UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

LINDA ANN MENDENHALL,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

AT-0752-15-0718-C-1

DATE: May 21, 2024

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Stanford J. Mendenhall, Camden, Alabama, for the appellant.

Toby V. Davis, Esquire, and Scott M. Merrifield, Redstone Arsenal, 

Alabama, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied her petition for enforcement. Generally, we grant petitions such as this

one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

1

 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner

has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for

review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY the

administrative judge’s analysis of the agreement’s clean record and neutral

reference provisions and AFFIRM the remainder of the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

The parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving the appellant’s

joined Board appeals. Mendenhall v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket

No. AT-0752-15-0718-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID)

at 1-2. The administrative judge entered the agreement into the record for

enforcement purposes and dismissed the joined appeals as settled. Id. The initial

decision became final after neither party filed a petition for review. ID at 3.

In relevant part, the agency agreed to cancel the appellant’s removal and

issue a Standard Form (SF) 50 designating her separation as a resignation; pay

her $45,000; provide her a neutral reference from a designated point of contact

(DPOC); and remove documents from her official personnel file (OPF) pertaining

to other personnel actions. I-2 AF, Tab 7 at 2-4. In exchange, the appellant

agreed to waive her Board appeal rights. Id. at 3.

The appellant filed a petition to enforce the settlement agreement.

Mendenhall v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-15-0718-

C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1. The agency showed that it had complied with

each of its aforementioned obligations under the agreement. CF, Tab 7. In reply,
3

the appellant disputed the agency’s evidence and reasserted her claims of breach.

CF, Tab 11 at 4-28. She also challenged other actions taken by the Department of

the Air Force (AF), her subsequent employer. Id. at 4-42.

After considering the parties’ submissions and determining that the Board

had authority to enforce the settlement agreement, the administrative judge issued

a compliance initial decision, denying the appellant’s petition for enforcement.

CF, Tab 12, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 1-2 n.2. He determined that the

agreement did not contain an alleged gag order provision and that the agency

showed it had complied with the neutral reference provision. CID at 2-3. He

further found that the AF’s investigation into her employment history was not a

basis for finding noncompliance because it was not a party to the agreement. CID

at 3 n.2. He did not address the appellant’s other claims of wrongdoing by the

AF.

The appellant has filed a compliance petition for review, alleging that the

agency breached the clean record and neutral reference provisions. Compliance

Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. CPFR

File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The Board has the authority to enforce a settlement agreement that, like the

agreement in this case, has been entered into the record in the same manner as

any final Board decision or order. Haefele v. Department of the Air Force,

108 M.S.P.R. 630, ¶ 7 (2008). As the party asserting noncompliance, the

appellant bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that the agency

breached the settlement agreement. Id. However, following the appellant’s filing

of a petition for enforcement, the agency must produce relevant, material

evidence of its compliance with the agreement. Id.
4

The appellant did not prove that the agency breached the clean record provision.

Below, the appellant alleged that the agency failed to rescind or expunge

her personnel records. CF, Tab 11 at 5-6, 11. She also alleged that the agency

disclosed improper information in violation of what she termed the settlement’s

“gag order,” which she interpreted as prohibiting the agency from disclosing any

information about the settlement agreement. 2 Id. at 6-7, 11-12. We construe the

appellant’s arguments as a claim that the agency violated the agreement’s

non-disclosure provision. The appellant raises similar arguments on review.

CPFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. 

The settlement agreement does not contain a non-disclosure provision as

broad as the appellant contends. However, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit and the Board have construed settlement agreements that call for

rescinding a for-cause removal and issuing an SF-50 that reflects a resignation to

also contain implied provisions for expunging removal-related documents from

the employee’s OPF and non-disclosure of the rescinded action to third parties—

in other words, a “clean record” settlement. Conant v. Office of Personnel

Management, 255 F.3d 1371, 1376 (2001); 3 Doe v. Department of the Army,

116 M.S.P.R. 160, ¶ 8 (2011). The agreement expressly limited the agency’s

expungement obligations to the specified personnel actions, including the

appellant’s removal. I-2 AF, Tab 7 at 2-4. Pursuant thereto, the agency

expunged the relevant personnel records from the appellant’s electronic OPF.

CF, Tab 7 at 18-22, 24, 27. We further find that, to the extent the implied

non-disclosure provision exists and regardless of whether we rely on the agency’s

2

 Similarly, the appellant argues that the agency violated “the Clean Record Act,” which

does not describe a provision of law, but rather is her shorthand reference for a Board

report, i.e., U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Clean Record Settlement Agreements

and the Law (2013). CPFR File, Tab 1 at 10; CF, Tab 11 at 5-6 & n.1.

3

 As we observed in Allen, any reservations that we might entertain about Conant are

beside the point since we are bound by decisions of the Federal Circuit. Allen v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 659, ¶ 15 (2009), aff’d, 420 F. App’x 980

(Fed. Cir. 2011).
5

or the appellant’s allegedly contradictory evidence, which we discuss in more

detail below, there is no indication in the record that the agency disclosed any

prohibited information. CF, Tab 7 at 11-12, Tab 11 at 46, 49-50, 55.

The appellant did not prove that the agency breached the neutral reference

provision.

On review, the appellant reasserts her contention that the DPOC refused to

contact “many hiring officials” to provide a reference in violation of the

agreement and in reprisal for whistleblowing. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2, 6-7, 10.

She argues further that the administrative judge erred in relying on the agency’s

evidence of compliance showing otherwise. Id. at 7. 

The agency submitted a sworn declaration from the DPOC asserting that he

only received one request for the appellant’s employment information and, in

response to that request, disclosed to the appellant’s AF supervisor the title of the

appellant’s position held with the agency, the dates of her employment, and that

she resigned from her position. CF, Tab 7 at 11-12. As the administrative judge

found, the information he purportedly disclosed was of the type expressly

permitted by the settlement agreement. CID at 2-3; I-2 AF, Tab 7 at 4. In

response, the appellant submitted a sworn statement that the AF supervisor

prepared in another matter. CF, Tab 11 at 45-55. Therein, he stated that, after

determining that the appellant was not competently performing the duties of her

position, he sought substantive information about the appellant’s prior

employment; however, the DPOC never “returned [his] calls.” Id. at 49-50. The

administrative judge did not expressly discuss this purported evidentiary conflict;

therefore, we consider it on review.

The appellant’s evidence does not refute the DPOC’s assertion that he only

received one reference request. CF, Tab 7 at 11-12. Sworn statements that are

not rebutted are competent evidence of the matters asserted therein. Truitt v.
6

Department of the Navy, 45 M.S.P.R. 344, 347 (1990). 4 Moreover, the appellant

has not shown that the agency’s evidence is not credible. Although the

declarations contradict each other in some respects, both statements are sworn,

first-hand accounts signed long after the purported calls were made, and there is

no other record evidence that further bolsters or discredits them. 5 CF, Tab 7

at 11-12, Tab 11 at 46, 49-50, 55; see Borninkhof v. Department of Justice,

5 M.S.P.R. 77, 83 (1981) (considering, among other factors, the consistency of

the account with other record evidence and the absence of contradictory evidence

to determine the appropriate weight to ascribe hearsay evidence). We therefore

find that the agency’s evidence is at least as worthy of belief as the appellant’s.

When evidence is in equipoise, the party with the burden of persuasion has failed

to meet that burden. See Cook v. Department of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 178,

¶ 19 (2007) (citing Knudsen v. Department of Health and Human Services,

35 F.3d 543, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In a compliance matter, the overall burden of

persuasion on the issue of breach remains with the appellant. Turner v.

Department of Homeland Security, 102 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 5, review dismissed,

201 F. App’x 770 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, we find that the appellant has not met

her burden to show that the DPOC failed to respond to any other reference

requests. As a result, we also find that the appellant’s reprisal claim related

thereto, CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3, is without merit, see generally Kuykendall v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 68 M.S.P.R. 314, 329 (1995) (finding that claims

4

 The Board may substitute its own credibility findings for an administrative judge’s

explicit or implicit credibility findings when, as here, such findings are not based on the

demeanor of witnesses. Deskin v. U.S. Postal Service, 76 M.S.P.R. 505, 510 (1997);

see Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

5

 The appellant also submits a spreadsheet she created, which purportedly reflects

numerous nonselections, but in fact contains nearly no substantive information. CPFR

File, Tab 1 at 13-15. We decline to consider this evidence. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal

Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (finding that, generally, under 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.115, the Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the

petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was

closed despite the party’s due diligence).
7

of reprisal may properly be raised in a petition for enforcement to show that the

agency breached a settlement agreement by acting in bad faith).

At most, the appellant’s evidence contradicts the DPOC’s assertion that he

provided the identified employment information to her AF supervisor. CF, Tab 7

at 11-12, Tab 11 at 49-50, 55. However, that conflict is immaterial. I-2 AF,

Tab 7 at 2, 4. In construing a settlement agreement, the Board looks to the terms

of the agreement to determine the intent of the parties at the time they contracted.

Sweet v. U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 28, ¶ 9 (2001). To the extent that the

DPOC was required to respond to reference requests from prospective employers,

the AF supervisor’s request was not of the type contemplated by the agreement.

Id.; see Hoffmann v. General Services Administration, 57 M.S.P.R. 502, 507

(1994) (observing that the agency’s failure to respond to a reference request in

accordance with the settlement agreement would be excused if it proved that the

reference request was not from a bona fide employer). Accordingly, we agree

with the administrative judge that the appellant did not prove by preponderant

evidence that the agency failed to comply with the neutral reference provision or

any other aspect of the settlement agreement.

The appellant’s other allegations of error do not provide a basis for review.

The appellant alleges that the administrative judge denied her a hearing or

other opportunity to develop the record. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 16. She did not

request a hearing below. CF, Tabs 1, 11. In any event, the decision to hold a

hearing in a compliance matter is discretionary; the appellant has no right to a

hearing on her petition for enforcement. Knight v. Department of Treasury,

113 M.S.P.R. 548, ¶ 16 (2010); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(3). Moreover, she has not

shown that the administrative judge otherwise prevented her from submitting

argument and evidence in support of her claim. Rather, we find that he properly

notified her of her burden of proving noncompliance and allowed her the

opportunity to engage in discovery and supplement the record. CF, Tab 2 at 1-3.

He also considered the appellant’s additional submission, even though it was
8

untimely. CID at 2 n.1. Therefore, the appellant has not shown that the

administrative judge erred in this regard.

Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s petition for review and affirm the

initial decision, as modified.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS6

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

6

 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
9

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following

address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
10

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 
11

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction.7 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

7

 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510. 
12

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

 

 

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

Gina K. Grippando

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.