No. 01-056 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2002 MT 135 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

KEITH WARREN LONGHORN, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Hill, 

Honorable John Warner, Judge Presiding 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Jeremy S. Yellin, Attorney at Law, Fort Benton, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Honorable Mike McGrath; Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

David Rice, County Attorney, Havre, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: December 13, 2001 

 Decided: June 18, 2002 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
2 

Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Keith W. Longhorn (Longhorn) was charged by information in 

February 1994 with felony sexual assault. A warrant for his arrest 

was issued, but was not served on Longhorn until six years later. 

Longhorn filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which 

the District Court denied. After a jury trial, Longhorn was found 

guilty of sexual assault. Longhorn then filed a motion for a new 

trial, wherein he sought to set aside the jury verdict. The 

District Court denied that motion and sentenced Longhorn to seven 

years at Montana State Prison, with five years suspended. This 

appeal followed. We affirm. 

¶2 Longhorn raises the following issues on appeal: 

¶3 1. Did the District Court err when it denied Longhorn’s 

motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy 

trial? 

¶4 2. Did the District Court err when it denied Longhorn’s 

motion for a new trial? 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶5 In August 1992, Longhorn and his girlfriend Delaney stayed at 

the home of T.G. in Havre, Montana. At that time, T.G. was seven 

years old. Longhorn came to Montana to attend pow-wows, and T.G.’s 

mother Kathy recalled having a houseful of company at that time 

because of pow-wows in Fort Belknap and Rocky Boy. The company 

included Kathy’s sister-in-law Toni and Toni’s husband Chabon, her 

brother John and his wife Teresa, and her mother-in-law, Dee. 
3 

Toni, Chabon, Longhorn and Delaney all planned to compete in powwow dancing. 

¶6 The atmosphere at the home at this time was festive. There 

was constant activity and the adults frequently stayed up late. 

According to T.G., she had trouble sleeping on one of these nights, 

and she laid in the hallway in her pajamas with a sleeping bag and 

a pillow. Longhorn went upstairs to use the bathroom and asked 

T.G. what was wrong. He told her to go to her bedroom and said he 

would be there in a minute. 

¶7 T.G. returned to her bed. A few minutes later, Longhorn came 

into her room and laid next to her on the bed. There were no 

lights on in the bedroom. Longhorn started rubbing T.G.’s stomach, 

then began rubbing her chest and her vaginal area on top of her 

pajamas. Longhorn reached inside T.G.’s pajamas and touched her 

vagina with his fingers. Longhorn ultimately inserted one of his 

fingers into her vagina. T.G. recalled that one of her siblings, 

who was asleep in the room, woke up. Longhorn went to that 

sibling, patted his or her back, and instructed the child to go 

back to sleep. Longhorn then returned to T.G.’s bed and placed his 

fingers back on her vaginal area. Longhorn told T.G. this was 

their “little secret” and nobody else needed to know. 

¶8 The next day when T.G. saw Longhorn, he gave her an eerie 

smile. She ran away and cried. Longhorn later left T.G.’s home 

with her grandmother. T.G. did not see Longhorn again. 

¶9 On January 4, 1994, T.G. confided in her music teacher, 

Shirlie Hanson (Hanson), that Longhorn had sexually abused her two 
4 

years earlier. When T.G. told Hanson about the abuse, she was 

shaking and crying. Hanson testified that T.G. seemed very 

relieved after her disclosure. After her talk with T.G., Hanson 

informed the school principal about T.G.’s disclosure. The 

principal contacted the Havre police. The school counselor, Mark 

West (West), also offered T.G. support. 

¶10 Officer Haberlock, from the Havre Police Department, 

interviewed T.G. and her parents. T.G. informed Officer Haberlock 

that the man who assaulted her was staying at the family’s home to 

attend pow-wow and she described the man. T.G.’s parents were able 

to identify Longhorn as the suspect and told Officer Haberlock that 

Longhorn had only been at the house on one occasion in August 1992. 

¶11 After learning Longhorn’s name, Officer Haberlock assembled a 

photographic lineup for T.G. to review. As soon as he placed the 

photographs on the table, T.G. selected the photograph of Longhorn 

and identified him as the perpetrator. 

¶12 A warrant for Longhorn’s arrest was issued on February 22, 

1994. When the Hill County sheriff’s office received Longhorn’s 

arrest warrant, an officer entered the warrant into the National 

Criminal Information Center (NCIC) and sent a teletype message to 

the sheriff’s office in Cleveland County, Oklahoma, requesting a 

local officer’s assistance in finding and arresting Longhorn. 

Cleveland County, Oklahoma, was Longhorn’s last known address. 

¶13 Four years later, in March 1998, the Hill County sheriff’s 

office published a request for information of Longhorn’s 

whereabouts in the Havre Daily News “crime stoppers most wanted” 
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section. The sheriff’s office received no information as a result 

of this effort. In October 1998 and January 1999, the sheriff’s 

office sent messages to the Cleveland County sheriff’s office. 

Also, in January 1999, a deputy ran a criminal history check on 

Longhorn to determine if he had any recent arrests that would lead 

the sheriff’s office to his whereabouts. 

¶14 On February 22, 2000, Deputy Dwyer received a call from the 

Cleveland County sheriff’s office reporting that Longhorn had been 

arrested on a domestic assault charge and that Longhorn had been 

served Montana’s warrant. Deputy Dwyer immediately informed the 

Cleveland County sheriff’s office that Montana would extradite 

Longhorn. 

¶15 A jury trial was held on September 25, 2000, and a guilty 

verdict was returned on the offense of sexual assault, a felony. 

The District Court sentenced Longhorn to Montana State Prison for a 

period of seven years, with the last five years suspended. 

Longhorn appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

¶16 Did the District Court err when it denied Longhorn’s motion to 

dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial? 

¶17 Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial constitutes 

a question of constitutional law. We review a district court’s 

interpretation of the law to determine if it is correct. City of 

Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, ¶ 18, 290 Mont. 148, ¶ 18, 965 P.2d 

866, ¶ 18. 
6 

¶18 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee a 

criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial. In reviewing a claim that a 

defendant has been denied a speedy trial, we consider and balance each of the following four 

factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion 

of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 

530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117, as applied in Bruce, ¶ 19. Since no single 

factor is decisive, courts must engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. Barker, 

407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. As discussed in Bruce, our analysis of 

speedy trial claims features both a “straight balancing test” and a “motive test.” Bruce, ¶ 54. 

 As such, the importance of the prejudice factor and the degree of prejudice necessary to 

establish denial of speedy trial will vary based upon other considerations, such as the length 

of the delay and the reason for the delay. State v. Keyes, 2000 MT 337, ¶ 17, 303 Mont. 147, 

¶ 17, 15 P.3d 443, ¶ 17. The greater the degree of fault by the State in causing the delay, the 

less delay or prejudice that need be shown. However, if the State is not responsible for delay, 

greater prejudice, and presumably greater delay, would have to be shown. Bruce, ¶ 53. 

Length of Delay

¶19 We will first consider the length of delay from the time 

charges are filed until the defendant’s trial date for the purpose 

of determining whether there is a basis for conducting a speedy 

trial analysis. This period of time is calculated without 

assignment of fault to either party for the various periods of 
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delay. Bruce, ¶ 55. The necessary length of time to trigger 

further speedy trial analysis is 200 days. Bruce, ¶ 55. 

¶20 Here, the Information was filed on February 22, 1994. The 

trial was held on September 25, 2000. This time period is more 

than sufficient to trigger further analysis of whether Longhorn was 

denied his right to a speedy trial. 
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Reason for the Delay

¶21 The second factor requires the court to consider the reasons 

for the delay. The court determines which party is responsible for 

specific periods of time, then respectively allocates the total 

time delay between the parties. State v. Hardaway, 1998 MT 224, ¶ 

15, 290 Mont. 516, ¶ 15, 966 P.2d 125, ¶ 15. 

¶22 The right of a defendant to a speedy trial commences when he 

becomes an accused. If the accused is out of state, the State must 

act diligently and in good faith to acquire jurisdiction. State v. 

Robbins (1985), 218 Mont. 107, 116, 708 P.2d 227, 233-34. 

¶23 If the court determines that the State is responsible for 275 

or more days of the total delay, the State has the initial burden 

of demonstrating that the defendant has not been prejudiced by the 

delay. Hardaway, ¶ 20. 

¶24 The District Court separated the delay in this case into two 

time periods: the period between the issuance of the warrant and 

Longhorn’s arrest, and the period between Longhorn’s arrest and the 

trial. The court concluded that the arrest warrant was issued on 

February 22, 1994, and Longhorn was arrested on February 21, 2000. 

 The court found that the State acted diligently and in good faith 

in attempting to locate the defendant and did not attribute that 

time period to the State. For the second time period, the District 

Court allocated 99 days of delay to Longhorn for resisting 

extradition. The balance of time, from May 31, 2000, until 

September 26, 2000, was institutional delay. The court held that 
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since that time did not exceed 275 days, Longhorn had the burden of 

proving that he had been prejudiced by the delay. 

¶25 Only the time period between issuance of the warrant and 

Longhorn’s arrest is at issue here. Longhorn argues the State 

breached its duty to make a diligent good faith effort to locate 

and apprehend him. Specifically, he argues that the court erred 

when it considered the State’s limited resources; when it concluded 

that it was unreasonable to expect the Hill County sheriff’s office 

to locate him; and when it concluded that the State “wasn’t taking 

a leisurely pace in prosecuting the defendant for their own 

convenience.” Longhorn argues that “[t]he facts, fairness, and the 

guiding principles revolving around speedy trial analysis preclude 

blaming a citizen accused for delay when he knew nothing about the 

charges.” He asserts that the court wrongly attributed the sixyear delay to him and therefore, the court incorrectly placed the 

burden on him to prove that he had been prejudiced by the delay. 

¶26 The State argues that the Hill County sheriff’s office did all 

that it was able to do to locate Longhorn. At the time the warrant 

was issued, the only information available to the sheriff’s office 

was Longhorn’s last known address, date of birth and social 

security number. The sheriff’s office entered the information on 

the NCIC system and sent several teletype messages requesting 

assistance from the sheriff’s office in the county of Longhorn’s 

last known address. The State argues that the District Court 

correctly attributed the pre-arrest time to Longhorn, but that even 

if this Court disagrees with the District Court’s allocation, 
10 

Longhorn cannot prevail because he was not prejudiced by the prearrest delay. 

¶27 Longhorn relies on the United States Supreme Court decision in 

Doggett v. United States (1992), 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 

L.Ed.2d 520, in arguing that the State was negligent in its efforts 

to locate him. In Doggett, there was a delay of eight and a half 

years between indictment and arrest. Doggett was indicted in 1980 

for conspiring to import and distribute cocaine. The Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) was the principal agent 

investigating the conspiracy. In 1981, a DEA agent learned that 

Doggett had been arrested in Panama and he requested that Panama 

“expel” Doggett to the United States. Although Panamanian 

authorities promised to comply when their own proceedings were 

complete, they freed Doggett the following July and let him go to 

Columbia, where he stayed with an aunt for several months. In 

September 1982, he passed through customs in New York City and 

settled in Virginia. He married, earned a college degree, found a 

steady job as a computer operations manager and lived openly under 

his own name. In 1988 the Marshal’s Service ran a simple credit 

check on several thousand people subject to outstanding warrants, 

and Doggett was found and arrested. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 648-50, 

112 S.Ct. at 2689-90, 120 L.Ed.2d at 526-27. The district court 

concluded that the government was negligent in its attempts to 

locate the defendant, but that “Doggett had made no affirmative 

showing that the delay had impaired his ability to mount a 

successful defense or had otherwise prejudiced him.” Therefore, 
11 

the court denied Doggett’s motion to dismiss based on denial of a 

speedy trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 650, 112 S.Ct. at 2690, 120 

L.Ed.2d at 527. 

¶28 The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s 

decision, holding that “[w]hen the Government’s negligence thus 

causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to 

trigger judicial review . . . and when the presumption of 

prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the 

defendant’s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant 

is entitled to relief.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658, 112 S.Ct. at 

2694, 120 L.Ed.2d at 532 (citations omitted). The Court noted that 

it reviews trial court determinations of negligence with 

considerable deference and “[t]he government gives us nothing to 

gainsay the findings that have come up to us, and we see nothing 

fatal to them in the record.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 

at 2691, 120 L.Ed.2d at 529. Additionally, the Court stated that, 

“if the Government had pursued Doggett with reasonable diligence 

from his indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial claim would 

fail. Indeed, that conclusion would generally follow as a matter 

of course however great the delay, so long as Doggett could not 

show specific prejudice to his defense.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 

656, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 531. 

¶29 The State points out that there are several factual 

differences between Doggett and this case. We agree. Most 

significantly, when Doggett returned to the United States and began 

living in Virginia, he was openly living within the jurisdiction of 
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the DEA. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Longhorn, 

on the other hand, returned to Montana during the six years between 

issuance of the warrant and his arrest or was, at any time, within 

the State’s jurisdiction. 

¶30 Additionally, the trial court in Doggett found that the 

prosecution had been negligent and the Supreme Court concluded that 

the finding was not clearly erroneous. In this case, the District 

Court found that the State made a diligent good faith effort to 

locate Longhorn. The court found that the State “entered the 

warrant on the NCIC and sent a message to Oklahoma requesting 

assistance. The State ran a newspaper advertisement pertaining to 

locating the defendant on March 12, 1998. On October 4, 1998, a 

second message was sent to Oklahoma requesting assistance in 

apprehending the defendant. A third message was sent to Oklahoma 

on January 28, 1999, again requesting assistance in arresting the 

defendant.” 

¶31 We agree with the District Court that the State made a 

diligent good faith effort to locate Longhorn. Therefore, that 

time period is allocated to Longhorn, and he has the burden of 

showing that he was prejudiced by the delay. 

Longhorn’s Assertion of His Right

¶32 The State concedes that Longhorn made a timely assertion of 

his right to a speedy trial. 

Prejudice to Defense

¶33 The fourth factor considers whether Longhorn was prejudiced by 

the delay. We evaluate prejudice based on the three interests that 
13 

speedy trials are supposed to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive 

pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of the defendant’s anxiety 

and concern; and (3) avoidance of impairment of the defense. State 

v. Boese, 2001 MT 175, ¶ 12, 306 Mont. 169, ¶ 12, 30 P.3d 1092, ¶ 

12. The importance of this factor and the degree of prejudice 

necessary to establish denial of speedy trial will vary based upon 

other considerations, such as the length of delay and the reason 

for delay. Bruce, ¶ 58. To determine whether Longhorn has 

sustained his burden of proving prejudice, we address each of the 

traditional bases for prejudice in turn. 
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Pre-Trial Incarceration

¶34 Longhorn asserts that he was incarcerated for 220 days pretrial and because he was “incarcerated for a period greater than 

the time a speedy trial analysis is triggered, [his] incarceration 

is plainly substantial.” 

¶35 The State points out that 99 days of Longhorn’s incarceration 

was spent in Oklahoma while he resisted extradition to Montana and 

that the court released Longhorn on his own recognizance in July 

2000, provided that he abide by certain conditions. Longhorn could 

then not meet the terms of his release and he remained incarcerated 

until trial. 

¶36 Notably, a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not designed 

to prevent any pre-trial incarceration whatsoever. Rather, the 

speedy trial right is designed only to prevent oppressive pre-trial 

incarceration. State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 180, ¶ 26, 300 Mont. 367, 

¶ 26, 4 P.3d 654, ¶ 26. The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether 

Longhorn was “unduly prejudiced by pre-trial incarceration.” 

Johnson, ¶ 26 (emphasis in original). 

¶37 Longhorn does not raise any argument that he was prejudiced by 

his period of pre-trial incarceration. Considering the District 

Court’s willingness to release Longhorn on certain conditions, we 

conclude that his pre-trial incarceration was not unduly 

prejudicial. 

Anxiety and Concern

¶38 Anxiety and concern are an inherent part of being charged with 

a crime; therefore, the focus of this inquiry is on that anxiety 
15 

and concern which is aggravated as a result of the delay. State v. 

Highpine, 2000 MT 368, ¶ 28, 303 Mont. 422, ¶ 28, 15 P.3d 938, ¶ 

28. During the majority of the delay in this case, Longhorn was 

unaware that he had a criminal charge pending against him and there 

is nothing in the record to suggest that he suffered an inordinate 

amount of anxiety and concern. 

Impairment of Defense

¶39 Impairment of one’s defense is the most difficult form of 

speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of 

exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown. Highpine, 

¶ 31 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655, 112 S.Ct. at 2692-93, 120 

L.Ed.2d at 530). This interest of the defendant carries more 

weight than the other bases for finding prejudice. Johnson, ¶ 34. 

¶40 Longhorn argues that his defense was impaired by “the loss of 

possible exculpatory evidence by destruction of documents and 

deterioration of memory.” Specifically, Longhorn argues that 

school counselor Mark West remembered little if anything about the 

substance of his meetings with the complaining witness and he 

destroyed all of his records, including those pertaining to the 

complaining witness and her discussions about the sexual assault. 

He cites to our decision in Bruce where we stated, “we generally 

have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises 

the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove, or 

for that matter, identify.” Bruce, ¶ 37. Longhorn argues that the 

prejudice demonstrated explicitly by West’s lack of memory and 
16 

implicitly by the length of the delay “clearly shows that the 

District Court erred by not dismissing this case.” 

¶41 The State notes that upon learning of Longhorn’s arrest, it 

immediately contacted the victim and her mother, who had moved out 

of state, to make certain they were willing to return to Montana 

and testify at trial. The State then located the other witnesses 

who had been named in the Information. The only witness the State 

was unable to locate was a woman named Delaney, who was Longhorn’s 

girlfriend at the time of the incident. The State asserts that it 

cooperated in setting up pre-trial interviews of its witnesses for 

Longhorn’s counsel, Longhorn had every opportunity for pre-trial 

discovery, T.G. clearly recalled the details surrounding the sexual 

assault, and the teacher who T.G. confided in also clearly recalled 

T.G.’s report and her emotional state. The State argues that 

Longhorn’s defense was not impaired by the delay “because, other 

than holding the State to its burden of proof, he had no defense.” 

¶42 In denying Longhorn’s motion to dismiss, the District Court 

noted that “Defendant has come forward with no real evidence that 

his defense has been impaired by this delay. There appears to be 

little, if any, evidence lost by the lapse of time. No exculpatory 

testimony appears to be missing. The State has contacted all of 

witnesses listed on the original Information. The alleged victim 

recalls the incident.” Before trial and after deposing West, 

Longhorn renewed his motion to dismiss and the court again denied 

the motion, stating “there is no evidence here or no indications 

that the defendant was prejudiced by that or that there is any 
17 

indication that Mr. West would have said that the complaining 

witness was being untruthful.” 

¶43 We agree with the District Court’s analysis. Longhorn has 

presented no evidence that his defense was impaired by West’s lack 

of memory. As noted by the State, Longhorn’s only defense at trial 

was to hold the State to its burden of proof. West’s sketchy 

memory and the lapse of time actually worked against the State and 

did not impair Longhorn’s defense. 

Balancing Speedy Trial Factors

¶44 As discussed above, the Bruce test requires that we balance 

all four factors in our analysis of speedy trial issues, and that 

when there is less fault on the part of the State, greater 

prejudice need be shown. Bruce, ¶ 53. 

¶45 We conclude that (1) the length of delay was sufficient to 

raise the issue; (2) Longhorn asserted his right to a speedy trial; 

(3) Longhorn bore the burden of proving prejudice; (4) the delay 

does not weigh heavily against the State; and (5) Longhorn did not 

prove prejudice. After balancing all four factors, we conclude 

that the District Court did not err in holding that Longhorn was 

not denied a speedy trial and we accordingly affirm the District 

Court order denying Longhorn’s motion to dismiss for violation of 

his right to a speedy trial. 

¶46 Did the District Court err when it denied Longhorn’s motion 

for a new trial? 

¶47 Section 46-16-702, MCA, permits a defendant to move for a new 

trial and authorizes a trial court addressing such a motion to 
18 

modify or change a verdict by finding a defendant not guilty of the 

offense charged. State v. Harris, 1999 MT 115, ¶ 15, 294 Mont. 

397, ¶ 15, 983 P.2d 881, ¶ 15. The trial court’s decision to grant 

a new trial or modify or change a verdict must be justified by the 

law and the weight of the evidence. We review a district court’s 

decision on a motion for a new trial to determine whether the 

district court abused its discretion. Absent such abuse, we will 

affirm the district court’s decision. State v. Billedeaux, 2001 MT 

9, ¶ 23, 304 Mont. 89, ¶ 23, 18 P.3d 990, ¶ 23. 

¶48 On appeal, Longhorn argues that the District Court erred when 

it concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the complaining witness was sexually assaulted in August 1992. 

Specifically, Longhorn argues that the evidence introduced at trial 

demonstrates that the assault occurred during May or June 1991. He 

notes that T.G. testified that she has been “‘trying to get rid of 

this out of my mind for the last nine years’. . . . the clear 

implication of this comment is that the alleged sexual assault 

occurred in 1991.” He also points out that several witnesses 

testified that T.G. said the assault happened after her first grade 

year, which again was in 1991. 

¶49 In its Order denying Longhorn’s motion for a new trial, the 

District Court concluded that “[t]he jury was properly instructed 

that the incident either happened in August of 1992, or did not 

happened [sic] at all. . . . [A] reasonable juror could easily 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that this incident occurred in 

August of 1992 as alleged. The court looked at the witnesses, 
19 

heard the evidence and assessed the witnesses’ credibility as the 

jury did. Under the circumstances of this case, the court cannot 

second guess a jury and say it could not have happened as a matter 

of law.” 

¶50 After reviewing the trial transcript, we agree with the 

District Court that a reasonable juror could have found that the 

assault occurred in August 1992. Kathy, T.G.’s mother, testified 

that they had a lot of house guests in August of 1992, that the 

atmosphere in the house was consistent with what T.G. described, 

and that she remembered the time period specifically because the 

family car had broken down that summer on the way to the Fort 

Belknap pow-wow. Additionally, T.G. testified that the assault 

happened in the summer of 1992. 

¶51 The question of when the assault occurred was a factual 

question for the jury. There was substantial evidence for the jury 

to find that the assault occurred in August 1992. We conclude that 

the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Longhorn’s motion for a new trial. 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

We concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ JIM RICE 
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