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THE TERRORIST DIASPORA: AFTER THE FALL 

OF THE CALIPHATE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

TASK FORCE ON DENYING 

TERRORISTS ENTRY 

TO THE UNITED STATES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 13, 2017 

Serial No. 115–22 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

KATHLEEN CROOKS FLYNN, Deputy General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

TASK FORCE ON DENYING TERRORISTS ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin, Chairman 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York (ex officio) 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Mike Gallagher, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry to 

the United States: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Task Force on Denying 

Terrorists Entry to the United States: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Mr. Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher Fellow, The Heritage Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Colin P. Clarke, Political Scientist, The Rand Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for Thomas Joscelyn ....................... 41 

Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for Robin Simcox ............................ 41 

Questions From Chairman Mike Gallagher for Colin P. Clarke ......................... 43 

(1) 

THE TERRORIST DIASPORA: AFTER THE FALL 

OF THE CALIPHATE 

Thursday, July 13, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, TASK FORCE ON DENYING TERRORISTS

ENTRY TO THE UNITED STATES, Washington, DC. 

The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 3:31 p.m., in Room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mike Gallagher [Chairman 

of the task force] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gallagher, Higgins, Rutherford, Garrett, Fitzpatrick, Katko, Watson Coleman, Jackson Lee, and 

Barraga ́n. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Committee on Homeland Security Task 

Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States will come 

to order. First of all, thank you all for being so patient. 

Oftentimes you have to vote in Congress, and that can screw up 

our best-laid plans. So we really appreciate you sticking with us. 

This is an important topic, and we want to make sure we cover it 

as thoroughly as possible. 

We are meeting today to examine the current terror threat landscape, how the terrorist diaspora will affect the security of the 

homeland, and what additional measures the United States can 

take to mitigate the threat. 

In the interest of time, the Ranking Member and I have agreed 

to submit our opening statements for the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. OK. 

[The statements of Chairman Gallagher and Ranking Member 

Watson Coleman follow:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER

JULY 13, 2017 

Reports from the Middle East’s conflict zones contain the positive news of U.S. 

and allied forces’ successes in Syria and Iraq. In the past week, U.S.-backed forces 

in Syria have breached the wall around Raqqa’s Old City, marking a major advance 

in the months-long battle to drive the Islamic State out of its self-declared capital. 

In Iraq this week, Prime Minister Abadi arrived in Mosul to formally declare victory 

after Iraqi troops fought back a fierce resistance from the Islamic State, literally 

fighting meter by meter, to gain control of the city. 

Looming over news of victory are questions about the road ahead. Today, jihadi 

fighters are fleeing to other towns, concealing themselves among locals, and joining 

affiliates in places like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and the Philippines. A New York Times correspondent reported from Mosul that the recovered 

bodies of ISIS fighters are primarily from the Caucasus, leaving locals to believe 

that Iraqi fighters have been shaving their beards, blending into the population, and 

2 

fleeing with groups of refugees. Nor is the fighting over. ISIS still retains much of 

Al Anbar Province in Iraq and the Euphrates River valley in Syria. When I left Al 

Anbar in 2008, the neighborhoods were safe enough to walk around without body 

armor. My unit and I were fortunate enough to hand out soccer balls and school 

supplies to Iraqi children who were starting school and finally living in a safer area 

and free from terror. Within 7 years, that province was under ISIS’ control. 

Western Europe, with its access to the United States, has been a particularly concerning source of foreign fighters. Secretary Kelly recently described as many as 

10,000 European citizens that went to take part in the region’s sectarian struggle. 

While many of those who went to fight are now dead, there are numerous fighters 

now seeking to return home. The New York Times reported that between 100 and 

250 ideologically-driven foreigners are thought to have been smuggled into Europe 

between 2014 and mid-2016, nearly all through Turkey. These returning fighters 

pose a greater threat to the West than ever before. They have learned to make IEDs 

in many forms, deploy drones that can drop grenades, and engage in combat with 

a range of deadly weapons, including low-tech weaponry like vehicles. And they can 

use this knowledge to train a younger generation of Western citizens susceptible to 

radicalization. 

Europe has had to bear the brunt of the so-called Caliphate’s collapse. Facing the 

return of these jihadists, Europe has increased its defenses in many ways, including 

through increased intelligence collection and sharing, more programs to vet and 

screen travelers, and enhanced border security. 

The question is whether these improvements are enough in light of today’s grave 

threat. Authorities have not been able to identify all returnees, some of whom have 

sophisticated false documents. Patchwork screening and inconsistent border checks 

have allowed jihadists to hatch plots and hide from police by moving between European states. Additionally, limited intelligence sharing and unheeded warnings between the European Union’s member states allows plotters to slip through the nets 

of law enforcement. 

This task force’s primary concern is the degree to which jihadists threaten the 

homeland. The United States also faces a threat from returning foreign fighters. 

Our Visa Waiver Program, which allows European citizens to travel to the United 

States without a visa and with less screening, does provide an opportunity for determined terrorists to exploit. 

The United States and Europe’s close relationship, based on a common history, 

shared values, and dependent economies, means that we must ensure the safety of 

travel across the Atlantic without disturbing tourist and commercial activity. The 

solution lies in our ability to quickly and effectively vet and screen travelers, gain 

sufficient intelligence from our allies, and act on credible threats when identified. 

This task force was established to determine the threat that jihadists and returning foreign fighters pose to the homeland and our ability to meet that threat 

through the Department of Homeland Security’s vetting and screening infrastructure. 

I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses on the current threat and 

commensurate U.S. defenses. I thank the witnesses for being here and for the research they are conducting at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Heritage 

Foundation, and the Rand Corporation, which has informed lawmakers and the Executive branch on this critical topic. 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN

JULY 13, 2017 

Tens of thousands of foreign fighters from countries around the globe have traveled to Iraq and Syria to engage in the fight on behalf of ISIS. The vast majority 

of these individuals are thought to be from Europe, with a far smaller number coming from the United States. Over time, many of these fighters have begun to return 

home, raising concerns about the security threat they may pose both to their native 

countries and nations abroad. 

On this task force, we are charged with examining the potential threat foreign 

fighters and other terrorists may pose to the United States in particular. Specifically, we are focused on how our Government can identify foreign fighters who may 

seek to travel to this country to do us harm and deny them entry. 

This is no easy task, to be sure. Travel to and from the so-called caliphate is generally clandestine, and many countries lack either the capacity to collect information 

on their returning citizens or the will to share it with our Government. 

3 

Given this challenge, I strongly agree with the testimony of our witness, Dr. 

Clarke, that our first priority in addressing the foreign fighter threat should be detection. We must identify returning foreign fighters so we can determine which have 

the intent and means to travel to the United States to carry out an attack and focus 

our efforts to deny them entry to this country. 

That, in turn, requires increasing information sharing with partner nations and 

enhancing their capacity to screen potential terrorists. This initiative must be done 

cooperatively, recognizing the sovereignty of other nations and their varying laws 

and technological capacity, while underscoring our shared interest in this important 

goal. 

Unfortunately, I am concerned that the Trump administration’s travel ban and 

rhetoric about Muslims as well as alienation of our friends in Europe is counterproductive to the kind of multilateral cooperation that is necessary. I hope we can 

overcome these unfortunate actions to work cooperatively in the interest of the security of America. 

Today, I look forward to hearing the assessment of our witness panel about what 

our Government is currently doing to address the threat of returning foreign fighters to the homeland, and what more can and should be done. 

Of course, addressing the potential threat posed by returning foreign fighters is 

just one part of securing the homeland. But as events continue to unfold in Syria 

and more fighters return home, coinciding with increased attacks in Europe, we 

must ensure we are doing all we can to secure our Nation from this threat. 

I know the Members of this task force are deeply committed to doing our part 

in that effort, on a bipartisan basis, and I am pleased to be a part of it. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. With that, we are lucky—and the other Members of the committee are reminded that their statements may be 

submitted for the record as well. 

[The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Honorable 

Jackson Lee follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 13, 2017 

This committee has a long history of addressing terrorist travel to the United 

States through its oversight and legislative work. Today’s task force hearing will address a topic that has been addressed by a previous committee task force and subcommittees. 

The rising number of foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria to Europe, 

along with increased terrorist attacks in Europe, raises concern about the possibility 

of foreign fighters from Europe or elsewhere seeking to enter this country to do us 

harm. 

Identifying foreign fighters among the millions of legitimate travelers to the 

United States each year is a serious challenge for the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies. 

Individuals have become more sophisticated about traveling to the so-called caliphate undetected. Many of our foreign partners have limited ability to track their 

returnees and information sharing can be a challenge. It is therefore incumbent 

upon the United States to continue to enhance our capacity to identify those who 

have traveled to Iraq and Syria for terrorist purposes and support our partners’ capacity to do the same. 

It is also imperative that we strengthen information-sharing agreements and 

practices with foreign governments to ensure that they are providing information 

about their returnees who may pose a threat to the United States. This effort requires diplomacy and relationship building, neither of which have been a strong suit 

of the Trump administration thus far. Oftentimes, putting ‘‘America first’’ means 

working with foreign partners rather than alienating them. 

I know the operators at DHS and other Federal agencies have forged good working relationships with their foreign counterparts. Perhaps the administration at its 

highest level could take a lesson from them. 

I would also note that 7 months into the Trump presidency, the Department of 

Homeland Security still has numerous vacancies in critical leadership positions, including those integral to addressing the foreign fighter threat, including commissioner of Customs and Border Protection and director of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, under secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and assistant secretary 

for the Office of Policy. 

4 

‘‘Acting’’ agency heads may be career officials with substantial expertise, but they 

are generally not empowered to implement new policies and initiatives. The White 

House needs to ensure the Department has confirmed leadership in place to deal 

with emerging and evolving threats like the matter before the Task Force this afternoon. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

JULY 13, 2017 

Chairman Mike Gallagher and Ranking Member Bonnie Watson Coleman thank 

you for leading this task force as we consider the important question of ‘‘Denying 

Terrorists Entry to the United States: Examining Visa Security.’’ 

Today’s hearing allows Members of the task force to examine the current status 

of the changes to the terror threat landscape as ISIS continues to lose ground in 

Syria and Iraq and foreign fighters begin to return to their home countries. 

I look forward to exploring strategies and policy changes that are needed to combat this emerging threat, particularly as it relates to the homeland security. 

I welcome today’s witnesses: 

• Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; 

• Mr. Robin Simcox, Margaret Thatcher fellow, with the Heritage Foundation; 

and 

• Dr. Colin P. Clarke (Democratic witness), political scientist, with The RAND 

Corporation. 

The task force will examine all pathways by which extremists might infiltrate the 

homeland and will seek to identify gaps in U.S. Government information-sharing 

and vetting procedures. 

As for those of us who are senior Members of this committee, we understand how 

important it is to protect the security of our homeland from those who would do it 

harm. 

The purpose of the hearing is to examine the current status of the changes to the 

terror threat landscape as ISIS continues to lose ground in Syria and Iraq and foreign fighters begin to return to their home countries. Members of the task force will 

also explore strategies and policy changes that are needed to combat this emerging 

threat, particularly as it relates to the homeland. This is also an opportunity for 

the task force to exam how the U.S. Government can address foreign fighters who 

may seek to enter this country. 

Last Congress, I introduced H.R. 48, the ‘‘No Fly For Foreign Fighters Act.’’ This 

legislation sought to help keep foreign fighters and terrorists from entering our 

country through an American airport. 

Specifically, the ‘‘No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act’’ required the director of the Terrorist Screening Center to review the completeness of the Terrorist Screening Database and the terrorist watch list utilized by the Transportation Security Administration to determine if an individual who may seek to board a U.S.-bound or domestic 

flight, and who poses a threat to aviation or national security or a threat of terrorism and is known or suspected of being a member of a foreign terrorist organization, is included in the database and on such watch list. 

The route that the terrorist used on September 11, 2001 was commercial aircraft 

that they turned into improvised explosives that killed over 3,000 people, and 

caused life-changing injuries to hundreds of others. 

The efforts to combat terrorism that began as a result of this attack. 

As of December 2015, during ISIS’ peak, up to 31,000 people from 86 countries 

had traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight with ISIS and other extremist groups. 

Today, due to the determination and focus of the United States and our allies, 

which include predominantly Muslim nations in the region, cooperative intelligence 

assessments have limited the number of foreign fighter recruits entering Syria to 

as few as 50 per month. 

It is unclear when or if there will ever be an articulable ‘‘fall’’ of the ‘‘caliphate’’ 

or ending of ISIS, but it is clear that there has been and will continue to be a disbanding and subsequent reduction in its influence and ability to operate as a terrorist group. 

The lessons we have learned over the past 15 years is that we need cooperation 

and collaboration from Muslim nations to win the war on terrorism. 

This is why the Executive Order issued by the President banning Muslims from 

predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States was so problematic 

to the our National interest in combating terrorism. 

5 

The action has been: 

(1) denounced by leading National security and foreign policy experts, 

(2) deemed unconstitutional by scores of law professors and other scholars, 

(3) sparked peaceful mass demonstrations across the Nation, and 

(4) opposed by a majority of the American public, and enjoined by at least five 

Federal district courts before the Supreme Court ruled. 

The court is allowing the ban to go into effect for foreign nationals who lack any 

‘‘bona fide relationship with any person or entity in the United States.’’ 

The court’s unsigned opinion protects the vast majority of people seeking to enter 

the United States to visit a relative, accept a job, attend a university, or deliver a 

speech. 

The court said the ban could not be imposed on anyone who had ‘‘a credible claim 

of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.’’ 

What the travel ban did was despoil our relations with these six countries, and 

much of the Muslim world, which sees the ban, rightly, as religiously-motivated. 

It also diminishes our stature in the eyes of our allies who are taking in tens of 

thousands of refugees without excuses or complaint. 

So instead of strengthening relations with countries that should be our allies and 

partners in the fight against terrorism, we alienate them, inflame sentiment against 

the United States among their citizens, and deprive ourselves of vital intelligence 

and resources needed to fight the root causes of terror. 

According to the Pew Center, about 3 million refugees have been resettled in the 

United States since Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which created the 

Federal Refugee Resettlement Program and the current National standard for the 

screening and admission of refugees into the country. 

California, Texas, and New York resettled nearly a quarter of all refugees in fiscal 

2016, together taking 20,738 refugees. Other States that received at least 3,000 refugees included Michigan, Ohio, Arizona, North Carolina, Washington, Pennsylvania, 

and Illinois. By contrast, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, and Wyoming each resettled fewer than 10 refugees. Delaware and Hawaii took in no refugees. 

It is deeply disturbing to me that the President’s nominee to be the next Attorney 

General, Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama, appears not be troubled in the slightest by 

cavalier rejection of the principle of religious liberty implicit in the Executive Order. 

The Committee on Homeland Security is committed to ensure that no terrorists 

will have the opportunity to do such great harm to neither the United States nor 

its people ever again. 

I thank the Members of the task force who will work toward a better understanding of the threats posed by terrorist and how this committee and Nation may 

better prepare to repel them. 

I am looking forward to hearing what our witnesses have to say and I am sure 

they have important testimony. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. We are very pleased to welcome a distinguished 

panel of witnesses before us today on this very, very important 

topic. 

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Mr. Robin Simcox, the Margaret Thatcher 

fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and Dr. Colin P. Clarke, political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Thank you for being here 

today. The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the 

record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Joscelyn for 5 minutes for an 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, thank you, Chairman Gallagher and Ranking Member Watson Coleman for having me here today. I appreciate it—and Members of the committee. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Did you turn it on? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I turned it on, yes. What is wrong? I am all right. 

Thank you. 

6 

So just in brief, I will try and keep this very quick. You know, 

there is a lot of talk now with ISIS losing Mosul and the push into 

Raqqa about its impending defeat. I am here to sort-of basically 

blow a horn of caution on that. 

I think that ISIS is a very resilient organization. We have seen 

them come back from defeats in the past. I would say, if you look 

at my written testimony, there are some points in there I would 

make very quickly. 

I don’t even know that we know how many fighters they have 

left to this day. You know, this is the type of metric which is very 

simple to ask and yet you look back through the U.S. Government’s 

pronouncements in terms of ISIS, where at the beginning of the air 

campaign the CIA estimated they had 20,000 to 30,000 fighters, 

approximately. U.S. military now says we have killed about 70,000 

fighters since September 2014. 

So if you go by those metrics it, you know, it looks like the U.S. 

Government is saying that we basically killed more than two times 

the upper-end estimate of what this organization had at the beginning of the air campaign. I think that that speaks. 

The lesson I draw from that is that probably we do not know how 

many total fighters they have and that with all these sort-of, you 

know, pronouncements that we are seeing about their defeat in 

Mosul and pending defeat in Raqqa, be very careful because they 

have enough personnel left to wage insurgency in the near future 

and on-going. 

They are experts at guerilla warfare. They have known this is 

coming. This is not something that they are going to disappear 

overnight at all. 

Second point is that they are now an international organization. 

In November 2014, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced that his organization now had so-called provinces around the world. 

Some of these, as I say in my written testimony, amounted to 

nothing more than just small terror cells. Others metastasized or 

grew into full-scale insurgencies themselves, whether they be in 

Libya where they temporarily captured the city of Sirte or as we 

have seen in the Sinai and a few other hotspots. 

So what that means from a terrorist travel perspective is there 

is a lot of focus on Syria and Iraq, but this is not an organization 

that is only located in Syria and Iraq. 

That their membership and their leadership is actually dispersed 

and that they have what is known by the U.S. military and U.S. 

intelligence as external attack planners that are outside of Iraq 

and Syria who are capable of planning attacks against the West, 

including in Libya where some of those plots have been detected. 

Another quick point on this is that you will see in my written 

testimony that there was a recent report put out by Europol which 

I think had some very fascinating statistics in it. 

That report sort-of highlighted for me the fact that while the returnees are an issue from Iraq and Syria and elsewhere into Europe and potentially through Europe to here, although that is very 

difficult for them to pull off. 

Although the returnees are an issue from these war zones, that 

actually most of the arrests that take place in Europe today are acVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
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1Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, ‘‘Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,’’ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 11, 2017, p. 21 (https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 

os-coats-051117.pdf). 

tually of people who were either citizens or residents already of European nations. 

So for example, they listed in that report that in 2015 there were 

41 arrests of returnees from Iraq and Syria. In 2016 there were 22. 

The total number of arrests in 2015 for jihadi terrorism-related incidents or suspected incidents, was 687 and in 2016 it was 718. 

In other words, this leads to my next point, the problem when 

it comes to terrorist travel is not just about returnees coming back 

from the battlefields, but we have now, unfortunately, a situation 

where citizens and residents of European nations, according to European statistics, are by far the more numerous potential threats. 

For travel here that raises the issue of a citizen in the United 

Kingdom or France or somewhere where it is easier for them to get 

on a plane and get here to potentially do damage. 

Finally, and I will just wrap up, every one of these hearings I 

always sort-of always mention al-Qaeda. You already had another 

hearing on al-Qaeda today so I won’t belabor the point, but alQaeda is still very much alive. 

There was a recent plot that was actually announced by the Department of Justice on June 29, which I think is very important 

to keep in mind. They announced that after 2 years they actually 

announced this plea deal that this guy entered into who was from 

Ohio. 

He actually had gone off to Syria where he trained for a few 

months and came back. He was sent back here by senior al-Qaeda 

operatives in 2014 to establish a cell to launch an attack here in 

the United States. 

This was under the radar. As a counterterrorism nerd who studies this stuff very closely, we didn’t know about this for, you know, 

a couple years. The Department of Justice announced this on June 

29. 

To me, it is a lone case. It is an isolated case, but it emphasizes 

the fact that you are not just dealing with ISIS returnees or ISIS 

fighters who are coming abroad and who want to come back and 

do harm. You also still have to worry about al-Qaeda. We can talk 

more about that. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN

JULY 13, 2017 

Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and other distinguished 

committee Members, thank you for inviting me to testify today concerning foreign 

fighters and the threat some of them pose to the United States and Europe. 

The fall of Mosul and the likely fall of Raqqa won’t be the end of the Islamic 

State. The group has already reverted to its insurgent roots in some of the areas 

that have been lost. It also still controls some territory. The Islamic State will continue to function as a guerrilla army, despite suffering significant losses. In May, 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that even though 

it was losing significant ground, the Islamic State ‘‘will likely have enough resources 

and fighters to sustain insurgency operations and plan terrorists [sic] attacks in the 

region and internationally’’ going forward.1 Unfortunately, I think ODNI’s assessVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
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2 Jim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford and Chelsea J. Carter, ‘‘ISIS can ‘muster’ between 20,000 and 

31,500 fighters, CIA says,’’ CNN.com, September 12, 2014 (http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/11/ 

world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html). 3 Ibid. 

4 Reuters, ‘‘U.S. estimates 50,000 Islamic State fighters killed so far: U.S. official,’’ December 

8, 2016. (http://mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSKBN13X28N) See also: Ryan 

Browne, ‘‘US Special Ops chief: More than 60,000 ISIS fighters killed,’’ CNN.com, February 15, 

2017 (http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/isis-60000-fighters-killed/index.html). 5 Ryan Browne, ‘‘US Special Ops chief: More than 60,000 ISIS fighters killed,’’ CNN.com, February 15, 2017 (http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/isis-60000-fighters-killed/ 

index.html). 6Molly Hennessy-Fiske and W.J. Hennigan, ‘‘Civilian casualties from airstrikes grow in Iraq 

and Syria. But few are ever investigated,’’ Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2017 (http:// 

www.latimes.com/projects/la-fg-iraq-airstrikes/). 

ment is accurate for a number of reasons, some of which I outline below. I also discuss some hypothetical scenarios, especially with respect to returning foreign fighters or other supporters already living in Europe or the United States. 

Recent history.—The Islamic State’s predecessor quickly recovered from its losses 

during the American-led ‘‘surge,’’ capitalizing on the war in Syria and a politically 

poisonous environment in Iraq to rebound. Indeed, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization grew into an international phenomenon by the end of 2014, just 3 years after 

the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was completed. Baghdadi’s men did this while 

defying al-Qaeda’s leaders and competing with rival jihadist groups. This recent history should give us pause any time we hear rhetoric that sounds too optimistic 

about the end of the Islamic State’s caliphate. The enterprise has had enough resources at its disposal to challenge multiple actors for more than 3 years. There is 

no question that the Islamic State’s finances, senior personnel, and other assets 

have been hit hard. But it is premature to say its losses amount to a deathblow. 

Uncertainty regarding size of total membership.—While it is no longer at the peak 

of its power, the Islamic State likely still has thousands of dedicated members. We 

don’t even really know how many members it has in Iraq and Syria, let alone 

around the globe. Previous U.S. estimates almost certainly undercounted the group’s 

ranks. In September 2014, at the beginning of the U.S.-led air campaign, the CIA 

reportedly estimated that the Islamic State could ‘‘muster’’ between 20,000 and 

31,500 fighters.2 This figure was ‘‘more than three times the previous estimates,’’ 

CNN noted.3 By December 2016, the U.S. military was estimating that 50,000 Islamic State fighters had been killed.4 By February 2017, U.S. Special Operations 

command concluded that more than 60,000 jihadists had perished.5 Two months 

later, in April 2017, the Pentagon reportedly estimated that 70,000 Islamic State 

fighters had been killed.6

Taken at face value, these figures (beginning with the September 2014 approximation) would suggest that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s enterprise was able to replace 

its entire force structure more than two times over, while fighting multiple enemies 

on numerous fronts. This is, of course, highly unlikely. Even with its prolific recruiting campaign, it would be impossible for any cohesive fighting organization, let 

alone one under the sustained pressure faced by the Islamic State, to train, equip 

and deploy fighters this quickly. It is far more likely that the United States never 

had a good handle on how many jihadists are in its ranks and the casualty figures 

are guesstimates. The purpose of citing these figures is not to re-litigate the past, 

but instead to sound a cautionary alarm regarding the near-future: We likely do not 

even know how many members the Islamic State has in Iraq and Syria today. 

The Islamic State is an international organization.—Since November 2014, when 

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi first announced the establishment of ‘‘provinces’’ around the 

globe, the Islamic State’s membership grew outside of Iraq and Syria. This further 

complicates any effort to estimate its overall size. Some of these ‘‘provinces’’ were 

nothing more than small terror networks, while others evolved into capable insurgency organizations in their own right. The Libyan branch of the caliphate temporarily controlled the city of Sirte. Although the jihadists were ejected from their 

Mediterranean abode by the end of 2016, they still have some forces inside the country. Similarly, Wilayah Khorasan (or Khorasan province), which represents the ‘‘caliphate’’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan, seized upwards of ten districts in Afghanistan 

as of early 2016, but has since lost ground. More recently, jihadists in the Philippines seized much of Marawi, hoisting the Islamic State’s black banner over the 

city. Wilayah Sinai controls at least some turf, and is able to launch spectacular attacks on security forces. It was responsible for downing a Russian airliner in October 2015. Other ‘‘provinces’’ exist in East Africa, West Africa, Yemen, and elsewhere. 

9 

7Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, ‘‘Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,’’ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 11, 2017, p. 5 (https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 

os-coats-051117.pdf). 8Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson in the Pentagon Briefing Room, 

December 2, 2016 (https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/ 

1019029/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-general-nicholson-in-the-pentagon-brief/). 9Thomas Joscelyn, ‘‘Pentagon: Bombs struck Islamic State’s ‘external plotters’ in Libya,’’ 

FDD’s Long War Journal, January 21, 2017 (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/ 

01/pentagon-bombs-struck-islamic-states-external-plotters-in-libya.php). 10 All of the figures cited in this section are derived from infographics produced by the Islamic 

State’s Amaq News Agency. As discussed, there are some important caveats to keep in mind 

when evaluating these statistics. 11Washingtonpost.com, ‘‘Suicide Attacks Increase and Spread.’’ (http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2008/04/18/GR2008041800293.html?sid=- 

ST2008041800913). 

In May, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported that 

the so-called caliphate ‘‘is seeking to foster interconnectedness among its global 

branches and networks, align their efforts to ISIS’s strategy, and withstand counterISIS efforts.’’7 Gen. John Nicholson, the commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, has 

said that Wilayah Khorasan went through an ‘‘application process’’ and the Islamic 

State mothership provided it with ‘‘advice,’’ ‘‘publicity,’’ and ‘‘some financial support.’’8 Although it is impossible to judge the extent of the Islamic State’s cohesion, 

as much of the data is not available, there is at least some connectivity between 

the group’s leadership and its ‘‘provinces’’ elsewhere. This is best seen on the media 

side, as the organization is particularly adept at disseminating messages from 

around the globe in multiple languages, despite some recent hiccups in this regard. 

While their fortunes may rise or fall at any given time, this global network of Islamic State ‘‘provinces’’ will remain a formidable problem for the foreseeable future. 

Not only are they capable of killing large numbers of people in the countries they 

operate in, this structure also makes tracking international terrorist travel more difficult. For instance, counterterrorism officials have tied plots in Europe to operatives 

in Libya.9 This indicates that some of the Islamic State’s ‘‘external plotters,’’ who 

are responsible for targeting the West, are not stationed in Iraq and Syria. The 

U.S.-led air campaign has disrupted the Islamic State’s ‘‘external operations’’ capacity by killing a number of jihadists in this wing of the organization. But others live. 

The cult of martyrdom has grown.—A disturbingly large number of people are 

willing to kill themselves for the Islamic State’s cause. The number of suicide bombings claimed by the so-called caliphate dwarfs all other jihadist groups, including 

al-Qaeda. In 2016, for instance, the Islamic State claimed 1,112 ‘‘martyrdom operations’’ in Iraq and Syria alone.10 Through the first 6 months of 2017, the organization claimed another 527 such bombings (nearly three-fourths of them using vehicleborne improvised explosive devices, or VBIEDs) in those two countries. These figures do not include suicide attacks in other nations where Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s 

loyalists are known to operate. 

To put the Islamic State’s current ‘‘martyrdom operations’’ in perspective, consider 

data published by the Washington Post in 2008.11 According to the Post, there were 

just 54 suicide attacks in all of 2001, when al-Qaeda’s ‘‘martyrs’’ launched the most 

devastating terrorist airline hijackings in history. The Islamic State currently 

eclipses that figure every month in Iraq and Syria, averaging 93 suicide bombings 

per month in 2016 and 88 per month so far in 2017. Many of these operations are 

carried out by foreign fighters. 

These suicide bombers have been mainly used to defend Islamic State positions, 

including the city of Mosul, which was one of the self-declared caliphate’s two capitals. For instance, half of the ‘‘martyrdom operations’’ carried out in Iraq and Syria 

this year (265 of the 527 claimed) took place in Nineveh province, which is home 

to Mosul. The ‘‘martyrs’’ were dispatched with increasing frequency after the campaign to retake the city began in October 2016, with 501 claimed suicide bombings 

in and around Mosul between then and the end of June 2017. 

Some caveats are in order. It is impossible to verify the Islamic State’s figures 

with any precision. The fog of war makes all reporting spotty and not every suicide 

bombing attempt is recorded in published accounts. Some of the claimed ‘‘martyrdom operations’’ likely failed to hit their targets, but were counted by the Islamic 

State as attacks anyway. The U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi forces have routinely 

taken out VBIEDs before drivers could reach their mark. Not all ‘‘martyrs’’ are truly 

willing recruits. For instance, the Islamic State’s figures include numerous children 

who were pressed into service by Baghdadi’s goons. 

10 

12 EUROPOL, ‘‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,’’ p. 7 (https:// 

www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-reportte-sat–2017). 13 EUROPOL, ‘‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,’’ p. 10 (https:// 

www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-reportte-sat–2017). 14 Ibid. 

Still, even taking into account these caveats, it is reasonable to conclude that the 

number of people willing to die for the sake of the so-called caliphate is disturbingly 

high—much higher than the number of willing martyrs in 2001 or even much more 

recently. Even though most of these people have been deployed in war zones, it is 

possible that more will be used outside of Iraq and Syria if they survive the fight 

and are able to travel to other countries. The Islamic State has already had some 

success in instigating would-be recruits to die for its cause in the West after they 

failed to emigrate to the lands of the caliphate. It is certainly possible that more 

will be sent into Europe or the United States in the future. 

Children used in suicide attacks, executions, and other operations.—The Islamic 

State has a robust program, named ‘‘Cubs of the Caliphate,’’ for indoctrinating children. It is one of the most disturbing aspects of the organization’s operations. Not 

only does the Islamic State’s propaganda frequently feature children attending 

classes, its videos have proudly displayed the jihadists’ use of children as executioners. 

Earlier this month, for instance, the group’s Wilayah Jazirah disseminated a 

video entitled, ‘‘They Left Their Beds Empty.’’ Four children are shown beheading 

Islamic State captives. The same production is laced with footage of the terrorists 

responsible for the November 2015 Paris attacks, as well as other plots in Europe. 

Indeed, the children are made to reenact some of the same execution scenes that 

the Paris attackers carried out before being deployed. The Islamic State’s message 

is clear: A new generation of jihadists is being raised to replace those who have fallen, including those who have already struck inside Europe. 

The ‘‘Cubs of the Caliphate’’ program is not confined to Iraq and Syria, but also 

operates in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This means that numerous children who 

have been indoctrinated in the Islamic State’s ways will pose a disturbing challenge 

for authorities going forward. As I noted above, some have already been used in 

‘‘martyrdom operations’’ in Iraq and Syria. It is possible that others could be used 

in a similar fashion outside of the group’s battlefields, in Europe or the United 

States. One purpose behind making children or adults commit heinous acts is to 

shock their conscience into thinking there is no way back, that they have crossed 

a threshold and there is no return. There are no easy answers for how to best deal 

with this problem. 

Diversity of terrorist plots.—There are legitimate concerns about the possibility of 

well-trained fighters leaving Iraq and Syria for the West now that the Islamic State 

is losing its grip on some of its most important locales. We saw the damage that 

a team of Islamic State operatives can do in November 2015, when multiple locations in Paris were assaulted. Trained operatives have had a hand in other plots 

as well. This concern was succinctly expressed by EUROPOL in a recent report. 

‘‘The number of returnees is expected to rise, if IS [Islamic State], as seems likely, 

is defeated militarily or collapses. An increasing number of returnees will likely 

strengthen domestic jihadist movements and consequently magnify the threat they 

pose to the EU.’’12 While a true military defeat will be elusive, the central point 

stated here has merit, even though the number of arrests of returnees across Europe has recently declined. According to EUROPOL, ‘‘[a]rrests for traveling to conflict zones for terrorist purposes... decreased: From 141 in 2015 to 177 in 2016.’’ 

And there was a similar ‘‘decrease in numbers of arrests of people returning from 

the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq: From 41 in 2015 to 22 in 2016.’’13

However, the overall number of arrests ‘‘related to jihadist terrorism’’ rose from 

687 in 2015 to 718 in 2015, meaning that most of these terror-related arrests do 

not involve returnees.14

Still, returnees and the logistical support networks that facilitate travel to Iraq 

and Syria were prominently represented in court cases tried by EUROPOL member 

states. ‘‘As evidenced in the past couple of years, the majority of the verdicts for 

jihadist terrorism concerned offences related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq,’’ 

EUROPOL reported in its statistical review for 2016. ‘‘They involved persons who 

had prepared to leave for or have returned from the conflict zone, as well as persons 

who have recruited, indoctrinated, financed or facilitated others to travel to Syria 

and/or Iraq to join the terrorist groups fighting there.’’ In addition, ‘‘[i]ndividuals 

11 

15 EUROPOL, ‘‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,’’ p. 18. 16 EUROPOL, ‘‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,’’ p. 6. 17 EUROPOL, ‘‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017,’’ p. 61. 18 Ibid. 

and cells preparing attacks in Europe and beyond were also brought before 

courts.’’15

These data show that while the threat posed by returnees is real, it is just one 

part of the overall threat picture. The Islamic State has encouraged supporters in 

the West to lash out in their home countries instead of traveling abroad, directed 

plots via ‘‘remote-control’’ guides, and otherwise inspired individuals to act on their 

own. These tactics often don’t require professional terrorists to be dispatched from 

abroad. The Islamic State has also lowered the bar for what is considered a successful attack, amplifying concepts first espoused by others, especially al-Qaeda. A crude 

knife or machete attack that kills few people is trumpeted as the work of an Islamic 

State ‘‘soldier’’ or ‘‘fighter.’’ On Bastille Day in Nice, France last year, an Islamic 

State supporter killed more than 80 people simply by running them over with a 

lorry. Other Islamic State supporters have utilized this simple technique, repeatedly 

advocated by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s propagandists, as well. 

However, I would urge caution. While the amateurs or individual actors have become more lethal over time, the risk of professionally-trained jihadists carrying out 

a mass casualty attack remains distinct. On average, the professionals can still do 

more damage than their amateur counterparts—if they are not stopped before-hand. 

The threat to aviation demonstrates the point. In October 2015, the Islamic State’s 

Wilayah Sinai downed a Russian airliner, killing all 224 people on board. Although 

the jihadists claim to have used a crude improvised explosive device, the plot required that well-placed personnel implant it at an optimal location within the aircraft. U.S. officials are attempting to stop even more sophisticated devices, built by 

either the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, from being placed on-board flights bound for 

Europe or America. Other professionally-planned attacks could involve bombing 

commuter trains, Mumbai-style sieges, or multi-pronged assaults. Therefore, if the 

professionals are able to evade security measures, they could easily kill more people 

than the average amateur. 

Counterterrorism services in Europe and the United States have stopped a number of professional plots through the years. Some of those foiled in the past year 

may have been more serious than realized at the time. However, there is a risk that 

as counterterrorism authorities deal with a large number of individual or amateur 

plots, the professional terrorists will be able to find another window of opportunity. 

The various threats posed by the Islamic State have placed great strains on our defenses. 

The Islamic State could seek to exploit refugee flows once again. ‘‘The influx of 

refugees and migrants to Europe from existing and new conflict zones is expected 

to continue,’’ EUROPOL reported in its review of 2016. The Islamic State ‘‘has already exploited the flow of refugees and migrants to send individuals to Europe to 

commit acts of terrorism, which became evident in the 2015 Paris attacks.’’ The socalled caliphate and ‘‘possibly other jihadist terrorist organizations may continue to 

do so.’’16 While the overwhelming majority of migrants are seeking to better their 

lives, some will continue to pose a terrorist threat. European nations are dealing 

with this, in part, by deploying more ‘‘investigators’’ to ‘‘migration hotspots in 

Greece and soon also to Italy.’’17 These ‘‘guest officers’’ will rotate ‘‘at key points on 

the external borders of the European Union to strengthen security checks on the 

inward flows of migrants, in order to identify suspected terrorists and criminals, establishing a second line of defense.’’18

This makes it imperative that U.S. authorities share intelligence with their European counterparts and receive information in return to better track potential 

threats. The United States has led efforts to disrupt the Islamic State’s ‘‘external 

attack’’ arm and probably has the best intelligence available on its activities. But 

European nations have vital intelligence as well, and only by combining data can 

officials get a better sense of the overall picture. Recent setbacks with respect to 

this intelligence sharing, after details of British investigations were leaked in the 

American press, are troubling. But we can hope that these relationships have been 

repaired, or will be soon. 

It should be noted that would-be jihadists who are already citizens of European 

countries could have an easier route into the United States than migrants fleeing 

the battlefields. It is much easier for a British citizen to get on a plane headed for 

the United States than for an Islamic State operative posing as a Syrian refugee 

to enter the United States clandestinely through Europe. Given recent events in the 

United Kingdom, and the overall scale of the jihadist threat inside Britain, this 

12 

19 BBC, ‘‘General election 2017: Extremist exclusion orders ‘used’,’’ May 28, 2017 (http:// 

www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40072251). 

makes intelligence sharing on potential terrorists all the more crucial. British officials have said that they are investigating 500 possible plots involving 3,000 people 

on the ‘‘top list’’ of suspects at any given time. In addition, 20,000 people have been 

on the counterterrorism radar for one reason or another and are still considered potentially problematic.19

Exporting terror know-how.—It is possible that more of the Islamic State’s terrorist inventions will be exported from abroad into Europe or the United States. As 

the self-declared caliphate sought to defend its lands, it devised all sorts of new 

means for waging war. It modified drones with small explosives and built its own 

small arms, rockets, bombs, and the like. Al-Qaeda first started to publish ideas for 

backpack bombs and other IEDs in its on-line manuals. The Islamic State has done 

this as well, but we shouldn’t be surprised if some of its other inventions migrate 

out of the war zones. The group could do this by publishing technical details in its 

propaganda, or in-person, with experienced operatives carrying this knowledge with 

them. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Simcox for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, MARGARET THATCHER 

FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. SIMCOX. Chairman Gallagher, distinguished Members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. The 

views I express during this testimony are my own and do not represent the official position of the Heritage Foundation. 

My goal this afternoon is to highlight the ways in which foreign 

fighters returning from Syria and Iraq pose a clear risk to the 

West. I will focus particularly on the European components of this 

phenomenon. 

There are three aspects to the threat which I will discuss today: 

The short term, the medium term and the long term. In the short 

term, at least 5,000 to 6,000 Europeans have fought alongside ISIS, 

al-Qaeda, and other Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq. 

Some have already been killed in the fighting, and as ISIS’ caliphate in Iraq and Syria comes under more pressure, yet more will 

be. However, there is also an expectation that many foreign fighters will disperse and inevitably some of these individuals are going 

to return to their home countries. 

There could be approximately 1,000 returnees just from the 

United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The risk posed by these 

returning fighters is clear. Members of the cell that committed 

ISIS’ attacks in Paris in November 2015, killing 130 and wounding 

368, had traveled to Syria from Europe, fought and trained with 

ISIS, and then returned to Europe to carry out an attack. 

This cell also contained ISIS members who had entered Europe 

from Syria after making false asylum claims. Those plugged into 

the same network then committed the attacks in Brussels in March 

2016. 

It is worth noting that American citizens were killed in both the 

Paris and Brussels attacks. Clearly the threat is not consigned 

solely to the homeland. 

In the medium term, even if these returning fighters do not immediately plan to carry out terrorist attacks in the West, that does 

not mean they are still not detrimental to National security. In the 

13 

United Kingdom—these fighters will not be returning into a vacuum. They will be reconnecting with pre-existing Islamist networks. 

The United Kingdom, for example, has approximately 23,000 terror suspects on the intelligence radar. Those who fought in previous foreign conflicts, such as Afghanistan in the 1980’s and Bosnia in the 1990’s earned gravitas and credibility as heroic returning members of the Mujahedeen. This helped propel a younger generation toward radicalism. 

Take the example of a British citizen, Babar Ahmad. Ahmad, 

who pleaded guilty to terrorism offenses in the United States in 

2013 fought in Bosnia in the 1990’s and then returned to London. 

True he did not commit a terrorist attack there; however, he was 

able to leverage his experience fighting in Bosnia to become one of 

the key radicalizers in the entire country upon return. He inspired 

a younger generation of radicals to take up the fight. 

Moving on to the long term, entire families from the West move 

to Syria to live in this caliphate. Furthermore, there have been 

children born in Syria to Western parents. 

So it is not just adults now returning to Europe. It is also their 

children. These children will have at minimum been hugely exposed to ISIS’ ideology and most likely been indoctrinated with it. 

There are almost 500 children currently in Syria with connections to France. There are approximately 80 Dutch children born 

in the caliphate and as many as 50 from the United Kingdom. 

Europol has warned that ISIS will likely, ‘‘train these minors to 

become the next generation of foreign terrorist fighters.’’ Knowing 

how to deal with the potential security threat posed by children of 

hardened ISIS fighters is a major long-term problem for Western 

governments. 

Furthermore, there is already a clear problem on this front. My 

research has demonstrated that by the end of 2016 there had been 

34 ISIS or ISIS-linked plots carried out by teens or pre-teens in 

seven different countries in the West. 

Chairman Gallagher, distinguished Members of the committee, 

the risk that returning foreign fighters pose to the West is stark 

and will continue to be felt for many years to come. Countries impacted by this threat must continue to work together to mitigate 

this. 

Thank you for inviting me today, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simcox follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX

JULY 13, 2017 

Chairman Gallagher and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify here today. 

My name is Robin Simcox; I am the Margaret Thatcher Fellow at The Heritage 

Foundation. My responsibilities consist of research on terrorist groups, particularly 

those targeting Europe, as well as research on intelligence and security policy. 

These are issues I have helped governments across Europe shape their response to 

for almost 10 years. I also regularly speak to relevant U.S. Government agencies 

on such matters. 

The views I express in this testimony are my own and do not represent the official 

position of The Heritage Foundation. 

14 

1 ‘‘More than 6,000 European Jihadists in Syria, EU Official Says,’’ The Telegraph, April 13, 

2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11531884/More-than6000-European-jihadists-in-Syria-EU-official-says.html (accessed June 21, 2017). 2Sean O’Neill, Fiona Hamilton, Fariha Karim, and Gabriella Swerling, ‘‘Huge Scale of Terror 

Threat Revealed: UK Home to 23,000 Jihadists,’’ The Times, May 27, 2017, https:// 

www.thetimes.co.uk/article/huge-scale-of-terror-threat-revealed-uk-home-to-23-000-jihadists3zvn58mhq (accessed June 21, 2017). 3 United States v. Adis Medunjanin, March 29, 2012, https://www.documentcloud.org/ 

documents/1048734-deposition-in-u-s-v-adis-medunjanin.html (accessed July 6, 2017). 

My goal this afternoon is to highlight the ways in which fighters returning from 

Syria and Iraq pose a clear risk to the West. I will focus particularly on the European component of this phenomenon. 

There are three aspects to the threat which I will discuss today: The short term, 

medium term, and long term. 

THE SHORT TERM

At least 5,000 to 6,000 Europeans have fought alongside ISIS and other Islamist 

groups in Syria and Iraq.1 Some have already been killed in the fighting, and as 

ISIS’ ‘‘Caliphate’’ in Iraq and Syria comes under increasing pressure, yet more will 

be. 

However, there is also an expectation that many foreign fighters will disperse, 

and inevitably, some of these individuals will return to their home countries. There 

could be approximately 1,000 returnees just from the United Kingdom, France, and 

Germany. 

The risk posed by these returning fighters is clear. They will have fought in the 

Iraq/Syria conflicts and been trained by ISIS, al-Qaeda, or associated groups. 

Indeed, the danger these fighters pose has already been demonstrated on the 

streets of Europe. Members of the cell that committed ISIS’ attacks in Paris in November 2015—killing 130 and wounding 368—had traveled to Syria from Europe, 

fought and trained with ISIS, and then returned to Europe to carry out an attack. 

This cell also contained ISIS members who had entered Europe from Syria after 

making false asylum claims. 

Those plugged into the same network then committed the attacks in Brussels in 

March 2016, which killed 32 and wounded approximately 300. 

It is worth noting that American citizens were killed in both the Paris and Brussels attacks. Clearly, the threat to life of American lives is not consigned solely to 

the homeland. 

THE MEDIUM TERM

Even if these returning fighters do not immediately plan to carry out terrorist attacks in the West, that does not mean they are not still detrimental to National security. These fighters will not be returning into a vacuum; they will be reconnecting 

with pre-existing Islamist networks. The United Kingdom, for example, has approximately 23,000 terror suspects on the intelligence radar.2

How these pre-existing radical networks will treat returning fighters from Syria 

will likely differ on a case-by-case basis. Yet we must remember that those who 

fought in previous foreign conflicts—such as Afghanistan in the 1980’s and Bosnia 

in the 1990’s—earned gravitas and credibility as heroic, returning members of the 

mujahideen. This helped propel a younger generation toward radicalism. 

Take the example of a British citizen, Babar Ahmad. Ahmad, who pleaded guilty 

to terrorism offenses in the United States in 2013, fought in Bosnia in the 1990’s 

and then returned to London. True, he did not commit a terrorist attack there. However, he was able to leverage his experience fighting in Bosnia to become one of the 

key radicalizers in the entire country upon return. He was successful in inspiring 

a younger generation of potential radicals to take up the fight. 

This included men such as Saajid Badat, who was drawn into Ahmad’s circle in 

South London and then dispatched to Afghanistan to train with al-Qaeda.3 Badat 

was assigned by al-Qaeda to be part of the same suicide bombing mission as the 

‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid. He pleaded guilty in a U.K. court concerning his role 

in this plot in 2005. 

THE LONG TERM

The conflict in Syria has helped ensure that the war with Islamism will be a 

multi-generational one. Entire families from the West, including children, moved to 

Syria to live in the ‘‘Caliphate.’’ Furthermore, there have been children born in 

15 

4 Emily Feldman, ‘‘Can ISIS’s Indoctrinated Kids Be Saved from a Future of Violent Jihad?’’ 

Newsweek, July 6, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/2017/07/14/isis-kids-indoctrination-savedviolent-jihad-632080.html (accessed July 6, 2017). 5 Noman Benotman and Nikita Malik, The Children of Islamic State (London: Quilliam, 2016). 6Lizzie Dearden, ‘‘ISIS Training Children of Foreign Fighters to Become ‘Next Generation’ of 

Terrorists,’’ The Independent, July 29, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 

middle-east/isis-training-children-of-foreign-fighters-to-become-next-generation-of-terroristsa7162911.html (accessed July 6, 2017). 7 Benotman and Malik, The Children of Islamic State. 8 Robin Simcox, ‘‘The Islamic State’s Western Teenage Plotters,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, No. 

2 (February 2017), p. 21, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-islamic-states-western-teenageplotters (accessed June 21, 2017). 

Syria to Western parents who may now be attempting to return to Europe. Many 

will have inevitably been indoctrinated with ISIS’ ideology. 

To use France as an example: There are almost 500 children currently in Syria 

with connections to France. Approximately 150 such children have been born there. 

There are approximately 80 Dutch children born in the ‘‘Caliphate’’;4 and as many 

as 50 from the United Kingdom.5

How many of these children will end up returning to the West is at present unknowable. Yet knowing how to deal with the potential security threat from children 

of hardened ISIS fighters is clearly a major, long-term problem for Western governments. 

Europol has warned that ISIS has demonstrated ‘‘that they train these minors to 

become the next generation of foreign terrorist fighters’’ and that this ‘‘may pose a 

future security threat to member states.’’6 According to a report from the British 

counter-extremism think tank, Quilliam, ‘‘Boys learn a rigid Islamic State 

curriculum... Children churn out memorised verses of the Qur’an and attend 

‘Jihadist Training’, which includes shooting, weaponry and martial arts.’’7

Furthermore, my previous research demonstrates that there is already a pre-existing threat to the West from teens and pre-teens. By the end of 2016, there had 

been 34 such plots carried out by this demographic in seven different countries.8

Chairman Gallagher, distinguished Members of the committee, the risk that returning foreign fighters pose to the West is stark and will continue to be felt for 

many years to come. Countries impacted by this threat must continue to work together to mitigate this. Even then, however, we can only reduce the risk, not eliminate it. 

Thank you for inviting me today and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Simcox. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Clarke for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF COLIN P. CLARKE, POLITICAL SCIENTIST, THE 

RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member 

Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the task force for 

inviting me to testify today. 

My testimony will address three fundamental issues. First, what 

is the terrorist diaspora? 

Second, what are the implications of this diaspora or more precisely what is the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters? 

Third, what can the United States do to mitigate the threat 

posed by foreign fighters fleeing the battlefield in Iraq and Syria? 

The term terrorist diaspora as currently used more accurately 

describes foreign fighters who travel from more than 80 different 

countries to fight with militant groups in Iraq and Syria and who 

have moved on or soon will move on to other countries. 

While some of these fighters might go on to provide support to 

Salafi-jihadist insurgencies, the part of the terrorist diaspora we 

are most concerned about are the foreign fighters who will move on 

16 

from Syria and Iraq to participate in other civil wars or organized 

terrorist cells that plot to attack the West. 

So what is the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters? I foresee 

multiple categories. The hardcore fighters will likely remain in Iraq 

and Syria and look to join whatever the next iteration of the group 

becomes. In all likelihood, ISIS remnants in Iraq and Syria will 

hide, rest, rearm, recuperate, going underground to reorganize before returning to wage the next phase of the insurgency. 

A second group of fighters are the potential free agents or mercenaries who will travel abroad to take part in the next jihadist theater, whether it be in Yemen, Libya, the Caucuses, West Africa, or 

Afghanistan. 

ISIS affiliates and local Sunni jihadists would likely welcome an 

influx of battle-hardened fighters. These fighters are the militant 

progeny of the original Mujahedeen, the transnational jihadists 

that once filled the ranks of al-Qaeda and fought in Afghanistan, 

Chechnya, and the Balkans. 

A third group of foreign fighters, the returnees, has occupied 

much time and energy in policy and law enforcement circles. These 

fighters may attempt to return to their countries of origin, whether 

within the region to countries like Tunisia and Saudi Arabia or further afield to Europe, Asia, and North America. 

This third group is not as homogeneous as it may seem. Just as 

foreign fighters who travel to Syria and Iraq left for different reasons and fought with different groups, those that return will do so 

for varying reasons as well. 

The first subgroup of returnees might be labeled the disillusioned. These individuals went to Syria looking for Utopia, adventure, and a pure expression of religious identity, but they found 

something far different. 

The second subgroup is the disengaged but not disillusioned. 

These militants, however, are still committed to jihadism. Although 

these militants might have grown disillusioned with ISIS as an organization, they still believe in the concept of jihad and remain 

committed to holy war against the West. 

The final subgroup is called the operational returnees. These are 

the returning fighters who may attempt to resuscitate dormant 

networks or create new ones, recruit members, or conduct lone 

wolf-style attacks. 

They could very well be prepositioned and seek to attempt an attack under the command and control of ISIS remnants in the Middle East. These individuals are the most dangerous and deadly. 

The threat is far more serious for Europe and the Middle East 

than for the United States. The same factors that make Europe so 

vulnerable to the threat posed by foreign fighters, geography, the 

overall number of citizens who travel to Iraq and Syria, counterterrorism capabilities, poor continent-wide information sharing and 

intelligence and law enforcement coordination, and the relationship 

between Muslim communities and host nation governments are 

those same things that present favorably to the United States. 

The United States must continue to allocate sufficient resources 

to prevent any foreign terrorist fighters from attempting to sneak 

into the country. This includes not only a stout defense of American borders, but also intelligence sharing with allies overseas, inVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
17 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the sponsors of its 

research. 2The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy 

challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier, 

and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. 3 Josh Gerstein and Jennifer Scholtes, ‘‘Comey Warns of Post-ISIL Terrorist ‘Diaspora,’ ’’ Politico, September 27, 2016. 

cluding European countries, Turkey, and other nations throughout 

the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 

While we must continue to prevent foreign terrorist fighters from 

attempting to return to the United States, we must also focus on 

the more likely threat posed by radicalization and home-grown violent extremism. 

Countering violent extremism has proceeded in fits and starts in 

the West, including in the United States. We have too little data 

to understand which programs work well and which do not. Continued Federal support for on-going and future research will be critical to making progress in this area, as will oversight, monitoring, 

evaluation, and assessment to discern which programs work and 

why. 

We are entering yet another period of uncertainty. With the dissolution of the geographic entity known as the ISIS caliphate, new 

threats and challenges will arise. Hearings such as this one and 

many others of its kind underscore just how seriously the United 

States takes these challenges. 

The threat of terrorism can sometimes feel ubiquitous and how 

we communicate about terrorism and terrorist attacks affects how 

Americans assess the risk of terrorism. It is important to keep this 

overall perspective. 

In short, I believe that the danger posed by ISIS to the U.S. 

homeland is real but manageable, but also sympathize with recent 

remarks offered by Lieutenant General Nagata that with respect to 

ISIS, we have to conclude that we do not fully appreciate the scale 

or strength of this phenomenon. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Clarke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLIN P. CLARKE 1 2

JULY 13, 2017 

Thank you Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the task force for inviting me to testify today. My testimony 

will address three fundamental issues. First, what is the terrorist diaspora? Second, 

what are the implications of this diaspora, or more precisely, what is the threat 

posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters? Third, what can the United States do 

to mitigate the threat posed by foreign fighters fleeing the battlefield in Iraq and 

Syria? 

In September 2016, referring to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), thenFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey acknowledged ‘‘the socalled caliphate will be crushed,’’ although he subsequently warned that its fighters 

‘‘will not all die on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq’’ and the result ‘‘will be a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next 2 to 5 years like we’ve never seen before.’’3 The 

caliphate is indeed being crushed, but the second- and third-order effects of its deterioration could send shockwaves throughout the West, as surviving foreign fighters 

attempt to wreak havoc elsewhere. 

18 

4Seth G. Jones, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S. Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey 

Martini, Eric Robinson, and Nathan Chandler, Rolling Back the Islamic State, Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR–1912, 2017, See also David Francis, ‘‘Islamic State Revenues 

Down 80 Percent from 2015,’’ Foreign Policy, June 29, 2017. 5Loveday Morris, ‘‘Away From Iraq’s Front Lines, the Islamic State is Creeping Back In,’’ 

Washington Post, February 22, 2017. 6Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends 

in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR– 

1405–OTI, 2001. 7Salafi characterizes an adherent of an ideological strain in Sunni Islam that seeks to emulate, as purer, the thinking and practices of Muhammad and the earliest generations of Muslims. Jihadists believe that violent struggle against non-Muslims and Muslims they judge as 

apostate is an important religious duty (Benjamin W. Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, 

Renny McPherson, Barbara Sude, with Sara Beth Elson, and Ghassan Schbley, An Economic 

Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 

MG–1026–OSD, 2010. 8Thomas Hegghammer, ‘‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,’’ International Security, Vol. 

35, No. 3, Winter 2010/2011, pp. 53–94. 9 Edwin Bakker and Mark Singleton, ‘‘Foreign Fighters in the Syria and Iraq Conflict: Statistics and Characteristics of a Rapidly Growing Phenomenon,’’ in Andrea de Guttry, Francesca 

Capone, and Christophe Paulussen, eds., Foreign Fighters Under International Law and Beyond, 

The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2016. Importantly, this number likely does not include the foreign 

fighters in Syria fighting against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda-linked groups like Jabhat alNusra (since rebranded Jabhat Fateh al-Sham). Indeed, significant numbers of Afghan and Pakistani Shia are also fighting alongside Hezbollah and other pro-Assad elements and could very 

well be a problem for the United States in future conflicts, especially as tensions continue to 

grow with Iran. 10 R. Kim Cragin, ‘‘Early History of Al-Qa’ida,’’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2008, 

pp. 1047–1067. 11The Soufan Group, ‘‘Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters Into Syria and Iraq,’’ December 8, 2015. 

ISIS is hemorrhaging territory, its financing continues to be degraded, and popular support for the group has diminished significantly.4 As operations against ISIS 

in Mosul conclude and the offensive against the ISIS capital in Raqqa gains momentum, the terrorist group has begun shifting men and materiel to its stronghold in 

Deir Ezzor and Mayadeen, foreshadowing a potentially bloody conflict closer to the 

Iraqi and Jordanian borders. 

For months, ISIS fighters have been reinfiltrating towns and villages throughout 

the Euphrates River Valley that were thought to have been cleared.5 Furthermore, 

it is likely that hundreds of militants, including many foreign fighters, have already 

scattered elsewhere and are preparing to continue waging jihad in another theater. 

WHAT IS THE TERRORIST DIASPORA?

The term diaspora, in its most fundamental sense, refers to a national, cultural, 

or religious group living in a foreign land. Historically, many diasporas have left 

their mark on overseas conflicts by providing both active and passive support—from 

Irish-Americans in the United States to Sri Lankan Tamils living in Canada.6 But 

the term ‘‘terrorist diaspora,’’ as currently used, more accurately describes foreign 

fighters who traveled from more than 80 different countries to fight with militant 

groups in Iraq and Syria and who have moved on or soon will move on to other 

countries. While some of these fighters might go on to provide passive support to 

Salafi-jihadist insurgencies,7 the part of the ‘‘terrorist diaspora’’ we are most concerned about are the foreign fighters who will move on from Syria and Iraq to participate in other civil wars or organize terrorist cells. 

An unprecedented number of fighters joined the battle in Iraq and Syria—many 

more than the mujahideen guerillas who fought in the Soviet-Afghan conflict during 

the 1980’s. Jihadist expert Thomas Hegghammer estimated the number of foreign 

fighters in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet conflict at 5,000 to 20,000,8 while 

scholars such as Edwin Bakker and Mark Singleton have estimated that around 

30,000 foreign fighters have fought in Iraq and Syria.9 Thus, the wave of fighters 

who could emerge from the conflict is especially foreboding. Foreign fighters from 

the Afghan conflict went on to form the core of al-Qaeda and fight in the internecine 

conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Algeria, and Chechnya during the 1990’s.10

The fighters emerging from this conflict seek to leave a similar legacy. 

Where do these foreign fighters come from? The Soufan Group estimates that approximately 6,000 are from the West; of these, roughly 150 are from the United 

States and 5,000 are from Western Europe. Nearly three-quarters of Western European fighters hail from just four countries: France (1,800), the United Kingdom 

(760), Germany (760), and Belgium (470).11

19 

12David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts, New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2013. 13 Brian Michael Jenkins and Colin P. Clarke, ‘‘In the Event of the Islamic State’s Untimely 

Demise,’’ Foreign Policy, May 11, 2016; see also Colin P. Clarke and Amarnath Amarasingam, 

‘‘Where Do ISIS Fighters Go When the Caliphate Falls?’’ The Atlantic, March 6, 2017. 14 Colin P. Clarke and Craig Whiteside, ‘‘Charting the Future of the Modern Caliphate,’’ War 

on the Rocks, May 3, 2017. 15Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-‘Ubaydi, The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State’s Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities, Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, 

June 2017. It is also worth noting that, while ISIS will still pose a threat as a clandestine terrorist organization, the trajectory is moving in the right direction, as the organization is sequentially downgraded from a caliphate to an insurgency to a terrorist group. 16 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is the rebranded Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which itself was the rebranded al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has disavowed a formal connection with al-Qaeda, but the true relationship between the groups is a matter of skepticism 

and debate. 17 Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘Al-Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding,’’ The Cipher Brief, December 

30, 2016. 18 Colin P. Clarke, ‘‘Is ISIS Leader Baghdadi Still Alive?’’ Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2017; see 

also, Colin P. Clarke, ‘‘Can the Islamic State Survive if Baghdadi is Dead?’’ Foreign Policy, June 

30, 2017. 19David Malet, ‘‘Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context,’’ Terrorism 

and Political Violence, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2015, pp.454–473. 

The foreign fighter phenomenon is likely to worsen in the future as the caliphate 

continues to deteriorate. This phenomenon is not new. Over the past 200 years, foreign fighters have appeared in more than a quarter of all civil wars.12 However, this 

new generation of jihadists has improved communication, easier transportation, and 

diversified sources of information and money, making even small cadres of experienced fighters a dangerous force. These fighters can now engage in foreign civil 

wars and insurgencies—and export their expertise back to their home countries or 

to places they have newly immigrated. In addition, encrypted communications and 

the ubiquity of social media mean that even after the caliphate disappears, the ideology of Salafi-jihadism will persist on-line as a virtual caliphate, offering aspiring 

jihadists hope that the next major battle is all but inevitable and continuing to exhort its followers to conduct violence wherever they are. 

WHAT IS THE THREAT POSED BY FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS?

Accordingly, what might ISIS’ remaining foreign fighters choose to do next? When 

a conflict winds down, either through force or by negotiated settlement, where do 

transnational terrorists go? As I have outlined in Foreign Policy and The Atlantic, 

I see several possibilities.13

The ‘‘hardcore fighters’’ will likely remain in Iraq and Syria and look to join whatever the next iteration of the devolving group may be. In all likelihood, ISIS remnants in Iraq and Syria will hide, rest, rearm, and recuperate, going underground 

to reorganize before returning to wage the next phase of the insurgency.14 In the 

interim, ISIS could transform into a clandestine terrorist organization, retaining the 

ability to conduct sporadic raids, ambushes, and possibly spectacular suicide attacks, both in the region and abroad.15

During this time, militants may switch allegiances among the hodgepodge of 

groups on the ground, including ISIS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham,16 and Ahrar al-Sham 

(which is already a loose coalition of Islamist and Salafist units), and will actively 

seek out ungoverned areas still outside of the writ of either Syrian or Iraqi government forces and their allies. As terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has suggested, if 

the fortunes of ISIS continue to decline, some jihadists may see rapprochement with 

al-Qaeda as the only option to continue the struggle.17 Another factor leading to a 

marriage of convenience between former comrades could be the death of ISIS leader 

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leading to a new phase in the global jihad.18

A second group of fighters are the potential ‘‘free-agents or mercenaries,’’ who will 

travel abroad to take part in the next jihadist theater, whether it be in Yemen, 

Libya, the Caucasus, West Africa, or Afghanistan. ISIS affiliates and local Sunni 

jihadists would likely welcome an influx of battle-hardened fighters. These fighters 

are the militant progeny of the original mujahideen, the transnational jihadists that 

once filled the ranks of al-Qaeda and fought in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the Balkans. Some fighters who are prevented from returning to their home countries can 

be expected to form a cohort of state-less jihadists who deliberately seek out weaklygoverned conflict zones in unstable regions.19 World-wide attention has made such 

travel more difficult than for prior generations of extremists, but some will no doubt 

escape detection. 

20 

20Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, ‘‘Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights Into 

the Motivation for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,’’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 40, No. 3, 

2017, pp. 191–210. 21 R. Kim Cragin has argued that, contrary to popular belief, most foreign fighters do not die 

on battlefields or travel from conflict to conflict, but return home. See R. Kim Cragin, ‘‘The Challenge of Foreign Fighter Returnees,’’ Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 2017. 22 Alastair Reed and Johanna Pohl, ‘‘Disentangling the EU Foreign Fighter Threat: The Case 

for a Comprehensive Approach,’’ RUSI, February 10, 2017. 23Simon Cottee, ‘‘Pilgrims to the Islamic State,’’ The Atlantic, July 24, 2015. 24 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ‘‘ISIS and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon,’’ The Atlantic, 

March 8, 2015. 25See Rukmini Callimachi, ‘‘Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror 

Plots from Afar,’’ New York Times, February 4, 2017; see also Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and 

Madeline Blackman, ‘‘ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical Terrorist Innovation,’’ War on the 

Rocks, January 4, 2017; and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Seamus Hughes, ‘‘The Threat 

to the United States From the Islamic State’s Virtual Entrepreneurs,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, 

No. 3, March 2017, pp. 1–8. 26Thomas Hegghammer, ‘‘Should I Stay Or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western 

Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,’’ American Political Science Review, 

Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 1–15. 27 R. Kim Cragin, ‘‘The November 2015 Paris Attacks: The Impact of Foreign Fighter Returnees,’’ Orbis, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2017, pp. 212–226. 28 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘‘How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers,’’ 

New York Times, August 3, 2016; see also Bruce Hoffman, ‘‘The Global Terror Threat and 

Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next Administration,’’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 9, No. 11, November/December 2016. 

When terrorism scholar Amarnath Amarasingam interviewed a Western ISIS 

fighter in late 2016, he emphasized the global reach of ISIS, saying the caliphate 

‘‘has reached Afghanistan, Libya, West Africa, Algeria, Yemen, and many, many of 

its soldiers are in the lands of the [unbelievers]’’ (the West).20 As ISIS loses territory 

in Iraq and Syria, some fighters may indeed try to reach these other theaters of 

jihad to protect, sustain, and expand the boundaries of the so-called caliphate. In 

other words, they see other potential options. 

A third group of foreign fighters—the ‘‘returnees’’—has occupied much time and 

energy in policy and law enforcement circles.21 These fighters may attempt to return 

to their countries of origin, whether in the region to Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, or 

further afield to Europe, Asia, and North America. States with more robust national 

screening mechanisms, law enforcement, and intelligence structures stand a better 

chance of stopping the fighters at their border, blunting the impact of these returnees. But not all Western security services are created equal, and further complicating the issue is the inability to even agree on the definition of who constitutes 

a foreign fighter in the first place.22

This third group is not as homogenous as it may seem. Just as foreign fighters 

who traveled to Syria and Iraq left for different reasons and fought with different 

groups, those that return will do so for varying reasons as well. 

The first subgroup of returnees might be labeled the ‘‘disillusioned.’’ These individuals went to Syria looking for utopia, adventure, and a pure expression of religious identity,23 but they found something far different. Local Syrians did not respect them. They struggled with food, financing, and the tribulations of war. Upon 

returning to the West, these individuals could mentor other radicalized youth. These 

fighters may require psychological treatment in addition to prison time. 

The second subgroup is the ‘‘disengaged but not disillusioned.’’ Just as there are 

many reasons why militants go to fight, there are many reasons why they leave a 

conflict—marriage, battle fatigue, desire to be with family.24 These militants, however, are still committed to jihadism. Accordingly, individuals might grow disillusioned with ISIS as an organization, but not with jihad as a whole. 

The final subgroup is called the ‘‘operational’’ returnees. These are returning 

fighters who attempt to resuscitate dormant or create new networks, recruit members, or conduct home-grown-style attacks. They are likely to be pre-positioned and 

likely to attempt an attack under the command and control of ISIS remnants in the 

Middle East.25 These individuals are the most dangerous and deadly.26 The November 2015 Paris attacks are perhaps the clearest example; they were conducted by 

foreign fighters, who were trained in Syria and dispatched to France.27 Operational 

returnees are of even more concern if one believes that hundreds of operatives have 

already been deployed to Europe, with hundreds more hiding out on Europe’s doorstep in Turkey.28

The West must develop a range of strategies to handle the threat posed by these 

different groups. The ‘‘hardcore fighters’’ who remain in Iraq and Syria will need 

to be killed or captured by Iraqi Security Forces and the anti-ISIS coalition. The 

first priority should be detection, which goes hand-in-hand with increased informaVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
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29 Nicholas J. Rasmussen, ‘‘Fifteen Years After 9/11: Threats to the Homeland,’’ Statement for 

the Record: Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security Governmental Affairs Committee, 

September 27, 2016. 30Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone, and Eva Entenmann, Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization 

and Jihadist Attacks in the West, Institute for International Political Studies, June 2017. 31For more on specific programs and databases, including the Terrorist Identities Datamart 

Environment, the Transportation Security Administration’s Automated Targeting System, and 

the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, see Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘‘There Will Be Battles in the Heart of Your Abode: The Threat Posed by Foreign Fighters Returning from Syria 

Continued 

tion sharing and training partner nations to screen and investigate capacity potential terrorists. This suggests an even greater role for multilateral cooperation. 

Another major hurdle will be marshaling the resources necessary to monitor, 

track, and surveil dozens of battle-hardened jihadists attempting to blend back into 

Western society. Combating the threat posed by the ‘‘free agents’’ or roving band of 

militants calls for continued efforts by the West to build the partner capacity of 

host-nation forces in weak and fragile States. 

WHAT IS THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND AND WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO

TO MITIGATE THE THREAT?

It is critical to have a judicious discussion about the threat posed to the U.S. 

homeland while avoiding arguments that present the issue as binary. In other 

words, defining the threat as either completely overwhelming or relatively nonexistent is myopic at best and counterproductive at worst. The threat to the West 

posed by returning foreign fighters is anything but monolithic. 

It is prudent to discuss the longer-term consequences to the homeland of the unraveling so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria. In the long term, military gains 

against ISIS are a necessary step in ultimately defeating it. But in the shorter term, 

its dissolution will create uncertainty, rising threats, opportunities for extremists, 

and new challenges for our military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. 

I am comforted in knowing that much effort has been focused on this threat since 

the summer of 2014—testimonies by the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

Director of National Intelligence, and others have reinforced that the United States 

has taken the threat seriously and been a leader in international cooperation to 

combat these foreign fighters. And despite the high casualties inflicted on fighters 

who went to Iraq and Syria, their sheer numbers means that the threat will be with 

us for years to come. 

The threat is far more serious for Europe and the Middle East than for the United 

States. The same factors that make Europe so vulnerable to the threat posed by foreign fighters—geography; the number of citizens who traveled to Iraq or Syria; 

counterterrorism capabilities, including screening, watchlisting, and whole-of-government programs; poor continent-wide information sharing and intelligence and 

law-enforcement coordination; and the relationship between Muslim communities 

and host-nation governments—present favorably for the United States. As director 

of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Nicholas Rasmussen acknowledged in Congressional testimony that compared to European counterparts, U.S. 

ports of entry are under far less strain from migration and U.S. law enforcement 

agencies are not nearly as overtaxed by the sheer numbers of terrorist plots and 

potential suspects.29

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, 95 Americans have died in jihadist-related attacks in the homeland, with 63 of those deaths coming from just two attacks—San Bernardino and Orlando. According to a recent report on radicalization 

and jihadist attacks in the West, of the 17 successful attacks linked to jihadist terrorists in the United States between June 2014 and June 2017, none were perpetrated by foreign fighters.30 But Americans have gone to Syria and returned to 

the United States. A U.S. citizen from Florida, Moner Mohammad Abu-Salha, traveled to Syria to fight with al-Qaeda’s affiliate organization and returned to the 

United States without U.S. officials realizing that he had trained with a terrorist 

group, proving that government and intelligence authorities are not omniscient. 

Terrorists traveling to the United States from abroad to conduct attacks are still 

rare events. While 9/11 was undoubtedly a high-impact event, without question, it 

remains an anomaly. Moreover, since then, the United States has gone to great 

lengths to defend the homeland. The United States has worked with the screening 

community to develop a comprehensive, end-to-end vetting system that is part of a 

robust system of measures, including face-to-face interviews and biometric assessments, intended to serve as a line of defense against foreign fighters seeking to infiltrate the country.31

22 

and Iraq,’’ testimony presented before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee on March 12, 2015. 32 Rasmussen, 2016. 33 An especially promising study is Todd Helmus, Miriam Matthews, Rajeev Ramchand, Sina 

Beaghley, David Stebbins, Amanda Kadlec, Michael A. Brown, Aaron Kofner, and Joie D. 

Acosta, RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism, Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND Corporation, TL–243–DHS, 201. 34Daniel Byman and Will McCants, ‘‘Fight of Flight: How to Avoid a Forever War Against 

Jihadists,’’ Washington Quarterly, No. 40, No. 2, 2017, pp.67–77. 35 Thomas Hegghammer and Peter Nesser, ‘‘Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West,’’ Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2015. 

Even with these measures, the threat has atomized; in the United States, violence 

perpetrated by home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) remains perhaps our foremost 

concern. The FBI has investigations on approximately 1,000 potential HVEs across 

all 50 States. As ISIS continues to lose territory, it will likely seek to emphasize 

high-profile attacks to remain relevant and demonstrate virility in the face of severe 

adversity. This could result in an uptick in lone-wolf attacks in the West, including 

in the United States. Put simply, what happens in Raqqa matters in Rochester. 

Comparing the current threat level in the United States to the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Rasmussen observed, 

‘‘The threat landscape is less predictable and, while the scale of capabilities currently demonstrated by most of the violent extremist actors does not rise to the level 

that core al-Qaeda had on 9/11, it is fair to say that we face more threats originating in more places and involving more individuals than we have at any time in 

the past 15 years.’’32

Accordingly, the United States must continue to allocate sufficient resources to 

preventing foreign terrorist fighters from attempting to sneak into the country. This 

includes not only a stout defense of American borders, but also intelligence sharing 

with allies overseas, including European countries, Turkey, and other nations 

throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. 

And while we must continue to prevent foreign terrorist fighters from attempting 

to return to the United States, we must also focus on the more likely threat posed 

by radicalization and home-grown violent extremism. Countering violent extremism 

has proceeded in fits and starts in the West, including in the United States. We 

have too little data to understand which programs work well and which do not— 

continued Federal support for on-going and future research will be critical to making progress in this area, as will oversight, monitoring, evaluation, and assessment 

to discern which programs work and why.33

We still understand very little about the radicalization process, what role the 

internet and social media play in this process, and what policy should be when it 

comes to monitoring terrorist use of social media (e.g., is it more prudent to shut 

communication channels down or leave them up to monitor and map terrorist networks?) Congress might consider funding more fusion cells and allocating resources 

for law enforcement training to deal with the threat from returning foreign fighters. 

This could extend to funding for the recruitment of linguists and cultural experts 

working in tandem with Customs and Border Patrol and Citizenship and Immigration Services. 

CONCLUSION

We are entering yet another period of uncertainty. With the dissolution of the geographic entity known as the ISIS caliphate, new threats and challenges will arise. 

Hearings such as this and many others of its kind underscore how seriously the 

United States takes these challenges. The threat of terrorism can sometimes feel 

ubiquitous, especially as ‘‘the post-9/11 media has profoundly changed how Americans assess the risk of terrorism.’’34 It is important to keep a sober perspective. 

In their 2015 study, ‘‘Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the 

West,’’ Hegghammer and Petter Nesser conclude that ‘‘the Islamic State does not 

currently pose the same type of terrorist threat to the West as al-Qaeda did in the 

2000’s.’’35 I would extrapolate on this to argue that this statement may be true for 

the United States, but perhaps no longer true for Europe. But even within the 

United States, there are risks that may not stem from the terrorist diaspora. 

And while we focus on these new challenges posed by the unraveling of ISIS, let 

us not forget that our principal terrorist adversary over the past 20 years—al-Qaeda 

(or at least some form of it), is still with us, as evidenced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula’s increasing obsession with attacking commercial aviation; this group will 

remain a direct threat to the United States. 

23 

36 Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, ‘‘ISIS, Despite Heavy Losses, Still Inspires Global Attacks,’’ 

New York Times, July 8, 2017. 37Daniel Byman, ‘‘Beyond Iraq and Syria: ISIS’ Ability to Conduct Attacks Abroad,’’ testimony 

for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2017. 38 Hubbard and Schmitt, 2017. 

With each brutal battle in Iraq and Syria, the potential pool of foreign fighters 

is shrinking. ISIS fighters are dying in shocking numbers—nearly 60,000 have died 

since June 2014.36 The 300 that until recently were hunkered down in Mosul 

showed no proclivity to surrender or escape; they launched counteroffensives against 

Iraqi forces, including waves of suicide attackers. Those that survive these major 

battles will keep defending the caliphate until the bitter end, either in Mayadeen 

or in whatever disparate outposts of the Sunni Arab hinterlands remain available. 

In short, I agree with the assessment of Georgetown University professor Daniel 

Byman, who, in testimony last month to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, concluded the danger posed by ISIS to the U.S. homeland is ‘‘real but manageable.’’37 With 150 American foreign fighters, scores of whom are presumably 

dead, it may be possible to assign regular surveillance to each of these individuals 

in case they do attempt to return home. 

Yet even as the United States faces less of a threat than our European allies, we 

cannot become complacent and must ensure continued vigilance. Toward this end, 

I heed recent remarks offered by Lt. Gen. Michael K. Nagata, one of the Army’s top 

special operations forces officers, that with respect to ISIS, ‘‘we have to conclude 

that we do not fully appreciate the scale or strength of this phenomenon.’’38

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Dr. Clarke. 

In the interest of time, Member questioning will be limited to 3 

minutes each with multiple rounds if possible. Without objection, 

so ordered. 

I now recognize myself for 3 minutes for questioning. The primary purpose of this task force is denying terrorist entry into the 

United States, obviously, but what emerges from all of your testimony is, in my opinion, the urgent threat that our European allies—I think Mr. Simcox, you threw out the figure of 23,000 suspects in the United Kingdom. 

Maybe each of you briefly, could you address what steps our European allies have taken in terms of identifying and fixing gaps in 

screening, border security, information sharing, prosecution, and 

where they might need to go? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I will just add one quick response to that. One of 

the things in the Europol report that I pointed to, which I flagged 

for you in my written testimony, is that they are putting more investigators in the refugee hotspots pouring in through Italy and the 

Mediterranean and Greece and that sort of thing to try and figure 

out basically which ones are actually foreign fighters who were trying to use the refugee flows as a mask for their own operations, 

sort of as the Paris in November 2015 attackers did. 

I think what Robin pointed to and some of the other statistics 

I point to in my report that the main problem here is that European counterterrorism forces are basically—authorities are overwhelmed. They are trying to basically look at a vast threat pool, 

and they are trying to determine which ones are going to pop off 

at any given time. 

The link I wanted to highlight there was I think it is easier for 

European citizens or residents to get into this country if they wanted to come here and do an attack than somebody who wanted to 

come directly from Iraq and Syria or possibly one of these other 

hotspots. 

Mr. SIMCOX. So the Europeans have got better at sharing intelligence when it comes to the foreign terrorist fighter threat, but 

24 

where there hasn’t been an awful lot of progress and where there 

is inconsistency is the non-foreign fighters, the radicals that are already in that country. 

Say, are the Dutch sharing information with the United Kingdom? Are the United Kingdom sharing the information with 

France? Often they can’t because of the nature of how that intelligence has been gathered. So there is a real problem, not from the 

screening refugees problem, is still a major issue because of the 

scale of the numbers that are still coming in. I think there is a lot 

more that needs to be done on that. 

But I would just say in my conversations with European officials 

they know that their capacity on this isn’t good enough. They want 

help on it, and it is a real area of potential agreement and cooperation between the United States and the European partners who 

want to get better. 

Mr. CLARKE. My conversations I know the Europeans are working hard to build capacity in those areas, including training. But 

one area in particular, and I tend to focus a lot on the finance end 

of attacks, is synching law enforcement at the local level with the 

National-level entities. 

A lot of these jihadis have criminal backgrounds. Sometimes 

these are guys that are petty thieves and criminals and they are 

more well-known to the local beat cops than they are at the higher 

level. So connecting those two from the grassroots up to the top is 

critical to figuring out exactly who these people are and how they 

may attempt to fund their attacks. 

We know how they funded their travel to Iraq and Syria. We are 

now concerned about how they might fund their travel from Iraq 

and Syria back home to Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, 

Germany, et cetera. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Great, thank you. 

To my colleagues 3 minutes goes quickly, so use it wisely. 

The Chair now—but I do hope we are able to touch on both of 

your testimonies touch on the cubs of the caliphate program and 

the role of children, as well as domestic radicalization, which is a 

real thorny one. 

But the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the task 

force Mrs. Watson Coleman—— 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. GALLAGHER [continuing]. For 3 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you for your testimony. I think 

I want to follow up with what the Chairman was talking about. 

You talked about the impact on our European partners. 

What is it that we can do that European partners would allow 

us to do that would help them in what really becomes a crisis for 

them and that would therefore accrue a benefit to us by ensuring 

that what is happening there is documenting, is accountable, and 

makes us safer? 

I would like to hear from each of you on that. I guess that will 

be my 3 minutes. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. OK. Real quick, I will just say the United States 

is the best in the world at tracking the external attack network for 

ISIS, which are the plotters who are actually trying to send people 

25 

abroad to commit attacks. It is some of that intelligence I would 

imagine is probably highly classified and difficult to share. 

But what is imperative there is to try and identify the external 

attack planners and figure out any of the Europeans or Western 

citizens or people in their orbit who may be tied to their networks 

who then could be activated abroad or could be sent abroad for an 

attack. That is sort-of a key link, I think, in terms of the severity 

of terrorist plots. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I would suggest there are a couple of things. For example, one of the problems that European countries are having is 

when people, for example, from Tunisia have come into their countries illegally, they are having tremendous problems being able to 

send them back if they are a National security threat. 

So any pressure the pressure the United States can put on some 

of those countries to be able to get them to accept security threats 

from Europe would be a great help. 

Sharing intelligence where possible, although I know of course it 

isn’t always possible, it is very useful. Encouraging European governments to spend money on this, encouraging them to treat it 

with the seriousness it deserves, especially some of the smaller European countries. 

I think overall just taking a more aggressive and realistic approach to the issue. It seems hard to believe that Europe didn’t before 2016, but I think that is the reality in some of those countries. 

Mr. CLARKE. I think as Tom mentioned, I would echo the United 

States is the best in the world at screening, watchlisting, and connecting what we are doing offensively in the region in Iraq and 

Syria with what we are trying to do defensively in terms of securing borders at home. 

One area I think that the Europeans could probably use some advice is in triangulating intelligence, right? So all the different 

‘‘INTS’’ that we know and talk about, SIGINT, HUMINT, and everything else, because it has got to be really a multi-INT picture 

instead of looking at these in individual siloes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Do you believe that the current climate 

with sort-of our leadership at the very top and the way we have 

been dealing with our so-called allies on the international stage has 

any impact at all on whether or not they would be amenable to our 

assistance? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Well, there is a lot to answer there, ma’am, and 

I don’t have enough time, but I will just say one thing. The leaks 

that we saw coming out about the investigations in the United 

Kingdom around the Manchester arena bombing, which is not directly tied to politics but is tied to intel sharing, did cause problems. That sort of thing needs to be tamped down permanently. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Captain Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen from the 

panel, thank you for appearing. 

I believe that terrorists overseas that are identified as active, 

radicalized, Islamic jihadists should be tracked and killed. I believe 

we should identify and very closely monitor suspected radicalized 

Islamic terrorists. If it can be determined that they are involved in 

26 

conspiracy to commit actual acts of terror, then they should be arrested, prosecuted, and if convicted, incarcerated. 

I further believe that we need to stop or greatly interfere with 

the recruitment and radicalization efforts that are taking place as 

we defeat our enemy and it disperses, which is the essence of this 

particular hearing. They are recruiting new people. This is increasingly happening in the digital realm. 

So this leads me to my question for you, Mr. Joscelyn. Do you 

believe that the United States and our allies are sufficiently monitoring and defending our homelands, our respective homelands, as 

allies in regarding the digital realm, including monitoring social 

media, emails, et cetera, to stop radicalization efforts? 

That the time is coming fast when a man would have to travel 

to a foreign land to receive training in jihadist training. It could 

be done on-line. Are we doing what we need to do to stop that? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I don’t have enough time to give you a full answer. Maybe I will do something in writing, but there is a mixed 

bag is the answer basically. 

The FBI and others inside the United States do some amazing 

work in thwarting plots. If you go through their filings and legal 

filings in terms of detecting email traffic and that sort of thing in 

finding people who are radicalized and who are in communication 

with ISIS operatives overseas. There is some amazing work being 

done there. 

In terms of counter-messaging though, however, in the digital 

websites and social media and that and shutting that down, however, I would say no. The efforts don’t come close to being adequate 

to what they should be. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. If I can find the ISIS propaganda sites, if Calipha 

News 381 is suspended at 12:01, I know Calipha News 382 is up 

at 12:02. Doesn’t take me much to find it, you know? So they know 

that, too. So there are a lot of problems in that regard. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Would you be able to give this committee a more 

thorough answer in writing, sir, whereby we may examine your 

suggestions and consider them? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I would be happy to. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Barraga ́n for 3 minutes. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you. 

Mr. Clarke, the administration earlier this year instituted a travel ban that impacted mostly majority-Muslim countries. What is 

your opinion? Do you happen to think that a ban like this only exacerbates the threat of foreign fighters coming back? If so, why? 

Mr. CLARKE. I think it is still too early to tell what the impact 

of a potential ban is. In general I think it is a good idea to constantly reassess who we let into this country, so I do agree with 

taking a hard look and scrutinizing who travels to this country. 

But at the same time, there is a threat from countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere that weren’t included on the travel ban. So I think right now—again, there is also a lag effect in 

terms of a lot of this, how it is portrayed from a propaganda perVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
27 

spective. But again, a lot of things that the United States does is 

included in propaganda. 

So again, at the end of the day I think I would probably leave 

it as an incomplete. I think this is a period right now where we 

are in a pause, where we have an opportunity to look further and 

to see how effective this actually could be. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. OK. 

My next question for anybody is if foreign fighters are returned 

to the United States by what mode or means do you think they will 

return? What is the most likely? Would it be, you know, planes, 

airports, the port through board, on foot through that south border 

wall? I mean, if you are going to have ISIS fighters come to this 

country by what mode do you think it would be most likely to come 

back? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I mean, I think it probably they would try—the 

normal means that we all use to try to get back in the country I 

think is probably the way they go, flights, that sort of thing. I don’t 

see any data that is publicly available that says they are preferring 

one means over another, you know, if that is what you are asking. 

So there is no policy justification for trying to block one means 

versus another one, if that is what you are asking, as far as I can 

tell. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Does anybody else want to chime in? 

Mr. CLARKE. In terms of how jihadists or foreign terrorist fighters may attempt to infiltrate, yes, I think most likely they are 

going to try to fly here, but again, it is often presented as a binary 

debate. 

I hear all the time that it is framed in terms of there are terrorists pouring over the border or no, they would never come over the 

Southern Border. I don’t see evidence that there are terrorists 

pouring over the border, but at the same time it seems logical that 

that would be one way to sneak into the country. 

So my follow-up to that is always if someone were to infiltrate 

the country through the Mexican border, is there an existing infrastructure in place that would facilitate some kind of attack? I am 

far more doubtful about that. 

So if they were to go through the trouble of getting here, then 

what? I often don’t hear a good response to that. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Rutherford for 3 minutes. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Clarke, in your written testimony you had talked about really three types of fighters, the hardcore, the free agents, the mercenary types, and then also the returnees, as you call them. 

I am particularly concerned about the returnees who could come 

back to the United States, but could you talk about the breakdown 

of what you suspect that might look like? How many will actually 

remain hardcore in the region? How many will, do you think return? 

Mr. CLARKE. Yes. So it is difficult to quantify that, right, to say 

I think 30 percent are going to stay, you know, 20 percent—any 

number I gave you would be made up. I think by and large those 

28 

that are committed to the fight, as we have seen in Mosul, have 

dug in and are fighting to the death. 

A lot of foreign fighters, including a lot of Chechens have stayed, 

and they are meeting their death in Mosul. I think, again, due to 

geography it would be difficult for those that wanted to get back 

to the United States to do so. 

So I think the second-most likely category is probably the free 

agents and mercenaries who go on and fight another fight, whether 

that is in Libya, whether that is in other parts of North Africa or 

elsewhere. 

So I think the returnees are probably the smallest percentage. 

But as research by Thomas Hegghammer and others have shown, 

those that do make the trip back that are trained are the most lethal. So while it is a small chance or a small percentage, we still 

have to obviously guard against that. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Right. I particularly want to highlight that 

you said they are the most lethal. Which makes it imperative that 

we do all that we can to battlefield identify those individuals in all 

three groups because, as you said, we don’t really know who will 

be in which group. 

But Mr. Simcox, can you talk a little bit about how we are doing 

as far as battlefield identification of individuals and getting them 

into the terrorist system so that CBP and others know who these 

folks are when they start to travel? 

Mr. SIMCOX. Well, certainly from a European perspective, they 

are very confident that they know who most of the people are who 

have traveled. They are never going to get complete coverage, but 

they are quite confident. 

I think one of the things to look for when you are trying to assess 

and as Dr. Clarke said, it is very hard to know exactly who is going 

to pose the most lethal threat upon return and quantify it, but it 

is worth looking, I think, at when people traveled. Anyone traveling to Syria after 2014 at the latest knew what he was or she 

was going there to get involved in. They knew what ISIS represented. 

You could make an argument for maybe some of the 2011 travelers had different motivation, so I think it is borderline. But you 

could make an argument. So I do think it is worth looking at the 

dates of departure when trying to assess this. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee for 3 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the Chairman for yielding and 

thank the Ranking Member as well. 

The witnesses, I was in a similar hearing this morning so I am 

just going to follow the same tracking of questions. I like the opening statement that I am reading that indicates ‘‘The fall of Mosul 

and likely of Raqqa won’t be the end of the Islamic State.’’ I said 

this morning that our responsibilities are clearly the securing of 

the homeland. 

So I would be interested in your assessment of intelligence resources and how you think we should emphasize intelligence resources in terms of the preventative blocking or intelligence about 

29 

how many recruits may return or the idea of surveilling and determining—obviously we are a freedom of speech and thought Nation—those who may be radicalized right here in the United States 

off of social media. 

Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just real quick, that opening line was from my 

testimony, and the thought that leads off from—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I was wondering if you would recognize it. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I did. 

Main reason is because we are talking about the terrorist diaspora today. I think Robin in his testimony emphasized parts of this 

as well. I don’t think it is going to be a shotgun blast of a diaspora 

out of the lands of the caliphate where you have to deal with it sort 

of all at once. 

I think this is going to be an on-going problem for intelligence 

and homeland security officials, you know, in the near future. You 

have multilayers to the problem. Yes, you have the perspective of 

a guy or a gal who basically comes back directly to commit an attack that day or that week or that month. 

That is probably a low percentage of overall what you are going 

to be dealing with in the long run. The long run you have to worry 

about those sort of second-tier threats, the people who are going to 

come back and do, as Robin talked about, indoctrinating or recruiting a cell. 

There is an example I wrote up recently of somebody who came 

from al-Qaeda in Syria back to Columbus, Ohio or somewhere in 

Ohio and basically he was setting up a cell to commit an attack. 

He wasn’t even going to do it himself. 

That sort of thing is, I think, in the long run what is going to 

basically take up probably more resources than is probably appreciated right now. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. Simcox. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Well, I think you obviously need to take a board approach to this question. The thing that I would probably drill down 

on is there is a lot of discussion at the moment around CVE. 

I have always viewed that, and we have a lot of experience with 

this in the United Kingdom, is something that I understand why 

people have to try and why government has to try to take that preventative approach. I don’t have massive amounts of confidence in 

the program as it currently exists, and I do think there are an 

awful lot of improvements to be made. 

But even with improvements, that kind of program, I think is a, 

it needs to be in the toolbox for all the things you would bring to 

the counterterrorism, counter-radicalization discussion, but I 

wouldn’t put huge amounts of faith in it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would like Dr. Clarke to be able to answer, 

Mr. Chairman, and then I would like, Dr. Clarke, if you could comment on the importance of countering violent extremism as a component of our fight? 

Mr. CLARKE. Yes. I mean, I pretty much agree with Robin there. 

I think CVE is important, but I think the literature, the academic 

literature and I tend to base my judgments off of empirical eviVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
30 

dence and data, is so nascent that we really don’t know what works 

and what doesn’t. 

You know, people are coming out of the woodworks now promising CVE programs as if they were some kind of magic bullet or 

silver bullet. I just, you know, I totally dismiss that. I think it is 

important to learn what works and what doesn’t, but we are just 

not there yet. 

That doesn’t mean throw the baby out with the bath water. It 

means, you know, buckling down and getting some really smart 

people to start thinking about this in a focused manner. So and 

again, it is one pillar in an otherwise broad, comprehensive 

counterterror strategy. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick for 3 minutes. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. I will just address the question to 

the entire panel. It is the same question I asked Secretary Kelly 

when he appeared before us regarding Visa Waiver. 

So we all know the threats of entry through various mechanisms, 

whether it be the Northern Border, the Southern Border, the refugee program, the legal immigration process, as was the case with 

Malik regarding San Bernardino. But I want to address the Visa 

Waiver Program for a second to the extent that any of you have 

researched or put some thought into that. 

Thirty-eight countries roughly, part of the program started in the 

1980’s based on the Human Development Index, which is basically 

higher-income countries. That was the old model back then. 

We live in a very different world in 2017 than existed back in 

the 1980’s. The threats have changed, and terrorism is no longer 

a regional threat. 

It is a global threat, and there are a lot of really dangerous people that live in really nice places like Copenhagen and Brussels 

and Paris and London. There are some really good people that live 

in really tough places. 

The Visa Waiver Program I think last year about 70,000 came 

in. Currently I think there are about 150,000 overstays. It is I believe a dangerous situation we are in right now when you have a 

lot of people that have been radicalized in Western Europe that can 

essentially come in through the waiver process that goes unchecked. 

With all the billions of dollars we spend on National security, 

that seems to be a glaring gap. So I just wanted your perspective 

on that. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Congressman, I know I have colleagues at the Heritage Foundation who have done an awful lot of work on the Visa 

Waiver Program and are currently supportive of it, although they 

recognize some of the threats that you outlined. 

I would like to be able to give you a fuller answer with a testimony if that is OK? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just real quick, there are many reasons why I 

don’t think the travel ban, for example, works and is effective at 

31 

all. This is one of them. So if you look in European nations in 

terms of how they say the arrests or threats have manifested there, 

in 2016 Europol says there were 718 jihadist terrorist arrests 

across the European countries, many of whom, obviously, have a 

visa waiver in effect. 

Only 22 of those arrests were returnees from Iraq and Syria. And 

77 of the 718 were returnees from any battlefield, so Iraq, Syria, 

elsewhere. 

So 718 means that basically most of the threats that they are 

dealing with in Europe who are, can more easily get in to the 

United States via the Visa Waiver Program from European countries are actually already residents or citizens in Europe. 

I think that that—basically that doesn’t even—although 718 are 

potentially going to do that, all I am saying is that if I were looking 

to plan something in the United States and I wanted to get somebody to go do it, I would use somebody who could get in that way 

because it is easier. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Joscelyn, could you provide the committee 

with that information when you get it? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure. It is actually there. It is in my written testimony, but I can provide more on that one. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. OK. 

Mr. CLARKE. I would just add to what Tom said. We are talking 

about those arrests, and correct me if I am wrong, but those are 

people that didn’t travel to Iraq and Syria. So those are Europeans 

that never left. 

Dan Byman had a piece in Lawfare, either today or yesterday, 

talking about frustrated foreign fighters. So in some sense it is 

countries can be a victim of their own success. 

We spend a lot of time preventing people from going, right? But 

now they are home and they are still intent to attack or travel elsewhere to places including the United States to launch an attack. 

If I can just quickly, one thing we know about terrorist organizations is that they are highly adaptable. The Islamic State in particular has found a way around sending people from one battlefield 

to the other. 

That is, as I am sure all of you know, the virtual entrepreneur 

model where they are using encrypted comms to get in touch with 

people that never left the place to actually direct them through 

every step of how to conduct an attack. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross 

and others have written about this extensively. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. I yield back. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett for 3 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. So I would thank the Chair and Mr. Clarke for 

providing a wonderful segue into the line of questioning that I 

have. I was a moderately decent soldier and a competent prosecutor, and I am familiar with 18 Code U.S. 2332(b), which makes 

illegal acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries and the 

concepts of conspiracy and intent, which would allow the prosecution of individuals who might not have completed efforts to do 

these things. 

32 

Mr. Joscelyn spoke earlier of an individual in Cleveland who had 

returned after having been involved with al-Qaeda, and Mr. Clarke 

talks about individuals from other areas as well. 

I have read stories obviously of individuals from the United 

States who were arrested as they sought to travel to join ISIS. 

What I have not read is the proactive arrest of individuals who had 

been identified when they returned. 

Mr. Simcox, do you know of any instances where we have identified individuals who have traveled abroad to engage in or support 

terrorist organizations being arrested upon their return to the 

United States? 

Mr. SIMCOX. Well, the United States I am less familiar with. Europe is—many of those arrests have taken place, but there has 

been great difficulty in translating evidence or intelligence from the 

battlefield into courtrooms. So there has not been the success rate 

with convictions that European governments would have liked. 

Mr. GARRETT. Does anyone in the panel, and this is open-ended, 

familiar with any sort of proactive reverse investigative techniques? For example, we worked hard in a past life on those who 

might seek to use electronic communication devices to exploit children by creating individuals on-line who might appear to be someone who they are not, for example, a 13-year-old girl who is actually a 34-year-old detective. 

Do we ever engage in essentially chatroom conversation with 

folks who would allege that they had traveled abroad? Does anybody know about anything like that? If so, can you think of a good 

reason why or why not we might seek to do that sort of thing? 

Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes. So one of the things we track and what we 

journal is the FBI’s filings from the different cases. You can see in 

those filings that they have undercover operatives communicating 

with people who travel abroad or people who are suspected of being 

radicalized inside the United States who may commit an attack. 

The FBI clearly, if you just go through the filings, it is obvious 

to me they have a program to basically interdict or sort-of go after 

people who—— 

Mr. GARRETT. Sure, and with all due respect, I have got 45 seconds. That makes me feel good and I would argue—— 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Sure. 

Mr. GARRETT [continuing]. Though I would submit that perhaps 

the recent arrests at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii is indicative of 

this sort of engagement. 

But what I would like to know is given the fact that whether it 

is a local national, a U.S. citizen, or a foreign national coming to 

the United States, based on the current code of the United States, 

specifically 18 U.S. Code 2332, whether the current administration 

or the previous administration has done anything to round up folks 

who left the fight and came back? 

Because you give me the facts, and I will lock them up. Are we 

doing that? Anybody? 

Mr. Joscelyn. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. As the way you stated it probably not, no. We are 

not doing that, no. 

33 

Mr. GARRETT. But you would concede it is illegal to do that, and 

the statute of limitations is 8 years, why aren’t we? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Yes. I mean, the FBI knows—I am not defending 

the FBI here, but I know the FBI does investigate these people or 

tries to anyway, on a regular basis. 

Now, that doesn’t mean they are rounding up and arresting them 

like you are saying, but they are investigating and trying to stop 

people that they think or suspect are going to basically pop off. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I am 11 seconds over. I would submit that if we have laws on the books to arrest and incarcerate individuals who have traveled abroad to engage in and support terrorism and we are not doing it, somebody needs to whisper in the 

administration’s ear. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. 

We will now entertain a second round of questions, and I will 

recognize myself for 3 minutes. 

Mr. Simcox, I think you suggested there are 500 French children 

in Syria, 150 of which have been born in Syria, some 80 Dutch. 

Then Mr. Joscelyn, in your written testimony you talk about this 

cubs of the caliphate program. Talk to us just both of you, just talk 

a little bit more about that phenomenon and what unique challenges it might pose to our efforts as a task force? Because I think 

it is an underappreciated phenomenon right now. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Well, yes. So one of the complications right off the 

bat is the citizenship question of some of these children. Are they 

French? Are they British? Are they Dutch? Are they French Syrian? 

That is the first question that is being posed and obviously what 

we do with these children when they return to their countries of 

origin. Are there any kind of de-radicalization programs that we 

could put them through that we are confident would work? I don’t 

think there is. 

So in terms of this task force, this is a problem for 10, 20, 30 

years down the line where you have these children that have been, 

I think, brainwashed essentially with violent ideology who will 

have every right to return to Europe and somewhere down the line 

every right to travel to the United States. I think we need to be 

very, very wary of that as a potential future threat. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just so real quick, one of the more disturbing videos I have seen of late of the many disturbing videos we have seen 

come out of ISIS will star foreign children who were forced to commit beheadings of men who were imprisoned. They were dressed up 

like the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks. 

So what happened is before November 2015, some of the men 

who went off to commit that attack actually committed these brutal 

executions overseas in Iraq and Syria. These four children reenacted that scene on behalf of ISIS. ISIS made them do that. 

The message in the video was very explicit. You are getting some 

of our guys now. We are raising a new generation to come after you 

in the future. That was the whole idea and why they were dressed 

up like the Paris attackers. 

This is a massive psychological and security problem for the near 

future, mainly in Iraq and Syria, but of course elsewhere. This cubs 

34 

of the caliphate program exists elsewhere. We have seen it in Afghanistan. We have seen it in North Africa. 

This is absolutely a form of brainwashing. Back in the communist days in Maoist China and sort-of thing, we have read up 

on this, one of the reasons they do this is they want to shock the 

conscience of the person to think there is no way of coming back. 

That basically if you commit an absolutely horrific crime, that 

basically just violates all laws of human nature, then basically 

there is no way to come back from that. You are then indoctrinated 

for life. 

That is the idea behind it. That is part of what they are trying 

to do. This creates a massive problem, and I am not going to pretend I have the answers. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Then, I mean, as we look at the audience here 

today, we have mostly young people that are presumably interested 

in counterterrorism and National security. I mean, are we on the 

flip side—and I am going to go over my time, but that is OK. 

Are we—that is right. Thank you. Do you think are we doing 

enough to get that next generation engaged and just recruit the 

best linguists, regional experts? 

Does our security clearance process hinder the recruitment of the 

best analysts and that sort-of next generation of intelligence professionals and political warriors, if you will, although we have sortof lost the art of political warfare? 

Dr. Clarke, I am interested in your thoughts on that. 

Mr. CLARKE. Yes. So maybe I am a bit of an optimist here and 

in addition to being a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 

I am a college professor at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

At CMU in particular I was growing a program called the Institute for Politics and Strategy, which is really cross-cutting. It involves people that are involved in cybersecurity. 

As you probably know, CMU is a big engineering and computer 

science school, and so at least from my perch I think there is a lot 

of interest from younger generations in combining international relations with cybersecurity, which is a huge need, a growing need 

for our country with some of these other things like robotics, which 

could be used for the military in the future. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. We are out of time, but if there are any recommendations from FDD or Heritage on that front, I think we 

would welcome them. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mrs. Watson 

Coleman for 3 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for all of your testimony. It has been very interesting and very illuminating. I want to kind of take us back a little bit here. 

This task force is to deny foreign fighters entry into the United 

States of America. So I need to know from you a couple of things, 

if you don’t mind? Is the threat of those folks coming to the United 

States of America low, medium, or high? 

What is it that you think we should do differently than we do 

now in terms of who comes into this country? Get you to respond 

to that and whether or not you think that that is our biggest threat 

35 

or should we be focusing on those who get radicalized here and 

never leave here but become a threat to us? 

So would you all three have at it for me? Thank you. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Just very quickly, what I would say about this is 

as our security systems are overwhelmed by domestic threats, both 

in Europe and here in the United States, what I would say is it 

is a low-probability event that a highly-trained team of foreign 

fighters could come in here, but I think there is a higher probability to it than it is ascribed in the bureaucracy, is the way I 

would put it. 

So we have to be very careful because what is happening now 

with the FBI and the other security services is they are being overwhelmed by, you know, the 18-year-old who is downloading an ISIS 

magazine in their parents’ basement in Staten Island, OK? 

That guy may be a threat, but it does not necessarily deserve the 

amount of resources that he is being given. This is part of the conversations I am having is sort-of I think there is a resource allocation problem that is potentially could be exposed here by our enemies. I will leave it at that. 

Mr. SIMCOX. I would just add that I think that in terms of the 

plots, the most numerous are probably from the home-grown radicals that never made the trip to Syria or Iraq. But in terms of the 

potential scale of carnage, I would say the highest threat comes 

from those who have traveled to those conflict zones, fought and 

trained with these terrorist groups and come back and try and 

carry out an attack. 

I mean, just look at what happened in Paris. I think the highest 

risk in terms of the body count, to be frank, comes from that kind 

of fighter. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I am interested in knowing the level of 

threat you think it is to our homeland: Low, medium, or high? I 

understand what you are saying. 

Mr. CLARKE. I would say I agree with Tom. I think it is a lowprobability, high-impact event though. So we talk all the time 

about black swans, the unknowable event that has a catastrophic 

impact. 

I think this is probably more along the lines of a gray swan, 

something that is imminently knowable but we also have to do the 

legwork, connect the dots and share intelligence and work with our 

partners overseas to put those pieces together. 

It is not a fait accompli that we will just figure this out because 

we put a lot of resources into intel. We also have to do the hard 

work to get there. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Virginia, Mr. Garrett for 3 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. So we have three intelligent people in front of this 

committee, Mr. Chair, or this subcommittee. Along the line of questioning I touched on earlier is Sweden recently made it a crime to 

travel to engage in terrorist activity and support. 

You talked earlier, I believe Mr. Simcox, about encouraging Europeans to, and I quote, which is frightening, ‘‘to spend money and 

to take this seriously.’’ If the person with terminal lung cancer 

won’t quit smoking it is hard to help them. 

36 

But I would open the floor and we will go Joscelyn, Simcox, and 

Clarke in order. I have got about 2 minutes, to you gentlemen to 

suggest actions that would be appropriately within the purview of 

the Legislative branch of the U.S. Federal Government that might 

further the goal of making our homeland safer from returning 

would-be jihadists, radicals, or anything tangentially related thereto? 

We don’t have a monopoly on good ideas. What are we not doing 

that you think we might do more of within the purview of this 

body? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I have to review the laws. I am not sure what 

you—I think you hinted at basically something that was not being 

enforced basically on the legal side. I have to look into that a little 

bit more. 

If our current material support for terrorism laws are not being 

fully sort-of leveraged to the extent that they could be, that may 

be—I don’t know if that is something that could be encouraged 

from this body or not. But that is something to look at. 

I think that there was a sort-of a lag during the Obama administration on the full sort-of implementation of material support for 

terrorism laws, and I would look into that is what I would say. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you very much. I will tell you that we 

looked at carrying a bill to do what Sweden did realized we had 

laws on the books that could deal with that, but that they need to 

be uniformly enforced. On the answers to the questions I asked you 

earlier are, yes, we do that sometimes. 

But to the best of my ability to ascertain, no we don’t do it all 

the time, and I can’t figure out why not. 

Mr. Simcox, what should we be doing differently within the purview of the Legislative branch? 

Mr. SIMCOX. There is a clear need here to take on the ideology 

in a way that I don’t think was done over the last 8 years. There 

was a lot of talking around the problem. 

I think that taking the European approach that the language 

around CVE, the community-led approach, I understand the arguments behind there. I don’t think there is any great success that 

it has worked, either in the United States or in any European 

country. So I would suggest we need to re-look at that. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

Dr. Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE. So I think before we jump to enact any kind of legislation we need to figure out what works and what doesn’t. 

Mr. GARRETT. Sure. 

Mr. CLARKE. I am referring here specifically to the use of social 

media. So there was a big announcement a couple of weeks ago 

about some of the tech giants, Facebook and others, that they are 

becoming more active in shutting down websites and trying to discard jihadist ideology. 

I am just not sure, not because I think it is a bad idea, but I 

genuinely don’t know if it is better to shut down the websites or 

to keep them up and running just to monitor them. 

Mr. GARRETT. Dr. Clarke, I think you made an amazing point. 

I also think that when we start determining what speech isn’t acceptable it is a very slippery slope. 

37 

I do wish, however, we would do a better job of differentiating 

how we treat American citizens and foreign nationals because the 

bountiful blessings bestowed upon us by our Constitution and Bill 

of Rights, in my estimation, don’t extend to those who come here 

to do us harm from abroad. 

Mr. CLARKE. But I see it as a form of open-source intelligence—— 

Mr. GARRETT. Yes, I agree. 

Mr. CLARKE [continuing]. And open-source networks. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. GARRETT. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 

Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee for 3 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. I want to pursue Dr. 

Clarke’s thought of open-source and form of securing, soliciting, or 

obtaining better intelligence. But let me indicate that, or at least 

pose a question, about the weaponizing of cyber and that that now 

adds a different component to whether it is a returning fighter, 

whether it is somebody on social media. 

The question I asked you all originally was the assessment of 

how we should focus our resources, FBI, intelligence resources, et 

cetera. 

Let me be very clear. A lot of resources are now being used to 

follow the tracks of the Russian connection, the Russian collusion, 

children of Donald Trump having conversations with known affiliates of the Kremlin. 

Having just come back from a former Soviet Bloc country, 

Belarus, there is no doubt that every effort that the Russian and 

Russian affiliates have to follow, track, undermine the United 

States they will do it. Their leader is a KGB. 

So the issue becomes the choice and use of resources. So terrorism is defined as somebody else’s flower, somebody else’s terrorism. The question becomes how do we allocate the resources? 

Do you consider the need for us to be able to follow both streams 

of potential threat to the United States and using heavy resources 

in both categories following the Russian intrusion, the election, collusion with the election, trying to recruit or penetrating individuals 

that are close to the White House? 

Then, of course, the idea of a different component, a returning 

fighter or someone, if you will, becoming radicalized on the social 

network? 

Dr. Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE. So let me say I am here as a subject-matter expert 

on terrorism, but to put on my international security hat for a second, I don’t view these as different things. 

I view—to use kind-of Pentagon parlance the four-plus-one 

threat, so both nation-states and violent non-state actors as part of 

the suite or portfolio of threats that the United States faces. So I 

don’t think that we get to choose who we get to defend against and 

who we don’t. 

I think we need to take a broad approach to countering all of our 

enemies and we are also moving into places like the gray zone and 

hybrid warfare. So again, it would be nice to pick and choose what 

we could react to, but again, we have got to do it all. 

38 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Anyone else? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I will just say this on Russia. They are prolific at 

hybrid warfare and information warfare and cyber intrusions and 

all of these things. 

We absolutely need to devote resources across the board to figuring out exactly what they have tried to do here in the United 

States and what they are trying to do to Western democracies writ 

large, because this is a sustained effort by Russia. It is not a oneoff type of event. 

Mr. SIMCOX. Very quickly on the counterterrorism side of things, 

there was a period maybe a year, 18 months ago when an awful 

lot of attention was paid to the social media side of things. 

I think the social media side of things is important when it 

comes to recruitment, but I still think that the key to this is faceto-face individual contacts with people who know each other and 

draw people into terrorist networks that way. On-line is important, 

but it is not the whole ball game. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me just finish this point, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your indulgence. I agree with all three of you, 

and I guess that is the point that I am making is that we need to 

have pointed resources, Dr. Clarke, that doesn’t leave any aspect 

that may be a threat to the United States. 

I will just cite—I am on the Judiciary Committee—the Department of Justice had grants that were going to educate local law enforcement to be—not a little bit, but to be sophisticated in fettering 

out these individuals who may be in the community or also being 

able to intervene. 

I think that is an element that is equally important because now 

who is going to catch them at the border’s edge on our border, and 

if they are radicalized here we need to have local communities 

being a little bit more informed. 

But my final point is, it is a multi-task situation, and I hope that 

that is something we get out of this task force that we need to be 

looking at a Russia. We need to be looking at those who may potentially come from the fight, start the fight here, because our idea is 

to protect the homeland. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. I would love to continue questioning, but—well, since Mr. Joscelyn self-identified as a nerd I 

would love to continue nerding out with all of you on this topic. But 

we have kept you here 2 hours longer than we anticipated, and we 

want to be respectful of your time and everyone else’s time. 

I thank you very much for your flexibility, your patience, and for 

your thoughtful testimony. I know you spend an enormous amount 

of time sitting in tanks and thinking and would love nothing more 

than your thoughts to become legislative reality or policy that is 

implemented. 

I just would submit that you have an opportunity to do just that, 

and I would hope that the three of you will continue to work with 

this task force as we go forward. 

We welcome all of the ideas you have as we draft our report and 

as we continue to study this issue. We are trying to recommend 

concrete things that our Government can do to do a better job of 

keeping terrorists out of this country, a very complex topic, one 

39 

that you have all suggested we are going to be dealing with for 

years to come. 

There are no silver bullet solutions, but we are asking you for 

your best ideas. So please, I just would ask for you to continue 

working with us and the staff here on that. 

I want to thank the Ranking Member for her help and support. 

I want to thank everyone who showed up for this important hearing. I want to thank all of the young people that attended this. 

This is an important topic, and I hope you will pursue a career in 

this field. We need you. 

So with that, pursuant to committee Rule VII(D), the hearing 

record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the task 

force stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the task force was adjourned.] 

(41) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER FOR THOMAS JOSCELYN

Question 1. You described the process of terrorists returning from the battlefield 

to Europe. How, practically speaking, would terrorists find the money to support 

this travel? Are they still able to find the funds in light of the loss of territorial control? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. In light of the tighter border security between Turkey and the European Union, how would the foreign fighters book flights to return to Europe or other 

locations? How might they go about falsifying their identities? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Experts have articulated that as ISIS continues to lose territory, some 

foreign fighters may seek out other terrorist organizations. What other conflict 

zones may these fighters flock to and how will these foreign fighters interact with 

other terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda? Is it likely they will be absorbed by 

these other terror groups or will they remain a distinct organization? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER FOR ROBIN SIMCOX

Question 1. As you mentioned in your testimony, entire families have moved to 

Iraq and Syria and many children have been born in the caliphate. There is concern 

that ISIS has been training minors in Iraq and Syria to be ‘‘the next generation of 

foreign terrorist fighters,’’ and it is likely that those with Western parents will eventually return home. How can Europe protect itself against this threat, which may 

not manifest itself for several years? 

Answer. Governments cannot be complacent about the threat that radicalized 

teenagers and pre-teens can pose. Teens or pre-teens featured in almost a quarter 

of plots in Europe between January 2014 and May 2017. 

As children return from the ‘‘Caliphate’’ back to Europe, there is unlikely to be 

a fool-proof approach which European governments will be able to adopt to protect 

themselves. However, some steps can be taken. 

Clearly, intelligence agencies need to be cognizant of the potential threat that 

these children could pose in the short, medium, and long term, and work closely 

with law enforcement when appropriate. 

However, a thorough psychological assessment of these children is also necessary, 

with child protection agencies and social workers engaged. Parents should lose custody rights to their children in some circumstances. 

Education is also important. Teachers, for example, could be trained to be aware 

of the potential signs of radicalization in their students. In the United Kingdom, legislation has been passed—as part of the U.K.’s broader Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) strategy—to ensure that teachers are required to be on the lookout for 

this as part of their broader safeguarding duty, much as they would to try and ensure children were not becoming involved with gangs, drugs, or being sexually exploited. 

Ultimately, however, this is a generational problem. As long as the ideology of 

Islamism exists, there lies the possibility of even children being drawn into terrorism and extremism. 

Question 2. The United Kingdom’s impending exit from the European Union will 

certainly have enormous ramifications. In the security sphere, how do you think 

Brexit will affect information sharing and cooperation between the United Kingdom 

and the European Union, especially with regard to Europol and the Schengen Information System? What impact will Brexit have, if any, on the U.S.-U.K. security and 

information-sharing relationship? 

42 

Answer. The United Kingdom has a series of bilateral intelligence-sharing relationships, which should be unaffected by Brexit. The intelligence-sharing relationship with the United States—and the rest of the Five Eyes community—was extraordinarily robust before Brexit and will continue to be so afterwards. 

Countries within the European Union are aware of the United Kingdom’s vast intelligence-gathering capacity. It is, therefore, very much in the interest of the 

United Kingdom’s friends in the European Union for cooperation to continue. 

One example of where cooperation will likely continue is over the Schengen Information System (SIS). The United Kingdom currently submits information to the 

SIS. The European Union cutting off the United Kingdom’s access to it benefits no 

one and can only harm collective European security. Furthermore, a non-E.U. country having some form of access to the SIS is not an unprecedented situation (Iceland, for example). 

When it comes to Europol, the United Kingdom has never relied on this body as 

much as some other European countries do. Still, the influence Britain has to shape 

European Union bodies such as Europol will likely diminish with Brexit. 

However, it is not yet clear whether the United Kingdom has to leave Europol 

entirely. Europol has a variety of organizational agreements with countries outside 

the European Union and the United Kingdom could potentially arrange a similar 

agreement. 

It is also important not to overstate Europol’s efficacy. It is a place for information 

sharing on a variety of law enforcement issues and focused on improving coordination and cooperation within the European Union. Yet Europol has no power of arrest and can only ever be as powerful as the nations involved will allow it to be. 

If they are not sharing intelligence with Europol—and that has proven to be the 

case consistently—then Europol’s usefulness as an intelligence-sharing hub is clearly limited anyway. 

Question 3. The American NCTC brings together the intelligence community and 

law enforcement in a way that allows both branches to cooperate in identifying and 

interdicting terrorists. To what extent has Europe had success or faced challenges 

in facilitating the flow of information between law enforcement and intelligence? 

Answer. Ensuring that information is going back and forth between intelligence 

and law enforcement agencies is an on-going challenge for many countries in Europe, although European officials state that progress has been made, particularly 

since ISIS’ attack in Brussels in March 2016. 

According to a BBC analysis, there are occasions when, ‘‘for a Belgian police officer to find out what Belgian intelligence knows about a threat, he or she sometimes 

needs to learn it from the U.K. police, who learn it from U.K. intelligence, who learn 

it from Belgian intelligence.’’ These turf wars doubtless limit the operational effectiveness of many European countries’ efforts. 

There are a multitude of reasons behind this. If a European spy agency is handed 

intelligence from a foreign country, it may be that it is shared under the agreement 

that this intelligence is then not passed on to others. This secrecy is understandable. Revealing intelligence haphazardly can lead to the compromising of sources, 

potentially endangering agents in the field and national security more broadly. 

The structure of European countries also presents a problem. Belgium, for example, has very localized policing arrangements: There are six separate police forces 

just in Brussels. Another example is Germany, whose Federal structure makes it 

harder to centralize intelligence. 

At other times, a country’s particular history is a hindrance. Conversations with 

German officials have demonstrated that the country remains highly resistant to 

further integration of police and intelligence agencies due to memories of the Gestapo. 

Question 4. What progress has Europe made on the judicial front in prosecuting 

cases of terrorism or material support? 

Answer. European countries have had success with prosecuting Islamist terrorists. In the United Kingdom, for example, a Henry Jackson Society report has 

shown that there were 264 convictions for Islamism-inspired terrorism offences as 

a result of arrests taking place between 1998 and 2015. 

However, issues remain. European countries have found it easier to prosecute 

those planning attacks than those verbally encouraging or inciting such attacks, or 

voicing support for terrorist groups. This is partially because freedom of speech 

issues come into play, but also because legislation may not always be robust enough 

to be able to sustain successful prosecutions. 

Those who have fought in Syria and then return to their countries of origin are 

also not always easy to prosecute. For a multitude of reasons, it is very hard for 

European police forces to travel to Syria to collate evidence from a war zone and 

then use that evidence in a civilian court. The reality is that European governments 

43 

will not be able to prosecute anything like all returning fighters from the Syria/Iraq 

conflict. This is not something unique to the war in Syria. Over the past 25 years, 

thousands of Europeans have traveled to fight in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kashmir, Somalia, and Yemen without prosecution. 

Convictions are only part of the solution anyway as long as there is a relaxed approach to sentencing and law and order more generally. Take the example of 

Ibrahim el-Bakraoui. As part of an armed robbery he was taking part in Brussels, 

he shot a police officer with a Kalashnikov. El-Bakraoui was sentenced to 9 years 

in prison in August 2010. However, by 2014, he had been released. This release was 

sanctioned under the condition that he did not leave Belgium for any longer than 

a month at a time. El-Bakraoui ignored this, and in June 2015, was thwarted in 

his attempt to enter Syria, being detained in Turkey and sent back to Europe. Despite this, el-Bakraoui remained free to be part of the ISIS cell that carried out attacks in Brussels in March 2016, killing 32 and injuring approximately 300. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MIKE GALLAGHER FOR COLIN P. CLARKE

Question 1. You’ve described the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a global 

group that is regionally anchored and sees its members as players in local conflicts. 

When it comes to Europe, what is the ISIS strategy? Are they hiding in place or 

is the problem less severe than that? What about the United States? Are they hoping to attack the United States directly or through proxies? What is their long-term 

goal when it comes to both the United States and Europe? 

Answer. In terms of what the ISIS strategy is in Europe, I’d say that it is multitiered. First, I expect ISIS to continue to use its propaganda to attempt to radicalize 

people living in Europe in hopes of convincing them to launch terrorist attacks, 

what we might call the classic ‘‘lone-wolf’’ or inspired terrorist. Second, ISIS will attempt to make direct contact with individuals through the internet in what many 

have called the ‘‘virtual planning model’’ of terrorist attacks, in which ISIS members 

direct the individuals through encrypted applications and help them plan each step 

of the attack. Third, it is likely that ISIS members are in Europe, either with or 

without direct instructions, and these members or cells could conduct attacks similar in style to the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Fourth, and finally, ISIS will 

likely continue to send fighters from the Middle East to try to surreptitiously infiltrate Europe to conduct attacks. 

The situation for the United States is different, because the United States is insulated by two oceans and thus safer as a matter of pure geography. The United 

States also benefits from more-robust defenses, including superior security and intelligence services and far fewer overall targets. Furthermore, it appears that U.S. 

policing, intelligence, and border officials have been able to prevent ISIS members 

from arriving in the United States, although there is no way to be certain of this. 

ISIS will likely focus its attempts on the first two options listed above (lone-wolf 

and virtual planning model) but might also attempt something similar to the recent 

plot in Australia, in which ISIS mailed explosives to terrorists already living in the 

country. There is a lower probability (albeit not a negligible one) that ISIS will attempt to send fighters directly to the United States via air travel from Europe or 

the Middle East, or first to Canada and Mexico or points south and then over the 

border into the United States. 

ISIS’ long-term goal when it comes to the United States and Europe is to continue 

sowing terror and trying to show U.S. and European citizens that their governments 

are incapable of protecting them. Most experts assess that ISIS would ideally like 

to conduct an attack in a U.S. or European city using chemical weapons. ISIS, like 

al-Qaeda, also remains fixated on attacking aviation, as evidenced by the recent plot 

in Australia. 

Question 2. The recent pace of terrorist plots and attacks in Europe, carried out 

by both home-grown extremists and foreign fighter returnees, has been staggering. 

Since the rise of ISIS, the West has experience several ‘‘lone-wolf’’ attacks, where 

the attackers were seemingly inspired by ISIS’ ideology or carried the attack out in 

the name of ISIS. Is it accurate to describe these attacks as ‘‘lone wolves,’’ or after 

closer examination, do ISIS members usually play some role in facilitating the attacks? How should the West address the threat of ISIS operatives exploiting 

ungoverned spaces to continue directly or indirectly executing and inspiring attacks? 

Answer. ISIS operatives do not follow one simple model in planning terrorist attacks; instead, the operatives hedge their bets to achieve the highest rate of success 

in conducting an attack. There have indeed been true lone wolves who have merely 

been inspired by Salafi-jihadist ideology—the ISIS and al-Qaeda ideology that seeks 

to emulate the presumed practices of the earliest generation of Muslims and that 

believes in violent struggle against non-Muslims and apostates as an important reliVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:59 Jan 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17TF0713\17TF0713.TXT HEATH
44 

gious duty. But ISIS would prefer to play a more direct role in these attacks, because virtual planner-style attacks or ISIS-directed attacks involving trained militants dispatched to attack a target typically result in higher lethality rates. 

With respect to ungoverned spaces, I think the term itself is somewhat misleading. ISIS prefers ‘‘alternatively governed’’ spaces, where the government in place 

is tribal, clan-based, or generally anti-Western and that either is overtly tolerant of 

extremists operating from its soil or lacks the capacity to do anything about it. In 

the West, I’m very concerned about places like Molenbeek, Belgium, and the 

banlieues of France, the ex-urban, depressed suburbs that are homes to many immigrants and that have seemingly become incubators of extremism and given rise to 

hundreds of jihadists determined to attack the West. In these cases, Western governments need to devise a plan to root out extremists, which is not only a multigenerational effort but one comprising economic, political, social, cultural, religious, 

and security dimensions. Finally, it will be crucial to monitor social media and online activity to ensure that ISIS does not find safe haven in the virtual space. 

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