Filed 12/29/21 Acorn hill Investments v. Pan C i ty Pla za CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ACORN HILL INVESTMENTS, LLC , et al.,

Plaintiff s and App ellant s ,

v.

PAN CITY PLAZA , LLC

, et al.,

Defendant s and Respondent s

. B 305473

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LC100782 )

PAN CITY PLAZA, LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

ACORN HILL INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant. (Los Ange les County Super. Ct. No

. LC104819)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Ange les County, Huey P. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed.2 Randall A. Spencer for Plaintiffs and Appellant s.

Law Offices of Terence M. Sternberg and Terence M. Sternberg f

or Defendants and Respondents

.

_________________________
Appellants on the one hand, and r espondents on the other, own neighboring commercial building properties each with their own parking lot. Appellants’ parking lot is small and landlocked,
while res pondents’ parking lot is large and has an entrance off Van Nuys Boulevard. The only way to access appellants’ landlocked small parking lot is via the driveway through and on respondents’ large parking lot. Appellants hold an easement over respondents’ la rge parking lot to access the small parking lot; this easement was created by a covenant and agreement signed by previous owners of both properties. Immediately prior to appellants’ purchase of the commercial building with the small parking lot, respondent s narrowed the width of the driveway from 20 feet to 11 feet
8 inches. Appellants contend respondents were precluded from reducing the 20

- foot width of the driveway. Respondents argue the law requires the width of the driveway to be a minimum of
9 to 10 feet. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents, and ordered the driveway width be increased by one foot, making it 12 feet 8 inches. Appellants appeal the judgment.
We affirm.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Factual Ba ckground
In 1981, Clyde and Sandra Mitchell owned three properties: 1) a commercial building with a small parking lot directly behind it, located at 8737 Van Nuys Boulevard in Panorama City, California ( 8737 property) ; 2) a commercial building located at 8727 Van Nuys Boulevard in Panorama City,
California (8727 property) ; and 3) a large parking lot

— located between the two commercial buildings

— with a driveway opening onto Van Nuys Boulevard . The only way to access the small parking lot behind the 8737 pro perty is via the driveway on the large parking lot. The Mitchells sold the 8737 property with the small parking lot to Paul and Edith Cohen. Upon completion of the sale, the small parking lot was going to become landlocked, as the
Mitchells retained owner ship of the large parking lot with the driveway that provided the only access to the small parking lot. Thus, the City of Los Angeles required the Mitchells to enter into three agreements/covenants, all recorded with the County Recorder’s Office on Novemb er 6, 1981, as follows: The first covenant and agreement was for a “community driveway.” The respective owners of the 8727 and 8737 properties “covenant and agree . . . to establish and maintain . . . a common or community driveway for ingress and egress to each [p]arcel and general driveway purposes over the entirety of the area.” The covenant was created “to comply with Section [12.21(A)(4)(h)] of the Los Angeles Municipal Code relating to required access to automobile parking spaces.” This covenant

an d agreement “shall run with the land and shall be binding upon” the owners and all parties acquiring any right, title, or4

interest in the properties in the future. The second covenant and agreement provided that the 8737 property with the smaller lot has t he right to use 10 parking spaces in the large parking lot. This covenant and agreement also runs with the land and is binding upon current and future owners of the properties and their successors, heirs, or assignees. The third covenant and agreement pro vided that the 8727 property has the right to use 18 parking spaces in the large parking lot. This covenant and agreement also runs with the land and are binding upon current and all future owners of both properties and their successors, heirs, assignees. In 1994, the Cohens transferred their interest in the 8737 property with the small parking lot to the Cohen F amily Trust (Cohen Trust)

. In 1999, the Cohen Trust built a disabled person’s parking space in the large parking lot, in compliance with the Ameri cans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Thereafter, the 8737 property owned by the Cohen Trust used 10 parking spaces and one ADA parking space in the large parking lot, with the consent of the owners of the large lot. Ten years later, in 2009, the successors t o the Mitchells sold the 8727 property and the large parking lot to Pan City Plaza, owned by Daryoush Kashani, M.D. At time of purchase, there were 26 parking spaces on the large parking lot. We collectively refer to Pan City Plaza and Kashani as respond ents. On March 16, 2012, a lawsuit between the Cohen Trust and EilEil, LLC (Pan City Plaza’s immediate predecessor) settled pursuant to terms of the “Deal Memo.” The Deal Memo required the Cohens to remove their ADA parking spot from the large parking lot and reinstall it in the small parking lot.5 In May 2013, the Cohen Trust sold the 8737 property with the small parking lot to Acorn hill Investments. Acorn hill then leased the property to cardiologist Ravi Gupta, who used it as a
medical office. We collec tively refer to Acorn hill and Ravi Gupta, M.D., Inc., as appellants.

B. Appellants’ Civil Action
On September 12, 2013, appellants filed a complaint against respondents and EilEil, LLC, alleging causes of action for declaratory relief, breach of contract, bre ach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence per se, fraud, and negligence. Appellants sought punitive damages and attorney fees. Appellants’ complaint included the following allegations: Appellants acquired and/or leased the 8737 property “ in total and complete reasonable reliance upon the recorded Covenants and Agreements.” For approximately 31 years, “the owners, tenants and visitors of the 8737 property continually, visibly, openly and without objection used” the parking spaces in
the la rge parking lot. However, within the few months preceding appellants’ acquisition of the 8737 property, respondents, “contrary to the Covenants and Agreements entered into in 1981”, added an electric gate separating the small parking lot from the large

par king lot with the driveway, “thereby barring and blocking the sole entrance and exit to and from the small parking lot.” Respondents erected a metal fence on the property which hindered access from the large parking lot to the 8737 property. Respondents g ave appellants two electronic clickers for their staff and visitors to access the small parking lot. This was done “without justification or any advance notice” to appellants.6 Appellants argued respondents “breached the terms and
conditions of the Covenan ts and Agreements.” Appellants believed “they are entitled to enforce the terms and conditions of the Covenants and Agreements and the open, obvious and established use” of the properties, which required removal of the electronic gate to provide appellant s “unfettered access to the small parking lot”, and removal of the fence separating the large parking lot from the 8737 property, to provide appellants “unfettered use of the [11] parking spaces.” Appellants requested a judicial determination of the partie s’ rights/obligations as it pertains to the covenants and agreements as well as damages, attorney fees and costs, and interest at the legal rate. On December 3, 2013, respondents filed their first amended answer to the complaint, denying the relevant alleg ations and asserting 10 affirmative defenses. EilEil, LLC was dismissed from the case.

C. Preliminary Injunction and Supplemental Orders

On January 9, 2014, the court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering respondents to “remove the fence and electronic ga te” located on appellants’ property. Appellants and their successors

- in

- interests were awarded “exclusive use of not less than ten (10) parking spaces in the common usage parking lot located between the 8727 and 8737 properties.” Respondents and their suc cessors

- in

- interests were awarded “exclusive use of not less than eighteen (18) parking spaces in the common usage parking lot.” The remaining parking spaces in the common usage parking (including the ADA parking spot) “shall be available for usage by eit her property on a first come, first serve basis.”7 Respondents were ordered to “do nothing to unlawfully impede or stymie” appellants’ use of their parking rights as well as their “ingress and egress over the entirety of the area to gain access to their par king lot behind the 8737 property.” Appellants were awarded “the unimpeded right, without the need for [respondents’] approval, permission or concurrence, to contact [respondents’] towing company and have cars improperly parking in [appellants’] ten space s towed from the common usage parking
lot.” In January 2014, the court entered a supplemental order wherein it noted respondents “had not complied with the January 9, 2014 order requiring removal of the entire fence.” The court empowered appellants to rem ove the fence. The court issued a modification to the preliminary injunction, designating two parking spots from the large parking lot as exclusively for respondents’ use as owners of the 8727 property. In June 2014, appellants filed a motion to enforce an d reinstate easement rights for egress and ingress through the driveway, claiming they had the right to a 20

- foot

- wide passageway as it existed in 2009 when respondents purchased the 8727 property. Appellants advised that because respondents added more pa rking spaces in the large parking lot, the width of the driveway to the small parking lot was reduced from 20 feet to
10 feet. In August 2014, the court found that the language of the covenant and agreement as to the community driveway did not designate or specify the width of the driveway to and from the small parking lot. The court noted that “for approximately
30 years, the ingress and egress to the [large] parking lot was8

approximately 20 feet and was narrowed down to 10 feet in 2012, prior to [appella nts’] ownership of the property.” The court also “noted that city ordinances require only a minimum of 10 feet” for the driveway. The court held that there was “no evidence that [appellants], their predecessor or anyone else used the easement for anythin g other than entering and exiting the parking lot.” The court further held that appellants did not explain “how narrowing the ingress and egress has caused any impairment to its intended use.” In September 2014, respondents secured from the Los Angeles De partment of Building and Safety an approved plan to increase the total number of parking spaces to 37. In September 2015, the court authorized respondents to re

stripe the large parking lot in conformity with the approved plan, which eliminated one parking space, leaving a total of 36 spaces. The approved plan specified the width of the driveway between the large and small parking lots as 11 feet 8 inches.

D. Respondents’ Civil Action

On October 31, 2016, respondents filed a complaint against appellants for b reach of contract, account stated, and to enjoin an encroachment. They requested damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs. 1

1 In their opening brief, ap pellants present two arguments on appeal; neither raise issues about orders made a s to respondents’ complaint. For that reason, we do not delve into the details of respondents’ complaint.9 Appellants filed an answer generally denying the allegations. Appellants also filed a cross

- complaint against

respo ndents for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference with contract, and negligence. On January 25, 2017, respondents filed their answer to the

cross

- complaint, denying the allegations. They requested appellants’ c ross

- complaint be dismissed in its entirety.

E. Consolidation of Two Actions

On December 1 3 , 2016, the court ordered both actions consolidated for all purposes, including trial.

F. Trial
At a hearing on May 14, 2019, the court set the matter for trial, scheduled to commence August 27, 2019. The parties provided an agreed statement of facts in lieu of live trial testimony. Both agreed to the following facts : 2 There are 36 parking spaces in the large parking lot, two of which are ADA compliant. The small parking lot has a total of seven spaces, one of which is ADA complaint. The covenants and agreements “run with the land and are enforceable by the respective successors” to the property owners. On August 27, 2019, a two

- day court trial commenced. The following relevant testimony was elicited.

1. Daryoush Kashani’s Testimony
Kashani purchased the 8727 property and the large parking lot which included “a covenant which, to [his]

2 In addition to the relevant factual background provided in part A above.10

understanding, becomes an easement.” The “8737 [property] has a right of passage”, i.e., the “ability to pass through the lot and get into their lot.” The City of Los Angeles required the large parking lot to include 21 parking spaces for the 8727 property and the second covenant requires 10 parking spaces for the 8737 property. Technically, the commercial building at 8727 Van Nuys
Boulevard is required “to have 50 parking spaces . . . . But since that area is an enterprise zone area, that requirement is exempt by the [Dep artment of Building and Safety] to no more than . . . 21 [parking spac es].” That meant the lot needed a minimum of 31 parking spaces in the large parking lot (21 for the 8727 property and 10 for the 8737 property). Respondents restriped
the lot to include 36 parking spaces. Kashani “reduced [the passageway between the two parking lots] to more than the minimum legal requirement . . . for passageway[s].” The minimum requirement “is 9 feet or 10 feet”, but the width of this passageway is 11 feet 8 inches. The width was reduced because “parking was a requirement” for the
872 7 property; there was “an absolute need” for parking spaces. The driveway on the large parking lot opening onto Van Nuys Boulevard has greater width than the driveway between the large and small parking lots. The large parking lot “requires

two

- way access in and out, and it is governed by number of parking spaces located in there.” The minimum requirement for the driveway in the large parking lot is “19 or 20 feet” whereas the minimum requirement for the driveway to the small parking lot (with only seven parking spaces) is “9 or 10 feet” wide.11 2. Jim Farasatpour’s Testimony
Farasatpour is a licensed civil and structural engineer for
the State of California and is one of “the most famous civil engineer[s] in this area in this field.” He opined the large parkin g lot is “not fully” in compliance with the California Building Code. The parking spaces striped on the large parking lot did not conform to the plan that was submitted to the Dep artment of Building and Safety. The dimensions of some of the parking space s did not match what was written on the plan. Although the driveway into the small parking lot measures 11 feet 8 inches wide, there is only 10 feet of space for a vehicle to drive through if a truck is parked in the parking space near the driveway, as “tr uck [ s ] often times protrude much beyond [the space].” The width of the access and driveway “is significantly grossly inadequate.” The ADA parking space in the small parking lot behind appellants’ 8737 property “has to be a van access” which “requires must larger radius and larger access and backup space” than an ADA spot for car access. There is not enough space for a van to enter or park in that ADA parking space if there is a car parked near the driveway. While the driveway “can be as
narrow as almost 10 feet,” the backup space for the ADA parking spot requires more. Farasatpour relied on California Building
Code section 11B

- 503.2, which provides: “Passenger drop

- off and loading zones shall provide a vehicular pull

- up space 96 inches

. . . wide minimu m and 20 feet

. . . long minimum.”12 3. Hamid Dehghan’s Testimony
Dehghan has a Master’s Degree in architecture, an
architect license since 2015 and a certificate of construction management since 2017. Dehghan opined that Los Angeles Municipal Code 3 section
12. 21(A)(5)(f) 4 deals with the width of the passageway and applies in commercial settings. The width of the driveway depends on the number of spaces to be accessed in that parking lot. “The width of the driveway should be a minimum ten feet,
and if the numb er of the parking [spaces in] that driveway is more than 25, it should be increased to 19 feet” so as to allow for

two

- way traffic. He reasoned that because there are only seven parking spaces in the small parking lot behind the 8737 property,
the width o f the passageway to the small parking lot must be a
minimum of 10 feet. During closing argument, appellants argued respondents’ actions in unreasonably limiting the width of the passageway to approximately 10 feet “undermines the very purpose for which
the covenants were initially executed.”

3 F urther undesignated statutory references are to the Los Angeles Municipal Code.

4 Section 12.21(A)(5)(f) provides: Every access driveway shall be at least 9 to 10 feet in width; provided however, every access driveway serving a parking area having a capacity of more than 25 automobiles or trucks shall be at least 19 feet in width, or in lieu thereof, there shall be two access driveways, each of which is at least 10 feet in width.13

G. The Judgment
On January 31, 2020, the trial court entered judgment. The judgment provided as to appellants’ cause of action for declaratory relief:
Two ADA

- compliant parking spaces in the large parking lot
shall be fo r respondents’ exclusive use. None of the remaining parking spaces in the large parking lot shall be for the exclusive use of appellants or respondents. The large parking lot shall be monitored by an attendant (employed by respondents, whose
costs shall be shared by both owners) who will enforce the parties’ respective parking rights. Via a covenant, Acorn hill is entitled to
the non

- exclusive use of 10 parking spaces in the large parking lot (but not the ADA

- compliant parking spaces). Six parking

spaces shall be re

- striped to a width of 8 feet 2 inches, which will widen the passageway from the large parking lot to the small parking lot “by a total of one foot”; the passageway shall not be
narrowed without the written consent of the owner of the 8737

prop erty with the small parking lot. The owner of the 8727 property shall not construct a fence on the boundary of the adjacent property. This portion of the judgment is binding upon all subsequent owners of the 8727 and 8737 properties and the large parking lot. With respect to appellants’ remaining causes of action, judgment was entered against appellants and in favor of respondents. With respect to respondents’ complaint in the consolidated action, judgment wa s entered against appellants and in favor of

re spondents. Respondents were awarded the aggregate principal sum of $94,039.0 3 , with interest thereon in the sum of $32,485.35.14 With respect to appellants’ causes of action in the cross

complaint in the consolidated action, judgment was entered against app ellants and in favor of respondents. Appellants timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Appellants make one primary argument on appeal. They argue the trial court “erroneously permitted the reduction of the width of an easement” that is contrary to the law and withou t appellants’ consent.

A. Applicable Law
Generally speaking, an easement is a “ ‘restricted right to specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another’s property, which right must be less than the right of ownership.’ ” ( Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 , italics omitted ( Scruby ).) The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant by which it was acquired. (Civ. Code, § 806.) “Where the easement is founded upon a grant . . . only those interests expres sed in the grant and those necessarily incident thereto pass from the owner of the fee. “The general rule is clearly established that, despite the granting of an
easement, the owner of the servient tenement may make any use of the land that does not inter fere unreasonably with the

easement .” ( City of Pasadena v. California

- Michigan Land &
Water Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 579.) The owner of the dominant tenement must use his/her easements and rights in such a way so as to impose as slight burden as possibl e on the servient tenement. ( Scruby , at p. 702.) Civil Code section 1104 provides: “A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in15

favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person
whose estate is trans ferred in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed .” (Italics added.) Once a covenant and agreement re easement is recorded, “the burdens of the covenant shall be binding upon, and the benefits of the covenant shall inure to, all successors in interest to the real property.” (Gov. Code, § 65873.) In construing an instrument convey ing an easement, “the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. If the language is clear and explicit in the conveyance, there is no occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights acquired.” ( Scrub y , supra , 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.) If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument creating the easement is not reasonably susceptible. ( Ibid .)

B. Stan dard of Review
We exercise our independent judgment to interpret the language of an instrument granting easement rights and we review for substantial evidence the trial court’s resolution of any conflicting extrinsic evidence. ( Pear v. City and County of San
Francisco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 61 ( Pear ).) Additionally, whether a particular use by the servient owner of land subject to an easement is an unreasonable interference with the rights of the dominant owner is a question of fact for the trier of fact, and its findings based on conflicting evidence are binding on appeal. ( Scruby

, supra , 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.)16

C. Analysis
We begin by exercising our independent judgment to interpret the language of the instrument creating easement rights, i.e., the first covenant and agreement. The covenant expressly provided for a “community driveway.” It was a
covenant “to establish and maintain . . . a common or community driveway for ingress and egress to each [p]arcel .” The covenant

was created in order “to comply with Section [12.21(A)(4)(h)] of the Los Angeles Municipal Code relating to required access to automobile parking spaces .” This covenant runs with the land and is binding on all future owners, including appellants and respondents

— a fact conceded by all

. Section 12.21(A)(4)(h), expressly referred to in the covenant, provides: “An access driveway shall be provided and maintained between each automobile parking space or area and a street, or alley, or a private street or easement approved in
accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of this chapter. Such access driveway shall be located entirely on the lot which it serves.” Nothing in this section, nor A rticle 8 of said chapter, provide any width requirements for driveways such as the one
between the lar ge parking lot and small parking lot. If the scope or extent of an express easement is unclear, its use is to be measured rather by such uses as the parties might reasonably have expected from the future uses of the dominant tenement. ( Pear

, supra , 67 Ca l.App.5th at p. 71 .) The conveyance of an easement limited to driveway use
grants a right of ingress and egress and a right of unobstructed

passage to the holder of the easement. ( Scruby

, supra , 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.) A right

- of

- way to pass over the land of another carries with it the implied right to make such changes in17

the surface of the land as are necessary to make it available for travel in a convenient manner. ( Dolnikov v. Ekizian (2013)

222 Cal.App.4th 419, 428 ( Dolnikov ).) An obstruction wh ich unreasonably interferes with the use of a roadway easement can be ordered removed for the protection and preservation of the easement. ( Scruby , at p. 703.) However, the owner of a dominant tenement (appellants) must use their easement and rights in s uch a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible on the servient tenement (owned by respondents). ( Pear

, supra , 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 71 ; Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994)

7 Cal.4th 327, 356, fn. 17.) An easement gives a nonpossessory
and restricte d right to a specific use or activity upon another’s property . (

McBride v. Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1174.) The servient owner, here respondents, may use their property in any manner not inconsistent with the easement so long as it does not unreas onably impede the dominant tenants (i.e., appellants) in their rights. ( Dolnikov

, supra , 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.) Actions that make it more difficult to use an easement, that interfere with the ability to maintain and repair improvements built for its enjoyment, or that increase the risks attendant on exercise of rights created by the easement are prohibited unless justified by needs of the servant estate. ( Id . at

pp. 429

– 430.) In determining whether the holder of the servient estate has unreasonably interfered with exercise of an easement, the interests of the parties must be balance d to strike a reasonable accommodation that maximizes the overall utility to the extent consistent with effectuating the purpose of the easement. ( Id . at p. 430.) The q uestion before the trial court, as
the fact

- finder, was whether respondents’ reduction of the driveway from 20 feet to 11 feet 8 inches amounted to an18

unreasonable interference on appellants’ use of the driveway as part of their rights of ingress and egres s. Here, in the declaratory relief portion of the judgment, the trial court made an order that six parking spaces in the large parking lot be re

- striped to “widen the passageway” from the large parking lot to the small parking lot “by a total of one foot”, making the width of the driveway from the large parking lot to the small parking lot 12 feet 8 inches. This means the trial court impliedly found that the width of the driveway

— at that time

11 feet 8 inches

— was not wide enough. Thus, the trial court imp liedly found that respondents’ reduction of the driveway to

11 feet 8 inches was an unreasonable interference with appellants’ use of the driveway.
Whether encroachments in the easement area constitute an unreasonable interference with plaintiff’s use pres ents a question of fact to be resolved in the first instance by the trial court, whose determination is to be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. ( Scruby

, supra , 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.) Here, the record is replete with substantial e vidence supporting trial court’s implied finding that respondents’ reduction of the driveway to 11 feet 8 inches constituted an unreasonable interference with appellants’ use of the driveway. Appellants’ expert witness, Jim Farasatpour, opined that the wi dth of the driveway “is significantly grossly inadequate.” He also opined
that there was n o t enough space for a van to enter or park in the ADA parking space in the small parking lot if a car is parked near the driveway. However, appellants believe the tr ial court’s ruling is erroneous in that the driveway should have been restored to its original width of 20 feet; they disagree with the trial court’s19

implied finding that the width of 12 feet 8 inches is adequate for the driveway between the large and smal l parking lots. In support, appellants cite Youngstown Steel etc. Co. v. City of L.A. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 407 for the proposition that “[o]nce the location of an easement has been finally established, whether by express terms of the grant or by use and acquie scence, it cannot be substantially changed without the consent of both parties. [Citations.] And the grantor has no right either to hinder the grantee in his use of the way or to compel him to accept another location, even though a new location may be ju st as convenient.” ( Id. at pp. 410

– 411.) Appellants’ support is misplaced as this case provides that relocating or changing the location of an easement (as opposed to changing the width of an easement) requires the consent of both parties. Similarly, oth er cases cited by appellants, namely, Tarr v.
Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362

, 366 and Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673

, 681 are inapposite, as both cases stand for the proposition that where the width of a right of way is expressly specified , the ow ner may have the absolute right to use to the limits of the specified width even if that gives the owner a wider way than necessary. Those cases do not apply here where the first covenant and agreement does not expressly specify or qualify the right to in gress/egress on the driveway with width
dimensions. Appellants refer to the Dep artmen t of Building and Safety’s Zoning Code Manual and Commentary, which provides the following information with respect to section 12.21(A)(4)(h):
A community driveway “withi n such easement is improved to a width in conformance with the Fire Department’s fire access
standards . . . but in no event less than 20 feet.” ( City of L.A.20

Dept. of Building & Safety Zoning Code Manual & Com. (4th ed. 2021), pp. 149

– 150 .) While the zo ning manual provides commentary that a community driveway shall be 20 feet wide,
the fact remains that the law requires otherwise. S ection 12.21(A)(5)(f) provides that e very access driveway shall be at
least 9 to 10 feet in width , unless the access drivew ay serves a parking lot having a capacity of more than 25 automobiles or
trucks , in which case the driveway shall be at least 19 feet in
width . Here, the evidence provides that the small parking lot contains seven parking spots (including the ADA spot); t hus, the

court

- ordered driveway width of 12 feet and 8 inches is more than the required legal minimum width of 9 to 10 feet. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding. Additionally, appellants failed to provide any practical

reason w hy the driveway should be widened from 12 feet 8 inches to 20 feet. Appellants did not proffer evidence proving harm or damage because of a width of 12 feet 8 inches. No evidence of accidents or other dangerous conditions. No evidence that the

court

- ord ered width created a material interference incompatible with use of the easement. Appellants presented nothing to suggest that increasing the width of the driveway to 12 feet 8 inches is contrary to law. Appellants rely heavily on the fact that respondent s created 36 parking spaces in the large parking lot when they are legally required to have a minimum of 31 parking spaces. Appellants contend the creation of 36 parking spaces contributed to the reduction of the driveway’s width from 20 feet to 11 feet 8 inches. The reasons prompting the reduction of the width of the driveway are, for our purposes, unimportant. What matters is that the driveway now maintains its purpose and use by21

appellants as an easement for ingress and egress, as defined by
section 1 2.21(A)(4)(h).

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WILEY , J.

OHTA

, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.