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Prepared by: USINDOPACOM Joint Operational Law Team (INDOPACOM.J06.OPLAW@pacom.mil) / U.S. Army Pacific Command Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

Last Updated: 11 March 2024 (all prior versions are obsolete)

***This TACAID includes legal opinions and analysis that does not necessarily represent the official positons of the U.S. government***

USINDOPACOM J06/SJA TACAID SERIES

TOPIC: BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN CHINA AND BHUTAN 

 BOTTOM LINE

 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims approximately 581 square miles of Bhutanese territory. 

 Despite formally agreeing to recognize Bhutanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, the PRC is continuing to 

build infrastructure in Bhutan while denying Bhutanese civilians and security forces access to disputed areas. 

 The PRC principally covets the Doklam Plateau in western Bhutan, a strategically valuable high ground that is 

militarily advantageous to both the PRC and India. 

 The PRC’s new territorial claims to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary and Chinese settlements in Bhutan’s Beyul 

Khenpajong region provide trade space for the PRC to pressure Bhutan into ceding the Doklam Plateau. 

 The PRC has publicized a variety of legal arguments to justify its claims to Bhutanese territory, but none are 

recognized as a matter of international law. 

 The United States has not expressly taken a position on the PRC’s claims in Bhutan, but prioritizes “reinforcing 

support for Bhutanese sovereignty” and Bhutan’s “active role in supporting the rules-based international order.”

WHY THIS MATTERS 

 Exposing and opposing efforts to acquire disputed land territory through force or coercion is essential to 

preserving peace and upholding international law. 

 The PRC seems to be incrementally and systematically advancing territorial claims along the border to gain 

favorable access routes through the Himalayas in a potential conflict with India. 

 Bhutan relies on India for arms, military training, and air defense. Border encroachments into Bhutan are not only 

a threat to Bhutan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but they also risk implicating India’s defense 

commitments and could spark a broader conflict. Deadly border clashes between the PRC and India in recent 

years exemplify the risk of tensions boiling over into violence that could threaten regional peace and security.

 The PRC’s encroachments into Bhutan undermine the rule of law and typify a multi-domain “gray zone” 

approach to advancing territorial ambitions at the expense of other nations’ sovereignty – if left unchecked, the 

PRC could be emboldened to take further coercive against other vulnerable nations. 

DETAILED DISCUSSION

 The Himalayan nation of Bhutan is located between the PRC’s southeast border and India’s northeastern border.i

 India and Bhutan have historically had a close relationship. For decades, India guided Bhutan’s foreign policy in 

accordance with a 1949 treaty. However, in 2007, India and Bhutan renegotiated their treaty, removing the 

foreign policy clause such that Bhutan now conducts its foreign policy.ii India continues to train and equip the 

Bhutanese military and provide Bhutan with air defense.iii

 The PRC and Bhutan are involved in a long‐standing border dispute, with China claiming approximately 581

square miles of Bhutanese territory.

iv (Figure 1). 

 As a result of the 2007 treaty renegotiation, India has lost influence over Bhutanese and PRC border negotiations.v

 Portions of the disputed Bhutanese territory are militarily advantageous to both India and the PRC.

1. Executive Overview
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 In particular, the Doklam Plateau in western Bhutan is a strategically valuable high ground that allows India to 

protect access to its northeastern states

through the Siliguri corridor, a narrow strip 

of Indian territory that connects these 

states with central India. (Figures 2 and 3).

 Control of the Doklam Plateau would put 

the PRC in a position to cut off India’s 

access through the Siliguri corridor in the 

event of a military conflict.vi

 In 2020, the PRC claimed sovereignty over 

Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, a 

territory the PRC had not previously 

disputed.vii

 In addition, recent satellite imagery 

revealed new Chinese outposts in Bhutan’s remote but culturally significant northern Beyul Khenpajong 

region.

viii (Figure 1)

 The PRC is likely using the settlements and new territorial claims to gain leverage during border dispute 

negotiations to pressure Bhutan into yielding territory in the Doklam Plateau.ix

 The United States has not expressly taken a position on the PRC’s claims, but prioritizes “reinforcing support for 

Bhutanese sovereignty” and Bhutan’s “active role in supporting the rules-based international order.”xIn addition, 

the United States Congress has focused its interest on human rights and the PRC's territorial claims in Bhutan.xi

 Bhutan shares a 296‐mile border with Tibetan China to the north and west and a 409-mile border with India’s 

eastern states to the east and south.xii

 In 1910, due to China’s invasion of Tibet, Bhutan and Britain signed the Treaty of Punakha. The Treaty guaranteed 

Bhutan’s defense against China and, in exchange, allowed the British Government to guide Bhutan’s foreign 

relations. Britain’s association with Bhutan ended in 

1947 when British rule over India ended. 

 However, in 1949, Bhutan and India signed the 

Treaty of Friendship, which allowed India to guide 

Bhutan’s foreign affairs.xiii In 2007, Bhutan and India 

renegotiated the Treaty of Friendship, removing the 

foreign affairs provision. However, both countries 

agreed to cooperate closely on “issues relating to 

their national interests.”xiv 

 Bhutan joined the United Nations in 1971. However, 

it does not have formal diplomatic relations with any 

permanent Security Council member. xv 

 The Royal Bhutan Army and the National Militia comprise approximately 8,000 active-duty personnel.xvi Bhutan 

continues to rely on India for military training, arms supplies, and air defense.xvii 

 The PRC claims approximately 581 square miles of Bhutanese territory including ~191 square miles in the 

Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys, ~104 square miles in western Bhutan, and ~251 square miles of the Sakteng 

Wildlife Sanctuary in Bhutan’s east.xviii (Figure 1).

 The most strategically significant disputed territory is the Doklam Plateau, which is in Bhutan’s west and shares 

borders with Tibetan China and India. (Figure 1). 

2. Detailed Background on the PRC’s Claims to Bhutanese Territory

(Figure 2) Location of Chumbi Valley and Siliguri 

Corridor

(Figure 1) Bhutanese Territory Claimed by China
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 The Plateau is just north of India's strategically vital Siliguri corridor. PRC control of the Siliguri corridor would 

isolate 45 million Indians in eastern India in an area 

the size of the United Kingdom.xix (Figures 2 and 3). 

 The PRC claims the Doklam Plateau is part of Tibet.

The Doklam Plateau, which rises 1,400 meters 

above China’s Chumbi Valley,xx “provides a 

commanding view” of the valley and gives India, via 

their close relationship with Bhutan, a “major 

terrain advantage” in protecting the Siliguri 

corridor.xxi (Figure 2). 

 The PRC also views the Chumbi Valley as a 

weakness in its defense of Tibet. India currently controls both sides of the valley (from Bhutanese and Indian 

territory). In the event of a military conflict, India could conduct a pincer movement, destroying the Chinese 

positions in the valley and allowing India access to Tibet. As a result, the PRC seeks control of the Doklam Plateau 

to give it both an offensive and defensive advantage.

xxii

 

 Highlighting Doklam’s strategic importance, in 2017, Chinese and Indian troops clashed during a 73-day standoff 

after the PRC began constructing a road leading from the Chumbi Valley onto the Doklam Plateau.xxiii (Figure 4). 

 To lay claim to the Doklam Plateau, the PRC has relied on conflicting language in the 1890 Convention of Calcutta. 

 The Convention, signed by Britain and China regarding the territorial boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, 

identifies the border between modern-day Tibet and Bhutan.xxiv

 However, the Convention’s border description “contains a contradiction that allows each side to claim [the 

Convention] supports its own position.”xxv 

 Adding to the confusion, sometime between 1907 and 1913, Britain published a map of the area showing 

Bhutan’s border in a location further north (into Tibet) than was described in the Convention.xxvi

 In 1930, Mao Zedong claimed that the entirety of Bhutan and other Himalayan kingdoms fell within “the correct 

borders of China.”xxvii Mao based his assertion on the premise that during the 18th century, Tibet held vassalage 

over Bhutan.xxviii Because China claimed Tibet as Chinese territory, Mao also asserted Bhutan was part of China. 

 However, no historical evidence supports the vassalage claim, which Bhutanese scholars have rejected and 

labeled as Chinese “misinformation.”xxix

 Since annexing Tibet in 1951, the PRC has pursued similar expansive territorial claims by advancing narratives 

and publishing maps showing parts of 

Bhutanese territory as belonging to China.

xxx

 

 For example, the PRC bases its claim over 

Bhutan’s Beyul Khenpajong region on an 18thcentury Chinese Emperor’s ruling, granting 

herding rights in the Beyul to Tibetan herders. 

 While PRC officials report they “discovered” this 

ruling, they have never produced it publicly.xxxi 

 Some observers speculate that the PRC’s claims 

over the Beyul Khenpajong region, including the 

Jakurlung and Pasamlung Valleys and the Sakteng 

Wildlife Sanctuary in Bhutan’s east, are designed 

to pressure Bhutan into yielding territory around 

the Doklam Plateau. 

 Additional territorial claims provide the PRC with

leverage during border dispute negotiations.xxxii 

 As an example of this tactic, in 1996, the PRC offered to resolve the long-standing border dispute by proposing to 

recognize Bhutanese sovereignty over the Pasamlung and Jakarung valleys in exchange for Bhutan’s recognition of 

PRC sovereignty over the Doklam Plateau and other areas in Bhutan’s west.xxxiii 

(Figure 3) Location of Doklam Plateau in relation to Siliguri 

Corridor

(Figure 4) Location of Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Doklam 

Region
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 Boundary negotiations between Bhutan and the PRC began in 1984, with the two sides engaging in 24 rounds of 

talks. In 1998, the two countries signed an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace, Tranquility and Status Quo in 

the Bhutan-China Border Areas. This agreement was supposed to freeze borders during negotiations.xxxiv

 In 2021, China and Bhutan signed a new “Three-Step Roadmap,” which endeavored to reinvigorate negotiations 

and end the border dispute, but despite the 1998 and 2021 agreements, the PRC has continued to build 

infrastructure in Bhutan’s territory and denied Bhutanese civilians and security forces access to those areas.

xxxv

 In addition, in June 2020, the PRC made a new claim to the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in Bhutan’s east, which 

the PRC had not disputed in the past.xxxvi

 By incrementally claiming pieces of Bhutanese territory and executing unilateral construction projects in claimed 

territory, the PRC seems to be systematically consolidating its sovereignty claims along the border to gain 

favorable access routes through the Himalayas in a potential conflict with India.xxxvii

 The PRC has used a similar strategy in the South China Sea and its border dispute with India.

xxxviii

 

 Gaining control over the Doklam Plateau would provide the PRC with a strategic advantage over India in the 

event of a military conflict. 

 Consistent with its 1996 border proposal, the PRC is likely pursuing expansive territorial claims over Bhutanese 

territory to give it territory to ‘trade’ in return for Bhutan’s cession of control over the Doklam Plateau.

 The PRC’s recent infrastructure projects in the Beyul Khenpajong region, an area of ancestral and cultural 

significance for the Bhutanese, and its new claim over the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary provide the PRC with 

additional leverage during border negotiations.xxxix

 Under international law, a state’s establishment of sovereignty over territory is a complex topic.

xl

o The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered territorial sovereignty claims based on treaties, 

geography, economy, cultural homogeneity, effective control (i.e., adverse possession), history, uti 

possidentis (colonial boundaries becoming international boundaries), elitism, and ideology.xli

o However, the ICJ has relied on only three bases (in order of precedence): treaties, uti possidentis, and 

effective control.xlii

o For claims based on effective control, a state asserts it has “uncontested administration of the land and its 

resident population,” and there is “abandonment of the land by the last governing entity.”xliii

o Territorial sovereignty “involves the exclusive right to display activities of a state”xliv and therefore, 

ownership claims must establish a state’s “continuous and peaceful display of authority.”xlv

o Essentially, the more authority and governance a state exerts over territory and the longer the control 

lasts, the stronger the state’s sovereignty claim will be.

o Effective control is still necessary for claims based on history because a “reasonable manifestation of 

state authority in the modern period is sufficient to ensure a continuing claim to sovereignty, especially in 

light of similar historical activity.”xlvi

 The PRC is taking multiple legal approaches to its territorial disputes with Bhutan. 

o For its claim over the Doklam Plateau, the PRC relies on the conflicting language in the 1890 Convention 

of Calcutta, which does not clearly demarcate portions of the border between Tibet and Bhutan. Under 

the Convention, both Bhutan and the PRC have supportable positions.xlvii

o The PRC has not asserted a legal or factual basis for its claims over the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary or 

the Menchuma Valley, a disputed area adjacent to the Beyul Khenpajong region.xlviii

o In fact, up until July 2020, the PRC had not disputed the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, and Chinese maps 

showed it to be within Bhutanese territory.xlix

o For the Beyul Khenpajong region, the PRC seems to rely on history and effective control including an 

18th-century Emperor’s ruling on herding rights, which the PRC has yet to make public. Additionally, the 

PRC has not shown a “continuous and peaceful display of [its] authority”lfrom the 18th century ruling 

until the present, and has not produced evidence of Bhutanese abandonment of the territory.

o In contrast, the Bhutanese have long ancestral connections with the Beyul Khenpajong region, dating 

back to the 15th century. In fact, the current Bhutanese ruling dynasty traces its royal lineage to the 

3. Analyzing the PRC’s Claims under International Law 
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region.li In addition, the Bhutanese have historically stationed border guards throughout the Beyul 

region during the summer months, primarily to protect the civilian Bhutanese herders who use the land. 

o However, over the past few decades, the Bhutanese herders and border guards have been slowly pushed 

out of the region by the PRC’s infrastructure projects and aggressive Tibetan herders.lii 

 The PRC’s establishment of settlements in disputed 

Bhutanese territory, including the Gyalaphug village in 

Bhutan’s Beyul Khenpajong region, one of three new 

Chinese settlements,liii raises distinct legal questions 

concerning occupation and international law. 

 Reportedly, Gyalaphug includes Chinese “settlers, 

security personnel, and military infrastructure,” which 

are now “within territory internationally and 

historically understood to be Bhutanese.”

liv

 Under international law, if an occupation exists, then 

sovereignty over that territory cannot be transferred 

– i.e., the PRC cannot lawfully use occupation as a 

means to usurp territorial sovereignty. 

 While the existence of an occupation is not clear-cut as a matter of international law, the rules that apply to 

occupation nonetheless merit consideration based on the PRC’s actions. 

o Article 2, common to the four Geneva Conventions, which is reflective of customary international law, lv

states, “the present Convention shall apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 

High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”

lvi

o A belligerent/occupying power’s “effective control” of foreign territory is the legal standard for 

“determining the existence of a state of occupation.”lvii This standard reflects customary international law 

and is derived from common Article 2 and Article 42 of 1907 Hague Regulations (Hague IV).lviii

o Article 42 states, “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 

hostile army.”

lix The “effective control” standard “substantiates and specifies [Article 42’s] notion of 

‘authority’” and describes the degree of control a hostile force must have “over all or parts of a foreign 

territory in lieu of the territorial sovereign.”lx 

o Occupation “does not require the presence of military forces in every populated area.”lxi Rather, 

occupation pertains to “the suspension of the territorial state’s authority and the substitution of the 

Occupying Power’s authority.”lxii

o Importantly, if an occupation exists, then states cannot transfer the sovereignty of that territory. 

Occupation “is only a temporary situation,” and the occupying power “does not acquire sovereignty over 

the territory."lxiii A transfer of sovereignty may only occur when peace is restored.lxiv

 The PRC reportedly established the village of Gyalaphug in Bhutan’s northern territory, moved in Tibetan settlers 

under the administration and control of the PRC, and deployed security and military forces to the area.lxv

 Bhutanese military forces and civilian herders are restricted from this area, and the PRC reportedly controls “all of 

the Menchuma Valley and most of the Beyul.”lxvi

 By design, the PRC appears to have established Gyalaphug village in a manner that did not trigger an apparent 

international armed conflict and associated legal obligations – i.e., the PRC skirted the rule of law by operating in 

the so-called “gray zone,” much as it does across a span of activities in other domains and geographic areas. 

 Rather than accept “gray zone” coercion as a tactic without legal recourse, the international community may 

look to long-established international laws, rules, and norms – such as those pertaining to occupation – to

inform understandings of normative behavior and hold bad actors accountable as appropriate. 

4. PRC Settlements & International Law on Occupation
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PROPOSED COUNTER-LAWFARE APPROACH

**This section offers suggested language for incorporation into communication strategies**

 The United States prioritizes reinforcing support for Bhutanese sovereignty and values Bhutan’s active role in 

supporting the rules-based international order.

 The PRC’s claims to sovereignty over Bhutanese territory are not recognized under international law. 

 Exposing and opposing efforts to skirt international law and acquire disputed land territory through force or 

coercion is essential to preserving peace and stability.

 Upholding international law and the rules-based international order along disputed land borders is an enduring 

interest for the international community and one that is vital to peace and security throughout the region. 

 Border encroachments by the PRC into Bhutan pose a threat to Bhutan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and 

risk sparking a broader conflict that could threaten regional peace and security.

 The PRC’s encroachments into Bhutan undermine the rule of law and typify a multi-domain “gray zone” 

approach to advancing territorial ambitions at the expense of other nations’ sovereignty. 

 USINDOPACOM seeks to preserve peace and stability in accordance with international law and opposes any 

attempt to use coercion or force to settle disputes. 

 USINDOPACOM shares these deep and abiding interests with allies and partners who champion a free and open 

Indo-Pacific supported by the rules-based international order. 

i Bhutan Country Profile, BBC NEWS (March 21, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12480707. 

ii JOSEPH O. YINUSA & MARIA A. BLACKWOOD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE KINGDOM OF BHUTAN 2 (Sep. 6, 2023), 

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10660. 

iii U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BHUTAN, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/bhutan/#military-and-security 

(last visited Feb. 14, 2024) [hereinafter THE WORLD FACTBOOK].

iv Sudha Ramachandran, China’s Bhutan Gambit, THE DIPLOMAT (July 23, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/chinas-bhutan-gambit/.

v See generally China and Bhutan aim to resolve a long-running border dispute, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2023),

https://www.economist.com/china/2023/11/02/china-and-bhutan-aim-to-resolve-a-long-running-border-dispute. 

vi YINUSA, supra note 2, at 2; Ramachandran, supra note 4. 

vii YINUSA, supra note 2, at 2.

viii John Pollock & Damien Symon, China takes more land in Bhutan before expected border deal, CHATHAM HOUSE

(December 1, 2023), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-12/china-takes-more-land-bhutan-expected-border-deal. 

ix YINUSA, supra note 2, at 2. 

x

Id. at 1. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Bhutan. This TACAID’s references to the PRC’s claims to Bhutanese territory do 

not reflect an official positon by the U.S. government regarding sovereignty. 

xi Id. 

xii THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 3; FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONG., NEPAL AND BHUTAN COUNTRY STUDIES 266 (Andrea Matles Savada ed., 3rd 

ed. 1993), https://www.loc.gov/item/93012226/ [hereinafter BHUTAN COUNTRY STUDY]. 

xiii Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship Between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan, Bhutan-India, Art. II, Aug. 8, 1949, 

15 B.F.S.P. 214, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5242/treaty+or+perpetual+p. 

xiv India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, Bhutan-India, Art. 2, March 2, 2007, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf. 

xv U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN: BILATERAL RELATIONS FACT SHEET (July 18, 2022), https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-withbhutan/. 

xvi THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 3.

xvii Id.

xviii Ramachandran, supra note 4. Some estimates suggest that the PRC’s claims to Bhutanse territory amount to approximately 581 square miles 

(see e.g., https://usanasfoundation.com/bhutan-china-border-issues-unravelling-implications-for-india). 

xix YINUSA, supra note 2, at 2. 

xx M. Taylor Fravel, Danger at Doklam, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (July 18, 2017), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/danger-at-dolamplateau-doklam-stand-off-india-china-4755269/.

xxi Ramachandran, supra note 4.

xxii Marcus Andreopoulos, China’s Border Talks with Bhutan are Aimed at India, FOREIGN POLICY (July 18, 2023), 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/18/china-bhutan-border-talks-india-dispute-security/.

xxiii Sushant Singh, Out of Control, THE CARAVAN (September 30, 2022), https://caravanmagazine.in/security/india-china-ladakh; Ramachandran, supra

note 4; Steven Lee Myers et al., How India and China Have Come to the Brink Over a Remote Mountain Pass, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 26, 2017), 

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-china-indiabhutan.html#:~:text=On%20a%20remote%20pass%20through,China%2C%20India%20and%20Bhutan%20meet; YINUSA, supra note 2.

 
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xxiv Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, Gr.Brit.-China, Art. I, March 17, 1890. 

xxv Fravel, supra note 20. 

xxvi Id. 

xxvii Ramachandran, supra note 4. See also BHUTAN COUNTRY STUDY,supra note 12, at 262.

xxviii Ramachandran, supra note 4.

xxix Ramachandran, supra note 4. See also BHUTAN COUNTRY STUDY,supra note 12, at 256-259. 

xxx Ramachandran, supra note 4; Robert Barnett, China Is Building Entire Villages in Another Country’s Territory, FOREIGN POLICY (May 7, 2021), 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/07/china-bhutan-border-villages-security-forces/.

xxxi Barnett, supra note 30. 

xxxii YINUSA, supra note 2, at 2; Andreopoulos, supra note 22; Pollock, supra note 8. 

xxxiii Ramachandran, supra note 4. 

xxxiv ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL TRADE, PRESS RELEASE (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.mfa.gov.bt/press-release519/ (the PRC “recognize[d] Bhutan’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity and agree[d] that ‘no unilateral action will be taken to change the 

status quo on the border). 

xxxv ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXTERNAL TRADE, PRESS RELEASE (June 29, 2017), https://www.mfa.gov.bt/press-release272/; Pollock, supra note 8.

xxxvi YINUSA, supra note 2, at 2.

xxxvii Andreopoulos, supra note 22; Barnett, supra note 30.

xxxviii Barnett, supra note 30; Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon & Anirudh Kanisetti, China, India and Doklam in 2020, TAKSHASHILA INSTITUTION 7, 10 (V1.0, 

Jan. 4, 2021), https://takshashila.org.in/s/China-India-Doklam-2020_TSA_GPM_AK_v10.pdf. 

xxxix Andreopoulos, supra note 22.

xl See generally Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L. J. 1779 (Apr. 2004); Peter Dutton, An 

Analysis of China’s Claim to Historic Right in the South China Sea, in MAJOR LAW AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 57 (Yann-Huei Song & Keyuan 

Zou eds., Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2014). In his chapter, Professor Dutton analyzes the relevant international case law related to the territorial 

sovereignty of islands and China's historical claims. 

xli Sumner, supra note 40, at 1779.

xlii Id. at 1803-1804. 

xliii Id. at 1787. 

xliv Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), Award, II RIAA 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_II/829-871.pdf.

xlv Id. at 846. 

xlvi Dutton, supra note 44, at 70. See generally Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgement, PCIJ Series A/B No 53, ICGJ 303 (PCIJ 

1933), https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-legal-status-of-eastern-greenland-judgment-wednesday-5th-april-1933.

xlvii Fravel, supra note 20.

xlviii Barnett, supra note 30.

xlix Anbarasan Ethirajan, Why Bhutan's Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is Disputed by China, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2020), 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55004196. 

l

Island of Palmas Case, supra note 44, at 846. 

li Barnett, supra note 30.

lii Id.

liii Id.

liv Id. 

lv See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND 

SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 350, (2016) [hereinafter 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gci-1949/article2/commentary/2016?activeTab=1949GCs-APs-and-commentaries; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 

226, ¶¶79, 82 (1996), https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

lvi See Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (emphasis 

added). 

lvii 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 55, ¶ 301.

lviii Id. at ¶¶ 301-303. 

lix Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 

art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. See also David Wallace, Ukraine Symposium – The Law of Belligerent Occupation, ARTICLES OF WAR

(Mar. 8, 2023), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/law-belligerent-occupation/.

lx 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 55, ¶ 302. 

lxi OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 11.2.2.1 (updated ed. July 2023).

lxii Id. at § 1.2.2.2. 

lxiii Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Apr. 8, 2004), 

https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm.

lxiv Michael N. Schmitt, Ukraine Symposium – Territorial Acquisition and Armed Conflict, ARTICLES OF WAR (Aug. 29, 2023), 

https://lieber.westpoint.edu/territorial-acquisition-armed-conflict/.

lxv Barnett, supra note 30.

lxvi Id.