contractors for repair assistance. However, the Navy's limited stock of repair parts for LCS 

systems, many of which were sourced from offshore vendors, can result in long logistics delays 

and occasionally forces the Navy to resort to cannibalization of another ship in order to expedite 

repairs. Because of the planned reliance on shore-based contractor support, in many cases the 

LCS crew lacks the documentation, training, test equipment, and tools required to troubleshoot 

and repair serious problems as they emerge. An example of this limitation occun·ed during LCS 

4's operational testing during 2015 and 2016, where the ship's primary air defense system, 

SeaRAM, suffered Jrom seven long periods of downtime (greater than 48 hours). Each repair 

required the delivery of replacement components that were not stocked aboard the ship, and most 

required assistance from shore-based, subject matter experts. These failures lett the ship 

defenseless against ASCMs, and would likely have forced it to return to port for repairs if it had 

been operating in an ASCM threat area. During the LCS 3 operational test period, the crew was 

unable to repair multiple critical systems, such as the ship's navigation data distribution system, 

the air search radar, and Link 16 tactieallink, each of which resulted in multiple days of 

downtime while awaiting assistance from contractors to troubleshoot and repair the systems. 

The limited ability of the crew to effect repairs became particularly acute during the 2015 MCM 

technical evaluation period; the LCS 2 crew relied on shore-based maintenance personnel to 

complete repairs of the ship's twin boom extensible crane, main propulsion diesel engines, 

5 
107 

electrical systems, boat davit, straddle lift carrier, and air conditioning units and the mission 

package's Remote Multi-Mission Vehicles (RMMV) and Airborne Mine Neutralization System 

(AMNS) Launch and Handling Systems. In the preceding six month work-up period, the ship 

also called on contractor personnel to troubleshoot, diagnose, and correct problems. It remains 

to be seen whether the Navy can provide the same level of support in theater for wide-area, 

multi-LCS MCM operations that must be completed quickly, let alone during combat at sea. 

In September 2016, the Navy released new plans to change the LCS crewing structure. 

The Navy now plans to phase out the 3:2: I crewing construct and transition to a Blue/Gold 

model similar to the one used in crcwing Ballistic Missile submarines. Originally, core crews 

and mission module crews were intended to move from hull to hull independently of one 

another, but core crews will now merge with mission module crews and focus on a single 

warfare area either SUW, MCM, or ASW. DOT&E does not yet have sufficient infonnation to 

assess whether the new crewing model will solve some of the problems observed in the previous 

testing of both variants. 

Air Defense Capabilities of LCS 

Air defense testing has not yet been completed for either LCS variant. The Navy has not 

conducted any of the planned live-fire air defense test events or the modeling and simulation 

studies necessary to definitively determine the ship's ability to defend itself against ASCMs. 

Despite the dearth of testing, DOT&E has compared the capabilities ofLCS's air defense system 

to other ships in the Navy. I assess that LCS likely has less or nearly equivalent capability to the 

LPD 17 air defense systems, which also employ Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) but have a 

more capable combat system. In 2011, I assessed the LPD 17 class ships are not operationally 

effective against several modern classes of ASCMs. Therefore, it is unlikely that LCS will be 

able to meet the Navy's requirements for air defense based on the results available from LPD 

testing. More recently, limitations in the SeaRAM system (cun·ently installed on Independence 

variants) revealed some significant classified concerns. 

for the Freedom variant, DOT&E learned in fiscal year 2015 (FYI5) that the Navy 

stopped work on the air defense modeling and simulation test bed because it did not have the 

intellectual property rights and detailed technical information for the ship's air defense radar 

(AN/SPS-75). The lack of intellectual property for these foreign radars has been a problem for 

6 
108 

both variants of LCS, making it dit1icult for engineers to develop high-tidelity models and 

understand the capabilities and limitations of these radars or effect changes when problems are 

found. I proposed alternative test strategies to overcome this dii1iculty; however, in 2016, the 

Navy decided it is not satisfied with the Freedom variant's radar and RAM system for defense 

against ASCMs. The Navy now plans to replace the RAM system with SeaRAM, which is the 

system installed on the Independence variant. Because of this decision, the Navy does not plan 

to test (at all) the existing Freedom-variant air defense systems installed on LCS 1 through 15. 

This is a high risk for deploying crews, given that many Freedom-variant ships will deploy 

between now and 2020 when backfits of the SeaRAM system on those hulls are scheduled to 

begin. Although the Navy has conducted some training events where a single subsonic drone is 

shot down in non-stressing, operationally unrealistic conditions (not emulating actual threats), 

the fact remains that no end-to-end operationally realistic live-fire testing has been conducted. 

The crews of these ships will remain unaware of any problems with their air defense systems that 

might have been discovered during testing, and will likely discover these problems at the worst 

possible time: when under attack. The need for this testing is all the more acute given the recent 

ASCM attacks against Navy ships offthe coast of Yemen. 

For the Independence variant, air defense testing continues to be delayed and its 

completion is now in doubt as well because of higher priority testing of the CVN 78 air defense 

systems. Additionally, the Program Executive Office for LCS sent a letter to the Navy's Surface 

Warfare Director (N96) stating that Independence variant air warfare testing cannot be executed 

at current funding levels. The Navy had planned to conduct the first of the planned operationally 

realistic live-fire events on the self-defense test ship in FYI6, but postponed the test indefinitely 

because of anticipated poor performance predicted by pre-test modeling and analysis of the 

plam1ed test event scenario. Without these tests, an adequate assessment of the Independenceclass probability of raid annihilation requirement is not possible. Based on the Navy's most 

recent plans, DOT &E expects that the Independence variant will have been in service nearly I 0 

years by the time that air defense testing is complete, which at the time of this testimony is not 

anticipated before FY20. 

Although the Navy has postponed indefinitely its plans to conduct live-fire testing of the 

LCS air defense systems, the Navy has conducted some initial testing of the SeaRAM system, as 

7 
109 

it is employed aboard Arleigh Burke destroyers. In December 2015, the Navy-conducted a livefire event aboard the self-defense test ship, the SeaRAM system was successful at defeating a 

raid of two GQM-163 supersonic targets. Although a stressing event, these targets were not 

representative of the threats they were attempting to emulate. The Navy does not currently have 

an aerial target that is capable of emulating some modern ASCM threats. During this test, 

SeaRAM employed the RAM Block 2 missile, which is different than the current LCS 

configuration that employs the RAM Block lA missile. However, if the Navy decides to deploy 

LCSs with the Block 2 missile, then this test and others planned are germane to an LCS 

evaluation, however incomplete. DOT&E and the Navy continue to conduct test planning to 

make best use of the available resources and ensure that LCS's air defense testing reflects the 

capabilities of deploying LCSs. 

The Navy has also successfully completed some non-firing air defense tests that provide 

some initial insights into the capabilities and limitations of components of the air defense 

systems. For the Freedom variant, these tests revealed that because of the limited capabilities of 

the air defense radar, the crew was unable to detect and track some types of air threats well 

enough to engage them. The lack of integration between the WBR-2000 Electronic Support 

Measures (ESM) system and the RAM system limited the ship's capability to make best use of 

its limited RAM inventory. For the Independence variant, although the ships relies on the 

SeaRAM system, the ship's air surveillance radar provided LCS crews with only limited warning 

to defend itself against ASCMs in certain situations. The Independence variant's ESM system is 

able to detect the presence of the ASCM seekers in most instances but did not reliably identify 

certain threats, and in some cases did not provide LCS crews with adequate warning to defend 

itself. 

Finally, with respect to air defense, the ship is expected to struggle to defend itself 

against low, slow-flying aircraft such as unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, and small planes. 

In the Navy's developmental test events, we learned that the electro-optical system used to target 

the seaframe's gun was unable to provide reliable tracking information against some targets. 

Furthermore, the safety standotT requirements on Navy test ranges were so severe that they 

precluded meaningful live-fire gun engagements against these targets. Because of these 

problems and constraints, the program decided to cancel all subsequent live-fire events, 

8 
110 

including those scheduled for operational testing, conceding that the Independence variant is 

unlikely to be consistently successful when engaging some of these threats until future upgrades 

of the tracking system can be implemented. 

Cybersecurity 

Much of my assessment of the two seaframes' cybersecurity posture and capabilities is 

classified and covered in detail in my recent operational test reports. However, I will state that 

the testing conducted in FY14 on LCS 3, testing conducted in 2015 on LCS 2, and finally the 

most recent test aboard LCS 4 have revealed significant deficiencies in the ship's ability to 

protect the security of information and prevent malicious intrusion. Although the Navy is 

developing plans to modify the network architecture in the both Freedom and Independence 

variants to enhance cybersecurity, the severity of the cybersecurity problems discovered on LCS 

will degrade the operational etlectiveness of either variant until the problems are corrected. 

In early 2016, the Navy made substantial changes to the LCS 4's networks, calling the 

effort "infom1ation assurance (TA) remediation," to correct many of the deficiencies in network 

security on the baseline Independence variant's total ship computing environment. The Navy 

designed and implemented the IA remediation program to mitigate or eliminate some of the 

vulnerabilities found during the 2015 test aboard LCS 2 and was successful in eliminating some 

of the deficiencies that placed the ship at risk from cyber-attacks conducted by nascent 

(relatively inexperienced) attackers. 

Unfortunately, because of numerous limitations, the Navy's testing aboard LCS 4 was 

inadequate to fully assess the LCS 4's survivability against cyber-attacks originating outside of 

the ship's networks (an outsider threat). The testing was adequate to determine that some 

deficiencies remain when attacks occur from an insider threat; however, it was not adequate to 

determine the full extent of the ship's cybersecurity vulnerability or the mission effects of 

realistic cyber-attacks. 

Although the Navy's lA remediation corrected some of the most severe deficiencies 

known prior to the test period, the testing revealed that several problems still remain which will 

degrade the operational etlectiveness of Independence-variant seaframes until the problems are 

corrected. The Navy plans a second phase of lA remediation to con·ect additional network 

deficiencies; however, DOT &E is unaware of the plans to install or test these changes on future 

9 
111 

ships, or whether these changes will con·ect the problems observed during the LCS 4 test 

Nevertheless, routine and thorough cybersecurity assessments of each ship, and each 

configuration of mission packages, particularly those being deployed, should be a core strategy 

for LCSs as well as all Navy ships. The inadequacies in test execution and poor performance 

discovered in recent LCS cybersecurity testing strongly suggest that the Navy must undertake a 

more concentrated and focused effort to improve cybersecurity for these ships. 

Self-Defense against Surface Threats 

Both variants of LCS rely exclusively on the sea frame's MK 110 57 mm gun and a 

gunfire control system that is fed by an electro-optical/infrared sensor to defend the ship against 

attacking surface threats, such as a small fast boat Unless the SUW mission package is 

installed, this one gun is the ship's only defense against these targets (as well as low, slow-flying 

targets). Too few data exist on the Freedom variant to provide a definitive evaluation of that 

ship's ability to defend itself with only the 57 mm gun. Furthermore, the test that was conducted 

was limited to a single target boat attacking LCS and the events were not conducted in a realistic 

cluttered environment where identification of threats will be more challenging. 

On the Independence variant, however, the Navy conducted seven test events, each 

consisting of a single attacking small boat LCS failed to defeat the small boat in two of these 

events, because of gun failures that have since been corrected. Overall, the 57 mm gun 

demonstrated inconsistent performance even in benign conditions, which raises doubts about the 

ship's ability to defend itself without the SUW mission package installed. The inaccuracy of the 

targeting systems, the difficulty in establishing a track on the target, and the requirement to hit 

the target directly when using the point-detonation fuze combine to severely impair effective 

employment of the gun, and limit effective performance to dangerously short ranges. The Navy 

has not conducted any testing to determine how well the ship will perfom1 when faced with an 

attack in a realistic cluttered maritime environment including both neutral and hostile craft; the 

Navy has also not conducted operational testing to determine how well the ship (without the 

SUW mission package) will perform against multiple attacking boats. Nevertheless, given the 

performance observed during operational testing, the combination of faster threats, multiple 

threats, threats with longer-range standoff weapons, cluttered sea tratlic, or poor visibility are 

likely to make it difficult for LCS (without the SUW mission package) to defend itself. 

10 
112 

The ship's electro-optical/infrared camera, SAFIRE, is the primary sensor for targeting 

the 57 mm gun. The system suffers from a number of shortcomings that contribute to 

inconsistent tracking performance against surface and air targets, including a cumbersome 

human-systems interface, poor auto-tracker performance, and long intervals between laser range 

finder returns. These problems likely contributed to the poor accuracy of the 57 mm gun 

observed during live-fire events, though the root cause(s) of the gun's inaccuracy have not been 

determined definitively. 

In the most recent of the seven live-fire test events the Navy conducted against a singleboat target, the crew employed the 57 mm differently than it had in previous live-tire events, and 

defeated the attacking boat with less ammunition and at a slightly longer range than in previous 

events. One event does not provide conclusive evidence that the ship can be e!Tective in these 

scenarios, and such performance was never observed during the swarm-defense test events. 

Nevertheless, these results are encouraging and suggest that the Navy should examine tactics and 

alternative gun employment modes, including different projectile fuze settings, as a means to 

enhance LCS's currently limited capabilities. 

Self-Defense against Subsurface Threats 

As I have stated in multiple reports, LCS will have no capability to detect or defend 

against torpedoes unless the ASW mission package is embarked, specifically the lightweight tow 

countermeasure. This is in contrast to the USS Oliver Hazard Pen:y Class Frigates (FFG), which 

had some inherent capability to detect threat torpedoes and could employ a torpedo 

countermeasure system. The lack of capability implies that a submarine could launch an attack 

on an LCS, without the crew knowing that they were under attack, and successfully hit the ship. 

Because an LCS equipped with the SUW mission package has no ASW capability, nor 

any torpedo defense capability, many areas of operation where multiple threats are present will 

require multiple LCSs to work together for mutual protection, or for the likely multi-mission 

character of many Navy warfare scenarios. Such groups of two or three LCSs with disparate 

single-mission packages is in addition to the now-acknowledged need for destroyer/cruiser 

support for air defense in some scenarios. The Navy's CONOPS documents acknowledge the 

difficulty of planning LCS surface action groups because of the inherent lack of multi-mission 

capabilities, making three or four ships sometimes necessary to enable mission accomplishment 

11 
113 

and ensure survivability. The same mission scenarios might be accomplished by fewer ships, 

provided those ships had multi-mission capabilities. The original vision, therefore, of a nimble, 

mission-focused ship has been overcome by the realities of the multi-mission nature of naval 

warfare combined with the multiple threat environments of high-intensity naval conf1icts. 

Survivability 

As I have previously reported, neither of the LCS designs includes survivability features 

necessary to conduct sustained operations in a combat environment. Furthermore, during 

DOT &E's review of the work completed by the Navy's Small Surface Combatant Task Force in 

2014, it became clear that LCS does not have the survivability features commensurate with those 

inherent in the FFG it is intended to replace. The FFG is designed with shock-hardened mission 

and propulsion systems. It has redundancy and separation of major combat and engineering 

systems and equipment. These design features are meant to enable the ship to not only exit the 

area once hit by significant threat weapons, but also to retain critical mission capability and 

continue fighting if need be. LCS is not designed to do so. 

The LCS CONOPS acknowledges LCS vulnerabilities to some air, surface, and 

subsurface threats and suggests that LCS is best suited for missions such as Theater Security 

Cooperation and Maritime Security Operations. At the same time, the LCS CONOPS states that 

LCS is expected to spend the majority of its time operating independently or in surface action 

groups, ahead of the strike group, preparing the environment for joint force access to critical 

littoral operating areas. Such operations could expose LCS to the full spectrum of potential 

threats, and the CONOPS acknowledges that the limited air defense and survivability capabilities 

ofLCS will necessitate an appropriate defense plan provided by the very forces LCS is 

supporting. Providing additional warships for LCS protection means stretching already limited 

battle group air defense assets. Furthermore, the presence of such air defense ships to aid LCS 

does not guarantee the susceptibility to these attacks will be reduced to zero or its survivability 

improved, given the potential threats that LCS might encounter as one of the first assets present 

in a hostile combat environment. 

Aluminum Ship Vulnerability 

The Navy has not yet adequately assessed the LCS aluminum hull and deckhouse tire 

vulnerability; however, this is an obvious survivability concern for these ships. Aluminum 

12 
114 

structure is vulnerable to melting and loss of structural integrity during shipboard tires. This is 

not a problem for steel hulled ships. Battle damage and collision incidents involving ships with 

aluminum superstructures, such as USS Stark and USS Belknap, highlighted these survivability 

concerns for the Navy. The Navy's Survivability Review Group concluded in the 1980s that 

aluminum ship structure was highly vulnerable to tire spread and loss of strength, which was 

codified in the 1985 edition of the General Specifications for Ships of the United States Navy, 

section 150a, by requiring deckhouscs and superstructure to be steel. This policy was reversed 

for LCS. More recently, an aluminum ship, HSV Swift, suffered extensive structural damage 

trom blast and tire when she was hit by a missile off the coast of Yemen. This recent attack 

serves as a grim reminder of the increased risk inherent in the independence variant, which is 

constructed primarily from aluminum. 

The Navy has not yet assessed the likelihood of major structural damage from a weaponinduced fire on LCS. These assessments have not been done because the Navy was not equipped 

with the analytical tools necessary to model this problem. The LCS LFT &E program included 

tests to gather data for model development and validation, but that process is still ongoing. The 

independence-variant survivability assessment report that is due in FY17 will not include 

comprehensive analysis of fire induced structural damage potential. 

Based on testing of fire insulation conducted by the LCS program, the Navy reported that 

it is unlikely that major structural damage will occur to aluminum structures from an internal fire 

in an undamaged compartment (i.e., all fire suppression systems are operable and fire insulation 

is intact). This nuanced reporting did not address the fact that internal blast etTects can damage 

fire insulation and suppression systems that would normally be available to mitigate the tire 

elTects in an undamaged compartment. It is, therefore, premature to draw any other conclusions 

about the structural integrity of the LCS hull. 

Shock Trials 

This year, the Navy conducted reduced severity shock trials on the Independence-variant 

USS Jackson (LCS 6) and the Freedom-variant USS Milwaukee (LCS 5). I approved the 

reduced severity trial geometries for LCS 6 because of serious concerns about the potential for 

damage to non-shock hardened mission critical equipment and ship structure. There was also 

13 
115 

concern about the damage tolerance of the ship's hull structure relative to steel hulled ships. 

Unlike other surface combatants the combat systems on LCS are not shock hardened. Also, the 

main propulsion system on the Independence variant is not shock hardened. The Navy argued 

that the reduced severity approach was necessary because they lacked specific test data and a 

general understanding of how the non-Grade A systems (Grade A systems must remain 

functional after shock) would respond to shock. To further mitigate potential equipment damage 

and personnel injury, some mission systems were removed, other equipment was modified to 

improve shock resistance, and construction deficiencies were corrected. 

LCS 6 was tested in June and July 2016. The trial consisted of three shots of increasing 

severity, ending at 50 percent of the required shock design level. At these reduced levels, most 

non-Grade A components and systems, including electrical power generation systems and the 

SeaRAM air defense system, remained operable or were restored to a limited or full capability 

prior to the ship's return to port after each shot. The Navy is still analyzing the structural 

response data. 

Based on the LCS 6 shock trial lessons learned and limited equipment damage, 1 directed 

the Navy to conduct a traditional three shot shock trial for LCS 5, with the final shot at twothirds the required shock design level. The Navy conducted the first two shots from August 29 

through September 23, 2016, starting the trial at the same shock severity as other modern surface 

combatants. However, the Navy stopped the LCS 5 trial after the second shot, thereby not 

executing the planned third shot due to concerns with the shock environment, personnel, and 

equipment. The Navy viewed the third LCS 5 trial as not worthwhile because the Navy was 

concerned shocking the ship at the increased level of that trial would significantly damage 

substantial amounts of non-hardened equipment, as well as damage, potentially significantly, the 

limited amount of hardened equipment, thereby necessitating costly and lengthy repairs. The 

Navy view is that its modeling could be used to confidently conclude what would occur if the 

third shot were conducted based on the results of the first two shots. l disagree and maintain that 

the third LCS 5 shot is needed: the Navy's models have not correctly predicted important 

aspects of the response ofthe LCS 6 and LCS 5 seaframes to the shock events that were 

conducted; nor have those models accurately predicted the responses of the equipment installed 

and integrated onto the ships. 

14 
116 

As planned and conducted, neither shock trial resulted in catastrophic damage, yet both 

shock trials exposed critical shock deficiencies, which I will detail in an upcoming classified 

report. These deficiencies, which were only identified in the shock trial, can now be specifically 

addressed and corrected by Navy engineers to make the ships more survivable. 

Total Ship Survivability Trials (TSST) 

As an element of the LFT&E program, the TSST is the primary source ofrecoverability 

data and is intended to provide a damage scenario-based engineering assessment of the ability of 

the ship's crew to utilize the installed firefighting and damage control systems to control damage, 

reconfigure, and reconstitute mission capability after combat damage. 

The LCS 3 TSST revealed significant deficiencies in the Freedom-variant design. Much 

of the ship's mission capability would have been lost because of damage caused by the initial 

weapons effects or fi·om the ensuing fire. The weapons effects and fire damage happened before 

the crew could respond, and the ship does not have sufficient redundancy to recover the lost 

capability. Some changes could be made to make the ship less vulnerable and more recoverable 

without major structural modifications. Examples include providing separation for the water jet 

hydraulic power units, redesigning the Machinery Plant Control and Monitoring System, and 

reconfiguring the chilled water system into a zonal system with separation for the air 

conditioning (chilled water) plants. The Navy has not yet made any plans to make such changes 

in future ships, however. 

The LCS 4 TSST, conducted in January 2016, exposed weaknesses in the Independencevariant design. While the shock-hardened auxiliary bow thruster would have provided limited 

post-hit propulsion, much of the ship's mission capability would have been lost because critical 

support systems such as chilled water are not designed for reconfiguration and isolation of 

damage caused by the initial weapons effects or from the ensuing tire and flooding. There were 

many survivability improvements identified by the trial team that could be implemented in the 

Independence-variant ships, for example, outfitting the rescue and assistance locker with 

additional damage control gear to make it a third damage control locker, and modifying the 

damage control and chill water systems to increase the ability to reconfigure and isolate damaged 

sections. 

15 
117 

Mission Packages 

The ability of LCS to perfonn the bulk of its intended missions (SUW, MCM, and ASW) 

depends on the effectiveness of the mission packages. To date, despite LCS having being in 

service since 2008, the Navy has not yet demonstrated effective capability for LCSs equipped 

with the MCM, SUW, or ASW mission packages. The Increment 2 SUW mission package is the 

only fielded system on LCS seaframes; it has demonstrated some modest ability to aid the ship 

in defending itself against small swarms of fast-inshore attack craft (though not against threatrepresentative numbers and tactics), and the ability to support maritime security operations, such 

as launching an recovering boats and conducting pirate interdiction operations. 

Surface Warfare (SUW) 

The Navy has now conducted one operational test of the Increment 2 SUW mission 

package installed aboard a Freedom variant and one operational test of the mission package 

installed aboard an Independence variant. The ship's organic 57 mm gun is augmented with two 

30 mm guns and an MH-60R helicopter, which can be anned with a machine gun and 

HELLFIRE missiles. 

For the Freedom variant, the Navy conducted three live-fire engagements aboard LCS 3 

consisting of a small swarm of last-inshore attack craft (small boats) under the specific 

conditions detailed in the Navy's reduced and interim requirement. LCS 3 achieved mixed 

results against these small swarms during FY 14 testing. In the first developmental test, the ship 

successfully defeated a small swarm beyond the prescribed keep out range. ln the second 

developmental test, LCS 3 was not successful. Following intensive remedial training to hone the 

crew's tactics, ship-handling, and gunnery, LCS 3 repeated the test and was successful in the one 

operational test event. Although the tests demonstrated that the Freedom variant could defeat a 

small swarm under benign conditions, there is little evidence that such results are repeatable 

under these same conditions as well as other less favorable conditions. Moreover, the Navy does 

not have in place intensive training programs for small boat defense that enabled the crew to be 

successful in the last test event, nor has the Navy taken my recommendation to develop a shorebased operator-in-the-loop team trainer, which has the potential to alleviate some of the 

uncertainty in LCS SUW perlonnance, enable more adequate testing ofthe ship's capabilities in 

16 
118 

these scenarios where test resources are scarce, and potentially examine other conditions (such as 

varying sizes of swarms and interfering traffic). 

In 2015, LCS 4, similar to LCS 3, participated in three engagements with small swarms 

of small boats. LCS 4 failed the Navy's reduced requirement for interim SUW capability, failing 

to defeat each of the small boats before one penetrated the prescribed keep-out zone in two of the 

three events. Although LCS eventually destroyed or disabled all of the attacking boats in these 

events, these operational test results confirmed that the Increment 2 SUW mission package 

provides the crew with a moderately enhanced self-defense capability (relative to the capability 

of the 57 mm gun alone) but not an effective offensive capability. LCS 4's failure to defeat this 

relatively modest threat routinely under test conditions raises questions about its ability to deal 

with more realistic threats certain to be present in theater, and suggests that LCS will be 

unsuccessful operating as an escoti (a traditional frigate role) to other Navy ships. Additional 

details about the LCS gun performance and the factors and tactics that contribute to the ship's 

effectiveness are discussed in my November 2016 classified report. In it, I also detail my 

recommendations for improving performance and tactics so that these ships might be effective in 

these scenarios. 

The Navy has begun work on developing and testing the Surface-to-Surface Missile 

Module (SSMM), the core component of the Increment 3 mission package. Although early 

developmental testing has shown the Longbow HELLFIRE missile employed from the SSMM 

has the needed lethality to defeat some of these small boat threats, operational testing in 2015 

and 2016 revealed some potential limitations in the targeting capability of the ship. The Navy 

intends to conduct additional developmental testing to better understand these limitations; and 

the results of these tests will be used to inform future decisions by the Navy to modify missile 

targeting algorithms and tactics, as needed to overcome the limitations. The Navy plans to 

demonstrate the ability to meet the LCS requirements for SUW swarm defense during 

operational testing of the Increment 3 mission package in FY18. These tests will be the first time 

that the Navy will have investigated LCS's ability to defend ships other than itself. 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 

In 2009, the Navy recognized that its legacy MCM capabilities, particularly Avengerclass and Osprey-class surface ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters, were aging while the 

17 
119 

worldwide mine threat continued to modernize2 In response to the advancing mine threat 

abroad and planned retirement oflegacy assets at home, the Navy articulated an overarching 

vision for 21st-century mine warfare hailing the LCS as the "keystone" of the future MCM 

force. 3 The principal objective of the Navy's MCM vision was "to decrease significantly the 

time required to conduct countermeasures operations, while ensuring low risk to naval and 

commercial vessels, and to remove the man from the minefield." The plan was based on the 

premise that a suite ofMCM systems, deployed from an LCS stationed outside the minefield, 

could replace and outpace legacy capabilities that put sailors in harm's way. 

After initially setting high expectations for LCS MCM performance, the Navy continues 

to temper its outlook. As the Navy embarked on efforts to transform its MCM vision to reality, 

analysts employed performance modeling to estimate the area clearance rates of each LCS 

equipped with a package of MCM systems in a variety of operational scenarios, including largescale scenarios requiring operations of multiple LCSs for sustained periods. These modeling 

estimates formed the basis for the MCM requirements the Navy documented in the LCS Flight 

0+ Capabilities Development Document (CDD) approved in 2010. In the CDD, the Navy also 

postulated that remaining development and integration ofthe systems needed to complete the 

fully capable MCM mission package could be accomplished quickly, indicating that "delivery of 

the first baseline Spiral Alpha MCM mission package is on schedule for FY12."4 As it became 

clear that this optimistic goal would not be met, the Navy developed a plan to test and field three 

"increments" of partial Spiral Alpha capability before achieving full Spiral Alpha capability in a 

fourth and final increment. In doing so, the Navy asserted that an LCS equipped with the first 

partial Spiral Alpha MCM mission package (or Increment I MCM mission package) would 

replace aging legacy systems and improve clearance rates by a factor of two. 

The Navy has not yet delivered on the promise of its 21st-century MCM vision, even at 

reduced expectations. The Navy has not yet demonstrated in end-to-end testing that the 

sustained area clearance rate of an LCS equipped with the cun·ent MCM mission package 

Legacy MCM capabilities also include Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units and Marine Mammals. 

"Ensuring Global Access and Commerce- 21" Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare," PEO(LMW) I OPNAV N85 

Mine Warfare Primer, June 2009. 

In Annex A Section 5.4 of the LCS Flight 0+ CDD, the Navy further defined baseline mission packages as 

'·those that will contain the full set of Spiral Alpha systems and achieve all Spiral Alpha performance attributes 

contained in this CDD." More recently. the Navy described the Increment 4 MCM mission package as the 

configuration expected to achieve LCS Flight 0+ COD requirements. 

18 
120 

exceeds its own estimates of legacy clearance rate, nor has it demonstrated that an LCS could 

meet the Navy's Increment 1 requirements for area clearance rate. The Navy has also not yet 

demonstrated the capability of an LCS to conduct eHicient MCM operations in an operationally 

realistic shipping channel. Given the currently ineffective and limited line-ot:sight 

communications between LCS and off-board vehicles, an LCS is forced to clear a series of 

operating areas that allow the ship to follow MCM operations as they progress along the channel 

while remaining within operational range of its oft: board systems. This alone has the negative 

effect of vastly increasing mission timelines regm·dless of the effectiveness of the minehunting 

and clearing systems LCS employs. In addition, the performance demonstrated during LCS 

developmental testing that has been completed since 2014 provides ample evidence that the 

small number ofLCSs equipped with the current MCM mission package that the Navy might be 

able to muster before FY20 would not provide an operational capability to complete MCM 

clearance missions at the levels needed by operational commanders. Even under the best 

conditions the Navy might hope to experience, the technical evaluation in 2015 revealed that an 

LCS with the current MCM mission package would deliver less than half the Increment I 

requirements, which themselves are a fraction of the full Spiral Alpha requirements. 

In a June 2016 early fielding report, based exclusively on the testing conducted before 

2016, I concluded that an LCS employing the current MCM mission package would not be 

operationally effective or operationally suitable if called upon to conduct MCM missions in 

combat. In the same early fielding report, I concluded that the current versions of the individual 

systems that comprise the current MCM mission package-- specifically the RMS (consisting of 

the RMMV and AN/AQS-20A) and the MH-60S Airborne MCM (AMCM) helicopter equipped 

with the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) or the AMNS --would not be 

operationally etTective or operationally suitable if called upon to conduct MCM missions in 

combat. 

The Navy has conducted limited operational testing of the individual systems it expected 

to field in the Increment 1 MCM mission package and has not initiated any operational testing of 

an LCS equipped with an integrated MCM mission package, other than a preliminary 

cybersecurity assessment. The lack of progress in developing, operationally testing, and fielding 

a credible, LCS-based MCM capability contrasts sharply with the time line and perfonnance 

19 
121 

expectations the Navy conveyed in the LCS Flight 0+ CDD. As the Navy attempts to till 

capability gaps left by canceled programs and correct shortfalls in the performance of the 

original Spiral Alpha systems still in development, it is increasingly likely that the Navy will not 

complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (JOT&E) of either LCS variant equipped with 

the final (fully capable, Spiral Alpha) MCM mission package until at least 2023, more than a 

decade after the optimistic schedule set forth in the CDD. 5 Moreover, it is not clear that any 

future version of the mission package will meet the MCM requirements the Navy established in 

the LCS Flight 0+ CDD. Not surprisingly, I understand the Navy is now considering changes 

that would reduce some requirements for the so-called Spiral Alpha (or final) MCM mission 

package. Although such reductions may ultimately prove necessary to realign expectations with 

technical reality, the operational implications of lower clearance rates include longer clearance 

timelines and more LCSs equipped with MCM mission packages, as scenario geometry permits. 

In October 2015, the Navy delayed operational testing of the Independence-variant LCS 

equipped with the first increment of the MCM mission package pending the outcome of an 

independent program review, including an evaluation of potential alternatives to the RMS. The 

Navy chartered the review in response to an August 21,2015, letter from Senators John McCain 

and Jack Reed, Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces 

expressing concerns about the readiness to enter operational testing given the significant 

reliability problems observed during a technical evaluation in 2015, a topic l have repeatedly 

reported on in previous years. In early 2016, following the completion of the independent 

review, among other actions, the Navy canceled the RMS program, halted further RMMV 

procurement, abandoned plans to conduct operational testing of individual MCM mission 

package increments, and delayed the start ofLCS MCM mission package IOT&E until at least 

FY20. After canceling the RMS program, the Navy also announced its intention to evaluate 

altematives to the RMS such as the unmanned surface craft towing improved minehunting 

sensors, and an improved version of the Knifetish unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV). 

However, the Navy has not yet fully funded these potential alternatives. 

Ironically, the Navy's mine warfare resource sponsor (OPNAV N852) identified a multifunction LCS unmanned surface vessel (USV) as a "game changer" and potential RMMV 

Since 2010. the Navy has canceled the RMMV. OASIS, and RAMICS programs and discontinued use of the 

MH-60S in towing missions (thereby eliminating its employment of the AN/AQS-20A). 

20 
122 

replacement in 2012.6 In the years that followed, however, Navy otlicials touted RMMV 

reliability improvements that never materialized and funded additional RMMV development, but 

did not prioritize development of a multi-function USV capable of integrating with the RMS's 

AN/AQS-20 sonar.7 These choices could leave the Navy without a viable means of towing 

improved AN/AQS-20C sonars when the contractor delivers initial production units next year 

and could delay realistic testing and fielding of the system. By accepting objective analysis of 

RMMV performance and committing to the USV sooner, the Navy could have avoided this 

unfortunate position and saved millions in RMMV development costs. 

The Navy is developing the AN/ AQS-20C sonar with upgrades designed to correct RMS 

and AN/AQS-20A minehunting performance shortfalls observed in combined developmental and 

integrated testing. Unless corrected, AN/ AQS-20A shortfalls will delay completion of LCSbased mine reconnaissance and mine clearance operations. Although the Navy has demonstrated 

the AN/ AQS-20A can find some mines when employed in ideal conditions, the sonar does not 

meet its detection and classification requirements over the prescribed depth regimes and 

simultaneously provide adequate coverage against all threats spanning a representative range of 

operationally realistic conditions. In addition, testing has repeatedly shown that AN/AQS-20A 

sensor does not meet Navy requirements for contact depth localization accuracy or false 

classification density (number of contacts erroneously classified as mine-like objects per unit 

area searched). Contact depth localization problems complicate efforts to complete identification 

and neutralization of mines. False classifications, unless eliminated from the contact list, require 

identification and neutralization effort, result in the expenditure of limited neutralizer assets, and 

negatively affect the LCS sustained area coverage rate. 

Because of funding constraints, the Navy is struggling to implement many of the 

independent review team's recommendations. Although the Navy now plans to employ the 

Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) and AN/AQS-20C as the primary replacement for 

OPNAV N852 MIWIP 2012 briefing 

See Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and 

Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Richard Hunt. Director. Navy Statfbefore the Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces of!he House Armed Services Committee. July 25,2013 and Statement of the Honorable Sean 

J. Stacklcy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition). Vice Admiral Joseph P. 

Mulloy, Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and resources. and Lieutenant General 

Kenneth J. Glueck. Jr., Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration and Commanding General. 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of 

the House Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2014. 

21 
123 

the RMS, even by its own optimistic schedule the Navy will not complete !OT&E of the system 

until at least FY21. In addition, the program does not appear to have sufficient funding to 

compare the capabilities of the AN/AQS-24 (currently operated in 5th Fleet) to the AQS-20, nor 

to examine different configurations ofMCM mission packages with the two sonars .. 

Many of the Navy's recent decisions regarding the future composition of the MCM 

mission package have focused on improving surface and subsurface MCM capabilities, but the 

suite ofLCS-based airborne MCM systems, which the Navy plans to Initial Operational 

Capability (!OC) in FYI7, is not without problems requiring attention. For example, 

developmental and operational testing of the MH-60S with either the ALMDS or the AMNS has 

shown that the reliabilities of MH-60S and its AMCM mission kit do not support sustained 

operations at a high tempo. Although the ALMDS pods themselves have not been the primary 

source of mission downtime, at least during stateside testing, the associated equipment for 

conducting missions with ALMDS, including the helicopter and AMCM mission kit, together 

experience a high failure rate (approximately once every 12 flight hours), making sustained LCSbased operations difficult. Similarly, the combined results of Mil-60S, AMCM mission kit, and 

AMNS reliability suggest that the integrated AMCM system experiences one operational mission 

failure every 7 neutralizer launches and 5.9 flight hours, on average, during AMNS operations. 

By any measure, system reliability precludes timely and sustained operations. 

The ALMDS does not meet Navy detection/classification requirements, except in 

particularly benign conditions such as those observed during the technical evaluation in 2015. 

Earlier testing revealed that the system does not meet the Navy's detection requirement in all 

depth bins or Navy's requirement for the average probability of detection and classification 

across a specified depth band. When the system and operator detect and classify a smaller 

percentage of mines than predicted by fleet planning tools, the MCM commander will likely 

underestimate the residual risk to transiting ships following clearance operations. In favorable 

conditions, tactics, techniques, and procedures, specilically a multiple-pass technique, has been 

successful in reducing false classifications (erroneous indications of mine-like objects) to the 

Navy's acceptable limits. However, in other conditions, the system generates a large number of 

false classifications that can delay ncar-surface minchunting operations until conditions improve 

or slow mine clearance etTorts because of the need for additional search passes to reduce the 

22 
124 

number of false classifications. In 2016, the Navy reportedly reallocated funding intended to 

support near-term development of ALMDS pre-planned product improvements, to correct some 

of the detection and classification limitations and improve false classification rates. The Navy 

also reported that the improved system would not be available to the LCS MCM mission 

package until at least FY21. 

The current increment of the AMNS cannot neutralize mines that are moored above the 

system's prescribed safe operating ceiling, which will preclude neutralizing most of the mines 

expected in some likely threat scenarios. In addition to this fundamental limitation which 

precludes the system's use against many threat mines, AMNS performance is frequently 

degraded by the loss of fiber-optic communications between the aircraft and the neutralizer. The 

system often experiences loss of fiber-optic communications in a wide range of operationally 

relevant operating conditions, including those that are relatively benign, and has not 

demonstrated the ability to neutralize mines in even moderate water currents. Although the 

Program Office has stated that it intends to develop an improved AMNS to extend its depth 

range and potentially improve performance in coarse bottom conditions and higher currents, 

none of these efforts are funded. The Navy is now considering the Barracuda Mine 

Neutralization System as a potential alternative to the AMNS, but does not expect to commence 

Ban·acuda developmental testing until at least FY22. In the meantime, legacy forces will be 

needed in all MCM missions requiring clearance of near-surface mines. 

The Navy is continuing to develop the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis 

(COBRA), Knife fish UUV, and Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS), but has not yet 

conducted any operational testing of these systems. However, early developmental testing or 

contractor testing of COBRA Block land Knifefish have revealed problems that, if not 

corrected, could adversely affect the operational effectiveness or suitability of these systems, in 

operational testing planned in FY 17 or FY 18, and subsequently the future MCM mission 

package. In addition, LCS-based communications and launch and recovery problems observed 

in earlier testing of the RMS are likely to affect the upcoming phases of Knifefish and UlSS 

operational testing. Thus, it is critically important that developmental and operational testing of 

these systems include end-to-end operations encompassing multiple sorties and realistic 

23 
125 

conditions and communications ranges to identity additional problems that must be corrected 

prior to fielding. 

During developmental testing of COBRA Block I in early FY16, test data revealed that 

the system's probability of detection is low against small mines and mines emplaced in some 

environmental conditions. Without improvements, the capability ofthe current system will 

likely be limited in some operationally realistic threat scenarios and will not provide the 

capability needed to satisty LCS MCM requirements for minehunting in the surf zone and beach 

zone. The Navy expects the COBRA Block II system to include surf zone capability, improved 

beach zone detection capability against small mines, and nighttime capability. The Navy expects 

these improvements to provide the capability needed to meet LCS MCM requirements in the surf 

zone and beach zone and expects the Block II system to reach IOC in FY22. 

Knifefish contractor testing in September 2016 identified a significant problem with 

Knifefish watertight integrity that will require a redesign of components that will likely delay the 

start of operational testing. During testing in October 2016, an engineering development model 

Knifefish UUV broke in half as contractor personnel attempted to launch it into the water from a 

shore base. The Navy and contractor have suspended further testing pending the outcome of a 

root cause investigation of the latest failure. Although billed as another potential game changer 

following cancelation of the RMS program, pre-planned product improvements to Knifefish are 

currently unfunded. In fact, the entire Kni fefish program is in jeopardy pending funding 

decisions. The program is currently examining the possibility of delaying Milestone C 

indefinitely until additional funding can be provided, which also places the delivery of a full 

MCM mission package in jeopardy on the time lines described above. 

The UISS contractor delivered the first engineering development unit only recently and 

has not yet conducted testing of a production representative system. The Navy will need to 

consider integration challenges that include off-board communications, maintainability, launch 

and handling equipment and procedures, and the ability of the crew to recover the system safely 

and reliably. Although the Navy plans to characterize UTSS performance in dedicated 

minesweeping scenarios during the initial phases of LCS-based testing, operationally realistic 

testing of the system in the combined MCM mission package is essential. The UISS program, 

24 
126 

similar to Knifelish, is also facing the potential of significant delays to the delivery of capability, 

because of funding shortfalls. 

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 

The Navy has not yet conducted any operational testing of the planned ASW mission 

package since it is still in the early stages of development. The Navy planned an IOC for the 

mission package in FYI6 following operational testing in FYI5. Now, however, the earliest the 

LCS program might achieve IOC for the ASW mission package is FY 19 for the Freedom variant 

and FY20 tor the Independence variant. The primary causes lor these delays are higher testing 

priorities of the other mission packages and the lack of availability of ships, which in recent 

years have been affected by the push for deployments. Additionally much work has gone into a 

weight reduction program for the sonar and handling system, and are-compete of the variable 

depth sonar. The Navy recently downselected from three vendors, selecting the variable depth 

sonar and handling system, and will begin ship integration efforts in the coming year. IOT&E is 

now planned tor 2019. 

The Navy did conduct an at-sea test of an advanced development model of the variable 

depth sonar in September 2014 aboard LCS I, albeit that test was conducted with a different 

sonar than was selected in the Navy's recent decision. Those tests showed promising sensor 

performance in one acoustic environment, and demonstrated the potential of a variable depth 

sonar, which several other foreign navies already employ from their frigates. The operators were 

highly-cued in that test, since they were provided prior knowledge ofthe target submarine's 

position, and the submarine did not execute evasion tactics. Given the significant departures 

from operational realism in that test and given the Navy has now chosen to go with a different 

design and vendor, I cannot provide any assessment of the expected effectiveness of the ASW 

mission package in a real-world combat scenario at this time. 

LCS 's sonar system is specifically optimized tor deep water and will not be suitable for 

some very shallow-water environments such as in the littorals. Its limitations in shallow water 

are yet to be detennined, however, and operational testing against diesel-electric submarines will 

be essential for understanding the ship's capabilities. Nevertheless, in deep water environments, 

the ASW mission package has the potential to provide LCSs with comparable or enhanced 

detection capability relative to other surface ships that employ hull-mounted sonars. LCS will 

25 
127 

face challenges that other ships do not, particularly the need to tow two systems behind the ship 

reliably. 

The Navy is developing a torpedo countermeasure as part of the ASW mission package, 

which will provide LCSs equipped with that system to counter some, but not all, threat 

torpedoes. The lightweight tow countermeasure is still in development, but the Navy has 

completed some initial testing of prototypes. Most recently the Navy has determined that LCS 

seaframes will need to be moditied for the employment of this system; these changes will be 

implemented on LCS 7, LCS 10, and all future seaframes planned to receive an ASW mission 

package. The Navy has not yet addressed the plan for backfitting these changes in earlier 

seaframes. Nor is there any plan to outfit other LCSs equipped with MCM or SUW mission 

packages with torpedo defense capabilities, making those ships reliant on protection from a 

second LCS, equipped with the ASW mission package, or an Aegis combatant that is operating 

nearby. 

With respect to the ability to engage a submarine once detected, LCS will be less capable 

than Navy frigates or other ASW-capable surface ships. LCS has no organic capability to 

engage submarines and must rely on a single embarked helicopter to deliver torpedoes, whereas 

FFGs have the capacity to launch two helicopters (meaning at least one is more likely to be 

available), or use over-the-side torpedo launchers to engage nearby targets immediately. LCS, 

along with other Navy units, will suffer from the limitations of the Mk 54 torpedo's effectiveness 

and lethality recently discovered in testing; these problems affect LCS, DOGs, P-8, P-3, and 

helicopter effectiveness in ASW missions, and warrant a concerted effort to correct as soon as 

possible. 

LCS-Frigate Design 

In December 2015, the Secretary of Defense curtailed the buy ofLCSs from 52 to 40, 

citing that a rebalancing of capability is needed to "reverse the trend of prioritizing quantity over 

lethality" and "reduce the number ofLCS available for presence operations," a need that will be 

met by other high-end ships. The Secretary's decision is supported by the results of operational 

testing and the lack of lethality demonstrated by LCS to date. Of those 40, the Navy now plans 

to build the last 12 as a modified version ofLCS that is more frigate-like. r have reported 

multiple times on the anticipated capabilities and limitations of the envisioned LCS-frigate; my 

26 
128 

most comprehensive assessment was provided in recent Congressionally-directed repmting 

requirements and in the assessment the Secretary requested of my office when the Small Surface 

Combatant Task Force was stood up in late 2014. I summarize some of my observations here 

from that and other recent reports. 

The Navy's Small Surface Combatant Task Force identified that only major 

modifications to the existing LCS design could provide the Navy the survivability and lethality 

characteristics of past frigates desired for the future Small Surface Combatant. Because of the 

Navy's decision to keep the LCS seaframe, any future small combatant will, by and large, inherit 

the limited survivability characteristics inherent to the LCS design as well as the limitations in 

space, weight, power, and cooling. 

The Joint Staff recently approved a CDD for the LCS-Frigate. The CDD requires that the 

modified LCS be multi-mission capable, more lethal, and more survivable. Its primary missions 

will be ASW and SUW, but is also required to be capable oflaunching an over-the-horizon 

missile, albeit without a clearly specified means of target designation. Because of the space, 

weight, power, and cooling limitations inherent in the current LCS design, the LCS-frigate most 

likely will not meet all of the requirements specified in the CDD simultaneously; this was a 

finding from the Navy's Small Surface Combatant Task Force. It will most likely require 

swapping mission modules or components of the modules to provide either the full mission 

capability for SUW or ASW, but not all of the capabilities of both mission sets simultaneously. 

In my estimation, the LCS-frigate will, therefore, not be a true multi-mission frigate. For 

example, the LCS-frigate configured with full SUW capability, would likely only retain an 

acoustic towed array and towed torpedo countermeasure to provide the ship some limited 

submarine detection capability and a torpedo defense capability, but not an active sonar. While 

such a configuration is clearly more capable than an LCS equipped with the SUW-mission 

package alone, it does not enable the LCS-frigate to conduct full ASW missions with an active 

sonar and act as an etTective escort to high-value naval units. 

Moreover, the ship's ability to simultaneously be equipped to conduct these missions plus 

others such as land-attack, anti-ship warfare, or provide local air defense to other Navy units (a 

traditional frigate role) are likely infeasible given the limitations imposed by this design. The 

Navy's Small Surface Combatant Task Force identified that if a true multi-mission SUW, ASW, 

27 
129 

and local area defense air warfare capability (for the frigate to be able to act as an escort) are 

desired, then a major design change to the LCS seaframes or a new design would be required. 

I have previously expressed my concern that the CDD relegates all mission performance 

measures, other than the two measures for force protection against surface and air threats, to Key 

System Attributes rather than Key Perfonnance Parameters, which permits the combat 

capabilities desired in these follow-on ships to be traded away as needed to remain within the 

cost constraints. As a result, the new LCS-frigate could, in the extreme, be delivered with less 

mission capability than desired and with limited improvements to the survivability of the ship in 

a com hat environment. In fact, the LCS-ffigate could meet all its KPPs without having any 

mission capability. 

The vulnerability reduction features proposed for the LCS-frigate, while desired and 

beneficial, provide no significant improvement in the ship's survivability. Notwithstanding 

potential reductions to its susceptibility due to improved electronic warfare system and torpedo 

defense, minor modifications to LCS (e.g., magazine armoring) will not yield a ship that is 

significantly more survivable than LCS when engaged with threat missiles, torpedoes, and mines 

expected in major combat operations. The vulnerability reduction features included in the FFGs 

the Navy has deployed in the past made them significantly more survivable than an LCS. The 

LCS-frigate requirements do not address the most likely causes of ship and mission loss against 

certain threats. Specifically, the current LCS seaframes do not have sufficient separation and 

redundancy in their vital systems to recover damaged capability. Because the LCS-frigate design 

is not substantially different from the LCS Flight 0+ baseline and will not add much more 

redundancy or greater separation of critical equipment or additional compartmentation, it will be 

less survivable than the Navy's previous frigate class. 

The Navy does plan several susceptibility reduction features to offset the above-described 

limitations of!he seaframes. Testing has demonstrated that while the proposed susceptibility 

reduction features are clearly desirable, they do not reduce susceptibility to being hit to a value at 

all close to zero. Therefore, the incorporation of these features does not allow the assumption the 

ships will not be hit in high-intensity combat. The susceptibility reduction features to be 

incorporated in the LCS-trigate would not eliminate the possibility of being hit, and would, 

28 
130 

therefore, not provide significant improvement in the ship's overall survivability relative to the 

current LCS. 

Finally, while the Navy is examining methods to reduce weight, it is anticipated the LCSfrigate, because of the simultaneous employment of ASW and SUW equipment, will be 

significantly heavier than the existing LCS resulting in a lower maximum sprint speed and less 

fuel endurance. The loss of sprint speed will therefore affect its success in small boat swarm 

defense, and its ability to keep up with a carrier strike group. 

At a recent Surface Navy Association national symposium, the Secretary of the Navy 

redesignated LCS as a frigate, stating that LCS can "deploy with a carrier strike group," has 

"robust anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare capabilities" and "is capable of putting the enemy 

fleet on the bottom of the ocean." 8 None of these claims appear to be supported by the current 

capabilities demonstrated in testing, and instead describe a ship that is not yet built and under 

current Navy plans may never be built. Current LCSs do not have the endurance to deploy with 

a carrier strike group, its ASW and MCM mission packages do not yet exist, LCS has no antiship weapon to sink enemy combatants, and only a limited capability to sink a few small fast 

attack craft as I previous described. Some subset of these capabilities may yet come to fruition 

in the coming years; however, currently, LCS's limited lethality make these ships a shadow of 

the abilities of modern navy frigates. 

Future Test and Evaluation Plans 

In response to conditions that the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act placed on 

the availability of LCS program funding, the Navy successfully completed a partial update of the 

LCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) to support future OT&E ofthe seaframes and 

mission packages. Congress required the update to support planning of the needed testing of the 

Increment 3 SUW mission package, the ASW mission package, to reflect the significant changes 

to the program's air defense plans, as well as MCM mission package development and 

composition. I approved the change pages to the TEMP in March 2016. Additional updates are 

now required to complete a revision to the TEMP, including developmental and integrated 

testing plans, changes to reflect the Navy's evolving plans for the MCM mission package, air 

See also the Senate Armed Services Committee letter to Secretary Mabus and Chief of Naval Operations 

Admiral Richardson dated February 5, 2016. 

29 
131 

de tense testing of the seati·ames, and plans for providing sea1i·ames with an over-the-horizon 

missile capability. 

In closing, I would like to emphasize that operational, live-fire, and operationally-realistic 

developmental testing have been essential in identifYing the significant problems that need to be 

overcome for this program to be successful. Although I had predicted the poor performance in 

my earlier reporting on the MCM mission package, it was only in testing of the full mission 

package, at sea, and aboard the ship with a trained crew that the Department was able to discover 

the significant problems and shortfalls that crews would face in MCM missions. In fact, the 

Navy's independent review team emphasized that a reliance on shore-based metrics and shorebased testing "provided a false sense of[system] maturity". Similarly, only in operationallyrealistic testing of the SUW mission package were the inaccuracies of the gun, the limitations of 

the ship's maneuvering and tactics, and the deficient training revealed, and the overall 

effectiveness of the ship in those missions characterized. Testing should not be limited to only 

self-defense scenm·ios (as has been suggested by a narrow reading of the requirements), but 

should examine the LCS's ability to escort other ships, as a frigate would. I continue to 

recommend to the Navy that adequate developmental and operational testing be funded and 

conducted to ensure that the future capabilities envisioned for LCS are adequately characterized, 

and problems discovered and fixed prior to deployment and future procurements. 

30 
132 

Dr. J. Michael Gilmore 

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Dr. J. Michael Gilmore was sworn in as Director of Operational Test and Evaluation on 

September 23, 2009. A Presidential appointee confirmed by the United States Senate, he 

serves as the senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational and live fire test and 

evaluation of Department of Defense weapon systems. 

Prior to his current appointment, Dr. Gilmore was the Assistant Director for National 

Security at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In this position, he was responsible 

for CBO's National Security Division, which perfonns analyses of major policy and 

program issues in national defense, international affairs, and veterans' affairs. Specific 

areas of investigation included the long-term implications of current defense policies and 

programs, the implications of transformation for equipping and operating U.S. military 

forces, the effectiveness and costs of alternative approaches to modernizing U.S. military 

forces, and the resource demands associated with operating and supporting U.S. military 

forces. 

Dr. Gilmore is a former Deputy Director of General Purpose Programs within the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD(PA&E)). As the 

Deputy Director, he was responsible for developing, formulating, and implementing 

Secretary of Defense policies on all aspects of Department of Defense general purpose 

programs, including analyzing the operational effectiveness and costs of U.S. conventional 

military forces and supporting programs. Before serving as a Deputy Director, Dr. Gilmore 

served as the Division Director of Operations Analysis and Procurement Planning, within 

the Office of the Deputy Director, Resource Analysis and prior to that as an Analyst for 

Strategic Defensive and Space Programs Division, Office of the Deputy Director, Strategic 

and Space Programs. Dr. Gilmore's service with Program Analysis and Evaluation 

covered II years. 

Early in his career, Dr. Gilmore worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

Livermore, California performing research in their magnetic fusion energy program. He 

has also worked as an Analyst with the Falcon Associates, McLean, VA, and the 

McDonnell Douglas Washington Studies and Analysis Group, where he became Manager, 

Electronic Systems Company Analysis. 

A native of Ohio and resident of Virginia, Dr. Gilmore is a graduate ofThe Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he earned a B.S. in Physics. He 

subsequently earned a M.S. and Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of 

Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. 
133 

Statement of 

Ronald O'Rourke 

Specialist in Naval Affairs 

Before 

Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on 

Oversight Review of the U.S. Navy's Littoral 

Combat Ship (LCS) Program 

December 8, 2016 

Congressional Research Service 

7-5700 

www.crs.gov 
134 

Congressional Research S_e_rv_ic_'e ______________________________ _ 

Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members oftbe subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate 

(LCS/Frigate) program, a program that l have tracked for CRS since its inception 15 years ago,' In my 32 

years as a naval issues analyst for CRS, no program has been more complex to track, or has posed more 

potential oversight issues for Congress, than the LCS program. 

A Program at a Crossroads for Multiple Reasons 

The LCS/Frigate program is at a crossroads not only because of the Navy's proposal to shift from 

production of the baseline LCS design to production of the frigate variant of the LCS, but also because of 

three significant additional factors: 

the rapidly shifting international security environment, which could alter requirements for 

U.S, naval forces, including small surface combatants such as the frigate variant of the 

LCS; 

the possibility that the incoming Trump administration might make significant changes in 

U.S. foreign and security policy-changes that might further alter requirements for U.S. 

naval forces, including small surface combatants such as the frigate variant of the LCS; 

and 

the Trump campaign organi7lltion's announced objective of building the Navy toward a 

goal of 350 ships, rather than the Navy's current 308-ship force-level objective, which if 

adopted as policy by the incoming Trump administration, could alter the Navy's desired 

numbers of small surface combatants such as the frigate variant of the LCS. 

These three factors-particularly the rapidly shifting intemational security environment and possibility of 

significant changes in U.S. foreign and security policy-profoundly affect the circumstances for 

conducting oversight of U.S. defense programs, including the LCS/Frigate program. They introduce 

oversight issues and considerations that differ from those that have characterized oversight of U.S. 

defense programs, including the LCS/Frigate program, in recent years. In short, for U.S, defense 

programs, including the LCS/Frigate program, the ground beneath us is shifting in a fundamenta 1 way, 

complicating the task of conducting oversight. A number of the comments that follow reflect this 

challenging situation. 

Issue for Congress 

Regarding the future of the LCS/Frigate program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 

framed the question as follows: "A more basic oversight question today is whether a ship that costs twice 

as much [as originally estimated] yet delivers less capability than planned warrants an additional 

investment of nearly $14 billion."2 That is one way to frame the question. Another would be: "What 

capability gaps will the Navy bave in coming years, what are the likely costs and capabilities of the 

frigate variant ofthe LCS, and is the Navy's proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS 

1 Sec. for example. the current CRS rcpmi on the program~ .. ·-CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LC)"'J/FriJ?ale 

Program: Background and !S.\'Uesfor Conf{ress. by Ronald O'Rourke-as well as t\vo earlier CRS reports on the program. CRS 

Repot1 RL32109, Smy DDG-1000 (DD(X)), CG(X), and L( 'S ~)'hip Acquisition Programs: OrenJght Issues and Opthmsjhr 

Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke (this report now focuses on the DD0-51 and DDG-1000 destroyer programs). and CRS Report 

RS21305. Nat:v Littoral Comhai Ship (LCS): Background and L1:suesf(w Congress, by Ronald o·Rourke. 

2 Government Accountability Office, Littoral Combat Ship Pros;ram: Congress Faced wNh Critical Acqui$·Won Dcci5'ions. GAOl7-262T. December 1, 2016 (Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. Statement ofPauJ L Francis, 

Managing Director. Acquisition and Sourcing Management), summary page. 
135 

Congressional H.esearcll Service 

consequently the most cost-effective approach for addressing those capability gaps?" These are not the 

only two ways of framing the question. 

Analytical Foundation 

A key oversight issue for the Navy's proposal for procuring the fi·igate variant of the LCS concerns its 

analytical foundation. The question of a program's analytical foundation is not a mere academic matter. 

Rather, it gets to whether the service has a rigorously formed and compelling basis for what it is 

proposing to do. In this case, the service (the Navy) is proposing to build a certain number of LCS 

variants (twelve), to a certain design (the currently envisioned frigate design), at a certain annual rate (as 

shown in the Navy's shipbuilding plan), using a certain acquisition strategy (a single shipyard chosen in a 

down select between the two current LCS shipyards). 

Some observers might refer to a program's analytical foundation as its business case, although that term 

can also be used to mean other things. Creating a rigorous analytical foundation involves performing 

disciplined, structured analyses. Such analyses may either confinn intuitions and subjective judgments 

that policymakers and uniformed officials may have about a proposed program, or instead produce 

unanticipated or counterintuitive results that challenge those intuitions and judgments. Indeed, a major 

reason for performing rigorous analyses is to uncover unanticipated or counterintuitive results. Another 

major reason is to provide the service with a strong case for convincing others about the merits of the 

service's proposed program. 

As a result of how the LCS/Frigate program was restructured twice in less than two years at the direction 

of two Secretaries of Defense, the Navy's proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS now 

appears to have three potential weaknesses in its analytical foundation: 

The first and second apparent potential weaknesses, which arise from the absence of an 

analytically rigorous capability gap analysis (what might also be called a mission-need 

analysis) and the absence of an analytically rigorous analysis of multiple concepts (an 

analysis of broadly different potential approaches for filling the identified capability 

gaps), resulted from the way in whicb then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed the 

program's first restructuring in 2014. In short, Secretary Hagel's direction to the Navy in 

2014 appears to have left the Navy with little opportunity to perform these two analyses. 

The third apparent potential weakness concerns the absence of a detailed analytical 

foundation tor the decision by Secretary of Defense Carter in the program's second 

restructuring in 2015 to reduce planned procurement in the LCS/Frigate program from a 

total of 52 ships to 40 ships, resulting in a planned procurement of 12 frigate variants 

(and 28 baseline LCSs), rather than 20 frigate variants (and 32 baseline and transitional 

LCSs). 

Although the 20 14restructuring of the program left the Navy with little oppo1tunity to perfonn an 

analytically rigorous capability gap analysis and an analytically rigorous analysis of multiple concepts, 

the Navy did perform an analytically rigorous analysis of alternatives (AoA), which is the third study that 

would follow a capability gap analysis and an analysis of multiple concepts. 

(For further details on the above situation, see Appendix A ofthis statement, which is adapted from the 

CRS rcpmt on the LCS/Frigate program.) 

The fact that the 2014 and 2015 restructurings of the program created these three apparent potential 

weaknesses in the program's analytical foundation does not mean that the changes to the program made in 

these two restructurings were wrong-they might very well have been the right changes to make. Nor 

does it mean that the Navy's proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS is not the most cost 
136 

Congressional Researc_'h_S_e_rv_ic_e ______________________________ _ 

effective approach for meeting the Navy's future needs-it might very well be the most cost effective 

approach, 

These three apparent potential weaknesses do, however, reduce the Navy's ability to demonstrate to 

others that its proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the I ,CS is the most cost effective approach, 

They also create additional room f(lr skeptics to question the Navy's proposal using arguments that might 

themselves lack a firm analytical foundation. A situation where there are weaknesses in the service's 

analytical foundation for defending its proposal, and parallel weaknesses in the analytical foundation of 

the skeptics' arguments t(lr questioning the service's proposal. can lead to a sprawling and disorganized 

debate that can make it difficult to keep key issues in focus and reach a well-founded conclusion 

regarding the merits of the service's proposal. 

As I discuss in the CRS report on the LCS/Frigate program, the Navy 15 years ago did not perform a 

rigorous analysis of multiple concepts prior to announcing the original version of the LCS program. The 

Navy acknowledged this in testimony to the then-Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed 

Services Committee in April2003. This created a weakness in the analytical foundation of the original 

version of the program that can be viewed as the root cause of some (perhaps much) of the controversy 

over the program's cost effectiveness that continued from the program's inception until its 2014 

restructuring. 

The rapidly shifting international security environment and the possibility of significant changes in U.S. 

foreign and security policy compound the three existing apparent potential weaknesses in the analytical 

foundation for the Navy's proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS. This compounded 

situation does not prove that the Navy's proposal is not the most cost effect approach for meeting the 

Navy's future needs. It might very well be the most cost effective approach. But as a result of these 

compounded weaknesses, the Navy now has less of a basis for being certain that its proposal is the most 

cost effective approach, and less ability to demonstrate this compellingly to others. 

The rapidly shifting international security environment and the possibility of significant changes in U.S. 

foreign and security policy also, however, create a fresh opportunity for the Navy to create a new 

analytical foundation tor the effort that is both rigorous and fully up to date. Following the development 

of an updated national military strategy that reflects the incoming Trump administration's foreign and 

security policy goals, the Navy would have an updated basis tor perfonning a rigorous capability gap 

analysis, a rigorous analysis of multiple concepts, and a rigorous new AoA tor procuring small surface 

combatants. These analyses would take some time to perform, but performing them would not prevent 

some variant of the LCS fi·om being procured in FY20 17 and FY20 18 while the analyses were being 

done. 

The LCS/Frigate program is by no means the only DOD program affected by the situation created by the 

rapidly shifting international security environment and the possibility of significant changes in U.S. 

foreign and security policy. But it is one of the programs that are affected. 

The shifting international security environment involves the ending of the post-Cold War era that first 

took shape in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and its replacement by a new international security situation 

featuring renewed great power competition. As such, the shifting of the international security environment 

can be viewed as a once-in-a-generation event. The changes in U.S. foreign and security policy that some 

observers, noting comments made on the campaign trail, believe might be implemented by the incoming 

Trump administration would, in the view of some of these observers, have the potential of being the 

largest changes since World War U. The combination of an approximately 25-year event and (in the view 

of some observers) a potential 70-year event, respectively, would create a situation for conducting 

oversight of defense programs that in fundamental ways would not be business as usual. A key current 

challenge in conducting oversight of DOD programs, including the LCS/Frigate program, is to be fnlly 
137 

Congressional Research Service 

cognizant of how current circumstances are shifting the ground under our feet and potentially changing 

familiar oversight frameworks. 

Program Quantity 

As part of its vision for national defense, the Trump campaign organization announced an objective of 

"Rebuild[ing] the U.S. Navy toward a goal of350 ships, as the bipartisan [2014] National Defense Panel 

[NDP] has recommended."3 The Trump campaign organization did not specifY the composition of this 

350-ship fleet. 

4 

A CRS report on the idea of a bigger Navy provides a notional composition for a fleet of about 350-

ships.' This notional fleet, which happens to total 349 ships, is not based on any analysis of Navy mission 

requirements; it was derived by simply scaling up the Navy's 308-ship force structure proportionately 

(while holding the planned number of ballistic missile submarines constant) and adjusting some of the 

resulting numbers so that they would reflect numbers for cettain categories of ships that have appeared in 

Navy plans in recent years for fleets of 300 to 400 ships. 

This notional349-ship fleet may be of value as a point of departure for those interested in discussing the 

idea of a 350-ship fleet. lt may also he of value as a tool for quickly understanding how other proposals 

for 350-sbip fleets depart from a proportional scaling up of the Navy's 308-ship fleet. And it can serve as 

a placeholder, pending a proposal from the incoming Trump administration that provides a detailed 

composition of its desired 350-ship fleet. 

The notional 349-ship fleet presented in the CRS report includes 56 small surface combatants-four more 

than the 52 small surface combatants included in the Navy's 308-ship force-level objective. The CRS 

report shows a notional procurement pro tile for achieving a force level of 56 small surface combatants 

over a 30-year shipbuilding period. This notional profile is shown in Appendix B of this statement. 

Compared to the Navy's FY2017 30-year shipbuilding plan, this notional profile would add 17 small 

surface combatants in the period FY2017-FY2025 and remove five small surface combatants in the period 

FY2029-FY2035, for a net addition of 12 small surface combatants through FY2035. 

A key oversight issue regarding an objective of building the Navy toward a goal of350 ships is that there 

currently is no rigorous, up-to-date analytical basis for a fleet of 350 ships. As noted above, the Trump 

campaign organization's announced objective regarding a 350-ship fleet references the recommendation 

of the 2014 NDP. As discussed in the CRS repmt on the idea of a bigger Navy, the 2014 NDP, in making 

its recommendation, referenced DOD's 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a major review that reshaped 

U.S. defense strategy, plans, and programs in response to the end of the Cold War and the start of the 

post-Cold War era.5 

The analytical foundation of the 346-ship fleet called for in the 1993 BUR reflected the international 

security environment of the early post-Cold War era, as well as Navy ship types, technologies, opemtional 

concepts, basing anangements, and deployment cycles of that time, all of which have changed over the 

3 Source: National Defense. Donald J. Trump's Vision. accessed December 5. 2016. at: 

https:/ /wV\'\V,donaldjtrump.com!policies/national-defense. 

4 CRS Report R44635. )Vt:n:v Force Structure: A Bige;er Fleet? Background and Lssue.\'fhr Con}Zress. by Ronald O'Rourke. 

5 For more on the 1993 BlJit see Department of Defense. Les Aspin. Secretary of Defense. 

October 1993. I 09 pp. See also CRS Report R43838. A Potential Irnplications 

~Issues for ( 'ongrcss. by Ronald O'Rourke. See also CRS Report 93-839 F. Department Bottom-Lip Review: 

October 6, 1993, 6 pp., by Edward F. Bruner, und CRS Report Defense Department Bottom-Up 

Review.· The Process. July 2. 1993. 9 pp .. by Cedric W. Tarr. Jr. (both out of print but available from the .author of this 

testimony). 
138 

Congressional Researct1 Sendee 

past 20-plus years. The analytical foundation for the 1993 BUR's 346-ship fleet consequently is now out 

of date. (It can also be noted that a detailed composition of the 1993 BUR's 346-ship fleet was not 

presented to Congress; when the Navy eventually provided Congress with a detailed composition of its 

planned fleet, the numbers added to a total of 331 to 341 ships rather than 346.6

) 

The absence of a rigorous, up-to-date analytical basis for a tleet of 350 ships doesn't prove that a 350-ship 

fleet would be inappropriate for meeting the Navy's future mission demands. But the case for a 350-ship 

fleet would be more compelling if it had a rigorous, up-to-date analytical basis. The Navy's Force 

Structure Analysis (FSA) process provides a mechanism for creating a rigorous, up-to-date analytical 

basis for the Navy's force-level objectives. The FSA takes inputs from U.S. regional combatant 

commanders for desired Navy capabilities for wartighting and day-to-day forward-deployed presence, 

and then translates those desired capabilities into ship quantities based on ship capabilities, basing 

anangements, and deployment cycles. Figure l summarizes the FSA process. 

Figure I. Navy Force Structure Analysis (FSA) Process 

Force Structure Analysis 

Source: Navy briefing on Navy forceMievel requirements, October II, 2013. 

Navy glot>al jj~y-lri'day 

posltlre Q®dild f<:>r 

assigned ~sks 

6 See Table B~ 1 in CRS Report RL32665. Nat}' Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Back[{ round and Tssuesfor Congress, 

by Ronald O'Rourke. 
139 

Congressional Research Servic_e ______________________________ _ 

The development of an updated national military strategy reflecting the foreign policy and security goals 

of the incoming Trump administration would permit U.S. regional combatant commanders to provide 

updated inputs to the FSA conceming their desired Navy capabilities for warfighting and day-to-day 

forward-deployed presence. The FSA could then translate those updated inputs into updated desired 

quantities for various ships types, including small surface combatants such as baseline LCSs and frigatevariant LCSs. The result could be a force-level goal for a fleet of about 350 ships, less than 350 ships, or 

more than 350 ships. 

Down Select 

Another oversight issue concerning the Navy's proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS 

concems the plan (directed by Secretary of Defense Carter as part of the program's 2015 resutructuring) 

to conduct a down select between the two LCS designs and build all the frigate-variant LCSs to a single 

design. This is generally understood as meaning that the 12 planned frigate-variant LCSs would all be 

built by a single shipyard. 

As shown in Appendix B, building up to a notional force of 56 small surface combatants over the next 

several years could notionally involve increasing the small combatant procurement rate to three or four 

ships per year during the period FY2017-FY2025. A similar profile might result from building up to a 

notional force of 52 small surface combatants-the number included in the Navy's 308-ship force-level 

objective. In terms of industrial base capacity, it might be easier to execute a procurement rate of three or 

four LCS variants per year with two LCS builders rather than one. 

As discussed in the next section, whether the 12 planned frigate-variant LCSs would be acquired via 

annual contracting or block buy contracting is not yet settled. lfthc ships are acquired with annual 

contracting, then depending on the annual procurement rate, maintaining two LCS builders might enhance 

the Navy's ability to use competition effectively in the procurement of all 12 ships. This might he true 

even if the procurement rate were no more than two ships per year. Under that scenario, the Navy could 

allocate one ship per year to each shipyard and use Profit Related to Offer (PRO) bidding (i.e., 

competition for profit) to generate competitive leverage for the government7 Conversely, conducting a 

down select to a single shipyard and using annual contracting could limit the government's ability to use 

competitive pressures in procuring frigate-variant LCSs, potentially increasing procurement costs for 

those ships. 

Block Buy Contracting 

As mentioned above, another oversight question concerns whether to use annual contracting or block buy 

contracting for procuring the frigate variants of the LCS. Annual contracting preserves llexibi lity for 

Congress regarding whether and when to procure follow-on units in an ongoing procurement program, 

while multiyear contracting in the form of block buy contracting or multiyear procurement (MYP) 

reduces that flexibility in return for reducing the procurement costs of the units being procured8 

7 For more on PRO bidding, sec Statement of Ronald O'Rourke. Specialist in Naval Affairs. Congressional Research Service. 

Before the House Armed Services Committee on Case Studies in DOD Acquisition: Finding What Works. June 24,2014. p. 7. 

8 Stated more fully. from a congressional perspective~ trade~offs in using block buy contracting include the fi.Jllowing: 

reduced congressional control over year-to-year spending. and tying the hands of future Congresses: 

reduced i1exibihty fi)r making changes in acquisition programs in response to unforeseen changes in strategic or 

budgetary circumstances (which can cause any needed funding reductions to fall more heavily on acquisition programs 

not covere-d by multiyear contracts); 

(continued ... ) 
140 

Congressional Research Service 

One question that sometimes arises in connection with the LCS/Frigate program, which has used block 

buy contracting for units 5 through 26, is the relationship between the past cost growth in the procurement 

ofLCSs and the use of block buy contracts to procure LCSs. The relationship can be summarized as 

follows: The growth in the procurement cost of LCSs came primarily, if not entirely, before the use of 

block buy contracts. Procurement costs under the block buy contracts appear to have stabilized. The block 

buy contracts are fixed price incentive contracts, which limits the government's exposure to cost growth. 

The block buy contracts may have reduced LCS procurement costs, perhaps by upwards of about five 

percent, due to cost reductions at shipyards that arc possible when shipyards, viewing a commitment by 

the government to procure ships over a period of several years, have the confidence in future business 

needed to make investments in their work force and capital plant that can better optimize the shipyards for 

production of the ships covered by the contract. 

Another question is whether the use of block buy contracts would reduce Congress' ability to conduct 

effective oversight of the Navy's activities for procuring frigate variants of the LCS. In connection with 

this question, it can be noted that the LCS program has been executed under block buy contracts since 

December 2010. In the period since then, the LCS program has been a recurring topic of oversight 

questions at annual hearings on the Navy's budget, the subject of numerous legislative provisions and 

instances of report language in annual national defense authorization acts, and the subject of multiple 

oversight reports from GAO. Additional oversight on the program has been provided in GAO's annual 

report assessing selected DOD weapon programs, the periodically updated CRS repmt on the program, 

and reports from the Congressional Budget Office ( CBO) that discuss potential costs for the program. 

Although the use of a block buy contract reduces the government's flexibility regarding whether and 

when to procure follow-on units in the program, Congress and the executive branch retain the ability to 

terminate a block buy contract should circumstances dictate. A block buy contract can be written lo 

exclude a termination penalty, and a block buy contract can be implemented without the use of an upfront batch order of components intended for ships to be procured in fiscal years after the first year of the 

contract. (The block buy contracts that the Navy has used for procuring Virginia-class submarines, LCSs, 

and TA0-205 class oilers have not used up-front batch orders of components.) 

Congress or the executive branch might wish to terminate or suspend procurement of a ship class due to 

causes such as cost growth, schedule slippage, problems in production quality, or changes in the 

government's need for the ships. Block buy contracts can be (and in the LCS program, have been) fixed 

price contracts, reducing the government's exposure to cost 6'fov.1h. If one or more of the other factors 

just mentioned emerge as a problem serious enough to convince Congress or the executive branch that 

procurement ofthe ships should be terminated or suspended, the question is how much more difficult it 

would be to terminate or suspend procurement if the ships were being procured under a block buy 

conu·act rather than annual contracts. Supporters of annual contracts could argue that block buy contracts 

by design make it more difficult for the government to change its plan to procure the ships. Supporters of 

block buy contracts, while acknowledging this, might argue that the relative rarity ofterminations or 

suspensions of DOD procurement programs suggests that tl1e primary source of reluctance to tenninate or 

( ... continued) 

a potential need to shift funding from later fiscal years to earlier fiscal years to fund economic order quantity (EOQ) 

purchases (i.e., up~fi:ont hatch purchases) of components; 

the risk of having to make penalty payments to shipbuilders if multiyear contracts need to be tenninated due to 

unavailability of fimds needed to the continue the contracts: and 

the risk that materials and components purchased for ships to be acquired in future years might go to \v--astt: if those 

ships are not eventually acquired. 

I:or more on block buy contracting, sec CRS Report R41909, J.lultZ)'ear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in 

Defense Acquisiiian: Background and !ssues_/(>r Congress, by Ronald 0 1

Rourke and Moshe Schwartz. 
141 

Congressional Researc!1 Servic_e ______________________________ _ 

suspend procurement arises from the fact that procurement has begun, regardless of the contract type 

being used, and that using a block buy contract might add to that reluctance in a secondary or marginal 

manner. 

Another question concerns the signal that could be sent to other DOD acquisition programs by not 

agreeing to a Navy request (should the Navy make one) to use a block buy contract t<H· procuring the 

frigate variants of the LCS. The effective cost of sending that signal might be upwards of$400 million in 

terms of savings under a block buy contract for 12 frigate-variant LCSs that would not be realized. There 

would also be a question of the signal that would be received by other DOD acquisition programs. Would 

the signal received be the (presumably) intended one that Congress will not tolerate poorly performing 

programs? Would the signal received instead be a (presumably) unintended one-that even when DOD 

and a military service take actions to restructure a program so as to avoid a recurrence of the problems 

experienced by the original version of the program. the restructured program might still be penalized for 

the problems of the original version of the program? Would the signal received be something else? 

An additional consideration concerns the relationship between the contracting approach for the frigatevariant LCSs and the currently planned down select. As noted in the previous section, down selecting to a 

single LCS design (and consequently to a single LCS shipyard) and then using annual contracting could 

limit the government's ability to use competitive pressures in procuring frigate-variant LCSs, potentially 

increasing procurement costs for the ships. 

Survivability 

Another oversight issue for the LCS/Frigate program concerns ship survivability, meaning the ship's 

ability to avoid, withstand, and recover fi·om battle damage. The issue has been a matter of debate in 

connection with hoth baseline LCSs and the proposed frigate-variant LCSs. 

It is important to note that in terms of oversight, the survivability issue encompasses two questions. One 

is whether tests of the ship's survivability against its designed survivability standard accurately emulate 

threats and operating circumstances the ship might face, and whether the tests demonstrate that the ship is 

meeting its survivability design standard. The other question is whether the designed survivability 

standard itself is appropriate, given the ship's projected uses. This is a requirements question rather than a 

test-and-evaluation question. These two questions have sometimes been conflated in discussions of the 

survivability of LCSs. 

The baseline LCS was designed to what used to be called a Level I+ survivability standard, meaning that 

the ship was designed to something more than what used to be called Level I survivability standard9 The 

choice of the Level 1 +survivability standard might be viewed as a reflection of how baseline LCSs arc 

9 In an Apdl2011 briefing on LCS sunivability, the Navy summarized the baseline LCS's: Levell+ survivability standard as 

f{Jllows: 

[The] LCS design includes Level I [survivability] plus tailored survivability enhancements ("Level 1+"). 

such as: 

-Electro· magnetic pulse (EMP) hardening 

Individual Chemical, BiologicaL Radiological protection vvith decontamination stations 

- Sho-ck hardening of damage control (DC) and propulsion systems 

- Redundant. automated firefighting systems 

- Select fi·agmemation armor 

-Ability to survive in sea state 8 

(Navy briefing on LCS smvivability. April29, 201 I, slide 2.) 
142 

Congressional Research Service 

intended to perform missions previously performed by ships such as patrol combatants and mine warfare 

ships, which were designed to a Level I standard, as well as missions performed by frigates, which were 

designed to the higher Level2 standard, (Ships designed to the old Level3 standard, the Navy's highest 

survivability standard, include aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.) 111 The Navy's Level 1/2/3 

nomenclature for ship survivability standards was replaced in 2012 by a new and different framework for 

discussing surface ship survivability, but ships designed under the old Level 1/2/3 nomenclature, such as 

the baseline LCS, are still discussed in connection with the old nomenclature.'' 

The trigate-variant of the LCS has some survivability improvements compared to the baseline LCS, but 

apparently not enough to qualify under the old survivability nomenclature as a ship with Level 2 

survivability. One might say that, in terrns of its intended survivability standard, the frigate variant of the 

LCS under the old survivability nomenclature might be considered a Level I++ ship. It might be possible 

to change the design of the frigate variant of the LCS to further increase its survivability. Whether such 

changes would be enough to convert the frigate variant of the LCS into a Level2 ship under the old 

survivability nomenclature is not clear, but the changes could make the ship more expensive to procure. 

Whether the current survivability standard for the frigate variant of the LCS is appropriate is a question 

that should now be evaluated in the context of the rapidly changing international security environment 

and possible significant changes in U.S. foreign and security policy. 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Module 

Much of the oversight activity related to the LCS/Frigate program in recent years concems the 

development and testing of the mine countermeasures (MCM) mission module. The fielding of the MCM 

mission module has been delayed several years compared to earlier schedules, and these delays have 

contributed significantly to the debate and controversy over the LCS program. 

10 A table sho\ving the survivability standards for various categories of Navy ships is presented in OPNAVINST 9070.L 

Survivahility Policy tOr Surface Ships of the U.S. Navy, September 23, 1988. Enclosure 3. Survivability Protection Requirements 

by Ship Class. 11 The Navy"s old Levell/2/3 nomenclature for surface ship survivability standards is outlined in OPNAVJNST 9070.1 of 

September 23. 1988. This docmncnt was superseded by OPNAVINST 9070.1A of September 13, 2012. \:vhich sets fmih the 

Navy's new fl·amework tOr discussing surface ship survivability policy and standards. Under the old Level 112/3 nomenclature, 

Levels 1, 2, and 3 were defined as fOllows: 

Levd I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability 

or designated ship classes to susta-in operations in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the 

general \var~at~sca region. In·-· this category, the minimum design capability required shall, in addition to 

the inherent sea keeping mission. provide for EMP and shock hardening. individual protection for CBR. 

including decontamination stations. the DC/FF capability to control and recover from conflagrations and 

include the ability to operate in a high latitude environment. 

Levelll represents an increase of severity to include the ability for sustained operations when in support of a 

Battle Group and in the general war-at-sea area. This level shall provide the ability tOr sustained combat 

operations fOllowing weapons impact Capabilities shall include the requirements of Level I plus primary and 

support system redundancy. collective protection system, improv~d structural integrity and subdivision, 

fragmentation protection, signature reduction, conventional and nuclear blast protection and nuclear 

hardening. 

Level III, the most severe environment projected for combatant I3attle Groups. shall include the requirements 

of Level II plus the ability to deal "With the broad degrading effects of damage fi:om anti-ship cruise missiles 

(ASCMS), torpedoes and mines. 

(OPNAVINST 9070.1. Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the U.S. Navy. September 23. 1988. 

Enclosure 2, Definition of Survivability Levels for Surface Ships.) 
143 

Congressionai Researct1 Service 10 

Much of the oversight of regarding the MCM module has focused on the question of whether the module 

is meeting its stated perfonnance requirements. This is a key oversight question. In focusing on this 

question, however, it is possible to lose track of another question, which is whether the MCM module, 

even if it is not meeting its stated performance requirements, is nevertheless demonstrating a level of 

performance that is better than the legacy MCM capability that forward-deployed Navy forces have today. 

In the absence of a significant mine threat to forward-deployed Navy forces, this second question might 

not be very important. But if Navy forces are exposed to such a threat, as they might be when operating, 

for example, in the Persian Gulf region, this second question can take on greater importance. Congress 

and the Navy have an interest in seeking to ensure that the MCM module meets its stated performance 

requirements as much as possible. But Con[,,>ress and the Navy also have a potential interest seeking to 

ensure that forward-deployed Navy forces facing a significant mine threat are not deprived of a new 

MCM capability that performs better than the legacy MCM capability, should the new capability 

demonstrate such a level of performance, on the grounds that the new capability has not met its stated 

performance requirements. 

A second point concerning the MCM module is that the Navy does not plan to use the frigate variants of 

the LCS for the MCM mission. (The Navy plans to use only baseline LCSs for the MCM mission.) In this 

sense, problems experienced in developing and testing the MCM module might not speak directly to the 

merits of the Navy's proposal for procuring frigates variants ofthe LCS. 

A third point is that problems experienced in developing and testing the MCM module appear to relate 

more to the MCM systems themselves than to the ship from which they are being deployed (i.e., the 

LCS). To the extent that these same MCM systems would be used by other Navy ships that could be 

assigned the MCM mission, terminating procurement ofLCSs and procuring some other ship for the 

MCM mission might not do that much to directly improve the situation. In this sense, the challenges the 

Navy currently faces with the MCM module may be less an LCS issue than an MCM issue that would 

exist whether the Navy procures LCSs or some other type of ship. 

Propulsion Equipment Problems 

The multiple propulsion equipment problems (aka propulsion equipment casualties) experienced by 

commissioned LCSs raise a number of potential oversight questions for Congress, including the 

following: 

How many of these casualties were due to design problems? How many were due to 

production quality issues? !low many were due to issues relating to crew training and 

operation? 

Arc there any common factors linking most or all of the casualties? 

What arc the costs associated w itb fixing the damage to the LCSs caused by these 

casnalties? Who is responsible for paying these costs? 

Are propulsion casualties on LCSs more common, less common, or about as common as 

propulsion casualties on other classes of Navy surface ships 0 If they are more common, 

what are the reasons why? 

What is the Navy's plan for reducing the frequency of propulsion casualties on LCSs? 

When does tbe Navy expect to see results from this plan? 

The Navy's December 1 written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the 

propulsion casualties, which addresses some of these questions, is shown in Appendix C of this 

statement. 
144 

Congressional Research Service 11 

New Crewing and Operating Approach 

In September 2016, the Navy announced a new approach for ere wing and operating the first 28 baseline 

LCSs. This new approach is referred to as the Blue/Gold approach (because it involves maintaining two 

crews, known as the Blue and Gold crews, for certain individual LCSs), or as the 7-4-3 approach (because 

it involves maintaining a total of seven crews for each f(ll!r-ship gronp ofLCSs, with three of the LCSs in 

each group forward deployed). The 7-4-3 approach replaces the previous 3-2-1 approach, so-called 

because it involved maintaining three crews for every two LCSs, so that one of those two LCSs would 

always be available for deployment. The 7-4-3 approach is summarized in Appendix D of this statement. 

The Navy states that the 7-4-3 approach is intended to: 

reduce disruptions to the deployment cycles of LCSs that were being caused by LCS 

mission module testing under the 3-2-l approach; 

improve training and proficiency ofLCS crews; 

enhance each LCS crew's sense of ownership of(and thus responsibility filr taking good 

care of) the ship it operates; and 

achieve a percentage of LCSs in deployed status, and numbers of forward-stationed 

LCSs, similar to or greater than what the Navy aimed to achieve under the 3-2-l plan. 

Potential oversight questions regarding the 7-4-3 approach include the following: 

How was this new approach developed? 

Why does the Navy believe the new approach is the best approach? 

How fully developed is the new approach this point? If further details need to be 

developed, when does the Navy anticipate developing them? 

How will the new approach affect the total number of personnel needed to operate the 

Navy's force of LCSs'? 

How will it affect projected life cycle operation and support (O&S) costs for LCSs? 

What is the Navy's schedule for transitioning to the new approach? 

When does the Navy expect to start seeing benefits fi·om the new approach? 

How does the Navy intend to measure the effectiveness of the new approach? 

What was the thinking behind the previous 3-2-1 approach 1{lr crewing and operating 

LCSs, and what turned out to be wrong with this thinking? 

How likely is it that the Navy at some point in the future might need to again change its 

approach for crewing and operating LCSs? 

Defense-Acquisition Policy Lessons Leamed12 

Another oversight issue for Congress concerns what defense-acquisition policy lessons, if any, the LCS 

program may offer to policymakers, pmiicularly in terms of the rapid acquisition strategy that the Navy 

pursued for the LCS program, which aimed at reducing acquisition cycle time (i.e., the amount of time 

between starting the program and getting the first ship into service). One possible perspective is that the 

LCS program demonstrated that reducing acquisition cycle time can be done. Supporters of this 

12 This section is adapted from a section in CRS Rcp011 RI,33741. Nat)' Uttoral ( 'ombat Ship (L('S}/Frigate Program: 

Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 
145 

Congressionai Research Service 12 

perspective might argue that under a traditional Navy ship acquisition approach, the Navy might have 

spent five or six years developing a design for a new ti·igate or corvette, and perhaps another five years 

building the lead ship, for a total acquisition cycle time of perhaps 10 to II years. For a program 

announced in November 2001, this would have resulted in the first ship entering service in between late 

20 II and late 2012. In contrast, supporters of this perspective might argue, LCS-1 entered service on 

November 8, 2008, about seven years after the program was announced, and LCS-2 entered service on 

January 16, 2010, a little more than eight years after the program announced. Supporters of this 

perspective might argue that this reduction in acquisition cycle time was accomplished even though the 

LCS incorporates major innovations compared to previous larger Navy surface combatants in terms of 

reduced crew size, "plug-and fight" mission package modularity, high-speed propulsion, and (in the case 

ofLCS-2) hull form and hull materials. 

Another possible perspective is that the LCS program demonstrated the risks or consequences of 

attempting to reduce acquisition cycle time. Supporters of this perspective might argue that the program's 

rapid acquisition strategy resulted in design-construction concurrency (i.e., building the lead ships before 

their designs were fully developed), a practice long known to increase risks in defense acquisition 

programs. Supporters of this perspective might argue that the cost growth, design issues, and 

construction-quality issues experienced by the tlrst LCSs were due in substantial part to designconstruction concurrency, and that these problems embarrassed the Navy and reduced the Navy's 

credibility in defending other acquisition programs. They might argue that the challenges the Navy has 

faced in terms of developing an LCS concept of operations (CONOPS), LCS manning and training 

policies, and LCS maintenance and logistics plans were increased by the rapid acquisition strategy, 

because these matters were partly deferred to later years (i.e., to today) while the Navy moved to put 

LCSs into production. Supporters of this perspective might argue that the costs of the rapid acquisition 

strategy are not offset by very much in terms of a true reduction in acquisition cycle time, because the 

tlrst LCS to be equipped with a mission package that had reached IOC (initial operational capability) did 

not occur until 2014. Supporters of this perspective could argue that the Navy could have avoided many 

of the program's early problems and current challenges-and could have had a fully equipped first ship 

enter service in 2011 or 20 12-if it had instead pursued a traditional acquisition approach for a new 

frigate or corvette. They could argue that the LCS program validated, for defense acquisition, the 

guideline from the world of business management that if an effort aims at obtaining something fast, 

cheap, and good, it will succeed in getting no more than two of these things, 13 or, more simply, that the 

LCS program validated the general saying that haste makes waste. 

A third possible perspective is that the LCS program offers few if any applicable defense-acquisition 

policy lessons because the LCS differs so much from other Navy ships and the Navy and DOD are 

unlikely to attempt a program like the LCS in the future. Supporters of this perspective might argue that 

the risks of design-construction concurrency have long been known, and that the experience of the LCS 

program did not provide a new lesson in this regard so much as a reminder of an old one. They might 

argue that the cost growth and construction delays experienced by LCS-1 were caused not simply by the 

program's rapid acquisition strategy, but by a variety of factors, including an incorrectly made reduction 

gear from a supplier firm that forced the shipbuilder to build the lead ship in a significantly revised and 

sub-optimal construction sequence. 

Chairwoman Hartzler, this concludes my statement. Thank you again for the opportunity to testifY, and I 

will be pleased to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have. 

u Tbe guideline is sometimes referred to in the business world as "Fast, cheap, good.--~pick two:' 
146 

Congressional Research Service 

Appendix A. Analytical Foundation 

This appendix presents additional discussion on the issue of the analytical foundation for the Navy's 

proposal for procuring the frigate variant of the LCS. It is adapted from the CRS report on the 

LCS/Frigate program. 

Three Analyses That Can Strengthen an Analytical Foundation 

The analytical foundation for an acquisition program can be strengthened by performing three formal, 

rigorous analyses prior to the start of the program: 

an analysis to identify capability gaps or mission needs;" 

an analysis to compare potential general approaches for filling those capability gaps or 

mission needs, so as to identify the best or most promising approach; 15 and 

an analysis to retine the approach selected as the best or most promising."' 

Original LCS Program Lacked One of These Analyses Prior to 

Announcement of Program 

13 

As discussed in CRS reports covering the LCS program going back more than a decade, the Navy, prior to 

announcing the establishment of the LCS program on November 200 I, performed the first and third 

studies listed above, but it did not perform the second. In other words, the Navy, prior to announcing the 

establishment of the LCS program on November I, 200 I, did not perform a formal, rigorous analysis to 

show that a small, fast modular ship was not simply one way, but rather the best or most promising way, 

to fill the three littoral warfare capability gaps (for countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric 

submarines) that the Navy had identified. Instead of performing such an analysis, which at the time might 

have been called an analysis of multiple concepts, the Navy selected the concept of a small, fast, modular 

ship based on the judgment of senior Navy leaders. 17 In testimony to the House Armed Services 

14 Such a study might be referred to under the dctense acquisition system as a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA), as 

referenced. for example, on page A-1 of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stafflnstruction (C JCSI) 3170.01 H of January 10, 2012. 

entitled "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.·· Such analysis might lead to a "validated capabiHty 

requirements document" or '·equivalent requirements document" as referenced on page 5 of DOD Instruction {DOD I) 5000.02 of 

January 7, 2015. entitled '·Operation of the Defense Acquisition System." An example of such a requirements document is an 

Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), which is also mentioned on page 5, although that might not be the correct term to use in this 

instance. which concems an effort to acquire ships in the latter portion of an existlng shipbuilding program. For additional 

background discussion on the defense acquL')ition system. sec CRS Report RL34026. Defense Acquisitions: floH' DOD Acquires 

fVeapon S):stems and Recent Efforts to Re_f(Jrm the Process. by Moshe Schwmtz. 

15 Such a study, like the third study listed above. might be reterrcd to under the defense acquisition system as an Analysis of 

Alternatives (AoA). (In earlier years. a study like the second of the three studies listed above might have been referred to as an 

Analysis of Multiple Concepts. or AM C.) In discussing 1he AoA for a new acquisition program, it can be helpful to understand 

whether the AoA was more like the second or third of the studies listed here. 

16 Such a study. like the second study listed above, might be referred to under the defense acquisition system as an AoA. ln 

discussing the AoA for a new acquisition program, it can be helpful to understand \vhcthcr the AoA w-as more like the second or 

third of the studies listed here. 

17 For example, the October 28.2004. version of a CRS report covering the DD(X) (aka, DDG-1 00) and LCS progr~m1s stated: 

ln contrast to the DO( X). which reOects the outcome of a fOrmal analysis intended to identify the best or most 

promising way to perform certain surface combatant missions (the SC-21 COEA of 1995-1997). the Navy 

prior to announcing the stmt of the LCS program in November 2001 did not conduct a formal 

which would nmv be called an analysis of multiple concepts (AMC)-to demonstrate that a ship LCS 

would be more cost-effective than potential alternative approaches for performing the LCS's stated missions. 

(continued ... ) 
147 

Congressional Research Servtce 14 

Committee in April 2003, the Navy acknowledged that, on the question of what would be the best 

approach to perform the LCS's stated missions, "The more rigorous analysis occnrred after the decision to 

move to LCS." 18 This issne may have led to some of the controversy that the program experienced in 

subsequent years, 19 which in turn formed the backdrop for Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's February 

24, 2014, announcement of the program's restructuring. 

2014 Restructuring of LCS Program Appears to Have Been Announced 

Without Two of These Analyses 

The Navy's restructured plan for the trigate design appears to have potential weaknesses in its analytical 

foundation due to two formal, rigorous analyses that do not appear to have been conducted prior to 

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's announcement on February 24,2014, of the effort to restructure the 

program. Specifically, neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Navy has presented 

a formal, rigorous analysis to identify capability gaps or mission needs that was done 

prior to the Secretary of Defense Hagel's February 24,2014, announcement, or 

a formal, rigorous analysis that identified "a capable and lethal small surface combatant, 

generally consistent with the capabilities of a fi·igate" as not simply one way, but rather 

the best or most promising way, to fill those capability gaps or mission needs that was 

done prior to the February 24, 2014, announcement. 

( ... continued) 

Potential alternative approaches for performing the LCS's stated missions include (1) manned aircraft. (2) 

submarines equipped \\ith UVs, (3) a larger (perhaps frigate-sized) surface combatant equipped \V:ith UVs 

and operating further o!Tshore, (4) a noncombat littoral support crall (LSC) equipped "ith UVs. or (5) some 

comhination. An AMC is often performed before a service stans a major acquisition program. 

The absence of an AMC raises a question regarding the analytical basis fOr the Navy's assertion that the LCS 

is the most cost~effective approach for performing the Lcs·s stated missions, particularly given the Navy·s 

pre-November 2001 resistance to the idea of a smaller combatant. As a result. the issue of whether a ship like 

the LCS represents the best or most promising approach has become a subject of some debate. 

(CRS Report RJ.32!09. Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for 

Congress. by Ronald O"Rourke. The title of this report is now Nmy DDCi-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer 

Prop·ams: Background and lssuesfbr Congress.) 

18 Spoken testimony of Vice Admiral John Nathman. Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations (Warfare Requirements and Programs). 

at an April 3, 2003. hearing on Navy programs before the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services 

Committee. At this hearing. the chairman of the subcommittee. Representative Roscoe Bartlett a._<;ked the Navy >Vitness.es about 

the Navy's analytical basis for the LCS program. The witnesses defended the analytical basis of the LCS program but 

acknowledged that ·'The more rigorous anal~ysis occurred after the decision to mo\'e to LCS." See U.S. Congress. House 

Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, I fearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2004-H.R. 1588, and Oversight ofPrcviously Authorized Programs. 1 081

h Cong., pt sess .. Mar. 27. and Apr. 3, 2003. 

(Washington: GPO. 2003-). p. 126. For an article discussing the exchange. see Jason Ma, "Admiral: Most LCS Requirement 

Analysis Done After Decision To Build:' inside the Nmy, April 14~ 2003. 19 A January 2015 journal article on the lessons of the LCS program stated: 

As Ronald 0' Rourke of the Congressional Research Service described it early on [at a presentation at the 

Surface Navy Association annual symposium in January 2003], the J.CS had come about through an 

"analytical virgin bitih ... that is going to be a problem for this program do\\TI the road."' This can be argued 

to be the root cause of the subsequent LCS woes. One hopes that the new surface combatant [i.e., the Navy's 

design for the frigate 1 won't suffer the smne problem. 

(Gregory V. Cox, "Lessons Lcamed tfom the LCS~" (l.S. iVavallnstitutc Proceedings. January 2015: 37-38 

(ellipse as in original), citing (for the quoted remark) Hunter Keeter, ·'O'Rourke: Lack Of Pedigree May 

Haunt LCS Program," Def('}Jse Daily, January 16, 2003.) 
148 

Congressional Research Service 15 

Given a July 31, 2014, deadline for the Navy to complete its work, the Navy's Small Smface Combatant 

Task Force (SSCTF) charged with analyzing options for "a capable and lethal small surface combatant, 

generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate" apparently did not have enough time to conduct 

either of the two above analyses. Instead, the task force surveyed Navy fleet commanders to collect their 

judgments on capability gaps and mission needs, and to get their judgments on what capabilities would be 

the best to have in "a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the 

capabilities of a frigate.""' 

In addition to permitting the task force to complete its work by July 31, 2014, surveying tleet 

commanders offered the advantage of collecting the "wisdom of the crowd" on the issues of capability 

gaps and mission needs and what features "a capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally 

consistent with the capabilities of a frigate" should have. One potential disadvantage of this approach is 

that it deprived the Navy of a chance to uncover the kind of counterintuitive results that a formal analysis 

can uncover. (Indeed, this is a key reason why formal, rigorous analyses are done.) Another potential 

disadvantage is that fleet commanders can be focused on what they see the Navy needing today, based on 

current Navy operations, which might not be the same in all respects as what the Navy wi!l need in the 

future, given the evolving international security environment, potential changes in technology, and 

resulting potential changes in the nature of warfare and operational concepts. The risk, in other words, is 

of fielding years from now the best possible improved LCS for the world of2014. 

Using the results it had gathered from surveying fleet commanders, the SSCTF then performed the third 

of the three above-listed studies-a formal, rigorous analysis to refine the concept for "a capable and 

lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a fi·igate." 

A question for Congress is whether the analytical foundation for the frigate design will provide sufficient 

stability for acquiring those ships in coming years. Navy officials stated that, having refined the design 

concept for the modified LCS design, the Navy will now define and seek approval for the operational 

requirements for the ship.21 Skeptics might argue that definition and approval of operational requirements 

20 A January 8. 2014. press report. for example, states that "The task force canvassed fleet commanders 

baseline LCS design. (Tony Capaccio. ··Navy Fixes Won't Much Help Littoral Ship, Tester Says,'" 

20!5. A January !6, 20!5. press report similarly states: 

improve" the 

January 8. 

Fleet commanders told Navy otlicials over the past year t11at they sec anti-submarine w-arfare, surface warfare 

and ship self:.defCnse as the most important capabilities fOr a new small surface combatant. Suri3ce Warfare 

Director Rear Adm. Peter Fanta said Jan. 13 during the Surface Navy Associatimfs annual symposium. This 

feedback led the Navy to its decision to move to a modified LCS that ·will have enhanced weapons, sensors 

and annor-along with increased \Veight and a slower top speed. 

·'What we did first wns \YC went and asked all the warfightcrs ... \Yhat do you want most?" I saidl fanta, vvho 

served as one of the co-chairs of the small surface combatant task force that \Vas stood up last year to provide 

the defense secretary v.,.ith alternatives for a more lethal and survivable LCS. ·'They said '\veiL we'd like a 

small surface combatant that does a lot ofASW work. covers our mine mission and still does a lot of surface 

engagements depending on dif1erent parts of the world:· 

(Lara Seligman. "Upgunned LCS Will Trade Speed, Weight For Offensive Capabilities,'' Inside the Nm~r. 

January 16. 2015 [with additional reporting by Lee Hudson! Ellipse as in original.) 

.cJ A January 1 L, 2014. press report. for example, quotes Sean Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development. m1d Acquisition (i.e .. the Navy's acquisition executive) as stating "We"ve gone ffom ·here's the concept.' 110\YWe 

have to go through the tOnnal requirements review board ... to detine requirements in tenus of updating the capabilities 

document.'' (As quoted in Christopher Cavas, --small Combatant EITort Cranks Up:· Defi:nsc Neu's, Jmmary 11.2015. [E!lipse as 

in originaL j) A January 16. 2015. press report similarly states: '"The Navy needs to take all the task force's concpts for 

capabilities and translate them into specific. fOrmal requirements. Stackley explained. Those requirements then need approval by 

a Resources and Requirements Review Board (lUB).'' (Sydney J. .Freedberg Jr. ... What's In A name? Making The LCS 'Frigate' 

Reality," Breaking Defense. January 16. 2015.) A January 26.2015. press report similarly states that "the Navy needs to tinn up 

the concept for the new ship's capabilities and translate them into fonnal requirements. Stack ley explained. Those requirements 

then need to each be approved by a Resources and Requirements Review Board, \'ihich is set to occur in the spring.'· (Lara 

(continued ... ) 
149 

Congressional Research s.~m_v_ic_e ______________________________ 1~6 

should come first. and conceptual design should follow, not the other way around. One possible 

altemative to the Navy's approach would be to put the announced design concept for the modified LCS 

design on hold, and perform both a formal, rigorous analysis of capability gaps/mission needs and a 

formal, rigorous analysis of general approaches for meeting those identified capability gaps/mission 

needs, and be prepared to follow the results of those analyses, whether they lend back to the announced 

design concept for the modified LCS design, or to some other solution (which might still be a design of 

some kind for a modified LCS). 

Potential Oversight Questions Regarding December 2015 Restructuring 

of LCS/Frigate Program 

Regarding the analytical foundation for the December 2015 restructuring of the LCS/Frigate program, 

potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: 

What is the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) analytical basis for directing the 

Navy to reduce the LCS/Frigate program from 52 ships to 40, and to redirect the savings 

from this action to the other Navy program priorities shown in the December J 4, 2015, 

memorandum from the Secretary? What is the analytical basis for directing the Navy to 

reduce the LCS/Frigate program to 40 ships, as opposed to some other number smaller 

than 52? What studies were done within OSD to form the analytical foundation for the 

directions in the memorandum? 

What arc the potential operational advantages and disadvantages of reducing the 

LCS/Frigate program from 52 ships to 40 ships and redirecting funding to the other Navy 

program priorities? 

How would unit procurement costs for LCSs/Frigates be atlected by reducing the 

program's procurement rate to two ships in FY2017, one ship per year in FY20 18· 

FY2020 and two ships in FY202l? 

How much is OSD's direction to the Navy to reduce the LCS/Frigate program from 52 

ships to 40 ships and redirect funding to the other Navy program priorities dependent on 

an assumption that limits on defense spending under the Budget Control Act of2011 (S. 

365/P.L. 112·25 of August 2, 2011), as amended, will remain in place? How might the 

merits of this direction be affected, if at all, by a decision to further amend or repeal these 

limits? 

Between the program's 2014 restructuring and the direction in the December 14,2015, 

memorandum, the program has now been changed by OSD substantially twice in a period 

of two years. Although these changes are intended by OSD to improve program 

e!Iectiveness and better optimize Navy spending, what impact might changing the 

program substantially twice in a period of two years have on program's stability and the 

ability of the Navy and industry to implement the program efficiently? 

At a February 25, 2016, hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House 

Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified that 

The 2014 FSA update li.e., the Navy's most recently completed Force Structure Assessment for 

determining the Navy's torce-level goals for ships] outlines the requirement tor 52 Small Surface 

Combatants (SSCs) 'md determined a need lor 26 deployed SSCs to meet the Navy's glohal 

. .continued) 

Seligman, "Navy Working To lron Out Details Of Plan For Backfitting LCS Upgrade,'' Inside the Xm:v. January 26, 2015.) 
150 

Congressional Research Seivice 

peacetime and wartime requirement. The Navy's 2016 Long Range Shipbuilding Plan and the 

FY2016 Future Years Defense Plan (cYDP) included procurement of 14 LCS/fast frigate (FF) 

ships in FY2017-202l.ln order to balance current and future capability needs within the FY 2017 

top line constraints, the procurement plan for LCS/ff \vas reduced to seven ships within the 

FYDP and the overall inventory objective was reduced ffom 52 to 40 ships. The Navy will 

evaluate the risk associated with this budget decision, in the broader context of total large and 

small surtUce combatant ship inventory. in the course of the 20l6 FSA update to inforn1 future 

shipbuilding plans. 22 

A February 26, 2016, press report states: 

During hearings on the budget held Thursday on Capitol llill, top Detcnse Department officials 

revealed a stark difterence of opinion over the direction of the Littoral Combat Ship (l.CS) 

program, which was slashed !rom 52 to 40 ships in the !I seal year 20 17 budget request. 

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told House appropriators Thursday afternoon that the decision to 

moYe to 40 ships-which \vas dictated to the service through a December memo \vrittcn by 

Carter-vvas driven by longterm national security considerations. 

But in a House Armed Services Committee seapower and projection fOrce subcommittee hearing 

that afternoon, the Navy's top acquisition ot1icial Sean Stackley painted a very different picture. 

''This budget cycle, the decision was made fto cut the program],'' he said, "It comes down to 

reductions in the budget. Reductions in the budget drove trades in terms of capability in the near 

term. and long term. The decision was made not based on a force structure a'iScssment." 

The latest force structure assessment. \\·hich lays out the size and shape of the Navy, was 

published in 2014 and stated a 52-vessel small surface combatant requirement, which would be 

made up of 40 LCS and 12 of the "last irigatc'' variant of the ship. That requirement has not 

changed, Stacklcy said, 

''The Navy's analysis is captured hy the force structure analysis. \Yhich still requires 52 small 

surfUce combatants." he said. '"The decision to go from 52 to 40 becomes a budget-driven decision 

and accepts risk.",, 

In the House Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing, Carter characterized the reduced buy 

diflerently. 

"The Littoral Combat Ship is a successful program, It is an excellent ship," he said, "The Navy's 

\Varfighting analysis concluded 40 of them were enough. And, yes \\'C did \\'ant to apply resources 

else\vhere to the lethality of our ships. That's critically important. that we not only have e.nough 

ships,,but that they're the very best"" 

A March 6, 2016, press report states: 

A controversial request to cap the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and follow-on frigate programme at 

40 hulls. instead of 52, vvas made because Pentagon ot1icia1s felt the lovver number \Vas still 

sufficient for a ·presence· role and funding was prioritiscd elsewhere. 

"A fleet of 40 of those is going to be fully capable of providing more presence than the fled it 

replaces:· Jamie Morin, director of the Department of Defense's (DoD's) Cost Assessment and 

17 

22 Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley. Assistant Secretary of the Navy \Research, Development and Acquisition) and 

Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources and Lieutenant 

General RobertS. Walsh~ Deputy Commandant Combat Development and Integration & Commanding GeneraL Marine Corps 

C{)mbat Development Command, Before the Subcommittee on Seap<)\ver and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services 

Committee on department of the Navy Scapo\vcr and Prqjcction Forces Capabilities, February 25.2016, p. 15. 

Valerie lnsinna, "On Capitol Hill, OSD and Navy Officials at Odds Over LCS,'' Defense Daily, February 26, 2016: l-2. 
151 

Congressionai Researc!1 Sentice 

Program Evaluation office. said during a 7 March briefing at the Center tOr Strategic and 

International Studies .. 

Morin said the navy had a 52-ship total fi)r LCSs because that accounted tor replacing 

·wartighting· requirements as well as 'presence· requirements, but the Pentagon believes it can do 

both with fewer ships and thereby free resources to buy more advanced munitions, bolster USN 

aviation, and protect investments for readiness and tOr fUture capabilities.2

·t 

18 

z-t Daniel Wasserbly, "US Official: 40 LCSs Sufficient for Navy's 'Presence' Role," !H) Jane's DefCnce Weekly. T\hrch 6, 2015. 
152 

Congressionai Researct1 Se_rv_ic_'e _______________________________ 1_9 

Appendix B. Notional Procurement Profile for a Force of 

56 Small Surface Combatants 

This appendix shows a notional procurement profile for achieving a force of 56 small surface combatants, 

and compares it to the procurement profile for small surface combatants in the Navy's fY2017 30-year 

shipbuilding plan. The notional profile is shown in the table below, which appears in the CRS report on 

the idea of a bigger Navy. 25 

Table B-1. Frigate and LCS procurement profiles 

Current 30~ 

year 

shipbuilding 

Fiscal year plan 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

Notional 

profile for 

56·ship 

force 

4 

4 

4 

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data. 

Annual 

difference 

+I 

+2 

+3 

+3 

+2 

+2 

+2 

+I 

+I 

-I 

-I 

-I 

0 

-I 

-I 

Cumulative 

difference 

+I 

+3 

+6 

+9 

+II 

+13 

+15 

+16 

+17 

+16 

+15 

+14 

+14 

+13 

+12 

z:; CRS Repmi R44635. ,\lavy Force S'tructure: A BiRger Fleet? Background and Issues/or Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 
153 

Congressional Research Service 

Appendix C. December 1 Navy Testimony on LCS 

Propulsion Casualties 

This appendix presents the Navy's written testimony on LCS propulsion casualties for a December l, 

2016, hearing on the LCS program before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Navy's testimony 

states: 

As vv-e increase our operational experience 'vith LCS, we are closely monitoring material readiness 

and making changes. as warranted to improve operational availability. In total, LCS readiness as 

reflected in operational availability and casualty report metrics is consistent with other combatant 

ship classes. However, vve are quickly and strongly addressing issues as they emerge to raise the 

system reliability to yet higher levels sooner in this new class. Of particular concern. five LCS 

class ships have been operationally impacted by propulsion casualties in the past year. The Navy 

has conducted tbnnal engineering revie\VS and command investigations to assess the root cause 

and corrective action fOr each of the casualties. In generaL the root causes can be broken into three 

separate calcgorics: procedural non-compliance (failure to follmv approved engineering 

procedures): design related deficiencies: or production-related deficiencies. 

T\vo of the five engineering casualties "\Vere related to procedural (non-) compliance: 

The first such casualty occurred onboard USS FORT WORTH while [it was] inport [at] 

Singapore. after 12 months of her 14 month maiden deployment. As a result of improper 

alignment of the lube oil service system (as outlined by the ship's Engineering Operating 

Procedures), three of the five bearings in the Combining Gear \Vere damaged and USS FORT 

WORTH was unable to continue her mission in the western Pacific. Upon completion of repairs, 

the ship departed Singapore and returned to San Diego in early October 2016. 

The second casualty related to procedural (non-) compliance occurred onboard USS FREEDOM 

while inport San Diego. lmproper corrective action following the routine failure of FREEDOM's 

Main Propulsion Diesel Engine (MPDE) attached seawater pump mechanical seal resulted in 

seawater contamination of the engine. Upon subsequent inspection, significant corrosion and 

damage was discovered inside the MPDE. The affected engine is planned for replacement 

commencing December 20 l6. 

In response to these procedural compliance issues, the Type Commander has conducted a formal 

investigation and root cause analysis on both casualties. The Commander. Naval Surface Forces 

directed an engineering stand down for all LCS Class crews to review, evaluate, and renew their 

commitment to safe ship operation, procedural compliance, and good engineering practices. 

Additionally. the Navy·s Surface Warfare Officer"s School Command is revising the current LCS 

training program. to include LCS specific engineering training and related proficiency 

examinations. In parallel. the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is revic\ving design 

details tOr potential design enhancements that may mitigate the possibility of such operator errors. 

One of the five engineering casualties was specitically design-related: 

While operating USS MILWAUKEE (LCS 5) on all four engines at full power during transit in 

the Atlantic, an emergency stop of the gas turbine engines led to excessive \Vear of the high speed 

clutch causing damage to the high speed clutch and combining gear. Root cause analysis is in 

progress. but the combining gear on LCS 5 and follmv is a ne\v design (prior manufacturer ceased 

operations). and changes to the control logic for the de-clutch sequence and clutch piston release 

speed associated with the new design are apparent causes. Design modifications based on root 

causes have been developed and are being tested by Lockheed Martin and RENK (the gear 

manufhcturer). in parallel with ongoing root cause analysis effmis. Pending satisfactory testing 

this month (December 2016), the associated high speed clutch modifications and machinery 

control software updates will be applied to LCS 9 and follow prior to delivery and LCS 5 and 7 

during their Post Shakedown Availabilities (PSAs). LCS 1 and LCS 3 gear sets are not aftccted. 

20 
154 

Congressionai Research Service 

The remaining hvo engineering casualties trace to deficiencies in the ship construction process: 

USS CORONADO (LCS 4) experienced a failure of the tlexible shaft coupling between the 

starboard MPDE reduction gear and stern tube during transit from Hav.raii to Singapore. J\ htilure 

review board was convened. and while material testing of the tailed coupling is still in progress. 

shaft misalignment has been identified as a contributing factor in the root cause analysis. An 

alignment summit \\·ith the shipbuilder. NA VSEA design engineers. the Original Equipment 

Manufacturer. the Supervisor of Shipbuilding. and the Program Office has since been conducted to 

revie\v, validate. and better document vvaterborne alignment procedures. The coupling in LCS 4 

vvas replaced with a new coupling design in Hawaii. USS CORONADO is nmv on station in 

Singapore on her maiden deployment. This new coupling design has already been installed on 

LCS 6 and follow ships. 

USS MONTGOMERY (LCS 8) experienced a production deficiency related propulsion casualty 

shortly after sail away from the new construction shipyard. Prior to getting underway. the crew 

discovered seawater contamination in the steering hydraulic system for one of the four watcrjets. 

The shipbuilder drained the system. replaced the system·s seawater cooler. and flushed the system 

restoring full waterjet functionality. The root cause assessment determined that the cooler had not 

tUilcd, but rather contamination was introduced into the system most likely in conjunction with the 

repair of a component external to the hull in the period between delivery and sailaway !rom the 

building yard. The shipbuilder has since implemented an improved procedure tOr waterborne 

wate1:jet hydraulic \York. 

The Navy- has taken a consistent and rigorous approach in assessing and addressing root causes of 

equipment casualties in LCS. Early dctlcicncies in the designs of each variant have been addressed 

in follmv ships. but there is still work to be done in increasing the operational availability of the 

ships in-service. ln response. NA VSEA has initiated a comprehensive engineering revie\-v of both 

propulsion trains. to include logistics and training, and will report their findings upon completion 

()fthc review. 26 

26 Statement of The Honurablc Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research. Development and Acquisition) and 

V ADM Thomas S. Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on tbe Littoral 

Combat Ship. December 1. 2016. pp. 8-10. 

21 
155 

Congress1onal Research Service 22 

Appendix D. New Crewing and Operating Approach 

This appendix presents additional background information on the Navy's new 7-4-3 approach for crewing 

and operating LCSs. It is adapted from the CRS report on the LCS/Frigate program. 

In September 2016, the Navy announced a new approach for crewing and operating the first 28 baseline 

LCSs. This new approach is referred to as the Blue/Gold approach (because it involves maintaining two 

crews, known as the Blue and Gold crews, for certain individual LCSs), or as the 7-4-3 approach (because 

it involves maintaining a total of seven crews for each four-ship group of LCSs, with three of the LCSs in 

each group forward deployed). Key elements of the 7-4-3 approach include the following: 27 

the first four LCSs (LCSs I through 4) will each by operated by a single crew and be 

dedicated to testing and evaluating LCS mission packages (though they could he 

deployed as fleet assets if needed on a limited basis); 

the other 24 LCSs (LCSs 5 through 28) will be divided into six divisions (i.e., groups) of 

four ships each; 

three of the divisions (i.e., 12 of the 24 ships), all of them built to the LCS-1 design, will 

be homeported at Mayport, FL; 

the other three divisions (i.e., the remaining 12 ships), all of them built to the LCS-2 

design, will be homeported at San Diego, CA; 

among the three divisions on each coast, one division will focus on MCM, one will focus 

on ASW, and one will focus on SUW; 

in each of the six divisions, one ship will be operated by a single crew, and will focus on 

training the crews of the other three ships in the division; 

the other three ships in each division will each be operated by dual crews (i.e., Blue and 

Gold crews), like the Navy's ballistic missile submarines; 

the crews for the 24 ships in the six divisions will be unified crews-the distinction 

between core crew and mission package crew will be eliminated; 

the 24 ships in the six divisions will experience changes in their mission packages (and 

thus in their mission orientations) infrequently, if at all; and 

13 of the 24 ships in the six divisions (i.e,, more than 50%) are to be forward stationed at 

any given point for periods of24 months, with three at Singapore, three at another 

Western Pacific location, such as Sasebo, Japan, and seven at Bahrain. 

The Navy states that the 12 frigates to be procured after the 28 baseline LCSs will also use this new 

crewing and operating approach,28 and that as the fleet continues to accumulate experience in operating 

and maintaining LCSs, elements of this new plan might be modified.29 

Source: Navy briefing on new- LCS crewing and operating approach given to CRS and CBO. September 26~ 201-6. See also 

··Navy Adjusts LCS Class Cre\ving, Readiness cmd Employment," September 8, 2016; Sam LaGrone, 

''Results of New LCS Reviev.r is Departure from Original Vision." September 8. 2016: Sydney J. Freedberg Jr .. 

'•Kavy Sidelines first 4 LCS: Overhauls Deployment, Crcwing:· September 8. 2016: Justin Doubleday. '·Navy 

Introduces Major Change to Littoral Combat Ship Operations:' September 9. 2016; Davjd B. Lartcr. '"Rebooting 

LCS: Hundreds More Sailors Needed in Sweeping OverhauL" Times. September 9. 2016; Justin Doubleday. ··Navy 13egins 

Implementing Changes to Littoral Combat Ship Program.·· Imide Sm:v. October 1 0. 2016. 

28 See "'Navy Adjusts LCS Class Crewing. Readiness and Employment," A·'m-Ji _i\''ews 5:erl'ice, September 8, 2016. 

29 Sec. for example. 'Sydney J. Frccdbcrg .k. '"Navy Sidelines 1-irst 4 LCS: Overhauls Deployment. Crcv.ing." Breaking Defense. 

September 8, 2016. 
156 

Biography-- Ronald O'Rourke (updated 9/6/16) 

Mr. O'Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he 

received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate of the University's Paul 

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field. 

Since 1984, Mr. O'Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service 

of the Library of Congress. He has written numerous reports for Congress on various issues 

relating to the Navy. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Congressional staffers, and 

has testified before Congressional committees on several occasions. 

In 1996, Mr. O'Rourke received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for 

his service to Congress on naval issues. 

ln 2012, Mr. O'Rourke received the CRS Director's award for his outstanding contributions in 

support of the Congress and the mission ofCRS. 

Mr. O'Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the 

U.S. Naval Institute's Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on Navy-related 

issues to a variety of audiences in government, industry, and academia. 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

(159) 
LCS Broken Promises 

Cost overruns 

Delayed schedule 

Design changes 

Cannot survive 

combat 

Poor mission 

capability 

Early program 

• $220 million per seaframe 

• 64 mission packages, $2.3 

billion 

"Updated" program 

• $478 million per seafram

• 64 mission packages, $5

billion 

• Initial operational capability in • Initial operational capabi

2007, 3 years after program 2013, 9 years after progstart start 

• Use low-cost existing 

designs 

• To be used in major combat 

operations 

• Self-sufficient in nearshore 

operations 

• Can handle three types of 

mission 

• Can switch rapidly between 

missions 

• High-cost changing de

throughout first several s

built 

• Weapons systems offe

"little chance of surviva

combat scenario" 

• Cannot be deployed alon

combat without large mu

mission escort 

• Can only handle one ty

mission, for which 

requirements were red

• Takes 12-29 days to swit

missions 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

(163) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Secretary STACKLEY. USS CORONADO (LCS 4) transited the Panama Canal in 

February, 2014. As the ship transited the canal, CORONADO suffered four separate 

allisions (instances where the ship structure was pierced or deformed by hitting the 

Panama Canal wall structure). Two of the allisions were created transiting the 

Gatun Locks and the two others were created in the Pedro Miguel Locks. The total 

cost to repair CORONADO as a result of the damage was $820,492. Initially, temporary repairs were conducted to remove debris and install additional structure to 

the damaged areas to continue operating at sea, until the ship was able to conduct 

more permanent repairs. Permanent repairs were completed during CORONADO’s 

Post Shakedown Availability (PSA). Lessons learned from prior LCS ships transiting 

the Panama Canal are being incorporated to mitigate the risk of recurring instances 

of the damages referenced above. For instance, prior to the transit of the Panama 

Canal, both LCS 6 and LCS 8 had a temporary fendering system installed to provide additional mooring fender strengthening. Permanent Independence variant improvements to protect against ship damage in the canal and in port include 

strengthening for fendering and tug loads. This improvement will be accomplished 

during PSA for LCS 6 through LCS 12 and in line construction on LCS 14 and follow. The decision for the point of incorporation for each of these improvements is 

based upon available funding, and considerations for minimizing schedule disruption and significant amounts of re-work in the construction yard. In addition to addressing hull strengthening issues, a delegation from the Navy has held on-going 

meetings with the Panama Canal Authority (ACP), most recently on February 7, 

2017 to discuss lessons learned and actions that could be taken by the ACP to mitigate or eliminate damage to LCS ships during canal transits. The February 2017 

meeting was very productive and Commander, FOURTH Fleet is codifying the 

agreements reached in a letter to the ACP. [See page 32.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE 

Admiral ROWDEN. The following table summarizes all known incidents of ships 

sustaining damage while transiting the Panama Canal: 

SHIP Hull Number Date of Incident Incident 

USS TORTUGA LSD 46 13 Feb 06 Allision 

SWIFT HSV 2 02 Apr 07 Allision 

USS HALYBURTON FFG 40 16 Nov 07 Grounding 

USNS COMFORT T–AH 20 21 Jul 09 Allision 

USNS DAHL T–AKR 312 03 Jan 10 Allision 

USNS 1st LT JACK LUMMUS T–AK 3011 10 May 10 Allision 

USS PASADENA SSN–752 25 Aug 11 Allision 

USS INDEPENDENCE LCS 2 15 Apr 12 Allision 

USS CORONADO LCS 4 23 Feb 14 Allision 

USS BARRY DDG 52 09 Feb 16 Damage to Flight Deck Nets 

[See page 36.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

DECEMBER 8, 2016 

(167) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In your written testimony you stated that the revised Independent Review Team (IRT) implementation plan focuses on one delivery vehicle 

with the current MCM package sonar; however, the FY17 NDAA Conference report 

requires a review of synthetic aperture sonar technologies for the MCM package. 

Please provide the subcommittee the following information: • Does the Navy plan to test and evaluate any additional conventional or synthetic aperture sonar technologies as part of its revised IRT implementation 

plan briefed to the committees in September 2016? • In light of the Conference Report requirement (section 1071), does the Navy intend to revise its September 2016 implementation plan for testing sonar technologies for the MCM package? 

• Has the Navy considered all available synthetic aperture sonar technologies to 

include those from our ally navies? 

• How many conventional and synthetic aperture sonar technologies does the 

Navy plan to test to meet the requirements of the FY17 NDAA and to ensure 

the success of the MCM package? 

Admiral ROWDEN. The Navy has selected the Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle 

as the tow vehicle for the minehunting sonar as part of the MCM Mission Package. 

The Navy continues to conduct testing and evaluation of synthetic aperture sonar 

technologies through existing program of records (POR). 

Does the Navy plan to test and evaluate any additional conventional or synthetic 

aperture sonar technologies as part of its revised IRT implementation plan briefed 

to the committees in September 2016? 

Yes, additional direct testing and evaluation of synthetic aperture sonar technologies is being conducted through existing programs of record (POR). 

• The AQS–20C production configuration of the towed sonar is conducting subsystem testing. 

• The AQS–24C towed sonar and the Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned 

Underwater Vehicle (SMCM UUV) POR containing the Knifefish Engineering 

Design Model (EDM) are both currently undergoing in-water developmental 

testing. 

• The AQS–24C sensor configuration for the MH–53E helicopter is undergoing 

production testing with an anticipated completion date of July 2017. 

• In addition to these POR efforts, the Navy has coordinated with and sent observers to the UK Royal Navy through technology exchange agreements to participate in ongoing evaluations of the Thales sonar system towed by both the 

ATLAS Elektronik and Thales unmanned surface vehicles. 

In light of the Conference Report requirement (section 1071), does the Navy intend 

to revise its September 2016 implementation plan for testing sonar technologies for 

the MCM package? 

No, the current test and evaluation approach is sufficient to provide a sound technical and operational assessment to support the IRT Implementation for the MCM 

mission package and the Congressional reporting requirements. 

Has the Navy considered all available synthetic aperture sonar technologies to include those from our ally navies? 

Yes, the Navy has evaluated foreign produced systems and continues through 

technology exchange agreements to monitor ongoing allied efforts of the most mature systems that have potential application for the MCM mission package. The 

most mature foreign systems under review are produced by ATLAS Elektronik and 

Thales, both of which are being assessed by the UK Royal Navy. 

How many conventional and synthetic aperture sonar technologies does the Navy 

plan to test to meet the requirements of the FY17 NDAA and to ensure the success 

of the MCM package? 

The current Navy plan assesses a total of six (6) sonar technologies that will inform the final configuration of the MCM mission package: 1) AQS–20C configuration 

with a synthetic aperture sonar, a digital gap filler sonar, and a high frequency wide 

band forward looking sonar is the primary candidate at present. 2) AQS–24C configuration with a high speed synthetic aperture sonar and high frequency wide band 
168 

* U.S. Navy controlled testing is not planned but performance data will be captured for comparison via existing data/technology exchange agreements. 

rear looking sonar. 3) Knifefish UUV with low frequency broad band synthetic aperture sonar. 4) AQS–20A configuration with conventional real aperture sonar. 5) 

AQS–24B configuration with high speed synthetic aperture sonar. 6) Thales towed 

sonar with synthetic aperture sonar.* 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Your written testimony states that ‘‘the department chose a frigate 

concept based on a minor modified LCS in lieu of more capable—and more expensive—small surface combatant options.’’ 

What are the key mission capabilities that the Navy identified and prioritized as 

needed for a potential frigate in its recent study of alternatives? 

Ms. MACKIN. Our report GAO–16–356, ‘‘Littoral Combat Ship: Need to Address 

Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and Frigate Acquisition Strategies’’ described our 

evaluation of the Navy’s Small Surface Combatant Task Force’s efforts to meet the 

Secretary of Defense’s direction to study alternatives to the LCS that would provide 

capabilities ‘‘consistent with a frigate’’. As we reported, the task force identified 

eight concepts for the capability of the small surface combatant (SSC)—known as 

capability concepts—representing the range of operationally acceptable mission alternatives. These are shown below. 

The task force found that a minor modified LCS (of either variant) was the least 

technically feasible of meeting any of the eight capability concepts among all of design categories that it considered. As shown, 7 of the 8 concepts included local surface warfare (meaning the ship can defend other ships against threats and attack 

targets within a medium range); 5 feature local anti-air warfare (meaning the ship 

can defend other ships against air-based threats within a medium range), and 5 also 

featured anti-submarine warfare capability. However, based on direction from senior 

Navy leaders, the task force ultimately focused on creating ship design concepts 

based on capability concept 7, which does not include a local anti-air warfare capability. 

As part of its methodology, the task force solicited feedback from fleet operators. 

In these fleet engagement sessions, Navy operators were given a set of performance 

capabilities—like speed, range, over-the-horizon surface warfare capability, and others—and were told to prioritize them. All of the concepts featured some degree of 

multi-mission capability—meaning that the ship can conduct more than one type of 

mission (e.g., surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare) at one time. The fleet operators consistently ranked local anti-air warfare and over-the-horizon surface warfare with anti-submarine warfare as their highest priorities for a future SSC. However, as noted above, capability concept 7 does not have local anti-air warfare capability. Other trade-offs were also made. For example, the fleet operators also highly 

valued an endurance range of 4,000 nautical miles and an ability to remain underway for 30 days. The chosen capability concept will have a range of less than 4,000 

nautical miles, and only a 14 day underway duration. 
169 

As shown below, the task force found that an LCS with minor modifications was 

the least feasible at meeting the Navy’s identified capability requirements, meaning 

that LCS with minor modifications was the least capable option considered. 

Ms. SPEIER. How does GAO rank-order the capabilities and design characteristics 

of each of the ships that the Navy considered during its study to determine how 

to develop the frigate platform, and how does GAO assess the capabilities of the 

ship that the Navy ultimately chose as the baseline for the frigate? 

Ms. MACKIN. GAO does not have the information to conduct a detailed analysis 

such as this, because the task force used statistical analysis software that GAO does 

not possess to assess the most likely cost and characteristics of over 19 million potential ship designs. Since new designs provide the most flexibility, the Navy would 

be able to identify many potential new design configurations to meet any set of SSC 

requirements. For existing designs, the task force analyzed 23 designs, but its supporting workpapers do not contain adequate information for a rank-ordering since 

limited information is presented about each option and the relative cost. 

We found that the task force considered both new and existing ship design options 

that were more capable than the LCS with minor modifications than the Navy ultimately selected. According to task force documentation, the inherent space, weight, 

power, and cooling constraints of the LCS with minor modifications limited the extent of changes that could be accommodated. With modifications, the task force 

found that other existing designs could provide additional capability, including local 

anti-air warfare. For example, the task force identified that an LCS with major 

modifications and a modified U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter—which, 

like LCS, is also currently in production—could both provide a full multi-mission capability, would provide greater weight and other margins which would allow for future upgrades, and have greater range and underway days. The task force also 

found that most of the existing designs considered could accommodate survivability 

improvements above those found on LCS. 

Ms. SPEIER. Does GAO believe that the minor modified LCS will or will not meet 

the combatant commander’s stated operational requirements for a frigate? Why, or 

why not? 

Ms. MACKIN. A frigate based on an LCS with minor modifications will not meet 

all the requirements prioritized by the fleet operators during engagement sessions. 

The results of the fleet engagement process imply that the fleet prioritized local 

anti-air warfare capabilities which are not included in ability concept 7, and the 

Navy subsequently based its frigate requirements on a reduced capability concept 

7, so it may no longer be reflective of the concepts developed in consultation with 

the fleet. An LCS with minor modifications could not achieve these requirements. 

The task force also determined that a minor modified LCS could not be modified 

to the level of vulnerability resistance like that of a legacy FFG 7 class frigate due 

to LCS weight and design constraints that would prevent adding more physical 

structure. If a greater level of vulnerability resistance was desired, a minor modified 

LCS would also not meet these requirements. 

The task force found that a minor modified LCS (of either variant) was the least 

technically feasible of meeting any of the eight capability concepts among all of de-
170 

sign categories that it considered. According to the task force’s report, the Navy 

would need an LCS with major design modification, a new design, or a modified 

(non-LCS) existing design if it wanted an SSC with multi-mission surface warfare, 

anti-submarine warfare, and local anti-air warfare capability and/or major survivability improvements. An LCS with minor modifications could not support these upgrades. Moreover, a minor modified LCS will not fully address all lethality and survivability concerns raised by the former Secretary of Defense. 

The planned modifications to LCS will offer some improvements (multi-mission 

capability and some survivability improvements related to reducing the susceptibility of the ship to attack). However, beyond the addition of an over-the-horizon 

missile that is also under consideration for addition to LCS, the proposed frigate 

does not add any new offensive anti-submarine or surface warfare capabilities that 

are not already part of LCS. 

Ms. SPEIER. Were other options considered that were more capable at meeting all 

of the Navy’s capability priorities other than LCS? 

Ms. MACKIN. The task force identified a number of designs that were more capable than the minor modified LCS, including a major modified LCS (of either variant), a modified National Security Cutter, and some foreign frigate designs. New designs—since they are by definition the most flexible—could also be developed to 

achieve the higher levels of capability sought by the Navy. However, Navy leaders, 

based on affordability concerns and a desire not to have a production break at the 

current LCS shipyards, ultimately recommended the minor modified LCS. 

Ms. SPEIER. What role did industrial base considerations have in the frigate study 

and in the Navy’s choice of using a minor modified LCS for the frigate baseline? 

Ms. MACKIN. In a November 2014 memo in which it recommends selecting a 

minor modified LCS, senior Navy leadership highlighted the speed with which they 

believe a minor modified LCS based frigate could be fielded as a deciding factor in 

its deliberations, as well as a desire to maintain stability in the LCS industrial base 

and vendor supply chain. The task force report stated that this option could achieve 

full capability faster than the others, and with a neutral impact to the industrial 

base (i.e., the LCS shipyards). In particular, the task force wrote that a minor modified LCS design would provide the shortest timeline to first ship delivery and that 

a major modified LCS and new and existing designs would result in production gaps 

of 1 to 5 years. Due to the scope and timeframe for our audit, we did not verify 

these task force findings. 

Æ