Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:

PAUL D. LUDWIG CHARLES C. HOPPE, JR.

Redman Ludwig, P.C. Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight, LTD.

Indianapolis, Indiana Schererville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

NATHAN and DEANNA FERGUSON, )

)

Appellants-Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) No. 29A05-1301-CT-8

)

SHIEL SEXTON COMPANY, INC., WR DUNKIN)

& SON, INC., LYNCH, HARRISON & )

BRUMLEVE, INC., L’ACQUIS CONSULTING )

ENTERPRISES INDIANAPOLIS, LLC, d/b/a )

L’ACQUIS CONSULTING ENGINEERS, CSO )

ARCHITECTS, INC., BEATY CONSTRUCTION, )

INC., THE HAGERMAN GROUP, INC., d/b/a )

HAGERMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, )

COMPLETE MASONRY SERVICES, INC., )

BYBEE STONE COMPANY, INC., PURDY )

MASONRY, INC., SIMPLEXGRINNEL, LP, )

ERMCO, INC., and LITHKO CONTRACTING, )

INC. )

)

Appellees-Respondents. )

APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Steven R. Nation, Judge

Cause No. 29D01-1110-CT-10575
2

October 10, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge

Nathan and Deanna Ferguson appeal from the trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Poynter Sheet Metal, Inc. in their negligence action against Poynter and 

others. The Fergusons present the following issue for our review, which we restate: Did the 

trial court err by granting Poynter’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of duty?

We affirm.

The Fergusons filed a complaint in Hamilton County against Poynter and fourteen 

other defendants seeking damages for injuries Nathan alleged that he sustained on October 

20, 2009, while working on the construction of the Carmel Regional Performing Arts Center 

in Carmel, Indiana, and for Deanna’s consequent loss of consortium. The Fergusons claim 

that on that date, Nathan, who was an employee of General Piping, Inc., was traversing the 

worksite when the composite-wood (OSB board) temporary walkway placed on the worksite 

for use by project workers to gain access to their project work areas broke beneath him 

causing physical injuries, including an injury to his left knee. The Fergusons alleged that the 

OSB board was placed across a void in the building’s foundation by either Shiel Sexton 

Company, Inc. or at its direction by another of the named defendants. They contended that 

the OSB board was unsuitable for use as a temporary walkway because it deteriorated from 

exposure to the weather and ultimately broke.
3

On March 16, 2012, Poynter filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue 

whether Poynter owed a duty to Nathan to refrain from creating or permitting a hazardous 

condition at the project site. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and after taking the 

matter under consideration, granted Poynter’s motion. The Fergusons now appeal.1

In an Indiana summary judgment proceeding, “the party seeking summary judgment 

must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, and 

only then is the non-movant required to come forward with contrary evidence.” Jarboe v. 

Landmark Cmty Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994). T.R. 56(C) 

provides in pertinent part:

At the time of filing [a] motion [for summary judgment] or response, a party 

shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on 

which it relies for purposes of the motion. A party opposing the motion shall 

also designate to the court each material issue of fact which that party asserts 

precludes entry of summary judgment and the evidence relevant thereto. The 

judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the designated evidentiary 

matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment should not be entered where material facts conflict or where 

conflicting inferences are possible. Miller v. Monsanto Co., 626 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1993). When we review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment our standard 

of review is the same as that used by the trial court. J.C. Spence & Assoc., Inc. v. Geary, 712 

N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We must determine whether there is a genuine issue of 

 

1 Alt Wizig Engineering, Inc., a named defendant in this matter, has entered an appearance on appeal, but was 

not a movant or participant in the summary judgment proceedings from which this appeal was taken. 
4

material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In 

resolving those inquiries, we consider only the evidence that has been specifically designated 

to the trial court. Id. The party appealing the trial court’s ruling has the burden of 

persuading this court that the trial court’s decision was erroneous. Id. A summary judgment 

determination shall be made from any theory or basis found in the designated materials. Id. 

“We give careful scrutiny to the pleadings and designated materials, construing them in a 

light most favorable to the non-movant.” Id. at 1102 (quoting Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. 

Miner, 713 N.E.2d 293, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

Our Supreme Court has observed the following: An employee’s rights and remedies 

against his or her employer on account of jobsite injuries are governed by the Indiana’s 

Worker’s Compensation Act. But that Act does not restrict an injured employee from 

pursuing a claim against any “other person than the employer.” Ind. Code [Ann.] § 22-3-2-

13[(West, Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation)]. Hunt Constr. Grp, Inc. v. Garrett, 964 

N.E.2d 222, 224 (Ind. 2012).

The Fergusons’ complaint against Poynter and the other defendants, none of which are 

Nathan’s employer, alleges negligence. The three elements of negligence are a duty owed to 

the plaintiff by the defendant, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and injury to the 

plaintiff proximately caused by that breach. Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2002). “Negligence will not be inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence 

action must be supported by specific facts designated to the trial court or reasonable 

inferences that might be drawn from those facts.” Id. at 911. An inference resting on no 
5

more than speculation or conjecture is not a reasonable inference. Kincade v. MAC Corp., 

773 N.E.2d 909. 

Furthermore, we have held that a negligence action is generally not appropriate for 

disposal by summary judgment. Id. A defendant in a negligence action, however, may 

obtain summary judgment in such an action when the undisputed facts negate at least one 

element of the plaintiff’s claim. Id. Here, the question involves the existence of a duty.

“Whether a defendant owes a duty of care to a plaintiff is a question of law for the 

court to decide.” Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, 

the argument presented by the Fergusons is that Poynter had a contractual, non-delegable 

duty to Nathan and that argument is supported by reference to several provisions in Poynter’s 

contract with the Carmel Redevelopment Commission (CRC). Poynter contends that the 

Fergusons have waived arguments based upon various portions of Poynter’s contract by 

failing to make the appropriate designations and argument when the trial court was 

considering the issue. Arguments not presented to the trial court on summary judgment are 

waived for purposes of appeal. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Ault, 918 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009). 

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Poynter designated the Fergusons’ 

complaint, Poynter’s answer and affirmative defenses, and the affidavit of Bill Clements, 

Poynter’s project manager at the work site. Attached to Clements’s affidavit was a copy of 

Poynter’s contract with the CRC. Poynter argued in its memorandum of law in support of its 

motion that Poynter owed no duty to Nathan because Poynter was not an owner of the 
6

premises, nor was Poynter a general contractor. Poynter was not doing any work in the area 

of the alleged incident, and none of Poynter’s employees placed, maintained, or controlled 

the walkway or the walkway area. Nathan was not an employee, agent, or servant of Poynter 

or any of Poynter’s subcontractors.

The Fergusons designated three documents to the trial court in opposition to Poynter’s 

motion for summary judgment. The first document was the Fergusons’s complaint. In the 

complaint, no reference is made to a contractual duty on the part of Poynter to Nathan. The 

second document was the affidavit of Bill Clements. In his affidavit, Clements denied the 

existence of a duty to Nathan as Nathan was not an agent of or in the employ of Poynter or 

any of Poynter’s subcontractors. Clements denied that anyone associated with Poynter had 

anything to do with the placement or maintenance of the temporary walkway. The third 

document was a copy of the OSHA Multi-Employer Citation Policy. Under OSHA 

regulations, according to the Multi-Employer Citation Policy, a duty is imposed on 

contractors and subcontractors to protect all employees, whether their own employee or the 

employee of another from hazardous conditions at a work site. 

In response, Poynter alleged that the Fergusons did “not present any argument that 

Poynter owed [Nathan] a duty of care under common law, contract or statute.” Appellants’ 

Appendix at 204. Poynter noted that the Fergusons relied solely upon OSHA regulations and 

cited to Stumpf v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 863 N.E.2d 871, 876 n2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), for 

the proposition that “a duty cannot be created by an OSHA regulation alone.” 
7

During the summary judgment hearing, counsel for the Fergusons made the following 

argument to the trial court:

Under the contract that Poynter had with the City of Carmel for its work on the 

Performing Arts Center which is sponsored by their Affidavit, at Section 620, 

there are provisions 620.1, 620.2 that provide that the contractor, being 

Poynter, will comply with all applicable laws regarding the safety and 

precautions to be taken on the project. Applicable laws include OSHA 

regulations, Your Honor. And the OSHA regulations cited in our Reply 

[B]rief specifically place the Plaintiff in the [protected] class from all 

contractors’ safety responsibilities. Under the OSHA Multi-Employer Citation 

Policy, the responsibility covers all contractors on the site. Each contractor has 

a duty under OSHA to protect other employees, not only their own, from 

perils. And Poynter specifically assumed that obligation and that duty as a 

matter of contract in its contract with the City of Carmel. . . .

Transcript at 11-12. Thus, the argument has not been waived, and consistent with our 

standard of review, we will consider the additional arguments made by the Fergusons, the 

non-movants, that Poynter’s duty to Nathan arose by contract. 

On appeal, the Fergusons contend that Poynter, as a contractor at the worksite, had a 

duty to abide by OSHA regulations. They cite to a provision of Poynter’s contract whereby 

Poynter agrees to comply with “all present and future federal, state[,] and local laws, 

executive orders, rules, regulations[,] codes and ordinances which may be applicable” to 

Poynter’s performance under the contract. Appellants’ Appendix at 85. The Fergusons claim 

that Poynter’s duty to Nathan arose from the contract because OSHA requirements are 

federal regulations. Under OSHA regulations, according to the Multi-Employer Citation 

Policy, employers on multi-employer worksites have a duty to protect all employees whether 

their own employee or the employee of another from hazardous conditions at a work site. 

CPL 02-00-124. 
8

As we stated in Armstrong v. Cerestar USA, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002) and noted in Stumpf v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 876, “an OSHA 

standard cannot be used to expand an existing common law or statutory duty, or be used as 

evidence of an expanded duty of care.” Here the question is whether a duty arose 

contractually. A duty of care, the breach of which will support a negligence action, may arise 

contractually. Plan-Tec, Inc. v. Wiggins, 443 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 

In interpreting a written contract, it is the duty of the trial court to interpret the 

contract so as to ascertain the intent of the parties. It must accept an 

interpretation of the contract that harmonizes its provisions as opposed to one 

which causes the provisions to be conflicting. The meaning of a contract is to 

be determined from an examination of all its provisions, not from a 

consideration of individual words, phrases or even paragraphs read alone.

The court will attempt to determine the intent of the parties at the time the 

contract was made as disclosed by the language used to express their rights and 

duties. If the contract is ambiguous or uncertain in its terms and if the 

meaning of the contract is to be determined by extrinsic evidence, its 

construction is a matter for the fact finder. If, however, as here, the ambiguity 

arises because of the language used in the contract and not because of extrinsic 

facts, then its construction is purely a question of law to be determined by the 

court.

On appeal we will independently evaluate a pure question of law, substituting 

our judgment for that of the trial court if necessary.

Teitge v. Remy Constr. Co., Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Borrowing again from our Supreme Court’s opinion in Hunt Constr. Grp, Inc. v. 

Garrett, we reproduce the following passage here:

A brief overview of the construction industry as it relates to this case is a 

helpful starting point. “Construction management” has grown in recent 

decades as an alternative to the conventional approach to large construction 
9

projects. A conventional construction project typically features owners, 

architects, engineers, general contractors, and subcontractors with discrete 

project responsibilities, none of which consist of overall management of the 

construction project as a primary activity. In contrast, construction 

management separates and consolidates the management function in one entity 

called the construction manager. Construction management offers certain 

advantages over the conventional approach—sophisticated cost estimating 

capabilities, practical analysis of design alternatives, and shortened 

development processes. It also has its disadvantages—higher fees, 

coordination problems, and a lack of single-point responsibility for both the 

construction process and the construction product. A construction manager 

undertakes a variety of responsibilities as specified in a written contract 

between the construction manager and the project owner. And some of these 

responsibilities often relate to jobsite safety. 

964 N.E.2d at 224-25 (internal citations omitted). We now turn to the provisions of 

Poynter’s contract with the CRC.

The contract was attached to Clements’s affidavit. Important definitions are included 

in the City of Carmel Standard General Conditions for Construction Contracts, which was 

explicitly incorporated in Poynter’s contract. The definitions follow:

CONSTRUCTION MANAGER—Shiel Sexton Co., Inc., acting by and 

through the Carmel Redevelopment Commission. 

CONTRACTOR—The person, firm or corporation with whom OWNER has 

entered into the Agreement.

Laws and/or Regulations—Laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, codes, 

administrative actions and/or orders of any court or governmental agency or 

unit.

OWNER—The City of Carmel, Indiana.

Project—The total construction of one or more improvements or structures of 

which the Work to be provided under the Contract Documents may be the 

whole, or a part, as indicated elsewhere in the Contract Documents. 

Work—The entire construction, or the various separately identifiable parts 

thereof, required to be furnished under the Contract Documents. The Work is 
10

the result and product of performing services, furnishing labor and furnishing 

and incorporating materials and equipment into the construction, all as 

required by the Contract Documents. 

Appellants’ Appendix at 92-95. Armed with the pertinent contractual definitions, we turn to 

the provisions at issue.

The agreement entered into between the City of Carmel by the CRC and Poynter was 

entitled “AGREEMENT, City of Carmel, Indiana, Bid Package #4310—HVAC Sheet Metal, 

Agreement #2695-4310” and consisted of several documents and attachments. Id. at 82. The 

Fergusons contend that section 5.9, which establishes the Contractor’s agreement to comply 

with government regulations, is the basis for Poynter’s duty to Nathan. Section 5.9 provides 

as follows: 

Government Compliance

CONTRACTOR [Poynter] agrees to comply with all present and future 

federal, state and local laws, executive orders, rules, regulations, codes and 

ordinances which may be applicable to CONTRACTOR’S performance of its 

obligations under this Agreement, and all relevant provisions thereof are 

incorporated herein by reference. CONTRACTOR agrees to indemnify and 

hold harmless OWNER [CRC] from any loss, damage or liability resulting 

from any violation of such laws, orders, rules, regulations, codes and/or 

ordinances. This indemnification obligation shall survive the termination of 

this Agreement.

Id. at 85. They claim that since Poynter agreed to comply with federal regulations, and since 

OSHA regulations and the Multi-Employer Citation Policy are federal regulations, Poynter 

owed a duty of care to Nathan. Poynter, on the other hand, cites Section 5.4, which provides 

that nothing contained within the agreement gives any rights or benefits to anyone other than 

the Owner and the Contractor. 
11

Section 6.2 provides as follows:

6.2 Resident Superintendent—Contractor [Poynter] shall keep on the work site 

at all times during its progress a competent resident superintendent, who shall 

not be replaced without written notice to Owner, Construction Manager, and 

Engineer except under extraordinary circumstances. The superintendent 

[Clements] will be Contractor’s representative at the site and shall have 

authority to act on behalf of Contractor. All communications given to or 

issued by the superintendent shall be as binding as if given to or issued by 

Contractor. 

Id. at 108. Section 6.4 contains the following language:

6.4 Full Responsibility. Unless otherwise specified in the Contract 

Documents, Contractor shall furnish and assume full responsibility for all 

material, equipment, labor, transportation, construction equipment and 

machinery, tools, appliances, fuel, power, light, heat, telephone, water, sanitary 

facilities, and all other facilities, services and incidentals necessary for the 

furnishing, performance, testing, start-up and completion of the Work.

Id. An additional provision, which is contained in Section 6.14, is relied upon by the 

Fergusons and states:

Laws and Regulations. CONTRACTOR shall give all notices and comply 

with all Laws and Regulations in effect during the furnishing and performance 

of the Work. Except where otherwise expressly required by applicable Laws 

and Regulations, neither OWNER nor CONSTRUCTION MANAGER nor 

ENGINEER shall be responsible for monitoring CONTRACTOR’s 

compliance with Laws or Regulations.

Id. at 110. 

One of the attachments, Exhibit A, which was incorporated into the contract, provides 

as follows with respect to “SAFETY/QUALITY CONTROL:” 

--Prime Contractor responsible for quality control and sign-off forms

--CM will have hold points throughout the work

--Shiel Sexton does have a full time safety manager on site to enforce project

safety.
12

Id. at 89 (Emphasis supplied). Furthermore, in regard to safety, Section 6.20.1 provides in 

pertinent part as follows:

CONTRACTOR shall be solely responsible for initiating, maintaining and 

supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work 

and shall take all necessary precautions for the safety of, and provide the 

necessary protection to prevent damage, injury or loss to (i) all employees on 

the Work and other persons and organizations who may be affected thereby, 

(ii) all the Work and all materials or equipment to be incorporated therein, 

whether in storage on or off the site, and (iii) other property at the site or 

adjacent thereto, including trees, shrubs, lawns, walks, pavements, roadways, 

structures, utilities and Underground Facilities not designated for removal, 

relocation or replacement in the course of construction.

Id. at 112. 

In Teitge v. Remy Constr. Co., Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), we 

analyzed a very similar issue. In Teitge, a negligence action arose from an injury suffered by 

an employee of one of several prime contractors doing work on a multi-employer 

construction site. The appeal involved the determination of a duty, if any, owed to the 

injured employee by a prime contractor who was not the employee’s employer. The contract 

between the prime contractor and the project owner included language that also appeared in 

the contracts of other prime contractors to the effect that the contractor “shall comply with all 

applicable provisions of Federal, State, and Municipal safety laws and building codes to 

prevent accidents or injury to persons on, about or adjacent to the premises where the work is 

being performed.” Id. at 1011.

We stated the following about the plaintiff’s argument about the prime contractor’s 

duty in that situation:
13

Teitge fails to show how this provision of the contract—applicable to each and 

every prime contractor on the construction site—imposes upon Remy, one 

prime contractor, any duty to Teitge, an employee of another prime contractor. 

Indeed, Paragraph 1(B) of the General Conditions makes it clear that the word 

“Contractor,” when not further qualified, refers to all contractors on the site. 

Thus, here, the word “Contractor” does not refer only to Remy and, standing 

alone, we cannot conclude that this provision of the contract imposes upon 

each contractor a duty to protect all of the employees on the job site.

In fact, it makes no sense to conclude that the contractors were required to 

constantly inspect the work of the employees of all the other contractors, to 

supply their omissions, and to neutralize the dangerous effects of their 

negligent workmanship. It is more logical to conclude that each contractor 

was responsible for protecting its own employees during the performance of its 

portion of the contract. Otherwise, the cost of avoiding or insuring against 

such potential liability would be entirely out of proportion to anticipated 

profits for most, if not all, of the contractors. Furthermore, chaos would reign 

supreme on any job where several contractors with divergent concepts of 

safety might take seriously their supposed duty to supervise the safety practices 

of themselves and each other. 

Such a chaotic result cannot reasonably be said to have been envisioned by the 

parties. Where one construction of a contract would make it unusual and 

extraordinary, but another, equally consistent with the language, would make it 

reasonable, just, and fair, the latter construction must prevail. 

Id. at 1011-12. 

The cases to which we are directed by the Fergusons are factually distinguishable 

from the present case and as such are not controlling here. For example, in Moore v. 

Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 821 (S.D. Ind. 2011), a general 

contractor was found to owe a contractual duty of care to a subcontractor’s employee. The 

contractual language used was such that a contractual duty of care arose with respect to all 

employees at the worksite. That contract stated that the contractor “shall be fully and solely 
14

responsible for the jobsite safety of such means, methods, techniques, sequences or 

procedures. . . .” Id. at 825. 

In Perryman v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), a 

worker in charge of setting four steel, I-beam columns at a construction worksite was killed 

when he fell approximately ninety feet to his death. His widow brought an action alleging 

negligence and the failure to enforce OSHA regulations as the proximate cause of her 

husband’s death. We reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the construction management 

company had not assumed a duty to ensure worker safety at the project site. The construction 

management company had argued that because each of the individual contractors 

contractually agreed to comply with all state and federal regulations, the construction 

management company was relieved of its project-wide duty to enforce safety regulations. 

We held that the fact the individual contractors also agreed to comply with state and federal 

regulations did not relieve the construction management company of its duties, but rather 

made both the individual contractor and the construction management company potentially 

liable. 

In Stumpf v. Hagerman, 863 N.E.2d 871, an employee of an independent contractor 

who had been hired by a subcontractor brought a negligence action against the subcontractor 

and general contractor for injuries the employee suffered during his work on a construction 

project. We reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the 

general contractor and subcontractor. In so doing, we held that the contract language 

“evinces intent by the parties to charge [the general contractor] with a duty of care for the 
15

safety of all the employees on the project, including the employees of its subcontractors.” Id. 

at 878. The pertinent contract language that we interpreted read as follows:

The Contractor shall take all necessary precautions for the safety of employees 

on the work, and shall comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, State, 

and Municipal safety laws and building codes to prevent accidents or injury to 

persons on, about or adjacent to the premises where the work is being 

performed. . . . Contractor shall designate a responsible member of its 

organization on the work, whose duty shall be the prevention of accidents. 

Id. at 877. That language illustrated what we concluded was an intent to make the general 

contractor follow applicable laws for the benefit third parties, i.e., those on or about the 

premises. Language in the present case provided that Poynter would indemnify the CRC for 

any violation of the law. Appellants’ Appendix at 85. 

Further, in Harris v. Kettelhut Constr., Inc., 468 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), the 

employee of a subcontractor brought an action against the prime contractor and owner for 

damages due to injuries sustained after a fall on the worksite. In that case we acknowledged 

the general rule that because a general contractor typically exercises little, if any, control over 

the means or manner of work of its subcontractors, requiring only that the completed work 

meet the contractual specifications of the owner, liability is seldom imposed on the general 

contractor for the negligence of a subcontractor. 468 N.E.2d at 1072. We also 

acknowledged five well-recognized exceptions to the general rule, in particular, where a 

party is by law or contract charged with a specific duty. The general contractor’s contract 

with the owner provided that the general contractor “shall take all necessary precautions for 

the safety of all employees on the Project, and all other persons who may be affected 

thereby.” Id. 
16

The trial correctly found that Poynter did not have a duty of care arising by contract to 

Nathan. Poynter’s contract specifically provided that Poynter was responsible for “all safety 

precautions and programs in connection with the Work and shall take all necessary 

precautions for the safety of, and provide the necessary protection to prevent damage, injury 

or loss to (i) all employees on the Work and other persons and organizations who may be 

affected thereby.” Appellants’ Appendix at 112 (emphasis supplied). Of note is the use of 

the word “Work” instead of “Project.” The work Poynter was called on to perform involved 

the HVAC system on the project, and not the digging of trenches or other work pertaining to 

foundations or walkways.

The Fergusons, however, direct us to Poynter’s contractual duty to comply with 

OSHA’s Multi-Employer Citation Policy, CPL 02-00-124. Specifically, the Fergusons claim 

that Poynter was required to make sure that the cover over the hole was capable of supporting 

at least twice the weight of employees, equipment and materials that it would be exposed to 

at any time, ensure that any covers are secured when installed to prevent accidental 

misplacement by wind, equipment or employees, and to ensure that the cover was colorcoded or marked with a warning of the hazard such as ‘HOLE’ or ‘COVER.’ Appellants’ 

Brief at 18-19 (citing 29 CFR § 1926.501(i); § 1926.502(i)(3); § 1926.502(i)(4)).

The Fergusons’ argument fails because Poynter was not a creating, exposing, 

correcting, or controlling employer. Under OSHA’s Multi-Employer Citation Policy, a 

creating employer is “[t]he employer that caused a hazardous condition that violates an 

OSHA standard.” Appellants’ Appendix at 199. The only designated evidence in the record 
17

pertinent to that characterization comes from Clements’s affidavit in which he attests that 

neither Poynter, “nor any of its agents or employees or anyone under its supervision or 

control had anything whatsoever to do with placing or maintaining the alleged temporary 

walkway at the location where Nathan Ferguson alleges that he was injured.” Id. at 80. 

Thus, the only relevant designated evidence in the record supports Poynter’s contention that 

it was not a creating employer. 

Next, an employer can be cited for an OSHA violation if it is an exposing employer. 

An exposing employer is defined as “an employer whose own employees are exposed to the 

hazard.” Id. at 199. Again, turning to the evidence designated to the trial court, Clements’s 

affidavit established that Poynter “did no work outside of the building at the entrance to the

construction site” where the alleged incident occurred. Id. at 79. The Fergusons have 

claimed only that Poynter’s employees were exposed to the hazard, and have failed to support 

their claim by the designation of evidence in support of it. 

Because the Fergusons have claimed that the hazard existed and was not corrected 

prior to Nathan’s alleged worksite injury, we do not and need not address whether Poynter 

was a correcting or controlling employer. In sum, the Fergusons have failed to establish that 

the trial court erred. 

Our resolution of this appeal finds support in a case from the Seventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals. In Anning-Johnson Co. v. U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 516 

F.2d 1081 (1975), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the potential liability of 

subcontractors on a multi-employer construction site under OSHA. The issue in Anning-
18

Johnson was whether subcontractors working at a multi-employer construction site could 

receive OSHA citations or could be held liable for OSHA penalties for nonserious violations 

of promulgated standards to which their employees were exposed, but which the 

subcontractors neither created nor were responsible for by contract. In finding that the 

subcontractors could neither be cited nor held liable for penalties in that situation, the 

Seventh Circuit set out the parties’ positions, which we find instructive here. The position 

advanced by the Secretary of Labor in favor of liability follows:

(T)hese contentions by Respondent evade the real issue which is the exposure, 

if any, by Respondent of his employees to hazards. The underlying duty of 

each and every employer under Section 5 of the Act, regardless of whether an 

alleged violation was predicated upon paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) thereof, is to 

refrain from exposing employees to hazards. The Act grants no exceptions nor 

does it permit any delegation of this duty. The Act does not abridge the right to 

contract, it merely implies that an employer cannot by contract evade this duty 

to furnish a place of employment that is free of hazards. This duty is imposed 

upon each employer and makes no distinction as to whether the employer is a 

general contractor or a subcontractor; it may even include a lessor of 

employees relinquishing all control. Further the Act does not allow for any 

severance of responsibility predicated upon who produced or created the 

hazard or who may initially be responsible for its eradication.

Simply stated, whenever a subcontractor exposes his employees to hazards the 

employer subjects himself to the enforcement provisions of the Act and this is 

so regardless of who created the hazard or who may be responsible for its 

elimination. 

Id. at 1085 (quoting Charles S. Powell d/b/a Powell Elec., 3 OSSAHRC 1056, 1060-61 

(1973)). The opposing position was summed up as follows and lends support to our 

resolution of this appeal:

Admittedly, the respondent is responsible for the “place of employment,” yet 

no one should conclude that such responsibility imposed by the Act embraces

the entire work project as shown in this case. This responsibility is the 
19

responsibility of the prime contractor. What then is the responsibility of the 

respondent, as a subcontractor employer? His responsibility is his worksite or 

that portion of the work as provided in his contract of employment. Under the 

Act, the respondent is required to comply with occupational safety and health 

standards and upon doing so, complys (sic) with the Act by furnishing a place 

of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely 

to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees. Laws usually follow 

the rule of reason and thus it would not be reasonable to require a 

subcontractor to insure a safe workplace for his employees, if to do so would 

embrace an entire work project on which numerous other contractors’ 

employees are working.

Under section 9(a) (29 U.S.C. s 658(a)) of the Act it is mandatory for an 

abatement period to be fixed with respect to each alleged violation. 

Respondent then is required to correct any violations, but can he correct a 

violation, the creation of which was not of his doing nor over which he has any 

control? Can respondent correct a violation which by doing so would interfere 

with the work endeavor of another subcontractor? Did Congress intend for an 

employer to correct a violation, to cease his portion of the work he is required 

to perform under contract, although the cause of the violation has no relation to 

his portion of the work under contract? Certainly, these queries must be 

resoundingly answered in the negative.

Id. at 1085-86 (quoting Robert E. Lee Plumbers, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 2431 at 7-8).

The Fergusons have failed to establish that the trial court erred by the entry of 

summary judgment in favor of Poynter on the issue of duty of care.

Judgment affirmed. 

BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.