THE SIEGFRIED LINE 

CAMPAIGN 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The European Theater of Operations 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE 

CAMPAIGN 

by 

Charles B. MacDonald 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.G., 1993 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-60001 

First Printed 1963-CMH Pub 7-7-1 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Stetson Conn, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of 24 May 1961) 

Fred Harvey Harrington 

University of Wisconsin 

William R. Emerson 

Yale University 

Oron J. Hale 

University of Virginia 

W. Stull Holt 

University of Washington 

Bell 1. Wiley 

Emory University 

Maj. Gen. Louis W. Truman 

US. Continental Army Command 

Maj. Gen. Evan M. Houseman 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

Brig. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr. 

US. Army War College 

Brig. Gen. William A. Cunningham III 

US. Army Command and General Staff College 

Col. Vincent J. Esposito 

United States Military Academy 

C. Vann Woodward 

Johns Hopkins University 

Office 0/ the Chiif 0/ Military History 

Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, Chief of Military History 

Chief Historian 

Chief, Histories Division 

Chief, Publication Division 

Editor in Chief 

Stetson Conn 

Col. Leonard G. Robinson 

Lt. Col. James R. Hillard 

Joseph R. Friedman 

· . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

To many an Allied soldier and officer and to countless armchair strategists, 

World War II in Europe appeared near an end when in late summer of 1944 

Allied armies raced across northern France, Belgium, and Luxembourg to the 

very gates of Germany. That this was not, in fact, the case was a painful 

lesson that the months of September, October, November, and December would 

make clear with stark emphasis. 

The story of the sweep from Normandy to the German frontier has been 

told in the already published Breakout and Pursuit. The present volume 

relates the experiences of the Fir:st and Ninth U.S. Armies, the First Allied 

Airborne Army, and those American units which fought under British and 

Canadian command, on the northern flank of the battle front that stretched 

across the face of Europe from the Netherlands to the Mediterranean. The 

operations of the Third U.S. Army in the center, from mid-September through 

mid-Decem.ber, have been recounted in The Lorraine Campaign; those of the 

Seventh U.S. Army on the south will be told in The Riviera to the Rhine, a 

volume in preparation. 

Unlike the grand sweep of the pursuit, the breaching of the West Wall 

called for the most grueling kind of fighting. Huge armies waged the campaign 

described' in this book, but the individual soldier, pitting his courage and 

stamina against harsh elements as well as a stubborn enemy, emerges as the 

moving spirit of these armies. In the agony of the Huertgen Forest, the 

frustration of MARKET-GARDEN, the savagery of the struggle for Aachen, the valor 

of the American soldier and his gallant comrades proved the indispensable 

ingredient of eventual victory. 

Washington, D.C. 

24 May 1961 

JAMES A. NORELL 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 
The Author 

Charles B. MacDonald, a graduate of Presbyterian College, is the author 

of Company Commander/ an account of his experiences as an officer of the 

2d Infantry Division in the European theater during World War II. He is 

coauthor and compiler of Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt and 

a contributor to Command Decisions. Since 1953 he has supervised the 

preparation of other volumes in the European and Mediterranean theater subseries of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II and is currently 

writing another volume in the European theater subseries. In 1957 he received a Secretary of the Army Research and Study Fellowship and spent a 

year studying the relationship of terrain, weapons, and tactics on European 

battlefields. A lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, he holds the Purple 

Heart and the Silver Star. 

1 Washington, 1947. 
Preface 

Some who have written of World War II in Europe have dismissed the 

period between 11 September and 16 December 1944 with a paragraph or two. 

This has been their way of gaining space to tell of the whirlwind advances 

and more spectacular command decisions of other months. The fighting during 

September, October, November, and early December belonged to the small 

units and individual soldiers, the kind of warfare which is no less difficult and 

essential no matter how seldom it reaches the spectacular. 

It is always an enriching experience to write about the American soldier-in 

adversity no less than in glittering triumph. Glitter and dash were conspicuously absent in most of the Siegfried Line fighting. But whatever the period 

may lack in sweeping accomplishment it makes up in human drama and 

variety of combat actions. Here is more than fighting within a fortified line. 

Here is the Huertgen Forest, the Roer plain, Aachen, and the largest airborne 

attack of the war. The period also eventually may be regarded as one of the 

most instructive of the entire war in Europe. A company, battalion, or 

regiment fighting alone and often unaided was more the rule than the exception. 

In nuclear war or in so-called limited war in underdeveloped areas, of which 

we hear so much today, this may well be the form the fighting will assume. 

As befits the nature of the fighting, this volume is focused upon tactical 

operations at army level and below. The story of command and decision in 

higher headquarters is told only when it had direct bearing on the conduct of 

operations in those sectors under consideration. The logistics of the campaign 

likewise has been subordinated to the tactical narrative. It is a ground story 

in the sense that air operations have been included only where they had direct 

influence upon the ground action. It is also an American story. Although 

considerable attention has been paid British and Canadian operations where 

U.S. units were involved, this is designed only to place U.S. operations in 

proper perspective. 

In the fullest sense of the term, this volume represents a co-operative enterprise. Reference in the footnotes and the bibliographical note can give only 

partial credit to the scores of officers and men who furnished information or 

unraveled questions of fact. Nearly every officer who held the post of division 

commander or above during the campaign has read the manuscript of this 

volume, and at least one ranking officer from each division, corps, and army 

headquarters has read and commented upon the manuscript. 

Xl 
To list all present and former officials of the Office of the Chief of Military 

History who by their advice and support helped make the work possible would 

be prohibitively lengthy. Those of my colleagues whose invaluable contributions to this co-operative enterprise can be precisely noted are as follows: 

The historian who performed most of the original research in German 

materials and by his monographs on German actions provided in effect a 

companion manuscript to the author's American story was Lucian Heichler. 

The editor was Miss Ruth Stout, who accomplished her task with high professional skill and commendable tact and understanding. Copy editing was 

done by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes. The maps, which serve not only to illustrate 

the narrative but also to tie diverse actions together, are the work of Charles 

V. P. von Luttichau. Miss Ruth Phillips seleCted the photographs. Mrs. Lois 

Aldridge of the World War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, displayed remarkable patience in assisting the author's exploration 

of mountains of records from the European theater. 

The contributions of Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, chief historian at the 

time this volume was prepared, cannot be so precisely stated, yet no individual 

contributed more. It was he who first brought the author into the field of 

military history and patiently and astutely guided his early efforts. 

Any credit for this volume should be divided among all those who helped 

make it possible. On the other hand, the author alone is responsible for 

interpretations made and conclusions drawn, as well as for any errors of 

omission or commission which may appear. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 May 1961 

XlI 

CHARLES B. MAcDONALD 
Chapter 

Contents 

PART ONE 

Breaching the Siegfried Line 

I. THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

Allied Strategy . 

The Shadow of Logistics 

The Germans in the West 

II. THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

Weapons and Equipment 

The Terrain and the West Wall 

A Pause at the Border 

III. V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

The Race for the West Wall 

Into Germany 

Battle of the Schnee Eifel 

Bridgehead at Wallendorf 

Defense of the Bridgehead 

IV. VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

German Developments 

The Battle of the Stolberg Corridor 

The Drive on the Second Band 

A Wall About Aachen 

Battle of the Monschau Corridor 

The Germans Strike Back 

The Onset of Position Warfare 

The First Fight in the Forest 

XIll 

Page 

3 

6 

10 

14 

20 

25 

28 

36 

39 

41 

43 

49 

56 

63 

66 

69 

71 

75 

80 

82 

86 

90 

92 
Chapter 

V. ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

Defense oj the Albert . 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

From the Albert to the Border 

Delay in the Assault . 

PART TWO 

An Airborne Carpet in the North 

OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

The Germans in the Netherlands 

Seven Days for Planning 

What Did the Germans Know? 

The Flight to the Corridor . 

INVASION FROM THE SKY « a remarkably beautiful late summer day" 

Hell's Highway 

Six Bridges and a Ridge . 

Taking the Objectives 

The Red Devils at Arnhem 

DECISION ON THE GROUND 

Developments on D Plus 2 (19 September) 

The Fight for the Nijmegen Bridges 

First Attempts To Drive on Arnhem 

Keeping the Corridor Open 

T he Outcome at Arnhem 

The Ac'hievements and the Cost 

Release of the U.S. Divisions 

THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

The Controversy About Antwerp 

The Battle of the Schelde 

Baptism of Fire . 

South Beveland and Walcheren 

Something Beastly in Antwerp 

THE PEEL MARSHES 

First Army Draws the Assignment 

The British Attempt 

A Spoiling Attack 

XIV 

Page 

96 

98 

101 

112 

119 

123 

127 

134 

136 

140 

140 

143 

154 

100 

170 

174 

174 

179 

184 

186 

195 

1~8 

201 

207 

209 

215 

222 

227 

229 

231 

231 

241 

242 
PART THREE 

The Battle of Aachen 

Chapter 

XI. A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 

First Army Readjusts the Front 

Planning the West Wall Assault 

"Those infantrymen have guts!" 

Commitment of CCB . 

XII. CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

The 18th Infantry Drives North 

The 30th Division Strikes South 

Sealing the Gap 

XIII. ASSAULT ON THE CITY 

The Assault Begins 

Holding the Last Link 

The Final Blow . 

What Aachen Cost 

PART FOUR 

The Roer River Dams 

XIV. THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

The Neglected Objective 

Objective: Schmidt . . . . . . 

To the First Clearing. . . . . . 

Toward Raffelsbrand and V ossenack 

Regiment Wegelein . . . . . . 

XV. THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

Planning the Thrust 

Objective: Schmidt 

The Germans React 

Events Along the Trail 

Catastrophe in Vossenack 

The Kall Gorge. . . . 

Climax at Kommerscheidt 

Withdrawal Across the Kall 

New Missions 

xv 

Page 

251 

251 

252 

260 

269 

281 

287 

293 

304 

307 

309 

313 

314 

317 

323 

324 

328 

331 

334 

337 

341 

343 

348 

352 

359 

364 

366 

368 

369 

372 
PART FIVE 

The Huertgen Forest 

Chapter 

XVI. THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 

Air Support . . . . . . 

An Enigma Named Logistics . . . 

XVII. NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 

German Resurgence and Deception 

First Army Plans . 

Ninth Army Plans . . . . . . 

Operation QUEEN . . . . . 

The Roer River Dams and the Weather 

XVIII. VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 

The State of the LXXXI Corps . . . 

Preliminary Bombardment . . . . . 

The Push Northeast From Schevenhuette 

Armor in the Stolberg Corridor . . 

The Second Battle of the Donnerberg 

Another Victim of the Huertgen Forest 

XIX. V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

A Fourth Fight on the Bloody Plateau 

The Fight for Huertgen. . . 

An Armored Drive on Kleinhau 

Page 

377 

381 

382 

390 

392 

397 

400 

403 

406 

408 

409 

411 

415 

421 

424 

428 

440 

440 

447 

448 

Broadening the Effort 451 

Bergstein and Castle Hill 457 

XX. THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 464 

The Fruits of Deception. . . 464 

A Handful of Old Men . . . . 470 

Resuming the Corps Main Effort. 474 

Towns, Woods, Hills, and Castles 479 

German Reinforcements 487 

Debacle at Merode. . . . . . 490 

XVI 
PART SIX 

Battle of the Roer Plain 

Chapter 

XXI. CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 

The Fight North of the Boundary 

The Fight South of the Boundary 

The Push to the Inde. . 

Taking the High Ground . . . 

XXII. THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

Planning Period. . . . 

D Day on the Roer Plain 

Armor Attracts Armor 

Finding the Formula . . 

The Push to Gereonsweiler 

XXIII. THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 

Operation CLIPPER . . 

The Jump-off . . . . 

An Exercise in Frustration 

XXIV. NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 

" ... in effect we are there ... " . 

A Hundred Men of the XIII Corps 

A Shift in the Main Effort . . 

Gut Hasenfeld and the Sportplatz . 

PART SEVEN 

Conclusion 

XXV. THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

On the Plain 

In the Forest 

To the River 

XVll 

Page 

497 

499 

503 

506 

510 

516 

516 

522 

530 

534 

540 

545 

546 

550 

554 

558 

560 

566 

571 

574 

581 

583 

587 

590 
Chapter Page 

XXVI. OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 596 

The Neglected Objective 596 

The Second Battle of the Monschau Corridor 602 

Heartbreak Crossroads 606 

Something in the Air 611 

The VIII Corps in the Ardennes-Eifel 612 

XXVII. THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 616 

Appendix 

A. TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS 623 

B. RECIPIENTS OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS 624 

C. FIRST ARMY STAFF ROSTER AS OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1944 627 

D. NINTH ARMY STAFF ROSTER AS OF 4 OCTOBER 1944 628 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 629 

GLOSSARY . 633 

CODE NAMES 636 

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 637 

INDEX. . . . . . . . . . . 641 

Maps 

1. Drive From the Albert Canal to the West Wall, XIX Corps, 10-19 

September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 

2. The Battle of the Schelde, 2 October-8 November 1944 . . . 216 

3. Operations in the Peel Marshes, 29 September-3 December 1944 234 

4. Encirclement of Aachen, 7-20 October 1944 . . . . . . . 282 

5. The Roer River Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 

6. The First Attack on Schmidt, 9th Division, 6-16 October 1944 329 

7. The Second Attack on Schmidt, 28th Division, 2-9 November 1944 344 

8. Tanks Along the Kall Trail . . . . . . . . . . . ; . 345 

9. Objective: the Roer River Dams, V Corps, 13-15 December 1944 599 

XVlll 
Maps I-IX are in accompanying map envelope 

I. Pursuit to the Border, 26 August-II September 1944 

II. V Corps Hits the West Wall, 11-19 September 1944 

III. Breaching the West Wall South of Aachen, VII Corps, 12-29 

September 1944 

IV. Invasion from the Sky, Operation MARKET-GARDEN, 17-26 

September 1944 

V. XIX Corps Breaks Through the West Wall, 2-7 October 1944 

VI. The Huertgen Forest, 16 November-9 December 1944 

VII. Drive to the Roer, 16 November-9 December 1944 

VIII. The Approaches to Dueren, 10-16 December 1944 

IX. The Siegfried Line Campaign, 11 September-15 December 1944 

Illustrations 

Page 

The Siegfried Line . 

The Our River . 

. Frontispiece 

Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower . 

Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model . 

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt 

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges . 

Thirteen Commanders of the Western Front 

Captured Panzerfaust . 

Captured Nebelwerfer . 

Plan of Typical German Pillbox 

Interior of German Pillbox . 

Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow 

Dragon's Teeth . 

Wallendorf . 

Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins 

General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger 

Task Force Lovelady 

Remains of a Pillbox 

Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett 

Fort Eben Emael 

The Albert Canal 

MARKET-GARDEN 

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton 

Generaloberst Kurt Student 

Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor 

XIX 

Facing 1 

9 

17 

17 

21 

22 

26 

28 

32 

33 

41 

51 

58 

67 

69 

73 

79 

98 

104 

105 

117 

128 

141 

143 
101st Airborne Division Landings . 

506th Parachute Infantry . 

Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin and Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey 

82d Airborne Division Drop 

Dutch Farmer Near Zon . 

Hell's Highway 

Nijmegen Highway Bridge 

General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen 

Troops of the 104th Division 

The Peel Marshes Area 

Aachen 

Practicing Flame Thrower Technique 

Abandoned Crossing at the Wurm River 

Rim burg Castle . 

Slag Pile and Tower Used for Observation 

A German Boy 

Civilian Refugees Leave Aachen 

Rifleman in Burning Aachen 

Col. Gerhard Wilck 

Aachen Munster 

View of Ruined Aachen 

Urft Dam 

Schwammenauel Dam 

Kall Trail . 

Weasel 

The Huertgen Forest 

Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson 

A Winter Overcoat Reaches the Front Line 

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley and Generals Eisenhower and Gerow 

General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel 

A Rest Period Behind the Lines 

I55-mm. Self-Propelled Gun 

American Tank Burning Outside Hamich 

Struggling up a Wooded Hillside 

V Corps Rocket Launchers . 

Engineers Repair a Road . 

A Tank Moves Through Huertgen 

A Sea of Mud in the Huertgen Forest 

Veterans of the Huertgen Forest . 

Medics Aid a Wounded Soldier 

Infantry and Tanks Near Huecheln 

The Frenzerburg . 

The Roer Plain 

Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain 

xx 

Page 

144 

149 

155 

159 

183 

194 

202 

218 

225 

239 

Facing 249 

256 

265 

268 

271 

300 

308 

311 

317 

318 

319 

Facing 321 

325 

. 354 and 356 

370 

Facing 375 

380 

387 

391 

394 

398 

415 

423 

435 

443 

447 

449 

456 

458 

468 

483 

486 

495 

499 
Devastated Duerwiss 

Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. 

Captured German Tiger Tank 

British Flail Tank 

British Churchill Tanks 

British Flame-Throwing Crocodile 

Gut Hasenfeld 

Entrance to Swimming Pool Near Sportplatz 

Winter Battlefield 

Men of the 331st Infantry Advance on Gey 

2d Division Troops 

Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton . 

Illustrations are from Department of Defense files. 

XXI 

Page 

5CJ4 

517 

531 

549 

552 

553 

575 

578 

Facing 579 

588 

605 

613 
The U.S. Army Center of Military History 

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by 

the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaison with public 

and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field 

of military history. The Center is located at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, 

D.G 20005-3402. 

XXll 


PART ONE 

BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE 

CHAPTER I 

The Road to Germany 

The shadows were growing long as five 

men from the Second Platoon, Troop B, 

85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 

5th U.S. Armored Division, reached the 

west bank of the Our River. To cross 

and claim credit as the first patrol on 

German soil, their commander had told 

them, they would have to hurry. 

Though the bridge over the Our had 

been demolished, the water was shallow 

enough for the men to wade across. On 

the far bank they climbed a hill to a cluster 

of farm buildings. Nearby they could see 

some nineteen or twenty concrete pillboxes. Around one somebody had built a 

shed for chickens. 

The men made only a hasty inspection 

before starting back. An hour later the 

report of their crossing was on the way up 

the chain of command. At 1805 on I I 

September 1944, the report read, a patrol 

led by S. Sgt. Warner W. Holzinger 

crossed into Germany near the village of 

Stalzemburg, a few miles northeast of 

Vianden, Luxembourg. 1 

Sergeant Holzinger's patrol preceded 

others only by a matter of hours. In 

early evening, a reinforced company of the 

109th Infantry, 28th Division, crossed the 

1 Other members of the patrol: Cpl. Ralph F. 

Diven, T/5 Coy T. Locke, Pfc. George F. 

McNeal, and a French interpreter, a Lieutenant 

DeLille. V Corps G-3 Jnl, II Sep 44; Combat 

Interv with Lt. L. L. Vipond, Ex 0, Troop B, 

85th Rcn Sq. 

Our on a bridge between Weiswampach, 

in the northern tip of Luxembourg, and 

the German village of Sevenig. Almost coincidentally, southeast of St. Vith, Belgium, a patrol from the 22d Infantry, 4th 

Division, also crossed the Our near the village of Hemmeres. Men of this patrol 

spoke to civilians and, to provide proof of 

their crossing, procured a German cap, 

some currency, and a packet of soi1.2 

The armored and infantry divisions 

which furnished these patrols were units 

of the V Corps of the First U.S. Army. 

Their presence along the German border 

marked the start of a new phase in the 

execution of a directive that the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allied Powers 

had given earlier in World War II to 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme 

Allied Commander in Europe. General 

Eisenhower was to "undertake operations 

aimed at the heart of Germany and the 

destruction of her armed forces." 3 

As the First Army's patrols crossed the 

border, three Allied army groups and 

seven armies were deployed in a grand arc 

stretching from the North Sea to Switzerland. On the Allied left wing was the 2 I 

Army Group under Field Marshal Sir 

2 28th Div G-3 Jnl, II Sep 44; 4th Div AAR, 

Sep 44. A patrol from the 28th Division's Iloth 

Infantry crossed a short while later near the 

village of Harspelt. 

3 For details, see Forrest C: Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY 

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 

49-55· 
4 

Bernard L. Montgomery, consisting of the 

First Canadian and Second British Armies. 

(Map l) 1ft In the center was the 12th 

Army Group under Lt. Gen. Omar N. 

Bradley, with the First and Third U.S. 

Armies and the new Ninth U.S. Army, 

which had become operational on 5 September and was reducing the Breton 

coastal fortress of Brest, far behind the 

current front lines. On the right wing 

were the 1st French and Seventh U.S. 

Armies, destined to become on 15 September the 6th Army Group under Lt. 

Gen. Jacob L. Devers.4 

The crossing of the German border on 

I I September was another strong draught 

contributing to a heady optimism with 

which Allied troops and their commanders 

were reeling. Operating along the Channel coast, the Canadians already had 

captured Dieppe and the 1st British Corps 

of the Fir~t Canadian Army was putting 

the finishing touches to conquest of 

Le Havre. The Second British Army had 

overrun Brussels and Antwerp, the latter 

with its deepwater port facilities almost 

intact. 5 The First Army had taken Liege 

and the city of Luxembourg. The Third 

Army in northeastern France was building 

up along the Moselle River and already 

had a brid~t:bead near the Lorraine city of 

I" Maps numbered in Roman are placed in 

iriverse order inside the back cover. 

4 For the story of the creation of the 6th Anny 

Group, see Robert Ross Smith, The Riviera to 

the Rhine, a volume in preparation for the series 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II. 

o Accounts of British and Canadian operations 

may be found in: Field Marshal the Viscount 

Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic 

(Boston: Houghton MifHin Company, 1948); 

Charles P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-

1945 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, King's Printer, 

1948); and Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand, 

Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Metz. 6 Having successfully landed in 

southern France on 15 August, the two 

arniies. in the south soon would become 

part of a single western front. During I I 

September a patrol from the Third Army 

made contact with French units from the 

south near Dijon. 

Most of the fighting immediately preceding the crossing of the German border 

had been pursuit warfare. The Germans 

were on the run. Except for the Third 

Army, which had been handicapped for 

five days while bearing th~ brunt of a general transportation shortage and gasoline 

drought, the Allied drive had reached its 

zenith during the· period. I-oJ I September. 

During these eleven days the British had 

traveled approximately 250 miles, from 

the Seine River to the Belgian-Dutch 

border. The First U.S. Army had taken 

time out near Mons, Belgium, to bag 

about 25,000 Germans in a giant pocket 

and make an abrupt change in direction, 

but still had covered approximately 200 

miles. By I I September the Allies had 

reached a general line which pre-D-Day 

planners had expected would be gained 

about D plus 330 (2 May 1945). The 

advance thus was far ahead of schedule, 

some 233 days.7 

A most encouraging feature of Allied 

success was that casualties had been 

lighter than expected. Exclusive of the 

forces in southern France, Allied casualties 

from 6 June to I I September were 39,96 I 

killed, 164,466 wounded, and 20,142 

6 For Third Army operations in Lorraine, see 

H. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950). 

7 Maps in Post NEPTUNE Planning Forecast L 

27 May 44, SHAEF SGS381 Post OVERLORD 

Planning, I. The planners expected the surrender 

about D plus 360. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

missing, a total of 224,569, or a little 

more than 10 percent of the total 

strength committed.s Since the landings 

in Normandy, the Germans had lost approximately 300,000 men, while another 

200,000 were penned in various redoubts. 

Despite an acute shortage of ports, 

Allied build-up in men and materiel had 

been swift. By the afternoon of 1 1 September a cumulative total of 2,168,307 

men and 460,745 vehicles had landed in 

Normandy.9 General Eisenhower, who 

had assumed direct operational command 

in the field on 1 September, controlled on 

the Continent 26 infantry divisions (including 1 airborne division) and 1 3 armored divisions (not including a number 

of cavalry groups and separate tank battalions) . Of this total the British and 

Canadians had furnished 16 divisions (including 1 Polish armored division), while 

the Americans had provided 23 (including 

1 French armored division) .10 As soon as 

General Eisenhower assumed direct command of the forces in southern France, he 

would gain 3 American infantry divisions 

(not including an airborne task force of 

approximately divisional size), 5 French 

infantry divisions, and 2 French armored 

divisions. The total for the Western Front 

would then be 35 infantry and 14 armored 

divisions. In addition, 2 V.S. and 2 

British airborne divisions, 1 Polish airborne brigade, and a British airportable 

infantry division were in Supreme Headquarters reserve. 

General Eisenhower's 49 divisions were 

opposed, theoretically, by about 48 infantry and 15 panzer-type divisions, plus 

several panzer brigades. As noted by 

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, 

8 SHAEF G-3 War Room Summary 102. 

9 SHAEF G-3 War Room Summary 99. 

10 Ibid. 

5 

who on 5 September began a second tour 

as Oberbefehlshaber West (Commander in 

Chief West), these forces actually existed 

only on paperY While Allied units were 

close to full strength, hardly a German 

division was. Most had incurred severe 

losses in both men and equipment, and 

many were badly demoralized from constant defeat in the field. The equivalent 

of five divisions had been corralled in the 

Channel Islands and the coastal "fortresses." Rundstedt estimated that his 

forces were equivalent to about half the 

number of Allied divisions. Allied superiority in guns was at least 2 Y2 to 1 and 

in tanks approximately 20 to l.u 

The disparity between forces was less 

striking on the ground than in the air. 

The Allies had three tactical air forces: 

the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands 

(both under the Ninth Air Force) and the 

2d Tactical Air Force (British). Operating from bases in the V nited Kingdom 

and France were 5,059 American bombers, 

3,728 American fighters, 5,104 combat 

aircraft of the Royal Air F0rce, and additional hundreds of miscellaneous types for 

reconnaissance, liaison, and transport. 13 

11 The German term Oberbe/ehlshaber West 

means either the Commander in Chief West or 

his headquarters. In this volume, the term Commander in Chief West will be used to refer to 

the person holding the title Oberbefehlshaber 

West, while the abbreviated form OB WEST will 

refer to his headquarters. 

120B WEST, A Study in Command, pp. 176, 

180. This manuscript, by Generalleutnant Bodo 

Zimmermann (G-3, OB WEST) and others, was 

written under the auspices of the Department of 

the Army Historical Division in 1946 and is filed 

in OCMH. Materiel estimates are from Cole, 

The Lorraine Campaign, p. 3. 

13 AAF Staff Control Aircraft Inventory, Combined Allied vs. Axis Air Strength Rpts, I Sep 44. 

All U.S. air records u~ed in this volume are 

located at the Air University Library, Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Montgomery, Ala. 
6 

The enemy's one tactical air force in the 

West, the Third Air Force (Luftflotte 3), 

had only 573 serviceable aircraft of all 

types. In the entire Luftwaffe the Germans had only 4,507 serviceable planes, 

and most of these had to be retained 

within Germany to contest Allied strategic 

bombers.14 

The ground front was too fluid during 

the early days of September for Field 

Marshal von Rundstedt to accomplish 

much toward forming one of the new lines 

which Adolf Hitler designated with febrile 

frequency. Nevertheless, by I I September Rundstedt and his subordinates were 

making honest efforts to conform to the 

latest decree, to man a new line that was 

to be held "under any conditions." The 

line ran from the Belgian coast, including 

the banks of the Schelde estuary-which 

might be employed to deny use of Antwerp 

even though the port had been lostsoutheastward along the Dutch-Belgian 

border to the West Wall ( the Siegfried 

Line) and along the West Wall to 

the western boundaries of Lorraine and 

Alsace.15 

For all the catastrophic nature of the 

retreat from France, Rundstedt's order of 

battle at army and army group levels 

looked on I I September much as it had 

before the Allied invasion. On the right 

wing, along the Dutch border and within 

the northern half of the West Wall opposite the 2 I Army Group and the First U.S. 

Army, was Army Group B under Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model. Model, 

whom Rundstedt had replaced as Commander in Chief West, controlled the 

14 German -figures furnished from Luftwaffe 

records by the British Historical Section, as cited 

by Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 4. 

i50B WEST, A Study in Command, pp. 

175-78. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Fifteenth, First Parachute, and Seventh 

Armies. On the left wing was ArmyGroup G (Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz), composed of the First Army, which 

confronted the Third U.S. Army, and the 

Nineteenth Army, which faced what was 

to become the 6th Army Group. What 

was left of the Fifth Panzer Army was 

assembling behind the German border. 

The Germans had a sound framework 

upon which to hang reinforcements-if 

reinforcements could be found. 16 

Allied Strategy 

Allied strategy, as expressed in pre-DDay planning at Supreme Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 

looked toward the ultimate objective of 

Berlin; but on the way the Allies wanted 

an economic objective, which, if captured, 

"would rapidly starve Germany of the 

means to continue the war." This was 

the Ruhr industrial area, the loss of which, 

together with Belgium and Holland, would 

deprive Germany of 65 percent of its 

-production of crude steel and 56 percent 

of its coalY 

The widespread deployment of the Allied armies on I I September reflected 

General Eisenhower's pre-D-Day decision 

to go after the Ruhr and Berlin on a broad 

front. Later to become known as the 

"broad front policy," this concept was not 

appreciably different from the time-tested 

military strategy of multiple parallel columns. 

1 G Opns Maps (I : 1,000,000) dtd I I Sep 44, 

Operationskarte West. See also OB WEST, A 

Study in Command, p. 177. 

17 SHAEF Planning Staff draft of Post 

NEPTUNE Courses of Action After Capture of the 

Lodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axis of 

Advance, I, 3 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. An 

exhaustive study of Allied strategy may be found 

in Pogue, The Supreme Command. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

In considering which routes of advance 

were best, SHAEF planners had seriously 

studied four: (I) the plain of Flanders; 

(2) the Maubeuge-Liege-Aachen axis 

north of the Ardennes; (3) the Ardennes; 

and (4) the Metz-Kaiserslautern gap. IS 

After deliberation, they had ruled out 

Flanders, because of too many water obstacles, and the Ardennes, because of 

rugged terrain and limited communications. The other two avenues merited 

greater attention.I9 

The northern route via MaubeugeLiege-Aachen (the Aachen Gap) obviously leads more directly to the Ruhr. 

The terrain is relatively open, particularly 

beyond Aachen on the Cologne plain. 

Although an advance via Metz-Kaiserslautern leads also to another industrial 

prize, the Saar Basin with its mines and 

smelters, the terrain in both Lorraine and 

the Saar is broken. Advance to the Ruhr 

after reaching the Rhine along this route 

is canalized up the narrow Rhine valley. 

Although both avenues had exercised attraction in modern and earlier wars, the 

northern route had commanded almost 

obligatory attention since the northward 

shift of German industry about 1870 

and since the neutrality of Belgium and 

the Netherlands ceased to command respect. In terms peculiar to the war at 

hand, the northern route offered promising 

intermediate objectives: a chance to meet 

and conquer major German forces expected to be concentrated in defense of 

the Ruhr; elimination of the enemy's 

strategic reserve; access to the best air18 Two others, the Belfort and Saverne gaps, 

were too far south to afford any appreciable 

threat to the Ruhr or Berlin. 

19 SHAEF Planning Staff draft, 3 May 44; see 

also SHAEF Planning Staff draft, 30 May 44. 

Both in SHAEF SGS 381, I. 

7 

fields between the Seine and Germany; a 

secure left flank resting on the coast; 

proximity to air bases in England; and 

access to the Channel ports, including 

Antwerp, lack of which would severely 

limit the forces that could be maintained. 20 

Before the invasion, General Eisenhower 

had concurred in the planners' recommendation that the main advance be directed 

toward the northeast "with the object of 

striking directly at the Ruhr by the route 

north of the Ardennes." He also had 

agreed that a "subsidiary axis" be maintained south of the Ardennes to provide a 

threat to Metz and the Saar. This was 

understood to mean an "advance on a 

broad front North and South of the 

Ardennes," which would avoid committing 

the Allied forces irretrievably to one or the 

other of the comparatively narrow gaps.21 

General Eisenhower looked to Field Marshal Montgomery's 2 I Army Group to 

make the main thrust in the north; the 

Americans under General Bradley, the 

subsidiary effort in the south. 

When the breakout from the Normandy 

beachhead had turned into wholesale 

pursuit, Allied commanders had been 

confronted with glittering opportunities 

at every turn. Yet the whirlwind advance 

also introduced logistical complications 

of a distressing complexity. Though supplies already ashore were for the moment adequate, the explosive advance so 

stretched lines of communication that a 

transportation system geared for slower, 

more methodical moves proved totally 

unequal to the prodigious tasks suddenly 

thrust upon it. Having neither the 

strength nor the transport to exploit all 

the tempting possibilities, the Supreme 

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid. 
8 

Commander had to face the fact that some 

kind of deviation from the original concept 

of a broad front advance had to be made. 

Out of this undeniable reality emerged 

decisions which were to affect the conduct 

of operations in the fall of 1944 throughout the course of the Siegfried Line Campaign. 

Meeting with Bradley and Montgomery 

on 23 August, General Eisenhower remarked the likelihood that the logistical 

situation soon might crimp Allied operations severely. The crux of the problem, 

as General Eisenhower saw it, was in the 

ports. To provide a solid base for 

sustained operations, an invasion force 

must have ports; yet the Allies at this point 

had only the Normandy beaches and 

Cherbourg. Perhaps it would be best, 

while the momentum of the advance continued, to forego some of the glamorous 

tactical opportunities in favor of more 

utilitarian objectives. 

Between the Seine River and the Pas de 

Calais, on a direct route north toward the 

Channel ports and Antwerp, sat the 

enemy's Fifteenth Army, the only sizable 

reserve the Germans still possessed in 

northern France. Were the 2 I Army 

Group to attack northward through the 

plain of Flanders, this reserve might be 

eliminated even as the Channel ports were 

captured, whereupon, with a firm base 

assured, Montgomery might reorient his 

drive more specifically in keeping with the 

direction SHAEF planners had intended. 

In the process, the other intermediate 

objectives along the northern route, like 

the airfields and the flying bomb launching sites, also might be attained. In the 

meantime, the Americans might be establishing their own firm base by opening 

the Brittany ports and might be preparing 

to continue their subsidiary thrust. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Though Field Marshal Montgomery 

proved receptive to General Eisenhower's 

plan, he insisted on having an entire 

American army moving along his right 

flank. Since General Eisenhower already 

intended reinforcing the British with the 

airborne troops at his disposal, he thought 

Montgomery overcautious; but in order to 

assure success, he acceded to the request. 

The location of the First U.S. Army 

dictated its selection for the supporting 

role, while the Third Army was to clear 

the Brittany ports and amass supplies for 

an advance eastward through Metz.22 

As developed in detail by Field Marshal 

Montgomery, the First Army's mission was 

to support the British advance by establishing forces in the area of BrusselsMaastricht~Liege-Namur-Charleroi. At 

the suggestion of General Bradley the 

boundary between the two army groups 

was adjusted so that Brussels was allotted 

to the British, the boundary then swinging 

distinctly northeast at Brussels. This adjustment would eliminate the possibility 

that the British might be pinched out at 

Antwerp.23 

In essence, the decision emerging from 

the 23 August meeting resulted in a 

temporary shift of the main effort from the 

Maubeuge-Liege-Aachen axis to the plain 

of Flanders, a route that preinvasion 

planners had blackballed as a primary axis 

into Germany. Yet the shift was more 

22 Eisenhower to Gen George C. Marshall, 

CPA 90235, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF cable log; Ltr, 

Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug 44, SHAEF 

SGS 38 I, I; Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Sep 44, 

Pogue files. 

23 Montgomery to army comdrs, M-520, 26 

Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 38 I, I; 12th A Gp Ltr of 

Instrs 6, 25 Aug 44, 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, 

V, 85-87; Ltr, Bradley to Montgomery, 26 Aug 

44, 12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, I; 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 200. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOME RY AND 

GENERAL EISENHOWER during an informal discussion at Montgomery's headquarters in France early in September 1944. 

tactical than strategic in that it was made 

for the purpose of gaining intermediate 

objectives vital to a final offensive along 

the lines of the original strategic concept. 

It could be argued that it involved no 

real shift of any kind because of the broad 

interpretation that had come to be accorded the route "north of the Ardennes." 

The most salient change from original 

planning was the new location of the First 

. Army. General Eisenhower had intended 

to employ both the First and Third Armies 

south of the Ardennes. Though both 

Eisenhower and Bradley were to try to get 

at least parts of the two armies moving 

together again, the fact was that through 

the course of the Siegfried Line Campaign 

the First and Third Armies were to be 

9 

separated by the barrier of the Ardennes. 

The First Army-not the British-was to 

attack through the preferred Aachen Gap 

and eventually was to be designated the 

Allied main effort. 

More than the shift of the First Army, 

the fact emerging from the August discussions which upset General Bradley was 

that the priority assigned the northern 

thrust meant severe restrictions on supplies 

for the Third Army. Both Bradley and 

the commander of the Third Army, Lt. 

Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., reacted to the 

decision as if Montgomery had stolen their 

birthrights.24 General Bradley wanted instead a "modified double thrust," one that 

would achieve the goals in the north with 

the help of only one American corps, while 

the rest of the First Army joined the Third 

on the southern route. 25 Patton, for his 

part, thought his army by itself could get 

across the German border in record time 

if properly supplied. Even after General 

Patton had felt the stringent logistical 

pinch which held him immobile for five 

days along the Meuse, he still had VISIOns 

of one thrust taking the Third Army 

across the Rhine River.26 

General Eisenhower had no intention of 

abandoning the subsidiary thrust. Revelation of this fact prompted Field Marshal 

Montgomery to voice an objection as 

24 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New 

York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951) , pp. 

40,0-403; George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew 

It (Boston: Houghton MifHin Company, 1947) , 

pp. 114, 117, 132. 

25 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 399. 

26 Patton, War As I Knew It, pp. 114, 117, 132. 

As late as 19 October, General Patton felt that, 

given proper maintenance and supplies, he could 

reach the Siegfried Line in two days and "stand 

a high probability of penetrating it and thus be 

in position to make a rapid advance to the 

Rhine." Patton to Bradley, 19 Oct 44, 12th A 

Gp 371. 3 Military Objectives, II. 
10 

strong or stronger than those registered by 

Bradley and Patton. The crux of Montgomery's argument was that the thrust 

toward Antwerp should not be looked 

upon as a limited objective operation but 

should be broadened into "one powerful 

full-blooded thrust across the Rhine and 

into the heart of Germany, backed by the 

whole of the resources of the Allied 

Armies .... " This would involve relegating some sectors of the Allied front to 

a "purely static role." 27 

Both Montgomery's and Patton's "onethrust" theories probably will attract 

polemic disciples through the years, despite the damage done these theories by 

German tenacity in later stages of the war. 

Yet even as Montgomery and Patton 

promoted their ideas, planners at SHAEF 

labeled them castles of theory built upon 

sand. A drive by General Patton's army 

alone was logistically and tactically feasible, ·the planners noted, only so far as the 

Rhine and thus was unlikely to force any 

decisive result. One thrust in the north, 

the planners admitted, might succeed in 

capturing the Ruhr and even in reaching 

Berlin; but it was neither tactically nor 

logistically feasible unless certain conditions were met. One was that by September all Allied armies would have 

reached the Rhine; another, that by the 

same date Antwerp would have been 

receiving at least 1,500 tons of supply per 

day. Neither premise had shown any 

immediate signs of becoming a reality.28 

27 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 

193, 196; see also Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-160, 4 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, 1. 

28 An exhaustive discussion of the subject is 

found in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. II, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 

1959)· 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

As an army commander, General Patton 

had few channels for making his voice 

heard on the subject after the first refusal. 

Not so Field Marshal Montgomery, who 

was both an army group commander and 

the top military representative in the 

theater of one of the major Allies. In one 

form or another, Montgomery was to raise 

the issue repeatedly, though the Siegfried 

Line Campaign was to open in an atmosphere of accord because of a temporary 

settlement reached on 10 September. 

Meeting Montgomery at Brussels, General 

Eisenhower refused to accept the view that 

the field marshal's priority should prevail 

to the exclusion of all other operations. 

Nevertheless, he agreed to a temporary 

delay in clearing the seaward approaches 

to Antwerp, a project which he felt should 

have chief emphasis, while Montgomery 

extended his northern thrust to gain a 

bridgehead across the Neder Rijn (Lower 

Rhine) in the Netherlands. Although 

Montgomery had failed to gain unqualified support for his northern thrust, his 

army group still retained the role of Allied 

main effort.29 

The Shadow of Logistics 

The fervor with which Allied commanders contended for supplies stemmed 

directly from the critical nature of the 

logistical situation. Perhaps the most 

dramatic and widely publicized result of 

the supply crisis was the enforced halt of 

the entire Third Army when it ran out of 

fuel along the Meuse River from I to 6 

September. Yet the units in the north 

29 Notes on mtg at Brussels, 10 Sep 44, by Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, OCMH; 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, t;;rusade in Europe (New 

York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), pp. 

306- 07. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

had their problems as well, despite the 

priority assigned the northern thrust. A 

corps of the Second British Army, for 

example, was halted for two weeks west of 

the Seine so that its transport could help 

supply the rest of the army. A corps of 

the First Army also had to halt for four 

days in Belgium for want of gasoline. 

I t was not shortage of supplies on the 

Continent that plagued the Allies. Buildup of supplies in Normandy had exceeded 

expectations. It was shortage of transportation, a problem created and intensified mainly by the sporadic and explosive 

nature of the tactical advance. 3o 

For all the lack of deepwater port 

facilities and a steady, orderly advance, 

supply echelons could have built a sound 

logistical structure had they been afforded 

a reasonable pause after the breakout 

from the confined Normandy beachhead. 

That was how the invasion had been 

planned: a pause at the Seine River for 

regrouping and amassing supplies. But 

the planners had not foreseen the nature 

of the German defeat in France. Every 

path strewn with gems of tactical opportunity, Allied field commanders had felt 

compelled to urge their armies to go 

faster, faster. They had leaped the Seine 

briskly and kept going. 

While the timetable prepared by preinvasion planners was admittedly conjectural, it was nevertheless the only basis 

upon which those charged with delivering 

supplies could estimate the men, materiel, 

and transport needed. In gaining the D 

plus 330 line by D plus 97 (I I September), the armies had covered almost the 

30 Unless otherwise noted, this study of supply 

is based upon Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical 

Support of the Armies, Vol. I, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), and Vol. II. 

11 

entire distance in the last 48 days. The 

kind of logistical system that planners had· 

expected would be developed over 233 

days obviously could not be created in 48. 

Furthermore, the pre invasion planners had 

stipulated that in early September twelve 

U.S. divisions could be supported as far 

east as the Seine; in actuality, sixteen U.S. 

divisions were more than 200 miles beyond 

the Seine in early September and several 

others were fighting in Brittany. The fact 

that these divisions could be maintained 

in any fashion under these circumstances 

came under the heading of a near miracle, 

for the exploitation of the tactical situation had produced a ruthless disregard for 

an orderly development of a sound communications zone. 

During the period of confinement in 

Normandy, the inadequacy of the Norman 

rail net had not been felt too keenly. 

Distances were short and trucking proved 

equal to the demands placed upon it. 

When the armies spurted eastward, they 

uncovered a more extensive rail network, 

but it had been damaged severely by Allied 

bombing and French sabotage. Trucking 

companies had to carry their loads farther 

and farther forward. Despite extensive 

improvisation and emergency supply, deliveries to the armies during the last few 

days of August dwindled to a few thousand tous. 

At the end of August the First Army 

estimated its daily average tonnage requirement as 5,500 tons. Even after 

General Eisenhower vested. supply priority 

in the First Army and hilted the Third 

Army, only 2,225 tons daily reached the 

First Army.31 In addition to immobilizing an entire corps for four days for want 

31 By using its own transportation, the army 

raised this to 3,000 tons. 
12 

of gasoline, the First Army had to halt the 

armored divisions of the two advancing 

corps for periods as long as twenty-four 

hours.32 When recorded receipts took a 

turn for the better on 5 September to 

reach 7,000 tons, General Bradley altered the previous allocation to split the 

available tonnage equally between his two 

armies, providing each with 3,500 tons. 

That was how the Third Army got moving 

again. 

The day the new allocation went into 

effect the First Army claimed that the 

Communications Zone had failed by 1,900 

tons to meet the 3,500 figure. This kind 

of thing was all the more serious because 

the army's meager reserves had long since 

been exhausted. By the end of August 

90 to 95 percent of all supplies on the 

Continent lay in depots near the beaches. 

There were two solutions: (I) Pause 

while the Communications Zone moved 

depots forward. Doing this would upset 

the momentum of a victorious advance 

and afford the enemy additional time to 

put the West Wall into shape. ( 2) Get 

new ports closer to the front. This Hitler 

himself had circumvented, over the objections of his generals, by designating the 

ports as "fortresses" and directing that 

they be held to the last, even though 

valuable troops would be sacrificed in the 

process. 

The alternative to these solutions was a 

variation of the first. The 12th Army 

Group stated it as early as 27 August. 

"It is contemplated," the army group 

noted, "that the Armies will go as far as 

practicable and then wait until the supply system in rear will permit further 

advance." 33 The pursuit would come to 

32 FUSA AAR, Sep 44. 

33 12th A Gp Admin Instrs 13, 27 Aug 44, 

FUSA AAR, Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

no dramatic end. It would sputter out. 

In an effort to keep the armies moving, 

commanders from divisional units all the 

way back to the Communications Zone 

took extraordinary measures. That the 

advance carried as far as it did was 

attributable in no small part to these 

improvisations. 

Though rail reconstruction was pushed 

with vigor, it hardly could have been 

expected to keep pace with the violent 

spurts of the combat formations. Nevertheless, by 30 August, railroad engineers 

and French civilians working round the 

clock had pushed two main routes as far 

as Paris. The network beyond the Seine 

was less severely crippled; but to get 

supplies through the damaged yards of 

Paris and beyond the destroyed rail 

bridges of the Seine, they had to be unloaded and trucked through the city. In 

the First Army area, reconstruction crews 

quickly opened a line from Paris northeast 

through Soissons and by 18 September 

were to push it to a point just west of 

Liege.34 

For all the accomplishments under this 

program, motor transport had to assume 

the principal burden, even though production difficulties in the United States had 

imposed limitations on trucks long before 

D-Day. When confronted with the engulfing demands of the pursuit, available 

motor transport could not deliver even 

daily maintenance, much less provide 

stocks for intermediate or advance depots. 

To make the mo~t of available facilities, 

commanders decided on 23 August to 

establish a special truck route, the Red 

Ball Express. By closing off civilian 

traffic on two parallel routes to points 

34 FUSA Rpt of Opns, I Aug 44-22 Feb 45, 

p.62. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

southwest of Paris and by pushing the 

trucks and their drivers to the limit, they 

delivered 89,939 tons in eight days between 25 August and 6 September. Beginning on 25 August with 67 truck 

companies, the Red Ball attained peak 

capacity on 29 August when 132 

companies, using 5,939 trucks, moved 

12,342 tons of supplies. The Red Ball 

was to continue operation for another 

eleven weeks and was to serve as the 

prototype for several less ambitious express 

serVIces. 

The armies themselves took over much 

of the hauling. On 22 August General 

Bradley told both his armies to leave their 

heavy artillery west of the Seine and use 

the artillery trucks for transporting supplies. Because Communications Zone depots were far in the rear, trucks of the 

First Army often had to make round trips 

totaling 300 miles or more. On a few 

occasions truck companies searched for 

supplies all the way back to the invasion 

beaches. The First Army quartermaster 

scouted for advancing gasoline trains from 

a cub airplane. The First Army had 43 

Quartermaster truck companies, which 

were supplemented by 10 to 20 provisional 

companies made up from artillery and 

antiaircraft units. The infantry divisions 

advanced either on foot or by shuttling in 

trucks borrowed from their organic artillery and attached antiaircraft.35 

Though emergency air supply proved 

highly valuable, tonnage delivered by this 

method fell short of 1,000 tons per day. 

Most of this went to the Third Army. 

The vagaries of weather, lack of serviceable Continental airfields, and the need to 

withhold planes for their primary mission 

of training for and executing tactical aIr35 FUSA AAR, Sep 44. 

13 

borne operations imposed severe restrictions on the airlift program. Another 

restriction developed when the city of 

Paris was liberated far ahead of schedule. 

Responsible for providing 1,500 tons of 

supplies daily for civil relief in the capital, 

the 12th Army Group had to obtain 500 

tons of this from the airlift. 

Major efforts were made to speed construction of fuel pipelines, but this task 

was inherently slow and was retarded 

further by the limitations on moving pipe 

imposed by the transportation shortage. 

While construction sometimes reached a 

record 30 to 40 miles a day, the combat 

troops were going even faster. During 

the early days of September the terminus 

of the pipeline was some 170 miles southwest of Paris. 

Combat commanders urged strictest 

supply economy.36 All units rationed 

gasoline. Food was of emergency types, 

mostly C and K rations, supplemented in 

the First Army by approximately 75,000 

captured rations that added <\ new monotony of canned fish to the diet. The 

Third Army captured huge quantities of 

German beef, not to mention the exciting 

acquisition of great stores of champagne. 

Cigarettes became so scarce in the First 

Army that the soldiers accepted even the 

mostly ersatz German cigarettes with relish. 

Gasoline was the main problem, not 

because enough had not reached the Continent but because it could not be moved 

forward overnight and because worn-out 

vehicles used inordinate amounts. AmmumtlOn presented no great problem 

during the mobile warfare of the pursuit, 

but it would, should a pitched battle 

develop at the gates of the West Wall. 

With all available transport used for daily 

36 See, for example, FUSA AAR, Sep 44. 
14 

maintenance and none for reserve stocks, 

what would happen should the armies run 

into intense fighting? How to equip the 

men with heavier clothing now that winter 

was coming on? How to replace the 

worn-out items of signal, quartermaster, 

medical, engineer, and ordnance equipment? 

Had the effects of the logistical crisis 

disappeared with the close of the pursuit, 

the costly, miserable fighting that came to 

characterize the Siegfried Line Campaign 

might never have occurred. Yet the fact 

was that the pursuit ended because of the 

effects of the logistical crisis. The imprint 

of a weakened logistical system on the 

conduct of operations was to be marked 

for at least two more months. As many 

an Allied commander was to discover 

during the fall of 1944, a logistical headache is a persistent illness. 

T he Germans in the West 

For all the implications of the logistical 

crisis, sober appreciations of the situation 

were none too common during late summer 1944. The German army was "no 

longer a cohesive force but a number of 

fugitive battle groups, disorganized and 

even demoralized, short of equipment and 

arms." 37 This was the Allied view. 

Political upheaval within Germany or insurrection withih the Wehrmacht was 

likely to hasten the end. 38 The First 

Army G-2 believed that the enemy was 

concentrating all he had left opposite Metz 

and along the Lower Rhine, "leaving a gap 

from Trier to Maastricht which he is 

37 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 23, week 

ending 2 Sep 44. 

38 FUSA G-2 Estimate 24, 3 Sep 44, FUSA 

Rpt of Opns; TUSA G-2 Estimate 9, .28 Aug 

44, TUSA AAR, Vol. II. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

attempting to fill with everything on which 

he can lay his hands." This, the G":'2 

declared, "had proved his undoing." 39 

This kind of optimism reflected no fleeting impression. In mid-September, when 

a corps commander took temporary leave 

of his troops for a short assignment elsewhere, he declared it "probable" that the 

war with Germany would be over before 

he could return.40 On 15 September the 

First Army was almost sanguine over the 

possibility of enemy collapse in the Rhineland and the "enormous" strategic opportunity of seizing the Rhine bridges 

intact.41 As late as the last week in 

September, the First" Army commander 

believed that, given two weeks of good 

weather, Allied air and ground forces 

could "bring the enemy to their knees." 42 

Although a few dissenting voices tried to 

make themselves heard, caution was not 

the fashion during the late summer season 

of 1944. 

In many respects the true German situation nurtured optimism. In five years 

of war the German armed forces had lost 

114,215 officers and 3,630,274 men, not 

including wounded who had returned to 

duty. The bulk of these had been Army 

losses. Many had been incurred during 

the recent months of June, July, and 

August, which had brought the Germans 

their most disastrous defeats in both East 

39 FUSA G-2 Estimate 26, I I Sep 44. 

40 Memo, Maj Gen Leonard T. Gerow for 

O's and EM of V Corps, 17 Sep 44, V Corps 

Operations in the ETO, 6 Jan 42-9 May 45, 

p. 256. 

41 FUSA G-2 Estimate 28, 15 Sep 44. 

42 Personal Diary of Maj William C. Sylvan, 

former aide to the First Army Commander, Lt 

Gen Courtney H. Hodges. Entry of 24 Sep 44. 

Major Sylvan kept his diary, dealing primarily 

with General Hodges' activities, with the approval of General Hodges. A copy is on file ill 

OCMH through courtesy of Major Sylvan. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

and West. During these three months 

the Army alone had suffered losses in 

dead, wounded, and missing of 1,2 10,600, 

approximately two thirds of which had 

been incurred in the East where both 

sides employed larger masses of men. 

Losses in transport and equipment also 

were tremendous; during August alone, 

for example, a total of 254,225 horses were 

10stY 

Not counting "paper units," which had 

headquarters but no troops, the Third 

Reich in early September possessed some 

252 divisions and 15 to 20 brigades, 

greatly varied as to strength and capabilities. They were deployed in five theaters. 

In Finland, the East, and the Balkans 

they were supplemented by approximately 

55 allied divisions (Finnish, Hungarian, 

and :Bulgarian), for which the Germans 

had little respect. Most of the total of 

some 7,500,000 men were in the Field 

Army (Feldheer), the Replacement Army 

(Ersatzheer), or the services of supply. 

About 207,000 were in the Waffen-SS, a 

mechanized Army-type force originally 

made up of volunteers from Nazi-party 

organizations. 

Of the 48 infantry and 15 panzer or 

panzer-type divisions which Field Marshal 

von Rundstedt controlled in the West, two 

represented a new class of 18 divisions 

which had been in process of formation 

since early July. These 18 divisions-I5 

of which went to the East and I to 

Scandinavia-were the first of the "volks 

grenadier" divisions, an honorific selected 

to appeal to the national and military 

pride of the German people (das V olk ) . 

The troops were hospital returnees, con43 A detailed annotated account of German 

strength, losses, and organization may be found 

in Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 29-43. 

15 

verted naval and Luftwaffe personnel, 

previously exempt industrial workers,· 

and youths just reaching military age. 

When Hitler in late August began to 

consider how to stop the headlong retreat 

in the West, he settled upon a plan to 

increase the number of volks grenadier 

divisions. On 2 September-already seriously planning a large-scale operation 

designed to regain the initiative-he directed creation of an "operational reserve" 

of twenty-five new volks grenadier divisions. They were to become available III 

the West between October and 

December. 

Organization and equipment of the new 

divisions reflected a tendency, current in 

the German Army since 1943, to reduce 

manpower while increasing fire power. 

Early in 1944 the standard infantry division had been formally reduced from 

about 17,000 men to 12,500.44 By cutting each of the conventional three infantry regiments to two rifle battalions apiece 

and by thinning the organic service troops, 

the volks grenadier divisions were further 

reduced to about 10,000 men. Attempts 

were made to arm two platoons in each 

company with the 1944 model machine 

pistol (known to Americans as the burp 

gun), increase the amount of field artillery, and provide a larger complement 

of antitank weapons and· assault guns 

(self-propelled tank destroyers). Approximately three fourths of the divisional 

transportation was horse drawn, while one 

unit, the Fuesilier battalion, had bicycles. 

To supplement divisional artillery and 

antitank guns, Hitler ordered formation 

44 The 1944-type division and other divisional 

organizations are discussed in Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 

1951), pp. 23 6-41. 
16 

of a number of general headquarters 

(H eeres) units; 12 motorized artillery 

brigades (about 1,000 guns), lOW erier 

(rocket projector) brigades, 10 assault 

gun battalions, and 12 20-mm. machine 

gun battalions. These were to be ready 

along with the last of the 25 volks 

grenadier divisions. In addition, Hitler 

on 4 September assigned the West priority 

on all new artillery and assault guns. 

Two other steps were of a more immediate nature. As the month of September 

opened, 10 panzer brigades were either 

just arriving at the front or were being 

formed. These were built around a panzer battalion equipped with about forty 

Mark V (Panther) tanks. On the theory 

that the Mark V was tactically superior to 

the U.S. Sherman tank, the panzer brigades were expected to make up temporarily for Allied numerical superiority in 

armor. 

The other step was to commit to battle 

approximately a hundred "fortress" infantry battalions made up of the older 

military classes and heretofore used only in 

rear areas. About four fifths of these 

were to be assigned to the West. Calling 

the battalions a "hidden reserve," the First 

U.S. Army later was to credit them with 

much of the German tenacity in the West 

Wall. 45 

Had Allied commanders been a ware of 

the enemy's necessity to resort to expedients like these, it probably would have fed 

their optimism. Neither could they have 

been impressed by the command situation 

as it had developed at the top level. After 

the reverses on the Eastern Front during 

1941-42, Hitler had assumed more and 

more the role of supreme military leader, 

so that by the fall of 1944 the concept of 

45 FUSA AAR, Oct. 44-. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

maneuver had been all but stultified by 

a complete centralization of command.· 

Hardly anybody could do anything without first consulting Hitler. After the 

unsuccessful attempt on his life in July, he 

looked upon almost every proposal from a 

field commander with unalloyed suspicion. 

To reach the supreme military leader, 

field commanders in the West had to 

go through a central headquarters in Berlin, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 

(OKW), which was charged with operations in all theaters except the East. 

(Oberkommando des Heeres-OKHwatched over the Eastern Front.) Hitler's impression of the situation thus 

stemmed directly frorn a staff far removed 

from the scene of action. 

OB WEST, the headquarters in the 

West that was comparable to SH AEF, 

was a supreme headquarters in theory 

only, for the ties imposed by OKW were 

stringent. The jealousies that played 

among the Army, the Luftwaffe, the Navy, 

the Waffen-SS, and' Nazi party political 

appoi~tees also limited OB WEST's independence. 

Hitler's order for early September to 

hold "under any conditions" a line from 

the Schelde estuary along the face of the 

W est Wall and the western borders of 

Lorraine and Alsace had shown little 

appreciation of the difficulties facing OB 

WEST. This was despite the fact that 

Field Marshal Model, who had preceded 

Rundstedt as Commander in Chief West, 

had done his best to convey some sense of 

the crisis by sending report after report 

couched in dire terms. The retreating 

troops, Model had warned, possessed few 

heavy weapons and little else except carbines and rifles. Few of the eleven panzer 

divisions had more than five to ten tanks 

in working order. Artillery in both in-
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

FIELD MARSHAL MODEL 

fantry and panzer divisions was almost a 

thing of the past. The troops were 

depressed by Allied superiority in planes 

and tanks and by the contrast between 

their own horse-drawn transport and the 

motors of their enemy. In Alsace a wide 

gap had developed between the two groups 

of armies that could not be filled with less 

than three fresh infantry divisions. Hardly 

had Model reported this gap than he 

wrote it off as no longer of primary concern. The entire Western Front, he 

pleaded, needed propping up lest it give 

way completely.46 

On 4 September Model had given a 

detailed appraisal of the front of Army 

Group B, which Model himself com46 Heeresgruppe B (hereafter cited as A Gp B), 

Lagebeurteilungen, la. 

17 

FIELD MARSHAL VON RUNDSTEDT 

manded in addition to his major post as 

Commander in Chief West. His army 

group alone, Model had said, needed a 

minimum of 25 fresh infantry divisions 

and 5 or 6 panzer divisions.47 

To this plea Model received not even the 

courtesy of a reply. It was at this point 

that he was replaced in the top half 

of his dual command responsibility by 

Rundstedt. 

Field Marshal von Rundstedt's return 

to his former command on 5 September 

came on the heels of personal indoctrination from Hitler. The Allies, Hitler had 

told him, were outrunning their supplies 

and soon would have to halt, at which 

time counterattacks could cut off the 

"armored spearheads" and stabilize the 

47 Ibid. 
18 

front. The West Wall, Hitler insisted, 

had all the elements of impregnability and 

would afford the much-needed respite. 

Hitler's final instructions were much like 

the earlier order to hold "under any conditions." Rundstedt was to stop the Allies 

as far to the west as possible, then was to 

counterattack along the boundary between the two army groups into the south 

flank of the Third U.S. Army.48 

After assuming command in the main 

DB WEST command post near Koblenz, 

Rundstedt's most urgent problem was the 

restoration of a collective strategy for the 

whole of the Western Front, something to 

which Model, in his preoccupation with 

Army Group B, had paid scant attention. 

Rundstedt correctly held out little hope 

for the counterattack; for continued advances by the Third Army denied mounting one in any appreciable strength. Yet 

the very fact that any troops were on hand 

to counterattack lessened this particular 

threat. He could see no solution for two 

other threats: one against the Ruhr, particularly via Aachen, and another in uncommitted Allied airborne forces, which 

he expected might attack either in rear 

of the West Wall or east of the Rhine. 

Rundstedt's first estimate of the situation, forwarded to OKW on 7 September, 

echoed Model's pessimistic reports. After 

emphasizing the overwhelming Allied su48 MS # T-122, Geschichte des "Oberbefehlshaber West," edited by Generalleutnant Bodo 

Zimmermann (G-3, OB WEST), hereafter cited 

as MS # T-122 (Zimmermann et al.), Part II, 

Kampf in Belgien und Holland von Mitte September-Mitte December 1944. MSS # T-121, 

122, and 123-History of OB WEST -make up 

a million-word manuscript prepared in part by 

Zimmermann, in part by generals and general 

staff officers associated with OB WEST, OKW, 

OKH, OKL, OKM, and various subordinate 

commands. No page numbers are cited because 

the manuscripts exist in several differently 

paginated versions. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

periority in divisions and in armor, Rundstedt insisted on the immediate need of at· 

least five, "and better ten," infantry 

divisions. He needed tanks and tank 

destroyers desperately, he said, to counter 

the threat at Aachen. At the moment 

the only reserves of any description were 

a "weak" 9th Panzer Division, a "weak" 

Sturm panzer battalion, and two assault 

gun brigades. All of these already were 

on the way to Aachen.49 

The answer from Berlin must have been 

as frustrating to Rundstedt as earlier 

responses had been to Model. Spike 

down the front as far to the west as 

possible. Pull out the shattered divisions 

for reconstitution. Counterattack into 

the flank of the Third U.S. Army. No 

promise of any immediate assistance. As 

the American First Army noted, "The 

moment called for a real soldier." 50 

Subsequent events might prove that in 

Field Marshal von Rundstedt the moment 

had found the soldier it called for. The 

German situation in the West was bad, 

even desperate. Yet it was a situation 

that a strong leader still might make something of. 

The true German .situation was perhaps 

most aptly described by one of the few 

voices of caution raised on the Allied side 

during the halcyon days of pursuit. On 

28 August the Third Army 0-2 had put 

it this way: 

Despite the crippling factors of shattered 

communications, disorganization and tremendous losses in personnel and equipment, 

the enemy nevertheless has been able to 

maintain a sufficiently cohesive front to 

exercise an overall control of his tactical 

situation. His withdrawal, though continuing, has not been a rout or mass collapse. 

Numerous new identifications in contact in 

40 A Gp B, Lagebeurteilungen, la. 

50 FUSA AAR, Sep 44. 
THE ROAD TO GERMANY 

recent days have demonstrated clearly that, 

despite the enormous difficulties under which 

he is operating, the enemy is still capable 

of bringing new elements into the battle 

area and transferring some from other 

fronts .... 

It is clear from all indications that the 

fixed determination of the Nazis is to wage a 

last-ditch struggle in the field at all costs. 

It must be constantly kept in mind that 

fundamentally the enemy is playing for time. 

Weather will soon be one of his most potent 

Allies as well as terrain, as we move east to 

narrowing corridors . . . .51 

The fact was that the German penchant 

and respect for organization and discipline 

had preserved organization at the headquarters levels basically intact. Though 

some top commanders and many staff 

officers had been lost, the Germans still 

had enough capable senior officers to replace them. Nor had the Germans as a 

nation resorted to total mobilization before 

the fall of 1944.52 

51 TUSA G-2 Estimate 9, 28 Aug 44, TUSA 

AAR, Vol. II. 

52 See Charles V. P. von Luttichau, The 

Ardennes Offensive, Germany's Situation in the 

Fall of I944, Part III, The Strategic Situation, 

MS in OCMH. 

19 

This is not to say, the Germans had not. 

full justification for alarm as the first 

patrols crossed their border. The situation still was chaotic, but the ingredients 

for stabilization were present. In the 

north, for example, opposite the British 

and the First V.S. Army, though the 

Seventh and Fifteenth Armies were skeletons, the army and corps staffs still 

functioned and each army had at least ten 

division staffs capable of attempting to 

execute tactical assignments. V pon news 

of the fall of Antwerp, Hitler had rushed 

to the Netherlands headquarters of a 

training command, the First Parachute 

Army, to fill a gap between the Seventh 

and Fifteenth Armies. Though the First 

Parachute Army brought with it little 

more than its own headquarters, it was 

able in a matter of days to borrow, confiscate from the retreating masses, or 

otherwise obtain functioning staffs of one 

corps and several divisions. Winning a 

war with a setup like this might be 

impossible, but it could be effective in 

stopping an overextended attacker long 

enough to permit creation of something 

better. 
CHAPTER II 

The First U.S. Army 

In crossing the German border, the 

First U.S. Army had added another justification for its numerical name to that 

already earned in establishing the first 

American foothold in Normandy. After 

the landings, the First Army had forged 

the gap through which the more flamboyant Third Army had poured from the 

beachhead. Not to be outdone, the First 

Army also had taken up the pursuit, with 

less fanfare than its sister army, perhaps, 

but with equally concrete results. In less 

than a month and a half the First Army 

had driven from St. La to Paris, thence 

northward to Mons, thence eastward to 

the German border, a distance of approximately 750 miles. (See Map 1.) This 

it had accomplished against the bulk of 

the German forces, including German 

armor, still opposing an American army in 

northern France. 

At the beginning of September the First 

Army numbered 256,351 officers and men. 

It had 3 corps made up of 5 infantry 

divisions, 3 armored divisions, and 3 mechanized cavalry groups. The 8 combat 

divisions were almost at full strength: 

109,5 I 7 officers and men. Also a part of 

the army were 9 separate tank battalions 

(7 medium, 2 light), 12 tank destroyer 

battalions, 3 I antiaircraft battalions (including automatic weapons and gun battalions) , 3 field artillery observation 

battalions, 46 separate field artillery 

battalions, 3 chemical (mortar) battalions, 

and a number of engineer, signal, quartermaster, and other service units.! 

Though the First Army's strength in 

medium tanks was a theoretical 1,0 I 0, 

only some 85 percent was actually on 

hand. Many of even these were badly in 

need of maintenance following. the rapid 

dash across France and Belgium. The 3d 

Armored Division, for example, reported 

on 18 September that of an authorized 

medium tank strength of 232, only 70 to 

75 were in condition for front-line duty.2 

The commander of the First Army was 

a calm, dependable, painstaking tactician, 

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges. After 

the manner of his predecessor in command 

of the First Army, General Bradley, General Hodges was a "soldier's soldier," a 

title to which no other American army 

commander and few corps commanders in 

action in Europe at the time could lay 

more just claim. No other was more sincere and sympathetic toward his troops 

and none except Hodges and one corps 

commander had risen from the ranks. 3 

Though General Hodges had sought a 

commission at West Point, he had flunked 

1 12th A Gp and FUSA G-I Daily Summaries, 

12 Sep 44; FUSA, Order of Battle, Combat 

Units, 20 Sep 44, FUSA G-2 TAC Mise file, 

Sep 44. Ct. Third Army strength as found in 

Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 18. 

2 3d Armd Div AAR, Sep 44, and Combat 

Interv with 3d Armd Div G-4. 

3 Maj Gen Troy H. Middleton, VIII Corps. 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

out in geometry during his first year. A 

man of determination, as he was to demonstrate often during the fall of 1944, he 

had enlisted in the Army as an infantry 

private and had gained his commission 

only a year later than his former classmates at the Military Academy. He 

served in the expedition against Pancho 

Villa in Mexico and was one of a small 

fraternity of top American commanders in 

World War II who had seen combat before at a line company level, in the 

Meuse-Argonne campaign of World War I. 

Upon completion of a stint of occupation duty after World War I, General 

Hodges had served the usual tours of 

troop duty in the United States and 

attended the Army schools. D~ring additional service in the Philippines his path 

crossed that of the future Supreme Commander in Europe. Later he served successively as assistant commandant and 

commandant of The Infantry School. In 

1941 General George C. Marshall, Chief 

of Staff, who had first been impressed 

with Hodges while he himself was assistant 

commandant of The Infantry School, 

brought Hodges to Washington as Chief 

of Infantry. His performance as an 

administrator already proved, General 

Hodges showed his ability as a field 

commander while directing the Third 

Army during the 1943 Louisiana maneuvers. 

In early 1944 General Hodges had left 

for England to become deputy commander 

of General Bradley's First Army and to 

direct the training and co-ordination of 

the various corps and divisions readying 

for D-Day. It was a foregone conclusion 

that Hodges would take over when 

Bradley moved upstairs. On 1 August he 

had become commanding general of the 

First Army. 

21 

G ENERAL HODGES 

General Hodges was fifty-seven years 

old at the start of the Siegfried Line 

Campaign. Tall, erect, his moustache 

closely clipped, he was an impressivelooking soldier. Averse to tumult and glitter, he preferred restrained behavior to 

publicity-provoking eccentncItIes. Discipline, General Hodges maintained, could 

be achieved without shouting. 

A close friend of the Third Army's 

General Patton, Hodges shared Patton's 

enthusiasm for what machines and big 

guns could do for his infantrymen. The 

First Army almost always had more 

medium tanks than did the Third Army, 

despite the myth that the Third was "topheavy with armor." That Hodges knew 

how to use tanks had been demonstrated 

amply during the pursuit. He was also 

alert to what artillery could do. General 

Hodges worked no more closely with nor 
22 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

THIRTEEN COMMANDERS OF THE WESTERN FRONT photographed in Belgium, 10 October 1944. Front row, left to right: General Patton, General Bradley, General Eisenhower, General Hodges, Lt. Gen. William H Simpson. Second row: Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, Maj. 

Gen. Charles E. Corlett, Maj. Gen. ]. Lawton Collins, Maj. Gen. Leonard P. Gerow, Maj. 

Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. Third row: Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, Brig. Gen. Charles C. Hart, 

Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson. 

depended more on the advice of any man 

on his staff than his chief of artillery, 

Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hart.4 

The First Army headquarters under 

General Hodges was vitally concerned 

with precision and detailed planning. 

"When you did a situation report for the 

4 Interv with Maj Gen Truman C. Thorson, 

former G-3, FUSA, 12 Sep 56; Sylvan Diary, 

passim. 

Third Army," said a former corps G-3, 

"you showed the positions of the regiments. When you did one for the First 

Army, you had to show platoons." 5 The 

army's concern for detail was clearly reflected in the presence within the office of 

the Assistant G-3 for Plans and Operations alone of sixteen liaison officers 

5 Interv with Brig Gen John G. Hill, former 

G-3, V Corps, IS Oct 54· 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

equipped with jeep and radio. 6 "A good 

army headquarters," General Hodges' 

G-3 believed, "is always right on top of 

the corps and divisions, else you cannot 

carry out the orders and wishes of the 

commander." 7 

The staff which General Hodges inherited from General Bradley was basically 

intact at the start of September. Possibly 

reflecting the primary interest of both 

Bradley and Hodges, it was strong in 

infantry officers. 

The chief of staff was a specialist in the 

role, a forty-seven-year-old infantryman, 

Maj. Gen. William B. Kean. General 

Bradley had brought General Kean along 

from earlier service as chief of staff of an 

infantry division to fill the same role, first 

with the II Corps in Tunisia and Sicily, 

and later with the First Army. Kean 

became "very close" to General Hodges as 

adviser and confidant and "a leading 

light" in the First Army headquarters. 

"It was Kean," one of his associates recalled, "who would crack the whip. We 

called him 'Old Sam Bly.''' 8 Both the 

G-2, Col. Benjamin A. Dickson, and the 

G-3, Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson, also 

were infantrymen.9 

Like almost all American units in action 

at this stage, the corps and divisions under 

the First Army's command were thoroughly seasoned. Two of the 3 corps and 

6 of the 8 divisions would provide the 

nucleus of the First Army through almost 

all of the Siegfried Line Campaign. 

Weakest numerically of the three corps 

was the XIX Corps under Maj. Gen. 

6 Interv with Col R. F. Akers, former Asst 

G-3, FUSA, I I Jun 56. 

7 Interv with Thorson. 

8 Ibid. 

U The G-I was Col. Joseph J. O'Hare; the 

G-4, Col. Robert W. Wilson; the G-5, Col. 

Damon M. Gunn. 

23 

Charles H. Corlett, an infantryman who 

had gained combat experience earlier in' 

World War II as a commander of the 7th 

Division in the Pacific. Under General 

Corlett the XIX Corps had become operational on 1 4 June. The corps had helped 

pave the way for the breakout of the 

original beachhead, fend off the enemy's 

desperate counterattack at Mortain, and 

close both the Argentan-Falaise and Mons 

pockets. On 1 I September the XIX 

Corps had but two divisions-the 30th 

Infantry and 2d Armored, plus the 1 13th 

Cavalry Group and supporting troops. 

Unfortunately, General Corlett was not 

physically at his best during the summer 

and fall of 1944. 

The VII Corps, which had assaulted 

UTAH Beach on D-Day and captured 

Cherbourg, was under Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins. Collins was an infantryman 

who had gained battle experience and a 

nickname-Lightning Joe-as an infantry 

division commander on Guada1canal and 

New Georgia. Like the Third Army's 

General Patton, Collins was a dynamic, 

driving personality whose opinions often 

exerted more than the normal influence at 

the next higher level of command. At the 

time of the drive into Germany, the major 

units of the VII Corps were the 4th 

Cavalry Group, the 1st and 9th Infantry 

Divisions, and the 3d Armored Division. 

Completing the triangle of corps was 

the V Corps under Maj. Gen. Leonard 

T. Gerow. Like the other corps commanders, General Gerow was a veteran 

infantryman. He had spent the early 

days of the war with the War Plans 

Division of the War Department General 

Staff and as commander of an infantry 

division in the United States. Two of the 

more notable accomplishments of the V 

Corps were the D-Day landing on OMAHA 
24 

Beach and the liberation of Paris. On I I 

September the corps controlled the I02d 

Cavalry Group, the 4th and 28th Infantry 

Divisions, and the 5th Armored Division. 

Though almost all the infantry and 

armored divisions of the First Army were 

at or near full strength in mid-September, 

the army faced a handicap both at the 

start and all the way through the Siegfried 

Line Campaign in a lack of a reserve 

combat force. On occasion, a separate 

infantry battalion or a combat command 

of armor occupying a secondary defensive 

line would be called a reserve, but no one 

could accept these designations as other 

than nominal. 

It could be said that the First Army had 

a fourth corps in an old ally, the IX 

Tactical Air Command, a component of 

the Ninth Air Force. Commanded by 

Maj. Gen. Elwood R. ( Pete) Quesada, 

the IX T AC was the oldest unit of its kind 

in the theater and long ago had established 

with the First Army "an indissoluble 

operational partnership." 10 When General Hodges' headquarters settled down 

for the fall campaign in the Belgian town 

of Spa, General Quesada moved in next 

door. Air officers attended First Army 

briefings, and vice versa. F or all the 

difficulties of weather that were to plague 

the airmen during the Siegfried Line 

Campaign, ground commanders were to 

continue to pay tribute to the close and 

effective co-operation they received from 

the IX TAC.l1 

Like divisions attached to ground corps 

and armies, the fighter-bomber groups assigned to tactical air commands often 

10 The Ninth Air Force and Its Principal 

Commands in the ETO, Vol. II, Pt. I. 

11 See, for example, testimony in Operational 

History of the Ninth Air Force, Book V, Ground 

Forces Annexes. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

varied. On occasion, the IX TAC controlled as many as eighteen groups, but' 

usually the number averaged about sixY 

A group normally had three squadrons of 

twenty-five planes each, P-38's (Lightnings), P-4 is (Thunderbolts), or P-5 I'S 

(M ustangs), except in the case of night 

fighter groups, which had P-6I'S (Black 

Widows). 

Requests for air support usually were 

forwarded from the air support officers at 

division through the air support officer and 

G-3 Air Section at corps to the G-3 Air 

at army for transmission to the IX T AC. 

The air headquarters ruled on the feasibility of the mission and assigned the 

proper number of aircraft to it. Since 

air targets could not always be anticipated, most divisions came to prefer a 

system of "armed reconnaissance flights" 

in which a group was assigned to the 

division or corps for the day and checked 

in by radio directly with the appropriate 

air support officer. Thus the planes 

could be called in as soon as a target 

appeared without the delay involved in 

forwarding a request through channels. 13 

Available also for direct support of the 

ground troops were the eleven groups of 

medium bombers of the IX Bombardment 

Division (Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson), another component of the Ninth Air 

Force. Each of these groups normally 

employed thirty-six planes, either B-26's 

(Marauders) or A-20'S (Havocs), which 

12 As of 30 September, the IX TAC commanded the 368th, 370th, 404th, and 474th 

Fighter-Bomber Groups and the 67th Tactical 

Reconnaissance Group. 

13 Ninth Air Force, Vol. I, Ch. VII. For a 

detailed study of air-ground liaison, see Kent 

Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the 

Air-Ground Battle Team Including Organic 

Light Aviation, Army Ground Forces Study No. 

35, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948. 

Copy in OCMH. 
THE FIRST V.S. ARMY 

bombed from altitudes of 10,000 to 12,000 

feet.14 Though the mediums sometimes 

made valuable contributions to direct 

support, they were used for the purpose 

somewhat infrequently, both because it 

was hard to find targets large enough to be 

easily spotted yet small enough to assure a 

good concentration of bombs and because 

the request for medium support had to be 

approved by the 12th Army Group G-3 

Air Section and took from forty-eight to 

seventy-two hours to come through.15 

Weapons and Equipment 

The weapons and equipment with 

which the American soldier was to fight 

the Siegfried Line Campaign might have 

needed repair and in some cases replacement after the ravages of Normandy and 

the pursuit, but in general the soldier's 

armament and equipment were the envy 

of his adversary. Indeed, the theory 

which German officers and soldiers were 

to perpetuate to explain their defeat in 

World War II, in much the same way 

they blamed lack of perserverance on the 

home front for the outcome of World 

War I, was the superiority of American 

and Allied materieP6 

It is axiomatic that the American soldier 

in World War II was the best-paid and 

best-fed soldier of any army up to that 

time. He clearly was among the best14 IX Bomb Div, Medium Bombardment-Its 

Use in Ground Support, copy in History, IX 

Bomb Div, Nov-Dec 44. 

15 Ninth Air Forte, Vol. I, Ch. VII. Though 

the masses of Allied heavy bombers were used on 

one occasion during the Siegfried Line Campaign 

for direct support of the ground troops, their role 

was primarily strategic and the effects on the 

ground fighting difficult to specify. 

16 Wartime prisoner of war interrogations and 

postwar manuscripts by German officers provide 

ample evidence of German belief in this theory. 

25 

clothed as well, even though controversy 

would rage later about the adequacy of 

his winter clothingP In the matter of 

armament also American research and 

production had done exceedingly well by 

him. On the other hand, his adversary 

likewise possessed, qualitatively, at least, 

an impressive arsenal. 

The basic shoulder weapon in the V.S. 

Army during the Siegfried Line Campaign 

was the .30-caliber M I (Garand) rifle, a 

semiautomatic piece much admired by its 

users. Though the Germans possessed a 

few similar models, their basic individual 

piece was a 7.g2-mm. (Mauser) boltaction rifle not greatly different from the 

V.S. MIg03. Two favorite weapons of 

the American soldier were outgrowths of 

World War I, the .30-caliber Browning 

Automatic Rifle (BAR) and the .30-

caliber Browning machine gun in both 

light (air-cooled) and heavy (watercooled) models. The most effective closerange antitank weapons were, on the 

German side, a one-shot, shaped-charge 

piece called a panzerfaust, and, on 

the American side, a 2.36-inch rocket 

launcher, the bazooka. The most widely 

used artillery pieces of both combatants 

were light and medium howitzers, German 

and American models of which were 

roughly comparable in caliber and performance.1s 

17 See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the 

Armies, Vol. II, pp. 218-35. 

18 This account is based primarily on Research 

and Development Service, Office of the Chief of 

Ordnance, Comparison of American, German, 

and Japanese Ordnance, 6 May 1945, Vols. I and 

II. A comprehensive study and comparison of 

American and German wea'pons and equipment 

will be included in Ordnance Overseas, a volume 

in preparation in the Ordnance subseries of THE 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II. The German infantry division, like the 

American, had four artillery battalions-three 
26 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

CAPTURED PANZERFAUST 

German artillery doctrine and organization for the control and delivery of fire 

differed materially from the American only 

in that the German organic divisional 

artillery was less well equipped for communication. The excellent American facilities of communication down to battery 

level, and the effective operation of the 

American fire direction centers on many 

occasions permitted more accurate fire and 

greater concentration in a shorter time. 

But the shortcomings of the enemy in the 

matter of effective concentrations during 

this campaign were largely attributable to 

the effects of war-loss of air observation, 

--------------- ----

light and one medium. The German pieces 

were gun-howitzers (105-mm. light, and I50-mm. 

medium); the American pieces were howitzers 

( 10 5-mm. and I 55-mm.) . 

shortages of ammumtIOn and equipment, 

damage done to the artillery system, high 

casualties among skilled artillerists, and 

the disruption of smooth teamworkrather than to deficiences of doctrine and 

organization. 19 

Both sides had the same excellent 

1/25,000 metric scale maps of the area, 

reproduced from those originally made by 

the French Army, showing roads, railroads, contour lines, towns, and forests. 

To offset superior knowledge of the terrain 

that the Germans enjoyed, the Americans, 

controlling the air, had the advantage of 

aerial photographs, and they could use 

their artillery spotter planes while the 

10 Charles V. P. von Luttichau, Notes on 

German and U.S. Artillery, copy in OCMH. 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

Germans could not. The simple little 

monoplane that the Americans used for 

artillery observation appeared, in relation 

to contemporary fighters and bombers, to 

be an example of retarded development, a 

throwback to the aircraft of World War I. 

I t was the L-4 (in some cases, L-5 ) , 

variously called a Piper Cub, cub, liaison 

plane, grasshopper, or observation plane. 

Though its most significant role was as the 

eyes of the field artillery, it performed 

various other tasks, such as courier and 

liaison service, visual and photographic 

observation, emergency supply, and emergency evacuation of wounded. Not only 

the artilleryman but the infantryman and 

armored soldier as well swore by it, while 

the Germans swore at it. The very presence of one of the little planes aloft often 

silenced the German artillery. American 

air superiority permitted their consistent 

use, and also gave the Americans the benefit of air photographs made almost daily 

behind the German lines from the faster 

planes of the Army Air Forces. The 

photographs were made available to 

American artillerymen to identify pillboxes 

and other defensive installations of the 

enemy.20 

In the matter of tanks the Americans 

possessed no such advantage. Their 

standard tank, the M4 Sherman, a 33-ton 

medium, was relatively obsolescent. Although a few Shermans equipped with a 

high-velocity 76-mm. gun in place of the 

usual short-barreled 75 were to become 

available during the Siegfried Line Campaign, most medium tanks still mounted 

the 75. They plainly were outgunned, 

20 For a detailed study of the liaison plane, see 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces 

and the Air-Ground Battle Team, AGF Study 

No. 35; I. B. Holley, Evolution of the Liaison 

Type Airplane, 1917-1944, USAF Historical 

Studies 1946. 

27 

not only by the enemy's heaviest tank, the 

63-ton Mark VI (Tiger), but also by the 

50-ton Mark V (Panther) .21 The Tiger, 

the Panther, and the medium Mark IV all 

had thicker armor than the Sherman. 

Equipped with wider tracks than the 

Sherman, the enemy tanks likewise possessed greater flotation and thus on occasion might vitiate a superiority in mobility 

which U.S. tanks possessed when on firm 

ground. The only advantages left to the 

Sherman were superiority in numbers, 

comparatively easy maintenance, and 

greater flexibility and rapidity of fire as a 

result of a gyrostabilizer and power 

traverse.22 

Some equalization' in the matter of tank 

and antitank gunnery was to be provided 

in November when a considerable number 

of U.S. self-propelled tank destroyer battalions were to receive new vehicles. In 

place of the M I 0 destroyer with its 3-inch 

gun, the units were to receive M36 

vehicles mounting a high-velocity go-mm. 

piece. Though the go-mm. had long been 

a standard antiaircraft weapon, its presence on the actual firing line was in the 

nature of an innovation. 

Other than tanks, the German weapons 

which would most impress the American 

soldier in the campaign were the burp 

gun, the Nebelwerfer, and the 88. Two 

of these-the burp gun and the 88-he 

had met before and had long since accorded a ubiquitousness neither deserved. 

The burp gun-so-called because of a 

distinctive emetic b-r-r-r-r-p sound attributable to a higher cyclic rate of fire than 

21 An American heavy tank did not reach the 

theater until 1945 and then in relatively insignificant numbers. 

22 Cole, in The Lorraine' Campaign, pages 

603-04, compares characteristics of German and 

. American tanks during the fall of 1944. 
28 

CAPTURED N EBELWERFER 

American automatic weapons~was an 

individual piece, a machine pistol, similar 

to the U.S. Thompson sub machine gun. 

Because the standard German machine 

gun made a similar emetic sound, it 

seemed to the American soldier that burp 

guns were all over the place. The 88~an 

88-mm., high-velocity, dual-purpose antiaircraft and antitank piece~had been 

accorded the respect of the American 

soldier since North Africa. A standard 

field piece in the German army and the 

standard weapon of the Mark VI Tiger 

tank, the 88 was nevertheless not nearly so 

plentiful as reports from the American side 

would indicate. A shell from almost any 

high-velocity German weapon the American attributed to the 88. 

The Nebelwerfer was a newer weapon, 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

one which had seen some service in 

Normandy but which came into general 

use only at the start of the Siegfried Line 

campaign as the Germans called upon it 

to supplement their depleted artillery. It 

was a multiple-barrel, 150-mm. mortar, 

mounted on wheels and fired electrically. 

The screeching sound of its projectiles in 

flight earned for it the nickname, Screaming Meemie. The U.S. equivalent, a 4.5-

inch rocket launcher, was not used widely 

until later in the war. 

T he Terrain and the West Wall 

In less than a fortnight the forces in the 

north~the First Army and the 21 Army 

Group~had driven the enemy almost 

entirely from two countries: the kingdom 

of Belgium, approximately the size of the 

state of Maryland, and the grand duchy 

of Luxembourg, somewhat smaller than 

Rhode Islanc!. In the process they had 

jumped a number of major obstacles, like 

the Escaut and Meuse Rivers and the 

Belgian and Luxembourgian Ardennes; 

but the path ahead was far from smooth. 

The strategic goal of the forces in the 

north, the Ruhr industrial area, lay about 

seventy-five miles away. Germany's most 

important concentrated mining and industrial region, the Ruhr had grown up east 

of the Rhine largely after 1870. It embraces major cities like Essen, Dortmund, 

and Duesseldorf. An elliptical-shaped 

basin, it measures some fifty miles at its 

base along the Rhine and about seventy 

miles in depth. 

The terrain next to be encountered on 

the march to the Ruhr can be divided into 

four geographical sectors: ( I) Opposite 

the left wing of the 21 Army Group, the 

Dutch islands and the Dutch littoral, most 

of it land reclaimed from the sea and at 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

this stage studded with fortifications 

denying seaward access to the prize of 

Antwerp. ('2) In front of the '2 I Army 

Group's right wing, the flatlands of the 

Netherlands, crisscrossed by waterways, 

including three major rivers, the Maas 

(Dutch equivalent of the Meuse), the 

Waal ( a downstream branch of the 

Rhine) , and the N eder Ri jn ( Lower 

Rhine). (3) Facing the left wing of the 

First U.S. Army, the Aachen Gap, 

guarded by the sentinel city of Aachen but 

affording access to an open plain leading 

all the way to the Rhine. (4) Opposite 

the right wing of the First Army, the Eifel, 

forested highlands whose division from the 

Ardennes is political rather than geographical. 

Of the four sectors, the Dutch islands 

and the Dutch littoral, for all their importance to the use of Antwerp, offered 

little toward an advance on the Ruhr. 

Despite some major obstacles, the other 

three regions had greater possibilities. 

The waterways of the Netherlands, like 

those which earlier had prompted Allied 

planners to rule out the plain of Flanders 

as a major route, might forestall a normal 

military advance; but the British already 

had proved in Flanders that in pursuit 

warfare waterways may not be a serious 

deterrent. As with Flanders, the rewards 

of success were tempting. The great 

Dutch ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam might fall, the West Wall might be 

outflanked, the Rhine left behind, and the 

British positioned for envelopment of the 

Ruhr from the north via the North German Plain. On the other hand, defense 

of the east-west waterways was facilitated 

by a shortage of major roads and railroads 

leading north and northeast. 

To the southeast, the Aachen Gap is a 

historic gateway into Germany dating 

29 

from early Christendom. It was a major 

east-west route during the height of the 

Roman Empire when the old Roman 

highway ran slightly north of Aachen 

on a line Brussels-Maastricht-Cologne. 

Birthplace and reputed burial place of the 

Emperor Charlemagne and capital of the 

Carolingian Empire, Aachen had a prewar 

population of 165,7 10. Its military value 

lies in the roads that spread out from the 

city in all directions. In 1944 the city 

had an added military significance as a key 

to the second most heavily fortified portion of the West Wall. 

The only troops in the Aachen region 

still to cross the major obstacle of the 

Meuse River were the divisions of the XIX 

Corps, which were approaching the city of 

Maastricht in the province of Limburg, 

which the Americans called "the Dutch 

Panhandle." At the border of Germany, 

the XIX Corps would have to cross a 

minor stream, the Wurm River, which 

German engineers had exploited as an 

antitank barrier for the West Wall. But 

once past the Wurm, the terrain is open 

plain studded by mining and farming 

villages and broken only by the lines of the 

Roer and Erft Rivers. Weakest of the 

First Army's three corps and the only one 

forced to undergo a handicap because of 

the gasoline drought, the XIX Corps was 

the unit most directly oriented along the 

route of the old Roman highway north of 

Aachen, the route which represents the 

most literal interpretation of the term 

Aachen Gap. 

South of the XIX Corps, the VII Corps 

was headed directly for Aachen and for a 

narrow corridor of rolling hills between 

Aachen and the northern reaches of the 

Eifel. For convenience this corridor may 

be called, after an industrial town within 

it, the Stolberg Corridor. It leads onto 
30 

the Roer plain near the town of Dueren 

(population: 45,44I), nineteen miles east 

of Aachen. The fringe of the Eifel is 

clothed in a dense jungle of pines, a major 

obstacle that could seriously canalize an 

advance along this route. Communications through the forest are virtually nonexistent. Within the forest a few miles to 

the south lie two dams of importance in 

control of the waters of the Roer River, 

the Schwammenauel and the Drft. 

Some of the hardest fighting of the 

Siegfried Line Campaign was to occur in 

the region toward which the XIX and VII 

Corps were heading. It is a fan-shaped 

sector with a radius of twenty-two miles 

based on the city of Aachen. The span is 

the contour of the Roer River, winding 

northeast, north, and northwest from 

headwaters near Monschau to a confluence with the Wurm River near Heinsberg. 

Southeast of the VII Corps zone lay the 

heartland of the Eifel, heavily forested 

terrain, sharply compartmentalized by numerous streams draining into the Moselle, 

the Meuse, and the Rhine _ and traversed 

by a limited road and rail net. This was 

the region where the first patrols had 

crossed the German border. Not including the forested fringes between Aachen 

and Monschau, the Eifel extends some 

seventy air-line miles from Monschau to 

the vicinity of Trier. It is divided into 

two sectors: the High Eifel, generally 

along the border, and the Volcanic Eifel, 

farther east where the ground begins to 

slope downward toward the Rhine. One 

of the most prominent features within the 

High Eifel is a ridge-2,286 feet high, 

running along the border a few miles east 

of St. Vith, Belgium-the Schnee Eifel. 

Entrance to the Eifel from Belgium and 

Luxembourg is blocked by the escarpment 

of the Schnee Eifel, by a continuous river 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

line formed by the Our, Sauer, and 

Moselle Rivers, and by a high, marshy,' 

windswept moor near Monschau called 

the Hohe Venn. Yet for all the difficulties of the terrain, German armies had 

turned the Eifel and the adjacent 

Ardennes to military advantage in both 

I9 I 4 and I940 and were to utilize it again 

in December I 944. 

During the late summer of I944 Allied 

vision had stretched across the obstacles of 

terrain to gaze upon the Rhine; but few 

eyes could ignore a man-made obstacle 

which denied ready access to the river. 

This was the fortified belt extending along 

the western borders of Germany from the 

vicinity of Kleve on the Dutch frontier to 

Lorrach near Basle on the Swiss border. 

Americans knew it as the Siegfried Line. 

The nation that built it called it the West 

Wall.23 

Construction of a West Wall first had 

begun in I936 after Hitler had sent German troops back into a demilitarized 

Rhineland. It was originally to have been 

a short stretch of fortifications along the 

23 The name Siegfried Line, or Siegfriedstellung, 

originated in World War I. It was a German 

code name given to a rear defensive position 

established in 19 I 6 behind the central portion of 

the western front, from the vicinity of Arras to 

a point just east of Soissons. The position 

played an important role as the front line 

fluctuated during the last two years of the war. 

The Germans fell back on this line in early spring 

of 19 I7 and from it launched their last great 

offensive in March 19 I 8. Unless otherwise 

noted, information on the West Wall is from the 

following: SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 25 

for week ending 9 Sep 44; 12th A Gp Weekly 

Intel Summaries 4 and 7 for weeks ending 26 Aug 

and 23 Sep 44, respectively; OB WEST, A Study 

in Command; German maps in OCMH; FUSA 

Rpt of Opns, pp. 51-54; VII Corps, Office of 

the Engineer, Initial Breaching of the Siegfried 

Line; Sidney Bradshaw Fay, West Wall, The 

Encyclopaedia Britannica (University of Chicago, 

1948 edition), Vol. 10, p. 243c. 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

Saar River, opposite the French Maginot 

Line. Unlike the French position, it was 

to be no thin line of gros ouvrages~ 

elaborate, self-contained forts-but a band 

of many small, mutually supporting pillboxes. 

Work on the West Wall had begun in 

earnest in May I938, after Czechoslovakia 

had taken a somewhat defiant attitude 

toward German indications of aggression. 

The task went to Dr. Fritz Todt, an able 

engineer who had supervised construction 

of the nation's superhighways, the Reichsautobahnen. By the end of September 

I938 more than 500,000 men were working on the W (lst Wall. Approximately 

a third of Germany's total annual production of cement went into the works. The 

new West Wall was to extend from a 

point north of Aachen all along the border 

south and southeast to the Rhine, thence 

along the German bank of the Rhine to 

the Swiss border. More than 3,000 concrete pillboxes, bunkers, and observation 

posts were constructed. 

As much because of propaganda as 

anything else the West Wall came to be 

considered impregnable. It contributed 

to Hitler's success in bluffing France and 

England at Munich. In I939, when 

Hitler's designs on Danzig strained German-Polish relations, Hitler ordered a film 

of the West Wall to be shown in all 

German cinemas to bolster home-front 

conviction that Germany was inviolate 

from the west. 

Although some additional work was 

done on the West Wall between I938 and 

I940' Germany's quick victory in France 

and the need to shift the defenses of the 

Third Reich to the Atlantic and the 

Channel brought construction to a virtual 

halt. Not until 20 August I944, when 

Hitler issued an eleventh-hour decree for 

31 

a levy of "people's" labor, was any new 

effort made to strengthen the line. 

When the first American patrols probed 

the border, Allied intelligence on the West 

Wall was sketchy. Most reports on it 

dated back to I940. Because four years 

of neglect had given the works a realistic 

camouflage, aerial reconnaissance failed to 

pick up many of the positions. 

The West Wall's value as a fortress 

had been vastly exaggerated by Hitler's 

propagandists, particularly as it stood in 

September I944, after four years of neglect. In I944 it was something of a 

Potemkin village. Dr. Todt and the 

German Army had never intended the line 

to halt an attack, merely to delay it until 

counterattacks by mobile reserves could 

eliminate any penetration. In early fall 

of I944 no strong reserves existed. 

In I939-40 any threatened sector of 

the line was to have been manned by an 

infantry division for every five miles of 

front. Adequate artillery had been available. Although few of the pillboxes could 

accommodate guns of larger caliber than 

the 37-mm. antitank gun, this piece was 

standard and effective against the armor 

of the period. In I944 the situation was 

different. The most glaring deficiency 

was lack of troops either to man the line 

or to counterattack effectively. Artillery 

was severely limited. Even the 75-mm. 

antitank gun, which could be mounted in 

a few of the pillboxes, was basically inadequate to cope with the new, heavier armor. 

The smaller works CQuid not accommodate the standard I942 model machine 

gun because embrasures had been constructed for the I934 model. Expecting 

to find a strong defensive position in 

being, the troops falling back on the 

West Wall from France· and Belgium saw 

only a five-year old derelict. There were 
&'-7" 

TROOP QUARTERS 

12'- 5° X 15'- ,. 

Plan view of 

typical German pillbox 

1.1" STEEL. DOOR 

Section of 

typical German pillbox 
TYPICA L PILLBOX. Above (left) exterior, showing door with firing embrasure. Interior 0/ 

firing embrasure at right. Below (left) bunk area, and (right) ventilation device. 
34 

no mines, no barbed wire, few communications lines, and few fortress weapons. 

Field fortifications had been begun only at 

the last minute by well-intentioned but 

un-co-ordinated civilians. The West Wall 

in September 1944 was formidable primarily on the basis of an old, unearned 

reputation. 

The strongest portion of the line was 

the segment constructed in 1936 along the 

Saar River between the Moselle and the 

Rhine. Lying mainly in the zone of the 

Third U.S. Army, this portion would be 

spared until December because of the 

fighting in Lorraine. The next strongest 

portion was a double band of defenses 

protecting the Aachen Gap. Here the 

First U.S. Army already had reached the 

very gates. 

The extreme northern segment of the 

West Wall-from Geilenkirchen, about 

fifteen miles north of Aachen, to Kleveconsisted only of a thin, single belt of 

scattered pillboxes backing up natural 

obstacles. South of Geilenkirchen, the 

pillboxes began to appear in a definite 

pattern of clusters on a forward line 

backed up by occasional clusters a few 

hundred yards to the rear. At a point 

about halfway between Geilenkirchen and 

Aachen, the density of the pillboxes increased markedly and the line split into 

two bands about five miles apart. 

Aachen lay between the two. Though 

two bands still were in evidence in the 

forest south and southeast of Aachen, the 

pillboxes were in less density. At a point 

near the northern end of the Schnee 

Eifel, the two bands merged, to continue 

all the way south to Trier as a single line 

with pillboxes in medium to heavy density. 

The greatest concentration in the Eifel 

was near the southern end of the Schnee 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Eifel where the terrain is relatively open. 

In many places the West Wall depended 

for passive antitank protection upon natural obstacles like rivers, lakes, railroad 

cuts and fills, sharp defiles, and forest. 

In other places, the German engineers had 

constructed chains of "dragon's teeth," 

curious objects that looked like canted 

headstones in a strange cemetery. In some 

cases the dragon's teeth were no more 

than heavy posts or steel beams embedded 

in the ground, but usually they were 

pyramid-shaped reinforced concrete projections. There were five rows of projections, poured monolithic with a concrete 

foundation and increasing in height f~om 

two and a half feet in front to almost five 

feet in rear. The concrete foundation, 

which extended two and a half feet above 

the ground on the approach side, formed 

an additional obstacle. 

Roads leading through the dragon's 

teeth were denied usually by a double set 

of obstacles, one a gate and another three 

rows of steel beams embedded diagonally 

in a concrete foundation. The gate consisted of two 12-inch H-beams welded 

together and hinged at one end to a 

reinforced concrete pillar. The beams 

could be swung into place horizontally 

and bolted to another concrete pillar on 

the opposite side of the road. The second 

obstacle consisted of three rows of 12-inch 

H-beams offset like theater seats. Embedded in the concrete foundation at an 

angle of about 45 degrees, the beams were 

attached at their base by a flange connection which hooked over an iron rod in the 

bottom of the recess. Though this and 

other obstacles conceivably could be 

removed or demolished by an attacking 

force, it presumably would prove difficult 

under fire from nearby pillboxes. 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

Pillboxes in general were 20 to 30 feet 

in width, 40 to 50 feet in depth, and 20 to 

25 feet in height. At least half of the 

pillbox was underground. The walls and 

roofs were 3 to 8 feet thick, of concrete 

reinforced by wire mesh and small steel 

rods and at times by heavy steel beams. 

Each pillbox had living quarters for its 

normal complement, usually about seven 

men per firing embrasure. Few had more 

than two firing embrasures, one specifically sited to cover the entrance. 

Although fields of fire were limited, 

generally not exceeding an arc of 50 degrees, pillboxes were mutually supporting. 

Bunkers usually were designed to house 

local reserves and command posts and had 

no firing embrasures except small rifle 

ports to cover the entrance. Bunkers 

used as observation posts usually were 

topped by a steel cupola. 

Most pillboxes and bunkers had several 

rooms, one or more for troop quarters 

and one or more either for ammunition 

storage or for firing. All were gasproof 

and equipped with hand-operated ventilation devices. Only a few installations had 

escape hatches. Heat might come from a 

small fireplace equipped with a tin chimney, both of which might be closed off by 

a heavy steel door. Each entrance usually had a double set of case-hardened 

steel doors separated by a gasp roof vestibule. Bunks were of the type found on 

troop ships, oblong metal frames covered 

with rope netting and suspended in tiers 

from the ceiling. Sanitary facilities were 

rarely provided. Though both electric 

and telephone wires had been installed 

underground, it is doubtful that these 

were functioning well in September I944. 

Some installations were camouflaged to 

resemble houses and barns. Except in 

35 

the sparse sector north of Geilenkirchen, . 

pillbox density averaged approximately 

ten per mile. Most pillboxes were on 

forward slopes, usually 200 to 400 yards 

behind the antitank obstacles. 

Without question, these fortifications 

added to the defensive potentiality of the 

terrain along the German border; but 

their disrepair and the caliber of the defending troops had vitiated much of the 

line's formidability. It could in no sense 

be considered impregnable. Nevertheless, 

as American troops were to discover, steel 

and concrete can lend backbone to a 

defense, even if the fortifications are outmoded and even if the defenders are old 

men and cripples. 

The climate in the region of the West 

Wall is characterized during autumn and 

winter by long periods of light rain and 

snow. Although less rain falls then than 

during summer, there are more days of 

precipitation likely to curtail air activity 

and maintain saturation of the fine textured soils found in the region. Even in 

winter temperatures are usually above 

freezing except during seven to eight days 

a month when snow covers the ground. 24 

These were the climatic conditions 

which Allied planners might expect. In 

reality, the fall and winter of I944 were to 

produce weather of near record severity. 

Rainfall was to be far above average, and 

snow and freezing temperatures were to 

come early and stay for long periods. It 

wasn't very good weather for fighting a 

motorized, mechanized war or, as cold, 

rain-soaked infantrymen would attest, for 

fighting a foxhole war. 

24 More on climate may be found in: The 

Climate of the Rhine Valley, Germany, XIX 

Corps AAR Oct 44; The Climate of Central and 

Western Germany, Annex I to FUSA G-2 Per 

Rpt 92, JO Sep, FUSA G-2 file, Sep 44. 
36 

A Pause at the Border 

On I I September the seemingly vagrant 

path which the Allied armies had followed 

through North Africa, Sicily, Italy, 

France, and Belgium at last was heading 

for its destination. The First Army was 

preparing to invade Germany. 

The First Army's greatest concentration 

lay well to the north of the center of the 

army zone near Liege. Here General Collins had kept the three divisions of his 

VII Corps close to his left boundary in a 

relatively compact formation covering 

about fifteen miles. The 1st Division was 

astride the main Liege-Aachen highway 

less than ten miles from Aachen. (Map 

//1) The 3d Armored Division had captured the city of Eupen in the borderland 

ceded to Belgium after World War I. 

The 9th Division was moving into assembly areas near Verviers, a textile and 

communications center about halfway 

between Liege and the German frontier. 

The 4th Cavalry Group, perhaps spurred 

by the nature of its objective, had occupied the beer-producing town of Malmedy. 

The cavalry was responsible for screening 

a twenty-five mile gap extending southward to the boundary with the V Corps. 

General Gerow had tried to keep the 

main force of his V Corps near his 

northern boundary in order to be as close 

as possible to the main concentration of 

the VII Corps. The 4th Division was in 

assembly areas near St. Vith, about six 

miles from the German border. (Map 

//) The 28th Division was assembling in 

the northern tip of Luxembourg, its easternmost disposition not over four miles 

from Germany. To cover a front of 

approximately thirty miles from the 

infantry divisions south to the boundary 

with the Third Army, the 5th Armored 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Division was assembling on three sides of 

the city of Luxembourg. 

On the First Army's north wing, 

General Corlett's XIX Corps still had 

some twenty to thirty miles to go before 

reaching the German border. The XIX 

Corps still had to cross the Meuse River 

and clear the Dutch Panhandle around 

Maastricht. The 2d Armored Division 

was on the left, near the boundary with 

the 2 I Army Group; the 30th Division 

and the I 13th Cavalry Group were on 

the right. (See Map 1, below.) 

Though the general location of the 

First Army was the result of the high-level 

decisions of 23 August, the specific orientation of the three corps had emerged 

from a meeting between General Eisenhower and his top commanders on 2 

September at Chartres. Indeed, it was 

the tentative directive emerging from this 

meeting, plus amplifications on 4 and 14 

September, that was to govern First Army 

operations through the remainder of the 

month and into October.25 

Meeting at Chartres with Bradley, 

Hodges, and Patton, Eisenhower had directed that two corps of the First Army 

drive northeast alongside the British to 

help secure the Ruhr industrial area. 

The remaining corps was to be prepared 

to accept a handicap while accumulating 

enough gasoline and other supplies to 

permit a drive eastward in conjunction 

with the Third Army. It was at this 

meeting that General Eisenhower granted 

approval for the Third Army to resume its 

attack. 

25 Memo for Record, 2 Sep 44, Notes on 

Meeting of Supreme Commander and Commanders; FWD 13765,.4 Sep 44, and FWD 

14764, 14 Sep 44, Eisenhower to Comdrs, all in 

12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, I. 
THE FIRST U.S. ARMY 

As finally determined by General Bradley, the First Army was to get over the 

Rhine at Koblenz, Bonn, and Cologne, 

while the Third Army was to cross at 

Mainz and Mannheim. 26 Within the 

First Army, the V Corps was to drive 

toward Koblenz, the VII Corps toward 

Bonn, and the XIX Corps toward Cologne. 

General Hodges, in turn, had ordered 

what might appear at first glance to have 

been a contradiction of General Eisenhower's assignment of priority to the two 

corps alongside the British. Instead of 

the V Corps on the right wing, the corps 

which he had halted for want of gasoline 

was the XIX Corps on the left wing, 

closest to the British. In reality, General 

Hodges had made the alteration in order 

to utilize the modicum of gasoline available at the moment to close a yawning gap 

that had developed between the First and 

Third Armies and to get at least two corps 

across the Meuse River, the only logical 

defensive line to be crossed in this sector 

short of the West Wall. He apparently 

had chosen the V and VII Corps because 

they had been closest to the Meuse. 27 

General Hodges' reaction later in the 

month after the V Corps had entered the 

West Wall would demonstrate his basic 

obedience to the assignment of priority.28 

Having crossed the Meuse, General 

Hodges on I I September faced the second 

big step in the drive to the Rhine. Before 

him lay the prospect of two of his corps 

assaulting the vaunted West Wall. Gasoline suddenly dropped from the highest 

position of priority in the supply picture 

26 12th A Gp Ltrs of Instrs 8, 10 Sep 44, 12th 

A Gp Rpt of Opns, V, 91-92. 

27 This is the author's analysis of material 

found in FUSA AAR, Sep 44. See also Interv 

with Gen Bradley, 7 Jun 56. 

28 See below, Ch. III. 

37 

in favor of ammunition. Facing a heavily 

fortified line, General Hodges could not 

ignore the possibility that a period of 

intense fighting might ensue. Though 

the First Army had received a thousand 

tons of ammunition on I I September, 

time would be required to move it forward 

from the railhead. Not until 15 September, the logistics experts estimated, would 

sufficient stocks of ammunition be available for five days of intensive fighting.29 

Loath to upset the impetus of his 

victorious troops, General Hodges nevertheless deemed it imperative to order a 

pause of at least two days. He attempted 

to bridge the period by directing extensive 

reconnaissance and development of enemy 

strength and dispositions. Both the V 

and VII Corps then were to launch 

co-ordinated attacks not earlier than the 

morning of 14 September. 

The VII Corps commander, General 

Collins, chafed under even this much 

delay. In the afternoon of 1 I September, 

General Collins asked permission to make 

a reconnaissance in force the next day to 

advance as far as possible through the 

border defenses. If progress proved 

"easy," he wanted to make a limited 

penetration beyond the West Wall before 

pausing for supplies. 

General Hodges was torn by a dilemma 

of time versus power. A hastily mounted 

attack might quickly bog down, yet every 

day of delay would aid the enemy's efforts 

to man the West Wall. Making his decision on the side of speed, General 

Hodges approved Collins' request. He 

also authorized General Gerow to make a 

similar reconnaissance in force with the V 

Corps. Should the maneuvers encounter 

solid opposition and fail to achieve quick 

29 Sylvan Diary, entry of 10 Sep 44. 
38 

penetrations, General Hodges directed, 

the corps were to hold in place to await 

supplies before launching major attacks. 30 

General Hodges obviously based these 

eleventh-hour authorizations on a hope 

that resistance still would be disorganized 

and spotty. The assault formation alone 

would indicate that pursuit still was the 

order of. the day. Here were two corps, 

widely separated and without support on 

either flank. To the south, the closest 

concentration of the Third Army was 

more than eighty miles away from the 

main concentration of the V Corps. To 

the northeast, the First Army's XIX Corps 

had gained sufficient gasoline on I I September to resume the northeastward drive, 

but it would be several days before the 

XIX Corps would be in a pOSItion to 

protect the exposed left flank of the VII 

Corps. 

The first thrust toward the West Wall 

and the Rhine thus devolved upon the V 

and VII Corps, both widely extended, 

virtually devoid of hope for early reinforcement, and dangerously short of supplies. 

Still there was reason to believe that the 

reconnaissance in force might succeed. 

:.0 See Ltr, Hodges to Gerow, I I Sep 44, V 

Corps G-3 file, I I Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Though resistance against both corps had 

been stiffening perceptibly as the troops 

neared the border, it was not strong. 

enough to disperse the heady optimism of 

the period. Hardly anyone believed that 

the West Wall would be surrendered 

without a fight, yet the troops available to 

defend it probably would be too few and 

too disorganized to make much of a stand. 

The V Corps estimated that on its immediate front the enemy had only 6,000 

troops. Not a single German unit of 

divisional size, the V Corps G-2 noted, 

had been encountered for at least a week. 

The VII Corps expected to encounter 

only about 7,700 Germans.31 

The over-all First Army view was that 

the Germans would defend the West Wall 

"for reasons of prestige," but that they 

hardly could hope to hold for long. Even 

the increased resistance becoming manifest 

at the moment in Lorraine and the Netherlands, the First Army took to be a good 

omen. Since the enemy had concentrated 

elsewhere, he had nothing left for defending either the Eifel region or the Aachen 

Gap.32 

31 V Corps G-2 Estimate I I, IO Sep 44; Order 

of Battle, Incl 2 to VII Corps G-2 Per Rpt 97. 

32 FUSA G-2 Estimate 26, I I Sep 44. 
CHAPTER III 

V Corps Hits the West Wall 

It was almost dark on I I September 

when General Gerow, the V Corps commander, received General Hodges' authorization for a reconnaissance in force to 

penetrate the West WalI.1 Thus General 

Gerow hardly could have expected to 

begin by the next morning a reconnaissance on the scale contemplated by 

General Collins and the neighboring VII 

Corps. He directed, in effect, little more 

than movement to assembly areas closer 

to the German border in preparation for 

the co-ordinated attack to be launched on 

14 September. 

Interpreting the order to mean sending 

only reinforced patrols against the West 

Wall for. the moment, the infantry division commanders obviously anticipated no 

immediate breakthrough of the fortified 

line. The corps armor, in turn, was 

merely to reconnoiter the West Wall with 

patrols and provide a demonstration by 

fire "to conceal our real intention to make 

the main effort in the north half of [the] 

Corps zone." 2 

The plan which General Gerow had in 

mind for the co-ordinated attack on 14 

September had been worked out several 

days earlier before General Hodges had 

indicated the necessity of a pause at the 

border.3 It reflected in some measure a 

1 Ltr, Hodges to Gerow, I I Sep 44, FUSA 

G-3 file, 9-23 Sep 44. 

2 Dir, Gerow to CO, 5th Armd Div, I I Sep, 

FUSA G-3 file, 9-23 Sep 44. 

3 V Corps FO 26, 9 Sep 44, V Corps G-3 

file, 9 Sep 44. 

basic incongruity in corps objective and 

mission as transmitted down the chain of 

command from the meeting of top American commanders at Chartres. In driving 

toward Koblenz, the V Corps was to attack "in conjunction with Third Army." 4 

Yet if the corps tried to stick close to the 

Third Army, this would mean attacking 

up the valley of the Moselle River, a 

narrow compartmentalized route of advance far removed from the rest of the 

First Army upon which the V Corps 

depended for supply and for assistance in 

event of trouble. 

Having attempted to resolve the conflict 

by stationing the infantry divisions near 

the northern corps boundary, General 

Gerow then had to depend upon his 

armored division to cover the great gap 

between the infantry and the Third Army. 

Thus he in effect had demoted his armor 

to the role of a cavalry group, which 

meant that the weight of the armor would 

be lost to him in at least the initial stages 

of his attack. Meeting with his three 

division commanders on 10 September, 

General Gerow revealed his desire to get 

the armor into the fight if possible. He 

directed the 5th Armored Division to 

demonstrate to its front and be prepared 

to assault the West Wall on order, all the 

while holding out one combat command 

4 Memo for Record, 2· Sep 44, Notes on 

Meeting of Supreme Commander with Subordinate Commanders. 
40 

prepared on short notice to exploit any 

breakthrough achieved by the infantry.5 

Perhaps the incongruity between corps 

objective and mission was basically insoluble. The difficulty, for example, was 

clearly reflected on I I September at First 

Army headquarters where General Gerow 

and the army commander, General 

Hodges, engaged III "an occasionally 

rather tempestuous discussion" over the V 

Corps plan. Aware of "the importance 

that General Bradley [12th Army Group 

commander] placed on the strength of the 

right flank," Hodges insisted that an infantry regimental combat team be attached to the armor on the right. General Gerow gave the role to the 28th 

Division's I 12th Infantry. Possibly also 

as a result of General Hodges' views, 

Gerow on I I September enlarged the 

armored division's assignment by ordering 

that if the armor found the West Wall in 

its zone lightly held, it was to attack to 

seize objectives in the south that would 

protect and promote the main advance in 

the north while at the same time lessening 

the gap between the First and Third 

Armies. 6 

No one had any illusions at this stage 

about the terrain over which the V Corps 

was to attack. Already familiar were the 

sharp ridges, deeply incised ravines, 

numerous streams, dense forests, and 

restricted road net of the Ardennes. Attacking through the Eifel meant more of 

the same but with the added obstacle of 

the West Wall. 

All along the V Corps front the West 

Wall was a single belt of f ortifica tions in 

5 V Corps Memo for Record, 10 Sep 44, V 

Corps G-3 file, I I Sep 44· 

6 Sylvan Diary, entry of I I Sep 44; Memo, 

Gerow to CGs, 4th and 28th Divs, I I Sep 44, 

FUSA G-3 file, 9-23 Sep 44· 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

greatest density along a possible avenue of 

approach southwest of the Schnee Eifel, 

the high wooded ridge just across the Our 

River and the German border. (See Map 

II. ) Along the Schnee Eifel itself the 

Germans had depended so much upon the 

rugged terrain that they had built fewer 

fortifications than at any point from 

Aachen south and southeast to the Rhine. 

The objectives assigned the divisions of 

the V Corps were based upon three distinct elevations lying astride the route of 

advance. The first was the Schnee Eifel, 

extending unbroken for about fifteen 

miles from Ormont to the vicinity of the 

village of Brandscheid where it develops 

into a high, relatively open plateau. The 

4th Division was to seize the crest of the 

Schnee Eifel to facilitate advance of the 

28th Division across the plateau. Farther 

south the plateau is blocked by dense 

woods and sharp, clifflike slopes to a point 

between Vianden and Echternach. Here 

exists a suggestion of a corridor through 

which the 5th Armored Division was to 

advance upon order to take high ground 

about the village of Mettendorf. 

The second elevation, taking the form 

of a high north-south plateau, lies beyond 

the Pruem River. At the western edge 

of the plateau lie the towns of Pruem and 

Bitburg. Though these towns have a 

population of only a few thousand, they 

are among the largest in the Eifel and are 

important communications centers. The 

infantry in the north was to take Pruem; 

the armor in the south, to secure Bitburg. 

Beyond the second elevation lies the 

little Kyll River, barring access to a third, 

high mountainlike plateau which slopes, 

grooved and broken, to the Rhine. 

Across this plateau the divisions were to 

make the final· advance on Koblenz, some 

fifty miles inside the German border. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

Located opposite the Schnee Eifel near 

St. Vith, the 4th Division was about four 

miles south of the boundary with the VII 

Corps but some twenty miles from the 

main concentration of the VII Corps. 

To cover the gap, the I02d Cavalry Group 

was to screen and maintain contact with 

cavalry of the VII Corps and was to be 

prepared to advance eastward along the 

upper reaches of the Kyll through what is 

known as the Losheim Gap. 

The location of the 28th Division 

(minus one regimental combat team) near 

the right flank of the 4th Division served 

to effect a concentration of five regiments 

on a frontage of approximately fourteen 

miles. South of this limited concentration, the 5th Armored Division and the 

28th Division's 112th Infantry were to 

cover the rest of the corps front of about 

thirty miles. 

As General Gerow was a ware, he had 

achieved, for all his efforts, no genuine 

concentration for the attack. Yet the 

very fact that the corps had been assigned 

a rugged route of advance like the Eifel 

meant that American commanders still 

were thinking in terms of pursuit warfare. 

If pursuit remained the order of the day, 

the spread formation was acceptable, even 

in front of a fortified line like the West 

Wall. 

Available intelligence gave no reason 

for concern. The V Corps G-2, Col. 

Thomas J. Ford, predicted that the corps 

would meet only battered remnants of the 

three divisions which had fled before the 

corps across Belgium and Luxembourg. 

These were the 5th Parachute, Panzer 

Lehr, and 2d Panzer Divisions. It was 

possible, Colonel Ford added, that the 

corps might meet parts of the 2d SS 

Panzer Division, known to have been 

operating along the corps north boundary. 

41 

GENERAL GEROW 

"There seems no doubt," Colonel Ford 

concluded, "that the enemy will defend 

[the Siegfried Line] with all of the forces 

that he can gather." But, he intimated, 

what he could gather was open to question. 7 

T he Race tor the West Wall 

The true German situation in the Eifel 

was fully as dismal as the V Corps G-2 

pictured it. The corps which controlled 

the sector roughly coterminous to that of 

the V Corps was the I SS Panzer Corps 

under General der Waffen-SS Georg 

Keppler. Of four divisions nominally 

under General Keppler's command, two 

had been so depleted that Keppler had 

merged them with another, the 2d SS 

Panzer Division. This "division was to 

7 V Corps G-2 Estimate I I, 10 Sep 44. 
42 

defend the Schnee Eifel. The remaining 

division, the 2d Panzer, was to Wiard the 

West Wall south of the Schne,i Eifel. 

Between them the 2d Panzer and 2d SS 

Panzer Divisions could muster no more 

than 3 nominal panzer grenadier regiments, none with greater strength than a 

reinforced battalion; 2 engineer battalions; 2 signal battalions; I7 assault guns; 

26 105-mm. and 3 150-mm. howitzers; 

plus no more than 6 tanks, 3 in each 

division. Tp this force might be added 

the nondescript garrison troops actually in 

position in the West Wall in this sector, 

but these were so few that they could have 

manned no more than every fifth position. 8 

General Keppler's I SS Panzer Corps 

formed the southern (left) wing of the 

Seventh Army, commanded by General 

der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger. 

The Seventh Army in turn formed the left 

wing of Field Marshal Model's Army 

Group B. The corps, army, and army 

group boundaries ran through the southern part of the V Corps zone along a line 

Diekirch-Bitburg. Below this line was 

the LXXX Corps, which was the northern 

(right) wing of the First Army (General 

der Panzertruppen Otto von Knobelsdorff) in Lorraine, which was in turn the 

right wing of Army Group G. 

Because the German unit boundaries 

did not correspond to the one between the 

First and Third U.S. Annies, the V Corps 

attack was to strike the inner wings of 

both German army groups. Thus, northernmost contingents of the LXXX Corps 

also would be involved. Commanded by 

8 MS # C-048 (Kraemer). Generalmajor der 

Waffen-SS Fritz Kraemer was chief of staff of 

the I SS Panzer Corps. Greater detail and 

fuller documentation on the German side may be 

found in Lucian Heichler, The Germans Facing 

V Corps, MS prepared to complement this 

study, OCMH. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

General der Infanterie Dr. Franz Beyer, 

the LXXX Corps had only one unit in 

this' sector bearing a division label. This 

was the 5th Parachute Division, which, 

like some of General Keppler's units, had 

little left except a name. To a nucleus of 

the division headquarters and a company 

of the reconnaissance battalion, General 

Beyer had attached a security regiment, a 

motorized infantry regiment, and a few 

miscellaneous units of company size. The 

division had neither armor nor artillery. 

Although the LXXX Corps controlled 

a Kampfgruppe of the once-proud Panzer 

Lehr Division, the Kampfgruppe was a 

far cry from a division. It consisted only 

of a panzer grenadier battalion of 

company strength, an engineer company, 

six 105-mm. howitzers, five tanks, a 

reconnaissance platoon, and an Alarmbataillon (emergency alert battalion) of 

about 200 men recruited from stragglers 

and soldiers on furlough in Trier. Although the corps was destined on 14 

September to receive a regiment and a 

light battery of a division newly committed in Lorraine, the addition hardly 

would make up for the over-all deficiencies 

,in the command. The First Army put 

the matter succinctly in a report on 13 

September: "At the present time, LXXX 

Corps cannot hold a defense line with 

these forces . . . ." 9 

9 Order, A Gp B to Armies, 10 Sep 44, A Gp 

B KTB Anlagen, 0 perationsbefehle, I.IX.-30.IX. 

44 (hereafter cited as A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle); Entries of 10 and 13 Sep 44, A Gp G 

KTB 2, I.VII.-30.IX.44 (hereafter cited as A 

Gp G KTB (Text)); MSS # B-081 (Beyer) and 

# B-214 (Col Willy Mantey, CofS First Army); 

Gen. St. d. H. sit maps, Lage Frankreich, 10-14 

Sep 44; Rpt, A Gp G to OB WEST, 13 Sep 44, 

A Gp G KTB 2, Anlagen, r.IX.-30.IX.44 

(hereafter cited as A· Gp G KTB, Anlagen). 

Quotation is from entry of 13 Sep 44, A Gp G 

KTB (Text). 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

In the feeble hands of units like these 

had rested German hopes of holding the 

Allies beyond the West Wall long enough 

for the fortifications to be put into shape. 

As the Commander in Chief West had 

recognized, this was a big assignment. 

As late as IO September Field Marshal 

von Rundstedt had warned that he 

needed another five to six weeks to restore 

the West Wall. That very day he had 

been so perturbed by a gap which had 

developed between the First and Seventh 

Armies that he had authorized General 

Beyer's LXXX Corps to leave only rear 

guards behind in Luxembourg and to fall 

back on the West Wall. This move 

obviously foreshadowed a quick end to 

any hope that Keppler's I SS Panzer 

Corps might continue to hold beyond the 

West Wall; for it had left General Keppler without even a guise of a southern 

neighbor. 10 

On I I September. Army Group B 

summed up the gloomy story in a few 

words: "Continued reduction in combat 

strength and lack of ammunition have the 

direst effects on the course of defense 

action." That was understatement. On 

I I September, for example, the 2d SS 

Panzer Division possessed no ammunition 

for either its 75-mm. antitank guns, its 

2 Io-mm. mortars, or its light and medium 

howitzers. That evening General Keppler told the 2d Panzer Division to fall 

back on the West Wall and the next day 

repeated the order to the 2d SS Panzer 

Division.ll 

10 Entries of 10 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB, 

I.IX.-3o.IX.44 (hereafter cited as OB WEST 

KTB (Text)), and A ep e KTB (Text). 

11 Quotation from Evng Sitrep, II Sep 44, A 

ep B, Ia Letzte Meldung, IO,VIII-30.IX.44 (hereafter cited as A ep B KTB, Letzte Meldung); 

Rpt by Model (CG A ep B) II Sep 44, A ep B 

KTB, Operationsbefehle; MSS # B-730 (Brandenberger) and #B-623 (Keppler). 

43 

The fear behind these withdrawals was 

that American columns might exploit one 

of the yawning gaps in the line to spurt 

forward and gain a hold on an undefended West Wall while German units 

dangled impotently farther west. Reports 

reaching Seventh Army headquarters the 

night of I I September to the effect that 

the 2d Panzer Division had found the 

Americans already in possession of a number of West Wall bunkers for a while 

confirmed the Germans' worst apprehensions. German commanders breathed 

only slightly more easily when a new 

report the next day revealed the penetration to be the work of reconnaissance 

patrols. 12 

On I4 September, the day the V corps 

was to attack, the I SS Panzer Corps 

officially halted its retreat and began to 

occupy the West Wall along a forty-mile 

front stretching from the northern extremity of the Schnee Eifel to the vicinity 

of the little river village of Wallendorf, a 

few miles southeast of Vianden. General 

Keppler split the front between his two 

divisions, the 2d Panzer and the 2d SS 

PanzerY Already the LXXX Corps had 

begun to occupy the bunkers farther south. 

The race for the W esL,W all was over. 

Technically, the Germans had won it; but 

so soon were the Americans upon them 

that the end results looked much like a 

dead heat. 

Into Germany 

As the divisions of the V Corps began 

moving toward the German border early 

on I2 September, it Was obvious that 

12 MS # B-730 (Brandenberger). 

13 Sitrep, 13 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Anlage, 

Tagesmeldungen, 6. VI.-I 5.X.44 (hereafter cited 

as A ep B KTB, Tagesmeldungen). 
44 

General Gerow's plan of piercing the West 

Wall on a broad front with limited means 

could work as a genuine corps maneuver 

only if attended by considerable success. 

Because the vanous divisional attacks 

were to occur at relatively isolated points, 

only a{ter attainment of unequivocal 

breakthrough could the divisions unite in 

concerted, mutually supporting maneuver. 

The V Corps attack thus began as three 

separate operations: the 4th Division on 

the Schnee Eifel, the 28th Division on the 

plateau southwest of the Schnee Eifel, 

and the 5th Armored Division far to the 

south. 

The first of the three divisions to come 

full against the West Wall was the 28th 

in the center, both because the fortifications in the 28th Division's sector extended 

farther to the west and because the division commander gave a relatively broad 

interpretation to the authorization to make 

a reconnaissance in force. 14 

Even before receiving the authorization, 

the division commander, Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cota, Hi had issued a field order 

directing, in essence, a minor reconnaissance in {orce. His two regiments ( the 

14 The 28th Division had received its baptism 

of fire with the XIX Corps in the closing days of 

the Normandy hedgerow battles and had joined 

the V Corps on 28 August. By staging a liberation parade up the Champs Elysees on the way 

to the front, the division got its picture on a U.S. 

postage stamp. A nickname, The Bloody Bucket, 

probably was derived from a red keystone 

shoulder patch denoting the division's Pennsylvania National Guard origin. The division's 

story is based upon official records and combat 

interviews. The interview file contains a particularly valuable and detailed narrative on the 1 10th 

Infantry action, entitled Into Germany, by Capt. 

John S. Howe. 

15 Promoted to major general, 26 September 

1944. General Cota assumed command on 14 

August, after relief of one commander and the 

battle death one day later of his successor. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

third was attached to the 5th Armored 

Division) were to "attack" during daylight 

by sending strong patrols to feel the way 

and by closing up before dark to hold 

gains made by the patrols. In deference 

to the twelve- to fifteen-mile width of the 

division zone and to the unknown caliber 

of the enemy, neither regiment was to 

commit to action more than one reinforced battalion. 16 

The first objective was the crest of the 

high plateau a few miles beyond the German border in the vicinity of the West 

Wall village of Uettfeld. The route of 

approach was the closest thing to a 

natural corridor leading into Germany in 

this sector, even though it consisted of 

steep, broken terrain served by a limited 

road net. Though the pillboxes here were 

in but one band, they were dense and 

fronted by an almost continuous line of 

dragon's teeth antitank obstacles. 

On the right wing, the Iogth Infantry 

(Col. William L. Blanton) moved toward 

the village of Roscheid, which rested in 

a bend in the West Wall. Through Roscheid the regiment was to converge with 

the I loth Infantry ( Col. Theodore A. 

Seely) on high ground around Uettfeld. 

By nightfall of 12 September a battalion 

had crossed a bridge over the Our River 

secured earlier by a patrol and had advanced unopposed through outpost pillboxes to the village of Sevenig, separated 

from Roscheid by the muddy course of the 

little Irsen creek. 

To the north, the I loth Infantry also 

sent a battalion across the border to take 

up positions for the night west of Grosskampenberg, a village about 600 yards 

short of the dragon's teeth on a road 

16 28th Div FO 17; II SelJ 44, 28th Div G-3 

file 1 1 Sep 44. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

leading through Kesfeld to Uettfeld. The 

objective of Uettfeld lay about two miles 

beyond the dragon's teeth. 

It was the report of the 2d Panzer 

Division's encounter with 28th Division 

reconnaissance patrols which disturbed the 

febrile Seventh Army headquarters into 

belief that the Americans had won the 

race for the West Wall. Even the clarification of the matter later on 12 September 

could have afforded little relief to the 

panzer division commander, General der 

Panzertruppen Heinrich Freiherr von 

Luettwitz. Although the line remained 

inviolate, the Americans had camped on 

the threshhold. Luettwitz' hope of stopping a thrust the next day, 13 September, 

rested mainly with three tanks and eight 

assault guns. 17 

General von Luettwitz might have 

breathed more easily had he known the 

true situation in the American camp. 

Moving directly from the scramble of 

pursuit warfare, the 28th Division was 

not ready for an attack on a fortified line. 

Neither of the two regiments had received 

special equipment needed in pillbox 

assault, such as flame throwers and 

explosive charges. Attached tank and 

self-propelled tank destroyer units still 

were repairing their pursuit-damaged vehicles and had yet to come forward. 

The infantry would face the West Wall 

with direct fire support only from organic 57-mm. antitank guns and a few 

platoons of towed tank destroyers, both 

highly vulnerable to return fire. Few 

units of the division had more than a basic 

load of ammunition, enough perhaps for a 

meeting engagement but not for sustained fighting. So concerned about the 

17 MSS # B-730 (Brandenberger) and B-623 

(Keppler). 

45 

ammunition shortage was the division commander, General Cota, that he forbade 

unobserved artillery fires except previously registered concentrations and others 

specifically approved by his headquarters. 

In addition, both regiments of the 28th 

Division would be restricted for still 

another day to committing but one battalion to action. 

F or all these problems, a battalion each 

of the Iogth and I loth Infantry Regiments attacked the West Wall early on 13 

September. Trying to cross the Irsen 

creek to gain a foothold among the 

pillboxes on high ground west of Roscheid, 

a battalion of the Iogth Infantry failed 

even to reach the creek. Rifle and automatic weapons fire from the pillboxes 

brought the attackers up sharply more 

than 700 yards away from the West Wall. 

A battalion of the I loth Infantry met a 

similar fate halfway between Grosskampenberg and the line of dragon's teeth. 

Pinned to the ground by small arms fire 

from the pillboxes, the men were ready 

prey for German mortar and artillery fire. 

Though both attacking battalions tried to 

use towed antitank guns for direct fire 

support, enemy gunners endowed with 

superior observation made sudden death of 

the efforts. Indirect artillery fire did little 

damage to the pillboxes other than to "dust 

off the camouflage." 18 

When the next day, 14 September, 

brought removal of the restriction on committing more than one battalion, both 

regiments attacked frontally with one 

battalion while sending another around to 

a flank. Along with a company of tanks, 

the Iogth Infantry was plagued all day by 

antitank fire and mines and by a natural 

tank trap in the muddy Irsen creek bot18 Howe, Into Germany. 
46 

tom land. At heavy cost the regiment 

finally seized a strip of forward pillboxes 

more than a mile wide but fell short of 

taking Roscheid. 

Two miles to the north, the 1 loth Infantry renewed the attack toward Kesfeld 

while sending a battalion around to the 

north through the village of Heckhuscheid 

to move .southeast on Hill 553, a West 

Wall strongpoint along the HeckhuscheidUettfeld highway. Once again the regiment found that without direct fire 

support the infantry could make no headway against the pillboxes. The battalion 

southeast of Heckhuscheid found the way 

barred by dragon's teeth and a roadblock 

at the base of Hill 553 and could get no 

farther. Though the battalion near Kesfeld had tried during the night to bring 

up explosives to blast a path through the 

dragon's teeth for tanks, the explosives 

had blown up unexplainably and killed 

the men who were carrying them. Arriving in midmorning, the tanks could provide little assistance because they could 

not get past the dragon's teeth and 

because poor visibility restricted fire 

against distant targets. Advance might 

have been stymied indefinitely had not 2d 

Lt. Joseph H. Dew maneuvered his tank 

to within a few feet of the dra,gon's teeth 

and methodically blasted a path with his 

75-mm. gun. 19 Accompanied by the 

tanks, the infantry managed to seize a tiny 

foothold within the forward band of pillboxes, but at severe cost in casualties; 

From prisoners, both regiments learned 

something of the desperation with which 

the Germans had tried to man the West 

Wall. Many pillboxes, prisoners revealed, 

still were unmanned, and others contained 

19 Lieutenant Dew was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

only two or three men armed with rifles 

and an occasional machine gun or panzerfaust. Gathered from almost every conceivable source, many of the men had 

arrived in the line only the night before. 

Complaining bitterly about having to 

fight, a forty-year-old cook said he was 

captured little more than two hours after 

reaching the front. 

These revelations must have galled 

those American troops who had fought so 

hard to effect even these two small punctures in the German line. Maj. James C. 

Ford, the 1 loth Infantry S-3, spoke for 

them when he said: "It doesn't much 

matter what training a man may have 

when he is placed inside such protection 

as was afforded by the pillboxes. Even if 

he merely stuck his weapons through the 

aperture and fired occasionally, it kept our 

men from moving ahead freely." 20 

Though the 28th Division's gains were 

meager, they looked different when viewed 

against the backdrop of the situation along 

the entire corps front. Seeing the first 

punctures of the line as the hardest, the V 

Corps commander, General Gerow, ordered the 5th Armored Division to send an 

officer that night to advise the 28th Division on use of armor in event of a breakthrough the next day. The 5th Armored 

Division's Combat Command B, located 

northwest of Diekirch, was ready to move 

through if the infantry forged a gap. 

When the next day came, General 

Gerow saw his hopes quickly dashed. 

Even before the 10gth Infantry could get 

an attack going on 15 September, a small 

counterattack forced two platoons to relinquish some ground. For the next two 

da ys the 10gth Infantry was to fight in 

20 Howe, Into Germany: 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

vain to get past Roscheid and secure a 

hill that provided damaging observation 

off the regiment's right flank. In the 

process, the enemy's 2d Panzer Division 

gradually chewed the regiment to pieces. 

Battered by German shelling, the American riflemen could not be trusted to hold 

the positions already gained. In at least 

two instances they fell back in panic before limited objective counterattacks. So 

poor was the showing that General Cota 

subsequently relieved the regimental commander. 

Through most of 15 September the 

situation in the I loth Infantry's sector 

appeared equally discouraging. The 1st 

Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Floid 

A. Davison, was to try again to take Hill 

553; but the late arrival of tanks and of 

engineers equipped with explosives to blow 

the troublesome roadblock precluded early 

success. Not until 1700 did the engineers arrive. The plan at this point was 

for the engineers to advance to the roadblock under cover of fire from the tanks 

and a platoon of towed tank destroyers. 

Blowing of the roadblock was to signal 

the start of an attack by infantry and tanks. 

Ten unarmed engineers, each carrying a 

50-pound load of TNT, began to creep 

slowly, carefully toward the roadblock. 

Though the day was foggy, the engineers 

felt naked. As they inched forward, tension mounted, passing almost electrically 

to the waiting infantrymen and tankers. 

Reaching the objective at last, the engineers found that the roadblock consisted 

of six steel I-beams emplaced in concrete 

caissons on either side of the road. Large 

portable iron tetrahedrons reinforced the 

whole. Working swiftly, they placed 

their charges. 

Shortly after 1830, an hour and a half 

47 

after start of the tedious journey, the 

engineers completed their work. Activating the eharges, they jumped to their feet. 

In the words of their lieutenant, they 

"went like hell to the rear." The roadblock disintegrated with a roar. 

Acting on cue, the tanks fired pointblank at the pillboxes. The infantry went 

forward on the run. In about forty-five 

minutes the battalion had stormed the 

objective, Hill 553. It yielded seventeen 

pillboxes and fifty-eight prisoners. After 

almost three days of mounting casualties 

and frustrations, the I loth Infantry in a 

quick, co-ordinated assault at last had 

gained a significant objective within the 

West Wall. 

The regimental commander, Colonel 

Seely, planned for his two committed battalions to converge the next day upon 

the regimental objective of Kemper Steimerich Hill (Hill 560), key to the commanding ground around Uettfeld. In 

order to better the jump-off position and 

to narrow a gap between the two bat~ 

talions, the fatigued battalion west of 

Kesfeld sent a company in late afternoon 

to clear a nest of pillboxes in the direction 

of Hill 553. As darkness came, Company 

F under Capt. Robert H. Schultz completed the mission. Sending back more 

than fifty prisoners, the men began to 

settle down for the night in and about 

the pillboxes they had captured. 

The first sign of an impending counterattack came about half an hour after 

midnight. The men could hear tracked 

vehicles moving through the darkness 

toward Company F'E, positions. On 

guard at the time at a pillbox occupied by 

the company's rear command group, Pvt. 

Roy O. Fleming said later, "Suddenly 

everything became quiet. I could hear 
48 

the clank of these vehicles .... I saw 

the flame thrower start and heard the 

sounds of a helluva scrap up around 

Captain Schultz's position _ .... " 21 

A few minutes after the firing began, 

another company intercepted a frantic 

radio message: "KING SUGAR to anybody. KING SUGAR to anybody. 

Help. We are having a counterattacktanks, infantry, flame throwers." 

What could anybody do to help? By 

the time the messages could be exchanged 

and artillery brought to bear, the action 

had subsided. Company F's radio apparently was defective, capable of sending 

but not of receiving. The situation thus 

was so obscure that Colonel Seely dared 

not risk immediate commitment of his 

reserve. 

What happened remained a mystery difficult to piece together from the fragments 

of information provided by the few men 

who escaped. The Germans apparently 

had attacked with about seventy to eighty 

men reinforced by two flame-throwing vehicles. A prisoner captured some days 

later said the vehicles were improvised 

flame throwers constructed from Schuetzenpanzerwagen (armored half-tracks). As 

late as two days after the event, Company 

F could muster no more than forty-four 

men, including cooks and supply personnel. 

The news of Company F's disaster 

dealt a heavy blow to the optimism engendered by the success of the preceding 

afternoon. Only a few hours before the 

Germans hit Company F, General Cota 

had expressed "high hopes" about the 

division's prospects.22 He could have 

been thinking only of the I loth Infantry, 

21 Ibid. 

22 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 15 Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

which now would have to use its reserve 

battalion to retake the pillboxes Company 

F had lost. 

Delayed again by the late arrival of 

supporting tanks and unassisted by the 

rest of the regiment, Colonel Davison's 1st 

Battalion nevertheless attacked again in 

midmorning of 16 September. Assisted 

by effective counterbattery artillery fires, 

the battalion quickly seized Losenseifen 

Hill (Hill 568), adjacent to Hill 553 and 

one of the highest points in the 28th 

Division's sector. Leaving a company to 

hold the hill, the 1st Battalion continued 

to attack and stopped for the night only 

after capturing Spielmannsholz Hill (Hill 

559), less than a thousand yards short of 

the regimental objective overlooking Uettfeld. 

In a day of rapid, determined advance, 

Colonel Davison's men had progressed a 

mile and a half past the dragon's teeth and 

had captured some of the most commanding ground for miles around. Beyond 

them lay only scattered West Wall fortifications. Though the penetration was 

narrow and pencillike, the 28th Division 

had for all practical purposes broken 

through the West Wall. 

It was ironic that even as Colonel Davison's men were achieving this feat, General 

Gerow was visiting the division command 

post with orders to call off the offensive. 

Having incurred almost 1,500 casualties, 

the two regiments of the 28th Division 

were in no condition to expand or exploit 

the I 10th Infantry's narrow penetration.23 

Neither was the situation elsewhere in the 

V Corps encouraging enough to justify 

23 Though the casualty figures are for the 

entire month of September, the only heavy fighting occurred during these five days. See 28th 

Div AAR, Sep 44. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

bringing troops from some other part of 

the front. 

During the next few days, the 109th 

and I loth Infantry Regiments jockeyed 

for position, while the Germans registered 

their protest with small counterattacks 

and continued shelling.24 The attempt to 

get across the high plateau into the rugged 

Eifel was over. 

Battle of the Schnee Eifel 

A few miles to the north, the 4th Division in the meantime had been more 

conservative in interpreting the authority 

to reconnoiter in force but had experienced more encouraging initial success. 

The action took place on the imposing 

ridge line east of St. Vith, the Schnee Eifel. 

Preceded by combat patrols, the 4th 

Division had resumed eastward march on 

12 September. By nightfall the next day 

two regiments had crossed the border and 

moved into assembly areas in the shadow 

of the Schnee Eifel. On the north wing, 

the 12th Infantry (Col. James S. Luckett) 

assembled at the village of Radscheid; the 

22d Infantry (Col. Charles T. Lanham) 

nearby at Bleialf. Impressed by a lack of 

opposition, the division commander, Maj. 

Gen. Raymond O. Barton, ordered both 

regiments to push reconnaissance patrols 

forward; but he reserved any real attempt 

to move into the West Wall for the next 

day, 14 September, the day General 

24 During one counterattack, a squad leader in 

Company K, I09th Infantry, T. Sgt. Francis J. 

Clark, assumed command of two leaderless 

platoons. Moving among the men without regard for enemy fire, he encouraged them to 

hold. Later, though wounded, he refused evacuation. These were but two of a series of heroic 

actions over the period 12-I7 September for 

which Sergeant Clark received the Medal of 

Honor. 

49 

Gerow had designated for the V Corps 

attack.25 

Patrols probing the woods line of the 

Pruem State Forest, which crowns the 

Schnee Eifel, learned little except that 

some Germans-number and capabilities 

undetermined-were in the pillboxes. 

This information did nothing to alter General Barton's anticipation that only a crust 

of resistance stood between the 4th Division and a breakthrough operation.26 

General Barton ordered the 12th and 

22d Infantry Regiments to attack abreast 

at 1000 on 14 September to seize an 

ambitious objective, commanding ground 

on the crest of the central plateau beyond 

the Pruem River, more than 10 miles 

away.27 The 8th Infantry (Col. James S. 

Rodwell) was to remain in division reserve. 

Commanders of the two forward regiments 

designated initial objectives astride a lateral highway that follows the crest of the 

Schnee Eifel. These regiments also were 

to protect the division's exposed flanks, for 

to the southwest, closest units of the 28th 

Division were more than four miles away, 

and to the northwest, the closest friendly 

troops, except for a thin veil of cavalry, 

were twenty-five miles away. 

The attack on 14 September was, at the 

start, more a reconnaissance in force than 

anything the division had attempted dur25 The 4th Division story is based on combat 

interviews and official records of the division and 

attached units. Veteran of the D-Day assault on 

UTAH Beach, the 4th Division also participated 

in the capture of Cherbourg and the battles to 

break out of the Norman hedgerows. The division joined the V Corps for the pursuit and 

shared in the liberation of Paris. The division's 

nickname, Ivy, comes from the Roman numerals, 

IV. 

26 See Ltr, Barton to OCMH, 5 Oct 53, 

OCMH. 

274th Div FO 37, 13 Sep 44, 4th Div G-3 

file, 13 Sep 44. 
50 

ing the two preceding days. Although the 

regiments had intended to attack together, 

the 22d Infantry was delayed until noon 

while awaiting arrival of an attached company of tanks and then used, according to 

plan, but one infantry battalion. The 

12th Infantry intended to employ two 

battalions, but one took a wrong trail 

upon entering the forest and contributed 

little to the day's action. Thus the 4th 

Division attacked on 14 September in no 

greater strength at first than the 28th Division had employed the day before. 

Screened by a drizzling rain, the 12th 

Infantry on the left advanced virtually 

unimpeded up the steep western slopes of 

the Schnee Eifel. The only battalion to 

make actual contact with the West Wall 

found the pillboxes undefended. Cutting 

the Schnee Eifel highway without difficulty, the battalion turned northeast along 

the highway toward the wooded high 

ground of Bogeyman Hill (Hill 697, the 

Schwarzer Mann). Only here did the 

battalion encounter a defended pillbox. 

Accompanied by tanks, the infantry moved 

along firebreaks and trails to outflank and 

carry the position. The men dug in for 

the night on Bogeyman Hill, all the way 

through the fabled West Wall. Resistance had been so light that the infantry 

had called only once for supporting artillery fire. 

A mile to the south, the leading battalion of the 22d Infantry had been nearing 

the woods line east of Bleialf when a round 

from an 88-mm. gun ripped into one of 

the accompanying tanks. As the crewmen piled from the tank, the other tanks 

maneuvered about on the open hill. 

Thinking the tanks were withdrawing, the 

riflemen began to fall back in a panic. 

The attack might have floundered on this 

discreditable note had not unit comTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

manders acted aggressively to bring the 

men under control. 28 Then, as if to atone 

for their earlier hesitancy, the men charged 

forward at a run. In about twenty minutes their charge carried not only to the 

woods line but past a row of pillboxes all 

the way to the crest of the ridge. Like 

the 12th Infantry, the 22d Infantry had 

achieved an astonishingly quick penetration of this thin sector of the West Wall. 

To enlarge the penetration, the regimental commander, Colonel Lanham, quickly 

committed his other two battalions. One 

continued the drive to the east to gain the 

woods line on the eastern slope of the 

ridge while the other joined the assault 

battalion in fanning out to right and left 

to roll up the line of pillboxes. Some of 

the fortifications turned out to be undefended, and the enemy had manned the 

others predominantly with middle-aged 

men and youths who had little unit organization and less conception of tactics. One 

or two rifle shots against embrasures often 

proved persuasion enough to disgorge the 

defenders, hands high. Only to the 

southwest at a crossroads settlement on the 

Bleialf-Pruem highway did the Germans 

fight with determination, and here close-in 

fire from self-propelled tank destroyers had 

a telling effect. By the end of the day the 

22d Infantry held a breach in the West 

Wall about two miles wide. One battalion had reached a position on the eastern 

slopes of the Schnee Eifel overlooking the 

village of Hontheim, a mile and a quarter 

past the forward pillboxes. 

On the German side, the 2d SS Panzer 

Division either had waited a day too long 

before falling back on the West Wall or 

28 For their roles in rallying the troops, the 

regimental commander, Colonel Lanham, and the 

S-2, Capt. Howard C. Blazzard, received the 

DSC. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 51 

DRAGON'S TEETH near Brandscheid. The wooded section at upper left is the edge of the 

Schnee Eifel. 

had concentrated first on manning the 

fortifications along more logical routes of 

advance than the rugged Schnee Eifel. 

The division commander, SS-Brigadefuehrer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS 

Heinz Lammerding, set out immediately to 

try to contain the penetration; but the 

strength available to him still was unimpressive, even though he had received a 

few new attachments upon withdrawal 

behind the border. He had about 750 

men in four organic battalions and I,goo 

in nine attached battalions, a total of 

about 2,650. To support them, he had 

14 75-mm. antitank guns, about 37 artillery pieces, 1 assault gun, and 1 Mark V 

Panther tank. Two other tanks were in 

the repair shop.29 

To the American commander, General 

Barton, the successes on 14 September 

confirmed his belief that the West Wall 

would be only a minor obstruction in the 

path of the pursuit. The corps commander, General Gerow, apparently shared 

this view, for it was during the night of 14 

September that he directed an officer of 

29 TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 22 Sep 44 

(based on weekly strength rpt of ,6 Sep 44), A 

Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle; MS # C-048 

(Kraemer). 
52 

the 5th Armored Division to advise the 

28th Division on the use of armor in event 

of a breakthrough. Though the greatest 

success had been in the 4th Division's 

sector, the terrain along the Schnee Eifel 

discouraged use of armor there. 

Having virtually walked through the 

West Wall, General Barton acted on 15 

September bo~h to broaden his effort and 

speed the eastward advance. He comitted his reserve, the 8th Infantry, in a 

motorized advance along the best axial 

highway in his zone to skirt the northern 

end of the Schnee Eifel along th(t narrow 

corridor afforded by the valley of the 

upper Kyll, the Losheim Gap. The regiment was to occupy a march objective on 

the north bank of the Kyll six miles inside 

Germany. The 12th Infantry meanwhile 

was to sweep northeastward along the 

Schnee Eifel for several miles in order to 

uncover roads leading east. The 22d Infantry was to turn southwest to take 

Brandscheid, a village within the West 

Wall at the southern end of the Schnee 

Eifel. These objectives accomplished, the 

12th and 22d Infantry Regiments were to 

renew the eastward drive to seize march 

objectives fourteen miles away on the 

Kyll.30 

With the 8th Infantry on 15 September 

rode General Barton's main hope for a 

breakthrough. If the 8th Infantry could 

push rapidly, the Schnee Eifel could be 

outflanked and the West Wall left far 

behind. 

Starting early from the border village of 

Schoenberg, the 8th Infantry ran into 

blown bridges and roadblocks almost from 

the beginning. A heavy mist also slowed 

the column and for the second straight 

day denied tactical air support. At the 

30 4th Div FO 38, 14 Sep 44, 4th Div G-3 

file, 14 Sep 44; Ltr, Barton to OCMH. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

border near the village of Losheim the 

column hit definite resistance. Sideslipping to the south along a secondary 

highway, the regiment encountered a relatively stout outpost position near the 

village of Roth. By late afternoon the 

leading battalion had pushed the outpost 

back to the West Wall. But the 8th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Rodwell, 

saw no hope of readying a co-ordinated 

attack against the fortifications before the 

next morning.31 

Colonel Rodwell's anticipation of delay 

was attributable more to organization 

problems than to any real concern about 

the enemy. One of his battalions, for 

example, reported finding German reconnaissance parties just moving into the 

pillboxes. Yet in the pressure of events, 

this information escaped the division commander, General Barton. Not having 

realized the rapid thrust he had anticipated and somewhat perturbed by the 

turn of events during the day on the 

Schnee Eifel, General Barton told Colonel 

Rodwell to abandon the maneuver.32 

In the wet foxholes astride the Schnee 

Eifel, the infantrymen of the 4th Division's 

other two regiments had noted a distinct 

change in the situation early on 15 September. German mortar and artillery fire 

markedly increased and began to have 

telling effect from tree bursts in the thick 

forest. About 300 Germans counterattacked the most forward battalion of the 

22d Infantry near Hontheim. A battalion scheduled to take Brandscheid spent the 

morning rounding up Germans who had 

318th Inf AAR, Sep 44, and S-3 Jnl, 15 

Sep 44. 

32 Ibid.; Ltr, Barton to OCMH; Ltr, Maj Gen 

H. W. Blakely (former 4th Diy Arty commander 

and later commander of the 4th Div) to OCMH, 

26 Jun 56. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

infiltrated behind the battalion during the 

night. Few pillboxes now were undefended. A battalion of the 12th Infantry 

spent several hours routing about sixty 

Germans from a nest of pillboxes at a 

crossroads, the Kettenkreuz (Hill 655). 

Two other fortified positions centering on 

crossroads occupied the 12th Infantry for 

the rest of. the day, so that by nightfall 

roads leading east still were out of reach. 

Though all advances by the 12th and 

22d on 15 September were labored, they 

nevertheless had covered sufficient ground 

in diametrically divergent directions to 

create a gap between regiments of more 

than two and a half miles. Disappointed 

in the outcome of the 8th Infantry's 

maneuver farther north, General Barton 

saw a chance to secure the gap on the 

Schnee Eifel while at the same time exploiting it as a possible point of breakthrough. He told Colonel Rodwell to 

move his regiment to the Schnee Eifel and 

drive through the middle of the other two 

regiments. The flank regiments would 

open adequate roads to him later. Hope 

that a breakthrough still might be accomplished was nurtured by promising developments reported during the day to the 

south in the zone of the 5th Armored 

Division.33 

Unfortunately for the 4th Division, it 

takes only a few defenders to hold up an 

attacker in cruel terrain like the Schnee 

Eifel. Though the Germans had no reserves to commit in this sector, they were 

able gradually to build up the 2d SS 

Panzer Division with replacements and odd 

attachments while the original few were 

fighting effective delaying action. By 16 

September, for example, the Germans had 

established a fairly strong blocking position 

33 See Msg, Gerow to CGs 4th and 28th Divs, 

15 Sep 44, 4th Div G-3 file, 14 Sep 44· 

53 

across the Schnee Eifel to deny the 12th 

Infantry the coveted road lea.,ding east. 

The 12th Infantry's casualties soared in 

exchange for almost no further advance. 

Several days later, on 19 September, t1M:: 

Germans had obtained two companies of 

infantry and three Mark IV tanks with 

which to counterattack. They would 

ha ve recovered some ground had it not 

been for the courage and resourcefulness 

of an American company commander, 1st 

Lt. Phillip W. Wittkopf, who called down 

artillery fire almost atop his own position.34 

The difficulties of terrain were nowhere 

more evident than in the center of· the 4th 

Division's formation where the 8th Infantry began to drive down the wooded 

eastern slopes of the Schnee Eifel early on 

16 September. By nightfall the next day 

parts of the regiment were near the eastern 

edge of the forest; but behind them lay 

hundreds of yards of dense woods crossed 

only by muddy, poorly charted firebreaks 

and trails subject to constant enemy infiltration. 

On the division's south wing, the 22d 

Infantry could attribute a lack of success 

against the village of Brandscheid to the 

backbone which West Wall pillboxes put 

into the German defense. The only bright 

development on this part of the front came 

in the afternoon of 16 September when the 

I st Battalion pushed out of the Pruem 

State Forest to seize a hill that commanded the Bleialf-Pruem highway a few 

hundred yards west of the German-held 

village of Sellerich. Even this achievement was marred by the loss from German 

shelling of some thirty-five men wounded 

and eight killed, including the battalion 

commander, Lt. Col. John Dowdy. 

Encouraged by the 1st Battalion's ad34 Lieutenant Wittkopf received the DSC. 
54 

vance, the 22d Infantry commander, 

Colonel Lanham, ordered continuation of 

the attack the next day to pass beyond 

Selle rich and seize high ground east of the 

Mon creek on the road to Pruem. Commanded now by Maj. Robert B. Latimer, 

the 1st Battalion faced terrain that tended 

to funnel its attack dangerously. In front 

of the battalion were three villages: 

Hontheim, on high ground to the northeast; Herscheid, on high ground to the 

southeast; and Sellerich, along the main 

highway in a depression exposed to the 

dominating ground on either flank. 

Because Major Latimer deemed his 

strength insufficient for taking the high 

ground, he saw no alternative to attacking 

directly down the valley. Recognizing 

the danger in this approach, he requested 

artillery fire to blanket the high ground 

and directed only one company to move at 

first to the objective. Company A was 

to take the objective, Company B was to 

follow soon after with attached tank destroyers and tanks to help hold the objective, and Company C was to maintain the 

jump-off positions west of Sellerich. 

Even before the attack began, adversity 

overtook the 1st Battalion. Into the 

morning of 17 September enemy shelling 

so unnerved several officers, including the 

commander of the attached tank platoon, 

that they had to be evacuated for combat 

exhaustion. About 0830, as Company 

A moved to the line of departure, another 

severe shelling so upset the company commander that he too had to be evacuated. 

1st Lt. Warren E. Marcum assumed command of the company. 

Still under German shellfire, Lieutenant 

Marcum and Company A moved quickly 

down the highway into Sellerich. They 

found not a single German in the village 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

and continued unopposed across the Mon 

creek. By I 100 they had occupied the 

crest of the objective, Hill 520. 

When Company B and the tanks and 

tank destroyers started to follow, one of 

the tank destroyers hit a mine in the deeply 

incised ravine of the creek. Almost immediately the Germans came to life. 

Opening fire with antitank weapons from 

both north and south, they drove the 

armor to cover in Sellerich. With interlocking fires from machine guns and light 

caliber antiaircraft weapons, they sealed 

off the route of retreat. Mortar and 

artillery fire rained upon the trapped 

troops. East of the creek, about a hundred Germans began to counterattack 

Company A from two directions. Try as 

they would, Company B and the tanks 

could not cross the ravine to Lieutenant 

Marcum's aid. 

Fearful of losing the hill west of SelIe rich, Major Latimer was reluctant to 

commit his remaining company. To make 

it available, Colonel Lanham called off an 

attack at Brandscheid to send tanks and 

a rifle company to hold the hill; but by 

the time this force could disengage, the 

situation at Selle rich and beyond the creek 

had so deteriorated that reinforcement 

appeared futile. 

Only minutes before Lieutenant Marcum was wounded, he requested permission to withdraw. Then his radio 

ceased to function. By the time Major 

Latimer got a decision from the regimental 

commander authorizing withdrawal, he 

had no communications with Company A. 

Although he sent two messengers forward, 

he could see no evidence that they reached 

the company. When the battalion S-3 

tried to get forward, he was wounded five 

times. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

Whether Company A ever received 

the withdrawal authority became incidental; for when Lieutenant Marcum was 

wounded, the other officers apparently lost 

all control. Men began to get back 

individually and in small groups. A few 

made it out with Company B, but most 

who survived the action beyond the creek 

did not reach the I st Battalion's lines until 

after dark. A count showed later that 

but two officers and sixty-six men had 

escaped, a loss of more than 50 percent. 

The disaster east of the Mon creek for all 

practical purposes ended the battle of the 

Schnee Eifel. That night the assistant 

division commander, Brig. Gen. George A. 

Taylor, went to the corps command post 

to give details on the division's situation. 

He emphasized the damage the 22d Infantry had incurred from shelling and counterattack, the inadequacy of roads and trails 

through the Pruem State Forest, and the 

effect of the woods and adverse weather on 

American advantage in air, artillery, and 

armor. He noted also how vulnerable the 

division was to counterattack on both 

fianks. 35 

General Taylor actually had no major 

selling job to do at V Corps headquarters. 

Already General Gerow had called off the 

attack of the 28th Division. When the 

4th Division commander, General Barton, 

issued a new field order, he worded it in 

accord with confidential information that 

the First Army intended to call off the V 

Corps attack that night. 36 

35 Rpt, Gen Taylor to V Corps Comdr, 4th 

Div G-3 file, I7 Sep 44. Note that when the 

Germans launched their counteroffensive in this 

region in December, they cut off American troops 

on the Schnee Eifel by driving around both ends 

of the ridge. 

36 Ltr, Barton to OCMH; 4th Div FO 4I, I7 

Sep 44, in 4th Div G-3 file, I7 Sep 44. 

,55 

For the next few days all three regiments of the 4th Division were to engage 

in local attacks to adjust their lines for 

defense, but they registered no major 

gams. The battle was over. Neither 

Germans nor Americans possessed either 

the strength or inclination to push all out 

for a decision. In four days of combat 

ranging from light to intense, the 4th 

Division had torn a gap almost six miles 

wide in the West Wall but at a point offering no axial roads and few objectives, short 

of the Rhine, attractive enough to warrant 

a major effort to secure them. The 

breach had cost the division about 800 

casualties. 

Four major factors had worked against 

both the 4th and 28th Divisions in making 

the V Corps main effort. First, the cruel 

terrain and the West Wall had enabled a 

few Germans to do the work of many. 

Second, rain and generally poor visibility 

had denied air support, restricted observation for tank and artillery fires, and 

produced poor footing for tanks. Third, 

a shortage of artillery ammunition, which 

in the case of the 28th Division had 

limited artillery units to twenty-five rounds 

per gun per day, had denied the infantry 

large-scale fire support and had afforded 

German guns an immunity that otherwise 

would not have existed. Fourth, an inability to concentrate had prevented either 

division from employing overwhelming 

weight at any critical point. The last 

factor had affected the 28th Division particularly, for General Cota had possessed 

no reserve regiment. 

Had either General Gerow or the division commanders interpreted the authorization for a reconnaissance in force 

more broadly, they might have beaten 

the Germans into the West Wall. On 

the other hand, General Hodges, the 
56 

First Army commander, had been distinctly conservative in his authorization. 

Hodges, for example, had insisted that 

"all troops should stay tightly 'buttoned 

up,' " and Gerow had received a "definite 

impression" that the army commander 

would not sanction the corps becoming 

"involved" in the West Wall before 14 

September.37 Even had the infantry divisions achieved a coup de main, might they 

not in exploiting it have encountered 

similar difficulties? Indeed, in view of the 

ammunition shortage and the dispersion of 

units, they might have had trouble even 

holding a major breach of the West Wall. 

Bridgehead at Wallendorf 

From the viewpoint of both the V Corps 

and the Germans, the main effort by the 

infantry divisions actually had shown less 

promise of far-reaching results than had 

another attack in the south of the V Corps 

zone. Here an anticipated secondary effort by the 5th Armored Division had 

developed into a genuine opportunity for 

a breakthrough which showed promise of 

welding the three separate division actions 

into a cohesive corps maneuver. 

Withheld from immediate commitment 

against the West Wall, the 5th Armored 

Division in the interim had drawn a 

variety of responsibilities. Not the least 

of these was securing approximately thirty 

miles of the corps front. The division 

commander, Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. Oliver, assigned Combat Command A and 

the attached I 12th Infantry to patrol the 

southern portion of the zone, maintain 

contact with Third Army cavalry far to 

the south, and protect the city of Luxembourg. He designated Combat Command 

37 Sylvan Diary, entry of I4 Sep 44; Ltr, 

Gerow to OCMH, 29 Aug 53, OCMH. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

R to probe the West Wall with patrols 

along the central portion of the zone and 

be prepared upon order to attack the West 

Wall between Vianden and Echternach 

and seize the communications center of 

Bitburg on the Eifel's central plateau. 

He gave Combat Command B responsibility for the northern portion of the 

division zone and alerted it for commitment upon corps order to exploit any 

breakthrough achieved by the infantry divisions. 38 

Observers in posts along the Our and 

Sauer Rivers, which separate Luxembourg 

from Germany, and patrols that probed 

the West Wall brought back similar reports: In some places the pillboxes were 

not manned; in others the Germans were 

hurriedly moving in. Though the Americans did not know it, this was the sector 

of the great gap between the ['58 Panzer 

Corps and the LXXX Corps, which was 

perturbing both enemy corps commanders, Generals Keppler and Beyer. 

In the afternoon of 13 September, as 

the infantry divisions in the north closed 

to the West Wall, CCR conducted a 

reconnaissance by fire near the village 

of Wallendorf, about halfway between 

Echternach and Vianden. It failed to 

provoke a single return shot from the 

Germans. 

Convinced that the West Wall opposite 

the armor was no more than weakly 

manned, General Gerow in early evening 

of 13 September ordered General Oliver to 

advance. With one combat command he 

38 The 5th Armored Division story is based on 

official records and combat interviews. Nicknamed Victory, the division entered combat with 

the Third Army on 2 August and joined the V 

Corps for the pursuit .. Troops of the 5th 

Armored Division captured historic Sedan and 

the city of Luxembourg. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

was to attack through Wallendorf to 

seize high ground near Mettendorf, about 

five miles inside Germany, and then drive 

to Bitburg, twelve miles beyond the border. 

The 1st Battalion, I 12th Infantry, was to 

assist the attack. 

In directing an attack between Vianden 

and Echternach, General Gerow had exercised a choice between two existing avenues of approach into Germany in this 

region. One extends northeast from the 

vicinity of Wallendorf, the other almost 

due north from an eastward bend in the 

German border east of Echternach. 

Though the Wallendorf corridor is more 

sharply compartmentalized and has fewer 

good roads, General Gerow chose it because it was somewhat closer to the 

infantry divisions (about fifteen miles). 

General Oliver decided to attack from 

the southwestern corner of the Wallendorf 

corridor at the village of Wallendorf itself. 

Here his right flank might hug the Nussbaumer Hardt, a great forest barrier, 

leaving room for later broadening of the 

base of the penetration to the northwest 

and north. Though the ground rises so 

abruptly beyond Wallendorf that it reminded some men of the Palisades on the 

Hudson, similar heights bar the way all 

along the entrance to the corridor. 

CCR knew little about the enemy 

situation across the border except what 

patrols and observers had discerned in the 

preceding three days. A number of patrols, including that of Sergeant Holzinger 

on I I September at Stalzemburg, about 

eight miles northwest of Wallendorf, had 

encountered no opposition. Reports indicated that water seepage filled some pillboxes and that dust blanketed the inside 

of others; but on I 2 and 13 September 

observers had noted a few German soldiers 

entering the pillboxes. 

57 

In light of the true German situation, 

the choice of the Wallendorf sector for an 

attack was fortunate. It was on the 

extreme right of the LX X X Corps, the 

weakest point in General Beyer's defenses. 

Not until the morning of 14 September, 

when the hastily recruited Alarmbataillon 

arrived from Trier, did any organized unit 

take over the sector. About two miles 

north of Wallendorf lay the boundary not 

only between the two enemy corps but also 

between the First and Seventh Armies and 

between Army Groups Band G. A certain element of divided responsibility was 

bound to exist. 39 As for the West Wall 

itself in this sector, it was markedly thin 

because German engineers had leaned 

heavily upon the rugged nature of the 

terrain. Although all bridges near Wallendorf had been demolished, the river is 

only about forty yards wide and at this 

time of year fordable at a number of points. 

The status of supply in the 5th Armored 

Division was similar to that in the rest of 

the V Corps, although the logistical pinch 

might not be felt so severely since only one 

combat command was to see action. The 

three-day pause in Luxembourg had enabled the division to refill its fuel tanks 

and constitute a nominal gasoline reserve. 

Although artillery ammunition on hand 

was no more than adequate, a shortage of 

effective counterbattery fires in the coming 

offensive was to arise more from lack of 

sound' and flash units and from poor visibility than from any deficiency in ammunition supply. 

Shortly after noon on 14 September 

CCR began to cross the Sauer River into 

Germany at a ford below the confluence 

of the Our and the Sauer. When no 

antitank opposition developed, the com39MS#B-081 (Beyer). 
58 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

W ALLENDORF CIVILIANS strive to save their belongings from the burning town after German 

troops have lift. 

mander, Col. Glen H. Anderson, sent his 

armor and infantry across together. Although the enemy's Alarmbataillon had 

only small arms weapons, the troops defended with tenacity. Not until Wallendorf was wreathed in flame and smoke 

caused by artillery fire, tracer bullets, 

and infantry flame throwers was the enemy 

dislodged. 40 

40 German propagandists cited the destruction 

of Wallendorf as evidence of "the Allies' will to 

destroy all Germans together with German 

culture and history." See Hq T Force, 12th A 

Gp, German Propaganda, Sunrise, 14 Oct 44, 

FUSA G-2 Tac file, 14-15 Oct 44. 

The Alarmbataillon might'have made an 

even better fight of it had not its artillery 

support, the Alarmbatterie, failed miserably. Court martial proceedings taken later against the battery commander revealed 

that (I) he was a reserve officer of 

Luftwaffe signal communication troops, 

(2) he knew nothing about artillery, (3) 

the battery had possessed little ammunition and almost no observation or optical 

equipment, and (4) among the entire 

enlisted personnel were only three trained 

artillerymen. 41 

41 MS # B-081 (Beyer). 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

Continuing past Wallendorf, tanks and 

infantry of CCR knocked out lightly defended pillboxes to gain a firm foothold 

astride the first high ground, a promontory 

of clifflike terrain between the Sauer and 

the sharply incised Gay creek. As darkness came, the only exit the troops could 

find leading off the high bluff into the Gay 

gorge was blocked by a big crater. 

Awaiting results of further reconnaissance 

for another route, the tanks and armored 

infantry laagered for the night. 

The armor temporarily stymied by the 

blocked road, Colonel Anderson ordered 

the attached 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Ross C. 

Henbest, to take up the attack. Colonel 

Henbest's infantry was to seize Biesdorf, a 

village beyond the Gay creek, capture of 

which should facilitate CCR's efforts to 

get off the high bluff the next morning. 

Unfortunately, the infantry lost direction 

in the foggy darkness and wandered aimlessly through the night. 

Having discovered another road leading 

north to span the Gay creek at Niedersgegen, the armor resumed the advance the 

next morning, 15 September. At the 

creek the combat command ran into an 

understrength company of Mark IV tanks 

supported by a scattering of infantry. In 

a noisy but brief engagement, the American gunners accounted for 3 enemy tanks 

and 6 half-tracks and sent 5 other tanks 

scurrying to the east. CCR's only loss 

came later when a wooden bridge over the 

Gay collapsed under the weight of a Sherman tank. The column crossed nearby at 

a spot that later came to be known by the 

dolorous name Deadman's Ford. 

The enemy armor encountered at the 

creek probably was the major portion of 

the Kampfgruppe of the Panzer Lehr Di· 

vzszon. Perturbed from the start about 

59 

this American thrust, the First Army 

commander, General von Knobelsdorff, 

had announced his intentions late the 

day before "to commit all forces which 

could possibly be spared" to the Wallendorf sector. In the meantime, the 

Kampfgruppe of the Panzer Lehr and the 

remnants of the 5th Parachute Division, 

which held the line farther south near 

Echternach, were to do what they could to 

oppose the penetration.42 

These two German units actually could 

do little more than harass CCR with a 

succession of small pinprick thrusts.43 

Pushing northeast and east from Niedersgegen, CCR moved virtually unopposed. 

In rapid succession the armor seized four 

villages and occupied Hill 407, the crest of 

the high ground near Mettendorf, the 

initial objective. Already CCR had left 

all West Wall fortifications in its wake. 

One column continued east and northeast 

and at dusk was nearing the village of 

Bettingen on the west bank of the Pruem 

River when German antitank guns suddenly opened fire. Forced back in confusion by the unexpected resistance, the 

column withdrew a few hundred yards 

into the villages of Halsdorf and Stockem 

to await daylight before coming to blows 

with the German gunners. 

By nightfall of 15 September CCR had 

advanced through the West Wall and 

across the western plateau almost to the 

banks of the Pruem, some six miles inside 

Germany. Though the combat command 

actually controlled little more than the 

roads, the fact that a force could march 

practically uncontested through the enemy 

rear augured new life to hopes of a drive 

to the Rhine. With the armor apparently 

loose behind enemy lines, General Gerow 

42 Ibid. 

43 Ibid. 
60 

conceived an audacious scheme to assist 

his infantry divisions and reopen his front. 

He told General Oliver first to seize Bitburg, then to swing north on main roads 

to Pronsfeld and Pruem. This would 

place the armor squarely in rear of the 

enemy opposing the 28th Division and 

relieve the south flank of the 4th Division. 

The corps cavalry was to take over a 

portion of the 5th Armored Division's 

Luxembourg front to free another combat 

command, CCB, for the maneuver. The 

plan involved advances of from fifteen to 

thirty miles by two columns, parallel to, 

but deep behind, the enemy front. 

For their part, the Germans had quickly 

recognized the portent of the situation. 

One enemy headquarters reported in alarm 

that American troops were only three 

miles from Bitburg. With no reserves to 

send, General von Knobelsdorff at First 

Army headquarters called for help. 

When Army Group G passed on the plea, 

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the 0 B 

WEST commander, replied at first that 

responsibility for sealing off the penetration belonged to the army group, but he 

soon relented enough to order transfer to 

the LXXX Corps of two grenadier battalions and a flak regiment with eleven 

antiaircraft batteries.44 

By shuffling troops in another corps, 

Knobelsdorff at First Army at last managed to put his hands on a reserve to send 

the LXXX Corps. He released a regimental combat team of the 19th Volks 

Grenadier Division, which began moviI)g 

north by truck during the night of 15 

September. The rest of the division, 

minus one regiment, followed two days 

44 Entries of 15 and 16 Sep 44, OB WEST 

KTB (Text); Entry of 15 Sep 44, A ep e KTB 

(Text); Evng Sitrep, 15 Sep 44, A ep e KTB, 

Anlagen. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

later. In yet another move, Knobelsdorff 

reduced the corps sector by ordering· the 

adjacent corps to take over the southern 

wing of the LXXX Corps front.45 

In the meantime, while the Germans 

had been making these frantic moves and 

while CCR had been recording its rapid 

advance, Colonel Henbest's 1st Battalion, 

I 12th Infantry, had renewed the attack 

against Biesdorf. The battalion cleared 

the town by late afternoon of ) 5 September. On orders from the CCR commander, Colonel Anderson, the infantry 

then moved about two miles farther to 

assume positions protecting the southeast 

flank of the armor near the settlement of 

Stockigt. 

Organic engineers at the same time 

were constructing a treadway bridge 

across the Sauer at Wallendorf. Late in 

the day the attached 254th Engineer Combat Battalion began construction of a 

wooden trestle bridge. Upon arrival of 

the engineer battalion, the organic engineers moved forward to begin demolition of captured pillboxes. 

At dusk (16 September) an engineer 

reconnaissance party investigating the Gay 

creek crossing at Niedersgegen ran into 

enemy small arms fire near Deadman's 

Ford. Two engineers were killed. The 

experience presaged the fact that the 

Germans were going to do something 

about CCR's penetration, for this was the 

first example of what was to become a 

continuing difficulty with German infiltration into the undefended flanks of the 

penetration. 

Among the first to feel the effect was 

the supporting artillery, which was leapfrogging forward in order to support the 

45 MS # B-214 (Mantey); Entry of 16 Sep 44, 

A ep e KTB (Text); Sitrep, I7 Sep 44, A ep 

e KTB, Anlagen. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

next day's advance on Bitburg. When 

the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion 

tried to cross the Gay creek at Deadman's 

Ford, the column came under machine 

gun and mortar fire from the north. 

Though the CCR commander, Colonel 

Anderson, sent back a married platoon of 

infantry and tanks from Hill 407 to clean 

out the opposition, the force failed to 

reach the creek. On the way, about midnight, the lieutenant in charge came upon 

a portion of the combat command supply 

trains that had avoided the enemy fire by 

cutting cross-country south of Deadman's 

Ford. Because the lieutenant knew that 

the trains usually followed the artillery, he 

assumed that the artillery already had 

passed and that the ford was clear. As 

a result, the opposition was not eliminated 

until the next day, 16 September, and 

soon thereafter German tanks appeared to 

interdict the stream crossing. Not until 

late on 16 September did all the artillery 

get into firing positions east of the Gay 

creek. 

The Germans hardly could have 

touched CCR at a more senSItIve spot. 

Through most of 16 September Colonel 

Anderson held in place, wary of racing 

east with the armor until the artillery 

could get forward. By the time the big 

guns were ready to fire, a heavy fog had 

closed in and darkness was approaching. 

Enemy artillery had been moving up all 

day and had begun to shell CCR with 

disturbing accuracy. When the task 

force at Halsdorf and Stockem did launch 

an attack in late afternoon, the enemy 

near Bettingen proved to have lost none of 

his tenacity or fire power from the night 

before. The attack faltered almost immediately. 

Infiltration at Deadman's Ford and a 

lieutenant's error thus had cost CCR any 

61 

advance on a day when every effort should 

have been made to exploit the penetration. 

As it was, only Colonel Henbest's 1st 

Battalion, I 12th Infantry, gained any 

ground on 16 September. The infantry 

moved from Stockigt through Stockem, 

eastward to the Pruem River at Wettlingen. Pushing quickly across the little 

river in the face of heavy shelling and 

small arms fire, the infantry by nightfall 

had seized high ground several hundred 

yards northeast of Wettlingen. Supported 

by a self-propelled tank destroyer platoon, Colonel Henbest's battalion had 

reached a point only five miles from 

Bitburg. 

In midafternoon CCB, commanded by 

Col. John T. Cole, had begun to cross 

into the Wallendorf bridgehead and assumed responsibility for the troublesome 

north flank near Niedersgegen. Even 

though CCR had not moved during the 

day, the presence of CCB and the success 

of Colonel Henbest's infantry engendered 

optlmism. At the end of the day the 5th 

Armored Division G-2 doubted that the 

enemy had sufficient strength "to do more 

than delay us temporarily." 46 While the 

Germans had countermeasures in the 

making, all they actually had accomplished 

was to fling a papier-mache cordon about 

the penetration with every available man 

from the LXXX Corps and every man 

that could be spared from the adjacent I 

SS Panzer Corps, the latter to hold the 

north flank of the penetration with elements of the 2d Panzer Division. 

No matter what the G-2 estimate or the 

true enemy situation, General Gerow at 

2040 on 16 September ordered General 

Oliver to call off the offensive. Consolidate your force, he said, and send strong 

46 5th Armed Div G-2 Per Rpt, 16 Sep 44. 
62 

patrols to develop the enemy situation in 

the vicinity of Bitburg. The armor was 

also to "mop up" the West Wall north and 

northeast of Wallendorf but was to make 

no attack on Bitburg except on corps 

order. General Gerow's directive meant, 

in effect, that the 5th Armored Division 

was to assume the defensive. It must 

ha ve rome as a shock to both troops and 

commanders. 

That the Germans had not stopped the 

V Corps armor was plain. The first real 

adversities to come in the Wallendorf sector hit after the issuance of this order. 

The explanation for the halt appeared to 

lie instead in the decisions that· had 

emerged from the meeting of General 

Eisenhower and his top commanders on 2 

September at Chartres and in a critical 

over-all logistical situation. 

In commenting later on the reasons for 

calling off the 5th Armored Division's attack, General Gerow explained the halt of 

all three of his divisionsY The plan, 

General Gerow said, had been agreed 

upon by General Hodges and himself. It 

was to have been an "investigation" proceeding to the ambitious objectives if 

resistance proved "negligible." When defeme actually p:"oved "so stout," the First 

Army had instructed the V Corps "not to 

get too involved." 

The fact was that the V Corps had been 

operating on borrowed time and borrowed 

supplies. The presence of the corps this 

far east was attributable only to the fact 

that General Hodges had deviated from 

the Chartres instructions, giving the V 

Corps some of the limited gasoline available rather than assigning all of it, as 

directed, to the other two corps next to 

47 Combat Interv with Gerow, filed with 5th 

Armd Div Intervs. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the British. Although Hodges had done 

this with an eye only to the limited objectives of closing the gap between the First 

and Third Armies and getting the V 

Corps across the obstacle of the Meuse 

River, he must have been reluctant to 

abandon without at least a trial the splendid opportunity which had developed to 

put the obstacle of the W est Wall behind 

in the same jump. Under the circumstances he could have countenanced continued logistical priority for the V Corps 

only if far-reaching successes could have 

been had for the asking. Though the V 

Corps obviously could have continued the 

advance, it would have taken some fighting to achieve it, no matter how makeshift 

the units with which the Germans had 

shored up the West Wall in the Eifel. 

Even had General Gerow not stopped 

the V Corps on 16 September, a halt 

within a few days probably still would 

have been imperative. The next day, for 

example, the 12th Army Group commander, General Bradley, brought to 

First Army headquarters a doleful picture 

of the over-all supply situation. "It is 

not improbable," noted General Hodges' 

aide-de-camp in his diary, "that we shall 

have to slow up, even altogether halt, our 

drive into Germany and this in the very 

near future." 48 

48 Sylvan Diary, entry of 17 Sep 44. For a 

German viewpoint, see General Siegfried Westphal (chief of staff to Rundstedt), The German 

Army in the West (London: Cassel and Company Ltd., 1951). "If the enemy had thrown in 

more forces he would not only have broken 

through the German line of defences which were 

in process of being built up in the Eifel, but in 

the absence of any considerable reserves on the 

German side he must have effected the collapse 

of the whole West Front within a short time." 

(Page 174) 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

Defense of the Bridgehead 

The most serious trouble in the Wallendorf bridgehead began after dark on 16 

September, after General Gerow had 

called off the attack. Using air bursts 

from the antiaircraft guns of a newly 

arrived flak regiment with deadly effect, 

the enemy counterattacked the I st Battalion, I 12th Infantry, near Wettlingen. 

Although the infantry held in the face of 

almost overwhelming casualties, Colonel 

Anderson on 17 September ordered abandonment of the foothold beyond the 

Pruem. 49 

At dawn on 17 September German 

armor and infantry of the Panzer Lehr 

and 5th Parachute Divisions struck several 

points along the eastern tip of the salient, 

while elements of the 2d Panzer Division 

hit Hill 407. Although CCR knocked out 

eight of the German tanks, not until about 

1000 could the combat command report 

the situation under control. The Germans 

captured one of the American tanks. 50 

Lamenting the basic failure of these 

countermeasures, the Commander in Chief 

West, Rundstedt, believed they might have 

succeeded had they been directed not at the 

tip of the salient but at the flanks close to 

the base at Wallendorf. 51 Though Rundstedt's criticism was largely justified, the 

40 Infantrymen gave much of the credit for 

their stand to two officers of supporting units: 

the forward observer from the 400th Armored 

Field Artillery Battalion, 2d Lt. Roy E. Gehrke, 

who was mortally wounded, and the commander 

of the attached platoon of the 628th Tank 

Destroyer Battalion, 1st Lt. Leon A. Rennebaum. 

Both were subsequently awarded the DSC. 

50 German information from entries of 17 Sep 

44, OB WEST KTB (Text); Daily Sitrep, 17 

Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Sitreps, 

First Army, 17 Sep 44, A Gp G KTB, Anlagen. 

51 Order, OB WEST to A Gp G, 17 Sep 44, 

A Gp G KTB, Anlagen. 

63 

Germans nevertheless had used much of 

their strength to prevent the newly arrived 

CCB from expanding the base of the 

salient appreciably. In many instances, 

after pillboxes were taken, the Germans 

had infiltrated back into them. 

Unaware that the Americans had 

called off their attack, Rundstedt and the 

other German commanders saw the situation as extremely serious. Late on 17 

September Rundstedt gave Army Group B 

a reserve panzer brigade, the lOBth, for 

employment under the 2d Panzer Division 

against the north flank of the bridgehead. 

At the same time, General von Knobelsdorff at First Army laid plans to commit 

the 19th V olks Grenadier Division in a 

counterattack against the south flank on 

18 September. 

Rundstedt also acted to remove the 

problem of divided responsibility occasioned by the location of the American 

strike along the army and army group 

boundaries. Extending the Army Group 

B and Seventh Army boundaries south to 

a line roughly the same as that between 

the First and Third U.S. Armies, he 

transferred the LXXX Corps to the 

Seventh Army. Responsibility for eliminating the Wallendorf salient passed 

entirely to Field Marshal Model's Army 

Group B and General Brandenberger's 

Seventh Army.52 

Lack of time for preparation and a 

desperate shortage of ammunition and fuel 

forced postponement of. the 19th V olks 

Grenadier Division'scounteratta<:k on 18 

September. As it turned out, this meant 

a stronger counterattack in the end, for 

r,2 Entries of 17 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB 

(Text); Daily Sitrep, Lageorientierung, and Daily 

Sitrep First Army, 17 Sep 44, A Gp G KTB, 

Anlagen; Daily Sitrep, 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Tagesmeldungen. 
64 

during the day the I08th Panzer Brigade 

arrived. Early on 19 September the panzer brigade, the 19th Volks Grenadier 

Division, elements (probably a regiment) 

of the 36th Infantry Division, and remnants of the Panzer Lehr were to launch 

an enveloping attack. In preparation, the 

Seventh Army issued two thirds of its 

entire fuel supply to the I08th Panzer 

Brigade, a somewhat shocking commentary upon the state of the German fuel 

situation."3 

The LX XX Corps commander, General 

Beyer, directed the I08th Panzer Brigade 

to hit the main positions of CCR on Hill 

407 from the north while the infantry units 

supported by the remnants of the Panzer 

Lehr attacked from the south. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Americans 

were ready, and a fortuitous break in the 

weather made possible the first major 

contribution by U.S. air since the crossing 

of the border. 

Knocking out ten German tanks, CCR 

sent the enemy armor and infantry reeling 

back from Hill 407 in disorder. Adjusted from a light observation plane, 

American artillery followed the retreat. 

Taking quick advantage of the clearing 

weather, two squadrons of P-47 Thunderbolts of the 365th Group took up the fight. 

The air strike was so effective that the 

First Army subsequently sent the squadron leaders54 a special commendation. 

German artillery, which by this time 

had begun to fire on the bridgehead from 

almost every direction, eluded the pilots 

until the next day when the "enemy 

53 Entry of 18 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB 

(Text); Daily Sitrep, 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Tagesmeldungen; Forenoon and Noon Sitreps, 

18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

54 Maj William D. Ritchie and Maj John R. 

Murphy. IX Fighter Command and IX T AC, 

Unit History, Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

caught hell." About fifty planes of the 

365th Group participated on 20 September, primarily against German tanks and 

artillery. The artillery included a number 

of big railroad guns, of which the pilots 

claimed to have destroyed four. The 

armored troops rewarded the fliers with a 

laconic: "They sure do a fine job; thanks." 

If the airmen were good on 19 and 20 

September, they were superb the next day, 

21 September. For the first time since 

the West Wall campaign began, the sky 

was cloudless, the ground perfectly devoid 

of haze. So helpful was the three-day air 

effort that the V Corps commander was 

moved to .dispatch a letter of appreciation 

to the air commander, General Quesada."" 

In the meantime, during the big German drive of 19 September, Colonel 

Henbest's infantry and the tanks of CCB 

had thrown back the bulk of the 19th 

V olks Grenadier Division on the south 

flank of the bridgehead. Nevertheless, 

about noon, an enemy group infiltrating 

from the southeast reached the eastern 

end of the two tactical bridges across the 

Sauer at Wallendorf. For about an hour 

the issue of the bridges was in doubt until 

finally fire from the engineers and from 

antiaircraft guns west of the river drove 

the Germans back. The bridges still were 

intact.56 

Though the 5th Armored Division had 

held at all points, General Oliver saw a 

chance to improve the positions by reducing th~ perimeter of the bridgehead. He 

ordered his battered CCR to withdraw. 

Defense of a reduced perimeter centering 

upon the high ground near Wallendorf 

55 Ibid. 

56 For courage in defending the bridges, 1st 

Lt. Stanford F. Hall, 254th Engineers, and Pvt. 

Sheldon D. Jennings, 46Ist Antiaircraft Artillery 

(AW) Battalion, were awarded the DSC. 
V CORPS HITS THE WEST WALL 

was to pass to CCB and a fresh battalion 

of the I 12th Infantry. The infantry and 

CCB were to hold the bridgehead "until 

corps permits withdrawal." Now that 

all hope of continuing the offensive was 

over, the 5th Armored Division plainly 

looked upon the Wallendorf assignment 

with distaste. Keenly aware of the shock 

role of armor, many officers in the division 

were none too happy about performing 

an infantry-type defensive role. 51 

Heavy shelling and ground pressure 

continued against the reduced bridgehead. 

Despite relentless attacks by the same 

German units that had opened the drive 

on 19 September, CCB gave no ground 

except according to plan. Then, in late 

afternoon of 2 I September, the V Corps at 

last gave approval to abandonment of the 

bridgehead. 

In pulling back across the Sauer before 

daylight on 22 September, CCB had to use 

the ford which the first troops to cross the 

river had employed eight days before. 

During the preceding night the Germans 

once again had penetrated to the Wallendorf bridges. In reporting the situation 

after having driven off this second infiltration, CCB had made a notable use 

of understatement. "Only change," the 

combat command had reported, " [is] 

both bridges blown." 

Though the Wallendorf fight had ended 

in abandonment of the bridgehead, neither 

CCB nor CCR had incurred exce,,~ive 

losses in either personnel or equipment. 

For the month of September, for example, 

the entire 5th Armored Division, including 

57 This attitude is reflected clearly in combat 

intervs and in orders to CCR and CCB found in 

5th Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 16-22 Sep 44. See also 

Ltr, General Oliver to OCMH, 4 Jul 56. 

65 

CCA, had incurred 792 casualties, of 

which 148 were killed or missing. Likewise for the entire month, the division's 

nonsalvageable vehicular losses included 

only 6 light tanks, I I medium tanks, and 

18 half-tracks. The 1st Battalion, 112th 

Infantry, incurred losses proportionately 

much heavier, more than 37 percent of 

the original command. 58 

At noon on 18 September, before withdrawal at Wallendorf, General Gerow relinquished command of the V Corps to 

Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, formerly 

commander of the 2d Armored Division. 

Having been chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department at the time of 

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 

General Gerow had been called to Washington to testify in a Congressional investigation. In an optimistic farewell message 

to his command, he indicated that the 

opposition the Germans had mustered 

against his offensive had failed to impress 

him. "It is probable," General Gerow 

said, "the war with Germany will be over 

before I am released to return to the V 

Corps." 59 

Under General Brooks, the divisions of 

the V Corps rotated their battalions in the 

line while the corps staff worked on proposed plans for relief of the corps and a 

lateral shift to the north. In the meantime, the Ardennes-Eifel front lapsed into 

a relative quietness that was to prevail 

until December. 

58 The Germans said they took 52 prisoners, 

counted 531 American dead, and destroyed 10 

half-tracks and 31 tanks. See Noon and Evng 

Sitreps, 22 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB (Text); 

Daily Sitrep, 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Tagesmeldungen; Noon and Evng Sitreps, 2::1 

Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

5" V Corps Operations -in the ETO, p. 256. 
CHAPTER IV 

VII Corps Penetrates the Line 

Having engineered the authorization to 

reconnoiter the West 'Vall in force on I2 

September, General Collins of the VII 

Corps expected to accomplish more by 

the maneuver than did General Gerow of 

the V Corps. General Collins had in 

mind a strong surprise attack which might 

breach the fortified line in one blow before 

the Germans could man it adequately. 

Even if he had to pause later for resupply, 

the West Wall would be behind him. 

Though oriented generally toward the 

region known as the Aachen Gap, the VII 

Corps operated in a zone about thirty-five 

miles wide that encompassed only a 

narrow portion of the gap. This portion 

was the Stolberg Corridor, southeast and 

east of Aachen. The rest of the zone was 

denied by dense pine forests in sharply 

compartmented terrain. Stretching northeast from Verviers, Belgium, for about 30 

miles almost to Dueren on the Roer River, 

the forest barrier averages 6 to IO miles 

in width. (See Map Ill.) Within Belgium, it embraces the Hertogenwald; 

within Germany, the Roetgen, Wenau, 

and Huertgen Forests. Only one logical 

route for military advance runs through 

the forests, a semblance of a corridor extending from the German border near 

Monschau northeast across a villagestudded plateau toward the Roer at 

Dueren. For convenience, this route may 

be called the Monschau Corridor. 

It was obvious that the main effort of 

the VII Corps should be made in the 

north of the zone through the more open 

Stolberg Corridor. Yet even this route 

had some disadvantages. At one point it 

is less than six miles wide. At others it 

is obstructed by the sharp valleys of the 

lnde and Vicht Rivers and by a congested 

industrial district centering on Stolberg 

and the nearby town of Eschweiler. 

General Collins entrusted the reconnaissance in force on I2 September to two 

combat commands of the 3d Armored 

Division and two regiments of the I st 

Division. Each of the infantry regiments 

was to employ no more than a battalion 

at first. The infantry was to reconnoiter 

in the direction of Aachen, while the 

armor was to strike the face of the Stolberg Corridor. Should the West Wall be 

easily breached, the Ist Division was to 

capture Aachen, the 3d Armored Division 

was to push up the corridor to Eschweiler 

and thence to Dueren, and the 9th Division was to operate on the right wing to 

sweep the great forest barrier. 1 

In the event, the reconnaissance on I2 

September failed to accomplish what General Collins had hoped for. Not through 

any great German strength did it fail, but 

because roadblocks, difficult terrain, and 

1 VII Corps Opns Memo 9 I, I I Sep 44, VII 

Corps Opns Memos file, Sep 44; FO I I, I g Sep 

44, VII Corps G-g FO's file, Sep 44. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

occasional resistance held both armor and 

infantry outside the West Wall until too 

late in the day for an attempt to penetrate 

the line. Although a battalion of the 1st 

Division's 16th Infantry got well into the 

line south of Aachen in the Aachen Municipal Forest, where pillboxes were sparse, 

a counterattack by about eighty Germans 

discouraged farther advance for the evening. After losing three tanks to a nest of 

cleverly concealed antitank guns, the left 

combat command of the 3d Armored 

Division stopped for the night a thousand 

yards from the West Wall. The second 

combat command sent two task forces 

probing generally east from Eupen. Delayed by roadblocks and mines, one task 

force came up to the West Wall south of 

the village of Schmidthof too late to make 

an attack. Encountering similar obstacles, the other finally reached Roetgen, 

just short of the pillboxes, in late afternoon, only to find entry into the line 

barred by dragon's teeth on one side of the 

road, a precipice on the other, and a big 

crater in the road itself. The task force 

laagered for the night in Roetgen. The 

West Wall remained undented. 

Still intent on pressing forward without 

delay, General Collins nevertheless interpreted the results of the reconnaissance as 

an indication that farther advance might 

not be gained merely by putting in an 

appearance. In these circumstances, capturing the city of Aachen at this stage 

would serve no real purpose. The open 

left flank of the VII Corps might be 

secured by seizing high ground overlooking 

Aachen rather than by occupying the city 

itselP The decisive objective was the 

2 Interv by the author with Cen Collins, Washington, 25 Jan 54; Ltr, Maj Cen Clarence R. 

Huebner (former CC 1st Div) to OCMH, 3 Sep 

53,OCMH. 

67 

second or main band of West Wall fortifications which ran east and southeast of 

Aachen. 

Reflecting this interpretation, General 

Collins told the 1st Division to avoid the 

urban snare of Aachen and protect the 

left flank of the corps by seizing the high 

ground east of the city. When the XIX 

Corps came abreast on the north, Aachen 

then could be encircled. The 3d Armored 

GENERAL COLLINS 

Division was to proceed as before to 

penetrate both bands of the West Wall, 

capture Eschweiler, and turn east toward 

the Roer River; the 9th Division was to 

protect the right flank of the armor by 

penetrating the great forest barrier to seize 

road centers in the vicinity of Dueren. 

Though General Collins was not officially 

to label his advance an "attack" for another twenty-four hourS, he was actually 

to launch a full-scale attack on 13 Septem-
68 

ber under the gUIse of continuing the 

reconnaissance in force. 3 

General Collins specified further that 

advance was to be limited for the moment 

to the west bank of the Roer River, a 

stipulation probably based upon the physical and logistical condition of the VII 

Corps. The troops, their equipment, and 

their vehicles had been taxed severely by 

the long drive across France and Belgium. 

Little more than a third of the 3d 

Armored Division's authorized medium 

tanks were in operational condition. 

Shortages in ammunition, particularly in 

10s-mm. ammunition, necessitated strict 

rationing. The divisions often had to 

send their own precious transportation far 

to the rear in search of army supply 

dumps that had fallen behind. Trucks of 

the 1st Division made two round trips of 

700 miles each.4 

For all these problems and more, the 

temptation to breach the West Wall before 

pausing was compelling. Even if the 

Germans had been able to man the line, 

there was some chance that they intended 

to fight no more than a delaying action 

within the fortifications, reserving the 

main battle for the Rhine River. "Militarily," the VII Corps G-2, Col. Leslie D. 

Carter, noted, "[the Rhine] affords the 

best line of defense·." Yet, Colonel Carter 

conceded, "for political reasons, it is believed that the West Wall will be held in 

varying degrees of effectiveness." 5 Perhaps the most accurate indication of what 

the VII Corps expected came from the 

G-2 of the 9th Division. Vacillating for 

3 VII Corps Opns Memo 92, 13 Sep 44, VII 

Corps Opns Memos file, Sep 44; VII Corps FO 

I I, 13 Sep 44. 

4 See 3d Armd, 1st, and 9th Div AARs, Sep 44. 

5 VII Corps, Annex 2 to FO I I, 13 Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

a while between two theories, the 9th 

Division G-2 finally merged them in a 

prediction that the enemy intended to hold 

the West Wall but that he probably was 

capable only of delaying action. 6 

The first of the two bands of the West 

Wall facing the VII Corps was a thin 

single line closely following the border 

west and south of Aachen. This band the 

Germans called the Scharnhorst Line. 

About five miles behind the first, the second band was considerably thicker, particularly in the Stolberg Corridor. Called 

the Schill Line, the second band became 

thinner in the Wenau and Huertgen 

Forests before merging with the forward 

band at the north end of the Schnee Eifel. 

Dragon's teeth marked the West Wall in 

the Aachen sector along the forward band 

west of Aachen and across the faces of the 

Stolberg and Monschau Corridors. 

Colonel Carter, the VII Corps G-2, 

expected the Germans to try to hold the 

two bands of the West Wall with the battered remnants of two divisions and a 

haphazard battle group composed primarily of survivors of the 105th Panzer 

Brigade and the 116th Panzer Division. 

All together, he predicted, these units 

could muster only some 7,000 men. Elements of two SS panzer corps, totaling 

no more than 18,000 men and ISO tanks, 

might be in reserve, while some or all of 

two panzer brigades and four infantry divisions-all makeshift units-might be 

brought from deep inside Germany. 

"However," the G-2 added, "transportation difficulties will add to the uncertainty 

of these units making their appearance 

along the VII Corps front." 7 

6 9th Div G-2 Per Rpts 58, 59, and 60, 12-14 

Sep 44. 

7 VII Corps, Annex 2 to FO I I. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

GENERAL BRANDENBERGER 

German Developments 

The German commander charged directly with defending the Aachen sector 

was the same who bore responsibility 

for the Eifel, the Seventh Army's General Brandenberger. Not the Eifel but 

Aachen, General Brandenberger recognized, would be the main point of 

American concentration. Yet he had 

little more strength there than in the Eifel. 

As was the I SS Panzer Corps for a 

time, the other two of General Brandenberger's three corps were trying to hold in 

front of the West Wall while workers 

whipped the fortifications into shape. On 

the north wing, sharing a common boundary with the First Parachute Army at a 

point approximately six miles northwest of 

Aachen, was the LX X XI Corps commanded by Generalleutnant Friedrich August Schack. General Schack's zone of 

responsibility extended south to Roetgen 

69 

and a boundary with the LXXIV Corps 

under General der Infanterie Erich 

Straube. General Straube's responsibility 

ran to the Schnee Eifel and a common 

boundary with General Keppler's I SS 

Panzer Corps near the Kyll River. 8 

Probably weakest of the Seventh Army's 

three corps, Straube's LXXIV Corps was 

to be spared wholesale participation in 

the early West Wall fighting because of 

the direction of the U.S. thrusts. General 

Schack's LXXXI Corps was destined to 

fight the really decisive action. 

General Schack had to base his hopes of 

blocking the Aachen Gap upon four badly 

mauled divisions. Northwest of Aachen, 

two of these were so occupied for the 

moment with the approach of the XIX 

U.S. Corps that neither was to figure until 

much later in the fight against the VII 

U.S. Corps. At Aachen itself General 

Schack had what was left of the 116th 

Panzer Division, a unit whose panzer regiment had ceased to exist and whose two 

panzer grenadier regiments were woefully 

depleted. The fourth unit was the 9th 

Panzer Division, earmarked to defend the 

face of the Stolberg Corridor. 

The 9th Panzer Division had been reorganizing in a rear assembly area when 

Field Marshal von Rundstedt had seized 

upon it as the only sizable reserve available 

on the entire Western Front for commitment at Aachen. Though traveling under 

urgent orders, only a company of engineers, three companies of panzer grenadiers, and two batteries of artillery had 

arrived at Aachen by I I September. 

Desperate for some force to hold outside 

B Greater detail on the Germans in the Aachen 

sector may be found in Lucian Heichler, The 

Germans Opposite VII Corps· in September 1944, 

manuscript prepared to complement this volume, 

filed in OCMH. 
70 

the Vv' est Wall, General Schack had 

merged the early arrivals with remnants 

of the 105th Panzer Brigade, which still 

had ten tanks. As might have been expected, this Kampfgruppe 9th Panzer DiVISion was damaged severely in its first 

action west of the German border on I I 

September. This was a harbinger of what 

was to come, for as other units of the 9th 

Panzer Division reached the front General 

Schack would have to throw them piecemeal into the fighting and later shore 

them up with diverse reinforcements. 

The name «9th Panzer Division" thus was 

to become a collective term for a hodgepodge of armor, infantry, and artillery.9 

Nominally, General Schack had a fifth 

unit, the 353d Infantry Division, but 

about all that was left of it was the 

division headquarters. Schack assigned it 

a sector in the Schill Line, the second 

band of the West Wall, and put under it 

a conglomeration of five Landesschuetzen 

(local security) and Luftwaffe fortress 

battalions and an infantry replacement 

training regimenL10 

The LXXXI Corps had in addition a 

few headquarters supporting units, of 

which some were as much a hindrance as 

a help. Overeager demolition engineers 

of one of these units in rear of the 116th 

Panzer Division had destroyed bridges on 

I I and 12 September before the panzer 

division had withdrawn. A battery of 

Luftwaffe antiaircraft artillery in position 

near Roetgen panicked upon hearing a 

rumor that the Americans were approachD MS # B-730 (Brandenberger). 

10 ETHINT-18 (Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf 

von Schwerin, comdr of the 116th pz Div); 

Order, Seventh Army to alI corps, 9 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw., 5. VIlI.-:n .X.44 (hereafter 

cited as LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

mg. Abandoning their three 20-mm. 

guns, the men fled. ll 

To General Schack's misfortune, he 

anticipated the VII Corps main effort 

against Aachen itself. Shoring up the 

116th Panzer Division at Aachen with 

three Luftwaffe fortress battalions and a 

few other miscellaneous units, he gave 

command of the city to the division commander, Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf 

von Schwerin. His limited corps artillery 

he put under direct control of Schwerin's 

artillery officer. For defense of the Stolberg Corridor, he subordinated all miscellaneous units between Aachen and 

Roetgen to the 9th Panzer DivisionP 

Other than this General Schack could 

not do except to wish Godspeed for 

promised reinforcements. Most likely of 

these to arrive momentarily was the 

394th Assault Gun Brigade, which had six 

or seven assault guns. A firmer hope lay 

further in the future. During 12 September, Schack had learned that the first 

of three full-strength divisions scheduled 

11 TWX, 116th pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 0155. 

12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen, 

Meldungen der Divisionen [Div Sitreps], 25· 

VIIl.-I.X.44 (hereafter cited as LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Meldungen der Diu); Tel Cony, LXXXI 

Corps with 116th pz Diu, 0810, 12 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen, Kampfverlauf 

[Operations], 2.VIIl.-21.X.44 (hereafter cited as 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Tel COny, 

Seventh Army with LXXXI Corps, 0050, 22 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen, Befehle 

an Divisionen [Orders to Divs], 3·VIIl.-2I.X·44 

(hereafter cited as LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle 

an Div). 

12 Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs, 2230, 12 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Diu; 

TWX, A Gp B to DB WEST, 2350, 22 Sep 44, 

A Gp B KTB, Dperationsbefehle; Daily Sitreps, 

116th pz Diu, 21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Anlagen, Tagesmeldungen, 6. VIlI.-21 .X.44 

(hereafter cited as LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen); Tel ConY, LXXXI Corps with 9th 

pz Div, 1500, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfverlauf. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

to reinforce the Aachen sector in September would arrive in a few days. Hitler 

himself had ordered the 12th Infantry 

Division, which was rehabilitating in East 

Prussia, to begin entraining for Aachen at 

0001, 14 SeptemberY 

Though hope existed, an observer in 

Aachen the night of 12 September could 

not have discerned it. Aachen that night 

was Richmond with Grant in Petersburg. 

While General von Schwerin was regrouping his 116th Panzer Division north of the 

city before moving into battle, only local 

defense forces remained between the 

Americans and the city itself. Through 

the peculiar intelligence network war-torn 

civilians appear to possess, this knowledge 

had penetrated to a civilian population 

already in a quandary over a Hitler order 

to evacuate the city. Entering Aachen, 

Schwerin found the population "in 

panic." 14 

Aware that the 116th Panzer Division 

could not fight until regrouped and that 

local defense forces were no match for 

their opponents, Schwerin was convinced 

that the faIl of the city was only hours 

away. This, the German commander 

thought privately, was the best solution 

for the old city. If Aachen was to be 

spared the scars of battle, why continue 

with the civilian evacuation? Schwerin 

decided to calI it off. Though he may not 

have known that Hitler himself had ordered Nazi officials to evacuate the city, 

he must have recognized the gravity of his 

decision. He nevertheless sent his officers 

to the police to countermand the evacuation order, only to have the officers return 

with the shocking news that not only the 

13 Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs, 2230, 12 

Sep 44; Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 12 Sep 44, DB 

WEST KTB (Text). 

14 ETHINT-18 (Schwerin). 

71 

police but all government and Nazi party 

officials had fled. Not one police station 

was occupied. 13 

Not to be sidetracked by this development, General von Schwerin sent his officers into the streets to halt the evacuation 

themselves. By daylight of 13 September 

the city was almost calm again. 

In the meantime, Schwerin searched 

through empty public buildings until at 

last he came upon one man still at his 

post, an official of the telephone service. 

To him Schwerin entrusted a letter, 

written in English, for transmission to the 

American commander whose forces should 

occupy Aachen: 16 

I stopped the absurd evacuation of this 

town; therefore, I am responsible for the 

fate of its inhabitants and I ask you, in the 

case of an occupation by your troops, to take 

care of the unfortunate population in a humane way. I am the last German Commanding Officer in the sector of Achen. 

[signed] Schwerin. 

Unfortunately for Schwerin, General 

Collins at almost the same moment was 

deciding to bypass Aachen. No matter if 

innocently done, Schwerin had countermanded an order from the pen of the 

Fuehrer himself. As proof of it, he had 

left behind an incriminating letter he 

would surely come to rue. 

The Battle of the Stolberg Corridor 

With the decision to bypass Aachen, the 

VII Corps scheme of maneuver became 

basicaIly a frontal attack by the corps 

15 Ibid.; Rpt, Model to DB WEST, 2230, 15 

Sep 44, A GP B KTB, Dperationsbefehle; Ltr, 

General der Infanterie Franz Mattenklott (commander of Wehrkreis VI, the military district 

which included Aachen) to Reichsfuehrer SS 

Heinrich Himmler, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Meldungen der Div. 

16 Rpt, Model to DB WEST, 2330, 15 Sep 

44, A GP B KTB, Dperationsbefehle. 
72 

armor, protected on either flank by infantry, to penetrate the West WallY A 

corollary objective was the encirclement of 

Aachen in conjunction with the XIX 

Corps to the north. As events developed, 

because of terrain, the nature of resistance, 

and the delay imposed on the XIX Corps 

by the gasoline shortage, the battle actually took on the aspects of three distinct 

maneuvers. The least spectacular was to 

develop primarily as a defensive engagement involving the bulk of the 1st Division 

in containing Aachen. Another was to 

involve two regiments of the 9th Division 

in an attempt to break through the 

Monschau Corridor and secure the corps 

right flank in the forest barrier. The 

third and most critical was to be executed 

by. the corps armor with an assist from a 

regiment of each of the two infantry 

divisions. This can be called the battle of 

the Stolberg Corridor. 

Commanded by Maj. Gen. Maurice 

Rose, the 3d Armored Division was to 

pierce the West Wall with two combat 

commands abreast. 18 From Roetgen and 

17 Interv with Collins, 25 Jan 54. 

18 Like the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, the 

3d was activated before adoption of the organization of three combat commands. Instead of 

three separate tank and armored infantry battalions, these divisions had two tank regiments 

and an armored infantry regiment. Though 

usually holding out a portion of the three 

regiments as a reserve, the divisions had no 

"CCR" per se. The table of organization 

strength called for 3,822 more men than the later 

armored divisions. Nicknamed Spearhead, the 

3d Armored entered combat with the XIX Corps 

in Normandy. The division joined the VII 

Corps for the breakout of the hedgerows, the 

Falaise gap operation, and the pursuit. At the 

instigation of General Rose, the division commander, combat commands in the 3d Armored 

Division were known by the names of their 

commanders. CCA, for example, was Combat 

Command Hickey. To avoid complications, the 

conventional CCA and CCB are used in this 

volume. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Schmidthof, Combat Command B was to 

drive northeast along the fringe of the 

Roetgen and Wenau Forests, on an axis 

marked by the villages of Rott, Zweifall, 

Vicht, and Gressenich. After crossing 

the Inde and Vicht Rivers, CCB was to 

attack over open ground east of Stolberg 

to come upon Eschweiler, some ten miles 

inside Germany, from the south. Assailing the face of the corridor near Ober 

Forstbach, about three miles north of 

Schmidthof, CCA was to pass through the 

villages of Kornelimuenster and Brand to 

hit Stolberg from the west, thence to turn 

northeast against Eschweiler. 

The mission of the 1st Division having 

changed from capturing to isolating 

Aachen, the commander, Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, planned to send his 16th 

Infantry northeast along the left flank of 

the armor. After penetrating the Scharnhorst Line-the first band of pillboxesthe 16th Infantry was to secure hills that 

dominate Aachen from the east. The remainder of the I st Division (minus a 

battalion attached to the armor) was to 

build up on high ground south and southeast of Aachen. 19 

Because the 9th Division still had to 

move forward from assembly areas near 

Verviers, the first p~rticipation by this 

division would come a day later. On 14 

September one regiment was to move close 

along the right flank of the armor through 

the fringes of the Wenau Forest while 

another regiment attacked northeast 

through the Monschau Corridor. 

The main attack began at dawn on 13 

September when the 3d Armored Divi10 The exploits of the Big Red One, the 1st 

Division, had become as renowned by this time 

as any in the American Army. The division's 

first combat in World War II was in the invasion 

of North Africa, followed by the invasion of 

Sicily and D Day at OMAHA Beach. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 73 

TASK FORCE LOVELADY passes through the dragon's teeth near Roetgen, 15 September. 

sian's CCB under Brig. Gen. Truman E. 

Boudinot moved out in two columns. At 

Roetgen Task Force Lovelady (Lt. Col. 

William B. Lovelady) eventually had to 

blast a path through the dragon's teeth 

after dirt thrown in the big crater in the 

highway turned to muck. Not until late 

in the morning did the armor pass the 

dragon's teeth. As the task force proceeded cautiously northward along a 

forest-fringed highway leading to the village of Rott, the Germans in eight pillboxes and bunkers along the way turned 

and fled. In one quick blow Task Force 

Lovelady had penetrated the thin Scharnhorst Line. 20 

20 The 3d Armored Divi~ion story is from 

official records, plus an authoritative unit history, 

Spearhead in the West (Frankfurt-am-Main: 

Franz Joseph Heurich, 1945). 

On the outskirts of Rott the picture 

changed suddenly when a Mark V tank 

and several antitank guns opened fire. In 

the opening minutes of a blazing fire fight, 

Task Force Lovelady lost four medium 

tanks and a. half-track. For more than an 

hour the enemy held up the column until 

loss of his Mark V tank prompted withdrawal. Because a bridge across a stream 

north of Rott had been demolished, the 

task force coiled for the night. 

At Schmidthof the second and smaller 

task force of CCB found the pillboxes in 

greater density and protected by a continuous row of dragon's teeth. From 

positions in and around the village, the 

Germans had superior observation. The 

task force commander, Lt. Col. Roswell 

H. King, recognized that to carry the 

position he needed more infantry than his 
74 

single company of 60 men; but he nevertheless attempted an attack. German fire 

brought it to an abrupt halt, and night 

came before additional infantry arrived. 

A few miles to the northwest, the other 

combat command, CCA, attacked at daylight against a nest of four or five pillboxes 

at a point south of Ober Forstbach. 

Supported by tanks and tank destroyers 

deployed along the edge of a woods, the 

infantry battalion of Task Force Doan 

(Col. Leander LaC. Doan) got across the 

dragon's teeth before machine gun fire 

from the pillboxes forced a halt. Because 

mortar fire prevented engineers from blowing a gap through the dragon's teeth, tanks 

could not join the infantry. Their fire 

from the edge of the dragon's teeth failed 

to silence the enemy gunners. 

In midafternoon, when the attack appeared to have faltered irretrievably, 

someone made a fortuitous discovery a few 

hundred yards away along a secondary 

road. Here a fill of stone and earth built 

by local farmers provided a path across 

the dragon's teeth. Colonel Doan quickly 

ordered his tanks forward. 

For fear the roadway might be mined, 

a Scorpion ( flail) tank took the lead, 

only to founder in the soft earth and 

block the passage. Despite German fire, 

Sgt. Sverry Dahl and the crew of the 

Scorpion helped a tank platoon leader, Lt. 

John R. Hoffman, hitch two other tanks 

to pull out the Scorpion. Climbing back 

into the flail tank, Sergeant Dahl tried the 

roadway again. This time he rumbled 

across. 

The other tanks soon were crUlsmg 

among the pillboxes, but without infantry 

support. Pinned down and taking disconcerting losses, the infantry could not 

disengage from the first encounter. With 

panzerfausts the Germans knocked out 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

four of the unprotected tanks and accounted for others with three assault guns 

of the 394th Assault Gun Brigade. Having detrained at Aachen at midday, these 

assault guns had been en route to oppose 

Task Force Lovelady at Rott when diverted to meet the new threat posed by 

Task Force Doan.21 In an hour Colonel 

Doan lost half his tanks. Only ten 

remained. 

To guarantee this foray beyond the 

dragon's teeth, the CCA commander, 

Brig. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, called on two 

platoons of tanks from another task force, 

plus the attached 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, provided from the division reserve. 

Together, Task Force Doan and the 

reinforcements were to push beyond the 

pillboxes to the village of Nuetheim, which 

affords command of roads leading deep 

into the Stolberg Corridor. 

At first, these reinforcements merely 

provided more targets for the German 

gunners, but as the approach of darkness 

restricted enemy observation, both tanks 

and infantry began to move. Blanketing 

N uetheim with artillery fire, the armor of 

Task Force Doan reached the western 

edge of the village in little\ more than an 

hour. Approaching over' a different 

route, the fresh infantry battalion was not 

far behind. Because the hour was late, 

Task Force Doan stopped for the night, 

the first band of the West Wall left behind. 

Slightly to the northwest, the I st Division's 16th Infantry in the attempt to 

advance close along the north flank of the 

armor had run into one frustration after 

21 Daily Sitrep, 9th pz Diu, 13 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Tel Convs, 

LXXX"f Corps with 9th pz Diu, 1420 and 1830, 

13 Sep 44, and LXXXI Corps with Il6th pz Diu, 

1430, 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

another. The battalion which had entered the Aachen Municipal Forest the 

day before remained absorbed with smallscale counterattacks. Not until nightfall 

did the other two battalions fight their 

way past roadblocks and delaying detachments to approach the dragon's teeth not 

far from Ober Forstbach. A genuine 

attack against the West Wall by the 16th 

Infantry would await another day, after 

contingents of the 26th Infantry took over 

the 16th's left wing and the 18th Infantry 

moved up on the far left. 

Despite the tribulations of the infantry 

regiment and of Colonel King's task force 

at Schmidthof, the "reconnaissance in 

force" on 13 September had achieved two 

ruptures of the Scharnhorst Line. That 

both were achieved along the face of the 

Stolberg Corridor rather than at Aachen 

went a long way toward convincing the 

German commander, General Schack, that 

he had erred in his estimate of American 

intentions. 

General Schack had not been so sure 

when soon after noon he had ordered 

General von Schwerin at Aachen to counterattack immediately with the 116th 

Panzer Division to wipe out the Americans 

in the Aachen Municipal Forest.22 Reluctantly-for Aachen now would become 

a battleground-Schwerin had ordered his 

men to countermarch to the southern outskirts of the city. Augmented by a few 

replacements, which brought the panzer 

grenadier battalions to an average strength 

of about 300, and by half the six assault 

guns of the 394th Assault Gun Brigade, 

the panzer division nevertheless succeeded 

only in driving back American patrols. 

Though the Germans claimed they had 

22 Rad, LXXXI Corps to 116th pz Div, 1230, 

13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf· 

75 

"closed the gap" south of Aachen, the 

Americans in the forest remained. 23 

By nightfall of the 13th General Schack 

had fewer doubts. The main threat apparently was in the Stolberg Corridor. 

In response to pleas from the commander 

of the 9th Panzer Division, Generalmajor 

Gerhard Mueller, Schack sent the only 

reserves he could muster-a Luftwaffe 

fortress battalion and a battery of artillery-to Kornelimuenster. The LX X X I 

Corps operations officer directed headquarters of the 353d Infantry Division to 

alert its Landesschuetzen battalions to 

stand by for action because "the enemy 

will probably launch a drive bypassing 

Aachen . . . toward the second band of 

defenses." As the night wore on, engineers began to demolish all crossings of 

the Vicht River between the Wenau Forest and Stolberg in front of the Schill 

Line. 24 

The Drive on the Second Band 

General Collins' plans for renewing the 

attack on 14 September were in effect a 

projection of the original effort. On the 

left wing, the 16th Infantry was to try 

again to get an attack moving against the 

Scharnhorst Line. At Nuetheim CCA's 

second task force coiled behind Task Force 

Doan in preparation for a two-pronged 

drive northeast on Kornelimuenster and 

23 ETHINT-18 (Schwerin); Daily Sitrep, 

116th pz Div, 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfverlauf; Rad, 116th pz Div to LXXXI 

Corps, 2235, 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Meldungen der Div; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0100, 

14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

24 Tel Convs, Gen Mueller with LXXXI Corps, 

1340, LXXXI Corps with 9th pz Div, 1730 and 

2030, LXXXI Corps with· 353d Diu, 2040, and 

LXXXI Corps with 116th pz Div, 2320, 13 Sep 

44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf· 
76 

Brand, thence into the second band of the 

West Wall near Stolberg. CCB prepared 

to continue from Rott into the Schill Line 

below Stolberg. While one regiment of 

the 9th Division began an attack in the 

Monschau Corridor, another, the 47th 

Infantry, was to move so closely along the 

right flank of the armor that it would 

become embroiled in the battle of the 

Stolberg Corridor. 

German commanders, for their part, 

did not intend to fall back on the Schill 

Line without a fight. Yet to some 

American units, the German role as it 

developed appeared to be nothing more 

than a hastily executed withdra wal. 

Cratered roads, roadblocks, and what 

amounted to small delaying detachments 

were about all that got in the way. 

As on the day before, CCB's Task Force 

Lovelady made the most spectacular advance on 14 September. Sweeping across 

more than four miles of rolling country, 

the task force approached the Vicht River 

southwest of Stolberg as night came. 

Though the bridge had been demolished, 

the armored infantry crossed the river, 

harassed only by an occasional mortar 

round and uneven small arms fire. Engineers began immediately to bridge the 

stream. On the east bank the infantry 

found a nest of 88-mm. guns well supplied 

with ammumtIOn which could have 

caused serious trouble had the Germans 

used them. The infantrymen had to ferret the demoralized crews from their 

hiding places. 

Though General Mueller's 9th Panzer 

Division by this time had begun to move 

into the Schill Line, this particular sector 

was held by one of the 353d Division's 

Landesschuetzen battalions. Before daylight the next morning, 15 September, the 

men of this battalion melted away in the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

darkness.25 \'\Then the American armor 

crossed a newly constructed bridge about 

noon on 15 September, the pillboxes were 

silent. Winding up a road toward Mausbach, a village one mile north of a bend 

in the Vicht River on the planned route 

toward Eschweiler, the armor passed the 

last bunker of the Schill Line. Ahead lay 

open country. Task Force Lovelady was 

all the way through the West Wall. . 

CCB's other prong, Task Force Mills 

(formerly Task Force King but renamed 

after Colonel King was wounded and 

succeeded by Maj. Herbert N. Mills), 

matched Task Force Lovelady's success at 

first. Because Lovelady's advance had 

compromised the German positions in the 

Scharnhorst Line at Schmidthof, Task 

Force Mills had gone through the line with 

little enough difficulty. But by midmorning of 15 September, as Mills approached 

Buesbach, a suburb of Stolberg on the 

west bank of the Vicht River, the armor 

ran abruptly into four tanks of the I05th 

Panzer Brigade and four organic assault 

guns of the 9th Panzer Division, a force 

which General Mueller Vias sending to 

counterattack Task Force Lovelady.26 

Confronted with the fire of Task Force 

Mills, the German tanks and assault guns 

fell back. Task Force Mills, in turn, 

abandoned its individual drive and tied in 

on the tail of CCB's larger task force. 

Elsewhere on 14 and 15 September, 

General Hickey's CCA had begun to exploit the penetration of the Scharnhorst 

Line at Nuetheim. By nightfall of 14 

September the combat command had advanced four miles to the fringes of Eilen25 Rad, 9th pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 0353, 15 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div. 

26 Tel Convs, LXXXI· Corps with 9th pz Div, 

1740, 14 Sep, and 0015 and 1540, 15 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

dorf, a suburb of Aachen which marks 

the beginning of the high ground east of 

the city. Here CCA waited for the 

arrival of the 1st Division's 16th Infantry, 

which was to seize the high ground and 

protect CCA's left flank during the drive 

on Eschweiler. 

The 16th Infantry, General Hickey 

knew, would be there soon. After days of 

frustration with outlying obstacles, this 

regiment at last had launched a genuine 

attack against the Scharnhorst Line on 14 

September. The leading battalion found 

the pillboxes at the point of attack hardly 

worthy of the name of a fortified line. 

Though skirmishes with fringe elements of 

the Aachen defense forces prevented the 

infantry from reaching Eilendorf the first 

day, the regiment entered the town before 

noon on 15 September. Fanning out to 

the west, north, and northeast to seize the 

high ground, the 16th Infantry by nightfall of 15 September had accomplished its 

mISSIon. The I st Division now ringed 

Aachen on three sides. 

Upon arrival of the 16th Infantry, 

CCA renewed the drive northeast toward 

Eschweiler. Nosing aside a roadblock of 

farm wagons on a main highway leading 

through the northern fringes of Stolberg, 

the armor headed for the Geisberg (Hill 

228), an eminence within the Schill 

Line. As another unreliable Landesschuetzen battalion fled from the pillboxes, the going looked deceptively easy. 

Eight U.S. tanks had passed the roadblock 

when seven German assault guns opened 

fire from concealed positions. In rapid 

succeSSIOn, they knocked out six of the 

tanks. 27 

n German material from Tel Cony, LXXXI 

Corps with 9th pz Diu, 1540, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Kampfuerlauf; Eyng Sitrep, LXXXI 

Corps, 1700, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Tagesmeldungen. 

77 

For use in an event like this, General 

Hickey had obtained permission to supplement his armored infantry with a battalion 

of the 16th Infantry. He quickly committed this battalion to help his armor 

clear out the guns and the cluster of 

pillboxes about the Geisberg. The fighting that developed was some of the fiercest 

of the four-day old West Wall campaign, 

but by nightfall the tanks and infantry 

had penetrated almost a mile past the first 

pillboxes. Only a few scattered fortifications remained before CCA, like CCB, 

would be all the way through the West 

Wall. 

From the German viewpoint, the advance of CCA and the 16th Infantry 

beyond Eilendorf was all the more distressing because it had severed contact 

between the 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions. Because the 116th Panzer Division 

estimated that an entire U.S. infantry 

division was assembling south of Aachen 

and almost an entire armored division 

around Eilendorf, General Schack was 

reluctant to move the 116th Panzer Division from Aachen into the Stolberg 

Corridor. Almost continuous pounding 

of Aachen by American artillery strengthened a belief that the city would be hit by 

an all-out assault on 16 September. Thus 

the German defense remained divided. 28 

In the meantime, the battle of the 

Stolberg Corridor had been broadened by 

commitment of the 9th Division's 47th 

Infantry close along the right flank of the 

3d Armored Division. So that the regi28 TWX, LXXXI Corps to II6 pz Diu, 1718, 

15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Diu; 

Daily Sitrep, 116th pz Diu, 2100, 15 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Tel 

Cony, LXXXI Corps with 116th pz Diu, 0915, 

15 Sep 44, and Rpt on Situation in Aachen Area, 

Gen Schack, 2 145, 14 Sep 44, both in LX X X I 

Corps KTB, Kampfuerlauf. 
78 

ment might be availa5le, if needed, to 

assist the armor, General Collins had specified the route of attack. The regiment 

first was to roll up a portion of the Schill 

Line by outflanking from the east the 

towns of Zweifall and Vicht, both on the 

western edge of the Wenau Forest, then 

was to proceed along the fringe of the 

forest toward Dueren.29 

Commanded by Col. George W. 

Smythe, the 47th Infantry began to move 

through Roetgen early on 14 September 

in the wake of Task Force Lovelady. 

Even after the route of the main column 

diverged from that of Task Force Lovelady, resistance was light. One battalion 

which moved into the Roetgen Forest to 

come upon Zweifall and Vicht from the 

east advanced rapidly, but the main 

column proceeding down a highway got to 

Zweifall first. While engineers began rebuilding bridges in Zweifall, a second 

battalion pushed into the forest to eliminate a line of pillboxes. 3o 

On IS September the situation in the 

forest near Zweifall and Vicht changed 

abruptly, not so much from German design as from the confusion of chance 

encounters with errant Germans of a 

poorly organized replacement training 

regiment. Before daylight enemy estimated at less than battalion strength blundered into the perimeter defense of one of 

the American battalions. One of the 

first to spot the Germans, Pfc. Luther 

Roush jumped upon a tank destroyer to 

fire its .50-caliber machine gun. Though 

knocked from his perch by an enemy 

bullet, he climbed up again. Eventually 

~9 VII Corps FO I I, 13 Sep 44. 

30 The 9th Division combat interview file for 

September 1944 contains a detailed account of 

this action, Penetration of the Siegfried Line by 

the 47th Infantry Regiment. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the Germans melted in confusion into the 

forest. A mess sergeant on his way with 

food for one of the American companies 

bumped into a group of the fleeing enemy 

and captured six. 

Another battalion attempting to move 

through the forest to envelop Vicht ran 

into a German platoon accompanied by a 

Mark V tank. Though an American 

Sherman knocked out the Mark V with 

its first round, the morning had passed 

before all these Germans were eliminated. 

Through the rest of the day both the 

battalions in the forest found that almost 

any movement brought encounters with 

disorganized German units. It was fact 

nonetheless that in their maneuvers within 

the forest the battalions actually had 

penetrated a portion of the Schill Line. 

The fighting near Zweifall prompted 

the German corps commander, General 

Schack, to order General Mueller's 9th 

Panzer Division for a third time to counterattack. "9th Panzer Division armor 

will attack the enemy," Schack directed, 

"and throw him back behind the West 

Wall. There is no time to lose!" 31 Although General Mueller tried to comply, 

his force could not advance in the face of 

heavy artillery, tank, and mortar fire. 32 

This was not to say that General 

Mueller could not cause trouble. Contingents of the 9th Panzer Division demonstrated this fact in late afternoon of IS 

September, after Task Force Lovelady had 

crossed the Vicht River and filed past the 

silent pillboxes of the Schill Line. The 

31 Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps with 9th pz Div, 

0925, 15 Sep 44 LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf· 

3~ Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps with 9th pz Div, 

1655, 15 Sep 44 LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th pz Diu, 1910, 15 Sep 

44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 79 

REMAINS OF A PILLBOX, showing massive construction. 

highway between the villages of Mausbach 

and Gressenich lies in a shallow valley 

bordered on the southeastern rise by the 

Wenau Forest and on the northwestern 

rise by the high ground of the Weissenberg 

(Hill 283). The expanse on either side 

of the highway is broad and open. As 

Task Force Lovelady reached a point not 

quite half the distance between the two 

villages, six or seven German tanks and 

self-propelled guns opened fire from the 

flanks. In quick succession they knocked 

out seven medium tanks, a tank destroyer, 

and an ambulance. Colonel Lovelady 

hastily pulled his task force back into 

Mausbach. Reporting that he had left 

only thirteen medium tanks, less than 40 

percent of authorized strength, Colonel 

Lovelady asked a halt for the night. 

Adroit use of a minimum of tanks and 

assault guns during the afternoon of 15 

September thus had produced telling 

blows against both main columns of the 

3d Armored Division-against CCB at 

Mausbach and CCA at the Geisberg. To 

the Germans, these events would have 

been encouraging even had the LX X X I 

Corps not been notified that night of the 

impending arrival of the 12th Infantry 

Division. First contingents were sched-
80 

uled to reach the Roer River towns of 

Dueren and Juelich during the night, and 

the entire division would arrive during 

the next thirty hours. 33 

Unaware of this development, the units 

of the VII Corps renewed their attacks 

the next day, 16 September. For the 

most part, the armored combat commands had a bad day of it, though no real 

cause for concern became evident. At 

the Geisberg the Germans mounted a 

local counterattack, but CCA's armored 

infantry soon disposed of it with concentrated machine gun fire. Nevertheless, 

when CCA tried to continue northeastward through the industrial suburbs of 

Stolberg, intense fire from commanding 

ground brought both armor and infantry 

up sharply. To the east, CCB shifted 

the direction of attack from Gressenich 

to the Weissenberg, only to be denied all 

but a factory building on the southwestern 

slope. 

The 3d Armored Division's only real 

advance of the day came in late afternoon 

when the division commander, General 

Rose, acted to close a four-mile gap between his two combat commands. Scraping together a small force of tanks to join 

with the attached 1st Battalion, 26th 

Infantry, he sent them against high 

ground near Buesbach, within the Schill 

Line southeast of Stolberg. It was a hard 

fight, costly in both men and tanks, but 

the task force held the objective as night 

came. 

The difficulties of the 3d Armored Division were offset by a spectacular advance 

achieved by the 9th Division's 47th 

Infantry. With the aid of a captured 

map, the 47th Infantry cleared Vicht and 

33 Tel Cony, Seventh Army with LXXXI 

Corps 2015, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfverlauf. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

mopped up nearby pillboxes during 

the morning. Thereupon, one battalion 

pressed on two and a half miles northeast 

through the fringe of the Wenau Forest 

to seize the village of Schevenhuette, east 

of Gressenich. This late-comer to the 

West Wall fighting thus had advanced 

deeper into Germany than any other Allied 

unit, approximately ten miles. 

The 47th Infantry's deep thrust, which 

put a contingent of the VII Corps less 

than seven miles from the Roer at Dueren, 

augured well for a renewal of the attack 

the next day. On the other hand, indications began to appear during late afternoon and evening of possibly portentous 

stirrings on the enemy side of the line. In 

late afternoon, for example, a platoon of 

the 16th Infantry patrolling north from 

Eilendorf reported the enemy approaching 

the village of Verlautenheide in a column 

of twos "as far as the eye could see." 

That night almost every unit along the 

front noted the noise of heavy vehicular 

traffic, and the 47th Infantry at Schevenhuette captured a German colonel who 

had been reconnoitering, presumably for 

an attack. Even allowing for hyperbole 

in the patrol's report, these signs had 

disturbing connotations. 

A Wall About Aachen 

While events in the Stolberg Corridor 

gave some evidence of reaching a climax, 

other events transpiring on the left and 

right wings of the VII Corps exerted a 

measure of influence on the fight in the 

corridor. On the left wing, at Aachen, 

the most significant development was that 

two regiments of the I st Division unintentionally maintained the myth that the 

city was marked for early reduction. 

Thus they prompted the Germans to con-
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

tinue to withhold the 116th Panzer Division from the more critical fighting in the 

Stolberg Corridor. 

In reality, the 1St Division commander, 

General Huebner, had no intention of 

becoming involved among the streets and 

bomb-gutted buildings of Aachen. He 

was trying to build a wall of infantry 

defenses on the southwest, south, southeast, and east of the city while awaiting 

arrival of the XIX Corps to assist in 

encircling the city. It was no easy assignment, for the 1St Division's left flank was 

dangling, and the defensive line eventually 

encompassed some eight miles of front. 

As the 16th Infantry tried on 13 and 

14 September to get through the Scharnhorst Line and advance alongside the 3d 

Armored Division, the 18th Infantry 

moved up west of the Liege-Aachen 

highway to push through the Aachen 

Municipal Forest southwest of Aachen. 

Before digging in on high ground in the 

forest, the 18th Infantry penetrated the 

Scharnhorst Line. A gap between the 

regiment's left flank and cavalry of the 

XIX Corps was patrolled by the 1St 

Division Reconnaissance Troop. 

General Huebner's third regiment, the 

26th Infantry, was minus a battalion attached to the 3d Armored Division. To 

the remaining battalions General Huebner 

gave the mission of . following in the wake 

of the 16th Infantry and filling in to 

confront Aachen from the south and 

southeast. By the evening of 15 September, the basic form of the wall about 

Aachen had set, a half-moon arc extending 

from the 18th Infantry's positions southwest of the city to the 16th Infantry's 

advanced hold at Eilendorf. 

Stretched to the limit, the 18th and 

26th Infantry Regiments patrolled actively toward the buildings and smoke81 

stacks of Aachen a mile and a half 

away and fought off enemy patrols and 

local counterattacks. It was no easy assignment, for the Aachen Municipal Forest was damp and cold and the enemy 

was always close. 

The Germans, for their part, could not 

believe that the Americans would stop 

short of the city, particularly in light of 

the condition of the Aachen defenses. 

Charged with the defense, General von 

Schwerin's 116th Panzer Division was 

only a shell. Schwerin had only five 

organic battalions with a "combat 

strength" 34 of roughly 1,600 men, plus 

two Luftwaffe fortress battalions and a 

grenadier training battalion. In armor 

and artillery, he had 2 Mark IV tanks, I 

Mark V, I organic assault gun, 4 assault 

guns of the 394th Assault Gun Brigade, 

9 75-mm. antitank guns, 3 I05-mm. howitzers, and 15 150-mm. howitzers.35 

To add to the problems of the German 

commander, the panic which had struck 

the population of Aachen the night of 12 

September came back. Conditions on 14 

September, Schwerin said, were "catastrophic." Because no police or civil 

authorities had returned, a committee of 

leading citizens begged Schwerin to form 

a provisional government with the city's 

former museum director at its head. On 

top of everything else came a special order 

from Hitler, this time through military 

channels rather than through the Nazi 

34 "Combat strength" is a translation of 

Kampfstaerke, which includes men actually engaged in the fighting or in immediate support 

forward of a battalion command post. See Gen 

Order Nr. 1/2000/44 g., 25 Apr 44, OKH/Gen. 

St.d.H. Org Abt. 

35 These strengths are as of 16 September 1944. 

For a detailed breakdown from contemporary 

sources, see Heichler, Germans Opposite VII 

Corps, pp. 41-42. 
82 

party, that Aachen was to be evacuated of 

civilians-if necessary, by force. Schwerin 

reluctantly agreed for the evacuation to 

begin.36 

When police and Nazi officials returned 

to Aachen on 15 September, they found 

the civilian evacuation once more in full 

swing; but that wasn't enough to keep 

General von Schwerin out of trouble. 

Schwerin's compromlsmg letter to the 

American commander had fallen into the 

hands of the N azis. You are relieved of 

your command, they told Schwerin, to 

stand trial before Hitler's "People's Court." 

The fractious Schwerin refused to comply. The men of his division, he believed, 

would protect him. While he took refuge 

in a farmhouse north of Aachen, a reconnaissance platoon from his division surrounded his hideout with machine guns. 

Confident that the battle of Aachen was 

about to begin, Schwerin determined to 

stick with his division to the bitter end. 

As it gradually became evident that the 

Americans had no intention of fighting for 

Aachen immediately, Schwerin at last decided to present himself at Seventh Army 

headquarters to appear before a military 

court. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the 

Commander in Chief West, apparently 

had interceded on Schwerin's behalf to 

get the trial shifted from a "People's 

Court" to a military tribunal. Rundstedt 

even proposed that Schwerin be reinstated 

as commander of the 116th Panzer Divi36 Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps 'Yith Schwerin, 

0930, and with 116th pz Div, 2345, 14 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Rpt, A 

Gp B to OB WEST, 1200, 14 Sep 44, OB WEST 

KTB (Text); Rad, II6th pz Div to LXXXI 

Corps, 1310, 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Meldungen der Div; ETHINT-18 (Schwerin); 

MS # B-058 (Generalmajor Heinrich Voightsberger, at this time commander of the 116th pz 

Div's 60th pz Gr Regt). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

sion. This last Hitler would not permit, 

though he agreed to no greater punish:.. 

ment than relegation to the OKH Officer 

Pool, which since the 20 July attempt on 

Hitler's life had become a kind of military 

doghouse. Surprisingly, Schwerin later 

emerged as commander of a panzer 

grenadier division and at the end of the 

war had risen to a corps command in 

Italy.37 

Battle of the Monschau Corridor 

At the southern end of the VII Corps 

front, the 9th Division in the meantime 

had launched an ambitious attack designed to clear the great forest barrier off 

the right flank of the Stolberg corridor. 

Though the 47th Infantry on the fringe of 

the forest was making the announced main 

effort of the 9th Division, the course of 

events had allied this regiment's attack 

more closely to that of the 3d Armored 

Division. The real weight of the 9th 

Division was concentrated farther south 

in the Monschau Corridor.38 

In terms of ground to be cleared and 

variety of missions to be accomplished, 

the 9th Division had drawn a big assignment. The division's sector, for example, 

was more than seventeen miles wide. In 

sweeping the forest barrier, the division 

37 Rpt, Model to OB WEST, 2330, 15 Sep 44, 

A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle; Tel Convs, 

G-I with G-3, LXXXI Corps, 1045, 16 Sep 44, 

and Seventh Army with LXXXI Corps, 1945, I7 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps, KTB, Kampfverlauf; 201 

file on General von Schwerin, ETHINT-18 

(Schwerin) . 

38 Veteran of the invasions of North Africa and 

Sicily, the 9th Division had entered combat in 

Normandy on i4 June 1944. Its octofoil shoulder 

patch came out of the fifteenth century, a heraldic 

symbol denoting the ninth son. Official records 

of the division are supplemented by extensive 

combat interviews at battalion level. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

would have to clear some seventy square 

miles of densely wooded, sharply compartmented terrain. Other responsibilities included seizing road centers near 

Dueren, protecting the right flank of the 

3d Armored Division, and securing the 

right flank of the corps, which except for 

a thin cavalry screen was open for more 

than ten miles. 

In other than a pursuit situation, the 

9th Division's responsibilities clearly would 

have been out of keeping with the division's strength. Even as matters stood 

the only factor tending to license the scope 

of the assignment was the expectation 

that the enemy had no real strength in the 

forest. 

To all appearances, this expectation was 

correct. On 14 September, that part of 

the forest lying in the zone of the enemy's 

LX X X I Corps, north of Roetgen, was 

virtually unoccupied while General Schack 

concentrated on holding Aachen and the 

Stolberg Corridor. South of Roetgen, 

the weakest of the Seventh Army's three 

corps, General Straube's LXXIV Corps, 

had but two infantry divisions, the 347th 

and the 89th. Hardly any organic forces 

remained in either division. 

The 347th Division, which held the 

southern portion of the LXXIV Corps 

front and thus was to be spared direct 

involvement with the 9th Division, was 

perhaps the weaker. So understrength 

was the division that when a training 

regiment, a fortress battalion, and a 

"Stomach Battalion" 39 were attached, the 

39 Special units comprised of men with similar 

physical disabilities were not uncommon along 

the Western Front during the fall of 1944. All 

troops of the so-called Stomach Battalions had 

ailments of the digestive tract. 

83 

newcomers exceeded the organic personnel 

by more than ten to one. 40 

The other division, the 89th, which held 

the Monschau Corridor, had few more 

organic forces left. Of two infantry regiments, one had been destroyed completely 

and the other had but 350 men. The 

commander, a Colonel Roesler, long ago 

had redesignated his artillerymen, engineers, and service troops as infantrymen. 

The only reinforcements upon arrival in 

the West Wall were a Landesschuetzen 

battalion, three Luftwaffe fortress battalions, 14 75-mm. antitank guns, about 

450 Russian "volunteers" in a so-called 

Ost-Batallion (East Battalion), and a 

grenadier training regiment. The OstBatallion and the training regiment provided the 89th Division's only artillery. 

The former had four Russian 122-mm. 

howitzers; the latter, two pieces: a German 105-mm. howitzer and an Italian 

medium (about I 50-mm.) howitzer. 

When the Italian piece ran out of ammunition after two days of firing, the 

Germans towed it about the front to give 

an impression of artillery strengthY 

The American division commander, 

Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig, assigned responsibility for pushing through the 

Monschau Corridor to the 39th Infantry. 

This regiment and the 47th Infantry, 

which was making the thrust alongside the 

3d Armored Division, together were to 

clear the forest barrier and converge near 

Dueren. The remaining regiment, the 

40 Entry, 1320, 12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Kampfverlauf; TWX, A ep B to OB 

WEST, 2350 and 2400, 22 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, 

Operationsbefehle; MS # B-563 (Generalleutnant 

Wolf Trierenberg, comdr of the 347th Div). 

41 TWX, A ep B to OB WEST, 2350 and 

2400, 22 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Operationsbefehle; MS # B-793 (Col Hasso Neitzel, CofS, 

89th Div). 
84 

60th Infantry, had to serve both as a 

division reserve and as security for the 

right flank of the corps. Deducing that 

the flank might be secured by seizing a 

high ridge line southeast of Monschau, 

crowned by the villages of Hoefen and 

Alzen, General Craig told the 60th Infantry to send a reinforced battalion to 

the ridge. Covered with West Wall pillboxes, this ridge represented in effect a 

fortified dagger pointed at the base of the 

Monschau Corridor and commanding the 

roads through Monschau. 

Under Lt. Col. Lee W. Chatfield, the 

reinforced battalion of the 60th Infantry 

began operations a day ahead of the rest 

of the 9th Division by moving to Camp 

d'Elsenborn, a road center and former 

Belgian Army garrison ten miles south of 

Monschau. From here Colonel Chatfield 

turned north early on 14 September to 

come upon the Hoefen-Alzen ridge from 

the southwest. Pushing back a small 

delaying detachment at the German 

border, the battalion occupied the border 

village of Kalterherberg. 

Though Colonel Chatfield attacked the 

Hoefen-Alzen ridge during the afternoon 

of 14 September, 350 men of the I056th 

Regiment, representing the hard core of 

veterans available to the 89th Division, 

already had occupied the pillboxes. 42 

When Chatfield's infantrymen crossed a 

deep ravine separating Kalterherberg from 

the ridge, they met the full force of small 

arms and machine gun fire from the pillboxes. 

To make quick work of the ridge and 

get on with the main task of driving 

northeast up the Monschau Corridor, General Craig decided during the evening of 

14 September to send the rest of the 60th 

42 For distribution of German units, see MS 

# B-793 (Neitzel). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Infantry to help. Both remaining battalions were to move southeast from Eupen . 

through the Hertogenwald to Monschau. 

Thereupon a battalion from Monschau 

and Colonel Chatfield's battalion at Kalterherberg were to press the ridge between 

them. The remaining battalion was to 

defend at Monschau; in effect, a reserve. 

On 15 September Colonel Chatfield 

noted no slackening of fire from the pillboxes opposite Kalterherberg. Nor was 

the weight of the other battalions around 

Monschau felt appreciably, because the 

length of the journey from Eupen and 

demolished bridges at Monschau delayed 

any real participation by them. Only the 

advent of supporting tanks on 16 September had any real effect. With the help of 

the tanks, a battalion from Monschau 

drove into Hoefen on the 16th, but even 

then Colonel Chatfield could detect no 

break at the other end of the ridge. 

Indeed, the next day the Germans reacted 

actively with a counterattack which carried to the center of Hoefen before the 

Americans rallied. Not until 18 September, when Colonel Chatfield abandoned 

the attack from Kalterherberg and joined 

the other battalion in Hoefen, did the 

enemy relinquish his hold on Alzen and the 

rest of the ridge. By a tenacious defense, 

the I056th Regiment had tied up the 

entire 60th Infantry for five days at a time 

when the weight of the regiment might 

have been decisive elsewhere. 

General Craig obviously could have used 

the regiment to advantage elsewhere, particularly in the Monschau Corridor. 

Here the 39th Infantry had been discovering how much backbone concrete fortifications can put into a weak defensive 

force. 

That part of the Scharnhorst Line 

blocking the Monschau Corridor was one 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

of the strongest in the forward band of the 

West Wall; for German engineers had 

recognized that the high, rolling plateau 

northeast of Monschau was a likely avenue 

for pushing through the forest barrier. 

Into the pillboxes the 89th Division commander, Colonel Roesler, had thrust the 

1,200-1,500 men of his attached grenadier 

training regiment. This regiment subsequently was to become an organic part of 

the division and be redesignated the 

1055th Infantry.43 

Commanded by Lt. Col. Oscar H. 

Thompson, the 39th Infantry's 1st Battalion marched almost unopposed on 14 

September across the German border into 

the village of Lammersdorf at the northern 

edge of the Monschau Corridor. Colonel 

Thompson then turned his men northward 

to strike the West Wall at a customhouse 

a mile away. The customhouse guarded 

a highway leading northeast through the 

Roetgen Forest in the direction of Dueren. 

Hardly had the infantrymen emerged 

from Lammersdorf before small arms and 

mortar fire from pillboxes around the 

customhouse pinned them to the ground. 

Though Colonel Thompson sent two of 

his companies on separate flanking maneuvers, darkness came before any part of the 

battalion could get even as far as the 

dragon's teeth. 

Soon after Colonel Thompson met his 

first fire, the 39th Infantry commander, 

Lt. Col. Van H. Bond, committed another 

battalion on Thompson's right. This battalion was to pass east through Lammersdorf, penetrate the Scharnhorst Line, and 

take the village of' Rollesbroich, two miles 

away. Capture of Rollesbroich would 

open another road leading northeast 

43 MS # B-793 (Neitzel). 

85 

through the forest. But here again the 

Germans stopped the attackers short of 

the dragon's teeth, this time with antitank fire to supplement the small arms 

and mortars. 

In a renewal of the two-pronged attack 

on 15 September, the 39th Infantry displayed close co-ordination between infantry and attached tanks and tank destroyers; but the fortifications in most cases 

proved impervious even to point-blank fire 

from the mobile guns. Sometimes the 

Germans inside the pillboxes were so 

dazed by this fire that the attacking 

infantry could slip up and toss hand 

grenades through firing apertures, but 

this was a slow process which brought 

reduction of only about seven pillboxes 

and by no means served to penetrate the 

entire band. 

Attempting to open up the situation, 

Colonel Bond sent his remaining battalion 

far around to the north to pass through 

the Roetgen Forest in a wide envelopment 

of the customhouse position. By nightfall of 15 September this battalion had 

reached the rear of the enemy strongpoint, 

but not until after a full day of tedious, 

costly small unit fighting was the position 

reduced. 

Three days of bitter fighting had 

brought a path only a mile and a half 

wide through the Scharnhorst Line and no 

advance beyond the line. Even this path 

could not be used, for strong West Wall 

positions stretching south to Monschau 

commanded almost all roads leading to 

Lammersdorf. By holding between Lammersdorf and Monschau, the Germans still 

kept a dagger pointed toward the 9th 

Division's flank and rear, thereby virtually 

negating the importance of the 60th Infantry's conquest of· the Hoefen-Alzen 

ridge. 
86 

It had become apparent by this time 

that the 39th Infantry alone was insufficient for pushing through the Monschau 

Corridor. Separated by more than seven 

miles from the 47th Infantry at Schevenhuette and five miles from the 60th Infantry at Monschau, the regiment needed 

help. Not until 18 September, after the 

60th Infantry at last eliminated the enemy 

on the Hoefen-Alzen ridge, would General 

Craig- be able to provide it. 

The Germans Strike Back 

Looking beyond the troubles of the 

39th Infantry to the situation of the entire 

VII Corps, the first five days of West Wall 

fighting had produced encouraging, if 

not spectacular, results. Though success 

probably was not commensurate with 

General Collins' early hopes, the corps 

nevertheless had pierced the forward band 

of the West Wall on a front of twelve 

miles and in the second belt had achieved 

a penetration almost five miles wide, The 

VII Corps clearly had laid the groundwork for a breakthrough that needed only 

exploitation. 

On the other hand, was the VII Corps 

in a position to reap the rewards? The 

logistical situation, particularly in regard 

to los-mm. howitzer ammunition, still 

was acute. Though supporting aircraft 

normally might have assumed some of the 

artillery missions, overcast skies, mists, 

drizzles, and ground haze had been the 

rule. Day after day since the start of the 

West Wall fighting the airmen had bowed 

to the weather: 13 September-"While 

we had cloudless skies, nevertheless, haze 

restricted operations .... " 14 September-"Weather again proved to be our 

most formidable obstacle . . .." So it 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

had gone, and so it would continue to go: 

17 September-" ... 77 sorties were 

abortive due to the weather." 18 September-"Only two missions were flown 

due to the weather." Although the 

weather often was good enough for longrange armed reconnaissance flights, these 

provided little direct assistance to the 

troops on the ground.44 

Nor was the condition of the divisions 

of the VII Corps conducive to encouragement. The 3d Armored Division, for 

example, had only slightly more than half 

an authorized strength of 232 medium 

tanks, and as many as 50 percent of these 

were unfit for front-line duty:45 By 

nightfall of 16 September, every unit of 

the VII Corps was in the line, stretched 

to the limit on an active front which 

rambled for almost thirty miles from 

Aachen to Eilendorf to Schevenhuette to 

the Hoefen-Alzen ridge. Great gaps 

existed on either flank of the corps and 

gaps of seven and five miles within the 

lines of the 9th Division. 

The only genuine ground for optimism 

lay in the deplorable condition of the 

German units. The 89th Division in the 

Monschau Corridor, for example, had re44 IX FC and IX TAC, Unit History, Sep 44, 

and FUSA and IX T AC Daily Summaries, Sep 

44. A compendious account of tactical air operations during the fall of 1944 may be found in 

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., 

The Army Air Forces in World War II: Vol. III, 

Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 

to May 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, I951), pp. 600 and 614, (hereafter cited 

as Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT 

to V-E Day). 

45 The 3d Armored Division on 18 September 

had I53 medium tanks, of which only 70 to 75 

were actually available for use. See 3d Armd 

Div AAR, Sep 44, and Combat Interv with 3d 

Armd Div G-4. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

ceived no major reinforcements since the 

start of the fighting and obviously was 

even more of a makeshift than before. 

The division still had to rely for artillery 

support upon antitank guns and mortars. 

In the sector of the LXXXI Corps, 

neither the 9th nor 116th Panzer Division 

had been shored up appreciably. Still 

facing the main weight of the VII Corps, 

the 9th Panzer Division was in particularly bad shape. The division had less 

than 2,500 infantrymen, some 200 machine guns, 13 Mark V (Panther) tanks, 

12 assault guns, 15 75-mm. antitank guns, 

20 105- and 15 150-mm. howitzers, and I 

88-mm., 3 37-mm., and 3 20-mm. antiaircraft guns. As of nightfall, 16 September, the division lacked even a commander. Visiting the division command 

post, the Seventh Army commander, 

General Brandenberger, charged that General Mueller was una ware of the actual 

situation on his front. He relieved both 

Mueller and Mueller's chief of staff.46 

To reduce the 9th Panzer Division's 

responsibility, the corps commander, General Schack, transferred a few hundred 

men to the headquarters of the almostdefunct 353d Infantry Division and told 

that division to defend the Wenau, 

Huertgen, and Roetgen Forests from 

below Schevenhuette southward to the 

boundary with the LXXIV Corps. General Brandenberger, in turn, eased the 

responsibility of the LXXXI Corps by 

transferring the 353d Division to General 

Straube's LXXIV Corps and altering the 

46 Rpt, Brandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Be/ehle: Heeresgruppe, 

Armee, usw. See Heichler, Germans Opposite 

VII Corps, pp. 42-44, for a detailed breakdown 

of 9th Panzer Division strength as determined 

from contemporary German sources. 

87 

boundary between the two corps to run 

just south of Schevenhuette.47 

These adjustments obviously were feeble 

moves hardly worthy in themselves of any 

great expectations. Nevertheless, the 

Germans did possess a genuine hope in the 

impending arrival of a fresh division, 

something which the VII U.S. Corps could 

not duplicate. The first contingents of 

the 12th Infantry Division arrived at 

detraining points along the Roer River 

early on 16 September. These and subsequent units of the division made a deep 

impression on a military and civilian 

population starved for the sight of young, 

healthy, well-trained soldiers. 

Numbering 14,800 men, the 12th Division was organized along the lines of the 

"Type-1944 Infantry Division." It had 

three regiments of two battalions eachthe 27th Fusilier Regiment and the 48th 

and 89th Grenadier Regiments-plus a 

separate infantry unit, the 12th Fusi.· 

lier Battalion. The division was fully 

equipped except for an authorized twenty 

assault guns, a defect which Field Marshal 

Model at Army Group B remedied by 

attachment of seventeen assault guns of 

the 102d Assault Gun Brigade. 48 The 

12th Artillery Regiment had its authorized 

strength of nine batteries of 10 5-mm. 

howitzers and three batteries of 150-mm. 

howitzers. The division's antitank battalion had twelve 75-mm. guns. Thanks 

to priority growing out of specific orders 

from Hitler and Field Marshal von Rund47 Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps with 353d In/ 

Div, 2310, 14 Sep, and 1510, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Kamp/verlau/; Daily Sitrep, 

LXXXI Corps, 2100, 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Order, Seventh Army to 

all corps, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw. 

48 These assault guns we,e similar to the 

American tank destroyer. See above, p. 27. 
88 

stedt and of prevailing misty, rainy 

weather that had cloaked German trains 

from Allied aircraft, the 12th Division was 

arriving in record time and in top condition. 49 

"Seventh Army will defend the positions . . . and the West Wall to the last 

man and the last bullet," General 

Brandenberger declared. "The penetrations achieved by the enemy will be wiped 

out. The forward line of bunkers will 

be regained . . . ." 50 

Cognizant of the dangers of piecemeal 

commitment, General Schack assured the 

12th Division commander, Col. Gerhard 

Engel, that he would try to wait until the 

entire division had arrived. 51 He kept the 

promIse less than twenty-four hours. 

Straight from the railroad station at 

Juelich General Schack sent the first 

battalion of the 27th Fusilier Regiment 

to Verlautenheide, north of Eilendorf, 

whence the battalion was to attack on I7 

September to thwart the thrust of CCA, 

3d Armored Division, toward Eschweiler. 

The second battalion of the 27th Fusiliers 

moved to Stolberg. When the other two 

regiments and some of the organic artillery 

detrained before daylight on 17 September, General Schack ordered them to start 

immediately driving CCB from the vicinity 

of the Weissenberg (Hill 283) and Maus49 Rpt, A ep B, 1335, 14 Sep 44, OB WEST 

KTB; Tel ConY, Model to Seventh Army, 1350, 

16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kamp/verlau/; 

TWX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200, 16 

Sep 44), LXXXI Corps, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Befehle an Div; Daily Sitrep, A ep 

B, 0230, I7 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-97 I (Col Gerhard Engel, 

comdr, 12th In/ Div). 

50 Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 16 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, 

Armee, usw. 

51 Order, LXXXI Corps to 12th Div, 2300, 15 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Be/ehle an Div. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

bach in order to restore the Schill Line 

southeast of Stolberg.52 

Renewing the two-pronged thrust 

toward Eschweiler on 17 September, both 

combat commands of the 3d Armored 

Division bumped head on into the German 

reinforcements. On the left, while CCA 

was getting ready to attack shortly before 

dawn, the Germans began a heavy artillery barrage against both CCA and the 

16th Infantry at Eilendorf. Plunging out 

of a woods between Verlautenheide and 

Stolberg, men of the 27th Fusilier Regiment charged in well-disciplined waves 

with fixed bayonets. They made a perfect target for prepared artillery and 

mortar concentrations. Those who got 

through the curtain of shellfire were cut 

down close to American foxholes with 

small arms and machine gun fire. 

Though the fusiliers tried again in the 

afternoon and prevented CCA from attacking, they gained no ground. American casualties were surprisingly light. 

The hardest hit battalion of the 16th 

Infantry, for example, lost two men killed 

and twenty-one wounded. 

Split into two task forces, CCB attacked 

at midday to take the Weissenberg. The 

task force on the left ran almost immediately into an attack by a battalion of the 

89th Grenadier Regiment, while the task 

force on the right encountered a thrust 

by a battalion of the 48th Grenadier Regiment supported by three tanks. On the 

left, neither side could gain. On the 

right, the grenadiers shoved the armored 

task force back a thousand yards. Late 

52 Tel Conys, LXXXI Corps with 12th Div, 

0850 and 1800, and with 116th pz Div, 2130, 16 

Sep 44; Tel ConY, Seventh Army with LXXXI 

Corps, 1150, 17 Sep 44; Order, LXXXI Corps to 

12th Div, 1015, 16 Sep 44; all in LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Kampfverlauf, MS # A-971 (Engel). 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

in the afternoon the enemy drive bogged 

down, but not before the situation had 

become so grave that the division commander, General Rose, had sent his reserve 

to CCB's aid. Though CCB noted the 

loss of only one light and one medium 

tank, the Germans claimed to have destroyed nine tanks and to have taken 

fifty-seven prisoners. 53 

The other battalion of the 48th 

Grenadier Regiment intended to retake 

Schevenhuette. Here the 47th Infantry 

commander, Colonel Smythe, had decided 

to delay his attack in view of the indications of German build-up. In midmorning, a patrol under S. Sgt. Harold 

Hellerich spotted the Germans moving 

toward Schevenhuette from the village of 

Gressenich. Notifying his company commander, Sergeant Hellerich waited for the 

Germans to enter an open field, then 

pinned them to the ground with fire from 

his patrol. At this point gunners in the 

main positions of the 47th Infantry raked 

the field with machine gun, mortar, and 

artillery fire. Observers estimated that of 

at least 200 Germans who had entered the 

field no more than ten escaped. 

Before daylight the next morning, 18 

September, a reinforced company of the 

48th Grenadier Regiment sneaked through 

the darkness to surprise the defenders of 

a roadblock on the Gressenich-Schevenhuette road. V ndetected until too late, 

the Germans pushed quickly into the village, only to encounter an American tank 

hidden among the buildings. Assisted by 

nearby riflemen and machine gunners, the 

53 German sources are: Daily and Evng Sitreps, 

LXXXI Corps, 1620 and 2145, 17 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Sitrep, 

12th Div, 1340, and Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps 

with 12th Diu, 1535 17 Sep 44, both in LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; MS # A-971 (Engel). 

89 

tank's fire virtually wiped out the enemy 

company. Not until four days later, on 

22 September, did the 48th Grenadiers 

desist in their attempts to retake Schevenhuette, and then only after a full battalion 

had failed in the face of "murderous" 

losses. Schevenhuette, the survivors reported, had been turned into a veritable 

fortress, fully secured by mine fields and 

barbed wire and tenaciously defended by 

600-700 men. 54 

Even before this action at Schevenhuette, the very first day of active 

commitment of the 12th Division had 

shown the division commander, Colonel 

Engel, how difficult-perhaps how insurmountable-was his task. On the night 

of 17 September, the Americans had begun to pound the fresh division with 

artillery fire of alarming proportions. In 

another few hours Colonel Engel was to 

report his units hard hit by casualties, 

particularly a battalion of the 89th Regiment that was down to a hundred men, 

less than a fifth of original strength.55 

Somewhat disheartened by the outcome 

of the counterattacks and possibly more 

than a little displeased at the piecemeal 

commitment of his troops, Colonel Engel 

called off offensive action for most of the 

division the next day to permit regrouping. 56 

On the American side, General Collins 

had noted that the advent of a fresh 

German division had changed the situation materially. Though the Germans 

had gained ground in only isolated instances, he recognized that as long as his 

54 Daily Sitrep, 12th Diu, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

55 Evng Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1625, 18 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

56 MS # A-971 (Engel); Tel Convs, LXXXI 

Corps with 12th Diu, 0400 and 0425, 18 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 
90 

adversary had reserves and he had none 

further large-scale advances were impossible. Ordering the 1st Division, 3d 

Armored Division, and the 47th Infantry to 

consolidate, Collins directed the rest of 

the 9th Division to shorten the corps 

line by cleaning out the forest between 

Schevenhuette and Monschau. 57 

The Onset of Position Warfare 

On the surface General Collins' order 

to consolidate looked like a sorely needed 

rest for most of the troops of the VII 

Corps. Yet the divisions were in the delicate situation of being through the West 

Wall in some places, being half through in 

others, and at some points not having 

penetrated at all. The line was full of 

extreme zigs and zags. From an offensive standpoint, the penetrations of the 

Schill Line were too narrow to serve 

effectively as springboards for further 

operations to the east; as a defensive 

position, the line was open to infiltration 

or counterattack through the great forest 

between Schevenhuette and Lammersdorf 

and through the daggerlike redan which 

the Germans held between Lammersdorf 

and Monschau. In addition, the positions within the Stolberg Corridor were 

subject to observation from high ground 

both east and west of Stolberg. To 

eliminate these flaws, the VII Corps was 

destined to attack on a limited scale for 

most of the rest of September. 

The 9th Division drew what looked to 

be the major role. General Collins directed General Craig to drive through the 

Roetgen, Wenau, and Huertgen Forests 

to occupy a clearing near the villages of 

57 VII Corps Opns Memo 94, 18 Sep 44, confirming oral orders issued the day before, VII 

Corps G-3 file, 18 Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Huertgen and Kleinhau, about six miles 

east of Zweifall. This would bring. control of the only good road net between 

the forest barrier and the Roer River and 

also knit together the two forces in the 

Stolberg and Monschau Corridors. At 

the same time, the combat commands of 

the 3d Armored Division were to seize 

heights on either side of the Vicht River 

valley at Stolberg, both to eliminate superior enemy observation and to merge the 

two penetrations of the Schill Line. Only 

the 1st Division, in the half-moon arc 

about Aachen, was to stick strictly to the 

defense. 58 

As the fighting continued in the Stolberg Corridor, both German and American units wore themselves out. While 

the 3d Armored Division's CCA tried to 

take high ground about the industrial 

suburb of Muensterbusch, less than half a 

mile west of Stolberg, and CCB to occupy 

the high ground east of Stolberg, the 

enemy's 12th Division and what was left 

of the 9th Panzer Division continued their 

futile efforts to re-establish the Schill Line. 

The result was a miserable siege of deliberate, close-in fighting which brought few 

advantages to either side. 

Attachment of the remnants of the 

9th Panzer Division to the 27th Fusilier 

Regiment made CCA's task at Muensterbusch considerably more difficult. 59 Not 

until late on 19 September did troops of 

CCA gain a foothold in M uensterbusch 

from which to begin a costly, methodical 

mop-up lasting over the next two days. 

For two days CCB fought in vain for 

58 The development of corps plans may be 

traced in VII Corps Opns Memos 94-97, 18-20 

Sep 44. 

50 Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps with Engel, 2045, 

and with 12th Diu, 2230, 18 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Kampfuerlauf. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

the Weissenberg (Hill 283) on the other 

side of Stolberg; then early on 20 September a task force under Lt. Col. Samuel 

M. Hogan employed a radical change in 

tactics. Instead of an artillery preparation and tank support, Colonel Hogan 

sent the attached battalion of the 26th 

Infantry forward alone under concealment 

of an early morning haze. Catching the 

Germans off guard, the infantry took the 

hill with hardly a shot fired. 

CCB's remaining task was to occupy 

the Donnerberg (Hill 287), another major 

height overlooking Stolberg from the east. 

The assignment fell to Task Force Mills, 

which with but fourteen effective medium 

tanks still was stronger than Task Force 

Lovelady. Screened by smoke and protected on the east by fire of the combat 

command's tank destroyers, Task Force 

Mills dashed across a mile of open ground 

and took the height in one quick thrust. 

Holding the Donnerberg was another 

matter. No sooner had the smoke dissipated than the Germans knocked out 

half of the tanks. Afraid that loss of the 

height would compromise a switch position under preparation in the center of 

Stolberg, the Germans on 22 September 

mustered a battalion of the 27th Fusilier 

Regiment to counterattack.60 In the 

meantime, CCB's Task Force Lovelady 

had moved up the hill to strengthen Task 

Force Mills. In danger of losing almost 

all the combat command at one blow, the 

division commander, General Rose, authorized withdrawal. Behind a smoke 

screen the two understrength task forces 

dashed down the slopes into Stolberg. 

Here they found sanctuary, for in bitter 

60 Mng Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 0525, and Daily 

Sitreps, LXXXI Corps and 116th pz Div, 21 Sep 

44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

91 

fighting Task Force Hogan by this time 

had pushed the enemy back to the switch 

position across the center of the town. 

This was about all either Germans or 

Americans could accomplish in the Stolberg Corridor. After 22 September the 

fighting died down. Despite grievous 

losses, the Germans actually ended up 

stronger than they had been since General 

Collins first opened his "reconnaissance in 

force"; for as the fighting died, reinforcements began to arrive. Unfortunately 

for the LXXXI Corps commander, General Schack, they came too late to benefit 

him. On 20 September, because of 

Schack's connection with the Schwerin 

affair in Aachen, General Brandenberger 

relieved him of command. General der 

Infanterie Friedrich J. M. Koechling took 

over. 

The first major reinforcement to arrive 

was the 183d V olks Grenadier Division, 

which had to be employed north of 

Aachen against the XIX U.S. Corps. 

Having shored up the line there, General 

Koechling pulled out the depleted 27Sth 

Infantry Division and sent it southward 

to occupy a narrow sector around 

Schevenhuette between the 12th Division 

and the LXXIV Corps. On 23 September a third full-strength division, the 

246th V olks Grenadier, entrained in Bohemia with a mission to relieve-at long 

last-the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions. 

These two units were to pass into reserve 

for refitting and reorganization.61 

61 Tel ConY, Seventh Army with LXXXI 

Corps, 1130, 17 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 22 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; 

Order, LXXXI Corps to 27Sth Div, 1730, 22 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div; 

Order A Gp B to Seventh Army, 1315, 23 Sep 

44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 
92 

The First Fight in the Forest 

On the south wing of the VII Corps, 

General Collins' order to push through 

the forest barrier to the clearing around 

Huertgen and Kleinhau coincided roughly 

with completion of the 60th Infantry's 

conquest of the Hoefen-Alzen ridge on 18 

September. Relinquishing responsibility 

for holding the ridge to the 4th Cavalry 

Group, the division commander, General 

Craig, left one battalion behind to back 

up the cavalry and moved the rest of the 

regiment northward for commitment in 

the forest. To make up for the battalion 

left behind, General Craig withdrew the 

1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, from the 

fighting in the Monschau Corridor and 

attached it to the 60th Infantry. 

The new drive through the forest in no 

way lessened the necessity for the 39th 

Infantry to enlarge the penetration of the 

West Wall in the Monschau Corridor. 

Given no respite, the two remaining battalions of the regiment were to fight 

doggedly for the rest of the month in 

quest of two dominating pieces of terrain 

which would secure the penetration. 

These were Hill 554, within the West 

'Vall south of Lammersdorf, and an open 

ridge between Lammersdorf and Rollesbroich. 

By this time the American battalions 

had developed closely co-ordinated patterns of maneuver with their attached 

tanks and tank destroyers, but at best 

reduction of the pillboxes was slow and 

costly. Late on 19 September success 

appeared imminent when tanks and infantry plunged through the line more than 

two miles toward Rollesbroich, but so 

fatigued and depleted were the companies 

that they had no energy left to exploit the 

gam. Having failed to reach RollesTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

broich, the thrust provided no real control 

of an important road net leading northeast from the village. Hill 554 was finally 

secured on 29 September after two tenuous holds on it had given way. 

In the meantime, the 60th Infantry's 

attempt to push through the forest and 

seize the road net around Huertgen and 

Kleinhau also had begun on 19 September. Something of the confusion the 

dense forest would promote was apparent 

on the first day when the lead battalion 

"attacked" up the main supply route 

leading to the 47th Infantry at Schevenhuette. 

Embracing approximately seven miles, 

the 60th Infantry front in the forest corresponded roughly to the sector which the 

enemy's nondescript 353d Infantry Division had assumed when transferred from 

the LXXXI to the LXXIV Corps. The 

60th Infantry commander, Col. Jesse L. 

Gibney, planned to attack with two battalions moving directly through the center 

of the forest. This was tantamount to 

two separate operations; for as Colonel 

Gibney knew, secure flanks within a forested zone seven miles wide would become 

a fancy that one had read about long ago 

in the field manuals. 

The attached 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Thompson, was to move almost due east from 

Zweifall to seize a complex of trails in the 

valley of the Weisser Weh Creek, about a 

mile from the woods line at Huertgen. 

Colonel Gibney intended later to send this 

battalion into Huertgen, thence northeast 

to the village of Kleinhau, only three miles 

from the flank of the 47th Infantry at 

Schevenhuette. On the right, a battalion 

of the 60th Infantry under Colonel Chatfield was to advance southeast from 

Zweifall, follow the trace of the second 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

band of the West Wall, and occupy an 

initial objective astride a wooded ridge 

just north of Deadman's Moor (Todten 

Bruch), a stretch of marshy ground 

along the Lammersdorf-Huertgen highway. Colonel Chatfield's battalion then 

was to continue east through about two 

more miles of forest to cut the Lammersdorf-Huertgen highway at the village of 

Germeter. 

Experiencing more difficulty from terram than from the enemy, Colonel 

Thompson's 1st Battalion reached the 

valley of the Weisser Weh by nightfall of 

20 September. Though Colonel Gibney 

ordered a push the next day into Huertgen, the enemy awoke at daylight to the 

battalion's presence. Colonel Thompson's 

men spent the entire day beating off 

diverse elements of the 353d Division and 

trying to get tanks and tank destroyers 

forward over muddy firebreaks and trails 

to assist the attack on Huertgen. 

Before the battalion could get going on 

22 September, orders came to cancel the 

attack. Colonel Thompson was to move 

north to back up the 47th Infantry at 

Schevenhuette where the 12th Division's 

48th Regiment was threatening to push in 

that regiment's advanced position. The 

division commander, General Craig, also 

sent the 60th Infantry's reserve battalion 

northward to Schevenhuette. 

Even though neither of these battalions 

had to be committed actively at Schevenhuette, concern over the situation there 

had served to erase the penetration 

through the forest to the valley of the 

Weisser Weh. By the time Colonel 

Thompson's battalion became available to 

return three days later, on 25 September, 

the Germans had moved into the Weisser 

Weh valley in strength. Not only that; 

now Colonel Thompson's men had to go 

93 

to the aid of Colonel Chatfield's battalion 

astride the wooded ridge near Deadman's 

Moor. 

Colonel Chatfield's battalion of the 

60th Infantry had found the opposition 

tough from the outset. Strengthened by 

the pillboxes in the Schill Line, the Germans clung like beggar lice to every 

position. Two days of fighting carried 

the battalion over a thousand yards to the 

western slopes of the objective, the ridge 

north of Deadman's Moor; but the next 

morning, 22 September, the Germans began to counterattack. 

The counterattack resulted from direct 

intervention by the Seventh Army commander, General Brandenberger. Concerned about American advances in the 

forest on 20 September, Brandenberger 

had transferred an understrength assault 

gun brigade from the LXXXI Corps to 

the 353d Division. About this brigade 

the 353d Division had assembled a battalion each of infantry and engineers, an 

artillery battery, and five 75-mm. antitank 

guns. 62 

Though the counterattack on 22 September made no spectacular headway, 

close combat raged back and forth along 

the wooded ridge for the next three days. 

The fighting centered primarily on possessesion of a nest of three pillboxes that 

changed hands time after time. Having 

entered the forest with only about a hundred men per rifle company, Colonel 

Chatfield's battalion felt its casualties 

62 Tel ConY, LXXXI Corps with 353d Div, 

1720, 21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 

1940 21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: 

H eeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; Evng Sitrep, A Gp 

B, 1840, 21 Sep 44, A Gp' B KTB, Letzte 

Meldung; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0110, 22 Sep 

44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 
94 

acutely. Though a few wide-eyed replacements arrived, the rate of attrition 

proved far greater than the build-up. At 

one point the Germans overran a pillbox 

and captured forty-five men, including all 

officers and the command group of one of 

the companies. Only thirty disorganized 

men remained in that company. 

By 25 September losses had become so 

oppressive that the regimental commander, 

Colonel Gibney, saw no hope for the 

battalion's renewing the attack. Altering 

his plan of maneuver, he sent both his 

reserve battalion and Colonel Thompson's 

I st Battalion, 39th Infantry, to take over 

the assault role. From the contested 

ridge, these two battalions were to drive 

south through Deadman's Moor, cut the 

Lammersdorf-Huertgen road, and make 

contact to the southwest with that part of 

the 39th Infantry which had pierced the 

forward band of the West Wall at 

the customhouse near Lammersdorf. If 

this could be accomplished, the 60th Infantry would have carved out a sizable 

salient into the forest and would have 

secured at least one of its flanks. Then 

the regiment conceivably might renew the 

drive northeast up the highway to the 

original objective of Huertgen. 

Both battalions attacked early on 26 

September. Five days later, by the end 

of the month, the 60th Infantry at last 

had cut the Lammersdorf-Huertgen highway near Jaegerhaus, a hunting lodge 

that marked a junction of the highway 

with a road leading northwest through 

the forest to Zweifall. But it had been 

a costly, frustrating procession of attack 

followed by counterattack, a weary, plodding fight that pitted individual against 

individual and afforded little opportunity 

for utilizing American superiority in artillery, air, and armor. Enemy patrols 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

constantly infiltrated supply lines. Although units at night adopted the 

perimeter defense of jungle warfare, the 

perimeter still might have to be cleared of 

Germans before the new day's attack 

could begin. So heavy a toll did the 

fighting take that at the end of the month 

the 60th Infantry and the attached battalion from the 39th Infantry were in no 

condition to resume the attack toward 

Huertgen. 

The Germans had effectively utilized 

terrain, the West Wall, and persistent 

small-unit maneuver to thwart the limited 

objective attack of the widespread 9th 

Division. As others had been discovering 

all along the First Army front, General 

Craig had found his frontage too great, 

his units too spent and depleted, and a 

combination of enemy and terrain too 

effective to enable the division to reach its 

objectives. In the specialized pillbox and 

forest warfare, "the cost of learning 'on 

the job' was high." 63 

As events were to develop, the 9th 

Division was the first of a steady procession of American units which in subsequent weeks were to find gloom, misery, 

and tragedy synonymous with the name 

Huertgen Forest. Technically, the Huertgen Forest lies along the middle eastern 

portion of the forest barrier, but the name 

was to catch on with American soldiers to 

the exclusion of the names Roetgen and 

Wenau. Few could distinguish one dank 

stretch of evergreens from another, one 

abrupt ridge from another. Even atop 

the ridges, the floor of the forest was a trap 

for heavy autumn rains. By the time 

both American and German artillery had 

done with the forest, the setting would 

G:; Ltr, Craig to OCMH, 3 I Aug 53. 
VII CORPS PENETRATES THE LINE 

look like a battlefield designed by the 

Archfiend himself. 

The VII Corps was stopped. "A combination of things stopped us," General 

Collins recalled later. "We ran out of 

gas-that is to say, we weren't completely 

dry, but the effect was much the same; we 

ran out of ammunition; and we ran out 

of weather. The loss of our close tactical 

air support because of weather was a 

real blow." The exhausted condition of 

American units and the status of their 

equipment also had much to do with it. 

It was a combination of these things, plus 

"really beautiful" posItIOns which the 

Germans held in the second band of the 

West Wall. 64 

General Collins had gone into the West 

Wall on the theory that "if we could 

break it, then we would be just that much 

to the good; if we didn't, then we would 

be none the worse." 65 Perhaps somewhere between these conditions lay the 

true measure of what the VII Corps had 

accomplished. The West Wall had been 

penetrated, but the breach was not secure 

enough nor the VII Corps strong enough 

for exploitation. 

The fighting had cost the Germans 

dearly in casualties. In a single week 

from 16 to 23 September, for example, 

the 12th Division had dropped from a 

"combat strength" of 3,800 men to 1,gOO, 

a position from which the division was not 

64 Interv with Collins, 21 Jan 54. 

65 Interv with Collins, 25 Jan 54. 

95 

to recover fully through the course of the 

autumn fighting. During a similar period, the 9th Panzer Division had lost over 

a thousand men representing two thirds of 

its original combat strength. One unit, 

the Iosth Panzer Grenadier Battalion, 

had been reduced from 738 officers and 

men to 116. Only the [[6th Panzer Division in the relatively quiescent sector 

about Aachen had avoided appreciable 

losses. 66 On the other hand, the Germans had bought with those losses a 

priceless commodity. They had bought 

time. 

As September came to an end, the VII 

Corps all along the line shifted to defense. 

Before General Collins could hope to renew the attack, he had somehow to 

shuffle the front to release some unit with 

which to attack. 67 The logical place to 

shuffle was in the defensive arc about 

Aachen; for the next fight lay not to the 

east or northeast but in con junction with 

the XIX Corps against the city which 

General Collins had by-passed in favor of 

more critical factors like dominant terrain 

and the West Wall. 

66 For detailed figures and documentation on 

enemy strengths, see Heichler, Germans Opposite 

VII Corps, pp. 84-86. 

67 During this period a squad leader in the 

18th Infantry, S. Sgt. Joseph E. Schaefer, earned 

the Medal of Honor. After helping thwart a 

local counterattack, Sergeant Schaefer went beyond his lines to overtake a group of withdrawing 

Germans and liberate an American squad captured earlier in the fighting. The sergeant 

personally killed between 15 to 20 Germans, 

wounded as many more, and took 10 prisoners. 
CHAPTER V 

Action on the North Wing 

First Army's third major component, 

the XIX Corps under General Corlett, 

was out of the running in the race for the 

West Wall. Immobilized four days by 

the gasoline shortage and possessing but 

two divisions, the XIX Corps at the time 

the first patrols probed the German 

border still was west of the Meuse River. 

At the closest point, Germany still was 

fifteen miles away. The XIX Corps 

nevertheless had an integral role in the 

First Army's scheme of attack-to penetrate the West Wall north of Aachen and 

form the northern arm of a pincers enveloping the city. 

In much of the XIX Corps sector, the 

Meuse River was strengthened by another 

obstacle, the Albert Canal. The Albert 

parallels the Meuse from Liege to the 

vicinity of Maastricht before swinging 

northwest toward Antwerp. (Map 1) 

Built before World War II with military 

utility in mind, the canal is no minor 

obstacle. In many places it cuts deep 

through the soft soils of the region. Its 

banks are great concrete-reinforced precipices, sometimes as high as 160 feet from 

the water line. 

On the XIX Corps left wing, where the 

2d Armored Division was approaching the 

canal and facing almost due north, the 

region beyond the canal is marshy and 

creased by numerous small streams. Here 

dug-in Germans reacted nervously and 

apparently with some strength against 

XIX Corps patrols. On the corps right 

wing the 30th Division faced the dual 

obstacle of the Albert and the Meuse. 

Near the center of the XIX Corps zone 

lay Maastricht, capital city of the province of Limburg, the Dutch Panhandle. 

A road hub through which the XIX Corps 

would have to funnel its supply lines, 

Maastricht was the logical pivot on which 

to base a wheeling movement through the 

Panhandle and thence east to the German 

border. The city lies on an island about 

seven miles long and two miles wide, 

formed by a complex of man-made waterways and by the Meuse (known in the 

Netherlands as the Maas). General Corlett was to clear the enemy from north of 

the Albert Canal and east of the Maas 

(Meuse) up to an operational boundary 

with the British. This boundary ran 

northeast from a point between Hasselt 

and Beeringen and passed about thirteen 

miles north of Maastricht. 

Because the XIX Corps was running 

several days behind its neighbors on both 

left and right, General Corlett saw no 

necessity for assault crossings of the Albert 

and the Meuse. At Beeringen, northwest 

of Hasselt, the 30 British Corps already 

had forged a substantial bridgehead across 

the Albert, and at Liege the VII Corps 

had thrown a bridge across the Meuse. 

Since the Germans appeared ready to de-
CONTACT WITH U.S. 

AIRBORNE DIVISION 

ESTABLISHED ON 18 SEP 

.~\~t~\. 

\ 

\ 

MAP] 

DRIVE FROM THE ALBERT CANAL 

TO THE WEST WALL 

XIX CORPS 

10-19 September 1944 

---••• ALLIED POSITIONS, 10 SEP 

----t.~ MAIN AXIS OF ADVANCE. DATE INDICATED 

'TTTTr!!!!!1Tf! 0 0 0 POSITIONS, NIGHT. 19 SEP 

~ GERMAN UNIT 

~ 

~ 

~ ~ GERMAN LINE OPPOSITE XiX CORPS, (9 SEP 

WEST WALL 

5 

1 I 

o I 1 I I Iii i [ 

5 0 

10 MILES 

1 

H,C,Brewel·,Jr. 
98 

GENERAL CORLETT 

fend the obstacles, why not, General Corlett reasoned, utilize the crossings already 

made?1 

Defense of the Albert 

As General Corlett suspected, the Germans were planning to defend the Albert 

Canal. Also as General Corlett suspected, 

they hadn't much to do the job with. 

As the city of Maastricht marked 

roughly the center of the XIX Corps zone, 

so it represented a line of demarcation 

between contingents of two German 

armies. North of a line marked by the 

Maastricht "island," Valkenburg, and 

Stolberg, the defense was the responsibility of the First Parachute Army, a newcomer in the line, most of whose troops 

1 Combat Interv with Corlett, filed with XIX 

Corps Combat Intervs for Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

opposed the British. The other half of 

the XIX Corps zone, that area between 

Maastricht and Liege, was the responsibility of General Brandenberger's Seventh 

Army, the same headquarters whose 

troops faced the V and VII Corps. 

As the northernmost portion of General 

Brandenberger's zone, this sector came 

under General Schack's LXXXI Corps, 

that headquarters whose major responsibility was the defense of Aachen. An 

extension of the boundary between the 

XIX and VII Corps would run just north 

of Aachen and thereby split General 

Schack's zone almost in the center. The 

two divisions on the LXXXI Corps south 

wing (the 9th and I 16th Panzer Divisions) 

would oppose the VII Corps; the two on 

the north wing could face the XIX Corps.2 

These two divisions comprising General 

Schack's northern wing were the 49th and 

27sth Infantry Divisions. The strength 

and caliber of neither could have afforded 

the corps commander any genuine confidence. 

Smashed in France, the 49th Division 

under the aegis of its commander, Generalleutnant Siegfried P. Macholz, had tried 

to reorganize earlier in Hasselt; but only 

about 1,500 men-mostly service troopshad reached the assembly area. Of the 

combat forces, hardly anything remained. 

General Macholz had left but one regimental headquarters-that of the 148th 

Infantry-and no artillery or antitank 

guns except one I 12-mm. Russian howitzer. General Schack on 7 September had 

ordered General Macholz to put a regiment of two battalions, created around 

2 For a detailed account of the German order 

of battle and operations in this sector, see Lucian 

Heichler, The Germans' Opposite XIX Corps, a 

study prepared to complement this volume; copy 

in OCMH. 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

the headquarters of the 148th, into the 

line along a seven-mile front on the east 

bank of the Meuse running north from an 

industrial suburb of Liege. 

By IO September the 49th Division had 

been reinforced by a security regiment 

composed of older men, staffed by officers 

of World War I vintage, and equipped 

with small arms and a few machine guns 

but no heavy weapons. This unit General Macholz assigned to cover half his 

division front and was subsequently to 

redesignate to replace his defunct 149th 

Infantry Regiment. Reinforcements were 

to continue to arrive in driblets so that by 

the time the battle was fully joined, General Macholz in one regiment had a 

strength of I, I 88 officers and men and in 

the other, 858. Although both regiments 

gained a reasonable complement of machine guns, they had only two mortars 

and five 75-mm. antitank guns between 

them. The division still had no motor 

transport and no artillery.3 

Sharing a common boundary with the 

49th Division in the vicinity of Vise, 

about halfway between Liege and Maastricht, was the 275th Division under Generalleutnant Hans Schmidt. The 275th's 

northern boundary coincided with that 

between the First Parachute and the 

Seventh Armies, which was in turn 

roughly comparable to the boundary between the U.S. 2d Armored and 30th 

Divisions. By IO September, the day 

when patrols of the XIX Corps reached 

3 MS # B-792, Die Kaempfe der 49. Inf Div 

von der M aas bis an den Westwall noerdlich 

Aachen (2 Sep 44-18 Sep 44) und die Kaempfe 

um den Westwall (10 Sep 44-10 Nov 44) 

(Macholz); Rpt, 49th Diu to LXXXI Corps, 14 

Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div; 

TWX (Weekly Strength Rpt as of 16 Sep 44), 

LXXXI Corps to Seventh Army, 22 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div. 

99 

the Albert Canal and the Meuse in force, 

General Schmidt had under his command 

approximately 5,000 men. Like General 

Macholz and the 49th Division, he had 

only one regimental headquarters, the 

984th Infantry; but in comparison to the 

49th, General Schmidt was rich in artillery: he had a battery of four I 05-mm. 

howitzers inherited from an SS division 

which had returned to Germany.4 

The third German division opposing the 

XIX Corps held positions from Maastricht along the Albert Canal to the 

vicinity of Hasselt. This was the 176th 

Infantry Division under the banner of the 

First Parachute Army. 

The presence of the First Parachute 

Army in the line west of Maastricht was 

an exemplification of the kind of eleventhhour improvisation to which the Germans 

had been forced by several factors: the 

haphazard nature of their retreat, the 

lengthening of their defensive front as 

they fell back on Germany and the Netherlands, and the virtual isolation of an army, 

the Fifteenth, when the British had captured Antwerp. Pinned against the 

Channel coast by the British coup de 

main, the Fifteenth Army had to employ 

all its resources in escaping across the 

Schelde estuary and in holding banks of 

the estuary in order to deny the Allies 

access to Antwerp from the sea. 5 This 

had left between the Fifteenth Army and 

the Seventh Army's westernmost position 

near Maastricht a vacuum of critical 

proportions, a gap along the Albert Canal 

of almost sixty miles. The "door to 

northwestern Germany stood open." 6 

4 MS # B-372 (Schmidt). 

5 See below, Chs. VI and IX. 

6 OKWjWFSt KTB, Ausarbeitung, der Westen 

J.IV.-I6.XII. 44, MS # B-034 (Schramm). 
100 

When news of the fall of Antwerp had 

reached Berlin, the German headquarters 

OKW had acted quickly to do something 

about the great gap. Telephoning Generaloberst Kurt Student, commander of 

German parachute troops, OKW had 

ordered him to assume command of the 

First Parachute Army, a headquarters 

which previously had controlled units only 

in training. General Student and his new 

command, OKW directed, were then to 

come under the control of Field Marshal 

Model's Army Group B and defend the 

north bank of the Albert Canal from 

Maastricht west to the vicinity of 

Antwerp.7 

Upon inspecting the Albert Canal on 5 

September and getting an idea of the 

troops he would control, General Student 

could generate no enthusiasm for either. 

The initial organization of his new army 

he termed "an improvisation on the grandest scale." 8 Although Student's army 

was to increase rapidly in strengtli because his superiors considered this sector 

so important, the size of the army as the 

XIX Corps reached the Albert Canal 

left much to be desired. General Student 

had at this time but one corps headquarters, borrowed from the Fifteenth 

Army, with three infantry divisions and a 

parachute division, the latter little more 

deserving of the honorific "parachute" 

than was the army as a whole. These 

four divisions General Student had arrayed in a linear defense along the Albert 

Canal with the 176th Division occupying. 

the left sector between Maastricht and 

7 Entries of 3 and 4 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB 

(Text); MS # B-7I7, Zusatz zum Bericht von 

Oberst i.G. Geyer (concerning First Prcht Army) 

(Student). 

8 MS # B-717 (Student). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Hasselt. Because of the northeasterly direction of the XIX Corps attack; the 

176th Division would be the only one of 

Student's divisions to be encountered by 

General Corlett's forces. 

Commanded by Colonel Christian Landau, the 176th Division was one of those 

replacement training units which the Germans had upgraded hurriedly to meet the 

crisis of the Allied march upon the homeland. Replacement trainees, convalescents, and semi-invalids in a total strength 

of approximately 7,000 made up the 

command. Only a few of these men were 

unconditionally fit for active fighting. 

Grouped for combat into three regimental 

teams, the division had a heterogeneous 

assortment of units: several infantry battalions formed from replacement training 

units, two Luftwaffe battalions made up 

of air force personnel, an "ear battalion," 

two engineer battalions, and a reconnaissance battalion made up of two bicycle 

compames. 

Whereas Colonel Landau's infantry 

was about equal to that of the neighboring 

27Sth and 49th Divisions, his artillery was 

stronger. He had two so-called light battalions with 6 10 5-mm. howitzers and I 

heavy battalion with 8 infantry cannon, 4 

German, 2 Czech, and 2 Russian 150-mm. 

howitzers. Possessing I 75-mm. gun, 20 

20-mm. guns, and 5 88's, Colonel Landau 

also was better off than his neighbors in 

the antiaircraft and antitank departments. 

Like the other divisions, he had only 

limited signal equipment, almost no services, and no motor transport. 9 

When first committed, Colonel Landau 

had been impelled to put one battalion 

9 Rpt on Trip to 1]6th Inf Div, 1st Lt Klaus 

Liebrecht to Model, 7 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

0p.-Befehle; MS # B-362, 176. Inf Div (Landau). 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

forward of his main line on the opposite 

side of the Albert Canal in order to fulfill 

an order from Hitler to defend Fort Eben 

Emael, the most elaborate fort in what 

had once been a complex Belgian defensive 

system. Though conforming, General 

Student had protested the disposition because of numerous factors, not the least 

of which were that the main entrance to 

the fort was on the American side and 

that the firing embrasures were clogged 

with wrecked Belgian cannon from 1940 

when German airborne troops had 

swooped down on the fort. Not until 

early on IO September, a step ahead 

of the 30th U.S. Division, did Field 

Marshal Model's concurrence in Student's 

view permit the battalion of the I76th 

Division to abandon Eben Emael and 

retire to the other side of the Albert. 10 

From the Albert to the Border 

While the two German armies thus 

were concocting a defense on their inner 

wings, the American commander, General 

Corlett, was directing the maneuvers by 

which he hoped to turn the German 

flanks without the necessity of forcing 

bridgeheads across the Albert and the 

Meuse. Contacting the 30 British Corps 

and the VII Corps, he secured permission 

to utilize their bridges on either of his 

flanks at Beeringen and at Liege. 

Though Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, 

10 TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST (relaying and 

endorsing Msg, Student to A Gp B), 1400, 9 Sep 

44, and Order, A Gp B to First Prcht Army, 2105, 

9 Sep 44, both in A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle; MS # B-372, Kaempfe [der 275. Inf 

Diu] in Nordfrankreich (Schmidt); and Noon 

Sitrep, A Gp B, 1345, IO Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Letzte Meldung. 

101 

commander of the 30th Division, wanted 

to put his entire division across the VII 

Corps bridge at Liege, General Corlett demurred. Tying up the bridge the length 

of time required to move an entire division 

he deemed an undue imposition on the 

VII Corps. Instead, Corlett ordered the 

I 13th Cavalry Group (Col. William S. 

Biddle) to cross the Meuse at Liege and 

drive northward behind the dual obstacle 

of the canal and the river. As soon as 

the cavalry had cleared a portion of the 

east bank within the XIX Corps zone, 

the 30th Division then could cross unopposed in its own sector. The 2d Armored 

Division was to execute a similar maneuver with its own reconnaissance battalion 

at Beeringen.ll 

Delayed somewhat by mines, demolished bridges, and occasional defended 

roadblocks, Colonel Biddle's cavalry nevertheless made good progress. By late 

afternoon of I I September, the cavalry 

had pushed north from Liege through all 

resistance General Macholz' feeble 49th 

Division could offer and was engaging a 

part of General Schmidt's 275th Division 

near Vise, well within the XIX Corps 

zone. In the meantime, reconnaissance 

patrols sent out by the 30th Division's 

I 19th Infantry (Col. Edwin M. Sutherland) had discovered that a narrow strip 

of land between the canal and the Meuse 

was undefended. By the time the cavalry 

arrived opposite this point, Colonel Sutherland already had a footbridge across the 

canal and was ready with assault boats to 

cross the river. Disturbed only by an 

occasional round of artillery fire, the I 19th 

Infantry reached the far bank and fanned 

out to the east and northeast. Before 

11 113 th Cay Gp and 2d Armd AARs, Sep 44. 
102 

daylight on 12 September, the I 17th Infantry (Col. Walter M. Johnson) followed 

suit. 12 

While these crossings were in progress, 

the 30th Division's third regiment, the 

120th Infantry, was holding the west bank 

of the canal farther north near the point 

where the canal swings northwest away 

from the Meuse. Commanded by Col. 

Hammond D. Birks, this was the regiment 

which on the day before (10 September) 

had occupied Fort Eben Emael. 

Not content to sit idly while waiting for 

the other two regiments on the east bank 

to come abreast, Colonel Birks turned his 

attention to a lock on the canal near Fort 

Eben Emael. So long as the Germans 

held this lock, Colonel Birks believed, they 

might demolish it at any time to inundate 

some of the Dutch lowlands to the north 

and northwest. 

Getting to the lock, Colonel Birks soon 

discovered, posed quite a problem. Located at the southeastern tip of the Maastricht island, the lock could be reached 

only from the island or from the narrow 

strip of flat terrain between the canal and 

the Meuse. At first glance, Colonel Birks 

and his engineer advisers could see no 

hope of crossing the canal at any point 

12 For operations of the 113th Cavalry Group 

and the 30th Division, see official records of the 

group, division, and attached units. An unofficial history of the 30th Division by Robert L. 

Hewitt, entitled Workhorse of the Western Front 

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), is 

comprehensive and apparently authoritative. 

Nicknamed "Old Hickory" in recognition of its 

Tennessee-C arolinas National Guard origin, the 

30th Division entered combat on 10 June. At 

Mortain, in Normandy, the division held a flank 

of the American breakout at Avranches against 

the major German panzer counterattack to cut 

off Hodges' and Patton's armored spearheads. 

General Bradley, in A Soldier's Story, page 375, 

calls the 30th the "Rock of Mortain." 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

close to the lock; for the concrete-faced 

west bank of the canal at this point is too 

high and steep for launching assault boats 

in any orthodox manner. The closest 

place where assault boats might be 

launched was opposite the village of 

Lanaye, a mile south of the lock, but the 

route from Lanaye to the objective was 

cruelly exposed to German fire from the 

east bank of the Meuse. 

The problem of how to get to the lock 

remained until a local Belgian electrical 

engineer suggested a solution. Two tunnels, he pointed out, leading from deep in 

the bowels of Fort Eben Emael, emerge 

along the steep west bank of the canal a 

short distance from the lock. Large 

enough to permit passage of rubber assault 

boats, the upper tunnel emerges about 

halfway up the bank. More a drainage 

pipe than a passageway and so small a 

man would have to crawl to negotiate it, 

the lower tunnel opens directly below the 

upper tunnel right at the water line; 

While engineers carried assault boats 

through the upper tunnel, a squad of 

infantry slithered 500 yards through the 

lower to gain the canal. When the engineers overhead lowered the rubber boats 

down the concrete face of the west bank, 

the infantry clambered in and quickly 

paddled across. Taking a small German 

party guarding the lock by surprise, the 

infantry made short work of the wires to 

the demolitions. 

On the enemy side of the canal and the 

river, the outcome of fighting on I I 

September had emphasized the patent impossibility of the 49th and 275th Divisions' 

holding even for a reasonable length of 

time along the east bank of the Meuse. 

As early as the day before, when the 

I 13th Cavalry Group first had crossed 

the Liege bridge, the German generals 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

had recognized that fact. 13 Yet as night 

came on I I September their corps commander, General Schack, reiterated their 

mission of preventing an attack on the 

West Wall before the fortifications could 

be readied. Form a new line, General 

Schack directed, facing south and running 

generally along the Dutch-Belgian border 

eastward from the Meuse in the vicinity 

of Lanaye. The 275th Division was to 

stick close to the river while the 49th 

Division held the line farther east and 

maintained contact with the 116th Panzer 

Division, which was falling back on 

Aachen before the VII U.S. Corps. "The 

fight for time," General Schack warned, 

"is of paramount importance!" 14 

As General Schack must have realized, 

it would take more than platitudes to 

halt the onrush of American troops. On 

I 2 September he appealed unsuccessfully 

to the Seventh Army commander, General 

Brandenberger, in hope of shortening his 

front by adjustment of the boundary with 

the First Parachute ArmyY 

On the American side, the I 17th and 

I 19th Infantry Regiments were handicapped through most of 12 September 

because lack of treadway bridges across 

the Albert and the Meuse prevented attached tank companies from crossing, but 

they continued to push steadily north and 

northeast. Driving northeast on the right 

flank of the infantry, Colonel Biddle's 

cavalry group also advanced steadily and 

13 Rad, 49th Div to LXXXI Corps, 1440, 10 

Scp 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der 

Diu; MS # B-372 (Schmidt). 

14 Order, LXXXI Corps to 275th and 49th 

Divs, 2210 and 2215. II Sep 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Kampflferlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps 

to Seventh Army, 2300, II Scp 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

1" Tel Convs, Seventh Army with LXXXI 

Corps, 1500 and 1600, 12 Scp 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Kampfverlauf. 

103 

maintained contact with the I st Division 

of the VII Corps. The 30th Division and, 

the ca valry were shoving the Germans 

back as though forcing open a giant door 

hinged on Maastricht. In little more than 

two days after the cavalry had wedged a 

foot in the door near Liege, the gap was 

widening. 

By nightfall of 12 September the infantry troops had gained as much as five 

miles to bring them abreast of Colonel 

Birks' 120th Infantry, which by this time 

had crossed the canal to take the village 

of Lanaye. In the process, the Americans 

hardly were aware that the Germans had 

attempted a new line along the DutchBelgian border. By nightfall they were 

almost a mile inside the Netherlands. 

Maastricht lay but four miles away. 

The Germans made one feeble counterattack during the day, not for a tactical 

objective but in an attempt to rescue the 

driver and aide-de-camp of the 275th 

Division commander, General Schmidt, 

and a dispatch case containing important 

papers. Traveling with his aide in a 

command car, General Schmidt earlier in 

the day had narrowly escaped capture 

when he came suddenly upon an American patrol. As the Americans opened 

fire, they killed both Schmidt's driver and 

his aide and wounded the general in the 

left hip. Unaware that his companions 

were dead, General Schmidt hobbled and 

crawled away from the scene and back to 

his own lines, whereupon he organized a 

counterattack in an attempt, he said, "to 

rescue my comrades." The German general might better have spared the effort. 

Both his aide and his driver were corpses 

by this time, and at 30th Division headquarters American officers already were 

poring over the papers from the dispatch 

case. 1st Lt. Elwood G. Daddow had 
104 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

PORTION OF FORT EBEN EMAEL 

spotted the case and dashed out under 

fire to get it.16 

Intelligence officers of the 30th Division 

were elated to discover among the German papers documents indicating the 

strength and missions of many units under 

the Seventh Army and a situation map 

spotting the command posts of the 

Seventh Army, two corps, and twelve diVlSlOns. In light of the fluidity of German 

units at the time, the documents hardly 

could have been as valuable as either the 

Germans or the Americans indicated; 

lGIn MS # B-372, General Schmidt h as provided a lucid if somewhat mock heroic account 

nevertheless, the incident had provided a 

cloak-and-dagger element often lacking in 

plodding infantry operations. 

After a third day of fighting the 49th 

and 27Sth Divisions again had no alternative but to fall back and try to establish 

another line. Urging that the 27Sth Division do everything possible to prevent a 

crossing onto the Maastricht island, General Schack authorized a withdrawal of 

about three miles.17 Schack conceivably 

might have wished to withdraw the two 

divisions all the way back to the West 

Wall before the Americans could wipe 

them out completely; but Army Group B 

of this action. Records of American units also 17 Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs, 2230, [2 

tell of it. Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Be/ehle an Diu. 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 105 

THE ALBERT CANAL, as seen from a machine gun emplacement in Fort Eben Emael. 

(Captured film.) 

thought otherwise. During the night of 

12 September Field Marshal Model ordered specifically that the LXXXI Corps 

cling to the Maas River between Vise and 

Maastricht. Withdrawal from that front 

would require his special authorization, 

he said.is 

Model probably did not know that Vise 

already had fallen at least twelve hours 

before and that his order was no longer 

relevant. Better informed about the true 

situation, General Schack paid scant at1 8 Rad, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corp s (relaying order, A Gp B), 0300, 13 Sep 44, LXXXI 

Corp s KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw. 

tention to the order. The LXXXI Corps 

commander told the 275th Division to fall 

back on the Maastricht-Aachen highway 

but to hold a small sector alongside the 

Maas in order to keep U.S. forces away 

from Maastricht long enough to permit 

the garrison of the Maastricht island to 

withdraw eastward over the city's bridges. 

For his part, the ailing 275th Division 

commander, General Schmidt, had no 

faith in this plan. He apparently wanted 

to abandon Maastricht and fall back 

another four or five miles behind a minor 

but deep-cut stream, the Geul River. In 

the first place, he believed the Americans 
106 

could break any line he might form other 

than one behind a difficult obstacle. In 

the second place, he saw no reason for 

trying to save the Maastricht bridges, 

because that part of the First Parachute 

Army's I76th Division on the Maastricht 

island surely would not withdraw eastward into another division's sector but 

northward into the division's own rear 

areas. 19 

Only one more day was necessary to 

prove General Schmidt right on both 

scores. Indeed, he had much less chance 

than before to hold the line; for during 

the night attached tanks and organic 

artillery had crossed the Meuse to join the 

30th Division's infantry. The two assault 

regiments swept forward rapidly on 13 

September. The commander of the 

I76th Division's garrison of Maastricht 

and the island became convinced that the 

island positions were untenable. In withdrawing, the garrison turned, as General 

Schmidt had predicted, not to the east but 

to the north. 

General Schmidt was not the first to 

discover that this American infantry-tankartillery team was a difficult thing to stop. 

In the long march across northern France 

and Belgium, General Hobbs's troops and 

those of the other divisions had become 

masters of the art of pursuit warfare. 

They had attained an almost reflexive 

knowledge of how to fight this kind of 

war. The infantry-tank-artillery teams 

were close-knit families, into which had 

been adopted the fighter-bomber. At the 

first word to advance, the infantry would 

clamber to accustomed perches upon its 

attached tanks. Upon encountering opposition, the infantry would dismount 

and engage the enemy while forward ob10 MS # B-372 (Schmidt). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

servers for the artillery would bring down 

fire in a matter of minutes. Atop the 

tanks and trucks were brilliant fluorescent 

panels to serve as identification for the 

pilots of fighter-bombers flying column 

cover. Although weather often deterred 

air activity during these latter days of the 

pursuit, the pilots still were able to make 

the enemy's daytime movements a risky 

business. 

Before dark on 13 September a battalion of the I 17th Infantry entered Wi jk, 

Maastricht's sprawling suburb lying east 

of the Maas, but discovered that the 

Germans had demolished the bridges between Wi jk and the city on the island. 

Crossing the river in assault boats the 

next day (14 September), the men found 

the city empty of the enemy except for 

three Germans burning papers in the local 

Gestapo headquarters. 

In the meantime, the other battalions of 

Colonel Johnson's regiment and those of 

the I 19th Infantry were pushing northeast to gain the line of the Geul River. 

Not without some trepidation did the two 

regiments approach the Geul, for the valley of this little tributary of the Maas is a 

marked feature in a region where hills fuse 

with lowlands. From a captured document, XIX Corps intelligence had determined that the Germans planned to 

defend the line of the Geul as a switch 

position between Aachen and Maastricht, 

thereby tying in the West Wall at Aachen 

with the First Parachute Army's line along 

the Albert and Meuse-Escaut Canals,20 

in what had been designated as the West 

Stellung. 

20 See Defensive Line Between Maastricht and 

Aachen, notes on a captured document to be 

found in G-2 Sec, XIX Corps AAR, Sep 44; also 

LXXXI Corps Order for Preparation to Occupy 

West Wall, 10 Sep 44, V Corps G-2 file, 14 

Sep 44. 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

The Gennans did intend to defend the 

Geul, but the American advances on 13 

September into Wijk and farther east along 

the boundary between the 49th and 27Sth 

Divisions near the town of Gulpen came 

close to compromising the position before 

it could be established. Registering particular concern about the gap at Gulpen, 

Field Marshal Model at Army Group B 

directed the LXXXI Corps to commit all 

available forces to restore a continuous 

front there. Though General Schack 

shifted a straggler battalion, a machine 

gun company, and two engineer companies of the 49th Division into the gap, 

this was not enough. 21 

Early on 14 September a battalion of 

the I 19th Infantry crossed the Geul at a 

ford a mile north of Gulpen without opposItIon. At the same time another battalion of the I 19th Infantry crossed at 

Valkenburg, about seven miles east of 

Maastricht. Choice of the Valkenburg 

site for a crossing was unfortunate because of the proximity of the 27Sth Division's artillery. With observation from 

atop a water tower, General Schmidt's 

lone original battery of 105-mm. howitzers plus three other newly attached 

batteries could readily ad just their fire 

on the crossing.22 Though the Germans 

claimed to have reoccupied Valkenburg 

itself, the I 19th Infantry still maintained 

a foothold beyond the GeuI. 

With Maastricht captured and bridgeheads having apparently compromised the 

Geul switch position, General Hobbs now 

was ready to wheel to the east in order to 

21 Tel Convs, Seventh Army with LXXXI Corps 

(relaying order, Model to Seventh Army), 2050, 

13 Sep 44 and LXXXI Corps with 275th Div, 

2345, 13 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 

22 MS # B-373, Kaempfe in Rheinland der 

75. Infanterie-Division (Schmidt). 

107 

assault the West Wall north of Aachen. 

The fact that he failed to do so immediately, the German commanders opposite 

him could attribute only to the possibility 

that he was busy regrouping and moving 

up reinforcements and supplies.23 

Although General Hobbs did use the 

opportunity to move Colonel Birks' 120th 

Infantry forward, this was not his real 

reason for a pause. General Hobbs was, 

in reality, perturbed by the fact that any 

move to the east would leave his left flank 

dangling. On his right flank he had 

adequate protection from a screen raised 

by the 113th Cavalry Group along an 

eight-mile front in the direction of the VII 

Corps near Aachen; but on his left flank 

the 2d Armored Division still was straining to come abreast through the marshy 

flatlands west and northwest of Maastricht. General Hobbs told his regiments 

to put in bridges across the Geul and 

strengthen the bridgeheads, but the 30th 

Division would not drive eastward alone. 

More dependent upon bridges than an 

infantry division, the 2d Annored Division 

under Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Hannon had 

been a day later than the 30th Division in 

beginning to advance beyond the Albert 

CanaP4 Crossing the British bridge at 

23 MSS # B-372 (Schmidt) and # B-792 

(Macholz). 

24 General Harmon formally assumed command 

on 12 September when General Brooks left in 

anticipation of assuming command of the V Corps 

(see above, Ch. III). The 2d Armored (Hell 

on Wheels) Division had the same organization 

as the 3d Armored Division of the VII Corps 

(see above, Ch. IV). Having campaigned previously in North Africa and Sicily, the division 

entered combat in Normandy on 10 June. Its 

after action reports for September are particularly detailed. The division has published a 

sketchy account of its operations, entitled, A 

History of the Second United. States Armored 

Division, E. A. Trahan, ed. (Atlanta, Ga.: A. 

Love, 1947). 
108 

Beeringen at first light on I I September, 

General Harmon's reconnaissance battalion had driven southeast to re-enter the 

XIX Corps zone before dark at a point 

north of Hasselt. A counterattack during 

the night by contingents of Colonel 

Landau's I76th Division and occasionally 

stanch resistance the next day so delayed 

the battalion in clearing a stretch of the 

north bank of the Albert Canal that 

supporting engineers did not get a bridge 

completed until midnight of 12 September. Thereupon, CCA under Col. John 

H. Collier rumbled across, though not 

until daylight of 13 September would the 

left hook of General Corlett's double envelopment of the Albert Canal line really 

begin to roll. 

With the reconnaissance battalion protecting the left flank, Colonel Collier's CCA 

drove eastward on 13 September toward 

the Maas. Resistance took the form of 

numerous roadblocks, reinforc~d by mines 

and occasional antitank guns and defended by tenacious knots of infantry. 

Though the marshy terrain forced the 

armor to stick to the roads and limited 

maneuver against the roadblocks, the 

enemy's I76th Division was no more equal 

to holding an unyielding line than were 

the two divisions opposite the XIX Corps' 

other wing. On both. 12 and 13 September, the enemy commander, Colonel 

Landau, had to fall back several miles and 

try to form a new line. Governed by the 

only main road even approximating the 

desired direction of advance, Colonel Collier's CCA had to take a somewhat 

circuitous route northeast toward the 

town of Asch, thence east and southeast 

to the Maastricht Canal north of Maastricht. Even so, the armor took only two 

days to cover the fifteen miles. 

Before the 2d Armored Division could 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

come fully abreast of the 30th Division, 

somebody had to clear the Maastricht 

island. General Harmon had intended 

that CCB (Brig. Gen. Isaac D. White) 

cross the Albert south of Maastricht, 

sweep the island, then pass through Maastricht and drive northeast along the east 

bank of the Juliana Canal, which 

parallels the Maas north of Maastricht. 

That would put CCB alongside the left 

flank of the 30th Division in a drive 

aimed at Sittard, a city that was to serve 

as a northern anchor when the assault 

turned eastward against the West Wall. 

But on 14 September a Bailey bridge 

General White's engineers were constructmg across the Albert Canal to the 

Maastricht island buckled just before 

completion. CCB's attack had to wait 

another day. 

Actually, little need remained for clearing the Maastricht island. The onrush 

of CCA driving eastward toward the 

Maastricht Canal and the entrance of a 

battalion of the 30th Division into Wijk, 

the eastern suburb of Maastricht, had 

convinced the I76th Division commander, 

Colonel Landau, that any attempt to 

defend the island or the city could end 

only in destruction of the forces involved. 

Ordering all his units during the night of 

13 September to fall back behind the 

Maastricht Canal north of Maastricht, 

Colonel Landau abandoned both the 

island and the city. 

In approving this withdrawal, Field 

Marshal Model at Army Group B directed an adjustment of the boundary 

between the First Parachute Army and 

the Seventh Army. Heretofore, the First 

Parachute Army's I76th Division had 

operated only west of the Maas; now the 

division would be responsible for a sector 

on the east bank extending northeastward 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

toward Sittard. The boundary would 

run from the vicinity of Meerssen, five 

miles northeast of Maastricht, northeastward in the direction of Geilenkirchen, 

a German border town twelve miles north 

of Aachen. The new' enemy boundary 

would be roughly identical to that between the 2d Armored and goth Divisions. 25 

Rather than sit idly on the west bank 

of the Maastricht Canal, Colonel Collier's 

CCA late on 14 September jumped the 

canal onto the Maastricht island, only a 

step behind Colonel Landau's withdrawing Germans. By the next day, when 

General White's CCB at last bridged the 

Albert south of Maastricht, Colonel Collier's combat command already had 

cleared all stragglers from the island. 

General White was free to move immediately east of the Maas and start the drive 

on Sittard. By nightfall of 15 September 

a task force of CCB had secured a tiny 

bridgehead under fire across the Geul 

northwest of Meerssen. 

Now that the corps armor was coming 

abreast of the 30th Division, General 

Hobbs on 16 September renewed his attack eastward to reach the West Wall 

north of Aachen, though the promise of a 

protected north flank for the infantry still 

needed two days for fulfillment. Moving 

up assault guns, the 176th Division delivered such intensive shellfire on CCB's 

little bridgehead near Meerssen that it 

took the armor all of 16 September to fill 

out the bridgehead. Although CAA utilized the I 19th Infantry's bridge over the 

Geul at Valkenburg, Colonel Collier's 

combat command came under such heavy 

interdictory fires in the Valkenburg defile 

that it too needed an entire day to cross 

25 Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1530, 14 Sep 44, A 

Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

109 

the flver. On 17 September the armor 

gradually expanded its two bridgeheads, 

each to a depth of about two miles, but 

not so much through sheer weight as 

through the enemy's fear of envelopment. 

Probings by the 2d Armored Division's 

reconnaissance battalion across the Maastricht Canal north of Maastricht had 

convinced Colonel Landau, the 176th Division commander, that the Americans 

intended to drive from that direction to 

link with their forces from the Geul 

bridgeheads in a pincers movement. To 

escape envelopment, Colonel Landau began to withdraw in the direction of 

Sittard.26 

On 18 September both CCA and CCB 

broke loose to cover the remaining six 

miles to Sittard. That set telephones to 

ringing high up the German chain of 

command. It was of "decisive importance," Field Marshal Model informed 

the First Parachute Army's General Student, that his forces hold the line at 

Sittard and keep the' Americans out of the 

West Wall. OB WEST already had 

made available one infantry division (the 

12th), which was even then restoring the 

line against the VII U.S. Corps in the 

Stolberg Corridor southeast of Aachen; in 

a matter of days now General Brandenberger's Seventh Army was to get another 

fresh division, the 183d Volks Grenadier 

Division) which General Brandenberger 

was to commit between Sittard and 

Aachen. Relief was on the way, the 

Army Group B commander said, in effect; 

hold out until then! 27 

General Student might have reacted 

with more vigor to Model's appeal had he 

26 Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0730, 17 Sep 44, A Gp 

B KTB, Letzte Meldung; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 

0400, 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

27 Order, A Gp B to First Prcht Army, 2230, 

18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB Operationsbefehle. 
110 

not at this time had his hands full with as 

grave a threat as the Western Front had 

known since the Allies first neared the 

German border. Just the day before, 

deep in the rear areas of the First Parachute Army within the Netherlands, 

thousands of Allied parachutes had blossomed in an airborne operation aweinspiring in scope. 28 General Student 

nevertheless spared a small Kampfgruppe 

from the loth SS Panzer Division, which 

had been refitting far behind the lines, to 

go to Sittard and counterattack on 19 

September.29 

As all concerned soon discovered, this 

Kampfgruppe might have served the German cause better had Student retained it 

to fight the Allied parachutists. The 

counterattack delayed the 2d Armored 

Division's CCB a day, but CCA continued to push northeastward toward 

Geilenkirchen to enter that portion of 

Germany which projects into Holland in 

the form of a cat's head and forequarters. 

The West Wall lay but a few miles to the 

east. The enemy commander, Colonel 

Landau, expected total disaster to overtake his division at any moment. 3D 

In the meantime, General Hobb's 30th 

Division on the right wing of the XIX 

Corps had broken out of the Geul bridgeheads more readily than had the armor, 

despite the fact that the enemy had 

received several infantry battalions as reinforcements. By last light on 16 September the infantry columns and their 

supporting tanks and tank destroyers 

obviously were ready to roll across a 

28 See below, Ch. VI. 

29 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0230, 19 Sep 44, A Gp 

B KTB Tagesmeldungen; Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 

0900, 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

30 Tel ConY, LXXXI Corps with I76th In! 

Div, 2150, 19 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfverlau!. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

remaining eight or nine miles to the 

German border. Indeed, at the town of 

Simpelveld, some companies of the 120th 

Infantry already were no more than three 

miles from the border. Here Field Marshal Model directed a futile counterattack 

by an SS assault gun battalion that 

represented Army Group B's only remaining reserve for commitment in this sector. 

All through the evening of 16 September, General Schmidt kept the LX X X I 

Corps switchboard busy with appeals to 

permit his 275th Division to withdraw to 

a new line near the border. The American thrust to Simpelveld had sliced 

through on the boundary between his 

division and that of General Macholz' 

49th Division. Most of his units were 

north of that penetration, some still as far 

west as the Geul River near Meerssen, 

and all were in imminent danger of being 

taken from the rear should the Americans 

turn north from Simpelveld. Yet neither 

the LXXXI Corps commander, General 

Schack, nor the Seventh Army Chief of 

Staff, Col. Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von 

Gersdorff, had any ear for General 

Schmidt's impassioned pleas. Except for 

a few scattered replacement units, the 

West Wall from Aachen northward, they 

knew, lay naked. No matter what happened, Generals Schmidt and Macholz 

must hold as far west of the West Wall as 

possible until the promised 18 3d V olks 

Grenadier Divi,fion could arrive. 31 

31 Tel Convs, Seventh Army with LXXXI 

Corps, 19[0 and 2400, [6 Sep 44, and 01[5,17 

Sep 44, Schack with G-3 LXXXI Corps, 23 00, 

16 Sep 44, and LXXXI Corps with 275th Div, 

0035 and 0110, I7 Sep 44, all in LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, LXXXI Corps to all 

divs, 2000, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Be!ehle an Div; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps to 

Seventh Army, 2[40, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS # B-373 (Schmidt). 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

Just as the 12th Division's race into the 

Stolberg Corridor to prevent a breakthrough southeast of Aachen must have 

left more than one German commander's 

hair on end, so the arrival of the 183d 

V olks Grenadier Division in the West Wall 

north of Aachen was a matter of splitsecond timing. Under the command of 

Generalleutnant Wolfgang Lange, the 

183d Division had been refitted and rehabilitated in Austria. Like the 12th Division, the 183d was at full strength and 

completely equipped, except for its assault 

gun battalion. Its troops, however, were 

largely Austrian, inadequately trained, and 

inexperienced.32 

On 17 September the inexorable push 

of General Hobbs's 30th Division continued. On the division's left wing, the 

I 19th Infantry tore right through the 

middle of the 275th Division to capture 

Heerlen, the last Dutch town of appreciable size in this sector. The I20th Infantry on the right actually crossed the 

German border east of Simpelveld but at 

a point where the West Wall lay more 

than a mile behind the border. The 

enemy still had time to get the 18 3d 

Division into the pillboxes. 

As was the American custom, the 

Germans noted, the U.S. troops during 

the night of 17 September "called off the 

war at midnight." As the front settled 

down, train upon train bearing arms and 

men of the 183d Volks Grenadier Division 

rolled into blacked-out railheads along the 

Roer River. The entire division would 

require two more nights to arrive, but a 

strong vanguard was soon en route toward 

assembly areas near the front. 33 

32 MS # B-753, Die Kaempfe der 183. Volksgrenadier-Division im Raume Geilenkirchen von 

September 1944 bis Ende Januar 1945 (Lange). 

33 Ibid. 

111 

Having won a third lap of the race for 

the West Wall, the Germans were in no 

haste to substitute the 183d Division for 

those replacement units already in the 

pillboxes and for the withdrawing survivors of the 49th and 275th Divisions. 

Model instead withheld the fresh division 

close behind the pillboxes as a tactical 

reserve. 34 

Unaware that a frenzied race for the 

West Wall had been taking place, the 

Americans in the meantime had been 

pushing steadily forward. On 18 September General Hobbs committed the 

I 17th Infantry to extend his left flank in 

the direction of the 2d Armored Division; 

by nightfall the I 19th Infantry in the 

center of the 30th Division had reached 

pOSItIOns overlooking the little Wurm 

River and the forward reaches of the West 

Wall. The 2d Armored Division, in turn, 

pushed into Gangelt on the corps north 

flank on 19 September. In the process 

the armor shoved what was left of Colonel 

Landau's 176th Division back to the north 

and northeast and severed all contact 

between the 176th Division and General 

Schmidt's 275th.35 

To Field Marshal Model the gap between the two armies appeared particularly dangerous, for it constituted an open 

route into Germany northwest of the West 

Wall strongpoint of Geilenkirchen by 

which the West Wall might be pierced in 

a sector where Model had virtually no 

troops at all. Drawing a new boundary 

between the First Parachute and Seventh 

Armies, Model gave part of the old 176th 

Division sector to the Seventh Army and 

34 Order, A Gp B to Seventh Army, 2230, 18 

Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 

35 Tel ConY, Seventh Army with LXXXI Corps, 

[I [5, [9 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 
112 

told General Lange to counterattack with 

a Kampfgruppe of his 183d Volks Grenadier Division, re-establish contact between the 176th and 27Sth Divisions, and 

subsequently relieve the 27Sth Division 

and northern elements of the 49th Division. "I expect," said the Army Group B 

commander, not without some causticity, 

"that once [the] 183d Volks Grenadier 

Division is committed, the withdrawal of 

the army's right wing will at last be 

brought to a halt." 36 

Unfortunately for the Germans, Field 

Marshal Model's information about the 

front was running several hours behind 

reality. In most of the sectors where he 

intended the 183d Division to take over, 

either the 2d Armored or the 30th Division 

already had arrived. The 2d Armored 

Division, for example, reached the village 

of Teveren, a stone's throw from Geilenkirchen. In addition, the LXXXI Corps 

commander, General Schack, ran into difficulties at every turn in trying to assemble 

forces and arrange proper support for 

the 183d Division. Delay after delay 

finally ended in ineffective improvisation. 

Though a Kampfgruppe eventually did 

attack into the north flank of the 2d 

Armored Division, it accomplished nothing 

other than to re-establish contact between 

the two German armies. 

When this maneuver failed, the German 

commanders acted on the assumption that 

an immediate assault against the West 

Wall was inevitable. Relieving those 

troops of the 183d Division that were 

west of the West Wall with heterogeneous 

forces, they thrust the entire division into 

36 Ibid.; Orders, Seventh Army to LXXXI 

Corps (relaying A ep B orders intended for 

183d ve Div), 1050 and 1220, 19 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, 

Armee, usw. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the pillboxes. The division's responsibility extended from Geilenkirchen south to 

the area opposite Rimburg. From here 

the remains of the 49th Division, holding 

a small bridgehead at the Dutch town of 

Kerkrade, tied in with the 116th Panzer 

Division north of Aachen. The remnants 

of the 27Sth Division were collected in 

the West Wall east of Geilenkirchen.37 

An immediate assault was the American 

intention. As early as 18 September General Corlett alerted both the 2d Armored 

and 30th Divisions to prepare to hit the 

West Wall. The next day he ordered an 

attack on the following day, 20 September. The XIX Corps was to breach the 

West Wall, seize crossings over the Roer 

River nine miles beyond, and assist the VII 

Corps in encircling Aachen. 38 

Delay in the Assault 

This was the intention. The event was 

different because of a factor beyond General Corlett's control. 

This factor had seen its beginning during the first days of September when 

General Bradley had transferred one of 

Corlett's divisions to the Third Army. 

The loss added to Corlett's difficulty in 

solving the problem of an exposed left 

flank. Before the transfer, Field Marshal 

Montgomery had announced plans for 

commitment of part of his 2 I Army Group 

close alongside the left flank of the First 

Army, and thus of the XIX Corps. Although Montgomery had stipulated that 

the main weight of the British drive was 

to be directed against the Lower Rhine 

37 For fuller details and documentation on this 

period, see Reichler, Germans Opposite XIX 

Corps, pp. 54-63. 

38 XIX Corps FO 26, 19 Sep, XIX Corps 

G-3 file, 19 Sep 44· 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

between Wesel and Arnhem, he had stated 

that he intended to threaten frontally the 

western face of the Ruhr between Duesseldorf and Duisberg. Writing later, General Bradley maintained that Montgomery 

had told him he planned "to advance 

straight against the Ruhr as a feint, but 

after reaching the vicinity of the Rhine 

was then going to throw a force around 

to the north." 39 In either event, a feint 

against the Ruhr would have involved a 

British advance close alongside the First 

Army's left flank. 

The trouble began when the threat 

against the face of the Ruhr did not 

develop. Instead, the Second British 

Army had begun to drive almost due 

north into the Netherlands at 'a point 

south of Eindhoven. Then Field Marshal 

Montgomery had suggested and General 

Eisenhower had authorized a special operation known as MARKET-GARDEN to be 

launched in the Netherlands on 17 September to extend the Second Army's axis 

of advance even farther to the north. 

When the First U.S. Army continued to 

drive northeastward, the result was a 

growing gap which left both British and 

Americans with exposed flanks. Neither 

had the troops at hand to fill the gap 

adequately. 

To do what he could to fill the gap, 

Montgomery had committed the 8 British 

Corps to drive north and northeast on the 

right wing of the Second Army; but like 

the XIX Corps, the 8 Corps had only two 

divisions. Two divisions could not hope 

to eliminate a great right-angle gap which 

ran from the vicinity of Ni jmegen to the 

39 Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 14 Sep 44, 12th 

A Gp 371.3, Military Objectives, I. Note also 

par, 6, 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir M-523, 

3 Sep 44, same file, 

113 

boundary with the XIX Corps near 

Sittard. 

On 19 September, the date when General Corlett issued the order to attack the 

West Wall, the great gap already was a 

matter of primary concern. The front of 

the 8 Corps ran along the Maastricht 

Canal from a point near the army group 

boundary thirteen miles north of Maastricht northwest to Bree, thence to a 

bridgehead across the Meuse-Escaut Canal, eight miles beyond. The 30 Corps 

in the meantime had pushed north into 

Eindhoven, enabling patrols of the 8 Corps 

to get into Heeze, southeast of Eindhoven; 

thus the tip of the 8 Corps at Heeze was 

more than thirty-five miles from the main 

concentration of the 2d U.S. Armored 

Division at Sittard. A great triangular 

expanse of territory of more than I 12 

square miles lay open to the Germans. 

The northern flank of the XIX Corps already was exposed for more than nine 

miles. Continuing east through the West 

Wall would extend the flank proportionately. 

No one could say that the XIX Corps 

had not kept its own house in order, for 

General Corlett had made special efforts to 

clear his zone right up to the boundary 

with the British. On 16 September, 

while the 2d Armored Division was 

attacking east of the Maas River to close 

up to the boundary around Sittard, a 

special task force had crossed the Maastricht Canal just north of Maastricht to 

attack north and clear a strip of land 

lying between the canal and the Maas as 

far north as the boundary with the 

British. Commanded by Lt. Col. William 

M. Stokes, Jr., the task force was composed of the separate 99th Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert' G. Turner), a 

battalion of the 2d Armored Division's 
114 

tanks, plus increments of artillery, engineers, and medics. Either pushing back 

or annihilating parts of the 176th 

Division, Task Force Stokes in three days 

had covered the nine miles north to the 

boundary. While the tanks returned to 

their parent division, the 99th Infantry 

Battalion stayed behind to defend the sector and maintain contact with the British 

to the northwest on the other side of the 

cana1. 40 

On the other hand, clearing the entire 

zone was not sufficient to override the fact 

that the responsibility for protecting First 

Army's left flank belonged undeniably to 

the XIX Corps. First Army's General 

Hodges and the Second British Army's 

Lt. Gen. Miles C. Dempsey had discussed 

the problem on 15 September and reiterated that understandingY For the moment, at least, the British had incurred no 

obligation to advance east of the Maas 

River. Even if the British cleared the 

west bank of the Maas, the XIX Corps 

still would be in danger, for most of the 

open flank lay east of the river. 

For all the concern about the open 

flank, General Corlett intended to go 

through with the West Wall attack on 20 

September before the Germans could get 

set in their fortifications. Assisted by a 

saturation air bombardment, the 30th 

Division was to assault the line near the 

village of Rimburg, between Geilenkirchen 

and Aachen, nine miles north of Aachen. 

The 2d Armored Division was to protect 

the corps north flank along the SittardGeilenkirchen highway and prepare to 

40 For a detailed account of this operation, see 

Capt. Franklin Ferriss, Operation of Task Force 

"Stokes," 16-18 September, 1944 a preliminary 

manuscript in XIX Corps Combat Interv files. 

41 Memo to CG XIX Corps, 15 Sep 44, FUSA 

G-3 file, 9-23 Sep 44· 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

send one combat command through the 

West Wall to exploit to the east the gains 

of the 30th Division. To assist the 

armor on the north flank, General Corlett 

told the 30th Division to take over the job 

of maintaining contact with the VII 

Corps west of Aachen; then he transferred the 1 13th Cavalry Group to the 

corps north flank on the left of the armor 

between Sittard and the Maas. 42 

As soon as the 30th Division could 

pierce the West Wall, General Hobbs was 

to turn his infantry southeast to make a 

junction seven miles away with the VII 

Corps northeast of Aachen. But by daylight of 20 September-D Day for the 

assault--both Hobbs and General Corlett 

were displaying mounting concern over 

the fact that once the 30th Division 

turned to make this junction, both the 

division's left and right flanks would be 

exposed, the latter toward enemy forces 

still remaining in Aachen. Although 

neither commander doubted that the 

infantry could pierce the West Wall itself, 

the experience of the VII Corps near 

Stolberg had shown that the Germans, 

for all their deficiencies, could muster 

reserves for commitment at critical points. 

Because the XIX Corps was drastically 

short on artillery ammunition, the fear of 

German reserves took on added weight. 

The ammunition shortage likewise increased the need for large-scale air support, 

and the weather forecast for 20 September 

was not at all promising. General Corlett 

insisted that he make no attack without 

adequate support from the air. 

Because the weather failed to clear 

sufficiently eithe"r on 20 September or the 

day after, General Corlett postponed the 

42 XIX Corps FO 26, 19 Sep 44; 113th Cay 

Gp and zd Armd Div AARs, Sep 44· 
ACTION ON THE NORTH WING 

offensive both times. To the Germans, 

these two days meant an unexpected but 

welcome chance to improve their positions. 

To the Americans, they provided an opportunity to ponder those apprehensions 

generated by the exposed north flank, by 

the paucity of ammunition reserves, and 

by the possibility of violent enemy reaction 

whenever the 30th Division exposed both 

flanks to link up with the VII Corps. 

News about the German countermeasures 

against the V Corps bridgehead at Wallendorf did nothing to alleviate these fears. 

General Corlett must have noted that 

from the British front in the Netherlands 

all the way down to the Third Army's 

battleground at Metz, the enemy was 

rebounding almost miraculously. 

Though not so obvious as cloudy skies 

or scant stocks of ammunition, this growing belief that, after all, the Germans had 

only been playing dead was perhaps the 

most important deterrent to launching the 

W cst Wall attack. Besides, the port of 

Brest had fallen; the commanders must 

have been aware that if they waited long 

enough, at least one of the divisions .from 

Brittany might become available for the 

assault. In midmorning of 22 September, 

after all three of the First Army's corps 

commanders had conferred for two hours 

with the army commander, General 

Hodges authorized General Corlett to 

postpone the attack indefinitelyY 

43 30th Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Sep 44. See also Tel 

Convs, Corlett with Hobbs, recorded in 30th Div 

115 

On this same day of 22 September, the 

VII Corps went on the defensive in the 

Stolberg Corridor and the V Corps withdrew the last troops from the ill-starred 

Wallendorf bridgehead. Thus, all of the 

First Army with the exception of two 

regiments of the 9th Division in the 

Huertgen Forest sector settled down to a 

period of readjustment of lines, replenishment of supplies, and general preparation 

for the day when General Hodges would 

direct a continuation of the drive toward 

the Rhine. 

General Corlett's XIX Corps in ten days 

had pushed from the Albert Canal to the 

German border, a distance ranging from 

fifteen to thirty-three miles. The corps 

had cleared approximately 547 square 

miles of territory in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany and had pushed back 

parts of three German divisions. The 

Germans nevertheless had made noteworthy inroads on the ~,peed of the American advance. When combined with the 

gasoline shortage and the reduction in 

strength which had cut the XIX Corps to 

two divisions, this resistance had provided sufficient time to enable a fresh 

German unit to reach the West Wall and 

to deny the XIX Corps a timely intervention in the neighboring battle of the 

Stolberg Corridor. 

G-3 Jnl file, 19-22 Sep 44; Memo, Corlett for 

Hodges, 21 Sep 44, XIX Corps G-3 file, 19-22 

Sep 44; Sylvan Diary, entry of 22 Sep 44; Ltr, 

Corlett to OCMH, 2 Sep 53, OCMH. 

PART TWO 

AN AIRBORNE CARPET IN THE NORTH 

CHAPTER VI 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN 

A maxim· of war is that you reinforce 

success. In early September of 1944, the 

problem was not to find a success but to 

choose among many. The very nature of 

General Eisenhower's strategic reserve narrowed the choice. His reserve was not 

conventional but airborne. 

In anticipation of an opportunity to use 

this latent strength, General Eisenhower 

as early as mid-July had solicited his 

planners to prepare an airborne plan 

marked by "imagination and daring." 

Spurred by this directive and the glittering 

successes of the breakout and pursuit, the 

planning staffs had begun almost to mass 

produce bluepvints for airborne operations. 

By mid-August creation of a combined 

Allied airborne headquarters controlling 

most of the airborne troops and much of 

the troop carrier strength in the theater 

had implemented the planning. This 

headquarters was the First Allied Airborne Army.l General Eisenhower's desire for a suitable occasion to employ the 

army was heightened by the fact that the 

U.S. Chief of Staff, General Marshall, 

and General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 

wanted to see what a large-scale airborne 

attack could accomplish deep in enemy 

territory.2 

By the time the first Allied patrols 

neared the German border, eighteen sep1 For details on formation of the FAAA, see 

James A. Huston, Airborne Operations, MS in 

OCMH. 

2 Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 279 If. 

arate airborne plans had been considered. 

Five had reached the stage of detailed 

planning. Three had progressed almost 

to the point of launching. But none had 

matured. The fledgling plans embraced 

a variety of objectives: the city of 

Tournai, to block Germans retreating from 

the Channel coast; the vicinity of Liege, 

to get the First Army acroSS the Meuse 

River; the Aachen-Maastricht gap, to 

get Allied troops through the West Wall. 

In most cases fast-moving ground troops 

were about to overrun the objectives before an airborne force could be thrown in. 3 

No matter that circumstances had 

denied an immediate commitment of 

SHAEF's strategic reserve; the maxim of 

reinforcing success was nonetheless valid. 

Indeed, each day of fading summer and 

continued advance heightened desire for 

early use of the airborne troops. The 

paratroopers and glidermen resting and 

training in England became, in effect, 

coins burning holes in SHAEF's pocket. 

This is not to say that SHAEF intended 

to spend the airborne troops rashly but 

that SHAEF had decided on the advisa3 The five major plans are discussed in detail 

in Hq, F AAA, History of Headquarters First 

Allied Airborne Army, 2 Aug 44-20 May 45 

(hereafter cited as F AAA, History), SHAEF 

F AAA files. For a discussion of the methods by 

which planning was initiated see John C. Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, 

European Theater (USAF Hist Studies: No. 97, 

USAF Hist Div, Research Studies Institute, Air 

University) (Maxwell, Ala.: Maxwell Air Force 

Base, September 1956), p. 82. 
120 

bility of buying an airborne product and 

was looking about for the right occasion. 

Even the Germans believed an airborne 

attack imminent, although they had no 

fixed idea where. 4 

The fact that a sensitive ear might haye 

detected portentous sputterings as the 

Allied war machine neared the German 

border did little or nothing to lessen interest in an airborne operation. Except in 

the case of General Bradley, who was 

reluctant to relinquish the support of 

troop carrier aircraft flying supply missions, the signs that the pursuit might be 

nearing an end heightened the desire to 

use the airborne troops.3 Both General 

Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery began to look to the airborne 

forces for the extra push needed to get the 

Allies across the Rhine River before the 

logistical situation should force a halt and 

enable the Germans to recoup behind the 

Rhine. 

Most of the airborne plans considered 

in the last days of August and in early 

September focused upon getting some part 

of the Allied armies across the Rhine. 

Among these was Operation COMET, a 

plan to seize river crossings in the Netherlands near Arnhem along the projected 

axis of the Second British Army. COMET 

still was on the drawing boards when 

concern mounted that the one and a half 

airborne divisions allotted for the job 

would be insufficient. On 10 September 

COMET was canceled. 

Though canceled, COMET was not 

abandoned. On the day of cancellation, 

10 September, Field Marshal Montgomery approached General Eisenhower 

4 See Lucian Heichler, Invasion From the Sky, 

MS prepared to complement this volume and 

filed in OCMH. 

"General Bradley's views are expressed in A 

Soldier's Story, page 403. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

with another proposal that was in effect 

a strengthening of COMET. After General Eisenhower had endorsed it, this plan 

looked like the real thing. 

The new plan was labeled Operation 

MARKET. Three and a half airborne 

divisions were to drop in the vicinity of 

Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem to seize 

bridges over several canals and the Maas, 

Waal (Rhine), and Neder Rijn Rivers. 

They were to open a corridor more than 

fifty miles long leading from Eindhoven 

northward. As soon as an adequate landing field could be secured, an air portable 

division was to be flown in as reinforcement. 

In a companion piece named Operation 

GARDEN, ground troops of the Second 

British Army were to push from the 

Dutch-Belgian border to the IJsselmeer 

(Zuider Zee), a total distance of ninetynine miles. The main effort of the ground 

attack was to be made by the 30 Corps 

from a bridgehead across the MeuseEscaut Canal a few miles south of Eindhoven on the Dutch-Belgian frontier. 

(See Map 1.) On either flank the 8 and 

12 Corps were to launch supporting 

attacks. 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two 

major objectives: to get Allied troops 

across the Rhine and to capture the Ruhr. 

Three major advantages were expected to 

accrue: ( I) cutting the land exit of 

those Germans remaining in western Holland; (2) outflanking the West Wall, 

and (3) positioning British ground forces 

for a subsequent drive into Germany along 

the North German Plain.6 

6 21 A Gp General Operational Situation and 

Directive, M-525, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, 

I; FAAA, Operations in Holland, Sep-Nov 44, 

and Hq Br Abn Corp's, Allied Airborne Operations in Holland (Sep-Oct 44), SHAEF F AAA 

files. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

Although the proposed operation 

prompted some objections at 12th Army 

Group, at First Allied Airborne Army, and 

even among some members of Field Marshal Montgomery's staff, it conformed to 

General Arnold's recommendation for an 

operation some distance behind the enemy's forward positions and beyond the 

area where enemy reserves normally were 

located; it afforded an opportunity for 

using the long-idle airborne resources; it 

was in accord with Montgomery's desire 

for a thrust across the Rhine, while the 

enemy was disorganized; and it appeared 

to General Eisenhower to be the boldest 

and best move the Allies could make 

at the moment. At the least, General 

Eisenhower thought the operation would 

strengthen the 2 I Army Group in its 

later fight to clear the Schelde estuary 

and open the port of Antwerp to Allied 

shipping. Field Marshal Montgomery examined the objections that the proposed 

route of advance "involved the additional 

obstacle of the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) 

as compared with more easterly approaches, and would carry us to an area 

relatively remote from the Ruhr." He 

considered these to be overridden by the 

fact that the operation would outflank the 

West Wall, would be on a line which the 

enemy would consider least likely for the 

Allies to use, and would be within easy 

range of Allied airborne forces located in 

England. 7 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN was nothing if not daring. It was particularly so 

in light of a logistical situation that, at 

best, was strained and in light of the 

unpredictable nature of the weather in 

northwestern Europe at this season. Set 

against these factors was the climate of 

7 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 281-82. 

121 

opmlOn that pervaded most Allied headquarters during early September. This 

was the same optimistic period when the 

First Army was preparing to dash through 

the West Wall in a quick drive to the 

Rhine. Not until the day Operation 

MARKET began was the First Army to 

experience any particular trouble in the 

West Wall; even then it would have been 

hard to convince most Allied commanders 

that this rugged countenance the Germans 

had begun to exhibit was anything more 

than a mask. 

Fairly typical of the Allied point of view 

was SHAEF's estimate of the situation a 

week before the airborne attack. The 

SHAEF G-2 estimated enemy strength 

throughout the West at 48 divisions with 

a true equivalent of 20 infantry and 4 

armored divisions. Four days before the 

airborne attack the I st British Airborne 

Corps calculated that the Germans in the 

Netherlands had few infantry reserves and 

a total armored strength of not more than 

fifty to one hundred tanks. While numerous signs pointed to German reinforcements of river and canal lines near Arnhem and Nijmegen, the British believed 

the troops manning them were few and of 

a "low category." Thinking back after 

the operation was over, the 1st British Airborne Division recalled, "It was 

thought the enemy must still be disorganized after his long and hasty retreat 

from south of the River Seine and that 

though there might be numerous small 

bodies of enemy in the area, he would not 

be capable of organized resistance to any 

great extent." 8 

8 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 25, week 

ending 9 Sep 44; Hq Abn Troops Opnl Instr I, 

13 Sep 44, 1st Abn Div Rpt on Opn MARKET, 

Pts. 1-3, SHAEF FAAA files. 
122 

This is not to say that warning notes 

were not struck. By 10 September, the 

day when General Eisenhower approved 

the operation, the British had remarked 

that "Dutch Resistance sources report 

that battered panzer formations have been 

sent to Holland to refit, and mention 

Eindhoven and Nijmegen as the reception 

areas." 9 A few days later the SHAEF 

G-2 announced that these panzer formations were the 9th SS Panzer Division 

and presumably the 10th SS Panzer DiVlszon. They probably were to be reequipped with new tanks from a depot 

reported "in the area of Cleves [Kleve] ," 

a few miles across the German frontier 

from Nijmegen and Arnhem.lO 

News of these two German armored 

divisions near Arnhem caused particular 

concern to General Eisenhower's chief of 

staff, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith. Believing strongly that the Allies would have to 

employ not one but two airborne divisions 

at Arnhem if they were to counter the 

German armor, General Smith obtained 

the Supreme Commander's permission to 

go to Field Marshal Montgomery with a 

warning. Either they should "drop the 

equivalent of a second division in the 

Arnhem area" or change the plan and 

move one of the American divisions, 

scheduled to drop farther south, up to 

Arnhem. But, General Smith recalled 

after the war, "Montgomery "ridiculed 

9 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe 

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 488. 

Though sparse in his annotation, Wilmot appears 

to speak with some authority on British sources 

not readily available to the American historian. 

In this instance he refers to an unspecified intelligence report of the Second Army. 

10 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 26, week 

ending 16 Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the idea" and "waved my objections airily 

aside." 11 

The likelihood of encountering enemy 

armor in the vicinity of the drop zones 

obviously was of serious concern to airborne commanders, particularly in view of 

the fifty-mile dispersion of the airborne 

drop. American commanders, whose 

troops possessed even less in the way of 

antitank weapons than did British airborne troops, were especially perturbed. 12 

There were other disturbing signs. Stiffening resistance around the British 

bridgehead across the Meuse-Escaut 

Canal did not go unremarked. 13 The 

G-2 of the 82d U.S. Airborne Division 

noted further, "A captured document 

indicates that the degree of control exercised over the regrouping and collecting 

of the apparently scattered remnants of a 

beaten army [was] little short of remarkable. Furthermore, the fighting capacity 

of the new Battle Groups formed from the 

remnants of battered divisions seems unimpaired." 14 

Despite these warnings, the general view 

appeared to be as recounted after the 

operation by the British Airborne Corps. 

This was that "once the crust of resistance 

in the front line had been broken, the 

11 Interv by European theater historians with 

Gen Smith and Maj Gen Harold R. Bull (G-3, 

SHAEF), 14 Sep 45; Interv with Gen Smith by 

S. L. A. Marshall, 18 Apr 49, both in OCMH. 

12 Ltr, Lt Gen Anthony C McAuliffe (formerly 

CG, 10Ist Abn Div Arty) to OCMH, 8 Feb 54, 

and Ltr, Maj Gen James M. Gavin (formerly 

CG, 82d Abn Div) to OCMH, 17 Jan 54, 

OCMH. 

13 Wilmot, in The Struggle for Europe, notes 

that General Dempsey, commander of the Second Army, was so concerned about this and the 

reported panzer formations that he recommended 

a drop near Wesel, upstream from Arnhem, 

closer to the flank of the First u.S. Army. 

14 82d Abn Div, Annex IC to FO I I (13 Sep 

44), dtd I I Sep 44, 82d Abn Div FO I I file. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

German Army would be unable to concentrate any other troops in sufficient 

strength to stop the breakthrough." Although the 30 British Corps would have 

to advance ninety-nine miles, leading units 

"might reach the Zuider Zee between 

2-5 days after crossing the Belgian-Dutch 

frontier." 15 

T he Germans In the Netherlands 

Had MARKET-GARDEN been scheduled 

two weeks earlier than it was, the Allies 

would have found the German situation in 

the Netherlands much as they predicted. 

For not until 4 September, when news of 

the fall of Antwerp had jolted Hitler into 

dispatching General Student and headquarters of the First Parachute Army to 

the Dutch-Belgian border, was cohesion 

of any description introduced into German 

defenses along this "door to northwestern 

Germany." General Student had at first 

but one corps, the LXXXVIII Corps 

under General der Infanterie Hans Reinhard, and one division, the 719th Infantry 

Division under Generalleutnant Karl 

Sievers. The corps headquarters General 

Student had borrowed from the neighboring Fifteenth Army. (See Map 1.) The 

division was a "fortress" division that had 

been guarding the coast of the Netherlands since 1940. 

Though at full strength, this one division was scarcely sufficient to cover the 

entire corps front, a fifty-mile stretch 

along the Albert Canal from Antwerp 

southeast to Hasselt. General Reinhard 

therefore concentrated the bulk of the 

719th Division in the west near Antwerp 

where he expected the main British attack. A drive north from Antwerp was 

15 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns in 

Holland. 

123 

logical, for by continuing in this direction 

the British might seal off the island of 

Walcheren and the peninsula of South 

Beveland from the Dutch mainland. This 

appeared expedient; for even though 

seizure of Antwerp had trapped the German Fifteenth Army against the coast the 

bulk of that army yet might escape across 

the Schelde estuary to Walcheren and 

South Beveland and thence to the mainland. If the British corked up these two 

promontories, they might annihilate the 

Fifteenth Army at will and in so doing 

clear the seaward approaches to Antwerp, 

without which the port was useless. 16 

General Reinhard hardly could have 

anticipated that Field Marshal Montgomery was so intent on getting a bridgehead across the Rhine that he would turn 

his drive northeastward toward the left 

wing of the LXXXVIII Corps in the 

direction of Eindhoven. From a local 

viewpoint, the reorientation of the British 

drive meant that the 719th Division's 

Albert Canal line would be hit along its 

weak eastern extension. 

Prospects for averting a major breakthrough across the Albert toward Eindhoven were dark, when from an 

unexpected source came assistance. It 

16 This account is based upon Heichler, Invasion From the Sky. Primary sources are: MS 

# B-7 I 7, Zusatz zum Bericht von Oberst i.G. 

Geyer (Student); MS # B-I56, Bericht ueber 

den Einsatz des General-Kommandos LXXXVIII. 

A.K. vom Albert Kanal bis zur unteren Maas, 

5 Sept 44-21 Dez 44 (Reinhard); MS # B-004, 

Bericht ueber de Einsatz der 719. Inf-Div im 

Raum Antwerpen-Breda Sep 44 (Sievers); MS 

# B-846, AufsteUung und Einsatz der 85. Infanterie-Division im Westen (Feb-Nov 44) (Lt 

Col Kurt Schuster, formerly G-3, 85th Inf Div); 

MS # C-OOI, Kaempfe des Fallschirmjaegerregiments 6 mit amerik. Fallschirmjaegern im 

H oUand im Sept 44 (von del' Heydte); 20 I file 

of senior officers of the Wehrmacht; Lage West 

and Lage Frankreich sit maps for Sep 44. 
124 

emerged in the form of an audacious and 

prescient commander, Generalleutnant 

Kurt Chill. Retreating from the debacle 

in France with remnants of his own 85th 

Infantry Division and two others, General 

Chill had received orders to assemble his 

survivors in the Rhineland. Soon thereafter, General Chill perceived the critical 

situation along the Albert Canal. Acting 

with independence and dispatch, he postponed his withdrawal in order to set up 

straggler rallying points along the canal. 

By nightfall of 4 September General Chill 

had caught in his net a conglomeration of 

Navy, Luftwaffe, and military government 

troops and men from almost every conceivable branch of the Wehrmacht. A 

crazy-quilt mob-but General Chill managed in a matter of hours to fashion a 

fairly presentable defense that was sufficient to repulse the first minor British 

probes toward the canal. 

On 6 September General Chill reported 

to General Reinhard to subordinate his 

Kampfgruppe Chill to the LXXXVIII 

Corps. General Reinhard must have embraced the reinforcement with delight; for 

on this same day the British had penetrated the extended outposts of the 71 9th 

Division to force a bridgehead over the 

Albert at Beeringen. (This was one of 

the bridgeheads subsequently employed by 

General Corlett's XIX U.S. Corps to get 

across the canal.) To General Chill fell 

the problem of containing the bridgehead. 

F or all the danger inherent in the 

Beeringen bridgehead, the First Parachute 

Army commander, General Student, could 

take satisfaction in the fact that tangible 

subordinate units now were controlling 

the bulk of his front from Antwerp to 

Hasselt. Only on the extreme eastern 

wing near Maastricht was there an outand-out gap, and this he was to fill the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

next day, 7 September, with the 176th 

Division under Colonel Landau. (This 

was the division which subsequently opposed the left wmg of General Corlett's 

XIX Corps.) 

During the next fortnight, some of 

General Student's own parachute troops 

began to arrive in the army sector. Having been either rehabilitated or newly 

constituted, these units included five new 

parachute regiments, a new parachute 

antitank battalion, about 5,000 service 

troops, a battalion of the 2d Parachute 

Regiment, and another formation with a 

noble record, the 6th Parachute Regiment. Under command of Lt. Col. 

Friedrich-August Freiherr von der Heydte, 

the 6th Parachute Regiment had acquitted itself admirably enough in Normandy to attain the prestige, if not the 

strength, of a division. The regiment 

had been reconstituted to a strength 

considerably in excess of a normal parachute regiment. I7 

General Student threw in the bulk of 

his parachute troops against the British 

bridgehead at Beeringen. First he committed one of the newly constituted 

parachute regiments, the battalion of the 

2d Parachute Regiment, and the entire 

6th Parachute Regiment, all organized into 

a Kampfgruppe that took its name from 

the commander, Colonel Walther.I8 Next 

General Student threw in three of his 

remaining new parachute regiments, organized into Parachute Training Division 

17 This regiment should not be confused with 

the 6th Parachute Division. 

18 Few records pertaining to Kampfgruppe 

Walther survived the war. Composition of the 

Kampfgruppe apparently underwent constant 

change. Both the 6th Parachute Regiment and 

the battalion of the 2d Parachute Regiment, for 

example, subsequently .were attached to Kampfgruppe Chill, while Kampfgruppe Walther took 

on new attachments. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

Erdmann under Student's chief of staff, 

Generalleutnant Wolfgang Erdmann. 19 

These units were responsible for the 

stiffening German resistance noted along 

the Dutch-Belgian border. Yet the end 

result was merely to weaken the German 

paratroopers on the very eve of MARKETGARDEN. By mid-September the British 

had defeated every effort to repulse them 

at Beeringen and had pressed forward an 

additional twenty miles to throw two 

bridgeheads across the Meuse-Escaut 

Canal. The main bridgehead was at De 

Groote Barrier on the road to Eindhoven. 

There the British paused to await their 

role in MARKET-GARDEN. 

From west to east the First Parachute 

Army was lined up in this order of battle: 

From Antwerp to the juncture of the 

Albert and Meuse-Escaut Canals was 

General Sievers' 7 19th Division. Opposing the two British bridgeheads beyond 

the Meuse-Escaut were Kampfgruppe 

Chill and Kampfgruppe Walther, th,e latter with at least two battalions of Colonel 

von der Heydte's 6th Parachute Regiment 

still on hand. All these troops were under 

General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps. 

From the bridgehead on the Eindhoven 

highway east to the boundary with the 

Seventh Army near Maastricht were the 

two divisions under General Student's 

direct control, Division Erdmann and the 

176th Division. 

In the meantime, the trapped Fifteenth 

Army under General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen had been taking advantage of the reorientation of the British 

drive. Leaving some units to hold the 

south bank of the Schelde, Zangen began 

to ferry the bulk of his army across the 

estuary. Divisions released by this move19 This unit later was redesignated the 7th 

Parachute Division. 

125 

ment he assembled behind the western 

wing of the First Parachute Army. 

The first of these divisions was the 

245th Infantry, a collection of chaff that 

even a mild wind might blow away. On 

16 September this division was transferred 

to the First Parachute Army's LXXXVIII 

Corps and utilized by General Reinhard 

to back up the line in rear of Kampfgruppe Chill. 

The second was the 59th Infantry 

Division under Generalleutnant Walter 

Poppe, which was in transit to the First 

Parachute Army's sector just as the Allied 

airborne landings occurred. General 

Poppe still had about a thousand good 

infantrymen and a few engineers, a field 

replacement battalion, eighteen antitank 

guns, and about thirty 105- and I5o-mm. 

howitzers. 2o 

Both the First Parachute Army and the 

Fifteenth Army were subordinate to Field 

Marshal Model's Army Group B, the 

same headquarters which controlled General Brandenberger's Seventh Army at 

Aachen. In addition, Field Marshal 

Model exercised tactical control over 

forces of the Armed Forces Command 

Netherlands, a headquarters not appreciably unlike that of a U.S. communications 

zone. Specifically, an armed forces commander was the highest military commander in occupied territories (like 

Norway or the Netherlands), which were 

governed by a civilian (Nazi party) Reich 

commISSIOner (Reichskommissar). His 

duties were to represent the interests of the 

Wehrmacht with the civilian administration, to safeguard the administration, to 

guard military installations such as railways, roads, and supply dumps, and to 

20 MSS # B-I56 (Reinhard) and # B-I49, 

Einsatz der 59. Infanterie-Division im Holland, 

18 SePt-~5 Nov 44 (Poppe). 
126 

co-ordinate the needs of individual 

branches of the Wehrmacht m his 

territory. In the Netherlands this post 

had been held since 1940 by the senior 

Luftwaffe officer, General der Flieger 

Friedrich Christiansen.21 

Even though the First Parachute Army 

and part of the Fifteenth Army had moved 

into the Netherlands, General Christiansen's Armed Forces Command Netherlands on the eve of MARKET-GARDEN still 

was charged with considerable responsibility. Much as U.S. forces draw army 

rear boundaries delineating responsibility 

between the armies and the communications zone, the Germans had drawn a line 

across the rear of their two armies in the 

Netherlands. General Christiansen still 

was charged with defending all territory 

north of that line, which followed generally the Maas and Waal Rivers. Because 

MARKET-GARDEN involved a penetration 

deep into the enemy rear areas, Christiansen and his troops would be embroiled in 

the fighting much as would the field 

armIes. 

Through events culminating in departure of the 7 19th Division for the 

Dutch-Belgian border, General Christiansen had lost to the active fighting commands all of three divisions which 

originally he had possessed for defense of 

the Netherlands. As mid-September approached, he had left only a miscellany of 

regional defense and housekeeping troops 

21 OKH /Op Abt (II), Befehlsbefugnisse, 

NARS No. H 22/243; MS # T-IOI, The 

German Armed Forces High Command (Winter 

et al.), Pt. II, pp. 95-96. Heichler, Invasion 

From the Sky, Appendix A, provides a comprehensive essay upon the German command picture 

in the Netherlands. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

of all four services: Army, Navy, Luftwaffe, and Waffen-SS. 22 

Because the Allied landing zones at 

Nijmegen and Arnhem were but a few 

miles from the German border, troops and 

headquarters of another of the enemy's 

rear echelon formations also might become 

involved. This headquarters was Wehrkreis VI. Similar in some respects to the 

corps areas into which the United States 

was divided before the war, the German 

Wehrkreise were, in effect, military districts. The headquarters of these districts 

were administrative commands responsible 

for training replacements, organizing new 

units, and channeling materiel. Ad jacent 

to the corridor the Allies planned to seize 

in the Netherlands, Wehrkreis VI embraced almost the whole of the province of 

Westphalia and parts of three other provinces. During the course of the war, 

Wehrkreis VI had activated numerous 

divisions and, as the war in the West had 

taken a turn for the worse, had relinquished as combat divisions even its 

replacement training units, the very 

framework about which the replacement 

system functioned. In mid-September the 

only major headquarters remaining in 

Wehrkreis VI was an administrative unit. 

This too had to go into the line to occupy 

the West Wall north of Aachen as the 

406th (Landesschuetzen) Division. 

Upon reaching the front, the 406th 

Division came under an ad hoc corps staff 

headed by General der Kavallerie Kurt 

Feldt, formerly Military Governor for 

Southwest France (M ilitaerbefe hlshaber 

Suedwestfrankreich) until the inexorable 

22 A complete list of all units and headquarters 

under Armed Forces Commander Netherlands 

may be found in TWX, A Gp_ B to OB WEST, 

2355, 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

march of events had dethroned him. In 

recognition of the provisional nature of the 

command, General Feldt's corps became 

known not by numerical designation but as 

Corps Feldt. Except for the 406th Division, General Feldt had only a smattering 

of armored replacement units. Within 

his lone division the troops represented the 

very last reserve Wehrkreis VI possibly 

could muster: vanous Alarmeinheiten 

(emergency alert units), numerous "ear" 

and "stomach" battalions, and several 

Luftwaffe battalions formed from Luftwaffe noncommissioned officer training 

schools. 

The Allied airborne attack under normal circumstances might have encountered only a portion of the First Parachute 

Army, those two divisions of the Fifteenth 

Army which by mid-September had 

escaped across the Schelde, and those 

scratch rear echelon formations of Armed 

Forces Commander Netherlands and 

Wehrkreis VI. But as luck would have 

it, Field Marshal Model late on 3 September had issued an order that was destined 

to alter markedly the German strength in 

the immediate vicinity of the Allied landing zones. On 3 September the Army 

Group B commander had directed that 

the Fifth Panzer Army, retreating in disorder from France, release the 9th and 

loth SS Panzer Divisions to move to the 

vicinity of Arnhem for rehabilitation. 23 

Two days later Model ordered that 

headquarters of the II SS Panzer Corps 

under SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen-SS Willi Bittrich also 

move to the vicinity of Arnhem. General 

Bittrich was to direct rehabilitation of the 

9th SS Panzer Division and two panzer 

23 Order, A ep B to Fifth pz Army, 2215, 3 

Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 

127 

divisions (the 2d and I 16th), which were 

to move to the Netherlands whenever they· 

could disengage from combat under 

General Brandenberger's Seventh Army.24 

In failing to include the loth SS Panzer 

Division in the charge to General Bittrich, 

Model apparently had in mind another 

order which he issued formally four days 

later on 9 September. He instructed the 

loth SS Panzer Division to continue past 

Arnhem into Germany for rehabilitation 

presumably more thorough than could be 

accomplished near Arnhem. At the same 

time, Model altered General Bittrich's 

orders in regard to the 9th SS Panzer 

Division. Seeing the threat to Aachen 

posed by continuing advance of the First 

U.S. Army, Model instructed the 9th SS 

Panzer to prepare to move against this 

threat. 25 

Unfortunately for the Allies, only minor 

elements of either of these SS divisions had 

begun to move away when the first Allied 

parachutists landed unsuspectingly within 

half a day's march from their assembly 

areas. Field Marshal Model thus had a 

ready reserve with which to fight back. 

Seven Days for Planning 

On the Allied side, the planning and 

command for the airborne phase of 

MARKET-GARDEN became the responsibility of the First Allied Airborne Army. 

The army commander, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. 

Brereton, had been a top air commander 

24 Order, A ep B to II SS pz Corps, 1230, 

5 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Operationsbefehle. See 

also MS # B-749, Kurzschilderung der Kaempfe 

des II SS-pz Korps im der Zeit vom 28 Aug-5 

Sept 44 (Bittrich). 

25 Orders, A ep B to II SS pz Corps, 1345 and 

1830, 9 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 
128 

in the Pacific and the Middle East.26 

Having moved to England as commander 

of the Ninth Air Force for the air war 

against Germany, General Brereton had 

assumed command of the First Allied Airborne Army on 8 August 1944. He was 

given operational control of the following: 

headquarters of the XVIII U.S. Corps 

(Airborne), commanded by Maj. Gen. 

Matthew B. Ridgway; headquarters of the 

I st British Airborne Corps, commanded 

by Lt. Gen. F. A. M. Browning, who 

served also as deputy commander of the 

First Allied Airborne Army; the IX U.S. 

Troop Carrier Command under Maj. 

Gen. Paul L. Williams; and two Royal 

Air Force troop carrier groups (38 and 

46) . American airborne troops under 

General Brereton's control were the veteran 82d and IOIst Airborne Divisions 

and the untried 17th Airborne Division, 

the latter not scheduled to participate in 

MARKET. British troops at his disposal 

were the I st Airborne Division and the 52 

Lowland Division (Airportable), plus special air service troops and the I st Polish 

Independent Parachute Brigade, the latter 

to serve in MARKET under command of 

the I st Airborne Division.27 

The first major planning conference -on 

Operation MARKET convened in England 

late on 10 September, only a few hours 

after General Eisenhower in a meeting 

with Montgomery at Brussels had given his 

approval. The first conference dealt pri26 In the Pacific as commander of the U.S. 

Far East Air Force and as deputy air commander 

in chief of the Allied Air Forces. In the Middle 

East as commander of the Middle East Air Force. 

27 For details see FAAA, History. The 6th 

British Airborne Division was not to participate 

in MARKET. Huston, Airborne Operations, 

discusses the location and training of airborne 

troops in England. A detailed discussion of the 

planning phase may be found in Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, pp. 80-100. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

GENERAL BRERETON 

marily with command and administration. 

As deputy commander of the First Allied 

Airborne Army, General Browning was to 

direct operations on the ground through 

headquarters of his British Airborne 

Corps. He and his headquarters were to 

fly in with the airborne divisions. The 

XVIII U.S. Corps was relegated to certain administrative functions and to general observation of the planning and 

conduct of the operation. Once the 

ground troops overran the airborne divisions, command was to pass to the 30 

British Corps. Responsibility for the 

complex troop carrier role fell to the 

commander of the IX Troop Carrier 

Command, General Williams. The overall commander was General Brereton.28 

Although planning proceeded swiftly, 

Operation MARKET did not mature with2 B F AAA, Opns in Holland; XVIII Corps, 

Report of Airborne Phase, Operation MARKET, 

SHAEF F AAA files. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

out acute growing pains. At the outset, 

lack of supply threatened to stunt or at 

least delay growth. On I I September 

Field Marshal Montgomery protested to 

General Eisenhower that the Supreme 

Commander's failure to give priority to 

the northern thrust over other operations 

(that is, to the exclusion of other offensive 

operations) meant that the airborne attack 

could not be staged before 23 September, 

and possibly not before 26 September. 

"This delay," the British commander 

warned, "will give the enemy time to 

organise better defensive arrangements 

and we must expect heavier resistance and 

slower progress." 29 

General Eisenhower promptly sent his 

chief of staff, General Smith, to 2 I Army 

Group headquarters to assure Montgomery that Allied planes and American trucks 

could deliver a thousand tons of supplies 

per day. Confirming this in wntmg, 

General Eisenhower promised this tonnage 

until about I October. At the same time, 

he said, the First U.S. Army would have 

sufficient supplies to continue its attack at 

Aachen.30 

Except that Montgomery urged that 

emergency supply be continued a week 

past I October, by which time a through 

railway supporting the British should be 

in operation, he was thoroughly placated. 

"Most grateful to you personally and to 

Beetle," Montgomery wrote the Supreme 

Commander, "for all you are doing for 

me." Making the usual salaam to the 

vagaries of weather, he set forward the 

target date six days to 17 September.31 

29 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-192, I I Sep 

44, SHAEF SGS 381, 1. 

30 Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD 14758, 

13 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, 1. 

31 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-205, 14 Sep 

44, SHAEF SGS 381, 1. 

129 

Field Marshal Montgomery's decision 

meant that the First Allied Airborne Army 

had but seven days for planning and 

preparation, a period strikingly shorteven in view of the similarity to the 

defunct operation COMET-when contrasted with the long weeks and even 

months of planning and special training 

that had gone into most earlier airborne 

operations. Yet one of the cardinal reasons for executing MARKET at all was to 

take advantage of German disorganization: each day's delay lessened that 

advantage. With that in mind, Field 

Marshal Montgomery had made his decision on the side of speed. In approving, 

General Eisenhower noted that not only 

could advantage be expected from speedy 

exploitation of the enemy's condition but 

that an earlier release of the U.S. airborne 

divisions might be effected. This was 

desirable because of proposed operations 

to support General Bradley's 12th Army 

Group.32 

One of the more crucial decisions facing 

General Brereton and the staff of the First 

Allied Airborne Army was that of daylight 

versus night attack. Moving by day, 

planes and gliders would be exposed to 

more accurate flak. This was a serious 

consideration, both because the C-47 

(Sky train) troop carrier planes were lowspeed aircraft possessing neither armor nor 

self-sealing gasoline tanks and because 

marked increase had been noted recently 

in antiaircraft guns in the vicinity of the 

target area. On the other hand, moving 

by night invited greater danger from 

enemy aircraft. Although the enemy's 

daylight fighter force had been reduced 

almost to inconsequence, his night fighters 

32 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Sep 44. 

Montgomery comments in Normandy to the 

Baltic, p. 229. 
130 

had retained some measure of potency. 

In regard to the actual drop, it went 

without saying that a daylight operation 

should provide a better drop pattern. To 

realize what could happen in the dark, 

one had but to recall the Normandy 

operation when drop sticks had scattered 

like windblown confetti. 

A major factor governing selection of a 

night drop in Normandy had been a need 

to co-ordinate airborne and seaborne 

units. The plan for co-ordination of air 

and ground efforts in Operation MARKETGARDEN imposed no restrictions. Neither 

had the Allies at the time of the Normandy 

drop possessed the unquestioned air supremacy they now had attained. It was 

an air supremacy that could be maintained through proximity of the target 

area to bases in England, France, and 

Belgium. Assured of a comprehensive 

antiflak program, General Brereton made 

his decision: by day.33 

Another question was which of two 

routes to take to the target area. (M ap 

IV) The more direct route from England 

passed over islands in the Schelde-Maas 

estuary. The aircraft would be subject 

to fire from flak barges and coastal flak 

positions and would have to fly some 

eighty miles over enemy-occupied territory. 

The alternative was a longer southern 

route. Over friendly Belgium most of the 

way, this route involved a maximum flight 

over enemy territory of sixty-five miles. 

On the other hand, flak was thick among 

the enemy front lines south of Eindhoven. 

General Brereton and his planners considered that one long column would expose 

rear elements to an alerted enemy and 

that parallel columns along the same path 

33 FAAA; Opns in Holland; XVIII Corps, 

Rpt of Abn Phase, comments by General 

Ridgway. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

would provide too many flak gunners 

with optimum targets. With these points 

in mind, they found a solution in compromise. The two divisions scheduled to 

land farthest north were to take the 

northern route across the Dutch islands. 

The other division was to follow the 

southern route across Belgium to a point 

near Bourg-Leopold, thence north across 

the front lines into the Netherlands.34 

A third task of selecting appropriate 

drop and landing zones was more complex. 

Factors like flak, terrain, assigned objectives, priority of objectives, direction of 

flight-these and countless others entered 

into the consideration, so that in the end 

the drop zones that were selected represented, as always, compromise in its 

least attractive connotation. The division 

scheduled to land farthest north, for example, wanted drop zones close to and on 

either side of the major objective of the 

Arnhem bridge across the Neder Rijn. 

Because of the buildings of the city, flak 

concentrations close to the city, and terrain south of the bridge deemed too boggy 

and too compartmented by dikes, this 

division settled for drop zones only on 

one side of the river and no closer to the 

bridge than six to eight miles. Whether 

flak and terrain might not have been less 

of a problem than distance from the 

objective hardly could have been answered unequivocally during the planning 

stage; indeed, the actual event may not 

always provide an unqualified answer.35 

Terrain in the target area was unusual, 

a patchwork pattern of polder land, dikes, 

34 FAAA, Opns in Holland. 

35 Ibid.; also Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn 

Opns in Holland; Montgomery, Normandy to the 

Baltic, pp. 227-28; Ltr, Rev. Arie D. Bestebreurtje, formerly captain, commander of a 

Special Forces team attached to 82d Abn Div, to 

OCMH, 25 Oct 56, OCMH. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

elevated roadways, and easily defended 

waterways. The biggest obstacles were 

the three major rivers, ranging in width 

from 200 to 400 yards, which provided the 

basic motive for airborne participation: 

the Maas ( Meuse), the Waal (Rhine) , 

and the Neder Rijn. The proposed corridor also encompassed two smaller rivers, 

the Dommeland the Aa, and three major 

canals: the Wilhelmina, the Willems, and 

the Maas-W aal. 

Because of these waterways, the texture 

of the soil, and innumerable drainage 

ditches and dikes, a vehicular column 

would be road-bound almost all the way 

from Eindhoven to Arnhem. This was a 

harsh restriction. Although the cities of 

Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem are 

communications centers, all with more 

than 100,000 population, only one main 

highway passes through them in the direction the ground troops in Operation 

GARDEN were to take. It runs from 

Eindhoven through St. Oedenrode, Veghel, Grave, and Nijmegen, thence to 

Arnhem. The planners had to consider 

that failure to secure any of the bridges 

along this route might spell serious delay 

and even defeat for the entire operation. 

Between Eindhoven and Arnhem the 

highway passes through fiat, open country 

with less than a 30-foot variation in altitude over a distance of fifty miles. The 

only major elevations in the vicinity of 

the road are two hill masses: one north 

of the Neder Rijn, northwest and north of 

Arnhem, rising to more than 300 feet; the 

other between the Maas and Waal Rivers, 

southeast of Nijmegen, rising to 300 feet. 

The two elevations represented some of 

the highest ground in the Netherlands. 

Perhaps the most striking feature of the 

terrain is the extent and density of the 

vegetation. Almost every path and road 

131 

is lined on either side by trees. Almost 

every field and every dike is topped by 

trees or large bushes. The result, during 

spring, summer, and early fall, is severe 

restriction of observation. Indeed, those 

who would fight in the Netherlands would 

encounter just as many problems of observation as did others in earlier wars in 

Flanders and the Po Valley of Italy. In 

terrain like this, it is difficult for the 

stronger force to bring its full power to 

bear at anyone point, and the ability of 

the weaker, defending force may be considerably enhanced. 

Either the bridges over the waterways 

or features necessary to ensure seizure and 

retention of the bridges made up the 

principal objectives assigned to the three 

airborne divisions. Dropping farthest 

south between Eindhoven and Veghel, the 

IOIst Airborne Division was to secure 

approximately fifteen miles of the corridor, 

including the city of Eindhoven and 

bridges at Zon, St. Oedenrode, and 

Veghel. The 82d Airborne Division was 

to drop in the middle to capture bridges 

over the Maas at Grave, the Waal at 

Nijmegen, and the Maas-Waal Canal in 

between, plus the high ground southeast 

of Nijmegen. To the 1st British Airborne 

Division fell the role farthest from the 

start line of the ground troops, that of 

securing a bridge over the Neder Rijn at 

Arnhem and maintaining a bridgehead 

north of the river sufficiently large to enable the 30 Corps to pass through en route 

to the IJsselmeer.36 The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade was to drop on D plus 2 to 

30 General McAuliffe recalls that in the original plan the JOIst Airborne Division was to have 

dropped at Arnhem but that the 1st Airborne 

Division had requested a switch because its staff 

already had studied the Arrihem area for the 

defunct Operation COMET. Ltr to OCMH, 8 

Feb 54. 
132 

strengthen the British at Arnhem, and the 

52 Lowland Division (Airportable) was to 

be flown in north of Arnhem as soon as 

landing strips could be prepared. Reinforcing the British was in keeping with the 

fact that the I st Airborne Division would 

be the last to be relieved by the ground 

columns. 37 

Operation MARKET was the largest airborne operation ever mounted and was 

destined to retain that distinction through 

the rest of World War 11.38 Nevertheless, the size of the initial drop was 

restricted by the number of troop carrier 

aircraft available in the theater. Only 

about half the troops of the three airborne 

divisions could be transported in one lift. 

Naturally anxious that all their strength 

arrive on D-Day, the division commanders 

asked that the planes fly more than one 

mission the first day. They pointed to 

the importance of bringing all troops into 

the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an 

organized ground assault. For their part, 

the troop carrier commanders dissented. 

Flying more than one mission per aircraft, 

they said, would afford insufficient time 

between missions for spot maintenance, 

repair of battle damage, and rest for the 

37 XVIII Corps, Rpt of Abn Phase, JOist 

Abn Div, and A Graphic Account of the 82d 

Airborne Division; F AAA, Opns in Holland; 

Hq Br Abn Corps, Opn Instr I and 2, 13 and 14 

Sep 44.. Allied Abn Opns in Holland. 

38 In Operation VARSITY, launched in the spring 

of 1945, more planes, gliders, and troops were involved on D-Day than in Operation MARKET, but 

additional airborne troops flown in on subsequent 

days made MARKET the larger operation. For details 

on VARSITY, see The Last Offensive, a volume in 

preparation for the series UNITED ST ATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

crews. High casualties among the airmen 

might be the result. If weather remained 

favorable, they pointed out, and if combat 

aircraft assumed some of the resupply 

missions, the troop carriers might fly but 

one mission daily and still transport three 

and a half divisions by D plus 2. 

Although it meant taking a chance on 

enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier 

commanders. He decided on one lift per 

day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days 

to convey the divisions, General Brereton 

stuck by his decision.39 

The D-Day lift would be sufficient for 

transporting the advance headquarters of 

the British Airborne Corps, the three 

parachute regiments of both the 82d and 

10 I st Airborne Divisions, and three major 

increments of the 1st Airborne Division: 

a parachute brigade, an air landing brigade, and a regiment of air landing 

artillery. Enough space remained in the 

first lift to permit the division commanders 

a degree of flexibility in choosing small 

units of supporting troops to go in on 

D-Day. In the second lift, on D plus I, 

the remainder of the British airborne division was to reach Arnhem, the 10 I st 

was to get its glider infantry regiment, the 

82d its airborne artillery, and both American divisions another fraction of their 

supporting troops. On D plus 2, despite 

anticipated demands of resupply, the 1st 

Polish Parachute Brigade was to join the 

British at Arnhem, the 82d was to get its 

glider infantry, and the roISt was to 

39 F AAA, Opns in Holland; Hq Br Abn 

Corps, Allied Abn Opns in Holland; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 227; de 

Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 415. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

receive its artillery. On the fourth day 

the tails of all divisions might arrive.40 

For the D-Day lift the 10Ist Airborne 

Division was allotted 424 American parachute aircraft and 70 gliders and tugs, 

while the 82d Airborne Division was to 

employ 480 troop carriers and 50 gliders 

and tugs. The 1 st Airborne Division was 

to have 145 American carriers, 354 British 

and 4 American gliders, and 358 British 

tugs. Variance in the number of parachute and glider craft assigned the British 

and American divisions stemmed primarily 

from organizational differences. The variations between the American divisions 

were attributable to differences in objectives and proposed tactical employment. 

The 10 I st, for example, was to use the 

second lift to build up infantry strength, 

while the 82d, in anticipation of a longer 

fight before contact with the ground 

column, was to concentrate on artillery. 

Some elements of all divisions not immediately needed were to travel by sea and 

thence overland in wake of the ground 

column.41 

While the airborne planning proceeded 

in England, planning and preparation for 

the companion piece, Operation GARDEN, 

progressed on the Continent under General Dempsey's Second British Army. 

The 30 Corps under Lt. Gen. Brian G. 

Horrocks was to strike the first blow on 

the ground an hour after the first para40 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 

227; Leonard Rapport and Arthur Northwood, 

Jr., Rendezvous With Destiny, A History of the 

lOIst Airborne Division (Washington: Combat 

Forces Press, 1948), pp. 256-57, one of the best 

of the division histories; XVIII Corps, A Graphic 

Account of the 82d Abn Div; Hq Br Abn Corps, 

Allied Abn Opns in Holland; 1st Abn Div Rpt 

on Opn MARKET, Pt. I. 

41 FAAA, Opns in Holland; Hq Br Abn Corps, 

Opns Instrs I and 2, 13 and 14 Sep 44, Allied 

Abn Opns in Holland. 

133 

chutists jumped. As soon as logistics and 

regrouping might permit, the 8 and 12 

Corps were to attack along either flank of 

the 30 Corps and gradually were to 

assume responsibility for the flanks of the 

salient created by the main attack. The 

advance of these two corps obviously 

would be affected by the strained logistical 

situation, by belts of marshy terrain 

crossed by few improved roads leading 

northward, and by the weakness of the 8 

Corps, on the right, which would possess 

at first only one division. 

The start line for the main attack by the 

30 Corps was the periphery of the bridgehead north of the Meuse-Escaut Canal 

beyond De Groote Barrier, thirteen miles 

below Eindhoven. By moving behind a 

heavy curtain of artillery fire and fighter 

bomber attacks, General Horrocks hoped 

to achieve a quick breakthrough with the 

Guards Armoured Division, supported by 

the 43d and 50th Infantry Divisions. 

In his formal orders, General Horrocks 

assigned the armor a D-Day objective of 

the village of Valkenswaard, six miles 

short of Eindhoven, which was the designated point of contact with the 10Ist 

Airborne Division.42 Yet General Horrocks said informally that he hoped to be 

in Eindhoven before nightfall on D_Day.43 

Certainly the corps commander's aside 

was more in keeping with Field Marshal 

Montgomery's directive that the ground 

thrust be "rapid and violent, and without 

regard to what is happening on the 

flanks." 44 In the same manner, a D-Day 

objective of Eindhoven rather than Valk42 See extracts from Guards Armd Div Opns 

Order 12; 21 A Gp, Opn MARKET-GARDEN, 

17-26 Sep 44, SHAEF F AAA files. 

43 As quoted in Combat Interv with Col 

Curtis D. Renfro, Liaison Officer, JOist Abn Div. 

44 2 I A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-525, 

14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. 
134 

enswaard was more realistic if General 

Horrocks was to succeed in expectations 

of reaching Arnhem "before the end of D 

plus 3" and of attaining the IJsselmeer, 

ninety-nine miles from his start line, in 

"six days or less." 45 

Directing that vehicles advance two 

abreast along the single highway through 

Eindhoven to Arnhem, General Horrocks 

prohibited southbound traffic. Over this 

highway to Arnhem, he told a briefing 

conference, he intended to pass 20,000 

vehicles in sixty hours. Yet the British 

commander hardly could have been as 

sanguine as he appeared, judging from 

questions he asked later, in private. 

"How many days rations will they jump 

with? How long can they hold out? 

How many days will they be supplied by 

air?" 46 

What Did the Germans Know? 

In hope of deceiving the Germans into 

believing that the Allied supply situation 

denied offensive action other than that 

already under way by the First and Third 

U.S. Armies, the British withdrew their 

advance patrols, in some cases as much as 

ten miles. They might have spared themselves the trouble. The Germans already 

had noted with apprehension a "constant 

stream" of reinforcements concentrating 

behind the right wing of the Second 

British Army. From 9 to 14 September 

the intelligence officer of Field Marshal 

4 5 Renfro Interv. 

46 Ibid. Other sources for British ground 

planning are: 21 A Gp, Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, 

M-S2S; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, 

p. 229; Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton 

Diaries (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946); Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns 

in Holland, especially Instr No.2, 14 Sep 44; 21 

A Gp Opn MARKET-GARDEN. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Model's Army Group B issued daily warnings of an imminent British offensive, probably to be launched in the direction of 

Ni jmegen, Arnhem, and Wesel. The 

objective: the Ruhr.47 

Projecting himself with facility into the 

position of the Allied high command, the 

Army Group B G-2 on 14 September put 

imaginary words into the mouth of General 

Eisenhower in the form of a mythical 

order: 

. . . The Second British Army [he imagined 

the Supreme Allied Commander to say] will 

assemble its units at the Maas-Scheldt 

[Meuse-Escaut] and Albert Canals. On its 

right wing it will concentrate an attack force 

mainly composed of armored units, and, 

after forcing a Maas crossing (see order to 

First U.S. Army), will launch operations to 

break through to the Rhenish-Westphalian 

Industrial Area [Ruhr] with the main effort 

via Roermond. To cover the northern 

flank, the left wing of the [Second British] 

Army will close to the Waal at Nijmegen, 

and thus create the basic conditions necessary to cut off the German forces committed 

in the Dutch coastal areas [the Fifteenth 

Army].48 

As far as the ground picture was concerned, this German intelligence officer 

should have been decorated for his 

perspicacity. The British actually had 

intended earlier to do as the German G-2 

predicted, to strike close along the left 

flank of the First U.S. Army to cross the 

Rhine near Wesel. But the introduction 

of Operation MARKET had altered this 

concept drastically. 

The German conception of what the 

Allies would do with their airborne reserve 

was far more daring than anything the 

47 A Gp B G-2 Rpts, 9, 1 I, and 14 Sep 44, 

A Gp B KTB, Anlagen, Ie/AO [G-2J, I.VII.-

3I.XII.44 (hereafter cited as A Gp B KTB, 

Ie/AO; OB WEST KTB (Text), 12 Sep 44· 

48 Assumed Eisenhower Order, A Gp B G--2 

Rpt, 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Ie/AO. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

Allies actually considered. Even though 

the Germans on the basis of purely strategic considerations expected an airborne 

operation about mid-September and even 

though they had a long-time paratrooper 

in command of the sector the Allies had 

chosen (First Parachute Army's General 

Student), they could not see the southern 

part of the Netherlands as a likely spot. 

In putting words into the mouth of 

General Eisenhower, the Army Group B 

G-2, for example, predicted airborne operations in conjunction with the ground 

offensive which he outlined, but he 

looked far beyond the Netherlands to a 

spot fifty miles east of the Rhine. 49 

As incredible as an operation like this 

might have appeared to the Allies at the 

time, the Germans saw no fantasy in it. 

Indeed, a step higher up the ladder of 

German command, at OB WEST, Field 

Marshal von Rundstedt endorsed the view 

that the Allies would use their airborne 

troops east of the Rhine.50 Even within 

Hitler's inner circle of advisers, none saw 

disparity between this prediction and reality. On the very eve of MARKETGARDEN, the chief of the Armed Forces 

Operations Staff, Generaloberst Alfred 

JodI, voiced his concern about possible 

airborne landings in the northern part of 

the Netherlands, northern Germany, and 

Denmark.51 

4D "In conjunction with [the Second British 

Army's attack]," the G-2 noted in his mythical 

order, "a large-scale airborne landing by the First 

Allied Airborne Army north of the Lippe River in 

the area south of Muenster is planned for an as 

yet indefinite date .... " Ibid. Eight days 

earlier this same G-2 had predicted, more conservatively, airborne operations near Aachen and 

in the Saar region. Summary Estimate of Allied 

Situation, 6 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Ie/AO. 

50 OB WEST KTB (Text), 15 Sep 44. 

51 MS # P-069, The Kreipe Diary (Generalleutnant Werner Kreipe) . 

135 

Thinking independently of his G-2, the 

Army Group B commander, Field Marshal Model, strayed equally far from 

reality, but with results not unfavorable to 

the Germans. Having received a report 

on I I September that the Allies were 

assembling landing craft in British ports, 

Model reasoned that this meant a seaborne invasion of the Netherlands. 52 Reports as late as the morning of 17 September, D-Day for Operation MARKET, of 

"conspicuously active" sea and air reconnaissance of the \Vadden Islands off the 

Dutch coast fed both Model's and 

Rundstedt's apprehension. 53 Both believed 

that the Allies would drop airborne troops 

in conjunction with a seaborne invasion. 

Even as Allied paratroopers and glidermen 

were winging toward the Netherlands, 

Rundstedt was ordering a thorough study 

of the sea- and air-landing possibilities in 

northern Holland. The results were to be 

reported to Hitler. 54 

As for Field Marshal Model, he had 

gone Rundstedt one better. As early as 

I I September, Model had alerted General 

Christiansen, the Armed Forces Commander Netherlands, and ordered him to 

defend the coast of the Netherlands with 

all forces at his disposal. Model went so 

far as to order that mobile interceptor 

units be formed from various forces, 

including elements of the II SS Panzer 

52 See Order, A Gp B to Armed Forces Comdr 

Netherlands, 0115, I I Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Ie/AO. 

53 Daily G-2 Rpt for 15 Sep 44, 00 I 5, 16 Sep 

44, OB WEST KTB, Anlagen, Ie-Tagesmeldungen [Daily G-2 Rpts], I.VII.-30.-IX.44 

(hereafter cited as OB WEST KTB, Ie-Tagesmeldungen); OB WEST KTB (Text), 17 

Sep 44. 

54 OB WEST KTB (Text), 17 Sep 44. 
136 

Corps that had been sent to the Netherlands for rehabilitation. 55 

No indications existed to show that this 

order had any effect on the actual Allied 

attack. Another order, however, issued 

to provide Army Group B a reserve, did 

serve the Germans well. This was a directive from Model on 12 September 

transferring the 59th Division (General 

Poppe) from the Fifteenth Army to the 

sector of the First Parachute Army.56 

As a result, the 59th Division was in 

transit near Tilburg, seventeen miles 

northwest of Eindhoven, when the first 

Allied parachutists dropped. This good 

fortune-plus the chance presence of the 

II SS Panzer Corps near Arnhem-was 

all the more singular because not only 

Model but no other German commander, 

including Hitler, had so much as an 

inkling of the true nature, scope, or 

location of the impending Allied airborne 

operation. 57 

55 Order, A Gp B to Armed Forces Comdr 

Netherlands, II Sep 44. 

56 OB WEST KTB (Text), 12 Sep 44. 

570reste Pinto, Spy Catcher (New York: 

Harper & Brothers, 1952), maintains that presence of the SS divisions near Arnhem was the 

result of a betrayal of the MARKET-GARDEN plan 

before the event by a Dutch traitor. The theory 

has no basis in fact. I t ignores German surprise 

at the landings as well as the fact that Model 

ordered the SS divisions to the Netherlands on 3 

September, before the Allies even considered a 

plan like MARKET-GARDEN. The divisions were, 

in fact, ordered to Arnhem as the first step in 

later commitment of them in the Ardennes 

counteroffensive, an operation which Hitler had 

already decided upon. A retired Dutch army 

officer, Col. Th. A. Boeree, has prepared a pointby-point refutation of the betrayal story and has 

provided a copy of his findings, entitled The 

Truth About the Supposed Spy at Arnhem, for 

OCMH. A commission of inquiry of the Netherlands Lower House has reported its findings on 

the matter in the fourth volume of its proceedings (Staten-Generaal Tweede Kamer Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, Volume 

THE SIEGFRIEH LlNE CAMPAIGN 

The Flight to the Corridor 

Back in England, troops not already on 

the airfields began to assemble on 15 

September and were sealed in at daylight 

the next morning. At headquarters of 

General Browning's British Airborne 

Corps, the general belief, as recalled later, 

was "that the flight and landings would 

be hazardous, that the capture intact of 

the bridge objectives was more a matter 

of surprise and confusion than hard fighting, that the advance of the ground forces 

would be very swift if the airborne operations were successful, and that, in these 

circumstances, the considerable dispersion 

of the airborne forces was acceptable. 58 

The troops themselves underwent the 

inescapable apprehensions that precede 

almost any military operation. In spite of 

their status as veterans, their fears were in 

many instances magnified for Operation 

MARKET. Not only were they to drop far 

behind enemy lines; they were to fly for a 

half hour or more over enemy territory 

and land in the full light of day. Neither 

of these had they done before.59 

Armed with forecasts for favorable 

weather, General Brereton at I goo on 16 

IV, 's-Gravenhage, 1950). Interrogated under 

oath by the commission, Mr. Pinto was unable 

to substantiate his conclusions. (Enquetecommissie 4C, pp. 1581-91). See also C. T. de Jong, 

"La Pretendue trahison d'Arnhem," Revue 

d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale 

(January 1955), pp. 110-12. 

58 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns in 

Holland; F AAA, Opns in Holland. By dispersion, the British apparently referred to the 

extreme depth of the airborne penetration. 

American officers had found unacceptable an 

original plan that involved considerable dispersion of drop zones within division sectors and 

had insisted upon changes. See Ltrs, McAuliffe 

and Gavin to OCMH, '8 Feb and 17 Jan 54. 

5U This attitude is reflected clearly in the 505th 

Parachute Infantry AAR. 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

September made the final, irrevocable deCISIOn. D-Day was the next day, 17 

September. H Hour was 1300.60 

The campaign began that night when 

the Royal Air Force Bomber Command 

started a program to eliminate as much as 

possible of the enemy's antiaircraft defense while at the same time concealing 

the fact that anything unusual was in the 

offing. A force of 200 Lancasters and 23 

Mosquitoes dropped some 890 tons of 

bombs on German airfields from which 

fighters might threaten gliders and C-47's. 

Another force of 59 planes struck by 

night at a flak position. In each case, the 

pilots reported good results. Particularly 

effective was a strike against an airfield 

where the enemy's new Messerschmitt 262 

jet aircraft were based. So cratered were 

the runways after the RAF raid that no 

jets could take off on q September. 61 

Early on D-Day morning, 100 British 

bombers escorted by Spitfires renewed the 

assault by bombing three coastal defense 

batteries along the northern air route. 

As time pressed close for the coming of the 

troop carriers, 8 I 6 Flying Fortresses of 

the Eighth Air Force, escorted by P-5 I 's, 

took up the fight. They dropped 3, I 39 

tons of bombs on I I 7 flak positions along 

both the northern and southern routes. 

Six other B-q's hit an airfield at Eindhoven. Including escor.ts, 435 British and 

983 American planes participated in the 

preliminary bombardment. Only 2 B17'S, 2 Lancasters, and 3 other British 

planes were lost. 

60 FAAA, Opns in Holland. 

6! OB WEST KTB (Text), 17 Sep 44. The 

air phase of Operation MARKET is covered in 

more detail in Graven and Gate, eds., Europe: 

ARGUMENT to V-E Day, pp. 598-61 I, and in 

Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, 

passim. 

137 

To weave a protective screen about the 

two great trains of troop carriers, I, I 3 I 

Allied fighters took to the air. Along the 

northern route, a British command, 

Air Defense of Great Britain, provided 37 I Tempests, Spitfires, and Mosquitoes. Along the southern route, the 

Eighth Air Force employed 548 P-47's, 

P-38's, and P-5 I 'so Adding to the total, 

the Ninth Air Force employed 2 I 2 planes 

against flak positions near the front lines 

along the Dutch-Belgian border. 

All flights got an invaluable assist from 

the weather. Overland fog at the airfields in England had cleared by 0900. 

Over the North Sea and the Continent the 

weather was fair with a slight haze. 

Visibility varied from four to six miles. 

Had the day been tailor-made it hardly 

could have been better for an airborne 

operation. 

Beginning at 1025 on Sunday morning, 

17 September, 12 British and 6 American 

transport planes flew into the east to drop 

Pathfinder teams on drop and landing 

zones 20 minutes before H-Hour. Close 

behind them, from the stationary aircraft carrier that England had become, 

swarmed the greatest armada of troopcarrying aircraft ever before assembled for 

one operation. 62 

A force of 1,545 transport planes and 

478 gliders took off that day from 24 

airfields in the vicinity of Swinden, Newbury, and Grantham.63 Converging· at 

rendezvous points near the British coast, 

the streams of aircraft split into two great 

trains to cross the North Sea. Along the 

62 FAAA, Opns in Holland. 

63 American planes: 1,175; British planes: 

370; American gliders: 124; British gliders: 354. 

For the air routes, see Graven and Gate, eds., 

Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, map opposite 

p. 602. 
138 

northern route went the planes and gliders 

carrying the 1st and 82d Airborne Divisions and General Browning's corps headquarters. Along the southern route went 

the roIst Airborne Division. Beacons and 

searchlight cones marked both rendezvous 

points and points of departure from the 

coast, while two marker boats fixed the 

routes over the North Sea. 64 

A small percentage of planes and gliders 

aborted over England and the sea. To 

save personnel who ditched in the sea, the 

Air/Sea Rescue Service, a component of 

Air Defense of Great Britain, had placed 

a string of seventeen launches along the 

northern route and ten along the shorter 

southern route. In addition, planes of Air 

Defense of Great Britain, the British 

Coastal Command, and the Eighth Air 

Force flew as spotters for ditched planes 

and gliders. During the course of Operation MARKET, a total of 205 men were 

snatched from the sea. 

The average time of flight from base to 

target area on D-Day was two and a half 

hours. From thirty to fifty minutes of 

this time was spent over enemy territory. 

Once the planes and gliders on the 

northern route reached the Dutch coast, 

they attracted flak ranging from light to 

heavy; but few aircraft were hit. Many 

German batteries were silent, victims of 

the preliminary bombardment. Others 

gave in quickly to ubiquitous British escort 

craft. 

Along the southern route the 10 I st 

Airborne Division encountered concen64 A comprehensive report on the intricate 

details of planning and operating the troop 

carrier units may be found in IX Troop Carrier 

Command, Air Invasion of Holland. Unless 

specifically cited, other sources for this section are 

F AAA, Opns in Holland, and Hq Br Abn Corps, 

Allied Abn Opns in Holland. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

trated flak as soon as the planes headed 

across German lines. One of the Pathfinder planes was hit and crashed. Some 

of the lower-flying planes and gliders in 

the main waves drew small arms fire. 

Although some serials escaped the flak 

almost without losses, others incurred 

severe damage. Yet few crippled planes 

fell before reaching the targets and releasing their loads. The paratroopers had 

unqualified praise for pilots who held 

doggedly to their courses, sometimes with 

motors in flames or wings broken and 

often at the price of their own lives after 

passengers or gliders had been released. 

No instance of a pilot resorting to evasive 

action under the stress of antiaircraft fire 

came to light on D-Day. 

Luftwaffe reaction was hesitant, almost nonexistent. Although Allied pilots 

spotted approximately 30 German planes, 

only one group of about 15 Focke-Wulf 

Igo's dared to attack. These engaged a 

group of Eighth Air Force fighters over 

Wesel but quickly gave up after shooting 

down but I U.S. fighter, hardly fair exchange for the loss of 7 German planes. 

The airmen executed two other missions 

on D-Day. Almost at H-Hour, 84 British planes of the 2d Tactical Air Force 

attacked German barracks at Nijmegen, 

Arnhem, and two nearby cities; and after 

nightfall the RAF Bomber Command 

executed two dummy parachute drops 

with 10 aircraft each at points several miles 

to both east and west of the actual drop 

zones. 

Planning staffs for Operation MARKET 

had been prepared to accept losses in 

transport aircraft and gliders as high as 30 

percent. In reality, losses were a phenomenally low 2.8 percent. The enemy 

shot down not one plane or glider carrying 

the British airborne division and knocked 
OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN 

out only 35 American troop carriers and 

13 gliders, most of them along the southern route. Of the escort, the British lost 

2 planes, the Americans 18. Total losses 

in transports, gliders, and fighters were 68. 

Out of a total of 4,676 transports, gliders, 

fighters, and bombers that participated on 

D Day, only 75 craft failed to get through. 

Almost exactly at H-Hour transports 

in the leading serials began to disgorge 

their loads in the beginning of what was 

to become the most successful drop any of 

the three airborne divisions ever had 

staged, either in combat or training. 

British landings were almost IOO percent 

on the correct drop and landing zones. 

The 82d Airborne Division's landings were 

"without exception" the best in the division's history. The lOISt Airborne Division's operation was a "parade ground 

jump" that from any viewpoint was the 

139 

most successful the division had ever 

had. 65 

A total of 33 I British aircraft and 3 19 

gliders and I, I 50 American planes and I06 

gliders got through. Within an hour and 

twenty minutes, approximately 20,000 

American and British troops landed by 

parachute and glider in good order far 

behind enemy lines. The unparalleled 

success of the drops and landings made it 

clear early that the decision for a daylight 

operation had been, under the circumstances, a happy one. Up to this point, 

the Allies had staged an overwhelming 

success. 

65 Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous With 

Destiny, pp. 260, 268; Ltr, Gavin to Maj Gen 

Paul L. Williams, reproduced in IX Troop Carrier 

Comd, Air Invasion of Holland; Ist Abn Div, 

Rpt on Opn MARKET, Pt. 1. 
CHAPTER VII 

Invasion From the Sky 

Along a fifty-mile corridor extending 

from Eindhoven to Arnhem the sky in 

early afternoon of 17 September grew dark 

with a fecund cloud of planes and gliders. 

A minute or so after 1300, the cloud 

opened and seeded the sky. 

"a remarkably beautiful late summer day" 

Thousands of Dutch civilians craned to 

see the show. As many a soldier has come 

to know, civilians in a war zone possess a 

kind of sixth sense that tells them when 

to parade the streets and when to seek 

shelter. Those civilians paraded the 

streets. Most were strolling casually 

home from church. Others had sat down 

to Sunday dinners. Here and there, at 

once a part of the crowd and yet isolated, 

strolled German soldiers absorbing the 

sunshine and rest of a day away from their 

posts. Until the planes came, none knew 

17 September as anything but another 

occupation Sunday. 

From battalions on the scene to the 

Fuehrer's spartan command post in East 

Prussia, surprise in German headquarters 

was equally great. An SS battalion commander was entertaining an intimate lady 

friend. Upon first sight of the parachutes, 

the occupation "mayor" of Arnhem 

dashed out on a personal reconnaissance, 

only to take a British bullet for his 

troubles. The Armed Forces Commander 

Netherlands, General Christiansen, was 

dining leisurely with his chief of staff at a 

restaurant far from the scene near Amsterdam. I 

The commander of the First Parachute 

Army, General Student, was at his desk 

in his command post in a cottage only nine 

miles west of one of the designated American drop zones. To Student the appearance of the Allied armada came as a 

"complete surprise." 

The 17th of September, 1944 [General 

Student recalled later] was a Sunday, a remarkably beautiful late summer day. All 

was quiet at the front. Late in the morning 

the enemy air force suddenly became very 

active. . .. From my command post at 

Vught I was able to observe numerous enemy 

aircraft; I could hear the crash of bombs 

and fire from air craft armaments and antiaircraft guns in my immediate vicinity .... 

At noon there came the endless stream of 

enemy transport and cargo planes, as far as 

the eye could see . . . .2 

While Student had a front row seat, his 

superior, Field Marshal Model, sat virtually upon the stage. Model's headquarters of Army Group B was in a hotel at 

Oosterbeek on the western outskirts of 

Arnhem. Parachutists and gliders of the 

I st British Airborne Division came to 

earth about two miles away. Unaware of 

this ripe chance to capture the commander 

1 Boeree, The Truth About the Supposed Spy 

at Arnhem, provides an informative, welldocumented trip around various German headquarters at the time of the Allied strike. 

2 MS # B-7I7 (Student). German clock time 

was an hour behind the British Summer Time 

used by the Allies. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

and entire staff of Army Group B, the 

British made no immediate move against 

the hotel. Model and his coterie folded 

their tents and stole away. They did not 

stop until they reached headquarters of 

the II SS Panzer Corps beyond the IJssel 

River about eighteen miles east of Arnhem. 3 

In East Prussia, first reports of the 

airborne landings threw Hitler's headquarters into a state of high excitement. 

Although report after report came in, the 

over-all picture remained obscure. Only 

highlights emerged. 

Hitler's personal reaction could best be 

described as febrile. The narrow escape 

of Model and his staff from the British at 

Oosterbeek appeared to impress him most 

at first. "At any rate," Hitler raged, 

"the business is so dangerous that you 

must understand clearly, if such a mess 

happens here-here I sit with my whole 

supreme command; here sit the Reichsmarschall [Goering], the OKH, the 

Reichsfuehrer SS [Himmler J, the Reich 

Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop ] : Well, 

then, this is the most worthwhile catch, 

that's obvious. I would not hesitate to 

risk two parachute divisions here if with 

one blow I could get my hands on the 

whole German command." 4 

During the first hour or two, no German commander could begin to estimate 

the scope and strength of the Allied 

operation. Reports and rumors of landings at almost every conceivable spot in 

the Netherlands spread through every 

headquarters. 5 As late as the next day 

o B WEST still was excited enough to 

3 MSS # T-121, T-122 (Zimmennann et 

a/.). 

4 Minutes of Hitler Conferences, 17 Sep 44 

(Fragment No. 42) . Copy of transcribed notes 

in OCMH. 

5 MS # T-122 (Zimmermann et a/.). 

141 

GENERAL STUDENT 

pass along the fantastic report that a U.S. 

airborne division had landed at Warsaw, 

Poland. 6 

By a stroke of luck for the enemy, this 

kind of delirium was not to last long at 

the lower headquarters. Someone in an 

American glider that was shot down near 

the First Parachute Army's command post 

was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first 

parachute had blossomed, this order was 

on General Student's desk.7 

Having the Allied objectives and dispositions at hand obviously facilitated 

6 Tel Conv, G-3 OB WEST to G-3 A Gp B, 

Ig05, 18 Sep 44, in A Gp B KTB (Text) 

(Rommel Papers) . 

7MS # B-717 (Student). Though no confirmation of this event is to be found in American 

records, there appears no reason to question 

Student's recollection. 
142 

German reaction. Possibly as a result of 

the captured Allied order, Field Marshal 

Model divided the affected zone into three 

sectors corresponding roughly to the sectors of the three Allied divisions. 

To General Student and the First Parachute Army Model gave the dual mission 

of containing the British ground offensive 

opposite the Meuse-Escaut bridgehead 

and of destroying the 10 I st Airborne 

Division in the vicinity of Eindhoven. 

(See Map IV) Already committed along 

the Meuse-Escaut, Kampfgruppe Chill 

was to oppose the British ground troops. 

For fighting the Americans, Model gave 

Student the 59th Infantry Division, so 

fortuitously in transit near Tilburg, and 

the l07th Panzer Brigade. 8 Under command of Major Freiherr von Maltzahn, 

this panzer brigade had been en route to 

Aachen to engage the First U.S. Army.9 

The job of contesting the 82d Airborne 

Division at Nijmegen fell to Wehrkreis VI, 

the rear echelon German headquarters 

which controlled Corps Feldt and the 

406th (Landesschuetzen) Division. These 

Wehrkreis units were ordered to destroy 

the airborne troops along the high ground 

southeast of Nijmegen, seize and hold the 

rail and road bridges across the Waal 

River at Nijmegen, and stand by for 

continued operations "in a southerly direction." Model must have recognized this 

as a pretty big assignment for a makeshift 

force like C orps Feldt; for he advised 

Wehrkreis VI that he intended shifting to 

Nijmegen corps troops and increments of 

parachute troops under General der 

Fallschirmtruppen Eugen Meindl, commander of the II Parachute Corps. Yet 

this help obviously could not arnve 

8 Order, A Gp B to First Prcht Army, 23 I 5, 

I7 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 

gOB WEST KTB (Text), 15 and 16 Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

immediately, for General Meindl's headquarters would have to move from 

Cologne.1o 

Whether from design or merely because 

the troops were at hand, Model sent 

stronger forces against the British at Arnhem. To General Christiansen as Armed 

Forces Commander Netherlands he gave a 

task of attacking toward Arnhem from the 

northwest and north. General Christiansen would have at his disposal Division 

von Tettau, a collection of regional defense 

and training battalions quickly thrown 

together under command of Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau, Christiansen's 

director of operations and training. In 

the meantime General Bittrich's II SS 

Panzer Corps with the 9th and 10th SS 

Panzer Divisions was to move toward 

Arnhem. After the bridge across the 

Neder Rijn at Arnhem was secure, the 

10th SS Panzer Division was to continue 

south to Nijmegen. The panzer corps 

was to be reinforced with a motorized 

infantry battalion commandeered from 

Wehrkreis VI, even though that headquarters could ill afford to part with 

anythingY 

Bearing the proud names H ohenstaufen 

and Frundsberg, the two SS panzer divisions under Bittrich's command were 

drastically depleted. Badly mauled at 

Caen and in the Argentan-Falaise pocket, 

the two divisions apparently had the 

10 Order, A Gp B to Wehrkreis VI, 2315, I7 

Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle; OB 

WEST KTB (Text), I7 Sep 44· 

11 Orders, A Gp B to Armed Forces Comdr 

Netherlands, 2215, and II SS pz Corps, 2315, I7 

Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, OPerationsbefehle; answers by Bittrich to questionnaire prepared by 

Colonel Boeree, 1955, copy in OCMH through 

courtesy of Colonel Boeree (hereafter cited as 

Bittrich Questionnaire). Bittrich notes that 

Model's orders to the II SS Panzer Corps were 

merely in confirmation of measures which he himself already had taken. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

strength only of reinforced regiments. The. 

9th SS Panzer was the stronger with I 

armored infantry regiment, I artillery battalion, 2 assault gun batteries, I reconnaissance battalion, I company of Panther 

(Mark V) tanks, and increments of 

engineers and antiaircraft troops. The 

IOth SS Panzer probably had I armored 

infantry regiment, 2 artillery battalions, I 

reconnaissance battalion, I engineer battalion, and I antiaircraft battalion. 12 

Confronted with a dearth of reserves all 

along the Western Front, the Commander 

in Chief West, Rundstedt, could do little 

immediately to help. About all Rundstedt could contribute on the first day was 

approval for rerouting from Aachen the 

Io7th Panzer Brigade and another unit, 

the 280th Assault Gun Brigade; but these 

obviously could not reach the threatened 

sector for a day or two. As for Hitler, 

he had to content himself for the moment 

with somewhat empty orders to throw all 

available Luftwaffe fighters into the fray 

and with bemoaning the Luftwaffe's failure to set everything right. The entire 

Luftwaffe was incompetent, cowardly, the 

Fuehrer raged. The Luftwaffe had deserted himY 

12 Strength of these two divisions on I7 September is a matter of some conjecture. Neither 

of the usual sources (records of the 

General Inspekteur der Panzertruppen and OKH, 

Zustandberichte, SS-Verbaende-Strength Reports of SS units) is rewarding in this instance. 

Figures given are based upon the Bittrich Questionnaire, copy in OCMH. Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, page 532 and 532n, says the 

divisions each had the "the strength of a brigade 

pi us some thirty tanks and assa ul t guns." Although Wilmot provides no direct source for this 

information, he notes that Rundstedt's chief of 

staff (Westphal) "was as surprised as the Allies 

to find that II SS Panzer Corps had so much 

armor," 

13 MS # P-06g (Kreipe). 

143 

GENERAL TAYLOR 

Hell's Highway 

On the Allied side, from the moment 

men of the IOIst Airborne Division came 

to earth on I7 September, they began to 

fight a battle for a road. Theirs was the 

responsibility for a I5-mile segment of 

narrow concrete and macadam ribbon 

stretching northward and northeastward 

from Eindhoven in the direction of Grave. 

That segment men of the division were to 

nickname Hell's Highway.14 

14 The Screaming Eagles of the IOIst Airborne 

Division saw their first combat on D Day in 

Normandy. Before Operation MARKET, the division's three organic parachute regiments had 

been augmented by attachment of the 506th 

Parachute Infantry. Unless otherwise noted, 

this account is based on official unit records and 

extensive combat interviews; on Rapport and 

Northwood, Rendezvous With Destiny; and on 

two preliminary manuscripts at a small unit level 

prepared by Col S. L. A. Marshall, Parachute 

Battalion in Holland and Parachute Infantry at 

Best. Copies in OCMH. 
144 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

- , - .. 

• 

- - . " -

10 1 ST AIRBORNE DIVISION LANDINGS near ;:pn. 

The objectives vital for subsequent passage of the British ground column were 

located at intervals along the entire 

15-mile stretch of road. This meant that 

a lightly manned and armed airborne 

division would be widely extended in taking and defending the objectives. The 

division commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell 

D. Taylor, later was to compare the 

situation to the early American West, 

where small garrisons had to contend with 

sudden Indian attacks at any point along 

great stretches of vital railroad. 

The dispersion of the 10 I st Airborne 

Division's objectives made sense only in 

light of the expectation of early contact 

with the British ground column, probably 

within twenty-four hours after the jump. 

With this and the widely separated objectives in mind, General Taylor concentrated 

in his early lifts upon bringing in his 

infantry rather than his artillery. Centrally located artillery of the caliber 

available to airborne troops, he reasoned, 

could not reach targets on the extremities 

of his division. The number of objectives 

meant that the perimeter defenses about 

them would be so small that guns emplaced 

within the perimeters could render no 

more than limited service. Infantry and 

mortars were to do the work at first along 

Hell's Highway. 

Recalling dispersion that had plagued 

the division in Normandy, General Taylor 

insisted upon drop zones fairly close 

together, no matter how scattered the 

objectives. Two regimental drop zones 

and the division landing zone were located 

near the center of the division sector, west 

of Hell's Highway in a triangle marked by 

the villages of Zon, St. Oedenrode, and 

Best. Dropping close to Zon, the 506th 

Parachute Infantry (Col. Robert F. Sink ) 

was to secure a highway bridge over the 

Wilhelmina Canal a few hundred yards 

south of Zon, then was to march south on 

Eindhoven. Coming to earth just to the 

north, the 502d Parachute Infantry (Col. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

John H. Michaelis) was to guard both 

drop zones in order to ensure their use as 

a glider landing zone and was to capture 

a road bridge over the Dommel River at 

St. Oedenrode. Because General Taylor 

believed his over-all position might be 

strengthened by possession of bridges over 

the Wilhelmina Canal south of Best, four 

miles from Zon off the west flank of Hell's 

Highway, Colonel Michaelis was to send a 

company to these bridges. The remaining 

parachute regiment, the 50lst Parachute 

Infantry (Col. Howard R. Johnson), was 

to drop a few miles farther north near 

Veghel to seize rail and road bridges over 

the Willems Canal and the Aa River. 

Despite flak and small arms fire, only I 

Pathfinder plane and 2 of the other 424 

parachute aircraft of the IOlst Airborne 

Division failed to reach the drop zones, 

although some planes went down after the 

paratroopers had jumped. Incurring casualties of less than 2 percent in personnel 

and 5 percent in equipment, 6,769 men 

made the jump. They did it in half an 

hour beginning three minutes after HHour, at 1303. Among the casualties 

was I man killed by antiaircraft fire as he 

poised in the open door of his plane. 

While floating earthward with parachutes 

open, 2 other men were cut to pieces by 

the propellers of a crashing C-47. 

One of only two units of the division 

which were not delivered to the correct 

drop zone was the I st Battalion (Lt. Col. 

Harry W. O. Kinnard, Jr.), 50lst Parachute Infantry. Scheduled to drop just 

west of Veghel, between the Aa River 

and the Willems Canal, the battalion 

instead came to earth three miles to the 

northwest. The battalion nevertheless 

had a compact drop pattern and in less 

than an hour was on the move to seize the 

bridges over the Aa River at Veghel. An 

145 

officer and forty-six men, including eight 

jump casualties, stayed behind at a 

chateau (Kasteel) to care for the casualties and to collect equipment bundles. 

While the bulk of Colonel Kinnard's 

battalion marched directly down a main 

road toward Veghel, an advance patrol 

occupied the railway bridge over the Aa 

without contest. Only as the battalion 

entered Veghel in quest of the highway 

bridge did any Germans fight back, and 

these offered only desultory, halfhearted 

fire. 

Meanwhile the main force of this regiment had been landing southwest of 

Veghel on the other side of the Willems 

Canal. Unopposed in the drop and assembly, one battalion organized within 

forty-five minutes, quickly secured the 

nearby village of Eerde, and sent a detachment to throw a roadblock across Hell's 

Highway between Veghel and St. Oedenrode. The remaining battalion dispatched 

a small force to seize the railway bridge 

over the Willems Canal and then marched 

toward the highway bridge over the canal 

on the outskirts of Veghel. Inside Veghel, this battalion contacted Colonel 

Kinnard's men, who by this time had 

secured the road bridge over the Aa River. 

In approximately three hours, Colonel 

Johnson's 50lst Parachute Infantry had 

seized all its D-Day objectives. Now the 

real problem was to organize a defense in 

spite of ecstatic Dutch civilians. 

In late afternoon a message arrived that 

cast a shadow on the day's success. At 

the chateau (Kasteel) northwest of Veghel, a force of about fifty Germans 

supported by mortars had surprised the 

officer and forty-six men who had stayed 

behind to collect equipment bundles. 

Mindful of the need to· defend Veghel 

securely as darkness approached, the 
146 

regimental commander, Colonel Johnson, 

could spare no more than a platoon for 

the relief of these men. A few hundred 

yards short of the chateau German fire 

forced this platoon to dig in for the night. 

The next morning it was obvious that the 

platoon either had to be reinforced or 

pulled back. Still apprehensive about 

the defense of Veghel, Colonel Johnson 

ordered the platoon withdrawn. That 

afternoOn Colonel Kinnard sent a small 

patrol in another attempt to contact the 

bundle-collecting detail. "I am now at 

Kasteel," the patrol leader reported by 

radio, ". . . there are no signs of our men 

here but bloody bandages." 

Other than Colonel Kinnard's battalion, 

the only unit of the IOIst Airborne Division that was not delivered to the correct 

drop zone on D-Day was a battalion of 

Colonel Michaelis' 502d Parachute Infantry. The regiment was scheduled to 

drop on the northernmost of the two drop 

zones between Zon and St. Oedenrode; 

this battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. 

Patrick F. Cassidy, came down two miles 

away on the neighboring drop zone. Although delayed by this misadventure, 

Colonel Cassidy's battalion by nightfall 

had brought a persistent bunch of rear 

echelon Germans to heel in St. Oedenrode 

and thereby secured both a main highway 

and an alternate bridge over the Dommel 

River. Deploying to defend the village, 

Colonel Cassidy sent a patrol northeast 

along Hell's Highway to contact the 50Ist 

Parachute Infantry at Veghel. 

Another battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry deployed to protect the 

glider landing zone, while the bulk of the 

third battalion moved to an assembly area 

near Zon, ready to assist if need be the 

march of the neighboring regiment on 

Eindhoven. At the same time a comTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

pany of this battalion proceeded upon a 

separate mission, to capture the rail and 

road bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal 

southeast of Best. Although these bridges 

were not assigned objectives for the IOIst 

Airborne Division, General Taylor considered them valuable for three reasons: 

first, as an outpost protecting his glider 

landing zone and his main positions along 

Hell's Highway; again, as alternate crossings of the Wilhelmina Canal should the 

Germans destroy the bridges at Zon; and 

again, as control of a main highway (between Eindhoven and's Hertogenbosch) 

by which the Germans otherwise might 

feed r:einforcements to Eindhoven. To do 

the job, Colonel Michaelis sent Company 

H reinforced by a light machine gun 

section and a platoon of engineers. 

En route to the bridges, the Company 

H commander, Capt. Robert E. Jones, lost 

his way in a thick woods, the Zonsche 

Forest. Emerging near a road junction 

east of Best, the company came under fire 

from a small group of Germans apparently rallied by some local commander. 

The Germans gained the upper hand when 

infantry reinforcements and several small 

cannon arrived by truck from the direction of's Hertogenbosch. These could 

have been an advance detachment of 

General Poppe's 59th Infantry Division, 

which was detraining at Tilburg under 

orders from the First Parachute Army's 

General Student to enter the fight. 

Goaded by radio messages from his 

battalion commander to get somebody to 

the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, 

Captain Jones organized a reinforced patrol. A platoon leader, Lt. Edward L. 

Wierzbowski, was to take a rifle platoon 

and the attached engineers and machine 

gun section to the bridges. 

Lieutenant Wierzbowski found in turn 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

that casualties and disorganization had 

left him with but eighteen riflemen and 

twenty-six engineers. The lieutenant and 

his little force still were picking their way 

through the Zonsche Forest toward the 

bridges when night came, and with the 

darkness, a cold, penetrating rain. 

Back at regimental headquarters, Colonel Michaelis meanwhile had become 

perturbed about reports of Company H's 

encounter. He directed that the rest of 

the company's parent battalion go to 

Captain Jones's assistance. The commander, Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, started 

with the battalion toward Best at 1800, 

but darkness fell before physical contact 

could be established with Captain Jones. 

In the meantime, Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his men had crawled the last few 

yards on their bellies to reach the Wilhelmina Canal several hundred yards east 

of the highway bridge. Slithering along 

the dike, the men neared the bridge, 

apparently undetected. While the lieutenant and a scout crawled ahead to 

reconnoiter, the main body of the patrol 

slid down the embankment to await their 

return. 

A barrage of "potato masher" hand 

grenades came suddenly from the darkness 

on the other side of the canal. Scared, a 

couple of men scrambled up the bank of 

the dike. Others followed. The night 

erupted with the fire of machine guns and 

rifles. Some of the men stampeded back 

toward the forest. 

When he heard this firing, Lieutenant 

Wierzbowski had come within sight of 

the bridge, only to find it covered by 

German sentries. Scurrying back, he discovered he had left but 3 officers and 15 

men, and 3 of these wounded. They had 

their individual weapons, plus a machine 

gun with 500 rounds of ammunition, a 

147 

mortar with 6 rounds, and a bazooka with 

5 rockets. Here, as the cold rain fell, the 

men dug in for the night. 

As these events had developed, the IOIst 

Airborne Division's D-Day glider lift had 

begun to arrive. Although not as immune to mishap as the parachutists, a 

total of 53 out of 70 gliders landed 

successfully with 32 jeeps, 13 trailers, and 

252 men. Of those that failed to make it, 

I fell in the Channel, I crash-landed on 

the landing zone, 2 collided in the air 

above the landing zone, 2 were unaccounted for, 4 landed in friendly territory, 

and 7 came down behind enemy lines. 15 

The part of the division headquarters 

that had not parachuted with General 

Taylor came in by glider. Also arriving 

by glider were reconnaissance, signal, and 

medical units. A radio net linked division 

headquarters with the three parachute 

regiments within minutes after the glider 

landings. By 1500 medics were treating 

casualties in a temporary hospital erected 

in a field and at 1700 began a major 

operation. An hour later the medics 

moved to a civilian hospital in Zon. 

Before the gliders arrived, General Taylor's third regiment, the 506th Parachute 

Infantry, had assembled after a nearperfect drop on the southernmost division 

drop zone near Zon. Unhampered by 

opposition, a portion of one battalion 

assembled in less than forty-five minutes. 

Commanded by Maj. James L. LaPrade 

and accompanied by General Taylor, this 

battalion moved south to bypass Zon and 

come upon the highway bridge over the 

15 Another glider narrowly escaped a crash. 

When flak knocked out both pilot and copilot, 

CpJ. James L. Evans, a passenger unfamiliar 

with the controls and himself wounded by flak, 

steadied the ship until he could rouse the dazed 

pilot. 
148 

Wilhelmina Canal from the west flank. 

After capture of this bridge, the 506th 

Parachute Infantry was to continue south 

about six miles to Eindhoven. 

As Major LaPrade and his men advanced, they came under deadly fire from 

an 88-mm. gun emplaced south of the 

Zonsche Forest. Hope for quick capture 

of the bridge from the flank began to fade. 

As soon as the other two battalions of 

the 506th Parachute Infantry assembled, 

the regimental commander, Colonel Sink, 

directed them in a column of battalions 

to Hell's Highway, thence south through 

Zon toward the canal. In Zon the leading battalion also came under fire from an 

88, but a platoon acting as a point deployed among the buildings and advanced 

undetected within fifty yards of the gun. 

A round from the bazooka of Pvt. Thomas 

G. Lindsey finished it off. 

Evidently expecting that Major LaPrade's flanking battalion would have 

captured the highway bridge, these two 

battalions made no apparent haste in 

moving through Zon. They methodically 

cleared stray Germans from the houses, so 

that a full two hours had passed before 

they emerged from the village. Having 

at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the 

Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about 

the same time. Both forces were within 

fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar. Debris from 

the explosion rained all about. 

Rushing to the bank of the canal, 

Major LaPrade, a lieutenant, and a 

sergeant jumped into the water and swam 

across. Though Germans in a house on 

the south bank opened fire, other paratroopers found a rowboat and ferried a 

squad across. This advance party reduced the opposition. The little rowboat 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

made trip after trip across the canal while 

a platoon of engineers improvised a shaky· 

footbridge, but not until an hour before 

midnight was the entire regiment across. 

Perturbed by civilian reports of a 

strong German garrison in Eindhoven, 

Colonel Sink was reluctant to enter the 

city by night. Aware that Eindhoven 

was a secondary objective on the division's 

timetable and that the British had been 

told the city might not be taken on D-Day, 

General Taylor approved a halt until 

daylight. 

As matters stood, the British ground 

column was no closer to Eindhoven than 

were the paratroopers, so that this conservative approach worked no hardship. 

Yet it was a distinct risk, because General 

Taylor and Colonel Sink hardly could 

have known where the British were at the 

time. One of the gliders that failed to 

reach the IOIst Airborne Division's landing zone had contained attached British 

signal personnel; without them, immediate 

contact with the 30 Corps proved impossible. Not until the next morning, when 

the 506th Parachute Infantry made radio 

contact with some American signalmen 

attached to the 30 Corps, could the 

Americans learn how far the British had 

advanced. 

Behind an artillery barrage that began 

an hour after the first troop carrier aircraft passed over the British lines, the 30 

Corps had attacked on schedule with 

tanks in the lead. Against five German 

battalions, including two SS battalions 

that 30 Corps intelligence had failed to 

detect, the spearhead Guards Armoured 

Division had made steady progress. In 

view of the fact that woods and marshy 

ground confined the attack to a front not 

much wider than the highway leading to 

Eindhoven, progress was remarkable, 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 149 

THE DUTCH WELCOME the 506th Parachute Infantry. 

though not sufficient to take the tanks to 

Eindhoven. As night came the British 

stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" 

objective. The objective of Eindhoven, 

which General Horrocks had indicated he 

hoped to reach on D-Day, lay six miles to 

the north. 16 

Against ineffective delaying actions by 

16 The story of the ground attack is from 

Combat Interv with Renfro; Br Abn Corps, 

Allied Abn Opns in Holland; 2 I A Gp, Opn 

MARKET GARDEN. Wilmot, The Struggle for 

Europe, provides a lucid account. 

small enemy groups, Colonel Sink's 506th 

Parachute Infantry pressed the advance 

on Eindhoven early on D plus I, 18 September. By midmorning, the leading battalion had knocked out a nest of two 

88-mm. guns and pushed deep into the 

heart of the city. Colonel Sink had expected to find at least a regiment of 

Germans in Eindhoven; he actually 

flushed no more than a company. Having 

taken four bridges over the Dommel River 

and a canal in the city by noon, the 

paratroopers spent the rest of the day 
150 

rounding up enemy stragglers and clearing 

the southern outskirts for entry of the 

Guards Armoured Division. As they performed these tasks, Eindhoven went on a 

binge. As if by magic the city blossomed 

with the national color. "The reception 

was terrific," said one American officer. 

"The air seemed to reek with hate for the 

Germans .... " 

In the carnival atmosphere the paratroopers failed for a long time to hear the 

fretted clank of tanks they were listening 

for. At I I 30 the first direct radio 

communication with the Guards Armoured Division had revealed that the 

armor still was five miles south of 

Eindhoven, engaged in a bitter fight. At 

1230 hopes rose with the appearance of 

two British armored cars, but these had 

sneaked around the German flank to 

reach Eindhoven from the northwest. 

Shadows were falling when about 1900 

the paratroopers at last spotted the head 

of the main British column. 

The Guards Armoured Division pushed 

through Eindhoven without pause. At 

Zon, British engineers, who had been 

forewarned that the bridge over the 

Wilhelmina Canal was out, set to work. 

During the night they installed a Bailey 

bridge, so that at 0645 (D plus 2, 19 

September) the armor rumbled across. 

The ground advance was proceeding 

swiftly, but was it swift enough? General Horrocks' 30 Corps was at least 

thirty-three hours behind schedule. 

Though overshadowed by the events at 

Eindhoven, the side show that had developed near Best actually provided the 

10 I st Airborne Division's stiffest fighting 

on D plus I and 2. Destruction of the 

bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon 

having lent exigency to the 502d Parachute Infantry's mission of securing alTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

tern ate bridges, Colonel Michaelis early on 

D plus I, 18 September, committed it 

second battalion to the Best fight. 

The answer to the situation at Best lay 

in General Poppe's 59th Division. No 

sooner had this force detrained at Tilburg 

than the First Parachute Army's General 

Student sent the bulk of the division to 

secure the bridges near Best. In the 

meantime, three companies reinforced by 

two replacement battalions and a police 

battalion were to cut Hell's Highway at 

St. OedenrodeY 

The Americans could be grateful that 

General Poppe's division faced an ammunition situation that was "nearly desperate," having had to leave behind most of 

its ammumtIOn when ferried across the 

Schelde estuary as part of the Fifteenth 

ArmyY As it was, the two American 

battalions had all they could do to hold 

their own. The fresh battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis, 

tried to drive to the bridges over the 

Wilhelmina Canal but had to fall back to 

a defense with Colonel Cole's battalion on 

the edge of the Zonsche Forest. A timely 

strike by a flight of P-4 is held the 

Germans off. Colonel Cole himself fell, 

dead of a German bullet through the 

temple. 

All through the day of D plus I the 

sound of firing had fanned hope of relief 

in the minds of Lieutenant Wierzbowski 

and his group of fifteen men along the 

dike near the highway bridge. Then, at 

I 100, the hundred-foot concrete span over 

the Wilhelmina Canal trembled and lifted 

with a violent explosion. The objective 

for which the 502d Parachute Infantry 

17 Mng, Noon, and Evng Sitreps, A Gp B, 

1000, 1530, and 2000, 18 "Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Letzte M eldung. 

18 Ibid. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

continued to fight the rest of the day was 

no longer worth fighting for. 

The experiences of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little group were a testimonial to the kind of hardship small, 

isolated units sometimes are called upon 

to endure. In midafternoon their troubles 

increased when a small German force 

attacked. One man was killed outright. 

Seriously wounded in the base of the 

spine, another slowly died from loss of 

blood. Obsessed with a belief that enemy 

fire had torn off his testicles, one of the 

engineer officers pleaded with Lieutenant 

Wierzbowski to kill him. Wierzbowski 

finally convinced him his wounds were 

not that serious. Two German bullets 

hit the platoon's lead scout, Pfc. Joe E. 

Mann, who already had incurred two 

wounds; now both his arms hung useless. 

Though an engineer lieutenant and a 

sergeant tried to break through for aid, 

the lieutenant was captured and the 

sergeant wounded. 

Hope stirred again during the late 

afternoon and early evening. First, a 

British armored car and a reconnaissance 

car appeared on the opposite bank of the 

canal. The British tried to raise headquarters of the JOIst Airborne Division on 

their radio, but to no avail. They provided fire support until later in the evening 

when a platoon of paratroopers who had 

gotten lost stumbled onto Lieutenant 

Wierzbowski's position. 

Although this platoon agreed to defend 

one of Lieutenant Wierzbowski's flanks, 

the men fell back during the night in the 

face of a small German attack. Again 

Wierzbowski and his little group were 

alone. Then a small patrol from Colonel 

Chappuis' battalion stumbled onto the 

pOSItIOn. Though the lieutenant sent 

word of his plight by this patrol, the 

151 

report was not to reach Colonel Chappuis 

until the next morning. Distorted in 

transmission, the message said only that 

the bridge had been blown. 

As a misty daylight began to break on 

D plus 2, 19 September, Lieutenant 

Wierzbowski spotted a small German 

force bearing down on his pOSItIon. 

Though the lieutenant yelled an alarm, 

the Germans already were too close. Two 

German grenades rolled down among the 

wounded. Although the men tossed these 

out before they exploded, another hit the 

machine gun and blinded the gunner. A 

moment later another grenade rolled into 

this man's foxhole. One eye blown out 

entirely, the other blinded, the soldier 

groped wildly for the grenade. He found 

it and tossed it from his foxhole only a 

split second before it exploded. 

Another grenade fell behind Private 

Mann, who was sitting in a trench with 

six other wounded. Mann saw the 

grenade come and felt it land behind him. 

Helpless, his arms bound and useless from 

the wounds incurred the day before, he 

yelled: "Grenade!" Then he lay back to 

take the explosion with his body.19 

"Shall we surrender or fight?" the men 

had asked persistently. As the Germans 

made a final charge, Lieutenant Wierzbowski gave them a succinct answer: 

"OK. This is the time." Only three of 

his men had gone unscathed. They had 

virtually no ammunition. Their last grenade was gone. One man put a dirty 

handkerchief on a rifle and waved it.20 

19 Private Mann was posthumously awarded 

the Medal of Honor. The Dutch have erected 

a memorial in his honor in the Zonsche Forest. 

20 Cpl. Daniel L. Corman played dead by falling across what he thought was the corpse of his 

foxhole mate. Unmoving, Corman stayed there 

until late afternoon when other paratroopers at 

last arrived. Then he fo~nd that the man he 

had been lying on still had a breath of life in him. 
152 

In the meantime, a kind of stalemate 

had developed in the fighting along the 

edge of the Zonsche Forest. Though the 

two American battalions held their own, 

their regimental commander, Colonel 

Michaelis, could not reinforce them without neglecting defense of St. Oedenrode, 

which was one of his primary missions. 

The solution came at last in the juncture with the British ground troops, 

whereby a squadron of British tanks and 

a modicum of artillery support became 

available. Arrival by glider in the afternoon of D plus I of two battalions of the 

327th Glider Infantry under Col. Joseph 

H. Harper also helped. 21 Because of rain 

and mist along the southern air route, 

this glider lift had come in via the northern route and brought successful landing 

of 428 out of 450 gliders of the IO I st 

Airborne Division. A total of 2,579 men, 

I46 jeeps, I09 trailers, 2 bulldozers, and 

some resupply had arrived. 

General Taylor ordered his assistant 

division commander, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. 

Higgins, to take over-all command of the 

two battalions of the 502d Parachute 

Infantry near Best, contingents of the 

327th Glider Infantry, a squadron of 

British tanks, and elements of British artillery and to reduce all enemy east of the 

highway between Eindhoven and's Hertogenbosch and north of the Wilhelmina 

Canal. Though the destruction of the 

21 Like all glider regiments, the 327th Glider 

Infantry had but two organic rifle battalions. In 

informal reorganization between actions in Sicily 

and Normandy, the glider regiments of both the 

82d and JOIst Airborne Divisions had gained a 

third battalion by splitting between them another 

regiment, the 401st. Thus, the 1st Battalion, 

40lst Glider Infantry, while retaining formal 

status as an independent unit, normally functioned as the 3d Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Best highway bridge had eliminated the 

original purpose of the Best fighting, the 

job of protecting the west flank of the 

I 0 I st Airborne Division remained. 

The British tanks made the difference in 

an attack that began at 1400 on D plus 2. 

Within German ranks, a festering disintegration by late afternoon became a rout. 

"Send us all the MP's available," became 

the cry as hundreds of Germans began to 

give up. For almost three days a bitter, 

costly, and frustrating fight, the action at 

Best now became little more than a mopup. By the end of D plus 2 the prisoners 

totaled more than I,400, and the paratroopers actually counted more than 300 

enemy dead. Some of the prisoners 

came in with Lieutenant Wierzbowski and 

the survivors of his little band. They had 

been taken to a German aid station and 

there had talked their captors into surrender. 

Best itself remained in German hands, 

and much of the territory taken had to be 

abandoned as soon as the mop-up ended. 

Now the battle of Hell's Highway was 

developing into the Indian-type fighting 

General Taylor later was to call it, and 

these men from Best were needed at other 

points. The engagement near Best had 

been costly and had secured neither of the 

bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, yet it 

had parried what could have become a 

serious blow by the 59th Division. General Poppe now had scarcely a shell of a 

division. 

While the fight raged at Best on D plus 

I and 2, the rest of the IOIst Airborne 

Division was maintaining defensive positions at Eindhoven, Zon, St. Oedenrode, 

and Veghel. From Eindhoven, Colonel 

Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry sent a 

battalion to either flank to widen the base 

of the MARKET-GARDEN corridor, but in 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

both cases Sink recalled the troops before 

they reached their objectives. On the 

west the battalion returned because the 12 

British Corps had begun to advance along 

the left flank of the corridor and was 

expected soon to overrun the battalion's 

objective. The battalion on the east returned because Colonel Sink learned that 

a column of German armor was loose in the 

region and he wanted no part of a meeting 

engagement with armor. 

Late in the afternoon of D plus 2 this 

German column struck toward Zon in an 

attempt to sever the thin lifeline over 

which the British ground column was 

pushing toward Nijmegen. It was Major 

von Maltzahn's I07th Panzer Brigade that 

on D-Day had been rerouted from Aachen 

to the assistance of the First Parachute 

Army. Although General Student had 

ordered the panzer brigade and General 

Poppe's 59th Division to make a concentric attack toward Zon, the 59th Division at the time the brigade arrived was 

hors de combat.22 

Even without the 59th Division the 

German attack came close to succeeding. 

Only a scratch force that included General Taylor's headquarters troops was 

available at the time for defending the 

Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal 

at Zon. Darkness had fallen, a British 

truck struck by a round from a German 

tank was burning brightly atop the bridge, 

and a Panther was pumping round after 

round into a building housing the division 

command post when General Taylor himself arrived with reinforcements. He led 

part of a glider infantry battalion and a 

lone 57-mm. antitank gun. One of the 

first rounds from this gun knocked out a 

22 Evng Sitrep, A Gp B, 19 Sep 44, A Gp B 

KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

153 

German tank near the bridge. Bazooka 

fire disabled another. The Germans appeared to lose heart after this, and traffic 

gradually began to flow again along Hell's 

Highway. 

Another German blow against Hell's 

Highway on D plus 2 came from the air, 

perhaps as a direct result of Hitler's exhortations that the Luftwaffe put his little 

world right again. About a hundred 

German twin-engine bombers came out of 

hiding after nightfall to bombard the 

central part of Eindhoven. Because most 

American units held positions outside the 

city, they incurred no damage; but more 

than a thousand civilians were killed or 

wounded, and British units were heavily 

hit. Whether from lack of planes, fuel, 

or trained crewmen, or because of all 

three, this' was the only major strike by 

long-range German bombers during the 

course of the campaign in the West during 

the fall of 1944.23 

At both Veghel and St. Oedenrode 

during these first days, Colonel Johnson's 

50 I st Parachute Infantry and Colonel 

Cassidy's battalion of the 502d Parachute 

Infantry had held their positions about the 

canal and river bridges against persistent 

but small German attacks, most of which 

were in company strength. The strongest 

-by three companies of the 59th Division 

reinforced by police and replacement 

units-struck Colonel Cassidy's battalion 

on D plus 2 on the road to Schijndel. 

Hard pressed at first, Colonel Cassidy's 

men gained assistance from Sgt. James 

M. (Paddy) McCrory, commander of a 

crippled tank that had dropped out of the 

23 Greater detail on this and other German air 

operations against Operation MARKET may be 

found in Hq, AAF, Airborne Assault on Holland, 

an Interim Report, Wings at War Series, NO.4, 

pp. 37-39· 
154 

British ground column. Although the tank 

could make no more than five miles per 

hour, McCrory plunged unhesitatingly 

into the fight. When the paratroopers 

tried to thank him, he brushed them off. 

"When in doubt," Sergeant McCrory said, 

"lash out." His words became a kind of 

unofficial motto of the battalion. 

General Taylor had hoped to be in a 

stronger· position by the end of D plus 2 

with the addition of most of his airborne 

artillery. But the bugaboo that threatens 

all airborne operations had developed. 

The weather closed in. Though the 

flights on D plus 2 were postponed until 

late in the day on the chance the weather 

might clear, troops in the gliders still were 

to speak of a mist so thick they could see 

nothing but three feet of tow rope 

stretching out into nowhere. Because the 

glider pilots could not detect when their 

mother planes banked, many gliders 

turned over and had to cut loose prematurely. The Air/Sea Rescue Service 

worked overtime plucking ditched crewmen and passengers from the Channel. 

Many planes and gliders turned back. 

On the other hand, weather at German 

bases must have been better; for the 

Germans sent up more than 125 Messerschmitts and F ocke-W ulfs. A total of 

1,086 Allied troop carrier, tow, and resupply planes and 428 gliders took off on 

D plus 2. A large part of these returned 

to base, while 45 planes and 73 gliders 

were lost. 24 

Probably because the IOISt Airborne 

Division's landing zone was relatively secure, General Brereton allotted General 

Taylor, at the expense of the 82d Airborne 

24 FAAA, Opns in Holland. See also Rapport 

and Northwood, Rendezvous With Destiny, pp. 

3 12- 1 3. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Division, 384 gliders for the D plus 2 

flight, more than twice the number originally planned. Only 2 I 2 of these arrived. 

After missing the landing zone and circling 

vainly, 82 tow planes returned to England. 

These were minus 3 I of their gliders 

which cut loose behind friendly lines, 16 

known to have crash-landed in enemy 

territory, and 26 not accounted for. 

Those glidermen who landed behind German lines and eventually rejoined their 

units brought with them harrowing tales 

of hairbreadth escapes punctuated with 

praise for the Dutch underground. Most 

of these men were artillerymen, for the 

flights bringing in the artillery units were 

particularly cut up. Of 66 artillery 

pieces and antitank guns that started the 

flight, only 36 arrived. None was larger 

than the 75-mm. pack howitzer; all planes 

towing gliders with 105-mm. howitzers 

had to turn back. 

Difficulties imposed on the IOlst Airborne Division by the adverse weather 

could not be ignored, and General Taylor's 

"Indian War" to keep open Hell's Highway would remain critical as long as men 

and supplies had to go north over the 

highway. Nevertheless, at the moment, a 

situation had developed farther north that 

overshadowed events along Hell's Highway. Moving on Grave and Nijmegen, 

the British ground column was hard 

pressed to cross the Maas and Waal Rivers 

and reach the British airborne troops at 

Arnhem. To ensure passage of the 

grQund column, the 82 Airborne Division 

at Nijmegen was fighting against time. 

I 

Six Bridges and a Ridge 

For the 82d Airborne Division, the mere 

possession of the towns, the bridges, and 

the highway in the division's assigned sec-
INVASION FROM THE SKY 155 

GENERAL GAVIN and General Dempsey (on lift) confer during Operation MARKETGARDEN. 

tor was not sufficient to ensure the passage 

of the 30 Corps ground column. 25 

25 The 82d "All-American" Airborne Division 

made a first combat jump in Sicily, then reinforced the Fifth Army at Salerno. When the 

division returned to England, one regiment remained behind to fight at Anzio and missed the 

Normandy jump but later rejoined the division. 

Attachment of the 508th Parachute Infantry 

provided the division with a fourth infantry 

regiment. Unless otherwise noted, the story of 

the 82d in Operation MARKET is based upon 

official unit records and combat interviews. A 

unit history, Saga of the All-American, compiled 

and edited by W. Forrest Dawson (Atlanta, 

Albert Love Enterprises, 1946), is largely pictorial. As noted, because of sketchy records, 

considerable reliance has had to be placed upon 

postwar observations. 

Even the bridges over two of the most 

formidable water obstacles along the entire 

path, the sprawling Maas and Waal 

Rivers, were overshadowed by another 

feature of terrain: the hill mass southeast 

of Nijmegen. This high ground is generaJIy triangular in shape, but the most 

pronounced and highest elevations are 

mainly along the north and east, forming 

a wooded ridge line that extends southeast 

from Nijmegen past the resort hotel of 

Berg en Dal to the vicinity of the village 

of Wyler, thence south through Groesbeek 

to the village of Riethorst, close to the 

Maas River. Roughly 300 feet in height, 
156 

the ridge line is about eight miles long. 

At the base of its eastern slope lies the 

Dutch-German border, where the ground 

rises again to the east into a big forest, 

the Reichswald. 

In the eyes of the 8zd Airborne Division 

commander, Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin,26 

possession of the ridge represented the key 

to success or failure. "With it in German 

hands," General Gavin was to note later, 

"physical possession of the bridges would 

be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the 

terrain around it." General Gavin believed that if he held this ridge, the British 

ground column ultimately could succeed, 

even if his airborne troops should be 

driven away from the bridges. The high 

ground also represented a ready airhead 

for later operations.27 

An understanding of General Gavin's 

concern about this ridge involves going 

beyond consideration of the usual importance of high ground to success in almost 

any operation. The high ground in this 

instance was unusual in that almost all 

surrounding terrain was predominantly 

fiat. Not only did the high ground dominate all the other objectives-the bridges 

over the Maas, the Maas-W aal Canal, 

and the Waal-it also represented the only 

real barrier to counterattack should the 

Germans strike from the east from the 

direction of the Reichswald. This last the 

8zd Airborne Division G-z, Lt. Col. 

Walter F. Winton, Jr., predicted might 

constitute the major reaction to the land26 General Gavin was promoted to major general during the course of this operation. 

27 Ltr, Gavin to Capt John G. Westover, Hist 

Off, 25 Jul 45, in reply to questions submitted 

by Westover to CofS, 82d Abn Div, 82d Abn Div 

Combat Interv file. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

ings.28 From the direction of the Reichswald the Germans would have two major 

routes, one leading from Kleve along the 

north edge of the forest east into· 

Nijmegen, the other, from Venlo, passing 

along the south edge of the forest and 

thence northeast through the villages of 

Riethorst and Mook and generally alongside the Maas-Waal Canal into Nijmegen. 

The possibility of counterattack from 

this direction took on added credence from 

the Dutch resistance reports of panzer 

formations assembling in the Netherlands. 

The 8zd Airborne Division was led to 

believe that this armor was concentrating 

in the Reichswald. This information became "a major and pressing element in the 

pre drop picture of German forces." 29 

The possibility of encountering German 

armor underscored, in General Gavin's 

mind, the importance of the defensive 

aspects of the 8zd Airborne Division's 

assignment. Unlike the IOIst Airborne 

Division, the 8zd could anticipate contact 

with the ground column no sooner than 

D plus I, at the earliest, and even this 

was highly conjectural. General Gavin 

believed it necessary to plan his fight "in 

such a manner as to be able to conduct a 

good fight, well in hand, for at least three 

days, and almost certainly well beyond 

this time, if need be." 30 

Had the entire strength of the 8zd 

Airborne Division been available on DDay, all assigned objectives might have 

been designated to be taken at once as a 

matter of course, despite the threat of the 

28 Ibid., and Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 17 Jan 54. 

29 Ltr, Winton to OCMH, 8 Mar 54, OCMH; 

Intelligence Trace No. 5 in Hq, Troop Carrier 

Forces FO NO.4, 13 Sep 44; 505th Prcht Inf 

AAR. 

30 Gavin, Ltr to OCMH. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

Reichswald and delayed contact with the 

ground column. As it was, because of 

the limitations of the D-Day lift, the 

question of priority of objectives entered 

the picture. In anticipation of a heavy 

fight before the ground column could 

provide artillery and antitank support, 

General Gavin allotted a portion of his 

D-Day lift to a parachute artillery battalion. He also scheduled arrival of the rest 

of his artillery on D plus 1. This meant 

that the glider infantry regiment could not 

arrive until D plus 2, so that for the first 

two days the 82d would have but three 

regiments of infantry. If these three parachute infantry regiments tried to take all 

assigned objectives, they would be spread 

dangerously thin for holding the objectives 

in the event enemy armor materialized 

from the Reichswald. 

Take only the bridges and you probably 

could not hold them without the high 

ground. Take only the high ground, the 

Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the MaasWaal Canal bridges, and the ground 

column could not get across the Maas 

either to use the other bridges or to relieve 

the airborne troops. With only so many 

troops at hand, General Gavin saw no 

solution at first other than to take first the 

high ground and the Maas and MaasWaal Canal bridges-thereby ensuring 

juncture with the ground column-then 

Nijmegen. 

General Gavin and his staff were not 

alone in this thinking. Indeed, the directive from the corps commander, General 

Browning, was "clear and emphatic" to 

the effect that the division was "not to 

attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen 

Bridge until all other missions had been 

successfully accomplished and the Groesbeck-Berg en Dal high ground was firmly 

157 

in our hands." 31 In his formal order 

General Browning stated: "The capture 

and retention of the high ground between 

Nijmegen and Groesbeck is imperative in 

order to accomplish the Division's task." 32 

On the other hand, the question of 

taking the magnificent I,g60-foot span 

across the Waal River at Nijmegen obviously was not dismissed summarily. The 

bridge in relation to strength available to 

take it on D-Day was the subject of 

continuing discussion, not only before DDay but after the jump. As late as 

mid afternoon of D plus I General Browning disapproved a projected plan for 

taking the Nijmegen bridge and directed 

instead that the 82d Airborne Division 

continue to concentrate for the time being 

upon defending the high ground and the 

bridges over the Maas and Maas-Waa1.33 

After "almost daily" discussions about 

the Nijmegen bridge in relation to the 

over-all plan, General Gavin and his staff 

31 Ibid.; Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Airborne 

Warfare (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 

1947), p. 75· 

32 Hq Br Abn Corps, Opn Instr No. I, Allied 

Abn Opns in Holland. General Browning was 

to recall later: "I personally gave an order to 

Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be 

made to effect the capture of the Grave and 

Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was 

essential that he should capture the Groesbeek 

Ridge and hold it-for ... painfully obvious 

reasons . . .. If this ground had been lost to 

the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would 

have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance 

across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have 

been immediately outflanked. Even the initial 

advance of the Guards Armoured Division would 

have been prejudiced and on them the final 

outcome of the battle had to depend." Ltr, 

Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British 

Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 

Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH. 

3382d Abn Div CofS Jnl, entry of 0700, 19 

Sep 44, referring to conf, Gavin with Browning, 

1530, 18 Sep 44. See also Gavin Ltr to OCMH. 
158 

finally decided, "About 48 hours prior to 

take-off, when the entire plan appeared to 

be shaping up well," that they could risk 

sending one battalion in a quick strike for 

the bridge. This was admittedly a minimum force, but if the Germans were not 

in strength at the bridge and if the 

expected counterattacks from the Reichswald could be held with a smaller force 

than originally deduced, the risk would be 

justified because of the nature of the prize. 

"I personally directed Colonel Roy E. 

Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled 

later, "to commit his first battalion 

against the Nijmegen bridge without delay 

after landing but to keep a very close 

watch on it in the event he needed it to 

protect himself against the Reichswald." 34 

In the end, the 82d Airborne Division 

was to try to seize all its objectives on 

D-Day: bridges over the Maas at Grave; 

over the Maas-Waal Canal near Honinghutje,35 Hatert, Malden, and Heumen; 

and over the Waal at Nijmegen; plus the 

high ground. The only exception was the 

railroad bridge at Nijmegen for which no 

force apparently was allotted. 

The drop zone of the 508th Parachute 

Infantry (Colonel Lindquist) was on the 

high ground north of Groesbeek. In addition to the one-battalion assignment 

against the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel 

Lindquist drew responsibility for a major 

portion of the high ground from Nijmegen 

34 Gavin Ltr to Westover; Gavin Ltr to 

OCMH. 

:15 The Honinghutje bridge was not mentioned 

in 82d Abn Div FO 1 I, 13 Sep 44, which listed 

assignments. General Gavin in his letter to 

OCMH says that the 504th and 508th Parachute 

Infantry Regiments together were to take the 

bridge. The task "was to depend upon the 

development of the fight once the landings were 

accomplished." Presumably the same was true 

of rail bridges over both the Maas and the Waal. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

past the resort hotel of Berg en Dal to the 

village of Wyler, thence generally south to 

the vicinity of Groesbeek, a total distance 

of about six miles. The regiment also was 

to block enemy movement southward from 

Nijmegen and was to assist in taking the 

bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal at 

Hatert and Honinghutje, the last on the 

main Grave-Nijmegen highway. A final 

assignment involved securing the northernmost of two glider landing zones on the 

eastern slopes of the ridge line, south of 

Wyler. 

The 505th Parachute Infantry (Col. 

William E. Ekman) was to drop south of 

Groesbeek. The regiment then was to 

take Groesbeek, high ground in the vicinity, the southern glider landing zone 

southeast of Groesbeek, and the ridge line 

extending south as far as the Kiekberg 

(Hill 77.2), a high point overlooking the 

village of Riethorst. Patrols from this regiment were to assist in taking the MaasWaal bridges at Heumen and Malden. 

The principal assignment of the remaining regiment, the 504th Parachute 

Infantry (Col. Reuben H. Tucker), was 

to take the 9-span, I,800-foot bridge over 

the Maas River near Grave. In keeping 

with the theory that bridges are best taken 

by assault from both ends, one company 

was to drop south of the river. The rest 

of the regiment was to drop between the 

Maas and the Maas-W aal Canal. Other 

assignments included blocking enemy 

movement between the river and the canal 

from the west, assisting in taking the 

Honinghutje bridge, and capturing the 

Malden and Heumen bridges. Gaining at 

least one of the four bridges over the 

Maas-Waal Canal was vital, for the canal 

is a sizable waterway, in most places about 

200 feet wide. The 504th also was to 

guard against counterattack from the west. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

---- --- - . - .. .. --

.-. 

--. 

.. ~ ... 

-- -.-

~ 

-

• 

. 

~ 

• . ! 

, 

- t .-

.. -

159 

--

• 

82n AIRBORNE DIVISION DROP near Grave. 

The flight, drops, and landings of the 

82d Airborne Division on D-Day, 17 September, proved even more phenomenally 

successful than did the 10 1St'S. Employing the northern air route, the serials 

encountered only sporadic flak that was 

highly inaccurate even 'as it grew heavier 

near the drop zones. Only I of 482 

planes and 2 of 50 gliders failed to reach 

the target area. Incurring only 2 percent 

casualties, 7,277 men made the jump. At 

least 2 were killed, I who was struck by a 

supply bundle and another whose parachute failed to open. Only 7 out of 209 

men who arrived by glider were injured. 

Eight 75-mm. guns arrived without incident. The only miscalculation was the 

dropping of one battalion of the 508th 

Parachute Infantry a mile north of the 

assigned drop zone, but this had little 

effect on subsequent operations. Both 

General Gavin and the British Airborne 

Corps commander, General Browning, 

jumped with skeleton staffs. 

Resistance to the drop and assembly 

was "negligible," although some individuals had to fight their way off the drop 

zones. The 508th Parachute Infantry 

met resistance from "a few widely scattered" antiaircraft crews and "some isolated labor troops," but the general 

picture was as summed up by the G-2 : 

"Landed against almost no opposition." 36 

36 Msg, G-2 to CO Base Echelon, 17 Sep, in 

82d Abn Div G-2 Jnl, 17-21' Sep 44 ; 508th 

Prcht Inf AAR and other regtl AARs; Gavin Ltr 

to OCMH. 
160 

Taking the Objectives 

The task of seizing the big highway 

span over the Maas River near Grave was 

easier because one stick of sixteen men 

failed to get the green light signal to jump 

until "a bit late." 37 "Vhen the signal 

came the officer in charge of this stick, Lt. 

John S. Thompson, noted that his pla~e 

was directly over a group of buildings. 

He decided "to wait a few seconds and 

jump on a field just southwest of the 

Grave Bridge." 38 The result was that he 

and his men came to earth only about 700 

vards from the south end of the bridge, 

~hile the rest of the company of the 504th 

Parachute Infantry that jumped south of 

the Maas came down more than a mile 

away. 

Lieutenant Thompson lost no time 

getting started toward the bridge. Despite occasional small arms fire, he and his 

men made their way through drainage 

ditches to the vicinity of a tower near the 

bridge. Two hits 'from a bazooka silenced a 20-mm. flak gun in the tower. 

In keeping with established practice, the 

men made every effort to prevent any 

Germans from moving about near the 

bridge , lest they set or activate demolitions. , 

As the men reached the bridge, they cut 

all visible wires. 

In the meantime, the main body of 

Lieutenant Thompson's parent battalion 

had been assembling on the other side of 

the Maas River. As the battalion reached 

the north end of the bridge, only a flak 

gun on river flats nearby offered any real 

problem. In less than three hours, the 

504th Parachute Infantry was in firm 

37 Combat Interv with personnel of Co E, 

504 th Prch t Inf. 

38 Gavin letter to OCMH, citing an account 

of the event written by Lieutenant Thompson. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

control of the Maas bridge, one of the 

major prizes of the entire MARKETGARDE:\, operation. That the Germans 

had failed to demolish the bridge could be 

explained either through the precautions 

Lieutenant Thompson and his men had 

taken or through prisoner revelations that 

the bridge was to have been blown only 

on order of the German corps commander, 

who was not present. 39 

The bulk of Lieutenant Thompson's 

parent company had been unable to 

reach the bridge from the drop zone west 

of Grave because of small arms fire from 

the town. Aware that a twelve-mile gap 

existed between the company and closest 

units of the IO 1st Airborne Division at 

Veghel, the company commander set up 

a roadblock across the main highway to 

forestall German reinforcements from the 

south. That night a patrol went into 

Grave to investigate strange FlOises emanating from the town. The patrol found 

civilians gathered in the town hall lustily 

singing the Dutch version of "Tipperary." 

The Germans had gone. 

Of the other two battalions of Colonel 

Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry, one 

swept stray Gennans from between the 

Maas and the Maas-Waal Canal as far 

west as the main highway, while the 

second set out to take two bridges over the 

canal. Both bridges were near the southeast end of the canal where it joins the 

Maas River, one near the village of 

Malden, the other at Heumen. These 

bridges were important not only as possible routes north for the ground column 

but also as connections between the 504th 

Parachute Infantry and the other regiments on the high ground to the northeast. 

3U 82d Abn Div, Annex 3 to G-2 Rpt 91, 

Translation of Captured Document 15 Sep 44. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

The battalion commander, Maj. Willard 

E. Harrison, sent a company to each 

objective. The men who charged the 

bridge at Malden saw their objective go 

up in smoke as they made a final dash 

toward it. At Heumen, small arms fire 

from an island in the canal a few yards 

north of the bridge stymied advance until 

at last 8 men infiltrated to a point near 

the bridge from which they could 

spray the island with machine gun fire. 

Covered by this fire, 2 officers, a corporal, 

and a radio operator ran for the bridge. 

Three of them made it. Before dark, another officer and 6 men rowed across the 

canal to join thi~ trio.40 Yet the presence 

of this little force on the east bank of the 

canal had no apparent effect upon the 

Germans who were covering the bridge 

from the island. 

The American company commander, 

Capt. Thomas B. Helgeson, expected the 

bridge to be blown at any moment. As 

approaching darkness provided some concealment, Captain Helgeson sent the 

battalion demolition squad to search for 

and cut demolition wires. "The bridge 

had been prepared for demolition," men 

of the battalion recalled later, "and nobody knows why it was not blown." 41 

Darkness at last provided the antidote 

for the German fire from the island. Soon 

after nightfall, a strong patrol stormed 

across a footbridge and overran the 

German positions. Six hours after H 

Hour the Heumen bridge was safe. It 

subsequently was to serve as the main 

route across the Maas-W aal Canal for 

the British ground column. 

40 General Gavin recalls that the division 

Reconnaissance Platoon approached the east 

side of the bridge late in the afternoon. Gavin 

Ltr to OCMH. 

41 Combat Interv with personnel of 1st Bn, 

504th Prcht Inf. 

161 

Of two other bridges over the MaasWaal Canal-one near Hatert, northwest 

of Malden, the other on the main 

Grave-Nijmegen highway near Honinghutje-only the Hatert bridge was attacked on D-Day. To Hatert went 

elements of the 504th and a platoon of 

Colonel Lindquist's 508th Parachute Infantry, only to find the bridge demolished. 

Before dawn the next morning, Colonel 

Lindquist sent a platoon to seize the 

bridge at Honinghutje. When German 

fire pinned this platoon to nearby drainage 

ditches, another platoon arrived to help. 

Together they stormed the bridge, but 

not before the Germans hurriedly set off 

demolitions. Though the explosion failed 

to demolish the bridge, it weakened it to 

the extent that the ground column subsequently avoided it in favor of a more 

circuitous route via the Heumen bridge. 

Like Colonel Tucker's battalions, those 

of Colonel Lindquist's 508th Parachute 

Infantry and of Colonel Ekman's 505th 

Parachute Infantry had assembled within 

an hour after the D-Day drop. One 

battalion was moving toward its objective 

within twenty minutes after the drop. 

With the assistance of the Dutch underground, one battalion of the 505th 

Parachute Infantry rounded up stragglers 

in Groesbeek. The battalion then occupied a peak (Hill 8 I .8) of the ridge line 

in woods west of the village, constituting 

a division reserve, and also sent patrols 

southwest toward Heumen where soon 

after dark they contacted the 504th 

Parachute Infantry at the Heumen bridge. 

Part of another battalion occupied the 

Nijmegen-Groesbeek ridge south of Groesbeek, including the Kiekberg (Hill 77.2), 

which overlooks the village of Riethorst 

and the highway leading from the Reichswald to Mook and Nijmegen. A company 
162 

later in the day cleared Riethorst and set 

up roadblocks. Although patrols attempted to seize a railroad bridge over the 

Maas River near Mook, the Germans blew 

the bridge with moments to spare. Colonel Ekman's remaining battalion dug in 

along the ridge at Groesbeek and north of 

that village and sent a company-size 

patrol east to the Reichswald. 

Because of the proximity of the sosth 

Parachute Infantry to the Reichswald, 

these men were particularly concerned 

about the report they had received in 

England that the Reichswald was a nest 

of German armor. They breathed more 

easily when the patrol returned with 

word that "no tanks could be seen." 

This was in keeping with information 

provided by Dutch civilians soon after 

the landings to the effect that "the report 

about the 1000 tanks in the Reichswald 

was false." 42 

Colonel Lindquist's s08th Parachute 

Infantry had begun work in the meantime 

on a variety of missions. One battalion 

moved west toward Hatert to assume defensive positions astride the Ni jmegenMook highway, in order to block enemy 

movement southward from Nijmegen into 

the division's perimeter. This was the 

same battalion which sent a platoon on the 

unsuccessful quest of the Hatert bridge 

over the Maas-Waal Canal and the next 

morning sent two platoons to the Honinghutje bridge. Another battalion advanced north from the drop zone to 

occupy the northern prong of the wooded 

ridge line, a three-and-a-half-mile stretch 

extending from the southeastern fringe of 

Ni jmegen past Hotel Berg en Dal. This 

the battalion had accomplished by nightfall of D Day "without senous resist42 505th Prcht Inf AAR. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

ance." 43 Occupying the village of Beek 

at the foot of the ridge and thereby 

physically cutting the important KleveNijmegen highway would have to await 

the next day. 

In the hands of the remaining battalion 

of the s08th Parachute Infantry rested a 

special destiny. This battalion, the 1st, 

commanded by Lt. Col. Shields Warren, 

Jr., represented the 82d Airborne Division's best chance for a cheap and rapid 

capture of the highway bridge over the 

sprawling Waal River at Nijmegen. 44 

After receiving General Gavin's prejump orders in regard to the Nijmegen 

bridge, Colonel Lindquist had earmarked 

Colonel Warren's battalion as one of two 

battalions from which he intended to 

choose one to move to the bridge, depending upon the developing situation. General Gavin's understanding, as recalled 

later, was that Warren's battalion was to 

move "without delay after landing." 45 

On the other hand, Colonel Lindquist's 

understanding, also as recalled later, was 

that no battalion was to go for the bridge 

43 508th Prcht Inf AAR. 

44 Although extensive combat interviews were 

conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from 

Department of the Army files. The story has 

been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's 

letters I to Westover and OCMH; letters to 

OCMH from Colonel Warren, 5 July 1955, 

Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. 

Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 

508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. 

Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview 

with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, 

copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview 

file; and Westover, The American Divisions in 

Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater short! y after the war, 

copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access 

to all the combat interViews when writing his 

narrative. 

45 Gavin Ltr to Westover. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

until the regiment had secured its other 

objectives, that is to say, not until he had 

established defenses protecting his assigned 

portion of the high ground and the 

northern part of the division glider landing 

zone.46 Instead of moving immediately 

toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel 

Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of 

De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen a mile 

and a quarter southeast of the city 

astride the Ni jmegen-Groesbeek highway.47 Colonel Warren was to organize 

this objective for defense, tying in with 

the battalion near Hatert and the other 

near Hotel Berg en Dal, 

"be prepared to go 

later." 48 

and then was to 

into Ni jmegen 

The assembly and movement to De 

Ploeg took approximately three and a half 

hours. After organizing a defense of the 

objective, Colonel Warren about 1830 

sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of 

a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section. This patrol was to make 

an aggressive reconnaissance, investigate 

reports from Dutch civilians that only 

eighteen Germans guarded the big bridge, 

and, if possible, capture the south end of 

the bridge. Unfortunately, the patrol's 

radio failed to function so that Colonel 

Warren was to get no word from the 

patrol until the next morning. 49 

As darkness approached, General Gavin 

ordered Colonel Lindquist "to delay not a 

second longer and get the bridge as 

quickly as possible with Warren's battalion." 50 Colonel Warren, in the mean46 Lindquist Ltr to OCMH. See also letters 

from Shanley, Warren, and Bestebreurtje. 

47 508th Prcht Inf AAR. 

48 Warren Ltr to OCMH. 

49 Ibid. See also Shanley Ltr to OCMH. 

50 Gavin Ltr to OCMH. See also letters from 

Lindquist and Shanley. 

163 

time, had found a Dutch civilian who 

said he could lead the battalion to the 

bridge and en route check with resistance 

headquarters within the city for the latest 

developments on German strength at the 

bridge. 51 Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point 

just south of Nijmegen at I goo and move 

with the Dutch guide to the bridge. 

Company C, a platoon of which already 

had gone into the city as a patrol, was 

withheld in regimental reserve. 

Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got 

lost en route." 52 After waiting until 

about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide 

for Company B and moved through the 

darkness with Company A toward the 

edge of the city. Some seven hours after 

H-Hour, the first real move against the 

Nijmegen bridge began. 

At the edge of the city Company A 

halted again while a patrol searched the 

first buildings. Finding no Germans, the 

company continued for several blocks up 

a main thoroughfare, the dark, deserted 

Groesbeekscheweg. As the scouts neared 

a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped 

circular park near the center of Nijmegen, 

the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a 

mall-like park led northeast toward the 

Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic 

weapons fire came from the circle. The 

time was about two hours before midnight. 

As Company A formed to attack, the 

men heard the noise of an approaching 

motor convoy emanating from a side street 

on the other side of the traffic circle. 

Enemy soldiers noisily dismounted. 

51 Warren Ltr to OCMH. 

52 Msg, Harness Red to CO (no time signed, 

but sent to div hq at 23 15, 17 Sep), 508th Prcht 

Inf Jnl file, 17 Sep-I6 Oct 44· 
164 

No one could have said so with any 

finality at the time, but the chance for an 

easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen 

bridge had passed. This was all the more 

lamentable because in Nijmegen during 

the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly 

low quality" 53 troops encountered at most 

other places on D Day. 

Although the enemy commander, Field 

Marshal Model, had entrusted Corps 

Feldt under Wehrkreis VI with responsibility for Nijmegen, he apparently had 

recognized the dire necessity of getting a 

more mobile and effective force to the 

Nijmegen bridge immediately. Sometime 

during late afternoon or early evening of 

17 September Model had dispatched an 

advance guard from the 9th SS Panzer 

Division's Reconnaissance Battalion to defend the highway bridge. The commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, 

General Bittrich, in turn directed the 

entire loth SS Panzer Division to move 

to Nijmegen. The main effort of the II 

SS Panzer Corps, General Bittrich 

believed, should be directed toward 

thwarting the Americans at Nijmegen, 

whereupon the British at Arnhem might 

be defeated in detail. He directed the 

first arrivals of the 10th SS Panzer Division-an infantry battalion and an engineer company-to relieve the 9th SS 

Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion, which presumably then was to return 

to Arnhem. 54 

The 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion 

5382d Abn Div G-2 to Br Abn Corps G-2, 

1810, 17 Sep 44, 82d Abn Div G-2 Jnl file, 17-21 

Sep 44. 

54 Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0400, 18 Sep 44, A Gp 

B KTB, Letzte Meldung; Minutes of Hitler 

Conference, 17 Sep 44 (Fragment No. 42); 

Bittrich Questionnaire, OCMH. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

apparently had gotten across the Neder 

Rijn at Arnhem before British paratroopers 

reached the Arnhem bridge, but the men 

of the loth SS Panzer Division were too 

late. They subsequently crossed the 

Neder Rijn at a ferry near Huissen, southeast of Arnhem. Whether it was troops 

of the 9th or of the loth SS Panzer 

Division which reached the Keizer Karel 

Plein was conjectural, though probably it 

was the former. What mattered was that 

they had arrived in time to stop the first 

American thrust toward the Nijmegen 

bridge. 55 

When Company A attacked at the 

traffic circle, the SS troopscounterattacked. The men of Company A became 

so disorganized in the darkness that they 

might have had to withdraw altogether 

had not Company B arrived to help 

stabilize the situation. 

While Colonel Warren reported news of 

the encounter to his regimental commander and asked reinforcement by Company C, the commander of Company A, 

Capt. Jonathan E. Adams, Jr., received 

a report from Dutch civilians that the 

control mechanism for demolishing the 

highway bridge was housed in the main 

post office, only a few blocks north of the 

Keizer Karel Plein. Captain Adams himself led a patrol of platoon size to destroy 

the mechanism. Though guards at the 

post office put up a fight, the paratroopers 

forced the building and destroyed what 

they took to be the control apparatus. 

Getting back to the traffic circle was 

another proposition. The Germans had 

closed in behind them. For three days 

these men and sympathetic civilians were 

to hold out at the post office until relief 

came. 

55 Ibid. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

In the meantime Colonel Warren had 

tried to get a new attack moving toward 

the highway bridge; but this the Germans 

thwarted just before dawn with another 

sharp counterattack. While the counterattack was in progress, General Gavin 

arrived at the battalion command post. 

Noting that the companies had become 

"very heavily engaged in close quarters in 

city streets under very difficult circumstances," General Gavin directed that the 

battalion "withdraw from close proximity 

to the bridge and reorganize." 56 This 

was to mark the end of this particular 

attempt to take the Nijmegen bridge. 

A new attack to gain the bridge grew 

out of an early morning conference between General Gavin and Colonel Lindquist. In considering alternate means of 

getting the bridge with the limited forces 

available, it appeared possible that one 

company still might succeed if the advance 

was made along the less constricted southeastern and eastern fringe of Ni jmegen. 

The unit designated was Company G, 

part of the 3d Battalion, 508th, under Lt. 

Col. Louis G. Mendez, Jr., which was 

defending the three-and-a-half-mile stretch 

of high ground centered on Berg en Dal. 

Company G already had occupied Hill 64, 

little more than a mile from the south end 

of the highway bridge. 57 

At 0745 on 18 September, D plus I, 

Company G under Capt. Frank J. Novak 

started toward the bridge. Civilians 

showered the paratroopers with fruit and 

flowers as the advance began; but closer 

to the bridge the crowds markedly 

56 Gavin Ltr to Westover. 

57 Gavin Ltr to OCMH. Colonel Mendez recalled after the war that he directed Company 

G's attack "on his own responsibility." Statement by CO, 3d En, 508th Prcht Inf, to Hist Off, 

8 Sep 44, as cited by Westover, The American 

Divisions in Operation MARKET, Ch III, p. 38. 

165 

thinned. The reason soon became apparent. From dug-in positions about a 

small traffic circle south of a common, 

the Hunner Park, which embraces the 

southern approaches to the bridge, the 

Germans lay in wait. The center of the 

defense was a historic observation tower, 

the Belvedere, and medieval walls surrounding it. 

Company G was but two blocks from 

the Maria Plein when the Germans 

opened fire. With small arms and antiaircraft guns ranging from 20- to 88-mm., 

they searched the streets opening onto the 

circle. 

Captain Novak quickly deployed his 

men and attacked. Storming into the 

teeth of the enemy fire, they gained a 

position only a block from the traffic 

circle. German artillery fire emanating 

from the north bank of the Waal reinforced the defense. The men of Company G could go no farther. 

Reinforcement of Company G appeared 

inadvisable. The battalion commander, 

Colonel Mendez, could send no help without jeopardizing his defense of the high 

ground in the vicinity of Hotel Berg en 

Dal. The regimental commander, Colonel Lindquist, had only a company in 

reserve, and this company probably 

would be needed to clear one of the 

division's glider landing zones for a glider 

lift that was scheduled to arrive almost 

momentarily. Some consideration apparently was given at division headquarters 

to reinforcing the troops in Nijmegen with 

a portion of the 505th Parachute Infantry, one battalion 'of which was in division 

reserve in the woods west of Groesbeek, 

but it was not done. 58 

58 82d Abn Div G-3 to CO 508, 18 Sep (no 

time signed, but msg entered in jnl file at 1150), 

508th Prcht Inf Jnl file, 17 Sep-16 Oct 44. See 

also Shanley Ltr to OCMH. 
166 

At 1400 on 18 September Colonel Mendez ordered Company G to withdraw 

from Nijmegen to Hill 64. Nijmegen 

and the highway bridge so vital to relief 

of the British airborne troops farther 

north at Arnhem remained in German 

hands. 59 Of three attempts to capture 

the bridge on D-Day and D plus I, one 

of patrol size had failed because it was too 

weak and lacked communications; another of two-company size, because the 

Germans had had time to reinforce their 

garrison; and the third of company size, 

for the same reason. Though small, at 

least two of these attacks conceivably 

might have succeeded except for their 

tImmg. No attempt to seize the railway 

bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen had 

been made. GO 

The problem of the glider landing zones, 

which appeared to be one of the reasons 

why no stronger effort was made at 

Nijmegen, had grown out of two factors: 

the location of the landing zones and the 

82d Airborne Division's shortage of infantry in relation to its numerous and 

widely dispersed objectives. The landing 

zones were situated near the bottom of the 

eastern slopes of the ridge between Groesbeek and the Reichswald. Though the 

landing zones had been fairly well cleared 

on D-Day, not enough infantry could be 

spared to hold them in strength. Beginning soon after daylight on D plus I, 

the equivalent of two understrength Ger50 To anyone following progress of the fight for 

the bridge in the 82d Airborne Division G-2 

Journal, withdrawal must have corne as something 

of a surprise. Three separate entries in the 

journal early on ,8 September-all erroneousreported "patrols on Nijmegen bridge." 

00 Reconnaissance patrols were to move toward 

both bridges during the night of D plus J. 82d 

Abn Div G-2 J nl file, '9 Sep 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

man battalions began to infiltrate from 

the Reichswald onto the landing iones. 

Some of this infiltration reached the 

proportions of strong local attacks, one of 

which encircled a company of the 508th 

Parachute Infantry near Wyler and others 

which exerted troublesome pressure 

against easternmost contingents of the 

505th Parachute Infantry. The enemy 

troops probably were advance guards of 

Corps Feldt's 406th (Landesschuetzen) 

Division, only "line-of-communications" 

troops, as American intelligence soon 

fathomed, but supported by flak wagons 

mounting 20-mm. antiaircraft guns. 61 

Since Allied tow planes and gliders 

took off from England at 1000, their 

arrival soon after midday was almost a 

certainty. In preparation, Colonel Lindquist released the reserve company of 

Colonel Warren's battalion of the 508th 

Parachute Infantry to battalion control 

and directed that the company secure a 

line of departure overlooking the northern 

landing zone. After the other two com" 

panies had withdrawn from the Keizer 

Karel Plein in Ni jmegen, they moved to 

assist in the clearing operation. The 

505th Parachute Infantry scheduled one 

company to clear the other landing zone 

in an attack to begin at 1240. 

As events developed, German pressure 

against the 505th Parachute Infantry was 

so strong that the designated company 

was not freed for its attack without some 

difficulty. Fortunately, resistance on the 

landing zone itself proved light and disorganized. The southern landing zone 

was cleared with a half hour to spare. 

Opposition on the northern landing 

61 Evng Sitrep, A 'Cp B, 2000, ,8 Sep 44, A 

Cp B KTB, Letzte Meldung; 82d Abn Div G-2 

Rpt 92 and Jnl, ,8 Sep 44. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

zone was stiffer. Beginning at 1300, 

after the troops had made a forced march 

of eight miles from Nijmegen, the attack 

by Colonel Warren's battalion might have 

stalled in the face of intense small arms 

and flak gun fire had not the paratroopers 

charged the defenders at a downhill run. 

At the last minute, the Germans panicked. 

It was a photo finish, a "movie-thriller 

sight of landing gliders on the LZ as the 

deployed paratroops chased the last of the 

Germans from their 16 20-mm. guns." 62 

The enemy lost 50 men killed and 150 

captured. Colonel Warren's battalion incurred but 1 1 casualties. 

The gliders had been flown in via the 

northern air route over the Dutch islands. 

Totaling 450, they brought primarily the 

last of General Gavin's artillery, one parachute and two glider battalions. Following the gliders by about twenty minutes, a 

flight of 135 B-24 bombers dropped resupply south of Groesbeek. A good drop 

pattern resulted in an estimated recovery 

of about 80 percent. 

Involving not only the 82d Airborne 

Division but the British and the 101 st 

Airborne Division as well, these new landings on D plus 1 gave the Germans a jolt. 

This was in spite of the fact that the 

ommSCIent Hitler had predicted the 

course. "Tomorrow," the Fuehrer had 

noted at his D-Day conference, "they will 

surely come back; they are making such a 

fuss-appeal to the Dutch, and all that 

•••• " 63 The possibility which disturbed 

the Germans on the scene was that the 

new landings might mean arrival of additional Allied divisions. Several hours 

62 508th Prcht Inf AAR. 

63 Minutes of Hitler Conference, I7 Sep 44 

(Fragment No. 42). 

167 

passed before German intelligence determined the true nature of the reinforcement. 

The gliders having arrived, the 82d 

Airborne Division by midafternoon of D 

plus 1 was in a position to focus attention 

upon gaining a bridge over the Waal at 

Ni jmegen. Though enemy pressure from 

the Reichswald had been troublesome, it 

was more a "feeling out" than actual attack. "The intent was," noted the 82d 

Airborne Division G-2, Colonel Winton, 

"to apply pressure and gain information." 64 Noteworthy German counteraction had not developed elsewhere, except 

in the neighborhood of the 505th Parachute Infantry's reserve battalion west of 

Groesbeek where two somewhat bizarre 

incidents had occurred. After nightfall of 

D-Day, a German-operated railroad train 

had slipped out of Nijmegen and escaped through Groesbeek to the east. 

Before daylight on D plus I, another train 

had tried it. This one the paratroopers 

knocked out with a bazooka and small 

arms fire. Though many of the Germans aboard escaped into the surrounding woods, they eventually were rounded 

up, sometimes only after hot little 

skirmishes. 

A battalion each of the 505th and 

508th Infantry Regiments had acted offensively during the day to improve the 

division's over-all position. A battalion of 

the 505th had cleared the village of Mook, 

southeast of Heumen, on the important 

Venlo-Nijmegen highway. Colonel Mendez' battalion of the 508th had secured 

Beek, at the foot of the ridge below Hotel 

Berg on Dal, and established roadblocks 

there astride the Kleve-Nijmegen highway. 

If the few instances where casualties 

were recorded could be taken as indica6482d Abn Div G-2 Rpt 92, 18 Sep 44. 
168 

tion, American losses had been-light. On 

D-Day, for example, one battalion of the 

S04th Parachute Infantry had incurred 19 

casualties. On D plus I the entire sosth 

Parachute Infantry had lost 63 men. 

The battalion of the s08th Parachute 

Infantry which was defending near Hatert 

lost but 7 men wounded on D-Day. 

Enemy killed were an estimated I So; 

German prisoners, 88S. 65 

The situation had been relatively quiet 

in the sector of the S04th Parachute 

Infantry between the Maas-W aal Canal 

and the Maas River and in the bridgehead 

south of the river, though some concern 

still existed that the enemy might move 

from the west against the S04th. Neither 

had the enemy been markedly troublesome in the sector of the battalion of the 

s08th Parachute Infantry, which was just 

across the canal near Hatert. Parts of 

both these units, General Gavin must 

have reasoned, might be used in a new 

attack against the Nijmegen highway 

bridge. 

In response to a request from General 

Browning, the British Airborne Corps commander, General Gavin in mid afternoon 

of 18 September outlined a plan for seizing the bridge that night. He intended 

usihg a battalion of the S04th Parachute 

Infantry "in conjunction with" the s08th 

Parachute Infantry to envelop the bridge 

from the east and west. 66 

General Browning at first approved this 

plan. Then, "on giving it more thought, 

[and] in view of the situation in the 30th 

Corps, he felt that the retention of the 

high ground S [outh ] of Nijmegen was of 

65 Ibid.; 504th and 505th Prcht Inf AARs; 

508th Prcht Inf Jnl file, I7 Sep-16 Oct 44· 

6682d Abn Div CofS Jnl, 0700, 19 Sep 44, 

reporting a conf held at 1530, 18 Sep 44. See 

also Ltr, Gavin to QCMH, 8 Jul 55. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

greater importance, and directed that the 

primary mission should be to hold the 

high gr [ ound ] and retain its position 

W [ est] of the Maas-W aal Canal." 

General Gavin thereupon apparently 

called off the projected attack; for he "issued an order for the defence of the 

position." 67 

The "situation in the 30th Corps" to 

which General Browning referred certainly represented no incentive for urgency 

at Nijmegen. At this time, contact between the ground column and the 10 I st 

Airborne Division at Eindhoven still was 

two and a half hours away. It might be 

a long time before the ground column 

reached Ni jmegen. 

Whether the prospects of difficulty in 

holding the high ground in the 82d Airborne Division's sector justified delay in 

renewing the attack at Nijmegen, even in 

view of the "situation in the 30th Corps," 

was a matter for conjecture. Few concrete indications that the Reichswald was 

rife with German armor, or even infantry, 

had developed. Civilians had told men of 

the soSth Parachute Infantry on D-Day 

that the Germans had no armor in the 

Reichswald. Patrols from the sosth had 

found no armor. One patrol reported 

that the "high ground" in the Reichswald 

was unoccupied. "Towers are empty, 

woods are tank obstacles-too thick." 68 

The 82d Airborne Division's G-2 estimated that the enemy had "probably two 

battalions of mixed L [ine ] of C [ ommunicationsJ Troops" in the Reichswald, 

though he modified this low evaluation 

by listing first among enemy capabilities 

the likelihood of continuing piecemeal 

attacks, "but III increasing strength," 

67 Ibid. 

68 S-I Jnl, 2040, I7 Sep, III 505th Prcht Inf 

AAR. 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

from the forest. 69 No tangible incidents 

of armor in action had developed; most 

vehicles reported as tanks turned out to 

be flak wagons.10 

On the other hand, General Gavin recalled later that the "Dutch underground 

chief" told him during the morning of 18 

September that "the Germans were in 

strength both with armor and infantry in 

the Reichswald area." 11 The division intelligence section noted early on 18 September that "civilians continue to report 

massing of German troops in the Reichswald Forest." 72 In late afternoon of the 

same day ninety-seven Spitfires and Mustangs of the British 2d Tactical Air Force 

bombed and strafed the Reichswald in 

response to a request from General 

Gavin.73 The 82d's airborne artillery delivered harassing fire on the forest from 

time to time.74 

No matter what the true situation in 

the Reichswald-which no one could have 

GD 82d Abn Div G-2 Rpt 92, 18 Sep 44. 

7°82d Abn Div G-2 Jnl, 17-18 Sep 44. 

71 Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 8 Jul 55. General 

Gavin's recollection is supported by Bestebreurtje, 

letter to OCMH, 25 October 1956. 

7282d Abn Div G-2 Jnl, entry dtd 0515, 18 

Sep 44. 

73 A detailed analysis of tactical air support in 

Operation MARKET may be found in Weapons 

Systems Evaluation Group, A Historical Study 

of Some World War II Airborne Operations, 

WSEG Staff Study NO.3, pp. 160-64, copy in 

OCMH files. The incident on D plus I was one 

of the few instances, other than on D Day, when 

tactical air made any substantial contribution to 

direct support of U.S. troops on the ground in 

this operation. Adverse weather was partly responsible. Also, technical problems prevented 

aircraft of the 2d Tactical Air Force from 

operating while Eighth Air Force fighters were 

escorting the various lifts of airborne troops and 

supplies. The effect of these two factors l'esulted 

on occasion in a local German all' superiority, 

a surprising paradox in view of Allied air 

superiority in the theater. 

74 See 504th Prcht Inf S-3 Jnl, 18 Sep 44. 

169 

known with any certainty at this pointGeneral Gavin endorsed the corps commander's view that the best practice for 

the moment was to focus upon holding 

what he had. General Gavin's confidence in the ability of his paratroopers 

made the decision easier. "To those on 

the ground," he recalled later, "there was 

no doubt . . . that the bridge would be 

captured and it would be captured in 

time to relieve the Arnhem forces." 

General Gavin's earlier experience in airborne combat reinforced this view. He 

recalled later: "Experience indicated 

that we could expect a linkup in about 

two days and we felt quite sure of one in 

three. If, therefore, by the end of the 

third day the bridge were in my hands, 

and I had fought a good battle with 

whatever might develop in the remainder 

of the area, I felt that I would have been 

fortunate enough to have done a good job 

as planned." 75 On the basis of this 

theory, General Gavin had another full 

day in which to tackle the Germans at 

Nijmegen. 

Perhaps the ultImate test of how urgent 

was the need for the bridge at Nijmegen 

lay not in the "situation in the 30th 

Corps" but in the status of the British 

airborne troops farther north at Arnhem. 

But this no one at Nijmegen-including 

both General Gavin and General Browning-knew much about. The only report 

that had been received on the fighting at 

Arnhem had arrived through the 505th 

Parachute Infantry at 1040 on 18 September. An intelligence unit of the Netherlands Interior Forces, located in this 

regiment's sector, had a telephone line to 

Arnhem. Because the telephone network 

was one connecting power stations and 

75 Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 17 Jan 54. 
170 

waterworks and messages over it had to 

be disguised as technical messages concerning the operations of these public 

utilities, the message about the fighting at 

Arnhem was necessarily brief. 

The sosth Parachute Infantry noted 

the message this way: "Dutch Report 

Germans Winning over British at Arnhem." 76 

T he Red Devils at Arnhem 

For all the lack of details, the message 

from the Dutch had not failed to state 

the situation as it actually existed with 

the 1 st British Airborne Division at Arnhem. Having jumped into the quickest 

enemy build-up of any of the three Allied 

divisions, the paratroopers soon had found 

themselves in a bad way. The Germans 

were winning over the British at Arnhem. 77 

The British misfortunes had not begun 

with the D-Day landings. Like the two 

American divisions, men of the 1 st Airborne Division-who called themselves 

Red Devils-experienced phenomenally 

successful flights, drops, and glider landings. Not an aircraft was lost as 331 

planes and 3 1 9 gliders dropped or deposited their loads with almost loo-percent 

success on the correct drop and landing 

zones. Unlike the Americans, the British 

sent their gliders in first. They brought 

an air-landing brigade, which was to 

7082d Abn Div G-2 Jnl, entry dtd I040, 18 

Sep 44; Ltr, Bestebreurtje to OCMH. 

77 This account is based primarily on 1st Abn 

Div, Rpt on Opn MARKET, Pt. I. See also 

F AAA, Opns in Holland; Hq Br Abn Corps, 

Allied Abn Opns in Holland; Boeree, The Truth 

About the Supposed Spy at Arnhem; Boeree, 

correspondence with the author, in OCMH files; 

and a colorful account in By Air to Battle, the 

Official Account of the British Airborne Divisions 

(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945), 

pp. 93 ff. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

protect the drop and landing zones, plus a 

light regiment of artillery and lesser antitank, medical, and reconnaissance units. 

Close behind the gliders came a parachute 

brigade with the primary mission of seizing the highway bridge over the Neder 

Rijn at Arnhem. 

The difficulties the British soon began 

to encounter arose not from any failure to 

achieve surprise. They were attributable 

to chance presence of General Bittrich's 

II SS Panzer Corps in assembly areas 

beyond the IJssel River a few miles east 

of Arnhem and to location of the British 

drop zones a long way from the objectives 

at Arnhem. Bowing to reputed difficulties of terrain and flak concentrations 

close to the city, the planning staffs had 

selected drop zones six to eight miles 

away, northwest of the suburb of Oostcrbeek. By the time the parachutists could 

assemble and approach the bridge, four 

invaluable hours had passed. 

The location of the drop and landing 

zones imposed an added burden in that 

the troops defending these zones could 

take no part in the main action. They 

would be tied up for three days until the 

three successive lifts had arrived. This 

meant that on D-Day only a brigade 

would be available for seizing and holding 

the main objectives. These objectives included not only the bridge at Arnhem but, 

as in the case of the 8zd Airborne Division, high ground. This was the high 

ground north of Arnhem, its capture 

essential to fulfilling one of the 1st Airborne Division's missions of providing a 

bridgehead of sufficient size to enable the 

30 Corps to pass through. 

The Red Devils had not long to wait to 

experience the difficulties emanating both 

from the dispersion' of effort and the 

presence of the SS panzer troops east of 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

Arnhem. Of three parachute battalions, 

two ran into serious difficulty almost 

at the outset. One heading northeast 

toward the high ground, the other moving 

east toward Arnhem, they both encountered armored reconnaissance patrols or 

advance guards of the 9th SS Panzer 

Division. When darkness came on DDay, the two British battalions still were 

held up, one near W olfheze Station, about 

two miles northwest of Oosterbeek, the 

other on the western outskirts of Oosterbeek. This left but one British battalion 

moving toward the vital bridge over the 

Neder Rijn. 

Commanded by Lt. Col. J. D. Frost, 

this battalion bypassed the Germans at 

Oosterbeek by taking a secondary road 

close to the river. En route toward Arnhem, one company detoured to capture 

the railroad bridge, only to see the Germans blow it. "It seemed," said one 

man, "to curl back on us .... "78 

Another company became involved in a 

fire fight in outlying buildings of Arnhem. 

This l~ft but one company and the 

battalion headquarters to sneak through 

back streets toward the north end of the 

highway bridge. At 2030 this little band 

under Colonel Frost seized the north end. 

The bridge still was intact. 

During the night another company also 

broke through to the bridge, but of the 

third, only remnants escaped from the 

fight in Arnhem. Colonel Frost's force 

ar the highway bridge numbered at peak 

strength about 500. 

Colonel Frost tried twice that night to 

cupture the south end of the bridge, once 

by attacking across the bridge and again 

by sending a platoon across the river III 

rowboats. Both attempts failed. As day78 By Air to Battle, p. 102. 

171 

light came of D plus I, the men holed up 

in buildings about the north end to begin 

a dogged defense of their precarious grip 

on this vital prize. 

Not long after daybreak (18 September) the enemy orders and preparations 

of the night before began to show effect. 

From the west, Division von T ettau, the 

haphazard collection of rear echelon and 

regional defense units belonging to the 

Armed Forces Commander Netherlands, 

attacked the air-landing brigade which 

was defending the drop and landing zones 

near W olfheze Station. From the east, 

the bulk of the 9th SS Panzer Division, 

and possibly some of the roth SS, bypassed Colonel Frost's little band at the 

highway bridge, pushed through Arnhem, 

and attacked westward, apparently in an 

attempt to link with Division von T ettau. 79 

The presence of the SS troops thwarted 

reinforcement of Colonel Frost at the 

bridge. Spurred by radio appeals for 

help, the two battalions of the British 

parachute brigade which had been held 

up on D-Day sideslipped to the south 

early on D plus I to try to reach the 

bridge. As they entered the western 

fringe of Arnhem, they ran head on into 

the attacking Germ:<ns. This rather than 

new airborne landings in reality stalled the 

German attack. Yet the meeting engagement brought high British casualties. 

Entire companies were cut off, and only 

shattered remnants survived. so In late 

afternoon the remaining men of one 

79 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200, 19 Sep 44, A 

Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

80 With one encircled group was the brigade 

commander, Brig. G. W. Lathbury. Seriously 

wounded, he had to be left behind. Many days 

later, after having been treated for wounds at a 

German-controlled hospital, Brigadier Lathbury 

escaped arid eventually led some 120 Red Devils 

through enemy lines to gain the south bank of the 

Neder Rijn. See By Air to Battle, pp. 130-131. 
172 

battalion, numbering about 140, launched 

a last effort to reach the bridge. They 

could make no headway. 

Despite Division von T ettau's pressure 

against the air-landing brigade holding 

the drop and landing zones, the British 

commander, Maj. Gen. R. C. Urquhart, 

released an understrength battalion to go 

to the aid of the parachute brigade. The 

battalion could not penetrate a German 

cordon that had closed behind the paratroopers. 

Delayed by the same soupy weather in 

England that had held up second lifts of 

the American divisions, the British lift on 

D plus I arrived about 1500. With this 

lift came the remainder of General Urquhart's division, including the other parachute brigade and last contingents of the 

air-landing brigade. Although this fresh 

parachute brigade was scheduled to capture high ground north of Arnhem, General Urquhart immediately diverted a 

battalion eastward to assist the hardpressed men that were trying to reach 

Colonel Frost. Another battalion attempted the original mISSIOn, while 

General Urquhart withheld the third as a 

reserve. 

The fresh paratroopers could make only 

slight inroads on the SS troops. Not 

until early the next morning (D plus 2, 

19 September) did they reach the remnants of the other battalions in the edge 

of Arnhem. Even then the composite 

force could make no appreciable gains in 

the direction of the highway bridge. 

Eventually they had to give up. Those 

who remained, no more than 200 men 

out of three battalions of paratroopers 

and one battalion from the air-landing 

brigade, filtered back after nightfall on D 

plus 2 through the German cordon to the 

vicinity of the drop and landing zones. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Their inability to reach the highway 

bridge was all the more frustrating because General Urquhart still had radio 

communication with Colonel Frost and 

knew that the gallant little band at the 

north end of the bridge still held out. 

The remainder of General Urquhart's 

division had been fighting in the meantime against increasing odds to hold the 

drop and landing zones. Under strafing 

from German planes, shelling by mortars 

and artillery, and intense ground attacks 

from both Division von T ettau and the 

II SS Panzer Corps, the perimeter began 

to shrink. The only hope for immediate 

relief lay in the scheduled arrival during 

the afternoon of D plus 2 of the 1st Polish 

Parachute Brigade. Even this hope failed 

as the weather closed in. Only a few 

gliders and no additional paratroopers 

arrived. 

As evidenced by the lack of information about the British situation at General 

Browning's headquarters near Nijmegen, 

General Urquhart's communications to 

the outside had failed. His radios were 

not strong enough to transmit successfully 

from the wooded and urban districts in 

which the British had to fight. General 

Urquhart thus had no way of notifying 

British bases in England not to drop the 

day's resupply on those of the drop zones 

the Germans had by this time overrun. 

As a result of this and of the weather, 

virtually all the resupply panniers dropped 

on D plus 2 fell into German hands. 

Critical shortages in food and ammunition 

were quickly manifest. 

Pinning his hopes on arrival the next 

day of the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade 

or on an early juncture with the 30 Corps 

ground column, General Urquhart disposed his depleted forces about his perimeter and in other positions designed to 
INVASION FROM THE SKY 

maintain a corridor to the Neder Rijn at 

the site of a ferry near Heveadorp, 

southwest of Oosterbeek. Perhaps either 

the Polish paratroopers or the ground 

column might push reinforcements across 

173 

the river at the ferry site. Because of the 

failure of communications, General Urquhart had no way of knowing that early 

arrival of the ground column still depended upon getting a bridge at Nijmegen. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Decision on the Ground 

Those Germans who were barring the 

way at Nijmegen and who subsequently 

might oppose the ground column between 

Nijmegen and Arnhem obviously held the 

key to the outcome of Operation MARKETGARDEN. Should they continue to deny 

a crossing of the Waal, the Red Devils 

near Arnhem might be systematically annihilated. 

Spearheading the 30 Corps ground 

column, reconnaissance troops of the 

Guards Armoured Division linked with 

Colonel Tucker's S04th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D 

plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) 

Major formations of the British armor 

were not far behind. From that point 

priority of objectives within the sector of 

the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge 

at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty 

three hours behind schedule because of 

earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at 

Zon, the ground column had to have a 

way to get across the Waal. 

Developments on D Plus 2 

(I9 September) 

Holding the objectives the 82d Airborne 

Division already had taken would be 

facilitated by the artillery and antitank 

strength that arrived with the ground 

column. In keeping with this new situation, General Gavin adjusted his units. 

Part of the S04th Parachute Infantry 

relieved the battalion of the s08th Parachute Infantry at Hatert and enabled 

this battalion to reinforce its parent regiment in defending the ridge line near 

Hotel Berg en Dal. Reducing defensive 

strength at the Maas bridge near Grave, 

General Gavin designated one battalion 

of the S04th as a new division reserve. 

The former reserve, the 2d Battalion, 

S05th Parachute Infantry, which had 

been located in the woods west of Groesbeek, was to drive for the Nijmegen 

highway bridge. 

In early afternoon of D plus 2, 19 

September, General Gavin met the commander of the British ground column, 

General Horrocks, and told him his plan 

to take the Nijmegen bridge. He intended immediately to commit the 2d 

Battalion, soSth Parachute Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. B. H. Vandervoort, 

against the south end of the bridge and 

"as quickly as possible" to send another 

force across the 'Vaal in boats to seize the 

north end. Since the paratroopers had 

not found any civilian boats to use, the 

British offered thirty-three canvas assault 

boats which were being carried in their 

engineer train and should be available 

early the next morning.! 

1 Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 17 Jan 54. Gavin 

says twenty-eight boats, but most combat interviews say thirty-thr~e. In addition to sources 

previously cited for the 82d Abn Div, see, for this 

period, 2 I A Gp, Operation MARKET-GARDEN, 

17-26 Sep 44. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

In the meantime, the attack against the 

south end of the bridge was to begin. 

To assist the zd Battalion, 505th, the 

British provided a company of infantry 

and a battalion of tanks of the Guards 

Armoured Division. Artillery of both the 

Guards Armoured and 8zd Airborne Divisions lent support. 

A small component of this force fought 

toward the south end of the railroad 

bridge over the Waal. Men of Company 

D, 505th Parachute Infantry, commanded 

by Ist Lt. Oliver B. Carr, Jr., climbed 

aboard five British tanks and five other 

armored vehicles and at I500 struck direct 

for the bridge through the western fringe 

of Nijmegen. They moved unopposed 

until hit by sporadic rifle fire in railroad 

marshaling yards about a thousand yards 

south of the railroad bridge. Dismounting, Lieutenant Carr's men continued 

under cover of fire from the British guns 

until, at a point less than 500 yards short 

of the bridge, small arms and zo-mm. fire 

in serious proportions blazed from a 

common off the right flank between the 

station and the railroad bridge. Though 

the infantry and tanks tried together 

through the rest of the afternoon, they 

could make no progress. At last an 

enemy 88 knocked out the lead British 

tank. The first attempt to take the railroad bridge had failed. 

The main attack against the south end 

of the highway bridge had begun concurrently. Following generally the same 

route through the eastern fringe of 

Nijmegen taken the day before by Captain 

Novak's Company G, the paratroopers, 

British infantry, and tanks met no resistance at first. Then the story became 

merely a variation on what had happened 

to Captain Novak and his men. 

Approaching within 300 yards of the 

175 

small traffic circle at the edge of Hunner 

Park, the force split. One American 

company and several British tanks veered 

to the left; the British infantry, the 

remaining American paratroopers, and the 

rest of the tanks to the right. At about 

the same time, the Germans at the traffic 

circle began to react. Each street radiating from the traffic circle became a deadly 

field of fire. Bullets and shells interlocked 

at street intersections. 

On the left, Company F under Capt. 

Hubert S. Bass inched toward the park 

through incessant fire until at last stymied 

by a log barricade which the British tanks 

could not pass. On the right, the British 

infantry, the rest of the tanks, and Company E under Ist Lt. James J. Smith 

ploughed through deadly fire to come 

within a hundred yards of the circle. 

Here an antitank gun knocked out the 

lead tank. The fire grew more intense. 

When three more tanks were hit, the 

remaining armor and the infantry had to 

pull back. Though they tried other 

maneuvers through the afternoon-including blasting a path through buildings 

and advancing from rooftop to rooftop, 

the paratroopers could not negotiate the 

last few yards to the traffic circle. 

Night came. Firing on both sides gradually died down. The fourth try for the 

south end of the highway bridge had 

failed. 

The afternoon of fighting in Nijmegen 

prompted the 8zd Airborne Division's 

intelligence section to revise upward earlier estimates of German strength in the 

city. The G-z believed now that about 

500 top-quality SS troops held the highway bridge alone. They had support, he 

estimated, from an 88-mm. gun on the 

traffic circle, a 37-mm. and four 47-mm. 

guns in Hunner Park, a number of mor-
176 

tars, and considerable artillery north of 

the Waa1. 2 

Elsewhere in the 82d Airborne Division's sector, D plus 2 was "a quieter 

day." 3 Through most of the day the 

enemy had nothing in the Reichswald 

but Corps Feldt's 406th (Landesschuetzen) Division with but four battalions 

totaling. about 500 men combat strength. 4 

When concentrated against an isolated 

outpost or in defense of a strong natural 

position, these Germans nevertheless could 

make a stiff fight of it. To this men of 

Company A, 508th Parachute Infantry, 

could attest after fighting through the 

afternoon to secure an eminence called 

Devil's Hil1. This was Hill 75.9, a high 

point east of Hotel Berg en Dal overlooking the Kleve-Nijmegen highway. In a 

determined charge covering 200 yards, 

Company A drove the Germans from the 

summit, but the enemy recovered on the 

slopes and counterattacked repeatedly 

with the support of eight machine guns. 

By nightfall Company A controlled the 

hill at a cost of seven wounded and ten 

killed, but so persistently did the Germans 

infiltrate during the night that another 

company had to flush the area the next 

mormng. 

In the meantime, Company B had less 

difficulty securing the vi-llage of Wyler, a 

mile and a half to the southeast. At the 

end of D plus 2, the 508th Parachute 

Infantry had firm control of the KleveNijmegen highway at three points: Wyler, 

Devil's Hill, and Beek.5 

2 82d Abn Div G-2 Sitrep, 19 Sep 44. 

3 50 jth Prcht Inf AAR. 

4 Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 19 Sep 44, A Gp B 

KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

5 50Bth Prcht Inf AAR. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Another event on D plus 2 that bore 

heavily upon the fighting was continued 

bad weather. So inclement was the 

weather that little resupply could be effected and the 325th Glider Infantry, 

scheduled to arrive on D plus 2, could not 

be flown in. This situation was to prevail 

for several days. Since General Gavin 

now was diverting much of his strength 

to Nijmegen, the lack of the glider regiment left an acute shortage of infantry 

that was heightened by the casualties the 

parachute battalions had incurred in three 

days of fighting. Company A, 508th, for 

example, in the attack on Devil's Hill had 

but 2 officers and 42 men. The commanders even moved 450 glider pilots into 

the line, a measure that to many of the 

paratroopers underscored the shortage of 

infantry.6 

During the night General Gavin designated Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute 

Infantry, less two companies defending 

bridges over the Maas and the MaasWaal Canal, to make the amphibious 

assault across the Waal River upon which 

the main hope for getting a bridge at 

Nijmegen rested. Because the canvas assault boats were not expected to arrive 

before noon the next day, D plus 3, 20 

t) Although quick to give credit to the glider 

pilots as pilots and to many as individual ground 

fighters, neither the 82d nor 10 1St Airborne 

Divisions had any real praise for the pilots acting 

collectively in tactical ground units. Rapport 

and Northwood, Rendezvous With Destiny, page 

3 I 8, call glider pilots "the most uninhibited 

individualists in the Army." Much of the difficulty lay in that American pilots received.mly a 

minimum of ground training and had no tactical 

organization once they had delivered their loads. 

The subject is discussed in detail in Houston, 

Airborne Operations, Chapter VII, and in Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, 

pages 152-53. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

September, the crossing was set for I400. 

In the meantime, in early morning of D 

plus 3, the 504th Parachute Infantry and 

two squadrons of tanks from the Guards 

Armoured Division set out to clear the 

south bank of the Waal in the vicinity of 

the designated crossing site. This was 

near the juncture of the Maas-W aal 

Canal and the 'Vaal about a mile northwest of the Nijmegen railway bridge. 

This maneuver was in process and 

Colonel Vandervoort's battalion had renewed the attack toward the south end of 

the Nijmegen highway bridge when the 

Reichswald suddenly developed into something of what it had been supposed to be. 

The fighting that ensued threatened for a 

time to upset the scheduled events at 

Nijmegen. 

The change in the status of the Reichswald had begun during the preceding 

night with arrival of the first units of 

General Meindl's II Parachute Corps, 

which eventually was to assume control 

of the Nijmegen fighting from the German 

side. These first arrivals consisted of a 

Luftwaffe battalion and six battalions 

made up of heterogeneous elements 

banded together under the II Parachute 

Corps, plus a smattering of armor. 7 The 

strongest of these were two understrength 

battalions which had been training under 

the banner of the 6th Parachute Division. 

Although American intelligence thought 

these two battalions the precursors of the 

entire 6th Parachute Division, this division 

actually had been destroyed in Normandy 

and was not to be reconstituted until 

7 Mng and Evg Sitreps, A Gp B, 20 Sep 44, 

A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung. Mention of 

armor appears only in American accounts. 

177 

October and would see no action until 

November. 8 

The addition of these hetereogeneous 

troops to those battalions operating under 

Corps Feldt nevertheless marked a sizable 

increase in German strength when measured against the five understrength parachute battalions responsible for holding 

almost twelve miles of front from 

Nijmegen to Wyler, thence southwest 

through Groesbeek to Riethorst and Mook. 

If concentrated adroitly, the Germans 

might attain a dangerous superiority in 

numbers, if not in fighting ability. 

The German plan was to gain control 

of the high ground by means cif two 

concentric attacks converging upon Groesbeek. Those battalions under Corps 

Feldt were to strike from the north and 

northeast against the ridge line near Hotel 

Berg en Dal and Wyler, while those 

under the II Parachute Corps attacked 

from the south and southeast in the 

vicinity of Mook and Riethorst.9 

A barrage from 88's, Nebelwerfer, and 

mortars at about I roo on 20 September 

signaled the start of the German attack at 

Riethorst and Mook. Because the Ist 

Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry 

(Maj. Talton W. Long), was responsible 

for more than two miles of front in this 

vicinity, neither of these villages was defended by more than two platoons. By 

using one of the training battalions of the 

8 MS # A-8g8, Kampfhandlungen in Nordfrankreich 1944 der 6.Fallschirmjaeger-Diuision. 

II. Teil. Kaempfe an der Seine und Rueckzugsbewegungen durch Nordfrankreich (Generalleutnant R. von Heyking, comdr, 6th Prcht Diu); 

MS # B-368, Einsatz und Kampf der 6. 

Fallschirmjaeger-Diuision uom 19. 11.1944 bis zur 

Kapitulation (10.5. 1945) (Generalmajor Rudolf 

Langhaeuser) . 

9 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200, 21 Sep 44, A Gp 

B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 
178 

6th Parachute Division at each village, 

the Germans attained a marked numerical 

su periority. 

At Riethorst close support from ten 

75-mm. pack howitzers enabled two platoons of Company B to stall the first 

German thrust. A second attack in midafternoon, featured by fire from a German 

tank that riddled American dugouts and 

machine gun positions, could not be repelled. Eventually the two platoons had 

to fall back on other positions on the high 

ground of the Kiekberg, north of the 

village. Here mortar fire and grenades 

rolled down the steep slopes helped to 

turn back every thrust. 

At Mook the situation prompted more 

concern because of the proximity of the 

village to the bridge over the M aas-W aal 

Canal at Heumen, the bridge which was 

being used in the northward movement of 

the British ground column. By 1500 the 

Germans had overrun the outposts at 

Mook. When General Gavin arrived on 

the scene, he could detect little barring the 

way between Mook and the vital Heumen 

bridge. He hurriedly sent a messenger for 

help to the Guards Armoured Division's 

Coldstream Guards Group, a unit which 

had been designated as a reserve for the 

airborne division. 10 Apparently unknown 

to General Gavin, however, the battalion 

commander, Major Long, already had 

committed his battalion reserve, two platoons of infantry that even then were 

approaching Mook from the north. In 

late afternoon six British tanks joined 

these infantry platoons in a counterattack 

that gradually drove the Germans out of 

the village. By nightfall Mook again was 

in hand, and the Heumen bridge was 

safe. In the short-lived but intense ac10 Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 17 Jan 54. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

tion, Major Long's battalion had incurred 

casualties totaling 20 killed, 54 wounded, 

and 7 missing. A German withdrawal 

during the night and the next day facilitated re-establishment of roadblocks in 

Riethorst.l.l 

The combat was none the less intense 

in the north where the Germans concentrated their efforts at Wyler and Beek. 

Despite close artillery support that broke 

up early strikes, two platoons of the 

508th Parachute Infantry eventually had 

to abandon Wyler. This withdrawal 

posed no special concern, however, because of other positions on higher ground 

to the west. The point of real concern 

was at Beek where in early evening the 

Germans, in battalion strength, forced 

two platoons of parachute infantry to fall 

back up the hill toward Hotel Berg en Dal. 

General Gavin arrived here at the height 

of the crisis. "By shifting one platoon 

from one place to another, and disengaging it and shifting it again," General 

Gavin recalled later, "Colonel Mendez 

managed to contain the attack. If the 

Germans had had the wit to move even 

several hundred yards to the right they 

could have walked into the outskirts of 

Nijmegen almost unmolested .... " 12 

The fighting for Beek was to continue 

through most of the next day (D plus 4, 

2 I September) as the 508th Parachute 

Infantry sought to regain its positions. 

At times it looked as if the Germans might 

push beyond the village onto the high 

ground at Hotel Berg en Dal, but the 

paratroopers by nightfall had reoccupied 

Beck, not to relinquish it again. 

11 Combat Intervs with Long and personnel of 

Co B, 505th Prcht Inf. 

"Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 17 Jan 54. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

The Fight for the Nijrnegen Bridges 

In stemming the counterattacks from 

the Reichswald, the paratroopers had been 

protecting a concurrent operation by their 

comrades in arms at Nijmegen that was 

one of the most daring and heroic in all 

the MARKET-GARDEN fighting. This was 

the 504th Parachute Infantry's assault 

crossing of the 400-yard width of the Waa-l 

River in order to get at the north ends of 

the rail and road bridges at Ni jmegen.13 

To provide more time for preparation, 

H Hour eventually was set back an hour 

to 1500 (D plus 3, 20 September). At 

this time the 504th'S 3d Battalion under 

Maj. Julian A. Cook was to cross the 

river in thirty-three plywood and canvas 

assault boats from a point near a power 

plant a mile northwest of the Nijmegen 

railway bridge. Two squadrons of British tanks, a portion of another battalion 

of the 504th Parachute Infantry, and 

approximately 100 American and British 

artillery pieces were to provide fire support. The artillery was to lay down a 

fifteen-minute preparation, including a 

smoke screen on the north bank which 

was to be filled in where necessary by the 

tank guns firing white phosphorus. British planes were to bomb and strafe for 

thirty minutes before H-Hour. As soon 

as the 3d Battalion had crossed, the 1st 

Battalion under Major Harrison was to 

follow. 

As assault crossing of the Waal would 

have been fraught with difficulties even 

had it not been so hastily contrived. Not 

only is the river wide, but the current is 

swift, running eight to ten miles an hour. 

The terrain on the south bank is flat, 

exposed to observation not only from the 

13 Combat interviews on this operation are 

available in considerable detail. 

179 

opposite bank but from Nijmegen and 

towering girders of the railroad bridge. 

Though General Gavin had intended 

that the boats be loaded from a concealed 

position within the mouth of the MaasWaal Canal, the current was so swift that 

boats launched at this point would have 

been carried too far downstream. The 

paratroopers would have to embark on the 

south bank of the river, east of the canal, 

in full view of the enemy. 

Just what strength the Germans had on 

the north bank of the Waal, no one on 

the Allied side knew with any assurance. 

In reality, not long after General Gavin 

had ordered an assault crossing,Field 

Marshal Model had directed reinforcement of the SS troops in and north of 

Nijmegen with "additional forces and all 

available antitank weapons" sent south 

from Arnhem. This was to have been 

accomplished during the night of 19 September in time for a counterattack to be 

launched at dawn the next day, D plus 

3.14 The Germans en route to Nijmegen 

had to cross the Neder Rijn by the ferry 

near Huissen, because Colonel Frost's 

little band of British paratroopers still 

held the north end of the Arnhem bridge. 

Just how many "additional forces" arrived by this method was indefinite. In 

any event, the counterattack scheduled 

for dawn on D plus 3 never came off. 

On the Allied side, tension rose as HHour for the assault crossing neared. 

The British boats were delayed. Not 

until twenty minutes before H-Hour, 

almost at the time the artillery preparation 

was to begin and even as rocket-firing 

Typhoons pummeled the north bank, did 

the paratroopers get their first look at the 

14 Order, A Gp B to Armed Forces Comdr 

Netherlands and II SS pz Corps, 2245, 19 Sep 

44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbe/ehle. 
180 

frail little craft. They were nineteen feet 

in length, of canvas with a reinforced 

plywood bottom. There were not thirtythree as expected; only twenty-six. To 

get all the men of the first-wave companies into the boats required dangerous 

overloading. Three engineers went along 

in each boat in order to paddle it back 

to the south bank for another load. 

Fifteen minutes before H-Hour, the 

artillery began to pound the north bank. 

After ten minutes, the artillerymen 

changed from high explosive shells to 

white phosphorus, but an erratic wind 

generally denied an effective smoke screen. 

As the paratroopers struggled toward the 

water's edge with the assault craft on 

their shoulders, the launching site lay 

naked to German observation. German 

shellfire began to fall. Allied artillerymen shifted again to ten minutes of high 

explosive fire. The British tanks churned 

forward to blast the north bank with 

overhead fire. Mortars of the parachute 

regiment began to cough. The assault 

was on. 

Almost from the start the crossing of 

the sprawling Waal was a nightmare. 

Because the water close to the south bank 

was shallow, the paratroopers had to wade 

far into the stream. Sometimes they 

climbed aboard where the water still was 

too shallow, then had to debark and push 

into deeper water. One boat pulled 

away, leaving a man standing behind, 

stuck in mud. As the man extricated 

himself, the current swept him into deep 

water. The commander of Company H, 

Capt. Carl W. Kappel, threw off his own 

heavy equipment, dived into the water to 

drag the man to safety, then regained his 

own boat. 

Once the boats moved into deep water, 

the strong current seized them. UnfaTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

miliar with the craft and buffeted by the 

current, the engineers and paratroopers 

could do little but point the boats toward 

the far shore and pray that the current 

would carry them across. At least one 

boat whirled crazily for a while in a dizzy 

circle. Any hope of maintaining unit 

organization upon touching the far shore 

was quickly dispelled. 

All the while German fire rained upon 

the hapless craft. The bullets and shell 

fragments hitting the water reminded one 

man of "a school of mackerel on the feed." 

It was primarily fire from machine guns 

on the north bank and machine guns and 

20-mm. antiaircraft guns on and near 

the railway bridge, but occasionally artillery fire from the north bank tormented 

the water. Bullets and shell fragments 

ripped the thin canvas on the assault 

boats. Some boats sank. One that was 

hit by mortar fire capsized only about 

twenty yards from the north bank, spilling 

its occupants into the water. Loaded 

down by an automatic rifle and heavy 

ammunition, Pvt. Joseph Jedlicka sank to 

the bottom in about eight feet of water. 

Holding his breath, he walked ashore 

without loss of equipment. 

Almost incredibly, half of the boats 

made it. Exhausted, dizzy from the circumgyrations, some of the men were 

vomiting. They had gained the north 

bank, but only thirteen of the twenty-six 

boats remained to make the return trip 

for the next wave. 

Virtually devoid of unit organization, 

the paratroopers rallied individually to 

the occasion. Killing more than fifty Germans near where the boats touched 

ground, the men dashed across an open 

field exposed to grazing fire to gain a 

diked road about 800 yards from the 

water's edge. Here they flushed Ger-
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

mans with bayonets, knocked out machine 

guns with hand grenades, and forged a 

temporary defensive line to await arrival 

of succeeding waves. 

Still subject to German fire, engineers 

with the thirteen remaining assault boats 

started back to the south bank. Eleven 

boats made it. Through the course of 

the afternoon,. engineers and paratroopers 

manning these eleven boats made six 

crossings of the Waal, bringing first the 

remainder of Major Cook's 3d Battalion 

and then Major Harrison's 1st Battalion. 

The operations on the north bank developed in a series of courageous smallunit actions by squads and individuals 

belonging to different units. The companies had assigned objectives: Company 

H, for example, was to bypass an old 

Dutch fortress, Fort Hof van Holland, 

seize the juncture of the railroad and the 

Nijmegen-Arnhem highway, then drive 

southeast down the highway to take the 

north end of the highway bridge. Company I was to defend against enemy 

counteraction from the northwest and 

north and, if possible, take the north end 

of the railway bridge. Yet accomplishment of few of the missions could be 

attributed to one unit alone. The crossing of the Waal had been a hopper that 

had scrambled the men almost inextricably. The commander of Company G, 

for example, discovered in late afternoon 

that in addition to many of his own men 

he was commanding much of Company 

H, a platoon of Company I, and parts of 

the battalion communications and medical 

sections. 

This handicap appeared to work little 

hardship on these veteran troops. The 

men saw jobs to be done and tried to do 

them. A platoon of Company H, scheduled to bypass Fort Hof van Holland, saw 

181 

an opportunity to take the fort and silence 

machine guns and 20-mm. antiaircraft 

guns that were firing from its towers. 

Sgt. Leroy Richmond swam underwater 

to get across a moat surrounding the fort, 

then signalled his companions to follow 

across a narrow causeway. Small groups 

of both Companies H and I converged 

on the north end of the railway bridge 

where they set up BAR's to play fire on 

the bridge until reinforcements arrived 

from Company G and the 1st Battalion. 

Parts of Companies H and I also fought 

together toward the highway bridge. 

This vital prize still was intact. 

In the meantime, in Nijmegen, Colonel 

Vandervoort's battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry, augmented by British 

infantry and tanks, at last had begun to 

wear down the defenders of the south end 

of the highway bridge. A tank-infantry 

assault at 1620 by both British and 

Americans against the traffic circle south 

of Hunner Park finally began to produce 

results. Advancing through and on top 

of buildings and up fire-raked streets and 

alleys, the infantry charged. This time 

they made it. Bolstered by the British 

tanks, they plunged on almost without 

pause into Hunner Park. The fight 

neared an end. 

The impending success in Nijmegen 

began to make trouble for the handful of 

Americans that were raking the north 

end of the railway bridge with fire, for the 

Germans began to retreat in wholesale 

numbers across the railway bridge. Not 

until the next day was it finally cleared 

of all enemy. Armament on this bridge 

alone totaled 34 machine guns, 2 20-mm. 

antiaircraft guns, and I 88-mm. dualpurpose gun. 

In Nijmegen, as the ·British tankers 

approached the south end of the highway 
182 

bridge, they spotted an American flag 

floating atop what they took to be the 

north end of the bridge. This the British 

assumed to be an American signal that 

the tanks could cross. In reality, the 

paratroopers still were a few steps from 

the highway bridge; the flag was flying 

from the north end of the railroad span. 

Spraying shells and machine gun bullets 

into the girders, the British tankers nevertheless raced onto the bridge. Three 

tanks reached the far end. Three privates 

from Companies H and I, 504th Parachute Infantry, got on the north end of 

the bridge at almost the same moment. 

The time was 19 I o. 

A lot of hard fighting remained before 

the toehold across the Waal could be 

deemed secureY but as night fell on 20 

September the fact was that the daring 

maneuver to gain the Waal bridges had 

succeeded. How and why in the light of 

all the obstacles could be explained only 

by the resourcefulness and courage of the 

men who did the job. 

The cost had been high. During the 

afternoon, Major Cook's 3d Battalion 

alone lost 28 men killed, I missing, and 

78 wounded. Total losses for the two 

battalions which crossed the Waal and 

Colonel Vandervoort's battalion in Nijmegen probably were about 200. Yet 

German losses must have been considerably more severe. On the railway bridge 

15 On 2 I September, near a Dutch fortress 

northeast of the highway bridge, a bazooka 

man from the 504th Parachute Infantry, Pvt. 

John R. Towle, rushed beyond his company's 

outposts to intercept a German attack that was 

supported by two tanks and a half-track. He 

was instrumental in breaking up the thrust before 

falling mortally wounded from enemy mortar fire. 

He was posthumously awarded the Medal of 

Honor. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

alone the paratroopers subsequently 

counted 267 German dead. 

Why the Germans failed to blow either 

the railway or highway bridge was a 

matter of some conjecture. Looking at it 

from the viewpoint of German commanders, the answer lay in German 

reluctance to admit until too late that 

these bridges-vital to taking effective 

countermeasures against the Allied landings-could not be held. Field Marshal 

Model himself had ordered that neither 

the bridges over the Waal nor those over 

the Neder Rijn were to be destroyed. 

Not until almost midnight on D plus 3, 

20 September, after the Allies held the 

Nijmegen bridges, had Model relented. 

"It is necessary to hold, and if necessary 

to blow up the highway bridge at 

Nijmegen," Model's chief of staff notified 

General Bittrich, commander of the II 

Panzer Corps. General Bittrich replied 

that the word had come too late. For 

two hours, he said, he had heard nothing 

from the Nijmegen garrison and assumed 

that the German units there had been 

destroyed. 

Despite this indication that the Allies 

were in control at Nijmegen, Model's chief 

of staff early the next morning, 2 I September, again brought up the subject of 

the bridges. "The Waal bridges will be 

destroyed in the face of enemy pressure," 

he directed. This may have been a belated attempt to cover Model's tracks in 

the expectation that failure to destroy the 

bridges would bring repercussion from 

superiors. Indeed, only a few hours 

later, OKW began to press the matter. 

Model's chief of staff admitted that hindsight did reveal that "demolition would 

have beel} indicated. However," he 

said, "on account of the enemy attack 

from both sides on the [highway] bridge, 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 183 

DUTCH FARMER NEAR ZON gives paratroopers a lift to their assembly area. 

the responsible commander was not able 

to blow up the bridge on his own authority." 16 

This coincided to a large degree with 

the opinion of the 82d Airborne Division 

commander, General Gavin. He later 

attributed German failure to demolish the 

highway bridge to three factors: (I) the 

assault from both ends, (2) destruction of 

the alleged demolition control mechanism 

16 Tel Convs, CofS A Gp B to Gen Bittrich, 

2330, 20 Sep 44; CofS A Gp B to CofS II SS 

pz Corps, 0915, 21 Sep 44; CofS OB WEST to 

CofS A ep B, 1355, 21 Sep 44; and CofS A ep B 

to OKW/ WFSt, 1440, 21 Sep 44. All in A ep 

B KTB (Text). 

in the post office, and (3) the cooperation of the Dutch underground in 

keeping the bridge under fire so that the 

Germans could not work on the demolitions. "In my opinion, at this time," 

General Gavin wrote later, "the capture 

of the bridge intact, like the other bridges 

in the area, was the result of careful study 

and planning on the part of the parachutists of the 82d Airborne Division who 

were assigned the task, and the careful 

carrying out of those plans by everyone 

regardless of his grade or position who 

was associated with the task. The underground played a major part in getting 

this done and they deserve a lion's share of 
184 

the credit for saving the big bridge at 

Nijmegen." 17 

Regardless of who or what saved the 

Nijmegen bridge, the contributions of the 

Dutch underground not only to the operations of the 82d Airborne Division but 

to those of other Allied units a~ well 

cannot be ignored. Known officially as 

the Netherlands Interior Forces, the 

Dutch underground was one of the most 

highly organized and efficient resistance 

units in all Europe. Hardly any who 

fought in Holland were not affected in 

some manner by help from these intrepid, 

shadowy figures who moved by night. 

Dutch civilians were a constant source of 

intelligence on the enemy. Countless 

parachutists and glidermen who landed 

off the beaten track owed their safe return 

to the fearless assistance of the underground. Many times the Dutch assembled equipment and resupply bundles at 

central points where the soldiers could 

get at them easily. Many a Dutchman 

went hungry because he shared his meager 

rations with paratroopers whose resupply 

had been cut short by adverse weather. 

An officer who had visited frequently in 

the Netherlands before the war, Capt. 

17 Ltr, Gavin to OCMH, 17 Jan 54. In 1949 

an official board of inquiry reported to the 

I'ietherlands Government as a majority finding 

that it was likely a young Dutchman, Jan van 

Hoof, cut some detonator wires on the bridge, 

but the board did not say whether this act 

actually saved the bridge. See Letter to OCMH 

(24 Sep 56) from Dr. L. de Jong, Executive 

Director of the Netherlands State Institute for 

War Documentation. Though the story has attracted considerable notice in the I'i etherlands, 

only vague and inconclusive reference to it can 

be found in Allied records. See also Gilbert R. 

Martineau, ed., Holland Travel Guide (Paris: 

Nagel, 1951), p. 528; Ltrs in OCMH files from 

Col. A. L. van den Berge, Military Attache, 

Embassy of the Netherlands, Washington, D.C.; 

and Ltr, Bestebreurtje to OCMH. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Arie D. Bestebreurtje, jumped with the 

82d Airborne Division as commander of a 

three-man Special Forces team and coordinated the activities of the Netherlands 

Interior Forces at Nijmegen. In response 

to a Dutch request for weapons, General 

Gavin authorized Captain Bestebreurtje 

to dispense the weapons from American 

dead and wounded. General Gavin 

termed the conduct of the underground 

"exemplary." "Sleep, I have no time for 

sleep," a fatigued Dutch boy said when 

denied a request to fight in the line. 

"For four years I have been waiting for 

this. No, this is not the time for sleep." 

Some evidence indicates that at least one 

German commander was slow to move his 

troops in early stages of the airborne 

attack for fear of general Dutch uprisings. 

The Allied attack clearly benefited from 

the fact that it took place in a country 

where the population was unquestionably 

and often openly hostile to the enemyY 

First Attempts To Drive on Arnhem 

Counting from the time of first contact 

between the British ground column and 

the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 

0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the 

Ni jmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D 

plus 3, 20 September, a case could be 

made to show that the ground column was 

delayed at Kijmegen for almost thirty-five 

hours. Yet this would be to ignore the 

facts that first arrivals of the ground 

column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that 

18 Almost all after action reports and combat 

interviews contain references to Dutch assistance. 

See also Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous 

With Destiny, passim; Ltr, Gavin to OC~IH, 17 

Jan 54; eorrespondenee with Colonel Boeree; and 

Ltr, Bestebreurtje to OCMH. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

several hours elapsed before sizable British 

units began to arrive. Indeed, almost 

another twenty-four hours would elapse 

after capture of the Nijmegen bridge 

before the British would renew the drive 

on Arnhem. 

At nightfall on D plus 3, the British had 

at Nijmegen only the Guards Armoured 

Division. Because inclement weather continued to deny arrival of the 82d Airborne 

Division's glider infantry, the Guards 

Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group 

still was needed as a reserve for the airborne division. This left but two armored 

groups to go across the Waal. Even 

these did not make it until the next day 

(D plus 4, 2 I September), primarily 

because of die-hard German defenders 

who had to be ferreted from the superstructure and underpinnings of the bridge. 

Once on the north bank, much of the 

British armor and infantry was used to 

help hold and improve the bridgehead that 

the two battalions of the 504th Parachute 

Infantry had forged. 1!! 

British commanders must have been 

aware of the necessity to get quickly to 

Arnhem. Although few details on the 

situation north of the Neder Rijn had 

emerged, some sketchy information had 

filtered back during the day through intermittent radio communication with General 

Urquhart's headquarters. Though garbled by distance and inadequate airborne 

radio sets, these fragmentary messages 

had basically confirmed the cursory Dutch 

communication of two days before. Yet 

the new details provided no occasion for 

despair. The report was that Colonel 

Frost and his little band still held the 

1" For this account of British units, see FAAA, 

Opns in Holland; Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn 

Opns in Holland; 1st Abn Div, Rpt on Opn 

MARKET, Pt. I. 

185 

north end of the Arnhem bridge. Though 

under constant pressure, the rest of the 

Red Devils in the perimeter at Oosterbeek 

still controlled the north end of the 

Heveadorp ferry. If the ground column 

could break through quickly, the Red 

Devils-and possibly the entire MARKETGARDEN operation-still might be saved. 

For all the concern that must have 

existed about getting to Arnhem, only a 

small part of the British armor was freed 

late on D plus 4, 2 I September, to start 

the northward drive. As the attack began, British commanders saw every apprehension confirmed. The ground off the 

main roads was low-lying, soggy bottomland, denying employment of tanks. 

A few determined enemy bolstered with 

antitank guns might delay even a large 

force. Contrary to the information that 

had been received, Colonel Frost and his 

men had been driven away from the north 

end of the Arnhem bridge the afternoon 

before, so that since the preceding night 

the bridge had been open to German 

traffic. At the village of Ressen, less than 

three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced with 

I I tanks, another infantry battalion, 2 

batteries of 88-mm. guns, 20 20-mm. 

antiaircraft guns, and survivors of earlier 

fighting at Nijmegen, all operating under 

General Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps.20 

Arnhem lay seven miles north of this 

screen. The British could not pass. 

Not until near nightfall on D plus 4 

did another British division arrive at 

Nijmegen, the 43d Infantry Division. 

Because of severe traffic congestion on the 

20 Evg Sitrep, A ep B, 1845, 21 Sep 44, A ep 

B KTB, Letzte Meldung; Daily Sitrep, A ep B, 

0135, 23 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; 

Bittrich Questionnaire, copy in OCMH. 
186 

lone highway extending from the DutchBelgian border to Ni jmegen, it had taken 

three days for this division to travel sixty 

miles. The infantry would not attack 

until the next day, D plus 5, 22 September.21 

Only one other possibility did the Allies 

have for helping the Red Devils at Arnhem 

on 2 I September. By I400 cloud above 

air bases in England at last had cleared 

sufficiently to enable parachutists of the 

I st Polish Parachute Brigade to take to 

the air. Under a new plan, the Poles 

were to drop close to the village of Driel, 

near the southern terminus of the Heveadorp ferry. During the night they were 

to cross the river by ferry in order to 

strengthen the British perimeter on the 

north bank until the 30 Corps might 

break through. 

Unfortunately, weather over the Continent had not cleared. Of I IO planes, 

only 53 dropped their loads. Those who 

jumped included the brigade commander, 

Maj. Gen. S. Sosabowski, and the equivalent of two weak battalions, a total of 

750 men. After overcoming minor opposltlon on the drop zone, General 

Sosabowski made the disheartening discovery that but a short while earlier the 

Germans had driven the British from the 

north end of the ferry site and sunk the 

ferry boat. Although General Urquhart 

radioed that his Red Devils would attack 

immediately to regain the site, the theory 

that the weakened, closely confined British could recapture it was, no matter how 

admirable, wholly chimerical. 

By now the Red Devils had been confined to a perimeter at Oosterbeek less 

than half a mile wide and a mile and a 

21 Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, pages 

514-16, vividly describes the traffic problems on 

the highway. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

half deep. In that perimeter the day 

( 2 I September) had brought no brighter 

developments than it had outside. The 

Germans the day before had captured the 

British hospital; the plight of the wounded 

now was pitiful because of both a dearth 

of medical supplies and a lack of food and 

water. The inexorable pounding of enemy guns set the ammunition depot on 

fire. The only bright spot came in late 

afternoon when an artillery observation 

unit at last established firm radio contact 

with an artillery regiment of 30 Corps. 

The news to be reported from Colonel 

Frost and his men at the Arnhem bridge 

was not good. By daylight of D plus 3, 

20 September, the British paratroopers 

had retained control of only a few buildings near the bridge. During the afternoon of D plus 3 they had been driven by 

point-blank tank fire from the last of 

these. Some I40 able-bodied men still 

had refused to give up, but about 50 of 

these had fallen during the night. At 

dawn on D plus 4, 2 I September, the order had been given to break into small parties and try to escape. None had made it. 

Keeping the Corridor Open 

For all the adversities north of the 

Neder Rijn, hope still existed as daylight 

came on D plus 5, 22 September, that the 

43d Infantry Division might break 

through at Ressen, relieve the British 

paratroopers, and bring over-all success to 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN. The 30 

Corps commander, General Horrocks, ordered the division "to take all risks to 

effect relief today." 

Yet, almost coincident with this hope, 

another major threat to the success of the 

operation was developing to the south in 

the sector of General Taylor's IO ISt Air-
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

borne Division. Despite an aggressive 

defense designed to prevent the enemy 

from concentrating at anyone crucial 

spot to cut Hell's Highway, General Taylor on 22 September was faced with report 

after report from Dutch sources of largescale German movements against the narrow corridor from both east and west. 

At a time when the 30 Corps needed 

everything possible in order to break 

through to the Red Devils, severance of 

the vital lifeline could prove disastrous. 

One reason the IOIst Airborne Division 

still faced a major task in holding open 

the corridor was the slow progress of the 

attacks of the 8 and 12 British Corps on 

either flank of the corridor . West of the 

corridor, the 12 Corps, controlling three 

divisions, had begun to attack during the 

evening of D-Day, 17 September; but by 

D plus 5, when the reports of German 

concentration began to give General Taylor genuine concern, the 12 Corps still 

was several miles south and southwest of 

Best. East of the corridor, the numerically weaker 8 Corps had begun to attack 

before daylight on D plus 2, 19 September, 

but by D plus 5 still was southeast of 

Eindhoven. Both corps had run into 

stanch resistance and had found the 

marshy terrain an obstacle of major 

proportions. As Field Marshal Montgomery was to put it later, progress was 

"depressingly slow." 22 

The IOISt Airborne Division commander, General Taylor, had recognized 

since late on D plus 2, 19 September, 

when his command post and the Bailey 

bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon 

had almost fallen to the first strike of the 

I07th Panzer Brigade, that his division 

22 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 

230 -43. 

187 

had entered a second and more difficult 

phase of the fighting. The point' was 

underscored in the morning mist of D 

plus 3, 20 September, when the I07th 

Panzer Brigade struck again at the Zon 

bridge. Though a reinforced battalion of 

infantry had been disposed to guard the 

bridge, German tank guns soon controlled 

the bridge by fire. The bridge might 

have fallen to the Germans had not ten 

British tanks belatedly responded to an 

SOS dating from the crisis of the night 

before. Knocking out four German 

tanks, the British forced the enemy back. 

Recognizing that he had not the 

strength to maintain a static defense along 

the I5-mile length of Hell's Highway, 

General Taylor on D plus 3 chose the 

alternative. He would keep the Germans 

surprised and off balance with limited 

offensive thrusts of his own. 

Perhaps the most successful of these 

was a maneuver on D plus 3 by Colonel 

Kinnard's battalion of the 50 1St Parachute Infantry. Although Colonel Kinnard had a company outposting the 

village of Heeswi jk, four and a half miles 

northwest of Veghel, the Germans had 

infiltrated in some strength along the 

Willems Canal between Heeswi jk and 

Veghel. Using the bulk of his battalion, 

Colonel Kinnard drove northwest alongside the canal to sweep these Germans 

into Heeswijk, where the outpost company 

played the role of a dust pan. It was a 

classic maneuver, a little Cannae, which 

by the end of the day had accounted for 

about 500 Germans, including 4 I 8 prisoners. 

On D plus 4, 2 I September, a reconnaissance by a company of Colonel 

Michaelis' 502d Parachute Infantry encountered stiff resistance near the village 

of Schijndel, four and one half miles 
188 

northwest of St. Oedenrode. This COIncided with civilian reports that the 

Germans were concentrating south of 

Schijndel for a counterattack upon St. 

Oedenrode. Impressed by Colonel Kinnard's successful maneuver the day before, 

Michaelis and the commander of the 

50Ist Parachute Infantry, Colonel Johnson, decided to press the Germans near 

Schi jndel between them. Two battalions 

of Johnson's regiment were to take 

Schijndel from the north. Thereupon 

two of Michaelis' battalions were to attack 

northward against the German force that 

was south of the village. 

In a swift move after dark on D plus 4, 

Colonel Johnson took Schijndel not long 

after midnight ( 2 I September) . Although a surprise counterattack against 

the village at dawn delayed start of the 

second phase of the planned maneuver, 

Colonel Michaelis' two battalions were 

able to begin their role by midmorning 

(D plus 5,22 September). Progressing 

smoothly, the attack gave promise of 

bountiful success. Then, abruptly, at 

1430, an urgent message from General 

Taylor forced a halt. 

While these four battalions had fought 

near Schijndel, General Taylor had 

learned that the Germans were concentrating for a major blow to sever Hell's Highway. During the morning, a drive on 

Nuenen, southeast of Zon, had revealed 

that a German column contacted there the 

day before had gone elsewhere. This coincided with report after report from the 

Dutch of enemy movements both east and 

west of the Allied corridor. Indications 

were that the Germans intended a convergent attack in the vicinity of Veghel 

and Uden. Lying five miles northeast of 

Veghel astride Hell's Highway, Uden 

heretofore had been ignored by the GerTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

mans and unoccupied by the Americans. 

General Taylor had ample reason fof' 

concern. A strong convergent attack 

upon Veghel was, in reality, the German 

plan. The plan had emerged from orders 

issued by Field Marshal Model the day 

before (D plus 4, 2 I September) .23 

While General Bittrich's II SS Panzer 

Corps and General Meindl's II Parachute 

Corps stepped up their operations against 

the British at Arnhem and the Americans 

at Nijmegen, General Student's First Parachute Army was to sever the Allied 

corridor farther south. 

The spot Field Marshal Model chose 

was Veghel. Pushed back by the British 

ground attack on D-Day and by the 

subsequent drive of the 12 British Corps, 

General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps 

now was located west of Veghel and 

might mount an attack from that direction. On the east the attack was to be 

mounted by a headquarters new to the 

fighting, the LXXXVI Corps under General der Infanterie Hans von Obstfelder. 

This headquarters Model had moved up 

hurriedly on D plus I to assume control 

of Division Erdmann and the I76th Division in order that General Student might 

give undivided attention to other units 

more directly involved against the Allied 

airborne operation.24 General von Obstfelder now was to assume a more active 

role. 

In the attack from the east, Obstfelder 

was to employ a force thrown together 

under Colonel Walther, who earlier had 

commanded a Kampfgruppe along the 

Meuse-Escaut Canal. The new Kampfgruppe Walther would control Major von 

23 Order, A Gp B to all subordinate commands, 

[700, 2 [ Sep 44, A Gp B KTB Operationsbe/ehle. 

24 See Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, [000, [8 Sep 44, 

A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

Maltzahn's l07th Panzer Brigade, a small 

contingent of the loth 55 Panzer Division 

(Kampfgruppe Heinke) that had earlier 

been used against the XIX U.S. Corps 

east of Maastricht, an artillery battalion 

with three howitzer batteries (lOS'S and 

ISO'S), and an infantry battalion of the 

180th Division, the last an advance contingent of a replacement division which 

had been scraped together hurriedly by 

Wehrkreis X. 

From the west, General Reinhard's 

LXXXVIII Corps was to employ a regimental combat team of the 59th Division 

that had been shored up with replacements after a disastrous initial commitment at Best. Commanded by Major 

Huber, this force included three infantry 

battalions, a battalion of I05-mm. howitzers, a battery of 15o-mm. howitzers, a 

battery of 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, seven 

antitank guns, and four Panther tanks. 

The axis of attack for Kampfgruppe 

Huber was from Schijndel through the 

villages of Wijbosch and Eerde to Veghel. 

Kampfgruppe Walther was to strike from 

Gernert through the village of Erp, three 

miles southeast of Veghe1. 25 

On the American side, the maneuver 

near Schijndel during the morning of 22 

September was occupying the bulk of 

Colonel Johnson's 50lst Parachute Infantry, but one battalion of that regiment 

still was in defensive positions in Veghel. 

Yet not a man was in U den, the other 

place which the Americans believed the 

Germans would strike. To U den General 

Taylor turned his attention first. 

The job of defending U den General 

Taylor gave to Colonel Sink's 506th Para25 TWX, A ep B to OB WEST, 0600, 22 Sep 

44, A ep B KTB, Operationsbefehle; MS # B149 (Poppe); Noon Sitrep, A ep B, 1330, 22 Sep 

44, A ep B KTB, Letzte Meldung. 

189 

chute Infantry, which was becoming 

available as British ground troops took 

over farther south around Eindhoven and 

Zon. Upon first word of the threat, 

Colonel Sink hurriedly collected about 150 

men from a rifle platoon and his regimental headquarters company and rushed 

them northward by truck. At 1100, 22 

September, they reached U den. Only a 

few minutes later the Germans appeared. 

For the remainder of D plus 5 and into 

the next day, the men of this little force 

dashed from house to house in Uden to 

spread their fire and give an impression of 

strength. They were fortunate that the 

Germans were concentrating instead upon 

Veghel. 

In the mam attack, Kampfgruppe 

Walther advanced through the village of 

Erp against Veghel shortly before noon. 

Commanded by Lt. Col. Robert A. Ballard, 

the lone American battalion in Veghel 

waited in houses and foxholes along the 

Erp road. In a stint of furious fighting, 

Colonel Ballard's men warded off the first 

German blow, but they could see part of 

the German column sideslip to the northwest. Unopposed m this direction, 

Kampfgruppe Walther with tanks of the 

l07th Panzer Brigade in the lead readily 

cut Hell's Highway between Veghel and 

Uden. Then the tanks turned down the 

highway toward Veghe1. 26 

Had it not been for the warnings of the 

Dutch underground, Kampfgruppe Wal26 For the story of the defense of Veghel, the 

author is indebted to Rapport and Northwood, 

Rendezvous With Destiny, pp. 352 fr. The 

authors of this authoritative work conducted 

additional interviews and correspondence to supplement unit records and combat interviews. 

See also battalion histories of the 327th Glider 

Infantry in combat interview files of the 10lst 

Airborne Division, plus unit journals and after 

action reports. 
190 

ther might have found in Veghel only 

Colonel Ballard's battalion and surprised 

British truck drivers who were trapped by 

the cutting of the highway. But upon 

receipt of Dutch warnings, General Taylor had acted swiftly. In addition to 

alerting Colonel Sink's 506th Parachute 

Infantry to move to Uden, he told the 

commander of the 327th Glider Infantry, 

Colonel Harper, to release a battalion 

from defense of the glider landing zone 

and send it to Veghel. Two battalions of 

infantry thus were advancing toward 

Veghel even as the German tanks turned 

toward the town. 

Having come into Veghel during the 

morning to select a new division command 

post, the IO I st Airborne Division's artillery 

commander, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, was at hand to co-ordinate the 

defense. Spotting a 57-mm. antitank gun 

of the 8 I st Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion, 

General McAuliffe yelled to get the gun 

forward. 

Divining the urgency of the situation, 

Colonel Harper meantime had intercepted 

his glider infantry battalion that was 

moving over back roads in deference to 

British priority on the main highway. He 

directed the battalion commander, Lt. 

Col. Ray C. Allen, to ignore the ban on 

travel on the main road. At the same 

time he told Colonel Allen's motorized 

antitank platoon to thread through traffic 

that was coagulating along the highway 

and race at full speed into Veghel. 

Almost simultaneously, the 57-mm. antitank gun and the antitank platoon from 

the 327th Glider Infantry arrived at the 

northeastern fringe of Veghel. A dispute 

was to arise later between crews of these 

guns as to which fired the first shot, but 

what mattered at the moment was that 

the first round struck the leading Mark V 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

squarely and set it afire. Faced with 

what they could not recognize immediately as only a makeshift defense, the 

other German tankers backed away. 

The delay thus imposed gave General 

McAuliffe time to get set. He directed 

the battalion of the 506th Parachute Infantry into position astride Hell's Highway 

in the northeast. Colonel Allen's battalion of the 327th Glider Infantry he ordered 

to defend in the north near a railroad 

bridge over the Aa River. General McAuliffe requested air support, but unfavorable weather denied any substantial 

assistance from that quarter. 

Though the timely arrival of antitank 

guns had stymied Kampfgruppe Walther 

temporarily, this was but half of the 

German strength. Kampfgruppe Huber 

was even then striking toward Veghel 

from the west. 

Because the Americans had taken 

Schijndel the night before, Major Huber 

had had to alter his plan of attack. Diverting an infantry battalion as a screen 

against Schijndel, he had advanced with 

the rest of his force along back roads and 

trails to Eerde, thence along a highway to 

Veghel.27 About 1400 (22 September) 

Major Huber's tanks and artillery brought 

fire to bear upon the bridge over the 

Willems Canal at Veghel. 

Once again General McAuliffe could 

thank the fortuitous arrival of fresh troops. 

General Taylor's order to the 506th Parachute Infantry to move to U den was 

paying off, not in the defense of Uden but 

of Veghel. Even as the Germans took 

the bridge under fire, another battalion of 

the 506th Parachute Infantry arrived 

from the south in company with a squadron of British tanks. Discouraged, Major 

Huber's tanks and· infantry recoiled. 

27 MS # B-I49 (Poppe). 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

If he could not get to Veghel, Major 

Huber must have reasoned, still he might 

cut Hell's Highway. Rallying his men 

quickly, he sideslipped to the south. Advance elements actually had crossed the 

highway when once again American 

reinforcements arrived, this time the two 

remaining battalions of Colonel Harper's 

327th Glider Infantry. Using marching 

fire, the glidermen quickly drove the 

Germans back. 

It was Major Huber's attack at 1400 

that had prompted the message to Colonel 

Johnson at Schijndel which in effect 

ended American attempts to eliminate the 

Germans south of that village. Although 

the message directed only that he release 

a squadron of attached British tanks to 

move to Veghel, Colonel Johnson did not 

stop there. Aware that defense of Veghel 

was his responsibility, he called off the 

maneuver at Schijndel and directed both 

his battalions to Veghel. 

By the time these two battalions had 

fought through rear elements of Kampfgruppe Huber to reach the villages of 

Wijbosch and Eerde, General McAuliffe 

already had obtained sufficient strength 

for defending Veghel. Colonel Johnson 

therefore directed one battalion to defend 

at Wi jbosch, the other at Eerde. These 

two battalions thus became the western 

segment of the Veghel defensive arc. In 

the process they in effect cut off Kampfgruppe Huber. Only a fraction of Major 

Huber's infantry escaped.28 

Through the rest of the afternoon of 

22 September, German artillery pounded 

Veghel, and Kampfgruppe Walther 

launched one strong attack and several 

probing thrusts. Yet the enemy would 

28 Daily Sitrep, A ep B, 0135, 23 Sep 44, A 

ep B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS # B-149 

(Poppe). 

191 

have to show greater strength if he were 

to succeed at Veghel, for General McAuliffe now had in defense of the town a 

total of eight infantry battalions. These 

included two battalions of the 506th 

Parachute Infantry, all of the 50 I st Parachute Infantry, and all of the 327th Glider 

Infantry. Some guns of the airborne 

artillery, some British pieces gathered 

from the highway, and two squadrons of 

British tanks also had been included within the perimeter. 

No matter how sanguine General McAuliffe might be about defending Veghel, 

the task was not so much holding the 

village as it was reopening Hell's Highway 

to the northeast in the direction of Uden. 

Already trucks, tanks, and supply vehicles so sorely needed at Nijmegen and 

Arnhem clogged the highway for miles, 

cruelly exposed to enemy attack along 

some other portion of the road. 

General McAuliffe found his impending 

task eased by the fact that radio communications with the 30 Corps at 

Nijmegen had remained constant. The 

30 Corps commander, General Horrocks, 

promised to send his 32d Guards Brigade 

to attack south the next day to assist in 

opening the road. General McAuliffe 

also received another assist from the British: during 22 September the 8 British 

Corps, which was advancing along the 

right flank of the corridor, had forced two 

crossings of the Willems Canal to the east 

of Eindhoven at Helmond and Asten. 

Even as Kampfgruppe Walther continued 

to fight, Colonel Walther had to keep one 

eye cocked to the southeast. A sudden 

spurt by the 8 Corps might sever his line 

of communications. 

Early the next day, D plus 6, 23 

September, Kampfgruppe Walther nevertheless resumed the attack against Veghe1, 
192 

while General Reinhard's LXXXVIII 

Corps tried to co-operate with a complementary thrust from the west. Unlike 

Colonel Walther, General Reinhard had 

no real concern about British advances, 

for west of the corridor his troops had 

held the 12 British Corps in the vicinity 

of Best. Yet because Kampfgruppe Huber had been mauled severely, General 

Reinhard had to turn elsewhere to find 

troops with which to attack. During the 

night he had moved up Colonel von der 

Heydte's 6th Parachute Regiment) which 

as a part of Kampfgmppe Chill had 

fought along the Meuse-Escaut Canal. 

In order to co-ordinate with the renewed thrust of Kampfgruppe Walther) 

Colonel von der Heydte had to attack I 

immediately after arrival, even though his 

troops were exhausted from two nights 

of marching. Moreover, one of the 6th 

Parachute Regiment's organic battalions 

had been left behind. In its stead von 

der Heydte had a battalion of the 2d 

Parachute Regiment) "a rotten apple," an 

outfit poorly led and poorly disciplined. 

To add to the problems, the command 

situation left something to be desired, 

As a component of Kampfgruppe Chill) 

the 6th Parachute Regiment received tactical orders from that source, but the 

regiment had to depend for supply upon 

the 59th Division. Faced with these conditions, the colonel understandably had 

little faith in the prospects of his attack. 

He was right. Scheduled to attack at 

0700 (23 September), the 6th Parachute 

Re giment did not get going until an hour 

and a half later. Striking toward Veghel 

along the same route taken the day before 

by Kampfgruppe Huber) von der Heydte's 

paratroopers ran into Colonel Johnson's 

parachute infantry at Wijbosch and Eerde. 

They could get nowhere. Soon after 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

noon von der Heydte told his men to 

defend the line they had reached. 29. 

In the drive against Veghel from the 

east, Kampfgruppe Walther found the 

going equally tough. Apparently in recognition of the threat posed by continued 

advance of the 8 British Corps, Kampfgruppe Walther by noon had begun to 

fall back. 

When at I300 General McAuliffe seized 

the initiative to send two battalions of the 

506th Parachute Infantry to break Kampfgruppe Walther's stranglehold on Hell's 

Highway between Veghel and Uden, the 

paratroopers found only a shell of German 

defenders remammg. They advanced 

quickly more than a mile to a juncture 

with the British armor driving southwest 

from Uden. As soon as tanks and bulldozers could nose damaged vehicles 

aside, traffic once again rolled on Hell's 

Highway. 

Even as fighting continued at Veghel, 

the lOIst Airborne Division's last glider 

serial was arriving at the glider landing 

zone. Blessed by genuinely favorable 

weather for the first time since D Day, this 

lift on 23 September arrived almost without incident. Included was the 907th 

Glider Field Artillery Battalion, whose 

lO5-mm. howitzers had been turned back 

by adverse weather on D plus 2. When 

the division's seaborne tail arrived during 

the night of D plus 5 and on D plus 6, 

General Taylor at last could count his 

entire division present. 

The Germans were convinced that these 

new landings were designed primarily to 

alleviate German pressure at Veghel. 

Indeed, they in part attributed Kampfgruppe Walther's failure to hold onto 

Hell's Highway to an erroneous belief that 

29 MS#--C-OOI (von der Heydte). 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

fresh Allied paratroopers had landed at 

Uden.30 

The Germans were concerned even 

more about new Allied landings on this 

date at Nijmegen, where General Gavin at 

last received his 325th Glider Infantry.31 

Despite the reinforcement of Corps Feldt 

by seven battalions under the II Parachute Corps; the Germans had been 

thrown on the defensive in this sector 

after their short-lived successes at Mook, 

Riethorst, Wyler, and Beek on D plus 3, 

20 September. To provide greater security for the Waal bridges at Nijmegen, 

General Gavin had ordered an attack to 

clear the flatlands between the ridge and 

the Waal as far as three miles east of 

Nijmegen. Parts of the 504th and 508th 

Parachute Regiments had begun to attack 

late on D plus 4, 2 I September, as soon 

as Beek had been retaken. By nightfall 

of D plus 6, 23 September, the 82d Airborne Division's new line in this sector 

ran from the foot of Devil's Hill (Hill 

75.9) northeast to the Waal near Erlekom. 

With the arrival of the 325th Glider 

Infantry (Lt. Col. Charles Billingslea) on 

23 September the Germans at the southern end of the high ground also came 

under attack. Relieving the 505th Parachute Infantry, the glidermen began to 

clear a patch of woods on lower slopes of 

the Kiekberg (Hill 77.2).32 

Perhaps as a corollary to the concern 

that grew from the new Allied landings, 

Field Marshal Model on 23 September 

reorganized his command in hope of a 

simpler and more effective arrangement. 

He in effect drew an imaginary line along 

30 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200, 24 Sep 44, A 

Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

:11 Ibid. 

32 See History of 325th Glider Infantry, 82d 

Abn Div Combat Interv file. 

193 

the west boundary of the corridor the 

Allies had carved. All forces to the west 

of this line came under General von 

Zangen's Fifteenth Army. Relieving the 

Armed Forces Commander Netherlands 

and Wehrkreis VI of their unorthodox 

tactical responsibilities, Model assigned 

the First Parachute Army the following 

forces: General Bittrich's II SS Panzer 

Corps (plus Division von T ettau ), General Meindl's II Parachute Corps, General 

von Obstfelder's LXXXVI Corps, Corps 

Feldt, and a new corps headquarters that 

was scheduled to arrive within a few days. 

With these forces, General Student was to 

execute the main effort against the Allied 

corridor. 33 

In the wake of this reorganization, a 

renewal of the attack by Colonel von der 

Heydte's 6th Parachute Regiment near 

Veghel on 24 September was made under 

the auspices of the Fifteenth Army rather 

than the First Parachute Army. Yet the 

pattern of the action was much the same 

as the day before. This time the fighting 

occurred only at Eerde, where a battalion 

of the 501st Parachute Infantry under 

Colonel Cassidy fought a courageous, 

hand-to-hand engagement for possession of 

local observation advantage in a range of 

sand dunes near the village. As German 

success appeared imminent, another battalion under Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell and 

a squadron of British tanks arrived. 

Thereupon Colonel Cassidy counterattacked to drive von der Heydte's paratroopers from the dunes. 

The fight might have ended in unequivocal American success had not the 

Germans committed alongside von der 

33 Order, A Gp B to First Prcht Army, Fifteenth Army, Armed Forces Comdr Netherlands, 

Wehrkreis VI, 1200, 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, 

o perationsbefehle. 
194 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

HELL'S HIGHWAY. Wrecked British supply trucks along the hotly contested route. 

Heydte's south flank a newly arrived unit, 

a Battalion JungwIrth. Advancing southeast down a secondary road, Battalion 

Jungwirth surprisingly found no Americans barring the way. As nightfall 

neared, the Germans approached the 

hamlet of Koevering, located astride Hell's 

Highway a little more than a third of the 

distance from St. Oedenrode to Veghel and 

heretofore unoccupied by the Americans. 

When outposts reported this movement, 

the commander of the 502d Parachute 

Infantry at St. Oedenrode sent two companies racing toward Koevering. Arriving 

minutes ahead of the Germans, these 

companies denied the village; but they 

could not prevent Battalion Jungwirth 

from cutting Hell's Highway a few hundred yards to the northeast. Scarcely 

more than twenty-four hours after the 

Allies had reopened the highway between 

Veghel and Uden, the Germans had cut 

it again. 

Through the night airborne and British 

artillery pounded the point of German 

penetration in an attempt to prevent reinforcement. The g07th Glider Field 

Artillery Battalion in firing positions only 

400 yards from the Germans laid the guns 

of one battery for direct fire, operated the 

others with skeleton crews, and put the 

rest of the artillerymen in foxholes as 

riflemen. Yet Colonel von der Heydte 

still managed to redeploy a portion of his 

6th Parachute Regiment to the point of 

penetration. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

Marching during the night from Uden 

in a heavy rain, Colonel Sink's 506th 

Parachute Infantry attacked at 0830 the 

next morning (D plus 8, 25 September) 

to squeeze the Germans from the northeast. A regiment of the 50th British 

Infantry Division and a reinforced battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry 

pressed at the same time from the direction 

of St. Oedenrode. As the day wore on, 

Battalion Jungwirth and reinforcements 

from the 6th Parachute Regiment held 

firm. By nightfall the Allies had drawn 

a noose about the Germans on three sides, 

but a small segment of Hell's Highway 

still was in German hands. 

During the night Battalion Jungwirth 

withdrew in apparent recognition of the 

tenuous nature of the position. The Germans nevertheless had held the penetration 

long enough to mine the highway extensively. Not until well into the day of 

D plus 9, 26 September, did engineers 

finally clear the road and open Hell's 

Highway again to traffic. 

The elimination of this break near 

Koevering marked the stabilization of the 

IO Ist Airborne Division's front. Although the Germans struck time after 

time in varying strength at various positions along the road, never again were 

they to cut it. Actually, General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps to the west of 

the highway concentrated primarily upon 

interfering with Allied movements through 

artillery fire, and General von Obstfelder's 

LXXXVI Corps to the east was too concerned with advance of the 8 British Corps 

to pay much more attention to Hell's 

Highway.34 Indeed, by nightfall of 25 

September patrols of the 8 Corps had 

34 See Daily Sitreps, A Gp B, 27 Sep 44, and 

later dates, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

195 

contacted contingents of the 30 Corps at 

St. Antonis, south of Nijmegen, thereby 

presaging quick formation of a solid line 

along the east flank of the corridor. Both 

General Taylor's IO Ist Airborne Division 

and General Gavin's 82d Airborne Division now might hold basically in place 

while the British tried to make the best of 

what had been happening at Arnhem. 

The Outcome at Arnhem 

The day the Germans first cut Hell's 

Highway at Veghel, D plus 5, 22 September, a new attack by the British ground 

column to break through to the hardpressed paratroopers north of the Neder 

Rijn began auspiciously. Just after dawn, 

patrols in armored cars utilized a heavy 

mist to sneak past the west flank of the 

German line via Valburg. Taking circuitous back roads and trails, the patrols 

in a matter of a few hours reached 

General Sosabowski's Polish troops at 

Driel, across the river from the British 

perimeter at Oosterbeek. 

When the main body of the 43d Infantry Division attacked, the story was 

different. During the night the Germans 

had reinforced their defensive screen with 

a headquarters infantry battalion and a 

company of Panther tanks.35 After a 

minor advance to a point well southwest 

of Elst, still not halfway to Arnhem, the 

British infantry despaired of breaking 

through. 

The British had one trick remaining. 

Mounting on tanks, a battalion of infantry 

traced the route of the armored cars over 

35 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0 I 35, 23 Sep 44, A 

Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Bittrich Questionnaire, copy in OCMH. 
196 

back roads to the northwest and reached 

Driel before nightfall. The column included DUKW's loaded with ammunition 

and supplies for the Red Devils. During 

the night, the Polish paratroopers were to 

cross the Neder Rijn in these craft. The 

need for reinforcement and resupply north 

of the river grew more urgent by the hour, 

for on 22 September perhaps the worst 

weather of the operation had denied air 

resupply of any kind. 

Unfortunately, the DUKW's could not 

make it. Mud along the south bank of 

the Neder Rijn was too deep. During 

the night of 22 September, only about 

fifty Poles riding makeshift rafts managed 

to cross. 

The break in the weather on D plus 6, 

23 September, permitted a degree of 

assistance for the Red Devils. Typhoons 

of the 2d Tactical Air Force and P-47's 

of the Eighth Air Force struck enemy 

positions all along the corridor, particularly around the perimeter at Oosterbeek. 

This was the day when the last serials of 

the 82d and IOlst Airborne Divisions arrived. Upon order of General Browning, 

the remainder of the 1st Polish Parachute 

Brigade landed on the secure drop zone of 

the 82d Airborne Division near Grave 

instead of at Driel and became a reserve 

for the American division. Thereupon, 

the Coldstream Guards Group reverted to 

the Guards Armoured Division. 

Now that the British had reached Driel, 

radio communication with the Red Devils 

at last was constant. As a consequence, 

General Horrocks and General Browning 

no longer anticipated recapture of the 

Arnhem bridge. At last the hard fact 

was evident that even should the ground 

column take the bridge, the Red Devils 

were too weak to help establish a bridgehead at Arnhem. The two commanders 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

agreed that the best chance of reinforcing 

or relieving the British airborne troops 

was through Driel. The 43d Infantry 

Division therefore concentrated upon 

strengthening the forces at Driel and upon 

clearing Elst, in order to open more direct 

secondary roads to Driel. 

By nightfall of D plus 6, 23 September, 

a brigade had fought into the outskirts of 

Elst, while another brigade had built up 

about Driel. To Driel went a small number of assault boats for putting the rest 

of the Polish paratroopers across the river 

during the night; for General Horrocks 

still hoped to turn the British perimeter 

into a secure bridgehead. But the Germans continued to control the north bank 

of the river, so that during the night only 

a modicum of ammunition and supplies 

and some 150 Polish paratroopers got 

across. 

This continued inability to reinforce 

the British at Oosterbeek brought the 

first formal recognition that Operation 

MARKET-GARDEN might have passed the 

point of saving. Even though the Allies 

controlled a grass landing field near Grave 

where planes could land the 52d Lowland 

Division (Airportable), the Second Army 

commander, General Dempsey, radioed 

during the evening of 23 September that 

this division was not to be flown in without his approval. He obviously was reluctant to throw additional airborne 

troops into the fray unless he could find 

more positive indication of eventual success. Apparently with the concurrence 

of General Brereton and Field Marshal 

Montgomery, he gave authority to withdraw the 1st British Airborne Division 

from north of the Neder Rijn, "if the 

position so warranted." 36 

36 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns III 

Holland. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

For a time, however, General Horrocks 

refused to give up without at least one 

more attempt to establish a bridgehead 

beyond the Neder Rijn. He directed that 

during the night of D plus 7, 24 September, the rest of the Polish paratroopers be 

ferried across. Nearby, two companies of 

the 43d Division's Dorsetshire Regiment 

were to cross, a first step in projected 

eventual commitment of the entire 43d 

Division beyond the river. 

Once again success hinged on whether 

sufficient troops could cross the river 

during the night. Using the limited number of assault boats available, the two 

companies of the Dorsetshire Regiment 

paddled over, but daylight came before 

the Poles could cross. Because of German 

fire, even the Dorsets failed to assemble in 

cohesive units on the north bank. Few 

of them reached the British perimeter. 

Only about seventy-five of 400 Dorsets to 

cross over made their way back to the 

south bank. 

If judged against German expectations, 

General Horrocks' hope that even at this 

late stage he still might establish a secure 

bridgehead was not unreasonable. The 

German commander, Field Marshal 

Model, was convinced that the airborne 

landings the day before presaged a renewed Allied effort. In regard to the 

over-all situation, Model was pessimistic. 

"The situation of Army Group B's northern wing," he reported on 24 September, 

"has continued to deteriorate . . .. In 

the bitter fighting of the past week we 

were able merely to delay the enemy in 

achieving his strategic objective.... 

The renewed large airborne operation of 

23 September ... is bound to result in 

highly critical developments . . .." He 

needed, the Army Group B commander 

reported, "minimum reinforcements" of 

197 

one infantry and one panzer division, a 

panzer brigade, two assault gun brigades,' 

increased supplies of artillery ammunition, 

and increased infantry replacements. 37 

For a few hours longer, General Horrocks' optImIsm continued to match 

Model's apparent pessimism. The British 

corps commander still wanted one more 

try at establishing a bridgehead before 

conceding defeat. Reasoning that he 

might force a bridgehead elsewhere while 

the Germans were occupied with the Red 

Devils at Oosterbeek, he directed the 43d 

Infantry Division to prepare to cross a 

few miles to the west at Renkum, where 

a British armored brigade, driving west 

and northwest from Valburg, had built 

up along the south bilnk of the river. 

Yet hardly had General Horrocks issued 

this order when he admitted his plan 

was illusory. A short while later he rescinded the order. 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN was almost 

over. At 0930 on D plus 8, 25 September, General Horrocks and General 

Browning agreed to withdraw the survivors of the British airborne division from 

the north bank. 

Hungry, thirsty, heavy-eyed, utterly 

fatigued, and reduced to a shell of a 

division after nine days of fighting, the 

Red Devils wrapped their muddy boots in 

rags to muffle the sound of their footsteps and began at 2145 on 25 September 

to run a gantlet of German patrols to the 

water's edge. The night was mercifully 

dark. A heavy rain fell. Thundering 

almost constantly, guns of the 30 Corps 

lowered a protective curtain about the 

periphery of the British position. In 

groups of fourteen to match capacity of 

37 TWX, Model to Rundstedt, I300, 24 Sep 

44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen, Lagebeurteilungenl 

Wochenmeldungen, IS. V.-I I.X.44. 
198 

the boats, the men inched toward the 

river. They had to leave their wounded 

behind. 

Patient despite nervousness, fatigue, 

and the cold rain, the men queued for an 

empty boat. As dawn approached and 

many remained to be ferried, all who 

could do so braved the current to swim 

across. Not all of them made it. As 

daylight called a halt to the withdrawal, 

some 300 men remained on the north 

bank. A few of these hid out to make 

their way south on subsequent nights, 

but most probably were captured. 

Guides led the weary soldiers to a 

reception point south of Driel where 

friendly hands plied them with rum, hot 

food, and tea. The survivors included 

1,741 officers and men of the I st Airborne 

Division, 422 British glider pilots, 160 men 

of the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade, and 

75 of the Dorsetshire Regiment, a total of 

2,398. These were all that remained of 

approximately 9,000 who had fought on 

the north bank. Judging from German 

reports, these men who wore the jaunty 

red berets had inflicted upon their enemy 

approximately 3,300 casualties, including 

1,100 dead. 38 Speaking for his troops, 

General Urquhart said: "We have no 

regrets." 39 

The Achievements and the Cost 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN accomplished much of what it had been designed 

to accomplish. Nevertheless, by the 

merciless logic of war, MARKET-GARDEN 

was a failure. The Allies had trained 

38 German figures from Daily Sit rep, A Gp B, 

0220, 27 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

The Germans claimed approximately 8,000 British casualties, including 6,450 prisoners (1,700 of 

them wounded) and 1,500 dead. 

39 1st Abn Div, Rpt on Opn MARKET, Pt. I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

their sights on far-reaching objectives. 

These they had not attained. 

On the credit side, MARKET-GARDEN 

had gained bridgeheads over five major 

water obstacles, including the formidable 

Maas and Waal Rivers. The bridgehead 

beyond the Maas was to prove a decided 

advantage in February 1945 when the 2 I 

Army Group launched a drive to clear 

the west bank of the Rhine opposite the 

Ruhr. The bridgehead beyond the Waal 

was to pose a constant threat of an Allied 

thrust northward, through the Germans 

subsequently lessened the threat by a 

program of widespread inundation. Operation MARKET-GARDEN also had forged 

a salient sixty-five miles deep into enemy 

territory, had liberated many square 

miles of the Netherlands, and had gained 

some valuable airfields. It also had 

drawn some German formations from 

other sectors of the Western Front and 

had imposed upon these forces a high rate 

of attrition. 

On the debit side, some might maintain 

that the cardinal point was the failure to 

precipitate a German collapse. Although 

the enemy's collapse was hardly a formal 

objective of the operation, few would deny 

that many Allied commanders had nurtured the hope. In regard to more 

immediate and clearly defined objectives, 

the operation had failed to secure a 

bridgehead beyond the Neder Rijn, had 

not effectively turned the north flank of 

the West Wall, had not cut off the enemy's 

Fifteenth Army, and had not positioned 

the 2 I Army Group for a drive around the 

north flank of the Ruhr. The hope of 

attaining these objectives had prompted 

the ambition and daring that went into 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Not to 

have realized them could mean only that 

the operation had failed. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

The cost was high. In what may be 

called the "airborne phase," lasting from 

D-Day until withdrawal from north of 

the Neder Rijn on 25 September, the 

British airborne troops, including glider 

pilots and headquarters of the British 

Airborne Corps, lost 7,2 I 2 men killed, 

wounded, and missing. The 82d Airborne Division lost 1,432; the IOIst 

Airborne Division, 2,110. Casualties 

among the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade 

totaled 378; among American glider pilots, 

122. British and American air transport 

units lost 596 pilots. Including airborne 

troops, glider pilots, and transport aIrcraft pilots, the airborne phase cost 

I 1,850 casualties. 40 

To this total belong those casualties 

incurred by the 30 Corps, an estimated 

1,480 through 25 September. In addition, the 30 Corps lost some 70 tanks, and 

together the Americans and British lost 

144 transport aircraft. 41 

40 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns in Holland. A complete tabulations of losses through 

25 September follows: 

Killed Wounded Missinf!, Total 

--------

Total 968 2.640 8,242 I 1.850 

Hq Br Abn Corps 

and Sig PerL ___ 4 - -------- 8 12 

1st Br Abn Div ___ 286 135 6,041 6.462 

82d Abn Div _____ 215 790 427 1.430 

IOIst Abn Div ____ 31 5 1.248 547 2. 1I8 

1st Pol Prcht Brig_ 47 158 173 378 

Br Glider Pilots- __ 59 35 644 732 

U.S. Glider Pilots- 12 36 74 122 

38 Group RAF __ . 6 23 184 213 

46 Group RAY-•. 8 II 62 81 

IX U.S. Troop 

Carrier Command __________ 16 204 82 302 

41 Casualty figures on British ground forces 

furnished by Cabinet Office Historical Section; 

others from Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns in 

Holland. The 8 and 12 Corps for the same 

period (17-25 Sep) incurred 3,874 casualties and 

lost approximately 18 tanks. 

199 

Though MARKET-GARDEN failed in its 

more far-reaching ramifications, to condemn the entire plan as a mistake is to 

show no appreciation for imagination and 

daring in military planning and is to 

ignore the climate of Allied intelligence 

reports that existed at the time. While 

reasons advanced for the failure range 

from adverse weather (Field Marshal 

Montgomery) and delay of the British 

ground column south of Eindhoven (General Brereton) to faulty intelligence (the 

Germans) ,42 few cntICIsms have been 

leveled at the plan itself. In light of 

Allied limitations in transport, supplies, 

and troops for supporting the thrust, in 

light of General Eisenhower's commitment 

to a broad-front policy, and in light of the 

true condition of the German army in the 

West, perhaps the only real fault of the 

plan was overambition. 

Field Marshal Montgomery has written: 

"We had undertaken a difficult operation, 

attended by considerable risks. It was 

justified because, had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we should 

have attained full success." 43 Whether 

one can ascribe everything to weather in 

this manner is problematical, for other 

dela ys and difficulties not attributable to 

adverse weather developed. Certainly the 

vagaries of weather played a major role. 

Weather delayed arrival of the 1st British Airborne Division's second lift on D 

plus I for five hours, thwarted all but a 

smattering of resupply north of the Neder 

Rijn, and delayed arrival of the 1st 

Polish Parachute Brigade for two days. 

Bad weather also delayed arrival of the 82d 

42 FAAA Memo, sub: German analysis of Arnhem, 18 Dec 44, in SHAEF F AAA files; Brereton, 

The Brereton Diaries, pp. 360-6 I; Montgomery, 

Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 242-43. 

43 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 242. 
200 

Airborne Division's glider infantry regiment and a battalion of the IOIst Airborne Division's artillery for four days and 

helped deny any really substantial contribution after D-Day from tactical aircraft. 

The major adversities attributable to 

unfavorable weather might have been 

avoided had sufficient aircraft been available to transport the entire airborne force 

on D-Day. Yet to have hoped for that 

many aircraft at this stage of the war 

would have been to presume the millenmm. As it was, more transport aircraft 

were employed in Operation MARKET 

than in any other operation up to that 

time. 

In the matter of intelligence, the Allies 

sinned markedly. In particular, they expected greatest opposition at those points 

closest to the German front line, that is, 

near Eindhoven, and failed to detect (or 

to make adjustments for) the presence of 

the II SS Panzer Corps near Arnhem, 

the 59th Division in transit near Tilburg, 

two SS battalions in the line opposite the 

30 Corps, and the proximity of Student's 

and Model's headquarters to the drop 

zones. The celerity of German reaction 

certainly owed much to the presence of 

Model and Student on the scene, as well 

as to the blunder of some American 

officer who went into battle with a copy 

of the operational order. Faulty intelligence indicating German armor in the 

Reichswald bore heavily upon General 

Gavin's disposition of his battalions. 

Allied intelligence also erred in estimates 

of the terrain and enemy flak near Arnhem, thereby prompting location of 

British drop and landing zones far from 

the primary objective of the Arnhem 

bridge. 

Yet all these handicaps possibly could 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

have been overcome had the British 

ground column been able to advance' as 

rapidly as General Horrocks had hoped. 

Perhaps the real fault was dependence 

upon but one road. In any event, the 

ground troops were delayed for varying 

amounts of time south of Eindhoven, at 

the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, and at the Waal 

bridge in Nijmegen. Had these delays 

been avoided, the Germans conceivably 

could not have seriously deterred the 

advance between the Waal and the Neder 

Rijn, for this would have put the ground 

column north of the Waal by D plus 2 at 

the latest. Not until the night of D plus 

3 were the Germans able to use the Arnhem bridge to get tanks and other reinforcements south of the Neder Rijn in 

order to form the defensive screen that in 

the end constituted the greatest delay 

of all. 

Perhaps the most portentous conclusion to be drawn from the failure of 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN was the fact 

that for some time to come there could be 

no major thrust into the heart of Germany. Combined with the kind of 

resistance the Americans had been experiencing at Metz and Aachen, MARKETGARDEN proved that the Germans in the 

West might be down but they were not 

out. 

To many commanders, the outcome 

meant that all efforts now must be turned 

toward opening Antwerp to shipping and 

toward building a reserve of supplies 

sufficient for supporting a major offensive. 

As for settling the great debate of broad 

front versus narrow front, the outcome of 

this operation proved nothing. To some 

partisans, it merely demonstrated that 

Field Marshal Montgomery had been 

wrong in insisting on his drive in the 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

north. To others, it showed that General 

Eisenhower had erred in deciding to advance along a broad front, that when 

committing a strategic reserve a commander should be prepared to support it 

adequately. 

Release of the U. S. Divisions 

Before the two U.S. divisions jumped in 

Operation MARKET, General Eisenhower 

had approved their participation with the 

stipulation that they be released as soon 

as ground forces could pass the positions 

they had seized and occupied. 44 This 

had led to an expectation that at least 

one of the divisions might be released as 

early as forty-eight hours after the jump. 

Nevertheless, when the British Red Devils 

withdrew from north of the Neder Rijn 

to signal the end of the airborne phase, 

both American divisions still were in the 

line. 

The Americans would be sorely needed; 

the Germans would see to that. The 

airborne phase might have ended, but the 

fighting had. not. No lesser person than 

Hitler himself during the night of 24 

September had commanded that the Allied corridor be wiped out with simultaneous attacks from Veghel northward. 

This was imperative, Hitler had warned, 

because the Allies had sufficient units to 

stage additional airborne landings in conjunction with seaborne landings in the 

western or northern parts of the Netherlands, "and perhaps even on German 

soil . . .." Hitler had ordered that 

Student's First Parachute Army be given 

a fresh panzer brigade, an antitank battalion, a battalion of Tiger tanks, and 

• 4 FWD 14764, Eisenhower to comdrs, 13 Sep 

44, in SHAEF SGS 381, I. 

201 

both the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions, 

these last two as soon as they could be 

refitted after their fight with the First U.S. 

Anny at Aachen. 45 

Even though the order came from 

Hitler, it was to encounter tough sledding from the start. Pointing to the 

"total exhaustion" of the forces immediately at his disposal, Field Marshal Model 

promptly notified his superior, Rundstedt, 

that "a simultaneous accomplishment of 

the missions ordered is unfortunately impossible .... " Noting that reinforcement by the 9th and 1 16th Panzer Divisions was but an empty gesture in light of 

the condition of these divisions, Model 

reiterated an earlier plea for genuine 

assistance. In particular, he pleaded for 

the 363d V olks Grenadier Division, a 

fresh unit whose impending availability 

Model had watched covetously for some 

time. 46 

Although subsequently promised the 

363d V olks Grenadier Division, Model 

found his plans to carry out the Hitler 

order hamstrung by delays in troop movements. Not until 29 September could he 

see any chance of launching even a preliminary attack, which involved in effect 

no more than local efforts to gain desired 

lines of departure. In the long run, he 

did intend to carry out an ambitious plan. 

With the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions 

attached, General Bittrich's II SS Panzer 

Corps was to make the main effort against 

Allied forces between the Waal and the 

Neder Rijn. A new corps headquarters, 

the XII SS Corps (Obergruppenfuehrer 

und General der Waffen-SS Curt von 

Gottberg) was slated to command the 

45 Copy of Hitler order, filed at 0500, 25 Sep 

44, in A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 

46 TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 0100, 25 Sep 

44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 
202 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

NIJMEGEN HIGHWAY BRIDGE 

363d Volks Grenadier Division in a supporting attack along General Bittrich's 

west flank. At the same time General 

Meindl's II Parachute Corps was to strike 

from the Reichswald against the high 

ground in the vicinity of Groesbeek, 

while a relatively fresh infantry division of 

the Fifteenth Army launched a supporting 

attack from the west against Grave. 47 

It was, in fact, not until I October that 

the First Parachute Army was able to 

mount any kind of attack other than a few 

47 TWX, A ep B to Fifteenth Army, 1630, 26 

Sep 44, and to First Prcht Army, 0030, 27 Sep 

44, and 1330, 28 Sep 44, A ep B KTB, 

o perationsbefehle. 

local stabs. Even then General Student 

had to attack without either the 9th and 

116th Panzer Divisions, which would require several days more to assemble, or 

the fresh 363d V olks Grenadier Division. 

The latter would not become available 

until the middle of October. 48 

This is not to say that German pressure 

was not keenly felt by the British and 

Americans who had to fight it. Indeed, 

the Germans launched powerful but isolated attacks well into October. By this 

time the 8 and 12 Corps had built up on 

either flank of the Allied corridor in such 

48 Daily Sitreps, A ep B, 0145, 2 Oct 44, and 

0030, 3 Oct 44, A ep B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

strength that the I 0 I st Airborne Division 

could be spared from the defense of 

Veghel to move north of the Waal River 

and reinforce the 30 Corps. Entering 

the line on 5 October in this sector, which 

the men called "the island," General Taylor's division was subjected to intense 

fighting and ever-mounting casualties; 

but in the process the 363d Volks 

Grenadier Division, which Model had 

awaited so eagerly, merely smashed itself 

to pieces and gained no ground to show 

for it. Coincidentally, the 82d Airborne 

Division was successfully repulsing all attempts by the II Parachute Corps to take 

the high ground around Groesbeek.49 

The only real success General Student could report occurred at the 

Ni jmegen bridges over the Waal. On 

two separate days the Germans struck at 

the bridges from the air, once with approximately forty planes, and each time 

scored one hit on the highway bridge. 

Both hits damaged the bridge but failed to 

halt traffic. Before daylight on 29 

September, German swimmers slipped 

through the darkness to place submarine 

charges against buttresses of both the rail 

and road bridges. For a day neither 

bridge could be used, though by I October engineers had repaired the road 

bridge to permit one-way traffic and 

restored it subsequently to full capacity. 

On 9 October General Browning's 

British Airborne Corps headquarters took 

leave of its adopted American divisions to 

return to England. Already the Ist 

49 For the defensive phase of MARKET 

GARDEN, see Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns 

in Holland; F AAA, Operations in Holland; 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 240-

4[; Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous With 

Destiny, pp. 374 ff; and unit journals and after 

action reports of the 82d and IOIst Airborne 

Divisions. 

203 

British Airborne Division and the I st 

Polish Parachute Brigade, both so severely battered that their value in the 

defensive battles was negligible, had left 

the combat zone. Also by this time 

headquarters of both the I2 and 30 Corps 

were in the vicinity of Nijmegen so that 

any need there for General Browning's 

command post had passed. 

By this date, 9 October, the British 

had widened the waist of the corridor to 

about twenty-four miles. Thereupon, the 

I2 Corps assumed responsibility for the 

"island" between the Waal and the N eder 

Rijn in order to free the 30 Corps for a 

projected drive against the Ruhr. Field 

Marshal Montgomery intended to strike 

southeast from Nijmegen in order to clear 

the west bank of the Rhine and the 

western face of the Ruhr and converge 

with a renewal of First Army's push 

against Cologne. 

Even as October drew to an end and 

enemy pressure against the MARKETGARDEN salient diminished, no release 

came for the two U.S. divisions. Like 

the IO I st Airborne Division, part of General Gavin's 82d moved northward onto 

the "island." Here the men huddled in 

shallow foxholes dug no more than three 

feet deep lest\they fill with water seepage. 

In an attempt ~ deceive the Germans into 

believing the Allies planned another thrust 

northward, patrol after patrol probed the 

enemy lines. One patrol, composed of 

six men of the I 0 I st Airborne Division 

under Lt. Hugo Sims, Jr., crossed the 

Neder Rijn and roamed several miles 

behind the German positions for longer 

than twenty-four hours. The patrol returned with thirty-two prisoners.r>o 

50 A colorful account of this· action, entitled 

"The Incredible Patrol," by Cpl. Russ Engel 

appeared in Life Magazine, January [5, [945· 
204 

This practice of keeping the two American divisions in the line long after they 

were to have been released became more 

and more a source of "grave concern" to 

the First Allied Airborne Army commander, General Brereton. "Keeping airborne 

soldiers in the front lines as infantry," 

General Brereton noted, "is a violation of 

the cardinal rules of airborne employment." 51 In protesting their continued 

employment to General Eisenhower, Brereton wrote that unless the divisions were 

withdrawn immediately, he could not 

meet a ready date for a proposed airborne 

operation to assist the 12th Army Group. 

"Further combat," he warned, "will deplete them of trained men beyond replacement capacity." 52 

Reminding Field Marshal Montgomery 

of the conditions under which use of the 

U.S. divisions had been granted, General 

Eisenhower pointed out that the maintenance of the divisions had been based on 

that plan and that he contemplated using 

the two divisions about the middle of 

November. "To enable this to be done," 

he said "at least one of these divisions 

should be released without delay, and the 

second one within a reasonably short time 

thereafter." 53 

This was on 2 October. Yet the days 

and the weeks and more artillery fire and 

more patrolling and more British rations 

and British cigarettes passed, and still the 

Americans stayed in the line. Even the 

British rum ration failed to act as a real 

palliative. 

51 Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 361, 

367-68. 

52 V- 2 5550 , Brereton to Eisenhower, 10 Oct 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

53 FWD 16687 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 2 

Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

To condemn the British for failing to 

give up the divisions is to show no appre~ 

ciation of the manpower problems that 

plagued the 2 I Army Group at the time. 

The British recognized the "accepted 

principle" that, because of specialist 

training and equipment and the difficulty 

of replacing casualties, airborne troops 

should be relieved as soon as possible 

from normal ground operations. The 

British Airborne Corps noted, however, 

"It is also a fact that they cannot be 

released until the major tactical or strategical situation allows them to be spared 

or replaced by other troops." 54 The 

simple fact was that Field Marshal Montgomery had a lot of jobs to do in light 

of the number of men he had to do them 

with. 

Even before creation of the MARKETGARDEN salient, the 2 I Army Group front 

had extended from near Ostend on the 

Channel coast to the boundary with the 

12th Army Group near Hasselt, a distance 

of more than ISO miles. In addition, 

German garrisons in the Channel ports of 

Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkerque had to 

be either annihilated or contained. Upon 

creation of the MARKET-GARDEN salient, 

about 130 miles of front had been added 

to British responsibility, almost double the 

original length. 

The need to hold the salient was obvious. It also was a big assignment that 

occupied most of the Second British Army. 

Neither could the necessity to secure 

the seaward approaches to Antwerp be 

denied. To that task Field Marshal 

Montgomery assigned the First Canadian 

Army, but the Canadians had to assume 

two other major tasks as well: (I) cap54 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns in 

Holland. 
DECISION ON THE GROUND 

ture completely two of the Channel ports 

and contain a third, and ( 2) attack 

northward from the Meuse-Escaut Canal 

both to complement the drive to open 

Antwerp and to relieve the Second Army 

of long frontage on the west flank of the 

MARKET-GARDEN salient. 55 

Still remaining was a task that General 

Eisenhower had assigned jointly to the 2 I 

Army Group and the First U.S. Army and 

had called "the main effort of the present 

phase of operations." 56 This was the 

conquest of the Ruhr. The First Army 

already was preparing to put another 

corps through the West Wall north of 

Aachen, seize Aachen, and renew the 

drive toward the Ruhr. The British 

shared responsibility for the drive on the 

Ruhr. To converge with the First Army 

along the west bank of the Rhine by 

driving southeast from Nijmegen became 

the "major task" of the Second British 

Army. The job would require at least 

two corps. Yet the emphasis on this 

task removed none of the Second Army's 

responsibility for holding the MARKETGARDEN corridor. There could be no 

doubt about it: Field Marshal Montgomery needed men. 

Despite the letter of 2 October urging 

quick release of the American airborne 

divisions, General Eisenhower was not 

unsympathetic to the British manpower 

problem. He knew that British Empire 

troops available in the United Kingdom 

had long since been absorbed and that 

only in reinforcement from the Mediterranean Theater, a long-range project, did 

the British have a hope of strengthening 

r.r. 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-S27, 27 

Sep 44, and Ltr, de Guingand to Smith, 26 Sep 

44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

56 FWD 16181, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

205 

themselves. 57 Even after Montgomery decided in early October that his commitments were too great and enemy strength 

too imposing to permit an immediate drive 

on the Ruhr, General Eisenhower did not 

press the issue of the airborne divisions. 

Though relieved temporarily of the Ruhr 

offensive, the British had to attack westward to help the Canadians open 

Antwerp. General Eisenhower had not 

underestimated the desirability of relieving 

the airborne troops; rather, he saw from 

his vantage point as Supreme Commander 

the more critical need of the 2 I Army 

Group. At a conference with his top 

commanders on I8 October in Brussels, 

he gave tacit approval to the continued 

employment of the two U.S. divisions. 

They were to be released, he said, when 

the Second Army completed its part in 

clearing the approaches to Antwerp.58 

As the fighting went on, figures in the 

day-by-day journal entries of the 82d and 

I 0 I st Airborne Divisions continued to 

rise: D plus 30, D plus 40, D plus 50. 

Then, at last, on I I November, D plus 55, 

the first units of the 82d Airborne Division began to move out of the line. Two 

days later, on D plus 57, the last of 

General Gavin's troops pulled back. 

Still the ordeal did not end for the 

IOIst Airborne Division. Not until 25 

November, 69 days after the first parachutes had blossomed near Zon, did the 

first troops of General Taylor's division 

begin to withdraw. Two days later, on 

27 November, D plus 7 I, the last American paratroopers pulled off the dreaded 

"island" north of the Waal. 

57 Eisenhower, Crusade in 'Europe, p. 328. 

58 Report on Supreme Comdr's Conf, 18 Oct 

44, dtd 22 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. 
206 

The defensive phase had been rough. 

Casualty figures alone would show that. 

In the airborne phase, the 101 st Airborne 

Division had lost 2,1 10 men killed, 

wounded, and missing. In the defensive 

phase, the division lost 1,682. The 82d 

had incurred 1,432 casualties in the first 

phase, 1,912 in the second. The cost of 

each of the two phases was approximately 

the same. 59 

In withdrawing after relief, the American divisions moved back by truck along 

the route of their landings. The Dutch 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

people turned out en masse. In Nijmegen, 

Grave, Veghel, St. Oedenrode, Zon, and 

Eindhoven, the Dutch set up a roar. 

"September I7!" the people shouted. 

"September 1 7 !" 

50 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Abn Opns in 

Holland. Detailed figures follow: 

Killed Wounded Miffing Total 

--------------------

TotaL_______ 685 

82d Abn Div a ___ _ 

IOIst Abn Div ___ _ 

310 

375 

1.396 206 

1.307 ________ _ 

1,912 

1,682 

a Figures for the 82d Airborne Dlvlslon are not available for the 

last six days, past 5 November 1944. 
CHAPTER IX 

The Approaches to Antwerp 

Legend has it that during the era of 

Roman transcendence in Europe, a regional lord by the name of Druon Antigon 

intercepted all ships plying the sixty miles 

of the Schelde estuary from the North Sea 

to the inland port of Antwerp. If the 

sailors refused or could not meet his demands for tribute, he cut off their right 

hands. 

Whether true or not, the legend illustrates a fact that for centuries has 

influenced the use and growth of one of 

Europe's greatest ports. Whoever controls the banks of the Schelde estuary 

controls Antwerp. Plagued by Dutch 

jealousies that found expression in forts 

built along the Schelde, Antwerp did not 

begin until 1863 the modern growth that 

by the eve of World War II had transformed it into a metropolis of some 

273,000 inhabitants. 

Even before the landings in Normandy, 

the Allies had eyed Antwerp covetously. 

While noting that seizure of Le Havre 

would solve some of the problems of supplying Allied armies on the Continent, the 

pre-D-Day planners had predicted that 

"until after the development of Antwerp, 

the availability of port capacity will 

still limit the forces which can be maintained." 1 By the time the Allies had 

broken their confinement in Normandy to 

run footloose across northern France, the 

1 SHAEF Planning Staff draft Post NEPTUNE 

Courses of Action After Capture of the Lodgment 

Area, II, 30 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. 

desire for Antwerp had grown so urgent 

that it had strongly influenced General 

Eisenhower in his decision to put the 

weight of the tottering logistical structure 

temporarily behind the thrust in the 

north. 2 

The decision paid dividends with capture of the city, its wharves and docks 

intact, by British armor on 4 September. 

(See Map 2.) Yet then it became apparent that the Germans intended to hold 

both banks of the Schelde along the 

sixty-mile course to the sea, to usurp the 

role of Druon Antigon. Antwerp was a 

jewel that could not be worn for want of 

a setting. 

Had Field Marshal Mongomery immediately turned the Second British Army 

to clearing the banks of the estuary, the 

seaward approaches to the port well might 

have been opened speedily. But like the 

other Allies in those days of glittering 

triumphs, the British had their eyes focused to the east. Looking anxiously 

toward the possibility of having to fight a 

way across the Maas and the Rhine, the 

2 I Army Group commander wanted to 

force these barriers before the Germans 

could rally to defend them. "I considered it worth while," Montgomery 

wrote after the war, "to employ all our 

resources [to get across the Rhine], at 

the expense of any other undertaking." 3 

2 Report by the Supreme Commander to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff (Washington, 1946), 

p.62. 

3 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 199. 
208 

Having captured Antwerp itself, General Dempsey's Second Army had made 

only a token attempt at opening the 

seaward approaches, an effort the Germans quickly discouraged with a series of 

small-scale counterattacks. Thereupon, 

one of the British corps resumed the chase 

northeastward toward Germany while 

another deployed about Antwerp in order 

to protect the left flank of the advancing 

corps. The Second Army's third corps 

had been left far behind, grounded in 

order to provide transport to move and 

supply the other two. 4 

Leaving Antwerp behind, the Second 

Army thus had embarked on a second 

part of its assigned mission, to "breach the 

sector of the Siegfried Line covering the 

Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr." 5 The 

task of clearing the banks of the Schelde 

eventually would fall to Lt. Gen. Henry 

D. G. Crerar's First Canadian Army, 

which was advancing along the Second 

Army's left flank under orders to clear the 

Channel ports. 

Fanning out to the northeast, the 

Second Army had begun to encounter 

stiffening resistance along the line of the 

Albert Canal, not far from the DutchBelgian border. Nevertheless, by nightfall on 8 September, the British had two 

bridgeheads across the Albert and were 

driving toward the next barrier, the 

Meuse-Escaut Canal. It was on I I 

September that the Guards Armoured 

Division seized the bridge over the MeuseEscaut at De Groote Barrier, south of 

Eindhoven. Two days later other contingents of the Second Army crossed the 

canal fifteen miles to the west near 

Herenthals. Here, with supply lines 

4 Ibid., p. 21 4. 

5 FWD 13765, Eisenhower to Comdrs, 4 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381, I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

twanging, preparations necessary before 

the Second Army could participate in 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN made a pause 

imperative.6 

In the meantime, the First Canadian 

Army had been investing the Channel 

ports, ridding the Pas de Calais of its 

launching sites for the deadly V-I and 

V-2 bombs, and sweeping clear the left 

flank of the Second Army in· the direction 

of Bruges and Ghent. On I September, 

the Canadians had seized Dieppe. On 9 

September, they took Ostend and, on 12 

September, Bruges, only to find that 

northeast of the two cities the Germans 

were preparing to defend the south bank 

of the Schelde estuary. The First Canadian Army's 1st British Corps7 overcame 

all resistance at Le Havre on 12 September, but the port was so badly damaged 

that it was to handle no Allied tonnage 

until 9 October. Although Boulogne 

was the next port scheduled to be taken, 

the attack had to await special assault 

equipment used at Le Havre. Boulogne 

did not fall until 22 September. Of the 

two remammg ports, Dunkerque was 

masked, while Calais, attacked after 

seizure of Boulogne, fell on I October. 8 

Although capture of the Channel ports 

was expected to improve the Allied logis6 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pages 

216-17, provides the tactical story for this period 

between 4 and 13 September. 

7 Most international of all Allied armies in the 

European theater, the First Canadian Army had 

two corps, one primarily Canadian, the other, 

during this phase of the war, primarily British. 

The army also included a Polish armored division, 

a Czechoslovakian armored brigade group, and 

at one time or another Dutch, Belgian, French, 

Norwegian, and American troops. 

8 Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 2 IO-17; 

Charles P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, vol. 

III of the official "History of the Canadian Army 

in the Second World War" (Ottawa: E. 

Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 1960), 323-425. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

tical picture somewhat, none other than 

Le Havre could approach the tonnage 

potentiality of Antwerp. Le Havre itself 

was too far behind the front by the time 

of capture to affect the supply situation 

appreciably. Even with possession of the 

Channel ports, the importance of Antwerp 

to Allied plans could not be minimized. 

While fighting to open the Channel 

ports, the Canadians had neither the 

strength nor supplies to do much about 

Antwerp. On 13 September one Canadian division had sought a bridgehead 

over two parallel canals northeast of 

Bruges (the Leopold Canal and the Canal 

de la Derivation de la Lys) that marked 

the line which the Germans intended to 

hold on the Schelde's south bank, but 

German reaction was so violent and Canadian losses so heavy that the bridgehead 

had to be withdrawn the next day. 

Beginning on 16 September the First 

Canadian Army assumed responsibility for 

Antwerp and its environs. Nevertheless, 

the supply demands of Operation 

MARKET-GARDEN and the battles for 

Boulogne and Calais continued to deny a 

large-scale offensive to open Antwerp. A 

lengthy stretch of the Schelde's south 

bank west and northwest of the city was 

clear as far west as a large inlet known 

as the Braakman, but it was from the 

Braakman to the sea that the Germans 

intended to hold the south bank. North 

of Antwerp the enemy remained perilously 

close to the city. During the night of 20 

September contingents of the First Canadian Army began operations against the 

Albert and Antwerp-Turnhout Canals 

near the city to alleviate this situation 

somewhat. In the bridgehead finally 

established, the Canadians held temporarily to prepare for a contemplated 

advance northwest to seal off the isthmus 

209 

of South Beveland and thereby cut off the 

Germans holding this isthmus and the 

adjoining island of W alcheren. 9 

The Controversy About Antwerp 

Because other responsibilities and the 

strained logistical situation would for some 

time deny unrestricted use of the First 

Canadian Army to open Antwerp, Allied 

plans for clearing the Schelde became 

inextricably tied up through September 

and well into October with Field Marshal 

Montgomery's determination to get a 

bridgehead beyond the Rhine. Though 

recognizing that use of Antwerp was 

"essential to sustain a powerful thrust 

deep into Germany," 10 General Eisenhower had agreed at the conference with 

his commanders in Brussels on I 0 September to defer the Antwerp operation 

while awaiting the outcome of Operation 

MARKET-GARDEN.l1 "The attractive possibility of quickly turning the German 

north flank led me to approve the 

temporary delay in freeing the vital port 

of Antwerp . . .," the Supreme Commander wrote later.12 

Even after blessing MARKET-GARDEN, 

General Eisenhower continued to emphasize the importance of the Belgian port. 

"I consider the use of Antwerp so 

important to future operations," he wrote 

Field Marshal Montgomery on 13 September, "that we are prepared to go a long 

way . k' h k " 13 III rna mg t e attac a success. ' 

On the same day the Supreme Com9 Ibid., pp. 220-21. 

10 FWD 13889, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 5 

Sep 44, Pogue files. 

11 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 306-07. 

12 Report by the Supreme Commander to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, p. 67. 

13 FWD 14758, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 

Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 38 I, I. 
210 

mander issued a new directive in which he 

reiterated both his desire to have the Ruhr 

and his "previously expressed conviction 

that the early winning of deepwater ports 

and improved maintenance facilities in 

our rear are prerequisites to a final all-out 

assault on Germany proper." He continued, "Our port position today is such 

that any stretch of a week or ten days of 

bad Channel weather-a condition that 

grows increasingly probable with the receding summer-would paralyze our activities and make the maintenance of our 

forces even in defensive roles exceedingly 

difficult." 14 

For all the emphasis on the need for 

Antwerp, the Supreme Commander issued 

no dictum calling for a complete halt of 

the drive on the Ruhr in order to ensure 

opening the port. "The general plan 

... ," he wrote, "is to push our forces 

forward to the Rhine, securing bridgeheads over the river, seize the Ruhr and 

concentrate our forces in preparation for 

a final non-stop drive into Germany." 

The 2 I Army Group, which with the 

First U.S. Army was responsible for 

seizing the Ruhr, was "while this is going 

on . . ." to secure either Antwerp or 

Rotterdam as a port and forward baseY 

In response to this directive, Montgomery quickly assured the Supreme 

Commander that he was "arranging to 

develop as early as possible operations 

designed to enable the port of Antwerp to 

be used." He explained that he was 

moving a British infantry division and 

headquarters of the First Canadian Army 

to Antwerp immediately.16 On the same 

14 FWD 14764, Eisenhower to Comdrs, 13 Sep 

44, SHAEF SGS 381 , I. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-205, 14 Sep 

44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

day the Field Marshal issued a new 

directive to his army group. While stating that «Our real objective . . . is the 

Ruhr," he said that "on the way" the 

Allies wanted Antwerp, plus Rotterdam. 

Clearance of the Schelde estuary to open 

Antwerp was to be "first priority" for the 

First Canadian ArmyY 

This matter of opening Antwerp became involved also with the continuing 

debate between General Eisenhower and 

Field Marshal Montgomery over the 

strategy of one thrust in the north as 

opposed to the Supreme Commander's 

"broad front" policy. The temporary accord that had come on this issue upon 

approval of MARKET-GARDEN at Brussels 

on IO September had been short-lived. 

Five days later, on I5 September, General 

Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, 

perhaps with a view to healing it once and 

for all through a process of bloodletting. 

Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate 

Allied goal and said he desired to move 

on the German capital "by the most direct 

and expeditious route, with combined 

U.S.-British forces supported by other 

available forces moving through key centres and occupying strategic areas on the 

flanks, all in one co-ordinated, concerted 

operation." Writing this to his army 

group commanders, he virtually invited 

1721 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-525, 

14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. Italics in the 

original. Capture of Rotterdam was considered 

from time to time but primarily in the event 

Antwerp could not be opened. See SHAEF 

Planning Staff: Relative Priority of Operations 

for the Capture of Rotterdam and Antwerp, 16 

Sep 44, Rapid Capture of Rotterdam, 18 Sep 44, 

and Rapid Capture of the' Antwerp Area, dated 

only September 1944 but probably issued 18 

September 1944, all in SHAEF SGS 38 I, I. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

resumption of the strategy debate by 

asking them to give their reactions.18 

Field Marshal Montgomery seized the 

opportunity to expound his view of one 

thrust in the north by the 2 I Army Group 

plus the First U.S. Army. A cardinal 

principle of his theory was that men and 

supplies should be concentrated on the 

single operation, not frittered away in 

complementary drives. 19 General Bradley, for his part, returned to the pre-DDay view that drives be made both north 

and south of the Ruhr. After seizure of 

the Ruhr, one main spearhead should be 

directed toward Berlin while the other 

armies supported it with simultaneous 

thrusts. 2o 

In announcing his decision, General 

Eisenhower firmly rejected the idea of 

"one single knifelike drive toward Berlin" 

but denied he was considering an advance 

into Germany with all armies moving 

abreast. Instead, he intended, while placing his greatest support behind Montgomery and the First U.S. Army, that the 

Third Army advance in a supporting 

position to prevent concentration of German forces against the main drive and its 

flanks. At this time the Supreme Commander most concisely stated what has 

become known as his "broad front" policy: 

What I do believe is that we must marshal 

our strength up along the western borders 

of Germany, to the Rhine if possible, insure 

adequate maintenance by getting Antwerp 

to working at full blast at the earliest pos18 Eisenhower to A Gp Comdrs, 15 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381, I. 

19 Montgomery to Eisenhower, 18 Sep 44; 

Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-223, 21 Sep 44, 

Pogue files. 

20 Bradley to Eisenhower, 2 I Sep 44, Pogue 

files. A detailed discussion of the strategy debate during this period may be found in Pogue, 

The Supreme Command, Ch. XIV. 

211 

sible moment and then carry out the drive 

you [Montgomery] suggest.21 

This exchange of views, plus Field 

Marshal Montgomery's insistence on putting everything behind the drive in the 

north to the exclusion of the forces in the 

south, led General Eisenhower to 

conclude that he and his chief British 

subordinate were not talking about the 

same thing. Not one but two drives were 

under consideration: one for getting the 

Ruhr, one after getting the Ruhr. At a 

conference with his army group commanders and supply chiefs at Versailles on 

22 September, he tried to clarify the 

matter.22 He asked his commanders to 

make a clear distinction between the final 

drive on Berlin and present operations, 

which aimed at breaching the West Wall 

and seizing the Ruhr. For the second 

drive, he said, he required "general acceptance of the fact that the possession of 

an additional major deepwater port on 

our north flank was an indispensable 

prerequisite for the final drive deep into 

Germany. The envelopment of the Ruhr 

from the north by 21st Army Group, 

supported by 1st Army," he continued, 

"is the main effort of the present phase of 

operations." In addition, the 2 I Army 

Group was to open Antwerp as a matter 

of urgency.23 

As the meeting progressed on 22 September, General Eisenhower approved a 

plan whereby the 2 I Army Group might 

utilize the gains of MARKET-GARDEN and 

the support of the First U.S. Army to 

21 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 20 Sep 44, 

Pogue files. 

22 Montgomery was not present because of 

operational duties connected with MARKETGARDEN but was represented by his chief of staff, 

General de Guingand. 

23 Min, Mtg held at SHAEF Fwd, 22 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381, I. 
212 

envelop the Ruhr from the north. First 

Army support involved assumin,e: responsibility for clearing the great gap which had 

developed west of the Maas River between 

the British right flank and the left flank 

of the XIX U.S. Corps, and, so far as 

current resources might permit, continuing a thrust toward Cologne and Bonn.24 

This plan General Eisenhower sanctioned 

despite a report from the 2 I Army Group 

Chief of Staff, General de Guingand, that 

an attack on Walcheren Island, the most 

formidable German position guarding the 

mouth of the Schelde, could not be 

mounted before 7 October "at the earliest" 

and despite an estimate by the Allied 

naval commander, Admiral Sir Bertram 

H. Ramsey, that somewhere between one 

and three weeks would be required to 

remove the mines from the entrance to 

Antwerp. The port might not be usable 

until about I November. 25 

These decisions of 22 September were 

made at a time when hope still remained 

for the unqualified success of MARKETGARDEN. Once the possibility of holding 

a bridgehead over the Neder Rijn at 

Arnhem and of outflanking the West Wall 

was gone, Field Marshal Montgomery had 

to turn to another plan for getting the 

Ruhr. While agreeing that the opening of 

Antwerp was "absolutely essential" to any 

deep advance into Germany, he proposed 

that he turn his attention for the moment 

to an existing opportunity to destroy the 

enemy forces barring the way to the Ruhr. 

He suggested that while the First Canadian Army cleared the approaches to 

Antwerp, the Second British Army operate 

from Nijmegen against the northwest 

24 Ibid, See also FWD 15510, Eisenhower to 

Bradley, 23 Sep 44, same file. 

25 Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, in 12th A Gp 

371.3, Military Objectives, I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

corner of the Ruhr in conjunction with a 

drive by the First U.S. Army toward 

Cologne. In effect, this was a returnafter a deviation imposed by Operation 

MARKET-GARDEN-to Montgomery's longadvocated plan for capturing the Ruhr 

by a double envelopment.26 

When General Eisenhower, at "first 

hasty glance," approved this plan,27 Field 

Marshal Montgomery issued the necessary 

directive. For the Antwerp phase, he 

emphasized that "The Canadian Army 

will at once develop operations designed 

to enable us to have the free use of the 

port of Antwerp. The early completion 

of these operations is vital." 28 

Without augmentation of the First 

Canadian Army's ground strength and 

logistical support, this actually was little 

more than lip service to the Antwerp 

cause. Dutifully, the Canadians launched 

an operation on 2 October designed to 

push northwest from Antwerp to seal off 

the isthmus of South Beveland, thereby 

setting the stage for a subsequent drive to 

open the Schelde. At the same time they 

were expected to make another drive 

northward along the left flank of the 

MARKET-GARDEN salient to reach the 

south bank of the Maas River, in order 

to release British forces for the drive on 

the Ruhr. A few days later they set out 

to clear the south bank of the estuary. 

Judging from the fighting that developed 

the Canadians would need a long time to 

do the entire complex job of opening 

Antwerp plus clearing the MARKETGARDEN left flank. Likewise, a prelim26 De Guingand to Smith, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF 

SGS 381, II. 

27 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 27 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

28 21 A Gp, Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, 11-527, 

27 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

inary step necessary before the Second 

British Armv could attack toward the 

Ruhr, that of eliminating the Germans 

from the British right and U.S. left flanks 

west of the Maas, failed when U.S. forces 

encountered unyielding resistance. 29 

Faced with four major tasks-opening Antwerp, maintaining the MARKETGARDEN salient, conducting the Ruhr 

offensive, and committing British forces in 

the great gap west of the Maas-Montgomery reported to General Eisenhower at 

the end of the first week in October that 

his forces were insufficient. Much of the 

problem, he intimated, might be solved by 

a change in the existing command situation between the 2 I Army Group and the 

First U.S. Army. This was a return to a 

long-standing tenet of the Field Marshal's 

that for purposes of co-ordination of the 

main thrust in the north, the First Army 

should be under British command.30 

While admitting that the 2 I Army 

Group's commitments were too heavy for 

its resources, General Eisenhower refused 

to agree that the problem had anything to 

do with command. He proposed either 

that U.S. forces relieve the British of some 

responsibility by pushing the 12th Army 

Group boundary northward or that General Bradley transfer two U.S. divisions 

to the British. He agreed that plans for 

a co-ordinated Ruhr offensive be post2V For the First Canadian Army mission, see 2 I 

A Gp, M-527. For the action west of the Maas, 

see below, Chapter X. 

30 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-260, 6 Oct 

44, and M-264, 7 Oct 44, both in Pogue files. 

General Eisenhower consistently refused this request. Because a command change did not 

occur during the period of the Siegfried Line 

Campaign and therefore did not affect First 

Army operations directly, the subject is not considered in detail in this volume. The command 

controversy is discussed at length in Pogue, The 

Supreme Command. 

213 

poned ~ntil more U.S. divisions could 

reach the front. Six of these, he noted, 

were marking time in staging areas on 

the Continent because of lack of transportation and supplies to maintain them 

up front. 31 

Of the two proposals for strengthening 

the 2 I Army Group, Field Marshal Montgomery accepted the second. General 

Bradley thereupon transferred a U.S. 

armored division (the 7th) to British 

command to help clear the great gap 

between British and U.S. forces west of 

the Maas. He also alerted the I04th 

Infantry Division to move from a N ormandy staging area to the vicinity of 

Brussels on 15 October to await any call 

for assistance in the Antwerp fight. 32 

Once the Ruhr offensive was postponed 

and two U.S. divisions became available, 

the way was clear for Montgomery to 

strengthen the First Canadian Army for 

the opening of Antwerp, or at least to 

remove the necessity for the Canadians to 

clear the left flank of the MARKETGARDEN salient. But the British commander still thought the Canadians could 

handle both jobs. On 9 October in a 

directive he said: "The use of Antwerp 

is vital to the Allies in order that we 

can develop our full potential. Therefore the operations to open the port must 

have priority in regard to troops, ammunition, and so on." Yet once again, in the 

matter of an increase in troops, he 

offered no genuine assistance. Still looking ahead to the Ruhr offensive, Montgomery forewent strengthening the First 

Canadian Army substantially by chaining 

31 Eisenhower to 2 I A Gp for Bradley (msg 

undtd but apparently written 8 Oct 44), Pogue 

files. 

32 Bradley to Hodges, 8 Oct 44, in 12th A Gp 

37 I ·3, Military Objectives, 1. 
214 

the Second British Army to two tasks he 

deemed prerequisite to a Ruhr offensive: 

( I ) making "absolutely certain" the 

Nijmegen bridgehead was "firm and 

secure," and (2) clearing the Germans 

from the region west of the Maas. 33 

On the same day that Field Marshal 

Montgomery issued this directive, General 

Eisenhower received a report from the 

Royal Navy that stirred him to action. 

The report apparently climaxed an apprehension that had been growing in the 

Supreme Commander's mind for several 

days, a concern that the 2 I Army Group 

could not open the Schelde estuary while 

at the same time pursuing its other objectives. Unless supplied immediately 

with adequate ammunition stocks, the 

report of the Royal Navy indicated, the 

First Canadian Army would be unable to 

move to open Antwerp until November. 

General Eisenhower promptly placed all 

stress on clearing the banks of the 

Schelde. He warned Field Marshal Montgomery that unless Antwerp were opened 

by the middle of November, Allied 

operations would come to a standstill. 

He declared that "of all our operations on 

our entire front from Switzerland to the 

Channel, I consider Antwerp of first importance, and I believe that the operations 

designed to clear up the entrance require 

your personal attention." 34 

Apparently stung by the implication 

that he was not pushing the attack for 

Antwerp, the 2 I Army Group commander 

promptly denied the Navy's "wild statements." The attack, he said, was already 

under way and going well. In passing, 

he reminded the Supreme Commander 

33 2 I A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-530, 9 

Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

345-61466, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 9 

Oct 44, Pogue files. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

that the Versailles conference of 22 September had listed the attack on the Ruht 

as the main effort of the current phase of 

operations, and that General Eisenhower 

only the day before had declared that the 

first mission of both army groups was 

gaining the Rhine north of Bonn.35 

In reply, General Eisenhower explicitly 

spelled out the pnonty of Antwerp. 

"Let me assure you," he declared in a 

message of 10 October, "that nothing I 

may ever say or write with regard to 

future plans in our advance eastward is 

meant to indicate any lessening of the 

need for Antwerp, which I have always 

held as vital, and which has grown more 

pressing as we enter the bad weather 

period." 36 Three days later, after Field 

Marshal Montgomery again had suggested changes in the command arrangement so that he might have greater 

flexibility in his operations, General 

Eisenhower acted to remove any doubts on 

both Antwerp and command. He declared that the question was not one of 

command but of taking Antwerp. He 

did not know the exact state of the Field 

Marshal's forces, he said, but he knew 

they were rich in supplies as compared 

with U.S. and French units. Because of 

logistical shortages, the need to put 

Antwerp quickly in workable condition 

was pressmg. Field Marshal Sir Alan 

Brooke and General Marshall, British and 

U.S. Army chiefs, had emphasized on a 

recent visit to SHAEF that they shared 

this view. Despite the desire to open 

Antwerp, General Eisenhower said, he had 

approved MARKET-GARDEN. All recent 

experience, however, had pointed to the 

35 M-268, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 9 Oct 

44, Pogue files. 

36 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 10 Oct 44, 

Pogue files. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

great need for opening of the Schelde 

estuary, and he was willing, "as always," 

to give additional U.S. troops and supplies to make that possible. 

General Eisenhower added that the 

operation could involve no question of 

command, "Since everything that can be 

brought in to help, no matter of what 

nationality, belongs to you." Then he 

dealt at length with the subject of command. If, after receiving these views, 

Field Marshal Montgomery still classed 

them as "unsatisfactory," an issue would 

exist which would have to be settled by 

"higher authority." 37 

Even before this message reached the 2 I 

Army Group commander, he apparently 

had concluded that the First U.S. Army 

could not reach the Rhine and thus that 

no reason existed for British forces to 

move alone toward the Ruhr. With the 

assertion that the Antwerp operations 

were to assume "complete priority ... , 

without any qualification whatsoever," he 

had already dispatched "the whole of the 

available offensive power" of the Second 

British Army to help the Canadians speed 

the opening of the port. 38 

After receiving General Eisenhower's 

letter, the Field Marshal assured him that 

"you will hear no more on the subject of 

command from me." He added: 

I have given you my views and you have 

given your answer. I and all of us will 

weigh in one hundred percent to do what 

you want and we will pull it through without a doubt. I have given Antwerp top 

37 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Oct 44, 

Pogue files. For a discussion of the command 

relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery, 

see Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 289-90. 

38 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-532, 16 

Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. See also M-n 

Montgomery to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 44, Pogue 

files. 

215 

priority in all operations in 21 Army Group 

and all energies and efforts will now be 

'ievoted towards opening up the place. 

Your very devoted and loyal subordinate. 39 

The Battle of the Schelde 

Much of the difficulty in clearing the 

approaches to Antwerp rested with terrain. This is the North Sea littoral, 

canal country, much of it below sea level 

and much of it at this time alreadv 

inundated at the personal order of Hitle~ 

in hope of augmenting German defenses. 4o 

( Map 2) The Schelde actuallv is two 

huge mouths, known as the East Schelde 

and the West Schelde, the latter being of 

primary concern as the channel to Antwerp. On the West Schelde's south 

bank the enemy had withdrawn into a 

bastion lying west of the Braakman and 

extending along the south bank to a point 

opposite Zeebrugge on the Channel coast. 

This was to become known, after a minor 

port within the sector, as the Breskens 

Pocket. To protect this pocket on the 

landward side, the Germans had constructed their defensive line behind an 

almost continuous moat formed by the 

Braakman inlet and two canals, the 

Leopold and the Canal de la Derivation 

de la Lys. The West ScheIde's north 

bank is formed by South Beveland, a 

peninsula joined to the mainland by an 

isthmus carrying a road and a railway, 

and, farther to the west, by Walcheren 

Island. About ten miles wide and joined 

to South Beveland only by a narrow 

causeway, this island was heavily fortified. 

So formidable did the Allies c~nsider the 

30 M-281, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 16 

Oct 44, Pogue files. 

40 TWX, Army Group B to Fifteenth Army, 

1830,7 Sep 44, Army Group B, Operationsbefehle. 
THE BATTLE OF THE SCHELDE 

2 October - 8 November 1944 

mrrrmrr mrrrmrr ALLIED FRONT LINE, 2 OCT 

lllillliiiiili ALLIED POSITIONS,S Nov 

• AXIS OF ALLIED ADVANCE 1 DATE INDICATED 

r;::.:.:.:.:., ....... ~ U. 5.104 TH Dlv AXIS OF ADVANCE, DATE INDICATED 

r<&_ ~ GERMAN DIVISION 

MAP 2 

FLOODED AREA 

10 MILES 

~~~~rt-----r--~,-----~I 
£.DUNAY 
218 

defenses that, in the early stages of planning to open Antwerp, General Eisenhower had allotted the First Allied 

Airborne Army to taking Walcheren, 

though this was later canceledY 

Whoever set out to clear the banks of 

the West Schelde also had to face the fact 

that the enemy here was a strong, concentrated force. Here was a main part of 

the Fifteenth Army-once Hitler's "antiinvasion army," which had waited futilely 

for invasion along the Pas de Calais while 

the weaker Seventh Army had absorbed 

the actual blow in Normandy. Although 

some divisions and weapons had been 

detached for use in Normandy, much of 

the Fifteenth Army had continued to 

guard the coast against a feared second, 

and perhaps larger, Allied landing. By 

the time the Germans had hearkened to 

the steadily growing danger of Allied 

spearheads racing across northern France 

and Belgium, it was too late. The swift 

British armored thrust which captured 

Brussels and Antwerp during the first 

days of September had trapped the 

Fifteenth Army against the coast. When 

counterattacks failed to break the British 

cordon, the only way out for the Germans 

la y to the north across the waters of the 

Schelde. 42 

41 Cbl ADSEC (de Guingand) to T AC Hq 

EXFOR (Montgomery), 7 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 

381, 1. Basing their judgment on terrain and 

types of targets, General Brereton, the airborne 

army commander, and Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Trafford Leigh-Mallory, chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, recommended cancellation. 

General Eisenhower canceled the plan on 21 

September 1944. See FWD 15384, Eisenhower 

to Montgomery, 21 Sep 44, same file. 

42 For additional details, see Lucian Heichler, 

German Defense of the Gateway to Antwerp, a 

study prepared to complement this volume and 

filed in OCMH. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

GENERAL VON ZANGEN 

Having left contingents to hold the 

Channel ports, the Fifteenth Army commander, General von Zangen, had been 

withdrawing toward the south bank of the 

Schelde with the bulk of his forces when 

word had come from Hitler himself that 

Walcheren Island was to be held as a 

"fortress," after the manner of the Channel ports, and that a "permanent" bridgehead was to be maintained on the 

Schelde's south bank. 43 As finally formulated, the German plan called for 

General von Zangen to assume command 

of all of the southwestern part of the 

Netherlands III a sector adjacent to 

43 Rads, A Gp B to Fifteenth Army, 1530, 5 

Sep, and 0100, 8 Sep 44, A Gp B, Operationsbelehle. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

General Student's First Parachute Army. 

Leaving an infantry division (the 64th) to 

defend the south bank of the Schelde, 

Zangen was to install another infantry 

division (the 70th) on Walcheren Island 

and a third (the 245th) on the peninsula 

of South Beveland. Because these positions were officially labeled "fortresses," 

the divisions operated through no corps 

headquarters but were directly subordinate to the Fifteenth Army. On the 

mainland, the LXVII Corps under General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer was 

to be responsible for a sector north of 

Antwerp along the west flank of the First 

Parachute Army. General Sponheimer 

was to control three divisions, including 

the 7 I9th Infantry Division, which was in 

sad shape after having constituted the 

west wing of the First Parachute Army 

along the Albert Canal. Another division 

was to act as a Fifteenth Army reserve, 

while another, the 59th Infantry Division 

(General Poppe), was to move to Tilburg 

as Army Group B reserve. As events 

developed, both the 59th Division and the 

245th Division from South Beveland were 

to be shifted against the MARKETGARDEN salient.44 

By 17 September most of these arrangements had been either initiated or completed. In the meantime, General von 

Zangen had been conducting a withdrawal from the south bank of the Schelde 

to Walcheren Island. In the light of 

Allied air superiority, this withdrawal was 

one of the more noteworthy German 

accomplishments during this stage of the 

war. As early as four days after British 

armor had trapped the Fifteenth Army by 

selzmg Antwerp, nearly ten thousand 

44 Details and documentation of these developments may be found in Heichler, German Defense 

of the Gateway to Antwerp. 

219 

Germans already had been ferried across 

the West Schelde from Breskens. By I I 

September Allied air attacks had damaged 

Breskens so severely that daily shipping 

capacity had been cut by 40 percent and 

transport across the three-mile width of 

the estuary was impossible during daylight 

except under the foulest weather conditions. Nevertheless, by 22 September, 

German evacuation was complete. In 

two and a half weeks, the Germans had 

staged a little Dunkerque to the tune of 

more than 86,000 men, more than 600 

artillery pieces, better than 6,000 vehicles, 

over 6,000 horses, and a wealth of miscellaneous materiel. For all the bombs 

and cannon of Allied aircraft, the Germans 

had saved a small army.45 

Completion of the Fifteenth Army's 

withdrawal across the West Schelde left 

the Breskens Pocket on the south bank a 

responsibility of the commander of the 

64th Infantry Division, Generalmajor 

Kurt Eberding. Possessing an infantry 

combat strength of roughly 2,350 men, 

General Eberding also had some 8,650 

support and miscellaneous troops. The 

troops were well supplied with machine 

guns, mortars, and artillery.46 

On the West Schelde's north bank, 

Generalleutnant Wilhelm Daser's 70th 

Infantry Division had an infantry combat 

strength of nearly 7,500, plus some 300 

engineers. These were organized into 

three regiments, two on the island and one 

on South Beveland, the latter after the 

245th Division was shifted eastward 

against the MARKET-GARDEN salient. 

45 Daily Sitreps, A Gp B, 0130, 9 Sep, 0215, 

12 Sep, and, 0135, 23 Sep 44, all in A Gp B, 

Tagesmeldungen. Strength figures from Navy 

Special Staff Knuth as furnished by Historical 

Section (GS), Canadian Army Headquarters. 

46 TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 1500, 23 Sep 

44, A Gp B, Operationsbefehle. 
220 

Some German commanders later were to 

criticize commitment of the 70th Division 

in a strategic spot like Walcheren, for the 

division represented a collection of men 

suffering from ailments of the digestive 

tract. Because of a special diet required, 

the division was nicknamed the White 

Bread DivisionY As if to compensate 

for physical shortcomings of the troops, 

the 70th Division controlled an unusual 

wealth of artillery, some 177 pieces, including 67 fixed naval guns. 48 

Two other German divisions were to 

figurt> prominently in the fighting about 

Antwerp. These were the 346th and 

7 I I th Infantry Divisions of General Sponheimer's LXVII Corps on the mainland 

north of Antwerp. Of the two, the 

346th (Generalleutnant Erich Diestel) 49 

was the stronger with an infantry combat 

strength of somewhat better than 2,400 

men, augmented by an artillery force of 

thirty-eight 105-mm. howitzers. The 

7 I I th Division ( Generalleutnant Josef 

Reichert) was considerably weaker, a 

"static" division which had been badly 

mauled during July and August. In midSeptember, the 71 Ith had only three 

battalions of German infantry and another composed primarily of Armenians 

and remnants of an Ost battalion. The 

division had but nine artillery pieces of 

various calibers. Less prominent roles 

would be played by the 7I9th Infantry 

Division on the LXVII Corps left wing 

and by contingents of the LXXXVIII 

47 MS # B-274, 165. Reserve Division und 

70. In/anterie, Division 1944 Holland (Daser). 

48 Strength figures for all but the 64th Diu are 

from TWX (Weekly Strength Rpt as of 16 Sep 

44), A Gp B to OB WEST, 2400, 22 Sep 44, 

A Gp B, Operationsbe/ehle. 

49 After II October 1944 Generalmajor Walter 

Steinmueller. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Corps, the latter after the left wing of the 

Second British Army got into the fight. 

On the Allied side, the decisive phase 

of the Antwerp operation opened on 2 

October, two weeks before Field Marshal 

Montgomery blessed it with unequivocal 

priority. Because the First Canadian 

Army commander, General Crerar, was 

absent on sick leave, his temporary replacement, Lt. Gen. G. G. Simonds, was 

in charge. General Simonds employed a 

plan previously formulated under General 

Crerar's direction and involving four main 

tasks: ( I) to clear the region north of 

Antwerp and seal off the isthmus to South 

Beveland; ( 2) coincidentally, to reduce 

the Breskens Pocket south of the Schelde; 

then ( 3) to seize South Beveland; and 

finally (4) to reduce Walcheren Island. 

All these tasks were to be accomplished by 

the 2d Canadian Corps. When Field 

Marshal Montgomery assigned the additional task of clearing the region south of 

the Maas River between the Schelde and 

the MARKET-GARDEN salient, General 

Simonds gave the job to the 1st British 

Corps. With the new emphasis on 

Antwerp that came in mid-October, the 

12 Corps of the Second British Army 

assumed part of the latter responsibility. 50 

From a bridgehead across the AntwerpTurnhout Canal northeast of Antwerp, 

the 2d Canadian Division opened the 

decisive phase of the battle of the Schelde 

on 2 October. Against the enemy's 

346th Division, the Canadians attacked 

northwest to seal the isthmus to South 

Beveland. For the first few days the 

Canadian infantry made steady progress, 

but as the drive neared W oensdrecht the 

50 Unless otherwise noted, the story of the First 

Canadian Army operations is based upon Stacey, 

The Canadian Army, pp. 220-30, and Stacey, 

The Victory Campaign. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

stalemate settling over the MARKETGARDEN salient permitted the Germans to 

send reinforcements. At W oensdrecht 

they committed both Colonel von cler 

Heydte's 6th Parachute Regiment and a 

part of Kampfgruppe Chill.51 Not until 

16 October, two weeks after the start of 

the attack, did W oensdrecht fall. 

In the meantime, on 6 October, the zd 

Canadian Corps opened the drive on the 

Breskens Pocket with the 3d Canadian 

Division, moving behind massed flame 

throwers, forcing two crossings of the 

Leopold Canal. Here General Eberding's 

64th Division lay in wait. For three days 

the situation in the Canadian bridgeheads 

was perilous. On 9 October contingents 

of the 3d Canadian Division staged an 

amphibious end run from Terneuzen, but 

not until 14 October, after a few tanks 

got across the canal, did substantial 

progress begin. By mid-October, after 

nearly a fortnight's fighting, about half 

the Breskens Pocket remained in German 

hands. 

This was the situation when on 16 

October Field Marshal Montgomery accorded unqualified support to the battle 

of the Schelde. The net effect was that 

the 12 Corps of the Second British Army 

took over the eastern part of the Canadian 

line to launch a drive from the MARKETGARDEN salient near s' Hertogenbosch to 

sweep the south bank of the Maas River. 

Their line thus shortened, the Canadians 

were to push their right wing forward to 

the Maas in that part of the zone remaining to them between Woensdrecht and 

the British. 

The bitter fight to eliminate the 

Breskens Pocket continued. On 2 I October Breskens finally fell. By the end of 

51 Daily Sitreps, A Gp B, 0045,8 Oct, and 0115, 

13 Oct 44, A Gp B, Tagesmeldungen. 

221 

the month the Canadians had pushed 

General Eberding's remaining troops into 

a water-logged pocket near Zeebrugge 

and on 2 November captured the German 

general. All resistance in the Breskens 

Pocket ended the next day. After almost 

a month of the most costly kind of fighting, the south bank of the West Schelde 

was clear. 

In fulfillment of Field Marshal Montgomery's directive of 16 October, a corps 

of the Second British Army on 22 October 

opened an offensive with four divisions to 

sweep the south bank of the Maas. At 

the same time, the 1st British Corps on 

the right wing of the First Canadian Army 

began to push northward toward the 

Maas. Its right flank thus protected, the 

2 d Canadian Corps was to accelerate 

operations to seize South Beveland and 

Walcheren, thereby to clear the West 

Schelde's north bank. 52 

Making labored but steady progress, the 

Second Army's drive resulted in capture 

of two main objectives, 's Hertogenbosch 

and Tilburg, two and six days, respectively, after the offensive opened. By the 

end of October Second Army patrols 

linked south of the Maas with the right 

flank of the First Canadian Army's 1st 

British Corps. By 5 November the Second Army had cleared its entire zone. 

Unfortunately, inclement weather during 

much of this period had enabled thousands of Germans to escape almost unhindered to the north bank of the Maas. 

Commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir John T. 

Crocker, the First Canadian Army's 1st 

British Corps had been far from idle, even 

during the month between mid-September 

52 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the 

Second British Army's October offensive is based 

on Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 

25 1- 67. 
222 

and mid-October when this corps alone 

had faced the giant task of clearing the 

entire region between South Beveland and 

the MARKET-GARDEN corridor. Before 

the end of September General Crocker's 

troops had pushed north to occupy 

Turnhout and had established a sizable 

bridgehead beyond the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal. By the time the Second 

Army took over part of the zone and 

attacked on 22 October, the 1st British 

Corps had pushed north to the DutchBelgian border. As the Second Army 

joined the offensive, General Crocker's 

corps consisted of one British infantry 

division and two armored divisions, one 

Polish, one Canadian. On 23 October, 

the day after the big drive commenced, 

the corps assumed even more of an international complexion as the I04th U.S. 

Infantry Division began moving into the 

line to help in the drive northward to the 

Maas. 

Baptism of Fire 

Commanded by Maj. Gen. Terry de la 

Mesa Allen, who already had gained renown as commander of the 1st Division in 

North Africa and Sicily, the I04th 

(Timberwolf) Division which entered the 

line on 23 October had never experienced 

combat. Almost two months before, the 

I04th had sailed for Europe but had spent 

most of the interval in a Normandy staging 

area because the logistical situation precluded maintenance of additional units 

up front. The division became one of 

two-one British (the 49th Infantry), one 

American-with which Field Marshal 

Montgomery bolstered the First Canadian 

Army for the battle of the Schelde.53 

Men of the Timberwolf Division assumed responsibility for a sector near the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Dutch-Belgian frontier astride a main 

highway leading northeast from Antwerp 

to Breda, some twenty miles south of the 

Maas River and six miles southwest of a 

German strongpoint in the village of 

Zundert. Here, at the town of Wuestwezel, the troops scarcely had time to 

erase their awe of combat or to become 

familiar with their surroundings-flat, 

pine-studded, water-soaked terrain-before General Crocker ordered that they 

join the corps offensive northward. The 

initial division objective was Zundert. 

The German situation in the sector of 

the 1st British Corps where the I04th 

Division was to operate obviously had 

become almost remediless. The day the 

Allied offensive began, the Commander in 

Chief West, Rundstedt, had admitted as 

much, though somewhat obliquely, in an 

appeal to the German high command. 

"On the occasion of my visit to Fifteenth 

Army," Rundstedt reported, "I was able 

personally to witness the exhaustion of 

the divisions fighting in the penetration 

area. For continuation of the operations 

there-which will decide the use of 

Antwerp harbor-immediate arrival of 

sufficient replacements is of decisive importance . . . ." 54 Four days later, in 

authorizing a withdrawal in front of the 

1st British Corps, Rundstedt warned that 

this move was not to be interpreted "by 

,3 The [04th Division story is based upon 

official unit records; a comprehensive unit history 

by Leo A. Hoegh and Howard J. Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks (Washington: Infantry Journal 

Press, [946), pp. 43-[02; and Lt Oliver J. Kline, 

Action North of Antwerp, in I\inth United States 

Army Operations, Vol. III, Combat in Holland, 

a mimeographed series prepared by the 4th 

Information and Historical Service and filed with 

official :'{inth Army records. 

.H TWX, OB WEST to OKW, [[ [j. 22 Oct 

44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen 2 I.X.-3I.X. 

44· 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

any stretch of the imagination" as foreshadowing a general withdrawal. That, 

he said, "is, and will be out of the 

question." 55 

No amount of forceful language actually could conceal that this authorized 

withdrawal was, in fact, a first step in a 

general withdrawal behind the water barriers to the north. Two days later, 

Rundstedt noted in a report to the high 

command that the Fifteenth Army would 

fight forward of the Maas, "to the last. 

Nonetheless," he added, "it is my duty to 

report that, if the heavy enemy pressure 

continues, we must expect the gradual 

but total destruction of Fifteenth Armyunless its mission is changed." 56 When 

this report reached Hitler, the Fuehrer 

displayed-for him-a remarkably sympathetic acceptance of the facts. Though 

Hitler reiterated that the Fifteenth Army 

must hold well south of the Maas, he as 

much as sanctioned further withdrawals 

by adding, "If new and serious penetrations should result from continued enemy 

attacks, threatening to destroy elements of 

the army, Fifteenth Army will at least 

maintain large bridgeheads south of the 

Maas .... " 57 

Though unaware of these German 

conversations, General Crocker's intelligence staff nevertheless had divined that 

the Germans had no choice but to delay 

in ~uccessive positions. The last in the 

sector of the 1st British Corps no doubt 

would be based upon the little Mark 

River, which runs generally from east to 

west about five miles south of the Maas. 

55 Order, OB WEST to A Gp B, 2145, 26 Oct 

44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen. 

56 Rpt, Rundstedt to Jodi (OKW), 1330, 28 

Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen. 

57 Order, OB WEST to A Gp B (relaying Hitler 

order), 2355, 29 Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/ 

Meldungen. 

223 

This was, in fact, the tack which the 

Fifteenth Army commander, General vori 

Zangen, followed in interpreting Hitler's 

orders as sanction for withdrawing to 

bridgeheads south of the Maas.58 

On a lower level the 104th Division, in 

assuming positions along the AntwerpBreda highway, had occupied a line 

virtually astride the boundary between 

the enemy's 346th and 7 I Ith Divisions. 

The first of the delaying positions the 

104th Division expected to encounter was 

southwest of Zundert almost exactly 

along the Dutch-Belgian border, a position 

manned by an estimated seven understrength infantry battalions. 

Advancing due north with three regiments abreast, General Allen's Timberwolves received their baptism of fire on 25 

October. By nightfall they had pushed 

back stubborn German patrols and outposts almost to the frontier. Continuing 

to advance in the darkness, the men made 

the first in a long procession of night 

attacks that were eventually to give the 

I04th Division something of a name in 

that department. The second day they 

forced the main delaying groups southwest of Zundert to withdraw and by 

daylight on 27 October were set to assault 

the village. 

While two regiments maintained pressure west of the Antwerp-Breda highway, 

the 4 13th Infantry ( Col. Welcome P. 

Waltz) moved dose behind an artillery 

preparation to storm the objective. Supported by attached British Churchill 

tanks, the regiment seized Zundert before 

the end of the day. No longer did men 

of the 104th wonder at the swish of a shell 

58 Rpt, A Gp B to OB WEST, 29 Oct 44, OB 

WEST, Befehle/ M eldungen: British intelligence 

estimates are reflected in lo4th Div, Annex 2, 

Intel Annex to AAR, 23-3 I Oct 44, dtd 5 Nov 44· 
224 

whether it was coming in or going out. 

They knew what it meant to kill men and 

to have their own killed. If a machine 

gun went "br-r-r-r-r-p," it was German; 

if it went "put-put-put," it was one of 

their own. The green division was fast 

becoming experienced. 

The next day, '28 October, the 104th 

Division occupied Rijsbergen, about halfway from Zundert to Breda. That night 

the 415th Infantry (Col. John H. Cochran) launched the second night attack in 

the division's short combat history to 

break another delaying position covering 

the Roosendaal-Breda highway that ran 

diagonally across the division's front about 

seven miles north of Zundert. General 

Allen now was prepared to direct his 

troops either on Breda or to the north and 

northwest against the Mark River. 

Even as Colonel Cochran's 415th Infantry was reaching the Roosendaal-Breda 

road, General Allen was receiving his 

orders. Along with the three other divisions of the corps, which had been advancing generally northward on either 

flank of the Americans, the 104th Division 

was to be reoriented to the northwest to 

force crossings of the Mark. Responsibility for Breda was to fall to the 1st Polish 

Armored Division on the 104th Division's 

right. 

By 30 October, sixth day of the 

offensive, General Allen had concentrated 

his division along the Roosendaal-Breda 

highway. As the day opened, Colonel 

Cochran's 4 15th Infantry spearheaded a 

drive toward the Mark River in quest of 

a crossing near the village of Standdaarbuiten. The 4 14th Infantry ( Col. 

Anthony J. Touart) subsequently was to 

cross and pursue the attack to seize Klundert, almost within sight of the south bank 

of the Maas. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

As the 415th Infantry neared a bridge 

over the Mark at Standdaarbuiten, any 

doubt that this was to be the enemy's 

main position rapidly dissolved. Machine 

gun, mortar, and artillery fire showered 

across from the north bank. Even so, a 

sneak attack by one battalion almost suc-

'ceeded in seizing the bridge intact; only 

at the last moment did the Germans 

blow it. 

Neither the 49th British Infantry Division on the 104th's left flank nor the 1st 

Polish Armored Division on the right had 

yet reached the Mark. Perhaps counting 

on the surprise a quick thrust might 

achieve, the corps commander, General 

Crocker, told General Allen not to wait 

for the other divisions but to force a 

crossing of the river alone before daylight 

the next day. The 4 15th Infantry's 1st 

Battalion, commanded by Maj. Fred E. 

Needham, drew the assignment. 

Crossing northeast of Standdaarbuiten 

just before dawn on 3 I October, men of 

the leading company clung to the sides of 

their assault boats to avoid grazing 

machine gun fire that swept the crossing 

site. Once on the north bank, they 

stormed across an open meadow to gain 

protection along a dike from which they 

might cover the crossing of subsequent 

waves. By 0900 the entire battalion had 

made it and pushed more than a thousand 

yards beyond the river. But here the 

Germans forced a halt. The men could 

advance no farther, and German fire on 

the exposed crossing site denied reinforcement. Enemy shelling severely limited 

use of the battalion's 8 I -mm. mortars 

and frustrated all efforts to keep telephones working. A heavy mist not only 

precluded any use of air support but also 

restricted the effectiveness of counterbattery artillery fires. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 225 

MEN OF THE 104TH DIVISION dig foxholes near Standdaarbuiten. 

Major Needham's men nevertheless 

successfully held their tiny bridgehead 

until late afternoon when the Germans 

stormed the position with infantry supported by six tartks. Firing into individual foxholes, the tanks soon encircled the 

posItIOn. As night came General Crocker 

gave approval to withdraw what was left 

of the battalion. A patrol led by Lt. 

William C. Tufts managed to cross the 

river and break through to the battalion 

to facilitate withdrawal of most of the 

men that were left. Two days later the 

division discovered that sixty-five officers 

and men, unable to withdraw, had hidden 

in buildings and foxholes, subsisted on 

raw beets and turnips, and withstood both 

American shelling and German patrols 

without the loss of a man. 

For the next day and well into 2 

November, the I04th Division held along 

the south bank of the Mark while General 

Allen and the other division commanders 

of the I st British Corps planned with 

General Crocker for a co-ordinated attack. General Crocker's final order directed assaults on the river line by the 

British and Americans at 2 100 on 2 

November while the Poles launched a 

separate attack farther to the east, north 

of Breda. Colonel Waltz's 4I3th Infantry was to cross west of Standdaarbuiten 

with one battalion closely followed by the 

remainder of the regiment. Colonel 
226 

Cochran's 415th Infantry was to send a 

battalion across at Standdaarbuiten and 

another just east of the village. The 

4 14th Infantry was to feign a crossing 

farther east and support the others by fire. 

The 104th Division G-2, Lt. Col. Mark 

S. Plaisted, estimated that within the 

division's boundaries the Germans held 

the north bank with the remnants of nine 

infantry battalions totaling 1,200 to 1,300 

men. Prisoners, he said, had told of the 

arrival of 2'00 replacements three days 

before and of German commanders who 

threatened their troops with force to fight 

to the last. 

For an hour preceding the nighttime 

assault, guns all along the corps front 

ripped into the German line north of the 

river. Sprinkling their volleys liberally 

with lethal timed bursts, artillerymen of 

the I04th Division concentrated much of 

their fire on Standdaarbuiten, believed to 

be a German strongpoint. 

In the left of the division sector, a 

battalion of the 413th Infantry commanded by Lt. Col. Collins Perry made 

the assault. Although the men were 

subjected to small arms fire even as they 

scrambled into their assault boats, they 

stuck to their task. Reaching the far 

shore, they found that only a few yards 

farther they faced a canal almost as wide 

as the Mark. Without hesitation, the 

men plunged into the chill water and 

waded across. Wet to their armpits and 

plagued in the darkness by persistent 

mortar and small arms fire, they nevertheless pushed steadily forward. The rest 

of the regiment followed and set about 

jamming a left hook around to the north 

of Standdaarbuiten. 

A driving force in the advance of 

Colonel Perry's battalion was a weapons 

platoon leader, 1st Lt. Cecil H. Bolton. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Wounded while directing fire of his 

60-mm. mortars on two German machine 

guns, Lieutenant Bolton nevertheless led a 

bazooka team against the positions. He 

charged the first machine gun alone to 

kill the crew with hand grenades. Then 

he led the bazooka team through intense 

fire toward the second gun. They killed 

the three Germans who manned it. 

Lieutenant Bolton later led the bazooka 

team against an enemy 88 and directed fire 

to knock out the gun. He subsequently 

received the Medal of Honor. 

In the meantime, the battalion crossing 

at Standdaarbuiten found that the artillery preparation had taken an awesome 

toll of the village and the enemy positions. 

The men quickly swept through. A few 

hundred yards farther east, another battalion successfully hurdled the river, despite 

machine gun and rifle fire at the crossing 

site, and soon linke,d its bridgehead to 

the others. Shortly after midnight the 

Germans counterattacked with infantry 

supported by four tanks, but the men of 

the 4 15th Infantry were too well established. They dispatched the Germans 

with small arms fire and timely artillery 

support. 

By 0 I 15, 3 November, only slightly 

more than four hours after the infantry 

had begun to cross the Mark, I04th 

Division engineers had constructed a 

treadway bridge near Standdaarbuiten. 

As they began work on a Bailey bridge, 

disturbingly accurate German shellfire began to fall. Before daylight enemy shelling knocked out a section of the treadway 

bridge. Convinced that the Germans had 

an observer in the vicinity, the engineers 

after dawn conducted a thorough search. 

They found a German officer and a 

sergeant hidden beneath the abutment of 

the old bridge directing fire by radio. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

By noon of 3 November a cohesive 

German line along the Mark River obviously had ceased to exist. Hostile artillery fire decreased as the Germans 

apparently withdrew their big guns toward 

their escape route at Moerdijk. Though 

countless strongpoints manned by diehard 

defenders remained to be cleared before 

the south bank of the Maas would be 

free, the British and the Poles had made 

comparable progress on either flank of the 

Americans, so that it could be only a 

question of time before the campaign 

south of the Maas would be over. Across 

the bleak and forbidding marshland and 

across canals and dikes swept by cold 

winds, the pursuit continued. At last the 

weather began to clear and British aircraft 

joined the battle. The Americans found 

close liaison between the British planes 

and air support teams attached to the 

infantry a rewarding experience. 59 

On 4 November the First U.S. Army 

directed that, as soon as released by the 

First Canadian Army, the I04th Division 

was to move to the vicinity of Aachen. 

The next day, when General Crocker assigned the division an additional mission 

of assisting the Polish armor to take 

Moerdi jk, General Allen decided to give 

the task to his division reserve, the 4 14th 

Infantry, while withdrawing the rest of 

the division to prepare for the move to 

Aachen. On 6 November this move 

began. 

Colonel Touart's 414th Infantry maintained pressure on the holdout position at 

Moerdijk until late on 7 November when 

relieved by a British regiment. The Poles 

and the British cleared the last Germans 

from the south bank of the Maas the 

next day, 8 November. 

,,0 Kline, Action North of Antwerp. 

227 

The campaign in the southwestern part 

of the Netherlands had cost the I04th 

Division in its first action almost 1,400 

casualties.60 The division made no estimate of enemy losses but recorded the 

capture of 658 prisoners. Though the 

fighting had been basically unspectacular, 

it had achieved the valuable end of 

establishing a firm and economical northern flank for the 2 I Army Group along 

the south bank of the Maas. 

South Beveland and Walcheren 

By 24 October, only a day after the 

I04th Division first had moved into the 

line, earlier advances of General Crocker's 

I st British Corps already had helped to 

provide a firm base near W oensdrecht for 

operations westward against South Beveland, while progress along the south bank 

of the West Schelde had removed any 

danger of German guns in the Breskens 

Pocket intervening in a fight on South 

BeveIand. That same day the Canadians 

opened a drive to clear the estuary's north 

bank. 

Despite the narrowness of the isthmus, 

a situation accentuated by flooded lowlands off the roads, the Canadians registered an advance of two and a half miles 

the first day. With the help of a British 

brigade that crossed the West ScheIde in 

assault boats from the south bank on 26 

October, they rapidly swept the peninsula. It was a hard fight; for the Germans had on the peninsula four battalions 

of infantry, two battalions of fortress 

troops, and ten batteries of artillery. But 

at last, in congruence with Hitler's 

expressed theory that "Defense of the 

Schelde Estuary is based on the heavy 

GO 179 killed, 856 wounded, 356 missing. 
228 

batteries on Walcheren Island," the 70th 

Division commander, General Daser, withdrew the survivors from South Beveland 

for a last-ditch defense of W alcheren. 61 

By the end of October, South Beveland 

was in Allied hands. 

The worst obstacle to free use of the 

port of Antwerp remained: the island of 

Walcheren. The scene during the Napoleonic era of a disastrous British 

military failure, here a garrison of some 

10,000 men formed around the 70th 

(White Bread) Division awaited the inevitable final fight.62 

Almost a month earlier the Allies had 

launched their first blow against the 70th 

Division by invoking the wrath of the sea 

upon Walcheren Island. Because the 

island is shaped like a saucer and almost 

all the interior lies below sea level, the 

acting First Canadian Army commander, 

General Simonds, had believed that Allied 

bombs could breach the dikes and thereby 

flood most of the island. While German 

G1 Orders, OB WEST to A Gp B, 20 Oct, 2355, 

29 Oct (relaying Hitler order), and 2215, 31 Oct 

44, all in OB WEST, BefehlelMeldungen. 

02 In estimating German units on Walcheren, 

intelligence officers of the First Canadian Army 

drew a chuckle at their own expense. Having 

stated that one of the German battalions consisted of "Americans," the Canadians with tongue 

in cheek sought an explanation in their next 

intelligence summary. "The map has been inspected by a more experienced eye," the second 

summary stated, "and clearly indicat~s that 

'I IIIII Armenl I 28' is the sub-unit in question. 

There are strong indications that this means 

'Armenians.' That there may be elements of 

Americans operating to rearwards of almost any 

German force cannot be denied in the light of 

experience at Argentan and Elbeuf. But that 

they are an integral part of a German training 

division is considered on balance to be unlikely." 

See Incl 5 to VII Corps G-2 Per Rpt I 15, 29 

Oct 44, wherein the VII Corps follows the lead 

of SHAEF in reproducing the discussion "in the 

interests of Allied co-operation and North American unity." 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

movement would be restricted, the Allies 

might use their profusion of amphibious 

vehicles to turn the flood to advantage. 

Although some experts had been dubious, 

on 3 October the experiment had been 

tried. Striking the big Westkapelle dike 

along the western edge of the island, 

bombers of the RAF Bomber Command 

had sent the North Sea rolling through a 

breach eighty yards wide. The next day 

the bombers had returned to widen the 

gap by another hundred yards. Although 

the Germans had tried to stem the flood 

with emergency dikes, gravity and the sea 

had flouted their efforts.63 

The greater portion of the island was 

flooded, but the fact remained that most 

German defenses were on higher ground. 

The main reliance for seizing Walcheren 

rested with seaborne assaults assisted by 

a drive across the causeway from South 

Beveland. During the night of 3 I October the Canadians assailed the narrow 

causeway to gain a tenuous foothold on 

Walcheren, but they could not make it 

stick. On I November British commandos sailed across the West Schelde 

from Breskens to establish a beachhead 

against only moderate resistance near the 

island's southern port of Flushing. By 

nightfall much of Flushing was under 

British control. The same day a seaborne 

force mounted at Ostend launched a 

frontal assault on strong, undamaged 

fortifications near Westkapelle. Tidal 

conditions having dictated a daylight 

assault, the British craft were easy targets 

for the enemy's big coastal guns. Nevertheless, aided by a timely strike by RAF 

Typhoons, the commandos fought their 

way ashore. The fall of the bastion of 

63 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0115, 4 Oct 44, A GP 

B, Tagesmeldungen. 
THE APPROACHES TO ANTWERP 

Walcheren became only a question of 

hard fighting and time. 

On the eastern side of the island, the 

Canadians at last had forced a bridgehead 

across the constricted causeway, but they 

could not expand it. British units took 

over with little more success until on the 

night of 2 November they moved in assault boats south of the causeway to gain 

another foothold on the island. Two days 

later troops in the two bridgeheads linked 

and started westward. 

In the meantime, the British at Flushing 

and at Westkapelle had joined forces on 3 

November. A systematic advance to 

clear all Germans from the island ensued. 

On 6 November the town of Middelburg 

fell and General Daser surrendered. On 

8 November, eight days after the first 

attack, the British reported all organized 

resistance on Walcheren at an end. Meanwhile, on 2 November, North Beveland 

also had fallen. 

The battle to clear the approaches to 

Antwerp was over. Only casualty figures 

could adequately bespeak the bitterness of 

a fight waged under appalling conditions 

of cold, rain, mud, and flood. Between 

I October and 8 November, the First 

Canadian Army-including Canadian, 

British, Polish, Czechoslovakian, French, 

and American troops-had incurred nearly 13,000 casualties. More than 6,000 

of these were Canadians. The Germans 

had lost in prisoners alone more than 

40,000 men. 

Even as the commandos and infantry 

rooted the last resistance from Walcheren 

Island, mine sweeping began on the 

Schelde estuary. Some three weeks later, 

on 28 November, almost three months 

(eighty-five days) after British armor had 

seized Antwerp's wharves and docks intact, the first convoy of Allied ships 

229 

dropped anchor in the port. Antwerp at 

long last was capable of producing for 

the Allied cause. 

Something Beastly zn Antwerp 

Allied ships were free to enter the port, 

yet clearing the approaches to Antwerp 

failed to spell an end to troubles besetting 

the city itself. Indeed, as indicated by 

the date of 14 October on a terse announcement in the intelligence report of a 

British division, Antwerp's troubles overlapped. Noted the report: " ... something beastly fell in Antwerp yesterday."64 

That "something beastly" was a Vbomb, one of two types of long-range 

projectiles which the Germans introduced 

during 1944. Probably as counterpropaganda to Allied use of the letter V for 

Victory, German propagandists named 

these projectiles after the German Vergeltung for vengeance. 65 The first to be 

introduced was the V-I, a pilotless aircraft or flying bomb; the next was the 

V-2, a supersonic rocket. After London, 

Antwerp was the city most seriously 

affected by these weapons.66 

From launching sites in the Netherlands 

and Germany, the Germans bombarded 

Antwerp with V-bombs and rockets all 

through the latter portion of the Siegfried 

Line Campaign and as late as 30 March 

1945. At least 1,214 V-I'S and V-2'S, a 

conservative estimate, struck Antwerp, 

H 7th Br Armd Div Intel Summary 124, 14 

Oct 44, as cited in FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 130, 18 

Oct 44, found in FUSA G-2 T AC Jnl file, 

18-19 Oct 44. 

65 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 140, n. 

37· (;6 For a detailed study of the history and effect 

of the V-weapons upon Allied military operations, see Royce L. Thompson, Military Impact 

of the German V-weapons, 1943-1945, prepared 

in OCMH. 
230 

while another 2,500 exploded in the 

environs. Casualties were high. Some 

2,900 Antwerp civilians were killed and 

another 5,433 seriously injured. Losses 

among Allied military personnel were 734 

killed and 1,078 seriously wounded, a 

total of 1,8 I 2. The most disastrous single 

incident resulting from V-weapon attacks 

either in Antwerp or elsewhere on the 

Continent occurred in Antwerp on 16 

December when a V-2 hit the Rex 

Cinema during a crowded matinee. In 

one blow, 296 soldiers were killed and 194 

seriollsly injured. 

In terms other than casualties, damage 

to military facilities in Antwerp and the 

port was slight, though civilian property 

loss was enormous. Major military losses 

were 2 or more warehouses, temporary 

damage to I lock, and slight damage to 

20 berths. Perhaps the greatest advantage accruing to the Germans from the 

bombardment was a drain upon Allied 

manpower, ordnance, and eCj.uipment occasioned by intricate and heavily manned 

antiaircraft defenses employed about the 

city.6i Although military authorities were 

concerned at times about unrest among 

dock workers and about civilian morale 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

in general, the citizens of Antwerp rallied 

to the challenge much as did the people 

of London. In the end, Allied use of 

Antwerp as a port never was seriously 

impaired by the bombardment. At times 

the port handled an average of 25,000 

tons of supplies per day. 

The third primary target of the Vweapons was the Belgian industrial city of 

Liege. As the First U.S. Army turned 

Liege .into a major supply center, the 

Germans as early as 14 September sited 

their bombs and rockets against the city. 

During the course of the war, Liege was 

hit about 1,086 times, while another 

thousand projectiles exploded nearby. 

Civilian casualties totaled I, 158, while 92 

soldiers were killed and 336 wounded. 

The only major damage to military installations was the loss of a hospital and some 

250,000 gallons of gasoline. As at 

Antwerp, the V-weapons, for all the terror 

of them, proved highly inaccurate and 

never interfered seriously with military 

operations at Liege. 

67 Labeled "Antwerp X," the antiaircraft defense of the city employed 18,000 troops and more 

than 500 antiaircraft guns. 
CHAPTER X 

The Peel Marshes 

Culmination of the fight for Antwerp 

meant that with one exception the front 

of the 2 I Army Group was economical 

and secure. Yet the exception was not 

minor. Until it could be taken care of, 

the British could not launch their longdelayed Ruhr offensive. 

The problem lay in that region west of 

the Maas River between the MARKETGARDEN salient and the 2 I Army Group 

boundary with the XIX U.S. Corps eleven 

miles north of Maastricht. Situated between the British and Americans, this 

region had become a joint problem as 

early as mid-September when the Americans had driven northeastward via Aachen 

and the British had turned northward 

toward Eindhoven, two divergent thrusts 

creating a great gap which would remain 

a threat to the open flanks of both forces 

until somebody got around to closing it. 

As events developed, neither Americans 

nor British were to turn sufficient attention to the gap until the Germans had 

displayed their penchant for exploiting 

oversights and weaknesses of their adversaries. 

First Army Draws the Assignment 

On 22 September-the day when General Hodges authorized postponement of 

the West Wall assault of the XIX Corps, 

when Hodges' entire army went on the 

defensive, and when hope still existed that 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN might succeed-the great gap on the left flank of 

the XIX Corps became not only a threat 

and an annoyance to the First Army but 

also First Army's responsibility. This 

stemmed from the conference of 22 

September at Versailles when General 

Eisenhower and his top commanders had 

noted the magnitude of the 2 I Army 

Group's assignments and decided that the 

British needed help.1 

To strengthen the British and thereby 

facilitate Field Marshal Montgomery's 

proposed new thrust against the Ruhr, 

the commanci-ers agreed to ad just the 

boundary between the two army groups 

northward from the old boundary which 

ran eleven miles north of Maastricht. 

General Bradley's 12th Army Groupmore specifically, the First Army and in 

turn the XIX Corps-was to assume 

responsibility for the major portion of the 

region west of the Maas that had been 

lying fallow in the British zone. At least 

two British divisions thus would be freed 

to move to the MARKET-GARDEN salient, 

the steppingstone for the projected Ruhr 

offensive. To become effective on 25 

September, the new boundary ran northeast from Hasselt through the Belgian 

town of Bree and the Dutch towns of 

Weert, Deurne, and Venray to the Maas 

at Maashees (all-inclusive to the 12th 

Army Group). The detailed location of 

1 Min, Mtg held at SHAEF FWD, 22 Sep 44, 

12th A Gp Military Objectives, 371.3, I; see also, 

Ltr, Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, same file 
232 

the boundary was to be settled by direct 

negotiation between Montgomery and the 

First Army commander, General Hodges, 

while any extension of it beyond Maashees 

was to "depend upon the situation at a 

later date." 2 

The task of the First Army in the Ruhr 

offensive became, for the moment, to clear 

the region west of the Maas while preparing, as far as logistical considerations 

would permit, for a renewal of the push 

toward Cologne. To provide forces for 

the new area of responsibility, General 

Bradley ordered the Third Army to release the 7th Armored Division to the 

First Army and also gave General Hodges 

the 29th Division from the campaign 

recently concluded at Brest. These two 

divisions, Montgomery, Bradley, and 

Hodges agreed at a conference on 24 

September, should be sufficient for clearing the region, whereupon one of the two 

might hold the west bank of the Maas 

while the other jQined the main body of 

the First Army in the drive on Cologne. 

Because Montgomery intended that a 

British corps in a later stage of the Ruhr 

offensive would drive southeast between 

the Maas and the Rhine, the commanders 

foresaw no necessity for extending the 

new boundary east of the Maas beyond 

Maashees. 3 

Despite the expectation that the First 

Army would not have to go beyond the 

Maas in the new sector, General Hodges 

was unhappy with the arrangement. 

Without a firm guarantee that the new 

boundary would not be extended, he 

2 Ltr, Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44; FWD 

15510, Eisenhower to 12th A Gp for Bradley and 

21 A Gp for Montgomery, 23 Sep 44; Min, Mtg 

at SHAEF FWD, 22 Sep 44. All in 12th A Gp 

371.3, Military Objectives, I. 

3 Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 25 Sep 44, 12th 

A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

could visualize a dispersion of his army's 

strength east of the river. Furthermore, 

he had been counting on the 29th Division to protect his own exposed flank, 

most of which lay east of the Maas; but 

use of' the division for this mission now 

obviously would be delayed. 4 

General Hodges apparently took these 

concerns with him on 26 September when 

he conferred with Field Marshal Montgomery and the Second British Army 

commander, General Dempsey, for he 

emerged from the meeting with an 

arrangement that satisfied him. Instead 

of a plan using both the 7th Armored and 

29th Divisions, a plan was approved 

whereby only the armor was to be employed, plus the I 13th Cavalry Group and 

a unit of comparable size provided by the 

British, the 1st Belgian Brigade.5 As for 

the boundary, the British had agreed on a 

line running from Maashees southeast, 

south, and southwest along the Maas 

back to the old boundary eleven miles 

north of Maastricht, thereby giving General Hodges the assurance he wanted 

against having to conduct operations 

4 Sylvan Diary, entries of 24 and 26 Sep 44. 

5 Commanded by Colonel Piron, B. E. M., the 

1st Belgian Brigade had three motorized infantry 

companies (325 men each), a field artillery 

battery, an engineer company, a squadron of 

armored cars, and headquarters, signal, supply, 

and medical personnel. Armed, equipped, and 

supplied by the British, the brigade fought with 

the British in Normandy and participated in the 

liberation of Brussels. Although the Kingdom of 

Belgium subsequently augmented Allied ranks 

with a number of units made up primarily of 

men from the Resistance, the troops of the 1st 

Belgian Brigade were Belgians who had escaped 

to England during and after 1940. See Narrative History by Colonel Mampuys, Directeur 

Superieur du Renseignment et de I'Historique, 

attached to Ltr, 6 Sep 5 I, Maj Count I. G. 

Du Monceau de Bergendal, Attache Militaire et 

de l'Air, Embassy of Belgium, Washington, D.C., 

to OCMH. 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

east of the river. 6 The end result was 

that the First Army was assigned a giant, 

thumb-shaped corridor about sixteen 

miles wide, protruding almost forty miles 

into the British zone west of the Maas. 

The entire corridor encompassed more 

than 500 square miles. 

That the basic objective in creation of 

the corridor, assisting the British· in the 

Ruhr offensive, might have been handled 

with less complexity by attaching American forces to British command and leaving the boundary in its old position eleven 

miles north of Maastricht must have been 

considered. After the war, General Bradley noted three reasons for the unorthodox 

arrangement, all related to the matter of 

supply. First, U.S. supply lines led more 

directly into the region; second, putting 

U.S. troops under British command would 

have complicated the supply picture because of differences in calibers and types 

of weapons; and third, U.S. troops, 

General Bradley had remarked as far 

back as the Tunisian campaign, disliked 

British supplies, particularly British rations.7 

The area which the First Army inherited is featured by the extensive lowlands of De Peel, or the Peel Marshes, a 

vast fen lying in the upper western part 

of the region. Covering some sixty square 

miles between the Maas and Eindhoven, 

the marshes are traversed only by a 

limited road net. They represent an 

obvious military obstacle of great tracts of 

swampland and countless canals. ( Map 

3) By 25 September, when the British 

relinquished control of the sector, the 

corridor was clear as far north as a canal 

several miles within the Netherlands, the 

G Sylvan Diary, entry of 26 Sep 44. 

7Interv with Bradley, 7 Jun 56; Bradley, A 

Soldier's Story, pp. 56-59. 

233 

Nederweert-Wessem Canal which runs 

diagonally across the corridor between 

the town of Nederweert at the southwestern edge of the Peel Marshes and a 

point on the Maas near Wessem, nine 

miles north of the old army group 

boundary. 

In early planning, when it was expected 

that two U.S. divisions would be employed in the corridor, the XIX Corps 

commander, General Corlett, had intended to clear the base of the corridor as 

far north as the Peel Marshes with the 

two divisions, then to dispatch a highly 

mobile force along a narrow neck of 

comparatively high ground between the 

marshes and the Maas to link with the 

British at the north end of the corridor. 8 

But General Hodges, after conferring with 

the British commanders on 26 September, 

had radically altered the plan. Hodges 

directed that the 7th Armored Division 

pass around through the British zone and 

make the main attack southward along 

the narrow neck of land between the 

marshes and the Maas. Coincidentally, 

the I st Belgian Brigade and the I 13th 

Cavalry Group were to launch a secondary thrust from the south. The 29th 

Division thus would be available immediately to hold the north flank of the XIX 

Corps east of the Maas, thereby freeing 

the entire 2d Armored and 30th Divisions 

to break through the West Wall north of 

Aachen and participate in the drive on 

Cologne.9 

So optimistic was General Hodges that 

a combination of the XIX Corps West 

Wall offensive and a renewal of the attack 

8 Memo, CG XIX Corps, to CG FUSA, 26 

Sep 44, XIX Corps Combat Interv file. 

D FUSA, Amendment I, 27· Sep 44, to FUSA 

Ltr of Instrs, 25 Sep 44, FUSA G-2 Jnl file, 

1-3 Oct 44; Sylvan Diary, entry of 26 Sep 44. 
OPERATIONS 

I N THE PEEL MARSHES 

29 September - 3 December 1944 

rrmrmmmmrm 

-••••••• 

~ 

~ 

TmTTTT!'m' 

ALL lED FRONT, 26 SEP 

U.S. AXIS OF ADVANCE 

ALLIED GAINS TO DATES SHOWN 

GERMAN ATTACK, 27-29 Oct 

LIMIT OF GERMAN ADVANCE 

7 ARMD DIV POSITIONS, 29 OCT 

ALLIED FRONT, 3 DEC 

o 5 MILES 

'---'----,'-r--'r-r'-rtl--,---' o 

MAP 3 D Ho1mes, Jr. 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

by the VII Corps would produce a 

breakthrough toward the Rhine that he 

seriously considered the possibility that 

the 7th Armored Division's operation west 

of the Maas might prove, unnecessary, 

Not to be caught unawares should this 

develop, he directed that the 7th Armored 

Division be prepared to jump the Maas 

and drive ea~tward or southeastward to 

complement any breakthrough achieved 

by the bulk of the XIX Corps,lO 

Bowing to his superior's direction, General Corlett issued final orders for the 

Peel Marshes offensive on 28 September. 

The 7th Armored Division was to pass 

through the British zone to positions north 

of the Peel Marshes and attack southeast 

and south through Overloon and Venray 

to clear the west bank of the Maas, 

Because the British had not occupied all 

their zone within the new boundary, the 

first five miles of the 7th Armored Division's route of attack lay within the 

British zone, The I st Belgian Brigade 

was to attack northeast across the Nederweert-Wessem Canal early on 29 September, eventually to link with the 7th 

Armored Division. The Belgians were to 

deny crossings of the Maas in the v~cinity 

of Roermond, six miles northe'!:st of 

Wessem, and were to regulate their advance with that of the I 13th Cavalry 

Group attacking north toward Roermond 

from the vicinity of Sittard along the east 

bank of the Maas. This move by the 

cavalry would tend to soften the angle of 

a gap which still would remain on the left 

flank of the XIX Corps east of the Maas 

even after completion of the Peel Marshes 

offensive.l1 

10 FUSA Ltr of Instrs, 25 Sep 44; Ltr Corlett 

to OCMH, 20 May 56. 

11 XIX Corps FO 27, 28 Sep, and Ltr of Instrs, 

29 Sep, XIX Corps G-3 file, 28-29 Sep 44. 

235 

To the detriment of the Peel Marshes 

operation, the plan to clear the thumb-' 

shaped corridor from the north instead of 

from the wuth and with but one instead 

of two available divisions reflected an 

erroneous impression of the dispositions 

and strength of German forces in the 

corridor. Usually prescient in these matters, the XIX Corps G-2, Col. Washington Platt, had erred notably in this 

instance in his estimate of the enemy. 

Perhaps the error resulted from the fact 

that the XIX Corps had so recently taken 

over the corridor; perhaps the fact that 

the British who had heretofore borne 

responsibility for the corridor had had 

little enemy contact upon which to base 

accurate intelligence information. In any 

event, Colonel Platt estimated that within 

the corridor the Germans had only about 

2,000 to 3,000 troops.12 

In reality, the Germans occupying the 

thumb-shaped corridor were at least 

seven to eight times stronger than Colonel 

Platt estimated. Just as in the other 

sectors of the First Parachute Army, the 

enemy here had increased greatly in 

strength and ability since General Student 

first had assumed command of the army 

three weeks before. Within the corridor 

itself, General Student had the bulk of an 

entire corps, General von Obstfelder's 

LXXXVI Corps. 

On 18 September the LXXXVI Corps 

had assumed command of Colonel 

12 See XIX Corps G-2 Per Rpts for the period 

and Maj Franklin Ferriss, Notes on XIX Corps 

Opns, 28 Jul 44-13 Jan 45, in particular entries 

for 26 through 28 Sep 44. A combat historian 

attached to the XIX Corps, Major Ferriss kept a 

detailed record of XIX Corps operations, field 

orders, and the like, and of his own observations. 

Filed with XIX Corps Combat Intervs. 
236 

Landau's I76th Division and Parachute 

Training Division Erdmann) the latter the 

division which General Student early in 

September had formed around a nucleus 

of three parachute regiments. After an 

initial commitment against the MARKETGARDEN salient at Veghel, Obstfelder had 

gone on the defensive against the 8 British 

Corps, which had driven northward along 

the right flank of the MARKET-GARDEN 

corridor. As September drew to a close, 

the LXXXVI Corps still was defending 

along the east wing of the First Parachute 

Army. The I76th Division was east of 

the Maas near Sittard but would be 

drawn into the battle of the corridor 

because of the I 13th Cavalry Group's 

northward attack toward Roermond. Although the I76th Division had been buffeted unmercifully in the zd U.S. Armored 

Division's mid-September drive toward the 

German border, General von Obstfelder 

was able during the latter third of 

September to replenish the division with 

heterogeneous attachments. By the end 

of the month Colonel Landau was capable 

of a presentable defense against an attack 

in no greater strength than a cavalry 

group could muster. 

Sharing a boundary with the I76th 

Division near the Maas, the Parachute 

Training Division Erdmann held the widest division sector within the LXXXVI 

Corps) a front some twenty-two miles 

long extending along the N ederweertWessem Canal northwestward to include 

about half the Peel Marshes. Had the 

Americans followed their original plan of 

attacking northeastward across the Nederweert-Wessem Canal with two divisions, 

they would have encountered in Division 

Erdmann a unit of creditable strength 

and fighting ability but also a unit hardly 

capable in view of this elongated front of 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

holding the attack of two U.S. divisionsY 

Had these been the only two German 

forces available, the choice of attacking 

along the narrow neck of land between 

the Peel Marshes and the Maas might 

have been a happy one. As it was, 

General von Obstfelder received two additional units only a few days before the 

Americans were to jump off. The first 

was an upgraded training division of 

doubtful ability, the I80th Replacement 

Training Division. This division assumed 

responsibility for the northern half of the 

easily defensible Peel Marshes north of 

and adjacent to Division Erdmann. The 

second unit was Kampfgruppe Walther) 

the combat team of varying composition 

which first had opposed the British in the 

bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut Canal 

and subsequently had cut the MARKETGARDEN corridor north of Veghel. Having failed to maintain severance of the 

corridor, Kampfgruppe Walther had been 

pulled back into the LXXXVI Corps 

sector and reinforced with a strong 

complement of infantry from the I80th 

Division. The major component still was 

the I07th Panzer Brigade) which even 

after fighting against the MARKETGARDEN salient had approximately seven 

Mark IV tanks and twenty Mark V's. 

Though Kampfgruppe Walther probably 

was no stronger than a reinforced U.S. 

regiment, it was a force to be reckoned 

with in constricted terrain.14 

13 Dispositions of German units are from 

TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 1330, 29 Sep 44, 

A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. See Heichler, 

The Germans Opposite XIX Corps. 

14 Records of Kampfgruppe Walther are as 

sketchy for this as for earlier periods. The above 

is based on Strength Rpt, I07th Panzer Brigade, 

I Oct 44, in records of General Inspekteur der 

Panzertruppen, Strength Rpts of Panzer Divs, 

Sep-Oct 44; TWX A Gp B to OB WEST, 1330, 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

Although the mission of the LXXXVI 

Corps was purely defensive, General von 

Obstfelder had specific orders to halt the 

Allies as far to the west as possible. That 

the point of decision in this defense might 

come at the exact spot the Americans had 

chosen for the main effort of their corridor 

campaign was indicated five days before 

the event by the Army Group B commander. "It is particularly important," 

Field Marshal Model said, "to hold the 

areas around Oploo and Deurne .... "15 

Deurne was but a few miles southwest 

of the spot chosen for the 7th Armored 

Division's attack. Oploo was to be the 

point of departure for the attack. 

But these things the Americans did not 

know. Still under the impression that 

only about 3,000 Germans held the entire 

thumb-shaped corridor, the 7th Armored 

Division moved early on 29 September to 

pass through the British zone and reach 

jump-off positions near Oploo. At the 

same time, both the I st Belgian Brigade 

and the I 13th Cavalry Group began to 

attack along the south of the corridor 

toward Roermond. 

Before crossing the Nederweert-Wessem 

Canal, the I st Belgian Brigade had to 

reduce a triangular "bridgehead"· which 

Division Erdmann had clung to about the 

town of W essem near the juncture of the 

canal with the Maas. But even this the 

lightly manned, lightly armed Belgians 

could not accomplish. Although strengthened by attachment of a U.S. tank 

destroyer group, the Belgians could make 

little headway across flat terrain toward 

the canal. By 2 October revised estimates 

of enemy strength in Wessem and beyond 

29 Sep 44; and XIX Corps in tel rpts for the 

period. 

15 Order, A Gp B to First Prcht Army, 1330, 

24 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Operationsbefehle. 

237 

the canal were so discouraging that the 

attack was called off.16 

The I 13th Cavalry Group's coincident 

attack developed in a series of piecemeal 

commitments, primarily because one 

squadron was late in arriving after performing screening duties along the XIX 

Corps south flank. By 4 October, two 

days after operations of the adjacent 

Belgian brigade had bogged down, a special task force had cleared a strip of land 

lying between the Maas and the Juliana 

Canal to a point a few miles beyond the 

interarmy group boundary; an attached 

tank battalion (the 7 44th) had built up 

along a line running northwest from 

Sittard to the point on the Juliana reached 

by the special task force; and other 

contingents of the cavalry and the armor 

clung precariously to a scanty bridgehead 

across the Saeffeler Creek a few miles 

northeast of Sittard. Assisted by numerous small streams and drainage ditches, 

the enemy's I76th Division had offered 

stout resistance all along the line, particularly in the bridgehead beyond the 

Saeffeler. The cavalry lost heavily in 

men and vehicles. Because the group had 

"exhausted the possibilities of successful 

offensive action" with the forces available, 

the commander, Colonel Biddle, asked to 

call off the attack. With its cessation, 

all hope that the main effort by the 7th 

Armored Division in the north might 

benefit from operations in the south came 

to an end.17 

In the meantime, on 30 September, the 

7th Armored Division under Maj. Gen. 

16 For tactical information on 'the 1st Belgian 

Brigade, see XIX Corps G-3 Per Rpts I 15 and 

I 16, 29-30 Sep 44; XIX Corps G-3 Msg files, 

29-30 Sep 44; XIX Corps AAR, Oct 44; and 

Mampuys, Narrative History.· 

17 See II3th Cav Gp AARs, Sep and Oct 44, 

and 29th Div AAR, Oct 44. 
238 

Lindsay McD. Silvester had reached 

jump-off positions southeast of CJploo and 

was prepared to launch the main drive 

aimed at clearing the west bank of the 

Maas.18 Having rushed north straight 

out of the battle line along the Moselle 

River near Metz, General Silvester had 

found little time in which to reorganize 

his troops and replace combat losses. 

Casualties in the Metz fighting, the division's first all-out engagement, had been 

heavy; and in seeking to get the best 

from his units, General Silvester had replaced a number of staff officers and 

subordinate commanders. Including officers killed or wounded as well as those 

summarily relieved, CCB now had its 

fourth commander in a month; CCR, its 

eighth. 

Immediate objectives of the 7th Armored Division were the towns of Vortum, 

close along the Maas, and Overloon, near 

the northeastern edge of the Peel Marshes. 

Hoping to break the main crust of resistance at these points, General Silvester 

intended then to sweep quickly south and 

bypass expected centers of resistance like 

Venray and Venlo. At these two points 

and at Roermond, which was to be taken 

by the Belgians and I 13th Cavalry, the 

Germans had concentrated the meager 

forces they had been able to muster for 

defense of the corridor. Or so General 

Silvester had been informed by those who 

predicted that the enemy had but two to 

three thousand troops in the corridor. 

Attacking in midafternoon of 30 Sep18 The 7th Armored Division first saw combat 

after the opening of the pursuit phase with Third 

Anny's XX Corps. Just before assignment to 

the XIX Corps, the division had helped establish 

a hotly contested bridgehead across the Moselle 

River south of Metz. The story of the Peel 

Marshes offensive is based on: div AARs, Jnls, 

and Jnl files for Sep-Oct 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

tember, the 7th Armored Division encountered terrain that was low, fiat, 

open, sometimes swampy, and dotted with 

patches of scrub pines and oaks. Moving 

on Vortum, a town blocking access to a 

highway paralleling the Maas on the 

division's left wing, a task force of CCB 

(Brig. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck) ran 

almost immediately into a strong German 

line replete with antitank guns, mines, 

panzerfausts, and infantry firmly entrenched. Because drainage ditches and 

marshy ground confined the tanks to the 

roads and because the roads were thickly 

mined, the onus of the attack fell upon 

the dismounted armored infantry. Fortunately, the infantry could call upon an 

ally, the artillery. Although the 7th Armored Division had only one 4.5-inch gun 

battalion attached to reinforce the fires 

of its organic artillery, General Silvester 

could gain additional support from organic guns of a British armored division 

that was in the line farther north. Thus 

on 2 October seven British and American 

artillery battalions co-ordinated their fires 

to deliver 1,500 rounds in a sharp twominute preparation that enabled the task 

force of CCB at last to push into Vortum. 

In the town itself, resistance was spotty; 

but as soon as the armor started southeast along the highway paralleling the 

Maas, once again the Germans stiffened. 

In tM meantime, General Silvester was 

making Ihis main effort against the road 

center of Overloon, southwest of Vortum. 

Col. Dwight A. Rosebaum's CCA attacked the village along secondary roads 

from the north. After pushing back 

German outposts, the armor early on I 

October struck the main defenses. Here 

the main infantry components of Kampfgruppe Walther were bolstered by remnants of a parachute regiment which had 
THE PEEL MARSHES 239 

USING A DRAINAGE DITCH FOR COVER, an infantryman carries a message forward in 

the Peel Marshes area. 

fought with the Kampfgruppe against the 

MARKET-GARDEN salient. 19 Employing 

the tanks of the I07th Panzer Brigade 

primarily in antitank roles from concealed 

positions, the Kampfgruppe was able to 

cover its defensive mine fields with accurate fire that accounted for fourteen 

American tanks.20 The American infantry nevertheless gained several hundred 

yards to approach the outskirts of 

Overloon; here small arms and mortar 

fire supplemented by artillery and Nebelwerfer fire forced a halt. 

19 7th Armd Div 0-2 Per Rpts, 1-2 Oct 44. 

20 Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0145, 2 Oct 44, A 

Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

Resuming the attack at daybreak on the 

third day (2 October) behind a preparation fired by seven battalions of artillery, 

the forces of the 7th Armored Division 

attempting to invest Overloon still could 

not advance. Although the first air 

support of the operation hit the objective 

in early afternoon and reportedly resulted 

in destruction of a German tank, this 

failed to lessen German obstinacy materially. An hour before dark, the enemy 

launched a counterattack, the first in a 

seemingly interminable series that must 

have left the American soldier in his foxhole or tank wondering just which side 

held the initiative. Fortunately none of 
240 

the counterattacks was in strength greater 

than two companies so that with the aid 

of supporting artillery and fighterbombers, the men of CCA and CCB beat 

them off-but not without appreciable 

losses, particularly in tanks. 

Late on 3 October General Silvester 

relieved CCA with CCR (Col. John L. 

Ryan, Jr.). The counterattacks continued. In the intervals, the Americans 

measured their advance in yards. Even 

though the combined efforts of CCA and 

CCR eventually forged an arc about 

Overloon on three sides, the Germans did 

not yield. 

By 5 October the 7th Armored Division 

had been stopped undeniably. For a total 

advance of less than two miles from the 

line of departure, the division had paid 

with the loss of 29 medium tanks, 6 light 

tanks, 43 other vehicles, and an estimated 

452 men. These were not astronomical 

losses for an armored division in a six-day 

engagement, particularly in view of the 

kind of terrain over which the armor 

fought, yet they were, in light of the 

minor advances registered, a cause for 

concern. The 7th Armored Division in 

gaining little more than two miles failed 

even to get out of the British zone into 

the corridor it was supposed to clear. 

As early as the afternoon of 2 October, 

the date of the first of the German counterattacks that eventually were to force 

acceptance of the distasteful fact that the 

7th Armored Division alone could not 

clear the thumb-shaped corridor, General 

Corlett had irretrievably committed the 

main forces of the XIX Corps in an 

assault against the West Wall north of 

Aachen. Thus no reinforcements for the 

secondary effort in the north were available. On 6 October General Hodges 

told General Corlett to call off the 7th 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Armored DIvision's attack.21 

The 7th Armored Division could point 

to no real achievement in terms of clearing of the corridor. Had the division's 

mission been instead to create consternation in German intelligence circles, General Silvester certainly could have claimed 

at least an assist. Indeed, had this been 

the purpose of the Allied commanders at 

Versailles in adopting a boundary creating 

such a cumbersome corridor, someone 

could have taken credit for a coup de 

maitre. For the German G-2'S just 

could not conceive of such an unorthodox 

arrangement. 

The order of battle of the Second British 

and First U.S. Armies [the Army Group B 

G-2 wrote on 2 October] at present is 

obscure in one significant point: We have 

not yet definitely determined whether the 

presence of 7th U.S. Armored Division opposite the right wing of LXXXVI Corps 

indicates a shift of the British-American 

army group boundary to the area eight to 

ten miles south of Nijmegen. If this should 

be so . . . we would then have to expect 

that the enemy will stick to his original plan 

to launch the decisive thrust into the industrial area (the Ruhr) from the area north 

of the Waal and Neder-Rijn [i.e., a projection of the MARKET-GARDEN salient] ; a new, 

major airborne landing must be expected in 

conjunction with such an operation. 

In any event the enemy will continue his 

attacks to widen the present penetration 

area [the MARKET-GARDEN salient] in both 

directions . . . . 

The assumption that the front of the 

American army group has been lengthened 

by 40-50 miles is a contradiction of intelligence reports concerning strong concentrations of forces at Aachen; it appears 

questionable whether the enemy forces [in 

the vicinity of Aachen] are strong enough 

that, in addition to this main effort concentra21 FUSA Ltr of Instrs, 6 Oct, in FUSA G-2 

file, 7-8 Oct 44; Sylvan Diary, entry of 6 Oct 44· 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

tion, they can also take over a sector 

heretofore occupied by the British . . . . 

We must also consider the possibility that 

the intelligence reports concerning the intended offensive via Aachen toward Cologne 

were intentionally planted by the enemy, and 

that in contradiction to them, the Americans 

will shift their main effort to push northeastward from the Sittard sector, and to roll 

up the Maas defense from the south .... 22 

On the date the Army Group B intelligence officer wrote this remarkable treatise, he was wrong in almost every respect. 

The interarmy group boundary had seen 

no genuine shift northward; on this very 

day of 2 October, U.S. forces in the 

Aachen sector had begun a drive designed 

to put the XIX Corps through the West 

Wall, a preliminary to resuming a major 

thrust from Aachen toward Cologne; and 

the British commander, Field Marshal 

Montgomery, had abandoned his intention 

of extending the MARKET-GARDEN salient 

northward in favor of a drive from 

Nijmegen southeastward against the western face of the Ruhr. 

A few days later Montgomery had to 

go a step further and forego all plans for 

an immediate drive on the Ruhr. Indications of enemy strength near Arnhem, 

British responsibilities in the opening of 

Antwerp, and the 7th Armored Division's 

experience with an unyielding enemy at 

Overloon-together these factors proved 

too overwhelming.23 Except for operations to open Antwerp, about all Montgomery could do for the moment was to 

attempt to set the stage for a later drive 

on the Ruhr by eliminating once and for 

all this problem of German holdout west 

of the Maas. 

22 G-2 Rpt, A Gp B, 2 Oct 44, A Gp B KTB, 

Anlagen, Ic/AO .. 

23 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 257. 

241 

In a conference on 8 October, the 

British commander and General Bradley 

agreed to readjust the army group boundary to its former position, thus returning 

the region of the Peel Marshes to the 

British. But the Americans still were to 

have a hand in clearing the sector. To 

General Dempsey's Second British Army 

General Bradley transferred the 7th 

Armored Division and the 1st Belgian 

Brigade, including American attachments. 

The complex situation whereby American 

units under American command had assumed responsibility for clearing a corridor 

running deep into the British zone was 

dissipated. Unfortunately, the problem 

of the Germans in this holdout positioJ) 

west of the Maas could be neither so 

readily nor so happily resolved. 

The British Attempt 

Upon transfer, General Silvester's 7th 

Armored Division came under the 8 

British Corps,commanded by Lt. Gen. 

Sir Richard N. O'Connor. Relieving the 

armor in the Overloon sector with British 

units, General O'Connor directed General 

Silvester to take over an elongated, zigzag 

defensive sector within, west, and south of 

the Peel Marshes. The line ran from the 

vicinity of Deurne southeast along the 

Deurne Canal to Meijel, a town well 

within the confines of the Peel Marshes, 

then southwest along the Noorder Canal 

to Nederweert and southeast along the 

Nederweert-Wessem Canal to the Maas 

near Wessem. Though this front was 

some thirty miles long, defense would be 

facilitated by obstacles like the three 

canals and the limited routes of communication through the marshes. In addition, 

General Silvester had the I st Belgian 

Brigade as an attachment to hold approxi-
242 

mately nine miles of the line along the 

Nederweert-Wessem Canal and the Maas 

River. 

Seeing advance to the Maas as a prerequisite to renewjng a British thrust on 

the Ruhr, Field Marshal Montgomery 

directed an early offensive by O'Connor's 

8 Corps. Using an infantry division (the 

3d), General O'Connor was to seize the 

elusive objective of Overloon and push on 

to Venray, the largest town the Germans 

held in this sector and the most important 

road center. Coincidentally, the 7th U.S. 

Armored Division was to feign an attack 

eastward through the Peel Marshes from 

the vicinity of Deurne. Upon seizing 

Venray, General O'Connor hoped to 

shake loose a British armored division (the 

I I th) to strike along the narrow neck 

between the marshes and the Maas southeastward to Venlo while as yet unidentified forces attacked northeastward to clear 

the southern part of the corridor from 

the vicinity of N ederweert. This offensive by the 8 Corps, Field Marshal 

Montgomery directed during the first week 

of October at a time before he had given 

unequivocal priority to the fight to open 

Antwerp.24 

On 12 October infantry of General 

O'Connor's 8 Corps attacked Overloon 

and just before dark succeeded in entering 

the village. Renewing the attack the next 

day to cover three remaining miles to 

Venray, the British encountered dogged 

opposition like that the Americans had 

faced earlier: extensive mine fields, 

marshes, woods, antitank guns, Nebel24 For the British story during this period, see 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 258, 

260-67, and 269-72. Unless otherwise noted, 

the 7th Armored Division story is based upon 

official unit records and Lt. Robert E. Merriam, 

Battle of the Canals, Ninth United States Army 

Operations, vol. III, Combat in Holland. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

werfer and artillery fire, and tanks cleverly 

employed in antitank roles. Not until 

five days later on 17 October did the 

British finally occupy Venray. 

Any plans General O'Connor might 

have had for exploiting the capture of 

Venray had been negated even before his 

troops took the town. For on 16 October, a day before occupation of Venray, 

Field Marshal Montgomery had issued his 

directive shutting down all offensive operations in the Second Army other than 

those designed to assist the opening of 

Antwerp. Completion of the task of 

clearing the west bank of the Maas had 

to await termination of the battle of the 

Schelde. 

A Spoiling Attack 

For ten days follomng postponement of 

British plans to clear the corridor west of 

the Maas, activity throughout the sector 

was confined to patrol and artillery warfare, except for a small incursion by the 

7th Armored Division's CCB during 19-

22 October across the Deurne Canal along 

a railway running east from Deurne. 

Not until Field Marshal Montgomery 

could complete the onerous tasks on his 

left wing could he again turn attention to 

this annoying holdout position. In the 

meantime, the First U.S. Army became 

heavily engaged in reorganization around 

Aachen in preparation for a new attempt 

to reach the Rhine. 

Where the Allies had to be content to 

file this region for future consideration, 

the Germans did not. Behind the facade 

of patrol clashes and artillery duels, German commanders hit upon a plan designed to exploit their holdout position to 

the fullest. In casting about for a way to 

assist the Fifteenth Army, which was 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

incurring Allied wrath along the ScheIde 

and in southwestern Holland, the' Army 

Group B commander, Field Marshal 

Model, suggested a powerful, raidlike 

armored attack from the Peel Marshes 

into the east flank of the MARKETGARDEN salient. If strong enough, this 

kind of attack might force the British to 

call off their efforts in the southwestern 

part of the Netherlands. 25 

The forces required for this maneuver 

happened to be available. A week before 

Model broached his idea to the Commander in Chief West, Rundstedt, headquarters of the XLVII Panzer Corps 

under General von Luettwitz (former 2d 

Panzer Division commander) had been 

disengaged from the front of Army Group 

G, whose forces sat astride the boundary 

between the 12th and 6th U.S. Army 

Groups. The corps had moved north to 

a position behind the left wing of the 

First Parachute Army, there to conduct 

training and rehabilitation of the 9th 

Panzer and [5th Panzer Grenadier Divisions and to constitute a reserve for Army 

Group B. 26 

By the latter part of October, strength 

of the two divisions under the XLVI I 

Panzer Corps was not inconsiderable, 

Numbering about 11,000 men, the 9th 

Panzer Division had at least 22 Panther 

tanks, 30 I05-mm. and I50-mm. howitzers, and some 178 armored vehicles of 

various types, probably including selfpropelled artillery. The [5th Panzer 

Grenadier Division numbered close to 

25 Tel Conv, OB WEST to A Gp B, 1230, 24 

Oct 44, OB WEST KTB, Anlagen, Be/ehle und 

Meldungen, 2I.X-3I.X,44 (hereafter cited as 

OB WEST KTB, Be/ehle und Meldungen), 

26 MS # B-367, Das XLVII Panzer-Korps im 

Rheinland, 23 nct-5 Dec 44 (Luettwitz). 

243 

13,000 men and had at least I Mark II 

and 6 Mark IV tanks. 27 

Endorsing the Army Group B commander's plan, Rundstedt ordered that the 

XLVII Panzer Corps attack on 27 October with the 9th Panzer Division and 

attachments from the [5th Panzer Grenadier Division, whereupon the rest of the 

panzer grenadiers were to exploit early 

gains of the armor. The attack was to 

strike sparsely manned positions of the 

7th U.S. Armored Division along the 

Deurne Canal and the Noorder Canal 

deep within the Peel Marshes west of 

Venlo. The center of the thrust was to 

be the town of Meijel, near the junction 

of the two canals. Only a limited objective was assigned: to carve a quadrilateral 

bulge into Allied lines six miles deep, 

encompassing about forty-five square 

miles. The deepest point of penetration 

was to be at Asten, northwest of Meijel 

alongside the Bois le Duc Canal. 28 

At 0615 on 27 October, after a week of 

bad weather that had reduced visibility 

almost to zero, the dormant sector within 

the Peel Marshes erupted in a fortyminute artillery preparation. The attack 

that followed came as a "complete surprise." As intelligence officers later were 

to note, the only prior evidence of German 

intentions had come the day before when 

27 Establishing the strength of these divisions is 

difficu1t. Figures given are for 1 November 1944, 

after five days of combat in the Peel Marshes, 

and do not indicate either losses or reinforcements during that period. See Strength Rpt, 

9th pz Diu, 1 Nov 44, General Inspekteur der 

Panzertruppen (OKH), Zustandsberichte-Panzerdivisionen, N ou-Dec 44. Allied estimates of 

German tank strength in the spoiling attack 

ranged from thirty to fifty, See also Lucian 

Heichler, Surprise Attack in the Peel Marshes, 

a MS prepared to complement this volume and 

filed in OCMH. 

28 Rpt, OB WEST to OKW/WFSt, 2200, 25 

Oct 44, OB WEST KTB, Be/ehle und Meldungen. 
244 

observers had detected about 200 infantry 

marching westward at a distance of 

several miles from the front and the night 

before when outposts had reported the 

noise of vehicles and a few tanks moving 

about. 29 Although no relationship between this attack and the enemy's 

December counteroffensive in the Ardennes could be claimed, the former when 

subjected to hindsight looked in many 

respects like a small-scale dress rehearsal 

for the Ardennes. 

The commander of the 9th Panzer Division, Generalmajor Harald Freiherr von 

Elverfeldt, made his first stab a twopronged thrust at Meijel, held only by a 

troop of the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance 

Squadron. Forced from their positions, 

the cavalrymen rallied and with the help 

of another troop of cavalry counterattacked. But to no avail. 

A few miles to the north along the 

Meijel-Deurne highway at Heitrak another armored thrust across the Deurne 

Canal broke the position of another troop 

of cavalrymen. Reacting quickly the 7th 

Armored Division commander, General 

Silvester, got reinforcements of CCR onto 

the Meijel-Deurne highway to deny 

further advance for the moment in the 

direction of Deurne; but another highway 

leading northwest from Meijel out of the 

marshes to Asten still was open. Farther 

southwest, near Nederweert, another German push forced a slight withdrawal by 

another cavalry unit; but here commitment of tank, infantry, and tank destroyer 

reinforcements from CCA stabilized the 

situation by nightfall of the first day. 

Seeking to bolster the 7th Armored 

29 See Annex 2 (Miscellaneous InformationRecent German Attacks) to XIII Corps G-2 Per 

Rpt, 16 Nov 44, citing XIX Corps, 13 Nov 44, 

found in XIII Corps G-3 Jnl file, 14-17 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Division by shortening the division's 

elongated front, the British corps commander, General O'Connor, sent contingents of a British armored division to 

relieve CCB in the bridgehead the 

Americans had won earlier beyond the 

Deurne Canal along a railroad that traverses the marshes. This relief accomplished not long after nightfall on 27 

October, General Silvester had a reserve 

for countering the German threat. He 

promptly ordered the CCB commander, 

General Hasbrouck, to counterattack the 

next morning. 

Early on 28 October, General Silvester 

aimed two counterattacks at Meijel along 

the two highways leading to the town. 

A task force of CCR under Lt. Col. 

Richard D. Chappuis drove southeast 

along the Asten-Meijel road, while General Hasbrouck's CCB pushed southeast 

along the Deurne-Meijel highway. One 

column of CCB branched off to the east 

along a secondary road in an effort to 

recapture a bridge the Germans had used 

in their thrust across the Deurne Canal 

to Heitrak. 

During the night, the Americans soon 

discovered, the 9th Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion had pushed several 

miles northwest from Meijel up the road 

toward Asten, and along the Deurne 

highway the Germans had consolidated 

their forces about Heitrak. At Heitrak, 

the XLVII Panzer Corps commander, 

Luettwitz, had thrown in the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division while shifting the entire 9th Panzer Division to the center and 

south of the zone of penetration near 

N ederweert and toward Asten.3o In the 

face of these developments and marshy 

terrain that denied maneuver off the roads, 

30 Rpt, OB WEST to OKW, 27 Oct 44, OB 

WEST KTB, Befehle und Meldungen. 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

none of the 7th Annored Division's counterthrusts made much headway. 

Early on the third day, 29 October, the 

Germans renewed the attack. A strong 

thrust drove Colonel Chappuis' task force 

back almost half the distance to Asten 

before concentrated artillery fire forced 

the enemy to halt. Two other thrusts, 

one aimed northwest from Heitrak toward 

Deurne, the second along the secondary 

road from the east, forced both columns 

of General Hasbrouck's CCB to fall back 

about half the distance from Meijel to 

Deurne. Trying desperately to make a 

stand at the village of Liese I, the combat 

command eventually had to abandon that 

position as well. The loss of Lie.;;el was 

particularly disturbing, for it opened two 

more roads to serve the Germans. One 

of these led west to Asten. If the Germans launched a quick thrust on Asten, 

they might cut off Colonel Chappuis' 

task force of CCR southeast of that 

village. 

From the German viewpoint, capture of 

Liesel had another connotation. This village was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division's farthest assigned objective along 

the Meijel-Deurne highway; its capture 

emphasized the rapid success the spoiling 

attack had attained. Perhaps equaling 

or surpassing Allied surprise upon the 

opening of the enemy's drive was Gennan 

surprise at the speed and extent of their 

own gains. So impressed was Field Marshal Model that he saw visions of turning 

what had been conceived as a large-scale 

raid into something bigger. As early as 

28 October, the second day of the attack, 

:Yfodel had asked Rundstedt at OB WEST 

to reinforce the XLVII Panzer Corps 

immediately with the 116th Panzer Division and the 388th Volks Artillery Corps.S! 

310B WEST KTB, 28 Oct 44. 

245 

The latter was no minor force: it controlled six artillery battalions totaling 87 

pieces ranging in caliber from 75-mm. 

guns to 2Io-mm. howitzers. 32 

This tract of marshland might have 

seen major Gennan commitments had it 

not been for two related factors. First, 

neither the 116th Panzer Division nor the 

388th Volks Artillery Corps was readily 

at hand. Second, before either could be 

committed, soberer heads than was 

Model's at this time had appraised the 

situation. On 28 October, they noted, 

the 7th Annored Division's counterattacks 

virtually had tied the Germans to their 

first day's gains while "droves" of Allied 

aircraft attacked delicate Gennan communications lines through the Peel Marshes. 

On 29 October, for all the success at 

Liesel and along the Asten road, the 

Americans had resisted stubbornly. The 

Gennans had lost up to thirty tanks. 

Furthermore, noted the OB WEST G-2, 

no indications existed to show that the 

attack had drawn any Allied strength 

from the attacks against the Fifteenth 

Army in the southwestern part of the 

Netherlands.33 

Perceiving that gains thus far were 

ephemeral, Field Marshal von Rundstedt 

called a halt. "Continuation of the 

XLVII Panzer Corps attack no longer 

promises any results worth the employment 

of the forces committed," Rundstedt said. 

"On the contrary, there is great danger 

that 9th and 15th Panzer Divisions [sic] 

will suffer personnel and materiel losses 

which cannot be replaced in the near 

32 Rpt, OB WEST to A Gp B, 25 Oct 44, OB 

WEST KTB, Befehle und Meldungen. 

33 Annex 2 to XIII Corps G-2 Per Rpt, 16 

Nov 44; OB WEST KTB, 28 Oct 44. 
246 

future. Hence the attack will be called 

off . . . ." 34 

Had Rundstedt waited a few more 

hours, he might have spotted an indication 

that the spoiling attack was accomplishing 

its purpose, that it was drawing Allied 

strength away from the Fifteenth Army. 

A British infantry division ( the 15th) 

which had fought in southwestern Holland began relieving the 7th Armored 

Division's CCB at Liesel and CCR southeast of Asten during the night of 29 

October. Noting the early identification 

of two fresh German divisions in the Peel 

Marshes, Field Marshal Montgomery himself had intervened to transfer this 

infantry division. Yet removal of the 

division from the southwestern part of the 

Netherlands was, in reality, no real loss 

there, for the division already had completed its role in the campaign south of 

the Maas. 

Upon arrival of this relief, the 8 Corps 

commander, General O'Connor, directed 

General Silvester to concentrate his 7th 

Armored Division to the southwest about 

Nederweert and Weert. As soon as the 

situation at Meijel could be stabilized, 

the American armor was to attack northeast from Nederweert to restore the 

former line along the northwest bank of 

the Noorder Canal while British infantry 

swept the west bank of the Deurne Canal. 

Arrival of British infantry to block the 

highways to Asten and Deurne and introduction of substantial British artillery reserves brought a sharp end to German 

advances from Meijel. For another day 

the Germans continued to try, for Field 

Marshal Model wrung a concession from 

Rundstedt to permit the attack to continue in order to gain a better defensive 

34 Order, OB WEST to A Gp B, I I 15, 29 Oct 

44, OB WEST KTB. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

line.35 On two days the elusive Luftwaffe 

even attempted a minor comeback, but 

with little success. To strengthen the 

British position further, Field Marshal 

Montgomery shifted to the sector another 

British infantry division (the 53d) that 

had been pinched out of the battle south 

of the Maas. Though the German attack in the end had prompted transfer of 

two British divisions and artillery reinforcement, it had failed to result in any 

diminution of other operations on the 2 I 

Army Group front. This the Germans 

failed to recognize when they belatedlyand wrongly-concluded that their attack 

had accomplished its original purpose.36 

All three combat commands of General 

Silvester's American division were in the 

vicinity of Nederweert and Weert by 

nightfall of 30 October. The front had 

been stabilized both at Nederweert and 

near Meijel. The next day General 

O'Connor narrowed the 7th Armored 

Division's sector even more by bringing in 

a British armored brigade (the 4th) to 

strengthen the I st Belgian Brigade along 

the Nederweert-Wessem Canal and by 

relieving the Belgians from attachment to 

the U.S. division. This left the 7th 

Armored Division responsible only for the 

Nederweert sector. 

While this adjustment was in process, 

General Bradley on 30 October came to 

the 7th Armored Division's headquarters 

and relieved General Silvester of his command, replacing him with the CCB 

commander, General Hasbrouck. The relief, General Silvester believed, was based 

not on the Peel Marshes action but on 

personality conflicts and a misunderstand35 Entry of 29 Ocr 44, OB WEST KTB. 

36 Daily Sitrep, OB WEST to OKW, 30 Oct 

44, OB WEST KTB. 
THE PEEL MARSHES 

ing of the armored division's performance 

in earlier engagements in France. General Bradley wrote later that he had made 

the relief because he had "lost confidence 

in Silvester as a Division Commander." 37 

In the meantime, the Germans also 

were making adjustments. During the 

night of 30 October, the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division withdrew to return to 

its earlier status as Army Group B reserve. 

The 9th Panzer Division disengaged during the first week of November. Also on 

30 October, headquarters of the Fifth 

Panzer Army (General der Panzertruppen 

Hasso von Manteuffel) assumed command of the XLVII Panzer Corps, General von Obstfelder's LXXXVI Corps, 

and Corps Feldt, the last the provisional 

corps that had opposed the 82d U.S. 

Airborne Division at Nijmegen. Thus 

the Germans carved a new army sector 

between the First Parachute and Seventh 

Armies. Command of the Fifteenth and 

First Parachute Armies was unified under 

Army Group Student, a provisional headquarters which subsequently was to be 

upgraded to a third full-fledged army 

group.38 

On the Allied side, plans for a coordinated drive by the British and Americans to clear the Nederweert-Meijel 

sector were changed on the first day of 

November when Field Marshal Montgomery foresaw an end to his campaign in the 

southwestern part of the Netherlands and 

decided to introduce his entire 12 Corps 

on the right flank of the 7th Armored 

Division along the Nederweert-Wessem 

37 Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 2 Nov 44, copy 

in personal papers loaned by General Silvester; 

Ltr, Silvester to OCMH, I May 56; 7th Armd 

Div AAR, Oct-Nov 44. After the war an Army 

court of inquiry upheld General Bradley's action. 

38 See below, Ch. XVI. 

247 

Canal. The 12 Corps then was to drive 

northeast through the thick of the enemv's . 

holdout position west of the Maas to 

Venlo, a first step in British co-operation 

with a new American offensive aimed at 

reaching the Rhine. The 7th Armored 

Division now was to attack alone to clear 

the northwest bank of the N oorder Canal. 

Not until the armor neared Meijel were 

the British to launch their part in the 

attack to take the town. 

Though indications were that the 7th 

Armored Division would meet only about 

a battalion of Germans on the northwest 

bank of the Noorder Canal, it was obvious 

that even an undermanned defender could 

prove tenacious in this kind of terrain. 

The· attack had to move through a corridor only about two miles wide, bounded 

on the southeast by the Noorder Canal 

and on the northwest by De Groote Peel, 

one of the more impenetrable portions of 

the Peel Marshes. The armored division's 

effective strength in medium tanks at this 

time was down to 6S percent, but in any 

case the burden of the fight in this terrain 

would fall on the armored infantry. 

Directing a cautious advance at first, 

the new division commander, General 

Hasbrouck, changed to more aggressive 

tactics when resistance proved light. The 

principal difficulties came from boggy 

ground, mines, and German fire on the 

right flank from the eastern bank of the 

Noorder Canal. On 6 November, as the 

armored division neared its final objective 

just south of Meijel, the British north of 

that village began their attack southward. 

But the 7th Armored Division was not to 

be in on the kill. Late that day General 

Hasbrouck received orders for relief of his 

division and return to the 12th Army 

Group. The Americans' had need of the 
248 

division in a projected renewal of their 

offensive toward the Rhine. The relief 

occurred the next day, 7 November. 

With this change, the Btitish delayed 

the final assault on Meijel to await advance of the 12 Corps northeast from the 

Nederweert-Wessem CanaL The Germans subsequently abandoned Meijel on 

16 November as the 12 Corps threatened 

their rear. The 8 Corps then drove 

southward from Venray while the 12 

Corps continued northeastward on Venlo. 

Not until 3 December, more than two 

months after the first optimistic attempt 

to clear the enemy from west of the Maas 

with a lone American division, did these 

two full corps finally erase the embarTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

rassment of the enemy's holdout. As the 

First U.S. Army had been discovering in 

the meantime in the Huertgen Forest 

southeast of Aachen, the Germans were 

great ones for wringing the utmost advantage from difficult terrain. 

Elsewhere along the 2 I Army Group 

front, the Canadians held their economical 

line along the south bank of the Maas and 

built up strength about Nijmegen, ready 

to help in Field Marshal Montgomery's 

Ruhr offensive. A British corps ( the 

30th) prepared to assist a new American 

offensive by limited operations along the 

American left flank. This general situation was to prevail on the 2 I Army Group 

front until mid-December. 
Hote l Quellenhoff Farwick Park 
PART THREE 

THE BATTLE OF AACHEN 
CHAPTER XI 

A Set Attack Against the West Wall 

The day that had seen the start of 

American activity in the region of the 

Peel Marshes-the day of 22 Septemberwas the same day when the First Army 

commander, General Hodges, had shut 

down almost all offensive operations on 

his front. The last troops withdrew from 

the Wallendorf bridgehead to mark the 

beginning of a lull in operations of the V 

Corps; except for a limited objective attack in the vicinity of the Monschau 

Corridor, the VII Corps quit trying to 

exploit the West Wall penetration southeast of Aachen; and the XIX Corps 

postponed its projected attack against the 

West Wall north of Aachen. A combination of German military renascence, American logistical problems, and a dispersion of 

forces had dictated a pause in First Army 

operations that was to last at least through 

the rest of September. 

First Army Readjusts the Front 

A major reason for the pause was the 

obvious fact that before renewmg the 

drive to the Rhine the First Army had to 

gam greater concentration at critical 

points. Although few American commanders at this time had any genuine 

respect for the tissue-thin formations the 

Germans had thrown in their way, none 

could deny that a push to the Rhine 

would have to be a new operation, preceded by a penetration that could be 

vigorously exploited. 

To help General Hodges concentrate, 

General Bradley sought to reduce the 

width of the First Army front. Into the 

line in the Ardennes-Eifel along the First 

Army's right wing he directed the Ninth 

Army under Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, 

which had recently concluded the campaign at Brest. 

Assuming responsibility for the old V 

Corps zone from the vicinity of St. Vith 

south to a new boundary with the Third 

Army near Echternach, the Ninth Army 

moved into the line during the days of 

transition from September to October. 

General Simpson had no alternative but to 

dig in and defend, for he was not strong 

enough either in men or supplies for an 

offensive. He had but one corps, Maj. 

Gen. Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps, 

which had only two divisions. 

When the Ninth Army arrived, General 

Hodges began to regroup. The point 

where he sought concentration was that 

upon which the army had focused since 

the start of the campaign, the Aachen Gap. 

Having relinquished the bulk of the 

Ardennes-Eifel, General Hodges directed 

the V Corps to take over about fifteen 

miles of front from the south wing of the 

VII Corps in the Monschau-Elsenborn 

sector. He thereby reduced the VII 

Corps zone in the vicinity of Aachen from 

a width of about thirty-five miles to 

twenty. In the XIX Corps zone north of 

Aachen, Hodges made no change. Although the XIX Corps had incurred 
252 

added responsibility in the thumb-shaped 

corridor west of the Maas, General Corlett's zone had been but sixteen miles wide 

originally, and he had received two new 

divisions (the 7th Armored and the 29th) 

to care for the added burden. 

Although the First Army in the process 

of realignment had gained two divisions, 

the army's expanded north flank would 

absorb at least one of these for an indefinite period. Thus the net increase for 

renewing the drive to the Rhine was but 

one division. The more noteworthy gain 

was in reduction of the army front from 

about a hundred miles to sixty. In effecting this reduction, General Hodges had 

relinquished some mileage on his south 

wing and acquired a lesser amount on his 

north wing, so that the army had in effect 

shifted northward. For this reason 

Hodges now changed the corps objectives: 

the XIX Corps from Cologne to Duesseldorf, the VII Corps from Bonn to 

Cologne, and the V Corps from Koblenz 

to Bonn-Remagen.1 

Even after realignment, General Hodges 

still was not ready to renew the offensive 

toward the Rhine. First he had to attend 

to four items of unfinished business. 

On his right wing, to provide a secure 

right flank for the Rhine offensive, General 

Hodges had to take high ground in the 

vicinity of the Monschau Corridor, a task 

that involved clearing the Germaninfested Huertgen Forest. Because the 

northward shift of the V Corps had 

enabled the 9th Division of the VII Corps 

to concentrate opposite the forest, this job 

would fall for a second time to the 9th 

Division. Another task was to capture 

Aachen. This was closely tied up with a 

third problem, putting the XIX Corps 

1 FUSA Ltr of Instrs, 25 Sep, FUSA G-2 Jnl 

file, 1-3 Oct 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

through the West Wall north of Aachen, 

for the XIX Corps had to get through the 

West Wall both to participate in a drive 

to the Rhine and to assist the VII Corps 

in encircling Aachen. The remaining responsibility was that of clearing the Peel 

Marshes. 

The two most urgent tasks, clearing the 

thumb-shaped corridor and putting the 

XIX Corps through the West Wall, 

Hodges determined to undertake simultaneously as soon as the two new divisions 

reached the XIX Corps. While the incoming 7th Armored Division operated 

west of the Maas, the newly acquired 

29th Division was to hold that portion of 

the exposed north flank lying east of the 

Maas. The 30th Division then could 

attack without further delay to penetrate 

the West Wall north of Aachen, while the 

entire 2d Armored Division stood by to 

exploit the penetration. 

Planning the West Wall Assault 

It was no news to the men of the 30th 

Division that they would make the first set 

attack against the West Wall. Through 

successive postponements since reaching 

the German border on 18 September, 

these men had known that eventually 

they must come to grips with the fortifications. From foxholes overlooking the 

little Wurm River, which marked the 

forward reaches of the enemy line in the 

sector between Aachen and Geilenkirchen, 

they had watched and waited. 

The new target date for the 30th Division's assault was I October. Except 

that not one combat command but the 

entire 2d Armored Division was available 

for exploitation, plans for the attack varied little from the original conception. As 

soon as the infantry could pierce the 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 253 

fortified line, the armor was to cross the 

Wurm, assume responsibility for holding 

the corps north flank east of the W urm, 

and drive eastward to seize crossings of 

the Roer River, only nine miles away. 

The infantry, in the meantime, was to 

strike south to link with the VII Corps 

northeast of Aachen near the town of 

Wuerselen, thereby completing the encirclement of Aachen. 

To assist the West Wall assault, the 

29th Division was to make limited objective attacks along the corps north flank 

between Sittard and Geilenkirchen. At 

the same time the right wing regiment of 

the 30th Division, the 120th Infantry, was 

to be prepared to annihilate are-entrant 

"bridgehead" the enemy had maintained 

outside the West Wall at Kerkrade and 

contain the enemy in the pillboxes and 

bunkers behind this "bridgehead." The 

other two regiments of the 30th Division 

were to make the assault upon the 

fortifications. 2 

The 30th Division commander, General 

Hobbs, had chosen to strike the West Wall 

on a narrow front little more than a mile 

wide along the W urm nine miles north of 

Aachen and three miles southwest of 

Geilenkirchen near the villages of Marienberg and Rimburg. (Map II/) Governing the choice was a desire to avoid 

stronger West Wall positions closer to 

Geilenkirchen and dense urban districts 

closer to Aachen. Whereas a rupture of 

the West Wall farther south might bring 

quicker juncture with the VII Corps, 

General Hobbs placed greater emphasis 

upon avoiding urban snares and upon 

picking a site served by good supply 

routes. That the enemy's fresh 183d 

V olks Grenadier Division had entered the 

2 XIX Corps FO 27, 28 Sep, XIX Corps G-3 

file, 28-29 Sep 44. 

line from Rimburg north toward Geilenkirchen apparently had no appreciable 

influence on General Hobbs's selection of 

an assault site, possibly because the XIX 

Corps G-2, Colonel Platt, deemed troops 

of this new division only "of a shade 

higher quality" than those of the 49th 

and 27Sth Divisions, which the XIX Corps 

had manhandled from the Albert Canal to 

the German border.3 

In the period of slightly less than a 

fortnight between the original target 

date and I October, the 30th Division 

launched preparations with a keen appreCIation of the importance and difficulties 

of this first set attack against the West 

Wall. Playing an integral role in the 

preparations was the infantry's sister arm, 

the artillery. On 26 September the artillery was to begin a systematic attempt to 

knock out all pillboxes along the 30th 

Division front, 75 percent of which had 

been plotted by air and ground observers. 

Fires were to increase in intensity until DDay. An impressive total of 26 artillery 

battalions eventually was to participate, 

including artillery of the 2d Armored, 

29th, and 30th Divisions, 4 artillery battalions attached to the 30th Division, 8 

battalions of XIX Corps artillery, and 3 

battalions of First Army artillery. 

A few hours before the attack, the 

artillery was to execute "blackout" missions against enemy antiaircraft guns as 

protection for planes in a preliminary air 

bombardment. Then the artillery was to 

fire counterbattery and finally an intensive neutralization program in the specific 

3 XIX Corps Special Rpt, Breaching the Siegfried Line, a narrative and convenient assimilation of relevant documents, filed with XIX Corps 

AAR, Oct 44; 30th Div G-2 Spot Estimate I I, 

30 Sep, and G-2 Per Rpt, I Oct, 30th Div G-3 

files, I -2 Oct 44. 
254 

assault zone, including a rolling barrage 

in front of the attacking infantry.4 

Expecting originally to have heavy 

bomber support, planners for the air 

phase grandiloquently announced that the 

air strike would include the greatest concentration of planes in close support of 

American ground troops since the "carpet" 

bombing along the St. La-Periers road in 

Normandy. That had involved more 

than 3,300 planes, including more than a 

thousand heavy bombers.5 

Because the 30th Division had been hit 

on two separate occasions when Allied 

bombs fell short in Normandy, few oldtimers in the division could have felt much 

regret when heavy bombers proved unavailable for the West Wall assault and 

participation by air forces proved less 

grandiose than originally conceived. As 

finally determined, the air bombardment 

was to approach the St. La bombing in 

neither bomb tonnage nor number of 

planes. Only 360 mediums (A-20 Havocs and B-26 Marauders) of the IX 

Bombardment Division and 72 fighterbombers (P-38 Lightnings and P-47 

Thunderbolts) of the IX Tactical Air 

Command were to participate. 

Use of mediums rather than heavies 

nevertheless entailed minute planning by 

both air and ground units. Recalling 

with trepidation the holocaust along the 

St. La-Periers road, officers of the 30th 

Division were seriously concerned about 

safety precautions. Their concern grew 

vociferous after 22 September when a 

flight of P-38's that already had begun a 

bomb run before cancellation of the West 

4 Annex 1 to XIX Corps FO 27. 

5 For an account of this action, see Martin 

Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1961 ) . See also Bradley, A S oidier' s 

Story, PP. 337-41, 346-49. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Wall attack on that day dropped four 

napalm bombs within 30th Division lines. 

The bombs destroyed an ammunition 

dmnp and six vehicles, injured four men, 

and killed two. 6 

General Hcibbs and his staff wanted the 

bomb run made over enemy territory 

parallel to the Wurm River and the division front in order to ensure that inadvertent shorts would not strike friendly 

troops. Basing their judgment on prevailing wind conditions and a heavy belt of 

enemy flak, air officers wanted to make a 

perpendicular approach. As many men 

in the 30th Division remembered, insistence upon a perpendicular approach had 

contributed directly to the disaster in 

Normandy. One of three American divisions hit, the 30th Division had lost to 

American bombs seventy-five men killed 

and 505 wounded. For the West Wall 

operation, General Hobbs was protesting 

the perpendicular approach almost until 

the very moment the planes appeared in 

the sky above his command post. 7 

Most commanders in the 30th Division 

also wanted to mark target areas with 

smoke, but on the theory that smoke 

might obscure the targets, air officers refused. It is possible that the airmen were 

concerned lest wind blow the smoke back 

on friendly lines and thus precipitate 

another short bombing. As finally determined smoke was to be used only to mark 

targets for dive bombers. 8 

6 Msg, Hobbs to Corlett, 22 Sep, XIX Corps 

G-3 file, 22 Sep 44. 

7 Note telephone conversations recorded in 

30th Div G-3 file, 1 Oct 44. A detailed explanation of the Air Force view in this instance may 

be found in Roswell King, Comments on the 

Medium Bombardment Effort to Support the 

30th Division, OCMH files. King was an air 

officer participating in this operation. 

8 Note Msgs 5, 6, and 7, 30th Div G-3 Jnl, 

1 Oct 44. 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 255 

To initiate the attack, artillery units 

were to concentrate on antiaircraft blackout missions for twenty minutes before 

arrival of the first flights of medium 

bombers. The Havocs and Marauders 

were to saturate village road centers and 

logical locations for enemy command posts 

and reserves along the periphery of an arc 

approximately four miles beyond the 

Wurm. The next flights of mediums 

were to carpet an oblong sector, beginning 

a thousand yards east of the W urm and 

extending east two miles, in which lay 

numerous pillboxes and bunkers, a German cantonment, several villages, and all 

the first objectives of the two assault 

regiments. About an hour after the start 

of the mediums' strike, fighter-bombers 

using napalm were to pinpoint specific 

targets among the pillboxes for half an 

hour before H-Hour. Artillery was to 

continue to fire during the saturation 

bombing but as a safety precaution for 

the low-flying fighters was to cease during 

the dive bombing. Shelling was to recommence at H-Hour as the foot troops 

crossed a line approximately a thousand 

yards west of the Wurm, a line representing both the line of departure and the 

no-advance line during the bombing. 9 

While plans progressed for supporting 

the attack with planes and artillery, infantry, tank, and engineer units prepared 

for the ground phase. 

Patrols probing the front along the 

Wurm brought back information that materially affected planning. One patrol, 

for example, revealed that mapmakers had 

dignified the Wurm in calling it a river, 

9 XIX Corps, Notes on Air Strike, 28 Sep, XIX 

Corps G-3 file, 28 Sep 44; 30th Div, Notes on 

Air Strike, 30th Div G--3 file, 28-30 Sep 44; 30th 

Div, Revised Air Plan, Annex 2 to FO 42, 29 

Sep, XIX Corps G-3 file, 30 Sep 44. 

for in reality it is but 2 to 4 feet deep and 

15 to 18 feet wide. This prompted acceptance of a plan to substitute duckboard 

footbridges for assault boats m the 

crossing. Another patrol discovered a 

concealed route of approach to the Wurm 

which a rifle company subsequently was 

to use to marked advantage. In at least 

two instances, patrols crept into the 

fortified belt to place demolitions in the 

firing apertures of pillboxes. These and 

other patrols determined that the Germans 

held no positions west of the Wurm other 

than outposts in Marienberg and Rimburg and that east of the Wurm the 

enemy's forward outposts were usually a 

few hundred yards back from the river 

along a railroad. This railroad, the men 

reported, was an effective antitank obstacle. Through the length of the attack 

zone it ran a course of either deep cuts or 

high fills.lO 

While awaiting D Day, the regiments 

rotated their battalions in the line, so that 

all might undergo refresher training in 

fundamental tactics, in assault of pillboxes, and in co-ordination with armor. 

No one could deny the need for this 

trammg: in one battalion, for example, 

only one man remained after four months 

of warfare who had any experience in 

operating a flame thrower. One regiment 

found a satisfactory training substitute for 

the W urm in a stagnant stream; the other 

regiment had to call upon the power of 

imagination to create a river out of a 

rear-area road. Officers of the battalion 

which was to spearhead the I 17th Infantry's assault improvised a sand table 

10 Extensive combat interviews supplement official records of the 30th Division and attached 

units for this period. See also XIX Corps 

Special Rpt, Breaching the Siegfried Line, and 

Ltr, Hobbs to OCMH, 26 Dec 53. 
256 

PRACTICING FLAME THROWER TECHNIQUE for reducing pillboxes. 

and reconstructed the terrain to the regiment's front. From the sand table the 

two assault companies learned their re5pective roles in detail, while the reserve 

company memorized both roles in event of 

having to take over from either of the 

other companies. Tankers and engineers 

constructed expedient bridges out of metal 

culverts encased in logs, bound together, 

and placed on a sled which a tank might 

pull to the river and a tank dozer shove 

into the stream. In experiments conducted behind the lines, these expedients 

-which the men called "culverts"-

worked satisfactorily. To supplement the 

culverts, the tankers planned to throw log 

mats into the stream to form a base for 

fords. 

Faced with a dual obstacle like the 

Wurm and the West Wall, the regimental 

commanders tried to avoid any complexity 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

in their attack plans. Both chose a 

simple column-of-battalions formation. 

On the left (north), the I I7th Infantry 

(Colonel Johnson) was to cross the W urm 

just south of Marienberg to gain a foothold within a single band of pillboxes 

several hundred yards east of the railroad 

on the eastern slope of the W urm valley. 

The line of pillboxes followed a road 

which runs from Palenberg, a coal-mining 

town just across the river from Marienberg, south and southwest to Rimburg 

Castle, lying east of the W urm opposite 

Rimburg. Although other pillboxes in 

occasional clusters extended east to give 

the West Wall in this sector a depth of 

about a mile and a half, seizure of the 

forward band would mean a rupture in 

the outer crust of the fortified belt. The 

slopes beyond the W urm are gentle like 

those west of the river, affording the 

enemy little advantage in observation except that inherent to a defender over an 

attacker and that provided by slag piles 

east of Palenberg. 

With a foothold within the West Wall 

assured, the I I7th Infantry was to fan out 

in two directions, northeast through the 

fringes of Palenberg to occupy high 

ground and anchor the northern flank of 

the bridgehead, and east through the 

town of Uebach to gently sloping high 

ground between Uebach and the village 

of Beggendorf. This eastward push was 

designed to sever a north-south highway 

that conceivably might serve the enemy as 

an artery of lateral communications. 

The I I9th Infantry (Colonel Sutherland) was in the meantime to have sent a 

battalion across the Wurm at Rimburg 

and through the first band of pillboxes to 

occupy a crossroads on the eastern crest 

of the valley just no'rthwest of the village 

of Herbach. This would provide the 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 257 

regiment firm footing for subsequent attacks to expand the bridgehead toward 

the southeast in the direction the 30th 

Division eventually was to take in order 

to link with the VII Corps near Aachen. 

Of the two regimental assault sectors, 

the I 19th Infantry's would prove the 

more difficult. Between the river and 

the railroad, the I 19th Infantry had to 

traverse a wider space of flatland before 

reaching the railroad embankment. At 

the northern edge of this flatland, the 

Rimburg Castle, encircled by a moat, 

afforded the enemy a strong outpost position. The pillboxes themselves were more 

difficult to locate in the I 19th Infantry's 

sector, because a dense woods 300 to 500 

yards deep concealed the defenses. To 

overcome these obstacles, the regimental 

commander, Colonel Sutherland, had to 

trust in the hope that the culverts tankers 

and engineers had developed would enable tanks to cross the river soon after the 

assault began. But concern that soft, 

muddy ground in the Wurm valley might 

stop the tanks grew as the sun failed to 

break through rain clouds for twelve days 

preceding the target date. 

Few commanders failed to recognize the 

obvious fact that the delay in assaulting 

the West Wall afforded the Germans an 

opportunity to man their fortifications and 

procure reserves. On the other hand, the 

preparations by planes and artillery and 

the additional troops provided by availability of the entire 2d Armored Division 

might offset this advantage. 

At the end of September General Corlett's G-2, Colonel Platt, estimated that 

from Geilenkirchen south to the corps 

boundary near Aachen, the Germans were 

manning the line with seven battalions of 

about 450 men each. From Geilenkirchen to Rimburg were two battalions 

of the 183d Volks Grenadier Division's 

330th Regiment. South from Rimburg, 

five battalions, Colonel Platt calculated, 

were operating under the 49th and 275th 

Divisions. He estimated that the Germans had four battalions of light and 

medium artillery capable of firing into the 

30th Division's zone, plus a battery of 

2 Io-mm. guns and one or two large caliber railroad guns. Observers had detected only an occasional tank in the 

vicinity. In the matter of reserves, Platt 

predicted the Germans would have at 

least one battalion from each of three 

regiments of the 183d Division available 

for quick counterattacks, while the 116th 

Panzer Division and contingents of an 

infantry division recently identified near 

Aachen might be backing up the line.ll 

Except in one instance, Colonel Platt 

was basically correct in his estimate of 

the enemy. That error was his failure to 

note that upon arrival of the 183d Volks 

Grenadier Division, the new LXXXI 

Corps commander, General Koechling, 

who had replaced General Schack, had 

pulled the 275th Division from the line 

and transferred it to the corps south 

wing in the Huertgen ForestY Colonel 

Platt was particularly presci~nt in his 

estimate of enemy artillery, for between 

them the 49th and 183d Divisions had, as 

Platt predicted, four battalions. Two 

railroad guns, which the XIX Corps G-2 

had noted might be present, were in the 

vicinity.13 

From Rimburg south to a point three 

miles north of Aachen, the troops con11 goth Div G-2 Spot Estimate ii, go Sep 44, 

and G-2 Rpt, i Oct 44. 

12 Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 22 Sep 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

13 Details of enemy strength and organization 

may be found in Heichler, The Germans Opposite 

XIX Corps. 
258 

trolled by General Macholz's 49th Division were organized around the same two 

regimental formations (I 48th and 149th 

Re giments) which had fallen back before 

the XIX Corps from the Albert Canal to 

the border. In the interim, such changes 

had occurred among personnel that the 

division was hardly the same as the one 

that had breathed a sigh of relief upon 

gaining the West Wall. In a period of 

slightly more than a fortnight, General 

Macholz had absorbed 4,326 "replacements" in the form of a hodgepodge of 

miscellaneous units. A tabulation of the 

units this division assimilated during the 

period would indicate to a degree the 

problem General Macholz and other German commanders all along the Western 

Front faced in creating a cohesive fighting 

force. Among the miscellany General 

Macholz received were 2 Landesschuetzen 

battalions, 2 "straggler" battalions, 3 

machine-gun battalions, 2 separate infantry battalions (probably replacement 

training units) 4 "security" battalions, 

and I Alarm Company Aachen.14 

American commanders, for their part, 

entertained no illusions that intentions of 

the XIX Corps were secret. Without a 

doubt, General Hobbs and General Corlett believed, the Germans were expecting 

an attack on the first clear day. Yet little 

could be done to deceive the enemy even 

as to the site of the attack, for the blow 

obviously was going to fall somewhere between Aachen and Geilenkirchen. General Hobbs nevertheless attempted some 

deception by spreading pre-D-Day artillery fires along the entire front, with 

emphasis on the sector opposite the 120th 

Infantry on the division south wing, and 

14 Heichler, in The Germans Opposite XIX 

Corps, gives strength figures and date of arrival 

of each of these units. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

by concentrating artillery units in the 

southern part of the division zone. Also, 

once the offensive began, pressure by the 

120th Infantry and the 29th Division on 

either flank might limit the forces the 

enemy could shift against the penetration. 

The Americans actually need not have 

concerned themselves with this problem, 

for German intelligence officers could not 

see the forest for the trees. So concerned 

were they with fear of a major American 

offensive on a broad front southeast of 

Aachen, with the Roer River towns of 

Dueren, Juelich, and Linnich as first objectives, that they failed to accord any real 

importance to the preparations in the 

Geilenkirchen sector. The Germans even 

anticipated a possible large-scale Allied 

airborne operation between the Roer and 

the Rhine as a corollary of a new offensive. 

With these ideas in mind, the new 

LXXXI Corps commander, General 

Koechling, wrongly assumed that the First 

U.S. Army would make a strong bid 

northeastward through the Stolberg Corridor during the very first days of October, 

with a possible diversion at Geilenkirchen. 

As a consequence, General Koechling and 

his staff spent the latter days of September 

in feverish preparations to strengthen the 

sectors of the 246th and 12th Divisions at 

Aachen and southeast of Aachen. 15 

Apparently the only commander to 

question Koechling's OpInIOn was the 

183d Division's General Lange; but he 

also guessed wrong. Cognizant of American armor opposite his division, Lange 

expected a major attack aginst his sector. 

Yet he could not believe that the Americans would try to push armor across the 

Wurm at the point they actually had 

15 Rpt, Seventh Army to A ep B, 30 Sep 44, 

A ep B KTB, Operationsbefehle; MS # A-ggo 

(Koechling); OB WEST KTB, 30 Sep 44. 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 259 

chosen because there the eastern slopes of 

the Wurm valley are higher and afford 

more commanding positions for antitank 

guns than do the slopes a few miles to the 

north at Geilenkirchen. He expected the 

blow to fall at Geilenkirchen in the very 

center of his division sector.16 

Even the one correct German prediction 

that the offensive would begin during 

the first days of October was to be 

discredited before the attack actually began. Noting on 29 September that American air activity had reached such a 

fortissimo that all daylight troop and 

supply movements in the LXXXI Corps 

had to be shut down, the Germans attached undue importance to virtual cessation of air attacks during the next two 

days. In reality, this could be attributed 

only to unfavorable weather; but when 

combined with lessening of American artillery fires, the Germans took it to mean 

that their earlier prediction had been 

wrong. Although General Koechling himself was not fooled, the fact that he 

expected the attack on his southern wing 

southeast of Aachen deprived his opinion 

of importance. The division commanders 

immediately concerned, Generals Lange 

and Macholz, were thorqughly lulledY 

Although part of the decrease in American artillery fires undoubtedly was caused 

by unfavorable weather limiting observation, it may have been more directly 

attributable to two other factors. First, 

earlier hopes that First Army's logistical 

situation might be showing marked improvement by this time. had faded; General Corlett now found he could not 

afford the expenditure of artillery ammu16 MS # B-753 (Lange). 

170B WEST KTB, 29 Sep 44; LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Tagesmeldungen, 30 Sep and I Oct 44; 

MS # B-792 (Macholz). 

nition he had planned. Indeed, on the 

very day of the West Wall attack General 

Bradley was to reinstitute rationing of 

artillery ammunition throughout the 12th 

Army Group. Second, both Corlett and 

General Hobbs had been disappointed 

with the effect of the elaborate pre-D-Day 

artillery program. 

Other than to clear away camouflage, 

they discovered, most of the shelling had 

little effect on the pillboxes. Only selfpropelled 155-mm. guns, often fired from 

exposed positions in order to engage the 

fortifications at close range, did any real 

damage, and then only after considerable 

expenditure of ammunition. IS The firing 

did reveal some cleverly camouflaged pillboxes not previously located. 19 This in 

itself was an advantage but hardly what 

the planners had hoped for and hardly 

enough to justify an elaborate program. 

As the target date of I October approached, artillery units began to husband 

more and more ammunition for the assault. 

At dawn on the target date, General 

Corlett, General Hobbs, and the men who 

were to make the West Wall assault 

looked with chagrin at a mournful sky 

which brought showers and visibility so 

limited that virtually no hope remained 

for a preattack aerial bombardment. 

Though reluctant to postpone the attack 

again, General Corlett was even more 

reluctant to move without aerial support. 

Eventually he bowed to the weather. A 

subsequent downpour brought more concern to tankers and engineers whose first 

18 The 258th Field Artillery Battalion (SP 

I 55's) claimed penetrations in all forty-three 

pillboxes engaged during a seven-day period. 

See Ltr, Lt Col Bradford A. Butler, Jr., comdg 

258th FA Bn, to CG XIX Corps, 5 Oct 44, XIX 

Corps G-3 file, 5-6 Oct 44. 

19 One unit reported: "Fired at haystack with 

machine gun. Shots bounced off." 
260 

task was to get the tanks across the soft, 

muddy shoulders of the Wurm. 

As night came a forecast of improved 

weather conditions for the next day put 

the offensive back in motion. After receiving an extra ration of cigarettes and 

chocolate during the night, few of the 

infantrymen had any doubt but that on 2 

October the oft-postponed attack at last 

would begin. They joked about fattening 

pigs for the kill. 

"Those infantrymen have guts!" 

At 0900 on 2 October, under a scattered overcast, the air strike began. Although the planes made a perpendicular 

approach across 30th Division lines, they 

dropped no shorts. They also overshot the 

targets. Five groups of mediums missed 

the target areas altogether, and the remaining four groups dropped only a 

portion of their bombs accurately. An 

hour after the air strike began, the I 17th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Johnson, reported that no bombs had fallen in front 

of his lines. Two of the groups of mediums were so late in arriving over the 

target that the low-flying dive bombers 

had to be cleared from the area to permit 

the mediums to drop their loads. One of 

these groups bombed on colored smoke 

markings which had been registered for the 

dive bombers in Palen berg and thereby 

produced the only results which ground 

observers could call "excellent." A note 

of tragedy entered the strike when one 

group of mediums bombed a town in 

Belgium, twenty-eight miles west of the 

assigned target, inflicting seventy-nine 

casualties upon Belgian civilians, including thirty-four killed. 20 

20 "This gross error," the IX Bombardment 

Division determined later, "was due to poor 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

No one could blame the failure of the 

medium bombing on enemy action. The 

Luftwaffe showed no signs of renewed 

activity, and enemy flak was virtually 

nonexistent. 

The fighter-bombers were more accurate in that they operated precisely over 

the target area, but they hit not one 

pillbox. "We had heard stories about 

thousands of planes that were supposed to 

have come and destroyed the pillboxes," 

said one private, "but we only saw a few 

of them and the damage was slight." 

Although this soldier obviously had been 

led to expect too much, even more conservative observers could discern no real 

benefit from the strike except that the 

bomb craters provided much-needed cover. Some napalm bombs hit field fortifications in the northern part of the zone, 

and others landed accurately in the woods 

east of Rimburg opposite the I 19th 

Infantry, but since the woods were wet, 

the burning oil failed to achieve the 

desired effect. As determined later by 

prisoner interrogations, psychological effect on the Germans was negligible. 

Some prisoners said they slept through the 

bombardment. "What bombing?" one 

German wanted to know. 21 

navigation, poor headwork, and misidentification 

of target." History, IX Bombardment Division 

(M) Sep-Oct 44, and attached copy of Teletype, 

Gen Anderson (CG IX Bomb Div) to Gp and 

Wing Comdrs; see also Craven and Cate, eds., 

Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 615. 

21 The air strike was called Operation CISCO. 

The story of the strike and the following attack 

is based upon observations in combat interviews; 

Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. I 12; 

Msg, 30th Div G-3 to XIX Corps CG, 2 Oct, 

in 30th Div G-3 file, 2 Oct 44; XIX Corps 

AAR, Oct 44; 30th Div G-3 Jnl, 2 Oct 44; History, IX Bombardment Division (M); Unit 

History, IX Fighter Comd and IX TAC, Oct 44; 

and Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT 

to V-E Day, p. 615. 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 261 

No matter what the shortcomings of 

the air strike, the XIX Corps now was 

irrevocably committed to the attack. 

There could be no turning back. 

As the infantrymen climbed from their 

foxholes and cellars to move toward the 

line of departure, more than 400 tubes of 

American artillery and mortars fired thunderous salvos that searched out enemy 

batteries, assembly areas, and the forward 

line of pillboxes. Some VII Corps artillery joined the demonstration. Both 8 1-

mm. and 60-mm. mortars participated. 

"Of course," said one platoon leader, "a 

60-mm. mortar shell would bounce off a 

pillbox like a peanut, but they caused the 

personnel in the firing trenches to duck 

inside." Chemical mortars concentrated 

at first on chewing paths through tactical 

wire beyond the Wurm, then shifted to a 

rolling barrage which started at the crossing areas and led the infantry by several 

hundred yards. Direct support battalions 

of I05-mm. howitzers contributed to this 

shifting curtain of fire. To make up for 

deficiencies of the air strike, artillery commanders dug deep into ammunition stocks 

they had earmarked for use against counterattacks. Inadequately supported riflemen could not successfully attack an 

obstacle like the West Wall, General 

Corlett reasoned; he would take his 

chances on getting more ammunition 

later. 22 At the end of twelve hours 

twenty-six supporting artillery battalions 

had fired a total of 18,696 rounds. 

At the line of departure, heavy machine 

gunners of the assault battalions delivered 

overhead fire against embrasures of the 

pillboxes. Because the machine gunners 

had to use tracer ammunition to regulate 

22 Ltrs, Corlett to OCMH, 2 Sep 53 and 20 

May 56. 

their firing, the Germans quickly spotted 

the guns. Losses were swift and heavy: 

Five of eight machine guns of the 1st 

Battalion, I 17th Infantry, for example, 

were knocked out. 

Carrying the duckboards that were to 

provide dry paths across the river, the 

infantrymen raced down the west slope of 

the valley through soggy fields ridged with 

rows of stock beets and turnips. A moving target, their leaders had told them 

again and again, is less easily hit than a 

stationary one. They operated now on 

that theory. 

At the river on the left of the crossing 

area, big 1st Lt. Don A. Borton of Company B, I 17th Infantry, seized one of the 

duckboards, waded into the water, and 

slapped it into place. "There's your goddamned bridge!" he cried. Men of his 

platoon sped forward. Throwing high 

their hands, eleven Germans who had 

occupied foxholes close along the river 

bank jumped up to surrender. In a matter of minutes, the men of Company B 

had gained the protection of the railroad 

embankment. The forward platoons of 

this company had lost not a single man. 

Although similarly impressed with the 

need for speed, the I 17th Infantry's Company C was not so fortunate in crossing 

the open slopes to the river. A concentration of hostile shells hit squarely 

among one of the forward platoons, killing 

or wounding all but 6 men. By the time 

Company C reached the river, heavy shelling and casualties obviously had broken 

the company's momentum. In less than 

an hour Company C had lost 87 men, 7 

of them killed. 

Faced with the possibility that his 

entire attack might flounder because of 

the misfortunes of this company, the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Robert E. 
262 

Frankland, quickly called on his reserve. 

Company A, he directed, was to cross the 

river on Company B's bridges and then 

assume the assault role of Company C. 

So thoroughly had the men of Company 

A learned the missions of the two assault 

companies that in less than half an hour 

they were building up along the railroad 

embankment beyond the river. 

In the meantime, those men of Company B who had first reached the railroad 

fought a tendency to take cover behind 

the embankment. The alternative was 

none too pleasant, for open ground rising 

from the embankment to the line of pillboxes along the Palenberg-Rimburg road 

was devoid of cover and concealment 

other than that provided by the corpses of 

several cows. Under the prodding of a 

platoon leader, 1st Lt. Robert P. Cushman, the men nevertheless recognized that 

they had to act at once while the rolling 

barrage and overhead machine gun fire 

kept the enemy pinned inside his fortifications. Some later attributed Lieutenant 

Cushman's goading to the fact that ten 

minutes before the jump-off the lieutenant 

had received a telegram announcing the 

birth of a son. He was in a hurry, they 

said, to get the war over with. 

The action that followed gave proof of 

the value of the refresher training Company B had undergone. As one part of 

each platoon took up support positions 

from which to fire into the embrasures of 

the pillboxes, specially organized assault 

detachments equipped with flame throwers and demolition charges pressed 

forward. Each man knew his job and 

did it. 

The courage of a volunteer flame 

thrower, Pvt. Brent Youenes, featured the 

taking of the first two pillboxes by Lieutenant Cushman's platoon. Advancing 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

within ten yards of the first pillbox, 

Private Youenes squirted two bursts of 

flame into the front embrasure. The occupants must have been cowering inside, 

for they fired not a shot. As soon as the 

flame dissipated, Pvt. Willis Jenkins 

shoved a pole charge into the same embrasure. Still no fire came from the pillbox. When supporting riflemen stormed 

the position, five Germans filed out, shaking from their experience and muttering 

surrender. So co-ordinated and daring 

had been the performance that a member 

of Company B's weapons platoon, whose 

job was in itself so far forward that few 

soldiers envied it, could not suppress his 

admiration. "Those infantrymen have 

guts!" was the way he put it. 

Turning to the other pillbox, Lieutenant Cushman and his assault detachment 

received machine gun fire from a trench 

outside the pillbox. Quick return fire 

killed one of two Germans manning the 

machine gun; the other retreated inside. 

Creeping around to a blind side of the 

pillbox, three riflemen tossed hand grenades through the embrasures and down 

a ventilator shaft. Arriving with his 

flame thrower, Private Youenes squirted 

an embrasure while another man placed a 

pole charge against the entrance to the 

pillbox. Soon after the explosion, a German officer dashed out, brandishing a 

pistol. When his first shot killed one man 

of the assault detachment, someone yelled, 

"He killed Smitty! The son of a bitch, 

he killed Smitty!" Every man in sight 

turned his weapon on the enemy officer. 

Six Germans who had remained in the 

pillbox then surrendered. 

Turning to three other pillboxes, Lieutenant Cushman and his men found that 

concussion from mortars and artillery had 

so intimidated the occupants and that fire 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 263 

of the support detachment was so effective 

in keeping the enemy away from his firing 

embrasures that resistance came from 

none of them. The first pillbox fell to a 

pole charge placed once again by the 

intrepid Private Jenkins. Hand grenades 

thrown through firing slits brought surrender of the other two. In less than two 

hours after crossing the line of departure, 

Lieutenant Cushman's platoon had taken 

five pillboxes with the loss of but one man. 

At the same time, Lieutenant Borton 

and his platoon were having similar 

experiences with two other pillboxes. Pvt. 

Harold Zeglien finished off the first with 

a pole charge set in an embrasure. The 

Germans in the second were not so easily 

subdued. Even after a pole charge had 

gone off against one of the embrasures, 

the enemy inside fired a machine gun to 

kill a bazooka man who was attempting to 

put a rocket through the entrance. 

Strangely, a change in tactics from force 

to intimidation at last did the trick. A 

prisoner captured earlier went inside the 

pillbox with word that if the Germans 

failed to surrender, they must face death 

from a flame thrower. Nine Germans 

filed out. 

Another pillbox earmarked for reduction by Company B was the responsibility 

of the company's support platoon under 

T. Sgt. Howard Wolpert. Operating a 

flame thrower, Pvt. Henry E. Hansen had 

directed two blasts toward one embrasure 

and was moving to another side of the 

pillbox when he spotted a German lying in 

wait for him to appear from another 

direction. As the German whirled to face 

him, Private Hansen caught him full in 

the face with a blast from his flame 

thrower. When pole charges set by 

others of the platoon brought no response 

from inside the pillbox, Sergeant Wolpert 

and his men began to reorganize, secure 

in the belief that they had taken their 

objective. The fight over, Private Hansen casually sprayed the embrasures of the 

pillbox again in order to empty his flame 

thrower and reduce its weight. Smoke 

began to seep from the embrasures, and 

small arms ammunition to explode inside 

the pillbox. A moment later ten Germans 

pushed open the door to surrender. 

Even as Company B was breaching the 

first band of West Wall pillboxes with the 

loss of but two men in actual assaults on 

the fortifications, Company A was following to take over the assault mission of 

Company C. Like the platoon leaders of 

Company B, the officers- of Company A 

found that the railroad embankment held 

an attraction for their men that could 

prove fatal. Already German mortar and 

artillerymen were turning the flatland 

between the river and the embankment 

into a maelstrom of bursting shells; in a 

matter of minutes the enemy's defensive 

fires might deny the route of approach 

from the embankment to the pillboxes. 

Using the theory that "you can't push a 

string, you gotta pull it," 1st Lt. Theodore 

Foote signaled men of his platoon to 

follow and clambered across the embankment. In a ragged skirmish line, the men 

charged across an open field toward a 

pillbox beyond the Palenberg-Rimburg 

road. 

Directing his support detachment into 

position along the road, Lieutenant Foote 

and the assault detachment raced on 

toward the pillbox. Finding a bomb crater almost in front of the pillbox, the men 

took cover while Pfc. Gus Pantazopulos 

fired two rockets from a bazooka against 

the closest embrasure and Pvt. Martin 

Sirokin dashed forward to place a pole 

charge in the hole the rockets made. Cpl. 
264 

Russell Martin pegged hand grenades into 

the enlarged embrasure as the rest of the 

assault detachment charged from the 

crater. The charge carried both the pillbox and a series of field fortifications 

nearby where a nest of Germans had been 

lying low during the fracas. By the time 

the rest of Company A arrived, nothing 

remained but to organize defensive positions in the vicinity of the pillbox. 

Only a few steps behind Colonel Frankland's 1st Battalion, the I17th Infantry 

commander, Colonel Johnson, sent a company of the 2d Battalion to clear enemy 

outposts from west of the river in the 

village of Marienberg. This done in less 

than two hours, despite delaying action by 

German riflemen and machine gunners, 

Colonel Johnson directed the company to 

cross the W urrh into the northern part of 

Palenberg while the remainder of the 

battalion crossed behind Colonel Frankland's battalion in order to approach 

Palen berg from the south. 

Two pillboxes provided the crux of the 

opposition in Palen berg, but persistent 

small unit maneuver and daring use of 

bazookas and pole charges after the manner of Colonel Frankland's battalion 

eventually carried the strong points. By 

about 1600 the men had eliminated small 

arms fire from a permanent bridge site 

between Marienberg and Palenberg while 

others continued a house-to-house fight to 

eject the enemy from the rest of Palenberg. 

This fight often lapsed into hand grenade 

duels. One rifleman, Pvt. Harold G. 

Kiner, spotted an enemy grenade that 

landed between him and two fellow riflemen, threw himself upon it, and saved his 

companions at the cost of his own life. 

He was posthumously awarded the Medal 

of Honor. 

Neither tanks nor tank destroyers beTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

came available to the I 17th Infantry 

during the day, not because the culverts 

designed for bridging the stream failed to 

work but because the banks of the Wurm 

were such a quagmire that the tank dozer 

which was to shave down the banks mired 

deep in the mud. Tanks brought up to 

pull out the tank dozer also bogged down. 

The tankers finally gave up to await 

construction of a treadway bridge. 

Having worked under steady enemy 

shelling, the engineers at 1830 completed 

the treadway, but when the tanks crossed, 

the soil on the east bank proved too soft 

for maneuver. A short while later, when 

other engineers completed another treadway between Marienberg and Palenberg, 

the tanks found firmer footing. Yet now 

they were too late to assist in the first day's 

fighting. 

Almost from the start, the 30th Division's other assault regiment, the 119th 

Infantry (Colonel Sutherland), had met 

with difficulties in the West Wall attack. 

Attempting to reach the Wurm south of 

Rimburg, to the right of the I 17th Infantry's crossing area, the I 19th's leading 

battalion came under German shellfire 

soon after crossing the line of departure. 

The two assault companies nevertheless 

reached the river and under light machine 

gun fire from the railroad embankment 

slapped their duck board footbridges into 

place. One company then managed to 

build up along the railroad, but fire from 

three pillboxes located west of the railroad 

near the Rimburg Castle stymied the 

other. The Germans had expertly camouflaged one of the pillboxes as a house. 

All through the afternoon this company 

fought until at last a combination of 

small arms and bazooka fire reduced these 

three posItions. Meanwhile, men of the 

other company found it impossible to 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 265 

ABANDONED CROSSI NG at the Wurm River. 

raIse their heads above the railroad embankment. From positions hidden in the 

Rimburg woods, blistering fire frustrated 

every attempt to cross the embankment. 

Commitment of the battalion's reserve 

company served merely to pin more men 

along the railroad. Artillery and mortar 

fire against the enemy positions also had 

little effect. Limits on observation imposed by trees and bushes denied accurate 

adjustment, and as soon as supporting 

shellfire lifted to permit an assault, the 

Germans would rush from their pillboxes 

and renew their fire from field fortifications. 

The I 19th Infantry's plan of attack 

had leaned heavily upon the early availability of tanks to neutralize just such 

positions as these in the western edge of 

the woods. But the culvert that engineers 

had prepared for bridging the W urm in 

this regiment's crossing area fell to pieces 

as the tankers towed it over rough ground 

to the river. Although the engineers 

rushed completion of a treadway bridge 

that enabled the tanks to cross in midafternoon, deep black mud halted every 

attempt to get the tanks up to the infantry positions. . 

In an attempt to open up the situation, 
266 

Colonel Sutherland early committed a 

second battalion of infantry on the left of 

the first. Delayed at the river because 

men responsible for bringing the duckboard footbridges had abandoned them en 

route, this battalion eventually crossed on 

bridges improvised from fence posts and 

doors. Once beyond the W urm, the men 

came under intense fire from the Rimburg 

Castle. At last they drove the Germans 

from positions along the wall and moat of 

the castle and by nightfall had built up 

on three sides of this strong outpost position. Protected by medieval masonry, 

the Germans inside held out. 

In late afternoon Colonel Sutherland 

committed his remaining battalion on his 

southern flank, but with no greater success. Once on the east bank, the men 

could advance no farther than the railroad. Like the others before them, they 

discovered it worth a man's life to poke 

his head above the level of the embankment. 

When engineers at midnight completed 

a second treadway bridge at a permanent 

bridge site between Rimburg and the 

castle, the attached tanks at last had firm 

footing, but the arrival of the tanks had 

come too late to assist the I 19th Infantry 

in getting beyond the railroad into the 

pillbox belt. The day's fighting had 

netted the regiment a shallow bridgehead 

a mile long and 300 yards deep, embracing only the flatland between the flver 

and the railroad. 

Anticipating immediate German reaction to the W' est Wall attack, General 

Hobbs and his regimental commanders 

waited apprehensively as night came for 

the first counterblow to fall. The bridgehead of the I 19th Infantry was tenuous 

at best, and that regiment's inability to 

advance beyond the railroad had left the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

I 17th Infantry with an exposed right 

flank. For those reasons, General Hbbbs 

told his artillery commander to hammer 

through the night at likely enemy assembly areas and routes leading into the 

restricted bridgehead. 

Unknown to General Hobbs, active 

German reaction to the West Wall assault 

had been delayed because the blow had 

achieved complete surprise. Deceived by 

diversionary attacks made during the day 

northwest of Geilenkirchen by the 29th 

Division and to the south at Kerkrade by 

the 30th Division's I20th Infantry, the 

commanders of the 49th and 183d Divisions had been unable to believe for several 

hours that this attack on the narrow 

Marienberg-Rimburg front was "it." 23 

Even when they finally accepted this fact, 

General Macholz of the 49th Division had 

virtually nothing to throw against the 

bridgehead and General Lange of the 

183d Division had only one battalion as 

an infantry reserve. This battalion General Lange ordered to counterattack soon 

after dark in company with an assault 

gun battalion. The counterattack could 

not be launched during the day because 

the Germans dared not move assault guns 

in this open terrain under the rapacious 

eyes of American planes and artillery.24 

As night came, interdictory fires laid 

down by 30th Division and XIX Corps 

artillery were far more effective than any 

American commander could have dared 

to hope. "Murderous" artillery fires, the 

Germans said, delayed the counterattack 

23 MS # B-792 (Macholz). 

24 183d VG Diu AAR; Evng and Daily Sit reps, 

183d VG Diu to LXXXI Corps, 2 Oct 44, in 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Tel 

Convs, LXXXI Corps, to 183d VG Diu, 1430, 

1800, and 2120, 2 Oct 44, in LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Kampfuerlauf. 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 267 

by three hours. 25 Not until midnight did 

the Germans strike and then only with a 

smattering of the original infantry force 

and but two assault guns. The mobile 

guns American bazooka men and rifle 

grenadiers on the northeastern fringe of 

the bridgehead turned back quickly, but 

not until after a brisk fire fight did the 

German infantry retire, leaving behind 

seven dead. The I 17th Infantry lost 

three men, including Private Sirokin, one 

of those who had performed so courageously that afternoon in the taking of the 

pillboxes. So discouraged by this feeble 

show was the German corps commander, 

General Koechling, that he ordered the 

183d Division's General Lange to confine 

his operations to "sealing off" the penetration until stronger forces could be assembled for more effective countermeasures.26 

Though the 30th Division had made no 

phenomenal advances during the first 

day of the West Wall attack, this was no 

cause for discouragement. The I 19th Infantry had failed to move far enough even 

to clear the Rimburg crossing area of 

direct small arms fire; yet the I 17th 

Infantry farther north had breached the 

forward line of pillboxes, had seized Palenberg and the high ground immediately 

south of it, and was ready to resume the 

advance along a main highway through 

U ebach. The leading battalion of the 

I 17th Infantry had incurred 146 casualties, including 12 killed, and the only 

other battalion to see major action had 

lost 70, including 12 killed. Engineers 

had thrown sturdy bridges across the 

Wurm at both Marienberg and Rimburg. 

25 r83d VG Div AAR; Mng Sitrep, LXXXI 

Corps to Seventh Army, 0555, 3 Oct 44, in 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

26 Ibid. See also American accounts in records 

of the II 7th Infantry. 

Prospects for the next day were bright, 

even in the sector of the I 19th Infantry 

where plans progressed during the night 

for outflanking the stubborn Germans m 

the Rimburg woods. 

The diversionary attack northwest of 

Geilenkirchen which had fooled the German division commanders for several hours 

had been launched on the left flank of the 

30th Division by two battalions of the 

29th Division. The purpose was to tie 

down enemy forces and prevent their use 

against the main attack. From the first 

resistance was stanch. Even on subsequent days when the 29th Division enlarged operations to include elements of 

two regiments, the Germans held firm. 

This was not to say that the attack did 

not worry the Germans. General von 

Obstfelder, whose corps of the First Parachute Army was adjacent to this sector 

and who was at the moment embroiled 

in a fight with the 7th U.S. Armored 

Division in the Peel Marshes, anxiously 

inquired on 3 October whether General 

Koechling's LXXXI Corps was going to 

take any countermeasures against the 

29th Division's attack. In view of the 

situation at Marienberg and Rimburg, 

General Koechling had to respond in the 

negative. 27 The Germans nevertheless reacted sensitively to the 29th Division's 

attacks, and in one instance virtually 

annihilated a company of American 

infantry in a village named Schierwaldenrath. A later raid on the village brought 

revenge, but as operations developed in 

the 30th Division sector, the 29th Division 

limited offensive action to reinforced 

27 Tel ConY, LXXXVI Corps to LXXXI 

Corps, 1920, 3 Oct 44, in LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfuerlauf. 
268 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

RIMBURG CASTLE, showing moat in the foreground. 

patrols. The Germans were content to 

let it go at that. 28 

In the meantime, along the railroad east 

of Rimburg, the 1 19th Infantry discovered 

early on the second day (3 October) of 

the West Wall attack that the passing of 

night had done little to lessen opposition 

in the Rimburg woods. The only progress at first was against the Rimburg 

Castle, and that because many of the 

28 See 29th Diy AAR, Oct 44, and Joseph H. 

Ewing, 29 Let's Go! A History of the 29th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: 

I nfa n try Journal Press, 1948) . This is among 

the better unit histories. 

Germans who had made the castle such a 

fortress the afternoon before had sneaked 

out during the night. 

No hope remaining for carrying the 

Rimburg woods in a frontal assault, the 

119th Infantry commander, Colonel 

Sutherland, put into motion plans he had 

made during the night. He dispatched a 

task force under command of his executive 

officer, Lt. Col. Daniel W. Quinn, to 

cross the I 17th Infantry's bridges at 

Marienberg, hit the Rimburg woods from 

the north, and cut off the German positions by moving behind the woods. 

Composed of two companies of infantry 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 269 

(both from the 2 d Battalion) and a 

company each of tanks and self-propelled 

tank destroyers, Task Force Quinn quickly 

made its weight felt. A few rounds from 

the tank guns against the northern tip of 

the woods brought about a hundred Germans scurrying from two pillboxes and 

surrounding entrenchments to surrender. 

Relieving pressure on the I st Battalion, 

I 19th Infantry, the task force continued 

to work south. The only real difficulty 

came from intense enemy fire from the 

vicinity of the regimental objective, the 

crossroads atop the eastern slopes of the 

Wurm valley near Herbach. 

This fire proved a harbinger of what 

was to greet the 1st Battalion when in 

late afternoon the men emerged from the 

Rimburg woods. Having cleared about a 

dozen pillboxes, the I 19th Infantry had at 

last broken through the first band of 

fortifications, but Task Force Quinn's 

envelopment had not been deep enough to 

precipitate any substantial advance. 

Once again the Germans brought the 

regiment to an abrupt halt after a gain of 

only a few hundred yards. Casualties 

from this kind of close, confined fighting 

were becoming increasingly heavy: one 

rifle company, for example, had lost half 

of one platoon and all of another except 

the platoon sergeant. By the end of the 

second day of fighting, the depth of the 

119th Infantry's bridgehead was still no 

more than a thousand yards. 

For his part in renewing the attack on 

3 October, the I 17th Infantry's Colonel 

Johnson committed his reserve battalion 

(the 3d) to drive on U ebach, about a 

mile east of the W urm, and then to cut 

the Geilenkirchen-Aachen highway and 

occupy high ground east of the highway 

between Uebach and Beggendorf. Almost immediately, tedious house-to-house 

fighting developed. The Germans seemed 

determined to make of Uebach a point of 

decision. Round after round of mortar 

and artillery fire they poured into the little 

town. Some of the American infantry 

called it the heaviest German shelling 

since the battles at Mortain in Normandy. 

The commander of the regiment's supporting I 18th Field Artillery Battalion hazarded a guess that the Germans had 

finally found a copy of the American field 

artillery manual telling how to mass their 

fires. The first few concentrations took a 

particularly heavy toll because the doors 

and windows of all houses except those 

actually defended were locked and barred. 

That made cover in the houses at first 

hard to get at. 

Commitment of CCB 

Into the maelstrom that Uebach had 

become rolled the tanks and half-tracks of 

the 2d Armored Division's Combat Command B. During the morning of 3 October, General Corlett had ordered the 

armor to start crossing the Marienberg 

bridges at noon. The 30th Division was 

to give priority to the armor's passage in 

order that the combat command might 

expand the bridgehead to the north and 

northeast and free the infantry for the 

push southward to link with the VII 

Corps. The rest of the. 2d Armored 

Division was to follow CCB as soon as 

enough space for deployment could be 

gained. 29 

Committing a combat command with 

its wealth of vehicles in a confined bridgehead where an infantry regiment still was 

struggling to gain enough room for its 

own operations was a risky business. 

29 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs 40, 3 Oct, XIX 

Corps Ltr of Instrs file, Oct 44. 
270 

None could have been more aware of this 

than General Corlett and the infantry 

commander, General Hobbs, for their 

memories would serve to remind them of 

a similar instance in Normandy where premature commitment of armor into a 30th 

Division bridgehead had brought a welter 

of confusion that had bogged down a 

promising attack. 30 Yet in the present 

situation Corlett was less concerned about 

likely confusion than about losing the little 

W urm River bridgehead altogether. He 

wanted the weight of the armor on hand 

before the Germans could mount a sizable 

counterattack.31 

For all the limitations of space, the 

commitment of the armor might have 

proceeded smoothly except for the intense 

German shelling. Although the infantry 

commanders adjusted their zones to give 

the armor free rein in the northern half of 

Uebach, the shelling intensified an inevitable intermingling of units in the 

winding streets of the town. A day of 

clouds and rain kept American planes 

from doing anything about the enemy's 

artillery. By nightfall ( 3 October) 

neither the armor nor the leading battalion 

of the I 17th Infantry had advanced 

farther than the northern and eastern 

edges of Uebach, and not all buildings 

within the town, particularly in the southern portion, were yet in friendly hands. 

Lined up almost bumper to bumper back 

to the Marienberg bridges, CCB's vehicles provided any incentive the enemy 

might have needed to continue and even to 

increase his disturbing shellfires. 

As General Corlett had feared, German 

commanders in the meantime had been 

30 For this story, see Blumenson, Breakout and 

Pursuit, Ch. VI. 

31 Ltr, Gen Harmon to OCMH, 5 Jan 54. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

rushing preparations for a concentric 

counterattack with main effort in' the 

south (primarily against the I 19th Infantry). To facilitate control III the 

attack, the enemy corps commander, 

General Koechling, put both 49th and 

183d Division troops in the threatened 

sector under one commander, the 183d 

Division's General Lange. Then Koechling ordered additional forces to the 

sector: two assault gun brigades, the 

183d Division's organic engineer battalion, 

two infantry battalions of the 49th Division, and an infantry battalion of the 246th 

Division from Aachen. 32 

To allow time for all these units to 

arrive, Koechling delayed the hour of 

attack until 02 I 5 on 4 October. 33 Yet 

when that hour approached, nobody was 

ready except the engineer battalion. 

When the engineers attacked from the east, 

heavy concentrations of artillery fire assisted the 3d Battalion of the I 17th Infantry in Uebach in beating off the assault, 

but not before the Germans had cut off 

about fifteen men in a house on the 

eastern edge of the town. These men 

played cat and mouse all day with German tanks and infantry and escaped only 

in late afternoon after artillery fire and 

advance of 2d Armored Division tanks 

scared off seven German tanks that were 

closing in. 

Not until dawn on 4 October were the 

bulk of the German reinforcements ready 

to counterattack. Their main strike hit 

the center of the 119th Infantry. Supported by the two assault gun brigades, 

one battalion of the 49th Division forced 

32 AAR, r83d VG Diu; Tel Cony, LXXXI 

Corps to r83d VG Diu, I900, 3 Oct 44, in 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 

33 Ibid. 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 271 

SLAG PILE AND TOWER used by Germans for observation in Uebach. 

an American company to fall back in 

confusion. Before the Germans could exploit the success, "shorts" from their own 

artillery threw the attackers into confusion. By the time they were able to 

renew the attack, the I 19th Infantry was 

set. 

The enemy was still much in evidence 

that afternoon when the 1 19th Infantry 

attempted to renew its drive from the 

Rimburg woods onto the eastern slopes of 

the Wurm valley. Knocking out two 

Sherman tanks, the Germans quickly 

broke the back of the push. 

In the meantime, on the northeastern 

edge ·of Uebach, the third German blow 

had been doomed from the start. The 

German thrust ran head on into an attempt by the right task force (Task Force 

I) of Combat Command B to emerge 

from Uebach. Only one German infantry battalion actually reached Uebach, 

there to be smashed completely and 

reduced to twenty-five men. 

This force which had looked so impressive to German commanders on paper 

thus was reduced to impotency in a 

matter of hours. Yet the achievement 

had not come easy for the Americans. 

So severe were the casualties of the battalion of the I I7th Infantry in Uebach 

that the commander, Lt. Col. Samuel T. 

McDowell, had difficulty reorganizing his 

men for resuming the offensive. Though 

not so hard hit by loss~s, the armor of 

CCB had similar difficulty in getting 
272 

started, partly because of striking direct 

into one prong of the German counterattack. 

Not until late afternoon of 4 October 

was any American advance of appreciable 

proportions achieved. At that time Task 

Force 2 of CCB under Col. Sidney R. 

Hinds attacked from Uebach to seize 

high ground about the settlement of Hoverhof, a mile north of Uebach, upon 

which to anchor the northern flank of the 

bridgehead. Delayed twice when two 

successive commanders of the armored 

infantry battalion fell vIctIm to the 

blanketlike shelling in Uebach, the advance finally began about 1600. Even 

though the sector opposite the task force 

was studded with pillboxes, the armored 

infantry and supporting tanks moved forward quickly. Operating with wellexecuted co-ordination, a forward observer 

first brought down artillery upon the 

pillboxes to drive the defenders from field 

positions into the fortifications; then the 

tanks blasted apertures and entrances of 

the pillboxes with armor-piercing ammunition. Almost invariably, as soon as the 

tanks ceased fire and the infantry closed 

in, the Germans emerged docilely. By 

nightfall Task Force 2 held the high 

ground near Hoverhof. Eighty Germans 

surrendered, and the attackers sustained 

not a single casualty once the attack had 

gotten under way.34 

In the meantime, Task Force I of CCB 

under Col. Paul A. Disney had been 

fighting its meeting engagement with one 

prong of the German counterattack northeast of Uebach. At one point Disney's 

task force dueled with a covey of seven 

34 Official records of the 2d Armored Division 

for this period are supplemented by one combat 

interview to be found in 30th Division Combat 

Interview files. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

self-propelled guns and destroyed them all 

with the loss of but two of its own tanks. 

By the end of the day, Colonel Disney 

had gained positions about 800 yards beyond Uebach, only a few yards short of 

the Geilenkirchen-Aachen highway; but 

the task force had paid for the short 

advance with heavy personnel losses and 

eleven medium tanks. 

Resuming the attack the next morning 

(5 October), CCB found the pattern of 

resistance unchanged. On the right wing, 

where the tanks and infantrv faced German tanks and self-propelled guns, Colonel Disney's Task Force I gained only a 

few hundred yards. Though this was 

sufficient to cut the Geilenkirchen-Aachen 

highway, it fell short of the objective, the 

village of Beggendorf. In the north, men 

of Colonel Hinds's Task Force 2 repeated 

the tactics used so successfully the day 

before against the pillboxes and found the 

enemy thoroughly cowed. Discovering 

telephone communications intact in a 

captured pillbox, a noncommissioned officer, Sgt. Ezra Cook, notified the Germans 

in another pillbox, "We've just taken 

your comrades and now we're coming 

after you." From a nearby pillbox that 

Sergeant Cook and his companions had 

not detected, twenty-five Germans 

emerged with hands high. By nightfall 

the assault teams had cleared Zweibruggen, another river village farther northFrelenberg-and had built up along a 

highway leading northeast out of Frelenberg. 

Not until the next day, 6 October, did 

the Germans get tanks and antitank guns 

into position to meet this threat. They 

finally stopped Task Force 2 late on 6 

October with dug-in infantry backed up 

by direct fire weapons along a spur railway less than a thousand yards short of 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 273 

the West Wall strongpoint of Geilenkirchen. On the same date, Task Force 

I, its objective changed from Beggendorf 

to Waurichen, northeast of Uebach, followed closely behind a rolling artillery 

barrage to reach the edge of the village. 

An additional short advance the next day 

would carry the objective and forge the 

last segment of a firm arc along the 

northeastern flank of the bridgehead. 

For all their inability to halt these 

armored thrusts on the third, fourth, and 

fifth days of the West Wall fight, German 

commanders were struggling to create 

another sizable reserve force capable of 

throwing back the American bridgehead. 

As early as 4 October, the day the first 

major counterattacks had failed, the 

Commander in Chief West, Field Marshal 

von Rundstedt, and the Seventh Army 

commander, General Brandenberger, had 

visited General Koechling's LXXXI Corps 

command post and come away with the 

impression that the forces locally available were insufficient. Directing General 

Koechling to send to the threatened sector 

every unit from the LXXXI Corps that 

possibly could be spared, General Brandenberger promised reinforcements from 

outside the corps.35 

Before the day was through, General 

Koechling had ordered five more units to 

the Uebach sector: a Landesschuetzen 

battalion, an assault gun brigade, and a 

howitzer battalion, all from the sector of 

the 12th Division southeast of Aachen, an 

antitank company with six 75-mm. antitank guns from the 246th Division at 

Aachen, and a separate, so-called "tank 

company" equipped with relatively ineffi35 LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfuerlauf, 4 Oct 

44· 

cacious gimmicks called "remote-control 

robot assault guns." Believing that the 

addition of these forces to the miscellany 

already in the threatened sector would 

create a force too big for adequate control 

by one man, Koechling removed the 

single command he had invested in General Lange and restored the boundary 

between the 49th and 183d Divisions to 

run roughly from Beggendorf west to 

Uebach.36 

For his part, the Seventh Army commander, General Brandenberger, lined up 

five units for transfer to the LXXXI 

Corps: Army NCO Training Schools 

Dueren and Juelich, which were to fight 

as infantry units; an infantry battalion 

from the 275th Division, which was now 

with the LXXIV Corps in the Huertgen 

Forest; a fortress machine gun battalion; 

and an artillery brigade which had two 

batteries of 150-mm. howitzers and one 

battalion of very heavy howitzers. 37 

In the meantime, the corps commander, 

General Koechling, took further steps to 

gain a greater concentration of troops. 

Having already drawn upon the resources 

of the 246th Division at Aachen, he nevertheless ordered that division to relinquish 

the entire 404th Grenadier Regiment. At 

the same time he directed the two incoming NCO training schools to relieve the 

183d Division's 343d Grenadier Regiment 

36 Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 246th Diu, 

1225,4 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps to Ii~th Diu, 1230, 

4 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps to 183d Diu, 1250 and 

1535, 4 Oct 44, and LXXXI Corps to 49th Diu, 

1530, 4 Oct 44, all in LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfuerlauf; Order, LXXXI Corps to 183d 

and 49th Dius, 1345, 4 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Befehle an Diu; AAR, 183d VG Diu. 

37 Order, Brandenberger to LXXXI Corps, 

2035, 4 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: 

H eeresgruppe, Armee, usw. 
274 

opposite the 29th U.S. Division northwest 

of Geilenkirchen in order that the 343d 

Regiment also might be available for the 

counterattack. As for artillery, General 

Koechling now had 10 batteries of 105-

mm. howitzers and 7 batteries of I5o-mm. 

howitzers, a total of about 60 pieces. He 

expected to add another 27 I5o-mm. 

howitzers within a few days and to put 

32 88-mm. antiaircraft guns opposite the 

threatened sector during the night of 6 

October.38 

Like the force assembled for the first 

major counterattacks on 4 October, the 

sum of these units was more impressive on 

paper than in reality. Nevertheless, if all 

could be assembled at once for a genuinely 

co-ordinated counterstroke, the possibilities were encouraging. 

Unfortunately for the Germans, the 

projected troop movements took considerably more time than anticipated. For 

the second time in the West Wall fight, a 

lesson as often demonstrated as any other 

from German experience during the fall 

campaign was repeated: assembling units 

from various sections of the front in a 

minimum of time and hoping to execute 

a co-ordinated counterattack with such a 

multipartite force is an exacting assignment. Although General Koechling had 

intended to assemble all forces during the 

night of 4 October and strike the next 

day, almost every unit ran into difficulties. Moving from the sector of the 12th 

Division southeast of Aachen, the Landes,· 

schuetzen battalion, for example, came 

under such heavy fire from artillery units 

of the VII Corps that the battalion had 

38 AAR 183d VG Div; Tel Convs, Seventh 

Army to LXXXI Corps, 2200, 2 Oct, and LXXXI 

Corps Arty 0 to aide, 2230, 4 Oct 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, LXXXI 

Corps to 183d and 49th Divs, 2040, 4 Oct 44, 

in LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

to delay until dense morning mists concealed movement. The NCO traine'es 

from Dueren and Juelich failed to arrive 

until just before daylight on 5 October, 

too late for relieving the 343d Regiment 

northwest of Geilenkirchen, for that regiment could not disengage in daylight. 

The 246th Division's 404th Regiment 

from Aachen did not reach a designated 

assembly area until noon on 50ctober.39 

Had the Americans been inactive in the 

meantime, the Germans might have been 

able to surmount the setbacks involved in 

these delays. As it was, the Americans 

were renewing their offensive. Having 

failed to strike early on 5 October, General 

Koechling had lost his chance. Now he 

might be forced to commit his units 

piecemeal according to the pattern of 

American attacks. 

Early on 5 October, as CCB was taking 

the first steps toward forging a firm arc 

about the northeastern fringes of the West 

Wall bridgehead, the two regiments of the 

30th Division renewed their drives-the 

one to break out of the Rimburg woods, 

the other to push southeastward from 

Uebach in the direction of Alsdorf, not 

quite three miles from Uebach and a 

major milestone on the road to juncture 

with the VII Corps northeast of Aachen. 

The first objective of the latter thrust, 

to be made by Colonel McDowell's 3d 

Battalion, I 17th Infantry, was a hamlet at 

a crossroads about halfway between 

Uebach and Alsdorf. Shortly after the 

jump-off, intense machine gun fire from 

the barracks of a cantonment on the 

eastern flank of the battalion's route of 

advance pinned McDowell's infantry to 

the ground. At the same time concealed 

39 AAR, 183d VG Div; Tel Convs, LXXXI 

Corps to 183d Div, OI45, 0600, 0640, and I200, 

5 Oct 44, in LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf· 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 275 

antitank guns knocked out five supporting 

tanks. Although the I 17th Infantry 

commander, Colonel Johnson, quickly 

committed another battalion, this unit 

could make little headway. The Germans 

might have failed in their efforts to 

muster sizable force for counterattack, 

but what they did have was proving no 

pushover. 

Meanwhile, the commander of the 

I 19th Infantry, Colonel Sutherland, had 

decided to abandon his frontal assault out 

of the Rimburg woods against the crossroads near Herbach. Instead, he planned 

to repeat the envelopment tactic he had 

used earlier in eliminating the Germans in 

the Rimburg woods, but this time the 

envelopment was to be deep enough to 

carve a sizable slice out of the German 

posItion. During the night of 4 October, 

Colonel Sutherland sent his 2d Battalion 

under Lt. Col. William C. Cox into the 

I 17th Infantry's zone at Uebach to attack 

south across his regimental front along 

gently sloping ground a thousand yards 

behind the ridge which was his first 

objective. The maneuver got off to an 

auspicious start during the night when a 

patrol sneaked up on one of at least ten 

pillboxes lying in the battalion's path and 

captured fourteen occupants. 

The real impetus to Colonel Cox's 

attack the next morning, 5 October, came 

from a platoon leader in Company E, 

T. Sgt. Harold L. Holycross, who adopted 

pillbox assault methods similar to those 

used north of Uebach by CCB's Task 

Force 2. Sergeant Holycross' methods 

may have been dictated by the fact that his 

company had neither flame throwers nor 

pole charges. While a platoon of selfpropelled tank destroyers acted as overwatchers on the east flank, two platoons 

of tanks fired high explosive against the 

pillboxes in order to drive the defenders 

from field fortifications into the pillboxes. 

Then the tankers switched to armorpiercing ammunition while Sergeant Holycross and an advance force of but four 

men pressed forward. When the five got 

within a hundred yards of the pillboxes, 

the tankers lifted their fire. Without 

exception, the enemy in each pillbox 

promptly raised a white flag. As one 

soldier put it, the infantry "just held the 

bag" while the Germans walked in. 

By the end of the day Company E had 

pushed all the way down the ridge to a 

point east of Herbach, and another company had followed closely to occupy some 

of the fortifications. Only one pillbox 

remained to be taken at the southern tip 

of the high ground. Against the wishes of 

the company commander, 1st Lt. Warne 

R. Parker, Company E had to let this 

pillbox wait until the next day, because 

the supporting tanks were running low on 

ammunition. 

As Lieutenant Parker had feared, failure to capture the last pillbox was a 

mistake. At daylight on 6 October, elements of two battalions of the 49th 

Division's 148th Regiment used the pillbox 

as a forward base for counterattacking 

the other positions. 40 Under cover of fire 

from two tanks or assault guns, at least 

one of which sat in hull defilade behind 

the mound of the pillbox, German infantry moved forward with three other tanks 

or assault guns in support. As they 

approached, the American riflemen in the 

most forward pillboxes failed to heed the 

lesson demonstrated the day before by the 

40 It presumably was a local counterattack of a 

type often launched for limited objectives but not 

always included in records of higher headquarters. 

German sources make no mention of this action. 
276 

ineffective German defense: pummeled by 

enemy fire, they retreated into the pillboxes. While some of the counterattacking infantry kept the apertures closed with 

small arms fire, other Germans assaulted. 

In this manner the enemy retook four 

pillboxes and captured at least a hundred 

men, including three officers. 

Throughout the action, Colonel Cox 

and his company commanders called 

frantically for tank support, but both the 

tanks and tank destroyers had retired for 

maintenance and supply. Not for two 

hours did they return. Only the courage 

of the men in the next two pillboxes in 

the path of the German advance, plus 

heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery fire, saved the day. Despite the 

enemy fire, these men refused to budge 

from their foxholes and trenches outside 

the pillboxes. As the enemy lifted his 

shellfire to permit his infantry to close, 

they mowed the Germans down with rifles 

and machine guns. When American 

tanks at last arrived, one commanded by 

1st Lt. Walter D. Macht knocked out 

three of the German vehicles. The other 

two withdrew. Using the same methods 

employed by both Sergeant Holycross and 

the Germans, a reserve company of the 

I 19th Infantry subsequently retook the 

four pillboxes. 

As on the day before, German artillery 

during the counterattack of 6 October 

continued to hammer the bridgehead with 

some of the heaviest concentrations many 

of the -American troops had ever experienced. One man said it was "really big 

stuff-it came in like an express train." 

Obviously, the German corps commander, 

General Koechling, was making good instructions from his army commander to 

mass all LXXXI Corps artillery against 

the bridgehead, no matter how this might 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

deplete other sectorsY Ringed around 

the extended periphery of the bridgehead 

and protected by clouds and overcast 

denying large-scale Allied air operations 

and limiting sound and flash detections, 

the German artillery was difficult to 

neutralize with counterbattery fires. A 

telling shortage of artillery ammunition on 

the American side contributed to the 

problem. Unable to allot more than an 

average of twenty-four rounds per German 

battery, U.S. gunners could hope to do no 

more than silence the enemy guns temporarily. On 5 October XIX Corps artillery executed ninety-nine counterbattery 

missions, and still the Germans fired. 

Approximately 66 percent of all casualties 

incurred in the West Wall fight by the 2d 

Armored and 30th Divisions stemmed 

from artillery and mortar shell fragments. 42 

Even the elusive Luftwaffe tried to get 

into the bombardment act on 5 October. 

Taking advantage of cloudy skies that 

discouraged Allied airmen, German planes 

came over in high-flying groups of twenty 

and thirty with the objective of bombing 

Palenberg. Although German ground 

observers reported results as "very good," 

American units noted no appreciable 

damage. The enemy's 49th Division requested that the planes strike American 

concentrations at Uebach next time, but 

there was no next time. 43 

Few could have recognized it as such at 

the time, but the German counterattack 

41 Order, Brandenberger to LXXXI Corps, 

2035, 4 Oct 44· 

42 XIX Corps Special Rpt, Breaching the 

Siegfried Line, and comments on draft of this 

study by Col James R. Winn, FA, found in XIX 

Corps AAR, Oct 44. 

43 See Tel Convs, Air Ln 0, Seventh Army, to 

LXXXI Corps, 1315, and LXXXI Corps to 49th 

Div, 2140, 5 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Kampfverlauf. 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 277 

against Colonel Cox's men in the pillboxes 

east of the Rimburg woods on 6 October 

was the high-water mark of resistance to 

the XIX Corps bridgehead. Every unit 

that Koechling and Brandenberger had 

fixed upon for movement to the threatened 

sector had been absorbed by the unremlttmg pressure of the 2d Armored 

Division's CCB and the two regiments of 

the 30th Division. Although the NCO 

training schools from Dueren and J uelich 

had at last relieved the 183d Division's 

343d Regiment northwest of Geilenkirchen, that regiment was so disabled 

during the night of 5 October in piecemeal 

and inconsequential counterattacks south 

of Geilenkirchen against contingents of 

CCB that it was capable of little other 

than defensive missions. The 246th Division's 404th Regiment from Aachen had 

been thrown hurriedly into the defense 

against other units of CCB between 

Geilenkirchen and Beggendorf. At Beggendorf the Landesschuetzen hattalion 

moved up from the 12th Division sector 

was seriously depleted. Elsewhere about 

the bridgehead were the original contingents of the 49th and 183d Divisions 

and a few other miscellaneous units the 

German commanders had brought up, all 

severely damaged by the American assault. 

Sprinkled among the infantry were 

twenty-seven assault guns remaining in 

five assault-gun units. 44 

In early stages of the West Wall fighting, the Germans were denied use of at 

least one battalion of the 49th Division 

because of holding the re-entrant "bridge44 AAR, 183d VG Div; Table of Tank and 

Antitank Gun Situation as of 2100, 5 Oct 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Table of 

independent units attached to LXXXI Corps divs 

as of 5 Oct 44, in LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle 

an Div. 

head" west of the Wurm at the town of 

Kerkrade. Even as two regiments of the 

30th Division had struck at Marienberg 

and Rim burg, the third regiment, the 

120th Infantry, had made a feint against 

the German position at Kerkrade. Then, 

on 4 October, the 120th Infantry had 

staged an actual attack. After fighting 

stubbornly and launching one futile counterattack, the Germans had withdrawn 

from the bridgehead during the night. 

This freed one battalion of the I 20th 

Infantry to move the next day (5 October) to cross the W urm and fill a growing 

gap between the I 17th and I 19th Regiments southwest of Uebach. The remainder of the 120th Infantry would 

follow later. 

During the afternoon of 6 October, the 

Army Group B commander, Field Marshal 

Model, went to the LXXXI Corps command post to attempt to do what Generals 

Koechling and Brandenberger thus far 

had failed to accomplish: to assemble 

sufficient forces for making a decisive 

counterattack against the West Wall 

bridgehead. 45 But Field Marshal Model 

was too late. The Americans now were 

getting set to exploit their bridgehead; 

the Germans would have to go to extraordinary measures to assemble sufficient 

strength to push them back behind the 

Wurm. Although Field Marshal Model 

could not have known it at the time, any 

counterattack he might devise at this 

point would be directed more toward preventing a link between the XIX and VII 

U.S. Corps northeast of Aachen than 

toward eliminating the XIX Corps 

bridgehead. 

Juncture with the VII Corps to en45 Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 

1340, 6 Oct 44, in LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf. 
278 

circle Aachen now was uppermost in the 

minds of American commanders. Though 

General Corlett had hoped originally to 

use only the 30th Division for the link-up 

while the 2d Armored Division struck 

eastward for crossings over the Roer River, 

the army commander, General Hodges, 

made it clear that operations were to be 

confined to the West Wall until link-up 

was achieved. 46 In early afternoon of 6 

October, General Corlett told the armor 

to hold in place along the northeastern 

and eastern fringes of the bridgehead while 

at the same time making a main effort 

southeastward to help the 30th Division 

link with the VII Corps.47 

The stage had been set for this maneuver 

during the preceding afternoon when the 

2d Armored Division commander, General Harmon, had brought his second 

combat command, CCA, across the Wurm 

bridges into Uebach. Once the armor 

had established a solid defensive line, 

General Harmon directed, CCB was to 

hold in place while CCA assisted the 

30th Division. As finally constituted, 

CCB's defensive arc along the north, 

northeast, and east of the West Wall 

bridgehead would run from north of 

Frelenberg east along the spur railroad 

below Geilenkirchen, thence southeast 

through Waurichen almost to Beggendorf. 

The easternmost troops of CCB would be 

just over three miles beyond the Wurm 

River. 

Even before General Corlett revealed 

his change of plan in the afternoon of 6 

October, CCA had gone into action in 

conjunction with the I 17th Infantry to 

expand the bridgehead. Early that day, 

as Colonel Cox's battalion of the I 19th 

46 Corlett to OCMH, 20 May 56. 

47 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs 4, 1400, 6 Oct, 

XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs file, Oct. 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Infantry was having trouble in the pillboxes near Herbach, one column of CCA 

struck northeast to take Beggendorf and 

two other columns moved southeast. 

One headed in the direction of Baesweiler, 

southeast of Beggendorf; the other advanced close along the flank of the I 17th 

Infantry in a renewal of the infantry's 

drive on the crossroads hamlet southeast 

of Uebach, where the 117th had been 

balked the day before. The weight of 

the armor and a clear day, which permitted six close-support mISSIOns by 

fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air 

Command, provided the margin of. success. The crossroads hamlet fell· and, in 

the process, the nearby cantonment which 

had bristled the day before with German 

guns. Beggendorf also fell, and CCA's 

center column pushed more than a mile to 

the east almost to the edge of the town 

of Baesweiler. 

This success on 6 October and General 

Corlett's order in early afternoon clearly 

indicated that the fight for a West Wall 

bridgehead was nearing an end. Indeed, 

so successful were the day's operations 

that the necessity for any part of the 2d 

Armored Division to assist the 30th Division to link with the VII Corps became 

questionable. Nevertheless, CCA did 

continue to attack and by the end of 7 

October had overrun Baesweiler and 

neared the neighboring town of Oidtweiler, thereby severing a main highway 

running northeast from Aachen to the 

Roer River town of Linnich. For the 

next few days the entire 2d Armored 

Division prepared an iron defensive arc 

about the eastern and northeastern rims 

of the bridgehead while the 30th Division 

continued the southward drive alone. A 

battalion of the 29th Division's I 16th 

Infantry reinforced the armor, while the 
A SET ATTACK AGAINST THE WEST WALL 279 

rest of the I 16th Infantry relieved the two 

remaining battalions of the 120th Infantry 

at Kerkrade so that this third regiment 

might participate in the 30th Division's 

drive. 

Although German commanders had anticipated in the first days of the West Wall 

fight that the XIX Corps might swing 

southward to link with the VII Corps, by 

the time the shift occurred, German 

strength was so depleted that there was 

little German commanders could do about 

it. Though they shifted the left regiment 

of the 49th Division to control of the 

246th Division to place the defense of 

Aachen in the hands of one commander, 

the day of 7 October became a day of 

exploitation against a beaten and disorganized enemy. Approximately a thousand prisoners passed through the 30th 

Division's cage. 

Led by tanks of the attached 743d 

Tank Battalion, the I 17th Infantry 

charged two miles into the town of 

Alsdorf. Reduced now to one organic 

infantry regiment, the enemy's 49th Division could do nothing about it. One 

unit overrun was an infantry battalion of 

the 12th Division the Germans had hurriedly brought into the line the night 

before. 48 Once the Americans had broken 

a crust of resistance on the fringes of 

Alsdorf, they moved in easily. "Alsdorf 

was a ghost town ... ," one officer reported, "and it was so damned quiet it 

scared you." 

Still assisted by a battalion of the 120th 

Infantry, Colonel Sutherland's I 19th Infantry also surged southward. At the 

coal-mining town of Merkstein, one reason 

for speedy success was a well-directed 

48 AAR on opns of 7 Oct 44, 49th Inf Diu, 

10 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der 

Diu. 

American air strike; another was the 

action of a one-man army, Pvt. Salvatore 

Pepe, a scout in one of the rifle platoons. 

Pepe refused to stay down when fire 

forced his platoon to cover. Firing his 

rifle and tossing hand grenades, he charged 

forward alone, wounded four Germans, 

and induced fifty-three others to surrender. He later received the Distinguished 

Service Cross. 

At the end of the day the I 19th Infantry 

was approaching the former 120th Infantry position around Kerkrade. The 30th 

Division was only about three miles 

away from Wuerselen, the planned point 

of contact with the VII Corps. 

Late on 7 October the 30th Division 

commander, General Hobbs, reported to 

General Corlett that the XIX Corps battle 

of the West Wall was over. "We have a 

hole in this thing big enough to drive two 

divisions through," General Hobbs said. 

"I entertain no doubts that this line is 

cracked wide open." 49 The general's 

statement contained no excess exuberance, 

for the West Wall bridgehead now was 

almost six miles long and more than four 

and a half miles deep. 

Executing this attack had cost the 30th 

Division and the 2d Armored Division 

more than 1,800 casualties in all categories, including about 200 killed. 50 The 

49 30th Div Tel Jnl, 7 Oct, 30th Div G-3 file, 

7-8 Oct 44. 

50 See 30th Div G-I Jnl Supplements, Oct 44, 

Daily Cumulative Casualty Estimates, and CCR, 

2d Armd Div, S-3 Per Rpt, 1-10 Oct 44, CCB 

AAR, Oct 44. See also 2d Armd Div AAR, Oct 

44. Figures for CCA, 2d Armored Division, are 

available only for the entire month of October; 

the author has made a conservative estimate of 

CCA losses based on the total for the entire 

month and on CCB losses during a comparable 

period in the bridgehead battle. The 30th Division estimate includes the 120th Infantry but not 

attached units. 
280 

cost in medium tanks to CCB alone was 

fifty-two. 51 Although high, these losses 

were hardly disparate in relation to the 

importance of the task as a prerequisite 

to a renewal of First Army's drive to the 

Rhine. Not only had these two divisions 

ruptured the West Wall, they also had 

forced the Germans to take extraordinary 

steps and expend precious units and materiel. A capsule indication of the extent 

to which the enemy had gone to fight 

the penetration might be found in the 

number of big guns he had assembled 

against it. In their futile stand, the Ger51 Compare losses of the entire 7th Armored 

Division in the unsuccessful Peel Marshes offensive. See Ch. X above. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

mans had employed at least 2 railroad 

guns, a battalion of "very heavy" howitzers, 40 105-mm. howitzers, 47 I50-mm. 

howitzers, 32 88-mm. guns, 40 antitank 

guns of 75-mm. caliber or larger, and 

approximately 50 assault guns of varying 

type and caliber. 52 

The first set attack against the West 

Wall was over. Though the 30th Division 

infantrymen and their supporting tankers 

might discern no break in the round-theclock combat routine, the battle now was 

entering a new phase. The next step was 

to link with the VII Corps and encircle 

the city of Aachen. 

52 This estimate is based on Heichler, The 

Germans Opposite XIX Corps. 
CHAPTER XII 

Closing the Circle 

Militarily, the city of Aachen in October 1944 had little to recommend it. 

Lying in a saucerlike depression surrounded by hills, Aachen is no natural 

fortress, nor was it an artificial fortress, 

even though it lay within the two bands 

of the West Wall. The city's roads were 

relatively unimportant, since American 

drives both north and south of Aachen 

already had uncovered adequate avenues 

leading toward the Rhine. Not for a 

long time would the city's railroads be of 

use to anyone, so shattered were they 

already from Allied bombs.! 

But in regard to Aachen the Germans 

had more to work with than usual military considerations. Nor was Hitler's 

insistence upon a fanatical, house-by-house 

defense of the city simply a superficial 

propagandism of the first major German 

city to be threatened with capture. No 

shrine of National Socialism in the sense 

of Munich or Nuremberg, Aachen nevertheless embodied a heritage precious to 

National Socialist ideology. Aachen represented the Holy Roman Empire, the 

First Reich. 

Hitler had no need to remind his 

followers of Aachen's proud history, how 

at one time Aachen was capital of the 

Holy Roman Empire. The Germans 

would know that here, where the Romans 

had built thermal baths amid an alien 

1 See 1St Lt Harry D. Condron, The Fall of 

Aachen, a preliminary MS in 1St Div Combat 

Interv files. 

wilderness, a Carolingian king had established his residence in Aquisgranum in 

the 8th century A.D. That here his son 

Charles was born-Charlemagne, first 

emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. 

That from Aachen Charlemagne had 

reigned over an empire destined to lilst, in 

one form or another, more than a thousand years. That in Aachen, between the 

years 8 I 3 and 153 I, thirty-two emperors 

and kings had been anointed. 

Hitler and his disciples were aware 

further how Aachen and the Holy Roman 

Empire were tied to National Socialism. 

After Napoleon had smashed the legalistic 

shell to which by the year 1806 the political reality of the Empire had been 

reduced, the romantic element in German 

nationalism soon had forgotten the jibes 

leveled at the "Holy Roman Empire of 

the German Nation" and had identified 

itself with the ideological Empire, one of 

the eternal verities transcending temporal 

politics and nations, the secular counterpart of the universal Church. The romantic element in German nationalism in 

time had become the religion of National 

Socialism. Hitler himself often prophesied that his empire, like Charlemagne's, 

would last a thousand years. 

To strike at Aachen was to strike at a 

symbol of Nazi faith. 2 

For all the importance of Aachen as a 

trademark of Nazi ideology, the Germans 

2 For a similar view, see MS # A-ggi (Koechling, comdr of the LXXXI Corps). 
ENCIRCLEMENT OF AACHEN 

7- 20 October 1944 

~ AXIS OF MAIN u.s. ATTACK 

AMERICAN POSITION, NIGHT 20 OCT 

F=lF=iF=l. GERMAN LINE, MORNING 70er 

0000000 GERMAN MLR,NIGHT 20 OCT 

CD LOUSBERG ® SALVATORBERG @ FARWICK PARK 

Elevations in meters 

MAP 4 

F. Temple 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

in early October were little better qualified to deny the city indefinitely than they 

had been in September when the 116th 

Panzer Division's General von Schwerin 

had despaired of holding the city and 

sought to spare it further fighting. 

Schwerin long since had traveled the 

ignominious path of military relief, and 

his division had been withdrawn for refitting and reorganization; yet the higher 

headquarters which earlier had borne 

responsibility for the city still was on 

hand. This was Koechling's LXXXI 

Corps under Brandenberger's Seventh 

Army. That the LXXXI Corps was no 

leviathan already had been proved during 

the early days of October by the West 

Wall penetration of the XIX Corps. 

On 7 October, as the XIX Corps 

entered Alsdorf on the first step of what 

looked like an easy move to encircle 

Aachen, General Koechling's LXXXI 

Corps comprised a nominal four divisions. 

(Map 4) North of Aachen were the 183d 

V olks Grenadier and 49th Infantry Divisions, both severely hurt by the American West Wall breakthrough. Aachen 

itself lay in the sector of the 246th V olks 

Grenadier Division, commanded by Col. 

Gerhard Wilck, the division which in late 

September had relieved the 116th Panzer 

Division. Southeast of Aachen the southern wing of the German corps was 

defended by Colonel Engel's 12th Infantry 

Division, which had arrived in the nick of 

time to thwart a breakthrough in the 

Stolberg Corridor but which had drawn 

a bloody nose in the process. The sum 

total of organic infantry and artillery combat effectives in these four divisions on 7 

October was about 18,000 men. 3 

3 LXXXI Corps, KTB, Anlagen, Meldungen 

der Diu. This figure takes no account of division staffs and organic service troops, corps 

283 

The LXXXI Corps had increased considerably since mid-September in artillery 

strength. Divisional and corps artillery 

totaled 239 serviceable pieces: 140 light, 

84 medium, and 15 heavy guns. An 

antiaircraft regiment provided added 

strength. Ammunition apparently was 

adequate except for 14 Russian guns 

which had neither ammunition nor transport. Moreover, four headquarters artillery battalions to serve under corps control 

were en route to the sector on 7 October.4 

Tank and antitank strength in the 

LXXXI Corps was less impressive. 

Among the divisional tank destroyer battalions were 12 serviceable assault guns 

and 26 heavy antitank guns, while under 

corps control were 2 assault gun brigades, 

2 assault gun battalions, and a robot tank 

company, with a combined total of only 

36 serviceable pieces. The 506th Tank 

Battalion had only 4 Mark VI (Tiger) 

tanks, while the 108th Panzer Brigade 

with 7 Mark V (Panther) tanks was 

troops, or attached units. For the German story, 

see Lucian Heichler, The Fall of Aachen, a 

manuscript prepared to complement this volume, 

in OCMH. 

4 LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen, Kampf um 

Aachen (Corps AAR on Second Battle of 

Aachen) (hereafter cited as LXXXI Corps, 

Kampf um Aachen). For historical purposes, 

the Germans divided the fighting around Aachen 

into three phases or "battles": first, penetration 

of the West Wall by the VII U.S. Corps in September; second, penetration of the West Wall 

north of Aachen and encirclement and reduction 

of the city; and third, operations east of Aachen 

in November, referred to in this volume as the 

"Battle of the Roer Plain." As a result of 

preservation of LXXXI Corps records covering 

the period of the "Second Battle of Aachen," 

plus many other types of sources, detailed information on almost every aspect of this engagement 

from the German side is available. Only a small 

portion could be used in this study. Additional 

details may be derived from the original records 

and from Heichler, The Fall of Aachen. 
284 

arriving in the sector on 7 October. 

Almost all these tanks and guns were 

clustered in the vicinity of Alsdorf where 

the XIX U.S. Corps was pressing southward in the direction of Wuerselen. 5 

In light of the condition and location of 

three of General Koechling's four divisions, the burden of the fighting at Aachen 

might fall upon the most recent arrival, 

the 246th V olks Grenadier Division. 

Though this division had engaged in no 

major action in its own sector, Colonel 

Wilck's troops already had been decisively 

weakened. In the desperate efforts to 

stem the XIX Corps breakthrough, General Koechling had rifled his front, including four of Colonel Wilck's seven organic 

infantry battalions. The entire 404th Infantry Regiment and a battalion each of 

the 352d and 689th Infantry Regiments 

had been attached to neighboring divisions. 

From a local standpoint, the outlook for 

preserving Aachen as a citadel of Nazi 

ideology was bleak indeed. Yet General 

Koechling's superiors had not let him 

down completely. Their most immediate 

step was to try again to assemble an 

effective counterattacking force from diverse elements to strike this time at Alsdorf 

in hopes of thwarting encirclement of 

Aachen. The main component of this 

force was to be Mobile (Schnelle) Regiment von Fritzschen, which comprised 

three battalions of bicycle-mounted infantry and engineers. Ma jor support was 

to come from the I08th Panzer Brigade 

and a total of twenty-two assault guns 

from various units. 6 

Any genuine hope of denying Aachen 

for an extended time lay not with this small 

5 LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen. 

6 Order, 49th Inf Div to Regt von Fritzschen, 

8 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen deT 

Div. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

force but with a promise from Commander in Chief West von Rundstedt 

to commit his most important theater 

reserves. These were the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier and 116th Panzer Divisions. 

Attaching these to headquarters of the I 

SS Panzer Corps (General der Waffen SS 

Georg Keppler), Rundstedt directed major operations intended to restore the 

situation about Aachen. Since leaving 

Aachen in September, the 116th Panzer 

Division had been built up to about 

1 1,500 men and its tank regiment restored, but of 151 authorized Mark IV 

and Mark V tanks only 41 were on hand. 

Although the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division was little more than a motorized 

infantry division, it numbered about 

12,000 men and had 31 75-mm. antitank 

guns and 38 artillery pieces.7 

Through 5, 6, and 7 October General 

Koechling had waited in vain for appearance of these reserves. They were on the 

way, but railroad disruptions from Allied 

air attacks had imposed serious delays. 

General Koechling feared catastrophe at 

Aachen before the reserves could be 

committed.8 

From the American viewpoint, the 

timing of the operation to encircle and 

reduce Aachen depended upon the progress of the West Wall penetration north of 

the city. As soon as the XIX Corps 

drive to the vicinity of Wuerselen gave 

evidence of success, General Collins' VII 

Corps was to attack north from a jumpoff base at Eilendorf, east of Aachen, 

seize Verlautenheide, a strongpoint in the 

second band of the West Wall, and meet 

7 See General Inspekteur der Panzertruppen, 

Zustandsberichte Panzer-Divisionen, Sep-Oct 44, 

and Zustandsberichte· Panzer Grenadier-Divisionen, Oct 44-Jan 45. 

8 OB WEST KTB, 5, 7 Oct 44. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

the XIX Corps near Wuerselen. With 

Aachen isolated, a part of the VII Corps 

might reduce the city at leisure while the 

XIX Corps and the rest of the VII Corps 

drove east and northeast to the Roer 

River. 9 

The broad outlines of this maneuver 

had been determined when the First Army 

first was approaching the German border. 

That various factors had delayed the XIX 

Corps outside the West Wall until October and that the Germans had halted the 

overextended VII Corps in the Stolberg 

Corridor had in no way decreased the 

necessity of occupying Aachen eventually. 

Indeed, the job had become more pressing. 

Containing the city was tying down the 

equivalent of a division, a precious commodity needed for more remunerative 

tasks. Besides, indications were that German propagandists were trying to make of 

Aachen a rallying point, a kind of German 

Stalingrad. 

Events at Alsdorf on 7 October convinced commanders on the American side 

that the time to force the issue at Aachen 

was at hand. To the commander of the 

30th Division, General Hobbs, the job of 

moving three more miles from Alsdorf 

south to the intercorps boundary and the 

link-up objective of Wuerselen appeared 

at worst no more than a two-day assignment. General Hobbs urged that the VII 

Corps waste no time in launching the 

other part of the encirclement maneuver. 10 

The 30th Division alone bore responsibility for the XIX Corfls role in the 

encirclement. Except for the 30th Division and the 2d Armored Division, which 

was holding the eastern and northeastern 

9 FUSA Dir, 29 Sep, as cited in FUSA and 

VII Corps AARs, Oct 44. 

10 30th Div AAR and G-3 Jnl file, Oct 44; 

Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 126. 

285 

arcs of the West Wall bridgehead, the 

rest of General Corlett's corps still was 

occupied with the attenuated north flank 

west of the West Wall. Although Corlett 

on 6 October had stipulated that the 

armor help the 30th Division, he had 

grown wary of taking the armor away 

from defense of the West Wall bridgehead 

and left the task of link-up to the infantry 

alone. 11 He had strengthened the two 

regiments of the 30th Division in the 

West Wall by providing relief of the 120th 

Infantry, which had been containing Germans southwest of the West Wall penetration at Kerkrade. He then committed 

the 120th between the 117th and I 19th 

Regiments. 

By virtue of positions on an arc containing Aachen on the south and east, General 

Huebner's 1st Division ~as the logical 

choice to fulfill the role of the VII Corps. 

For more than a fortnight General Huebner had known his assignment; when 

General Hodges in late afternoon of 7 

October endorsed the recommendation 

that the VII Corps begin to attack, the 

1st Division needed little time for preparation. General Huebner announced a 

night attack to commence· before dawn 

the next day, 8 OctoberP 

General Huebner's primary concern in 

planning his part of the encirclement 

maneuver had been to reduce his long 

defensive frontage-more than twelve 

miles along a semicircle west, south, and 

east of Aachen-and thereby free at least 

one regiment to make the attack. Since 

the 9th Division was committed in the 

Huertgen Forest and the 3d Armored 

11 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs, 6 Oct, XIX Corps 

Ltrs of Instrs file, Oct 44; subsequent tel convs 

between Corlett and Hobbs,· 30th Div G-3 Jnl 

file, Oct 44. 

12 VII Corps AAR, Oct 44. 
286 

Division at Stolberg, his corps commander, 

General Collins, had been unable to provide much help. He had exercised the 

only possibility, to put a corps engineer 

unit, the I 106th Engineer Combat Group 

(Col. Thomas DeF. Rogers), into the line 

south of Aachen, thus to release two 

battalions of the 18th Infantry to join the 

rest of. the regiment for the first blow 

north against Verlautenheide. Another 

regiment, the 16th Infantry, could not 

participate in the offensive because of the 

necessity to defend the division's northeastern wing from a point near Eilendorf 

to a boundary with the 3d Armored 

Division at Stolberg. The third regiment, 

the 26th Infantry, also held a defensive 

line; yet the positions faced Aachen from 

the southeast so that the 26th Infantry 

might assault the city itself after the 18th 

Infantry had taken Verlautenheide and 

linked with the XIX Corps. 

In terms of distance, the 18th Infantry's 

northward attack was no mammoth undertaking~only two and a half miles. 

On the other hand, terrain, pillboxes, and 

German determination to hold supply 

routes into Aachen posed a thorny problem. The first objective of Verlautenhe ide in the second band of the West Wall 

was on the forward slope of a sharp ridge, 

denied by a maze of pillboxes provided 

with excellent fields of fire across open 

ground. Crucifix Hill (Hill 239), a 

thousand yards northwest of Verlautenheide, was the next objective, another 

exposed crest similarly bristling with 

pillboxes. The third and final objective 

was equally exposed and fortified: Ravels 

Hill (the Ravelsberg, Hill 23 I). 

Taking these hills was in itself no minor 

assignment, yet holding them afterward 

might prove even more difficult. This 

would absorb the regiment's three batTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

talions successively and leave them exposed in a thin salient to German blows 

from two sides. To send to the 18th 

Infantry's assistance, General Huebner 

had in reserve but one battalion of the 

26th Infantry, plus a hope that some 

contingent of' the 3d Armored Division 

might be released to his aid. One way he 

hoped to spare the 18th Infantry was to 

launch the drive against the city itself 

the minute encirclement was complete, 

thereby to tie down those Germans west 

of the 18th Infantry's salientY 

Perhaps because the 1st Division had 

faced the enemy at Aachen for several 

weeks, the G-2, Lt. Col. Robert F. Evans, 

had a fairly accurate impression of enemy 

strength and dispositions. Counting support and service troops, his figure of 

12,000 Germans in Aachen and the 

immediate vicinity was fairly accurate, 

even though attempts to halt the American penetration north of Aachen had 

sapped considerable strength from the 

246th Division. Identifying this division 

and its neighbors correctly, Colonel Evans 

also ascertained most of the combat attachments to the 246th Division. These 

inclu'ded a weak infantry battalion that 

formerly had belonged to the 27Sth Division, a battalion of Luftwaffe ground 

troops, a machine gun fortress battalion, 

and a Landesschuetzen battalion. The 

local or "fortress" commander of Aachen, 

Colonel Evans correctly identified as Lt. 

Col. Maximilian Leyherr. Neither Evans 

13 Unless otherwise noted, the 1st Division 

story is based on official unit records and combat 

interviews. The records include a special account, Report of Breaching the Siegfried Line 

and the Capture of Aachen, dated 7 November 

1944. A division history, Danger Forward (Atlanta, 1947), is primarily a collection of 

impressions by war correspondents, of little value 

for this study. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

nor intelligence officers of neighboring 

units knew of Gennan plans to commit the 

3d Panzer Grenadier and [[6th Panzer 

Divisions; yet if events marched at the 

same pace as in recent days, the issue of 

Aachen might be settled before these reserves arrived. 

The [8th Infantry Drives North 

In preparing for the attack northward 

against Verlautenheide, the 18th Infantry 

commander, Col. George A. Smith, Jr., 

turned to the lessons he and his men had 

learned in their first encounter with the 

West Wall in September. Special pillbox 

assault teams were organized and 

equipped with flame throwers, Bangalore 

torpedoes, beehives, and pole and satchel 

demolition charges. A battery of 155-

mm. guns and a company of tank 

destroyers, both self-propelled, were prepared to spew direct fire against the 

pillboxes on the slope about Verlautenheide. An air-ground liaison officer was 

to accompany each infantry battalion. 

Preceding the attack, eleven artillery battalions and a company of 4.2-inch chemical 

mortars were to fire an hour-long preparation. The division's other two regiments 

and the I I06th Engineers were to feign 

attack in their sectors. After daylight, a 

company of medium tanks was to join 

the infantry in the village. 

Linked with a clever use of the cloak of 

night, Colonel Smith's elaborate preparations paid off, not only at Verlautenheide 

but against Crucifix Hill (Hill 239) and 

Ravels Hill (Hill 23 I) as well. Attacking 

before dawn on 8 October, a battalion 

commanded by Lt. Col. John Williams 

took full advantage of preliminary artillery 

fires and the darkness to gain Verlautenheide against defenders who for the most 

287 

part cringed in their foxholes or pillboxes 

until too late. Other than minor disorganization inherent in a night attack, only 

one platoon, which stirred up a hornet's 

nest of machine gun fire along the Eilendorf-Verlautenheide road, met any real 

difficulty. 

That afternoon a company of another 

battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Henry 

G. Leonard, Jr., followed preparation 

fires closely to overrun Crucifix Hill in an 

hourY A giant crucifix atop the hill 

was demolished later in the afternoon, 

victim either of shellfire or of American 

infantrymen who thought the Gennans 

had used it as an observation post. The 

next night, 9 October, two companies 

slipped through the darkness past the 

yawning apertures of enemy pillboxes to 

gain the crest of Ravels Hill without 

firing a shot. Even mop-up of eight 

pillboxes at dawn the next morning was 

accomplished without shooting. Unaware 

that the Americans had taken the hill, 

four Germans unwittingly arrived during 

the morning of 10 October with hot food 

for sixty-five men, a welcome change for 

the Americans from cold emergency 

rations. 

This was not to say that the 18th 

Infantry did not encounter serious fighting 

during the forty-eight hours it took to 

occupy the three objectives. Indeed, 

small-scale but persistent German counterattacks began as early as dawn the first 

morning (8 October) , then reached a 

zenith during the morning of 9 October. 

14 A driving force in the attack on Crucifix 

Hill was the company commander, Capt. Bobbie 

E. Brown. Though wounded three times, Captain Brown personally led. the attack and knocked 

out three pillboxes himself. He subsequently 

received the Medal of Honor. 
288 

Since the enemy's 246th Division was 

absorbing punishment on two fronts, both 

from the 18th Infantry's northward push 

and from southward attacks by the XIX 

Corps, the Germans had a real problem 

in releasing troops for counterattack. A 

solution was possible only because the 

Americans' northward thrust was on a 

limited front. Shifting the boundary between the 246th and 12th Divisions two 

miles to the west at Verlautenheide, General Koechling transferred responsibility 

for most of the sector threa:tened by the 

18th Infantry to the 12th Division, heretofore untouched by the American attack.15 

More damaging than the local counterattacks was German shelling. Perhaps 

because both U.S. attacks to encircle 

Aachen were confined to a combined front 

measuring little more than five miles, the 

Germans could concentrate their artillery 

fire with deadly effectiveness. No sooner 

had Colonel Williams' infantry in Verlautenheide begun mop-up of pillboxes 

and buildings at daylight on the first 

morning than this shelling began. As 

riflemen left their foxholes to ferret the 

Germans from their hiding places, the 

shellfire took an inevitable toll. Shelling 

of open ground between Eilendorf and 

Verlautenheide prevented Colonel Leonard's battalion from reaching jump-off 

positions for the attack on Crucifix Hill 

until midafternoon of the first day. 

Neither were supporting tanks immune. 

Shying at the fire and maneuvering to 

avoid it, a company of tanks seeking to 

join the infantry in Verlautenheide lost 

six tanks to mines, panzerfausts, mud, 

and mechanical failure. 

15 LXXXI Corps, Kampf um Aachen. Unless 

otherwise noted, subsequent German material in 

this chapter is based upon the same source. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

After capture of Crucifix and Ravels 

Hills, both these exposed heights were 

subjected to round after round of German 

fire. Captured pillboxes on the" crests 

represented the only cover worthy of the 

name. When two tank destroyers tried to 

climb Ravels Hill, the enemy scored direct 

hits on both. In Verlautenheide Colonel 

Williams' infantrymen lived in cellars, 

popping out to man their foxholes only as 

shelling temporarily diminished and German assault appeared imminent. Because 

of thick morning mists that persisted in 

the form of ground haze for three days, 

neither American planes nor counterbattery artillery fires could deal effectively 

with the Gennan guns. 

Despite the shelling, the counterattacks, 

and the fact that the three battalions of 

the 18th Infantry were stretched thin, 

the regimental commander, Colonel Smith, 

succeeded in freeing two rifle companies 

to seize a fourth objective on 10 October. 

This was Haaren, a suburb of Aachen 

controlling the highway to Juelich between Crucifix and Ravels Hills. The 

division commander, General Huebner, 

wanted Haaren because capturing it 

would cut one of two major supply routes 

left to the Germans in Aachen. Just as 

in the 18th Infantry's three other attacks, 

the infantry found seizure of this objective 

relatively easy; mop-up and defense 

proved the harder tasks. 

Occupation of Haaren underscored the 

success achieved during the preceding 

night against Ravels Hill. Because the 

position for making contact with the XIX 

Corps was at the base of Ravels Hill, the 

18th Infantry's offensive role in encirclement of Aachen was over. Yet the regiment's defensive role might be stretched; 

for the 30th Division, which was making 

the XIX Corps attack, had encountered 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

unexpected resistance during the last three 

days. 

To General Huebner, a final sealing of 

the ring about Aachen nevertheless must 

have appeared little more than formality. 

On 10 October he ordered delivery of an 

ultimatum to the commander of the enemy 

garrison in Aachen. If the commander 

failed to capitulate unconditionally within 

twenty-four hours, the ultimatum warned, 

the Americans would pulverize the city 

with artillery and bombs, then seize the 

rubble by ground assault. Already troops 

of the 26th Infantry were jockeying for 

position in preparation for starting the 

attack against a jungle of factories lying 

between the city proper and Haaren. 

Full meaning of the capture of Ravels 

Hill was no more lost upon German 

commanders than upon General Huebner. 

Appealing for replacements, Field Marshal 

Model reported in the trite phraseology of 

the day that "the situation around Aachen 

has grown more critical." Unless replacements arrived, Model noted, "continued reverses will be unavoidable." 16 

Though making no promise of individual replacements, the 0 B WEST commander, Rundstedt, took notice of the 

first arrivals of the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

and 116th Panzer Divisions in the Aachen 

sector on 10 October. On the same day 

he gave first official authorization for 

commitment of these two divisions under 

the I SS Panzer Corps. Yet several days 

still might elapse before the 18th Infantry 

or any part of the 1st Division encountered these reserves, for to his authorization Rundstedt attached a proviso that 

the reserve divisions must not be committed piecemeal but as closed units. In 

16 TWX, Rundstedt to Jodi, 1130, II Oct 44, 

relaying Msg, Model to Rundstedt, 1045, 10 Oct 

44, OB WEST KTB, Be/ehle und Meldungen. 

289 

the light of this condition, the Army 

Group B commander, Field Marshal 

Model, saw no hope of a major counterattack before 12 October. 

In the meantime, as these German 

reserves massed, as the ultimatum to the 

commander of Aachen expired, and as the 

26th Infantry began to attack the city, 

the 18th Infantry continued to hold thinly 

stretched positions at Verlautenheide and 

Haaren and atop Crucifix and Ravels 

Hills. Long days and nights in the line 

began to tell on the infantrymen, sometimes with costly results. One night 

someone in a group laying antitank mines 

on Ravels Hill inadvertently set off one of 

the mines and precipitated a chain reaction that exploded twenty-two mines. 

Some thirty-three men were either killed 

or wounded. Another night a rifle company commander guided a relief platoon 

from a different company toward his own 

defensive positions from the enemy side. 

Confusion and casualties resulted before he 

could convince his own men of his 

identity. Setting out on two occasions to 

contact the 30th Division to the north, 

patrols made virtually no headway. Possibly no patrol could have accomplished 

the mission, and accidents like those with 

the mines and loss of direction are not 

uncommon; yet the fact remained that 

the men involved were nervous and tired. 

Even when not defending their foxholes 

or hugging the earth to escape shell fragments, they had to attack to clean out a 

multitude of pillboxes that dotted the 

landscape or man roadblocks on highways 

running on either side of Ravels Hill. 

Relieving these battalions for rest was out 

of the question in view of the impoverished 

state of General Huebner's reserve. 

The Germans missed a chance for success when they failed to detect the true 
290 

condition of the 18th Infantry's defenses. 

Here was a likely spot for counterattacking to enlarge the pathway into Aachen, 

yet the Germans in preparing a counterattack missed the spot by a few hundred 

yards. 

That the Germans might be preparing 

a big blow became apparent to the 1st 

Division on 14 October upon receipt of an 

intelligence report noting that the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division was moving to 

the Aachen sector. Through the early 

daylight hours of 15 October, both the 

18th Infantry and its sister regiment, the 

16th Infantry, which defended between 

Verlautenheide and Stolberg, reported 

build-up of German infantry and armor in 

the vicinity of Verlautenheide. By 0830, 

despite repeated shelling of enemy concentrations, reports indicating a pending 

attack persisted. An air strike by fighterbombers at 0900 seemingly failed to deter 

German preparations. An hour later the 

Germans attacked. 

To the Americans, the thrust which 

followed was a powerful, well-prepared 

attack that shattered nerves at more than 

one echelon of command. In reality, the 

thrust was a hasty compromise growing 

out of events that had begun as early as 

five days before on 10 October. On that 

day, in cognizance of indications that 

Aachen might be sealed off before the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier and 116th Panzer Divisions arrived in entirety, Field Marshal 

Model at Army Group B authorized piecemeal employment of first arrivals of the 

116th Panzer DivisionY Although this 

measure was to be used only in event of 

di're emergency threatening loss of all 

access to Aachen, German commanders 

17 TWX, A Gp B to Seventh Army, I 145, 10 

Oct 44, A Gp B, Operationsbefehle. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

on the ground had not far to look during 

these hectic days to find plenty of dire 

emergenCIes. Less than twenty-four hours 

after receipt of Model's authorization, the 

Seventh Army's General Brandenberger 

directed commitment of a regiment of the 

panzer division against the XIX U.S. 

Corps. 

This precedent established, Brandenberger had no real trouble convincing his 

superiors that another emergency existed 

at Verlautenheide, justifying commitment 

there of the 3d Pan.zer Grenadier Division. 

A comprehensive plan for a co-ordinated 

counterattack thus became infected with 

the fungus of counterattack by installments that quickly ate away what could 

have been an effective reserve force. 

German counterattacks now had no genuine relationship other than a common goal 

of widening the corridor into Aachen. 

Subordinated directly to the Seventh 

Army rather than the LXXXI Corps, the 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division concentrated upon a first objective of high 

ground south and southwest of Verlautenheide, lying generally between that village 

and Eilendorf. From there the division 

commander, Generalmajor Walter Denkert, intended to swing northwest against 

Crucifix Hill (Hill 239) .18 

General Denkert directed his 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to make the main 

effort on the north from the skirt of a 

forest east of Verlautenheide. With a 

current strength of from ten to fifteen 

Tiger tanks, the bulk of the 506th Tank 

Battalion was to support the main effort. 

18 The German side of this action is based 

upon MS # A-979, Die 3. Panzer-GrenadierDivision in der Schlacht von Aachen (Denkert). 

Basic facts are corroborated by contemporary 

German records. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

Anchoring a left (south) flank on the 

Aachen-Dueren railroad east of Eilendorf, 

the 8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was 

to launch a coincident subsidiary attack. 

From the American viewpoint, the two 

German thrusts were to strike near the 

boundary between the 18th and 16th 

Regiments south of Verlautenheide. Here 

a 2,000-yard front covering the high 

ground between Verlautenheide and Eilendorf was held by a battalion of the 

16th Infantry commanded by Lt. Col. 

Joe Dawson. The German thrusts were 

to converge not against the weakened 18th 

Infantry but against the extreme left wing 

of the 16th Infantry. 

Upon leaving the woods line that represented the line of departure, both German columns had to cross a flat open 

meadow before reaching the base of the 

high ground held by Colonel Dawson's 

battalion. Forewarned by reports of 

enemy assembly, artillery of both the 1st 

Division and the VII Corps was ready. 

U sing prearranged fires, six field artillery 

battalions were able to concentrate their 

fire within six minutes of the first warning. Watching the attack from the 

woods line, the German commander, General Denkert, was iIppressed with the 

volume of American shellfire. "It was 

obvious," General Denkert noted later, 

"that an advance through this fire was 

impossible. It was equally impossible to 

feed the attack from the rear, to move up 

reserves or ammunition." 

General Denkert had no way of knowing that his attack actually was much 

closer to success than he believed. 

Though the defensive artillery fires stopped 

the bulk of his infantry, the Tiger tanks 

ploughed through to pour direct fire into 

American foxholes. The men said some 

of the tanks were captured Shermans and 

291 

that one still bore the unit markings of an 

American armored division. 19 

About noon, less than half an hour 

after the full fury of the attack hit, Colonel Dawson reported communications to 

his two left companies disrupted and the 

situation there "serious." The commander of one of the companies had 

called for artillery fire upon his own 

command post. "Put every gun you've 

got on it," he told his artillery observer. 

Only a short while later, a messenger 

arrived at Colonel Dawson's command 

post. The Germans, the messenger 

reported, were overrunning both companies.20 

Possibly because he had so little concrete knowledge of what was going on, 

the regimental commander, Col. Frederick W. Gibb, delayed committing his 

reserve, which consisted only of tanks and 

tank destroyers. A section each of light 

tanks and tank destroyers in position in 

the threatened sector had managed to 

make but one kill. Instead, Colonel 

Gibb called for air support and for whatever assistance the 18th Infantry might 

provide. A report that the 18th Infantry's right wing company had been 

overrun already had prompted the 18th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Smith, to 

send a company from Haaren to set the 

matter right. Finding the report erroneous upon arrival at Verlautenheide in 

midafternoon, this company subsequently 

assumed defensive positions blocking a 

gap along the interregimental boundary. 

This was the only force Colonel Smith 

could spare. 

General Huebner wasted no time alerting the division reserve, the battalion of 

the 26th Infantry, and requesting the 

19 The 5th; possibly captured at Wallendorf. 

20 16th Inf S-3 Jnl, 15 Oct 44. 
292 

corps commander, General Collins, to 

alert anything the 3d Armored Division 

might spare. But like Colonel Gibb, General Huebner delayed committing the reserve until he could kno"Y more specifically 

the extent of the enemy attack. 

In the meantime, both corps and division artillery continued to pound the 

German attack. Seven battalions, plus 

some of the 3d Armored Division's 

artillery, participated. Although the situation remained obscure on Colonel Dawson's left wing, the attack by the 8th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which hit a 

company on the right wing, definitely 

collapsed in the face of this fire and after 

loss of two out of three supporting 

tanks. The situation there never reached 

critical proportions. 

Arrival of air support in time to save 

the day appeared doubtful until at 1340 

the 30th Division announced release of a 

squadron which already had dispensed 

most of its bombs but which still had 

plenty of strafing ammunition. Ten minutes later P-47's of the 48th Group's 

492d Squadron led by Capt. George W. 

Huling, Jr., were over the 16th Infantry's 

lines. Two 5oo-pound general-purpose 

bombs that the squadron still had the 

pilots dropped "in the midst" of a concentration of some thirty German vehicles. 

Then they strafed. "They came in about 

25 feet frl;>m our front lines," an ecstatic 

1st Division G-3 later reported, "and 

strafed the hell out of the enemy and 

came down so low they could tell the 

difference between the uniforms." It I 

was a "beautiful job." So impressed by 

the performance was the corps commander, General Collins, that he sought 

the number of the squadron in order to 

commend the pilots.21 

Though the air strike alone hardly 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

could be credited with stopping the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division's attack, it 

effectively crowned the achievements of 

the artillery. The fire fight went on at 

close quarters for the rest of the day, but 

no real penetration developed. As the 

situation cleared, General Huebner held 

on to his reserve. A battalion of tanks 

from the 3d Armored Division, made available at the height of the fighting, 

likewise remained uncommitted. 

Lack of persistence certainly was no 

failing of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. Despite the sound defeat during 

the afternoon of 15 October, the Germans 

came back before daylight the next morning. By the light of flares, Colonel 

Dawson's left unit, Company G, spotted 

a company of infantry and two tanks as 

they reached the very brink of the defensive position. Quickly overrunning two 

squads, the Germans poured through. 

Confusion reigned. "Nobody knew what 

the situation was," someone said later, 

"because the enemy was in front and on 

both sides of you." Soon thereafter another German company and three tanks 

struck the adjacent unit as well. This 

company commander resorted to the 

stratagem of calling down artillery fire 

on his own positions. His men later 

counted some forty enemy dead. 

The main threat remained on the left 

in the sector of Company G. So concerned was General Huebner about the 

situation there that he released a company 

of his reserve battalion to back up the 

threatened sector and directed the rest of 

the reserve to move to an assembly area 

close behind the line. 

Though the reserve stood by, it never 

21 See Msg, sub: Mission Y-2I-I, FUSA G-3 

file, Oct 44, and IX FC and IX TAC Unit History, Oct 44. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

entered the fight. Aided by mortar and 

artillery support that was possible because 

communications remained constant, Colonel Dawson's infantry alone proved equal 

to the occasion. Though Germans were 

all among the foxholes and the enemy 

tanks perched little more than twenty-five 

yards away to pump fire into the holes, 

the men held their positions. Had it been 

daylight, the sight of some withdrawing 

might have infected others; as it was, the 

men stayed, basically unaware of what 

the over-all situation was. Out of little 

clumps of resistance and individual heroism they fashioned a sturdy phalanx. 

Colonel Dawson tried to institute a 

fire plan whereby his men were to burrow 

deep in their holes while he called down 

a curtain of shellfire on and behind the 

enemy tanks. Coincidentally, a platoon 

of tank destroyers was to engage the 

Germans frontally. "The whole thing," 

Colonel Dawson said, "is to knock them 

out or make them fight." 22 Whether 

this did the job-indeed, whether the plan 

worked at all in the maelstrom of confusion-went unrecorded. What mattered 

was that soon after dawn the German 

tanks fell back under concealment of I a 

heavy ground haze. The threatened 

rifle company soon thereafter cleared the 

last enemy from the positions. 

At intervals throughout 16 October the 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division continued 

to probe this weakened sector but usually 

with small units of infantry supported by 

two or three tanks. The Germans had 

lost their chance to break through, 

thwarted by a rifle company that would 

not recognize when it was beaten. 

The preponderance of losses incurred 

thus far by the 1st Division had occurred 

22 16th Inf S-3 Jnl, 15-16 Oct 44. 

293 

during the first two days while the 18th 

Infantry was pushing northward and during 15 and 16 October while the left wing 

of the 16th Infantry was repulsing these 

enemy thrusts. During the first two days 

the division incurred 360 casualties of all 

types; during the latter two, 178. 

Through 16 October the 1st Division had 

lost about 800 men, a relatively low 

figure that reflected the defensive nature 

of much of the fighting.23 

On the German side, severe losses 

prompted abandonment of the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division's fruitless counterattack until the division could regroup.24 

In but two days of fighting, this division 

had lost about one third of its combat 

effectives.25 Men of the 16th Infantry 

could attest to these losses; for in front 

of the left company alone they counted 

250 dead, "a figure," the G-3 noted, 

"unprecedented in the division's history." 

That went a long way toward explaining 

why the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division 

never again came close to breaking the 1st 

Division's defensive arc. 

The 30th Division Strikes South 

Thus had the 1st Division seized and 

then protected its assigned objectives during the first nine days of the operation to 

encircle Aachen. In the meantime, farther north, the 30th Division of the XIX 

Corps had been executing the other part 

of the joint maneuver. 

Having turned southward from the 

West Wall penetration in high spirits on 

7 October, the 30th Division commander, 

General Hobbs, had hoped by nightfall 

23 Casualty figures from VII Corps AAR, Oct 

44· 24 OB WEST KTB, 16 Oct 44. 

25 LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Diu. 
294 

the next day to be sitting tight on his final 

objective, awaiting arrival of 1st Division 

troops. So optimistic was General Hobbs 

that early on 8 October he told his corps 

commander that "the job is finished as far 

as this division is concerned . . .." He 

added that he hoped the First Army 

commander would appreciate "what this 

division has done." 26 

As General Hobbs was to learn to his 

chagrin, he had allowed the easy success 

of the day before, when his troops had 

plunged a third of the distance to the 

link-up objective of Wuerselen, to color 

his thinking. In the nine days that followed, the three-mile distance remaining 

before the job actually was completed 

was to become a route bathed in blood 

and frustration. 

Unlike the 18th Infantry, the 30th 

Division had no problem at first with 

enemy pillboxes, for the bulk of the troops 

already were behind the West Wall. 

Only the right wing regiment in the west 

was to encounter pillboxes at the start, 

and these might be rolled up from a flank. 

Yet this did not mean that the route of 

advance was not replete with obstacles. 

This region to the north and northeast of 

Aachen is highly urbanized coal mining 

country, honeycombed with slag piles, 

mine shafts, and villages that might be 

adapted readily to defense. 

General Hobbs could count on no direct 

assistance from other divisions of the XIX 

26 30th Div G-3 Jnl file, 7-9 Oct 44. The 

telephone journals in this file and others for this 

period are especially valuable. Unless otherwise 

noted, the 30th Division story is from these 

journals, from other official unit records of the 

division and the XIX Corps, from several noteworthy combat interviews, and from the division's unofficial unit history, Hewitt, Workhorse 

of the Western Front. The XIX Corps G-2 

reports for this period are particularly well done. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Corps. Already occupied in protecting 

the elongated corps north flank west of 

the West Wall, the 29th Division had had 

to stretch its :resources to send the I 16th 

Infantry to contain Germans holding out 

northwest of Aachen in order to free the 

30th Division's third regiment from that 

task to join the southward drive. This 

regiment, the 120th Infantry, commanded by Col. Branner P. Purdue,27 

General Hobbs thrust into the center of 

his sector to attack with his other two 

regiments on 8 October. The remaining 

division, the 2d Armored, still held the 

northern and eastern flanks of the West 

Wall bridgehead. General Corlett hesitated to weaken this defense, because 

German penetration of this bridgehead 

might cut off the 30th Division's southward drive at its base. 

Although indications existed that the 

30th Division already had neutralized all 

local German reserves, General Hobbs 

dared not concentrate on his southward 

drive to the exclusion of protecting a left 

( east) flank that would stretch steadily as 

his troops moved south. To shield his 

east flank, he directed the I 17th Infantry 

(Colonel Johnson) to seize high ground in 

the vicinity of Mariadorf, about two miles 

southeast of Alsdorf, the town which the 

regiment had taken with ease on 7 October. In addition, he told the 120th 

Infantry (Colonel Purdue) to take the 

high ground northeast of W uerselen. 

General Hobbs also told Colonel Purdue to capture high ground east of 

W uerselen, between that town and 

Broichweiden, in order to assure firm 

control of an arterial highway running 

diagonally across the 30th Division's zone 

27 The previous commander, Colonel Birks, 

had left on 6 October to become assistant division 

commander of the 9th Division. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

from Aachen northeast toward J uelich. 

This maneuver also was to set the stage 

for taking Wuerselen. The division's 

third regiment, the I 19th Infantry (Colonel Sutherland), was to take North 

Wuerselen, little more than a mile (2,000 

yards) from Ravels Hill, northernmost 1st 

Division objective, and protect the division's right (west) flank. Guarding the 

west flank appeared no major assignment, 

because the flank would rest on the W urm 

River and Germans west of the ,,y urm 

seemed a sedentary lot. 

Having dealt harshly with the enemy's 

49th and 183d Divisions, General Hobbs 

expected now to encounter primarily portions of the 246th Division, which was 

specifically responsible for defending 

Aachen. General Hobbs also might expect to meet diverse contingents of the 

12th Division, that might be spared from 

defense about Stolberg and possibly a 

panzer brigade which the XIX Corps 

G-2 persistently warned was in reserve a 

few miles to the east. Otherwise, the 

route to Wuerselen seemed clear, unless 

the enemy should rush in mobile reserves 

from other sectors or refitted units from 

deep behind the front. Should the Germans commit major reserves, the most 

likely spot was against the division's eastern and southeastern flanks. 

The XIX Corps G-2, Colonel Platt, 

had displayed his usual prescience, for 

this was about the sum of things from the 

German viewpoint. Even as the 30th 

Division planned renewal of the southward drive, the panzer brigade which 

Colonel Platt had warned against, the 

lO8th, and a unit rushed from another 

sector, Mobile Regiment von Fritzschen, 

were preparing to strike into the 30th 

Division's east flank. Reserves from deep 

behind the front in the form of the 116th 

295 

Panzer and 3d Panzer Grenadier Divisions 

were on the way. 

That the Germans soon might strike 

was not apparent on 8 October on the 

west and in the center of the 30th Division's sector. Closely following the valley of the Wurm, Colonel Sutherland's 

I 19th Infantry picked a way through 

mined streets of a village on the east bank 

of the W urm opposite Kerkrade, then 

pushed a mile and a half to another 

village. Advancing in the center toward 

objectives at Wuerselen and Broichweiden, 

Colonel Purdue's 120th Infantry soon secured two hamlets despite thick mine fields 

covered by small arms and antitank fire. 

With Colonel Johnson's I 17th Infantry 

on the east the situation at first was much 

the same. Moving southeast out of Alsdorf toward Mariadorf and the AachenJuelich highway, the regiment found 

advantage in a thick morning mist. The 

attack progressed steadily until about 

0930 when leading platoons began to 

cross a railroad a few hundred yards west 

of Mariadorf. Germans from Mobile Regiment von Fritzschen suddenly emerged 

from Mariadorf behind a curtain of small 

arms and artillery fire. They quickly 

sliced off a leading platoon commanded by 

Lieutenant Borton, who had played a 

prominent role in the crossing of the 

Wurm at the start of the West Wall attack. Lieutenant Borton and twenty-six 

of his men were either killed or captured. 

German guns disabled three out of four 

supporting American tanks. Another platoon that tried to advance even after the 

Germans struck also was cut off; only six 

men ever made their way back. So 

costly was the fight that when one of the 

leading companies eventually retired west 

of the railroad, only thirty-three men 

were on hand. 
296 

M obile Regiment von Fritzsc hen as it 

appeared against the I 17th Infantry on 8 

October was an effective force. In addition to two organic infantry battalions, 

the regiment possessed several attachments, including the eleven tanks available 

on this date in the lO8th Panzer Brigade, 

which included the 506th Tank Battalion, 

twenty~two assault guns in three assault 

gun battalions, an engineer battalion, and 

a depleted battalion from the 246th Division.28 The mission of this force was 

to retake Alsdorf and thereby close a 

great gap in the line of the 49th Division 

which the Americans had torn the day 

before ih occupying Alsdorf.29 

The German corps commander, General 

Koechling, had intended that Regiment 

von Fritzschen would attack before dawn 

on 8 October in order to cross an expanse 

of open ground between Mariadorf and 

Alsdorf before the Americans could bring 

observed artillery fires to bear. Instead, 

because of air attacks and fuel shortages, 

the regiment failed to reach Mariadorf 

until dawn. By the time the regiment 

was ready to attack the I 17th Infantry's 

drive had reached the railroad west of 

Mariadorf. No matter how severe the 

casualties on the American side, German 

losses were greater. American artillery 

fire was particularly disturbing, because 

by the time the Germans struck, morning 

mists had begun to lift. 

This charge west of Mariadorf was but 

half of Regiment von Fritzschen's attack. 

At the same time a force of equal size 

28 Order, 49th Div to Regt von Fritzschen, 8 

Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div. 

29 AAR concerning opns of Regt von Fritzschen on 8 Oct 44, 49th Div to LXXXI Corps, 

IO Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der 

Div. Details of this action on 8 October are 

available in Heichler, The Germans Opposite 

XIX Corps. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

drove toward Alsdorf via the village of 

Schaufenberg. This attack, too, might 

have bogged down in the face of American shelling had not the buildings of 

Schaufenberg provided a partial oasis. 

From there, some of the tanks and infantry gradually fought their way into 

Alsdorf, a move that posed the possibility 

of trapping the bulk of the I 17th Infantry 

southeast of the town. 

In Alsdorf, men manning regimental 

and battalion command posts rallied to 

the defense. Though surrounded, men in 

a battalion observation post under the 

personal leadership of their battalion 

commander, Colonel McDowell, held off 

the Germans with carbines and pistols. 

Roaming the winding streets of Alsdorf, 

attached tanks of the 743d Tank Battalion 

dealt the coup de grace to Regiment von 

Fritzschen's attack in less than an hour 

after the first Germans penetrated the 

town. The tankers knocked out three 

Mark IV's, while tank destroyers searched 

the streets the rest of the day for another 

which the crewmen christened The Reluctant Dragon. Weaker now by about 

500 men, Regiment von Fritzschen shifted 

to defense. 

The counterattack had blunted the 

I 17th Infantry's offensive thrust effectively. Both the regimental commander, 

Colonel Johnson, and the division commander, General Hobbs, acted to reinforce 

the regiment at Alsdorf in event this was 

but an opening blow in a major German 

counteraction. Colonel Johnson authorized a withdrawal from the railroad to 

the fringe of Alsdorf, while General Hobbs 

moved a neighboring battalion of the 

I20th Infantry into a reinforcing position 

and solicited assistance from the nearest 

combat command of the 2d Armored DiVISIOn. The combat command alerted a 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

medium tank company for possible commitment at Alsdorf. 

These measures taken, General Hobbs 

ordered resumption of the attack the next 

morning (9 October). This Colonel 

Johnson accomplished successfully at 

Schaufenberg, where a battalion routed 

remnants of Regiment von Fritzschen, but 

the bulk of the regiment could not advance across the open ground toward 

Mariadorf. Evidence existed to indicate 

that the I 17th Infantry's long period of 

attack without rest-a total now of more 

than a week-had begun to tell. About 

noon General Hobbs approved a request 

from Colonel Johnson to defend the 

division's east flank from Schaufenberg 

and Alsdorf rather than from the original 

objective of Mariadorf. 

Though the I 17th Infantry made no 

major gains on 9 October, Colonel Johnson could note with relief that the Germans had not renewed their counterattack 

against his regiment. The fact was that 

opening of the VII Corps drive northward 

against Verlautenheide the day before 

had diverted German attention. Upon 

the instigation of Field Marshal Model, an 

infantry battalion, an engineer battalion 

and the 108th Panzer Brigade (including 

the 506th Tank Battalion) had been detached from Regiment von Fritzschen late 

on 8 October. This force, reinforced by 

the 404th Infantry Regiment, now returned to its parent 246th Division, was 

to launch a new thrust farther southwest 

in the direction of Bardenberg, north~est 

of Wuerselen, presumably to thwart what 

looked like impending juncture of the two 

American drives. 3o 

30 Tel ConY, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 

1100, 8 Oct 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs, 8 Oct 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div. 

297 

As events developed, the 404th Regiment and the lo8th Panzer Brigade had 

a hard time getting a thrust going on 9 

October because every attempt ran into a 

prior American attack. Both at Euchen 

and Birk, two villages astride the route to 

Bardenberg, the Germans encountered 

battalions of the 120th Infantry which 

were driving toward that regiment's final 

objective, high ground near Wuerselen. 

Small-scale counterattacks and continuing 

pressure denied the Americans both 

Euchen and Birk, but the German timetable for the push to Bardenberg was 

seriously upset. Not until after dark did 

the Germans get started on the final leg 

of their journey. 

In passing through Euchen and Birk, 

the Io8th Panzer Brigade had cut directly 

across the front of the 120th Infantry. 

In pushing on to Bardenberg, the brigade 

was to encounter the 30th Division's 

right wing regiment, the I 19th Infantry. 

During the day of 9 October this regiment 

had been experiencing bountiful success 

in a drive aimed at North Wuerselen. 

Moving against halfhearted resistance 

from demoralized remnants of the 49th 

Division, two battalions of Colonel Sutherland's regiment had occupied Bardenberg 

in late afternoon. With a last burst of 

energy before night set in, both battalions 

had charged southeast more than a mile 

into North W uerselen. Here they stood 

little more than 2,000 yards short of the 

18th Infantry's objective of Ravels Hill 

(Hill 231). Closing this gap looked like 

little more than a matter of mop-up and 

patrols. 

Although the Germans had not known 

of this last advance when they had 

planned their thrust against Bardenberg, 

the chance timing of the attack made 

them appear Argus-eyed and omniscient. 
298 

By striking when and where they did, 

they made it hurt. 

When the two battalions of the 1 19th 

Infantry moved into North Wuerselen, 

they left behind to protect their line of 

communications at Bardenberg an understrength company commanded by Capt. 

Ross Y. Simmons. Captain Simmons put 

the bulk of his troops about a roadblock 

on the eastern edge of the village astride 

the highway leading east to Birk and 

Euchen. Not long after nightfall a covey 

of half-tracks spouting fire from 20-mm. 

antiaircraft guns struck this roadblock. 

No sooner had the Americans beaten back 

the half-tracks when a larger portion of 

the I08th Panzer Brigade estimated at 

five tanks and 300 infantry attacked with 

fury. Captain Simmons and his men 

could not hold. The panzer brigade 

poured through into Bardenberg. 

The portent of the German success 

at Bardenberg was not hard to see. 

Whether the enemy had strength enough 

to continue northward and cut off the 

XIX Corps West Wall penetration at its 

base was conjectural, but by taking 

Bardenberg he already had severed communications to the main body of the 

119th Infantry in North Wuerselen. 

The regimental commander, Colonel 

Sutherland, alerted his service company 

and regimental headquarters personnel for 

possible line duty and ordered his reserve 

battalion under Colonel Cox to retake 

Bardenberg from the north. Though one 

of Colonel Cox's companies got into action 

quickly, the Germans in Bardenberg were 

not to be pushed around. The advance 

c~rried no farther than a church in the 

northeastern part of the village. 

Tension that prevailed through the 

night was relieved somewhat early the 

next morning, 10 October, by a report 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

from the 120th Infantry. Having tried 

without success the day before to capture 

the Birk crossroads, a battalion of the 

1 20th Infantry moved by stealth at 0530 

and literally caught the Germans in Birk 

asleep at their posts. The battalion fired 

only one shot, that by accident. This 

lack of vigilance at a strategic point controlling the only road by which the enemy 

in Bardenberg might be supplied and 

reinforced helped convince General Hobbs 

and his regimental commanders that the 

I08th Panzer Brigade had no real knowledge of what an advantageous point 

d' appui it held there. When the Germans 

virtually ignored the main body of the 

119th Infantry in North Wuerselen until 

late in the day on 10 October, this belief 

was strengthened. 

That capture of the Birk crossroads had 

imperiled the I08th Panzer Brigade in 

Bardenberg hardly was apparent when 

Colonel Cox's battalion of the 11 9th 

Infantry renewed the attack to clear the 

village soon after daylight on 10 October. 

The Germans fought back intensely, their 

tanks hidden in gardens and behind 

houses, the cellars turned into imitation 

pillboxes. An estimated ten to twenty 

half-tracks mounting the pernicious multibarrel 20-mm. antiaircraft gun formed a 

protective screen that thwarted all attempts at infiltration. As darkness approached, Colonel Cox could point to 

little ground gained; only in the knowledge that the attack was making inroads 

on enemy strength was there consolation. 

During the day, for example, at Bardenberg, North Wuerselen, and Birk, 30th 

Division troops and artillery had knocked 

out twelve German tanks. Ingenious 

soldiers of the 120th Infantry had destroyed one with a captured Puppchen, 

a two-wheeled bazooka. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

At nightfall Colonel Sutherlanrl reluctantly ordered withdrawal from Bardenberg to permit the artillery to pummel the 

enemy through the night without concern 

for friendly troops. In the meantime 

General Hobbs had become impatient to 

reopen the line of communications to the 

main body of the regiment at North 

Wuerselen so he could get on with the 

job of linking with the I st Division. He 

decided to commit a fresh unit, the reserve 

battalion of the 120th Infantry. 

Early on I I October this battalion 

moved into Bardenberg against virtually 

no OpposItIOn. Not until reaching the 

southern half of the village did the battalion meet the grenadiers of the 10Bth 

Panzer Brigade with their ubiquitous 

tanks and half-tracks. Here the battle 

was met, but the attrition of the preceding 

day and night and the commitment of a 

fresh American battalion had done the 

trick. The battalion commander himself, 

Maj. Howard Greer, made a sizable 

contribution in other than his command 

role by personally knocking out two 

tanks with a bazooka. The total bag of 

enemy armor was six tanks and sixteen 

half-tracks. Though wounded, a squad 

leader, S. Sgt. Jack J. Pendleton, ensured 

the advance of his company by deliberately drawing the fire of an enemy machine gun. He gave his life in the 

process.3! 

As the fight progressed in Bardenberg, 

expeditious use of artillery on other parts 

of the 30th Division front, the effect of 

the blocking position of the 120th Infantry 

at the Birk crossroads, and the action of 

four squadrons of IX Tactical Air Com31 Sergeant Pendleton was awarded the Medal 

of Honor posthumously. Major Greer received 

the Distinguished Service Cross. 

299 

mand fighter-bombers prevented the 

Germans from sending help. Clearing 

weather enabled planes to operate for the 

first time in three days. By last light on 

I I October both Bardenberg and the 

route to North Wuerselen were clear. 

Commitment of the 120th Infantry's 

reserve battalion in Bardenberg absorbed 

the last infantry unit available in the 30th 

Division. This worried the division commander, General Hobbs, for reports of 

continued German build-up with likelihood of a large-scale thrust from east or 

southeast continued to come in. A 

worrisome but ineffective visit by the 

Luftwaffe added to General Hobbs's concern; attention from the long-dormant 

Luftwaffe had been received with such 

increasing frequency of late that one 

hardly could miss the importance the 

Germans attached to this sector.32 Furthermore, one of the reports General 

Hobbs received indicated that the 116th 

Panzer Division might be arriving soon. 

Under these conditions, Hobbs believed 

that to continue his attack eastward and 

southeastward into the teeth of what 

might develop into a major enemy blow 

had the makings of disaster. Since both 

the I 17th Infantry near Alsdorf and the 

120th Infantry near Euchen now occupied 

stanch defensive positions, he decided to 

forego further attempts to expand his left 

flank. He told these units to hold in place 

where they might be ready for any eventuality. Until German intentions were 

clear, he would confine offensive efforts to 

capture of Wuerselen in order to accomplish the primary mission of closing the 

gap in the circle about Aachen. 

32 On 9 October Field Marshal von Rundstedt 

said the greatest danger to the entire Western 

Front was presently at Aachen. OB WEST 

KTB, 9 Oct 44· 
300 

GERMAN BOY weeps over th e few possessions sa vedfrom his home outside Aachen. 

Viewed from the Gennan side, General 

Hobbs's concern was not without foundation, though urgency occasioned by continuing American successes might prompt 

dissipation of incoming German strength. 

Late on I I October the first of the 116th 

Panzer Division's regimental combat 

teams, composed primarily of the 60th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment, had arrived. 

On the same day, the LXXXI Corps 

was reinforced further by arrival of a 

Kampfgruppe Diefenthal, a hybrid collection of survivors of two defunct SS panzer 

divisions33 in strength of about two 

battalions. Also arriving on I I October, 

headquarters of the I SS Panzer Corps 

( Keppler) at 2 100 assumed command of 

the northern portion of the LX X X I Corps 

front. 

Faced with the IOBth Panzer Brigade's 

33 1St and 12th SS pz Divisions. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

failure at Bardenberg and with loss of 

North Wuerselen, the Seventh Army commander, General Brandenberger, deemed 

this emergency serious enough to justify 

use of Field Marshal Model's recent authorization to employ the 116th Panzer 

Division as it arrived. Reinforcing the 

60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment with the 

main body of Kampfgruppe Diefenthal, 

remnants of the IOBth Panzer Brigade, 

and two assault gun units possessing a 

total of thirty assault guns and howitzers, 

Brandenberger directed an attack early on 

12 October. The mission was to push 

back the XIX Corps to a line BardenbergEuchen, that is, to widen and defend the 

corridor into Aachen. 34 This was a far 

cry from original German intentions of 

using the 116th Panzer and 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Divisions in a concerted counterattack to wipe out the entire West Wall 

penetration north of Aachen; indeed,co~­

mitment of the 60th Panzer Grenadzer 

Regiment was the precedent which four 

days later was to lead to similar piecemeal 

use of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division 

near Verlautenheide. 

In line with the decision to maintain a 

static front except at Wuerselen, General 

Hobbs directed that the right wing of the 

120th Infantry first was to seize high 

ground just northeast of the town. 

Thereupon, both the 1I9th and 120th 

Infantry Regiments were to reduce 

Wuerselen. This was the agenda for 12 

October on the American side. 

As events developed on 12 October, the 

30th Division could not accomplish ev~n 

the advance of little more than a mIle 

from the Birk crossroads to the high 

ground northeast of Wuersel~n . Every 

unit had to turn to the defenSIve, for at 

:«TWX, Seventh Army to A Gp B, 1315, II 

Oct 44, A Gp B, Operationsbefehle. 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

almost every point the front blazed. Apparently the Germans during the night had 

directed that the counterattack by the 

60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment be reinforced by local stabs all along the line. 

The fight began just after dawn at Birk 

when a battalion of the 246th Division 

counterattacked in con junction with about 

ten tanks under the 506th Tank Battalion. 

A three-hour fight ensued. At first, the 

battalion of the 120th Infantry at the 

crossroads had but one tank, that commanded by S. Sgt. Melvin H. Bieber. 

Engaging a brace of the German tanks 

simultaneously, Sergeant Bieber and his 

crew forced the enemy to abandon one 

tank and knocked out the other after 

twelve hits. As an early morning fog began to lift, other Shermans of Sergeant 

Bieber's company arrived. Together with 

supporting artillery, they accounted for 

five more of the enemy tanks. 35 

The situation appeared grim at one 

spot in the 120th Infantry's line when a 

rifle company lost all four attached 

57-mm. antitank guns and when enemy 

shellfire knocked out the artillery observer 

and wounded another who tried to take 

his place. At last the battalion's artillery 

liaison officer, Capt. Michael S. Bouchlas, 

made his way forward. Up to this time 

friendly artillery had been firing spasmodically, sometimes even falling short. 

After Captain Bouchlas miraculously 

threaded his way through shellfire to the 

observation post, the picture changed. 

Within a half hour the threat was over. 

By 1030 the regimental commander, 

Colonel Purdue, could report the situation 

under control. "I never did see men 

going like these have been going," Colonel 

35 Sergeant Bieber subsequently received the 

DSC. 

301 

Purdue reported ecstatically. "We are as 

strong as we can be . . . ." 36 

Another fight developed as a meeting 

engagement southeast of Bardenberg when 

Colonel Cox's battalion of the 119th Infantry moved to strengthen the bulk of 

that regiment in North Wuerselen. Aided 

by artillery fire, Colonel Cox quickly 

drove off the Germans, but identification 

of prisoners promoted anxiety. Colonel 

Cox had met ·a battalion of the 60th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment. General 

Hobbs's fears about arrival of the [[6th 

Panzer Division apparently had materialized. Another identification near nightfall of that division's Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion underscored the concern. 

At North Wuerselen, about 200 infantry supported by eight tanks and a few 

assault guns struck the main body of the 

I 19th Infantry. After destroying five 

tanks and an assault gun, the 119th Infantry beat off this attack with celerity; 

but here too identification of prisoners 

nurtured apprehension. Here the German infantry was SS-Battalion Rink, that 

part of Kampfgruppe Diefenthal which in 

happier days had belonged to the ISt SS 

Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). To General Hobbs and his anxious 

staff, this posed the possibility that the 

entire ISt SS Panzer Division either had 

arrived or was on the way. 

Both General Hobbs and the XIX 

Corps commander, General Corlett, were 

frankly worried. They talked in terms of 

another Mortain and of commandeering 

antiaircraft, artillery, and service troops to 

back up the line. "If the [[6th Panzer 

and Adolf Hitler [ISt SS Panzer] are in 

there," General Corlett said, "this is one 

of the decisive battles of the war." 37 

36 goth Div G-g Jni, 12 Oct 44. 

37 Ibid. 
302 

While anxiety stimulated by these identifications remained, the 30th Division by 

noon of 12 October had contained every 

German thrust. The infantrymen were 

quick to transfer much of the credit to 

their supporting artillery and to fourteen 

squadrons of fighter-bombers that droned 

about the front all day like reckless but 

disciplined wasps. Sparkling weather 

gave both artillery and planes a clear 

field. At one time the planes attacked a 

concentration of a reported forty enemy 

tanks; they left eighteen of them, ground 

observers said, in flames. "The Germans 

are nibbling and pushing," General Hobbs 

reported in midafternoon, "but no 

general attack." 38 Everything was under control or-as General Hobbs put 

it-his men had "their tails over the 

dashboard." 

The First Army commander, General 

Hodges, was less sanguine. Even should 

the 30th Division continue to defend 

successfully and even should the fight fail 

to develop in the proportions Generals 

Corlett and Hobbs feared, the persistent 

problem of closing the circle about 

Aachen still would remain. Less visibly 

perturbed about German potentialitie; 

than his two subordinates, General Hodges 

insisted that they get going again on this 

primary task. "We have to close that 

gap," he told General Corlett; "it will 

have to be done somehow." 39 

In turn, General Hobbs pleaded for 

assistance. After almost two weeks of 

fighting, including the first set attack 

against the West Wall, his men were worn 

out, their numbers depleted. Since the 

start of the West Wall attack on 2 October, the 30th Division had incurred 2,020 

casualties, most of them hard-to-replace 

38 Ibid 

39 XIX Corps G-3 Jnl, 12 Oct 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

riflemen. Yet the First Army could provide little help other than to place the 

separate 99th Infantry Battalion (Maj. 

Harold D. Hansen) in XIX Corps reserve 

and to assume control over a combat command from the relatively inactive V Corps 

front in order to create an Army reserve. 

If the 30th Division was to be reinforced, 

General Corlett would have to do it by 

shuffling his own units. 

Though General Corlett hesitated to 

weaken the northeastern and eastern defensive arcs of the West Wall bridgehead, 

he nevertheless agreed to give General 

Hobbs a battalion of the 2d Armored 

Division's medium tanks. In addition, by 

assigning the 30th Division a battalion of 

corps engineers, he relieved the I 19th 

Infantry of responsibility for protecting 

the division's right flank along the Wurm 

River. By putting another corps engineer unit, the I I04th Engineer Combat 

Group (Lt. Col. Hugh W. Cotton), into 

the line near Kerkrade to contain the 

enemy in those pillboxes lying west of the 

Wurm, he freed the regiment of the 29th 

Division that had been doing that job. 

This regiment, the I 16th Infantry, minus 

one battalion already attached to the 2d 

Armored Division, Corlett awarded to 

Hobbs for continuing the link-up offensive. 

These orders issued, General Corlett 

directed that the 30th Division attack 

early the next morning, 13 October. 

Though Corlett suggested a wide end run 

southeast from the vicinity of Alsdorf, 

both General Hobbs and his regimental 

commanders demurred. Again they were 

reluctant to abandon good defensive positions on the east and southeast lest the 

indicated German strength materialize. 

Another suggestion that the drive be 

directed south aIo"ng the east bank of the 

Wurm also was abandoned for fear the 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

rest of the 116th Panzer Division had 

assembled there. An attack southward 

along the west bank of the W urm was out, 

not only because that also might encounter the panzer division but also because it 

would involve either a river crossing or a 

frontal attack against pillboxes in the 

sector now held by the I I04th Engineers. 

Only one method of effecting the link-up 

appeared feasible: to advance on a 

narrow front through the streets and 

buildings of Wuerselen. 

Assisted by attached tanks from the 2d 

Armored Division, the two fresh battalions of the I 16th Infantry launched this 

attack on 13 October, but to no avail. 

Because the attack was on such a narrow 

front, the Germans were able to concentrate against it the fire of an estimated 6 

to 7 battalions of light artillery, 1 or 2 

medium battalions, and at least 2 batteries 

of heavy artillery. Co-ordination between 

the 1 16th Infantry and the tanks of the 

2d Armored Division was slow to come.40 

Neither on 13 October nor on the next 

two days could the 116th Infantry make 

more than snaillike progress. 

During these three days General Hobbs 

constantly exhorted the 1 16th Infantry 

commander, Col. Philip R. Dwyer, and 

even called on the commander of the 

regiment's parent division to help prod 

the unit forward. But more than this 

was needed to pry apart the German 

40 A tank company commander, Capt. James 

M. Burt, did more than his share to alleviate the 

situation. Though he had two tanks shot from 

under him and was wounded at the outset on 

13 October, Captain Burt personally directed 

artillery fire from exposed positions, reconnoitered 

into enemy territory, and rescued several 

wounded. "Captain Burt held the combined 

forces together," says his citation for the Medal 

of Honor, "dominating and controlling the critical situation through the sheer force of his 

heroic example." 

303 

defense of Wuerselen. Here was located 

the entire 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by dug-in tanks and other 

armor cleverly concealed amid the houses 

and gardens of the town. Prisoner identifications also pointed to the presence of 

the 116th Panzer Division's engineer and 

reconnaIssance battalions. Even three 

dive-bombing missions and an artillery 

TOT just before a third attack . on 15 

October failed to turn the trick.41 

The First Army commander, General 

Hodges, was audibly perturbed at the 

slow pace. Indeed, both Generals Corlett and Hobbs considered they were 

"walking on eggs" in their relations with 

the army commander. "I always thought 

you ought to relieve Leland [Hobbs]," 

General Hodges told Corlett. "He hasn't 

moved an inch in four days." General 

Hobbs, Hodges observed, was always 

"either bragging or complaining." But 

General Corlett demurred. He could not 

believe that General Hodges or his staff 

realized how severe and constant had been 

the fighting to close the gap. On the 

other hand, Corlett was the first to admit 

that something had to be done to get the 

drive moving. By nightfall on I 5 October he had become convinced that the 

30th Division could not make it without 

broadening its effort. Ordering General 

Hobbs to make a general attack all along 

the line, General Corlett met every objection by repeating one sentence: "I want 

to close the (Aachen) gap." 42 

41 Details of the I 16th Infantry attacks are 

available in regimental journals and AAR's for 

October 1944; see also Tel Convs in 30th Div 

G-3 Jnl for the period. 

42 30th Div G-3 Jnl, 15 Oct 44; XIX Corps 

G-3 Tel Jnl, 14-16 Oct 44,·loaned by General 

Corlett; Ltr, Corlett to OCMH 20 May 56; 

Sylvan Diary, entry of 14 Oct 44 
304 

General Hobbs nevertheless remained 

reluctant to order the troops on his east 

wing to leave prepared positions for exposed ground, capture of which would do 

little, Hobbs believed, toward closing the 

Aachen Gap except to provide diversion 

for the southward drive. Although no 

additional troops of the ISt SS Panzer 

Division had been detected, General 

Hobbs was concerned about identification 

of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division opposite the VII Corps and about reports that 

at least another panzer grenadier regiment 

of the 116th Panzer Division had arrived. 

In addition, the XIX Corps G-2 had 

been predicting cautiously that the 9th 

Panzer Division, unidentified for some 

days on the British front, soon might be 

committed here. Hobbs insisted that the 

troops on his east wing should not 

debouch into the open to face these possibilities; they should make only diversionary demonstrations. 

At last General Hobbs wore down his 

corps commander's objections. Born almost of desperation, a plan for a new 

link-up attack the next day, I6 October, 

took form. 

Sealing the Gap 

Concern on the American side about 

delay in forging the last arc of the circle 

about Aachen was matched if not exceeded by anxiety on the German side that 

the doom of Aachen was near at hand. 

Late on I5 October, for example, Field 

Marshal Model at Army Group B reiterated that "the situation in Aachen may 

be considered serious." 43 

43 Rpt, OB WEST to OKW/WFSt (relaying 

rpt, A Gp B), 1800, 15 Oct 44, OB WEST KTB, 

Befehle und Meldungen. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Among German commanders, the only 

hope of relieving Aachen rested with the 

counterattacks by the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 116th Panzer Divisions. In reality, this was a fairly vain hope, as 

demonstrated on I5 October when the 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division failed to 

break the lines of the I st Division's I6th 

Infantry near Verlautenheide and Eilendorf. The Germans might have noted 

further that even though the entire 116th 

Panzer Division had arrived by I5 October, that division had been able to accomplish nothing offensively except for the 

first commitment of the 60th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment four days earlier. 

So sure of their position were the Americans that they had delivered a surrender 

ultimatum to the commander of the 

Aachen garrison five days before on IO 

October and the next day had begun 

assault against the city itself. 

Though not so fatalistic, concern on 

the American side was just as genuine. 

General Hobbs had expected to reach the 

ISt Division and Ravels Hill on 8 October; now, seven days later, a gap of more 

than a mile still existed. In the last three 

days the I I6th Infantry, in striking what 

was literally the stone wall of Wuerselen, 

had gained no more than a thousand 

yards. Obviously, if contact was to be 

made, the attackers would have to try 

some other maneuver. 

No matter the earlier objections to 

driving south along the east bank of the 

Wurm or to crossing the Wurm and 

striking south along the west bank, these 

two routes appeared now to offer the 

only solutions. General Hobbs chose 

them both. He ordered Colonel Sutherland's I I9th Infantry to send two battalions before daylight on I6 October 
CLOSING THE CIRCLE 

across the Wurm into the village of 

Kohlscheid, thence south along the west 

bank. The remaining battalion was to 

launch the main effort close along the 

east bank to seize Hill 194, just across 

the Aachen-\Vuerselen-Linnich highway, 

northwest of Ravels Hill (Hill 231). The 

I 16th Infantry and a battalion of the 

120th Infantry were to renew the frontal 

assault on Wuerselen, while the separate 

99th Infantry Battalion moved from corps 

reserve to back up the line. General 

Hobbs's other two regiments, the I 17th 

Infantry and 120th, were to stage diversionary attacks in company strength 

southeast from Alsdorf on the division's 

eastern flank. There could be no toleration of halfway measures. This was it. 

Even as supporting engineers worked 

under mortar fire to bridge the Wurm, 

two battalions of Colonel Sutherland's 

119th Infantry forded the river at 0500, 

16 October. Within half an hour one of 

the battalions had reached the fringe of 

Kohlscheid; the other joined the mop-up 

an hour before daylight. By noon 

Kohlscheid was clear. 

The main effort by Colonel Cox's 2d 

Battalion, I 19th Infantry, along the east 

bank of the Wurm did not go so easily. 

Here SS-Battalion Bucher of Kampfgruppe Diefenthal and a relatively fresh 

home guard unit, the 2d Landesschuetzen 

Battalion, had extended the line southwest from W uerselen. Fire from pillboxes 

occupied by these units stalled Colonel 

Cox's leading platoons short of a hilltop 

lying about halfway between the line of 

departure and the objective of Hill 194. 

The situation was disturbing until a platoon under Sergeant Holycross, who early 

in the West Wall attack had become 

something of an expert at reducing pillboxes, managed to slip around to one 

305 

flank. Urging both his men and accompanying tanks forward through a driving . 

rain, Sergeant Holycross once more demonstrated how pillboxes should be taken. 

Pinning the defenders in their shelters 

with tank fire, he worked his riflemen in 

close for the assault. Holycross and his 

men successively reduced seven pillboxes 

and captured about fifty prisoners. 

As Colonel Cox tried to push through 

a fresh company to continue the drive to 

Hill 194 and link-up, the Germans took 

the intermediate hill under such deadly 

shellfire that hopes for success of the main 

effort fell. While seeking to avoid the 

fire, the tanks became stuck in the mud. 

Without them the infantry could not 

advance. 

At about this same time the first of the 

diversionary efforts on the 30th Division's 

east wing began. Mortars and artillery 

in support of the I 17th and 120th Infantry Regiments maintained a smoke screen 

across the regimental fronts for half an 

hour, then opened fire to simulate a 

preparatory barrage. The Germans bit. 

Enemy artillery shifted from Colonel 

Cox's battalion west of Wuerselen to 

pummel the two east wing regiments. 

The thunder of the German fires awed 

the most seasoned fighters. 

The more guns the Germans turned 

against men of the I 17th and 120th Infantry Regiments, who were relatively secure 

in foxholes, the less they had to use against 

the exposed troops of the 119th Infantry. 

Leaving one company on the intermediate 

hill as a base of fire, the rest of Colonel 

Cox's battalion once more shook loose to 

advance methodically southward toward 

Hill 194. Since one of the battalions on 

the west bank of the W urm had come 

abreast, Colonel Cox was assisted by fire 

into the enemy's flank. Though the 
306 

I 16th Infantry's attack at Wuerselen was 

still a study in frustration in terms of 

ground gained, it assisted Colonel Cox by 

tying down that enemy strongpoint. 

Lest the Germans fathom the deception 

on the east and again turn their full 

wrath against Colonel Cox's battalion, the 

two east wing regiments in early afternoon 

launched another diversion. This time a 

company of each regiment actually attacked along the common regimental 

boundary to occupy a limited objective. 

Two platoons of the 120th Infantry gained 

the objective, though they had to wade 

through withering fire to make it. Later 

in the afternoon, as they sought to withdraw, only well-planned covering fires 

permitted their escape. 

The other diversionary attack by Company E, I 17th Infantry, met insurmountable difficulties. First the company had 

to pass through 500 yards of woods, thick 

with enemy outposts, before reaching main 

German positions astride a slag pile and 

a railroad embankment. Here- sat the 

second of the [[6th Panzer Division's 

panzer grenadier regiments, the [56th. 

Although devastating fire from automatic weapons drove back one of Company E's attacking platoons, the other 

struggled on almost to the railroad 

embankment. Then the panzer grenadiers 

emerged from a mine shaft in rear of the 

platoon. Only six of the Americans ever 

made their way back. 

Reorganizing those of his men who had 

withdrawn, the company commander, 

Capt. George H. Sib bald, inched forward 

in an effort to rescue his surrounded 

platoon. For more than an hour he and 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

his men fought doggedly through a hail 

of small arms and shellfire. They still 

were straining forward when word came 

that the diversionary thrust had done the 

job expected of it. Captain Sibbald 

made a last attempt to reach the surrounded platoon but failed. Reluctantly, 

he gave the order to withdraw. 

Though Company E had lost about 

fifty men, the diversion had, indeed, 

helped accomplish the main objective. 

At 1544 on 16 October, the I st Division's 

chief of staff had telephoned to say that 

men of his 18th Infantry on Ravels Hill 

could see American troops along the 

southwestern fringe of Wuerselen. They 

were men of Colonel Cox's 2d Battalion 

who had reached their objective, Hill 194. 

They were less than a thousand yards 

from the closest foxholes of the 18th 

Infantry. 

Led by S. Sgt. Frank A. Karwell, a 

patrol left Hill 194 to make the actual 

physical contact, so long awaited. En 

route, German fire cut down Sergeant 

Karwell and prevented the main body of 

the patrol from crossing the AachenWuerselen highway. Yet the two scouts, 

Pvts. Edward Krauss and Evan Whitis, 

continued. As they started up Ravels 

Hill, they made out figures in American 

uniforms. 

"We're from K Company," the men on 

the hill shouted. "Come on up." 

"We're from F Company," Whitis and 

Krauss replied. "Come on down." 

The men from the 1st Division talked 

faster and more persuasively. Whitis and 

Krauss went up. At 1615, 16 October, 

they closed the Aachen Gap. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Assault on the City 

When the Aachen encirclement maneuver began on 8 October, the city that 

was the ultimate objective was already a 

scarred shell. Less than 20,000 of 

Aachen's prewar population of some 

165,000 had clung to their homes through 

the various vicissitudes of Nazi evacuation 

orders. As early as two months before 

D-Day in Normandy, the British had 

bombed the city; in late May British 

planes had struck again and again for 

three days at what was left. By 8 October much of Aachen already was a sterile 

sea of rubble. Long before American 

tanks first had poked their snouts over 

nearby hills in mid-September, Aachen 

had learned what war is like. 1 

Few in Aachen could have doubted 

that the end was near when on 10 October three Americans-1st Lt. Cedric A. 

Lafley, 1st Lt. William Boehme, and Pfc. 

Ken Kading-approached along the 

Trierer Strasse bearing a white flag and 

a surrender ultimatum. As most were to 

learn from listening to Radio Luxembourg 

or to American public address systems, 

or else from examining leaflets which 

American artillery shot into the ruins, 

the Americans were granting the commander of the Aachen military garri~on 

1 See U.S. Military Government files on 

Aachen and Condron, The Fall of Aachen. 

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based 

upon official records of the 1st Div (in particular, the 26th Inf), the VII Corps, and the I I06th 

Engr (C) Gp, plus 1st Div Combat Intervs and 

FUSA AAR, Oct 44. 

twenty-four hours in which to surrender. 

The city of Aachen [the ultimatum stated 

in part] is now completely surro:llld~d by 

American forces . . " If the CIty IS not 

promptly and completely surrendered unconditionally, the American Army Ground 

and Air Forces will proceed ruthlessly with 

air and artillery bombardment to reduce it 

to submission.2 

The military commander of Aachen at 

the time of delivery of the surrender 

ultimatum was Colonel Leyherr, one of 

the 246th Division's regimental commanders. Colonel Leyherr dutifully rejected the ultimatum in accord with "last 

stand" orders that had come from the 

Jovian pen of Hitler himself. 

Two days later Colonel Leyherr was 

relieved in deference to the arrival of his 

division commander, Colonel Wilck 

(246th Division). Colonel Wilck established his headquarters in the Palast-Hotel 

Quellenhof, a luxurious Kurhotel in Farwick Park in the northern portion of the 

city. (See Map 4.) 

For bringing Aachen to heel, the attack 

force available to General Huebner, the 

American commander, was numerically 

inferior to that Colonel Wilck had for 

defense. Forced to dispose the bulk of 

the 1st Division elsewhere on an elongated 

front and to husband one infantry battalion as a reserve, General Huebner had 

but two battalions of the 26th Infantry 

2 For a full text of the ultimatum and an account of the experiences of those who delivered 

it, see 1st Div G-3 Per Rpt, 10 Oct 44. 
308 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

CIVILIAN REFUGEES LEAVE AACHEN 

free to assault the city. Within the inner 

defenses of Aachen, Colonel Wilck had 

roughly 5,000 men. Most were from 

Wilck's own 246th Division, though some 

represented nondescript fortress units and 

125 were Aachen policemen thrust into 

the line under command of the chief of 

police. Some eighty policemen from Cologne were later to slip through the gap 

at Wuerselen to join the fight. 

As Colonel Wilck must have known, 

the great American superiority was in 

armor, artillery, and planes. Although 

the Luftwaffe had begun to display recognition that a war still went on in the 

West, the German planes usually appeared 

only in small groups and at night when 

Allied aircraft were not around. As for 

armor, Colonel Wilck had no more than 

about five Mark IV tanks. As long as 

communications remained constant, Colonel Wilck might solicit substantial artillery 

support from outside the city; but at 

hand within the inner defenses were only 

19 I05-mm. howitzers, 8 75-mm. pieces, 

and 6 I50-mm. guns. 

On the American side, General Huebner naturally desired quick reduction of 

Aachen, yet he saw no point in a Pyrrhic 

victory. Even had he desired a bold 
ASSAULT ON THE CITY 

thrust, he could permit only a cautious 

advance because the gap at Wuerselen 

still was open and from Stolberg to 

Ravels Hill his defenses were dangerously 

thin. He told the 26th Infantry commander, Col. John F. R. Seitz, not to get 

inextricably involved in Aachen. The 

regiment would have to attack, as the 

26th Infantry S-3 put it, "with one eye 

cocked over their right shoulder." Yet in 

striking from the east defenses that until 

recently had been sited against assault 

from the west and south, the regiment 

held a distinct advantage. 

During the two days when the 18th 

Infantry was driving north through Verlautenheide to Ravels Hill, the 26th Infantry had been eating away at Aachen's 

eastern suburb of Rothe Erde and otherwise getting into position for assault on 

the city. To reduce his frontage, Colonel 

Seitz put a provisional company into the 

line on his left wing to face Aachen from 

the southeast. This company tied in with 

defenses of the I I06th Engineers south of 

the city. Although the engineers were to 

pivot their right wing from time to time 

in order to maintain contact as the 26th 

Infantry advanced into the city, they were 

not equipped to make a full-blooded 

attack. 

Colonel Seitz pressed his 2d Battalion 

under Lt. Col. Derrill M. Daniel up to 

the Aachen-Cologne railroad tracks at 

Rothe Erde and prepared to send the 

battalion westward through the heart of 

Aachen. His remaining battalion, the 3d, 

under Lt. Col. John T. Corley, moved to 

jump-off positions north of Rothe Erde 

(between Rothe Erde and Haaren) . 

From there Colonel Corley was to strike 

northwestward against a wilderness of 

factories lying between Aachen proper and 

Haaren and thence westward to seize 

309 

three hills that dominate Aachen from the 

city's northern fringes. 

The bulk of this hill mass, developed as 

a big public park, is known as the Lousberg. It rises to a height of 862 feet and 

casts a shadow over almost the entire 

city. The Americans were to know it as 

Observatory Hill after an observation 

tower on the crest. A lower knob on the 

southeastern slopes of the hill, crowned by 

a cathedral, is known as the Salvatorberg. 

Farther down the southeastern slopes in 

Farwick Park stands the elaborate PalastHotel Quellenhof and a municipal Kurhaus where, in happier days, patrons took 

the medicinal waters. 

The Assault Be gins 

Soon after the surrender deadline expired on I I October, four groups of IX 

Tactical Air Command P-38's and P4 is (about 300 planes) opened the 

assault. On targets primarily on the 

perimeter of the city, selected by the 

infantry and marked with red smoke by 

the artillery, the planes loosed more than 

sixty-two tons of bombs. In a deafening 

cacophony, twelve battalions of VII Corps 

and I st Division artillery took up the 

bombardment. Division artillery hurled 

some 2,500 rounds into the city while 

corps artillery contributed 2,37 I rounds, a 

total of 169 tons. Though both air and 

ground observers deemed the bombing and 

shelling accurate, patrols that tested the 

defenses in early evening found no appreciable lessening of German fire. 3 

3 In the light of cover available to the Germans 

in thick-walled building and cellars, seasoned 

observers hardly could have hoped for much 

more than a psychological effect from the 

bombardment. Airmen subsequently were to 

note "that the final capture of Aachen ... was 

not materially speeded by bombing .... " See 
310 

After daylight the next morning, 12 

October, three groups of fighter-bombers 

returned to drop ninety-nine tons of 

bombs. Thereafter Aachen became a secondary target. Except on the third day 

( 13 October) when two groups dropped 

eleven and a half tons of bombs, airmen 

made no other sizable contribution to the 

assault. Artillery likewise resumed the 

attack on 12 October. Corps and division artillery expended 5,000 rounds on 

that date.4 

Even as the air and artillery bombardment continued on 12 October, Colonel 

Corley's 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, attacked to clear the factories lying between 

Aachen and Haaren, a preliminary to the 

main attack set to begin the next day. 

Despite the urban nature of the battlefield, the battalion methodically cleared 

the objective and by nightfall was poised 

for the main assault. Early on 13 October Colonel Corley's battalion was to 

push northwest toward Observatory Hill 

while Colonel Daniel's 2d Battalion began 

a painstaking sweep through the heart of 

the city. 

In moving through the center of 

Aachen, Colonel Daniel's men not only 

Hq, USAF in Europe, The Contribution of Air 

Power to the Defeat of Germany, VoL 2, Western 

Front Campaign, p. J 70. 

• Not to be excluded from the bombardment, 

the J !06th Engineer Combat Group in defensive 

positions astride the heights south of Aachen 

rigged an ingenious device which the men dubbed 

the V-J3. Towing an Aachen streetcar to the 

crest of a hill, they stacked the car with captured 

explosives set with a time fuse and sent it 

careening down the trolley tracks into the city. 

On the first try, the car exploded prematurely. 

A second ground to a halt at the wreckage of 

the first. After patrols had cleared the track, the 

engineers tried again. This time the car reached 

the city proper before it exploded. Whether it 

did any actual damage to German installations 

was irrelevant in view of the impish delight the 

engineers derived from it. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

had to plow through the maze of rubble 

and damaged buildings in their path but 

also to maintain contact with Colonel 

Corley's main effort against the northern 

hills. His left (south) flank resting on 

the railroad, Colonel Daniel had an attack frontage of about 2,000 yards, no 

minor assignment in view of the density of 

the: buildings. Of necessity, his advance 

would be slow and plodding. 

The fighting in Colonel Daniel's sector 

quickly fell into a pattern. Dividing his 

resources into small assault teams, Colonel 

Daniel sent with each infantry platoon a 

tank or tank destroyer. These would 

keep each building under fire until the 

riflemen moved in to assault; thereupon, 

the armor would shift fire to the next 

house. Augmented by the battalion's 

light and heavy machine guns firing up 

the streets, this shelling usually drove the 

Germans into the cellars where the infantry stormed them behind a barrage of 

hand grenades. Whenever the enemy 

proved particularly tenacious, the riflemen used the other weapons at their 

disposal, including demolitions and flame 

throwers employed by two-man teams 

attached to each company headquarters. 

The men did not wait for actual targets 

to appear; each building, they assumed, 

was a nest of resistance until proved 

otherwise. Light artillery and mortar 

fire swept forward block by block several 

streets ahead of the infantry while heavier 

artillery pounded German commumcations farther to the rear. 

To maintain contact between units, 

Colonel Daniel each day designated a series 

of check points based on street intersections and more prominent buildings. 

No unit advanced beyond a check point 

until after establishing contact with the 

ad jacent unit. Each rifle company was 
ASSAULT ON THE CITY 311 

RIFLEMAN in burning Aachen. 

assigned a specific zone of advance; company commanders in turn generally designated a street to each platoon. 

After a few bitter experiences in which 

Germans bypassed in cellars or storm 

sewers emerged in rear of the attackers, 

the riflemen soon learned that speed was 

less important than pertinacity. The 

sewers posed a special problem; each 

manhole had to be located and thoroughly 

blocked and covered. Another special 

problem stemmed from glass and other 

litter that punctured tires on jeeps used 

for evacuating wounded. Medics found 

a solution in weasels ( M-29 ), tracked, 

lightly armored cargo carriers. 

In the other half of the attack, Colonel 

Corley's battalion, which was driving west 

toward the high ground marked by the 

Lousberg (Observatory Hill), the Salvatorberg, and Farwick Park, found the 

route blocked on the first day, 13 October, 

by stoutly defended apartment houses. 

The men measured their gains in buildings, floors, and even rooms. Someone 

said the fight was "from attic to attic and 

from sewer to sewer." 

As riflemen of Company K advanced 

down Juelicher Strasse, 20-mm. cannon 

fire from a side street drove them back. 

Two accompanying tanks remained exposed to lethal panzerfausts. The Ger-
312 

mans quickly knocked them out. One 

went up in flames. Disregarding enemy 

fire, a Company K squad leader, Sgt. 

Alvin R. Wise, rushed to the other tank 

to evacuate the wounded crew. The 

tank, he decided, might be recovered. 

Climbing inside, he began to spray adjacent German-held buildings with fire from 

the tank's machine guns. Under this 

covering fire, two privates from Sergeant 

Wise's squad joined him in the tank. 

Though none of the three ever had been 

inside a tank before, they somehow managed to start the motor, turn the tank 

around, and drive it down the street to 

safety." 

Having discovered on the first day that 

some apartment buildings and air-raid 

shelters could withstand the fire of tanks 

and tank destroyers, Colonel Corley 

called for a self-propelled 155-mm. rifle. 

Early the next morning the big weapon 

proved its worth in the first test when with 

one shot it practically leveled one of the 

sturdy buildings. Impressed, the regimental commander, Colonel Seitz, sent 

one of the big rifles to support his other 

battalion as well. 6 

By nightfall of the first day Colonel 

Corley's battalion had reached the base of 

the high ground. Early on 14 October, 

when two companies combined to overrun 

a strongpoint at St. Elizabeth's Church, 

the momentum of the attack carried one 

of the companies a few hundred yards 

past the church and into Farwick Park, 

the big park surrounding the Kurhaus 

and Palast-Hotel Quellenhof. Yet this 

company's hold was tenuous at best, for 

the rest of the battalion still was occupied 

in the buildings on the approaches to the 

5 Sergeant Wise was awarded the DSC. 

n These guns were from Btry C, 99Ist FA Bn. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

park. The Germans still held the buildings in Farwick Park: the hotel, the 

Kurhaus, a greenhouse (Orangerie) , and 

several gardening buildings. 

As early as 13 October, the drive 

toward the high ground had prompted 

the enemy commander, Colonel Wilck, to 

appeal for reinforcements. By nightfall, 

in response to this plea, the Germans on 

Observatory Hill were strengthened with 

about 150 men who were all that remained of Wilck's own 404th Regiment. 

Although Kampfgruppe Diefenthal's SSBattalion Rink also tried to reach the hill, 

that battalion was sidetracked by one of 

the 30th Division's attacks near Wuerselen. Colonel Wilck radioed his corps 

commander, in what was apparently a 

gross exaggeration, that American tanks 

had surrounded his command post in 

Hotel Quellenhof. 

In response to this startling message, 

the corps commander, General Koechling, 

tried throughout 14 October to disengage 

SS-Battalion Rink, reinforce the SS troops 

with a convoy of assault guns, and send 

them to Wilck's relief. Eight assault 

guns made it by early evening of 14 

October, but not until the next day was 

SS-Battalion Rink to arrive. In the meantime Colone Wilck apparently had moved 

his command post to some other structure 

less immediately threatened. 7 

For his part, Colonel Corley renewed the 

attack in Farwick Park early on 15 

October with the assistance of close support from attached chemical mortars. 

By midda y his men had wrested the 

gardening buildings, the greenhouse, and 

the Kurhaus from the Germans, but the 

enemy would not budge from behind the 

7 Unless otherwise noted, German material is 

from LXXXI Corps, Kampf um Aachen. 
ASSAULT ON THE CITY 

sturdy walls of Hotel Quellenhof. Colonel Corley was sending forward his 

155-mm. rifle to blast the building and 

readying his reserve company to flank it 

when the Germans launched a sharp 

counterattack. 

In strength of about one battalion, the 

counterattacking force apparently included remnants of both the 404th Regiment and SS-Battalion Rink. For about 

an hour the American company on the 

north edge of Farwick Park parried the 

blows, but at last the company had to 

fall back. Supported by assault guns, 

the Germans swept southward to hit the 

next company. Although forced to relinquish the Kurhaus, the company held 

fast in the park surrounding it. Refusing 

to leave his post, a mortar observer called 

down shellfire on his own position. By 

1700 the sting was gone from the German 

drive. Colonel Corley could report that 

his men not only would hold their own 

but soon would resume the advance. 

The battalion did hold, but in light of 

the bludgeoning blows which the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division had begun to 

direct against the 16th Infantry's linear 

defense near Eilendorf, General Huebner 

directed postponement of further offensive moves in Aachen. He told Colonel 

Seitz to hold in place until the situation 

along the division's east wing could be 

stabilized. 

Only for a day was it necessary for the 

two battalions in Aachen to desist from 

attack. By 16 October the 16th Infantry 

had repulsed the best the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division could offer. The longawaited juncture between 1st and 30th 

Division troops to close the W uerselen 

gap in the Aachen encirclement further 

allayed General Huebner's concern. Yet 

General Huebner still was to hold the 

313 

26th Infantry in check for another day 

while awaiting arrival of reinforcements 

promised for the final blow against 

Aachen by the corps commander, General 

Collins. 

Holding the Last Link 

In the meantime troops of both the 1st 

and 30th Divisions in the vicinity of 

Ravels Hill and Wuerselen fought to 

make a firm link from the tenuous patrol 

contact which Privates Whitis and Krauss 

had established between the two divisions 

late on 16 October. To prove their 

accomplishment no fluke, Whitis" and 

Krauss led a patrol from the 18th Infantry to 30th Division positions on Hill 194 

that night; yet German attempts to 

reopen a route into Aachen would deny 

genuine adhesion in the last link of the 

Aachen circle for several days. A company of the separate 99th Infantry 

Battalion (attached to the I 16th Infantry) discovered this fact early when 

German forays during the night of 16 

October seriously contested a roadblock 

which the infantry company established 

across the Aachen-Wuerselen highway.8 

It was obvious that so long as the enemy's 

3d Panzer Grenadier and 116th Panzer 

Divisions remained in this sector, a major 

counterattack to break the encirclement 

was a logical expectation. The XIX 

Corps G-2 fed the apprehension by 

continuing to express concern over the 

whereabouts of the 9th Panzer Division. 

The Germans for their part recognized 

that unless the 3d Panzer Grenadier and 

116th Panzer Divisions could break the 

encirclement soon, Aachen was lost. Cries 

of anguish from Colonel Wilck about the 

8 See 99th Inf En AAR, Oct 44; 30th Div 

Combat Intervs for the period. 
314 

weakness of his encircled forces heightened this concern. As commanders outside the city prepared a counterattack, 

the Commander in Chief West, Rundstedt, 

found it necessary to "remind the Commander of 246th Volks Grenadier Division 

[WilckJ once more, and with the utmost 

emphasis, that [in accordance with Hitler's order] he will hold this venerable 

German city to the last man, and will, if 

necessary, allow himself to be buried 

under its ruins." 9 

This-or surrender-was the only fate 

left to Colonel Wilck. Attempts by the 

3d Panzer Grenadier and 116th Panzer 

Divisions to break the encirclement on 

both 18 and 19 October again lacked 

co-ordination. Though some serious 

fighting occurred in the vicinity of Ravels 

Hill where the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division struck the 18th Infantry, no genuine 

likelihood of a breakthrough developed. 10 

An attempt by the Aachen garrison to 

complement these attacks from inside the 

circle got no place. By nightfall of 19 

October the German commanders had 

decided to abandon the defenders of 

Aachen to their fate. Headquarters of 

the I SS Panzer Corps was relieved; the 

3d Panzer Grenadier Division (reduced 

to half its original combat strength) prepared to pull out; and the LXXXI Corps 

resumed command of the entire sector.n 

D TWX, DB WEST to Army Group B, 2215., 

18 Oct 44, DB WEST KTB, Be/ehle und 

Meldungen. 

10 During a counterattack against Ravels Hill 

on 18 October, an 18th Infantry sergeant, Max 

Thompson, played the role of a one-man army. 

Seeing that the Germans had overrun a neighboring platoon, Sergeant Thompson used successively a machine gun, bazooka, automatic 

rifle, and hand grenades to halt the attack. He 

received the Medal of Honor. 

11 DB WEST KTB, 20 Oct 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

The Final Blow 

From the time Privates Whitis and 

Krauss first closed the Aachen Gap late on 

16 October, even the most fanatic of 

German defenders inside the city must 

have seen the end toward which they 

were headed. On that day Colonel Wilck 

had a total of 4,392 "combat effectives," 

plus I I surgeons and 34 medicsP 

As a result of a decision by the U.S. 

corps commander, General Collins, American strength in Aachen increased in a 

ratio greater than the decrease in German 

strength. General Collins had decided to 

reinforce the two battalions of the 26th 

Infantry with the two battalions of tanks 

and armored infantry of the 3d Armored 

Division that had been alerted to counterattack any penetration near Eilendorf 

but had not been needed there. Labeled 

Task Force Hogan, these two units were 

to join the fight on the north flank of 

Colonel Corley's battalion to fling a right 

hook against the Lousberg. The armor 

also was to occupy the village of Laurensberg, two miles northwest of Aachen, key 

to that part of the West Wall which 

remnants of the 49th Division still held 

north ,and northwest of the city. As an 

additional reinforcement, General Collins, 

through the auspices of the First Army, 

attached to the 1St Division a battalion of 

the I loth Infantry, brought north from 

Camp d'Elsenborn in the V Corps sector 

where the 28th Division was holding a 

relatively inactive front. General Huebner was to use this battalion only in a 

defensive role, to cover a growing gap 

between Colonel Daniel's battalion of the 

26th Infantry in Aachen and the I lo6th 

12 For a detailed breakdown of units, see 

Heichler, The Fall of Aachen. 
ASSAULT ON THE CITY 

Engineers south of the city.u On 18 

October as these new units moved into 

position, General Huebner authorized the 

26th Infantry to renew the assault. 

In Farwick Park, Colonel Corley's battalion set out to regain the ground lost 

there three days before, pass on to the 

Salvatorberg, and assist Task Force 

Hogan's drive on the Lousberg. One 

platoon rapidly recaptured the Kurhaus. 

While the enemy cowered in the basement 

of Hotel Quellenhof to escape American 

shelling, another platoon under 2d Lt. 

William D. Ratchford stormed into the 

hotel lobby. Hand grenade duels developed at every entrance to the basement. 

By the time Lieutenant Ratchford had 

procured machine guns to fire into the 

basement, the Germans had had enough. 

Twenty-five of the enemy had died in the 

fighting. A search of the hotel revealed 

large caches of food and ammunition and 

on the second floor a 20-mm. antiaircraft 

gun which the Germans had carted upstairs piece by piece, reassembled, and 

sited to fire into the park. 

Farwick Park and its buildings firmly in 

hand and Colonel Daniel's battalion continuing a methodical advance through the 

center of Aachen, fall of the city now 

could be only a question of time. The 

next day (19 October) Colonel Corley's 

men seized the Salvatorberg against a 

modicum of resistance. At the same 

time Task Force Hogan was overrunning 

the awe-inspiring but ineffectively defended heights of the Lousberg. Because 

30th Division troops already had occupied 

the village of Laurensberg, General Huebner changed the task force's second 

mission to cutting the Aachen-Laurens13 VII Corps Opns Memo 107, 18 Oct, VII 

Corps Opns Memo file, Oct 44. This confirms 

oral orders issued the day before. 

315 

berg highway a short distance south of 

the village. By nightfall of 19 October, a· 

part of the task force had occupied a 

chateau within 200 yards of this highway. 

In the chateau the men found stacks of 

ammunition of various types and, to their 

chagrin, whiskey bottles-all emptyscattered about the grounds. 14 

Reduction of the Salvatorberg and the 

Lousberg coincided with the enemy decision to abandon attempts to break the 

encirclement of Aachen. Within the 

city, Colonel Wilck during the afternoon 

of 19 October issued an order of the day: 

The defenders of Aachen will prepare for 

their last battle. Constricted to the smallest 

possible space, we shall fight to the last man, 

the last shell, the last bullet, in accordance 

with the Fuehrer's orders. 

In the face of the contemptible, despicable 

treason committed by certain individuals, 

I expect each and every defender of the 

venerable Imperial City of Aachen to do his 

duty to the end, in fulfillment of our Oath 

to the Flag. I expect courage and determination to hold out. 

Long live the Fuehrer and our beloved 

Fatherland !1 5 

Exhortations actually would do little to 

forestall the end. On 19 and 20 October 

resistance rapidly crumbled. Even though 

the battalion of the I loth Infantry was 

committed officially only to a defensive 

role, that unit joined Colonel Daniel's 

battalion in eviscerating the city. Already 

Colonel Daniel's men had seized the main 

railroad station and were nearing a railway line leading north to Laurensberg 

and Geilenkirchen and separating the 

main part of Aachen from western resi14 A detailed account of Task Force Hogan's 

role in the battle of Aachen may be found in 1st 

Division Combat Interview file, October 1944. 

15 TWX, OB WEST to OKW/WFSt, 1740, 

20- Oct 44, OB WEST KTB, Befehle und 

Meldungen. 
316 

dential sectors. After collapse of a strongpoint in the Technical University in the 

northwestern corner of the city, the 

battalion reached the western railroad 

tracks as night came on 20 October. 

The few Germans remaining were corralled in the western and southwestern 

suburbs. 

On 2 I October, Colonel Corley's battalion approached a big air-raid bunker 

at the northern end of Lousberg Strasse. 

Colonel Corley called for his attached 

155-mm. rifle. To the attackers, this 

was just another building that had to be 

reduced. They had no way of knowing 

that here was the cerebellum of the 

Aachen defense, the headquarters of Colonel Wilck. 

From this bunker, Colonel Wilck and 

his staff had been exercising their penchant for the melodramatic. "All forces 

are committed in the final struggle!" 

"Confined to the smallest area, the last 

defenders of Aachen are embroiled in their 

final battle!" "The last defenders of 

Aachen, mindful of their beloved German 

homeland, with firm confidence in our 

final victory, donate Reichsmark 10,468.00 

to the Winterhilfswerk [Winter Relief] 

Project. We shall fight on. Long live 

the Fuehrer!" Such was the tenor of 

Colonel Wilck's last messages to his superiors on the outside. 

As Colonel Corley called for his 155-

mm. rifle, Colonel Wilck, despite his 

exhortations, was ready to end the fight. 

But how to surrender? Two Germans 

who had tried to leave the bunker under 

a white flag had been shot down in the 

confusion of the battle. 

The solution appeared to lie among 

some thirty American prisoners the Germans were holding. From the prisoners 

they solicited volunteers to arrange the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

surrender. Two men from the I 106th 

Engineers who had been captured early 

in the Aachen fighting responded. They 

were S. Sgt. Ewart M. Padgett and Pfc. 

James B. Haswell. 

While Colonel Wilck by radio renewed 

his "unshakable faith in our right and 

our victory" and again paid obeisance to 

the Fuehrer, Haswell and Padgett stepped 

from the bunker. Small arms fire cracked 

about them. Bearing a white flag, the 

two men dashed into the middle of Lousberg Strasse. As they waved the flag 

frantically, the firing died down. An 

American rifleman leaned from a nearby 

window to motion the two men forward. 

Sergeant Padgett beckoned to two German officers behind him to follow. 

A company commander returned with 

Haswell, Padgett, and the Germans. 

Their luggage already packed, Colonel 

Wilck and his coterie were ready to 

depart. Before they left, Sergeant Padgett nabbed the prize souvenir of the 

occasion, the colonel's pistoP6 

At Colonel Corley's headquarters, the 

assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. 

George A. Taylor, accepted the German 

surrender. At 1205 on 2 I October, it 

was overY Because Colonel Wilck's internal communications had broken down, 

he had definite knowledge of the whereabouts of only some 500 of his soldiers. 

By nightfall, as American troops swept to 

every corner of the city, they had rounded 

up some 1,600 men, among" them a battalion adjutant to whom Lieutenants 

16 Sergeant Padgett has provided a lucid 

account of his experiences. FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 

154, 11 Nov 44, copy in 1st Div Combat Interv 

file. 

17 The German radio operator sent a final 

homespun message at 1:238: "We now sign off, 

with regards to our buddies and the folks back 

home." 
ASSAULT ON THE CITY 317 

COLONEL W1LCK and his headquarters group after their surrender. 

Lalley and Boehme had delivered the 

surrender ultimatum eleven days earlier. 

What Aac hen Cost 

The battle of Aachen was over. 

Though the Germans had failed to prevent encirclement and had held out within 

the city only five days after encirclement, 

the true measure of the battle from their 

standpoint was that they had imposed a 

telling, though costly, delay. The 30th 

Division listed 6,000 prisoners and the 

1st Division another 5,637, including 

3,473 taken within the city.IS The way 

in which German units were squandered 

without major reward was indicated by 

the fact that an equivalent of twenty 

battalions had been used in counterattack 

roles against the 30th Division, yet in 

only one or two cases had any counterattack involved more than two reinforced 

infantry battalions. A never-ending compulsion to stave off recurring crises had 

sucked the enemy's units into the abyss of 

piecemeal commitment. 

18 The Germans admitted but 5, J 00 casualties 

of all types. 
318 

On the American side, the 30th Division and attached troops, since the start 

of the West Wall campaign qn 2 October, 

had lost some 3,000 men. Indicative of 

1st Division casualties was a figure of 498 

incurred by the two battalions of the 

26th Infantry. Of these, 75 were killed 

and 9 missing.19 

A paradox of the battle, particularly in 

the sector of the 30th Division, was that 

it had involved primarily infantry units, 

yet it had assumed the complexion of an 

armored duel. Both sides had tank support, and few units, German or American, 

had experienced much success unless 

supporting tanks were on hand. By 

their own count, the Germans lost 45 

tanks.20 In one two-day period (9-IO 

October) the 30th Division claimed 20 

German tanks: I2 destroyed by I05-mm. 

howitzers, 5 by supporting tanks and tank 

destroyers, and 3 by bazookas. 

By way of an apologia for failure at 

Aachen, the Germans pointed to unchallenged American air superiority and 

to the ratio between American and German artillery in the Aachen sector. They 

estimated American batteries at 86 and 

reported opposing German batteries at 69. 

The average daily expenditure of rounds 

by U.S. artillery, they estimated, was 

9,300; by German artillery, 4,500.21 

19 The Germans estimated total American 

losses at 13,320. 

20 The 30th Division alone claimed to have 

destroyed 70. 

21 LXXXI Corps, Art.-Lage u. Art.-Gliederungen, I I Oct-I8 Dec 44. On 17 October the 

Germans had narrowed the LXXXI Corps sector 

by inserting the XII SS Corps north of the 

LXXXI Corps, establishing. the boundary between the 49th and 183d Divisions as the new 

corps boundary. Artillery in the XII SS Corps 

was not included in the estimate of batteries in 

the Aachen sector. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

AACHEN M UNSTER, popularly known as 

the Charlemagne Cathedral. 

The estimate of American batteries was 

no more than a slight exaggeration. 

Counting regimental cannon companies, 

organic artillery of the 1st and 30th 

Divisions totaled 30 batteries. Exclusive 

of tank and tank destroyer pieces, the two 

divisions possessed I I batteries of attached artillery. The two corps (VII and 

XIX.) had at least 33 more batteries 

under direct corps control. Not counting 

artillery under control either of the First 

Army or of adjacent divisions, the Americans had a minimum of 74 batteries 

capable of firing upon Aachen and its • 00 enVlrons.--

On 19 October the Germans fired 

leaflets into the 30th Division's zone. 

"The Ninth Army under General Simpson," the leaflets read, "[is] to relieve 

2 2 Arty AARs of VII and XIX Corps, I st and 

30th Divs, Oct 44. 
ASSAULT ON THE CITY 319 

VIEW OF RUINED AACHEN 

you on the 20th and 21st of October.” 

The Germans were only one day off. 

At noon on 22 October, General Simpson’s 

Ninth Army headquarters moved from 

Luxembourg to assume control of the 

XIX Corps. The boundary between the 

First and Ninth Armies was to follow the 

existing boundary between the VII and 

XIX Corps. 

As the XIX Corps had fought its last 

fight under the aegis of the First Army, 

so had the corps commander, General 

Corlett, fought his last fight with the 

XIX Corps. His health already severely 

strained during previous combat service 

in the Pacific, General Corlett had for the 

last few months found the rigor of his 

duties increasingly trying. On 18 October General Bradley relieved him of his 

command; shortly thereafter, General 

Corlett left for the United States on 

recuperation leave. He departed with the 

understanding that General Eisenhower 

wanted him to return to the theater when 

he was physically able.23 

23 Critics of General Corlett’s West Wall campaign have intimated that he was relieved 

because General Hodges was dissatisfied with 

methods of the XIX Corps in sealing the Aachen 

Gap. See XIX Corps Combat Intervs, Oct 44. 

ASSAULT ON THE CITY 319 

VIEW OF RUINED AACHEN 

you on the 20th and 21St of October." 

The Germans were only one day off. 

At noon on 22 October, General Simpson's 

Ninth Army headquarters moved from 

Luxembourg to assume control of the 

XIX Corps. The boundary between the 

First and Ninth Armies was to follow the 

existing boundary between the VII and 

XIX Corps. 

As the XIX Corps had fought its last 

fight under the aegis of the First Army, 

so had the corps commander, General 

Corlett, fought his last fight with the 

XIX Corps. His health already severely 

strained during previous combat service 

in the Pacific, General Corlett had for the 

last few months found the rigor of his 

duties increasingly trying. On 18 October General Bradley relieved him of his 

command; shortly thereafter, General 

Corlett left for the United States on 

recuperation leave. He departed with the 

understanding that General Eisenhower 

wanted him to return to the theater when 

he was physically able. 23 

23 Critics of General Corlett's West WaH campaign have intimated that he was relieved 

because General Hodges was dissatisfied with 

methods of the XIX Corps in sealing the Aachen 

Gap. See XIX Corps Combat Intervs, Oct 44. 
320 

General Corlett's successor was a 

former artillery commander of the 30th 

Division, Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain. 

General McLain had begun his army 

career when he enlisted in the Oklahoma 

National Guard. During the months 

preceding his assumption of command of 

the XIX Corps, he had made an enviable 

record as commander of the Third Army's 

90th Division.24 

If this was the case, it was diametrically opposite 

to General Eisenhower's view as expressed in a 

letter to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, 

dated 20 October 1944. Eisenhower wrote that 

he was relieving Corlett to send him home for 

sixty days "for physical check-up and rest. He 

has performed most effectively throughout the 

campaign . . .. I should like for him to get a 

chance for real recreation and then return here 

sometime within the allotted period. I regard 

him as an outstanding corps commander." 

Eisenhower to Marshall, S-63258, Pogue files. 

See also, Corlett to OCMH, 2 Sep 53, and 20 

May 56. 

24 In World War I, General McLain commanded a machine gun company in the Champagne and Meuse-Argonne Campaigns. In 

World War II, his early combat experience was 

as artillery commander with the 45th Division 

in Sicily. In July 1944, after the 90th Division 

had proved a disappointment in its first combat 

(see [Roland G. Ruppenthal] Utah Beach to 

Cherbourg, Washington, 1947, and Blumenson, 

Breakout and Pursuit), General McLain had 

assumed command of that division. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

As the fighting died in Aachen, the 

German commander, Schwerin, who in 

September had tried to spare the city, 

would have been horrified to see that 

once-proud coronation capital. "The city 

is as dead as a Roman ruin," wrote an 

American observer, "but unlike a ruin it 

has none of the grace of gradual decay 

Burst sewers, broken gas mains 

and dead animals have raised an almost 

overpowering· smell in many parts of the 

city. The streets are paved with shattered glass; telephone, electric light and 

trolley cables are dangling and netted 

together everywhere, and in many places 

wrecked cars, trucks, armored vehicles 

and guns litter the streets . . . ." 25 

The ironic truth of a prophecy which 

Hitler had made early in his career was 

nowhere more evident than on 2 I October 

I 944 in Aachen, the first large German 

city lost in the war: 

Give me five years and you will not 

recognize Germany again. 

- ADOLF HITLER 

25 City of Aachen, Annex 3 to VII Corps G-2 

Per Rpt 138, 21 Oct, VII Corps G-3 Jnl file, 

21-22 Oct 44. 

PART FOUR 

The Roer River Dams 

CHAPTER XIV 

The First Attack on Schmidt 

Looking east from the little German 

border villages southeast of Aachen, the 

Huertgen Forest is a seemingly impenetrable mass, a vast, undulating, blackishgreen ocean stretching as far as the eye 

can see. Upon entering the forest, you 

want to drop things behind to mark your 

path, as Hansel and Gretel did with their 

bread crumbs. 

By the end of September 1944 the 60th 

Infantry of General Craig's 9th Division 

already had tested the forest; encountered 

small but resolute German units, and 

drawn back bloodied. Seeking to pass 

directly through the woods to capture 

the Huertgen-Kleinhau road net along 

ridge-top clearings that characterize the 

eastern half of the forest, one regiment 

had proved no match for an enemy utilizing the defensive potentialities of the 

forest to advantage. Even an attempt to 

gain a compromise objective had failed. 

This was the try at turning south through 

Deadman's Moor (the Todten Bruch) to 

link with another regiment which had 

stalled half in, half out, of the West Wall 

in the Monschau Corridor. (See Map 

III.) 

As October opened and First Army's 

General Hodges prepared to clear up unfinished business before renewing a general 

offensive, the Huertgen Forest still stood 

unconquered athwart the path to the 

Roer River of the right wing of General 

Collins' VII Corps. It could not be 

wished away. To General Collins, who 

had served in the Meuse-Argonne campaign of W orId War I, the Huertgen 

Forest was a logical spot for concealed 

assembly and counterattack into the right 

flank of the VII Corps, much as the 

Argonne Forest had posed a threat to the 

American left flank twenty-six years before. I As had American commanders in 

the Argonne in October 19 I 8, those in 

October 1944 believed they might neutralize the forest facing them by seizing 

heights along the eastern edge. 

Beyond this negative factor of neutralizing the forest against enemy concentration, the prospect of conquering the forest 

posed several positive advantages. Most 

of these centered about the crossroads 

village of Schmidt, which sits astride one 

of the highest ridge tops west of the Roer 

in a clearing on the southeastern fringe of 

the forest. En route to Schmidt, an attacker might pave the way for subsequent 

capture of the Huertgen-Kleinhau road 

net leading northeast to Dueren by 

occupying the villages of Germeter and 

Vossenack. From Vossenack, a move two 

miles to the southeast across the deep 

gorge of the little Kall River leads to 

Schmidt. Occupying this crossroads village would expose from the rear the 

stubborn pillbox defenses in the Monschau 

Corridor that had halted the extreme 

right wing of the VII Corps in September. 

With both Schmidt and the Monschau 

1 See Interv with Collins, 25 Jan 54. 
324 

THE ROER RIVER DAMS 

Conto/Jr interval /00 meters 

MAP 5 

Corridor in hand, the VII Corps might 

peg its right flank firmly along the upper 

reaches of the Roer from Schmidt to the 

headwaters at Monschau. Another part 

of the front would have been put in order 

in preparation for the main drive across 

the Roer to the Rhine. 

Having cut the 9th Division's frontage 

in half since the mid-September fighting, 

General Collins told General Craig to 

regroup the division for a stronger attempt to penetrate the forest. The 

objective he assigned was Schmidt.2 

2 VII Corps Opns Memo 101, I Oct, confirming oral orders of 30 Sep, VII Corps Opns Memo 

file, Oct 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

The Neglected Objective 

As the 9th Division in early October 

prepared to attack, few within the American command appeared to appreciate the 

critical importance of another objective 

which capture of Schmidt might expose. 

This was a multiple objective, a series of 

seven dams near the headwaters of the 

Roer. Though three of the seven are on 

tributaries of the Roer, all came to be 

known collectively as the Roer River 

Dams. (Map 5) 

The two principal dams are the D rft 

and the Schwammenauel. Constructed 

just after the turn of the century on the 

Drft River between Gemuend and Ruhr-
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 325 

SCHWAMMENAUEL DAM 

berg, the Urft Dam is capable of impounding approximately 42,000 acre-feet 

of water. Built in the mid-thirties near 

Hasenfeld, about t~o miles downhill from 

Schmidt, the Schwammenauel Dam creates a reservoir encompassing about 

81,000 acre-feet. The Schwammenauel is 

of earth construction with a concrete 

core. Both the principal dams were designed for controlling the Roer River and 

providing hydroelectric power for Dueren 

and other cities downstream to the north. 3 

3 A theory prevalent among Americans that 

the Schwammenauel Dam was constructed with 

an eye toward augmenting the West Wall defenses cannot be supported. 

Lesser dams downstream from the 

Schwammenauel are at Heimbach and 

Obermaubach. These were designed primarily to create equalizing basins in 

accordance with industrial needs farther 

downstream. Of the other three dams, 

the Paulushof, near the confluence of the 

Roer and the Urft at Ruhrberg, was 

designed primarily to regulate water levels 

at the headwaters of the Schwammenauel 

reservoir; the Kall Valley Dam, on the 

upper reaches of the Kall River near 

Lammersdorf, has only a small capacity; 

and the Dreilaenderbach Dam creates the 

Hauptbecken Reser~oir near Roetgen on 

the headwaters of the Vicht River. The 
326 

Dreilaenderbach Dam was III American 

hands before the 9th Division's October 

attack. 4 

Value of the Roer River Dams to German defense was outlined several days 

before the 9th Division's October attack 

by the division G-2, Maj. Jack A. Houston. "Bank overflows and destructive 

flood waves," Major Houston concluded, 

"can be produted [on the Roer River] by 

regulating the discharge from the various 

dams. By demolition of some of them 

great destructive waves can be produced 

which would destroy everything in the 

populated industrial valley [of the RoerJ 

as far as the Meuse [Maas ] and into 

Holland." 5 The intimation was fairly 

obvious: should the Allies cross the Roer 

downstream from the dams, the Germans 

could release the impounded waters to 

produce a flood that would demolish 

tactical bridges and isolate any force east 

of the Roer. Allied troops beyond the 

river would be exposed to destruction in 

detail by German reserves. 

4 One of the better contemporary studies of the 

Roer River Dams is to be found in Annex 2 to 

5th Armd Div G-2 Per Rpt 85, 24 Oct, 5th 

Armd Div G-2 file, Oct 44. See also FUSA Rpt 

of Opns, Vol. I, p. 95; VII Corps Engrs, Study 

of Possible Flooding of the R ur (Roer) River, 

17 Nov, 1st Div G-2 Jnl file, 19-20 Nov 44. 

5 Annex I to 9th Div G-2 Per Rpt 78, 2 Oct, 

9th Div G-2 file, Oct 44. The first recorded 

references to the dams were contained in reports 

by Belgian officers on 23 and 30 September. See 

Memo to Col Dickson (G-2 FUSA), 23 Sep, 

FUSA G-2 Tac Jnl file, Sep 44; Memo to CofS 

from 1st Div, 23 Sep, VII Corps G-3 file, Sep 44. 

FUSA repeated the report of 30 Sep in its G-2 

Per Rpt 113, I Oct, FUSA G-2 Tac Jnl file, 

1-3 Oct 44. Existence of the dams and reservoirs could have been no secret, for the 1:25,000 

maps in use at the time showed most of them in 

detail. On 6 October a Belgian agent sent 

FUSA a report on the Urft Dam that was 

inexplicably labeled Secret, yet the agent's source 

was a French edition of Baedeker's Rhineland. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Despite this hazard, the Roer River 

Dams were not a formal objective' of the 

9th Division's October attack. 6 Indeed, 

as the division prepared to attack, advisers 

to the First Army commander minimized 

the defensive value of any floods which 

might be produced. On 3 October, the 

day after the 9th Division's appraisal 

appeared, the First Army's intelligence 

section believed that if "all of the dams" 

in the entire First Army sector were 

blown, "they would cause at the most 

local floodings for about 5 days counted 

from the moment the dam was blown 

until all the water had receded." 7 Two 

days later the First Army engineer 

amended this view somewhat with the 

opinion that "widespread flooding" might 

result. 8 But not for a long time were 

American commanders to appreciate the 

true value of the dams to the Germans. 

One explanation might rest in the fact 

that during October all reservoirs in the 

system were "considerably drawn down, 

in amount estimated at 30-50 percent of 

total capacity." 9 Yet as late as 28 November, after water level in the reservoirs 

had risen as high as two thirds of capacity, 

the First Army G-2 still could express 

the theory that "the economic importance 

of the dams to life in the Rhenish cities 

G See VII Corps and 9th Div FO's for this 

attack; also Notes for Chief of Staff, 22 and 23 

Sep 44, in VII Corps G-3 file, 23 Sep 44, which 

relate plans and objectives of the 9th Division 

attack as discussed by Generals Collins and 

Craig. The dams are not mentioned. See also, 

Ltr, Craig to OCMH, 3 I Aug 53. 

7 Record of tel conv between G-2, MASTER 

Command, and G-2 FUSA (Tac), 3 Oct, 

FUSA G-2 Tac Jnl file, 1-3 Oct 44. 

8 Msg, FUSA Engr to VII Corps Engr, 5 Oct, 

VII Corps G-3 file, 5 Oct 44. See also FUSA 

G-2 Estimate 3 I, 8 Oct, FUSA G-2 Tac file, 

8-9 Oct 44. 

9 Ltr, FUSA to 12th A Gp, 29 Oct, FUSA 

G-3 Ltrs and Inds file, Oct 44. 
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

could prevent the enemy blowing them up 

as part of a 'drowned earth' policy." 10 

Closer to reality was an early appraisal 

by the XIX Corps engineer. Aware that 

his corps eventually was to cross the Roer 

downstream from the dams near J uelich, 

where banks of the river are low, the XIX 

Corps engineer warned his corps commander on 8 October. "If one or all 

dams were blown," he estimated, "a flood 

would occur in the channel of the Roer 

River that would reach approximately 

1,500 feet in width and 3 feet or more 

deep across the entire corps front .... 

The flood would probably last from one 

to three weeks." 11 

Unfortunately, the XIX Corps engineer went on to dismiss the subject 

because all the dams were in the VII 

Corps zone. The VII Corps, he noted, 

"could be requested to capture and prevent destruction although they can be 

presumed to do so as their area is affected 

also." 12 On the contrary, General Collins and the VII Corps at this time were 

engrossed in plans to subdue Aachen and 

to send the 9th Division through the 

Huertgen Forest. They paid scant attention to an objective like the dams that 

did not lie along the planned route to the 

Roer and the Rhine. 13 

General Eisenhower's headquarters, 

SHAEF, remained aloof from the subject 

of the dams until 20 October, several 

lOFUSA G-2 Per Rpt 171, as cited in VII 

Corps G-2 Per Rpt 164, 28 Nov, FUSA G-2 

Tac Jnl file, 29 Nov 44. 

, 11 Memo, XIX Corps Engr for XIX Corps 

G-3, 8 Oct, XIX Corps G-3 Jnl file, 12 Oct 44. 

1 ~ Ibid. 

13 Planning for an offensive by the V Corps to 

complement a VII Corps push to the Rhine was 

in progress at this time, though it subsequently 

was canceled. Like the VII Corps, the V Corps 

made no plans to seize the dams. See V Corps 

Operations in the ETO, pp. 272-278. 

327 

days after the 9th Division's Huertgen 

Forest attack had ended. On that date 

the SHAEF G-2 repeated and enlarged 

upon information originally obtained by 

the V Corps from a German prisoner. 

In Dueren, the prisoner said, a persistent 

ringing of the city's church bells was to 

mean the dams had been blown. The 

people were to evacuate the city, because 

the flood there would reach a depth of 

almost twenty feet. Turning to photographic files, SHAEF noted that air cover 

of all dams except the U rft had existed 

since 10 September. Allied air officials, 

SHAEF remarked, were "prepared to 

study [the] question of [ air] attack." 14 

Like the First Army, General Bradley's 

headquarters, the I 2th Army Group, minimized the possible effects of a flood. Like 

SHAEF, the 12th Army Group in October looked upon the dams as "an Air 

Force matter." 15 

A realistic view toward the Roer River 

Dams was slow to come. All through 

October and November, the First Army 

and, in later stages, the Ninth Army were 

to fight to build up along the west bank 

of the Roer downstream from the dams 

without making any specific effort to 

capture the dams. Yet neither army 

could cross the Roer until the dams were 

either captured or destroyed. 

Just how long it took the American 

command to adopt a realistic attitude 

toward the dams is apparent only from 

the denouement of First Army operations 

through October and November and into 

December. As one considers the unfold14 Msg, SHAEF (MAIN) to 12th A Gp, 20 

Oct, FUSA G-2 Tac J nl file, 20-21 Oct 44. 

15 12th A Gp Weekly Intel Summaries II and 

12 for weeks ending 21 and 28 Oct, dtd 22 and 

29 Oct, respectively, 12th A Gp G-2 AAR, Oct 

44· 
328 

ing of operations in the Huertgen Forest 

and farther north amid the villages of the 

Roer plain, it becomes increasingly evident 

what a predominant role these dams came 

to play in German thinking and how 

determined German defense of the region 

of the dams had to become before American commanders heeded the danger. 16 

What happened in February 1945 as 

troops of the First Army at last neared the 

dams and the Germans attempted in panic 

to blow them was a flood in the valley of 

the Roer lasting one day short of two 

weeksY This the Germans accomplished 

with only partial destruction of but one 

dam, the Schwammenauel. 

Objective: Schmidt 

Had the Roer River Dams been an 

objective of the 9th Division's October 

attack, it is logical to assume that some 

extraordinary effort might have been made 

to reinforce the division. As it was, the 

division commander, General Craig, had a 

problem of concentrating enough strength 

to make a genuine difference between the 

projected attack and the one-regiment 

thrust which the 60th Infantry had 

launched without success in September. 

Through September the 9th Division 

had operated on a front stretching ftom 

Schevenhuette, near Stolberg, south 

through the Huertgen Forest and the 

Monschau Corridor to the Hoefen-Alzen 

ridge, southeast of Monschau, a distance 

of almost twenty miles. Even after entry 

of the Ninth Army into the line in Luxembourg enabled the First Army to adjust its 

corps frontages, the 9th Division still 

16 See Interv with Col Akers, II }un 56. 

17 See The Last Offensive, a volume in preparation in the series UNITED STATES ARMY 

IN WORLD WAR II. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

covered a front of nine miles. One regiment, the 47th Infantry, had to remain on 

the defensive at Schevenhuette. (Map 6) 

This left but two regiments free to attack: 

the 39th Infantry, which had been relieved 

in the Monschau Corridor by the 4th 

Cavalry Group, and the 60th Infantry. 

Even this concentration would have been 

impossible had not an attached unit, the 

298th Engineer Combat Battalion, held 

much of the Huertgen Forest front with 

roadblocks at intervals between Schevenhuette and Deadman's Moor (Todten 

Bruch) . 

Hope for success of the 9th Division's 

attack obviously rested less with American 

strength than an expectation of German 

weakness. For all the sacrifices the 

Huertgen Forest already had exacted 

from the 60th Infantry, no one yet had 

accorded any particular respect to the 

enemy units defending there. The division G-2, Major Houston, estimated that 

German strength opposite the entire ninemile front totaled no more than 5,000 men 

representing some fourteen separate home 

guard and replacement battalions. These, 

Major Houston believed, possessed no 

definite regimental organization and probably were no more than loosely and 

ineffectively knit together under an ersatz 

division staff. Although German leadership was for the most part excellent, Major 

Houston remarked, morale was "characteristically low." 18 

18 Intel Annex to 9th Div FO 39, 3 Oct, 9th 

Div AAR, Oct 44. Unless otherwise noted, this 

account is based upon official unit records and 

a series of detailed combat interviews at company 

and battalion level. An accurate presentation at 

a small unit level is available in an unpublished 

manuscript by Maj. Henry P. Halsell, Huertgen 

Forest and th'e Roer River Dams, copy in 

OCMH files through courtesy of Major Halsell. 
MAP 6 

THE FIRST ATTAOK ON SOHMIDT 

9TH DIVISION 

6-16 October 1944 

~ ~ ~ u.s. POSITIONS, 6 OCT 

~ ROADBLOCK 

---.~ u.s. AXIS OF ADVANCE 

<l==:=: GERMAN COUNTERATTACK 

llli i ill! i Ii i U.s. POSITIONS, 16 OCT 

.. '" • •• WEST WALL PI LLBOXES 

Contour Interval 50 meters 

1 MILES 

I 

D. Holmes, Jr'. 
330 

Basically, American intelligence estimates were correct. What they failed to 

remark was that in this kind of terrain 

high-level organization and even morale 

might not count for much. 

Until the day after General Collins 

directed a new attack, German units 

opposite the 9th Division had represented 

two divisions, the 275th and 353d Infantry 

Divisions. During the battle of the Stolberg Corridor in mid-September, the 

353d Division had been little more than a 

headquarters attached to the LXXXI 

Corps; but subsequently the division had 

been shifted into the Huertgen Forest, 

shored up with conglomerate units, and 

transferred to the neighboring LXXIV 

Corps (General Straube). In the meantime, the 275th Division had been falling 

back in front of the XIX U.S. Corps 

from Maastricht to the West Wall. After 

arrival of a new division to occupy the 

West Wall in front of the XIX Corps, the 

LXXXI Corps commander had transferred the remnants of the 275th Division 

into the forest near Schevenhuette. So 

that defense of the forest might not be 

weakened by a corps boundary, the 

Seventh Army commander, General 

Brandenberger, had transferred the 275th 

Division in place to the LXXIV Corps. 

During the latter days of September, both 

divisions had pursued the laborious task of 

rebuilding. 

On I October, as the 9th Division 

began to prepare its attack, the commander of the 275th Division, General 

Schmidt, unexpectedly received orders to 

absorb into his division both the troops 

and the sector of the 353d Division. 

Headquarters and noncombatants of the 

353d Division were disengaged. A man 

who bore the same name as the 9th DiviTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

sion's objective now became lord of the 

entire Huertgen Forest. 19 

The total of General Schmidt's infantry 

combat effectives when he first had moved 

into the Huertgen Forest was roughly 

800. By 3 October, when absorption of 

the 353d Division was complete, he could 

point to a combat strength of 5,000, plus 

an additional 1,500 men in headquarters 

and service units. As the 9th Division 

G-2 had predicted, regimental organization was shaky; nevertheless, the front 

had been formally broken down into three 

regimental sectors. In the north was the 

275th Division's organic 984th Regiment; 

in the center, a variety of units from the 

353d Division which were to be designated 

the 985th Infantry Regiment; and in the 

south, where the 9th Division was to 

strike, a former component of the 353d 

Division labeled the 253d Regiment. This 

regiment commanded a colorful array of 

unrelated units composed of replacements, 

Landesschuetzen, a few combat veterans, 

and others. 

In division reserve, General Schmidt 

had a replacement battalion numbering 

about 200 men and the 275th Fusilier 

Battalion with about 400 men. Also 

available but currently engaged in constructing defenses near Dueren were about 

600 men under one of the division's 

organic regiments, the 983d. 

For artillery support, General Schmidt 

had only 13 lO5-mm. howitzers, I 2 I 0-

mm. howitzer, and 6 assault guns. Other 

19 The basic source for the German side of 

this action is MS # B-8ro, Generalleutnant Hans 

Schmidt, Kaempfe im Rheinland 275. Infanterie Division. Additional details may be found 

in Lucian Heichler, The First Battle of the 

Huertgen Forest, a manuscript prepared to complement this volum'c and filed in OCMH. 
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

than bazookas and panzerfausts, the assault guns were the only weapons available 

for antitank defense. 

Other weapons were almost as diverse 

as the men who manned them. Though 

machine guns and mortars were of various 

types, they had enough of neither. Even 

rifles were of various types and makes, 

a fact which further complicated an ammunition supply situation already acute. 

All weapons, particularly artillery pieces, 

had to practice stringent ammumtlOn 

economy, though presence in the division 

sector of an adequately supplied antiaircraft artillery regiment was to alleviate 

the artillery situation somewhat. 

During the first week of October, the 

27Sth Division worked night and day on 

defensive positions. Mainly these were 

field fortifications-log bunkers, foxholes, 

connecting trenches, wire entanglements, 

mine fields, and roadblocks. The line 

followed generally the Rother Weh and 

Weisser Weh Creeks which bisect the 

approximate center of the forest, though 

some strong outposts were established 

west of the creek beds. 

Like the Americans, General Schmidt 

at this stage apparently took no special 

cognizance of the Roer River Dams. His 

mission, as he interpreted it, was to 

repulse the Americans inside the Huertgen 

Forest in order to deny access to the high 

clearings near the Roer which overlook 

flatlands leading to the Rhine. If he 

considered any feature within his sector 

more important than the others, it was the 

Huertgen-Kleinhau road net which leads 

to Dueren. Paradoxically, neither adversary in the first big fight to occur in the 

vicinity of the Roer River Dams apparently was thinking III terms of this 

important objective. 

331 

To the First Clearing 

The American commander, General 

Craig, directed attack from positions deep 

in the forest about a mile west of the 

Weisser Weh Creek. Ordering his two 

regiments to move abreast, he designated 

as first objectives the village of Germeter 

and settlements of Wittscheidt and 

Richelskaul, which lie north and south, 

respectively, of Germeter. Capture of 

these points would sever the main Monschau-Huertgen-Dueren highway and 

also provide egress from the forest into the 

first big clearing along the projected route 

to Schmidt. 

Attacking toward Wittscheidt and 

Germeter, the 39th Infantry on the left 

wing also was to guard against counterattack from the north from the direction 

of Huertgen. After occupying the first 

objectives, the 39th Infantry was to push 

on to Vossenack and subsequently southeast across the Kall River gorge to 

Schmidt. Upon seizure of Richelskaul, 

the 60th Infantry on the right wing was 

to turn south to occupy high ground 

about two forest-cloaked road junctions. 

Control of these points would block enemy 

movement against the division's penetration from the direction of the Monschau 

Corridor and open the way for a subsequent advance into the flank of the 

corridor. 

As demonstrated in later fighting over 

this same terrain, the weak point in General Craig's plan lay in an inability to 

protect the left (northern and northeastern) flank once the 39th Infantry left 

Germeter for Vossenack and subsequently 

for Schmidt. This flank would stretch 

eventually to at least six miles. To help 

protect it, General Craig would have at 
332 

best but one battalion in division reserve. 

This probably would be a battalion of 

the 60th Infantry which on the first day 

was to feign attack eastward from a 

position near Jaegerhaus, a forester's lodge 

southwest of Deadman's Moor (Todten 

Bruch) . 

If General Craig found any consolation 

in regard to this situation, it would have 

been in an erroneous belief which the division G-2 expressed two days after the 

attack began. "It is felt," the G-2 said, 

"that should a major breakthrough occur, 

or should several penetrations occur, the 

enemy will begin a withdrawal to the 

Rhine River, abandoning his Siegfried 

Line." 20 It was late in the West Wall 

fighting for this kind of thinking to persist. 

To initiate the attack on Schmidt, seven 

squadrons (eighty-four planes) of IX 

Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers 

were to hit three priority targets: first, 

a heavily forested plateau between the 

Weisser Weh and Germeter, where the 

enemy had located his main line of resistance; second, Germeter; and third, the 

forest-cloaked road junctions which were 

the 60th Infantry's final objectives. Supplemented by three battalions and two 

additional batteries of corps guns, 9th 

Division artillery was to follow the air 

strike with a sharp five-minute preparation. 

Though the attack was scheduled for 

5 October, low-hanging clouds which obscured targets from the fighter-bombers 

prompted successive postponements. At 

noon General Craig called off the attack 

until the next day. On 6 October, the 

weather cleared over the targets, but local 

fog over airfields in Belgium persisted. 

To the infantrymen, waiting with keyed 

nerves beneath the dark umbrella of fir 

20 9th Div G-2 Per Rpt 84, 8 Oct, 9th Div 

AAR, Oct 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

branches, it looked like another dry run. 

At last, shortly after 1000, a steady drone 

of planes drew near. 

Against targets marked with red smoke 

by the artillery, the bombing began. 

Diving low, P-47 Thunderbolts of the 

365th and 404th Groups struck with preCISIOn. Then outgoing shells from the 

throats of big artillery pieces stirred the 

tops of the tall firs. Three minutes of 

fire. Five minutes of silence. Two minutes of fire. At I 130, attack. 

Men of both regiments discovered early 

that the first clearing' in the Huertgen 

Forest was much farther away in terms 

of fighting and time than was indicated 

by the mile that showed on maps. Still 

800 yards west of the Weisser Weh, the 

2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, under Maj. 

Lawrence L. Decker, smacked against an 

outpost position that eventually would 

require almost a week to reduce. Though 

the 39th Infantry pushed back outposts in 

its sector, it was a gradual process 

crowned by even more rigid resistance 

from pillboxes along the east slope of the 

Weisser Weh. The Germans and the 

forest together were putting a high price 

on this little piece of real estate. 

Some idea of the stiff asking price was 

apparent from the first. One company 

of the 2d Battalion, engaging the outpost 

west of the Weisser Weh, ended the first 

day with two officers and sixty men, little 

more than a platoon. Though not engaged during the day by small arms fire, 

another battalion lost a hundred men to 

shellbursts in the trees. 

As reflected in casualty figures, advances were for the most part painfully 

slow. Because each regimental sector 

contained only one trail leading east and 

because these and the firebreaks were 

blocked with mines and felled trees, tanks 
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

and other direct fire weapons could not 

assist. Fighting was reduced to the simple 

equation of man against man, rifle against 

rifle, machine gun against machine gun. 

Though supporting artillery averaged 

about 5,000 rounds a day along the division front and fighter-bombers were active 

most of the time, so closely were the 

combatants locked that little of this fire 

could be directed against those positions 

posing the immediate problems. Relatively impervious to shelling themselves, 

the Germans in their bunkers could direct 

mortar and artillery fire to burst in the 

treetops and spray deadly ricochet fragments upon the floor of the forest. On 

the American side, the fight amid the 

firs was a plodding exercise in unsupported 

infantry maneuver. 

Two exceptions to the pedestrian pace 

developed, both on the second day, 7 

October. While P-47's strafed and 

bombed Germeter, a company of the 39th 

Infantry slipped past German positions on 

the wooded plateau between the Weisser 

Weh and Germeter to gain the woods line 

overlooking the village. In the face of 

immediate reaction by fire from Germans 

in the buildings, the battalion commander, 

Colonel Thompson, hesitated to order the 

company from the concealment of the 

woods. Before risking his men in the 

open astride a main highway, Colonel 

Thompson wanted tanks or antitank guns 

and some means of supplying them other 

than by long hand-carry through the 

woods. 

In the 60th Infantry's sector, a battalion under Colonel Chatfield faced much 

the same situation. Committed around a 

flank of the German outpost that had 

stymied the 2d Battalion west of the 

Weisser Weh, Colonel Chatfield's men by 

nightfall were overlooking the settlement 

333 

of Richelskaul. Like Colonel Thompson, 

Colonel Chatfield was reluctant to debouch from the woods without armor or 

antitank support. 

To grant passage for heavier weapons, 

engineers worked around the clock clearing 

firebreaks and trails. Because the Germans opposing Major Decker's 2d Battalion west of the Weisser Weh continued 

to hold out obstinately, the most direct 

route to the rear for the 60th Infantry 

was denied. Supply parties hand-carrying rations and ammumtlOn incurred 

severe losses from shelling, antipersonnel 

mines, and roving patrols. Not until 

nightfall of the third day (8 October) 

did tanks and tank destroyers negotiate the 

tortuous terrain to gain the woods line. . 

From the German viewpoint, an American offensive in such "extensive, thick, and 

nearly trackless forest terrain" had come 

as a surprise. 21 The 275th Division commander, General Schmidt, nevertheless 

had marshaled his 275th Fusilier Battalion and committed it, as the Americans 

had anticipated, against the north flank of 

the 39th Infantry. That regiment took 

care of the thrust in short order. On 8 

October the 275th Division engineers and 

600 men of the 9B3d Regiment arrived 

from Dueren to strike Colonel Chatfield's 

battalion of the 60th Infantry near 

Richelskaul. In a case like this, the 

Germans instead of the Americans were 

prey to tree bursts and other confusions 

of the forest. They fell back in disorder. 

By 8 October German shelling had increased. It stemmed from an order by 

the LXXIV Corps commander, General 

Straube, that more than doubled the 

275th Division's original artillery strength. 

General Straube directed support from 

batteries of the neighboring· 89th Division, 

21 MS #13-810 (Schmidt). 
334 

an antiaircraft artillery regiment, and a 

volks artillery corps. 

The Seventh Army commander, General 

Brandenberger, provided meager assistance 

in the form of two fortress infantry battalions, but both battalions incurred forbidding losses on the first day of 

commitment. By the end of the third day 

the Germans still maintained a continuous 

line along the west edge of the first 

clearing at Wittscheidt, Germeter, and 

Richelskaul, but further counterattacks 

before additional reserves could arrive 

were out of the question. The impoverished state of German reserves was 

illustrated dramatically on 9 October 

when two companies of overage policemen 

from Dueren were thrust into the line 

near Wittscheidt. 

The Germans in the Huertgen Forest 

were convinced that they faced an enemy 

with a well-nigh unlimited supply of topnotch, rested, and well-equipped combat 

troops specially trained and experienced 

in forest fighting. That the two regiments of the 9th Division could create an 

impression so different from the fact of a 

tired, overextended division, replete with 

inexperienced replacements, represents 

perhaps the highest tribute that can be 

paid them. The Germans were awed 

particularly by the efficiency of American 

communications as manifested by lightning 

shifts and adjustments in artillery fires. 

After tanks and tank destroyers at last 

reached both American regiments late on 

8 October, plans progressed to break out 

of the forest into the first clearing the 

next day. At Richelskaul, Colonel Chatfield's battalion attacked in a wedge 

formation behind a platoon of medium 

tanks. Their machine guns and cannon 

blazing, the tanks stormed so quickly 

from the forest that the Germans had 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

virtually no chance to fight back. When 

a lieutenant dared to rise from his foxhole 

to fire a panzerfaust, one of the tank 

gunners sliced him, in half with a round 

from his 75. So demoralized were the 

other Germans that almost a hundred surrendered and others fled. A count revealed fifty German dead. 

In the sector of the 39th Infantry, 

another day was needed before both attacking battalions could build up along 

the woods line. Only two platoons that 

occupied westernmost buildings of Wittscheidt emerged from the woods on 9 

October. Before dawn the next morning, 

a local counterattack apparently staged 

by a conglomerate German force overran 

these platoons. Retaking the position 

with the aid of tanks was all that could 

be accomplished here during the rest of 

10 October. Of the two platoons, which 

had totaled forty-eight men, only one 

body was found. 

Wariness over this action on the regimental north wing forestalled. any major 

offensive action by Colonel Thompson's 

battalion at Germeter until early afternoon 

when patrols reported that the Germans 

had withdrawn. Advancing cautiously 

into the village, the battalion found only 

enemy dead. After five days the 39th 

Infantry at last had gained one of its first 

objectives. From the line of departure 

west of the Weisser Weh to the first clearing, the forest fighting had cost the 9th 

Division's two regiments together almost 

a thousand men. 

T award Raffelsbrand and Vassenack 

Having gained the first clearing a day 

ahead of the 39th Infantry, the 60th 

Infantry began the second leg of the attack 

on 10 October even as the other regiment 
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

was moving into Germeter. Shifting his 

reserve battalion to hold Richelskaul, the 

regimental commander, Col. John G. Van 

Houten, directed Colonel Chatfield to 

re-enter the woods to secure the first of 

the two road junctions which were the 

regiment's final objectives. The first was 

near Raffelsbrand, a forester's lodge 

about a mile southwest of Richelskaul. 

As Colonel Chatfield's battalion attacked soon after noon on 10 October, 

the first impression was of dreary repetition 

of the pedestrian pace which had prevailed most of the time elsewhere in the 

forest. Then suddenly, as one company 

knocked out a pillbox near the road 

leading from Richelskaul to Raffelsbrand, 

the drive picked up momentum. Urging 

their men forward, the company commanders unhesitatingly bypassed enemy 

strongpoints. The Germans began to 

surrender in bunches. In less than three 

hours Colonel Chatfield's men seized the 

road junction and staked claim to the 

wooded high ground around it. They 

had taken more than a hundred prisoners. 

Despite this creditable operation, as 

night fell Colonel Van Houten must have 

considered his regiment in an unenviable 

position. His reserve committed at Richelskaul, he had no force available to 

prevent the Germans cutting in behind 

Colonel Chatfield's advanced position. 

The 2d Battalion, commanded now by 

Maj. Quentin R. Hardage, still was 

engaged west of the Weisser Weh against 

the German outpost which since the opening day of the offensive had shown no 

SIgns of collapse. Continued attacks 

against the position had shrunk the 

battalion alarmingly. 

Before daylight the next morning, I I 

October, German action began to emphaSIze these concerns. A company-size 

335 

counterattack struck Colonel Chatfield's 

position at Raffelsbrand. Though beaten 

off, the enemy maintained pressure here 

the rest of the day and crowned it just 

before dark with a bayonet charge. Although tanks and tank destroyers passed 

the roadblocks to reach Raffelsbrand, 

their presence complicated the supply 

picture. As expected, German patrols 

and snipers made supply through the 

thick forest a hazardous task. 

Taking the risk of defending Richelskaul with but one company, Colonel Van 

Houten sent the rest of his "reserve" 

battalion in midmorning to attack northwest from Raffelsbrand toward the regiment's remaining objective, Road Junction 

47 1. This road junction lies not quite 

half the distance between the two forester's lodges of Raffelsbrand and Jaegerhaus. 

Hope that this move might develop into 

a rapid thrust like Colonel Chatfield's was 

stymied, a direct result of the fact that 

Colonel Chatfield's battalion had advanced so quickly the day before. Of two 

companies which headed for Road Junction 47 I, one became fruitlessly embroiled 

with pillboxes which had not been cleared 

along the Richelskaul-Raffelsbrand road. 

The other became similarly engaged with 

a pillbox III rear of the Raffelsbrand 

position. 

Events on I I October might have 

proved thoroughly discouraging had not 

Major Hardage's 2d Battalion west of the 

Weisser Weh at last begun to detect signs 

of collapse in the outpost that had 

thwarted the battalion for five days. 

Driving southward against a flank of the 

outpost, the battalion began to make 

measured but steady progress. By the 

end of the day, the Germans had fallen 

back about 800 yards. While the weary 
336 

riflemen probably could detect little difference between one forest-cloaked piece 

of terrain and another, the battalion's 

position at nightfall actually posed a 

threat to the remaining regimental objective, Road Junction 47 I. 

Reports from prisoners that they had 

received no reinforcements and had not 

eaten for three days somewhat dimmed 

the luster of this advance; yet Major 

Hardage's battalion after five days of 

Huertgen Forest fighting was almost as 

depleted as the enemy unit. Any 

numerical advantage the Americans may 

have possessed lay only in bug-eyed replacements who had begun to arnve III 

small, frightened bunches. 

Like the others of the two regiments 

when they first entered the Huertgen 

Forest, these replacements had to adjust 

themselves to the tricks of woods fighting. 

Protection against shells that burst in the 

treetops was the main thing. Foxholes, 

the men soon learned, meant little unless 

roofed with logs and sod. If caught by 

shelling while out of a foxhole, your best 

bet was not to fall flat but to stand or 

crouch close against the base of a tree so 

that the smallest possible body surface 

would be exposed to fragments from 

above. As anyone would tell you, moving about at night was tantamount to 

suicide. Adjusting artillery and mortar 

fire by sight was impossible, even with the 

aid of smoke shells. You had to rely on 

sound. If you had a map, you might 

determine your position in the forest by 

means of cement survey markers to be 

found at intersections of firebreaks. 

Numbers on these corresponded to numbered squares on the map. Without a 

map, you had to depend on a compass-if 

you had a compass. There was a lot to 

learn in the Huertgen Forest. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

While the 60th Infantry re-entered the 

forest to seize the road junctions southwest of Richelskaul, the 39th Infantry 

attempted to move into the open, to 

advance across fields from Germeter to 

the regiment's second objective, the village 

of Vossenack. From Vossenack the 39th 

Infantry was to continue southeastward 

across the Kall gorge to Schmidt, the 

final objective. 

In this instance, men of the 39th 

Infantry found that the thick forest which 

they hated actually might be employed 

to advantage. During I I October several 

attempts by Colonel Thompson's battalion 

in Germeter to move across open ground to 

Vossenack accomplished nothing. Each 

time German assault guns in Vossenack 

exacted a prohibitive toll of Thompson's 

supporting tanks. Yet at the same time 

another battalion under Lt. Col. R. H. 

Stumpf a,dvanced under the cloak of a 

wooded draw from Wittscheidt to a position north of Vossenack, only a few hundred yards from the objective. 

Though delayed at first by a severe 

shelling, once Colonel Stumpf's battalion 

entered the woods east of Wittscheidt, 

the men found surprisingly light resistance. 

By late afternoon the battalion had advanced almost a mile apparently undetected, and was ready to emerge from the 

woods onto an open nose of the Vossenack 

ridge northeast of the village, where it 

could cut off the objective from the rear. 

Despite the encouragement provided by 

this battalion's success, the 9th Division 

commander, General Craig, was cautious. 

To defeat Colonel Stumpf's move against 

Vossenack, all the Germans had to do was 

to hold fast in the village while striking 

with another force from the north into the 

rear of Stumpf's battalion. General Craig 

directed that Colonel Stumpf delay until 
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

the next day when Colonel Thompson's 

battalion in Germeter might hit Vossenack 

simultaneously from the west. 

As night came on I I October Colonel 

Stumpf's battalion was stretched in an 

elongated column of companies through 

the woods north of Vossenack. This put 

a maximum strain on still another battalion of the 39th Infantry that heretofore 

had not participated in offensive thrusts 

eastward, yet had been heavily engaged 

nevertheless. Commanded by Lt. Col. 

Frank L. Gunn, this battalion had been 

charged with protecting the regimental 

north flank against likely counterattacks 

from the direction of Huertgen. This was 

no minor task, as Colonel Gunn soon 

discovered. Though the 298th Engineers 

and the 9th Division's reconnaissance 

troop assumed responsibility for blocking 

the Weisser Weh draw, Colonel Gunn's 

companies still became overextended. After Colonel Stumpf's battalion had moved 

fingerlike into the woods north of Vossenack, Colonel Gunn not only had to 

defend Wittscheidt but also had to send a 

company east of the highway to maintain 

contact with the tail of Stumpf's battalion. 

Plans for 12 October were for Ma jar 

Hardage's 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, to 

continue southward down the Weisser 

Weh to Road Junction 471 and for the 

39th Infantry to launch a co-ordinated, 

two-battalion attack against Vossenack. 

Though no battalion of the two regiments 

could field more than 300 men and 

neither the regiments nor the division had 

other than a nominal reserve, prospects 

for success on 12 October were relatively 

bright. Both the preceding days had 

brought undeniable cracks in German 

defenses. 

337 

Regiment Wegelein 

Though persisting in the belief that the 

enemy's over-all policy was withdrawal, 

the 9th Division G-2 noted that the 

enemy's more immediate concern was to 

re-esfablish a Huertgen Forest line similar 

to that which had existed before the 9th 

Division's attack. The most likely direction for a counterattack to take to 

accomplish this, the G-2 remarked, was 

from the northeast against the 39th Infantry, probably from Huertgen. In 

addition, the enemy might counterattack 

the 60th Infantry with a complementary 

drive from the south. 

As to the enemy's immediate plans, 

the 9th Division G-2 hardly could have 

been more prescient, even had he known 

that on 10 October the enemy commander, General Schmidt, had been 

honored by visitors who had promised 

help. These were the army and corps 

commanders, Generals Brandenberger and 

Straube, who had informed Schmidt they 

would send him a regiment with which to 

counterattack on 12 October. 

During the night of 11 October trucks 

carrying 2,000 men of Regiment Wegelein 

rolled north from former positions along 

the Luxembourg border. Commanded by 

a colonel from whom the regiment drew 

its name, the \unit was well equipped with 

machine guns and heavy and medium 

mortars. The men were of good quality, 

about half of them officer candidates. 

General Schmidt had reason to expect 

big things from the counterattack on 12 

October. 

Behind a brief but concentrated artillery 

preparation, Colonel Wegelein launched 

his counterattack at 0700 due southward 

along the wooded plateau between the 
338 

Weisser Weh and the Germeter-Huertgen 

highway. The objective of Richelskaul 

appeared at first to be within easy reach. 

Quickly enveloping a part of Colonel 

Gunn's overextended battalion of the 39th 

Infantry, the Germans poured through to 

cut an east-west trail leading into 

Germeter, a trail which served as the 39th 

Infantry's main supply route. 

The 39th Infantry commander, Colonel 

Bond, had virtually no reserve to throw 

against the penetration. Receiving an erroneous report that the engineer roadblock 

on the Weisser Weh road had been overrun, he requested the 298th Engineers to 

send their reserve there. He told Colonel 

Thompson, whose positions at Germeter 

were under pressure by fire, to release 

two platoons to Colonel Gunn's assistance. 

These two platoons actually had a strength 

no greater than one. Judging from the 

wording of this order, Colonel Bond 

believed Colonel Stumpf's battalion in the 

fingerlike formation north of Vossenack 

also to be under attack. In reality, 

Colonel Stumpf had experienced no enemy 

action and knew virtually nothing about 

what was going on to his rear. 

F or his part, General Craig alerted the 

division reserve-which consisted of a portion of the division reconnaissance troop 

and a platoon of light tanks. Acting on 

his own initiative, the reconnaissance troop 

commander actually committed the reserve to cover the 39th Infantry's exposed 

left flank. Though General Craig approved the move, it left him with no 

semblance of a division reserve. In early 

afternoon he sought to remedy the situation by directing that the 47th Infantry 

at Schevenhuette withdraw two companies to create a motorized reserve. 22 

For reasons that at the time appeared 

22 See Ltr, Craig to OCMH, 20 Apr 56. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

inexplicable, Regiment Wegelein failed to 

advance farther than the east-west trail 

leading into Germeter. The 275th Division commander, General Schmidt, said 

later that the battalion commanders were 

to blame. Yet prisoners, including a loquacious adjutant, said the fault lay 

in inadequate communications. Colonel 

Wegelein had protested the communications arrangement before the attack, the 

prisoners said, but General Schmidt would 

not sanction a delay to set it right. 

American artillery fire had quickly dealt 

a death blow to a communications system 

that was shaky from the start. 

Perhaps the genuine explanation lay in 

a combination of these two factors, plus 

the fact that confusion in the Huertgen 

Forest was not confined to the American 

side. Tenacious resistance by little knots 

of men in Colonel Gunn's battalion no 

doubt had contributed to the enemy's 

confusion. Although enveloped in early 

stages of the counterattack, Colonel Gunn's 

Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon and a 

platoon of Company G had held out in 

little islands of resistance while the Germans surged around them. Other groups 

also had continued to fight, though surrounded, including four men, three officers, and the crew of a heavy machine gun 

who represented Colonel Gunn's advance 

command group. 

Unaware of the problem on the German 

side, Colonel Bond in mid afternoon ordered Colonel Stumpf to withdraw from 

his salient in the woods north of Vossenack, leave one company east of the 

Huertgen highway to strengthen defense 

of Wittscheidt, and with the rest of his 

battalion attack the German penetration 

from the east. By nightfall Stumpf was 

poised for an attack the next morning, 13 

October. 
THE FIRST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

Though Regiment Wegelein's counterattack had struck before the 39th Infantry's planned attack against Vossenack 

had begun, the 60th Infantry already had 

started a new drive against Road Junction 

471 before trouble developed. Pushing 

southward down the Weisser Weh toward 

the road junction, Major Hardage's battalion of the 60th Infantry ran into a 

force of about 300 men, which apparently 

was attempting to complement Regiment 

Wegelein's attack. Because American 

units controlled the only roads in the 

vicinity of Road Junction 471, this complementary effort was doomed from the 

start. A stiff engagement developed, nevertheless. After beating off the counterattack, the U.S. battalion had to spend the 

rest of the day in reorganization. 

Though General Schmidt intended that 

Regiment Wegelein renew the attack on 

13 October, the plan was crossed up by 

an order from the LXXIV Corps that 

all officer candidates in the regiment be 

detached immediately. This cut the regiment's strength in half. Having lost 500 

men in the first day's fighting, Colonel 

Wegelein had only a smattering of his 

original force remaining. Further offensive action was out of the question. 

By midafternoon of 13 October, the 

39th Infantry had established a fairly solid 

line containing Regiment Wegelein's penetration. Then Colonel Bond set about to 

push the enemy back. 

It took three days for the 39th Infantry 

to restore the original flank positions 

running from the engineer roadblock 

astride the Weisser Weh highway across 

the wooded plateau to Wittscheidt. In 

light of Regiment Wegelein's depleted condition, this turtlelike pace obviously was 

attributable less to stout opposition than 

to the fact that the forest fighting had left 

339 

the 39th Infantry spent and groggy. One 

company commander had but two platoons left, one with twelve men, another 

with thirteen. One company lost two 

platoons in one fell swoop as they strayed 

into an ambush.23 Nevertheless, by 

nightfall of 15 October, Colonel Bond 

could point to the fact that his men had 

restored the northern flank and still held 

on to Wittscheidt and Germeter. Despite 

depletion of his units, he had been able 

to constitute a reserve with two companies of Colonel Stumpfs battalion. 

Among the victims of the elimination of 

the German penetration was the enemy 

commander, Colonel Wegelein. During 

the morning of 14 October, a noncommissioned officer of Company E saw an 

enemy soldier walking alone in front of 

his position and shot him. It was Colonel 

Wegelein. 

During this time the 60th Infantry 

resumed its attack to capture Road 

Junction 471. By nightfall of 13 October, Major Hardage's zd Battalion possessed the road junction, though the 

Germans held on to nearby pillboxes. 

Uncontested claim to the objective came 

the next day after General Craig committed to the sector the two-company 

reserve from the 47th Infantry. Reinforced by a medium tank company on 

loan from the 3d Armored Division, these 

two companies had moved in the day 

before behind the 60th Infantry. 

By 16 October few could have expected 

the 9th Division under existing circumstances to renew the offensive. As more 

than one division was to learn later with 

grim emphasis, it was impossible to fight 

23 In another instance, Pvt. James E. Mathews 

earned the posthumous award of the DSC as he 

saved his company commander from ambush at 

the cost of his own life. 
340 

in the Huertgen Forest for ten days without ending up spent and depleted. Only 

in the matter of weather, which had 

been generally favorable, did the 9th 

Division have an easier time in the forest 

than those units which would come later. 

Behind the scenes in the chain of command, plans progressed for the division's 

relief. The battle of Aachen was drawing to a close; thereupon, priority in the 

VII Corps was to go to the drive to the 

Roer. Although capture of Schmidt remained a prerequisite to the big drive, 

the VII Corps in providing a force to 

take Schmidt would have to siphon 

strength from the main effort. The First 

Army commander, General Hodges, 

erased this possibility by directing a temporary adjustment in the boundary between the V Corps and the VII Corps to 

glve the V Corps responsibility for 

Schmidt. Running east-west just north 

of Huertgen, this boundary was to become 

effective on 25 October. The 9th Division, less the 47th Infantry at Schev~nhuette, was to pass to the V Corps for 

relief and movement to the vicinity of 

Camp d'Elsenborn, while a fresh unit, 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the 28th Division, renewed the attack on 

Schmidt.24 

The two regiments of the 9th Division 

had fallen far short of the objective of 

Schmidt. Yet for some 3,000 yards in 

depth they had carved from the Huertgen 

Forest, they had paid dearly with more 

than one casualty per yard. The division 

had lost about 4,500 men. The drive 

had enveloped about 1,300 prisoners and 

inflicted on the enemy an additional estimated 1,500-2,000 casualties.25 On the 

basis of these statistics, neither side could 

claim undisputed victory in the October 

fighting. The real winner appeared to be 

the vast, undulating, blackish-green sea that 

virtually negated American superiority in 

air, artillery, and armor to reduce warfare 

to its lowest common denominator. The 

victor thus far was the Huertgen Forest. 

24 See VII Corps Opns Memo 107, dtd 18 Oct, 

confirming oral orders issued 17-18 Oct, VII 

Corps Opns Memo file, Oct 44. 

25 Although both American and German losses 

are for the entire month of October, most 

occurred during the ten days of offensive action. 

In MS # B-81O, General Schmidt estimates 

German losses through 12 October at 1,600 men, 

obviously conservati':e in light of confirmed 

prisoner statistics. 
CHAPTER XV 

The Second Attack on Schmidt 

As October neared an end, General 

Hodges set a tentative target date of 5 

November for renewal of the First Army's 

big push to the Roer and the Rhine. 

Additional divisions soon were to arrive to 

bolster the front. The Ninth Army was 

reorganizing hastily in the old XIX Corps 

zone, preparing to share responsibility for 

the coming offensive. The divisions near 

Aachen brought in replacements and readjusted their lines. The critical shortage 

of artillery ammunition was easing as 

stockpiles grew. 1 

As plans for the big push progressed, 

one deplorable fact persisted: you could 

not wish away the Huertgen Forest. 

General Hodges continued to believe 

that before launching his main effort, he 

needed a secure right flank along the 

headwaters of the Roer from Monschau to 

Schmidt and at least a line of departure 

behind the Huertgen Forest for early 

seizure of the Huertgen-Kleinhau road net 

beyond the forest. The key to all this 

was capture of Schmidt. 

Two factors had influenced General 

Hodges in his decision to shift responsibility for Schmidt from the VII Corps to 

General Gerow's V Corps. First, because after more than a month since 

collapse of the Schnee Eifel-Luxembourg 

offensive, the V Corps was rested; second, 

1 Tentative plans for renewing the offensive 

may be found in Operations Plan, VII Corps, 28 

October 1944, dated 27 October, VII Corps G-3 

FO file, Oct 44. 

because he wanted to keep the VII Corps 

fresh for the main drive. Having transferred the Vossenack-Schmidt sector to 

the V Corps by means of a temporary 

corps boundary just north of Huertgen, 

General Hodges directed that General 

Gerow attack on I November to clear the 

Vossenack-Schmidt-Lammersdorf triangle 

down to the headwaters of the Roer. 

Since the main First Army drive was to 

follow on 5 November, Hodges stipulated 

that under no circumstances was the V 

Corps attack to be delayed beyond 2 

November. 

Though addition vf the depleted 9th 

Division (minus one n -simental combat 

team) gave General Gerow a nominal 

strength of four divisions to cover a front 

of some twenty-seven miles, he had in 

effect but three, because the 4th Division 

was earmarked to join the VII Corps for 

the main drive. In addition, Gerow had 

to husband some strength for his own 

attack toward the Rhine, which was to 

begin soon after the VII Corps had 

pierced the enemy's positions west of the 

Roer. 

General Gerow at first directed attack 

on Schmidt by only one unit, the 28th 

Division. Upon further study, he amplified this plan to provide that after seizure 

of Vossenack and Schmidt, a combat 

command of the 5th Armored Division 

was to assist the 28th Division in clearing 

the Monschau Corridor. While the infantry turned southwest from Schmidt 
342 

into the corridor, the armor was to drive 

northeast from the vicinity of Monschau. 

Thus the stubborn West Wall positions in 

the Monschau Corridor, which had defied 

the 9th Division in September, would be 

hit by a double assault, front and rear.2 

Again as American commanders readied 

an attack on Schmidt, they made no 

specific plans for the objective which was 

in reality the ripest fruit that could be 

plucked as a corollary of an attack on 

Schmidt-the Roer River Dams. (See 

Map 5.) Even though the First Army 

drive which was to follow the preliminary 

thrust might be punished severely should 

the Germans make tactical use of the 

waters of the Roer reservoirs, neither the 

V Corps nor the First Army made any 

recorded plans for continuing the attack 

beyond Schmidt to gain the dams. The 

commander of the regiment that made the 

main effort of this second drive on Schmidt 

said later that the Roer River Dams 

"never entered the picture." 3 

This is not to say that the Americans 

were totally unaware of the importance of 

the dams. After the war, General Bradley noted, "It might not show in the 

record, but we did plenty of talking about 

the dams." 4 Earlier in the month of 

October the V Corps staff had studied 

the dams, and on 27 October the V Corps 

engineer had warned it would be "unwise" 

for American forces to become involved 

beyond the Roer at any point below the 

2 V Corps FO 30, 2 I Oct, and Ltrs of Instrs, 

23 and 30 Oct 44, V Corps Operations in the 

ETO, pp. 282, 284, and 288. 

3 Interv with Col Carl L. Peterson (formerly 

CO, 112th Inf), Bradford, Pa., 21-22-23 

Sep 48. 

4 Interv with Bradley, 7 Jun 56. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Schwammenauel Dam before that dam 

was in American hands. 5 Nevertheless, 

not until 7 November, six days after start 

of the second attack on Schmidt, was the 

First Army to call for any plan to seize the 

dams. On that date, General Hodges' 

chief of staff, General Kean, told the V 

Corps to prepare plans for future operations, one of which would be "in the event 

First Army is ordered to capture and 

secure the [SchwammenauelJ dam .... " 6 

Even as late as 7 November, General 

Hodges apparently had no intention of 

ordering an attack to the dams on his own 

ImtIatIve. All signs seemed to indicate 

that American commanders still did not 

appreciate fully the tremendous value of 

the dams to the enemy. As late as 6 

November, for example, one of the divisions that would have to cross the Roer 

downstream from the dams assumed the 

Germans would not flood the Roer because 

it might hinder movement of their own 

forces. 7 

5 V Corps Supplement No. I to Engr Intel 

Rpt 27, 27 Oct, V Corps G-3 file, 26-27 Oct 44; 

Interv with Gens Gerow and Hill (formerly G-3, 

V Corps), and Brig Gen Charles G. Helmick 

(formerly arty comdr, V Corps), 15 Oct 54. 

G Memo, FUSA to V Corps, Plans for Future 

Operations, V Corps, dtd 7 Nov, in V Corps 

G-3 FO file, Nov. 44. The FUSA Report of 

Operations, Volume I, says the 28th Division's 

Schmidt attack was "a preliminary phase of a 

plan by V Corps to seize the two large dams on 

the Roer River .... " Though General Hodges, 

in a letter to OCMH, I I July 1956, calls attention to this entry, the author has rejected it in 

the absence of contemporary evidence. The VII 

Corps commander, General Collins, has noted 

that American commanders are open to criticism 

for their delay in facing the problem of the dams. 

See Interv with Collins, 25 Jan 54. 

7 1st Div, Annex 2 (Intel) to FO 53, 6 Nov, 

1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt, Nov 44. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 343 

Planning the Thrust 

Though General Gerow seemingly had 

no plans in regard to the Roer River 

Dams, he chose nevertheless to reinforce 

the 28th Division strongly for the attack. 

Because at this time tht; cynosure of the 

V Corps-indeed, of the entire First Army 

-was one division, the 28th, supporting 

units were readily available. General Gerow attached to the division a chemical 

mortar battalion and the entire 117 1st 

Engineer Combat Group with three combat battalions. A battalion of towed 

tank destroyers supplemented the usual 

attachment of a battalion each of medium 

tanks and self-propelled tank destroyers. 

In recognition of the thick forest and 

roller-coaster terrain, he gave the division 

47 weasels (M 2 9 Cargo Carriers) to ease 

supply and evacuation. In direct and 

general support he placed eight battalions 

and a separate battery of V and VII 

Corps artillery. Six battalions of VII 

Corps artillery were to participate in 

preparatory fires. 8 Using five fighterbomber groups and a night fighter group, 

the IX Tactical Command was to direct 

its main effort toward air support of the 

division. 9 

The logical starting point for planning 

the V Corps attack was the experience of 

the 9th Division. The decision to crush 

the defenses of the Monschau Corridor in 

a vise, for example, no doubt was influenced by the 9th Division's difficulties 

in the corridor in mid-September. Be8 V Corps FO 30, 21 Oct, and Ltrs of Instrs, 

23 and 30 Oct, V Corps Operations in the ETO, 

pp. 282, 284, and 288. See also VII Corps 

Annex 1 to Opns Memo 114, 1 Nov, VII Corps 

Opns Memo file, Oct 44. 

n FUSA and IX T AC Summary of Air Opns, 

IX Fighter Command and IX TAC, Unit 

History, 1-30 Nov 44. 

sides that, General Gerow had the 

secondary missions, dictated by First 

Army, of securing a line of departure 

overlooking the Huertgen-Kleinhau road 

net and of occupying Vossenack. (M ap 

7) These virtually ordained that the 

28th Division's attack follow closely the 

planned route of the 9th Division's unsuccessful October thrust: Germeter, 

Vossenack, thence across the Kall River 

gorge to Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. 

In passing his orders to the 28th Division, General Gerow specified employment 

of one regiment in securing the line of 

departure overlooking Huertgen and 

guarding against repetition of the· kind of 

counterattack the late Colonel Wegelein 

had thrown against the north flank of the 

9th Division. To alleviate an admittedly 

precarious supply route to Schmidt via 

Vossenack and Kommerscheidt and to 

pave the way for the subsequent assault 

on the Monschau Corridor, Gerow specified that another regiment break past the 

Raffelsbrand road junction southwest of 

Germeter and clear a road net leading 

into the corridor. Only one regiment remained for the main effort of seizing 

Schmidt. These dictates left the 28th 

Division commander, Maj. Gen. Norman 

D. Cota, with little initiative m the 

planning. 10 

10 As General Cota so stated in an interview 

filed with 28th Div Combat Intervs for Nov 44. 

More combat interviews were obtained on this 

operation than on any other specific ground 

action in the European Theater of Operations. 

Unless otherwise noted; these interviews and 

official records of the V Corps, the 28th Division, and attached units constituted the sources 

for this account. Of additional value was a 

factual study on almost every phase prepared 

soon after the operation by a board of V Corps 

officers appointed by General Gerow, filed with 

V Corps records. A detailed, thoroughly documented account of the action at a small unit 

level, entitled "Objective: Schmidt," is to be 
344 

MAP 7 

The problem facing General Cota was 

how best to use such limited freedom as 

was left him in trying to circumvent three 

obstacles which always exercise heavy influence on military operations but which 

promised to affect the attack on Schmidt 

to an even greater extent than usual. 

These were: terrain, weather, and enemy. 

The overbearing factor about the terfound in Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. 

Mathews, Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and 

Schmidt, UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 

28TH DIVISION 

2-9 November 1944 

TTTTTTTTTTT u.s. L.JNE AM 2 Nov ~ ROADBLOCK 

.: : -.:. GROUND GAINED 

AND L.OST BY U.S. 

~ A)(IS OF MAIN U.S. ATTACKS 

o¢:;::::::: GERMAN COUNTERATTACI<S 

~ ~ U.S. LINE 9 Nov •• ••• WEST WALL. PILLBOXES 

(GERMAN 275TH DIVISION UNITS NOT SHOWN) 

1MILES 

~~~~++rl-------r-~I 

D.Holme:s, J,.. 

rain in this region is its startlingly assertive 

nature. Ridges, valleys, and gorges are 

sharply defined. The Roer and subsidiary 

stream lines, including the little KaH River, 

which cut a deep swath diagonally across 

the 28th Division's zone of attack, slice 

this sector into three distinct ridges. In 

the center is the Germeter-Vossenack 

ridge. On the northeast is the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge, which gives the 

impression to the man on the ground of 

dominating the Vossenack ridge. Except 

for temporary periods of neutralization by 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 345 

artillery fire, the 28th Division would have 

to operate through the course of its attack 

under observation from the BrandenbergBergstein ridge. The third ridge line runs 

between the Kall and the Roer, from the 

Monschau Corridor through Schmidt to 

the Roer near Nideggen. A spur juts out 

northwestward from Schmidt to Kommerscheidt. Because this ridge represents the 

highest elevation west of the Roer, the 

28th Division would be under dominant 

enemy observation all the way to Schmidt. 

Though the 9th Division had pierced 

the Huertgen Forest to the GermeterVossenack clearing, the 28th Division still 

would be enmeshed among the thick firs 

and undergrowth. Both the regiment 

attacking north fr6m Germeter to gain 

the woods line overlooking Huertgen and 

the regiment attacking south through 

Raffelsbrand would have to fight in the 

forest. The regiment making the main 

effort toward Schmidt would pass in and 

out of the woods. Along the route to 

be taken the trees hugged the lines of the 

streams for about 600 yards on either 

side, while the ridges were bald. 

Along the bald high ground ran the 

roads. A dirt road linked Germeter and 

Vossenack. From V ossenack to the 

southeast, the map showed a narrow cart 

track dropping precipitously to the Kall 

River, then rising tortuously to Kommerscheidt and along the spur to Schmidt. 

Through Schmidt passes a highway linking 

the Monschau Corridor to Nideggen and 

another leading downhill to Hasenfeld 

and the Schwammenauel Dam. General 

Cota could only hope that the cart track 

across the Kall, which had to serve as a 

main supply route, would prove negotiable: on aerial photographs parts of the 

track did not show up. (Map 8) He 

also could do little but hope for the best 

MAP 8 

TANKS 

ALONG THE KALL TRAIL 

• 

4-

o 

DISABLED TANK 

DISABLED TANK DESTROYER 

AID STATION 

in regard to those places where the track 

crossed the exposed Vossenack ridge and 

the bald spur leading to Schmidt. 

The factor of weather assumed tyrannical proportions, primarily because of the 

problem of getting tanks across the Kall 

gorge from Vossenack to Schmidt. Rain 

obviously would lessen chances of traversing the treacherous cart track across the 

Kall gorge, but more important still, rain 

would mean grounded aircraft. This 

might prove calamitous, for the planes 

had a big assignment. They were to isolate the battlefield to prevent the Germans 

from committing tanks and other reserves, 

particularly in the crucial zone beyond 
346 

the Kall River where American tanks 

probably could not go. 

Even assurance of fair weather would 

not have afforded peace of mind to the 

airmen. Few could cite an example 

where air power had been able to isolate 

such a small battlefield. In this instance, 

isolation would require destruction of 

bridges spanning the Roer, and bridges 

are difficult targets for planes. To compound the problem, the weather augury 

was anything but encouraging. 

In considering the enemy, General Cota 

must have noted with some alarm that his 

would be the only U.S. attack along more 

than 170 miles of front, from the thumbshaped corridor west of the Maas beyond 

Roermond all the way south to the Third 

Army near Metz. Whereas the 28th 

Division G-2 estimated the enemy had 

little more than 5,000 troops facing the 

division, these already had proved their 

mettle against the gth Division. Although 

the same grab-bag assortment under General Schmidt's 27Sth Division that had 

opposed the earlier attack still held the 

front, nothing in the gth Division's experience showed that the slackness of the 

enemy's organization appreciably lessened 

the vigor of his defense. Indeed, the 27sth 

Division's organization of the various 

Kampfgruppen under three regimentsthe 983d, 984th, and 98sth-had been 

progressing steadily. The 27Sth Division 

remained a part of General Straube's 

LXXIV Corps under General Brandenberger's Seventh Army. 

Although intelligence officers long had 

known that the 89th Infantry Division held 

the line farther south in the Monschau 

Corridor, they had not ascertained that a 

date for relief of the 89th by a volks 

grenadier division was fast approaching. 

The 89th'S relief might provide a reserve 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

close at hand to influence the battle for 

Schmidt. 

As the 28th Division moved into the 

Huertgen Forest, the Germans knew an 

attack was imminent. They had identified the division, though they had failed 

to detect the shift in boundaries that had 

assigned this sector to the V Corps. 

One thing the Germans recognized now 

without question: the importance of the 

Vossenack-Schmidt sector. Not only did 

it represent the key to the Roer River 

Dams; by holding its dominating ridges, 

the Germans also might forestall any 

threat to the road and communications 

center of Dueren while at the same time 

keeping the Americans bottled up in the 

Huertgen Forest. Those officers near the 

top of the German ladder of command 

recognized also that loss of Vossenack 

and Schmidt would pose a serious threat 

to plans already under way for a counteroffensive in the ArdennesY 

Unaware of the full value of Schmidt to 

the enemy, General Cota nevertheless did 

not like the idea of splitting his division 

in cruel terrain on three divergent missions. Moving with his men into the 

former gth Division positions on 26 October did nothing to help matters. They 

found themselves in a dismal forest of the 

type immortalized in old German folk 

tales. All about them they saw emergency rations containers, artillery-stripped 

trees, loose mines along muddy firebreaks 

and trails, and shell and mine craters by 

the hundreds. The troops they relieved 

were tired, dirty, unshaven, and nervous. 

11 MSS # A-8g1 (Generalmajor Rudolph Freiherr von Gersdorff) and # A-g05 (Generalmajor 

Siegfried von Waldenburg); ETHINT-53 (Gersdorff) , ETHINT -56 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg), and ETHINT-57 (Gersdorff); and Relief 

Schedule, Abloesungsplan, 28 Oct 44, found in 

OB WEST KTB, Anlage 50, Vol. I. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 347 

Everywhere the forest scowled-wet, cold, 

and seemingly impenetrable. 

By 29 October General Cota was ready 

to enunciate his plan. The attack was to 

open with a preliminary thrust northward 

by the I09th Infantry (Lt. Col. Daniel 

B. Strickler) . Attacking through Wittscheidt and across the same wooded terrain that earlier had seen defeat of Colonel 

Wegelein's counterattack, the 109th Infantry was to advance about a mile to 

gain the woods line on either side of the 

Germeter-Huertgen highway overlooking 

Huertgen. From that point the regiment 

was to prevent any repetition of Colonel 

W egelein' s counterattack. 

Meanwhile, a battalion of the I 12th 

Infantry (Lt. Col. Carl L. Peterson) was 

to attack from Germeter through Vossenack to occupy the northeastern nose of 

the Vossenack ridge. From here this 

battalion was to help protect the division's 

north flank. Subsequently, at H plus 

three hours, the remainder of the I 12th 

Infantry was to drive for the main objective. Passing through the road junction 

at Richelskaul, the bulk of Colonel Peterson's regiment was to move cross-country 

through the woods south of the Vossenack 

ridge, ford the Kall River, seize Kommerscheidt, then move on to Schmidt-a total 

advance of more than three miles. 

Coincident with this main effort, the 

I loth Infantry (Colonel Seely) was to 

attack southward to take a nest of pillboxes at Raffelsbrand and be prepared to 

continue on order southward into the 

Monschau Corridor. Colonel Seely was 

to withhold one of his battalions from 

offensive assignment to provide the division commander a small infantry reserve. 

Reflecting concern about counterattack 

from the direction of Huertgen, artillery 

units planned the bulk of their concentrations along the north flank. Except for 

one company of tanks to assist the I 12th 

Infantry in the attack on Vossenack, attached tanks and self-propelled tank 

destroyers were to augment division 

artillery fires. Of the supporting engineers, one battalion was to assist the 

I 12th Infantry by working on the 

precipitous cart track across the Kall 

gorge, another was to support the I loth 

Infantry in the woods south of Germeter, 

and the third was to work on supply 

trails in the forest west of Germeter. 

During the planning, General Cota 

charged the engineers specifically with 

providing security for the Kall River 

crossing. Because both ends of the gorge 

led into German-held territory and no 

infantry would be in a position to block 

the gorge, this was an important assignment. Nevertheless, as it appeared in the 

final engineer plan, the assignment was 

one of providing merely local security.12 

North of the 28th Division, engineers 

of the 294th Engineer Combat Battalion 

had taken over the job of holding roadblocks in the Huertgen Forest generally 

along the Weisser Weh Creek. Southwest 

of the 28th Division's main positions, the 

division reconnaissance troop screened 

within the forest and patrolled to positions 

of the 4th Cavalry Group along the face 

of the Monschau Corridor. 

After advancing the target date for the 

attack one day to 3 I October, General 

Gerow had to postpone it because of rain, 

fog, and mist that showed no sign of 

abatement. This was a matter of serious 

concern in view of the vital role planned 

for air support in the 28th Division's 

attack; yet by the terms of the First 

12 See Engr Plan, go Oct, 28th Div G-g Jnl 

file, Oct 44. 
348 

Army's original directive, the attack had 

to be made by 2 November, regardless of 

the weather. Much of the reason behind 

this stipulation-the hope that the 28th 

Division's attack might divert enemy reserves from the main First Army drive, 

scheduled to begin on 5 Novemberceased to exist on I November when the 

main drive was postponed five days. Yet 

General Hodges, the army commander, 

apparently saw no reason to change the 

original directive. The 28th Division was 

to attack the next day, no matter what the 

state of the weather. H Hour was ogoo, 

2 November.13 

Objective: Schmidt 

The weather on 2 November was bad. 

As the big artillery pieces began to fire an 

hour before the jump-off, the morning was 

cold and misty. Even the most optimistic 

could not hope for planes before noon. 

The squadrons actually got into the fight 

no sooner than mid afternoon, and then 

the weather forced cancellation of two out 

of five group missions and vectoring of 

two others far afield in search of targets of 

opportunity. Perhaps the most notable 

air action of the day was a mistaken 

bombing of an American artillery position 

in which seven were killed and seventeen 

wounded. 

Though mist limited ground observation 

also, both V Corps and VII Corps artillery 

poured more than 4,000 rounds into the 

preliminary barrage. Fifteen minutes before the ground attack, direct support 

artillery shifted to targets in the immediate 

13 Sylvan Diary, entry of 3 I Oct 44; Msg, 

Gerow to Cota, 28th Div G-3 J nl, 3 I Oct 44; 

Msg, CG FUSA to CG VII Corps, FUSA G-3 

Jnl file, Nov 44. Though the latter message IS 

undated, it obviously was sent on I November. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

sector. By H Hour the 28th Division 

artillery had fired 7,3 I 3 rounds. 

At ogoo men of the Iogth Infantry 

clambered from their foxholes to launch 

the northward phase of the operation. 

Harassed more by problems of control in 

the thick forest than by resistance, the 

battalion west of the Germeter-Huertgen 

highway by early afternoon had reached 

the woods line overlooking Huertgen. Yet 

:consolidation proved difficult. Everywhere 

the Germans were close, even in rear of 

the battalion where they infiltrated quickly 

to reoccupy their former positions. Advancing along the highway, another 

battalion had tougher going from the 

outset. After only a 3oo-yard advance, 

scarcely a stone's throw from Wittscheidt, 

the men encountered a dense antipersonnel 

mine field. Every effort to find a path 

through proved fruitless, while German 

machine guns and mortars drove attached 

engineers to cover each time they attempted 

to clear a way. 

The next day, on 3 November, the 

battalion along the highway sought to 

flank the troublesome mine field. This 

was in progress when about 0730 the 

Germans struck twice with approximately 

200 men each time at the battalion on the 

other side of the road. Though both 

counterattacks were driven off, they gave 

rise to a confusing situation on the American side. Misinterpreting a message from 

the regimental commander, the battalion 

near Wittscheidt sent two companies to 

assist in defeating the counterattacks. As 

these units became hopelessly enmeshed in 

the other battalion's fight and the depths 

of the forest, the day's attempt to outflank 

the mine field and occupy the other half 

of the Iogth Infantry's woods line objective ended. 

Though the regimental commander, 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 349 

Colonel Strickler, still had a reserve, attempts to thwart enemy infiltration behind 

the front had virtually tied up this battalion already. By evening of 3 November, 

the mold of the I09th Infantry's position 

had almost set. The regiment had forged 

a narrow, mile-deep salient up the forested plateau between the Weisser Weh 

Creek and the Germeter-Huertgen highway. But along the creek bed the 

Germans still held to a comparable salient 

into American lines. For the next few 

days, while the men dug deep in frantic 

efforts to save thf"mselves from incessant 

tree bursts, Colonel Strickler tried both to 

eliminate the Weisser Weh countersalient 

and to take the other half of his objective 

east of the highway; but to no avail. 

Every movement served only to increase 

already alarming casualties and to ensnare 

the companies and platoons more in extricab1y in the coils of the forest. 

Coincident with the I09th Infantry's 

move north on 2 November, the I 12th 

Infantry had attacked east from Germeter 

to gain Vossenack and the northeastern 

nose of the Vossenack ridge. The 2d 

Battalion under Lt. Col. Theodore S. 

Hatzfeld made the attack. The presence 

of a company of tanks with this battalion 

clearly demonstrated why the Germans 

wanted to keep the Americans bottled up 

in the Huertgen Forest. By early afternoon Colonel Hatzfeld's men had subdued 

Vossenack and were digging in almost at 

leisure on the northeastern nose of the 

ridge, though with the uncomfortable 

certainty that the enemy was watching 

from the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge to 

the northeast and from Kommerscheidt 

and Schmidt. 

The 28th Division's main effort began 

at noon on 2 November in the form of an 

attack by the two remaining battalions of 

Colonel Peterson's I 12th Infantry. Heading east from Richelskaul to move crosscountry through the woods south of 

Vossenack and cross the Kall gorge to 

Kommerscheidt and Schmidt, the lead 

battalion came immediately under intense 

small arms fire. For the rest of the day 

men of the foremost company hugged the 

ground, unable to advance. Though this 

was the divisional main effort, Colonel 

Peterson still did not commit the remainder 

of this battalion or his third battalion. 

Neither did he call for tank support nor 

make more than perfunctory use of 

supporting artillery. What must have 

occupied his mind was the ease with which 

his 2d Battalion had captured Vossenack. 

Why not follow that battalion, he must' 

have reasoned, and strike for Kommerscheidt and Schmidt from the southeastern 

tip of Vossenack ridge? At any rate, 

that was the plan for the next day, 3 

November. 

Even as the I 12th Infantry launched 

this irresolute main effort, Colonel Seely's 

I loth Infantry had begun a frustrating 

campaign in the forest farther south. One 

battalion was to take the pillboxes near 

Raffelsbrand while another drove through 

the woods to the east to the village of 

Simonskall alongside the Kall River. 

Seizure of these two points would dress 

the ground for advancing south along two 

roads into the Monschau Corridor, opening, in the process, a new supply route to 

Schmidt. 

If any part of the 28th Division's 

battleground was gloomier than another, 

it was this. Except along the narrow 

ribbons of mud that were firebreaks and 

trails, only light diffused by dripping 

branches of fir trees could penetrate to 

the forest floor. Shelling· already had 

made a debris-littered jungle of the floor 
350 

and left naked yellow gashes on the trunks 

and branches of the trees. Here opposing 

lines were within hand grenade range. 

The Germans waited behind thick entanglements of concertina wire, alive with 

trip wires, mines, and booby traps. 

Where they had no pillboxes, they had 

constructed heavy log emplacements flush 

with the ground. 

No sooner had troops of the two 

attacking battalions risen from their foxholes than a rain of machine gun and 

mortar fire brought them to earth. After 

several hours of painful, costly infiltration, 

one battalion reached the triple concertinas surrounding the pillboxes, but the 

enemy gave no sign of weakening. In 

mid afternoon, the battalion reeled back, 

dazed and stricken, to the line of departure. With the other battalion, events 

went much the same. Platoons got lost; 

direct shell hits blew up some of the 

satchel charges and killed the men who 

were carrying them; and all communications failed except for spasmodic reception 

over little SCR-536's. The chatter of 

machine guns and crash of artillery and 

mortars kept frightened, forest-blind infantrymen close to the earth. In late 

afternoon, the decimated units slid back 

to the line of departure. 

The II oth Infantry obviously needed 

direct fire support. Though the 9th Division's 60th Infantry had used tanks to 

advantage in the woods about Raffelsbrand, Colonel Seely bowed to the density 

of the woods, the dearth of negotiable 

roads, and the plethora of mines. Again 

on 3 November the infantry attacked 

alone. If anything, this second day's attack proved more costly and less rewarding 

than the first. One company fell back to 

the line of departure with but forty-two 

men remaining. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Failure of this second attack and more 

favorable developments in the ·11 2th 

Infantry's main effort prompted General 

Cota in early evening of 3 November to 

release Colonel Seely's remaining battalion, 

the one he had earmarked as division 

reserve. Before daylight on 4 November, 

this battalion was to move to Vossenack 

and thell drive due south into the woods 

to Simonskall. This might bring control 

of one of the llOth Infantry's assigned 

objectives while at the same time creating 

a threat to the rear of the pillboxes at 

Raffelsbrand. What had to be chanced 

in this decision was the possibility that 

after commitment of this reserve before 

dawn, something disastrous might happen 

elsewhere in the division zone-say, at 

daylight on 4 November, perhaps at 

Schmidt. 

To the surprise of almost everyone concerned, the 1 12th Infantry by nightfall of 

3 November possessed Schmidt. The 

regiment had done it by passing two 

battalions in column through Vossenack, 

thence southeast into the Kall gorge. 

While a company of tanks neutralized 

Kommerscheidt with fire from the Vossenack ridge, the leading battalion under 

Lt. Col. Albert Flood forded the cold, 

swift-flowing Kall and picked a way up 

the steep slope beyond. Pausing in Kommerscheidt only long enough to rout a 

handful of rear echelon Germans, Colonel 

Flood urged his men on toward Schmidt. 

By 1430 they were on the objective. 

Though persistent snipers delayed mop-up, 

Colonel Flood's men by nightfall had 

begun to organize the village for defense. 

Because Schmidt sprawled spreadeagled across a bald ridge, defending it 

with only one infantry battalion was a 

question more of outposts than of a solid 

line. Neither tanks nor antitank guns 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 351 

had crossed the Kall gorge, and not until 

after midnight did the infantry have any 

antitank defense other than organic bazookas. At midnight a supply train of 

three weasels got forward with rations, 

ammunition, and sixty antitank mines. 

These mines the men placed on the three 

hard-surfaced roads leading into the village. Weary from the day's advance, the 

men made no effort either to dig in the 

mines or to camouflage them. 

The other battalion of the I 12th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Robert T. 

Hazlett, had in the meantime followed 

Colonel Flood's battalion as far as Komerscheidt. Because Major Hazlett had left 

one company to defend an original position 

far back at Richelskaul, he had but two 

companies and his heavy weapons support. 

These he split between Kommerscheidt 

and a support position at the woods line 

where the Kall trail emerges from the 

gorge. Major Hazlett's battalion was to 

have joined Colonel Flood's in Schmidt, 

but the regimental commander, Colonel 

Peterson, had decided instead to effect 

a defense in depth in deference to his 

regiment's exposed salient. General Cota 

must have approved, for he recorded no 

protest. 14 

Because inclement weather on 3 November again had denied all but a 

modicum of air support, the need of 

getting armor across the Kall gorge to 

Schmidt grew more urgent. The spotlight in the 28th Division's fight began to 

settle on the precipitous trail leading 

through the gorge. 

An erroneous report prevalent in V ossenack during most of the day of 3 

November that the bridge spanning the 

14 See 28th Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44, and interv 

with Col Peterson, 21-22-23 Sep 48. 

Kall had been demolished served to discourage any real attempt to negotiate the' 

trail until late in the afternoon. After 

two engineer officers reconnoitered and 

gave the lie to this report, a company of 

tanks of the 707th Tank Battalion under 

Capt. Bruce M. Hostrup made ready to 

try it. The trail, the engineer officers 

said, was a narrow shelf, limited abruptly 

on one side by a dirt wall studded with 

rock obstructions and on the other by a 

sheer drop. A weasel abandoned on the 

trail by a medical unit blocked passage, 

but once this was removed tanks might 

pass by hugging the dirt bank. At the 

Kall itself, a stone arch bridge was in 

good condition. 

In gathering darkness, Captain Hostrup 

left the bulk of his tanks near the point 

where the Kall trail enters the woods, 

while he himself continued in his command tank to reconnoiter. About a 

quarter of the way from the woods line to 

the river, the trail became narrow and 

slippery. The left shoulder, which drops 

sharply toward the gorge, began to give 

way under weight of the tank. The rock 

obstructions in the dirt wall on the other 

side denied movement off to the right. 

The tank slipped and almost plunged off 

the left bank into the gorge. 

Returning to the rest of his company, 

Captain Hostrup reported the trail still 

impassable. His battalion commander, 

Lt. Col. Richard W. Ripple, radioed that 

the engineers were to work on the trail 

through the night and that Captain 

Hostrup's tanks were to be ready to move 

through to Schmidt at dawn. 

Under no apparent pressure except to 

get the trail open by daylight on 4 November, the 20th Engineer Combat Battalion, 

which was assigned to support the II2th 

Infantry, made a notably small ouday for 
352 

a job of such importance. Only two platoons worked on the trail west of the river 

and but one on the east. Because no 

one during the original planning had 

believed that vehicles could get as far as 

the Kall, the engineers had with them 

only hand tools. Not until about 0230 

in the morning did a bulldozer and an air 

compressor reach the work site. The 

bulldozer proved of little value; after 

about an hour'~ work, it broke a cable. 

The only vehicular traffic to cross the 

Kall during the night was th~ threeweasel supply train which carried the 

antitank mines to Schmidt. 

Despite failure of tanks to cross the 

Kall and no evidence of clearing weather, 

the map in the 28th Division's war room 

on the night of 3 November showed that 

prospects were surprisingly good. While 

Colonel Strickler's I09th Infantry had attained only half its objective, the regiment 

nevertheless was in position to thwart 

counterattack from Huertgen. By commitment of the reserve battalion of the 

I loth Infantry before daylight to seize 

Simonskall, stalemate in the woods south 

of Germeter might be broken. Enemy 

units encountered were about what 

everyone had expected: the three regiments of the 275th Division, representing, 

in fact, consolidations of numerous 

Kampfgruppen. Albeit the weather had 

limited observation, no one yet had spotted 

any enemy armor. Most encouraging of 

all, the 28th Division had two battalions 

beyond the Kall, one in Kommerscheidt 

and the other astride the division objective 

in Schmidt. Capture of Schmidt meant 

that the main supply route to the German 

forts in the Monschau Corridor was cut. 

The Germans would have to strike hard 

\ut.d soon or the 28th Division would be in 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

shape to start a push into the corridor. 

Division and corps commanders all along 

the front had begun to telephone their 

congratulations to General Cota, so that 

despite his reservations he was beginning 

to feel like "a little Napoleon." 15 

T he Germans React 

Had General Cota and his staff considered two facts about the enemy, one 

of which they did have at hand, no one in 

the 28th Division could have slept that 

night, no matter what the elation over 

capture of Schmidt. First, the relief from 

the line in the Monschau Corridor of the 

89th Infantry Division by the 272d Volks 

Grenadier Division had begun on 3 November. Indeed, when the first of Colonel Flood's troops had entered Schmidt, 

two battalions of the 89th Division's 

1055th Regiment had just passed through 

going northeast. They stopped for the 

night between Schmidt and the village of 

Harscheidt, less than a mile northeast of 

Schmidt. The remaining battalion of the 

1055th Regiment found upon nearing 

Schmidt after midnight that the Americans had cut the route of withdrawal. 

This battalion dug in astride the SchmidtLammersdorf road just west of Schmidt. 

A little patrolling by Colonel Flood's battalion might have revealed the presence 

of this enemy regiment deployed almost 

in a circle about Schmidt. Even without 

patrols, the 28th Division might have 

been alert to the likely presence of the 

89th Division, for during the day of 3 

November other units of the V Corps 

had taken prisoners who reported the 

division's relief. This information had 

15 Interv with Gen Cota, 15 Sep 48. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 353 

reached the 28th Division during the 

day.16 

The second fortuitous occurrence on the 

enemy side had as far-reaching effects for 

the Germans as the other. At almost the 

same moment that the 28th Division attacked at H-Hour on 2 November, staff 

officers and commanders of Army Group 

B, the Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies, 

and several corps and divisions, including 

the LXXIV Corps, were convening in a 

castle' near Cologne. There the Army 

Group B commander, Field Marshal 

Model, was to conduct a map exercise. 

The subject of the exercise was a theoretical American attack along the boundary of the Fifth Panzer and Seventh 

Armies in the vicinity of Huertgen. The 

meeting had been in session only a short 

time when a telephone call from the 

LXXIV Corps chief of staff told of the 

actual American attack. The situation, 

the chief of staff said, was critical: the 

LX X IV Corps had not enough men even 

to plug the gaps already opened; Seventh 

Army would have to send reserves. 

Directing the LXXIV Corps commander, General Straube, to return to his post, 

Field Marshal Model told the other officers 

to continue the map exercise with the 

actual situation as subject. Continuing 

reports of further American advances 

then prompted a decision to send a small 

reserve to General Straube's assistance. 

16 V Corps and 28th Div G-2 Jnl files, 3 Nov 

44; sitreps 2-4 Nov 44, found in OB WEST 

KTB, Be/ehle und Meldungen; Order of the Day 

commemorating the battles of Kommerscheidt 

and Schmidt, entitled Division Review of the 

89th Division (hereafter cited as 89th Div Order 

of the Day). This captured document is available only in translation by V Corps IPW Team 

II, both in the 28th Div AAR, Oct 44, and as 

reproduced in Halsell, Huertgen Forest and the 

Roer River Dams. 

A Kampfgruppe of the old warhorse, the 

116th Panzer Division, was to leave immediately to assist local reserves in a 

counterattack against the IOgth Infantry's 

penetration north of Germeter. Like 

the counterattack Colonel Wegelein had 

tried against the gth Division, this was 

designed to push through to Richelskaul 

and cut off that part of the I 12th Infantry 

which had penetrated into Vossenack. 

Without a doubt, chance presence of the 

various major commanders at the map 

exercise facilitated German reaction 

against the 28th Division's attack. 

Though the counterattack took place at 

dawn on 3 November, the IOgth Infantry 

beat off what amounted to two thrusts 

without loss of ground. At the map exercise, which was still in progress on 3 

November, news of the counterattack's 

failure prompted Field Marshal Model to 

send an entire regimental combat team of 

the 116th Panzer Division to Huertgen. 

The remainder of the division was to 

follow that night and the night of 4 

November. Since the pattern of American attack now indicated a thrust toward 

Schmidt, Model ordered the I055th Regiment of the 89th Division to halt in its 

movement from the Monschau Corridor 

and be ready to strike back at Schmidt. 

When the map exercise broke up, 

the Seventh Army commander, General 

Brandenberger, returned to his headquarters. There he learned in early 

evening of the 112th Infantry's conquest 

of Schmidt. Because he now controlled 

the 116th Panzer Division, he was able to 

order the commander, Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg, to reroute tanks 

of his 16th Panzer Regiment from Huertgen to Harscheidt. At dawn on 4 November this tank regiment and the 89th 
354 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

KALL TRAIL, looking toward Vossenack. Note thrown tank tracks. 

Division's I055th Regiment were to counterattack at both Schmidt and Kommerscheidt. At the same time Waldenburg's 

60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) en route 

to Huertgen, was to launch a new 

counterattack after the old plan against 

the IOgth Infantry. 

The pattern for German counteraction 

was taking shape rapidly. Because of 

terrain and mine fields, major tank participation was to be confined to Schmidt 

and Kommerscheidt. While the bulk of 

the 116th Panzer Division's armor (some 

twenty to thirty tanks) operated there in 

conjunction with the 89th Division, the 

panzer division's two panzer grenadier 

regiments were to strike at the Iogth 

Infantry and at Vossenack. Having trav-
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 355 

eled at night, neither armor nor infantry 

had encountered American planes and 

were arriving in good shapeY 

Before daylight on 4 November, two 

events were happening on the American 

side that were to bear heavily on the 

outcome of the day's action. First, 

General Cota was committing his only 

infantry reserve, a battalion of the I loth 

Infantry, to drive south from Vossenack 

through the woods to Simonskall in an 

effort to turn the stiff enemy line at 

Raffelsbrand. Launched before dawn, 

the attack met negligible resistance. By 

0900 the battalion had seized Simonskall, 

a commendable success but one which 

failed to weaken resistance at Raffelsbrand and served to occupy the only 

infantry reserve which General Cota 

might have used as the day's events 

developed. 

Second, after a somewhat feeble effort 

by attached engineers through most of 

the night to improve the Kall trail, tank 

crewmen under Captain Hostrup warmed 

their motors an hour or so before daylight 

for another try at crossing the Kall. The 

lead tank under 1st Lt. Raymond E. 

Fleig had just entered the woods along 

the slippery Kall trail when it struck a 

mine. A track disabled, the tank partially blocked the trail. 

By using a winch, the tankers finally 

got four tanks past. Lieutenant Fleig 

then boarded the lead tank and by tortuous backing and turning finally reached 

the Kall to begin the toilsome last lap to 

Kommerscheidt just as day was breaking. 

Behind him Fleig left the shoulder of the 

17 MSS # A-89 I and A-892 (Gersdorff) and 

A-90S (Waldenburg); ETHINT-S3 (Gersdorff) 

and ETHINT-S6 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg); 

Sitreps, 2-4 Nov 44, found in OB WEST KTB, 

Befehle und Meldungen; 89th Div Order of the 

Day; 28th Div G-2 Jnl file, 3 Nov 44. 

trail torn and crumbling. Only with the 

utmost difficulty and caution did the remaining three tanks of his platoon make 

their way. The tankers encountered a 

particular problem at one point where a 

giant outcropping of rock made it impossible to hug the right side of the trail. 

N ear the bottom of the gorge, the last of 

the three tanks stuck in the mud and 

threw a track. Only two tanks· now were 

following Lieutenant Fleig's toward Kommerscheidt. 

Trying to maneuver the rest of the 

tank company across the Kall, Captain 

Hostrup first met difficulty at the tank 

which Lieutenant Fleig had abandoned 

after hitting a mine. Here one tank in 

attempting to pass plunged off the left 

shoulder of the trail. U sing the wrecked 

tank as a buffer, two more tanks inched 

past; but near the rock outcropping both 

these slipped off the trail and threw their 

tracks. As battle noises from the direction 

of Schmidt began to penetrate to the 

gorge, three tanks under Lieutenant Fleig 

were beyond the river on the way to 

Kommerscheidt; but behind them, full on 

the vital trail, sat five disabled tanks. 

Not even the dexterous weasels could slip 

through. 

In Schmidt, as daylight came about 

0730 on 4 November, the crash of a 

German artillery barrage brought Colonel 

Flood's battalion of the I 12th Infantry 

to the alert. About half an hour later 

the peripheral outposts shouted that German tanks and infantry were forming up 

in the fringe of Harscheidt. For some 

unexplained reason, American artillery 

was slow to respond; not until 0850 did 

the big guns begin to deliver really effective defensive fires. By that time the 

fight was on in earnest. Infantrymen 

from the battalion of the I055th;Regiment 
356 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

KALL TRAIL, showing the Kommerscheidt side of the gorge in the background. 

that had found their route of withdrawal 

cut by American capture of Schmidt 

charged in from the west. The other 

two battalions of the regiment and at 

least ten tanks and assault guns of the 

16th Panzer Regiment struck from the 

direction of Harscheidt.

18 

As the German tanks clanked method18 Unlike most German regiments during this 

period, those of the 89th Division had three 

instead of two battalions of infantry, but the 

division had only two regiments. 

ically onward in apparent disdain of the 

exposed mines strung across the hardsurfaced roads, the defenders opened fire 

with bazookas. At least one scored a hit, 

but the rocket bounced off. The German 

tanks came on, firing their big cannon 

and machine guns directly into foxholes 

and buildings. Reaching the antitank 

mines, the tanks merely swung off the 

roads in quick detours, then waddled on. 

Such seeming immunity to the bazookas 

and mines demoralized the men who saw it. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 357 

Confusion mounted. As rumor 

hummed about that orders had come to 

withdraw, individually and in small 

groups those American infantrymen still 

alive and uncrippled pulled out. The 

overwhelming impulse to get out of the 

path of the tanks sent the men streaming 

from the village in a sauve qui peut. 

About 200 fled into the woods southwest 

of Schmidt, there to find they actually 

were deeper in German territory. The 

others tore back toward Kommerscheidt. 

The dead lay unattended. Because the 

battalion's medical aid station had not 

advanced any farther than a log-walled 

dugout beside the Kall trail west of the 

river, the only comfort for the wounded 

was the presence of company aid men 

who volunteered to stay with them. 

By I 100 most Americans who were to 

get out of Schmidt had done so. By 1230 

the 28th Division headquarters apparently 

recognized the loss, for at that time the 

first air support mission of the day struck 

the village. F or the third straight day 

fog and mist had denied large-scale air 

support. No more solid proof than the 

German attack on Schmidt was neederl 

to show that the attempt to isolat('~ the 

battlefield had failed. 

In Kommerscheidt and at the Kall 

woods line several hundred yards north 

of Kommerscheidt, the men of Major 

Hazlett's understrength battalion of the 

I 12th Infantry were exposed fully to the 

sounds of battle emanating from Schmidt. 

By midmorning small groups of frightened, disorganized men began to filter 

back with stories that "they're throwing 

everything they've got at us." By 1030 

the numbers had reached the proportions 

of a demoralized mob, reluctant to respond to orders. Some men wandered 

back across the Kall to V ossenack and 

Germeter. Yet within thl'; mass a few 

frantic efforts to stem the withdrawal had 

effect. When the enemy did not pursue 

his advantage immediately, groups of 

Colonel Flood's men began to reorganize 

and dig in with Major Hazlett's. About 

200 joined the Kommerscheidt defenses. 

Despite air attacks against Schmidt and 

round after round of artillery fire poured 

into the village, the reprieve from German 

tanks and, infantry did not last long. In 

early afternoon a posse of at least five 

Mark IV and V tanks and about 150 

infantry attacked. Imitating the tactics 

they had used at Schmidt, the enemy 

tankers stood out of effective bazooka 

range and pumped shells into foxholes 

and buildings. 

The day might have been lost save for 

the fact that Major Hazlett had an ace 

which Colonel Flood had not had in 

Schmidt. He had Lieutenant Fleig's 

three tanks. From right to left of the 

position Fleig and his tanks maneuvered 

fearlessly. Spotting a Mark V Panther 

overrunning pOSItIOns in an orchard on 

the eastern fringe of Kommerscheidt, 

Lieutenant Fleig directed his driver there. 

Although the lieutenant got in the 

first shots, his high-explosive ammunition 

bounced off the Panther's tough hide. 

All his armor-piercing rounds, Fleig discovered, were outside in the sponson rack. 

When Fleig turned his turret to get at 

these rounds, the Panther opened fire. 

The first shot missed. Working feverishly, the lieutenant and his crew thrust 

one of the armor-piercing rounds into the 

chamber. The first shot cut the barrel 

of the German gun. Three more in quick 

succession tore open the left side of the 

Panther's hull and set the tank afire. 

By 1600 the Germans had begun to 

fall back, leaving behind the hulks of five 
358 

tanks. A bomb from a P-47 had 

knocked out one, a bazooka had accounted for another, and Lieutenant Fleig 

and his tankers had gotten three. The 

presence of the lieutenant and his three 

tanks obviously provided a backbone to 

the defense at Kommerscheidt that earlier 

had been lacking at Schmidt. 

In midafternoon General Cota ordered 

that the units in Kommerscheidt attack to 

retake Schmidt, but no one on the ground 

apparently entertained any illusions about 

immediate compliance. When the regimental commander, Colonel Peterson, and 

the assistant division commander, Brig. 

Gen. George A. Davis, arrived in late 

afternoon to survey the situation, they 

must have realized that the question was 

not of retaking Schmidt but of holding 

Kommerscheidt. As the men on the 

ground soon came to know, it was a 

difficult position to hold, situated as it 

was under direct observation from the 

higher part of the Schmidt-Kommerscheidt spur and from the BrandenbergBergstein ridge. 

Not all the day's events brought on by 

entry of German reserves took place 

beyond the Kall. No one, for example, 

was more conscious of major additions 

to enemy artillery strength than the men 

of Colonel Hatzfeld's battalion of the 

I 12th Infantry on the bald Vossenack 

ridge. Both Army Group B and Seventh 

Army had sent several artillery, assault 

gun, antitank, and mortar battalions to 

the sector, and General Straube committed 

a portion of the artillery and antitank 

guns of the three of his LXXIV Corps 

divisions not affected by the American 

attack. 19 

19 MSS # C-oI6 (Straube) and # A-gas 

(Waldenburg); Sitreps, 2-4 Nov 44, OB WEST 

KTB, Befehle und Meldungen. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Subject as Colonel Hatzfeld's troops 

were to dominant observation from the 

Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge, they found 

it worth a man's life to move from his 

foxhole during daylight. Even if he 

stayed he might be entombed by shellfire. 

The companies began to bring as many 

men as possible into the houses during the 

day, leaving only a skeleton force on the 

ridge. Still casualties mounted. In the 

wester.n end of Vossenack, troops carried 

on their duties while traffic continued to 

flow in and out of the village. Someone 

entering Vossenack for only a short time, 

perhaps during one of the inevitable lulls 

in the shelling, might not have considered 

the fire particularly effective. But the 

foot soldiers knew differently. To them 

in their exposed foxholes, a lull was only 

a time of apprehensive waiting for the 

next bursts. The cumulative effect began 

to tell. 

The other center of German activity 

was against the IOgth Infantry's salient on 

the wooded plateau north of Germeter. 

Even as Colonel Strickler sent his reserve 

battalion on a futile attempt to take the 

other half of the regimental objective 

east of the Germeter-Huertgen highway, 

the 116th Panzer Division's 60th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment counterattacked west 

of the highway. Either poorly organized 

or thrown awry by American defensive 

fires, the strike became less a counterattack than amorphous infiltration. Yet 

before desisting, the Germans infiltrated 

the rear of the northernmost battalion, 

surrounded the battalion command post, 

and captured or killed about fifteen men, 

including most of the battalion staff and 

the artillery liaison party. 

Arrival during 4 November of two 

other units strengthened the German 

forces that now strongly penned the 28th 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 359 

Division on three sides. In and south of 

the Monschau Corridor, continuing relief 

by the 272d Volks Grenadier Division 

made available the 89th Division's second 

regiment, the 1056th. The 89th Division 

commander, Generalmajor Walter Bruns, 

ordered the 1056th Regiment into the 

woods to hold a line between Simonskall 

and the 105Sth Regiment, which was 

attacking Kommerscheidt.20 Also during 

the day of 4 November, the remaining 

regiment of the 116th Panzer Division, 

the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 

arrived at Huertgen. The division commander, General von Waldenburg, ordered 

the regiment into the woods north and 

northeast of Vossenack. He told attached 

engineers to build a road through the 

woods so that tanks might assist the panzer 

grenadiers in taking Vossenack, though 

eventually he had to abandon this venture.21 

As ordered by the Seventh Army commander, General Brandenberger, German 

plans to restore the situation which had 

existed on the opening day of the American offensive now were definitely formulated. The 27Sth Division was to ensure 

that the wings of the American salient 

were held against further widening. Renewing the attack against Kommerscheidt 

on 5 November, General Bruns's 89th 

Division was to clear the east bank of the 

Kall with the assistance of the bulk of the 

16th Panzer Regiment. Continuing to 

punch at the I09th Infantry with one 

panzer grenadier regiment, General von 

Waldenburg was to maneuver the rest of 

the 116th Panzer Division into position 

for a concentric attack on Vossenack. 

Both to gain a position from which to 

20 MS # P-032a (Bruns); 89th Div Order of 

the Day. 

21 MS # A-goS (Waldenburg). 

assist the attack on Vossenack from the 

south and also to cut off the Americans 

in Kommerscheidt, the 116th Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion was to 

drive on 5 November ·down the Kall gorge 

from the northeast to effect a link with 

the 89th Division. The Germans did not 

realize that the 28th Division had taken 

virtually no defensive measures in the 

Kall gorge. 22 

Events Along the Trail 

Although the spotlight from the American side was focused on the Kall gorge, 

the 28th Division was concentrating not 

on defending the gorge but on getting the 

precarious Kall trail open so that armor 

might cross to Kommerscheidt. Only 

three weasels and three tanks had crossed 

the Kall, and five disabled tanks now 

blocked the way. Despite the urgency 

of opening the trail, only a company and 

a platoon of engineers worked there during 4 November. For fear of damaging 

the disabled tanks, the engineers hesitated 

to use explosives on the main obstacle, 

the giant outcropping of rock. Indeed, 

everybody appeared to treat the disabled 

tanks with the kind of warm-hearted 

affection an old-time cavalryman might 

lavish on his horse. Why not sacrifice 

the five disabled tanks by pushing them 

off the trail into the gorge? This tank 

company under Captain Hostrup still had 

six more tanks, and the 28th Division had 

two other companies of tanks and almost 

a battalion of self-propelled tank destroyers available to cross the Kall. Yet all 

22 MSS # A-8g I and # A-8g2 (Gersdorff), 

# A-lOS (Waldenburg), # C-oI6 (Straube), 

and # P-032 (Bruns); ETHINT-S6 (Gersdorff 

and Waldenburg); Sitreps, 2~4 Nov 44, OB 

WEST KTB, Befehle und Meldungen; 89th Div 

Order of the Day. 
360 

through the day of 4 November and far 

past midnight the tankers worked at the 

frustrating task of righting the tracks on 

the tanks, inching the vehicles forward a 

few paces, and watching the tracks jump 

off again. 

Part reason for dalliance no doubt lay 

in the fact that General Cota all day long 

was ill informed about the condition of 

his vital main supply route across the 

Kall. Most reports reaching 28th Division headquarters repeatedly asserted that 

the trail was open. Neither the I I2th 

Infantry nor General Cota had liaison 

officers on the spot. Not until approximately 1500 did General Cota intervene 

personally by ordering the I I7 I st Engineer 

Combat Group commander, Col. Edmund 

K. Daley, to send a "competent officer" 

to supervise work on the trail. After 

visiting the site himself, Colonel Daley 

ordered the commander of the 20th Engineer Combat Battalion, Lt. Col. J. E. 

Sonnefield, to take personal charge. 

Not until approximately 0230, 5 November, did the tankers desist in their 

admirable but illogical struggle to save 

their tanks. At that time General Cota 

gave them a direct order either to have the 

trail clear by daybreak or to roll the 

immobilized tanks down the slope. As 

the engineers blew the troublesome rock 

outcropping, the tankers threw all their 

vehicles off the trail except the one stuck 

in the mud near the bottom of the gorge. 

That one might be bypassed, someone had 

discovered, by following a circuitous cutoff provided by two smaller trails. 

The first vehicular traffic to cross the 

Kall after removal of the tanks was a 

convoy of 5 weasels carrying rations and 

ammumtIOn. Later, soon after daylight 

on 5 November, 9 self-propelled M I 0 

tank destroyers of the 893d Tank DeTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

stroyer Battalion and the 6 remaining 

tanks of Captain Hostrup's company 

crossed the river. By noon of 5 November 

the Americans had 9 tanks and 9 tank 

destroyers east of the Kall. 

They needed these and more. Even 

before the first of these reinforcements 

arrived, the Germans struck again at 

Kommerscheidt. Weak from cold, rain, 

and fatigue, the remnants of the two 

battalions of the I 12th Infantry had no 

recourse but to huddle miserably in their 

foxholes, awaiting whatever the Germans 

might throw at them. Enemy observation 

from Schmidt was so damaging that men 

dared not emerge from their holes, even 

for sanitary reasons. As everywhere in the 

28th Division sector, casualties from com~ 

bat fatigue and trench foot were on the 

rise. The only real comfort the infantrymen had was the knowledge that their 

artillery was punishing the Germans with 

"terrifi c" fires. 

Lieutenant Fleig and his three veteran 

tanks saved the day against the first 

German attack soon after dawn on 5 

November. When they immobilized one 

of five enemy tanks, the others gradually 

withdrew. Although the Germans made 

several more strikes during the day, their 

tanks participated only by fire from covered positions in Schmidt. No doubt they 

hesitated to emerge because for the first 

time since the offensive had begun, American planes had good hunting. Clearing 

weather permitted the first planes to take 

to the air as early as 0835 and remain out 

all day. The pilots claimed at least 10 

enemy armored vehicles destroyed, but 

only 2 or 3 of these at Schmidt.23 

In the meantime, the Germans had 

taken up arms against another group of 

23 A not unlikely estimate in light of MS # 

A-go 5 (Waldenburg). 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 361 

American infantrymen whose detailed 

story may never be told. These were the 

men, perhaps as many as 200, who had 

fled from Schmidt on 4 November into 

the woods southwest of that village. On 

5 November the enemy's I055th Regiment 

noted the first prisoners from this group. 

Before dawn on 9 November three from 

the trapped group were to make their 

way to American lines but with the report 

that when they had left two days before 

to look for help, the remaining men had 

neither water nor rations. The three men 

doubted that on 9 November any still 

survived. They probably were right. 

The 89th Division reported that on 8 

November, after the Americans had held 

out for four days, the Germans captured 

133. Presumably, these were the last. 24 

A definite pattern in the fighting now 

had emerged. The battlefields of the 

I 12th Infantry at Kommerscheidt and 

Vossenack, while separated in locale by 

the fissure of the Kall gorge, were wedded 

in urgency. For even as the fight raged 

at Kommerscheidt, the inexorable pounding of the bald Vossenack ridge by the 

enemy's artillery went on. Not even 

presence overhead of American planes 

appeared to silence German guns. Casualties of all types soared. So shaky was 

the infantry that the assistant division 

commander, General Davis, ordered at 

least a platoon of tanks to stay in 

Vossenack at all times to bolster infantry 

morale. 

Action on the other two battlefields, 

that of the Iogth Infantry on the wooded 

plateau north of Germeter and of the 

I loth Infantry to the south at Simonskall 

and Raffelsbrand, ebbed and flowed with 

the fortunes of the center regiment. On 

24 German sources are an entry of 5 Nov 44 in 

OB WEST KTB and 89th Diu Order of the Day. 

5 November the Iogth Infantry held 

against continued counterattacks by the 

60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The 

I loth Infantry made virtually no progress 

in persistent attempts to close the pillboxstudded gap between the battalions at 

Simonskall and Raffelsbrand. Not for 

some days would the fact be acknowledged 

officially, but the I loth Infantry already 

was exhausted beyond the point of effectiveness as a unit. 

As these events took place on 5 November, another act was about to begin along 

the Kall trail. When the assistant division commander, General Davis, had 

traversed the trail the afternoon before en 

route to Kommerscheidt, he had noted 

that the engineers had no one defending 

either the bridge or the trail itself. Encountering a company of the 20th 

Engineers, General Davis told the commander, Capt. Henry R. Doherty, to 

assume a defensive position where the trail 

enters the woods southeast of Vossenack. 

Captain Doherty was also, General Davis 

said, to "guard the road near the 

bridge." 25 At the bridge, the engineer 

officer stationed a security guard of three 

men under T/4 James A. Kreider, while 

the remainder of the engineer company dug 

in at the western woods line. Except 

for Kreider's small force, the defensive 

positions chosen were of little value, for a 

thick expanse of woods separated the 

engineers from the bridge and from the 

main part of the Kall trail. 

The first indication that the Germans 

might accept the standing invitation to 

sever the I 12th Infantry's main supply 

route came about midnight on 5 November. Bound for Kommerscheidt, an antitank squad towing a gun with a weasel 

25 Quotation from a combat interview with 

Doherty. 
362 

was attacked without warmng near the 

bottom of the gorge. Even as this ambush occurred, engineers were working on 

the trail not far away, and two supply 

columns subsequently crossed the Kall 

safely. 

A few hours later, at approximately 

0230 on 6 November, two squads of 

engineers working on the trail near the 

bridge decided to dig in to protect themselves against German shelling. As they 

dug, these two squads and the four-man 

security guard at the bridge represented 

the only obstacle to uninterrupted German movement along the Kall gorge. 

The engineers still were digging when a 

German appeared on the trail some fifteen 

yards away, blew two shrill blasts on a 

whistle, and set off a maze of small arms 

fire. Taken by surprise, the engineers had 

no chance. Those who survived did so 

by melting into the woods. At the Kall 

bridge, Sergeant Kreider and the men of 

his security guard saw the Germans but 

dared not fire at such a superior force. 

Another group of Americans was in the 

Kall gorge at this time. They were 

medics and patients who occupied a logwalled dugout alongside the trail halfway 

up the western bank. The dugout was 

serving as an aid station for both American 

battalions III Kommerscheidt. About 

0300 several Germans knocked at the 

door of the dugout. After satisfying 

themselves that the medics were unarmed, 

the Germans posted a guard and left. At 

intervals through the rest of the night, 

the medics could see the Germans mining 

the Kall trail. 

At about 0530, as two jeeps left Vossenack with ammunition for Kommerscheidt, a platoon of Germans loomed out 

of the darkness on the open part of the 

trail southeast of Vossenack. Firing with 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

machine guns and a panzerfaust, the 

Germans knocked out both jeeps~ The 

lieutenant in one vehicle yelled to an 

enlisted man riding with him to fire the 

jeep's machine gun. "I can't, Lieutenant," the man shouted; "I'm dying right 

here !" 

These events clearly demonstrated that 

local security, as enunciated in the 

engineer plan, was not enough to prevent 

German movement along the Kall gorge. 

Indeed, these incidents indicated that the 

20th Engineers had an unusual conception 

of what constituted security. Except at 

the woods line where Captain Doherty's 

company held defensive positions, soldiers 

of the 116th Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion controlled almost every 

segment of the Kall trail west of the river. 

Erroneous reports about the status of 

the supply route through the hours of 

darkness on the morning of 6 November 

forestalled any last-minute attempt to defend the trail. Not until about 0800 did 

the engineer group commander, Colonel 

Daley, get what was apparently accurate 

information. He immediately ordered the 

20th Engineers to "Get every man you 

have in line fighting. Establish contact 

with the Infantry on right and left .... " 

No one did anything to comply with 

the order. By this time another crucial 

situation arising in Vossenack had altered 

the picture. 

The first step taken by the 28th Division to counteract the enemy's intrusion 

into the Kall gorge actually emerged as a 

corollary of a move made for another 

purpose. It had its beginning in late 

afternoon of 5 November when General 

Cota announced formation of a special 

task force under the 707th Tank Battalion 

commander, Colonel Ripple. Task Force 

Ripple was to cross the Kall and assist the 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 363 

remnants of the I 12th Infantry to retake 

Schmidt. Thereupon, the task force was 

to open the second phase of the 28th 

Division's attack, the drive southwest into 

the Monschau Corridor. 

Task Force Ripple looked impressiveon paper. Colonel Ripple was to have a 

battalion of the I loth Infantry, one of his 

own medium tank companies and his 

light tank company, plus a company and 

a platoon of self-propelled tank destroyers. 

Yet, in reality, Task Force Ripple was 

feeble. The stupefying fighting in the 

woods south of Germeter had reduced the 

infantry battalion to little more than 300 

effectives, of which a third were heavy 

weapons men. The company of medium 

tanks was that of Captain Hostrup, already in Kommerscheidt but with only 

nine remaining tanks. The company of 

tank destroyers was that in Kommerscheidt, reduced now to seven guns. The 

other platoon of tank destroyers and the 

company of light tanks still had to cross 

the mined and blocked Kall trail. So 

discouraging were prospects of passage 

that no one ever got around to ordering 

the light tanks to attempt it. 

The platoon of tank destroyers contributed to passage of Task Force Ripple 

across the Kall, though the destroyers 

themselves never made it. Moving along 

the open portion of the trail southeast of 

Vossenack, the destroyers dispersed the 

Germans who earlier had knocked out the 

two jeeps with machine guns and panzerfaust. When the depleted infantry battalion arrived at the entrance of the trail 

into the woods about 0600 on 6 November, the tank destroyer crewmen asked at 

least a platoon of infantry to accompany 

their guns down the Kall trail. Colonel 

Ripple refused. Considering his infantry 

force already too depleted, he intended to 

avoid a fight along the trail by taking 

instead a firebreak paralleling the trail.· 

Almost from the moment the infantry 

entered the woods at the firebreak, they 

became embroiled in a small arms fight 

that lasted all the way to the river. Not 

until well after daylight did the infantry 

cross the Kall and not until several hours 

later did they join Colonel Peterson's 

troops at the woods line north of Kommerscheidt. In the crossing the battalion 

lost seventeen men. Yet in getting beyond the Kall, Colonel Ripple in effect 

had made a successful counterattack 

against the 116th Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion. The enemy had 

fallen back along the river to the northeast. Though the Americans did not 

know until later in the day, the Kall trail 

as early as 0900 on 6 November was 

temporarily clear of Germans.26 

The scene that Task Force Ripple 

found upon arrival beyond the Kall was 

one of misery and desolation. Though 

one artillery concentration after another 

prevented German infantry from forming 

to attack, the enemy's tanks sat on their 

dominating perch in the edge of Schmidt 

and poured round after round into 

Kommerscheidt. Maneuvering on the 

lower ground about Kommerscheidt, the 

American tanks and tank destroyers were 

no match for the Mark IV's and V'S.27 

By midday on 6 November, only 6 American tanks remained fully operational and 

only 3 of an original 9 destroyers. The 

clear weather of the day before had given 

26 See Sitreps, 6 Nov 44, OB WEST KTB, 

Befehle und Meldungen. 

27 For heroic action at Kommerscheidt during 

4-6 November, one of the tank destroyer platoon leaders, 1st Lt. Turney W. Leonard, who 

was subsequently seriously wounded, was awarded 

the Medal of Honor. 
364 

way to mist and overcast so that the enemy 

tanks again had little concern about 

American planes. 

After seeing Task Force Ripple's battered infantry battalion, the I 12th Infantry commander, Colonel Peterson, could 

divine scant possibility of success in 

retaking Schmidt. He nevertheless fully 

intended to go through with the attack. 

But as the officers reconnoitered, one 

adversity followed another. In a matter 

of minutes the battalion of the I loth 

Infantry lost its commander, executive officer, S-2, and a company commander. 

Canceling ~he proposed attempt to retake 

Schmidt, Colonel Peterson told the men of 

the I loth Infantry to dig in along the 

woods line north of Kommerscheidt in 

order to strengthen his defense in depth. 

The lonely despair of the men east of 

the Kall by this time must have deepened, 

for surely they must have heard that the 

main drive by the VII Corps had been 

postponed to I I November and that even 

this target date was subject to the vagaries 

of weather. That higher commanders 

were concerned-as evidenced by visits to 

the 28th Division command post on 5 

November by Generals Hodges, Gerow, 

and Collins-was scarcely sufficient balm 

for the bitter knowledge that theirs would 

remain for at least five more days the only 

attack from the Netherlands to Metz. 

Catastrophe in Vossenack 

Though dreadful to the men involved, 

the retreat from Schmidt and the trouble 

at Kommerscheidt had posed no real 

threat to the 28th Division's integrity. 

As dawn came on 6 November, at the 

same time Task Force Ripple was unwittingly clearing the Germans from the 

Kall gorge, another crisis was arising that 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

did spell a threat to the very existence of 

the division. 

As day broke across the bald northeastern nose of the Vossenack ridge, events 

there were striding to a climax. Their 

men unnerved by three days and four 

nights of merciless shelling under the 

shadow of the Brandenberg-Bergstein 

ridge, the harassed company commanders 

of Colonel Hatzfeld's 2d Battalion, I 12th 

Infantry, had been apprehensive of what 

the day of 6 November might bring. 

They had reported to Colonel Hatzfeld 

that their men's nerves were shattered, 

that they had to order some to eat, and 

that many cried unashamedly when told 

to remain in their foxholes. But nobody 

had done anything about it. The battalion commander himself sat in his basement command post, his head in his hands. 

Few of themen on the Vossenack ridge 

could comprehend why the Germans 

failed to herald the dawn with their 

customary artillery concentrations. The 

unusual quiet bred misgivings. Then a 

burst of small arms fire sounded. Someone let go a piercing scream; then silence 

again. A half hour later, as daylight 

increased, the German guns spoke. 

Already groggy to the point of insensibility, the men could stand no more. 

Panic-ridden, men of one company 

grabbed wildly at their equipment and 

broke for the rear. Seeing his position 

compromised by the flight of his neighbor, 

the commander of another company ordered his platoons to fall back on the 

battalion reserve. The impulse to run 

was contagious. Once the men got going, 

they would not stop. The reserve company too pulled out. Although no one 

professed to have seen any enemy soldiers, 

few doubted ·that the Germans were close 

on their heels. Pushing, shoving, strew-
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 365 

ing equipment, the men raced wild-eyed 

through Vossenack. Circumstances had 

evoked one of the most awful powers of 

war, the ability to cast brave men in the 

role of cowards. 

Dashing from the battalion command 

post near the church in the center of 

Vossenack, the battalion staff tried frantically to stem the retreat. It was an 

impossible task. Most men thought only 

of some nebulous place of refuge called 

"the rear." By 1030 the officers nevertheless had established a semblance of a 

line running through the village at the 

church, but in the line were no more 

than seventy men. 

Even as the retreat had begun, a platoon of tank destroyers and a platoon of 

tanks were in the northeastern edge of 

Vossenack. Although both stayed there 

more than a half hour after the infantry 

pulled out, crewmen of neither platoon 

saw any German infantry either attacking 

or attempting to occupy the former 

American positions. First reports of the 

flight brought four more platoons of tanks 

racing from Germeter into the village. 

Not until midmorning did the last of the 

tanks leave the eastern half of Vossenack 

to join the thin olive drab line near the 

church. 

On the enemy side, General von 

Waldenburg's 116th Panzer Division had 

planned an attack on Vossenack for 0400, 

6 November. The 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment and some portions of the 

60th Panzer Grenadiers were to have 

struck from the woods north and northeast of the village. But something had 

happened to delay the attack; either the 

infantry or the supporting artillery was 

not ready on time. No positive identification of German troops in Vossenack before 

noon developed. I t was safe to assume 

that the rout of Colonel Hatzfeld's battalion had resulted not from actual ground 

attack but from fire and threat of attack. 28 

As the chaotic situation developed in 

V ossenack, the highest ranking officer on 

the scene, the assistant division commander, General Davis, found himself 

torn between two crises: that at Vossenack and that in the Kall gorge. He 

could not have known at this time that 

Task Force Ripple's advance through the 

gorge already had cleared the Germans 

from the Kall trail. His only hope for a 

reserve to influence either situation was 

the 1I7Ist Engineer Combat Group. 

Despite some contradictory orders and 

a lack of liaison between General Davis 

and the engineer commander, Colonel 

Daley, a pattern of commitment of the 

engineers as riflemen had emerged by 

midafternoon of 6 November. Into Vossenack went the 146th Engineer Combat 

Battalion (minus a company on detached 

service). To the Kall gorge went the 

remnants of the 20th Engineers and two 

companies of the 1340th Engineer Combat Battalion. A third company of the 

1340th Engineers remained in support of 

the I loth Infantry. 

In the Kall gorge the engineers happily 

discovered that the Germans had gone. 

By nightfall a company of the I 340th 

Engineers was digging in at the Kall bridge 

while another company and most of what 

was left of the 20th Engineers assumed 

Captain Doherty's old positions at the 

western entrance of the trail into the Kall 

woods. 

28 German sources on this point are vague. 

See MS # A-goS (Waldenburg) and # C-016 

(Straube); ETHINT-S6 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg); Sitreps 6 Nov. 44, OB WEST KTB, 

Befehle und Meldungen; 28th Div G-2 and 

G-3 Jnls and files, 6 Nov 44. 
366 

In Vossenack the two companies of the 

I46th Engineers were committed so 

quickly that the men still wore hip boots 

they had been using on road repair work. 

They moved immediately to take responsibility for the thin infantry line near the 

church. 29 

The crisis in V ossenack had repercussions all the way back to headquarters of 

the V Corps. Upon first news of the 

catastrophe, General Gerow hurriedly 

alerted the 4th Division's 12th Infantry. 

Beginning that night, the 12th Infantry 

was to relieve Colonel Strickler's IOgth 

Infantry on the wooded plateau nQrth of 

Germeter. Upon relief, the IOgth Infantry was to be employed only as approved by General Gerow. Even though 

this regiment had been mutilated in the 

fight in the woods, freeing it would decrease somewhat the apprehension over 

the recurring crises within the 28th 

Division. General Gerow must have 

recognized that should the Germans push 

on from Vossenack past Germeter, they 

would need only a shallow penetration to 

disrupt the First Army's plans for the 

main drive to the Roer by the VII Corps. 

During the night of 6 November both 

the I46th Engineers and the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment laid plans for 

driving the other out of Vossenack. 

Both attacks were to begin about 0800.30 

As daylight came the Americans started 

their preparatory artillery barrage first. 

29 As the engineers neared the church, Pvt. 

Doyle W. McDaniel climbed atop a building to 

search for enemy riflemen who were impeding his 

company's advance, Later he repeated the action; but the second time the Germans spotted 

and killed him. He was awarded the DSC 

posthumously, 

30 For German plans, see Sitreps, 7 Nov 44, 

OB WEST KTB, Be/ehle und Meldungen, and 

ETHINT -56 (Gersdorff and Waldenburg). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

When the barrage had ended and the 

two engineer companies moved into' the 

open to attack, German fire began. Although this shelling hit one of the 

companies severely, both charged forward, 

one on either side of the village'S main 

street. They had beaten the Germans to 

the draw. 

Despite relative unfamiliarity with an 

attack role and a lack of hand grenades, 

radios, and mortars, the engineers attacked with enthusiasm and energy.31 

W'here particularly stubborn resistance 

formed, a tank platoon advancing along 

the southeastern fringe of the village went 

into action. By early evening the engineers in a superior demonstration had 

cleared the eastern end of Vossenack at a 

cost to the 116th Panzer Division of at 

least 150 casualties. A battalion of the 

Iogth Infantry that had been relieved in 

the woods north of Germeter took over 

from the engineers. This time the infantry heeded the lesson demonstrated at 

such a price by Colonel Hatzfeld's battalion and holed up in the village itself 

rather than on the exposed nose of the 

ridge. Though patrol clashes and heavy 

shelling continued, the tempo of fighting 

at Vossenack gradually slackened. 

The Kall Gorge 

The situation in the Kall gorge was 

neither so quickly nor so decisively set 

right. To be sure, events along the trail 

had taken a turn for the better on 6 

31 Though out of ammunition, Pfc. Henry J. 

Kalinowsky stormed across an open field in the 

face of fire from five Germans in a house, jumped 

through a window, and forced the Germans to 

surrender at the point of his empty rifle. He 

was awarded the DSG. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 367 

November when passage of Task Force 

Ripple had driven away the enemy's 

116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 

and when the I340th Engineers had 

moved one company to the Kall bridge 

and another to the western woods line. 

Yet even as the engineers dug in, the 

Germans were planning a new move III 

the Kall gorge. 

Commanded by Capt. Ralph E. Lind, 

Jr., the engineer company at the Kall 

bridge had a strength of not quite a 

hundred men. Splitting his force, Captain Lind put one platoon east of the 

river and the remainder on the west. 

About a half hour before midnight on 6 

November, the Reconnaissance Battalion 

began to move back into the gorge. 

Behind heavy shelling, about a platoon 

attacked that part of Captain Lind's 

company west of the river. Some of the 

engineers left their foxholes to retreat up 

the hill toward the other engineer positions 

at the woods line. For the rest of the 

night the Germans again roamed the Kall 

gorge almost at will. 

Unaware of this development, a supply 

column carrying rations and ammunition 

to Kommerscheidt started from Vossenack about midnight. Once the men 

in the column thought they heard German 

voices, but no untoward incident occurred. On the return journey, the 

vehicles were loaded with wounded. 

Again the column crossed the river successfully but near the western woods line 

had to abandon two big trucks because of 

a tree that partially blocked the trail. 

By daylight on 7 November, the situation along the Kall trail was something of 

a paradox. The Germans claimed that 

despite "considerable losses" the 116th 

Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion again 

had cut the trail and established contact 

with the 89th Division in the woods to 

the south.32 Yet an American supply 

column had crossed and recrossed the 

Kall during the night. The Americans 

thought their engineers controlled the 

trail, but by midmorning of 7 November, 

the only force in position to do so-that 

of Captain Lind-was down to the company commander and five men. The rest 

of the engineers had melted away into 

the woods. 

Upon learning in early afternoon that 

the engineers had deserted the bridge, the 

battalion commander, Lt. Col. Truman 

H. Setliffe, ordered his third . company 

that had been supporting the I loth Infantry to move to the bridge and "stay 

there." Commanded by Capt. Frank P. 

Bane, this company moved down the 

firebreak paralleling the Kall trail, left a 

platoon near the foot of the firebreak, 

and then moved to the bridge. Considering his force too small to justify positions 

on both sides of the river, Captain Bane 

remained on the west bank and echeloned 

his squads up the trail to the west. They 

made no effort to contact- the infantry 

forces east of the Kall. Thus only a 

portion of the Kall trail west of the river 

was secure. 

One more effort on 7 November to get 

a firm grip on the elusive Kall trail 

emerged as a corollar,y to another commendable but feeble plan to retake 

Schmidt. Banking on a battalion of the 

newly relieved IOgth Infantry as the main 

component, General Cota ordered formation of another task force under the 

assistant division commander, General 

32 Sitreps, 7 Nov 44, OB WEST KTB, Befehle 

und Meldungen. 
368 

Davis, to recapture Schmidt. As had 

Task Force Ripple, Task Force Davis 

looked impressive on paper. In addition 

to the battalion of the IOgth Infantry, 

General Davis was to have the I 12th 

Infantry (minus Colonel Hatzfeld's destroyed battalion), the battalion of the 

I loth Infantry that had gone to Kommerscheidt as a part of Task Force Ripple, 

two companies of tanks, and two companies of self-propelled tank destroyers. 

Of this force only the battalion of the 

Iogth Infantry in reality had any offensive 

potential, and that based primarily upon 

arrival of green replacements the night 

before. Half of the armor still would 

have to cross the perilous Kall trail. Four 

of the tank destroyers tried that in early 

afternoon of 7 November, only to wreck 

on the open ridge southeast of Vossenack 

while shying at enemy shellfire. 

Both General Cota and General Davis 

nevertheless intended on 7 November to 

proceed with the attack on Schmidt by 

Task Force Davis. To ensure passage of 

the task force across the Kall, General 

Cota ordered another battalion of the 

Iogth Infantry to go to the gorge and 

secure the bridge and the trail. An hour 

or so before dark on 7 November this 

battalion reported being in position, but 

the next morning General Cota was to 

learn that in reality the battalion had got 

lost in the forest and ended up a thousand 

yards southwest of Richelskaul in rear of 

the I loth Infantry. 

By daylight of 8 November, General 

Cota still had issued no movement orders 

for Task Force Davis. At the task force 

command post a belief gained credence 

that the orders might never come. For by 

8 November events at Kommerscheidt 

already had dictated a more realistic appraisal of the 28th Division's capabilities. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Climax at Kommerscheidt 

During the evening of 6 November, 

while the issues at Vossenack and in the 

Kall gorge remained in doubt, the commander of the enemy's 89th Division, 

General Bruns, had convened the leaders 

of his IOssth and IOs6th Regiments and 

the attached 16th Panzer Regiment. The 

inertia at Kommerscheidt, General Bruns 

said,must end. At dawn on 7 November 

the 89th Division was to strike in full 

force. 33 

As daylight came, a cold winter rain 

turned foxholes and shellholes into miniature wells and lowered a gloomy backdrop for the climax of fighting at Kommerscheidt. A solid hour of the most 

intense artillery and mortar fire left the 

gutted buildings in flames and the fatigued 

remnants of Colonel Flood's and Major 

Hazlett's battalions of the I 12th Infantry 

in a stupor. Through the rain from the 

direction of Schmidt rolled at least fifteen 

German tanks. With them came a force 

of infantry variously estimated at from 

one to two battalions. 

In the pitched fight that followed, 

American tank destroyers knocked out five 

German tanks, while an infantry commander, Capt. Clifford T. Hackard, accounted for another with a bazooka.34 

Still the Germans came on. They 

knocked out three of the tank destroyers 

and two of the American tanks. By noon 

German tanks were cruising among the 

foxholes on the eastern edge of the village. 

Enemy infantrymen were shooting up 

buildings and systematically reducing each 

posItion. The Americans began to give. 

Individually and in small groups, the men 

33 89th Div Order of. the Day. 

34 Captain Hackard subsequently received the 

DSC. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 369 

broke to race across the open field to the 

north in search of refuge in the reserve 

position along the Kall woods line. 

Before the I 12th Infantry commander, 

Colonel Peterson, could counterattack 

with a portion of his reserve from the 

woods line, a message arrived by radio 

directing him to report immediately to 

the division command post. Colonel 

Peterson did not question the message for 

two reasons: ( I) he believed the situation at Kommerscheidt had been misrepresented to General Cota, and (2) he had 

heard a rumor that a colonel recently 

assigned to the division was to replace him 

as commander of the I 12th Infantry. 

Designating Colonel Ripple to command 

the force east of the Kall, Colonel Peterson started the hazardous trip westward 

across the Kall gorge. 

Wounded twice by German shellfire, 

Colonel Peterson was semi coherent when 

engineers digging along the firebreak west 

of the Kall came upon him in late afternoon. When medics carried him to the 

division command post, General Cota 

could not understand why the regimental 

commander had returned. Not until several days later did General Cota establish 

the fact that, by mistake, a message 

directing Colonel Peterson's return had 

been sent. 

In the meantime, at Kommerscheidt, 

Colonel Ripple found the situation in the 

village irretrievable. Reduced now to but 

two tank destroyers and three tanks, the 

armored vehicles began to fall back on the 

woods line. The last of the infantry took 

this as a signal to pull out. In withdrawing, two of the tanks threw their 

tracks and had to be abandoned. Only 

two destroyers and one tank remained. 

Aided immeasurably by steady artillery 

support, Colonel Ripple's battered force 

held through the afternoon at the woods 

line against renewed German attack. Yet 

few could hope to hold for long. Expecting capture, one man hammered out the 

H that indicated religion on his identification tags. 

Withdrawal Across the Kall 

Bearing the dolorous tidings that the 

Germans had ejected his forces from 

Kommerscheidt, General Cota talked by 

telephone during the afternoon of 7 November with General Gerow, the V corps 

commander. Cota recommended withdrawal of all troops from beyond the Kall. 

Concurring, General Gerow a short while 

later telephoned the tacit approval of the 

First Army commander, General Hodges. 

The army commander had kept in close 

touch with the 28th Division's situation 

and was "extremely disappointed" over 

the division's showing.35 On 8 November 

during a conference at the division command post attended not only by Hodges 

but by Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, and 

Gerow, General Hodges drew General 

Cota aside for a "short sharp conference." 

He particularly remarked on the fact that 

division headquarters appeared to have 

no precise knowledge of the location of its 

units and was doing nothing to obtain 

the information. Hodges later told General Gerow to examine the possibility of 

command changes within the division. 36 

Certain conditions went with General 

Hodges' approval of withdrawal from 

beyond the Kall. In effect, the conditions indicated that the army commander 

would settle for a right flank secured 

along the Kall River instead of the Roer. 

35 Sylvan Diary, entry of 8 Nov 44. See also 

entries of I through 7 November. 

36 Ibid. 
370 THE SIEGF_RIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

WEASEL (M29 Cargo Carrier), similar to those usedfor evacuating wounded, pulls jeep out 

of the mud. 

General Gerow ordered that the 28th 

Division continue to hold the Vossenack 

ridge and that part of the Kall gorge 

west of the river, assist the attached 12th 

Infantry of the 4th Division to secure a 

more efficacious line of departure overlooking Huertgen, continue to drive south 

into the Monschau Corridor, and be prepared to send a regiment to work with 

the 5th Armored Division in a frontal 

drive against the Monschau Corridor. 

As events were to prove, these were 

prodigious conditions for a division which 

had taken a physical and moral beating. 

After locating the battalion of the 

Iogth Infantry that had become lost en 

route to the Kall gorge, General Davis on 

8 November directed the battalion to continue to the Kall. With the battalion 

went a new commander for the 1 12th 

Infantry, Col. Gustin M. Nelson, who was 

to join what was left of the regiment 

beyond the river and supervise withdrawal.37 

Nearing .the Kall bridge, the battalion 

of the Iogth Infantry dug in along the 

----n-Colonel Nelson's presence confinned the fact 

that Colonel Peterson was to have been relieved, 

but not summarily, that is, not in the sense that 

his performance had been unsatisfactory. Interv 

with Cota. 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 371 

firebreak paralleling the Kall trail. Why 

a position was not chosen which would 

include the medical aid station in the 

dugout alongside the trail went unexplained. 

Assisted by a volunteer patrol of four 

men, Colonel Nelson continued across the 

river where in late afternoon he reached 

his new, drastically depleted command. 

Preparations for withdrawal. already were 

in progress. Soon after nightfall, while 

supporting artillery fired upon Kommerscheidt to conceal noise of withdrawal, 

the men were to move in two columns 

westward to the river. In hope of consideration from the Germans, a column of 

wounded and volunteer litter bearers was 

to march openly down the Kall trail. 

The column of effectives was to proceed 

cross-country along the route Colonel Nelson and his patrol had taken. 

The night was utterly black. Moving 

down the eastern portion of the Kall 

trail, the column of wounded at first 

encountered no Germans; but enemy 

shelling split the column, brought fresh 

wounds to some, and made patients out 

of some of the litter bearers. At the 

bridge the men found four German 

soldiers on guard. A medic talked them 

into letting the column pass. 

With the effectives, Colonel Nelson 

found the cross-country route through the 

forest virtually impassable in the darkness. 

Like blind cattle the men thrashed 

through the underbrush. Any hope of 

maintammg formation was dispelled 

quickly by the blackness of the night and 

by German shelling. All through the 

night and into the next day, frightened, 

fatigued men made their way across the 

icy Kall in small irregular groups, or alone. 

More than 2,200 men had at one time or 

another crossed to the east bank of the 

Kall. A few already had returned as 

stragglers or on litters; little more than 

300 came back in the formal withdrawal. 

In the confusion of withdrawal, the 

litter bearers carried the wounded no 

farther than a temporary refuge at the 

log-walled aid station alongside the western portion of the Kall trail. Situated in 

a kind of no man's land between the 

Germans and the battalion of the Iogth 

Infantry along the firebreak, the medics 

for several days had been able to evacuate 

only ambulatory patients. Their limited 

facilities already choked, the medics had 

to leave the new patients outside in the 

cold and rain. 

After the Germans had turned bac~ 

three attempts by weasels to reach the aid 

station, the medics decided early on 9 N 0-

vember to attempt their own evacuation. 

Along the Kall trail they found two 

abandoned trucks and a weasel. Though 

they loaded these with wounded, they 

found as they reached the western woods 

line that only the weasel could pass 

several disabled vehicles which partially 

blocked the trail. With instructions to 

send ambulances for the rest, the driver of 

the weasel and his load of wounded proceeded to V ossenack. 

By the time the ambulances arrived, a 

German captain and a group of enemy 

enlisted men had appeared on the scene. 

They refused to allow evacuation of any 

but the seriously wounded and medics 

with bona fide Red Cross cards. The 

two American surgeons and two chaplains 

that were with the aid group also had to 

stay behind. For the next two days, 

these officers and the remaining wounded 

stayed in the aid station, virtual prisoners. 

Not until late on the second day, I I 

November, when a German medical officer at the bottom of the gorge requested 
372 

a local truce to collect German dead, did 

the American surgeons find an opportunity to bypass the enemy officer at the 

western woods line and evacuate their 

remammg patients. 

New Missions 

As early as 8 November the battered 

I loth Infantry at Raffelsbrand and the 

recently attached 12th Infantry on the 

wooded plateau north of Germeter set out 

to accomplish two of the missions assigned 

when General Gerow had approved 

withdrawal. The I loth Infantry tried to 

drive south into the Monschau Corridor 

while the 12th Infantry attempted to 

better the line of departure oveflooking 

Huertgen. 

The attempt by the I loth Infantry to 

continue to attack long after the regiment's offensive ability had reached a 

point of diminishing returns served little 

purpose other than to prolong an exercise 

in futility. For five more terrible days 

Colonel Seely's two mutilated battalions 

tried to reduce the pillboxes at Raffelsbrand. The lines at the end remained 

almost the same. Visiting the regiment 

on 13 November, the assistant division 

commander, General Davis, caught a 

glimpse of the depressing situation at first 

hand. What he discovered prompted 

him to call off all offensive action by the 

regiment. One battalion, for example, 

though strengthened at one point by 

ninety-five replacements, had but fiftyseven men left, little more than a platoon. 

In the rifle companies not one of the 

original officers remained and only two 

noncommissioned officers. 

Though the attached 12th Infantry was 

near full strength at the start of attacks 

on 8 November, that regiment soon disTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

covered what tremendous sacrifices this 

ogre called the Huertgen Forest demanded. 

In five days the 12th Infantry's casualties 

soared to more than 500. As rain and 

snow persisted, more than a fifth of 

these were trench foot and frostbite cases. 

All about the salient the 12th Infantry 

had inherited on the wooded plateau 

north of Germeter, the Germans by this 

time had erected barbed wire obstacles, 

constructed log bunkers at ground level, 

and trimmed the woods with antipersonnel 

mines. To strengthen the regiment of 

the 27Sth Division that had held so stubbornly here against the 109th Infantry, 

the Germans had moved in an assault 

engineer battalion and a fortress machine 

gun battalion. None of the 12th Infantry's attacks made any noteworthy gains. 

One reason for the 12th Infantry's 

troubles was a shift in German plans 

brought about by the enemy's success at 

Kommerscheidt and his failure at Vossenack. On 9 November the Germans 

had decided to abandon their attempts to 

reduce Vossenack by frontal assault and 

returned to the original plan of driving 

south through the American salient north 

of Germeter to cut off Vossenack. 

The corps commander, General Straube, 

shifted the division boundaries to give the 

89th Division responsibility for Vossenack 

while the 116th Panzer Division concentrated at Huertgen to counterattack down 

the wooded plateau through the 12th 

Infantry. By this time, however, the 

German units were about as disorganized 

as was the 28th Division. Expecting 

momentarily to have to face the main 

American drive, the 116th Panzer Division 

hesitated to become deeply involved on 

the wooded plateau. Its counterattack 

amounted to little· more than local thrusts 

that served to stymie the 12th Infantry's 
THE SECOND ATTACK ON SCHMIDT 373 

offensive moves but failed to achieve 

any significant penetration.38 

The issue on the wooded plateau still 

was undecided when on 10 November the 

army commander, General Hodges, directed establishment of a new corps 

boundary between the V and VII Corps 

in preparation for the beginning of the 

main First Army drive. The 12th Infantry reverted to control of the 4th Division, 

which was moving into the Huertgen 

Forest to fight under the VII Corps in 

the coming offensive.39 

Before the 12th Infantry passed to the 

VII Corps on 10 November, General 

Cota ordered an attack to assist the 

attached regiment in securing the other 

half of the proposed line of departure 

overlooking Huertgen. The attack was 

to be made by the 1st Battalion, I09th 

Infantry. Driving north from the Vossenack church into the wooded (Tiefen 

creek) draw separating the Vossenack 

and Brandenberg-Bergstein ridges, this 

battalion was to gain that part of the 

woods line which had remained inviolate 

to repeated American attacks from the 

salient north of Germeter. 

This was a far different battalion from 

that which had moved toward Huertgen 

on 2 November. Even with some replacements the rifle companies now 

totaled only 62, 55, and 73 men, respectively. On 10 November a heavy German 

artillery concentration held up one company and another got lost in the woods, 

but the third reached the objective. 

There the company at first en joyed 

38 MS # A-8g! (Gersdorff); ETHINT-56 

(Gersdorff and Waldenb urg); Entries of ! -! 2 

Nov 44, OB WEST KTB, Sitreps, g-IO Nov 44, 

OB WEST KTB, Belehle und Meldungen. 

39 For this story and greater detail on the trials 

of the ! 2th Infantry, see below, Chapter XVIII. 

magnificent solitude. Nobody knew 

where the company was. For three days 

the men remained undetected while Germans shuffled past them in the forest. 

Yet even without enemy action, the basic 

process of keeping alive began to assume 

awesome proportions. Aggravated by 

snow, sleet, and cold and the total impossibility of rehabilitation, trench foot 

swept through the ranks. Some men 

stood guard in muddy foxholes on their 

knees. By the time the Germans discovered the company on 14 November, 

food already was exhausted. As the 

enemy surrounded them, the men clung 

to their position without food, drinking 

water, or ammunition other than that in 

their belts. To the 89th Division elimination of this position became a "point of 

honor." 40 Three days later a relief column finally broke through to halt the 

vendetta. Two days later the men fought 

their way back to Germeter. Only thirtythree were left. 

That marked the end of the 28th 

Division's participation in the carnage 

around Vossenack and Schmidt. By 13 

November General Hodges had recognized 

the patent impossibility of securing the 

right flank of the VII Corps with this 

battered division and ordered relief. The 

8th Division from the VIII Corps was to 

exchange sectors with General Cota's regiments. By 19 November the relief was 

completed. 

The second attack on Schmidt had 

developed into one of the most costly U.S. 

division actions in the whole of World 

War II. Hardest hit was the infantry 

regiment making the main effort, the 

112th Infantry. This regiment lost 232 

men captured, 43 I missing, 7 19 wounded, 

40 MS A-8g! (Gersdorff). 
374 

I67 killed, and 544 nonbattle casualtiesa total of 2,093. Including these and the 

losses of attached units and of the rest of 

the 28th Division, the second attack on 

Schmidt had cost 6, I 84 casualties. 

American materiel losses included I6 

out of 24 M I 0 tank destroyers and 3 I 

out of 50 medium tanks. Losses in 

trucks, weasels, antitank guns, machine 

guns, mortars, and individual weapons 

were tremendous. Some of this equipment the Germans transported to a training area for study and use less than a 

month later in the Ardennes counteroffensiveY 

During the main phase of the battle 

for Schmidt, between 2 and 8 November, 

the 28th Division took 9 I 3 prisoners and 

inflicted an estimated 2,000 other casualties on the enemy. Although one American source claimed the Germans lost about 

41 Secret order of 8 Nov 44, found in OB 

WEST KTB, Befehle und Meldungen. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

40 tanks, the enemy panzer commander, 

General von Waldenburg, put the losses 

at I5. 42 

Though the men of the 28th Division 

did not know it at the time, the end of 

their experience corresponded roughly 

with the first genuine Allied concern 

about the Roer River Dams. In midNovember, SHAEF became seriously concerned about the dams.43 The First 

Army, nevertheless, was to continue to 

build up downstream from the dams 

before doing anything specific about them. 

42 V Corps Factual Study, V Corps records; 

MS# A-905 (Waldenburg). 

43 Statement by Maj Cen Harold R. Bull, 

SHAEF C-3, in conf with Cen Smith, SHAEF 

CofS, and Cen Bull by ETO Theater Historians, 

copy in OCMH files. This document is undated, but the conference was held in the 

European Theater of Operations in September 

1945. Other than those instances mentioned in 

Chapter XIV, above, SHAEF files contain no 

reference to the Roer River Dams before midNovember. 

PART FIVE 

THE HUERTGEN FOREST 

CHAPTER XVI 

The Big Picture in October 

During the· early days of October, at 

the start of the bitter campaigning near 

Aachen and Schmidt, it had become 

obvious that the halcyon days of pursuit 

had ended. Yet because Allied commanders reckoned the enemy's resurgence 

more a product of transitory Allied 

logistical weakness than of any real 

German strength, they seem to have assumed that a lucky push at the right spot 

still might catapult the Allies to the 

Rhine. 1 

Not until October passed its mid-point, 

a fortnight before the start of the second 

attack on Schmidt, had the full portent of 

the hard fighting at Aachen, in the 

Huertgen Forest, along the Schelde estuary, in the Peel Marshes, and with the 

Third Army at Metz become apparent. 

The Germans had effected a remarkable 

reorganization. This made it imperative 

that General Eisenhower make a new 

decision. How best to pursue the war to 

advantage during the harsh, dreary days 

of poor campaigning weather that soon 

must set in? 

1 For an example of this state of mind, see 

XIX Corps combat interviews for October 1944. 

In A Soldier's Story, page 426, General Bradley 

relates that on 28 September 1944, more than a 

week after the first drives into the West Wall had 

stalled, First Army sent him a bronze bust of 

Hitler with this inscription: "Found in Nazi 

Headquarters, Eupen, Germany [sic]. With 

seven units of fire and one additional division, 

First U.S. Army will deliver the original in thirty 

days." 

As the Supreme Commander met with 

top officers at Brussels on 18 October to 

plan his decision, he faced the fact that 

in the period of slightly more than a month 

-since first patrols had crossed the German border-the most notable advance 

had been that of MARKET-GARDEN, which 

had fallen short of expectations. That 

was the story all along the line. Operations begun in an aura of great expectations usually had ended in bitter dogfights 

and plodding advances not unlike that in 

the Norman hedgerows. 

In the far north, Field Marshal Montgomery's 2 I Army Group, having failed 

with MARKET-GARDEN'S bold thrust to 

turn the north flank of the West Wall and 

sweep to the IJesselmeer, at last had given 

consummate priority to clearing Antwerp's 

seaward approaches. This the British 

commander had done even though it 

meant postponement of his plans to clear 

the western face of the Ruhr by driving 

southeast from Ni jmegen and to eliminate 

the enemy's bridgehead west of the Maas 

in the Peel Marshes. Bright prospects of 

opening Antwerp to Allied shipping had 

ensued. As the situation developed, the 

first cargo ship was not to drop anchor in 

the harbor until 28 November, but no 

one could have known in mid-October 

that the campaign along the Schelde 

would take so long. 

On the northern wing of General Bradley's 12th Army Group next to the 

British, the First Army had registered 
378 

several impressive achievements, including 

penetrations of the West Wall both north 

and south of Aachen. The fall of Aachen 

itself was only a few days off. Yet the 

sobering fact was that after more than a 

month of fighting, the First Army in no 

case had penetrated deeper than twelve 

miles inside Germany. The enemy had 

sealed off both West Wall breaches effectively and in the process had dealt the 

First Army almost 20,000 casualties. 2 

Though the hard-won gains about 

Aachen meant a good jump-off point for 

a renewal of the drive to the Rhine, the 

development in this sector auguring most 

for the future was not in the nature of an 

offensive thrust into the line but of a 

lateral shift in units behind the line. 

General Bradley had decided to introduce 

General Simpson's Ninth Army between 

the First Army and the British in the old 

XIX Corps zone north of Aachen. The 

12th Army Group commander had made 

the decision as early as 9 October, only 

five days after General Simpson's army, 

then containing only one corps of two 

divisions, had arrived from the conquest of 

Brest and assumed responsibility for the 

old V Corps zone in Luxembourg. 3 

Though Ninth Army's commitment in 

Luxembourg thus was to be but a pause 

in transit, General Bradley had not intended it that way. He had hoped that 

the Ninth Army's defense of the lengthy 

but relatively inactive front in the Ardennes might permit his two more experienced armies-the First and Third-to 

achieve greater concentration for renewing 

2 FUSA Rpt, Annex I, Vol. 2, p. 7. 

3 Memo for Rcd, Brig Gen Raymond G. 

Moses (G-4, 12th A Gp), 9 Oct 44, in 12th A 

Gp Supplies, Misc, filed with SHAEF records, 

Folder 79, Drawer 392. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the drive to the Rhine.4 But before the 

Ninth Army could be fleshed out with 

new divisions and accomplish much in 

this direction, Bradley made his decision 

to abandon this plan in favor of moving 

the Ninth Army to the north. General 

Bradley based his decision in part on a 

reluctance to put American troops under 

foreign command, in part on his knowledge of the working methods of the First 

and Ninth Army staffs. During these 

early days of October, while the Ninth 

Army was moving into Luxembourg, 

Bradley had come to believe that General 

Eisenhower would not long resist Field 

Marshal Montgomery's persistent request 

for an American army to strengthen the 

2 I Army Group. Bradley reasoned that 

unless he acted quickly to juxtapose another army next to the British, the arm y 

he would lose would be the First, his 

most experienced army, his former command for which he held much affection, 

and an army whose "know-it-all" headquarters staff was difficult to work with 

unless the higher commander understood 

fully the staff's idiosyncrasies. "You 

couldn't turn over a staff like that 

to Montgomery." 5 "Because Simpson's 

Army was still our greenest," General 

Bradley wrote after the war, "I reasoned 

that it could be the most easily spared. 

Thus rather than leave First Army within 

Monty's reach, I inserted the Ninth Army 

between them." 6 

4 See 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs 9, 25 Sep 44, 

12th A Gp, Rpt of Opns, V, 93-95. 

5 Interv with Bradley, 7 Jun 56. 

G Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 435-37. General Bradley errs in pinning the date of his 

decision to 18 October after the Brussels conference. Moses Memo for Rcd, 9 Oct 44, and 

Sylvan Diary, entry of 10 Oct 44. The Ninth 

Army subsequently was to come under Montgomery's command during the Ardennes campaign (as was the First Army for a brief period) 
THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 

To decide five days after moving an 

army into the center of the line to transfer 

the same army to the north wing during 

the height of a transportation shortage 

might appear at first glance impractical if 

not actually capricious. Yet a closer 

examination would reveal that General 

Bradley never intended to make a physical 

transfer of more than the army headquarters and a few supporting troops. 

Beyond circumventing loss of the First 

Army to the British, the. transfer would in 

effect further Allied concentration north 

of the Ardennes, which was in keeping 

with the Supreme Commander's longexpressed determination to put greatest 

strength there. In addition, to put the 

army that was the logical command for 

absorbing new corps and divisions into the 

line along the American north flank would 

serve to shore up what had been a chronic 

Allied weakness along the boundary between national forces. 

To avoid the complicated physical 

transfer of large bodies of troops and 

supplies, Bradley ordered that the First 

Army take command of the Ninth Army's 

VIII Corps and its divisions, thereby reassuming responsibility for the Ardennes, 

while the Ninth Army took over the XIX 

Corps north of Aachen. By the time 

written orders for the exchange could be 

distributed, the VIII Corps had grown 

from two divisions to four, including the 

veteran 2d, 8th, and 83d Infantry Divisions and the untested 9th Armored DiVISIOn. These were to pass to the First 

Army. Artillery was to be exchanged on 

a caliber-for-caliber basis. Supply stocks 

were to be either exchanged or adjusted 

on paper in future requisitions and allocations. The Ninth Army was to open a 

and to remain under the 21 Army Group to and 

beyond the Rhine. 

379 

new command post at Maastricht on 22 

October, and at noon on that date· the 

paper transfer of corps and supporting 

units was to take place.7 

The commander of this youngest Allied 

army on the Continent was an infantryman with a fatherly devotion to his troops 

after the manner of Bradley and Hodges. 

Even without insignia of rank, Bill Simpson looked the part of a general. His 

rangy, six-foot-four frame would have 

commanded attention even had he not 

kept his head clean-shaven. Having had 

wide combat experience-against the 

Moros in the Philippines, Pancho Villa in 

Mexico, and the Germans in the MeuseArgonne-General Simpson had a healthy 

respect for the assistance machines and 

big guns could give his riflemen. 

Like their commander, most members 

of the Ninth Army general staff were 

infantrymen. The exception was the 

G-2, Col. Charles P. Bixel, a cavalryman 

who had transferred his affection to 

armor. Though the Ninth Army had 

been organized no earlier than 22 May 

1944 and had become operational on the 

Brittany peninsula only on 5 September, 

the commander and staff had worked 

together for a longer period. Both had 

been drawn primarily from the Fourth 

Army in the United States, a training 

command General Simpson had held for 

seven months. The young Chief of Staff, 

Brig. Gen. James E. Moore, had even 

longer association with his commander, 

having come with General Simpson to the 

Fourth Army from a previous command. 

The important G-3 post was held by Col. 

7 Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 

66-68; FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, p. 65, and Annex I, 

Vol. 2, p. 114. 
380 

GENERAL SIMPSON 

Armistead D. Mead, Jr. 8 Under Simson's tutelage, the Ninth Army was to 

mature quickly and to draw from General 

Bradley the compliment that "unlike the 

noisy and bumptious Third and the 

temperamental First," the Ninth Army 

was "uncommonly normal." 9 

Even younger than the Ninth Army 

was the tactical air headquarters which 

was to work closely with General Simpson's command. This was the XXIX 

Tactical Air Command under Brig. Gen. 

8 Other staff members included: Col. George 

A. Millener, Deputy Chief of Staff; Col. Daniel 

H. Hundley, G-I; Col. Roy V. Rickard, G-4; 

and Col. Art B. Miller, Jr., Secretary of the 

General Staff. 

n Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 422. For details on the birth of the Ninth Anny, see 

Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, pages 15-25. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Richard E. Nugent, which was created 

by taking a rib from the other two tactical 

commands in the theater. Activated on 

14 September, the XXIX TAC, for want 

of assigned planes, pilots, and headquarters personnel, had operated through 

September more as a wing than as a 

separate command. The airmen nevertheless had gotten in a few licks at Brest, 

gaining a measure of experience for the 

support to be rendered the Ninth Army 

through the rest of the European campaign.1o 

Elsewhere on the American front during September and early October, German 

resurgence and American logistical limitations had restricted operations as much or 

more than in the northern sector. 

Though the logistical crisis had prompted 

General Eisenhower on 25 September to 

put the Third Army on the defensive, 

General Patton had refused to take the 

blow lying down. Under the guise of 

improving his positions, Patton had managed to concentrate enough ammunition 

and supplies to launch limited attacks in 

the vicinity of Metz. Yet neither General 

Patton's legerdemain in matters of supply 

nor his dexterity in interpreting orders 

from above had permitted a large-scale 

offensive. All of October was to pass 

before the Third Army could hope to 

push far beyond the MoselleY 

South of the Third Army, General 

Devers' 6th Army Group was more independent logistically by virtue of Mediterranean supply lines, yet this force too had 

ground to a halting pace. After crossing 

the upper Moselle in late September and 

10 Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, pp. 

29-30; Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 597: The Ninth Air Force 

and Its Principal Commands in the ETO, Vol. 

IV, Ch. I. 

11 See Cole, The Lorraine Campaign. 
THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 

entering the rugged Vosges Mountains, 

neither General Jean de Lattre de 

Tassigny's 1st French Army nor Lt. Gen. 

Alexander M. Patch's Seventh U.S. Army 

could make major gainsP 

Air Support 

A disturbing aspect of the over-all 

situation was the marked increase of unfavorable flying weather, which severely 

limited effectiveness of the tactical air 

arm. The IX Tactical Air Command, 

for example, was able to fly only two 

thirds as many missions in October as in 

September, and the prospects for November and the winter months were less than 

encouragingY "There's lots of times," 

noted a platoon leader, "when we can't 

move an inch and then the P-47's come 

over and we just walk in almost without 

a shot." 14 When weather drastically 

curtailed the number of times the P-47's 

could come over, this obviously was a 

serious turn of events. 

Weather had a particularly damaging 

effect as long as the crippled ground 

transport situation prevented the airmen 

from moving their bases close to the front 

lines. At the end of September most of 

the bases were far back in northern or 

northwestern France. Not only was time 

in flight wasted, but often the weather at 

the bases differed radically from that over 

the target area, forcing the pilots to return 

home prematurely. By the time transport became available to move the bases, 

heavy autumn rains had set in, making 

bogs of likely airfield sites and requiring 

increased outlay of time and equipment 

12 See Smith, The Riviera to the Rhine. 

13 IX FC and IX TAC, Unit History, Oct 44. 

14 XXIX T AC History, Operation Q. 

381 

for airfield construction. By the end of 

October, most bases of the IX T AC had 

been moved into Belgium, with the greatest concentration in the vicinity of Charleroi and Liege; but airfields even closer to 

the front were needed, particularly after 

the move of the XXIX Tactical Air 

Command with the Ninth Army to MaastrichtY' 

The primary missions of the tactical 

aircraft continued as before: rail-track 

cutting designed to interfere with movement of German reserves; armed reconnaissance and column cover; and close 

support of the ground troops against 

targets like gun positions, troop concentrations, and defended villages. Medium 

bombers of the IX Bombardment Division 

concentrated primarily upon interdicting 

enemy communications by bombing precision targets like road junctions and 

bridges. Though the airmen protested 

that pillboxes were an unprofitable target 

for tactical aircraft, they continued to 

answer ground requests for support 

against the West Wall fortifications. In 

general, the results of the fighter-bomber 

strikes were less spectacular than during 

the days of pursuit; but the workmanlike, 

deliberate effort of the air forces still was 

rewarding. "We could not possibly have 

gotten as far as we did, as fast as we did, 

with as few casualties," said General Collins of the VII Corps, "without the 

wonderful air support that we have 

consistently had." 16 

15 IX FC and IX TAC, Unit History, Oct 44; 

Hq AAF, Office of Asst Chief of Air Staff-3, 

Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in 

the ETO, p. 39. 

16 Operational History of the Ninth Air Force, 

Bk. V, Ground Force Annexes; The Ninth Air 

Force and Its Principal Commands in the ETO, 

Vol. II, Ch. II. 
382 

The differing duties and living conditions of air and ground troops sometimes 

led to misunderstanding, a problem intensified in the wake of short bombing or 

misdirected strafingY For all this, the 

ground troops gradually developed confidence in their air support and a genuine 

appreciation of it. Troops who early in 

the campaign seldom asked for air strikes 

against targets closer than a thousand 

yards from the front lines later were 

naming targets as close as 300 yards. 

For their part, airmen came to appreciate 

the effective protection which artillery 

could provide against enemy flak. 18 To 

help promote mutual understanding, 

teams of pilots and ground officers were 

exchanged for several days at a time to 

share their opposites' living conditions and 

combat hazards. 

A particular weakness of U.S. tactical 

air commands was a lack of night fighters. 

For a long time German troop movements 

after nightfall were virtually unopposed, 

and the Luftwaffe was free to operate 

with impunity. Noting during October 

that German night interceptor attacks 

against hea vy bombers had decreased 

markedly, top air officers made available 

the two P-6 I (Black Widow) night 

fighter squadrons in the theater to the IX 

and XIX (supporting the Third Army) 

Tactical Air Commands. Impressed by 

the accomplishments of the P-6 I 's in this 

role, air officials lamented only that they 

had so few of themY 

In an effort to make the best of the 

17 See, for example, Incoming Msg, IX T AC 

Opns from 28th Div, 9 Nov, IX T AC Opns 

Orders, 9 Nov 44· 

18 The Ninth Air Force and Its Principal 

Commands in the ETO, Vol. II, Ch. II. 

10 Hq AAF, Condensed Analysis of the Ninth 

Air Force in the ETO. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

unfavorable weather, the air commands 

turned more and more to special techniques of "blind bombing." The most 

widely used was the MEW (Mobile Early 

Warning) or SCR-584 radar system, 

whereby forward director posts equipped 

with radio and radar vectored the planes 

to the target area over the overcast, talked 

them into the proper approach, and took 

them down through the overcast directly 

over the target. At this point either the 

pilot himself made final adjustment for 

the attack or the forward director post 

specified the moment of bomb release. 

MEW also was used successfully in night 

control of aircraft. Despite the weather, 

the number of fighter-bomber missions, 

which dropped in October, was to rIse 

again in November and December.20 

An Enigma Named Logistics 

Two of the reasons for only limited 

Allied territorial gains in late September 

and early October were the weather and 

German resurgence. But the real felon 

was the crippled logistical structure which 

still had a long way to go before recovering from the excesses of the pursuit. 

Although commanders all the way up to 

General Eisenhower had been willing to 

defer capture of ports in favor of promised 

lands farther east, the tactical revelers at 

last were being forced to penitence. No 

matter how optimistic the planners or how 

enthusiastic the executors, the logistical 

situation never failed to rear its ugly 

head. October was destined to be the 

worst month in matters of supply the 

20 The Ninth Air Force and Its Principal 

Commands in the ETO, Vol. II, Ch. II, and IX 

TAC Memo 100-57, 12 Apr 45, included in 

annex thereto. 
THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 

Allies were to experience during the campaign on the Continent.21 

Though the bulk of American supplies 

still came in at only two points, Cherbourg and the Normandy beaches, the 

crux of the problem continued to lie less 

in shortage of ports than in limitations of 

transport. How to get supplies from 

Cherbourg and the beaches to a front 

that in the case of the First Army at 

Aachen was more than 500 road miles 

away? The answer obviously had two 

facets: improve the transportation system 

and/or get new ports closer to the fighting 

lines. 

Through all of September and until 

Field Marshal Montgomery in mid-October gave unequivocal priority to opening 

Antwerp, hope of new ports was dim. 

Even capture of Le Havre on 12 September failed to help much, both because 

damage to the harbor was extensive and 

because by this time Le Havre was far 

behind the front. The only hope for the 

moment lay in improvement in the transport situation. That would be a long 

uphill struggle. 

Railway repairmen, air transport pilots, 

truck drivers-all soon were performing 

near miracles. By 10 September sleepyeyed truckers had completed an original 

mission of delivering 82,000 tons of supplies to a point southwest of Paris near 

Chartres and were hauling their loads on 

an extended Red Ball Express route beyond Paris. By the first of October 

repairs on the rail net east and northeast 

of Paris made it possible to transfer truck 

cargoes near Paris to the railways. Yet 

21 Detailed information on logistical matters 

during this period is to be found in Ruppenthal, 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. II. Unless otherwise noted, the logistical story herein is 

drawn from that source. 

383 

not until 16 November was the Red Ball 

Express to halt operations. By that time, 

during a life of eighty-one days, the express 

service would have carried a total of 

4-12,91 3 tons of supplies. 

Many of the trucks borrowed during 

the pursu.it from artillery and antiaircraft 

units had to be returned as the nature of 

the fighting again called for all tactical 

formations at the front. The armIes 

themselves nevertheless continued to augment the trucking resources of the Communications Zone. Because army depots 

still were far behind the line, much army 

transportation went toward bridging the 

gap between the depots and the front. 

First Army, for example, transported supplies from army dumps at Hirson on the 

French-Belgian border until early October, when advancement of rail lines 

brought the dumps to Liege. To obtain 

winter clothing, the 5th Armored Division 

sent its organic trucks all the way to the 

beaches to pick up duffel bags containing 

long underwear and overcoats. To meet a 

crisis in 105-mm. ammunition, the First 

Army on 21 September sent six truck 

companies back to the beaches.22 

Though transport aircraft had made 

major contributions to supply during the 

pursuit, they had been withdrawn from 

this task in order to participate in Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Despite vociferous cries for renewal of an airlift, the 

SHAEF Air Priorities Board ruled this 

means of transport too extravagant for 

large-scale supply movements. Airlift 

gradually came to be restricted to meeting 

emergency requirements, as originally intended. 

In the last analysis, the railways were 

the workhorse of the transportation sys22 FUSA Rpt, Annex 2, Vol. 2, pp. 110-13. 
384 

tem. Engineers, railway construction battalions, and French and Belgian laborers 

worked round the clock to repair lines 

running deep into the army zones. By 

mid-September, although the Allies had 

uncovered almost the entire rail system of 

France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, rail 

lines actually in use were few. In little 

more than a fortnight repairmen opened 

approximately 2,000 miles of single track 

and 2,775 miles of double track. Two 

routes accommodated the First Army, one 

extending as far northeast as Liege and 

another as far as Charleroi, there to 

connect with the other line to Liege. 

For all the diligence of the truckers, the 

airmen, and the railway repairmen, no 

quick solution of the transport problem 

was likely. The minimum maintenance 

requirements for the 12th Army Group 

and supporting air forces already stood in 

mid-September at more than 13,000 tons 

per day and would rise with the commitment of new divisions. In addition, the 

armIes needed between 150,000 and 

180,000 tons of supplies for repair or 

replacement of equipment, replenishment 

of basic loads, rebuilding of reserves, and 

provISIOn of winter clothing. Against 

these requirements, the Communications 

Zone in mid-September could deliver only 

about 11,000 tons per day. Some 4,000 

tons of this had to be split among the 

Ninth Air Force and other special demands. Only 40,000 tons of reserves, 

representing but two days of supply, had 

been moved any farther forward than St. 

La. Temporarily, at least, U.S. forces 

could not be supported at desired scales. 

Tactical operations would have to be 

tailored to the limited means available. 

So tight was the supply situation that 

General Bradley saw no alternative but to 

continue the unpopular system of tonnage 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

allocations instituted at the height of the 

pursuit. On 2 I September Bradley approved an allocation giving 3,500 tons of 

supplies to the Third Army, 700 tons to 

the Ninth Army (which was en route to 

Luxembourg), and the remainder to the 

First Army with the understanding that 

the First Army would receive a minimum 

of 5,000 tons. This was in keeping with 

General Eisenhower's desire to put his 

main weight in the north. A few days 

later, upon transfer of the 7th Armored 

Division from Metz to the Peel Marshes, 

an adjustment in tonnage gave the First 

Army 5,400 tons per day to the Third 

Army's 3,100. The new allocation took 

effect on 27 September, at a time when 

General Hodges had ten divisions to General Patton's eight. 

By careful planning and conservation 

the two armies conceivably could execute 

their assigned missions with these allotments on a day-by-day basis. Yet the 

wildest imagination could not foresee 

accumulation of reserve stocks on this 

kind of diet. The fact that the First 

Army's operations during the latter days 

of September and through October developed more in a series of angry little 

jabs than in one sustained thrust thus 

had a ready explanation. 

Under these circumstances, the armies 

had to confine their requisitions to absolute essentials, for every request without 

exception went against the allocation. 

Even mail ate into assigned tonnage. 

That friction between the armies and the 

Communications Zone would arise under 

these conditions could not have been 

unexpected. The armies were piqued 

particularly by a practice of the Communications Zone of substituting some other 

item, often a nonessential, when temporarily out of a requested item. This 
THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 

practice finally stopped after the Communications Zone adopted a First Army 

recommendation that, when it was out of 

a requisitioned item, tonnage in either 

rations or ammunition be substituted. 

Less easily remedied was a failure of the 

Communications Zone to deliver total 

amounts allocated. From 13 September 

to 20 October, for example, the First 

Army averaged daily receipts of 4,27 I 

tons against an average daily allocation 

of 5,226.23 Only time and over-all improvement in the logistical structure could 

remove this source of contention. 

The Communications Zone, in turn, 

complained about an apparent paradox in 

the supply situation. During the latter 

days of October, supply chiefs noted that 

the armies were improving their reserve 

positions, even though deliveries had increased only slightly, to about I 1,000 

tons daily. By the end of October, 

though serious shortages existed in many 

items, stocks in the combat zone of the 

12th Army Group totaled more than 

155,000 tons. 

That the artnies could accumulate reserves at a time when deliveries averaged 

only I 1,000 tons against stated requirements of 25,000-28,000 could be explained partially by the quiescent state of 

the front; but to the Communications 

Zone it bore out a suspicion that the 

armies were overzealous in their requisitioning. The supply and transport 

services hardly could have let pass without 

question the dire urgency of army demands which listed as "critically short" 

items like barber kits and handkerchiefs. 

The Communications Zone suspected 

the First Army in particular of having 

taken for granted the supply advantage it 

23 Ibid. 

385 

had enjoyed since before the Normandy 

landings. The Third Army appeared to 

accept the supply hardship more graciously, and the Ninth Army, having been born 

in poverty, usually could be counted on to 

limit requests to actual needs. Of the 

three, the First Army was the prima 

donna, a reputation seemingly borne out 

by the army's own admission that the six 

truck companies which returned to the 

beaches for critically needed 105-mm. 

ammunition used some of their cargo 

space for toilet paper and soap.24 Even 

General Bradley, whose esteem for the 

army he formerly commanded was an accepted fact, later termed the FirSt Army 

"temperamental" and deserving of a 

reputation for piracy in supply. "First 

Army contended," General Bradley wrote, 

"that chicanery was part of the business 

of supply just so long as Group [headquarters] did not detect it." 25 

Both the Communications Zone and 

the armies found another supply expedient 

in local procurement. Though the economy and industrial facilities of the 

liberated countries were in poor shape, 

they made important contributions to 

alleviating the logistical crisis. Local procurement provided the First Army particular assistance in relieving shortages in 

spare parts for tanks and other vehicles. 

During October alone, First Army ordnance officers negotiated for a total of 

fifty-nine different items (cylinder head 

gaskets, batteries, split rings, and the 

like).26 

A factory in Paris overhauled radial 

tank engines. Liege manufactured tires 

and tubes and parts for small arms. The 

First Army quartermaster entered into 

24 Ibid., p. 113. 

25 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 422 and 431. 

26 FUSA Rpt, Annex 2, Vol. 2, pp. 114-18. 
386 

contracts for such varied servIces as 

manufacturing BAR belts, assembling 

typewriters, and roasting coffee.27 

No matter what the value of these 

expedients, the very necessity of turning to 

them was indicative of the fact that the 

logistical structure might be frail for a 

long time. In the first place, the shift 

from pursuit to close-in fighting had increased rather than decreased supply 

requirements. Though gasoline demands 

were lower, ammunition needs were higher. 

On 2 October, the day when the XIX 

Corps attacked to penetrate the West 

Wall north of Aachen, General Bradley 

instituted strict rationing of artillery ammumtIOn. A few days later Bradley 

discovered that even at the rationed rate 

of expenditure the armies by 7 November 

would have exhausted every round of 

artillery and 8 I -mm. mortar ammunition 

on the Continent. He had no choice but 

to restrict the armies further. They were 

to use no more ammunition than that 

already in army depots, en route to the 

armies, or on shipping orders. Not until 

the first of November was artillery ammunition to pass out of the critical stage.28 

Maintenance was a major problem. 

With the pause in the pursuit, commanders could assess the damage done to their 

vehicles during the lightninglike dashes 

when maintenance had been a hit-or-miss 

propOSItIOn. As autumn deepened, so 

did the mud to compound the maintenance problem. Depots often had to be 

moved to firmer ground. Continental 

roads, not built for the kind of traffic they 

now had to bear, rapidly deteriorated. 

27 For a detailed study of this subject, see 

Royce L. Thompson, Local Procurement in the 

ETO, D Day to V-E Day, MS in OCMH. 

28 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, VI, 44. General 

Bradley gives a personal view of the situation in 

A Soldier's Story, pages 430-32. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Sharp edges of C Ration tins strewn along 

the roads damaged tires. This and the 

deterioration caused by overloading and 

lack of preventive maintenance quickly 

exhausted theater tire reserves. Lack of 

spare parts put many a vehicle in deadline. 

Through September the First Army 

operated with less than 85 percent of 

authorized strength in medium tanks. To 

achieve an equitable distribution of those 

available and to establish a small reserve, 

the army adopted a provisional Table of 

Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) 

reducing authorized strengths in medium 

tanks. The new T/O&E cut the authorized strengths for old-type armored 

divisions from 232 to 200, for new-type 

divisions from 168 to ISO, and for separate 

tank battalions from 54 to 50. The 

Ninth Army later adopted the same expedient. 

The needs of winterization added greatly to the logistical problem. Transporting 

sleeping bags, blankets, wool underwear, 

overshoes, and overcoats often had to be 

accomplished by emergency airlift. In 

one instance the First Army took advantage of transfer of three DUKW 

companies from the beaches to obtain 

wool underwear and blankets. First 

Army engineers turned to local sawmills 

for more than 19,000,000 board feet of 

lumber needed to meet winter housing 

requirements.29 Not until well into 

November, after the winds had become 

chill and the rains were changing to sleet, 

was the bulk of the winterization program 

met. The 28th Division, for example, 

jumped off on 2 November in the cold 

and mud of the Huertgen Forest with 

only ten to fifteen men per infantry company equipped with overshoes. Through 

29 FUSA Rpt, Annex 2, Vol. 2, pp. 114-18. 
THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 387 

A WINTER OVERCOAT reaches the front lines. 

almost all of November antifreeze for 

vehicles was dangerously limited. 

Further compounding the logistical 

problem was the continuing arrival of new 

units, both new divisions and smaller 

separate units. From the time the first 

patrols crossed into Germany on I I September until General Eisenhower convened his commanders at Brussels on 18 

October, 357,272 more men (exclusive of 

those arriving via-southern France) set foot 

on the Continent. The cumulative total 

rose to 2,525,579.30 In terms of divi~ 

30 SHAEF G-3 Daily Summary 137, 18 Oct 44. 

sions, the Allied logistical structure at 

start of the Siegfried Line Campaign had 

to support 39 divisions. By 18 October 

General Eisenhower commanded 30 infantry, 15 armored, and 2 airborne 

divisions, an increase of 8 for a total of 

47. 31 

Though the 6th Army Group was outside the orbit of the supply services 

31 U.S. divisions : 21 infantry, 9 armored (including 1 French armored division), and 2 

airborne, a total of 32. British and Canadian 

divisions: 9 infantry and 6 armored (including 

1 Polish armored division), a total of 15. 

SHAEF G-3 Daily Summary 134. 
388 

operating from Normandy, General Eisenhower's assumption of command over that 

group had raised total Allied strength 

under SHAEF to 58 divisions. 32 This 

figure was to stand through the res~ of 

October, though 83,206 more men, either 

members of small units or replacements, 

were to arrive. Two more U.S. divisions 

were scheduled to arrive through Normandy soon after the first of November.33 

Tactical commanders naturally chafed 

to get the new divisions into the line; yet 

logistical planners on I I October warned 

General Bradley that for some six to eight 

weeks to come their resources would 

permit support in active combat of no 

more than 20 divisions, the number already committed. The incoming divisions 

would have to stick close to the Normandy 

depots. Though General Bradley did not 

heed this warning, he had to commit the 

divisions one by one, so that their arrival 

failed to produce any immediate marked 

change in the tactical situation. 

Of the new units, I infantry division 

went to the 6th Army Group, another to 

the Ninth Army, I armored and 2 infantry divisions to the Third Army, and I 

armored division to the First Army. The 

2 other new units were the airborne 

divisions which were paying a second visit 

to the Continent via MARKET-GARDEN. 

Of 2 additional divisions which had been 

arriving just as the first patrols crossed 

into Germany, the 94th Division had come 

directly under the 12th Army Group for 

3~ SHAEF G-3 Daily Summary 134. Two 

French armored, 5 French infantry, 3 U.S. 

;nfantry divisions, and I U.S. airborne task force 

of divisional size. 

33 SHAEF G-3 Daily Summary 150. The 

figure on new arrivals is exclusive of the 6th 

Army Group. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

containing bypassed Germans in the lesser 

Brittany ports, and the I04th Division 

had helped the Canadians open Antwerp 

and was soon to go to the First Army. 

Neither of these was included in the 

reckoning of 20 divisions supportable in 

the 12th Army Group. Two other infantry divisions which arrived soon after 

the first of November were split between 

the First and Ninth Armies. The net 

effect of these arrivals on the three armies 

of the 12th Army Group was to provide 3 

additional divisions each for the First and 

Third Armies and 2 for the Ninth. 

The new divisions represented only 

about one third of the new troops that 

had set foot on the Continent since early 

September. The others were in separate 

units-tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, 

and engineer battalions, line of communications units, and the like-or were 

replacements. Many were airmen. Most 

of these men and units had to be transported to the front, and all had to be 

supplied. 

Replacements by this time had high 

priority, for during September and October casualties had risen by 75,542 to a 

cumulative total, exclusive of the 6th 

Army Group, of 300, I I I. Two thirds of 

these were U.S. 10sses.34 Like ammunition at one time in October, replacements 

were a commodity in short supply on the 

Continent. On a series of inspection 

trips down to divisional level during October, General Eisenhower saw at first hand 

the need for replacements, particularly 

riflemen. He appealed to the War DeH SHAEF G-3 Daily Summaries 152 and 153. 

Including casualties of the 6th Army Group, the 

over-all Allied total. at the end of October was 

roughly 332,000. 
THE BIG PICTURE IN OCTOBER 

partment and also directed a rigid combout of men in the Communications Zone 

who might be converted into riflemen. 35 

Not the least of the logistical worries 

was the shift of the Ninth Army into an 

active campaigning role north of Aachen. 

Though General Bradley's "paper transfer" helped, the Ninth Army still had to 

amass reserve supplies before opening a 

major offensive. The logistical pie now 

had to be cut in three big slices. From 

the tonnage allocation of 14 October, for 

example, the Ninth Army drew almost 

5,000 tons, an increase over 8 October of 

3,200.36 

Somewhat paradoxically, even as supply 

forecasts were gloomiest, the black cloud 

which had hung depressingly over the 

logistical horizon actually began to lift. 

35 See Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 

306- 0 7. 

36 12th A Gp, Breakdown of Current Tonnage Allocations, in 12th A Gp, Tonnage, Folder 

89, filed with SHAEF records, Drawer 392. 

389 

During the last few days of October and 

the first week of November, forward de-· 

liveries fell short of the somewhat modest 

requirements set; nevertheless, the armies 

improved their reserve positions. The 

historian who tells the supply story for 

this period finds himself in the role of a 

novelist who leads his reader to believe 

one thing, then switches dramatically but 

incredibly to another. But in the autumn 

of 1944 that was how it was. This was 

clearly apparent from the fact that by the 

end of October, when stocks in the combat zone of the 12th Army Group totaled 

more than 155,000 tons, deliveries still 

were running far under the armies' stated 

requirements. By the end of the first 

week in November, army reserves were to 

reach 188,000 tons. 

The fact was that a relatively quiescent 

front and the extraordinary efforts of the 

supply and transport services at last had 

begun to show effect. The logistical patient had gained a new lease on life. 
CHAPTER XVII 

New Plans To Drive to the Rhine 

On 18 October, as General Eisenhower 

met his command chiefs at Brussels, he 

could only have speculated that the 

logistical situation even without Antwerp 

soon might permit resumption of the 

offensive. But as of 18 October, prospects for early use of Antwerp were bright, 

so bright that General Eisenhower's chief 

of intelligence saw November as the month 

Hitler dreaded most. 1 In any event, a 

commander failing to lay the groundwork 

for a new offensive purely on the basis of 

logistical question marks might one day 

find himself in the role of a foolish virgin 

with no oil in the lamp. 

General Eisenhower and his advisers 

dutifully considered a theory that with 

winter coming on, the best policy might be 

to hold in place, then to launch a final 

victorious offensive in the early spring. 

Three factors tipped the scales against the 

theory: ( I) The enemy's casualties were 

running about 4,000 per day, "or one 

'division' on his new standard every day or 

two, through simple attrition in the line." 

( 2) A winter sit-down would give the 

enemy's new divisions time for detailed 

training and combat blooding, would enable enemy industry to turn out new guns 

and tanks, and would provide time for 

building new concrete cordons about the 

rents in the West Wall. (3) A pause 

might enable the Germans to get their 

jet-fighter production into high gear and 

1 Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 306. 

possibly to discover the prOXImIty fuze, 

with which they might blast Allied bombers from the skies. "We were certain," 

General Eisenhower wrote after the war, 

"that by continuing an unremitting offensive we would, in spite of hardship and 

privation," shorten the war and save 

"thousands" of Allied lives. 2 

This issue decided, the conferees at 

Brussels turned to the task of planning a 

new offensive. 3 In keeping with General 

Eisenhower's "broad front" strategy, the 

first phase was to be a build-up along the 

west bank of the Rhine. General Eisenhower directed that as soon as possible, 

probably between 1 and 5 November, the 

First Army undertake an offensive to gain 

a footing over the Rhine south of Cologne. 

Protecting First Army's left flank, the 

Ninth Army also was to drive to the 

Rhine, then turn northward to assist in 

clearing the region between the Rhine and 

the Maas along the western face of the 

Ruhr. Preoccupied with the vital objective of Antwerp, Field Marshal Montgomery's 21 Army Group was not to 

participate until about 10 November, 

when, upon expected termination of the 

2 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 323; 

SHAEF G-2 Weekly Intel Summary, 15 Oct 44, 

copy in Pogue files; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 

p. 434; Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 306. 

3 Decisions at Brussels are drawn from Memo, 

sub: Decisions reached at Supreme Commander's Conf, 18 Oct 44,' dtd 22 Oct 44, and SCAF 

114, Eisenhower to com drs, 28 Oct 44, both in 

SHAEF SGS 381, II. 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 391 

Antwerp campaign, the Second British 

Army was to drive southeast from 

Nijmegen to meet the Ninth Army. Depending upon the logistical situation, the 

Third Army was to drive northeastward 

from the vicinity of Metz to protect the 

First Army's right flank. In the south 

the 6th Army Group was to resume its 

advance to the Rhine at Strasbourg. 

Upon gaining a foothold beyond the 

Rhine, the 12th Army Group was to 

assume responsibility for encircling the 

Ruhr by sending the Ninth Army north of 

and the First Army south of the Ruhr. 

But this was planning for the long pull. 

Despite some pressure from the home 

front,4 General Eisenhower could not look 

upon the November drive as an end-thewar. offensive, rather as a modest first of 

three phases in new plans to bring the 

Germans to heel. Thinking of the need 

for Antwerp, he could not see build-up 

beyond the Rhine and advance deep into 

Germany except as future operations dependent upon logistical improvements. 

The November offensive was expected 

neither to bring conquest of the Ruhr nor 

to end the war but to attain the more 

modest objective of clearing the Germans 

from the relatively narrow sector remaining west of the Rhine. 5 

Three days after the Brussels conference-on 21 October, the day Aachen 

fell-General Bradley outlined instructions to his three armies for the November 

offensive. He set a target date for the 

First and Ninth Armies of 5 November. 

In anticipation of improvements in the 

supply situation, he directed the Third 

4 See Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 

30 7-0 9. 

5 This attitude is clear from SCAF 114, 28 

Oct 44. 

GENERALS BRADLEY, EISENHOWER, 

AND GEROW making a front-line inspection early in November. 

Army to attack about five days later on 

10 November. 6 

As the target date for the First and 

Ninth Armies approached, Field Marshal 

Montgomery proposed a change in the 

British role. He acted in deference to the 

enemy's re-entrant bridgehead west of the 

Maas, the strength of which was demonstrated by the spoiling attack in late 

October in the Peel Marshes. Rather 

than a delayed attack southeast from 

Ni jmegen that would involve risk to the 

British flank and rear from the re-entrant 

bridgehead, Montgomery suggested that 

the Second Army begin immediately to 

clear the Peel Marshes, then develop later 

operations east of the Maas close alongG 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs ·10, 21 Oct 44, with 

amendments, 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, V, 97-

102. 
392 

side the Ninth Army's left flank. This 

was the decision behind the British attack 

in the Peel Marshes which began on 14 

November. 7 

In the meantime, it had become clear 

that neither the 104th Division from the 

Antwerp fight nor the 7th Armored Division from the Peel Marshes would be 

returned in time to meet the American 

target date of 5 November. Ostensibly 

because the First and Ninth Armies 

needed these two divisions before jump-off, 

but also because of the support a British 

drive close along the Ninth Army's left 

flank would provide, General Bradley set 

back the target date to IoN ovember. 

Even this date was subject to the 

weather; for Bradley intended to ensure 

success of the new drive with a saturation 

air bombardment. 8 

Still hopeful of getting at least a part of 

the drive going quickly, General Bradley 

turned on 2 November to the Third Army. 

Could the Third Army begin the offensive 

alone? General Patton answered with 

customary alacrity that he could attack on 

twenty-four-hour notice. The two commanders agreed that the Third Army 

should attack as soon as weather permitted the air forces to soften up the 

enemy, but in any event, not later than 8 

November. 9 So it was that the Third 

Army, after waiting in vain three days 

for good weather, was to strike the first 

blow of the offensive on 8 November in a 

driving rain. 

7 2 I A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-534, 2 

Nov 44, 12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, II. 

B Memo by Brig Gen A. Franklin Kibler 

( 12th A Gp G-3 ) , sub: Change of Plans, I 

Nov 44, 12th A Gp 371.3, Military Objectives, II. 

9TUSA Dairy, 2 and 5' Nov 44, as cited in 

Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 30 I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

German Resurgence and Deception 

The Allies hardly could have hoped to 

achieve strategic surprise with the November offensive; it was betrayed by its very 

logicality. After the fall of Aachen, the 

Germans were bound to know that the 

Allies soon would launch the offensive for 

which they had been setting the stage so 

meticulously for several weeks. 10 

Whether the Germans could be ready 

to meet the new offensive was another 

question. Certainly the Germans in November were better qualified to execute a 

steadfast defense than they had been, say, 

in mid-September when with little more 

than a coup de main the Americans might 

have taken Aachen. Nowhere had the 

Germans better demonstrated their resurgence than at Aachen itself in October. 

This remarkable resurgence the Germans hailed as the "Miracle of the West," 

in remembrance of, and answer to, World 

War 1's Miracle of the Marne. Much 

credit for it belonged to one able, energetic, and fanatical soldier: Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model; but the basic 

explanation for it rested in one simple 

truth: contrary to almost universal belief, 

Germany had not reached the peak of 

war production until the fall of 1944 and 

still retained a considerable pool of manpower. 

For all the Allied bombs, Germany's 

war industry in the fall of 1944 felt critical 

shortages only in oil and communica10 This is obvious from almost all German 

records of the period. See in particular Entry 

of 4 Nov, OKW/WFSt, KTB Ausarbeitung, der 

Westen I.IV.-I6.XII.44,MS # B-034 (Schramm). 

For details on this period from the German 

side, see Lucian Heichler, The Third Battle of 

Aachen-The German Situation III MidNovember 1944, MS prepared in OCMH to 

complement this volume. 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 393 

tions.ll Low as manpower reserves were 

after five years of war, the Germans still 

were able to mobilize waves of new divisions. They filled them by replacing 

more men in factories and farms with 

women and foreign slave labor, by lowering physical standards, by systematically 

combing out the Navy, Luftwaffe, and 

rear echelon units, and by extending both 

ends of the induction spectrum. During 

the second half of 1944, the skeletons of 

some 35 burned out divisions were refitted 

and returned to the front as the new 

volks grenadier divisions. The Replacement Army furnished 15 more, so that by 

the end of the year 50 volks grenadier 

divisions had reached either the Eastern 

or Western Fronts. 12 Albeit the caliber 

and . training of the replacements left 

something to be desired, the Germans 

were much like the giant Antaeus who 

regained his strength whenever he touched 

his mother earth. 

The most remarkable facet of the resurgence was not that the Germans found 

men and guns to fill the line but that 

coincidentally they mobilized a separate 

force eminently stronger and capable of 

offensive action. For three monthsfrom 16 September to 16 December 1944 

-the Germans planned and prepared for 

the great counteroffensive to be launched 

in the Ardennes. While the fight raged 

about Aachen and on the approaches to 

the Roer River, some thirty divisions were 

massed behind the Roer and in the Eifel, 

ammunition and fuel were stockpiled, and 

new volks artillery corps and V olks-werfer 

11 Charles V. P. von Luttichau, The Ardennes 

Offensive, Germany's Situation in the Fall of 

1944, Part II, The Economic Situation, MS in 

OCMH. 

12 MS # P-06Sb, The Yolks Grenadier Division and the Volkssturm (Generalmajor a.D. 

Hellmuth Reinhardt). 

brigades were assembled. Of the titan tic 

German mobilization and production effort for the West, the lion's share went to 

the build-up for the counteroffensive. 

All forces and materiel set aside for the 

Ardennes were designated OKW Reserves. 

No one, not even the Commander in Chief 

West, had any power to employ them 

without Hitler's authorization, though as 

the target date approached a few of the 

volks grenadier divisions were to be used 

in a kind of round robin of temporary 

reliefs so that some units long in the line 

might be refitted. The only contingents 

which, by Hitler's permission, might be 

used for any extended period were some 

of the volks artillery corps and V olkswerfer brigades. Any analysis of the 

enemy's defensive achievement during the 

fall of 1944 must be made in the light of 

these facts. 

While awaiting the Allied blow, the 

Germans cleverly utilized their foreknowledge that an Allied offensive was bound 

to come as a cover for their own preparations for the Ardennes counteroffensive. 

Lest the secret of the counteroffensive 

reach Allied ears, the Germans intended to 

conceal it from almost everyone on their 

own side below the rank of army group 

commander. Not even German army 

commanders were trusted with knowledge 

of the counteroffensive until late in the 

planning. 

To justify to friend and foe alike the 

massing of men and materiel, the Germans 

pointed to the imminent Allied offensive. 

Almost all moves were justified in the 

first paragraph of the order by "the anticipated enemy offensive." Indeed, the 

historian often finds it difficult to determine which moves were bona fide measures 

against the Allied blow, which concerned 

only the Ardennes counteroffensive, and 
394 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

which concerned both. When the Sixth 

Panzer Army> for example, earmarked for 

the counteroffensive, was ordered to mass 

near Cologne, the following entry appeared 

in the OB WEST War Diary: " ... there 

can be no doubt that the enemy will 

commit maximum strength and maximum 

materiel to force the breakthrough to the 

Rhine. . Our own defensive measures 

must be attuned to this . . .. Hence 

the Commander-in-Chief WEST will order 

the transfer of Sixth Panzer Army to the 

OB WEST theater on 7 November. ... " 13 

That the Ardennes counteroffensive remained a secret was to be demonstrated 

by American surprise when it began. As 

to the deception in regard to the Sixth 

Panzer Army, the Americans swallowed it 

wholeheartedly. While unaware at first 

of the existence of a panzer army per se, 

they perceived as early as 1 I November 

that the Germans were resting and refitting a panzer reserve of at least five 

divisions. On the eve of the November 

offensive the 12th Army Group G-2 saw 

in the disposition of the panzer and panzer grenadier divisions "the key to the 

enemy's essential capabilities and intentions. " Through November and until 

mid-December, both this intelligence officer and his opposite numbers at headquarters of the First and Ninth Armies 

expected the panzer reserve to be used to 

counterattack either west or east of the 

Roer.14 

In another German move truth and 

deception walked hand in hand. This 

was a shift on 23 October of Headquarters 

Fifth Panzer Army (General von ManteufU DB WEST KTB, 6 Nov 44. 

14 12th A Gp Weekly Int~l Summary 14 for 

week ending I I Nov, dtd 13 Nov, 12th A Gp 

0-2 AAR, Nov 44 ; subsequent 12th A Gp rpts 

until mid-Dec. See also G-2 Estimates of the 

First and Ninth Armies for the period. 

GENERAL VON MANTEUFFEL 

fel) from Army Group G to Army Group 

B. Like the Ninth U.S. Army, the Fifth 

Panzer Army brought no combat troops 

along and also moved to the vicinity of 

Aachen. The army entered the line between the First Parachute and Seventh 

Armies and assumed command of two 

corps already committed, the XII SS 

Corps and LXXXI Corps. Thus, two 

days after the fall of Aachen, General 

Brandenberger's Seventh Army ceased to 

be responsible for this sector and retained 

control only of the mountainous forest 

region of the Eifel. 15 

Adjustment of the Seventh Army's front 

was overdue, for it had become too long 

and the number of corps and divisions too 

large for one army headquarters to control 

15 Mng Sitrep, DB WEST to DKW/ WFSt, 23 

Oct 44, DB WEST KTB, Anlagen, Befehle und 

Meldungen. 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 395 

efficiently. Also, a panzer army was 

needed in the Aachen sector to face the 

coming Allied blow. The Fifth Panzer 

Army did effective work in preparing the 

sector for defense, but paradoxically, because of the deception program for the 

Ardennes, the army fought against the 

November offensive in name only. 

In a grand deception maneuver, H eadquarters Fifth Panzer Army was disengaged secretly on 15 November. Equally 

secretly, Headquarters Fifteenth Army 

(General von Zangen) arrived from Holland to take over the sector, the troops, 

and even the name of its predecessor. 

The Fifteenth Army's alias became 

Gruppe von Manteuffel. So that, in turn, 

the Allies in western Holland would not 

spot the absence of the Fifteenth Army, 

headquarters of the Armed Forces Commander Netherlands (General Christiansen), which took over the sector, called 

itself Fifteenth Army. To complete the 

deception game, Headquarters Fifth Panzer Army, after moving east of the Roer to 

prepare for the Ardennes fight, hid behind 

the innocuous name of Military Police 

Command for SPecial Assignment (Feldjaegerkommando z.h. V.) .16 

A parallel, though not so intricate, 

adjustment took place on the army group 

level. Bearing responsibility for most of 

the German front in the West-from 

Antwerp nearly to the Franco-German 

border-and controlling four armiesFifteenth, First Parachute, Fifth Panzer, 

160B WEST KTB, IS Nov 44; OB WEST 

KTB, Anlagen, Angriff H. Gr. "B". 16 Dez. 44, 

24.X.-3I.XII.44. Vol. I, V (Planning Papers); 

MS # A-8S7, Questions for CG Fifth Panzer 

Army, Statement made by PW LD 918 Gen von 

Manteuffel (Manteuffel). Greater detail on this 

deception maneuver may be found in Charles 

V. P. von Luttichau, The Ardennes Offensive, 

Planning and Preparations, MS in OCMH. 

and Seventh-Field Marshal Model's 

Army Group B also was to command the 

Ardennes counteroffensive. It was imperative that Model be relieved of some of 

his burdens. Hitler therefore decided to 

commit a third army group headquarters 

in the West. This was Army Group H, 

to be headed by General Student, commander of the First Parachute Army. 

On 10 November Army Group H assumed 

command of the First Parachute and 

Fifteenth Armies. In geographical terms, 

the lineup of army groups then was as 

follows: Army Group H under Student 

held Holland, Army Group B under 

Model defended those portions of Germany bordering on Belgium and Luxembourg, and Army Group G under General 

der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck continued to hold in Alsace and LorraineP 

Model's Army Group B now commanded two armies: Fifth Panzer under 

Manteuffel and Seventh under Brandenberger. The army group's northern boundary ran south of Roermond, thus 

corresponding roughly to the boundary 

between the Americans and the British. 

The southern boundary remained unchanged, in effect a prolongation of the 

boundary between the First and Third 

U.S. Armies. Within Army Group B, 

the boundary between the Fifth Panzer 

and Seventh Armies cut through the 

northern edge of the Huertgen Forest. 

Thus the Fifth Panzer Army (later to be 

relieved by the Fifteenth Army under an 

assumed name) faced the Ninth U.S. 

Army and part of the VII Corps of the 

First U.S. Army. The Seventh Army 

confronted the rest of the VII Corps, plus 

17 Order, OB WEST ·to all subordinate commands, 2 Nov 44, OB WEST KTB, Anlagen, 

Befehle und M eldungen. 
396 

the V and VIII Corps of the First U.S. 

ArmyY 

One trenchant fact about German improvement in the Aachen sector as the 

enemy awaited the November offensive 

stood out above all others. This was the 

intrinsic and potential strength of the 

Fifth Panzer Army in artillery. For once 

the Germans had reasonable complements 

of divisional artillery and "somewhat 

above average" amounts of ammunition. 

Artillery of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, for example, was fully motorized. 

The division had 24 105-mm. and 13 

150-mm. howitzers, 7 150-mm. rocket 

launchers, 2 loo-mm. cannon, 2 command 

tanks, I I 88-mm. antiaircraft guns, and 

35 assault guns. Although a portion of 

these weapons were in either short-term 

or long-term repair, the bulk was on hand, 

and almost all were to see service in some 

phase of the November fighting. 19 

Both corps of the Fifth Panzer Army 

had considerable forces of GHQ and corps 

artillery. The LXXXI Corps, for example, controlled an artillery regiment of 

varied but effective pieces: 2 24o-mm. 

railway guns, 9 French 220-mm. howitzers, 2 240-mm. guns, 24 76.2-mm. 

fortress antitank guns, and a few fully 

motorized Russian 152-mm. howitzers. 

The same corps also controlled a battalion 

18 OKH / Kriegswissenschaftliche Abteilung: 

Kampf um Aachen/Kampf um Metz: a coIlection of dated situation maps (hereafter cited as 

Kampf um Aachen: Maps). 

19 Strength Rpts, 15 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps, 

Ila/b KTB Anlagen, 2o.X-30.xI.44; LXXXI 

Corps, Ia KTB Anlagen, Kriegsgliederungen, 

22.x-3I.XIl.44; LXXXI Corps, Ia KTB Anlagen, Art.-Lage u. Art.-Gliederungen, I I.X.-

1B.XIl.44 (hereafter cited as LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Art.-Lage u. Art.-Gliederungen); LXXXI 

Corps Ia KTB Anlagen, Wochenmeldungen, 22. 

IX.-3I.XII.44; LXXXI Corps Ia KTB Anlagen, 

Zustandsberichte, 10.X-17.XII.44; Kampf um 

Aachen: Maps. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

of 14 Russian 12 2-mm. howitzers. Both 

corps had one of the new volks artillery 

corps and one of the V olks-werfer brigades. The volks artillery corps consisted 

of from 50 to 100 pieces, including guns 

and howitzers ranging from 75-mm. to 

210-mm., and were fully motorized. The 

V olks-werfer brigades had four firing battalions equipped in part with 150-mm. 

rocket projectors, in part with 2 lo-mm. or 

280-mm. projectors. Several tank and assault gun units were available under army 

control to supplement artillery of either or 

both corps.20 

This was the artillery strength before 

the Allied offensive began. In comparison 

to the number of pieces which the Germans would be using at the height of the 

offensive, it was only a beginning. In late 

November the Fifth Panzer Army (known 

then as Gruppe von M anteuffel) would 

be employing an estimated 1,000 artillery 

pieces, including antiaircraft guns used 

against ground targets. The guns were 

well directed, their positions so well concealed that they incurred little damage 

from either counterbattery fires or air 

attacks. The ammunition situation was 

satisfactory. For once the Germans were 

capable of laying down really massive 

fires. 21 

Not only in artillery but also in frontline divisions the Fifth Panzer Army was 

to gain greater strength after the November offensive began. The biggest addition 

20 LXXXI Corps Arty Sit as of 10 Nov 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Art.-Lage u. Art.-Gliederungen; LXXXI Corps KTB, Zustandsberichte; 

Kampf um Aachen: Maps; MS # B-290, Das 

XII. SS-Korps (7.bzw 15.Armee, H eeresgruppe 

B) westlich und an der Roer vom 20.X.1944-3I. 

1.1945 (General der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt) : MS # P-06Sb (Reinhardt); and 

MS # A-994 (Koechling). 

21 See, in particular, MS # T-122 (Zimmerman et al.), IlLS. 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 397 

was the number one OB WEST reserve 

and fire brigade, the XLVII Panzer Corps 

(General von Luettwitz), which in late 

October had launched the spoiling attack 

in the Peel Marshes but which was to have 

pulled back by the time the Allied offensive began. The corps still contained the 

two divisions which fought in the Peel 

Marshes, the 15th Panzer Grenadier and 

9th Panzer Divisions. Together these two 

divisions could muster 66 tanks, 4 I assault 

guns, 65 105-mm. and 150-mm. howitzers, and numbers of other lesser armored 

vehicles. 22 

Of particular import for the November 

fighting was the value of the Aachen 

sector to the Germans in terms of their 

plans and preparations for a counteroffensive in the Ardennes. When first informed of Hitler's plans, the Commander 

in Chief West, Rundstedt, had lamented 

that in case the Allies launched largescale attacks at Metz and Aachen, the 

counteroffensive would have to be called 

off. Hitler would entertain no such idea. 

On 9 November he instructed OB WEST 

to hold the line without committing a 

single unit earmarked for the Big Offensive, even if that meant losing some terrain. In subsequent discussions about 

which terrain might be relinquished with 

least impunity, it was decreed that holding 

in the Aachen sector was paramount. 

The Allies must not be allowed to cross 

the Roer River. In particular, the Germans were to maintain "at all cost" 

bridgeheads west of the Roer at Juelich 

and Dueren.23 

22 Strength Rpts, I Nov 44, XLVII pz Corps 

O. Qu., KTB Anlagen, Einzelbefehle, 17.x.-I8. 

XI.44 (hereafter cited as XLVII pz Corps O. 

Qu. KTB Einzelbefehle); Kampf um Aachen: 

Maps. 

23 Luttichau, The Strategic Situation, citing 

OB WEST KTB (Text) for Sep-Nov 44. 

First Army Plans 

On the Allied side, the army that was 

to carry the main burden of the new 

drive-General Hodges' First U.S. Army 

-also was stronger than before, though in 

no such ratio as displayed by the enemy. 

Two new divisions, the 99th and 104th, 

had been assigned to the V and VII 

Corps, respectively. This brought the 

army total within three corps (V, VII, 

and VIII) to three armored and nine 

infantry divisions. In addition, the army 

included a high number of nondivisional 

units, among them: I separate infantry 

battalion, I ranger infantry battalion, 30 

antiaircraft artillery battalions, 10 tank 

battalions (9 medium, I light), 12 tank 

destroyer battalions, approximately 40 

field artillery battalions, 6 cavalry reconnaissance squadrons, 4 engineer combat 

groups, 12 engineer combat battalions, 

and numbers of miscellaneous engineer 

and service units. As compared with a 

total strength in early September at the 

start of the Siegfried Line Campaign of 

256,351 men, the First Army now had 

318,422. Yet despite this gain, the First 

Army through the latter half of the Siegfried Line Campaign, as in the first half, 

would find its responsibilities too great to 

permit the luxury of more than a nominal 

army reserve. 24 

Except for men of the 28th Division, 

most troops of the First Army were basically rested. Although life in a front-line 

position was far from ideal under any 

conditions, the hardships of a relatively 

quiet period in no way compared with the 

24 12th A Gp G-I Daily Summary, I I Nov, 

12th A Gp G-I Daily Summaries file, Nov 44; 

FUSA G-I Daily Summaries, 12 Sep and I I 

Nov 44; FUSA Rpt, Annexes I, 5, 6, and 7, Vol. 

2; FUSA AAR, Nov 44; V Corps Opns in the 

ETO, p. 326. 
398 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

REST PERIOD BEHIND THE LINES 

rigors of a sustained attack. Displaying 

sometimes amazing ingenuity, the men 

scrounged material and equipment from 

damaged buildings to provide a measure 

of creature comforts for the foxhole or 

dugout. A wooden door covered by a 

shelter half, for example, was infinitely 

preferable to no roof at all. Wherever 

possible, divisions rotated battalions in the 

line to give as many men as possible a 

night or two in a dry place a few hundred 

yards behind the front. Most regiments 

maintained shower points close to the 

front, run on the order of an assembly line, 

where a dirty man entered one end of a 

tent or converted building and came out 

the other end clean. Division, corps, and 

army rest centers in cities beyond normal 

artillery range, like Verviers, Liege, and 

Maastricht, in time managed to accommodate almost every forward soldier with 

a forty-eight-hour rest, complete with 

bath, bed, movies, usa shows, and 

doughnuts and coffee dispensed from a 

Red Cross Clubmobile. A lucky few got 

to Paris. Post exchange supplies and 

cigarettes-the latter issued free to combat 

troops-became more plentiful. Quartermaster bakeries increased the issue of 

fresh bread, and company kitchens in 

most cases found time and shelter for 

preparing the relatively palatable B Ration. 

After almost two months of campaigning since the first patrol crossed the Ger-
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 399 

man border, the First Army's front line 

now ran from a point slightly northeast of 

Aachen near Wuerselen southeast through 

Stolberg to Schevenhuette, thence through 

the Huertgen Forest to Germeter and 

Vossenack, thence across the Monschau 

Corridor to Camp d'Elsenborn and on 

generally southward along the Schnee 

Eifel and the Luxembourg frontier to the 

Franco-Luxembourgian border. Though 

this front embraced approximately 120 

miles, about 80 of it belonged to the 

newly arrived VIII Corps for which no 

immediate offensive was contemplated.23 

General Hodges had concentrated the 

bulk of his strength in the V and VII 

Corps zones from Camp d' Elsenborn to 

Wuerselen, a distance of about 40 miles. 

The northernmost corps, General Collins' VII Corps, was General Hodges' 

choice for executing the army's main 

effort. The VII Corps was located in the 

foothills of the Eifel and along the fringe 

of the Roer plain with forward lines 

pointed along the most direct route northeast to Cologne. Hodges told Collins to 

plan a drive on Cologne. He also alerted 

General Gerow's V Corps and General 

Middleton's VIII Corps to be prepared to 

complement any VII Corps breakthrough 

by driving on Bonn and Koblenz, respectively.2G The V Corps also was to 

execute the preliminary operation to 

assure a firm right flank for the main 

effort by establishing a line along the 

headwaters of the Roer River. This was 

the disastrous second attack on Schmidt 

hy the 28th Division. 

"5 On 8 November VIII Corps relinquished 

approximately twenty miles on its southern wing 

as the 83d Division passed to "operational control" of the Third Army, but the arrangement 

lasted only four days. See 83d Div AAR, Nov 44. 

"6 FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, p. 67. 

General Hodges issued his order directing the VII Corps to make the main 

effort at a time when the target date 

still stood at 5 November. Even at this 

time-late October-doubt existed about 

availability by the target date of the I04th 

Division.27 General Hodges told the VII 

Corps to prepare two plans, one based on 

a target date of 5 November and a strength 

of but three divisions, another based on a 

target date between 10 and 15 November 

and the services of a fourth division, the 

lo4th. 

The two plans as developed by General 

Collins and his staff proved to be little 

different except in strength and in position 

of various divisions within the line. Both 

plans were predicated upon the objective 

of seizing crossings of the Roer-at the 

closest point, not quite seven miles awaywhereupon supplemental orders were to be 

issued for renewing the drive across the 

Cologne plain to the Rhine. Both plans 

also named the same three initial objectives as prerequisites for breaking the 

German containment of the VII Corps 

West Wall penetration and reaching the 

Roer. (Map VJ)These were: (1) the 

Eschweiler-W eisweiler industrial area 

northeast of Stolberg, capture of which 

would spell access to a more open portion 

of the Roer plain and firm contact with 

the Ninth Army on the north; ( 2) the 

Hamich ridge, one of the more prominent 

terrain features along a sixteen-mile corps 

front and one that denied egress from the 

Stolberg Corridor between the industrial 

complex and the Huertgen Forest (that 

is, the Wenau Forest); and (3) in the 

south of the corps zone, the long-sought 

Huertgen-Kleinhau-Gey road net, cap-

"7 For a time, it looked' as if the First Army 

would get the 84th Division instead of the I04th. 

The 84th eventually went to the Ninth Army. 
400 

ture of which would end the miserable 

confinement within the Huertgen Forest.28 

After General Hodges heard from 

General Bradley on I November of the 

decision to postpone the offensive five 

days, he notified General Collins that he 

sanctioned the VII Corps Plan No.2. 

This involved four instead of three divisions. The target date was 10 November 

with a deadline date of IS November.29 

In the meantime, the 28th Division of the 

V Corps was getting set to launch the 

preliminary operation against Schmidt on 

2 November, regardless of the weather. 

In the days preceding the new target 

date of 10 November, while the 28th 

Division was fighting it out at Vossenack 

and Schmidt, General Collins regrouped 

his divisions. Inexperienced in combat except for brief commitment near Antwerp, 

the incoming I04th Division was to relieve 

the I st Division on the corps left wing 

northwest of Stolberg. The veteran 1St 

Division then was to move to the center 

of the corps zone to carry the weight of 

the corps main effort. Discovering three 

days before the target date that the 104th 

Division would not arrive in time for this 

regrouping, the First Army G-3, General 

Thorson, recommended another postponement of twenty-four hours. General 

Hodges concurred. As finally determined, 

the First Army was to attack on I I 

November or the first day thereafter that 

weather permitted large-scale air support. 

The deadline date was I 6 November. 30 

28 Operation Plan VII Corps, 23 Oct 44, dtd 

27 Oct, VII Corps G-3 FO file, Oct 44. 

29 Msg, CG FUSA to CG VII Corps, FUSA 

G-3 Jnl file, Nov 44. Though undated, this 

message obviously was sent on 1 November. 

30 Memo CG FUSA for Thorson, 7 Nov, 

FUSA G-3 Ltrs and Inds file, Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Ninth Army Plans 

The extent of the Ninth Army's participation in the early phase of the new 

offensive was inevitably tied up with the 

army's growing pains. When General 

Simpson received the assignment to attack 

to the Rhine along the First Army's north 

flank, his headquarters only recently had 

moved north to Maastricht. In addition 

to perplexing problems of supply, he 

faced a shortage of combat units. 

Though two corps headquarters and six 

divisions were assigned to the Ninth Army, 

only one corps (the XIX) and three 

divisions were available for operations. 

Recently arrived from a Normandy staging area, the XIII Corps under Maj. 

Gen. Alv~n C. Gillem, Jr., had no troopS.31 

Of three divisions technically assigned to 

the Ninth Army that might have been 

attached to the XIII Corps, the I04th 

Division was destined to go to the First 

Army, the 7th Armored Division still was 

with the British, and the 102d Division 

lacked organic transport and artillery. 

The only tangible force the Ninth Army 

could muster was General McLain's veteran XIX Corps, controlling the I 13th 

Cavalry Group and the 2d Armored, 29th, 

and 30th Divisions.32 

31 Like the commander of the Ninth Army's 

other corps, General Gillem had risen from the 

ranks. Between wars he attended the usual staff 

colleges, served as an instructor at Fort Benning, 

Ga., and commanded both infantry and armored 

units. After the start of World War II, his early 

important posts included command of the Desert 

Training Center in California and later the 

Armored Force at Fort Knox. He trained the 

XIII Corps after assuming command in December, 1943. 

32 Unless otherwise noted, the story of Ninth 

Army planning is based upon Ninth United 

States Army Operations, Vol. IV, Offensive in. 

November, part of a mimeographed series prepared by the 4th Information and Historical 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 401 

Though the Ninth Army's frontage in 

the projected direction of attack was only 

about eleven miles, General Simpson had 

inherited from the First Army the old 

conundrum of what to do about an 

exposed north flank stretching some 

seventeen miles from the Maas River to 

the West Wall at Geilenkirchen. Defending this flank was eating up the 

services of a cavalry group and a division. 

As the advance progressed northeastward, 

the length of the exposed flank would 

grow proportionately. 

While the target date for the new offensive stood at 5 November, General Simpson's only hope for solving this problem 

was in obtaining at least one more division 

which he could put with his cavalry under 

the XIII Corps to defend the flank. But 

the chance of getting another division by 

5 November looked slim. Hope of using 

-either the 7th Armored, I04th, or I02d 

Division appeared doubtful, as did a 

possibility that a new unit earmarked for 

the Ninth Army, the 84th Division, might 

arrive in time. 

Concerned with the exposed flank and 

the threat to it inherent in enemy strength 

in the region of the Peel Marshes west of 

the Maas, General Simpson well may have 

played a role in General Bradley's decision 

to postpone the offensive until 10 November. He was present at Eindhoven on 3 I 

October when, in conference with Field 

Marshal Montgomery, Bradley made the 

decision.33 The Ninth Army clearly 

stood to benefit by postponement. Should 

the British clear the Peel Marshes, their 

Service and filed with official Ninth Army 

records (hereafter cited as NUSA Opns, Vol. 

IV), and upon Conquer-The Story of Ninth 

Army, pp. 71-85. Another useful source is the 

Ferriss Notes, described in Ch. VI. 

33 NUSA Opns, IV, 2. 

first order of business, a defin~te threat to 

the Ninth Army's rear would be eliminated. Should the British then execute 

their second assignment, which was to 

"develop offensive operations" on their 

right wing "in conformity with the advance" of the Ninth Army,34 the exposed 

left flank would be taken care of. Even 

should the British be delayed in attacking 

alongside the Ninth Army, Montgomery 

had promised that on or about 15 November he would assume responsibility for the 

seventeen-mile line east of the Maas. 

Another advantage to the Ninth Army in 

delaying the offensive was the time provided for the 7th Armored Divi"ion and 

the rear echelon of the I 02d Division to 

a;rive. The 84th Division also might 

make it. 

Even a superficial glance at the terrain 

in front of the Ninth Army as opposed to 

that facing the First Army would raise 

the question of why the First instead of 

the Ninth drew the role of "main effort" 

in the November offensive. The answer, 

as recalled after the war by the army 

group commander, General Bradley, had 

two facets. "You don't," General Bradley said, "make your main effort with 

your 'exterior' force." Because the extent 

~f British participation in the offensive 

was tied up with British problems of 

reorganization and manpower, it appeared 

doubtful that the British on the left could 

lend genuine assistance to the drive. The 

Ninth Army thus became in effect an 

"exterior" force. In addition, the First 

Army's staff and troops represented the 

more experienced American force. The 

Ninth Army, still involved during the early 

days of November in assembling sufficient 

34 2 I A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-534, 

2 Nov 44. 
402 

divisions to make the attack, was "relatively untried." 3~ 

On 4 November General Simpson issued a caveat to his two corps. With the 

I 13th Cavalry Group and the I02d Division, General Gillem's new XIII Corps 

was to occupy the seventeen-mile defensive 

line· on the army's north flank until 

relieved by the British. Upon arrival, 

both the 7th Armored and 84th Divisions 

were to go to the XIII Corps. Upon 

relief by the British, the XIII Corps was 

to be prepared to drive northeast along 

the left of the XIX Corps to the Rhine. 36 

Making the Army's main effort, General 

McLain's XIX Corps was to prepare 

plans for seizing a bridgehead over the 

Roer River at Juelich. In line with the 

mission of protecting the First Army's 

left flank, General McLain was to make 

his main effort close alongside the First 

Army. 

General Simpson's plans had an obvious 

bug in them from the start. What to do 

about the West Wall crossroads village of 

Geilenkirchen? Without this village-a 

logical base for enemy counterattackSimpson would have to funnel his army 

and subsequently support it through a 

narrow gap little more than ten miles 

wide between Wuerselen and Geilenkirchen. (Map VII) Yet taking it involved a special problem, for when the 

British assumed control of the seventeenmile line west of Geilenkirchen, the village 

would lie virtually astride a new boundary 

between national forces. The solution 

eventually was to be found in help from 

the British. 

In planning for the main drive to the 

Roer, General Simpson and his corps 

33Intervs with Gen Bradley, 7 Jun 56, and 

Gen Thorson, 12 Sep 56. 

36 NUSA Ltr of Instrs 7, 4 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

commanders focused their attention on the 

river at J uelich and a few miles down-· 

stream at Linnich. From the bridgehead 

through the West Wall-some nine miles 

wide and as much as six miles deep-the 

XIX Corps was to attack on D Day. 

After the British had relieved the XIII 

Corps and after the XIX Corps had 

uncovered sufficient ground along its left 

flank between Geilenkirchen and the Roer, 

the XII I Corps was to be committed 

along the left of the XIX Corps to seize a 

Roer bridgehead at Linnich. 

With but one corps of either- the Ninth 

or First Army scheduled to participate at 

the start of the new offensive, the force 

directly involved in the first phase thus 

was to be considerably less powerful than 

a superficial glance might indicate. 

Whereas two armies were involved, little 

more than a third of the combat strength 

of the two actually was to attack on 

D Day. Nevertheless, this was to be the 

biggest drive in the Aachen sector since 

position warfare had begun in September. 

In the south, the Third Army's attack on 

8 November and a complementary drive 

by the 6th Army Group would contribute 

to the over-all effect, while in the Peel 

Marshes the British were to be engaged in 

a limited offensive. 

By 8 November arrival of additional 

units had started to provide the Ninth 

Army more ready muscle for its part in 

the November offensive. Indeed, the narrow zone between the Maas and the West 

Wall became a hive of activity. More 

than one traffic control officer must have 

torn his hair as rain fell almost perpetually, roads began to break down, and still 

the troops and trucks churned about. 

Controlling the I 13th Cavalry Group 

and the complete I02d ·Division, General 

Gillem's XIII Corps on 8 November took 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 403 

over defense of the seventeen-mile line 

west of Geilenkirchen. The next day, 9 

November, General Horrocks began moving his 30 Corps headquarters and a 

British infantry division into the area as 

prelude to relief of the XIII Corps. At 

least thirty-three field artillery battalions, 

not counting either divisional units or the 

British, sought firing positions. The bulk 

of the 84th Division began to close to 

await its baptism of fire. Having been 

released by the British after fighting in 

the Peel Marshes, the 7th Armored Division began to occupy a reserve position 

while resting and refitting. Supply trucks 

rolling to and from the front compounded 

traffic problems. To add a final touch, 

the I04th Division en route to the First 

Army from Antwerp was cutting across 

the Ninth Army's rear lines of communication. 

Faced with this deluge of troops, the 

Ninth Army staff hardly could have been 

other than elated to learn of another 

postponement of twenty-four hours. General Simpson readily agreed to the new 

target date of I I November. 

Operation QUEEN 

To ensure success of the new offensive 

-indeed, in the hope of creating a sea of 

sterile rubble through which the ground 

forces might effect a swift breakthrough to 

the Roer-General Bradley requested air 

support of unprecedented magnitude. All 

types of planes-heavies, mediums, and 

fighter-bombers, both American and British-were to participate.37 

37 Unless otherwise noted, the air plan is 

drawn from the following sources: Ninth Air 

Force, Summary of Air Plan, 7 Nov 44, NUSA 

G-3 Jnl file, I-II Nov 44; FUSA, Air Support, 

Annex 4 to FO 12, 8 Nov, VII Corps Admin 

After close co-ordination in early planning, top air commanders and representatives of the ground forces met on 

7 November at Ninth Air Force headquarters to discuss and approve a final 

plan. Out of this conference emerged a 

blueprint for Operation QUEEN, "the 

largest air-ground cooperative effort yet 

undertaken . . . ." 38 

Because weather at this season was the 

great imponderable, the conferees prepared three different plans: one for 

fighter-bombers in event only tactical 

aircraft could operate, another for fighters 

and mediums, and a third for all threefighters, mediums, and heavies. Should 

adverse weather prevent any type of aircraft from operating between the target 

date of I I November and the deadline 

date of I6 November, the attack would 

begin on I6 November without air support. 

The alternate programs for fighters and 

for fighters and mediums were, in effect, 

but variations of the main plan for all 

three types of planes. Under this most 

comprehensive plan, the bulk of the air 

effort was to be centered in front of the 

First Army's VII Corps in keeping with 

the emphasis of the ground plan. Three 

divisions (more than I,200 planes) of 

Eighth Air Force heavy bombers were to 

concentrate on destroying personnel and 

field installations in two major target 

areas: the Eschweiler-W eisweiler ind ustrial complex and the LangerweheJuengersdorf area, an urban obstacle at 

the northeastern tip of the Wenau Forest 

and FO file, Nov 44; FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, pp. 

73-74; Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, 

pp. 80-81; NUSA Opns, IV, 34; and Craven 

and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, 

pp. 63 1-3 2. 

38 Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, pp. 631-32. 
404 

lying squarely astride the projected route 

of the VII Corps main effort. 

While this use of heavy bombers represented a radical departure from the norm, 

it had ample precedent in several missions 

flown earlier in support of British and 

Canadian ground troops and in the "carpet" bombing preceding American' breakout from Normandy. The assault troops 

in Normandy had been only 1,200 yards 

behind the bomb line, whereas in Operation QUEEN the heavies were to drop 

their loads no closer to the forward troops 

than three times that distance. Though 

the setting of this interval was obviously 

due to the disaster that short bombing 

had produced in Normandy, some wondered whether the ground troops could 

advance across the two-mile interval quickly enough to capitalize on the shock effect 

of the bombs. 

An equal number of heavy bombers 

(more than 1,200) from the Royal Air 

Force Bomber Command was to attack 

Dueren, J uelich, and Heinsberg, the latter 

a communications center north of the 

Ninth Army zone. In contrast to the 

American heavies, which were to employ 

fragmentation bombs for maximum effect 

against personnel and minimum cratering 

in areas through which the ground troops 

would have to pass early in the attack, 

the British bombers were to seek complete 

destruction of the three target cities in 

hope of blocking roads and intersections. 

A portion of eleven groups ( approximately 600 planes) of Ninth Air Force 

medium bombers drew a similar mission 

of devastating the towns of Linnich and 

Aldenhoven in the Ninth Army zone. 

The rest of the mediums were to concentrate on personnel and field installations in 

front of the First Army. The target areas 

were around three villages representing 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

likely sites for enemy command posts and 

local reserves: Luchem, Echtz, and Mariaweiler. 

In general, the fighter-bombers were to 

operate on call from the ground troops 

upon targets of opportunity, although 

some squadrons were to perform normal 

tasks of column cover and reconnaissance. 

Employing four groups ( about 300 

planes), the XXIX Tactical Air Command was to support the Ninth Army. 

The First Army's old ally, the IX T AC, 

was to employ three groups (about 225 

planes) in direct support of the VII Corps 

and three other groups on general missions throughout the First Army zone. 

Although most fighter-bombers would 

have no predesignated targets, those three 

groups in direct support of the VII Corps 

were to hit three specific target areas. 

These were: the Huertgen-Kleinhau sector on the VII Corps right wing; the 

southeastern end of the Hamich ridge 

near the village of Hamich; and a built-up 

area around the villages of Hastenrath 

and Scherpenseel in the center of the VII 

Corps zone. 

The total fighter-bomber force numbered some 750 planes. In addition, 800 

American and British fighters were to fly 

escort for the heavy bombers. Other 

Eighth Air Force fighters were to escort 

the mediums. 

Thus, for Operation QUEEN, World 

War II's largest air attack in direct 

support of ground troops, the Allied air 

forces were to employ more than 4,500 

planes, approximately half of them heavy 

bombers.39 Though the bombing was 

3U The largest up to this time was Operation 

GOODWOOD, a strike by 1,676 heavies and 343 

mediums and lights with 7,700 tons of bombs in 

support of the Second .British Army near Caen 

on 18 July. The largest in support of American 

troops was along the St. Lo-Periers road in 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 405 

not to be as concentrated as that in 

Normandy, both air and ground commanders expected it to disrupt enemy 

communications thoroughly and certainly 

to disorganize enemy front-line units and 

immediate reserves. 

A major question facing the air-ground 

planners was who should be responsible 

for designating the specific D Day within 

the allotted target period of 1 1 - 16 N 0-

vember. With alternate though less attractive air plans available, they also had 

to consider what circumstances were to 

guide this commander in settling or not 

settling for one of the alternate plans, that 

is, for less effective air support. Early in 

the target period, for example, whoever 

was to make the decision might bow to a 

fear that better weather or weather even 

as good might not be forthcoming. Having settled, then, for a day permitting 

only limited support, he might see the 

ground attack bog down for want of 

heavier air support and a day or so later 

watch in vexation as the sun began to 

shine. On the other hand, should one 

pass up weather permitting minor support 

on the gamble that weather favoring a 

full-scale air effort might arrive by the 

deadline date? The ground attack had 

to go off on 16 November regardless of 

Normandy where 1,495 heavy bombers and 338 

fighter-bombers dropped 4,790 tons of bombs. 

Another large-scale bombing was in support of 

the First Canadian Army the night of 7 August 

when 1,450 planes dropped 5,2 IO tons of bombs. 

See Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford LeighMallory, Air Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, "Despatch, Air Operations 

by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in N. W. 

Europe," Nov 44, found in Fourth Supplement 

to The London Gazette (December 31, 1946), 

dtd 2 Jan 47. The story of early uses of heavy 

bombers in this role in the European theater and 

of the Normandy bombing may be found in 

Biumenson, Breakout and Pursuit. 

the weather. Rain and fog on the last day 

would mean no air support at all. 

In making their decision, the planners 

leaned toward compromise. During the 

first three days of the target period, responsibility for designating D Day fell to 

the top American airman in the European 

theater, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, who obviously understood fully the weather 

requirements of his big bombers. Thus, 

in effect, the planners were to gamble 

during half the target period on an all-ornothing basis. During the last three days, 

if the attack had not begun, designation 

of D Day was to be up to the First Army's 

General Hodges. Thus the decision during the period of greatest gamble would 

rest with the ground commander who had 

most at stake. 

In either event, decision would have to 

be made before 2200 the night before D 

Day in order that both air and ground 

commanders might get their complex machines into gear. H Hour was to depend 

upon the time required to execute the 

bombing program, but in order that 

ground troops might have sufficient daylight in which to exploit the bombing and 

then consolidate, H Hour was not to be 

later than 1400. 

Recalling the catastrophe short bombing had wrought in Normandy, the 

planners developed an elaborate safety 

program in addition to designating a 

bomb line for the heavy bombers two 

miles in front of the troops. Two giant 

white panel markers were to be placed in 

rear of the First Army's lines to guide the 

pilots toward target areas. One panel 

was to be approximately nineteen miles 

in rear of the front line near Liege, the 

other about two miles behind the line near 

Aachen. At about the same distance 

from the front as the second panel, eleven 
406 

captive balloons borrowed from the British 

were to be flown in line parallel to the 

front at about 2,060 feet altitude. Five 

hundred yards in rear of forward ground 

positions, troops were to display a row of 

bright-hued panels, four per mile. Sixtyfour go-mm. antiaircraft guns within 

both the First and Ninth Armies were to 

fire red flak to mark the actual forward 

ground positions. The Eighth Air Force 

was to establish a series of beacons and 

buncher beacons close to the lines and a 

radio fan marker to transmit a thin 

vertical signal over the row of balloons. 

Bomb bays were to be opened and locked 

while over the English Channel to avoid 

damage should bombs be released accidentally in the process. To protect the 

bombers themselves, both First and Ninth 

Army artillery units were to fire a comprehensive counterflak program planned 

in close relation to incoming and outgoing 

flight routes. If elaborate precautions 

could do the trick, ground troops in 

Operation QUEEN need fear no repetition 

of the mishap in Normandy. 

The Roer River Dams 

and the Weather 

Continuing a weather pattern that 

since the start of the second attack on 

Schmidt on 2 November had been plaguing the 28th Division, leaden skies on II 

November made it evident that the big 

November offensive would not begin that 

day. Already rain far in excess of normal 

had fallen. Roads had deteriorated, 

streams were approaching flood levels, and 

the ground was such a morass that grave 

doubts were arising about traffic ability 

for armor. In long-range meteorological 

forecasts the commanders could find little 

of comfort. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Almost coincident with increasing concern over weather, another threat to the 

new offensive had festered and grown in 

the minds of American commanders so 

that by I I November it could not be 

ignored. This was a growing realization 

of the defensive importance to the Germans of the Roer River Dams. On 2 g 

October, before the 28th Division had 

jumped off for Schmidt, General Hodges 

had noted, "Present plans of this Army 

do not contemplate the immediate capture of these dams." 40 But on 7 

November, after the violent German reaction to the 28th Division's attack, General Hodges had directed the V Corps 

commander to prepare a plan for use "in 

the event First Army is ordered to 

capture" the damsY Four days later, 

faced with the hard facts that if all went 

well American troops soon might be east 

of the Roer River and subject to whatever 

plan the Germans might have for blowing 

the dams and flooding the Roer valley, the 

Americans adopted a more realistic attitude toward the dams. Apparently acting on orders from General Bradley, both 

General Hodges and Simpson on I I N 0-

vember told their respective armies: 

"Troops will not-repeat-not advance 

beyond line of Roer (Rur) River except 

on Army order." 42 

This restriction did not foreshadow any 

major change of plan for the new offensive 

other than a possible pause at the Roer. 

As soon as weather permitted, the First 

40 Ltr, FUSA to 12th A Gp, 29 Oct, FUSA 

G-3 Ltrs and Inds file, Oct 44. 

41 Memo, FUSA for V Corps, Plans for Future 

Operations, V Corps, 7 Nov, V Corps G-3 FO 

file, Nov 44. 

42 Msg, Col Akers (G-3 Sec FUSA) to CGs 

V and VII Corps dtd 1237, II Nov, FUSA G-3 

Jnl file, Nov 44.: Conquer-The Story of Ninth 

Army, p. 85. 
NEW PLANS TO DRIVE TO THE RHINE 407 

and Ninth Armies were to attack as 

scheduled, though in the end they might 

have to wait impotently downstream 

while someone made a belated attack to 

take the dams. 

In regard to weather, the day of II 

November passed with no sign of a break. 

Again on 12 November, and the next day, 

and the next, the ground troops and 

their commanders anxiously scanned the 

skies. No perceptible change appeared in . 

the overcast. By nightfall of 15 N ovember they could hope only for something 

close to a miracle to break the weather 

pattern so that full burden of the attack 

would not fall on the ground forces. For 

on 16 November, the ground troops were 

to attack, air support or not. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

VII Corps Makes the Main Effort 

Designating the VII Corps as the main 

effort of the First Army added fire support for the corps but did nothing to 

erase the difficult terrain which the corps 

would have to cross before reaching the 

open plain leading to the Roer. On the 

north wing lay the Eschweiler-Weisweilcr 

industrial complex; in the center, the 

Hamich ridge; and on the south wing, a 

part of the Huertgen Forest which had 

been penetrated hardly at alP (See Map 

VI.) 

The forest and the industrial area---the 

latter a kind of obtuse triangle whose 

sides were the long-held front line from 

Wuerselen to Stolberg, the boundary with 

the Ninth Army, and the course of the 

little Inde River-clearly ruled out the 

end" of the line for making the main effort 

within the corps. To General Allen's 

104th Division fell the task of clearing the 

triangle; to General Barton's 4th Division, 

which had been transferred from the V 

Corps, went the assignment within the 

forest. General Barton first had to push 

through the forest to the road net about 

the villages of Huertgen, Kleinhau, Grosshau, and Gey, then had to continue 

northeastward to the Roer at Dueren. 

Attached to the 4th Division to assist in 

taking Huertgen, key village of the four, 

1 The planning story is based mainly on VII 

Corps FO 12, 8 Nov 44, VII Corps Admin and 

FO file, Nov 44. 

was the 5th Armored Division's CCR, also 

moved up from the V Corps.2 

The only logical spot for the main effort 

thus was in the center of the corps zone 

opposite the Hamich ridge, even though 

the ridge line blocked the northeastern 

exit of the Stolberg Corridor from the 

edge of the industrial triangle at Nothberg 

to the forest at Hamich. The assignment 

fell to General Huebner's 1st Division. 

The division also would encounter the 

northernmost fringes of the Huertgen Forest, including the last vestiges of the Eifel 

heights, and the twin industrial towns of 

Langerwehe and Juengersdorf. Only after clearing these towns would the 

division gain the relatively open plain, 

whereupon its regiments were to spread 

northeastward all across the northern half 

of the corps zone and drive a few remaining miles to the Roer north of Dueren. If 

by this time the 104th Division had 

not finished clearing the Eschweiler-

'Veisweiler industrial triangle, the corps 

cavalry and a regiment of the I st Division 

were to block off the triangle at it'> eastern 

extremity along the line of the Inde River. 

To ensure success of the main effort in 

the early stages, General Collins gave 

General Huebner the 47th Infantry, 

which had remained at Schevenhuette 

when in October its parent 9th Division 

2 VII Corps Opns Memo 116, 10 Nov 44, VII 

Corps Opns Memo file. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 409 

had gone to the V Corps. The 47th Infantry first was to take Gressenich, 

thereby opening a road serving the 1st 

Division's attack, and then was to assist in 

reducing the Hamich ridge. Buttressing 

the 1st Division's attack further, a 

combat command of the 3d Armored 

Division was to finish clearing the Stolberg 

Corridor by driving to the little Omer 

River at the base of the Hamich ridge, 

taking four villages in the process-Werth, 

Koettenich, Scherpenseel, and Hastenrath. 

The combat command thus was to serve 

in opening stages of the attack as a bridge 

between the I st and 104th Divisions. 

The I04th Division in turn also was to 

assist the corps main effort by making its 

divisional main effort at first on its right 

wing alongside the armor. This involved 

clearing a forested sector about two miles 

wide, the only major portion of the 104th 

Division zone that lay south of the Inde 

River. 

A combination of General Collins' 

scheme of maneuver and of features of 

terrain, particularly the meandering course 

of the Inde, in effect dictated a geographical divorce between that part of the 

VII Corps north of the river and the 

bulk of the corps to the south. Most of 

the corps was to fight either within the 

Huertgen Forest or in that region between 

the forest and the Inde where the wooded 

highlands reluctantly give way to the 

Roer plain. Geographically speaking, 

those troops north of the Inde were more 

properly a part of the battle of the Roer 

plain. The unit to be divided by this 

divorce was the I04th Division. Indeed, 

the fact that a division on the inner wing 

of the Ninth Army also had an assignment 

of clearing an industrial triangle along the 

army boundary might mean that the 

I04th Division would be inclined to the 

north tactically as well as geographically. 

In any event, the force assembled under 

General Collins for the main effort of the 

November offensive was impressive. General Collins had 3 divisions and an extra 

regiment of infantry, I division and an 

extra combat command of armor, plus I 

cavalry group. On D Day 9 infantry 

regiments and I combat command were to 

attack. In support of the VII Corps 

attack alone were more than 300 tank 

and tank destroyer pieces and a total of 

32 battalions of field artillery. The big 

guns were to commence fire an hour 

before jump-off. If the weather cleared, 

the greatest air armada ever assembled in 

direct support of a ground operation was 

to pave the way on a two-army front. 

The three top American commanders 

most directly involved in the big push, 

Generals Collins, Hodges, and Bradley, 

were optimistic about it. For the ebullient Collins, this perhaps was not surprising, but the usually more restrained 

Hodges and Bradley were almost as 

enthusiastic. To at least one observer, 

General Bradley gave the impression that 

he believed this might be "the last big 

offensive necessary to bring Germany to 

her knees." 3 

The State of the LXXXI Corps 

By this time the VII Corps G-2, 

Colonel Carter, had acquired a measure of 

respect for German resurgence and tended 

to temper his estimates of enemy weakness. Nevertheless, he could not conceal 

the fact that the enemy opposite the VII 

Corps was no Goliath. The ratio of attacker to defender was almost 5 to I. 

3 Sylvan Diary, entry of 16 Nov 44. See also 

entries of 25 Oct and 9 Nov 44. 
410 

Only the possibility already expressed by 

the 12th Army Group that the Germans 

might employ part of the panzer reserve 

they were assembling west of the Rhine 

to counterattack gave the intelligence officer any real pause.4 

Six weeks of holding a fairly static line 

had provided a reasonably accurate estimate of the enemy's order of battle at 

corps and division levels. General Koechling's LXXXI C01·PS, which controlled 

most of the front opposite the VII Corps, 

had three divisions. Farthest north, beyond the sector of the VII Corps, opposite 

the Ninth U.S. Army, was the 246th 

Volks Grenadier Division, resurrected 

from the ruins of Aachen after the melodramatic surrender of Colonel Wikk. In 

the center, northwest of Stolberg, generally 

astride the U.S. interarmy boundary, was 

the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, which 

had intervened unsuccessfully at Aachen. 

In the Stolberg Corridor and the northern 

fringes of the Huertgen Forest was the 

12th V olks Grenadier Division, which had 

arrived in the nick of time during the 

West Wall breakthrough in September. 

The sector deep within the Huertgen 

Forest opposite the right wing of the VII 

Corps was held by the Seventh Army's 

275th Division. 

To have expected American intelligence 

before the November offensive to divine 

the intricate German deception maneuver 

practiced with the Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth Armies would have been asking too 

much; for the Germans made the move 

only on the eve of the American attack. 

As it was, the Americans before the 

jump-off had not even discovered that the 

Fifth Panzer Army had taken over the 

line between the First Parachute and 

• See Annex 2 to VII Corps FO 12, Il Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Seventh Armies. They still thought the 

XII SS and LXXXI Corps to be under 

command of the Seventh Army.5 

After arriving in the Aachen sector in 

mid-October, General von Manteuffel and 

his staff of the Fifth Panzer Army had 

organized a comprehensive digging program involving the troops, some men of 

the Organization T odt, boys of the Hitler 

Youth, and the civilian population. Extensive mine fields were sown, both in 

front of the main line and on approaches 

to second, third, and fourth lines of defense. Agreements were reached with the 

Seventh Army in regard to controlling the 

level of the Roer River by means of the 

Roer River Dams.6 During the three 

weeks in which the Fifth Panzer Army 

commanded the Aachen sector, it organized an impressive battle position, 

complete with several lines of defense, 

co-ordinated artillery positions, barbed 

wire entanglements, mine fields, and antitank obstacles. 

By the time Manteuffel relinquished 

command on 15 November to the Fifteenth Army's General von Zangen, the 

sector had been accorded the army group 

reserve, the XLVII Panzer Corps. Thus, 

when Zangen assumed command under 

the alias of Gruppe von M anteuffel, he 

controlled two corps on line and an 

armored corps in reserve. 

The divisions opposite the VII Corps 

in General Koechling's LXXXI Corps had 

been shored up with personnel and materiel replacements since the battle of 

Aachen. The 3d Panzer Grenadier DiVlswn ( General Denkert) had about 

I 1,000 men and was assigned the combat 

rating of "suitable for unlimited defensive 

5 FUSA G-2 Estimate 35, 12 Nov 44, copy 

found in I04th Div G-2 Jnl file, 14 Nov 44· 

6 MS # A-857 (Manteuffel). 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 411 

missions." The 12th Volks Grenadier Division (General Engel) had but 6,38 I 

men but was rated higher because of 

morale and training. The 12th Division 

was rated capable of limited offensive 

operations. The 246th Division, which 

was opposite the Ninth Army, was rated 

lowest of the lot. 

The 12th and 246th Divisions had, 

besides an artillery regiment, the usual 

three regiments of infantry with two 

battalions each and a tank destroyer and 

engineer battalion each. The 3d Panzer 

Grenadier had two armored infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and a tank 

battalion equipped primarily with assault 

guns. 

The three artillery regiments possessed 

a total of 66 I05-mm. and 31 I5o-mm. 

howitzers, plus 3 I other pieces ranging 

from 75-mm. cannon to I22-mm. Russian 

howitzers. The three tank destroyer battalions, plus the so-called heavy tank battalion, had 54 assault guns, I I 88-mm. 

guns, and 45 other antitank pieces of 

lesser calibers. 7 

Having been chosen to participate in 

the Ardennes counteroffensive, the 12th 

V olks Grenadier Division was earmarked 

for relief by a new unit, the 47th V olks 

Grenadier Division. American intelligence had noted the impending arrival 

of this division but did not know its 

identification, role, or destination. IS 

Commanded by Generalleutnant Max 

Bork, the 47th Division had drawn 

roughly half its men from the Luftwaffe 

7 LXXXI Corps Arty Sit as of IO Nov 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Art.-Lage u. Art.-Cliederungen; LXXXI Corps KTB, Zustandsberichte; 

Kampf um Aachen: Maps; MSS # B-290 

(Blumentritt), # P-065b (Reinhardt), and # A994 (Koechling). 

8 See FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 157, 14 Nov, 1st 

Div G-2 file, 15-18 Nov 44. 

and the Navy, the other half from new 

levies of 17- and I8-year-olds sprinkled 

with a few veterans of the Russian front. 

Contrary to usual territorial organizational procedures, the 47th was made up 

of men from all parts of Germany. 

Though weapons and materiel assigned to 

the division were new and modern, the 

crippled German transportation system 

had delayed their arrival at the division's 

trammg site. The artillerymen, for example, had but one week with their pieces 

before commitment near Aachen, and 

antitank weapons failed to arrive until 

the November offensive was well under 

way. The infantry had about six weeks' 

training.9 

Preliminary Bombardment 

To the American troops who pondered 

the skies, preparations for the November 

offensive had all the earmarks of breakout 

after the manner of Normandy. Yet 

spirits could not but fall as day after day 

dawned with rain and overcast. As night 

came on 15 November, all was in readiness except the weather. Farther south, 

the 28th Division was stumbling off the 

stage, having completed its tragic role in 

the drama of the Huertgen Forest. Now, 

air support or not, the main show was to 

go on. Shortly after midnight the First 

Army's General Hodges gave the word. 

D Day was 16 November. H Hour was 

1245. 

Dawn on 16 November brought slight 

encouragement. It looked like another 

day of ragged clouds, overcast, and mists; 

o Order, OB WEST to A Cp B, 2245, 5 Nov 

44, in OB WEST KTB, Anlagen, Befehle und 

Meldungen; MS # B-602, Generalleutnant Max 

Bork, Die 47. V olksgrenadierDivision im Westen 

(V.C.D.) 
412 

but by midmorning even the least optimistic among the sun worshipers of the First 

and Ninth Armies could hope for a 

miracle. The clouds were thinning. By 

1 100 a ceiling of broken clouds hovered 

about 1,000 to 1,500 feet over the target 

area. Above 8,000 feet visibility was 

from one to two miles in light fog. 10 

Steadily the weather improved. The day 

was not one for lounging in the sun, but 

planes could operate. At 1 130 the first 

of the big bombers in Operation QCEEX 

droned overhead.l1 

In contrast to the weather miracle over 

the target area, fog clung assiduously 

about some heavy bomber and fighter 

bases in England and about almost all 

medium and fighter-bomber bases on the 

Continent. :Many pl.anes could not take 

off. Nevertheless, I, I 9 I Eighth Air Force 

heavy bombers arrived and dropped 4,120 

tons' of fragmentation bombs within the 

Eschweiler-'Yeisweiler industrial triangle 

and on Langerwehe. A total of 1,188 

heavies of the RAF Bomber Command 

unloaded 5,640 tons of bombs on Dueren, 

Juelich, and Heinsberg. Almost half this 

tonnage fell on Dueren. Only 80 medi10 FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, p. 74. 

11 Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT 

to V-E Da)', page 632, points out that statistical 

data on Operation QUEEN \'ary so widely in 

"mious operations reports and special studies 

"as to preclude reconciliation." The author 

has leaned heavily upon the conclusions in this 

source and on a contemporary ground report, 

Summary of· Operations for 16 Nov 44. found 

in FUSA G-3 Tac file. 16-17 Nov 44. For 

results of the air strike, the historian has depended upon contemporary ground records, German sources. and three special reports: ( 1 ) 

FUSA, Effects of Our Air Attacks of November 

16. 20-21 :'<ov 44; (2) :\USA, Operation "Q." 

A Study in Air Support, 23 Jan 45; and (3) 

Annex 2 to FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 165, 22 Nov 44. 

The Enemy's View of Our Air Support on 16 

November. All in FUSA G-2 Tac file, 21-22 

Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

urn bombers of the Ninth Air Force 

reached the scene to drop 150 tons of 

bombs on Eschweiler and 1\.vo small towns 

deeper in the VII Corps zone. :\lmost 

a thousand fighters flying escort flushed 

only four enemy aircraft, and these did 

not attack. 

:\" with the medium bombers, fog at 

the bases severely crimped operations of 

both the IX and XXIX Tactical A.ir 

Commands. Throughout the day fighterbombers of the XXIX TAC in support 

of the Ninth Army flev,. but 136 sorties 

and dropped but 46,5 tons of bombs. 

The IX TAC did somewhat better in the 

VII Corps zone with 8 missions, 2 12 

sorties, and 140.5 tons of bombs. In 

addition to armed reconnaissance in support of the 1 st and I04th Divisions, the 

fighter-bombers flew several missions at 

the request of ground control and struck 

two of the preplan ned target areas, the 

Hamich ridge and the Huertgen-Gey 

sector. 

Meager and generally ineffective antiaircraft fire claimed 12 planes, 4 of them 

fighter-bombers, 8 heavy bombers. One 

other fighter-bomber cracked up m an 

accident. 

If judged solely by the safety of the 

ground troops during the bombing, the 

elaborate precautions taken to ensure accuracy paid off. Yet the safety plan was 

not entirely foolproof. One man was 

killed and two wounded in a field artillery 

unit of the 3d Armored Division when 

four bombs apparently released by a 

fault\' bomb release mechanism fell near a 

gun 'POSItIon. A P-38 later dive-bombed 

this same artillery unit but caused no 

casualties. 12 The 1St Division reported 

five instances of stray bombs falling near 

'" 391st Armd FA Bn, AAR. Nov 44; 3d Armd 

Div AAR. Nov 44. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 413 

its troops but noted only one casualty. 

One bomb exploded within 150 yards of 

the division artillery command post, and 

another knocked the wings off a liaison 

plane and destroyed the runway at the 

division artillery airfield. IS Yet if these 

were the sole losses among friendly troops, 

the margin of error was indeed small for a 

fleet of 4,000 heavy and medium bombers, 

fighter-bombers, and escort fighters which 

unloaded a total of more than 10,000 tons 

of bombs through a mask of haze and 

cloud. 

It was hard to say just how effective the 

bombing was. Since the bomb line was 

far in front of friendly troops, few of the 

enemy's forward units were hit hard, and 

most that were had been holding this front 

for so long that they had substantial 

cover close at hand. Prisoners from two 

forward regiments of the 12th Division, 

for example, estimated casualties no higher 

than I to 3 percent. Another group of 

prisoners reported that only one bomb fell 

in Langerwehe, one of the principal targets, though areas near Langerwehe were 

damaged severely.14 No indication developed of any overwhelming psychological 

impact like that in Normandy. "It 

should be noted," the First Army remarked later, "that the most forward of 

the enemy targets were 4,000 yards from 

our front line and that the target frontage 

in the zone of the First Army was approximately 9 miles wide. These facts prevent 

any comparison being made between this 

attack and the breakthrough at St. La." 15 

13 1St Div G-3 Per Rpt 164, 16 Nov, 1St Div 

G-2 file, 15-18 Nov 44; 26th Inf S-3 Jnl, 16 

Nov 44. 

14 1st Div G-2 Per Rpt 152, 18 Nov, 1st Div 

G-2 file, 15-18 Nov 44. 

15 FUSA AAR, Nov 44. 

The effect upon enemy communications 

was another matter. The consensus of' 

fifteen prisoners from the 12th Division 

was that "communication with the command echelons to the rear was impossible." 16 "I tried to use the telephone," 

one German said, "but the line had been 

cut by the bombardment and it was 

obviously too late to send one of my 

messengers back." 17 Other prisoners reported lack of warm food for days because 

the bombardment had knocked out kitchens, supply vehicles, and horses. 

American air commanders admitted 

that the bombing did not measure up to 

expectations. The airmen blamed clouds, 

haze, smoke, and snow that obscured 

many targets, plus reluctance of many 

bombardiers to bomb short. Nevertheless, 

the airmen said, the destruction wrought 

was "enormous." Juelich, they claimed, 

was "almost completely destroyed"; results in Dueren and Eschweiler were 

"similar." 18 Most air headquarters said 

the real trouble was the wide safety margin 

which enabled the Germans to recover 

before the ground attack reached them.19 

Most ground echelons agreed that the 

bombing failed to soften German lines as 

much as expected, though the First Army 

noted that resistance at first was not so 

strong as it was several hours later. 

"Damage to his artillery installations must 

have been great," the First Army said, 

16 FUSA PWI Rpt, Ind 4 to VII Corps G-3 

Per Rpt 167, 19 Nov, VII Corps G-3 Jnl file, 

20 Nov 44. 

17 Annex 2 to FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 165, 22 

Nov 44. 

18 Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 632, citing 8th AF and IX 

and XXIX T AC summaries and opns rpts. 

19 See, for example, the Ninth Air Force and 

Its Principal Commands in' the ETO, Vol. I, 

Ch. II. 
414 

"for throughout [the day of 16 November] comparatively light [ artillery] fire 

was received." 20 About eight batteries 

plus some single weapons near Eschweiler 

reacted first, followed by fire from a few 

guns in the forested sector opposite the 

right wing of the VII Corps. "These 

fires ... ," the First Army noted, "totalled the enemy artillery opposition." 21 

The most dramatic and damaging single 

event of the bombardment was J attributable to chance. Someone or something 

must have crossed the star of the 47th 

V olks Grenadier Division, for even as 

Allied planes struck, some units of this 

division were detraining in the Roer towns 

and others were relieving parts of the 

12th Division in the line. A battalion of 

artillery caught at the railroad station in 

Juelich was all but annihilated. Signal 

and headquarters troops were hit at 

Dueren. In process of relieving part of 

the 12th Division, a few companies of the 

I03d Regiment had reached the front 

where cover was at hand, but others were 

caught immediately in rear of the line 

where the blow was hardest. It was in 

this region behind the front line that the 

only indication of psychological impact 

developed. "I never saw anything like 

it," said a German noncommissioned officer. "These kids ... were still numb 

45 minutes after the bombardment. It 

was our luck that your ground troops did 

not attack us until the next day. I could 

not have done anything with those boys of 

mine that day." 22 

20 FUSA G-Q Per Rpt 160, 17 )Jov, FUSA 

G-Q Tac file, 17-18 Nov 44. 

21 FUSA Arty Intel Rpt 156, 17 Nov, FUSA 

G-2 Tac Jnl, 18 Nov 44. 

22 Annex 2 to FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 165, 22 

Nov 45; MS # B-602 (Bork); Annex 3 to 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

In some ways as impressive as the bombing program was the artillery effort. On 

the First Army front alone, 694 guns in 

an hour-long preparation fired approximately 45,000 light rounds, almost 4,000 

medium, and 2,600 heavy.23 In addition, 

hundreds of tank guns, 8 I -mm. and 4.2-

inch mortars, plus a battalion of 4.5-

inch rocket projectors, contributed to the 

barrage. On the Ninth Army front, another 552 field artillery pieces participated, 

raising the total in the two armies to 

1,246.

24 

The ill-starred 47th V olks Grenadier 

Division came in for a share of this 

pounding, though just how many of this 

division's troubles stemmed from American shelling was difficult to judge. The 

division was a primary target; for in early 

morning of D Day a prisoner had revealed 

the enemy's plan of relieving the 12th 

Division that day. Both 1st Division and 

VII Corps artillery then had taken all 

likely routes of approach under fire. 25 

In the final analysis, the only true 

measure of the effect of both air and 

artillery preparations was the amount of 

resistance to the ground attack. At 1245 

on 16 November ground troops all along 

the line from the vicinity of Geilenkirchen 

to Huertgen initiated that test. The big 

November offensive was on. 

FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 166, 23 Nov, The Rise and 

Fall of the 47 V. C. Division, FUSA G-2 Tac 

file, 21-22 Nov 44. 

23 FUSA AAR, Nov 44, Field Artillery Firing 

16-23 November. The figures on number of 

rounds are estimates based upon FUSA's statistics of 450 light, 126 medium, and 108 heavy 

guns, and an expenditure of 1,087 tons of 

ammunition. 

24 Statistics on Ground Effort, found in Hq IX 

TAC, Operation Q .. 

25 1st Div Intel Activities, Nov 44, dtd'l Dec 

44, found in 1St Div Combat Interv file, Nov 44. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 415 

I55-MM. SELF-PROPELLED GUN bombarding Gressenich. 

The Push Northeast 

From Schevenhuette 

The main effort within the First Army's 

VII Corps was to be launched from the 

village of Schevenhuette, the farthest 

point of penetration yet made by Allied 

troops into Germany. From Schevenhuette General Huebner's 1st Division was 

to attack northeast through the fringes of 

the Huertgen Forest to Langerwehe and 

Juengersdorf, not quite four miles away. 

From there the Roer lies but three miles 

distant across the open Roer plain. 

Getting across the first four miles past 

obstacles like the forest and the Hamich 

ridge obviously posed the big problem. 

This the VII Corps planners had foreseen. In attaching the 47th Infantry to 

the 1st Division and in assigning the 3d 

Armored Division the left portion of the 1St 

Division's zone for the first stage of the 

attack, they had enabled General Huebner 

to concentrate his strength at Schevenhuette in a sector less than two miles 

wide. Only after the major obstacle of 

the Hamich ridge was in hand would 

General Huebner have to spread his 

troops across the entire width of his zone 

north to the Inde River. 
416 

To clear the fringes of the Huertgen 

Forest, then to seize Langerwehe and 

Juengersdorf, General Huebner directed 

the 26th Infantry on his right wing to attack through the forest on the right of the 

Weh Creek and the SchevenhuetteLangerwehe highway. Meanwhile the 

16th Infantry was to take Hill 232, just 

to the northwest of the village of Hamich 

and key to the Hamich ridge. This hill 

was the enemy's primary observation point 

across the open spaces of the Stolberg 

Corridor. Seizure of it was prerequisite 

to occupying a series of hills along the left 

of the highway to Langerwehe and thus 

to opening the highway as a supply route. 

Following the valley of the little Weh 

Creek, this highway was needed by both 

the 16th and 26th Regiments, particularly by the 26th because of a dearth of 

roads in the forest. 

In the meantime, the attached 47th 

Infantry was to capture Gressenich, thereby opening a road to Hamich. The 47th 

Infantry then was to complete the task of 

clearing the Hamich ridge north from Hill 

232 to the boundary with the 104th Division along the Inde River. As the 

attached regiment completed this task, 

General Huebner planned to commit his 

reserve, the 18th Infantry, in order to 

secure a firm foothold on the Roer plain 

alongside the Inde. This accomplished, 

the 16th and 26th Regiments were to 

make the final thrust to the Roer. 26 

Perhaps the best spot for measuring 

the effect of the preliminary bombardment 

in front of the VII Corps was the sector 

2G 1St Div FO 53, 6 Nov, 1st Div G-J Opns 

Rpt, Nov 44. The division's records for the 

period are superior and include detailed journal 

entries. A small number of combat interviews 

supplement the official records. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

of the 16th Infantry at Hamich. Here 

were to be found all three major types of 

terrain confronting the corps: forest, open 

ground, and villages. 

Commanded by Lt. Col. Edmund F. 

Driscoll, the 16th Infantry's 1st Battalion 

moved on D Day north from Schevenhuette into the woods toward Hamich, 

only to run immediately into determined 

resistance from the kind of log-covered 

emplacements typical of the defenses of 

the Huertgen Forest. Through clinging 

mud that two weeks of inclement weather 

had produced, a platoon of tanks inched 

forward to the woods line to take out tht 

enemy's automatic weapons. Only theN 

could the 1 st Battalion move through the, 

woods to the objective of Hamich, a mile 

away. 

It began to look less and less as if the 

mammoth preliminary bombardment had 

precipitated a breakthrough. Certainly 

the men of the 16th Infantry could attest 

to the fact that even in the face of this 

bombardment, the enemy's resistance was 

tough. Only in artillery fires did they 

note any slackening, and from the infantryman's standpoint a prodigious enemy 

use of mortars more than made up for 

that deficiency. 

Hand-carrying their weapons, men of 

Colonel Driscoll's 1 st Battalion reached 

the edge of the woods overlooking Hamich just before dusk. From there full 

portent of the enemy's textbook observation post on Hill 232 became readily 

apparent. Not even a field mouse could 

get into Hamich without being seen. 

His first view of American troops at the 

edge of the woods prompted a hail of 

small arms fire from Hamich and artillery 

and mortar fire obviously adjusted from 

Hill 232. As night fell; the American battalion had to beat off persistent local 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 417 

counterattacks by elements of the 12th 

Division's 48th Regiment. 

The 16th Infantry's best hope for getting 

armor to assist the attack on Hamich lay 

in taking Gressenich with the division's 

attached regiment, the 47th Infantry, 

thereby opening a road to Hamich for 

tanks. Attacking at H Hour on 16 November close behind the fire of five. artillery battalions, a battalion of the 47th 

Infantry met initial success because the 

enemy in Gressenich had focused his attention on an attacking column of the 3d 

Armored Division. As the battalion of 

the 47th Infantry reached the first 

buildings, the Germans discovered their 

oversight and began a systematic houseto-house defense. 

Not until the next morning (17 November) did hopes rise for clearing 

Gressenich and getting armor to Hamich. 

Advance of the 3d Armored Division 

north of Gressenich and of the 16th 

Infantry through the woods to Hamich 

had threatened encirclement of Gressenich. 

During the night the Germans had withdrawn.27 

After daylight on I7 November a platoon of tanks from the attached 745th 

Tank Battalion moved to join Colonel 

Driscoll's infantry at Hamich, and in the 

afternoon tanks and infantry attacked. 

By this time, however, the processes of 

beating off the enemy during the night 

and of trying to get into Hamich without 

tank support had made serious inroads in 

the strength of Colonel Driscoll's companies. Having started the fight the day 

before with about 160 men per rifle 

27 In addition to 47th Infantry and 1St Division official records, a combat interview with Lt. 

Col. James D. Allgood, 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, provides details on the 47th Infantry action. 

See 1st Div Combat Interv file, Nov 44. 

company, one company was down to a 

hundred men and the other two down to 

60 or 70 each. About 70 percent of the 

casualties, Colonel Driscoll estimated, were 

from enemy shellfire, the rest from small 

arms fire. Neither tanks nor infantry 

could get into Hamich. 

The enemy's defensive success thus far 

at Hamich was attributable to men who 

had held the line from the first, for none 

other than local reserves yet had been 

committed. Soon after it had become 

evident that this was the big Allied attack, 

General von Zangen, Ilew commander of 

the Fifteenth Army (alias Gruppe von 

M anteuffel), had canceled the impending 

relief of the 12th Division. 28 Though 

Zangen had ordered artillery of the incoming 47th V olks Grenadier Division to 

reinforce the fires of the 12th Division's 

artillery, he had directed that the 47th 

Division's other troops assemble as an 

LXXXI Corps reserve. A small combat 

team of the 116th Panzer Division, moving north from Huertgen, was to 

strengthen the corps reserve. These were 

the only immediate German orders at an 

army level directly affecting the sector 

opposite the I st Division. 29 

To reinforce the assault on Hamich on 

the third day, 18 November, the 16th 

Infantry used the unit originally intended 

for taking Hill 232, the 3d Battalion 

28 Because Zangen and his staff of the Fifteenth Army had assumed command of Gruppe 

von Manteuffel only the day before the U.S. 

offensive, Manteuffel and his staff stayed on to 

assist until about 20 November. Orders apparently were prepared on a kind of informal 

"team" basis. 

29 Order, Gruppe von Manteuffel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 2225, 16 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB Anlagen, Befehle H eeresgruppe und 

Armee an Generalkommando,· 24·X.-30.XI·44 

(referred to hereafter as LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Bef. H. Gr. u. Armee). 
418 

under Lt. Col. Charles T. Horner, Jr. 

While Colonel Driscoll's depleted battalion 

maintained a base of fire and while 

artillery pummeled Hill 232, Colonel 

Horner's infantry with tank and tank 

destroyer support pressed the attack. 

Dashing through a steady thunder of 

German artillery fire, they gained the first 

houses. This signaled the start of a 

methodical house-by-house killing match 

against an enemy who had to be rooted 

from barricaded cellars that often were 

connected by communications trenches.so 

Five German tanks that started down the 

Hamich ridge toward the village might 

have turned the balance in favor of the 

enemy had not clearing weather on 18 

November enabled planes to operate. 

P-47's of the IX Tactical Air Command 

with an assist from the artillery quickly 

turned the tanks back. By mid afternoon 

Colonel Horner's infantry and armor had 

cleared all but a few houses on the 

northern edge of Hamich. i 

Seizing quickly upon his advantage, th'e 

16th Infantry commander, Colonel Gibb\ 

directed his remaining battalion under 

Colonel Dawson to strike immediately for 

Hill 232. Preceding the assault, fifteen 

battalions of field artillery laid an impresSIVe TOT on the height. With no 

conspicuous struggle, Colonel Dawson's 

infantry took the hill. Dazed, bewildered 

survivors of the 12th Fusilier Battalion, 

which had been sent to bolster the faltering 48th Regiment, hardly knew what 

had hit them. 

30 For personally eliminating a machine gun 

and an antitank gun in the attack on Hamich, 

S. Sgt. Paul W. Robey, Jr., was awarded the 

DSC. For sweeping the road into Hamich with 

a mine detector in the face of intense enemy fire, 

an attached engineer, Cpl. Bertol C. Swanberg, 

also received the award. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

In the meantime, remnants of the 48th 

Re giment had tried to get back into 

Hamich. In particular, they punched 

against Colonel Driscoll's 1St Battalion in 

the woods southeast of the village. Here 

the hero of the defense was a platoon 

leader, T. Sgt. Jake W. Lindsey, who 

refused to budge from his position even 

after casualties reduced his command to 

only six men. Despite a shell fragment in 

one knee, he personally accounted for 

two enemy machine gun crews, drove off 

two tanks with rifle grenades, and was 

credited officially with killing twenty of 

the enemy.31 

Though these counterattacks were 

troublesome, the toughest was reserved for 

the night of 18 November. It grew out of 

an authorization by the Army Group B 

commander, Field Marshal Model, for active commitment of the 47th V olks Grenadier Division. Reversing General von 

Zangen's earlier order, Model directed 

that the new division assume responsibility 

for the southern half of the 12th Division's 

line. This meant that almost the entire 

line in front of the 1St Division was to be 

taken over by the new division. 32 

The Germans threw a green division 

into the thick of the fight not without 

considerable reluctance. They chose the 

line opposite the 1St Division as the lesser 

of two evils, for they considered that the 

31 As the one-hundredth infantryman to be 

awarded the Medal of Honor, Sergeant Lindsey 

subsequently received the award from the hands 

of President Truman before a joint session of 

Congress. Other decorations for action in the 

Hamich sector included the posthumous award of 

the DSC to 1st Lt. Kenneth L. Johnson, Pfc. 

John W. Adams, Sgt. Alfred B. Nietzel, and S. 

Sgt. Robert D. Farmer. 

32 TWX, GruPPe von ManteufJel to LXXXI 

Corps, 1800, 17 Nov 44, relaying Order, A Gp B 

to Gruppe von ManteufJel, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Be!. H. Gr. u. Armee. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 419 

U.S. main effort was not here but farther 

north along the boundary between the 

XII SS and LXXXI CorpsJ within the 

zone of the Ninth Army, where terrain 

was more negotiable. If committed opposite the main effort, the Germans 

reasoned, the 47th Division surely would 

be chewed to pieces. If committed in the 

less threatened southern sector, the new 

division might survive while enabling the 

other divisions to shorten their zones and 

achieve greater concentration opposite the 

main effort. 33 

One of the first moves of the 47th 

Division was to prepare a counterattack 

with the support of the combat team of 

the 116th Panzer Division to retake Hamich and Hill 232. This combat team 

consisted of a battalion each of tanks and 

half-tracks, an artillery battery, and an 

engineer company. Half the combat team 

was to join each of two battalions of the 

47th DivisionJs l04th Regiment after 

nightfall on 18 November in assembly 

areas near Hill 232. At 0530 the next 

morning, half the force was to retake Hill 

232, the other half, Hamich. 

To the detriment of the German plan, 

the always imponderable human equation 

worked for the Americans. Leading half 

the counterattack force of tanks, halftracks, and engineers toward the assembly 

area, a German lieutenant lost his way in 

the darkness. Instead of taking a road 

which would have led to his assembly area 

near Hill 232, the lieutenant chose a route 

leading along the VfJ.lley of the Weh Creek 

in the direction of Hamich. Southeast of 

Hamich, the enemy column blundered 

into positions held by Company C, 16th 

33 Order, Gruppe von ManteufJel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 0130, 18 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Be/. H. Gr. u. Armee; LXXXI Corps 

Gefechtsbericht, AAR of 18 Nov 44. 

Infantry. Reduced to but forty-five men, 

Company C might not have been able to 

hold had the German lieutenant not tried 

to rectify his mistake by withdrawing. 34 

Trying next a trail that led north into 

the woods, the German lieutenant unwittingly led his forces directly into 

Hamich. The errant group had barely 

reached the village when outposts of 

Colonel Horner's 3d Battalion called for 

artillery fire. While Horner's infantry 

took cover in houses and cellars, fifteen 

battalions of artillery blanketed the village 

with time fire. 35 Though the German 

engineers and half-tracks fell back, several 

of the tanks pushed on. An eager but 

unidentified American bazooka man sent 

a rocket through the turret of one of the 

tanks from a second floor window. Two 

other tanks blundered into bomb craters 

and could not get out. The remaining 

tanks escaped to the north, while the 

German lieutenant, still bewildered, became the sole prisoner of the engagement. 

Alerted by this enemy blunder, the 

Americans in Hamich were ready a few 

hours later when a battalion of the l04th 

Regiment went through with the scheduled counterattack against the village. 

Though seven or eight tanks supported 

the maneuver, this stronger force actually 

made less of an impression than had the 

enemy lieutenant's. By daylight the Germans had been stopped. 

34 This incident is based primarily on American sources, including 1st Div Intel Activities, 

Nov 44, and 1st Div G-2 Per Rpt 153, 19 Nov, 

in 1st Div G-2 file, 19-20 Nov 44. Identifying 

the German officer as a Lieutenant Bayer, the 

1st Division G-2 may have been confused by the 

name of the combat team commander, Colonel 

Bayer, of the 16th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. 

35 In this and earlier firing during 18 November 

at Hamich, American artillery expended 5,350 

rounds, almost two thirds of normal daily German 

expenditure along the entire LXXXI Corps front. 
420 

Meanwhile, the other battalion of the 

I04th Regiment, which was to have been 

supported against Hill 232 by the lieutenant's tanks, had waited in vain. Aided 

by interrogation of the lieutenant, American artillery took the enemy's assembly 

area under fire. Though the artillery 

scattered one company, the enemy commander decided to go ahead with the 

attack. At 0530 his two remaining companies charged up the north slope of Hill 

232, only to be mowed down by the 

concentrated fire of Colonel Dawson's 

machine gunners and riflemen. Of one 

German company, only the commander 

survived. Even he was captured. 

Elsewhere in the 1st Division's sector, 

an attack by the 26th Infantry on the 

division's right wing moved into an area 

which had been accorded little of the 

preliminary bombardment. Preparation 

fires had been limited in front of the 

regiment because trees and undergrowth 

restricted identification of targets, not because the 26th Infantry's attack was any 

the less important to accomplishment of 

the 1st Division's mission. No matter 

how successful the 16th Infantry's advance west of the Weh Creek and the 

vital Schevenhuette-Langerwehe highway, 

the road could not be used without control 

of four wooded hills within the Huertgen 

Forest along the right of the highway. 

After taking these hills, the 26th Infantry 

was to continue to Langerwehe and 

J uengersdorf. 

Like many another unit which fought 

within the Huertgen Forest, the 26th Infantry engaged in an almost unalloyed 

infantry battle. Trees and undergrowth 

so limited observation that the effectiveness of artillery was reduced severely. 

Mud and a dearth of roads restricted 

armored support. The inevitable hazards 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

of forest fighting-shellbursts in the trees 

and open flanks-plagued the regiment 

from the start. Though the lead battalion 

gained but a few hundred yards, it still 

was necessary as night came to commit 

another battalion to bolster the lead unit's 

flanks. 

Inching forward on the second day, the 

26th Infantry's lead battalion under Lt. 

Col. Derrill M. Daniel gained only a few 

hundred yards more. Two days of fighting had brought an advance of little more 

than a mile. Return of wet weather on 

17 November had eliminated any hope of 

getting tanks or tank destroyers forward 

along the muddy forest trails. 

A second battalion joined the attack 

early on the third day, 18 November. 

Still the enemy yielded his bunkers grudgingly. Early on the fourth day, 19 November, as the regimental commander, 

Colonel Seitz, prepared to commit his 

remaining battalion, the Germans struck 

back. The counterattack grew out of 

Field Marshal Model's directive of two 

days before by which the 47th V olks 

Grenadier Division was thrust into the 

line along the interarmy boundary. A 

battalion of the 47th Division's I 15th I nlantry made the counterattack. 

Nowhere in the Huertgen Forest fighting was the stamina and determination 

of American infantry more clearly demonstrated than here as Colonel Daniel's 

fatigued, depleted battalion of the 26th 

Infantry beat off this fresh German force. 

Among numerous deeds of individual 

heroism, the acts of Pfc. Francis X. McGraw stood out. Manning a machine 

gun, McGraw fired until his ammunition 

gave out, then ran back for more. When 

artillery fire felled a tree and blocked his 

field of fire, he calmly rose from his foxhole, threw his weapon across a log, and 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 421 

continued to fire. Concussion from a 

shellburst tossed his gun into the air, but 

he retrieved it. His ammunition expended a second time, McGraw took up 

the fight with a carbine, killed one German and wounded another before a burst 

from a burp gun cut him down. He was 

posthumously awarded the Medal of 

Honor. 

As demonstrated soon after the counterattack, the 47th Division's commitment 

had come a little late. No sooner had 

Colonel Daniel's men beaten off the 

enemy than the 26th Infantry's remaining 

fresh battalion under Colonel Corley 

pressed an attack that carried northward 

more than a mile. Not until they had 

reached an improved road less than 500 

yards from a castle, the Laufenburg, did 

the men pause for the night. The castle 

marked the center of the four forested 

hills which were the 26th Infantry's objective. 

No matter how commendable and how 

encouraging this thrust, the 26th Infantry 

would have to stretch a point to find room 

for elation in the four days of slow, 

plodding fight. The regiment still had no 

adequate supply route and no way to get 

supporting weapons forward. Before renewing the drive to seize the hills around 

the Laufenburg and conquer a remaining 

mile and a half of forest, Colonel Seitz 

deemed it imperative to clear that part of 

the Langerwehe highway leading to his 

forward position. The force. he had to do 

this with was reduced now by some 450 

men who had succumbed to the enemy's 

fire and the cold, wet weather. Though 

high by ordinary standards, this casualty 

figure was about par for four days of 

fighting in the Huertgen Forest. 

Looking at the situation from a division 

standpoint, the 1st Division G-2 found 

occasion at nightfall on 19 November for 

some encouragement. "It is believed,'" 

Colonel Evans remarked hopefully, "that 

the units which have been identified . . . 

are not capable of preventing our further 

advance to the northeast. No reserve 

units of sufficient size to bolster up these 

forces are now believed to be available ... 

west of the Roer River." 36 

Under ordinary circumstances, there 

might have been room for such cautious 

optimism as Colonel Evans expressed. 

Both the 16th and 26th Infantry Regiments had penetrated the enemy's forward line to a maximum depth of about 

two miles, even though the feat had required four days and over a thousand 

casualties to accomplish. But these were 

not ordinary circumstances. This was the 

sector of the main effort of the VII Corps 

where the 1st Division was to have followed closely on the heels of a historic 

preliminary bombardment to effect a 

rapid thrust to the Roer. General Hodges 

and General Collins had bargained for a 

spectacular breakthrough. After four 

days of fighting from 16 through 19 

November, it looked as though they had 

bought a drab slugging match. 

Armor in the Stolberg Corridor 

Indications that this was the case were 

not confined to the vicinity of Schevenhuette and Hamich. Slightly to the west 

among the quartet of villages still remaining to the Germans in the Stolberg 

Corridor, even the added weight of tanks 

and tank destroyers of an armored combat 

command had not been enough to produce 

a rout. 

36 1st Div G-2 Per Rpt 153, 19 Nov 44, in 1St 

Div G-2 file, 19-20 Nov 44. 
422 

This was the only portion of the VII 

Corps zone where armor might maneuver 

during the opening stages of the new 

offensive. Here General Boudinot's CCB 

of the 3d Armored Division was to attack 

at H Hour on 16 November through 

Weissenberg to bridge the space between 

the 1st and 104th Divisions. The armor 

was to seize four villages: Werth, Koettenich, Scherpenseel, and Hastenrath. 

Lying at the western base of the Hamich 

ridge, these villages were not more than 

two miles from the armor's existing front 

line. The projected advance of the 

104th Division against the EschweilerWeisweiler industrial triangle and of the 

47th Infantry from Hill 232 northwest 

along the Hamich ridge eventually would 

pinch out the armor and permit the combat command to return to its parent 

division in time to exploit any breakthrough achieved by the infantry divisions.37 

Rejuvenated by replacements in both 

tanks and personnel since bogging down 

in the Stolberg Corridor almost two 

months before, General Boudinot's Task 

Forces Lovelady and Mills both participated in the opening attack. Of approximately equal strength, each task force 

had a battalion of tanks and a company 

of armored infantry. Task Force Lovelady on the right was to take Werth and 

Koettenich; Task Force Mills on the left, 

Scherpenseel and Hastenrath. 

Though some dive bombing and heavy 

concentrations of artillery fell on the four 

villages during the preliminary bombardment, the armor's observers could not 

373d Armd Div FO 16, 9 Nov 44. Though 

no copy of this order can be found, the contents 

are given in some detail in the CCB AAR, Nov 

44. AARs of the 3d Armd Div, CCB, and 

subordinate units contain valuable material on 

this action. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

determine in the hazy weather just what 

damage was done. It was equally difficut to judge the effects of the bombardment from the progress of the ground 

attack. 

Task Force Lovelady on the right had 

little difficulty. In about two hours both 

Werth and Koettenich were in hand. Yet 

while mopping up and consolidating, the 

men of Task Force Lovelady became 

aware that the Germans on Hill 232 and 

other parts of the Hamich ridge were 

breathing down their necks. With unerringly accurate artillery and mortar fire, 

the enemy left no doubt for the next two 

days of his superior observation. A Panther tank firing from the ridge knocked 

out three of five tanks in Koettenich 

before one of the remaining Shermans 

could silence it. 

Task Force Mills's troubles began at the 

start. The task force spent the first 

afternoon trying to get through mud and 

a mine field under the muzzles of antitank 

and dual-purpose antiaircraft guns located in the Eschweiler woods to the 

north within the 104th Division's zone. 

Incurring a loss of fifteen tanks, the task 

force fell several hundred yards short of 

Scherpenseel and Hastenrath. 

The second day, 17 November, brought 

several disturbing developments. First, 

the adjacent regiment of the 104th Division had run into CCB's old problem of 

the Donnerberg (Hill 287), the strategic 

height east of Stolberg, and had failed to 

keep abreast of the armor. This meant 

that the armor on the relatively low, open 

ground of the Stolberg Corridor still was 

exposed to fire from the north as well as 

from the Hamich ridge. Second, though 

parts of Task Force Mills got into the 

fringes of both Hastenrath and Scherpenseel, the cost in armored infantry was 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 423 

AMERICAN TANK BURNING outside Hamich. 

alarming. Though General Boudinot ordered forward the bulk of his reserve, 

primarily another company of armored 

infantry, antipersonnel mines and shelling 

prevented the reserve from reaching the 

task force until darkness had restricted 

the enemy's observation. Third, after 

only a day and a half of action, the 

combat command was down to 50 percent 

of original strength in tanks. Task Force 

Mills at the main point of danger had left 

only seven light tanks and eight mediums. 

Not all were permanently lost-the mud 

had claimed some-but for the moment 

those in the mud were of no more use 

than others that had succumbed to enemy 

fire. So perturbed was the 3d Armored 

Division commander, General Rose, that 

he alerted his division reserve to stand by 

for commitment upon an hour's notice. 

The problem was not so much the 

nature of the enemy as the nature of his 

observation. Combat Command B's adversary was, as expected, its old antagonist 

from the days of the first battle of the 

Stolberg corridor, the 12th Division. 

Here elements of the 89th Grenadier Regiment held the line. Perhaps the enemy 

might have taken even" greater advantage 

of his superior observation had not some 
424 

of his heavier weapons already been displaced in preparation for the impending 

relief by the 47th Volks Grenadier - Division. 38 

The day of 18 November opened 

inauspiciously when a shell fragment cut 

down the task force commander, Lt. Col. 

Herbert N. Mills.39 Yet with the assistanceof the infantry reserve, the task 

force went through with the planned 

attacks against Hastenrath and Scherpensee I. This time adroit cO-Dperation between tanks and infantry did the trick, 

so that by midafternoon Task Force 

Mills had cleared both villages. At 1745 

the task force called for a fifteen-minute 

concentration of time and impact artillery 

fire to thwart a two-company counterattack which struck between the villages. 

With Hastenrath and Scherpenseel secured, CCB could turn to the defensive. 

The 1st Division's capture of Hill 232 

during the afternoon of 18 November 

eased the problems of enemy observation 

to a degree; but until the 104th Division 

could clear the combat command's left 

flank and the 47th Infantry sweep the 

rest of the Hamich ridge across the combat 

command's front, damaging German fire 

still could be expected. 

Though CCB had taken its four objectives in less than three days, the results 

would stand as a monument to the 

celerity with which an enemy endowed 

with advantages in observation and assisted by nature can seriously cripple an 

armored force. The armored infantry 

had incurred losses of about 50 percent. 

Of 64 medium tanks at the start of the 

attack, all but 22 had been eliminated. 

Including 7 light tanks, total tank losses 

38 CCB AAR, Nov 44. 

39 Colonel Mills was posthumously awarded 

the DSC. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

were 49. Panzerfausts had claimed 6; 

mistaken U.S. bombing, I; artillery fire, 

6; mine fields, 12; and antitank fire, 24. 40 

These did not look much like statistics of 

a breakthrough operation. 

The Second Battle of 

the Donnerberg 

Much of the difficulty experienced by 

the armor might have been avoided had 

the 104th Division on the combat command's left flank been able to keep abreast. 

Here the problem again was dominant 

German observation, in this case from the 

Donnerberg (Hill 287), near Stolberg, the 

height which had defied the 3d Armored 

Division in September. 

In clearing the Eschweiler-W eisweiler 

industrial triangle on the north wing of 

the VII Corps, the 104th Division was to 

operate basically astride the snakelike valley of the little Inde River. Because of 

the terrain, the division in early stages of 

the offensive would assist the VII Corps 

main effort directly only on the division's 

right wing. The assignment involved 

clearing a sector of about five square 

miles, made up basically of the Eschweiler 

woods lying between Stolberg and Eschweiler. 

Having joined the VII Corps immediately after a baptism of fire with the 

Canadians near Antwerp, the 104th Division under General Allen had moved into 

the old positions of the I st Division. 

These extended from the army boundary 

near W uerselen southeast through Verlautenheide to the Inde River at Stolberg. 

On the eve of the attack one regiment of 

the 104th assumed control of a part of the 

40 Detailed statistics may be found in CCB 

AAR, Nov 44. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 425 

3d Armored Division's sector east of 

Stolberg and south of the Eschweiler 

woods opposite the Donnerberg (Hill 

287). Told by General Collins to put 

greatest strength on the right wing in 

order to support the corps main effort, 

General Allen had noted from the first 

how the Donnerberg dominated this part 

of the front. Without control of this 

eminence, there was obviously little hope 

either for a drive northward to clear the 

northern half of Stolberg or for a drive 

northeastward on Eschweiler through the 

Eschweiler woodsY 

Given two distinct missions-one to 

assist the VII Corps main effort by sweeping the Eschweiler woods, the other to 

clear the industrial triangle-General Allen divided his operations into two distinct 

phases. He directed Colonel Touart's 

4 14th Infantry on the right wing to make 

the divisional main effort northeast against 

the Donnerberg and the Eschweiler woods. 

In the meantime, the other two regiments 

were to be executing limited operations 

which General Allen described as "pressure attacks." After clearing the woods, 

thereby signaling the end of the first phase, 

Colonel Touart's 4I4th Infantry was to 

pause while the main effort shifted to the 

division's north wing. 

The main effort of the second phase was 

to be launched by the 4 13th Infantry 

from the vicinity of Verlautenheide, north41 For details of the attack plan, see I04th 

Div FO 10, 9 Nov, 104th Div G-3 file, 9 Nov 44· 

The only sources for this section are the official 

records of the division and attached units, and a 

letter from General Allen to OCMH, 26 Apr 56. 

Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, provides 

only a sketchy account of the opening phase of 

the November offensive. See pages 111-24. 

Combat interviews with the I04th Division cover 

only later actions. 

eastward along the southernmost reaches 

of the Roer plain to come upon Eschweiler 

from the north. This drive and a renewal of Colonel Touart's push would 

converge upon Eschweiler, the heart of 

the industrial triangle. In the process, 

the center regiment, which by this time 

would have cleared the northern half of 

Stolberg, would be pinched out. With 

Eschweiler in hand, the division was to 

continue northeast to clear the remainder 

of the industrial triangle lying between 

the army boundary and the Inde. For 

assistance in clearing the last of the triangle, General Allen had the promise of 

the 47th Infantry, which by that time 

should have completed its work with the 

I st Division. 

As in the sector of the VII Corps main 

effort, the Germans defending Stolberg, 

the Donnerberg, and the Eschweiler woods 

were a part of the 12th Division. In the 

left of the I04th Division's zone, in that 

sector close alongside the Ninth Army 

where General Allen intended the main 

effort of his second phase, the enemy units 

belonged to the 3d Panzer Grenadier DiVlszon. The I04th Division had fairly 

detailed intelligence information on these 

units, passed on when the 1st Division 

had relinquished this sector. 

Though the Eschweiler-Weisweiler industrial triangle was high on the priority 

list for the saturation bombing on 16 

November, most targets were so deep 

inside the triangle that the men of the 

I04th Division heard more of the bombing than they saw. None of the targets 

of the heavy bombers was closer than two 

miles from the division's forward lines. 

Somewhat inexplicably, I04th Division 

artillery played no large-scale role in the 

preliminary bombardment.· Though reinforced by an attached battalion of 
426 

155-mm. guns, the division's artillery fired 

only 27 I rounds all day. Even more surprising was the fact that the organic 

artillery battalion in direct support of the 

main effort by the 414th Infantry fired 

not at all. 42 

If surprise was the object of muzzling 

the artillery, the experience of the attacking infantry soon after crossing the line of 

departure on 16 November indicated that 

the stratagem was ill-advised. Only a 

drugged enemy could fail during daylight 

to spot attacking formations from an advantageous height like the Donnerberg. 

Despite incessant attacks all through 

16 and I7 November and into the next 

day, Colonel Touart's 414th Infantry 

made scarcely a dent in the enemy's hold 

on the Donnerberg. Possibly in an attempt at gaining surprise, one battalion 

attacked fifteen minutes before H Hour, 

but to no avail. Achieving a measure of 

cover and concealment among buildings, 

the right battalion of the 4 15th Infantry 

gained an insecure toehold in Birkengang, 

an industrial suburb of Stolberg located a 

few hundred yards northwest of the Donnerberg; but this was no real accomplishment toward the final end. Another 

battalion trying to bypass the Donnerberg 

and strike directly for the Eschweiler 

woods got nowhere. 

So late into the evening of 16 November 

was the 414th Infantry attacking that 

General Allen set the hour for the next 

day's attack no earlier than noon. By 

that time he had worked out a detailed 

plan of artillery support and had the 

42 See Arty Annex to I04th Div AAR, Nov 44, 

copy in I04th Div G-I file, Nov 44. General 

Allen in his letter to OCMH, 26 April 1956, 

notes that a detailed program of division artillery 

fire was carried out. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

promise of fighter-bombers against both 

the Donnerberg and the Eschweiler woods. 

Still the infantry could make no marked 

progress. During long weeks of stationary defense in this sector, the enemy's 

12th Division had sown mines and strung 

barbed wire lavishly. On the Donnerberg itself three giant pillboxes provided 

stanch protection. Artillery directed from 

the Donnerberg and antitank guns in the 

Eschweiler woods punished not only the 

American infantry but supporting tanks 

as well. 

By nightfall, optimists in the division 

could point out nevertheless that the 

advance of the battalion of the 415th 

Infantry into Birkengang, northwest of 

the Donnerberg, and limited success of a 

wide envelopment maneuver to the east 

through the zone of the 3d Armored 

Division had created an arc about the 

Donnerberg. In reality, so widespread 

were the segments of this arc that they 

offered little real hope for greater success 

the next day. As the assistant division 

commander, Brig. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, 

was to put it early on the third morning: 

"We must make some progress today. 

[It is] getting awful .... " The corps 

commander, General Collins, would agree. 

On 16 November he had told the 104th 

Division "in no uncertain terms to get 

moving and get moving fast." 43 

With just how much audacity the 414th 

Infantry had attacked during the first 

two days was difficult to determine. The 

only casualty figure the regiment had 

given, a record of 7 percent, or about 

fifty-four men, lost in the battalion that 

was attacking the Donnerberg frontally, 

revealed no fanatic determination. Never43 I04th Div G-3 JIiI, 18 Nov 44; Sylvan 

Diary, entry of 16 Nov 44. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 427 

theless, the 414th Infantry obviously was 

facing a formidable position which, except 

at Birkengang, had to be approached over 

terrain almost devoid of cover. The 

difficulty on 17 November did not lie with 

the volume of supporting fire, for the 

104th Division's organic and attached 

artillery had expended 5,62 I rounds, a 

marked change from the first day. 

Because the enemy had failed to counterattack in any strength, Colonel Touart 

could hope that this meant the enemy 

had no reserves. In this event, continued 

attack eventually would wear down the 

resistance. Because all the 414th Infantry's strength already was committed, 

Colonel Touart actually had little alternative but to pursue the same pattern 

of attack he had followed unsuccessfully 

for the first two days. While two battalions on the east pressed toward the 

Eschweiler woods, another was to renew 

the frontal strike against the Donnerberg 

and the right battalion of the 415th 

Infantry was to mop up in Birkengang. 

A lack of reserves was, in reality, the 

problem the enemy faced. The only reserves available to the LXXXI Corps, not 

released for commitment at all until late 

on 17 November, were those consigned to 

the Schevenhuette sector. Though movement of the reserves was designed to 

enable the 12th Division and the other 

units of the corps to constrict their zones 

and thereby gain local reserves, this would 

take time. The admittedly cautious 

"pressure attacks" that the other two 

regiments of the 104th Division were conducting enabled the adjacent 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division to release some troops; 

these, however, the LXXXI Corps commander consigned not to the Donnerberg 

but to the north opposite the Ninth Army, 

where he believed the Americans had 

pointed their main effort.44 The fact 

was that the attrition which naturally 

accompanied warding off persistent attacks had rendered those Germans near 

Stolberg much less capable of defending 

themselves on 18 November than they had 

been earlier. 

One factor the Germans on the Donnerberg, along with others on the LX X XI 

Corps front, would miss on 18 November 

was the kind of artillery support they had 

been receiving. Thanks in part to stockpiling and in part to a "one-time issue" of 

artillery ammunition from the Fuehrer 

Reserve (that is, ammunition stockpiled 

for the Ardennes offensive), the Germans 

in the LXXXI Corps sector had stepped 

up their artillery fire on 17 November to 

13,200 rounds. This was abnormally 

high. On 18 November and for several 

days thereafter, they were to be restricted 

to 8,000 rounds. Even this figure was to 

decline, despite the fact that Rundstedt 

attributed any defensive successes achieved 

thus far "to a very large extent to our 

artillery operations . " 45 

During the early part of the renewed 

attack against the Donnerberg on 18 

November, Colonel Touart's 414th Infantry could detect little change in the 

situation. Again advances were measured in feet and yards. Then, about 

noon, the bottom suddenly fell out of the 

German defenses. This could have been 

the result of the execution of an earlier 

order from the LXXXI Corps for the 

12th Division to bend back its north wing 

44 Opns Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs, 

1850, 16 Nov 44; Orders, LXXXI Corps to 

12th Diu, 1845, and to 12th and 47th VG Dius, 

1929, I7 Nov 44. All in LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Be/ehle an Diu. 

450B WEST KTB, 17 Nov 44; LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Art.-Lage u. Arty.-Gliederungen. 
428 

to a second line of defense. 46 More 

likely it was attributable at this particular 

point to the fact that persistent smC1-11 

unit maneuver at last paid off for the 

attackers. Germans in two of the big 

pillboxes surrendered. Though the occupants of the third refused to come out 

even after encirclement, for all practical 

purposes the Donnerberg by night of the 

third day of attack was in American hands. 

Having. lost the fortified high ground, 

the enemy stood little chance of holding 

the Eschweiler woods. In late afternoon, 

despite a mistaken strafing by U.S. 

fighter-bombers, the enveloping force on 

the east broke into the southern edge of 

the . woods. As night came, Colonel 

Touart directed the kind of attack for 

which General Allen had specially trained 

the division. In the darkness, one company slipped past the enemy to drive 

almost a thousand yards to a road junction atop high ground in the center of the 

woods. Colonel Touart wasted ,no time 

in reinforcing the advantage, so that by 

daylight on 19 November the task remaining to the 414th Infantry before completion of the first phase of the 104th 

Division's attack was mop-up and consolidation. 

The news of the 414th Infantry's success prompted the division commander to 

direct an immediate step-up of operations 

by his other two regiments. The main 

effort for the second phase of the attack 

shifted to the left wing regiment in the 

north alongside the Ninth Army, as much 

a complement to Ninth Army's battle of 

the Roer plain as to the VII Corps fight 

in the fringes of the Huertgen Forest. 

40 Opns Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs, 1850, 

16 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle ,an Div. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Another Victim of the Huertgen Forest 

These attacks by armor and infantry on 

the north wing of the VII Corps were 

subsidiary attacks designed primarily to 

assist the corps main effort. The same 

was true in some respects of the coincident 

attack by General Barton's 4th Division 

on the corps south wing. Yet the 4th 

Division also had a long-range mission. 

After assisting the corps main effort by 

clearing the Huertgen Forest between 

Schevenhuette and Huertgen, the 4th 

Division was to continue to the Roer 

River south of DuerenY 

With the depressing results of .the 28th 

Division's experience in the forest fresh in 

mind, General Barton must have been 

perturbed that even before the jump-off 

his division already had one strike against 

it. As the 4th Division had been moving 

from the V Corps to an assembly area 

behind the VII Corps lines the night of 6 

November, word had reached the 12th 

Infantry to drop out of the column. To 

shore up the faltering 28th Division, this 

regiment was to relieve the l09th Infantry 

astride the wooded plateau between the 

Weisser Weh Creek and the GermeterHuertgen highway. Danger from the 

recurring crises within the 28th Division 

left no time for prior reconnaissance. The 

12th Infantry had to go into the line that 

night. 

This urgency prevented the 12th Infantry commander, Col. James S. Luckett, 

47 Details of the attack plans may be found in 

4th Div FO 53, 7 Nov, and FO 53 revised, 15 

Nov, both in 4th Div FO file, Oct-Dec 44. The 

account of this period is based upon official unit 

records, combat interviews, and a narrative, 

Huertgen Forest Battle, written from the interviews by combat historiaris· and found in 4th Div 

Combat Interv file, Nov 44. 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 429 

from improving the dispositions which 

attack and counterattack had imposed 

upon the 109th Infantry. He had to 

relieve in place, unit for unit. Much of 

the effect of a fresh regiment entering the 

battle thus was dissipated at the start. 

In succeeding days, it was amply illustrated that while closely locked with the 

enemy a regiment has a hard time coordinating its battalions into a cohesive 

striking force. In the case of the 12th 

Infantry, divergent missions, made so remote by the dense forest that mutual 

support was impossible, quickly drained 

the battalions of offensive vitality. 

While attached to the 28th Division, 

Colonel Luckett was to reduce the enemy's 

countersalient in the Weisser Weh valley 

and also improve and lengthen the line of 

departure overlooking Huertgen, which 

the 109th Infantry was to have secured. 

The 12th Infantry could accomplish 

neither. One reason was that the regiment could not operate as a whole. Another was the situation that by 9 

November had enabled the Germans to 

shift strength from Kommerscheidt and 

Schmidt and counterattack southward 

from Huertgen against the 12th Infantry 

in an attempt at cutting off that part of 

the 28th Division still in Vossenack. 

On 10 November-the day that the 

First Army established a new intercorps 

boundary and thereby returned the 12th 

Infantry to 4th Division control-the 

Germans launched their counterattack. 

Coincidentally, one of Colonel Luckett's 

battalions was attacking northward. The 

enemy quickly surrounded two of the 

American companies. Only by hastily 

contriving a line several hundred yards to 

the south was the 12th Infantry able to 

hold onto as much as a third of the 

plateau. Two days later, on 12 November, when two other companies of the 

12th Infantry broke through to the encircled companies, the Germans closed in 

behind them. Then four companies instead of two were surrounded. 

Not until 15 November, on the very 

eve of the November offensive, was 

Colonel Luckett able to extricate these 

four companies. Even then he had to 

settle for a final defensive line near the 

southern edge of the plateau. In nine 

days of bitter combat, the 12th Infantry 

had lost rather than gained ground. A 

thousand men had fallen victim either to 

enemy fire or to combat exhaustion, 

trench foot, or respiratory diseases. The 

way the battalions had to absorb replacements accurately depicted the condition 

of the regiment: new men entered the 

line wherever gaps existed. Then each 

surviving platoon leader assumed control 

of all men in a designated sector. 

The contributions of Colonel Luckett's 

12th Infantry to the main offensive obviously would be limited. Anticipating 

this fact, General Hodges had on 10 

November attached to the VII Corps the 

5th Armored Division's CCR. On 16 

November Colonel Luckett was to renew 

his attack to regain the ground he had 

lost and secure control either of the Weisser Weh road or the Germeter-Huertgen 

highway so that the armor might debouch 

against Huertgen. 

That this maneuver never developed 

could have come as no surprise to those 

who knew the true condition of the 12th 

Infantry. Only in the Weisser Weh valley was the regiment able to gain any 

ground, and there only a few hundred 

yards. Casualties continued to soar so 

that by the end of the action the 12th 

Infantry counted its battle and nonbattle 

losses at more than 1,600. On 2 I No-
430 

vember this dismal failure astride the 

bloody little plateau by a commander and 

a regiment heretofore possessing enviable 

reputations cost Colonel Luckett his command. It was apparent, however, that 

Luckett's superior, General Barton, recognized extenuating circumstances, for 

Colonel Luckett was given command of a 

regiment in another division. 

Thus it was that the Germans already 

had called one strike on the 4th Division. 

General Barton had left but two regiments 

with which to attack on a four-mile front 

to penetrate three and a half miles of 

Huertgen jungle and then to push another 

three and a half miles to the Roer. In 

light of the involvement of the 12th 

Infantry in the V Corps zone, General 

Barton had requested reinforcement, but 

none was forthcoming. Though the shift 

in the corps boundary at midnight 10 

November and the attachment of the 

armored combat command were designed 

to assist, the in~reased responsibilities entailed in these changes created in the long 

run more hindrance than help. 

Because a primary part of the 4th 

Division's mission was to assist the advance of the 1st Division, General Barton 

had to direct one of his regiments to hug 

his north boundary close alongside the 

1st Division's 26th Infantry. This assignment . fell to the 8th Infantry ( Col. 

Richard G. McKee). From a point just 

south of Schevenhuette, the 8th Infantry 

was to attack northeast two miles through 

the forest to high ground about Gut 

Schwarzenbroich, a forest manor on the 

grounds of a ruined monastery. This 

would put the regiment about two thirds 

of the way through the forest in position 

to continue northeast toward Dueren. 

To cover a remaining three forested 

miles between this regiment's southern 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGl\i 

boundary and the positions of the 12th 

Infantry, General Barton had only one 

regiment, Colonel Lanham's 22d Infantry. 

Trying to maintain greatest strength in 

the north, in keeping with the requirement 

of assisting the I st Division, while at the 

same time reducing the gap to the 12th 

Infantry, General Barton directed an attack on a two-battalion front in the center 

of the three-mile zone. He told Colonel 

Lanham to make his main effort on the 

left, hold his reserve on the left, and with 

the help of an attached squadron of 

cavalry keep the area north to the regimental boundary clear. The danger inherent in the regiment's dangling right 

flank would have to be risked in the hope 

that the 12th Infantry might be able to 

close the gap. 

To the 22d Infantry General Barton 

gave initial objectives on the far fringe of 

the forest, the villages of Kleinhau and 

Grosshau. From these villages the regiment was to turn northeastward on Gey 

for eventual convergence with the 8th 

Infantry on the approaches to Dueren. 

On the eve of the November offensive, 

the disturbing thing about the 4th Division's impending attack was not so much 

that the 4th Division must fight in the 

Huertgen Forest. That division after 

division might have to do this had been 

foreordained weeks before when the Americans had persisted in trying to push 

straight through the forest even after the 

first attempts had been set back rudely. 

This American fixation would remain a 

puzzle to more than one enemy commander. As one German officer was to 

put it later, the Germans hardly could 

have used the forest as a base for 

large-scale operations into the American 

flank at Aachen, hoth because "there were 

no forces available for this purpose and 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 431 

because tanks could not be employed in 

this territory." 48 The disturbing thing 

was that despite the hundreds of American 

dead who had fallen victim to the forest, 

the Americans had not altered their 

methods of attack. As early as midSeptember the 9th Division had demonstrated that to send widely separated 

columns through such an obstacle was to 

invite disaster. Yet on a second occasion 

in October the 9th Division had tried the 

same thing and in early November the 

28th Division had followed suit. Now 

the 4th Division was to pursue the same 

pattern. 

The First Army commander, General 

Hodges, did not like the method of attack. 

On the day the 4th Division jumped off, 

Hodges came away from a visit to the 

division with the impression that "they are 

going about the attack in the wrong 

way-running down roads... instead 

of advancing through the woods tightly 

buttoned up yard by yard." 49 On the 

other hand, what was a division commander to do when faced with a frontage 

requiring regimental attack zones from 

one to three miles wide? A zone this wide 

was usually considered great even for 

open ground; the attacks of the 9th and 

28th Divisions already had proved it distinctly too much for the Huertgen Forest.5o 

It is possible that by some untried 

legerdemain the First Army might have 

juggled its units to decrease divisional 

frontages in the forest. Yet the basic 

48 MS # A-8g2 (Gersdorff). At least one 

U.S. commander, General Oliver of the 5th 

Armored Division, could not understand why 

the Huertgen Forest was not pinched out by 

attacks from north and south. See Ltr, Oliver to 

OCMH, 4 Jul 56, OCMH. 

49 Sylvan Diary, entry of 16 Nov 44. 

50 See War Department FM 7-40 (g Feb 42), 

p. 173· 

fact was that, in view of available troops, 

the First Army had a lot of ground to 

cover. This fact was clearly apparent 

from General Hodges' inability to constitute other than a nominal army reserve.51 

A superficial glance at the enemy opposite the 4th Division would not, of 

course, have inspired awe. The same 

nondescript 275th Infantry Division, 

which earlier had opposed the 9th and 

28th Divisions and which by this time 

had absorbed remnants of thirty-seven 

different units, held the line all the way 

from Schevenhuette to the forested plateau near Germeter. The controlling 

corps, General Straube's LXXIV Corps, 

was virtually without reserves. Except 

for the combat command sent north to 

strengthen the reserve of the LX X XI 

Corps, the depleted 116th Panzer Division 

still was on hand; but higher headquarters 

was becoming increasingly insistent that 

this division be released for refitting before 

the Ardennes counteroffensive. As events 

developed, the panzer division was to be 

withdrawn on 2 I November, along with 

most of the headquarters troops that had 

helped defeat the 28th Division's attack on 

Schmidt. The adjoining 89th Division, 

fatigued and markedly understrength after 

the Schmidt fight, obviously could provide 

the 275th Division little help.52 

A closer analysis of the German situation would reveal that the 275th Division 

51 Interv with Thorson, 12 Sept 56. 

52 MSS # C-016 (Straube) and # A-8g1 

(Gersdorff). German sources on Seventh Army 

operations during the latter part of November 

and early December are limited. The postwar 

German manuscripts provide almost the only 

material, although high-level references in the 

A Gp Band OB WEST KTB's are pertinent. 

One of the postwar accounts is excellent: MS # 

B-8IO, Generalleutnant Hans Schmidt, Kaempfe 

im Rheinland 275. Infanterie Division, Part IV. 
432 

had demonstrated twice already that 

within the Huertgen Forest large, wellorganized units composed of first class 

troops were not essential to a steadfast 

defense. Having thickly sown the limited 

network of firebreaks, trails, and roads 

with mines, a few poorly co-ordinated 

squads in well-prepared field fortifications 

might hold off a company or a battalion 

at heavy cost to the attackers. The 

ground under the closely planted trees so 

hoarded the late autumn rains that mud 

could deny routes of communication even 

when other means failed. Barbed wire, 

antipersonnel mines, log bunkers, and logcovered foxholes and machine gun emplacements honeycombed the forest. 

Meshed branches of trees hid them from 

VIew. 

What is more, the 27Sth Division had a 

strength in men and guns which was 

considerably more impressive than could 

have been deduced from the conglomeration of subordinate units involved. Two 

of the division's organic regiments were 

basically intact. Though the third was 

down to about 250 men and was held in 

reserve, a composite regiment created from 

various attached units had taken its place 

in the line. The division had some 6,500 

men, 106 tubes of artillery, 2 I assault 

guns, and 23 antitank guns of 75-mm. or 

above. 53 

Operating under strictest security while 

awaiting D Day, the 4th Division could 

learn little of the specific locations of the 

German positions. Because only small 

engineer units had held most of the line 

here with isolated roadblocks, intelligence 

information passed on to General Barton's 

G-2 was limited. In general, the division 

knew only that the enemy's main line of 

53 MS # B-8IO (Schmidt). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

resistance ran in the extreme south behind 

the Weisser Weh Creek, except for a 

small salient extending toward the Rother 

Weh Creek. After confluence of the 

Rother Weh and the Weisser Weh, about 

two miles southeast of Schevenhuette, the 

two creeks continue as the Weh. 

Of vital concern in the 4th Division's 

attack preparations was the limited road 

net. The key road was a lateral route 

that follows the course of the Weisser Weh 

and Weh. For purposes of identification, 

this was labeled Road W. From Road 

W other routes led both west and east 

like sparse branches on a grotesque tree. 

Those on the west afforded both regiments 

tortuous but adequate supply routes to 

their lines of departure. Attacking from 

the Weh Creek, the 8th Infantry would 

have one good road leading east as well, 

a route labeled Road U, which meandered 

northeast past Gut Schwarzenbroich all 

the way through the forest in the desired 

direction of Dueren. In the southern 

portion of the 8th Infantry's sector, another route called Road V also might 

serve the regiment during early stages of 

the attack. 

It was the 22d Infantry that would feel 

most the effects of the limited roads. 

From this regiment's line of departure 

along the Rother Weh, a mile west of 

lateral Road W, no road existed within 

the regimental sector to provide access 

across Raven's Hedge ridge (Rabenheck) , 

a mile-wide forested highland lying between the Rother Weh and the Weisser 

Weh. For getting supplies across Raven's 

Hedge ridge, the regimental commander, 

Colonel Lanham, had to bank upon improving a firebreak. Once past the 

Weisser Weh, however, the 22d Infantry 

would have one good route, Road X, 

leading east to the village of Grosshau, 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 433 

which was one of the 22d Infantry's 

objectives. A branch of Road X, labeled 

Road Y, led to the other objective, Kleinhau, and a second branch, Road Z, to 

Huertgen. 

Unlike most other units in the N ovember offensive, the 4th Division could count 

on little direct assistance from preliminary 

bombardment. Indeed, even though the 

division was strengthened by the attachment of four artillery battalions, General 

Barton decided against an artillery preparation. Under the conditions prevailing 

in the forest, he deemed the chance of 

achieving surprise more promising. The 

only preliminary support scheduled in the 

4th Division zone was by fighter bombers 

against the villages of Huertgen, Kleinhau, 

Grosshau, and Gey. 

On the 4th Division's left wing, the 8th 

Infantry attempted penetration of the 

enemy's Weh Creek line at a firebreak 

several hundred yards south of axial 

Road U. The leading battalion under Lt. 

Col. Langdon A. Jackson, Jr., took a few 

casualties from 120-mm. mortar fire while 

climbing a precipitous wooded slope beyond the creek, but contined to advance 

until, at a junction of firebreaks, a wellorganized German position came into 

view. Barring further advance was a 

pyramid of three concertinas of heavy 

wire, eight to ten feet high. The ground 

in front was thick with Schuh mines. A 

hail of machine gun fire met every attempt 

to move up to the obstacle. 

Inching forward, daring men tried to 

slide a Bangalore torpedo beneath the 

concertinas. As German fire cut down 

one man, another would take his place. 

At last they had the explosive lodged 

beneath the wire. Anxiously, the rest of 

the battalion waited for the explosion to 

signal a rush through the wire. The cue 

never came. The Bangalore torpedo was 

wet. It would not go off. 

That night the battalion's Ammunition 

and Pioneer Platoon at last blew a gap 

through the wire, but as daylight came on 

I7 November the enemy stymied every 

attempt to charge through. Three times 

Colonel Jackson's men tried it, only to 

falter each time as man after man fell 

before the enemy's fire. By noon this 

battalion had lost about 200 men, the most 

concentrated casualties any unit of the 

regiment was to Incur In the costly forest 

fighting. 

Even after a platoon leader, 1st Lt. 

Bernard J. Ray, had sacrificed his own life 

to blow another gap in the concertina 

obstacle, the men could not get through. 

Thrusting explosive caps in his pocket, 

wrapping a length of primer cord about 

his body, and carrying a Bangalore torpedo, Lieutenant Ray moved alone toward 

the wire. As he paused to prepare his 

demolition charge, an exploding mortar 

shell wounded him severely. Apparently 

aware that unless he completed his task in 

a matter of moments, he would fail, Lieutenant Ray hastily connected the explosive 

to the caps in his pockets and the primer 

cord about his body. Having turned 

himself into a human torpedo, he set off 

the explosion.54 

In the meantime, deep in the forest 

several miles to the southwest, the 22d 

Infantry also had attacked at 1245 on 16 

November. In driving toward Grosshau 

and Kleinhau, this regiment first had to 

cross the wooded Raven's Hedge ridge, 

lying between the line of departure at the 

Rother Weh and the Weisser Weh. 

Though the enemy line here was primarily 

a series of outposts, the going was far from 

54 Lieutenant Ray was posthumously awarded 

the Medal of Honor. 
434 

easy. By nightfall of D Day the leading 

battalion of the 22d Infantry still was 

some 300 yards short of the Weisser Weh. 

This first day's advance across a mile 

of wooded, precipitous ground that had 

no axial road quickly demonstrated the 

supply problems the 22d Infantry would 

experience for days to come. So onerous 

was the task that the leading battalion 

could not be ready to resume the attack 

the next morning. Instead, the regimental commander, Colonel Lanham, 

directed another battalion to move on 17 

November northeast up the ridge along a 

firebreak, which he hoped to develop as 

a supply route. Upon reaching a junction of several firebreaks, which the men 

called Five Points, this battalion was to 

turn east, cross the Weisser Weh, and 

drive on toward Grosshau along the north 

of Road X. As soon as the other battalion had been resupplied, it was to 

resume the attack eastward along the 

south of Road X. 

The firebreak leading to Five Points 

became troublesome almost from the start. 

Hardly had the fresh battalion begun to 

advance when an aptly directed German 

shelling inflicted fifty casualties on the 

lead company, knocked out all communications, and killed the battalion commander. When Colonel Lanham risked 

commitment of a platoon of light tanks, 

the first two tanks struck mines and 

blocked passage of the others. Even 

when the advance reached Five Points, the 

firebreak remained a problem. The 

enemy had strewn it with both antitank 

and antipersonnel mines. Carrying parties had to dodge mines and shells while 

fighting running battles with German 

patrols. The enemy artillery scored another lucky hit late on 17 November when 

a concentration wiped out the commander 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

of the 22d Infantry's reserve battalion and 

most of his staff. 

Despite the problems in the rear, the 

battalion at Five Points made a surprisingly swift advance on the third day, 18 

November. By early afternoon its troops 

not only had crossed lateral Road W but 

had moved several hundred yards beyond 

to occupy a wooded hill lying in the 

northeast angle of the juncture of Roads 

X and W. 

Coincidentally, the battalion on the 

south ran into myriad problems. Its 

south flank exposed, this battalion had to 

beat off a small counterattack before advance could begin. Thereupon the men 

encountered an extensive antipersonnel 

mine field. Trying to find a path around 

the mines, one company got lost and could 

not be located until late in the day. In 

the afternoon enemy fire claimed this 

battalion commander as well. The operations and communications officers and two 

company commanders also were wounded. 

When the battalion executive officer and a 

replacement S-3 moved forward to take 

over, the executive too was hit and the 

new S-3 killed. Not until the regimental 

S-2, Maj. Howard C. Blazzard, arrived in 

late afternoon to assume command was 

this battalion at last able to move. 

Darkness was falling as the depleted companies crossed Road W on the run, waded 

the icy Weisser Weh, and climbed the 

steep slope beyond. 

With a battalion entrenched beyond 

Road W on either side of Road X, the 

22d Infantry at last had registered an 

appreciable gain. But such a strain had 

the task been that Colonel Lanham appealed to General Barton for twenty-four 

hours in which to consolidate. In three 

days the regiment had ·incurred more than 

300 battle casualties, including all three 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 435 

STRUGGLING Up a wooded hillside. 

battalion commanders, several key staff 

officers, about half the company commanders, and many key company officers 

and noncommissioned officers. As others 

had found out before, the close combat of 

the Huertgen Forest was rough on leaders. 

Colonel Lanham had not only an exposed 

south flank, where the 12th Infantry was 

two miles away, but an open north flank 

as well. The 8th Infantry to the north 

was a mile away, and a mile was an alarming distance in the forest. Even between 

the two forward battalions on either side 

of Road X a problem of contact existed, 

for both enemy mines and shelling decreed 

that the troops give Road X a wide berth. 

Behind the lines lay one of the biggest 

problems of all: how to get a supply route 

across Raven's Hedge ridge. Though engineers had gone to work quickly on the 

firebreak leading to Five Points, the task 

had proved more difficult than any could 

have imagined. Constant dripping from 

sodden trees had so permeated the ground 

that passage of even a few vehicles quickly 

transformed the firebreak into a sea of 

mud. The enemy in some instances had 

stacked one mine upon another like pancakes and often had fitted them with 

antilifting devices so that the engineers 
436 

had to explode them in place and then fill 

the craters. Wheels of vehicles digging 

deep in the mud often exploded mines 

missed by the mine detectors. 

Even had the firebreak been passable, 

another obstacle still existed at the 

juncture of Roads X and W. There the 

enemy had destroyed a bridge across the 

Weisser Weh. Uncanny accuracy of German shellfire on the site denied speed in 

rebuilding the bridge and set many to 

wondering if the enemy had not left an 

artillery observer hidden nearby in the 

forest. 

Aside from the difficulty of getting 

supplies forward, the road problem also 

prevented getting tanks, tank destroyers, 

or antitank guns to the front. These 

were urgently needed, not only to support 

further infantry advance but also for defense in the event the enemy employed 

tanks either along Road X or against 

either of the undefended flanks along 

Road W. 

In light of these conditions, General 

Barton hardly could have denied Colonel 

Lanham's request for a twenty-four hour 

respite. Yet in authorizing a day's postponement, Barton sought to implement a 

plan contemplated from the first for easing 

the 22d Infantry's supply problems. He 

told the 8th Infantry also to postpone 

any further eastward advance temporarily 

while turning instead to clear lateral Road 

W southeast to the interregimental boundary. The 22d Infantry in the meantime 

was to clear north to the boundary. 

Vehicles supporting the 22d Infantry then 

might proceed northeast along a road 

paralleling the Rother Weh into the 8th 

Infantry's sector to the confluence of the 

Rother Weh and the Weisser Weh, thence 

south along Road W back into the 22d 

Infantry's zone. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Despite the hold-up at the concertina 

obstacle during the first two days of the 

attack, Colonel McKee's 8th Infantry at 

last had begun to advance. On the third 

day, 18 November, while the 22d Infantry 

was trying to cross Road W, Colonel 

McKee had decided that no matter how 

discouraging the terrain for use of tanks, 

the close fire support of tanks was the 

only solution. Committing afresh battalion of infantry, he sent along a platoon 

of light tanks, a platoon of mediums, and 

three tank destroyers. 

As the armor hugged the trees along 

either side of the firebreak, the infantry 

used the path of the treads as protection 

against antipersonnel mines. Remarkably, 

the tanks struck no antitank mines before reaching the concertina wire. Blasting away with their 75-mm. guns, the 

mediums tore away the obstacle. The 

infantry quickly followed them through. 

Not until the attack had carried a 

thousand yards to reach a clearing near 

the junction of Road U and the Renn 

Weg-the latter a trail leading southeastward in the direction of Gey, then turning 

sharply south toward Grosshau-did the 

infantry and tanks meet another nest of 

organized opposition. This was an elaborately prepared position within what was 

apparently a second line of defense, but 

the Germans had neglected to mine in 

front of it. While the medium tanks and 

tank destroyers provided a base of fire, the 

light tanks and a company of infantry 

threaded through the trees to come upon 

the enemy flank. A fortuitous assist from 

the pilot of a P-47, who flew low over the 

trees to diagnose the situation and then 

strafe the German position, aided the envelopment. 

A battalion of the 8th Infantry now 

had penetrated more than a mile past 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 437 

Road Wand stood no more than a 

thousand yards from high ground in the 

vicinity of Gut Schwarzenbroich, the regiment's first objective. Yet the penetration 

was so slim and pencillike that it hardly 

could be exploited without a broader base. 

To alleviate this situation and at the same 

time fulfill General Barton's directive of 

clearing Road W as far as the interregimental boundary, Colonel McKee on 

19 November sent a battalion southeastward parallel to Road W to seize high 

ground south of Road V. By nightfall 

this battalion was in place. 

Despite this advance, a short stretch of 

Road W between the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments still remained in enemy 

hands. Also, German shelling of the 

bridge site at the junction of Roads X 

and W again had prevented engineers 

from rebuilding the bridge. Thus no 

easing of the 22d Infantry's supply problems was discernible by nightfall of 19 

November. 

For all the American supply problems, 

it was obvious from the relative ease with 

which the 8th Infantry had advanced on 

18 and 19 November and from the 

achievements of the 22d Infantry in 

crossing Road W on 18 November that 

the enemy's overextended 275th Division 

was incapable of denying further advance. 

That this situation would arise could not 

have been unanticipated by the German 

commanders. For days they had been 

engaged in an almost frantic search for 

troops to back up the 275th Division. 

Already they had used contingents of 

what was left of the [[6th Panzer Division, but these were not enough. 

By stretching defensive lines dangerously 

thin, the adjacent corps to the south at 

last managed to pinch out and release the 

344th Infantry Division. A day later a 

volks grenadier division arrived in the 

Seventh Army's southernmost corps and 

eventually would relieve the 353d I nfantry Division. Though the 344th and 

353d Divisions "had little combat value in 

the unusually bitter fighting of the Huertgen Forest," the Germans rushed first the 

344th, then the 353d, to the forest. During the night of 19 November and the 

next day, the 344th moved in behind the 

275th Division. 55 

When both American regiments renewed their attacks to the east and 

northeast on 20 November, the effect of 

the German reinforcements was readily 

apparent. Colonel McKee's 8th Infantry 

cleared additional ground to the southeast 

in the direction of the interregimental 

boundary, but in the main effort toward 

Gut Schwarzenbroich, neither of two attacking battalions could gain. So close 

were the opposing forces in the forest 

that as night came, enemy fire prevented 

the men from cutting logs for overhead 

cover on their foxholes. As all had 

come to know, failure to provide overhead 

cover in the forest was an invitation to 

death. 56 

Resistance was stiff and local counterattacks severe as the 22d Infantry renewed 

its two-battalion attack toward Grosshau 

and Kleinhau. Counterattacks brought 

particularly heavy casualties along the 

open right flank of the regiment. As 

night came, the regiment could note ad-

,,5 MS # A-8g! (Gersdorff) and ETHINT 57 

(Gersdorff) . 

56 During the day, Maj. George L. Mabry, Jr., 

who had just assumed command of the 8th 

Infantry's center battalion, advanced alone to 

find a path through a mine field. He captured 

three of the enemy and had resorted to hand-tohand combat with nine others when his own 

scouts came to his aid. He subsequently received 

the Medal of Honor. 
438 

vances of only a few hundred yards, 

though this meant that the battalion on 

the north of Road X had moved almost to 

the junction of Roads X and Y. 

Going any farther than this in the face 

of determined resistance and without an 

adequate supply route obviously was a 

hazardous proposition. Although Colonel 

Lanham had but two battalions actually 

up front, his reserve already was tied up 

with diverse mISSIOns: protecting the 

regiment's exposed flanks, clearing Road 

W north to the 8th Infantry, and eliminating German infiltration and bypassed 

strongpoints, one of which had taken the 

regimental command post under fire. 

One company of the reserve was combing 

the woods near the Weisser Weh bridge 

site, trying to find the enemy artillery 

observer suspected of directing the uncannily accurate shellfire on the site. 

Casualties, even in the reserve, had been 

alarming. In addition, German tanks 

(or assault guns) had been spotted along 

Roads X and Y. Though these had 

operated singly in passive defensive roles, 

no one could say when they might change 

their tactics. 

By constructing a bridge in sections 

within the woods away from the bridge 

site, the engineers at last got a firm 

crossing of the Weisser Weh in place 

during the night of 20 November. The 

next day they were to find the enemy's 

artillery observer hidden in the woods. 

Yet the 22d Infantry still had no supply 

route, for not until late on 2 I November 

were patrols of Colonel Lanham's regiment to make contact along Road W with 

those of Colonel McKee's. 

By nightfall of 20 November the awful 

price the 4th Division's two regiments had 

had to pay in the five-day attack that 

had brought no penetration deeper than a 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

mile and a half was readily apparent. 

Some rifle companies were down below 

fifty effectives. Several had only one or 

two officers left. Losses in battalion 

commanders had been strikingly severe, 

particularly in the 22d Infantry. Perhaps 

the hardest hit unit of either regiment was 

the south-wing battalion of the 22d Infantry, which had both to attack and 

defend the regiment's open southern 

flank. That battalion had been reduced 

to the size of a company. For the two 

regiments the toll in battle casualties alone 

was about I,50o. Several hundred more 

men had been evacuated with respiratory 

diseases, trench foot, and combat exhaustion. Although replacements had begun 

what was to become a daily trek to the 

front lines, they never were to equal the 

fallen men in numbers, and days and 

weeks would pass before they might approach the fallen in experience. The 4th 

Division obviously needed a pause for 

breath. 

Out of a decision made at First Army 

level developed the opportunity for a 

pause. A day before, on I9 November, 

General Hodges had ordered the V Corps 

to join the offensive. The inability of the 

I2th Infantry to gain ground from which 

the attached combat command of the 5th 

Armored Division might take Huertgen 

had underscored the importance of that 

village. Transferring Huertgen to the V 

Corps sector would ensure its capture and 

at the same time help the 4th Division by 

decreasing its zone of responsibility. 

General Hodges reckoned that by speeding the relief of the 28th Division in the 

Germeter-Vossenack area, the V Corps 

might attack as early as 2 I November with 

a fresh infantry division. To assist this 

division, he gave the combat command to 

the V Corps. So that the new force 
VII CORPS MAKES THE MAIN EFFORT 439 

might assist the 4th Division even more, 

General Hodges gave the V Corps responsibility not only for Huertgen but 

also for Kleinhau, the southernmost of 

the 22d Infantry's objectives. 57 

As soon as troops of the V Corps 

passed through the 12th Infantry in the 

attack on Huertgen, the 12th Infantry 

was to move north into 4th Division reserve. After shoring up the regiment 

with replacements, General Barton might 

use it to protect the south flank of the 

57 See V Corps Ltr of Instrs, 19 Nov 44, V 

Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 310. 

22d Infantry. No doubt infinitely relieved by this turn of events, General 

Barton told Colonel McKee and Colonel 

Lanham to take another twenty-four-hour 

rest from the offensive. Use the time, he 

said, to consolidate gains and open adequate supply routes. The attack would 

be renewed on 22 November.58 

On 2 I November, fresh forces were to 

enter the November offensive. On the 

German side, the 344th Division had replaced the 27Sth. On the American side, 

the V Corps was to strike for Huertgen. 

58 4th Div FO 54, 20 Nov, 4th Div FO file, 

Oct-Dec 44. 
CHAPTER XIX 

V Corps Joins the Offensive 

Except for the preliminary operation by 

the 28th Division to capture Schmidt, 

General Hodges originally had not contemplated employing General Gerow's V 

Corps until after the VII Corps had 

achieved a penetration. At that point, 

General Gerow was to have launched a 

major drive close alongside the VII Corps 

in the direction of Bonn.l But by 19 

November, three days after start of the 

offensive, it had become obvious that 

extra weight was needed if the VII Corps 

was to achieve a genuine pentration. 

Because advance had not been sufficient 

to enable commitment of additional forces 

within the zone of the main effort, the 

most likely hope for quick assistance 

appeared to lie with the adjacent V Corps. 

(See Map VI.) 

Sharing a common boundary running 

just south of Huertgen with the 4th Division of the VII Corps, General Gerow by 

19 November had almost completed relief 

of the exhausted 28th Division with the 

full-strength 8th Division. By establishing a temporary corps boundary north of 

Huertgen and Kleinhau, this fresh division 

might be employed to broaden the offensive. Thereby progress of the main effort 

might be facilitated while at the same 

time the bulk of the V Corps would be 

reserved for exploiting a breakthrough. 

Commitment of the 8th Division surely 

could be expected to facilitate advance of 

the 4th Division through the Huertgen 

1 FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, p. 67. 

Forest. Aside from reducing the width of 

the 4th Division's zone by over a mile 

and enabling unrestricted use of all three 

of General Barton's regiments, relieving 

the 4th Division of responsibility for a 

stanchly defended objecti'{e like Huertgen 

would be a big help. With Huertgen in 

hand, the V Corps would be in position 

for continuing the attack to the southeast 

to clear the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge, 

which had proved such an embarrassment 

to earlier operations of the 28th Division. 

General Hodges specified his decision 

late on 19 November. Laying on a new 

intercorps boundary, he directed that the 

V Corps take Huertgen and Kleinhau. 

To assist, he relieved the 5th Armored 

Division's CCR from attachment to the 

VII Corps and gave it back to General 

Gerow for attachment to the 8th Division. 

D Day for the attack was 21 November. 2 

A Fourth Fight on the 

Bloody Plateau 

Despite the misfortunes that earlier had 

befallen three regiments of as many different divisions on the bloody, wooded plateau north of Germeter and astride the 

Germeter-Huertgen highway, this was the 

only place within the V Corps boundaries 

2 Although no copy of Hodges' order as contained in FUSA Ltr of lnstrs, 19 Nov 44, can be 

found, the essence is discernible from V Corps 

Ltr of lnstrs, 2230, 19 Nov 44. as reproduced in 

V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 3 ro. See 

also FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, p. 79. 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

that presented any real chance of success 

in attacking Huertgen. Indeed, a stipulation from General Hodges that the V 

Corps accomplish a rapid passage of the 

12th Infantry's existing lines so that the 

12th Infantry might move quickly to the 

zone of its parent division all but dictated 

that the first stage of the attack follow the 

old pattern. 

Both because of the configuration of 

terrain along the wooded plateau and because of defensive responsibilities inherited 

from the 28th Division, the burden of the 

first stage of the 8th Division's attack was 

to fall upon one infantry regiment. The 

division commander, Maj. Gen. Donald A. 

Stroh, had little choice but to conform 

rigidly to the framework that had been 

devised for the earlier attack on Huertgen 

by the 12th Infantry. As soon as the 

infantry could secure the long-sought line 

of departure along the woods line overlooking Huertgen, the attached combat 

command of armor would debouch from 

the woods against the village. 3 

Because two of the 8th Division's regiments already had occupied defensive 

positions around Vossenack, the logical 

choice for making the attack was the 

regiment which had not yet arrived from 

the division's former zone in Luxembourg. 

This was the 12 I st Infantry, commanded 

by Col. John R. Jeter. Unfortunately, 

when General Stroh received the order to 

3 See 8th Div FO 16, 20 Nov, 8th Div AAR, 

Nov 44. Unless otherwise noted, the story of this 

action is taken from official records of the 8th 

Division and CCR, 5 th Armored Division, and 

from extensive combat interviews with officers 

and men of both units. Having entered combat 

with the First Army on 6 July 1944, the 8th 

(Pathfinder) Division subsequently had moved to 

Brest to fight under the Ninth Army until capture of Brest on 19 September. Since that time 

the division had been holding defensive positions 

with the VIII Corps in the Ardennes. 

441 

attack, Colonel Jeter's 12 1st Infantry was 

107 road miles away from what would be 

its line of departure. The regiment could 

not arrive in the Huertgen Forest until 

late on 20 November, only a few hours 

before H Hour at ogoo, 2 I November. 

The stage was set for the same kind of 

bruising tumble Colonel Luckett and the 

12th Infantry had taken in this same 

sector little more than a fortnight before. 

Though General Stroh ordered the 

12 I st Infantry to begin moving north 

immediately, rain, fog, mud, and darkness 

so slowed the column that the last serial 

did not close in the detrucking area until 

just before dark on 20 November. The 

infantry then had a seven-mile foot march 

to assembly areas behind the 12th Infantry. Fatigued from the journey and 

the march, harassed by enemy shelling, 

and bewildered by the confusion of moving 

tactically into a strange woods at night, 

Colonel Jeter's troops at last lined up 

behind the 12th Infantry about three 

hours before daylight on D Day, 2 I 

November. 

Despite the dismal record of other units 

on the wooded plateau, some, including 

the army commander, General Hodges, 

believed that this fresh force had a strong 

chance for quick success. Indeed, by 

ordering originally that the attached 

armor pass through the 12 1st Infantry on 

the second day of attack, the corps 

commander had indicated an expectation 

that the infantry might reach the woods 

line on the first day.4 Even though General Gerow subsequently acceded to a 

request from General Stroh to leave the 

date of commitment of the armor indefinite, the V Corps commander hardly 

4 Sylvan Diary, entry of 20 Nov 44; see also 

Combat Interv with Colonel Jeter. 
442 

could have felt any particular concern for 

the enemy set to oppose the fresh American regiment. Latest identifications had 

revealed that the same four understrength 

German battalions of the 27Sth Division 

which had fought the 12th Infantry for 

more than ten days still held the area. 

In the immediate sector of the wooded 

plateau this was pretty much the true 

German situation. Yet intelligence officers 

had failed to note the arrival in the last 

few hours of the 344th Infantry Division, 

which German commanders had milked 

from adjacent corps farther south. 

Though these new troops might have 

"little combat value," as German commanders maintained, they still might give 

a good account of themselves in the 

constricted terrain of this region." 

An hour before the scheduled jump-off, 

V Corps artillery with an assist from some 

guns of the VII Corps began a preparation 

involving 4,500 rounds against known and 

suspected enemy gun positions. All were 

TOT missions with an average of five 

battalions of artillery on each target. 

Reinforced by guns of the 5th Armored 

Division's CCR and by two companies of 

chemical mortars, the 8th Division's 

organic artillery fired on the enemy's front 

lines and the villages beyond. By the 

end of the day 8th Division artillery was 

to have expended an impressive total of 

9,289 rounds. 6 Just how effective these 

fires were was hard to say, for the woods 

and a thick, low overcast severely restricted observation. The weather also 

prevented any assistance from fighterbombers. Though medium bombers got 

'MSS # A-891 (Gersdorff), B-8IO (Schmidt), 

and ETHINT-S7 (Gersdorff). 

Ii V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 316; V 

Corps Arty Per Unit Rpt 164, 21-22 Nov, V 

Corps G-3 file, 21-23 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

through to drop thirty-two tons of bombs 

on Bergstein, their strike was too far in 

advance of the ground troops to have 

immediate value. 7 

With all three battalions on line, the 

12 I st Infantry attacked at the scheduled 

hour, 0900, 2 I November. One battalion 

headed north up the Weisser Weh valley, 

another moved astride the bloody plateau, and the third attacked along the 

Germeter-Huertgen highway. 

Hardly had the artillery finished its 

bombardment before the pattern the 

ground fighting would take for the next 

four days emerged. On the first day, no 

unit made any appreciable advance except 

one company east of the GermeterHuertgen highway, which gained a meager 

500 yards.s The woods were as thick as 

ever with antipersonnel mines, with log 

bunkers bristling with automatic weapons, 

with barbed wire, and even more than 

ever with broken tree trunks and branches 

that obscured the soggy ground and 

turned any movement, even when not 

under enemy fire, into a test of endurance. 

Any hope that the enemy might not have 

much fight left was quickly dispelled. 

For all the good the American infantry 

could detect, the attempts by American 

artillery to silence the enemy's big guns 

and mortars might have been made with 

7 FUSA Rpt, Vol. I, p. 79, and V Corps 

Operations in the ETO, p. 316. 

R The men of this company could attribute 

much of this success to a squad leader, S. Sgt. 

John W. Minick. Having picked his way 

through a mine field crisscrossed with barbed 

wire, Sergeant Minick personally dispatched a 

force of German defenders by killing twenty and 

capturing. as many more. Later he knocked out 

a machine gun. As he tried to find a path 

through a second m.ine field, he stepped on a 

mine and was killed. Sergeant Minick was 

posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 443 

V CORPS ROCKET LAUNCHERS bombarding German positions. 

peashooters. Not until last light of the 

first day did Colonel Jeter's regiment 

complete even a passage of the 12th 

Infantry's lines. 

For three more days the 12 1st Infantry 

plodded on, absorbing sometimes alarming 

casualties, enduring conditions that made 

men weep, and registering daily gains that 

varied from nothing to 600 yards. On 

the second day, 22 November, a cold, 

driving rain mixed at intervals with snow 

added to the other miseries. Visibility 

was so poor that no planes could operate, 

not even the brave little liaison planes 

from which observers registered artillery 

fires. Although 8th Division and V 

Corps artillery fired 12,500 rounds during 

the second day, many of them against 

suspected mortar positions, visibility was 

so restricted and sound and flash conditions so poor that no one could make any 

definite claim for these fires. On 23 and 

24 November Colonel Jeter committed 

attached light tanks along the firebreaks, 

but they bogged helplessly in the mud. 

Other tanks trying to move up the 

Germeter-Huertgen highway fell quick 

prey to German guns in Huertgen. 

German shelling prompted one American commander to remark that the enemy 
444 

"threw back an equal amount of artillery." 9 As attested by a field artillery 

officer directly supporting the 121st Infantry, this was hardly the case, but the 

artillery officer did note that the Germans 

"fired unusually heavy concentrations for 

them." 10 The shelling probably took on 

added weight because the limited zone of 

operations permitted the Germans to concentrate their fires. For the first few 

days of the attack, German artillery and 

self-propelled guns estimated at from eight 

to ten battalions fired in excess of 3,500 

rounds per day. At first, this fire was 

distributed equally between light and 

medium rounds, but by 23 and 24 November medium shells had come to 

predominate, indicating that the German 

light batteries might be displacing rearward.ll 

The first positive indication of success 

in the attack arose on 24 November on 

the 12 1st Infantry's left wing. Here the 

westernmost battalion was trying to drive 

up the Weisser Weh valley in order that 

the subsequent attack by armor might 

be made up the Weisser Weh road (Road 

W) instead of the cruelly exposed 

Germeter-Huertgen highway. In three 

days this battalion had registered only 

minor gains, but on 24 November the 

commitment of a company around the 

left flank resulted in an encouraging 

advance. 

This news had scarcely reached the 

regimental command post when the bottom dropped out. The flanking company 

came suddenly under a heavy concentration of artillery fire, heightened as always 

9 Combat Interv with Maj Joseph D. Johnston, 

IstBn,I2Istlnf. 

10 Combat Interv with Maj R. W. Wiltsie, 

Exec 0, 56th FA Bn. 

11 Annex 3 to 8th Div AAR, Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

in the forest by deadly bursts in the trees 

and followed by a sharp local counterattack. The strain of the previous days 

of fighting apparently had unnerved both 

men and officers of this company. The 

men fell backP 

Colonel Jeter promptly relieved both 

the company and battalion commanders 

involved in this incident and a day later 

had to appoint a third company commander when artillery fire cut down the 

second. These were the first in a wave of 

summary reliefs touched off by the inconclusiveness of the regiment's advance. 

In four days a total of three company 

commanders lost their commands. In 

one company all officers either were 

relieved or broke under the strain. A 

second battalion commander also was replaced. One platoon leader who refused 

to order his men back into the line was 

placed under arrest. Unless the regiment 

could find some way to break the impasse, 

heads higher up also might roll. Two 

days before, for example, the army commander had "made it quite clear" to 

General Stroh that he expected better 

results. 13 

Justified or not, the reliefs took place 

under extenuating circumstances imposed 

by the misery and incredible difficulty of 

the forest fighting. It was attrition unrelieved. Overcoats soaked with moisture 

and caked with freezing mud became too 

heavy for the men to wear. Seeping rain 

turned radios into useless impedimenta. 

So choked with debris was the floor of the 

forest that men broke under the sheer 

physical strain of moving supplies forward 

and evacuating the wounded. The fighting was at such close quarters that hand 

12 See Combat Intc.rv with S Sgt Anthony 

Rizzo, Co G. 

13 Sylvan Diary, entry of 23 Nov 44. 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

grenades often were the decisive weapon. 

The mine fields seemed endless. A platoon could spend hours probing, searching, 

determining the pattern, only to discover 

after breaching one mine field that another just as extensive lay twenty-five 

yards ahead. Unwary men who sought 

cover from shellfire in ditches or abandoned foxholes might trip lethal booby 

traps and turn the promised sanctuary 

into an open grave. When a diabolical 

enemy planted booby traps underneath 

one seriously wounded soldier, the man 

lay motionless for seventy-two hours, 

driven almost insane in his efforts to 

maintain consciousness in order to warn 

whoever might come to his rescue.14 

Added to all the other miseries was a 

constant reminder of the toll this bloody 

little plateau already had exacted. Because concern for the living had from the 

first taken precedence over respect for the 

dead, the swollen bodies of the fallen of 

three other regiments still lay about in 

grotesque positions. At the end of the 

fourth day of fighting on 24 November, 

the 12 I st Infantry had deposited fifty 

known dead of its own on the ground and 

incurred a total of about 600 battle 

casualties. Almost as many more men 

had fallen prey to the elements or to 

combat exhaustion. 

By nightfall of 24 November, the 121st 

Infantry still had not gained 'the objective 

along the edge of the woods overlooking 

Huertgen. Unless some method could be 

devised for relieving the infantry of some 

of the offensive burden, there seemed to 

14 A vivid, moving account of the Huertgen 

Forest fighting may be found in Paul Boesch, Road 

to Huertgen: Forest in Hell (Houston: Gulf Publishing Co., 1962). The author assumed command of Company G,. 12 1st Infantry, at the 

height of the battle. 

445 

be no immediate hope of gammg the 

objective. Particularly disturbing was the 

fact that the regiment's left wing had 

failed to advance fa:r enough up the 

Weisser Weh valley to. enable the attached 

armor to use the Weisser Weh road in 

preference to the exposed GermeterHuertgen highway. 

Despite the patent impossibility of committing the armor anywhere but along the 

perilous highway, a conference at 8th 

Division headquarters during the day 

ended in a decision to' use the armor the 

next day as the only real hope for breaking 

what was beginning to look like a stalemate. The 8th Division commander, 

General Stroh, told the: 5th Armored 

Division's CCR to move- up the GermeterHuertgen highway before daylight the 

next day, 25 November, and to strike at 

0730 for Huertgen. 

For his part, the CCR commander, 

Colonel Anderson, noted that more than 

the enemy's long-range observation on the 

Germeter-Huertgen highway stood in the 

way of his combat command's successful 

debouchment against Huertgen. AI· 

though a company of the 12 I st Infantry 

had reached the woods line on the east of 

the highway, the Germans still controlled 

several hundred yards of forest bordering 

on the west of the road, a logical hiding 

place for antitank guns or panzerfausts. 

So long as the Germans held there, engineers could not sweep, that portion of the 

highway for mines. Besides that, a big 

bomb crater near the southern edge of 

the woods would have to be bridged 

before the tanks could get into position 

for their jump-off. 

As the night deepened, the 12 1st Infantry and the 8th Di.vision's organic 

engineers set out to put these matters 

right. At 0055, 25 NmTember, the 8th 
446 

Division's assistant G-3 acted upon reports from the I 2 I st Infantry to assure 

Colonel Anderson that both sides of the 

highwa y were clear as far as the woods 

line and that the engineers had swept the 

road for mines. Although the 8th Division recorded no specific message to the 

effect that the engineers had bridged the 

bomb crater, several recorded messages 

gave that impression. In any event, the 

8th Division engineer personally assured 

the combat command that by daylight 

either the crater would be bridged or a 

path around it cleared. CCR got set to 

move.!5 

Just as day was breaking on 25 November the lead tanks of CCR's loth Tank 

Battalion reached the crater. They found 

neither a path around it nor a bridge. 

A great, ya wning chasm, the crater 

blocked all vehicular passage. 

The commander of the first tank, I st 

Lt. J. A. Macaulay, was not easily discouraged. "I'm going to try to jump the 

damned thing," he called back on his 

radio. Gathering speed, his tank roared 

up the muddy road. At the last moment, 

the driver applied one final burst of speed. 

It wasn't enough. The tank slammed 

into the far wall of the crater, rolled to 

the left, and lay disabled on one side. 

The Germans obviously would not 

ignore the sound of all this activity along 

the road. Aided by increasing daylight, 

they began to plaster the road with 

mortar and artillery fire. Even though 

the l2 I st Infantry had reported the woods 

along the highway clear, small arms fire 

from the woods inflicted serious losses on 

CCR's armored infantry. In less than an 

15 See 8th Div G-3 Jnl, 24-25 Nov, 8th Div Jnl 

file for 23-27 Nov 44, and Combat Intervs with 

CCR personnel, particularly Interv with Capt 

Frank M. Pool, loth Tank En. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

hour one of the infantry companies took 

over sixty casualties, including all platoon 

sergeants and platoon leaders. 

Through the rest of the day men and 

commanders worked to get the armor 

moving. In a constant search for the 

enemy guns that were pounding the 

exposed highway, supporting artillery and 

tank destroyers poured over l5,000 

rounds into enemy lines. A temporary 

break in overcast skies enabled three 

squadrons of the IX T AC's 366th Group 

to bomb and strafe suspected tank and 

artillery pOSItIons near Huertgen and 

along the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge. 

Chemical mortars laid down smoke so that 

the engineers might try to bridge the big 

crater. 

Aided by a slight lessening of hostile 

shellfire, the engineers finally got a bridge 

across the crater in midmorning. First 

to cross was a tank commanded by Sgt. 

William Hurley. The tank had proceeded 

along the road only seventy-five yards 

when it struck a mine. Disabled, the 

tank blocked passage as effectively as had 

the crater. Though a tank retriever 

moved up and nosed Sergeant Hurley's 

tank aside, a round from an enemy tank 

or antitank gun ripped into the retriever. 

Again the highway was blocked. 

Though the annored infantry tried 

later to advance alone, this was in effect 

the end of CCR's abortive attempt to 

reach Huertgen on 25 November. Having lost some l50 men in an unfortunate 

experience, the combat command withdrew. 

In the meantime, that part of Colonel 

Jeter's I 2 I st Infantry that was west of 

the highway had been renewing the 

attempts to penetrate the forest. Though 

the infantry began to make toilsome but 

encouraging progress during the after-
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

ENGINEERS REPAIR A ROAD in the 

Huertgen Forest, 25 November. 

noon, the advances came too late to save 

Colonel Jeter his command. In midafternoon General Stroh relieved him. 

The 8th Division's Chief of Staff, CoL 

Thomas J. Cross, assumed command of 

the regiment. I6 

The Fight for Huertgen 

To the fatigued men of the 12 1st 

Infantry, the failure to shake the armor 

loose on 25 November meant another 

prolongation of their trials. No doubt 

impressed by the facility with which 

German gun~ in Huertgen could deal 

with armor, General Stroh directed that 

the infantry alone take Huertgen. Only 

16 Like the 12th Infantry's Colonel Luckett, 

Colonel Jeter retained his rank and was given 

command of a regiment in another division. 

447 

then, with firm control of the GermeterHuertgen highway assured, would CCR's 

armor be committed in quest of the 

remaining objective, the village of Kleinhau. 

The prospects of the infantry reaching 

the woods line and then taking Huertgen 

were not so dismal as a cursory look at 

the first five arduous days of fighting 

might indicate. Whereas the 12 1st Infantry's advances had been laborious, the 

regiment nevertheless had prodded the 

enemy from the more readily defensible 

lines in the forest. To the north, fairly 

consistent progress by the 4th Division 

had outflanked those Germans still in the 

woods along the left flank of the 12 1st 

Infantry. By juggling troops on the 

defensive fronts held by the 8th Division's 

other two regiments, General Stroh had 

freed the 1St Battalion, 13th Infantry, to 

assist in renewing the attack. He gave 

this battalion to Colonel Cross, the new 

121st Infantry commander, who told the 

battalion commander, Lt. Col. Morris J. 

Keesee, to circle around through the 

forest into the 4th Division's zone and on 

27 November to strike for Huertgen along 

the left flank of the 12 I st Infantry from 

the woods line northwest of the village. 

On 26 November, while Colonel Keesee's battalion was shifting position, the 

12 I st Infantry tried again to clear the 

Huertgen woods line. Even the most 

optimistic hardly could have predicted the 

ease with which the battalions advanced. 

The Germans had withdrawn from the 

woods. Only mines, sporadic shelling, and 

a few stragglers barred the way. By 

I 100 the 12 I st Infantry overlooked Huertgen from the west and southwest. 

The 12 1st Infantry commander, Colonel Cross, ordered an immediate attack on 

Huertgen. A report from the Intelligence 
448 

and Reconnaissance Platoon of a neighboring regiment to the effect that the 

Germans had abandoned the village 

spurred the prepaJ:ations. 

U nf ortunately, .as men of the 121 st 

Infantry and Colonel Keesee's battalion 

of the 13th Infantry soon discovered, the 

report of withdrawal from Huertgen was 

unfounded. The village that for more 

than two months had lain so near and yet 

so far still was not to be had at a bargain 

pnce. 

On 27 November tank destroyers took 

position along the woods line to spew 

covering fire into the village, and a platoon 

of Sherman tanks joined the leading 

infantry battalion. Artillery took quick 

advantage of improved observation and in 

one instance knocked out a German tank 

with five hits, not a unique but a nonetheless noteworthy accomplishment for 

guns laid indirectlyY By nightfall the 

Germans still held the bulk of Huertgen's 

shell-shattered buildings; but Colonel Keesee's battalion had severed the HuertgenKleinhau highway and gained a toehold in 

the northeastern edge of the village, while 

a battalion of the 121 st Infantry under 

Lt. Col. Henry B. Kunzig wriggled into a 

few buildings in the western edge. IS 

Bolstered by .the 31 st Machine Gun 

Battalion, one df 'several small units General Brandenberger's Seventh Army had 

solicited from the inactive front farther 

south, the enemy would make a fight of it 

in Huertgen for still another day. Even 

when Colonel Keesee's battalion at daybreak on 28 November seized Hill 401, a 

strategic height mthousand yards northeast of Huertgen, commanding the village, 

17 V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 319. 

18 The trials of the latter battalion are vividly 

depicted in Boesch, Road to Huertgen. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the Germans held on in Huertgen. They 

folded only in the afternoon after Colonel 

Kunzig's reserve company, riding medium 

tanks of the 709th Tank Battalion, edged 

onto the main street. Over 200 prisoners 

had been rounded up when Colonel Cross 

was able to announce about 1800 on 28 

November that Huertgen was in hand. 

Scores of other Germans lay buried amid 

the debris that long weeks of war had 

inflicted upon this little agricultural community. For a long time the village 

would bear the terrible stench of war. 

An Armored Drive on Kleinhau 

About the time Huertgen fell, the. 8th 

Division commander, General Stroh, was 

departing the division on a leave of absence. A veteran of the fighting since the 

North African campaign, General Stroh 

had seen his son shot down and killed 

while flying a fighter-bomber in support of 

the 8th Division at Brest. Higher commanders had deemed it time General Stroh 

had a rest, with the proviso that he return 

later to command another division. A 

former assistant commander of the goth 

Division, Brig. Gen. William G. Weaver, 

assumed command of the 8th.19 

As one of his first official acts in his 

new post, General Weaver directed the 

attached CCR, 5th Armored Division, to 

move to Huertgen. CCR was to attack 

at dawn the next day, 2g November, 

toward the 8th Division's next objective a 

mile north of Huertgen, the village of 

Kleinhau. 

198th Div AAR, Nov 44; Ltr, Weaver to 

OCMH, 9 Apr 56, OCMH; Interv with General 

Cross, 23 Aug 56; Sylvan Diary, entry of 27 Nov 

44. See also Maj. Gen .. William G. Weaver, 

Yankee Doodle Went to Town (privately 

printed, 1959). 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 449 

TANK ATTACHED TO T HE 8TH DIVISION moves through Huertgen. 

To soften up the objective, 8th Division 

and V Corps artillery and IX T AC 

fighter-bombers co-operated closely during 

the afternoon of 28 November in an attack 

by fire against Kleinhau. The artillery 

first laid down an antiflak barrage which 

the fliers subsequently termed "very effective." 20 As the planes appeared, the 

artillery switched to red smoke to mark 

the target. Coming in at treetop level, 

P-38'S of the 474th Group dropped 

sixty-three napalm fire bombs, some as 

close as 300 yards to friendly infantry. 

2 0 See Daily Summaries in IX TAC, Unit 

History, Nov 44. 

Pilots ecstatically reported the objective 

"practically destroyed by flames." More 

reserved in their comments, ground observers nevertheless praised the accuracy 

of the strike. This joint air-artillery 

operation was a model of its kind, one of 

the more spectacular examples of the type 

of co-operation between air and ground 

arms that became increasingly effective as 

the fall campaign wore on. 

At 0730 the next day, 29 November, a 

task force from CCR composed of two 

companies each of medium tanks and 

armored infantry under Lt. Col. William 

A. Hamberg, commander of the loth 
450 

Tank Battalion, moved forward. Because 

prisoners had reported an antitank mine 

field between Huertgen and Kleinhau, 

Colonel Hamberg attacked first with dismounted infantry; but when German fire 

forced the infantry to cover, he had little 

choice but to throw his tanks into the 

assault echelon. 

If the Germans actually had a mine 

field protecting Kleinhau, they had neglected to mine the road itself. Following 

closely in the tracks of a lead tank commanded by Capt. Francis J. Baum, the 

tankers plunged into the village. By 

0900, only minutes after entering the fight, 

the Shermans were cruising in the center 

of Kleinhau. 

A lone Mark IV tank in Kleinhau 

knocked out one Sherman before the 

Americans could eliminate it, and an SP 

gun in the woods east of the village scored 

one hit. Enemy shelling also made it 

difficult for infantry to accompany the 

tanks in mopping up. Not until early 

afternoon when the weather cleared and 

American planes appeared did the shellfire 

abate. "The mere presence of the planes 

caused a noticeable decrease in enemy 

artillery . . . ." 21 By midafternoon some 

fifty-five prisoners from diverse units were 

en route to PW enclosures. Kleinhau 

was clear. 

Task Force Hamberg continued to 

receive fire from the neighboring village of 

Grosshau to the north. This the armor 

could do little about, because the 4th 

Division was to have assaulted Grosshau 

at the same time CCR hit Kleinhau. 

During the morning the 4th Division's 

attack had been delayed, so that Colonel 

Hamburg had obtained permission to fire 

on the village to silence antitank guns; 

21 CCR, 5th Armd Div, AAR, Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

but by midafternoon the 4th Division's 

attack was on again. Grosshau again 

was out of bounds to fire from CCR. 

In late afternoon, Colonel Hamberg 

pushed a small force beyond Kleinhau to 

establish two roadblocks, one on either 

side of a commanding eminence, Hill 

401.3. The armor did not occupy the 

hill itself because-Colonel Anderson, the 

CCR commander, said later~the crest 

was "as flat as a billiard table" and the 

tanks could control it by fire. 22 Colonel 

Keesee's battalion of the 13th Infantry 

during the night relieved Task Force 

Hamberg. 

For all the speed of the attack on 

Kleinhau, it was not without appreciable 

cost. In armor, Task Force Hamberg 

had lost 8 tanks-2 to high-velocity fire 

and 6 to mines; 13 half-tracks, most of 

which were recovered; and 1 tank destroyer. In personnel, the task force lost 

approximately 60 men, most of them 

victims of German shellfire. 

The nine-day fight for Huertgen and 

Kleinhau had cost the 121 st Infantry and 

the attached CCR and 1 st Battalion, 13th 

Infantry, a total of approximately 1,247 

casualties.23 This was an awesome price 

to pay for a limited advance, but all who 

fought in the Huertgen Forest came to 

know that this was the kind of price that 

had to be paid. German casualties were 

at least equal and probably greater in 

view of the fact that the enemy lost 882 

in prisoners alone. 

A question existed as to whether this 

limited attack had, as intended, materi22 Combat Interv with Colonel Anderson. 

n CCR: approximately 2 10 casualties of all 

types; 121st Infantry: 63 killed, 899 others; 1st 

Battalion, 13th Infantry:. approximately 75 of all 

types. The last figure is an estimate based on 

figures for the entire 13th Infantry. 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

ally assisted advance of the VII Corps; 

but, even if the answer was negative, the 

fact was that control of Huertgen and 

Kleinhau marked an important contribution to subsequent operations. In driving 

northeastward on the Roer at Dueren, ~he 

4th Division now could flaunt its tail at 

Kleinhau, something which heretofore 

would have been perilous. Possession of 

the two villages spelled control of a sizable 

segment of the only good road network 

between the Huertgen Forest and the 

Roer and represented in effect a "bridgehead" upon the Brandenberg-Bergstein 

ridge, the most commanding terrain in 

the vicinity. Capture of the ridge would 

enable the V Corps to gain the Roer~a 

little more than two miles from Huertgen-and at last provide the long-sought 

secure right flank for the main drive of the 

VII Corps. The Brandenberg-Bergstein 

ridge also was important to any drive that 

subsequently might be aimed at the Roer 

River Dams. Anyone familiar with the 

28th Division's tragic attack for Schmidt 

could attest to that. 

Broadening the Effort 

It hardly could have come as a surprise 

when General Hodges late on 28 November directed a continuation of the V 

Corps offensive to take the BrandenbergBergstein ridge. Indeed, so obvious was 

the assignment that even before consultation with General Hodges the corps 

commander had told the 8th Division's 

new commander, General Weaver, to get 

started. CCR of the 5th Armored Division remained attached for the operation.24 

24 V Corps Ltrs of Instrs, 28 and 29 Nov 44, 

V Corps Operations in ETO, p. 320; FUSA Ltr 

of Instrs, 28 Nov 44. Although no copy of the 

FUSA order has been found, FUSA Rpt, Vol I, 

p. 83, contains an adequate summary. 

451 

Attacking the Brandenberg-Bergstein 

ridge from Huertgen and Kleinhau was 

infinitely preferable to the other route of 

approach across the heavily wooded draw 

from Vossenack, but the preferred 

route had drawbacks nonetheless. The 

Kleinhau-Brandenberg highway, running 

southeast along the spine of the ridge, 

marks a narrow corridor between two 

woods. On the southwest the enemy still 

controlled the Tiefen Creek woods between 

the ridge and Vossenack. He also still 

held a stretch of woodland embracing the 

northeastern slopes of the ridge. Advancing down the highway from Kleinhau to 

Brandenberg would be like attacking 

down a fairway while the enemy controlled the rough on either side. 

With explicit detail quite typical of 

most of his orders during the fall campaign, the V Corps commander, General 

Gerow, told General Weaver how to 

overcome the obstacle.25 Using part of 

the 28th Infantry Regiment from Vossenack and a battalion of the 12 1st Infantry, General Weaver was to clear the 

Tiefen Creek woods as far east as a dip 

in the ridge line about halfway between 

Hill 401, already held by the 121st 

Infantry, and Brandenberg. At this point 

the main effort might be launched southeast from Hill 401 via the KleinhauBrandenberg highway. 

The obvious answer to the question of 

which unit should make the main effort 

was the attached combat command, the 

5th Armored Division's CCR. Of the 

8th Division's remaining infantry, two 

battalions of the 13th Infantry were to 

maintain defensive positions in the Huertgen Forest southwest of Vossenack; 

25 V Corps Ltrs of Instrs, 28 and 29 Nov 44. 

See also 8th Div Fragmentary Orders, 29 Nov 

and I Dec, 8th Div AARs, Nov and Dec 44. 
452 

Colonel Keesee's battalion of the 13th 

Infantry was to continue to hold the 

division's north flank at Kleinhau; and 

those two battalions of the 12 1st Infantry 

not engaged in clearing the Tiefen Creek 

woods were to assist the armored drive by 

clearing the edges of the woods north of 

the dip. This latter task First Army's 

General Hodges made easier administratively by shifting the V Corps boundary 

temporarily in order to permit the V 

Corps to operate through almost all of 

the woods north and east of Brandenberg. 26 

Perhaps because the premature commitment of CCR toward Huertgen was 

fresh in mind, General Weaver insisted 

upon a healthy margin of safety before 

sending the armor down the fairway to 

Brandenberg. Before committing the 

armor, he intended to hold not only the 

Tiefen Cr~ek woods as far east as the dip 

in the ridge line but also a comparable 

position in the woods on the other side of 

the route of attack. 

In executing these precautions, infantrymen of both the 12 I st and 28th 

Infantry Regiments found in these offshoots of the Huertgen Forest the familiar 

pattern of stubborn German defense behind mine fields, barbed wire, and log 

emplacements for automatic weapons. 

Not until nightfall of I December was the 

infantry able to occupy the desired line. 

Even then a pocket of small arms resistance held out in a wooded gully just 

southwest of the dip. 

Having regrouped after capturing 

Kleinhau, CCR's Task Force Hamberg 

launched the main effort down the road 

to Brandenberg shortly after dawn on 2 

December. At the start it must have 

Oil FUSA Ltr of Instrs, 28 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

seemed to the tankers and armored infantry that somebody had slipped them 

the same old script CCR had used in the 

fiasco on the Germeter-Huertgen road. 

No sooner had the tanks reached the dip 

in the ridge line between Hill 40 I and 

Brandenberg than one of the lead tanks 

struck a mine. "Things not going worth 

a damn," reported the tank company 

commander.27 A few minutes later this 

officer had even greater cause for concern. 

Two more tanks struck mines. Small 

arms and mortar fire, much of it from the 

uncleared gully near the dip, stymied the 

armored infantry. Long-range, highvelocity fire from the KommerscheidtSchmidt ridge to the south greeted every 

movement the tankers tried to make. 

Ironically, it had been the BrandenbergBergstein ridge which had posed serious 

problems for the 28th Division in the 

earlier attack against Kommerscheidt and 

Schmidt; now the situation was reversed. 

"Having hell of a fight," was the way 

CCR's S-3 put it. Tank losses soon had 

risen to four. 

Not much time elapsed before the 8th 

Division commander, General Weaver, became convinced that Task Force Hamberg 

could do nothing until the mine field in 

the dip had been cleared. Considering 

the enemy's observation, that could not be 

done until after dark. Assuring Colonel 

Hamberg that the infantry battalions 

would clear the small arms opposition 

during the rest of the day, General Weaver 

told the tankers to seek defilade and 

prepare to renew the attack the next 

morning. 

That night, as artillery of CCR, the 8th 

Division, and the V Corps executed a 

determined program of interdictory fires, 

07 CCR, 5th Armd Div, S-3 Jnl, 2 Dec 44. 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

men of CCR's 22d Annored Engineers 

probed carefully, perilously, through the 

darkness for mines. By daylight of 3 

December they had removed from the 

road and adjacent fields in the vicinity of 

the dip some 250 mines. Few veterans 

in Task Force Hamberg could recall ever 

having encountered a mine field so intricately patterned nor one so effectively 

blocking all passage. Even after the 

engineers had lifted this impressive total of 

mines, the task force was destined to lose 

two more tanks in the same mine field. 

At 0800 on 3 December, two battalions 

of the 12 I st Infantry in the woods north 

of Brandenberg, another battalion of the 

12 I st Infantry and all of the 28th Infantry in the Tiefen Creek-Vossenack 

area, and CCR in the dip resumed their 

respective roles in the attack. Of the 

infantry units, the two battalions in the 

woods north of Brandenberg made the 

readiest progress. Patrols probing northeast reached the corps boundary, almost a 

mile inside the woods east of Hill 40 I . 

At one point they found mute testimony 

to the effectiveness of American artillery 

fire in "a mass" of dead enemy, dead 

horses, and abandoned vehicles.28 In 

the meantime, progress in the Tiefen 

Creek woods was spotty. Aided by 

medium tanks of the 709th Tank Battalion that somehow negotiated the muddy 

trails and firebreaks, one battalion gained 

positions on a nose of the BrandenbergBergstein ridge southwest of Brandenberg, 

but other units could make scarcely any 

advance in the face of stubborn German 

strongpoints. 

In the main effort by Task Force 

Hamberg along the spine of the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge, the decision to 

28 12Ist Inf AAR, Dec 44. 

453 

postpone the attack until 3 December 

proved a happy one. For the first time 

in several days, the weathennan smiled 

early and benignly. As supporting artillery completed a ten-minute preparation, 

P-47's of the 366th Group circled the 

area. A controller with a very high 

frequency (VHF) radio mounted in a 

tank at headquarters of Task Force 

Hamberg "talked" the pilots onto the 

target, the village of Brandenberg. "Keep 

the buzz boys up," Was the reaction of the 

leading tank company commander, "they 

are doing a good job." Maintaining close 

contact with the planes through the 

ground controller, the task force with 

infantry mounted in half-tracks began to 

roll. Even after reaching the very threshhold of the village, the leading company 

commander was loath to relinquish his air 

support. "Keep the buzz boys up," he 

cried again. "We are at a critical stage." 

Six minutes later (at og26) the first 

tanks and infantry entered Brandenberg. 

As soon as tank guns had blasted the 

buildings, the infantry boiled down into 

the cellars with rifles, tommy guns, and 

hand grenades to root out a cowed 

enemy. At I 115 Colonel Hamberg could 

report the village in American hands. 29 

Apparently carried away by the momentum of the attack, a platoon leader in 

charge of three tanks, Lt. George Kleinsteiber, roared all the way past the 

objective across the less than half a mile 

into Bergstein. Quickly knocking out 

two antitank guns, Lieutenant Kleinsteiber and his companions might well have 

seized the entire village had not Colonel 

29 For direct quotations, see GGR, 5th Arrnd 

Div, S-3 Jnl, 3 Dec 44. The 366th Group 

erroneously reported its attack against Bergstein 

rather than Brandenberg. See IX TAG, Unit 

History, Dec 44. 
454 

Hamberg called them back. Although 

Colonel Hamberg himself originally had 

recommended that Brandenberg and Bergstein be taken in a single operation, he 

had come to recognize that his task force 

had not the strength to hold both villages. 

Task Force Hamberg was far understrength by this time, and all other 

elements of the 8th Division and attachments, including CCR's other task force, 

were occupied elsewhere. Not until some 

other unit could be freed to defend 

Bergstein was it wise to take that village. 

As if to emphasize the capriciousness 

for which the weather had become noted 

during the Siegfried Line Campaign, the 

weatherman withdrew his support soon 

after Task Force Hamberg had taken 

Brandenberg. Though the weather remained favorable in the Huertgen Forest 

area, it began to close in at the air bases 

farther west in Belgium. The P-47's had 

to scurry home. 

This situation gave rise to one of the 

few noteworthy interventions by the 

Luftwaffe since the ground campaign 

along the German border had begun. 

Starting in early afternoon, about sixty 

Messerschmitt 109's roared in over the V 

Corps sector. Strafing front-line troops 

and bombing and strafing artillery and 

rear-echelon installations as far back as the 

V Corps headquarters city of Eupen, the 

planes were active for more than an hour. 

It was a new experience for most of the 

American troops, for even the most seasoned rarely had seen more than one to 

three German planes at a time. "Send 

up some more .50-cal ammo," an officer of 

CCR radioed back from Brandenberg; 

"have knocked down 3 Me 109's and 

there are still plenty to shoot at." 30 

30 CCR, 5th Armd Div, S-3 Jnl, 3 Dec 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

That appeared to be the spirit with 

which most V Corps troops accep'ted the 

Luftwaffe's venture. For the first time 

in months antiaircraft units got an opportunity to do what they were trained to 

do. The corps subsequently claimed Ig 

of the enemy aircraft destroyed and 10 

others probably destroyed. The antiaircraft unit attached to the 8th Division 

claimed 8 of the definites. As for the 

effectiveness of the enemy strike, it was 

not the kind of thing to sell anybody on 

the value of air power. Hardly any materiel damage resulted, and not a single 

unit reported a man killed or wounded. 31 

The enemy's air strike over, Task Force 

Hamberg settled down for the defense of 

Brandenberg-somewhat unhappily, for 

Colonel Hamberg was perturbed both 

about his lack of strength and about 

dominant German observation on the village. At Bergstein and on the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt ridge the Germans were 

on higher ground; in particular Colonel 

Hamberg was conscious of enemy observation from Castle Hill (the Burg-Berg, Hill 

400.5), a conical eminence a few hundred 

yards outside Bergstein that rises like a 

giant pimple at the eastern end of 

the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge. Enemy 

sheIIing directed from some or all of these 

places pointed up the depleted condition 

of Colonel Hamberg's command and the 

need for additional troops before attacking 

Bergstein and Castle Hill. Although the 

attack on Brandenberg had not been 

particularly costly in itself, the cumulative 

losses since the armor's first action in this 

sector on 25 November had reduced the 

task force markedly. In Brandenberg 

31 V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 322; 

8th Div AAR, Dec 44; IX TAC, Unit History, 

Dec 44. 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

were only eleven tanks, five tank destroyers, and 140 infantrymen. 

Officers of the combat command chafed 

in their desire to get CCR's other task 

force into Brandenberg. Led by Lt. Col. 

Howard E. Boyer, commander of the 47th 

Armored Infantry Battalion, basic components of this second and smaller task 

force were a company each of tanks and 

armored infantry. The 8th Division commander, General Weaver, had attached 

Task Force Boyer to the 28th Infantry 

Regiment in Vossenack for a special 

operation. The armor was to eliminate a 

German strongpoint located amid the 

debris of the northeasternmost houses of 

Vossenack, a strongpoint that had withstood infantry attempts at reduction. 

The position had become known as the 

"rubble pile." It had fallen into German 

hands during latter stages of the 28th 

Division's Schmidt operation after the 

tragic experience of an infantry battalion 

exposed to guns on the BrandenbergBergstein ridge had prompted abandonment of the more exposed portion of the 

Vossenack ridge. 

So expertly had the Germans organized 

the "rubble pile," so thickly had they 

fenced it with mines, and so deeply had 

they burrowed into the debris that Task 

Force Boyer fought all day on 3 December and well into the next day before 

overrunning the position. In the meantime, the 8th Division commander had no 

other unit to send to Brandenberg, either 

to strengthen Task Force Hamberg or to 

attack Bergstein. So concerned was General Weaver about his lack of a reserve 

that he petitioned General Gerow for use 

of the 2d Ranger Battalion, a special unit 

which had been backing up the line in this 

sector for about a week under V Corps 

control. General Gerow himself earlier 

455 

had noted the complete involvement of 

the 8th Division and had taken care to 

provide a corps reserve by moving an 

infantry regiment to back up the line a 

few miles to the south opposite the Monschau Corridor. 32 Although General 

Weaver might have used his organic 

engineer battalion as a reserve, he had 

become so perturbed over the depleted 

condition of some of his infantry battalions 

that he already had put the engineers into 

the line in the woods north of Brandenberg 

to bolster the infantry. 

Having fought almost continuously for 

thirteen days since 2 I November, the 

121st Infantry was particularly feeble. 

Although this regiment had received 

several score of replacements, these men 

for all their individual courage hardly were 

equivalent to the veterans who had fallen. 

The conditions of cold, rain, and close 

contact with the enemy under which these 

men were introduced to front-line warfare 

made matters worse. "Our missing men 

were mostly replacements," the 12 1st 

Infantry's sergeant major commented 

later. "Some were captured before they 

could get into action." Heavy shellfire, 

this same noncommissioned officer remarked, caused some of the new men to 

"scatter and run." 33 

Trench foot and combat fatigue hit 

veteran and replacement alike. Because 

few men had a chance to dry out, little 

could be done to reduce instances of 

trench foot. Severe cases of combat fatigue had to be evacuated through regular 

medical channels, but others merely 

32 The 9th Division's 60th Infantry. See V 

Corps Directive, 30 Nov 44, V Corps Operations 

in the ETO, p. 320. . 

33 Combat Interv with M Sgt Willard Bryan, 

121st Inf. 
456 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

A SEA OF MUD in the Huertgen Forest. 

retired to a rest tent in Huertgen. There 

they were given "coffee, a shot of whiskey, 

and some sleeping pills. After a day or 

two of rest and warm food, they went 

back." For one of the few times in the 

history of the 12 1st Infantry, some men 

refused to stay in the line. "We have 

found," said the sergeant major, "that old 

men break down under this weather. 

When we see they are about to crack we 

bring a lot of them back to do overhead 

work and thus keep down court martial 

cases of this type and also crack-ups." 34 

34 Ibid. 

Nevertheless, the regiment soon had eleven 

men awaiting trial. 

This was how a regimental staff officer 

saw the plight of one battalion: 

The men of this battalion are physically 

exhausted. The spirit and the will to fight 

are there; the physical ability to continue is 

gone. These men have been fighting without rest or sleep for four days and last night 

were forced to lie unprotected from the 

weather in an open field. In some instances 

men were forced to discard their overcoats 

because they lacked the strength to wear 

them. These men are shivering with cold 

and their hands are so. numb that they have 

to help one another on with their equipment. 

I firmly believe that every man up there 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

should be evacuated through medical channels.35 

To men in this condition, there obviously was scant consolation in the knowledge that German troops were undergoing 

similar hardships. "Great losses were 

occasioned by numerous frostbites," one 

German officer recalled later. "In some 

cases, soldiers were found dead in their 

foxholes from sheer exhaustion." 36 

Bergstein and Castle Hill 

Unable to reinforce Task Force Hamberg on 4 December, General Weaver 

dela yed attacking Bergstein until the next 

day, when Task Force Boyer should be 

available· after having cleared the "rubble 

pile." In the interval, he concentrated 

on pushing his infantry farther east and 

southeast through the woods on either 

side of the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge 

in order to provide flank protection for the 

projected armored thrust. 

Not all the infantry battalions were so 

bitterly fatigued or so woefully depleted 

as that described by the staff officer of 

the 12 1st Infantry, but they were a far 

cry from the formations which first had 

entered the Huertgen Forest a fortnight 

before. On 4 December a sleet storm 

that carried over from the preceding night 

added to the discomforts. By nightfall 

the infantry still had a long way to go 

before providing secure flanks for an 

armored drive on Bergstein. 

In the woods north of Brandenberg, 

Colonel Keesee's I st Battalion, 13th In-

:; 5 Remarks of the 12 1st Inf S-3 as taken 

down by S Sgt Carlton R. Brown and recorded 

in Combat Interv with Brown. See also Personal 

Diary of Maj Gen Thomas J. Cross, pp. 154-

56, loaned to OCMH by General Cross. 

30 MS # A-8g2 (Gersdorff). 

457 

fan try, moving east from Kleinhau, and a 

battalion of the 12 I st Infantry pushed 

deep into the forest to gain the corps 

boundary in the wake of patrols that had 

reached that line the day before. Another 

battalion of the 121St Infantry, trying to 

drive eastward to seal off Bergstein from 

the north by occupying wooded noses of 

high ground overlooking the Roer River, 

made virtually no progress. As night 

came this battalion still sat in the woods 

north of Brandenberg, in no spot to assist 

a drive on Bergstein and so perilously 

understrength that the regimental commander strove to ready another battalion 

to take its place. 

In the Tiefen Creek woods between 

Vossenack and Brandenberg-Bergstein the 

going was equally slow. Nevertheless, 

by nightfall of 4 December, a battalion of 

the 28th Infantry had gained a road that 

winds from the Kall River gorge to 

Brandenberg from which fire could control 

an exposed nose southwest of Bergstein. 

Thus a measure of assistance could be 

provided from this quarter for the next 

day's armored drive. 

No matter what the shortcomings on 4 

December, General Weaver scarcely could 

afford to delay longer before assaulting 

Bergstein. Though he sanctioned a late 

attack hour (1400) in hope the weather 

might clear sufficiently to permit air 

support, he insisted that whether the skies 

cleared or not, CCR was to attack on 5 

December. CCR would more than welcome air support; for, even with the 

addition of Task Force Boyer, the combat 

command had only twenty-two medium 

tanks and some 200 armored infantrymen. 

Though the weather did improve, CCR 

failed to get the kind of closely coordinated air support which Task Force 

Hamberg had enjoyed during the attack 
VETERANS OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

on Brandenberg. The difficulty appeared 

to lie in misunderstandings between CCR's 

controller and the air officer at 8th 

Division headquarters as to who was 

responsible for directing the strike. 

"STANZA screwed it up," the CCR 

controller said at 1415, referring to the Air 

Force code name for the 8th Division.37 

"[He J told planes Bergstein [was J ours 

and sent them to Nideggen. [IJ got 

them back and put them on wooded hill 

east of town and southeast part of 

town .... " 38 

Fifteen minutes later the CCR controller was thoroughly piqued. FoxHUNT here," he said, referring to the 

366th Fighter Group. "Hard to work 

[the J planes-STANZA constantly interferes . Finally got FOXHUNT to 

bomb and strafe ... southeast of Bergstein. 

Between weather, STANZA, and questions 

from turret, am tearing [my J hair." 39 

CCR evidently could thank a clever 

attack plan and an apparent breakdown 

in enemy communications for offsetting 

the deficiencies in air support. Having 

placed assault guns in defilade northeast 

of Brandenberg to provide covering fire, 

the combat command divided into three 

attacking forces, each composed of married 

companies of tanks and armored infantry. 

One delivered a long left hook against the 

northeastern fringe of Bergstein; another 

delivered a right hook against the southwestern fringe; and the third struck down 

the middle. In a matter of minutes the 

force in the middle had penetrated the 

;:7 Air and ground headquarters had different 

code names for the same units. The ground 

force code name for the 8th Division, for example, was GRANITE. 

38 CCR, 5th Annd Div, S-3 Air Jnl, 5 Dec, 

S-3 Jnl file, Dec 44. 

~9 Ibid. 

459 

edge of the village. Not until this force 

had reached the objective did German 

shellfire begin to fall and then apparently 

in response to a series of signal flares. 

Again CCR's controller was in a state. 

"FOXHUNT bombing," he reported at 1437. 

"STANZA put them on [theJ town while 

I was trying to tell them our troops [are J 

there. Finally got them off and back on 

the enemy." An hour later the controller 

had another scare. "Nearly frantic," he 

radioed. "STANZA nearly had Bergstein 

bombed." 40 

CCR's tankers and armored infantrymen in Bergstein hardly could have been 

aware of these near mix-ups, so occupied 

were they with their own problems. 

What the enemy's artillery fires lacked in 

timing, they made up in intensity. And 

the German infantry was not going to 

relinquish the objective without a fight. 

Not until nightfall was the bulk of 

Bergstein in hand. Even then snipers and 

small pockets of resistance held out. 

As CCR prepared to defend the village, 

few considered the objective secure. 

Towering menacingly on the eastern 

fringe of the village, Castle Hill (Hill 

400.5) in itself was enough to discourage 

a sense of security. In addition, Bergstein was exposed to counterattack from 

almost every side. Only at one point, 

where a battalion of the 28th Infantry 

was covering the exposed nose southwest 

of Bergstein, was there physical contact 

with friendly forces. To the north, where 

CCR had reason to expect protection, 

not even patrol contact existed. A battalion of the 121 st Infantry, which was 

to have pushed through the woods to 

reach the Roer and seal off Bergstein 

from the north, had gained but 400 yards 

40 Ibid. 
460 

during the day. That was not nearly 

enough to do the job. 

Although the enemy had been markedly 

parsimonious with his counterattacks up 

to this point, few could expect that he 

would let Bergstein and the BrandenbergBergstein ridge go without at least a token 

attempt to retake it. Not a man to 

endorse the use of armor in a defensive 

role under hardly any circumstances, the 

CCR commander, Colonel Anderson, 

looked with particular antipathy upon the 

situation in which he now found his commandY Not only was he concerned 

about the exposed nature of his position 

but also about the number of men and 

tanks he had to defend it with. By combing every source-including his organic 

engineers and reconnaissance platoon-he 

was able finally to assemble about 400 

men, including crewmen of six remaining 

tank destroyers and sixteen tanks. For 

defending an exposed position, that left 

little margin for comfort. 

Colonel Anderson may well have been 

concerned. German commanders considered CCR's penetration of "critical 

importance." Should the Americans 

reach and cross the Roer River at this 

point, they reasoned, it would "jeopardize 

the execution of the Ardennes offensive." 42 

On the basis of this thinking, the 

Seventh Army's General Brandenberger 

already had resorted to committing the 

remnants of the 47th Volks Grenadier 

Division on 29 November in a switch 

position along the threatened Roer sector 

northeast of the Brandenberg-Bergstein 

ridge. He now turned to the only nearby 

41 See CCR, 5th Armd Div, S-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44, 

and Combat Interv with Anderson. An earlier 

indication of this attitude may be found in CCR 

and 5th Armored Division journals for the Wallendorf fight. See Ch. III, above. 

42 MS # A-8g1 (Gersdorff). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

unit that had sufficient strength to afford 

any real promise of a successful counterattack. This was the 272d Volks Grenadier Division (Col. Eugen Kossmala), 

holding a quiet sector in the Monschau 

Corridor while awaiting an assignment in 

the counteroffensive. Reluctantly, for all 

concerned shuddered with the realization 

that heavy casualties at this late date 

would seriously hamper the effectiveness 

of the division in the Ardennes, 0 B WEST 

gave permission, but with the proviso that 

the division be released in time to regroup 

for the Ardennes. Two-thirds of the 

272d Volks Grenadier Division started 

marching toward the threatened sector, 

while the remainder continued to hold the 

Monschau CorridorY 

At 07 loon the morning of 6 December 

first arrivals of the 272d Volks Grenadier 

Division counterattacked at Bergstein. 

Supported by at least five tanks or assault 

guns-all the Seventh Army could provide-some 200 to 300 men of the 980th 

Regiment took advantage of early morning 

haze and darkness to get almost upon the 

village before discovery. 

The fight raged not on the approaches 

to Bergstein but amid the debris and the 

few remammg buildings. German infantry stalked the American tanks with 

Panzerfausts while CCR's gunners tried 

desperately to locate the German armor in 

the darkness. Even when they managed 

to pin their sights on the enemy vehicles, 

CCR's tankers had trouble. Most of the 

·~3 Ibid. See also Charles V. P. von Luttichau, 

The Ardennes Offensive, Progressive Build-up 

and Operations, MS in OCMH; MSS # B-602, 

Generalleutnant Max Bork, Die 47. V olksgrenadierdivision (V.G.D.) im Westen; B-I7I, Generalmajor Eugen Koenig, Kaempfe im Rheinland. 

(This latter MS covers the battles of the 344th 

Volks Grenadier Division, -formerly the 915t Air 

Landing Division. General Koenig later commanded the :; 7:;d V olks Grenadier Division.) 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

remaining American tanks were armed 

with 75-mm. instead of 76-mm. guns; 

rounds from the 75's "bounced off." H 

Fifteen more minutes of darkness, some 

participants ventured later, might have 

done the Americans in.45 With the coming of daylight, those few American tanks 

equipped with the more powerful 76-mm. 

guns made quick work of the enemy 

armor. As the German infantry fell back, 

artillery fires requisitioned from both the 

8th Division and the V Corps pummeled 

the retreat. By 0900 CCR again was in 

control of Bergstein. 

Halting of this counterthrust meant no 

day of serenity in Bergstein. Possessed 

of observation from Castle Hill (400.5), 

the enemy's big guns chewed viciously at 

the village. Twice more during the day 

contingents of the 272d V olks Grenadier 

Division came out of the woods and 

counterattacked. Fortunately, they made 

these sorties only in company strength. 

CCR beat them back. 

As night approached on 6 December, 

CCR was without question too weak to 

defend Bergstein with any degree of 

assurance. In medium tanks, for example, the combat command was down to 

seven. Had the two ad jacent infantry 

regiments made any real progress toward 

clearing the woods north and south of 

Bergstein, that might have compensated 

somewhat for the day's losses in men and 

armor. Yet neither regiment had gained 

substantially, although a battalion of the 

12 I st Infantry after nightfall at last was 

to reach a point overlooking the Roer 

north of Bergstein and thereby provide 

some protection from that quarter. 

H Combat Interv with Maj W. M. Daniel, 

Exec 0, loth Tank Bn. 

45 Combat Interv with Lts Lewis, Stutsman, 

and Goldman, 47th Armd Inf Bn. 

461 

To the V Corps, the 8th Division commander, General Weaver, appealed for aid. 

Again he had absolutely no unit with 

which to reinforce CCR, either for defending Bergstein or for seizing Castle 

Hill. He asked permission to use the 2d 

Ranger Battalion, that force which was 

present in the 8th Division's zone but 

which still was under V Corps control. 

Cognizant of the importance of Castle 

Hill both to defense of Bergstein and to 

accomplishment of the 8th Division's 

mission of reaching the Roer, both General Gerow and First Army's General 

Hodges approved the request. General 

Weaver promptly set about to commit 

the Rangers at Bergstein before daylight 

on 7 December. 

The 2d Ranger Battalion was a special 

assault force, organized. originally to 

perform especially hazardous and arduous 

tasks. The first of these had been to 

seize a dominating cliff on a flank of 

OMAHA Beach on D Day in Normandy.46 

Composed of about six companies of 

sixty-five men each, the battalion still had 

many of its original members. Its commander was Maj. George S. Williams.47 

Probably no news short of rotation to 

the United States could have cheered the 

men of CCR more than did the word that 

the Rangers were coming. This was how 

three officers of the 47th Armored Infantry 

Battalion described it: 

About midnight a guy came down the 

road, then two others, each one five yards 

46 See "Pointe du Hoe," in Small Unit Actions, 

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION (Washington, 1946). 

47 Even as the Rangers prepared to move to 

Bergstein, their original commander, Lt. Col. 

James E. Rudder, was relieved to assume command of a regiment in the 28th Division. The 

story of the 2d Ranger Bn in· this action is from 

the unit AAR, Dec 44, and from a Combat Interv 

with Williams. 
462 

behind the other. They were three Ranger 

lieutenants. They asked for enemy positions 

and the road to take; said they were ready 

to go. We talked the situation over with 

the officers. They stepped out and said, 

'Let's go men.' We heard the tommy guns 

click and, without a word, the Rangers 

moved out. Our morale went up in a 

hurry.4R 

In addition to seizing Castle Hill, Major Williams' Rangers were to strengthen 

the defense of Bergstein by establishing 

roadblocks on three noses of the ridge, 

southwest, south, and southeast of the 

village. Reinforced by two platoons of 

self-propelled guns from the 893d Tank 

Destroyer Battalion, three companies of 

the 2d Ranger Battalion had established 

these roadblocks two hours before daylight on 7 December. Because a battalion 

of the 12 I st Infantry by this time protected Bergstein on the north, this meant 

that the village was relatively secure on all 

sides except the east. In that direction 

lay Castle Hill. 

Designating one company to support 

the attack by fire, Major Williams sent 

his two remaining companies charging up 

the height just as dawn was breaking. 

So swiftly did the Rangers move that the 

Germans were thoroughly cowed, even 

though these were respectable troops of 

the 272d Volks Grenadier Division. By 

0835 the two companies had taken 

twenty-eight prisoners and held the crest. 

That was when the real fight began. 

Before the Rangers could dig in, a hail of 

enemy shellfire descended. Because the 

hill was predominantly wooded, bursts in 

the trees heightened effect of the fire. All 

morning the enemy kept up the shelling, 

so that by noon the two Ranger companies 

48 Combat Interv with Lewis, Stutsman, and 

Goldman. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

were perilously depleted. They could 

muster only thirty-two men between them. 

In the afternoon the Germans counterattacked twice, each time with about 150 

men, and maintained constant pressure. 

By 1600 the Rangers had only twenty-five 

men left. Although Major Williams dispatched an urgent message to General 

Weaver for reinforcements, he must have 

known that his only real hope lay in those 

of his own men still in Bergstein. He 

scraped together a platoon and sent them 

scurrying up the hill. The help arrived 

at precisely the right moment. The Germans fell back. 

The explanation for the seeming paradox of one platoon turning the tide against 

a superior enemy force lay, Major Williams 

said, in the artillery support he had recei\Ced. The Rangers got that support 

primarily through one man, 1St Lt. 

Howard K. Kettlehut, a forward observer 

from CCR's 56th Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion. The Rangers said Lieutenant 

Kettlehut was "the best man they ever 

worked with." At one point this officer 

requested simultaneous support from almost every caliber of artiIlery in the 

American arsenal up to 8-inch and 

240-mm. guns, a total of eighteen battalions. Lieutenant Kettlehut directed 

this fire not only to keep the Germans out 

of the hilltop positions but also to hem 

them in so that the infantry could destroy 

them with small arms and mortar fire. 

The key to his men's resistance, Major 

Williams said, was artillery. 

So certain was General Weaver that the 

back of the opposition in this sector had 

been broken that he ordered the remnants 

of CCR to withdraw from Bergstein during the night of 7 December. In the 

meantime, the 28th Infantry had renewed 

attempts to clear the woods south of 
V CORPS JOINS THE OFFENSIVE 

Bergstein and had advanced almost to the 

southern exit of the village. No longer 

were the troops in Bergstein exposed to 

enemy fangs on any side. 

By nightfall of 8 December, General 

Weaver had adjusted his lines in order to 

free a battalion of the 13th Infantry. 

This battalion went up Castle Hill, and 

the Rangers came down. The engagement had been but a two-day fight for the 

2d Ranger Battalion, yet it had made up 

in intensity what it lacked in duration. 

The Rangers had lost more than a fourth 

of their original strength-I 07 men 

wounded, 19 killed, and 4 missing. 

Anyone who stood atop Castle Hill and 

looked south could have predicted with a 

fair amount of certainty the direction of 

the next effort by troops of the V Corps. 

For from Castle Hill, one can see Schmidt, 

and beyond Schmidt, the waters of the 

Roer backed up behind the Roer River 

Dams. After a day or so of skirmishing 

the 8th Division would be ov~rlooking 

463 

the west bank of the Roer in the little 

angle foimed by the Kall River and the 

Roer. Much farther to the north, troops 

of the Ninth Army earlier had closed to 

the river, and First Army's VII Corps 

could not be denied much longer. Unless 

those dams could be breached from the 

air, somebody would have to take them in 

a ground attack. That somebody obviously would be the V Corps. 

"You can say," said one officer of the 

8th Division, "that we got to the Roer 

River by sheer guts." 49 A look at the 

casualty figures would bear him out. 

Total losses for the 8th Division, the 5th 

Armored Division's CCR, and the 2d 

Ranger Battalion were nearly 4,000, including approximately 1,200 felled by 

exposure or combat exhaustion. The 8th 

Division (and its attachments) would go 

down in the book as another victim of the 

Huertgen Forest. 

49 Combat Interv with Johnston. 
CHAPTER XX 

The Final Fight To Break Out of the Forest 

Take a "giant step," First Army's General Hodges had said in effect at the start 

of the November offensive. By 19 November, the day when Hodges directed 

commitment of the V Corps, results of the 

first four days of fighting had indicated 

that a giant step was not in the books. 

Certainly not for the moment. (See Map 

VI.) 

A regiment of the 104th Division on the 

VII Corps north wing had had a whale of 

a fight to capture dominating heights of 

the Donnerberg and the Eschweiler woods 

east and northeast of Stolberg. At the 

same time a neighboring attack for a 

limited objective by a combat command of 

the 3d Armored Division had proved as 

costly as many a more ambitious armored 

attack. In the sector of the 1 st Division, 

which was making the corps main effort, 

getting a toehold on the Hamich ridge and 

carving out a segment of the Huertgen 

Forest near Schevenhuette had been laborious tasks. On the corps south wing 

between the 1 st Division at Schevenhuette 

and the V Corps near Huertgen, the 4th 

Division still was ensnared in the coils of 

the forest. 

The 4th Division stood to benefit most 

directly from General Hodges' order to 

the V Corps to join the offensive. General Barton would gain both additional 

troops and a narrowed sector. The 12th 

Infantry, which had fought so long and 

so futilely on the bloody plateau near 

Germeter, at last was to join its parent 

division, and the shift northward of the 

intercorps boundary removed both Huertgen and Kleinhau from 4th Division 

responsibility. 

No lengthy wait would be necessary 

before measuring the· effects of the V 

Corps commitment upon the 4th Division's fight. Having paused to consolidate the limited gains of the first four 

da ys, General Barton had ordered renewal 

of the attack on 22 November, the day 

after the start of the V Corps offensive.] 

T he Fruits of Deception 

Despite alarming casualties, neither assault regiment of the 4th Division before 

22 November had penetrated much more 

than a mile beyond north-south Road W, 

which follows the Weisser Weh and Weh 

Creeks and marks the approximate center 

of the Huertgen Forest. On the north 

wing, Colonel McKee's 8th Infantry 

between axial routes U and V still was a 

thousand yards short of its first objective, forested high ground about the 

ruined monastery at Gut Schwarzenbroich. Troubled by a right flank 

dangling naked in the forest, Colonel 

Lanham's 22d Infantry had progressed 

little beyond the intersection of axial 

1 Unless otherwise noted, sources for the 4th 

Division action are as given in Chapter XVIII. 

above. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 465 

routes X and Y, still more than a mile 

away from the objective of Grosshau. To 

many, the final division objective of the 

Roer River at Dueren, not quite six miles 

to the northeast, must have seemed as 

far away as Berlin. 

On the more positive side, a day or so 

of consolidation had temporarily eased 

two of the more serious problems the 4th 

Division faced. First, both regiments 

now had vehicular supply routes reaching 

within a few hundred yards of the front. 

Second, a gap more than a mile wide between the two regiments had been closed. 

Had General Barton believed that these 

two problems would not recur and had 

he been fighting an inanimate enemy 

incapable of reinforcements or other countermeasures, he might even have entertained genuine optimism. As it was, 

mud, mines, enemy infiltration, and 

shelling again might compound the supply 

situation; and so long as the 22d Infantry 

drove east on Grosshau while the 8th 

Infantry moved northeast more directly 

toward Dueren, a gap between the two 

regiments would reappear and expand. 

As for the enemy, it was true that the 

275th Division had incurred crippling 

losses, as had the 116th Panzer Division's 

156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, a skeleton masquerading as the same regiment 

which had fought earlier near Germeter 

and Vossenack.2 But by 2 I November, 

the eve of the renewal of the American 

attack, the last contingents of the 344th 

Infantry Division which the Seventh Army 

had summoned up from the south were 

arnvmg. As this division took over, the 

116th Panzer Division was pulled out for 

refitting, and the new division began 

absorbing nonorganic survivors of the 

24th Div Opns Rpt, Nov 44. 

275th Division. Thus the Americans at 

this point faced a completely new German 

unit. 3 

The closeness of opposing lines and the 

density of the forest having denied unqualified use of air, armor, and artillery 

support, both commanders of the 4th 

Division's assault regiments in their attacks of 22 November turned to deception. 

Both Colonel McKee and Colonel Lanham 

directed one battalion to make a feint to 

the east with every weapon available, 

including smoke. At the same time, another battalion of each regiment was to 

make a genuine attack through the woods 

off a flank of each demonstrating battalion. 

The Germans reacted exactly as desired. Upon the demonstrators, who were 

relatively secure in foxholes topped by 

logs and sod, they poured round after 

round of artillery and mortar fire. 

Against the battalions which were slipping 

through the woods, they fired hardly a 

shot. 

On the north wing, the flanking battalion of the 8th Infantry swept through 

a thousand yards of forest to reach Gut 

Schwarzenbroich. Only there, in a cluster of buildings about the ruined monastery, did the Germans resist in strength. 

While this fight progressed, Colonel McKee poured his reserve battalion in behind 

the main enemy positions opposite his 

demonstrating battalion. Although the 

Germans soon deciphered this maneuver 

and opposed later stages of the advance, 

the fact that they had been lured from 

their prepared positions meant that the 

ruse had succeeded. As night came 

3 MSS # A-8g! (GersdorfI), # B-8IO 

(Schmidt), and ETHINT-S7 (Gersdorff). The 

4th Division G-2 identified the 344th Division 

by its old name, the 9ISt Air Landing Division. 
466 

Colonel McKee's reserve battalion dug in 

securely about a triangle of roads at the 

intersection of Road U and the Renn Weg 

(Point 3 I I. I) . From here Colonel McKee might exploit both northeast along 

Road U and southeast along. the Renn 

Weg. 

In one respect the fruits of deception in 

the sector of Colonel Lanham's 22d Infantry west of Grosshau were even more 

rewarding. While a battalion on the 

regiment's north wing demonstrated, the 

battalion stealing around the enemy's 

flank met not a suggestion of opposition. 

Alongside a creek and then along firebreaks, the battalion slipped like a 

phantom through the thick forest. More 

than a mile the men marched without 

encountering a German and at nightfall 

dug in to cover the junction of Roads V 

and X near the edge of the forest no more 

than 700 yards west of Grosshau. 

Colonel Lanham's reluctance to order 

this battalion alone and unsupported out 

of the woods into Grosshau may have 

stemmed from experience elsewhere in his 

sector. The enemy remained in strength 

astride the 22d Infantry's route of communications, as Colonel Lanham's right 

wing battalion had found while trying to 

protect the regimental southern flank. 

Only after incurring the kind of casualties 

that had come to be associated with 

fighting in the forest did this battalion 

succeed in gaining goo yards to reach a 

junction of firebreaks between Roads X 

and Y, still a thousand yards short of the 

eastern fringe of the forest. The battalion 

was so understrength and so disorganized 

from losses among officers and noncommissioned officers that at one point 

Colonel Lanham had to plug a gap in the 

line with a composite company of 100 

replacements. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

The problems to be solved before 

Grosshau might be attacked were serious. 

Though the 12th Infantry had left the 

wooded plateau near Germeter on 22 

November to begin an attack to secure the 

22d Infantry's right flank, this depleted 

regiment would require several days to 

do the job. It took, in fact, four days, 

until 26 November. In the meantime, 

the 22d Infantry was open to a punishing 

blow from those Germans who at this 

point still held Huertgen and Kleinhau. 

Neither was there a quick solution to 

eliminating the enemy that had been bypassed in the swift advance or to sweeping 

Road X of mines and abatis so that an 

attack on Grosshau might be supported. 

On 25 November, the day before the 

12th Infantry reached the woods line to 

provide the 22d Infantry a secure flank, 

Colonel Lanham saw a chance to capitalize on the commitment that day of the 

5th Armored Division's CCR against 

Huertgen. In conjunction with that attack, he ordered an immediate attempt to 

capture Grosshau. 

Seeking surprise, Colonel Lanham maneuvered one battalion through the woods 

to hit the village from the northwest 

while another battalion converged on it 

from the southwest. The plan did not 

work. Delayed four hours while tanks 

and tank destroyers picked a way over 

muddy trails and firebreaks, the attack 

lost every vestige of surprise. When the 

jump-off actually came at noon, coordination with the armor failed. Only 

three tanks and a tank destroyer emerged 

from the woods with the infantry. Antitank gunners in Grosshau quickly picked 

off the tanks. At the same time violent 

concentrations of artillery fire drove the 

infantry back. Men who had yearned 

for so long to escape the stifling embrace 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 467 

of the forest now fell back on it for refuge. 

The sad results of this attack prompted 

the division commander, General Barton, 

to approve another pause in the 22d 

Infantry's operations. Colonel Lanham 

was to consolidate his positions, bring up 

replacements, and make detailed plans for 

taking Grosshau. In particular, the regiment was to make maximum use of nine 

battalions of artillery which were either 

organic or attached to the division. Here 

on the edge of the forest the artillery for 

the first time might provide observed, 

close-in fires capable of influencing the 

fighting directly and decisively. 

In the meantime, on the division's north 

wing, Colonel McKee's 8th Infantry on 

the second and third days of the renewed 

attack had come to know the true measure 

of the advantage the regiment had scored. 

The battalion which on 22 November had 

reached the junction of Road U and the 

Renn Weg drove northeast along Road U 

for more than a mile. Although subjected to considerable shelling, this battalion encountered only disorganized infantry 

resistance. On 24 November Colonel 

McKee sent this battalion northward to 

fill out the line between Road U and the 

division's north boundary and at the same 

time to cut behind those Germans who 

still were making a fight of it at Gut 

Schwarzenbroich. During the same two 

days, another battalion moved slowly 

against more determined resistance southeast along the Renn Weg and on 25 

November surged to the regiment's south 

boundary. The total advance was more 

than a mile. 

Colonel McKee's 8th Infantry stood on 

the brink of a breakthrough that could 

prove decisive. In four days, the regiment 

had more than doubled the distance 

gained during the first six days of the 

November offensive. The forward positions were almost two miles beyond the 

line of departure along Road W. Only 

just over a mile of forest remained to be 

conquered. 

Yet how to achieve the last mile? The 

troops were exhausted. Because the leaders had to move about to encourage and 

look after their men, they had been among 

the first to fall. A constant stream of 

replacements had kept the battalions at a 

reasonable strength, but the new men had 

not the ability of those they replaced. 

For all the tireless efforts of engineers and 

mine sweepers, great stretches of the roads 

and trails still were infested with mines. 

Even routes declared clear might cause 

trouble. Along a reputedly cleared route, 

Company K on 23 November lost its 

Thanksgiving dinner when a kitchen jeep 

struck a mine. Every day since 20 November had brought some measure of 

sleet or rain to augmfnt the mud on the 

floor of the forest. To get supplies forward and casualties rearward, men 

sludged at least a mile under constant 

threat from shells that burst unannounced 

in the treetops and from bypassed enemy 

troops who might materialize at any 

moment from the depths of the woods. 

Again a gap had grown between the 8th 

Infantry and the 22d Infantry. The gap 

was a mile and a quarter wide. 

With the failure of the 22d Infantry at 

Grosshau on 25 November, the 4th Division commander, General Barton, had at 

hand an all too vivid reminder of the 

condition of his units. Much of the hope 

that entry of the V Corps into the fig~t 

might alter the situation had faded wikh 

the disastrous results of the J.1llrewardihg 

early efforts of that corps to captl/lre 

Huertgen. The successes of the 8th ~nd 

22d Infantry Regiments in renewing the 
468 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

MEDICS aid a wounded soldier in the woods. 

attack on 22 November appeared attributable more to local maneuver than to any 

general pattern of enemy disintegration. 

General Barton reluctantly ordered both 

regiments to suspend major attacks and 

take two or three days to reorganize and 

consolidate. 

D nable to strengthen the regiments 

other than with individual replacements, 

General Barton turned to a substitute for 

increased troops--decreased zones of action. Having reached the high ground 

about Gut Schwarzenbroich, the 8th 

Infantry now would derive some benefit 

from a boundary change made earlier by 

the VII Corps which transferred a belt of 

forest northeast of Gut Schwarzenbroich 

to the adjacent 1st Division. 4 This reduced the width of the 8th Infantry's 

zone by some 800 yards. To close the gap 

between the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments and enable the 22d to concentrate 

on a thousand-yard front at Grosshau, 

General Barton directed that the 12th 

Infantry prepare to move northward into 

the center of the division zone. Once the 

22d Infantry had taken Grosshau and 

turned northeastward along an improved 

4 VII Corps Opns Memo 119, 22 Nov, VII 

Corps Opns Memos file, Nov 44. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 469 

road net toward Dueren, the 12th Infantry might assist ari attack on Gey, the last 

major village strongpoint that could bar 

egress from the forest onto the Roer plain. 

For three days, 26 through 28 November, the 4th Division paused. Yet for 

only one regiment, the 8th Infantry, was 

there any real rest. Aside from the usual 

misenes of mud, shelling, cold, and 

emergency rations, the 8th Infantry engaged primarily in patrolling and in beating off platoon-sized German forays. 

These augured ill for the future, for 

indications were clear that the enemy had 

by 27 November begun to move in the 

353d Division to relieve the 344th.5 

Having cleared the 22d Infantry's right 

flank by nightfall of 26 November, the 

12th Infantry the next day relinquished its 

positions to a battalion from the V Corps. 

Dropping off one battalion as a division 

reserve, a luxury General Barton had not 

enjoyed since the start of the November 

offensive, the 12th Infantry on 28 November attacked to sweep the gap between 

the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments. Not 

until the next day was this task completed. 

In the meantime, most men of the 22d 

Infantry were scarcely aware that the 

division had paused. For two of the three 

days, the regiment made limitep. attacks 

with first one company, then another, in 

order to straighten the line and get all 

units into position for a climactic attack 

on Grosshau. One of these attacks inspired an intrepid performance from an 

acting squad leader, Pfc. Marcario Garcia. 

Although painfully wounded, Garcia persistently refused evacuation until he had 

knocked out three machine gun emplace5 4th Div Opns Rpt, Nov 44; MS # B-503, 

The 353d Division in the Rhineland (Gen 

MaJihnann); and contemporary German situation 

maps. 

ments and another enemy position to lead 

his company onto its objective.6 

Undoubtedly aware that an attack on 

Grosshau was impending, the Germans 

concentrated their mortar and artillery 

fire against the 22d Infantry. In two days 

of admittedly limited operations, the 22d 

Infantry suffered over 250 casualties. 

Despite a smattering of replacements, two 

companies had less than fifty men each in 

the line. 

The subject of replacements was a 

matter upon which the 4th Division by 

this time could speak with some authority, 

for during the month of November the 

division received as replacements 170 

officers and 4,754 enlisted men. Most 

commanders agreed that the caliber of replacements was good. 7 "They had to be 

good quick," said one platoon leader, "or 

else they just weren't. They sometimes 

would take more chances than some of the 

older J!len, yet their presence often stimulated the veterans to take chances they 

otherwise would not have attempted." 8 

Integrating these new men into organizations riddled by losses among squad 

and platoon leaders was a trying proposition. "When I get new men in the heat 

of battle," one sergeant said, "all I have 

time to do is . . . impress them that they 

have to remember their platoon number, 

and tell them to get into the nearest hole 

and to move out when the rest of us move 

6 He was awarded the Medal of Honor. 

7 Among those who dissented was Capt. Robert D. Moore, Company C, 8th Infantry. He 

said the replacements never had been taught the 

prime essentials that an infantryman must know, 

such as "the use of cover and concealment and 

the fire and movement principles," or else they 

were too frightened to use them. Combat Interv with Moore. 

8 Combat Interv with Lt. Bernasco, Co A, 22d 

Inf. 
470 

out." 9 That heavy casualties would 

strike men entering combat under conditions like these hardly could have been 

unexpected. Indeed, so unusual was it to 

get a packet of replacements into the line 

without incurring losses that companies 

noted with pride when they accomplished 

it. So short was the front-line stay of 

some men that when evacuated to aid 

stations they did not know what platoon, 

company, or even battalion and sometimes regiment they were in. Others 

might find themselves starting their first 

attack as riflemen and reaching the objective as acting squad leaders. 

Most of the newcomers were reclassified 

cooks, clerks, drivers, and others combed 

from rear echelon units both in the theater 

and in the United States. Somewhat 

typical was Pvt. Morris Sussman: 

From a Cook and Baker's School in the 

United States, Private Sussman had been 

transferred for 17 weeks' basic infantry training, then shipped overseas. Docking in Scotland in early November, he found himself in 

the Huertgen Forest by the middle of the 

month. At the Service Company of the 

22d Infantry someone took away much of 

what was called "excess equipment." From 

there Sussman and several other men 

"walked about a mile to some dugouts." 

At the dugouts the men received company 

assignments, and their names and serial 

numbers were taken down. A guide then led 

them toward the front lines. On the wav 

they were shelled and saw a number o'f 

"J erry" and American dead scattered through 

the forest. Private Sussman said he was 

"horrified" at the sight of the dead, but 

not as much as he might have been "because 

everything appeared as if it were in a dream." 

At a front line company, Sussman's company commander asked if he knew how to 

operate a radio. Sussman said no. Hando Combat Interv with S Sgt Louis Pingatore, 

Co C, 22d Inf. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

ing him a radio, the captain told him: 

"You're going to learn." Learning' consisted 

of carrying the radio on his back and calling 

the captain whenever he heard the captain's 

name mentioned over the radio. For all his 

ignorance of radios, Sussman felt good. 

Being a radio operator meant he would stay 

with the captain and back in the States he 

had heard that captains stayed "in the rear." 

Subsequently, Private Sussman said, he 

"found out different." 10 

A Handful of Old Men 

In the kind of slugging match that the 

Siegfried Line Campaign had become, 

little opportunity existed, once all units 

were committed, for division commanders 

to influence the battle in any grand, 

decisive manner. That was the situation 

General Barton had faced through much 

of the Huertgen Forest fighting. But as 

of 28 November, matters were somewhat 

different. Having narrowed his regimental zones of action, Barton had 

managed for the first time to achieve a 

compact formation within a zone of 

reasonable width. Looking at only this 

facet of the situation, one might have 

anticipated an early breakout from the 

forest. 

Unfortunately, General Barton could 

not ignore another factor. By this time 

his three regiments were, in effect, masqueraders operating under the assumed 

names of the three veteran regiments 

which had come into the forest in early 

November. In thirteen days some companies had run through three and four 

company commanders. Staff sergeants 

and sergeants commanded most of the 

rifle platoons. The few officers still running platoons usually were either replace10 From The Story of Private Morris Sussman. 

in 4th Div Combat Interv file. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 471 

ments or heavy weapons platoon leaders 

displaced forward. Most squad leaders 

were inexperienced privates or privates 

first class. One company had only 

twenty-five men, including replacements. 

Under circumstances like these, command 

organization hardly could be effective. 

Men and leaders made needless mistakes 

leading to more losses and thereby compounded the problem. This was hardly a 

division: this was a conglomeration. 

One man. summed up the campaign and 

the situation in a few words: "Then they 

jump off again and soon there is only a 

handful of the old men left." 11 

This was how it was. Yet a job had 

to be done, and these were the men who 

had to do it. General Barton issued his 

orders. His subordinates passed them 

down the line. "Well, men," a sergeant 

said, "we can't do a thing sitting 

still." 12 He got out of his hole, took a 

few steps, and started shooting. His men 

went with him. That was how this weary 

division resumed the attack. 

The critical action was at Grosshau, for 

here was the ripest opportunity to break 

out of the forest and at last bring an end 

to these seemingly interminable platoonsized actions. If Colonel Lanham's 22d 

Infantry could capture Grosshau, the 

division finally would be in a position to 

turn its full force northeastward on 

Dueren along a road net adequate for a 

divisional attack. Already commanders 

at corps and army level were making plans 

to strengthen the division for a final push. 

Except for CCR, which was fighting with 

the V Corps, the entire 5 th Armored 

Division was transferred to the VII Corps 

11 T / 5 George Morgan, as quoted in Combat 

Interv with Capt Jennings Frye, 1st Bn, 22d Inf. 

12 Combat Interv with Pingatore. 

and CCA earmarked for attachment to 

the 4th Division.13 

The 22d Infantry commander, Colonel 

Lanham, intended to attack early on 29 

November at the same time the V Corps 

was striking the neighboring village of 

Kleinhau. For all their proximity, 

Grosshau and Kleinhau were different 

types of objectives. Kleinhau is on high 

ground, while Grosshau nestles on the 

forward slope of a hill whose crest rises 

500 yards northeast of the village. Appreciating this difference and all too aware 

of the carnage that had resulted on 25 

November when the regiment had tried to 

move directly from the woods into Grosshau, Colonel Lanham planned a wide 

flanking maneuver through the forest to 

the north in order to seize the dominating 

ridge. Thereupon the enemy in Grosshau 

might be induced to surrender without 

the necessity of another direct assault 

across open fields. 

German shelling interrupted attack 

preparations early on 29 November, so 

that the 5th Armored Division's CCR 

under the V Corps already was clearing 

Kleinhau before Lanham's flanking force 

even began to maneuver. Perhaps because CCR was getting fire from Grosshau, the 4th Division's chief of staff, Col. 

Richard S. Marr, intervened just before 

noon in the name of the division commander to direct that Grosshau be taken 

that dayY 

Because Colonel Lanham could not 

guarantee that his delayed flanking 

maneuver would bring the downfall of 

Grosshau immediately, Colonel Marr's 

instruction meant in effect that he had to 

launch a direct assault against the village. 

1 a VII Corps Opns Memo 123, 30 Nov, VII 

Corp3 Opns Memo file, Nov 44. 

1-1 22d Inf AAR, Nov 44. 
472 

Too late to recall his flanking force, he 

had only one battalion left. This was the 

2d Battalion under Major Blazzard, which 

during the attack through the forest had 

borne responsibility for the regiment's 

exposed right flank and therefore had 

sustained correspondingly greater losses 

than the other battalions. Indeed, at this 

point, the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 

was easily as weak as any battalion in the 

entire 4th Division. To make matters 

worse, Major Blazzard had only one company in a position to attack immediately. 

Quickly scraping together two tanks 

and a tank destroyer to support this 

company, Blazzard ordered an attack on 

Grosshau down the main road from the 

west. Within an hour after receipt of the 

chief of staff's directive, the attack jumped 

off. Within fifteen more minutes, the 

infantry was pinned down in the open 

between the woods and the village and the 

two tanks had fallen prey to German 

assa ult guns. 

Two hours later Major Blazzard assembled eight more tanks of the attached 

70th Tank Battalion and sent them 

around the right flank of the infantry to 

hit the village from the southwest. Two 

of these tanks hit mines at the outset. 

The others could not get out of the woods 

because of mine fields and bog. 

The sun was going down on an abject 

failure when two events altered the 

situation. In the face of persistent resistance, Colonel Lanham's flanking battalion finally cut the Grosshau-Gey 

highway in the woods north of Grosshau, 

and as night came one battalion emerged 

upon the open ridge northeast of Grosshau, virtually in rear of the Germans in 

the village. Almost coincidentally, a 

covey of tanks and tank destroyers took 

advantage of the gathering darkness to 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

reach Major Blazzard's stymied infantry 

along the road into Grosshau from the 

west. Firing constantly, the big vehicles 

moved on toward the village. The infantry followed. In a matter of minutes, the 

resistance collapsed. By the light of 

burning buildings and a moon that shone 

for the first time since the 4th Division 

had entered the Huertgen Forest, Major 

Blazzard's infantry methodically mopped 

up the objective. More than a hundred 

Germans surrendered. 

In a larger setting, Grosshau was only 

a clearing in the Huertgen Forest, the 

point at which the 22d Infantry at last 

might turn northeastward with the rest of 

the 4th Division to advance more directly 

toward the division objective of Dueren. 

During the night of 29 November, General 

Barton directed the shift. The first step 

was to sweep the remainder of the 

Grosshau clearing and to occupy a narrow, irregular stretch of woods lying 

between Grosshau and Gey. This accomplished, CCA of the 5th Armored 

Division might be committed to assist the 

final drive across the plain from Gey to 

Dueren and the Roer River. 

To help prepare the way for CCA, 

General Barton attached the combat command's 46th Armored Infantry Battalion 

to the 22d Infantry. Colonel Lanham in 

turn directed the armored infantry to 

move the next day, 30 November, to Hill 

40I.3, an open height commanding the 

entire Grosshau clearing, whose lower 

slopes the 5th Armored Division's CCR 

had occupied temporarily in conjunction 

with the attack on Kleinhau. From Hill 

40 I. 3 the armored infantry was to attack 

into the woods east of the clearing in 

order to block the right flank of the 22d 

Infantry when that regiment turned 

northeast toward Gey. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 473 

Colonel Lanham held one battalion of 

his own infantry in reserve, directed another to attack alongside the GrosshauGey highway to gain the woods line 

overlooking Gey, and ordered Major 

Blazzard's unfortunate 2d Battalion to 

cross 800 yards of open ground east of 

Grosshau, enter the woods, and then turn 

northeastward along the right flank of the 

battalion that was moving on Gey. 

The direct move through the narrow 

stretch of woods to Gey was blessed with 

success. Behind a bank of crossfire laid 

down by fourteen tanks and tank destroyers advancing on either flank of the 

infantry, a battalion of the 22d Infantry 

by nightfall on 30 November was entrenched firmly at the edge of the woods 

overlooking the village. 

Things did not go as well for the rest 

of the regiment and the attached armored 

infantry. As men of the 46th Armored 

Infantry Battalion moved up Hill 40 I. 3, 

German fire poured down the open 

slopes. All day long the armored infantry 

fought for the hill and as night came 

finally succeeded through sheer determination. Yet in one day this fresh battalion 

lost half its strength. 15 

Fire from this same hill and from the 

edge of the woods east of Grosshau made 

the attempted advance of Major Blazzard's 

2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, just as difficult. The edge of the woods was to have 

been Blazzard's line of departure. In 

reality, the battalion fought all day to get 

to this line. Upon gaining it, the two 

companies that made the attack had 

15 Much of the eventual success against Hill 

40 I.3 could be attributed to courageous and 

resourceful action by the battalion commander, 

Lt. Col. William H. Burton, Jr. He subsequently 

received the DSC. For heroic action during the 

same attack, S. Sgts. Robert M. Henley and Brady 

O. Kelley also received the DSC. 

between them less than a hundred men. 

That this little force could continue 

northeast through the woods to come 

abreast of the battalion which had gained 

the woods line overlooking Gey was a 

patent impossibility. Early the next day, 

I December, Colonel Lanham reluctantly 

relinquished his reserve to perform this 

task. Now that Hill 40 I .3 was III 

American hands, the job was easier. A 

favorable wind that blew a smoke screen 

across open ground leading from Grosshau 

to the woods also helped. By nightfall 

the reserve battalion had reached the 

woods line overlooking Gey, refused its 

flank, and dug in. At Icing last, sixteen 

days after the start of the November 

offensive, the 22d Infantry-or what was 

left of it-was all the way through the 

Huertgen Forest. 

Success, yes; but how to maintain it? 

Every man of the rifle battalions was 

hugging a foxhole somewhere, yet the line 

wa'l desperately thin. As a last resort, 

Colonel Lanham robbed his Antitank, 

Headquarters, and Service Companies of 

all men that possibly could be spared to 

form a reserve. He could not have been 

more prescient, for early the next morning, 

2 December, the Germans counterattacked. In estimated company strength, 

the Germans struck southeast from Gey, 

quickly penetrated the line, surrounded a 

battalion command post, and gave every 

indication of rolling up the front. Only 

quick artillery support and commitment 

of the composite reserve saved the day. 

Had events followed earlier planning, 

the 5th Armored Division's CCA now 

would have joined the 22d Infantry and 

the rest of the 4th Division for the push 

across the Roer plain to Dueren. But 

one look at the condition of the 22d 

Infantry would have been enough to 
474 

convince anyone that this regiment could 

contribute little if anything to a renewed 

push. And the sad fact was that the 

22d Infantry was a microcosm of the 

entire 4th Division. 

In the center of the division's zone, the 

12th Infantry had been attacking in the 

woods west of Gey ever since first moving 

on 28 November to close the gap between 

the other two regiments. On 30 November the 12th Infantry had swept forward 

more than a thousand yards to gain the 

woods line west of Gey, whence the 

regiment was to make the main effort in 

an attack against that village. But the 

12th Infantry had entered the Huertgen 

Forest fighting ten days ahead of the rest 

of the division; after twenty-six days of 

hell, artillery fire alone against the regiment's woods line position was enough to 

foster rampant disorganization. 

On the 4th Division's north wing, the 

8th Infantry had attacked on 29 November in conjunction with the general renewal of the offensive. The objective was 

a road center at the eastern edge of the 

forest about a settlement called Hof 

Hardt. One day's action was enough to 

confirm the worst apprehensions about 

the enemy's forming a new line during the 

three-day pause that had preceded the 

attack. Not until 1 December did Colonel McKee's regiment make a genuine 

penetration, and then the companies were 

too weak to exploit it. Company I, for 

example, was down to 21 men; Company 

C had but 44 men; and some other 

companies were almost as weak. Total 

gains in three days were less than a 

thousand yards, and the regiment had 

almost as far again to go before emerging 

from the forest. 

Since 16 November the 4th Division 

had fought in the Huertgen Forest for a 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

maximum advance of a little over three 

miles. Some 432 men were known dead 

and another 255 were missing. The division had suffered a total of 4,053 battle 

casualties, while another estimated 2,000 

men had fallen to trench foot, respiratory 

diseases, and combat exhaustion. Thus 

the 4th Division could qualify for the 

dubious distinction of being second only to 

the 28th Division in casualties incurred in 

the forest. 16 

Late on 1 December General Barton 

spoke in detail to the VII Corps commander, General Collins, about the deplorable state of the division. The 22d 

Infantry, in particular, he reported, had 

been milked of all offensive ability. Replacements were courageous, but they did 

not know how to fight. Since all junior 

leadership had fallen by the way, no one 

remained to show the replacements how. 

General Collins promptly ordered General Barton to halt his attack. As early 

as 28 November, both the VII Corps and 

the First Army had noted the 4th Division's condition and had laid plans for 

relief. On 3 December a regiment of the 

83d Division brought north from the VIII 

Corps sector in Luxembourg was to begin 

relief of the 22d Infantry. In the course 

of the next eight days, the entire 4th 

Division was to move from the Huertgen 

Forest and arrive in Luxembourg just in 

time for the counteroffensive III the 

Ardennes. 

Resuming the Corps Main Effort 

Though the slowness of the advance 

through the Huertgen Forest was disappointing, it was to the north, in that 

16 The division took 1,757 prisoners. For detailed casualty figures, see 4th Div Opns Rpt, 

Nov 44. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 475 

region where the forested hills merge with 

the Roer plain, that the issue of whether 

the VII Corps had purchased a slugging 

match or a breakthrough would be 

decided. Here, in a sector no more than 

three and a half miles wide, extending 

from within the forest near Schevenhuette 

to the Inde River along the south boundary of the Eschweiler-Weisweiler industrial triangle, General Collins was 

making .his main effort. Here he had 

concentrated an' infantry division, the 1st, 

reinforced by a regiment, the 47th Infantry, and backed up by an armored 

division, the 3d. 

After four days of severe fighting, by 

nightfall of 19 November, there were 

limited grounds for encouragement in this 

sector. Given one or two days of good 

weather, the corps commander believed, 

"the crust could be smashed." 17 On the 

I st Division's left flank, the 104th Division 

had assisted the main effort by seizing 

high ground near Stolberg and now could 

start to clear the adjacent industrial triangle that lay between the 1st Division 

and the Ninth Army. A combat command of armor had cleared the last 

Germans from the Stolberg Corridor up 

to the base of the Hamich ridge, which 

stood astride the 1st Division's axis of 

advance. The 1st Division's 16th Infantry had taken the village of Hamich and 

a dominating foothold upon the Hamich 

ridge at Hill 232. In holding these gains, 

the 16th Infantry had decimated the 

fresh 47th Division's I04th Regiment, 

which had rushed to the aid of the faltering 12th Division. In the forest near 

Schevenhuette, the 26th Infantry now 

stood a stone's throw from the Laufenburg, the castle halfway through this 

portion of the Huertgen Forest. 

17 Sylvan Diary, entry of 18 Nov 44. 

So fierce had been the conflict to this 

point that the 1st Division cofnmailder, 

General Huebner, saw now that he could 

not afford the luxury of withholding 

reserves for exploitation upon the Roer 

plain. So obdurate were the Germans 

and so intractable the weather and terrain 

that he might need everything he had 

even to reach the plain. Huebner ordered his reserve regiment, the 18th 

Infantry, into the center of his line to 

make what was in effect a new divisional 

main effort. The fresh regiment was to 

attack northeastward astride the Weh 

Creek to clear the road net bordering the 

creek and seize the industrial town of 

Langerwehe, the last obstacle barring 

egress from the forest onto the plain. 

Originally scheduled to take Langerwehe and the neighboring town of 

Juengersdorf, the 26th Infantry in the 

thick of the forest on the division's right 

wing now was to make a subsidiary effort. 

This regiment was to ~ake J uengersdorf 

and a new objective, the village of Merode 

at the eastern edge of the forest near the 

boundary with the 4th Division. Having 

cleared Hamich and Hill 232, the remaining organic regiment, the 16th Infantry, 

was to advance close alongside the left 

flank of the newly 'committed 18th 

Infantry through broken terrain lying 

between the forest and the EschweilerWeisweiler industrial triangle. This would 

bring the 16th Infantry to the edge of the 

plain along the Weisweiler-Langerwehe 

highway close on the left of the center 

regiment. 

A change in plan instituted by the 

corps commander also affected the 1st 

Division. Attached to the I st Division, 

the 47th Infantry (9th Division) was to 

continue as originally directed to sweep 

the Hamich ridge extending northwest 
476 

from Hill 232. Under the original plan, 

this regiment then was to have passed to 

control of the 104th Division for seizing 

a narrow strip of land just south of the 

Inde River, lying between two parallel 

rail lines and embracing the industrial 

towns of Huecheln and Wilhelmshoehe. 

Apparently in anticipation of communications problems because of the Inde, 

General Collins now decided to leave the 

47th Infantry under control of the 1st 

Division until these towns had fallen. He 

shifted the interdivision boundary accordingly north to the IndeY 

This boundary change effected, the 

territory left to be cleared by the corps 

main effort before reaching the Roer 

plain took the form of a giant fan. The 

outer rim extended from Nothberg, at the 

northern tip of the Hamich ridge, a town 

still assigned to the 104 th Division, 

northeastward through Huecheln to Wilhelmshoehe, thence east to Langerwehe 

and southeast to Juengersdorf and Merode. At the conclusion of the renewed 

attack, the 47th Infantry and the 1st 

Division's three organic regiments would 

be arrayed along the rim of the fan on the 

threshold of the plain. 19 

A battalion of the 18th Infantry gained 

a leg on the renewed offensive during the 

afternoon of 19 November by driving on 

the village of Wenau, less than a mile 

northeast of Hamich on the route to 

Langerwehe. Temporarily off balance in 

the wake of the defeats at Hamich and 

Hill 232, the Germans could not genuinely 

18 VII Corps Opns Memo 118, 19 Nov, VII 

Corps Opns Memos file, Nov 44. 

19 I st Division and 47th Infantry records for 

this period are detailed and are supported by 

adequate journal entries. Combat interviews 

exist for all units except the 18th Infantry. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

contest the move except with mortar and 

artillery fire. Although this was sufficient 

to deny occupation of Wenau until early 

on 20 November, the 18th Infantry then 

had a solid steppingstone for launching 

the divisional main effort toward Langerwehe. 

Capture of Wenau also meant an assist 

to the 26th 'Infantry in clearing the Weh 

Creek highway and thereby gaining an 

adequate supply route to replace the 

muddy, meandering firebreaks and trails 

that had served this regiment during the 

first four days of attack. Assured of 

this supply route, the 26th Infantry 

commander, Colonel Seitz, renewed his 

drive on 20 November against the Laufenburg and the four wooded hills surrounding the castle. First the regiment had to 

beat off a counterattack by a battalion of 

the 47th Division's I 15th Regiment, sister 

battalion to that which had lost heavily in 

a similar maneuver the day before. In 

the end, this meant an easier conquest of 

the castle, for Colonel Seitz sent a battalion close on the enemy's heels before the 

defenders of the castle could get set. By 

nightfall Colonel Seitz had pushed a 

battalion beyond the castle along a forest 

trail leading east toward Merode. 

For two more days, through 22 November, the 26th Infantry continued to push 

slowly eastward through the dank forest 

with two battalions and to refuse the 

regimental right flank with the other. 

'The operation was monotonously the 

same. You attacked strongpoint after 

strongpoint built around log pillboxes, 

scattered mines, foxholes, and barbed 

wire. You longed for tank support but 

seldom got it. You watched your comrades cut down by shells bursting in the 

trees. Drenched by cold rain, y.ou 

slipped and slithered in ankle-deep mud. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 477 

Every advance brought its counterattack. 

When dusk approached you stopped early 

in order to dig in and thatch your foxhole 

with logs before night brought German 

infiltration and more shellfire. 

The 26th Infantry nevertheless made 

steady progress. Indeed, by nightfall of 

22 November, prospects were bright for 

sweeping a remaining mile of forest and 

emerging at last upon the Roer plain at 

Merode. Arrival of a contingent of the 

4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on 

the regiment's right flank to refuse the 

flank and maintain contact with the 4th 

Division meant that Colonel Seitz would 

have the full weight of all three of his 

battalions for the final push. 

Only from a regimental viewpoint, 

however, was the 26th Infantry ready to 

push out of the forest. In the division 

picture, General Huebner was concerned 

lest Colonel Seitz get too far beyond his 

neighbors. On the left, the 18th Infantry 

had become heavily engaged in the valley 

of the Weh Creek; and the 4th Division's 

8th Infantry at Gut Schwarzenbroich still 

was a long way from the eastern skirt of 

the forest. General Huebner was perturbed particularly that the Germans 

might push through the 8th Infantry 

down Road U to Schevenhuette to cut 

off the entire I st Division.20 He directed 

that until further notice Colonel Seitz 

make only limited attacks, some designed 

to assist the 18th Infantry. 

After a relatively painless conquest of 

Wenau, the 18th Infantry had stepped 

into hot water. "Shove off as fast as you 

can," General Huebner had told the 18th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Smith. 

" [If you] run into resistance, bypass it 

20 This is reflected in 1st Div G-3 J nl, 19-2 I 

Nov 44. 

and go around." 21 This might have 

worked except for two factors. First, the· 

Germans during the night had hurriedly 

shored up the depleted I04th Regiment 

with the 47th Division's 147th Engineer 

Battalion. The second was the nature of 

the next objective, the village of Heistern, 

about 500 yards beyond Wenau. Like 

Wenau, Heistern is perched on the 

western slope of the Weh Creek valley. 

Bypassing it was next to impossible, for by 

little more than rolling grenades down the 

slope the Germans in the village could 

deny movement up the valley toward 

Langerwehe. From Heistern they enjoyed almost as great an advantage over 

the 16th Infantry's sector to the west. 

"We need Heistern," said one officer of 

the I 6th Infantry, "before we can go 

anywhere .... " 22 

The fight for Heistern might have been 

as lengthy and as costly as the fight for 

Hamich except that here the Germans 

had no Hill 232 from which to pinpoint 

the slightest movement. Employing artillery and tank fire against fortifications on 

the fringe of the village, a battalion of the 

18th Infantry by nightfall had reached a 

main road junction in the center of the 

village. Still the Germans clung like 

cockleburs to the northern half. 

During the night, the commander of 

the enemy's I04th Regiment, Col. Josef 

Kimbacher, personally led his training and 

regimental headquarters companies into 

Heistern to reinforce what was left of the 

German garrison. At 0330, 2 I November, behind damaging concentrations of 

mortar and artillery fire, Colonel Kimbacher counterattacked. Not until short21 CG to 18th Inf, 0830, 20 Nov, 1st Div G-3 

Jnl, 19-21 Nov 44. 

22 16th Inf to G-3, 1500, 20 Nov, 1st Div 

G-3 Jnl, 19-21 Nov 44· 
478 

ly before daylight did the Americans beat 

off the enemy and spill over into the 

northern half of the village. They took 

about 120 prisoners, including Colonel 

Kimbacher, and subsequently counted 250 

German dead. Taking both Wenau and 

Heistern cost the 18th Infantry 172 casualties. As often happened, the Germans 

in a swift and futile counterattack had 

wasted the very troops who in a stationary 

defense might have prolonged the fight 

considerably.23 

Even before the attack for Heistern, the 

18th Infantry had sent another battalion 

on 20 November to cross the Weh Creek 

and advance on Langerwehe along a 

wooded ridge marking the east slope of 

the valley. Having no Heistern to contend with, this battalion moved fast until 

on 2 I November the leading company 

smacked into a real obstacle, Hill 207. 

Not quite a mile northeast of Heistern, 

wooded, and with an escarpment for a 

southern face, Hill 207 dominates the 

Weh Creek valley from the east as 

Heistern does from the west. Pounded 

by artillery fire in disturbing proportions 

and raked by small arms fire from atop 

the escarpment, the first company to test 

the hill fell back under severe losses. 

Eschewing another direct assault, the 

battalion commander the next day attempted to maneuver through the woods 

to take the hill from a flank. Maneuver 

in the Huertgen 

covered, was a 

commission. Not 

four hours, 23 

battalion able to 

vigorous flanking 

ried the hill. 

Forest, he soon discomplex and costly 

for another twentyNovember, was this 

get into position for a 

attack that at last car23 German material is from 1st Div Intel Activities. Nov 44, 1st Div Combat Interv file. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Having lost Hill 207, the Germans had 

no real anchor short of Langerwehe itself 

upon which to base a further defense 

along the east slope of the Weh Creek 

valley. Although they made a try a few 

hundred yards beyond Hill 207 at Schoenthal, they could hold onto this hamlet 

only through the night. On 24 November 

the battalion of the 18th Infantry pushed 

on northeastward paralleL to the valley. 

Except for minor strongpoints, a wooded 

door to Langerwehe stood ajar. 

Like the 26th Infantry deeper within 

the woods, the battalion of the 18th Infantry could not pursue its advantage. 

The most elementary caution would proscribe sending an understrength battalion 

into a town the size of Langerwehe unless 

a better supply route than muddy firebreaks was available. To the chagrin of 

the regimental commander, Colonel Smith, 

that was the supply situation this battalion had to face: the Weh Creek highway 

could not be used until both east and 

west slopes had been cleared. On the 

west slope, another battalion of the 18th 

Infantry had run into trouble. 

This was Colonel Smith's reserve battalion, committed through Heistern at 

midday on 2 I November to project the 

left prong of the regiment's double thrust 

on Langerwehe. Lying between the reserve battalion and the objective were 

two obstacles: a rectangular patch of 

woods covering the western slope of the 

valley and a dominating height at the 

northern end of the woods no more than 

half a mile from Langerwehe, Hill 203. 

Getting through the woods alone was bad 

enough. Hill 203 was worse. 

The critical importance of Hill 203 

obviously was not lost on the Germans. 

Topped by an observation tower and a 

religious shrine, the hill is bald once the 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 479 

rectangular patch of woods gives out on 

the southern slope. From the hill the 

enemy controlled both the Weh Creek 

highway and another road running from 

Heistern across the crest of the hill into 

Langerwehe. Without Hill 203, the Germans could not hope to hold onto 

Langerwehe. Without Hill 203, the 18th 

Infantry could not hope to take the town. 

Admonished by General Huebner not 

to commit full strength against Hill 203 

because "Langerwehe is where your big 

fight is," 24 Colonel Smith's reserve battalion at first sent only a company against 

the hill. No sooner had men of this 

company emerged from the trees toward 

the crest late on 23 November than small 

arms and artillery fire literally mowed 

them down. This was enough to convince Colonel Smith that he had a big 

fight here, no matter what he might run 

into later in Langerwehe. "The 1st 

Battalion," Colonel Smith reported, "will 

be unable to get to Hill 203 until we get 

armor." 25 Getting tanks forward over 

roads literally under the muzzles of German guns obviously would be toilsome. 

Through the night of 23 November 

and most of the next day, attached tanks 

of the 745th Tank Battalion tried to reach 

Hill 203. Slowed by mud, at least two 

were picked off by antitank guns concealed on the hill. Not until too late in 

the afternoon to be of any real assistance 

on 24 November did the tanks gain the 

woods line. Neither could tactical aircraft help, for the weather was rainy and 

dismal. Even the contribution of the 

artillery was limited, because the fighting 

was at such close quarters. Though 

Colonel Smith called on the battalion of 

24 CG to 18th Inf, 0843, 23 Nov, 1St Div G-3 

Jnl, 22-24 Nov 44. 

25 1St Div G-3 Opns Rpt, Nov 44. 

the 18th Infantry on the other side of the 

valley to help, that battalion soon had its 

hands full with a counterattack by 

contingents of the 47th Division's I 15th 

Regiment. 

Supported by two tanks, one company 

in midafternoon of the next day, 25 

November, at last began to make some 

progress against Hill 203. Although the 

enemy knocked out one of the tanks, a 

rifle platoon managed to gain a position 

near the crest of the hill. All through 

the night and the next day this little band 

of men clung to the hillside. Yet for all 

their courage and pertinacity, these men 

scarcely represented any genuine conquest 

of Hill 203. It would take more than a 

platoon to carry this tactical prize. 

Towns, Woods, Hills, and Castles 

Concurrently with the fight in the forest and along the Weh Creek valley, the 

16th Infantry and the attached 47th 

Infantry had been extending the 1St 

Division's battle line to the west and 

northwest. The 47th Infantry was to 

attack northwest along the Hamich ridge, 

thence northeast through Huecheln and 

toward Wilhelmshoehe in a scythelike 

pattern designed to place the attached 

regiment eventually on a line with the 

rest of its foster division. Attacking 

northeast from Hamich, the 16th Infantry 

was to serve as a bridge between this 

operation and the divisional main effort of 

the 18th Infantry up the Weh Creek valley. The 16th Infantry's first objective 

was high ground about a castle, the 

Roesslershof, at the edge of a patch of 

woods south of the Aachen-Dueren 

railroad. 

The sector through which the 16th and 

47th Infantry Regiments were to attack 
480 

took the form of a parallelogram, bounded 

on the southwest by the Hamich ridge, on 

the northwest by the Inde River, on the 

northeast by the Weisweiler-Langerwehe 

highway, and on the southeast by the 

Weh Creek. The parallelogram embraced 

the purlieus of the Huertgen Forest. A 

nondescript collection of farms, villages, 

industrial towns, railroads, scrub-covered 

hills, and scattered but sometimes extensive patches of woods, this region 

would offer serious challenges to an 

attacker, particularly during the kind of 

cold, wet weather late November had 

brought. Indeed, these troops who would 

fight here where the Huertgen Forest 

reluctantly gives way to the Roer plain 

would experience many of the same 

miseries' as did those who fought entirely 

inside the forest. Yet they might be 

spared the full measure of the forest's 

grimness. Sometimes they could spend a 

dry night ib a damaged house, and most 

of the time they could s~e the sky. 

Both regiments began to attack during 

the afternoon of 19 November after the 

16th Infantry's decisive victory at Hamich 

and Hill 232. Like the 18th Infantry at 

Wenau, the 16th Infantry found that 

closely following up the defeat of the 

enemy's I04th Regiment was a good stratagem. By the end of the day the 

regiment's leading battalion had reached 

the eastern part of the Bovenberger Wald, 

a patch of woods lying in the middle of 

the pa,rallelogram. The next day the 

16th Infantry would be ready to advance 

close alongside the 18th Infantry's left 

flank to cover the le~s than two miles to 

Roesslershof Castle. 

Given flank protection by the advance 

of the 16th Infantry, a battalion of the 

47th Infantry attacked northwest along 

the Hamich ridge from Hill ~32 with an 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

eye toward Hills 187 and 167, which 

mark the terminus of the ridge a few 

hundred yards short of Nothberg. 

The Germans on Hill 187 were part of 

the 47th Division's I03d Regiment. Having become embroiled earlier in the fight 

to keep the 3d U.S. Armored Division 

out of the villages southwest of Hill 187, 

the regiment had incurred serious losses. 

Yet when afforded advantageous terrain 

like Hill 187 and nearby Hill 167, even a 

small force was capable of a stiff fight. 

This the 47th Infantry discovered early 

on 20 November. Commanded by Lt. 

Col. James D. Allgood, a battalion attacked Hill 187 repeatedly but without 

appreciable success. Hill 187, the Germans recognized, was worth ~efending, 

for from it they could look down upon 

three U.S. divisions-the 104th in the 

Eschweiler-W eisweiler industrial complex, 

the 3d Armored in the Stolberg Corridor, 

and that part of the 1st Division in the 

parallelogram.26 

As the fighting stirred again on Hill 187 

the next day, 2 I November, the 47th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Smythe, 

sent another battalion through the Bovenberger Wald to the east of the hill. By 

taking the settlement of Bovenberg at the 

northern tip of the woods, this battalion 

would virtually encircle both Hills 187 

and 167 in conjunction with a concurrent 

attack by a unit of the 104th Division on 

the town of Nothberg. At the same time, 

an advance on Bovenberg would pave the 

2H When a round from a German gun set 

afire a tank destroyer supporting the 47th Infantry, a platoon leader, S. Sgt. Herschel F. Briles, 

8ggth Tank Destroyer Battalion, lowered himself 

into the burning turret to rescue the wounded 

crewmen inside. The next day he repeated the 

feat when another ·destroyer burst into flames. 

Sergeant Briles subsequently received the Medal 

of Honor. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 481 

way for executing the 47th Infantry's next 

mission of taking the industrial towns of 

Huecheln and Wilhelmshoehe, which lie 

north of Bovenberg. 

The idea was good. But it would not 

work without first wresting from the 

Germans the dominating observation from 

Hills 187 and 167. Tanks trying to accompany the infantry along a road skirting the western edge of the trees found 

the going next to impossible because of 

felled trees and antitank fire from the 

hills. In the thin northern tip of the 

woods, the infantry too was exposed to 

punishing shellfire obviously directed from 

the heights. The leading company nevertheless prepared to debouch from the 

wood to strike a strongpoint in the main 

building of a dairy farm on the edge of 

Bovenberg. 

Despite grazing small arms fire, one 

platoon actually reached the dairy, only 

to fall back in the face of hand grenades 

dropped from second story windows. 

Protected by thick brick walls, the Germans inside called down artillery fire on 

their own posItIOn. Another platoon 

which penetrated to a nearby copse could 

get no farther and could withdraw only 

by means of a smoke screen. Even then 

only 6 men emerged unscathed, though 

they brought with them 15 or 20 

wounded. The company lost 35 men 

killed in a matter of a few hours. All 

officers except the company commander 

were either killed or wounded. The company had only 37 men left. 

In the meantime, Colonel Allgood's 

battalion was having as much trouble as 

before with Hill 187. Despairing of taking the hill with usual tactics, the 1st 

Division commander, General Huebner, 

turned in midafternoon of 2 I November 

to the same pattern he had used two days 

before against Hill 232. As soon as 

Colonel Allgood's men could pull back· a 

safe distance, I st Division artillery was to 

fire a TOT. 

Hearing of this plan, the corps commander intervened. Because he deemed 

the effort too modest, General Collins directed assistance by all VII Corps artillery 

and any divisional artillery within effective 

range. Within ten minutes after the 1St 

Division's organic 155-mm. howitzer battalion had zeroed in on the hill, the 1St 

Division's artillery headquarters had transmitted the adjustment to all other firing 

battalions. At 1615, an awesome total 

of twenty battalions, including a 240-mm. 

howitzer battalion and two 8-inch gun 

battalions, fired for three minutes upon a 

target area measuring approximately 300 

by 500 yards. "It just literally made the 

ground bounce," said one observer.21 

Well it might have; for this ranked among 

the most concentrated artillery shoots 

during the course of the war in Europe. 

For some unexplained reason, Colonel 

Allgood made no immediate effort to 

occupy the hill. Instead, the 47th Infantry's Cannon Company interdicted the 

target through the night. The next 

morning, 22 November, a patrol that 

crept up the hill found only enemy dead 

and about eighty survivors who still were 

too dazed to resist. Another patrol discovered that the enemy had abandoned 

Hill 167. 

Rather than renew the drive on the 

dairy at Bovenberg and continue along 

that route to the next objectives of 

Huecheln and Wilhelmshoehe, the 47th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Smythe, 

asked permission to move into the 104th 

Division's zone at Nothberg and attack 

27 Combat Interv with Allgood. 
482 

from that ·direction. The I04th Division 

had occupied Nothberg during the morning of 22 November. Because the route 

via Bovenberg was more a trail than a 

road, the 47th Infantry's line of communications eventually would run through 

Nothberg anyway.28 

Although granted this permission, Colonel Smythe was reluctant to leave intact 

a strongpoint like the dairy at Bovenberg. 

This time the attacking company took a 

leaf from the successful artillery bombardment of Hills 232 and 187. After an 

8-inch gun battalion had scored at least 

twenty-six hits on the dairy, the riflemen 

attacked. The artillery alone, they discovered, had been enough. The Germans 

had fled. 

To make the main drive between the 

parallel rail lines toward Huecheln, Colonel Smythe early on 23 November committed his reserve battalion under Lt. 

Col. Lewis E. Maness. Canalized by the 

railroads into an attack zone only 500 

yards wide, Colonel Maness leaned heavily 

in his attack upon supporting fires. Artillery fired a ten-minute concentration 

upon the western edge of Huecheln, 

8 I -mm. mortars laid a smoke screen, a 

platoon of tanks accompanied the infantry, and tank destroyers and machine guns 

spewed overhead fire from the eastern 

edge of Nothberg. 

Unfortunately, Germans of the 12th 

Division's 27th Fusilier Regiment had 

shunned the obvious defensive spot along 

the fringe of Huecheln in favor of open 

ground west of the town. Though they 

had dug an elaborate zigzag trench system 

protected by mines, not a stray clod of 

earth betrayed their positions. Dependent upon an observation post in Nothberg, 

2S 47 th Inf to 1St Div G-3, 1448, 22 Nov, 1St 

Div G-3 Jnl, 19-21 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

a mile away, Colonel Maness had not 

accurately determined the enemy's. line. 

Most of the supporting fire was over. 

The enemy for his part had a towering 

observation post atop a slag pile in the 

104th Division's zone north of the northern railroad. On 23 November Colonel 

Maness' battalion hardly got past the 

eastern edge of Nothberg. Renewing the 

attack the next morning, Maness could 

detect nothing in the passing of night to 

alter the picture. 

Unknown to Colonel Maness, his superiors were concocting a formula which 

might prove just what this particular 

problem required. For several days the 

corps commander, General Collins, had 

been considering the idea of employing 

his armored reserve. Although Collins 

hardly could have entertained any illusions that a breakthrough calling for 

armored exploitation was near, he did see 

a possibility that an assist from armor 

might provide the extra push necessary to 

get onto the Roer plain. Impressed by 

unexpected celerity in the I04th Division's 

fight to clear the Eschweiler-Weisweiler 

industrial triangle, he had on 22 November increased that division's responsibility 

beyond the industrial triangle to the Roer. 

A byproduct of the change was an 

opportunity-almost a need-for a short, 

quick thrust by a small increment of 

armor. 

In directing the 104th Division to continue to the Roer, General Collins had 

extended that division's boundary east 

from Weisweiler to include a crossing of 

the Inde River along the Aachen-Cologne 

autobahn. A quick jab by armor through 

Huecheln and Wilhelmshoehe to the 

Frenzerburg, a medieval castle crowning a 

gentle hill a mile beyond Wilhelmshoehe, 

would enable the armor to control the 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 483 

INF ANTRY AND TANKS move through small truck farms near Huecheln. 

I04th Division's Inde crossing site by 

fire. 29 

Shortly before noon on 24 November 

General Collins attached Colonel Maness' 

battalion of the 47th Infantry to the 3d 

Armored Division as the infantry component of a task force to make the thrust 

to the Frenzerburg. Other components 

of the task force were a medium tank 

battalion from the 3d Armored Division's 

CCA, an armored field artillery battalion, 

and increments of tank destroyers and 

29 VII Corps Opns Memos 119 and 120, 22 

and 24 Nov, VII Corps Opns Memos file, Nov 44. 

armored engineers. All were under the 

command of Lt. Col. Walter B. Richardson. 30 

Task Force Richardson's first attack in 

midafternoon of 24 November ran into 

trouble at the start. Two medium tank 

companies in the lead blundered into a 

mine field. Attempts to find a path 

around the mines usually ended in tanks 

30 In addition to records of the 47th Inf and 

1st Div, the story of Task Force Richardson is 

based on official records of the 3d Armd Div and 

Combat Interv filed with lOst Div Intervs. The 

force shows on Map VII as TF R. 
484 

bogging deep in mud. One tank actually 

sank so deep that mud came up on the 

hull. 

As dusk approached, the armored engineers at last managed to clear a path. 

The enemy's observation severely restricted by gathering darkness, the attack 

began to roll. Tanks and infantry together stormed across the zigzag trenches 

into Huecheln. By 2100 (24 November) 

the town was clear. A hundred Germans 

were on their way to prisoner cages. 

Neither Huecheln nor the next town 

of Wilhelms hoe he are on commanding 

ground, so that in renewing the attack on 

25 November Task Force Richardson 

strove toward more dominating terrain 

along the Weisweiler-Langerwehe highway from which to attack the Frenzerburg. The Germans employed fire from 

self-propelled guns across the Inde at 

Weisweiler and from small arms and 

mortars among the houses and factories of 

Wilhelmshoehe. During the course of the 

day 200 Germans of the 12th Division's 

27th Regiment and the 47th Division's 

I03d Regiment were captured. So long 

as tanks and infantry enjoyed the protection of buildings, American losses were 

moderate; but once in the open, casualties 

rose alarmingly. An attempt on the right 

to reach the highway stalled when the bulk 

of one tank company bogged in the mud. 

At one time eighteen tanks were immobilized. A thrust on the left ran into 

intense fire upon emerging from Wilhelmshoehe. German guns knocked out three 

tanks, and small arms and artillery fire 

virtually destroyed an infantry company. 

That company had but thirty-five men 

left. The infantry commander, Colonel 

Maness, appealed for reinforcement before 

striking into the open for the Frenzerburg. 

The officers of Task Force Richardson 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

had ample justification for concern about 

moving alone onto the Roer plain. On 

the left, the task force would have some 

protection from the Inde River, even 

though the I04th Division had not yet 

come abreast; but on the right, the task 

force would be exposed to counterattack 

from Langerwehe. Nothing existed at 

this time (25 November) to indicate that 

the 1st Division's 18th Infantry soon 

might push the enemy off Hill 203 and get 

into Langerwehe. Neither was there any 

hope that the I st Division's 16th Infantry 

soon might come abreast along the 

W eisweiler-Langerwehe highway between 

the task force and the 18th Infantry, for 

on 25 November the 16th Infantry was 

having trouble holding onto terrain already taken. This was high ground about 

Roesslershof at the edge of a patch of 

woods southeast of Wilhelmshoehe. 

After the paths of the 16th and 47th 

Regiments had diverged on 19 November 

in the Bovenberger Wald, the 16th Infantry had delayed its attack until the 

18th Infantry had secured Heistern, the 

village alongside the Weh Creek valley 

which dominated the 16th Infantry's 

route of advance. Although able to make 

a genuine attack on 23 November, the 

regiment had been handicapped because 

General Huebner had withdrawn one 

battalion as a division reserve. 

Not until near nightfall on 23 November had the 16th Infantry pushed back 

stubborn remnants of the 47th Division, 

called Kampfgruppe Eisenhuber, and 

broken into Roesslershof. From that 

point the regiment had been involved in 

repulsing counterattacks and in clearing a 

patch of woods between the castle and 

Wilhelmshoehe. None other than a desultory effort had ·yet been made to cover 

about 750 yards remammg between 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 485 

Roesslershof and the Weisweiler-Langerwehe highway.3! 

In response to Colonel Maness' appeal 

for reinforcement before attacking the 

Frenzerburg, the 47th Infantry provided 

Company K, a unit seriously depleted but 

closer at hand than any other. The 

regimental commander, Colonel Smythe, 

also did something about the threat of 

counterattack from Langerwehe by sending another infantry battalion early on 26 

November toward Langerwehe to occupy 

a rough-surfaced hill only 800 yards short 

of the town. Colonel Smythe hardly 

could have anticipated how handsomely 

his perspicacity in sending a battalion to 

this hill was to be repaid. 

Task Force Richardson's plan of attack 

against the Frenzerburg on 26 November 

involved two simultaneous thrusts. Infantrymen mounted on tanks were to hit 

the castle from the south, while the infantry Company K was moving generally 

eastward alongside the Aachen-J uelich 

railroad. 

Hardly had the tanks and infantry 

reached open, cultivated fields south of 

the castle when German fire from positions 

a mile to the east near the village of 

Luchem knocked out two of the tanks. 

Scattering quickly, the infantry miraculously escaped in jury, but German fire 

continued in such intensity that Colonel 

Richardson ordered the composite force to 

fall back. 

For all practical purposes, this marked 

dissolution of Task Force Richardson. 

The armor assumed a role of long-range 

31 Combat Interv with Capt. Fred W. Hall, 

Jr., S-3, 2d Bn, 16th Inf. The 16th Infantry's 

official records for this period are notably poor. 

Details to be found in Combat Intervs should be 

checked against the 1st Div G-3 Opns Rpt. 

Nov 44. 

fire support, while the full burden of the 

attack fell upon Colonel Maness' 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, and Company K. 

When the Germans spotted the men of 

Company K sneaking along the AachenJ uelich railroad, they smothered them 

with shelling. "It was the heaviest 

mortar and artillery fire since El Guettar," 

said 1st Lt. William L. McWaters, the 

company commander and a veteran of 

North Africa. Having started his attack 

with but eighty men, McWaters could ill 

afford the twenty he lost in this shelling. 

To the east Lieutenant McWaters could 

see the towers of the Frenzerburg rising 

behind tall trees as if the castle stood in 

the middle of a wood. Wary of turning 

back over the open route he already had 

traversed, McWaters saw the concealment 

of the wood as his only hope. Once 

among the trees, however, he discovered 

with chagrin that the wood was no more 

than a copse. The castle stood full in the 

open, 300 yards beyond the last trees. 

Down to sixty men, Lieutenant McWaters hesitated before crossing this open 

ground to the castle. Yet only a moment's reflection was enough to remind 

him that his route of withdrawal was even 

more exposed and that the copse would be 

a hard place to hold once the Germans 

discovered his presence. He would attack. 

His radio destroyed in the earlier shelling, McWaters had no way to solicit 

supporting fire from other than his own 

machine guns. These he set up at the 

edge of the trees to form a base of fire. 

As the machine guns began to chatter, his 

riflemen dashed for the castle. 

They made it. Not to the castle itself 

but to an open rectangle of outbuildings 

enclosing a courtyard in front of the 

entrance. One glance was enough to 

reveal that getting into the castle was 
486 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

THE FRENZERBURG 

another proposition altogether. Of modest proportions as medieval castles go, 

Frenzerburg was nonetheless a formidable 

bastion to an unsupported infantry force 

reduced now to some half a hundred men. 

Denied on all sides by a water-filled moat 

twenty feet wide, the castle was accessible 

only by means of a drawbridge guarded 

by a gatehouse tower built of heavy stone. 

Although the drawbridge was down, a 

heavy oak gate blocked passage. A stone 

wall no more than waist high, bordering 

the moat near the drawbridge, offered the 

only protection to a move against the 

entrance. 

A lone bazookaman, Pfc. Carl V. 

Sheridan, dashed from the outbuildings 

toward the wall. Covered by two riflemen who pumped fire into windows of 

the gate house tower, Sheridan worked his 

way slowly toward the drawbridge. Unable to fire upon Sheridan because of the 

wall and the covering fire, Germans in the 

gate house tossed hand grenades from the 

windows. Somehow they missed. From 

the corner of the wall on the very threshold of the drawbridge, Sheridan loaded 

his bazooka, fired at the oak gate, 

calmly reloaded, and fired again. The 

heavy gate splintered but did not collapse. 

Sheridan had one rocket left. Again he 

loaded the awkward weapon. Ignoring 

grenades and rifle fire that popped about 

him, he took careful aim at the hinges of 

the gate and fired. Jumping to his feet, 

he brandished his bazooka, called to the 

men in the outbuildings behind him to 

"Come on, let's get 'em!" and charged. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 487 

The Germans cut him down a few feet 

from the gate. 32 

Lieutenant McWaters had no time to 

capitalize on Private Sheridan's feat before the Germans counterattacked from 

the gatehouse. They overran a squad in 

one end of the rectangle of outbuildings, 

captured the squad, and rescued about 

forty Germans Company K earlier had 

captured. In the face of this display of 

force, Lieutenant Mc Waters became 

acutely conscious of his plight. He sent 

a volunteer, Sgt. Linus Vanderheid, in 

quest of help. 

Sergeant Vanderheid had not far to go, 

for the 2d Battalion commander, Colonel 

Maness, had traced the route of Company 

K with four tanks and two rifle companies. This force already had reached 

the copse. Pointing up the anachronism 

of this twentieth century fight against a 

fifteenth century bastion, the tanks blasted 

the walls of the castle from the edge of 

the trees. As darkness came, Colonel 

Maness pushed his tanks and infantry 

across the open ground. Two tanks 

bogged down, an antitank gun in the 

castle set fire to another, and the one 

remaining blundered into the water-filled 

moat. Deprived of close support, Colonel 

Maness made no effort to assault the 

castle that night. 

Three hours before daylight the next 

morning, 27 November, the Germans 

counterattacked. About sixty paratroopers from the 3d Parachute Division, supported by six assault guns, struck the 

outbuildings. The Americans kept most 

of the assault guns at a respectable 

distance with artillery fire and bazookas, 

but one broke through into the courtyard. 

32 Sheridan was awarded the Medal of Honor 

posthumously. A combat interview with Maness 

and McWaters describes his deed. 

Churning back and forth, the German 

vehicle systematically shot up the landscape. The outbuildings began to burn. 

Somehow a section of the castle caught 

fire. Only as daylight approached did 

bazookas and hand grenades force the 

assault gun to retire. The paratroopers 

also fell back. 

All through the rest of 27 November 

American and German riflemen exchanged 

shots between the outbuildings and the 

castle, but not until early the next day 

did any break appear. During the night 

Colonel Maness brought up three tank 

destroyers. After the gunners had pummeled the gatehouse with go-mm. projectiles for several hours, the infantry 

moved in. The assault itself was an 

anticlimax. 

battle, the 

through an 

As a final anomaly in this 

Germans had slipped away 

underground passage. 

German Reinforcements 

The presence of sixty German paratroopers in the counterattack at the 

Frenzerburg marked the first major 

change in the line-up opposite the VII 

Corps since the early introduction (18 

November) of the 47th Volks Grenadier 

Division. That no other help had been 

accorded this part of General Koechling's 

LXXXI Corps was attributable to the 

jealous hoarding of the admittedly limited 

reserves for the Ardennes counteroffensive 

and to continued German belief that the 

biggest threat was farther north opposite 

the Ninth U.S. Army. Indeed, the southern wing of the LXXXI Corps had even 

provided one small reinforcement for the 

northern front when on 2 I November 

Kampfgruppe Bayer, which had fought at 

Hamich, was relieved from attachment to 

the 47th Division and sent north. Only 
488 

in artillery had there been any help 

provided; early on 22 November the 

partially motorized 403d Volks Artillery 

Corps had been committed between 

Dueren and J uelich.33 

The presence of the 3d Parachute Division stemmed indirectly from another 

request made on 22 November for at least 

one division from the Fuehrer Reserve. 

While turning down the request flatly, 

OKW sugared the pill with word that the 

3d Parachute Division soon would be 

shifted from the relatively inactive Holland front. Two days later, when confirming this move, OKW insisted that the 

parachute division must relieve at least 

one and preferably two divisions which 

might be refitted for the Ardennes. 34 

One division or two made little difference to the LXXXI Corps, so depleted 

were its units. The 12th Volks Grenadier 

Division, which had been fighting continuously since mid-September and which 

recently had been opposing the I04th 

U.S. Division and the 47th Infantry, 

finally was finished as a fighting force. 

The 27th Regiment, for example, had but 

120 combat effectives left; another regiment, but 60. After eight days of 

combat, the "new" 47th Division also had 

been virtually wiped out. The 104th 

Re giment had about 2 15 combat effectives 

left; the 103d Regiment, 60; and the 

115th Regiment, 36.35 

On 24 November Fifteenth Army 

(Gruppe von Manteuffel) , the army head330B WEST KTB, 20 Nov 44; LXXXI 

Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR of 2 I Nov 44; Order, 

Gruppe von Manteuffel to LXXXI Corps, 0010, 

22 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle, H. Gr. 

u. Armee. 

340B WEST KTB, 22 and 24 Nov 44. 

35 Notes of Inspection Trip by CG, LXXXI 

Corps, 24 Nov 44, in LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Befehle an Div. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

quarters superior to the LXXXI Corps, 

had directed that these two divisions be 

formed into a single Kampfgruppe under 

General Engel, commander of the 12th 

Division. This was the unit, designated 

Gruppe Engel, which the 3d Parachute 

Division eventually was to relieve. 36 

Submergence in a Kampfgruppe was an 

unhappy fate for a division which had 

acquitted itself as well as had the 47th. 

Having walked into a body blow at the 

start of the November offensive, this 

division had fought back by throwing 

every available man into the front linesheadquarters clerks, artillerymen, green 

replacements, engineers, even veterinarIans. Flagging morale and steadily decreasmg resolution could have been 

expected under these circumstances, but 

somehow the 47th Division had escaped 

these viruses. The 1st U.S. Division later 

was to call it "the most suicidally stubborn 

unit this Division has encountered . . . on 

the Continent." 37 

Composed for the most part of boys 

aged sixteen to nineteen, steeped in Nazi 

ideology but untested in combat, the 3d 

Parachute Division began to move into 

the line the night of 26 November. The 

division inherited a front about five 

miles long extending from Merode northward almost to the boundary between the 

First and Ninth U.S. Armies. 38 

As the German commanders soon were 

to discover, they had waited a day or so 

too long to act. Staging a relief under 

fire is risky business even with veteran 

36 Order, Gruppe von Manteuffel to LXXXI 

Corps, 1435, 24 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Bef. H. Gru. u. Armee. 

37 1st Div Intel Activities, Nov 44. 

38 TWX, Gruppe von Manteuffel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 0050, 25 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Bef. H. Gru. u. Armee; LXXXI 

Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 26 Nov 44. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 489 

units. About the only claim the 3d Parachute Division had to experience was the 

name of the division, but an honorific is 

hardly a substitute for experience. 

The first of the young paratroopers to 

run into trouble were those scheduled to 

counterattack at the Frenzerburg. These 

included a company each of reconnaissance, engineer, and antitank troops 

attached temporarily to Gruppe Engel 

and reinforced by assault guns of the 

newly arrived 667th Assault Gun Brigade. 39 The base for the attack was to 

be the hill along the LangerweheWeisweiler highway 800 yards west of 

Langerwehe which a battalion of the 

47th Infantry had occupied in order to 

protect the attack on the castle. Noone 

had told the paratroopers of the 47th 

Infantry's presence. As the Germans approached the hill, the Americans cut them 

down almost without effort. The German commander could reassemble only 

sixty men for the counterattack at the 

castle. 

In the meantime, a battalion of paratroopers moved west from Langerwehe to 

occupy positions at a settlement named 

Gut Merberich, south of the WeisweilerLangerwehe highway. Presumably this 

battalion was to thwart what looked like 

an impending attack by the 16th Infantry 

designed to assist a final drive by the 18th 

Infantry on Langerwehe. No sooner 

had these paratroopers reached Gut 

Merberich just after dawn on 27 November when artillery fire began to fall, a 

prelude to the 16th Infantry's attack. 

The Germans dived for the cellars. They 

were still there a few minutes later when 

the 16th Infantry moved in. This was a 

39 TWX LXXXI Corps to 12th Diu and 3d 

Prcht Diu, 2115, 26 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Befehle and Diu. 

prime example of what some of the few 

experienced noncommissioned officers in 

the parachute division meant when they 

said that under artillery fire, "the iron in 

the hearts of these kids turned to lead in 

their pants." 40 

To see two fresh battalions meet a fate 

like this must have convinced the Germans that they had a new enemy called 

Coincidence. This view must have been 

underscored an hour or so later on 27 

November when the 18th Infantry renewed its attempt to take Hill 203, which 

for more than three days had stymied an 

advance into Langerwehe. 

Relinquishing the crest of Hill 203, 

survivors of the 47th Division's I04th 

Re giment still clung to another position on 

the reverse slope. To strengthen the new 

position and then retake the hill, the 3d 

Parachute Division sent a battalion of the 

9th Parachute Regiment. The young 

paratroopers arrived just in time to catch 

the preparation fires of a renewal of the 

18th Infantry's attack. Like those at 

Gut Merberich, these Germans had no 

taste for shellfire. They surrendered III 

bunches. 

With Hill 203 out of the way, the 

industrial town of Langerwehe, gateway to the Roer plain, lay unshielded. 

Though the paratroopers and what was 

left of the 47th Division fought persistently to soften the blow, the 18th Infantry 

and a battalion of the 16th Infantry had 

swept the last Germans from demolished 

buildings and cellars by nightfall of 28 

November. At the same time the 26th 

Infantry was sending a battalion into the 

neighboring town of J uengersdorf. Despite counterattacks by the 5th Parachute 

40 Personnel and Equipme~t of 3d Prcht Diu, 

Incl 6 to VII Corps G-2 Per Rpt 177, 29 Nov, 

FUSA G-2 Tac file, 30 Nov 44. 
490 

Regiment, Juengersdorf too was secure by 

nightfall on 28 November. On this 

ignominious note, Gruppe Engel was officially relieved from the front and started 

rearward for refittingY 

Up to this point the debut of the 3d 

Parachute Division had been something 

short of spectacular. In only two more 

instances were the paratroopers to have an 

opportunity to make amends. One of 

these came five days later at Luchem, a 

village north of Langerwehe which the 

VII Corps commander, General Collins, 

ordered the I st Division to seize in order 

to form a straight line between Langerwehe and objectives of the 104th Division. 42 In a deft maneuver, a battalion 

of the 16th Infantry slipped into the 

village before dawn without artillery preparation, and at daylight tanks and tank 

destroyers raced forward to assist the 

mop-up. The paratroopers hadn't a 

chance. 43 

In the other instance, location of the 

objective was not so propitious for a 

swift, unsupported infantry attack. The 

objective was Merode, a village at the 

eastern edge of the Huertgen Forest 

southeast of Juengersdorf. At Merode 

the young German paratroopers had a 

chance to discover that war can be an 

exhilarating experience-when you win. 

H LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 28 

Nov 44. 

42 VII Corps Opns Memo 121, 26 Nov, VII 

Corps Opns Memos file, Nov 44. 

4;. As revealed by the experience of a 16th 

Infantry rifleman, Pvt. Robert T. Henry, Luchem 

was not taken without serious fighting. His 

platoon held up by a nest of five German 

machine guns, Private Henry voluntarily charged 

across 150 yards of open ground toward the 

position. Struck by a burst of fire when but 

halfway to the German emplacement, he staggered on until he fell mortally wounded only a 

few yards short of his goal. The intrepid rifleTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Debacle at Merode 

To the 26th Infantry, Merode was no 

ordinary objective. It was a promise of 

no more Huertgen Forest. To fulfill that 

promise, the 26th Infantry had but one 

battalion, already seriously weakened by 

thirteen brutal days in the forest. Another battalion was in J uengersdorf. 

The third had to hold the regiment's 

right flank in the woods because the 

adjacent 4th Division had not reached 

the eastern edge of the forest. 

Merode lies on a slope slanting downward from the eastern woods line. Although numerous roads serve the village 

from the Roer plain, only a narrow cart 

track leads eastward from the forest. 

Astride this narrow trail across 300 yards 

of open ground the 26th Infantry had to 

move. 

Behind a sharp artillery preparation, the 

attacking battalion commander, Colonel 

Daniel, sent two companies toward 

Merode shortly before noon on 29 November. Despite stubborn resistance from a 

battalion of the 5th Parachute Regiment 

in a line of strongpoints along the western 

edge of the village, Colonel Daniel's men 

by late afternoon had gained the first 

houses. Yet no one believed for a moment that the Germans were ready to 

relinquish the village. Employing numbers of pieces that the 1st Division G-2 

estimated to be equal to those of the 

Americans, German artillery wreaked 

particular havoc. Despite several strikes 

by tactical aircraft and several counterb~ttery TOT's by 1st Division artillery, 

the German pieces barked as full-throated 

and deadly as ever. 

man was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 491 

The minute the riflemen gained the 

first houses, Colonel Daniel ordered a platoon of tanks to join them. Two got 

through, although one was knocked out 

almost immediately after gammg the 

village. Commanders of the other two 

tanks paused at the woods line, noted the 

"sharpness" of the enemy's shellfire, and 

directed their drivers to turn back. 44 As 

they backed up, a shell struck a track of 

the lead tank. The tank overturned. 

Because of deep cuts, high fills, and dense, 

stalwart trees on either side of the narrow 

trail, no vehicle could get into Merode 

past the damaged tank. 

Various individuals tried in various 

ways through the early part of the night 

to get more tank and antitank support 

into Merode. They might have been 

dogs baying at the moon, so futile were 

their efforts. Someone called for a tank 

retriever to remove the damaged tank, but 

not until the next morning did one arrive. 

Then for some unexplained reason, the 

retriever could not remove the tank. 

Someone else called for engineers to build 

a bypass around the tank, but this 

would be at best a long, tedious process. 

A sergeant trying to borrow tanks attached to another battalion of the 26th 

Infantry met a rebuff from the regimental 

operations officer. "You keep your 

tanks," the S-3 told the battalion commander. "He can't have them unless we 

know the [ full] story on [his tanks]." 4;' 

This was fiddling while Rome burned. 

The Germans even then were laying down 

a curtain of shellfire to prevent reinforcement of American troops in Merode. 

Soon after, they counterattacked. Because American radio batteries had been 

44 Combat Interv with Lt. Col. Wallace J. 

Nichols, CO, 745th Tank Bn, et ai. 

45 26th Inf Unit Jnl, 29 Nov 44. 

weakened by constant use, communications with the two companies in Merode 

failed. No one knew where to throw 

artillery fire to stop the German drive. 

Not until near midnight was there further 

word from the men in Merode. Then a 

plaintive message, barely audible, came 

over Colonel Daniel's radio set. "There's 

a Tiger tank' coming down the street 

now, firing his gun into every house. 

He's three houses away now ... still 

firing into every house... Here he 

comes ... "46 

That was all anyone heard from the two 

companies in Merode until about three 

hours later when a sergeant and twelve 

men escaped from the village. Using 

these men as guides, a combat patrol tried 

to break through to any men who still 

might Qe holding out. Shellfire and burp 

guns forced the patrol back. 

F or all practical purposes, this marked 

the end of the 26th Infantry's fight 

for Merode. Though prisoner reports 

through the next day of 30 November 

and into I December continued to 

nourish hope that some of the two companies still survived, attempts to get help 

into the village grew more and more 

feeble'" Failure of every strong patrol 

that tried to get into the village convinced 

Colonel Daniel that only a full-strength 

battalion could do the job. The 26th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Seitz, dared 

not weaken the rest of his front by sending 

another of his battalions. Even when the 

1st Division G-3 offered to send a battalion from another regiment, Colonel 

Seitz declined. "What is in town may 

be annihilated by now," Colonel Seitz's 

46 Combat Interv with Capt James Libby, 5-3, 

2d Bn, 26th Inf, et at. 

47 The 26th Infantry Unit Journal for this 

period makes stark reading. 
492 

S-3 told the G-3' "Moreover any attack 

on the town would have to be strictly an 

infantry attack. There is no road .... " 48 

Made to look like fools in their first 

fighting, the enemy's young paratroopers 

at last had found the right time and place 

to deal a punishing blow. The 26th Infantry listed 165 men missing on the day 

of the Merode engagement. For the 

Americans it was an ignominious end to 

the final fight to break out of the Huertgen Forest. 

Had the VII Corps commander, General Collins, been unaware of the physical 

and even spiritual atrophy of the 26th 

Infantry and the entire 1st Division, the 

debacle at Merode certainly would have 

demonstrated the fact. On 2 December 

General Collins revealed that he would 

ask no more of the division than that it 

straighten the line and consolidate in preparation for relief by a fresh division. On 

5 December the 9th Division began to 

arrive. The 47th Infantry was relieved 

from attachment to the 1st Division and 

went into 9th Division reserve. Both the 

1st and 4th Divisions now were leaving 

the fight. The goal of the Roer River 

still was three miles away. 

In fifteen days the I st Division and the 

47th Infantry, with an assist on two 

occasions by contingents of the 3d 

Armored Division, had registered a total 

advance of not quite four miles from 

Schevenhuette to Langerwehe. The division had cleared a rectangle of approximately eleven square miles embracing the 

northeastern extremities of the Huertgen 

Forest and a fringe of the EschweilerWeisweiler industrial triangle. In light of 

original plans for a quick breakthrough on 

the heels of an unprecedented preliminary 

48 26th Inf Unit Jnl, 30 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

bombardment, that kind of progress was 

more than disappointing. The bombardment had not done all expected of it, and 

imponderables of German perseverance, 

adverse weather, and intractable terrain 

had entered the equation. 

For all the damage inflicted on the 

enemy's 3d Parachute, 12th, and 47th 

Divisions, the 1st Division also had paid 

dearly. Indeed, with 3,993 battle casualties, including 641 in the attached 47th 

Infantry, the 1St Division would go down 

as one of the more severely hurt participants in the Huertgen Forest fighting. 

The 26th Infantry, which fought fully 

within the forest, lost more than any of 

the other regiments, 1,479 men, including 

163 killed and 261 missing. 49 These did 

not include non battle losses attributable 

to combat exhaustion and the weather. 

For the 26th Infantry, at least, these must 

ha ve been as severe as in regiments of 

other divisions which fought completely 

within the confines of the forest. 

For all practical purposes, the dread 

battle of the Huertgen Forest was over. 

The 83d Division, which had relieved the 

4th Division, and parts of the 5th 

Armored Division still would have to drive 

through a narrow belt of woodland before reaching the Roer; but the bulk of 

the forest at last was clear. 

Since 14 September, when part of the 

9th Division first had entered fringes of 

the forest near Roetgen, some American 

unit had been engaged continuously in the 

forest. A total of five American divisions, 

40 Casualty figures are contained in annexes to 

1St Division Combat Interviews. Losses for other 

regiments were as follows: 18th Infantry: 87 I, 

including 188 killed and 21 missing; 16th Infantry: 1,002 including. 156 killed and 63 missing: 

Task Force Richardson (3d Armored Division): 

!O I, including 14 killed and 6 m:ssing. 
THE FINAL FIGHT TO BREAK OUT OF THE FOREST 493 

plus a combat command of armor, an 

additional armored infantry battalion, and 

a Ranger battalion had fought there. 

One division, the 9th, had engaged in two 

separate fights in the forest, one in September, another in October, and one of its 

regiments, the 47th Infantry, had been 

involved a third time. The 28th Division 

in early November had lost more men in 

the forest than any other U.S. unit. The 

1st, 4th, and 8th Divisions, the 2d Ranger 

Battalion, and the 5th Armored Division's 

46th Armored Infantry Battalion and 

CCR completed the tragic roll. 

To some at the time and to many after 

the event, the question occurred: why did 

the First Army keep feeding more and 

more units into the Huertgen Forest? 

Throughout the fighting, the army commander, General Hodges, was acutely 

conscious of the difficulties his troops were 

facing in the forest. 50 In early December, 

for example, on one of his tours of the 

front, he watched in admiration mixed 

with marked concern as a truck convoy 

passed carrying from the front the dirty, 

unshaven men of the 4th Division's 22d 

Infantry. Yet to General Hodges, his staff, 

and his corps commanders, there was no 

alternative. They admittedly might have 

bypassed the forest; but under the kind 

of conditions existing at the time, should 

an army with absolutely no reserve expose 

its flank to counterattack in this manner? 

Furthermore, when the First Army first 

entered the forest, nobody expected any 

real trouble. After the hard fighting de50 Sylvan Diary, entry of 4 Dec 44. 

veloped, the Germans had to endure the 

same kind of hardships as the Americans 

did and were infinitely less capable of 

replacing battle-weary formations with 

rested units. The expectation was always 

present that one more fresh American 

division would turn the trick. As the 

First Army G-3, General Thorson, put it 

succinctly: "We had the bear by the tail, 

and we just couldn't turn loose." 51 

More than 8,000 men from the First 

Army fell prey in the forest to combat 

exhaustion and the elements. Another 

23,000 were either wounded, missing, captured, or killed. That was an average of 

more than 5,000 casualties per division. 

What had been gained at this cost? 

The Americans had battered at least six 

German divisions. They also had eliminated hundreds of individual replacements. They had conquered a formidable forest barrier by frontal assault. 

They also had forced the Germans to 

commit some of the forces intended to be 

held intact for the Ardennes counteroffensive. Beyond these, the fight in the 

forest had achieved little in the way of 

positive advantages-no German industry, 

limited roads. The basic truth was that 

the fight for the Huertgen Forest was 

predicated on the purely negative reason 

of denying the Germans use of the forest 

as a base for thwarting an American drive 

to the Rhine. In the process the fight 

thus far had failed to carry the only really 

critical objective the forest shielded-the 

Roer River Dams. 

51 See Intervs with Thorson, 12 Sep 56; Collins, 

25 Jan 54; and Akers, I I Jun 56. 

PART SIX 

BATTLE OF THE ROER PLAIN 

CHAPTER XXI 

Clearing the Inner Wings of the Armies 

Coincident with the First Army's push 

through the Stolberg Corridor and the 

Huertgen Forest, the November offensive 

of General Simpson's Ninth Army began 

at 1245 on 16 November. The drive 

started from the periphery of the West 

Wall bridgehead secured in October on 

the east bank of the Wurm River north of 

Aachen. (See Map VI.) 

Except for the timing, the fighting on 

the Ninth Army front was as different 

from that on the First Army front as, say, 

Normandy was from Guadalcanal. While 

the First Army was engaged within a 

forest and its purlieus, the Ninth Army 

fought for possession of village strongpoints dotting a fertile plain. 

This was the Roer plain, lying between 

the W urm and the Roer. Although 

geographers seldom isolate the Roer plain 

from the broader Cologne plain that 

stretches to the Rhine, the fact that the 

Roer River was the objective of the first 

phase of the November offensive sharply 

delineated the region between the W urm 

and the Roer in the minds of the men who 

fought there. Encompassing a maximum 

width of about twelve miles, the Roer 

plain is bounded by the irregular skirt of 

the Huertgen Forest, by the Roer itself, 

and by the meandering course of the 

Wurm, which rises near Aachen and 

empties into the Roer about twenty-two 

miles north of Aachen near Heinsberg. 

As defined by American troops, the plain 

embodies approximately 200 square miles 

roughly in the form of a right-angle triangle marked at the corners by Aachen, 

Heinsberg, and Dueren. 

Most of the terrain in this triangle is 

low and flat, providing long, un.obstructed 

fields of fire and observation broken only 

occasionally by perceptible elevations. 

Scattered across the tableland are at least 

a hundred towns, villages, and settlements 

connected by an elaborate network of 

improved and secondary roads radiating 

like the strands of a spider's web. The 

villages seldom are more than one to three 

miles apart. Much of the ground in 

between is given over to agriculture. 

Only in the southwest and south near the 

base of the triangle is there a marked 

difference. Here deposits of coal along 

the upper valleys of the Wurm and the 

lnde account for a more urban district 

featured by mines, slag piles, factories, 

and densely populated towns and villages. Having inherited the bridgehead 

carved onto the plain in October, General Simpson's Ninth Army already possessed a portion of this urban district but 

still had to clear another portion along the 

interarmy boundary near the town of 

Wuerselen. An adjacent portion about 

the industrial town of Eschweiler was a 

responsibility of the First Army. 

The Ninth Army's ·initial assault was to 

be a simple frontal attack to break out of 

the West Wall bridgehead and gain a 
498 

crossmg of the Roer in the southeastern 

corner of the army zone at Juelich. This 

was to be accomplished by the XIX 

Corps, commanded now by General 

McLain. 

Like the First Army, the Ninth Army 

contemplated assistance from the prelimmary bombardment by Allied planes, 

Operation QUEEN. Unlike the First 

,\rmy, which wanted "carpet" bombing, 

the Ninth Anny saw in the village strongpoints dotting the plain a need for "target" bombing. Air operations against 

the villages close to the army's forward 

positions would be confined to the four 

groups of fighter-bombers available in 

General Nugent's newly operational 

XXIX Tactical Air Command. Medium 

and heavy bombers were to concentrate 

upon communications centers some distance behind the line, like the village of 

Aldenhoyen, three miles short of the Roer, 

and the Roer River towns of Juelich, 

Linnich, and Heinsberg. 

,\ major consideration influencing General Simpson's plan was that General 

Bradley had ordered the Ninth Army to 

protect the First Army's north flank and 

make its main effort close alongside the 

First Army.1 This General Simpson had 

fulfilled from an army standpoint by 

assigning his main effort to the south-wing 

XIX Corps. Yet from a corps standpoint, if General McLain followed instructions to the letter, the first step of the 

main effort would have to be made 

through the urban coal-mining district 

about 'Yuerselen in the southwest corner 

of the corps zone. Judging from the 

30th Division's experience near 'Yuersclen 

in October, this might prove more diffi1 12th A Gp Ltr of Instrs 10, 2 I Oct 44, with 

amendments, 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, v~ 97-102. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

cult than a push through the rural regions 

a few miles to the north. 2 

His problem analogous to that posed to 

the First Army's VII Corps by the 

Esch weiler-W eisweiler ind ustrial complex' General McLain chose a course 

similar to that pursued by General Collins. 

In the VII Corps, the 1st Division was 

to make the main effort near the center 

of the corps zone; then, once past the 

congested urban districts, was to expand 

northward to the army boundary. General McLain similarly directed his 29th 

Division to make the XIX Corps main 

effort in the center of the corps zone on a 

narrow front, then later to broaden the 

main effort southward to the army boundary. In each case, the corps main effort 

would bypass a triangular sector where 

German defense might benefit from 

urban congestion. 

In effect, the clearing of these two 

triangles would mark a renewal of the 

joint fight which the VII and XIX Corps 

had staged in October in closing the gap 

about Aachen. The front lines were 

much the same as they had been upon 

conclusion of the fight in October. The 

only real changes that had occurred were 

the transfer of the XIX Corps to the 

Ninth Army and the assignment of the 

104th Division to carry the banner of the 

VII Corps in place of the I st Division. 

To renew the fight for the XIX Corps, 

General McLain had the same 30th Division which had participated in October. 

Assigned missions so similar and in a 

sense ssparated from their parent corps by 

the nature of the missions, the 30th and 

104th Divisions formed, in effect, a kind of 

ad hoc corps. So long as the mISSIOns 

remained as originally given, the separate 

~ XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 499 

GENERAL McLAIN 

fights to clear the two industrial triangles 

actually would represent a single, broader 

engagement to clear an industrial parallelogram along the inner wings of the two 

armIes. 

The Fight North of the Boundary 

The interarmy boundary, which bisected this parallelogram, ran from the 

Ra velsberg (Hill 231) between W uerselen 

and Verlautenheide-both of which had 

figured prominently in the October fighting- northeast between the villages of 

Kinzweiler, on the north, and Hehlrath, 

on the south, thence on to the northeast 

to cross the Inde River near Inden. 

South of the boundary, the I04th Division's triangular share of the parallelogram was described clearly by existing 

front lines running from Verlautenheide 

southeast to Stolberg and by the trace of 

the Inde; while on the north, the triangle 

assigned to the 30th Division was less 

clearly defined without recourse to a map. 

One side was the existing front line, which 

ran from Alsdorf southwest to Wuerselen, 

the lower segment of the bridgehead arc 

the XIX Corps had forged in October. 

The second side was the boundary between the 29th and 30th Divisions. This 

ran southeast from a point near Alsdorf, 

past the villages of Hongen, Warden, and 

Luerken to the interarmy boundary. The 

sector embraced approximately twentyfour square miles. 

To strengthen the 30th Division in 

clearing the urban sector, General Simpson directed attachment of a regiment of 

the newly arrived 84th Division to act as 

a reserve. This freed all three of the 

30th Division's regiments for the attack. 3 

The corps commander, General McLain, 

added additional strength by placing three 

battalions of corps artillery in general 

support. 4 

The Germans in this sector composed 

the northern wing of General Koechling's 

LXXXI Corps. In Wuerselen, five battalions of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, which had denied the bulk of the 

town in October, still were around. The 

responsibility of this division, I 1,000 

strong, extended southeastward in the 

direction of Stolberg, including Verlautenheide, opposite the northern wing of 

the I04th U.S. Division. Northeast of 

Wuerselen from Euchen to include Mariadorf was the 246th V olks Grenadier 

Division's 404th Regiment, while the rest 

3 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs 64, 8 Nov, NUSA 

G-3 Jnl file, Nov 44. 

4 For details on attachments, see NUSA Opns, 

IV, I I. This account, plus Hewitt, Workhorse 

of the We stern Front, a.nd official records of the 

corps and division provide the basic sources for 

the 30th Division story. 
500 

of the 246th held posltlOns a little farther 

north opposite the center portion of the 

XIX Corps line. Of the three divisions 

in the LX X X I Corps at the start of the 

November offensive, the 246th was rated 

the weakest, despite the fact that its 

personnel numbered the same as the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division's. After the 

debacle at Aachen, the 246th Division 

had been fleshed out with replacements, 

including all survivors of the defunct 49th 

Division. Part of the 404th Regiment 

contained survivors of the old Mobile 

Regiment von Fritzschen, which had made 

a dramatic entry into the October fighting 

near this same spot. 5 

Perhaps because of earlier experience at 

Wuerselen, the 30th Division commander, 

General Hobbs, expected stiffest resistance among the rubble-strewn streets and 

battered buildings of that town. To 

eliminate this obstacle, Hobbs planned a 

maneuver not unlike the game of Crack 

the Whip. By means of a concentrated 

attack at Wuerselen, Colonel Sutherland's 

I 19th Infantry was to act as the pivot or 

snapper, while the other two regiments in 

more extended formation were to swing 

southeastward in a broad arc to clear the 

remainder of the urban district. Although Colonel Johnson's I 17th Infantry 

on the end of the whip would have to 

cover at least three times more ground 

than the 119th Infantry, this was in 

keeping with the belief that resistance 

would be weaker on the less congested 

outer rim. 

Much as did the divisions of the VII 

Corps, the units of the XIX Corps learned 

before daylight on 16 November that 

5 Strength Rpts, 15 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps, 

l1a/b KTB Anlagen, 20.X.-30,XI.44; LXXXI 

Corps, Zustandsberichte; Kampf um Aachen: 

Maps; MS # A-994 (Koechling). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

after many postponements the big offensive at last was to begin. In .keeping 

with the fact that 1944 was an election 

year, "The Democrats have won" were 

the code words General McLain telephoned to General Hobbs to indicate that 

the attack was on. 6 

Only three of the villages in the 30th 

Division's sector were hit in the aerial 

bombardment. Fighter-bombers of the 

XXIX Tactical Air Command struck 

both Mariadorf and Hongen in front of 

Colonel Purdue's 120th Infantry in the 

division center. Medium bombers attacked Luerken, at the extreme eastern 

end of the 30th Division's zone. None of 

these strikes was close enough to friendly 

positions to permit observation of the 

results. 

In the ground attack, each of the 30th 

Division's three regiments struck with two 

battalions abreast. Having studied the 

terrain thoroughly both on the ground 

and on sand-table models, the troops experienced few surprises. What did impress them was a prolific use of mines. 

Particularly disturbing were extensive 

nests of nonmetallic antipersonnel Schuh 

mines and antitank Topf mines, neither 

of which responded to ordinary mine 

detection devices. 7 The first day's worst 

losses occurred when the I 17th Infantry's 

Company F stumbled into an antipersonnel mine field on the western fringe of 

Mariadorf. German shelling forced abandonment of all attempts to extricate the 

company until after nightfall. The company lost sixty men. 

So thick were antitank mines in 

Wuerselen that supporting tanks and tank 

destroyers were reduced to providing 

G Tel Jnl in 30th Div G-3 Jnl file, 17-18 Nov 

44· 7 Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, p. 90. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 501 

static fire support. At any turn amid 

the rubble of the town a man or a 

machine might set off an explosion. Pvt. 

Alexander Mastrobattista of the 119th 

Infantry's Company L had to lie in an 

exposed position for four hours with one 

leg blown off by a Schuh mine before a 

litter team preceded by probers and mine 

detectors could reach him. 

For all the difficulty with mines, progress in the over-all division picture was 

encouraging. By nightfall four companies 

of the 1 17th Infantry had advanced more 

than a mile to establish firm control of 

Mariadorf. In the village of Eu~hen 

Colonel Purdue's 120th Infantry had 

caught the Germans cowering in their 

holes to escape shelling and machine gun 

fire which supporting weapons were firing 

over the heads of the attackers. Only in 

Wuerselen was there no major gain, but 

a plodding advance in this stronghold was 

understandable. Fighting in Wuerselen 

had developed into myriad small unit 

maneuvers as one squad or platoon after 

another tried to penetrate intricate cross 

fires laid down by well-positioned machine 

guns. 8 Despite the hard going at 

Wuerselen, the entire division on 16 

November incurred only 137 casualties, 

almost half of them in the mine field at 

Mariadorf. 

The penetration at Mariadorf disturbed 

the Germans particularly. As the 30th 

Division commander, General Hobbs, had 

hoped, the Germans saw this attack along 

the 30th Division's north wing as a first 

R S. Sgt. Freeman V. Horner, Company K, 

119th Infantry, charged alone across open ground 

into the teeth of fire from three machine guns 

hidden in a building. Armed with a submachine 

gun, he forced his way into the building, killed 

or captured seven of the enemy, and eliminated 

the enemy weapons. Sergeant Horner was 

awarded the Medal of Honor. 

step in a likely outflanking of '·Wuerselen. 

The Fifteenth Army headquarters (alias 

Gruppe von M anteuffel) authorized withdrawal to a second line of defense based 

on the next series of villages. 9 

At Broichweiden, a sprawling, loose 

confederation of four settlements a mile 

southeast of Euchen, the retiring troops of 

the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division had 

little chance to get set before the 120th 

Infantry hit them a half hour before dawn 

on 17 November. The Americans literally charged into the northern half of 

Broichweiden. In the course of mopping 

up, Colonel Purdue's battalions took 326 

prisoners, including virtually the entire 

strength of one panzer grenadier battalion. 

Buttressed by artillery, the Americans 

were too well set to be dislodged when at 

noon the Germans counterattacked with 

the support of seven tanks and assault 

guns. 

In Wuerselen the effects of the night 

withdrawal were readily apparent, yet 

advance in the face of a stubborn rear 

guard and an unprecedented profusion of 

mines still was agonizingly slow. Although a marked map captured from 

German engineers helped considerably, not 

until late afternoon was the whole of 

Wuerselen occupied. 

In the meantime, Colonel Johnson'S 

117th Infantry on the division's north 

wing had been keeping pace. One battalion moved in con junction with the 

120th Infantry's drive on Broichweiden 

to occupy a miners' housing development 

a mile southeast of Mariadorf. Another 

battalion met greater resistapce in a drive 

northeast from Mariadorf against Hongen, 

but with the help of overhead fire from 

9 Order, Gruppe von ManteufJel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 2225, 16 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Bet. H. Gr. u. Armee. 
502 

supporting armor entered the village in 

midafternoon. 

For all practical purposes, the 30th 

Division had broken the enemy's hold on 

the strictly urban portion of the triangle 

north of the interarmy boundary by the 

end of the second day. The part remaining to be cleared was more rural III 

nature. 

On the third day, 18 November, at 

Warden, southeast of Mariadorf, an adroit 

use of. machine guns and assault guns 

across flat, coverless fields enabled the 

enemy to repulse two attacks before succumbing to a third; but this was, in 

effect, no more than a delaying tactic 

preceding another shift to a new line of 

defense. During the evening of 18 November, the XIX Corps intercepted a 

German message designating a gentle 

ridge line a mile east of Warden as the 

new main line of resistance. A northeastward extension of high ground lying 

north of Stolberg, that part of the ridge 

opposite the 30th Division was little more 

than a ground swell on the Roer plain. 

The commander of the 3d Panzer 

Grenadier Division, General Denkert, 

could have entertained no more hope of 

holding this line than he had had of 

holding the two he had occupied earlier. 

As seen by the corps and army commanders, the focal point of danger was not 

here but farther north, in the sector of 

the 246th Division and even farther north 

outside the zone of the LXXXI Corps. 

When General Koechling on 18 November 

had introduced the 47th Division opposite 

the VII U.S. Corps and directed a general 

shift of division boundaries northward, he 

had done it in order that the 246th 

Division might achieve greater concentration. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division thus became responsible for the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

entire sector opposite the 30th U.S. 

Division and part of the I04th· as well. 

At the same time the division was called 

upon to relinquish an infantry battalion 

for attachment to the 246th Division.lO 

Despite this situation, General Denkert 

hardly could have anticipated the celerity 

with which the 30th Division might break 

his new line. Because the 30th Division 

was nearing the extremity of the triangle 

it had been assigned to clear, General 

Hobbs could concentrate almost unrestricted fire support against one short 

segment of the new line-at the villages 

of St. Joeris and Kinzweiler. Virtually 

all the divisional artillery, two companies 

of the 743d Tank Battalion, as many 

tank destroyers, and the heavy weapons of 

an adjacent regiment were available to 

support an attack by the I 17th Infantry. 

The Germans might have done better 

to raise a white flag. During the morning 

of 19 November, two battalions of the 

I 17th Infantry struck the villages simultaneously on the heels of thunderous 

supporting fire. In forty-five minutes 

both villages were secure. Two battalion 

commanders and 221 other prisoners were 

headed west. In St. Joeris the I 17th 

Infantry sustained but eight casualties; in 

Kinzweiler, only three. 

Although some mop-up work remained 

in the southern half of Broichweiden, 

General Hobbs might say without reservation that his division's part in clearing the 

parallelogram was over. In four days, at 

a cost of sixty killed and 474 wounded, 

the 30th Division had erased a position 

which could have embarrassed the XIX 

Corps. Enemy losses included 1,595 

prisoners, mostly from the 3d Panzer 

10 Order, Cruppe von ManteufJel to LXXXI 

Corps, 2230, 18 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Bef. H. Cr. u. Armee. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 503 

Grenadier Division. In achieving this 

goal, the 30th Division had realized little 

direct assistance from units on either 

flank, for not until 19 November did the 

I04th Division embark in earnest upon its 

part in clearing the inner wings of the 

armies, and not until the last two days had 

the 29th Division to the north, making 

the XIX. Corps main effort, come abreast. 

The fact was that the 30th Division's 

advance was one of the better gains made 

anywhere during the early days of the 

November offensive. Impressed by this 

development, the XIX Corps commander 

gave the division a new assignment. Redrawing his division boundaries, General 

McLain directed General Hobbs to renew 

his attack two days later. Along a front 

narrowing to a width of a mile and a half, 

the 30th Division was to cover a remaIning six miles to the Roer.u 

The Fight South of the Boundary 

In view of the coup at St. Joeris and 

Kinzweiler on 19 November, the I04th 

Division could have chosen no more 

auspicious time to begin clearing that 

part of the parallelogram lying south of 

the interarmy boundary. Because of the 

proviso that the lo4th Division make no 

major attack on its north wing until after 

capture of the Donnerberg (Hill 287), the 

height east of Stolberg, the two regiments 

which were scheduled to work alongside 

the 30th Division had been making only 

"pressure attacks," a kind of jockeying 

for position. But late on the day before, 

the Donnerberg had fallen. On 19 November the I04th Division was to attack 

with no holds barred. 

Because the Germans had shifted their 

11 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs 73, 19 Nov, NUSA 

G-3 Jnl file, 19-25 Nov 44· 

division boundaries slightly, the basic unit 

opposite two regiments of the I04th 

Division remained the same, the 12th 

Volks Grenadier Division which the 414th 

Infantry had encountered at the Donnerberg. Opposite the 4 13th Infantry on 

the left were a few contingents of the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division. 

The division commander, General Allen, 

intended that once the Donnerberg had 

fallen the 4 14th Infantry was to continue 

northeast through the Eschweiler woods 

into Eschweiler and a nest of industrial 

suburbs southeast of that town. Coincidentally, the 413th Infantry on the 

division's north wing was to sweep northeast from Verlautenheide past the northern fringe of Eschweiler, or perhaps 

converge upon the town in the event the 

4 14th Infantry ran into trouble. The 

third regiment, the 4 15th Infantry, was to 

clear the northern half of Stolberg and 

wooded high ground beyond. After serving briefly as a bridge between the other 

two regiments, the 415th Infantry under 

the original plan was to be pinched out 

short of EschweilerY 

While the 4 14th Infantry consolidated 

gains made in the Eschweiler woods in a 

night attack, the other two regiments 

struck early on 19 November. Because of 

the enemy's general withdrawal to a new 

line marked in this sector by the towns of 

Roehe, a northwestern suburb of Eschweiler, and of Hehlrath, near St. Joeris 

and Kinzweiler, resistance was spotty. 

Nevertheless, harassed by Schuh mines, 

barbed wire, rubble, and congestion, the 

4 15th Infantry ( Colonel Cochran) took 

the entire day to clear Stolberg. Guiding 

on the Aachen-Cologne autobahn, the 

4 13th Infantry (Colonel Waltz) pushed 

12 104th Div FO 10, 9 Nov, in I04th Div G-3 

.Jnl file, 5-10 Nov 44. 
504 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

DEVASTATED DUERWISS, saturated by Allied bombs. 

the division's north wing forward more 

than three miles to the base of the gentle 

ridge line marked by Roehe and Hehlrath. 

That the Germans intended to stand 

here was readily apparent early the next 

morning, 20 November. Not until late 

in the afternoon, after a TOT by VII 

Corps artillery using time fire, was one 

battalion able to gain a toehold in Roehe. 

Clearing the objective took another 

twenty-four hours. In the meantime, another battalion crossed the army boundary 

to Kinzweiler in order to use an approach 

to Hehlrath that afforded a measure of 

cover in houses and farmyards. Although 

this battalion and a platoon of supporting 

tanks got into Hehlrath before nightfall, 

they had to mop up from house to house 

in the darkness. As General Allen earlier 

had informed a neighboring commander, 

men of his I04th Division "don't go to bed 

too early. In fact, they have insomnia." 13 

Roehe and Hehlrath were clear examples of the pattern which fighting on 

the Roer plain would assume. There was 

seldom any "high ground" in the usual 

sense of the term. Here the men fought 

instead for towns, villages, and settlements. For one thing, the upper stories 

of buildings and the spires of churches 

often provided the only genuine observation advantage; for another, the buildings 

represented the only cover worthy of the 

name and spelled relief from cold, rain, 

mud, and sometimes sleet and snow. 

Seldom, if ever, would the Germans re13 Tel Jnl in 30th Div G-3 Jnl file, 17-18 

Nov 44. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 505 

linquish a town or a village without a 

fight. If the buildings happened to occupy ground rising above the surrounding 

fields, then that made them correspondingly harder to get at. 

Unlike the 413th Infantry, the I04th 

Division's other two regiments would serve 

a stint of street fighting before plunging 

fully into combat typical of the Roer plain. 

This was because of the industrial towns 

of Eschweiler and Weisweiler and their 

suburbs. 

Under General Allen's original plan, 

the center regiment, the 4 15th Infantry, 

was to have been pinched out short of 

Eschweiler. But on 19 and 20 November, the 4 14th Infantry on the right wing 

became too embroiled in Eschweiler's 

southeastern suburbs to afford much 

promise of an early capture of the industrial town itself. In a belief that the 

Germans would abandon Eschweiler if 

advances north and south of it threatened 

encirclement, the VII Corps commander, 

General Collins, suggested that General 

Allen "let [Eschweiler ] go." 14, General 

Allen for his part saw no reason to skip 

this objective-the largest town remaining 

to the Germans west of the Roer-so long 

as he had a ready force in the form of 

the 415th Infantry to take it. While the 

two flank regiments pushed their attacks 

on the north and south, Colonel Cochran 

was to take Eschweiler. Instead of converging at Eschweiler, the two flank 

regiments would converge a few miles 

farther east at Weisweiler. 

When the 4 15th Infantry first probed 

the western outskirts of Eschweiler on 2 I 

November, no evidence of German withdrawal was apparent. Yet on this day 

the 413th Infantry north of the city, in 

14 Collins to Allen, I04th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Nov 

44· 

renewing the fighting more typical of the 

Roer plain, pushed a mile beyond Hehlrath into Duerwiss. From the German 

viewpoint, Eschweiler was outflanked. 

OB WEST granted approval for withdrawal to a new line east of the townY 

Four hours before dawn on 22 November, 

two companies of the 415th Infantry 

entered Eschweiler in a night attack to 

find no more than a feeble and sleepy 

rear guard remaining. Hot food and 

burning candles told how recent had been 

the withdrawal. 

This matter of authorized withdrawals 

was a departure from Hitler-imposed 

tactics. Having always insisted upon 

stand fast tactics in the West, 16 Hitler had 

allowed himself early in November to be 

reconciled to limited withdrawal in an 

attempt to avoid committing those forces 

which he had earmarked for the Ardennes 

counteroffensive. The Fuehrer nevertheless had stipulated that his reversal of 

policy not become known below the level 

of army headquartersY DB WEST 

sanction of the withdrawals in this sector 

resulted partly from a hope of shortening 

the line and gaining some local reserves 

and partly from a recognition that, authorized or not, the withdrawals were 

inevitable. 18 

In the southeastern suburbs of Eschweiler, the 414th Infantry had begun to 

attack two days before the German 

withdrawal. Close to the boundary with 

15 Order, Gruppe von Manteuffel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 2225, 21 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Bet. H. Gr. u. Armee; OB WEST 

KTB, 21 Nov 44. 

16 See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 

445 ff. 

17 TWX, JodI to Westphal, 9 Nov 44, OB 

WEST KTB, Anlage 50, 1,.114-15. 

18 LXXXI Corps Getechtsbericht, AAR of 20 

Nov 44. 
506 

the 1St Division, the 414th Infantry's 

objectives of Bergrath and Nothberg were 

subject to observation from Hills 187 and 

167, which were holding out against the 

1St Division's attached 47th Infantry. 

Here German mortars and artillery put 

backbone into an infantry defense amid 

houses and factories. Because of a fiveday siege of inclement weather beginning 

on 20 November, fighter-bombers could 

not temper the curse of this fire. The 

4 14th Infantry measured its advance to 

Bergrath in blood-stained yards until 

finally, late on 2 I November, artillery 

supporting the adjacent regiment smothered Hill 187 with fire. The next morning 

the 414th Infantry moved into Nothberg 

against nothing more than rear guard 

opposition. 

Early the same day, 22 November, the 

4 13th Infantry encountered one of the 

few instances during the battle of the 

Roer plain where high ground other than 

that occupied by towns or villages figured 

prominently in the enemy's defense. The 

next objective facing the 4 13th Infantry 

was Puetzlohn, which occupies the western slope of a sharply discernible ridge 

line lying two miles west of the Inde River. 

Here the Germans would have to stand 

or else expose the entire valley of die Inde 

in the I04th Division's sector to damaging 

observation. To hold here, they counted 

not only upon defending Puetzlohn but 

upon denying a high point of the ridge 

south of Puetzlohn, Hill 154. To the 

south the new German line covered the 

western periphery of Weisweiler; to the 

north, the town of Lohn across the U.S. 

army boundary in the sector of the 30th 

Division. 

Because the excavation of a strip mine 

blocked the direct route eastward from 

Duerwiss to Puetzlohn, the 4 13th Infantry 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

again had to enter the 30th Division's 

sector to reach its objective. Attacking 

early on 22 November, the regiment's 

leading battalion scarcely had re-entered 

its own sector when savage fire from tanks 

or assault guns in Puetzlohn and from 

artillery caught the men in open fields 

west of the village. By working forward 

slowly under cover of artillery concentrations, the infantry at last gained the 

westernmost buildings, but even this advance was wiped out partially in late 

afternoon when flanking fire from the 

30th Division's sector forced a slight 

withdrawal. Puetzlohn and the high 

ground about it obviously were going to 

be hard to crack. Recognizing this as 

night came, the division commander, 

General Allen, prodded Colonel Touart's 

414th Infantry to get a complementary 

drive under way. "Weisweiler is necessary," General Allen said, "to take the 

curse off Puetzlohn." 19 

The Push to the Inde 

F or all the difficulty at Puetzlohn, the 

I04th Division by nightfall of 22 November had cleared the bulk of its share of the 

industrial parallelogram along the interarmy boundary. Only Puetzlohn and 

Hill 154, both about two miles short of 

the Inde, plus Weisweiler and a trio of 

little towns hugging the west bank of the 

river, remained to be taken. Although 

the fighting at times had been severe, the 

104th Division had incurred no more than 

moderate casualties. The 415th Infantry, 

for example, in a four-day fight from the 

northern reaches of Stolberg to the capture of Eschweiler had lost 37 men killed, 

7 missing, and I 18 wounded. The entire 

10 I04th Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Nov 44. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 507 

division took 600 prisoners. The Germans 

listed total casualties for the 12th Division, 

part of which also had opposed the north 

wing of the Ist U.S. Division, at 1,845.20 

The noteworthy aspect of the I04th 

Division's campaign to this point was that 

the attack had carried almost four times 

as far as had the Ist Division's in the VII 

Corps main effort, despite the urban nature of the battlefield. Because the I04th 

Division's start line had been farther west 

than had the Ist Division'S, the two units 

by 22 November were approximately on 

line. The VII Corps commander, General Collins, saw in the situation an 

opportunity to revise his original plan. 

In the beginning he had directed that the 

I04th Division be pinched out at the Inde 

while the I st Division was to assume 

responsibility for the entire northern half 

of the corps zone across the remaining 

five miles to the Roer. General Collins 

now redrew one of his boundaries, much 

as had General McLain of the XIX Corps 

three days before. The I04th Division 

now was to continue across the Inde all 

the way to and beyond the Roer.21 

Upon the immediate employment of 

the I04th Division's regiments, General 

Collins' change in plan had no effect. 

Colonel Waltz's 4 I 3th Infantry on the 

north wing was to continue to attack 

Puetzlohn and Hill I54, then to take two 

of the three villages along the west bank 

of the Inde. Colonel Touart's 414th 

Infantry on the south wing was to occupy 

Weisweiler and the remaining village. 

Only upon reaching the Inde did General 

Allen intend to vary his formation by 

replacing the 4 I 4th Infantry with Colonel 

~o Chart of Losses up to 24 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps Ila/b KTB, Anlagen, 20.x.-30.xI.44. 

~1 VII Corps Opns Memo 119, 22 Nov, VII 

Corps Opns Memos file, Nov 44. 

Cochran's 415th Infantry. The latter 

regiment had gone into reserve after taking 

Eschweiler. 

As the I04th Division renewed the 

attack before daylight on 23 November, 

another aspect of fighting upon the Roer 

plain was emphasized: many of the towns 

and villages were mutually supporting. 

Conquest of Puetzlohn was influenced by 

progress of the adjacent 30th Division 

against Lohn; capture of Weisweiler, by 

the degree of success in the I st DiVISIOn's sector against Huecheln and 

Wilhelmshoehe. 

Turning once again to the stratagem of 

night attack, two companies of the 4 I 3th 

Infantry moved in the predawn darkness 

of 23 November, one against Puetzlohn, 

the other against Hill I54. Although the 

Germans at each place were awake to the 

attack, their artillery and assault guns 

now lacked the observation necessary to 

prevent advance. Company L got atop 

Hill I54, while Company K gained a 

tenuous hold on the southwestern fringe 

of Puetzlohn. 

Soon after daybreak, the Germans 

counterattacked for the first time since 

the I04th Division had jumped off five 

days earlier. They used only an Alarmbataillon and six to eight tanks borrowed 

from a GHQ battalion operating farther 

north; yet even this force made for a 

disturbing day because the Americans had 

but two companies on the objectives and 

because in the daylight German fire on 

open fields around the objectives could 

deny reinforcement. As night came, the 

4I3th Infantry still controlled both 

Puetzlohn and Hill I54, but at a cost to 

Companies K and L of I I6 casualties, 

including I6 killed and 50 missing. 

In the meantime, at Weisweiler, the 

4 I 4th Infantry was encountering a more 
508 

passive defense, though it was none the 

less stubborn. On General Allen's theory 

that "The more they push under cover of 

darkness the better it is for 'em," 22 the 

4 I 4th Infantry also tried a night attack, 

but by the time the men had threaded 

their way to the line of departure, the 

predawn darkness of 23 November had 

dissipated. The men were subject to a 

house-by-house German defense along the 

route of approach while at the same time 

drawing flanking fire from Huecheln on 

the south and a high, flat-topped slag pile 

almost a mile square on the north. Not 

until the next day, 24 November, after the 

slag pile had been cleared, was any substantial progress made. One battalion 

reached the southwestern fringe of Weisweiler, while a company from another 

made a daring night attack to carry a 

power plant a few hundred yards west of 

the town. Once inside the plant, the 

men became acutely aware that they had 

sneaked into a building that housed a host 

of Germans. When the enemy commander assembled his men in an adjacent 

courtyard preparatory to routing the 

intruders, the American commander, 

Capt. Charles Glotzbach, called for time 

fire from his supporting artillery. While 

his men took cover in the building, the 

Germans in the courtyard caught the full 

force of the fire. 23 

Although the 4 14th Infantry had 

gained a steppingstone leading to the 

conquest of \Veisweiler, actions outside 

the regimental sector actually brought 

about the fall of the town. The first of 

these was capture of Puetzlohn and Hill 

C" I04th Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Nov 44. 

C3 Hoegh and Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks, pages 

14 I -44, can tains a detailed description of this 

action by Al Newman, correspondent for N ewsweek Magazine. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

154 on 23 November, thereby affording 

observation upon Weisweiler from the 

north. The others occurred at nightfall 

of 24 November and in the morning 

of 25 November in the 1st Division's 

sector when Task Force Richardson took 

Huecheln and Wilhelmshoehe. By early 

afternoon of 25 November, German withdrawal from Weisweiler was clearly evident. Taking quick advantage of the 

first break in the weather in five days, 

fighter-bombers of the IX Tactical Air 

Command roared to the attack. Only 

the size of the withdrawing columns 

limited the scope of the kill. 

Though the actual occupation of We isweiler was easy, the condition of the 

battalion of the 4 14th Infantry which had 

borne the brunt of the attack on the 

town showed how creditable had been 

the early stages of the German defense. 

So spent and depleted was this battalion 

that Colonel Touart wanted to replace it 

before following the enemy's withdrawal. 

The battalion was particularly hard hit in 

rifle company commanders. On 24 November when all three had assembled 

with the artillery liaison officer and a 

lieutenant from the weapons company for 

a conference, the Germans had captured 

the entire group. 

Now that the 104th Division possessed 

dominant observation upon the three villages along the floor of the shallow valley 

of the Inde, a German withdrawal to the 

east bank of the river would not have 

been unexpected. Yet this was not to be, 

probably because the villages made excellent outposts for the high ground on 

the east bank. Though the 12 t h V olks 

Grenadier Division was so depleted---

down to 800 combat effectives-that it 

soon would be' lumped with the 47th 

Division under the designation Gruppe 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 509 

Engel, the division had some fight left 

and on 28 November would be replaced 

by the 3d Parachute Division. Not until 

2 December-a week after the fall of 

Weisweiler-were the last Germans to 

retire or be eliminated from the west bank 

of the Inde. 

Employing automatic weapons and 

light mortars from trenches along the 

western periphery of the villages, the 

Germans halted the attacking infantry in 

flat, open fields leading to the villages. 

With antitank guns and a few tanks 

hidden among the buildings, they held off 

American tanks and destroyers. From 

eminences east of the river, almost as 

high as the Puetzlohn ridge, they had 

unrestricted observation upon the shallow 

valley for their artillery. Observers for 

the 104th Division plotted more than 

forty gun positions between the Inde and 

the Roer capable of firing into the valley 

of the Inde. 

Perhaps because the Germans had little 

time to perfect this pattern before the 

first blow, Colonel Touart's 414th Infantry took the southernmost village of 

Frenz on 26 November without undue 

difficulty. At the other two villages, 

Lamersdorf and Inden, the enemy was 

ready. A first try by the 413th Infantry 

to roll up the line by striking first Lamersdorf and then Inden from the 414th 

Infantry's positions at Frenz was abandoned after only a half day's exposure to 

crippling fire from the big guns east of 

the Inde. The regimental commander, 

Colonel Waltz, next directed separate 

attacks on each of the two objectives. 

Despite persistent efforts by tactical 

aircraft and divisional and corps artillery 

to silence the German batteries, and 

despite attempts to hide behind smoke, 

the attacks developed into costly slugging 

matches. Even the 104th Division's forte 

of night attack brought little advantage. 

Once when the battalion driving on Inden 

tried it, one company got lost and ended 

up assisting the 30th Division against the 

neighboring village of Altdorf. 

Not until after three days of close combat at Lamersdorf did the Germans finally 

withdraw the last of the tanks and antitank guns from this village to the east 

bank. Demolishing the Inde bridges behind them, they left only a thin rear 

guard in the village. By midnight of 29 

November, Lamersdorf was in hand. 

Inden took longer. By nightfall of 28 

November, a rifle company had gained a 

toehold in the village and had even 

grabbed a bridge intact and put a platoon 

onto the east bank of the river, but the 

hardest fighting began later. During the 

night, this village passed to the responsibility of the enemy's 3d Panzer Grenadier 

Division. Using miscellaneous forces 

from this division, plus some troops provided for the occasion by the LX X X I 

Corps, the Germans counterattacked in 

strength. Not only did they drive the 

platoon from the east bank, they split 

the American company and denied coordination with another company which 

arrived during the night as reinforcement. 

Shortly before daylight on 29 November 

the Germans captured about a platoon 

of men from both: companies who had 

become intermingled in a factory alongside 

the river. 24 Their bag included one of 

the company commanders. Two other 

men-So Sgt. Paul Shesniek and Pvt. Ben 

J. Travis-eventually escaped by hiding 

under heavy sacks filled with nuts. 

24 The Germans claimed seventy-nine prisoners. 

LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR of 30 Nov 

44· 
510 

Though cut to pieces, the bulk of these 

two companies fought on through the day 

of 29 November. By late afternoon 

Colonel Waltz was ready to relieve them 

by attacking with his reserve battalion 

and a company of the 750th Tank Battalion. Only three of the tanks escaped 

both German fire and paralyzing mud, 

but the infantry gained entry into the 

village. The next day the reserve battalion commander, Lt. Col. William M. 

Summers, took command of all five companies in Inden and began a methodical 

attempt to rid the village of Germans. 

Despite pressure to complete the job so 

the I04th Division could mount a crossing 

of the river, Colonel Summers could find 

no ready formula for rapid reduction of 

Inden. Enemy artillery fire, "at times, 

reached fifty rounds per minute." 25 Infantry reinforcements arrived when the 

246th V olks Grenadier Division, recently 

pulled from the line for a quick, three-day 

rehabilitation, took over from the 3d 

Panzer Grenadier Division. 26 Colonel 

Summers and the companies of the 413th 

Infantry nevertheless gradually increased 

their holdings. Late on the fifth day the 

Germans finally retired to the east bank. 

In the five-day fight, two American 

battalions had lost 3 I 9 men, 40 of them 

killed and 156 missing. 27 Inden was 

nothing but rubble. 

Taking the High Ground 

The last German position in the 

industrial triangle south of the interarmy 

boundary thus eliminated, the I04th 

25 4 1 3th Inf AAR, Dec 44. 

26 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR of 30 

Nov 44. 

27 Casualty Figures for the Battle of Inden, 

104th Div Combat Interv file, Nov-Dec 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Division turned next to crossing the Inde. 

In keeping with the change in plan which 

the VII Corps commander had directed 

on 22 November, the division was to 

continue to the Roer alongside the corps 

main effort. That the main effort by 2 

December was sputtering on the fringe of 

the Roer plain at Langerwehe and 

Merode did nothing to lessen the need for 

the I04th Division to get across the Inde 

in order to come abreast of the main 

effort and void the tactical divorce which 

the meandering Inde heretofore had imposed. 

The obvious key to a successful crossing 

was the village of Lucherberg, which 

crowns the high ground a mile beyond 

the river. In comparison to other high 

ground on the Roer plain, the Lucherberg ridge line is almost clifflike. Though 

not quite so high as the Puetzlohn ridge, 

the Lucherberg ridge's western approaches 

are steep, gutted by strip mines with 

sheer walls, and further obstructed by a 

nest of factories. From the southwest 

and south, the village and the ridge are 

denied by the bed of the Weh Creek, a 

slag pile, and more strip mines, one of 

which had filled with water to form a 

lake. On the north, the approach is 

open as the ridge line slopes gently northward parallel to the Inde. Recognizing 

that possession of Lucherberg spelled control not only of the Inde valley but also of 

a remaining three miles of flatland east to 

the Roer, the Germans had crisscrossed 

the northern approach with deep trenches 

from which machine guns might spew 

grazing fire across open fields. The positions were currently occupied by the 3d 

Parachute Division's 8th Regiment. 28 

28 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR of 3 

Dec 44. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 511 

Had the Inde River been more of an 

obstacle, the I04th Division commander, 

General Allen, might have asked to attack 

from the Ist Division's sector on the other 

side of the river, where troops of the 47th 

Infantry on 28 November had taken the 

Frenzerburg. But the Inde normally is 

little more than a winding creek, and 

even after abnormally heavy rainfall during the previous month was easily fordable 

by infantry at several points. 

Before the 4 I 3th Infantry had become 

so involved in severe fighting at Inden, 

General Allen had intended that the 413th 

force a bridgehead opposite Inden while 

the reserve regiment, the 4 I 5th Infantry, 

crossed the river at Lamersdorf to seize 

Lucherberg. Faced with severe losses at 

Inden, General Allen directed instead that 

the 4 I 3th Infantry fall back as division 

reserve, Colonel Touart's 414th Infanrry 

take over the assignment at Inden, and 

Colonel Cochran's 4I5th Infantry proceed 

as originally planned to accomplish the 

more critical task at Lucherberg. 

Colonel Cochran had four days to plan 

and prepare for the river crossing before 

the final conquest of Inden gave a green 

light. Deciding early on his maneuver, 

he provided his officers and men an 

opportunity for detailed study of their 

roles and the terrain. Although aware of 

the obstacles to attacking Lucherberg 

from the west, Colonel Cochran was 

equally aware of the defenses the Germans 

had erected along the open northern approach. Confident of the ability of his 

men in night operations, he believed they 

might get past the strip mines, the factories, and the clifflike portion of the ridge 

into Lucherberg before the Germans 

awoke to their presence. 

Colonel Cochran directed his 2d Battalion to send two companies across the 

river at Lamersdorf by fording-one to 

seize the nest of factories between the' 

river and Lucherberg, the other to provide 

flank protection by taking a castle 

(Luetzelen) south of the factories. An 

hour after these companies began to 

move, the 3d Battalion was to send two 

companies across the river on the debris of 

a spur railroad bridge between Lamersdorf 

and Inden. These two companies were 

to skirt the north side of the factories 

and move directly into Lucherberg. 

Each company received a detailed map 

upon which the artillery had plotted 

concentrations by number at almost every 

conceivable point of trouble. 29 

For an hour before the attack, artillery 

of both the I04th Division and the VII 

Corps fired constant concentrations upon 

Lucherberg. These were to continue at 

intervals until the infantry requested a 

concentration of white phosphorus, a signal 

that friendly troops were entering the 

village. 

At a point at Lamersdorf where the 

river was no more than knee deep, the two 

companies of the 2d Battalion waded 

across at 2300 the night of 2 December. 

Almost without enemy contact, one 

company raced southeast to Luetzelen 

Castle. In a matter of minutes, this 

objective on the south flank was secured. 

At the same time, the other company 

rushed through inky darkness into the 

factory buildings between Lamersdorf and 

Lucherberg. The Germans in the buildings were too surprised to offer more than 

desultory resistance. Under strict orders 

to use nothing but bayonets and hand 

grenades in the darkness, the Americans 

29 Combat interviews on the battle of Lucherberg are valuable and detailed and constitute the 

major source for this account. 
512 

knew that anyone who fired was a German. Within an hour after crossing the 

Inde, these men had a firm grip on the 

factories, though mop-up was a task that 

reached into the next day. 

Having allowed an hour for these 

preliminary operations to get under way. 

the two companies of the 3d Battalion 

began to cross the Inde between Lamersdorf and Inden at midnight. Commanded by 1St Lt. John J. Olsen, 

Company I was first. The men crossed 

on the remains of a spur railroad bridge. 

They negotiated the gap in the bridge by 

holding onto one of the rails which still 

was in place and walking on the other, 

which had been blown to a twisted position underneath. Though this kind of 

tight-rope crossing enabled the men to 

reach the east bank with dry feet, it was 

a slow process. Not until 0100, 3 December, did all of Company I get across. 

As Lieutenant Olsen and his men 

picked their way southeastward across 

marshy bottomland toward the nest of 

factories and Lucherberg, a three-quarter 

moon emerged. Occasional small arms 

fire began to search the column. Though 

the fire was inaccurate, it prompted some 

confusion. Company I's rear platoon 

became separated from the others. No 

doubt acutely conscious that success depended upon reaching Lucherberg before 

daylight, Lieutenant Olsen decided to 

continue with his two remaining platoons. 

Unknown to Lieutenant Olsen, the 

Germans had begun to fire on the crossing 

site soon after Company I had reached 

the east bank. Company L could not 

follow. Through the rest of the night 

Company L was to wander errantly in 

search of another place to cross, while 

the onus of the attack fell upon Lieutenant Olsen and the forward platoons 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

of Company I. In light of reports 

gleaned from prisoners the afternoon before, this was a big assignment. Some 

500 to 600 Germans and several tanks, 

prisoners had reported, garrisoned Lucherberg and the vicinity. 

Just how big the assignment was soon 

became apparent. Preceded by a platoon 

leader, 1st Lt. David Sheridan, who 

reconnoitered in advance, then sent a 

messenger back for the platoons, the men 

stumbled past the factories and up the 

steep slope toward Lucherberg more in a 

"column of bunches" than in any orthodox military formation. In spite of persistent but wild fire from an alerted 

German tanker, the men pushed into the 

village to gain three houses near a road 

junction in the northern end. At this 

point, trouble started. Even as the 

Americans tried to expand their holdings, 

the Germans set out to dislodge them. 

The company commander, Lieutenant Olsen, was shot in the head. He died 

before daybreak. 

In the meantime, the rear platoon, 

which had become separated from the 

others, also reached Lucherberg, but the 

leaders didn't know where to find the rest 

of the company. They holed up in what 

the men called a double house in the 

southwest part of the village. With this 

platoon were observers for both mortars 

and artillery, who had radio contact with 

the 3d Battalion headquarters. Unable 

to locate Lieutenant Olsen and the rest 

of Company I, they radioed the battalion 

commander for help. Though this request went out about 0400, no genuine 

assistance was to materialize until late in 

the day. 

While this platoon held in the double 

house, one of· those bizarre inoidents that 

make war a logical haven for lunatics 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 513 

was developing near the road junction in 

the north edge of Lucherberg. There a 

German medical officer, a lieutenant 

colonel, asked for a fifteen-minute truce in 

order that both sides might care for their 

wounded. As the truce more or less 

informally developed, most of Company 

1's men leaned their weapons against walls 

of the houses and began to help with the 

wounded. Three German medics assisted 

in a vain attempt to sustain Lieutenant 

Olsen. 

The truce still was in effect when another group of about thirty Germans 

arrived under command of a captain. 

Refusing to honor the truce, the German 

captain directed his men to collect the 

American weapons. The Americans, he 

insisted, were to surrender. The men of 

Company I gradually became aware that 

in the darkness the new arrivals had 

stealthily encircled them. 

Reminding the German captain of the 

tradition of discipline in his army, an 

interpreter, Sgt. Leon Marokus, insisted 

that the ranking officer, the lieutenant 

colonel, have the say. The captain refused. The lieutenant colonel, he said, 

was only a medical officer. 

In the end, the captain agreed to a 

compromise. Angrily, he announced that 

he would give the Americans fifteen 

minutes to get out' of the village. Conscious of their encirclement, Sergeant 

Marokus and his companions had little 

choice. As they assembled to leave, they 

became aware that only about twenty 

men out of an original two platoons and 

a machine gun section remained. Because 

the German captain insisted upon holding 

Company 1's sole remaining officer, Lieutenant Sheridan, as a hostage, Sergeant 

Marokus refused to part with the lieutenant colonel. Only as the fifteenminute period expired were these two 

exchanged. 

In the interim, the men of Company 1's 

rear platoon in the southwestern edge of 

Lucherberg had made contact with the 

others. Fleeing the truce site, Sergeant 

Marokus and the twenty who had escaped fell back to the double house. 

Through most of the day of 3 December, 

the composite group fought from this 

position, an island of resistance sustained 

only through persistent and effective employment of mortar and artillery fire. 

Fortunately for the forty-five men who 

made up the defense, two were the observers from the 8 I -mm. mortars and the 

artillery, 1st Lts. John Shipley and Arthur 

A. Ulmer. Some idea of the kind of fire 

support provided might be discerned from 

the day's artillery statistics. During the 

twenty-four hour period, organic and attached artillery fired 370 missions and 

18,950 rounds along the I04th Division's 

front, now only four miles wide. 

Reinforcing Company I was a slow 

process. Company L, which was to have 

followed Company I across the Inde the 

preceding night, had been stymied by fire 

both at the crossing site used by Company I and at the Lamersdorf site 

employed by the companies of the 2d 

Battalion. Not until daylight on 3 December had the company found another 

crossmg site at Frenz. Conscious of 

German observation, the men crawled 

and infiltrated in small groups to the nest 

of factories west of Lucherberg, whence 

they might make a concerted effort to 

reach the village. So slow was the process 

that the last men of Company L did not 

reach the factory buildings until noon. 

In the meantime, the reserve company 

of the 2d Battalion,· Company F, tried 

infiltrating across the river at Lamersdorf 
514 

and reached the factories soon after 

Company L. Placing both companies 

under Capt. F. J. Hallahan, Company L 

commander, Colonel Cochran directed 

an attack on Lucherberg at 1500 that 

afternoon, 3 December. The infantry 

would have to attack alone, for German 

shelling had stultified efforts to bridge the 

Inde, and an alarming rise in the waters 

had prevented tanks from fording. 

The ease and speed with which the 

attack progressed was hard to explain 

other than that an artillery preparation 

effectively pinned the enemy inside his 

foxholes and cellars. In a matter of only 

ten to fifteen minutes, both Companies F 

and L had broken into Lucherberg, and 

Company L had established contact with 

the forty-five men in the double house. 

Mop-up was slower, so that near midnight, when the men paused to strike a 

defense, some parts of the village remained 

in German hands. 

Before the companies could renew their 

mop-up the next morning, 4 December, 

the Germans counterattacked with infantry supported by damaging concentrations of mortar fire. From upper stories 

of the buildings, the Americans turned 

the village into a shooting gallery. By 

noon, it was over. An hour or so later, 

engineers at last bridged the Inde at 

Lamersdorf, and a section of 57-mm. 

antitank guns reached Lucherberg. Before midnight, a platoon of tanks and a 

platoon of towed tank destroyers also 

arrived. 

The enemy's major effort to retake 

Lucherberg began before daylight on 5 

December. Employing some eight to ten 

tanks and assault guns and about 450 

infantry from the 3d Parachute Division's 

8th Regiment, the Germans sneaked into 

the village through the early morning 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

ciarkness. For several hours the fighting 

raged at close quarters. Two of, the 

American tanks and one of the 57-mm. 

antitank guns were knocked out early in 

the engagement. One of the towed tank 

destroyers accounted for two German 

assault guns which bogged in the mud on 

the fringe of the village. Firing upon a 

German rifleman who apparently was 

carrying explosives, a squad of American 

infantry watched in horror as the German 

literally disintegrated in a loud explosion. 

An enemy tank laid some direct hits into 

Company F's command post, killing several men, including the company commander and the artillery observer. 

Like a storm that blows itself out, the 

fighting in Lucherberg the morning of 5 

December was too intense to last for long. 

Again with a noteworthy assist from 

mortars and artillery,30 the men of the 

4 15th Infantry were in control of the 

situation by 0830. Leaving behind the 

hulks of two Tiger tanks, two Panther 

tanks, and two assault guns, the Germans 

began to withdraw to the northeast. By 

midafternoon the arrival of a fresh company to relieve what was left of Company 

I underscored the fact that the enemy's 

chance of retaking Lucherberg had passed. 

Through means of continued shelling and 

a minor counterattack on 6 December, 

the Germans showed somewhat reluctant 

acceptance of that fact; but it was fact 

nonetheless.31 

In the three-day fight for Lucherberg, 

the Germans lost at least 204 men killed 

and 209 captured, plus an estimated 400 

to 500 wounded. Despite the initial 

30 Within a period of two hours, 8,000 rounds 

of artillery were fired in the vicinity of Lucherberg. I04th Div Arty AAR, Dec 44. 

31 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR of 5 

Dec 44. 
CLEARING THE INNER WINGS OF THE ARMIES 515 

misfortunes of Company I, the 415th 

Infantry's losses were relatively small. 

Incomplete figures showed 25 killed, 2 I 

missing, and about 60 wounded. 32 

In pushing beyond the Inde, the 104th 

Division had come abreast of the other 

divisions of the VII Corps. A smaller 

bridgehead which the 414th Infantry had 

been establishing at Inden even as the 

4 15th Infantry took Lucherberg made the 

division's position more secure and pro32 All casualty figures are from I04th Division 

combat interviews. 

vided an adequate base for renewing the 

push across the remaining three miles to 

the Roer. The 104th Division might 

have begun the new push immediately 

had not the corps commander, General 

Collins, ordered a pause. Because the 

other divisions of the corps had spent 

themselves in fighting to the fringe of the 

Roer plain, he needed time to replace 

them with fresh troops. Thereupon, the 

entire VII Corps would join the battle of 

the Roer plain in a final push to the 

Roer in the general direction of Dueren. 
CHAPTER XXII 

The Roer River Offensive 

Among numerous considerations affecting the Ninth Army's role in the November offensive, one of the most telling was 

German possession of the West Wall 

strongpoint of Geilenkirchen. Located ten 

miles north of Aachen along the Ninth 

Army's northern boundary, Geilenkirchen 

in German hands severely restricted the 

frontage available for deployment at the 

start of the planned offensive. The 

solution to the problem posed by the 

town eventually was to alter a simple plan 

for a frontal attack into a complicated 

blueprint involving progressive shifts in 

corps and division boundaries. (See Map 

VII.) 

Shifting the Ninth Army boundary 

northward was no solution, for any 

troops that attacked from northwest or 

north of Geilenkirchen eventually would 

have to cross the Wurm River, which 

could be a costly procedure. The situation was complicated further on the south 

wing because the congested urban district 

of Wuerselen was not desirable for early 

stages of the main attack. Once a sizable 

portion of the front at Wuerselen had 

been allotted to one division, the 30th, 

not quite six miles of frontage remained. 

The Ninth Army commander, General 

Simpson, had available for employment 

here the rest of the XIX Corps and all of 

General Gillem's newly operational XIII 

Corps. Thus developed perhaps the only 

instance during the Siegfried Line Campaign when a commander had more 

troops than he had space in which to use 

them. 

Planning Period 

In the final analysis, General Simpson 

found his solution in temporary boundaries. 

First, the adjacent 30 British Corps 

was to encompass Geilenkirchen in its 

sector temporarily and reduce the town 

with the assistance of the 84th U.S. 

Division. This arrangement had the dual 

virtue of taking care of Geilenkirchen 

while at the same time permitting employment at the start of at least a portion of 

the troops of General Gillem's XIII Corps 

(the 84th Division). Beyond Geilenkirchen, the northeastward trace of the 

Wurm promised enlargement of the Ninth 

Army's sector, thus permitting the 84th 

Division to return to the XIII Corps and 

other units of the corps to enter the line. 

Second, General Simpson directed that 

the 2d Armored Division, which as 

northernmost element of the XIX Corps 

was to attack northeastward toward the 

Roer at Linnich, was to halt a mile or so 

short of Linnich at the communications 

center of Gereonsweiler. After capture of 

Gereonsweiler, the XIX Corps north 

boundary was to be shifted to the south, 

further broadening the sector available to 

the XIII Corps. Upon shift of the 

boundary, the 2d Armored Division was 

to pull into an assembly area near J uelich 

and prepare to exploit a river crossing to 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

be staged by infantry of the XIX Corps. 

The 2d Armored Division thus had the 

twofold mission of protecting the north 

flank of the XIX Corps during the drive 

on Juelich while at the same time developing maneuver space for commitment of 

the XIII Corps. 

Third, after supply lines of the XIX 

Corps had been adjusted to the earlier 

temporary boundary, General Simpson 

planned another boundary adjustment, 

widening the XIII Corps sector by more 

than a mile and giving the XIII Corps 

more direct lines of communication leading to Linnich. 1 

As finally determined, the basic outline 

of the Ninth Army's role in the November 

offensive was as follows: 

On the heels of the target bombing 

which represented the Ninth Army's share 

of Operation QUEEN, General McLain's 

XIX Corps with three divisions (the 2d 

Armored, 29th, and 30th) was to make 

the Ninth Army's main effort alongside 

the First Army's left flank to seize a 

crossing of the Roer at J uelich. As an 

attached component of the 30 British 

Corps, which on 12 November had assumed responsibility for the Ninth Army's 

troublesome seventeen-mile north flank 

running eastward from the Maas River, 

the 84th Division was to attack on D plus I 

to capture Geilenkirchen. Thereupon, 

General Gillem's XIII Corps with the 

. I 13th Cavalry Group, two active divisions 

(the 84th and I02d), and a reserve 

division (the 7th Armored, which was 

recuperating from fighting in the Peel 

1 NUSA Ltr of Instrs 7, 4 Nov, and various 

other ltrs of instrs found in NUSA G-3 Jnl file, 

1-16 Nov 44. See also NUSA Opns, IV, I-g, 

and Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, pp. 

71-78, 81-83. Ninth Army journals for the 

planning period are of little value. 

517 

GENERAL GILLEM 

Marshes) was to be committed on the 

Ninth Army's north wing to cross the 

Roer at Linnich. After jumping the 

Roer, both corps were to drive northeast 

to the Rhine at Duesseldorf. Detailed 

plans for both the Roer crossings and the 

drive to the Rhine were to await developments, particularly in regard to the dams 

on the upper Roer which the Germans 

might blow to isolate any force east of the 

flver. 

Most of the terrain in the XIX Corps 

zone was typical of the Roer plain: generally flat, averaging about 300 feet above 

sea level, dotted with villages ranging in 

population from one to two thousand, 

composed primarily of cultivated fields 

outlined by shallow ditches and spat-'e 

hedges. Having seized the eastern slopes 

of the W urm River valley during the 

October penetration of the West Wall, 

the XIX Corps already possessed the 

highest ground in the sector. From four 

villages along the periphery of the West 
518 

Wall "bridgehead" - W aurichen, Beggendorf, Baeswei1er, and Oidtwei1er-the 

ground slopes gently downward a remaining six miles to the Roer. The highest 

ground still in German hands was along 

the proposed route of advance of the 29th 

Division, from Baesweiler and Oidtweiler 

east through the road center of Aldenhoven to J uelich, and near the village of 

Sette rich, northeast of Baesweiler, no more 

than a stone's throw from the projected 

line of departure. Two major highways, 

both originating at Aachen, traversed the 

plain in the direction the XIX Corps 

wanted to go. One would serve the 2d 

Armored Division in the direction of 

Linnich; the other, the 29th Division on 

the route through Aldenhoven to J uelich. 

Another major road cuts laterally across 

the plain from Geilenkirchen southeast 

through Aldenhoven in the direction of 

Dueren. 

Not only the main roads but also the 

secondary roads, crisscrossing the plain 

from village to village, attracted special 

attention. This was because commanders 

feared the soil off the roads might be too 

moist and soft for cross-country maneuver 

of tanks. Already indications had developed that the month of November might 

produce some kind of record for incessant 

rainfall and cloudiness. Meteorologists 

later were to note that a trace of rain 

appeared on all but two days of November 

and that one and a half inches fell in 

excess of a normally high precipitation.2 

In hope of increasing tank flotation, 

the Ninth Army, as did the First Army, 

called upon maintenance companies and 

battalions to set up special shops and 

adopt assembly line methods to equip 

2 NUSA Opns, IV, g, cltmg Rpt of Detachment "ZP," 2 I st Weather Sq, 4 Jan 45. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

tanks with track connector extensions 

("duck bills" ) . These were five-inch 

steel end connectors, a form of grouser. 

By D Day approximately three fourths of 

the medium tanks in both the 2d Armored 

Division and separate battalions supporting the infantry would have been modi- . 

fied. 3 

Still concerned, tankers lashed fascines 

to their vehicles to be used for increased 

traction should the tanks bog down. The 

2d Armored Division commander, General 

Harmon, mounted a tank shortly before 

D Day for a personal test of the soil 

situation. 4 

General Harmon's preoccupation with 

mobility had somber overtones. As an 

armored commander, he must have recognized the maxim that "armor attracts 

armor;" and the Ninth Army G-2, 

Colonel Bixel, had warned that the 

enemy's 9th Panzer Division occupied a 

reserve position only a few miles behind 

the front line. In the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, Colonel Bixel noted, the 

Germans had another force containing 

armor in a reserve location not much 

farther away.5 

Colonel Bixel was referring quite accurately to the two divisions which made 

up the DB WEST reserve in this sector, 

General von Luettwitz' XLVII Panzer 

Corps. Only recently returned from the 

:J NUSA Opns, IV, 7; Conquer-The Story of 

Ninth Army, p. 100; The Armored School, Hell 

on Wheels in the Drive to the Roer, App. VII. 

p. iii. The latter is a detailed study of the 2d 

Armored Division's part in the Roer offensive, 

prepared at Fort Knox in 1949. Copy in 

OCMH. Most track connector extensions were 

procured locally. See Thompson, Local Procurement in the ETO. 

4 NUSA Opns, IV, 58; Conquer-The Story of 

Ninth Army, pp. 85-86. 

5 NUSA Opns, IV, p. 6; XIX Corps AAR, 

Nov 44. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

spoiling attack in the Peel Marshes, the 

LXVII Panzer Corps had assumed a reserve position straddling the boundary 

between the XII SS and LXXXI Corps 

in rear areas of the Fifteenth Army (alias 

Gruppe von ManteufJel). From this position the reserve might move to the 

assistance of either corps. 6 With their 

combined total of 66 tanks, 41 assault 

guns, and 65 I05-mm. and I50-mm. 

howitzers, the two divisions of the XLVII 

Panzer Corps were capable of a telling 

contribution in the battle of the Roer 

plain.7 The boundary between the enemy's XII SS and LXXXI Corps ran 

from the vicinity of Beggendorf and Loverich northeastward to Linnich.8 

Other than the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

Division, which held the urban district 

about Wuerselen, that part of the LXXXI 

Corps opposite the Ninth U.S. Army consisted only of the 246th Volks Grenadier 

Division. Since Colonel Wilck's melodramatic surrender at Aachen, the division 

had been commanded by a Colonel 

Koerte. Though rated weakest of all 

LXXXI Corps units, the 246th Division 

had I I, 141 men organized into three 

infantry regiments, an artillery regiment 

with about 30 pieces of varying caliber, an 

engineer battalion, and additional units 

containing 13 assault guns, 7 88's, and 2 I 

lesser pieces.9 

Commanded temporarily by General 

der Infanterie Guenther Blumentritt, the 

XII SS Corps bore responsibility for alG See Heichler, The German Situation in MidNovember 1944. 

7 Strength Rpts, 1 Nov 44, LXVII pz Corps 

O. Qu., KTB Anlagen, Einzelbefehle, 17.x.-

18.XI·44· 

8 Kampf um Aachen: Maps. 

D Strength Rpts, 15 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps, 

IIa/b KTB Anlagen, 20.X-30.XI.44; Kampf um 

Aachen: Maps. 

519 

most twenty-two miles of front northwest 

of Loverich through Geilenkirchen all the 

way to the Maas River. This was a big 

assignment for a corps that had but two 

divisions, the 176th Infantry ( Colonel Landau) and the 18 3d Volks 

Grenadier (General Lange). Having absorbed rough treatment at the hands of 

the XIX U.S. Corps in September, the 

176th Division since that time had undergone major reorganization. It now was 

capable of fairly creditable defensive action. Though numbering only about 

8,000 men, the division had able troops 

and relatively high morale. The division's 

sector was opposite the British,from a 

point northwest of Geilenkirchen to the 

Maas River. The 183d Division, which 

had been rushed into the West Wall at 

the end of September, controlled Geilenkirchen and the corps south wing. 

The commander of the XII SS Corps, 

General Blumentritt, was less concerned 

about the American front east of the 

Wurm than about the British front west 

of the river. The position of the 176th 

Division, General Blumentritt noted, invited a pincers attack from the west and 

from the south up the valley of the Wurm 

through Geilenkirchen to cut off the entire 

division. With this in mind, he directed 

the main weight of his defenses on either 

side of Geilenkirchen. His infantry reserve-a battalion from each divisionwas located in that vicinity and his 

artillery batteries were instructed to be 

ready to mass fire on Geilenkirchen. 

Having been promised the assistance of 

the new 388th Volks Artillery Corps, 

General Blumentritt intended to commit it 

so that its fires also could be directed on 

the Geilenkirchen sector. 

General Blumentritt ·also concentrated 

his antitank defenses around Geilenkir-
520 

chen. The backbone of the antitank 

screen was provided by 20 assault guns 

and the 75-mm. and 88-mm. pieces of 

both divisions. The 30 lSt Tank Battalion 

with 3 I Tiger tanks and the 559th Assault 

Gun Battalion with 2 I assault guns were 

held in reserve. 10 

Neither General Blumentritt nor the 

commander of the LXXXI Corps, General Koechling, had any doubts that the 

Allies would resume their drive to the 

Roer and the Rhine in early November. 

Both expected the main effort to be 

directed toward J uelich and Dueren with 

a subsidiary effort toward Linnich. As 

indicated by concern about the 176th 

Division, General Blumentritt believed the 

British would participate actively in the 

offensive, thereby extending the zone of 

attack as far as Roermond, at the juncture 

of the Maas and the Roer sixteen miles 

northwest of Geilenkirchen.lI 

On the American side, Colonel Bixel 

and the XIX Corps G-2, Colonel Platt, 

had discerned quite accurately the kind of 

defense to be expected on the Roer plain. 

Having taken a leaf from Russian 

defensive tactics, the Germans had 

transformed the numerous villages into 

mutually supporting strongpoints. Fire 

trenches, foxholes, communications 

trenches, and antitank ditches wreathed 

the villages. Antitank and antipersonnel 

mines liberally dotted roads and other 

likely avenues of approach. Self-propelled 

guns could furnish direct support from 

within the villages, where they might be 

hidden behind stalwart stone houses. If 

driven from the trenches, German in10 Kampf urn Aachen: Maps; MS # B-290, 

The XII SS Corps, 20 Oct 44-31 Jan 45 

(Blumentritt) . 

11 MS # B-290 (Blumentritt) and MS # 

A-994, untitled (Koechling). 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

fantry might retire into the villages to 

cellars remarkable in the strength of their 

construction. 12 

American intelligence also had divined 

that the Germans looked upon the villages 

west of the Roer as integral parts of 

concentric arcs of defense fanning out 

from J uelich and Linnich, after the 

manner of ripples that spread on a pond 

when a pebble is thrown in. Since 

J uelich was the more important of the 

two towns, the concentric arcs protecting 

it overlapped at some points with those 

protecting Linnich. 

The outer, or westernmost, defensive 

arc was marked by a radius a little less 

than six miles from Juelich. Not quite 

four miles from the Roer was an intermediate arc. The inner arc ran not quite 

two miles from JuelichP 

Probably because aerial photographs 

had revealed the enemy's defensive pattern, most of the villages on the plainplus J uelich, Linnich, and Heinsberg, the 

last a road center along the Wurm outside 

the Ninth Army's zone-were included in 

plans for the target bombing in Operation 

QUEEN. Along with Dueren in the First 

Army's zone, Juelich and Heinsberg were 

scheduled as targets for heavy bombers of 

the Royal Air Force Bomber Command. 

Mediums of the Ninth Air Force were to 

strike Linnich and Aldenhoven, while 

fighter-bombers of General Nugent's XXIX 

Tactical Air Command were to concen1 ~ Although many Americans assumed that the 

solid cellars had been constructed with an eye 

toward support positions for the West Wall, this 

type of construction is characteristic of German 

cellars and no evidence supporting the thesis can 

be found. 

13 NUSA Opns, IV, 6; XIX Corps AAR, Nov 

44. See also Intel.Annex, dtd 10 Nov, to 29th 

Div FO 47, 7 Nov 44. German source, confirm 

this defensive arrangement. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

trate upon the villages, including most of 

those comprising the outer defensive arc. 

Although target bombing as contrasted 

with carpet bombing to be executed for 

the First Army involved less danger to 

friendly troops, safety measures prescribed 

were basically the same. 

In the matter of logistics, the Ninth 

Army on the eve of the Roer offensive was 

in a more delicate situation than was the 

First Army. Having moved to the sector 

north of Aachen only twenty days before 

the target date of 1 1 November, and 

having existed on a starvation diet for 

several weeks before the move, the Ninth 

Army had had little time to amass any 

sizable stockpiles or to alleviate shortages 

in several critical items. Artillery ammumtlOn was of particular concern. 

Giving personal attention to this problem, 

General Simpson set up a strict rationing 

program by which he was able to build a 

small reserve before the attack began; 

nevertheless, certain types of ammunition 

were to remain on the ration list through 

the entire month. Mostly these were 

multipurpose high explosive shells for almost all calibers and white phosphorus 

for some artillery calibers and for 81 -mm. 

mortars. Although the Ninth Army 

noted later that "Greater success would 

have been attained if more ammunition 

had been available," stocks accumulated 

through rationing were to prove basically 

adequate. 14 

Never during November was the Ninth 

Army able to keep its armored units 

supplied with medium tanks to fully 

authorized levels. This was true even 

14 NUSA G-4 AAR, Nov 44. Details on 

many facets of the supply situation are conveniently available in Conquer-The Story of 

Ninth Army. See also XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44, 

and NUSA Opns, IV, 7, 8, and 37. 

521 

after adoption of the First Army's expedient table of organization and equipment reducing tank authorizations in 

units like the 2d Armored Division from 

232 to 200 and 

from 54 to 50. 

ment of combat 

separate tank battalions 

Because of slow replacelosses and the fact that 

at least 10 percent of tank strength 

usually was in maintenance shops, both 

orgamc and attached tank battalions 

would operate during the Roer offensive 

at about 60 to 75 percent of authorized 

strength in medium tanks.15 

One of the more serious problems confronting the Ninth Army's G-4 section 

grew out of a combination of the Army's 

narrow sector and its rapid increase in 

troop strength. Almost overnight, the 

Army had expanded from three to six 

divisions, plus a cavalry group and at least 

one tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft 

artillery battalion per infantry division. 

In addition, the Army had thirty-three 

non divisional field artillery battalions, plus 

the numerous other units necessary for 

support: ordnance, signal, medical, quartermaster, and the like. Nowhere along 

the Western Front during the fall of 1944 

were so many troops and installations 

jammed into such a narrow sector. 

Shelter against the cold and rain was at 

a premium. The solution to providing 

storage facilities with hard-road access lay 

only in stacking supplies along shoulders 

of main highways. An already difficult 

problem was compounded when the 30 

British Corps on 12 November assumed 

responsibility for the sector from the Maas 

River to the area of Geilenkirchen. A 

limited number of bridges across the Albert Canal and the Maas providing access 

to the Army's rear areas also added to 

15 XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44. 
522 

the logistical problems. Later 10 the 

month that aspect was to reach critical 

proportions as the Maas rose to flood stage 

and washed out British bridges downstream. Supplies for the 30 Corps then 

had to move across already overloaded 

and flood-strained American bridges at 

Maastricht. 16 

Encumbered with hundreds of vehicles, 

both in combat formations and supply 

trains, General Harmon's 2d Armored 

Division was particularly hard-pressed for 

space. An exchange between General 

Harmon and the XIX Corps G-3, Col. 

Gustavus W. West, illustrates the point: 

Colonel West: G-4 told me that the I02d 

[Division] is trying to 

crowd you. They are getting pinched out and have 

to go someplace. 

General Harmon: They can't disturb my 

su pply installations; they 

will have to go someplace 

else. . .. I am not moving anything and I don't 

want any 2d Armored ins ta lla tions disturbed . . . . 

Keep those people off my 

back until I get some 

ground. 17 

For all these problems and more, the 

Ninth Army nevertheless was ready to 

attack by the target date of I I November, 

little more than six weeks after leaving the 

Breton peninsula and not quite three 

- weeks after departure from a temporary 

post in Luxembourg. Small wonder that 

the American press dubbed this a "phantom" army and hailed the rapid shift as 

a miracle of modern warfare. Even so, 

many a commander within the Ninth 

Army must have been gratified by the 

16 Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army provides lucid details on these problems. 

17 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, II Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

additional opportunity for preparation 

provided by the five-day delay which bad 

weather imposed on the offensive. 

On the eve of the attack, General 

Simpson and his subordinates were optimistic. In approving a policy of rest 

before the jump-off, the XIX Corps 

Commander, General McLain, told one of 

his division commanders he would need 

plenty of rest, because "when you go 

again it will be a long drive. Right into 

Berlin." 18 Though General McLain may 

have indulged in hyperbole, the commanders in general apparently shared 

"high hopes . . . that the enemy's stronghold could be breached and he be beaten 

down before the harsh winter ... set 

in." 19 For his part, General Simpson 

warned against taking the enemy too 

lightly. Even second-rate troops, he 

noted, "can fight well from fortified areas 

like the towns of the Roer Valley." He 

put the matter succinctly when he told his 

staff, "I anticipate one hell of a fight." 

Nevertheless, the general view was that 

the XIX Corps could reach the Roer in 

five days.20 

D Day on the Roer Plain 

In transposing General Simpson's plans 

from army to corps level, the XIX Corps 

commander, General McLain, inherited 

the problem of narrow frontage. Having 

bowed to reputed pitfalls in the Wuerselen 

industrial district and given the 30th 

Division a special mission there, he already 

had used more than half of ten miles of 

front available at his line of departure. 

To split the remaining four and a half 

miles equally between the 2d Armored 

18 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44. 

to NUSA Opns,·IV, 2. 

20 Ibid., pp. 6, 8; Combat Interv with McLain. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

and 29th Divisions was no ready solution, 

for the natural route of appFoach to the 

village of Setterich, which under this kind 

of arrangement would fall to the 2d 

Armored Division, would lie in the 29th 

Division's sector. Yet Setterich was important to the armor, because General 

Harmon needed to employ a main road 

leading from the W urm River through 

Uebach, Baesweiler, and Setterich to the 

armored division's objective of Gereonsweiler. On the other hand, if Setterich 

and the natural route of approach to the 

village were given to the armor from the 

start, the 29th Division would be left 

with a zone hardly wide enough at the 

line of departure for even one regiment. 

Much as had General Simpson, General 

McLain solved his problem by means of a 

temporary boundary. Setterich and that 

portion of the road running through the 

village were to be captured by the 29th 

Division. Thereupon, the interdivision 

boundary was to be shifted a mile to the 

south to give the village and the road to 

the armor.21 

At divisional level, plans of the 2d 

Armored Division also were influenced by 

the narrow zone. The armor drew a 

sector a mere two miles wide at the line 

of departure, marked by the villages of 

Waurichen and Beggendorf. Probably 

with the limited zone in mind, General 

McLain directed that the 2d Armored 

21 XIX Corps FO 28, 5 Nov, XIX Corps FO 

and Ltrs of Instrs file, Nov 44. Unless otherwise 

noted, other sources for the XIX Corps story are 

as follows: Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, 

pp. 89-93; NUSA Opns, IV, 1-89, I 12-73; 

XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44; XIX Corps G-2 and 

G-3 Jnl files, Nov 44; Ferriss Notes (cited in 

Ch. X, above); and official records of the 2d 

Armd and 29th Divs. Both these divisions recorded a number of telephone messages which are 

valuable in reconstructing the story of their engagements. 

523 

Division commit at first no more than one 

combat command. Designating CCB for 

the role, General Harmon told the commander, General White, to drive directly 

northeast to the division objective of 

Gereonsweiler, three miles away. Attached to CCB, both to assist in protecting 

the left flank and later to hold the high 

ground about Gereonsweiler after the objective was relinquished to the XIII 

Corps, was the 102d Division's 406th Infantry, a part of the XIII Corps. 

Once past the line of departure, the 2d 

Armored Division's sector funneled out to 

an ultimate width of about five miles, so 

that in later stages of the attack General 

Harmon would have room for the rest of 

his division, plus two attached battalions 

of the 30th Division's 119th Infantry. 

His maneuver space also would increase 

once the 29th Division captured Setterich. 

The second combat command, CCA, was 

to prepare to attack from Setterich almost 

due east along the division's right flank to 

occupy the assembly area northwest of 

J uelich where the division was to prepare 

for crossing the Roer. 

Having drawn responsibility for Setterich, the 29th Division had a sector 

about a mile wider than that of the 

armor. Attack plans of the 29th Division 

thus were less strongly affected by space 

limitations. Instead, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhardt, 

gave his attention to a scheme of maneuver based upon an analysis of the 

enemy's defensive plan as interpreted 

through the 29th Division's earlier experience in Normandy. Noting that the 

Germans depended upon the villages as 

strongpoints, General Gerhardt prepared 

to exploit what he deemed the weak 

points, the open ground between the 

villages. He told his regiments to stick to 
524 

the open terrain while isolating the 

villages; thereupon, company-size attacks 

should be sufficient to reduce each 

village. 22 

The 29th Division's line of departure 

was marked by the villages of Baesweiler 

and Oidtweiler. The first division objective was the road center of Aldenhoven, 

not quite four miles away; then the Roer 

at Juelich, three miles beyond Aldenhoven. 

As for the special mission of reducing 

Setterich, General Gerhardt intended to 

wait until his main drive opposite Baesweiler and Oidtweiler had uncovered the 

southern flank of Setterich. At that point 

he intended to commit a portion of his 

division reserve along the natural route of 

approach to the village, the AachenLinnich highway. 

General Gerhardt's plan for taking 

Setterich reflected an air of basic optimism 

about the coming offensive. In view of 

the importance of Setterich to progress of 

the armor, Gerhardt hardly would have 

adopted a plan dependent upon his main 

drive turning the flank of the village had 

he anticipated that his main drive might 

be stopped or even slowed. In like manner, General McLain's attack order to the 

2d Armored Division conveyed an air of 

optimIsm. After the initial attack by one 

combat command, General McLain directed, the rest of the armor "assembles on 

corps order northwest of Juelich .... " 23 

Only General Harmon appeared to express any real concern about the situation 

as reflected in the planning. For several 

days he tried in vain to solicit a limited 

objective attack by the I 02d Division to 

secure a knoll close alongside his left flank. 

Neither was he happy about the arrange22 NUSA Opns, IV, 34; Ewing, 29 Let's Go!, 

p. 169; 29th Div and 175th Inf AARs, Nov 44. 

23 XIX Corps FO 28. Italics supplied. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

ment for taking Setterich. "I am quite 

concerned about that south end there," 

General Harmon told his CCB commander. "I am not so sure that it is 

going to work out so well." 24 

Certainly the American commanders 

had reasons for optimism, not the least of 

which was the strong American artillery 

arm. Counting both divisional and corps 

artillery, the XIX Corps had at hand 25 

field artillery battalions. In organizing 

the artillery for the offensive, the XIX 

Corps artillery commander Brig. Gen. 

George D. Shea, allott~d 3 of 13 corps 

battalions to general support of the 30th 

Division, 2 to the 29th Division, 3 to the 

2d Armored Division, and the remaining 

5 to general support throughout the corps 

zone as needed. To supplement this impressive strength, each infantry division 

had a battalion each of towed tank 

destroyers and medium tanks, the 2d 

Armored Division had its organic tanks 

and assault guns, and the bulk of the 

92d Chemical Battalion's 4.2-inch mortars 

were apportioned throughout the corps. 

Furthermore, organic artillery of the 84th 

Division of the XIII Corps was to provide 

support as needed on D Day to the 2d 

Armored Division. In general, the XIX 

Corps plan for artillery support called for 

a preliminary counterflak preparation during the air strike, followed by concentrations for a half hour against the initial 

village objectives, intensive counterbattery 

preparations by corps guns, and subsequent on-call missions. 25 

Commanders and troops in the XIX 

24 2d Arrnd Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44, passim. 

25 No copy of the artillery annex to XIX Corps 

FO 28 can be found. This information is 

gleaned from the following sources: NUSA 

Opns, IV, I I; Conqu~r-The Story of Ninth 

Army, p. 71; 2d Armd Div AAR, Nov 44; and 

29th Div FO 47, 7 Nov. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

Corps no doubt watched the clearing 

skies on D Day, 16 November, with much 

the same jubilation as did their neighbors 

in the First Army. Soon after midnight 

assault units of both the 2d Armored and 

29th Divisions had begun to move to the 

line of departure. Considering the bulk 

and noisiness of tanks and the muddy, 

slippery condition of the roads, secrecy 

during the moves was particularly difficult 

for the 2d Armored Division. Yet no 

untoward incidents occurred, and the 

enemy displayed no indication that he 

detected anything unusual. Several dry 

runs which the armor had conducted on 

previous nights may have accustomed 

the Germans to the noise of churning 

vehicles behind the lines. 

Though the air strike began on schedule, it subsequently proved as difficult to 

measure the effect of the bombardment in 

support of the Ninth Army as of the 

saturation bombing in front of the First 

Army. Thus no worth-while comparison 

between the two types of air support 

could be made. That J uelich, Linnich, 

and Heinsberg incurred severe damage 

was readily apparent; 26 yet how serious 

were these blows to the enemy's war 

machine was open to question. A consensus of reports from prisoners was that 

the strikes on Linnich and J uelich "forced 

personnel to cover but did not cause 

excessive casualties or military damage. 

The bridge at Juelich was destroyed, 

effectively blocking movement through 

that town; however, German engineers 

quickly installed three ponton bridges 

capable of bearing more traffic than the 

original structure." 27 

26 OB WEST KTB, 16 Nov 44. 

27 NUSA Opns, IV, 39, citing Capt Carl 

Wheeldryer, PW interrogator, 2d Armd Div, to 

Maj Walter H. Mytinger, G-3 Air, 2d Armd Div. 

525 

The only major change in the original 

air plan was a last-minute cancellation of 

Aldenhoven as a target for tht- mediums. 

The change was requested by the 29th 

Division, which was reluctant to risk being 

blocked by rubble in the event an anticipated rapid thrust into Aldenhoven 

should materialize. Instead, the mediums 

hit the village of Luerken opposite the 

30th Division. 

In noting that the XXIX TAC's 

fighter-bombers "did the best job they 

have ever done for the XIX Corps," 28 

the corps apparently was favoring quality 

over quantity; for despite the dramatic 

clearing of the skies at the last minute, 

the P-47's and P-38'S still ran int9 

visibility problems. They flew but 136 

sorties, and dropped but 46,5 tons of 

bombs. 29 Yet to judge from initial reactions of the ground units, this limited 

program was effective. "Had excellent 

results," reported the 2d Armored Division. The air strike was effective, noted 

the 29th Division's 115th Infantry, "On 

Setterich particularly so." The other 

regiment in the line, the 17 5th Infantry, 

said the bombing was "fine." 30 Although German artillery fire subsequently 

proved "considerably less intense and 

effective than was expected," 31 it was 

ha. ~ to tell whether this was any more 

attributable to the air effort than to 

counterbattery fires or even to a possible 

G-2 overestimation of available German 

artillery. 

Close behind the air strike, even as the 

28 XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44. 

29 Specific figures vary; those given are an 

average from sev~ral· sources. 

30 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Nov 44; 29th 

Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 16 Nov 44. 

31 XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44. 
526 

artillery concluded its own target preparation, tanks and infantry of the 2d 

Armored Division's CCB struck northeastward just at H hour-1245. General 

White employed three task forces. The 

strongest operated on the south wing, first 

to seize the village of Loverich, then 

Puffendorf. The latter was a major objective, a crossroads village astride both 

the enemy's main route of lateral communications and the highway leading 

northeast from Sette rich to the division 

objective of Gereonsweiler. The second 

task force, in the center, first was to take 

Floverich, then Apweiler and a rise of 

ground between Apweiler and Puffendorf, 

not quite a mile from the final objective 

of Gereonsweiler. The third task force 

attacked from the vicinity of Waurichen 

toward Immendorf, there to defend the 

combat command's north boundary. 

Moving at first behind a smoke screen 

laid upon the enemy's outpost line by 

chemical mortars, all three task forces 

found resistance weak and spotty. The 

Germans appeared awed by the horde of 

tanks descending upon them and often 

surrendered in bunches. In the absence 

of stanch resistance, the muddy ground 

offered few problems to the tanks. Soon 

the countryside was dotted with fascines 

which the tankers unceremoniously discarded when they did not need them for 

increased traction. As elsewhere in the 

XIX Corps zone, a major surprise was 

lack of accurate German shellfire. Much 

of the artillery fire the Germans belatedly 

expended landed well in rear of the 

attacking tanks and infantry. Early prisoners suggested the explanation that they 

had been surprised because American 

artillery had not employed the kind of 

heavy blanket preparation the Germans 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

had come to expect before an attack. 32 

Task Force I, strongest of' the three 

task forces, was commanded by Col. Paul 

A. Disney, commander of the 67th 

Armored Regiment. Possessing a battalion of armored infantry and two battalions (less one company) of tanks, 

Colonel Disney had strength enough to 

split his force into two components, one 

to take Loverich, the other to bypass that 

village and capture Puffendorf. Though 

the component moving on Loverich came 

under intense antitank fire from the south 

flank at Setterich, a lieutenant bearing the 

illustrious name of Robert E. Lee directed 

fire of the leading tank company upon 

Setterich and in a matter of minutes 

silenced the guns. Loverich was under 

control not twenty minutes later. 

Moving past Loverich on Puffendorf, 

the largest portion of Task Force I lost 

four tanks to mud and six to mines. 

Nevertheless, by 1500, little more than 

two hours after the jump-off, leading 

tanks and armored infantry were entering 

the village. "Get that place tonight if 

you can," General Harmon admonished, 

"so the men will have some place to 

sleep.~:l 

Colonel Disney did that and more. 

After taking Puffendorf, he sent the component which earlier had taken Loverich 

to occupy a hill 700 yards northeast 

of Puffendorf astride the highway to 

Gereonsweiler. Boggy ground and antitank fire from higher ground southeast of 

Gereonsweiler interfered with this attack. 

Two tanks mired, another was lost to 

mines, two were disabled by antitank fire, 

and another burned after a direct hit. 

Nevertheless, as night came, the American 

:1" XIX Corps AAR, Nov 44; Ferriss Notes. 

33 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Nov 44. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

tanks commanded the hill along the 

Gereonsweiler road. Colonel Disney's task 

force had seized the first day's objectives 

and at the same time had gained a leg on 

the next day's journey to Gereonsweiler. 

Both CCB's other task forces had 

similar experiences at first. Composed 

primarily of a battalion each of tanks and 

armored infantry, Task Force 2 in the 

center cleared Floverich in less than two 

hours. In the process the task force lost 

six tanks to mines, panzerfausts, mortar 

fire, and mechanical failure but received 

no fire from antitank guns, possibly because tank destroyers kept neighboring 

villages under fire. On CCB's north 

wing, Task Force X, with a battalion of 

the 406th Infantry supported by Company H, 67th Armored Regiment; moved 

against Immendorf. In the assault echelon, Task Force X used two companies of 

infantry rather than tanks, but otherwise 

the story was much the same as elsewhere. 

Although four tanks were lost to mines, 

the village was secured in less than two 

hours. Task Force X spent the rest of 

the afternoon digging in to hold this village as protection for CCB's left flank. 

In the meantime, in the center of 

CCB's attack zone, the most portentous 

event of the day had developed. Having 

occupied Floverich, Task Force 2 in midafternoon continued northeast toward the 

next objective of Apweiler. Moving 

slowly in second gear because of the 

soggy ground, the tanks were unopposed 

until they reached a point about 300 yards 

from Apweiler. Unannounced, antitank 

guns that lay hidden in orchards and 

groves along the fringe of the village 

suddenly opened an intense and unrelenting fire. In less than two minutes the 

German gunners knocked out seven of the 

527 

U.S. tanks and scored glancing blows on 

a number of others. Three tanks burned: 

Task Force 2 could not silence this fire. 

Every attempt to rush the defenses with 

infantry failed in the face of fire from 

automatic weapons also hidden among the 

trees. In the end, Task Force 2 fell back 

a few hundred yards to the GeilenkirchenAldenhoven highway and dug in for the 

night. 34 

The difficulty at Apweiler was strangely 

inconsonant in view of the relative ease 

with which CCB had conquered the other 

objectives. Yet any veteran tanker might 

point to numbers of instances where a few 

strategically placed antitank guns had 

dealt costly blows to an attacking combat 

command but had failed in the long run 

to alter the over-all picture. On the 

other hand, the defense at Apweiler might 

have broader implications. Many a 

tanker and infantryman in CCB must 

have pondered that thought during the 

night as one outpost after another reported the noise of track-laying vehicles 

moving behind German lines. 

Meanwhile, to the south, in the zone of 

the 29th Division, events had been unfolding that were more in keeping with 

the difficulty at Apweiler than with 

CCB's successes. At I245, at the same 

time CCB had crossed the line of departure, a battalion each of the 29th 

Division's I I5th and I75th Infantry Regiments attacked. In line with General 

Gerhardt's scheme to reduce the village 

strongpoints by first penetrating the 

reputed weak spots in between, the first 

H After nightfall, a freakish accident put another tank out of action. A sliver of metal from 

a German shellburst wedged a round so securely 

in the barrel of one of the tank guns that 

ordnance crews subsequently had to replace the 

piece. 
528 

objectives were high ground north and 

southeast of the village of Siersdorf and 

southeast of Bettendorf. 

Lying behind open, gently rolling fields 

a mile and a half southeast of the regimental line of departure at Baesweiler, 

the 115th Infantry's objective was high 

ground about a coal mine 400 yards north 

of Siersdorf. It provided an acid test of 

General Gerhardt's plan. 

Though screened at first by smoke, the 

two leading companies of the I 15th 

Infantry's 1st Battalion came under 

small arms fire no more than 600 yards 

past the line of departure. The men 

still managed to advance by squad rushes. 

In the process, the commander of Company C on the left was killed, but the 

company nevertheless gained another 200 

yards. Here a deadly cross fire struck 

both companies. From four directions it 

came-from Setterich off the left flank, 

from the settlement of Roetgen to the 

northeast, from Siersdorf to the southeast, 

and from a windmill a few hundred yards 

to the east. A platoon leader later called 

it "the most intense and accurate small 

arms fire ... I have ever encountered." 35 

The men hit the ground. Hugging the 

earth between rows of beets, they gained a 

measure of protection from the small 

arms fire, only to be subjected to round 

after round of mortar and artillery fire. 

An automatic rifle man who had expended his ammunition tried to crawl 

through a beet row to reach the corpse of 

his ammunition bearer. "He was hit, 

tore off his pack and rolled over to get at 

his canteen and sulfa pills. The Germans 

saw him move and shot him again and 

again as he struggled." 36 Many men 

35 NUSA Opns, IV, 41, quoting 1St Lt Joseph 

D. Blalock, Co C. 

36 Ibid. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

threw away their combat packs because 

the Germans could spot them protruding 

across the tops of the beets. Forced to 

court the ground like the others, squad 

and platoon leaders could do little to 

reorganize their men. Here in all the 

terror and misery of it was a clear 

example of what infantrymen meant by a 

term that was common in their language. 

These men were "pinned down." 

The bulk of Company B on the south 

wing succeeded in falling back behind a 

slight rise in the ground, but Company C 

could not follow. Through the afternoon 

the men of Company C lay there, cruelly 

exposed. The battalion commander committed his reserve company. Artillery 

pounded the German positions. Yet 

neither helped appreciably. Not until 

after nightfall were any men of Company 

C able to escape. Only about twenty of 

them made it. 

Had it not been for a drainage ditch 

furrowing open ground between Oidtweiler and Bettendorf, the 29th Division's 

other attacking battalion from the I7 5th 

Infantry might have met the same fate. 

Otherwise the experiences were much the 

same. Small arms fire pinned the men to 

the ground. Shellfire pummeled them. 

The farthest advance was to the drainage 

ditch, not quite 400 yards west of Bettendorf. Every attempt to progress beyond 

the ditch brought unrelenting fire from 

Bettendorf and a railroad embankment 

to the southeast. As night came, the 

men clustered in the ditch for protection. 

Like the 115th Infantry, the I75th Infantry had moved no more than 600 yards 

past the line of departure. 

The results on 16 November had revealed a fundamental misconception in 

General Gerhardt's' scheme of attack. 

Unlike Normandy, the Roer plain is open 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

country. Defensive positions could be 

mutually supporting, so that an attacker 

could not concentrate upon the weak 

spots to the exclusion of the strongpoints. 

Someone in the 17 5th Infantry later put 

it this way: "One objective (usually a 

town or village) must be made secure and 

used as an anchor before attacking the 

next objective. Because of this, towns 

which in reality are strong points cannot 

be bypassed." 37 It could have been 

added that infantry alone might find the 

difficulties of advancing across exposed 

ground like this almost insurmountable. 

Some special provision might be needed, 

like, for example, exploiting the shock 

value of tanks. 

Only after darkness produced immunity from German observation did any 

contingent of the 29th Division make any 

real advance on D Day. Near midnight, 

the I 15th Infantry commander, Col. Edward H. McDaniel, sent his depleted 1st 

Battalion to eliminate the closest of the 

positions which had held up the battalion 

that afternoon. This was the windmill 

about halfway between Baesweiler and 

Siersdorf. When the battalion got there, 

the Germans had gone. 

For all the limited advance in the 29th 

Division's sector, the basic fact was that 

the division had fought only half a day 

and had committed but two battalions. 

Nevertheless, the neighboring 2d Armored 

Division was perturbed because of the 

effect the situation might have upon the 

taking of Setterich and thus upon continued progress of the armor. During 

the afternoon, General Harmon had 

reminded both General Gerhardt and the 

corps commander, General McLain, that 

he wanted to commit his second combat 

37 1 75th Inf AAR, Nov 44. 

529 

command through Sette rich the next 

morning. 38 Still, as night came, the· 

29th Division was yet to make a move 

against the village. "It's head-on stuff," 

General Gerhardt told General Harmon, 

"and just how we're going to work it out 

in the morning we don't know. Whether 

we can guarantee that town by noon 

[I7 November] is debatable. . .. Until 

we can get some ground straight ahead, 

we don't .want to start fooling with that 

flank thing .... " 39 

For his part, General McLain was 

inclined to be patient. Although both 

the armor and the 30th Division had far 

exceeded the 29th Division's gains during 

the day, the 29th Division was striking 

frontally against the outer defensive arc of 

J uelich, whereas the other two divisions 

were hitting glancing blows along the 

receding ends of the arc. General Gerhardt's job obviously was toughest. Committing more strength, General McLain 

told the 29th Division commander, 

"should loosen things up . . .. I think 

you'll bust on through there tomorrow." 40 

General McLain's patience was understandable, for from an over-all standpoint, 

progress of the XIX Corps on 16 November compared favorably with that of the 

VII Corps, where the First Army troops 

had run into trouble with the Donnerberg, the Hamich ridge, and the Huertgen 

Forest. In the Wuerselen industrial district, the 30th Division had gained a mile 

or more at two points and had sustained 

surprisingly light losses. The 2d Armored 

Division had made the most notable gains, 

more than two miles in one instance, and 

near Puffendorf had pierced the outer 

defensive arc of Juelich. For all the 

38 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Nov 44. 

39 29 th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 16 Nov 44. 

40 Ibid. 
530 

difficulties encountered by the 29th 

Division, the average gain along the XIX 

Corps front was about a mile. 

The XIX Corps also had dealt the 

enemy serious blows. The 2d Armored 

Division, for example, had virtually annihilated the 183d Volks Grenadier Division's 330th Regiment and had taken 

570 prisoners. The armor in turn had 

lost 196 men, 2 1 of them killed and 18 

mlssmg. Tank losses were 35, a somewhat disturbing figure except that many 

tanks were out of action only temporarily.41 

No German armor had been sighted; 

German artillery, though troublesome and 

even deadly in some instances, had not 

lived up to expectations. American artillery, on the other hand, had fired the 

impressive total of 20,758 rounds while 

remaining within rationing restrictions. 

All things considered, General McLain 

had reason to be encouraged. There was 

time for things to open up later. 

Armor Attracts Armor 

In reality, the situation was more 

fraught with danger than General McLain 

estimated. Under normal circumstances, 

a commander could consider himself 

relatively immune from intervention by 

major enemy reserves for at least twentyfour hours after the start of an attack, 

41 A German estimate of 18 U.S. tanks destroyed was conservative. See Order, Gruppe 

von Manteuffel to XII SS and LXXXI Corps, 

2225, 16 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Bef. H. 

Gr. u. Armee. A breakdown of eeB's tank 

losses on 16 November follows: to antitank 

guns-IO; to mines-14; to panzerfausts-I; to 

mines and antitank guns-I; to mortar fire-I; 

to mud-6; to artillery fire-I; to mechanical 

failure-I. Total: 35. Of these, 2 tanks which 

mired were returned to action before the end of 

the day, and 8 lost to mud and mines were 

returned within twenty-four hours. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

and often longer. This was not to be the 

case in the battle of the Roer plain. 

In mid afternoon of 16 November, officers at 0 B WEST had estimated that 

five Allied armored and seven infantry 

divisions were involved in the offensive 

against Fifteenth Army (Gruppe von 

M anteuffel). Though they overestimated 

the number of divisions, they were correct 

in divining this as the Allied main effort. 

At 1715 Field Marshal von Rundstedt 

released his strongest reserve force to 

Army Group B for use in Fifteenth Army's 

sector. This was the XLVII Panzer 

Corps with the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

and 9th Panzer Divisions, already positioned close behind Gruppe von M anteuffel's front lines. Rundstedt also ordered 

two volks artillery corps and "all available 

G HQ combat forces" to move to the 

threatened sector.42 

The most immediately dangerous threat 

obviously was the 2d U.S. Armored 

Division's penetration at Puffendorf in the 

open "tank country" of the Roer plain. 

Fifteenth Army (Gruppe von Manteuffel) 

ordered that the 9th Panzer Division 

counterattack early the next morning, 17 

November, to "wipe out" this penetration. 

The counterattack was to be supported by 

an attached headquarters unit, the 50 6th 

Heavy Tank Battalion, which had thirtysix Mark VI (Tiger) tanks.43 

The track-laying vehicles which outposts of the 2d Armored Division 

reported moving behind German lines 

during the night of 16 November were 

those of General Harald Freiherr von 

Elverfeldt's 9th Panzer Division. Unaware of the full import of these reports, 

42 OB WEST KTB, 16 Nov 44. 

43 Order, Gruppe von Manteuffel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 2225, 16 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Bef. H. Gr. u. Armee. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

CAPTURED GERMAN TIGER (MARK 

VI) TANK with temporary u.s. markings. 

Note 88-mm. gun with flash hider. 

the 2d Armored Division's CCB prepared to renew the offensive at dawn on 

r 7 November. One force was to take 

Apweiler, the village denied by the Germans the first afternoon, while another 

headed for the division objective of 

Gereonsweiler. 

CCB's tanks were moving to their lines 

of departure when out of a heavy mist 

rolled the German armor. Preceded by 

round after round of artillery fire, two 

columns of Mark V's and VI's appeared, 

one from the direction of Gereonsweiler 

against Colonel Disney's Task Force r at 

Puffendorf, the other from Prummern, 

beyond the XIX Corps boundary, against 

Task Force X at Immendorf. 

At Immendorf, the Germans employed 

a battalion of the loth Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment supported by tanks variously es531 

timated at from three to ten. Soon after 

the fight began, General Harmon placed 

the commander of the 406th Infantry, 

Col. Bernard F. Hurless, in command of 

Task Force X and authorized him to use 

all his regiment, if necessary. As events 

developed, Colonel Hurless needed no 

more than the one infantry battalion and 

a company each of tanks and tank destroyers already in the village. Using 

mortar, artillery, and small arms fire with 

deadly effect, the task force threw back 

the Germans after a fight lasting most of 

the morning. Guns of the 77 rst Tank 

Destroyer Battalion knocked out three 

Panther tanks. 

When the Germans came back at dusk 

with a battalion of infantry and eight 

tanks, Colonel Hurless did dip into his 

reserve. This time one of the Mark V's 

with a small escort of infantry broke 

into Immendorf. Calling up another of 

his infantry battalio'1s, Colonel Hurless 

sent the men into act.i.! n from their approach march formati"n to expel the 

German infantry, while a gunner from 

the 77 rst Tank Destroyer battalion 

knocked out the Panther at a range of 

thirty yards. 

The heaviest of the counterstrokes hit 

Colonel Disney's Task Force r at Puffendorf. Using twenty to thirty Panthers 

and Tigers accompanied by a battalion 

from the I Ith Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the Germans caught Colonel Disney's tanks drawn up in attack formation 

on the open hill northeast of Puffendbrf. 

Lacking depth of formation, caught by 

surprise in the open, and outmaneuvered 

on the soggy ground by wider-tracked 

German tanks, the Americans were hard 

put to stop the thrust. German shelling 

pinned down Task Force r's infantry 

while American artillery stopped the pan-
532 

zer grenadiers. The fight developed as a 

purely armored engagement. 

Some idea of the amount of V.S. 

artillery fire used at Puffendorf could be 

gained from the figure of 26,628 rounds 

expended during I7 November on the 

XIX Corps front, the largest volume of 

any day of the November offensive; yet 

the artillery could claim but one enemy 

tank destroyed. Fighter-bombers of the 

XXIX T AC braved unfavorable elements 

to maintain a semblance of air cover over 

the battlefield through most of the day, 

but mists and rain denied any real contribution against pinpoint targets like 

tanks. 

After several hours of fighting, some 

tanks of Task Force I were down to three 

or four rounds of ammunition. Although at least I I German tanks were 

knocked out, the Panthers and Tigers 

obviously had the better of the situation. 

In one of Colonel Disney's battalions, at 

least 2 light tanks and 7 mediums burned 

after direct hits. One company was down 

to 8 tanks, another to 4. Less directly 

engaged, the other tank battalion nevertheless came under fire from German 

support tanks near Gereonsweiler, perched 

out of range of V.S. 75-mm. and 76-mm. 

pieces. Long-range hits put the torch to 

at least 4 lights and 3 mediums. His 

tank afire, Sgt. Dennis D. French nevertheless managed to back into defilade and 

extinguish the blaze. Despite heroic actions like this, one of the companies of this 

battalion soon was down to 5 tanks, another down to 3. Colonel Di5ney decided 

to abandon the hill and fall back to the 

protection of the buildings in Puffendorf. 

Task Force I was in no shape after 

the withdrawal to repel another strong 

German thrust. Fortunately, the Panthers and Tigers did not follow. As 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

night came, the men of Task Force I 

worked without pause to replenish their 

ammumtlOn over muddy, blacked-out 

secondary roads leading from distribution 

points far back near the Wurm River. 

F or all the strength of German thrusts 

on either wing of CCB's sector, the 2d 

Armored Division nevertheless made two 

offensive moves on 17 November. The 

first was in the center of CCB's sector at 

Apweiler, where the CCB commander, 

General White, directed that Task Force 

X send one of the newly acquired battalions of the 406th Infantry to assist Task 

Force 2. Both components were to attack 

from the south along parallel axes of 

advance from the Geilenkirchen-Aldenhoven highway near Floverich. 

At 0800, even as the fight against the 

counterattacks raged, the two-pronged 

thrust against Apweiler began. It was 

a mistake. The Germans were as strong 

as before in Apweiler. In addition, the 

enemy tanks on the high ground near 

Gereonsweiler turned the approaches to 

Apweiler into a shooting gallery. They 

set one V.S. tank ablaze, knocked out 

another by a hit on the rear deck, and 

damaged the gun shield of a third. Another tank was disabled by a mine. In 

little more than an hour after the jumpoff, both Task Force 2 and the battalion 

of the 406th Infantry were back at the 

Geilenkirchen-Aldenhoven highway. The 

Task Force 2 commander, Lt. Col. Harry 

L. Hillyard, notified General White that 

under existing circumstances, the nature 

of the ground precluded a successful 

attack by his force against Apweiler. 

The second offensive move on 17 

November involved a fresh force, a portion 

of CCA. Although General Harmon had 

counted upon committing CCA through 

Setterich, he had told the commander, 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

Colonel Collier, to prepare an alternate 

plan to bypass Setterich, move over secondary roads to Puffendorf, and drive 

northeast along CCB's right flank on the 

village of Ederen. 44 Whether to relieve 

pressure against CCB or merely in a 

general extension of the offensive, General 

Harmon ordered Colonel Collier to put 

the alternate plan into effect. 

German shelling of the secondary roads 

leading to Puffendorf, a corollary of the 

counterattack, delayed a move by CCA 

until 1100. Even then, Task Force A, 

commanded by Col. Ira P. Swift and 

composed primarily of the headquarters 

and one battalion of the 66th Armored 

Regiment and a battalion of the 41St 

Armored Infantry, was subjected to brutal 

shelling while passing through Puffendorf. 

Colonel Swift knew that between Puffendorf and Ederen he would encounter 

an antitank ditch of impressive proportions, about fifteen feet wide and ten feet 

deep. The ditch originated in the 29th 

Division's sector, paralleled the Aldenhoven-Geilenkirchen road to a point east 

of Puffendorf, then swung north along 

the highway to Gereonsweiler. Aware of 

the obstacle, the 2d Armored Division had 

devised two methods of crossing it, one to 

form a bridge by driving tanks into the 

ditch and bulldozing them over with 

earth, another to use a portable treadway 

bridge improvised by the 17th Armored 

Engineer Battalion and transported by a 

T 2 tank retriever. 

Unfortunately, Task Force A on 17 

November had no opportunity to test 

either expedient. German antitank guns 

H See CCA, 2d Armd Div, Opns Plan, 7 Nov, 

CCA Rpts, Nov 44. General McLain authorized 

commitment of CCA late on 16 November. 

XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs 71, 16 Nov, XIII Corps 

G-3 Jnl file, 14- 17 Nov 44· 

533 

emplaced beyond the ditch near Ederen 

and the same tanks on high ground near 

Gereonsweiler that had spelled trouble 

elsewhere denied so much as egress from 

Puffendorf. In a matter of minutes, Task 

Force A lost four medium tanks and a 

tank destroyer. 

By this time the division commander, 

General Harmon, had become convinced 

that his men and tanks could do little 

through the rest of the day and possibly 

into the next day but hold their own. 

"I've been up there to see what the thing 

is like," General Harmon telephoned his 

operations officer. "Pretty tough. These 

tanks are on the other side of the ditch. 

We will have to come up on the other 

side of the ditch to get any place . . . ." 

Later General Harmon repeated this view 

to the corps commander. "Not much 

luck today," he said. "We have that 

tank ditch in front of us and can't do 

much to the north [toward Gereonsweiler] unless we flank it . . . ." 45 

Though the 2d Armored Division had 

relinquished little ground during the first 

encounter with the 9th Panzer Division, 

General Harmon obviously was concerned about what another day might 

bring. In the second day's fighting, CCB 

had lost 18 more medium tanks destroyed 

and 16 more damaged and out of action, 

plus 19 light tanks in similar categories. 

In a brief commitment, CCA had lost 4 

mediums. Personnel casualties were 

double those of D Day: 56 killed, 28 I 

wounded, 26 missing. "Sit tight the first 

thing tomorrow and see what develops," 

General Harmon told the CCB commander. "Have them alerted to be sharp as 

hell in the morning. . .. And for God's 

sake, get word to me as. soon as you get 

45 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, I7 Nov 44. 
534 

attacked." He noted in conclusion, "I 

think you will have a holding mission 

tomorrow." 46 

Finding the Formula 

General Harmon would have been 

. much less concerned about renewing his 

attack in the face of the 9th Panzer 

Division had he possessed Sette rich and 

the main highway leading from Setterich 

to Puffendorf. Without Setterich, he had 

no road adequate for supporting two 

combat commands. "There's a question 

in my mind," General Harmon noted, "if 

by noon [18 November] I might make a 

try to cross that ditch with Swift [Task 

Force A]." On the other hand, he 

reflected, "I may have too much in 

Puffendorf. [I] was up that road . . . 

and it's terrible. This rain isn't [any] 

help . . .. " 47 

The 29th Division commander, General 

Gerhardt, had told General Harmon on 

D Day that he hoped to have Setterich 

by noon on 17 November, but he was not 

so optimistic after the new day dawned. 

"It looks more dubious now than it did," 

General Gerhardt telephoned. "I think I 

can say no." 48 As events developed, the 

29th Division by noon had not even begun 

an attack against Setterich. . 

Discouraged, General Harmon told the 

commander of his reserve to reconnoiter a 

route of attack toward Setterich because 

the 2d Armored Division "might have to 

attack it tomorrow." Later, General 

Harmon asked the corps commander to 

put pressure on the 29th Division. Because the infantry was to secure a crossing 

of the antitank ditch northeast of Setterich 

.. ; Ibid.; NUSA Opns, IV, 74. 

47 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Nov 44. 

48 29 th Div G-2-G-3 JnI, I7 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

as well as take the village, a successful 

attack would afford the armor not only a 

good supply route but passage over the 

obstacle that was deterring Task Force A 

at Puffendorf. On this point, General 

Harmon himself discreetly pressured General Gerhardt. "We have that tank ditch 

in front of us," he said, "and it is giving 

us a lot of trouble. If you can get me 

a foothold across it, I will send a tank 

column across that will give them hell." 41) 

For his part, the corps commander, 

General McLain displayed less patience 

than he had the night before. When 

General Gerhardt told him that his assault 

regiments had to reorganize and could 

not attack before late morning, General 

McLain objected. "That reorganization 

should have been done last night," he 

said. "It will slow us up another day." 

Later he specifically directed General 

Gerhardt to "push that left thing in front 

of the 2d Armored." Talking to a liaison 

officer from General Gerhardt's reserve 

regiment, General McLain emphasized 

that the operation at Sette rich "is the 

most important thing we've got." 50 

For all the pressure, the 29th Division 

was slow getting started on the second 

day of the offensive. In the main eastward drive, this no doubt was attributable 

to major alterations in the plan of attack; 

in the push on Setterich, possibly to 

General Gerhardt's expressed reluctance 

to "start fooling with that flank thing" 

until he had secured "some ground 

straight ahead." 

The plans for the main drive indicated 

recognition that the enemy strongpointsthe villages-had to be attacked directly. 

Yet the new plans revealed no appreciation of the fact that the shock value of 

40 2d Armd Div G-3 JnI, 17 Nov 44. 

50 29 th Div G-2-G-3 JnI, 17 Nov 44. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

tanks was what had enabled the 2d 

Armored Division to advance. Again, 

neither of the 29th Division's regiments 

made any provision for tanks to accompany the infantry. 

In the end, the eastward drive accomplished no more than on the preceding 

day. A company of the I75th Infantry 

striking directly for Bettendorf eventually 

had to return to the drainage ditch 400 

yards short of the village where the men 

had taken cover the night before. A 

battalion each of the I 15th and 175 th 

Infantry Regiments attacked due east 

against Siersdorf but gained no more than 

a few hundred yards. Small arms fire 

from deep zigzag trenches pinned the men 

to the flat, exposed ground, whereupon 

German mortars and artillery worked 

them over. It was a lamentable repetition 

of what had happened on D Day to the 

115th Infantry's Company C. 

Not until near noon on the 17th did 

General Gerhardt waver from his theory 

that he had to gain ground to the east 

before attacking Setterich. Late the night 

before he had attached a battalion of his 

reserve regiment to the 115th Infantry to 

take Setterich, but not until he saw that 

his main drive would be delayed did he 

authorize the attack. At 1300 the 1St 

Battalion, 116th Infantry, commanded by 

Maj. James S. Morris, was to move on 

Setterich from the southwest astride the 

Baesweiler-Setterich highway.51 

Major Morris' attack actually did not 

begin until more than an hour past the 

appointed time. Again none of the tanks 

attached to the division accompanied the 

infantry, and when small arms fire from 

trenches on the fringe of Sette rich pinned 

51 See 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl; 116th Inf Jnl, 

16-17 Nov 44. 

535 

the men to the ground, little could be 

done about it. A process of fire and 

movement enabled a handful of men to 

gain a toehold in a series of zigzag trenches 

15.0 yards short of the village as night fell, 

but this achievement represented no real 

break in the issue. 

During the evening, General Gerhardt 

turned to General Harmon for assistance. 

Specifically, Gerhardt wanted to pass a 

battalion through the 2d Armored Division's sector to hit Setterich from the 

north and to obtain direct fire support 

from some of the armor. To this General 

Harmon agreed while reminding the 29th 

Division commander that he also wanted 

the infantry to get him a crossing of the 

antitank ditch northeast of Setterich. 

"If you could get me over that ditch," 

General Harmon said, "we'll put 75 tanks 

over there." 52 

Having decided to .broaden the efforts 

at Setterich, General Gerhardt gave full 

responsibility for taking the village to 

the 116th Infantry commander, Lt. Col. 

Harold A. Cassell. 53 As finally determined, Major Morris was to continue to 

hit Setterich from the southwest while 

sending his reserve company to strike from 

the west. This attack was to begin before dawn the next day. In the meantime, another battalion of the I 16th 

Infantry was to pass into the 2d Armored 

Division's sector and as soon as possibleprobably about noon on 18 November 

-attack from Loverich. In both attacks, 

General Gerhardt was to abandon his 

prejudice against using tanks on this sea 

of mud. A platoon of the 2d Armored 

52 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 17 Nov 44. 

53 A few days before D Day, Gerhardt had 

relieved the former 116th Infantry commander, 

in a dispute over the handling of a subordinate. 

See 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 13 Nov 44. 
536 

Division's 66th Armored Regiment was to 

assist the attack from Loverich, while a 

platoon from the attached 74 7th Tank 

Battalion was to be split between the two 

components of Major Morris' battalion. 

In the first instance, the 29th Division's 

reluctance to employ tanks appeared' 

justified, though not because of mud. Of 

three tanks assigned to that part of Major 

Morris' battalion southwest of Setterich, 

one struck a mine before reaching the 

line of departure, another succumbed to 

a panzerfaust, and the third withdrew 

after a projectile stuck in the barrel of its 

75-mm. gun. 

On the other hand, the difference tanks 

might make was demonstrated west of 

Setterich where two tanks supported the 

I 16th Infantry's Company A. When fire 

from a network of trenches in a sparse 

wood pinned down a platoon of riflemen, 

the tanks advanced to smother the 

trenches with both 75-mm. and machine 

gun fire. Another rifle platoon then 

found it relatively simple to swing around 

a flank of the first and charge the 

trenches. In much the same manner, the 

riflemen and their two tanks worked their 

way into the western fringe of Sette rich 

and by nightfall had established a firm 

toehold. 

Similarly, the platoon of tanks from the 

2d Armored Division assisted the battalion 

of the I 16th Infantry which attacked 

from Loverich. When the riflemen came 

upon an antipersonnel mine field, the 

tanks smashed a path through the mines. 

When the Germans opened fire with small 

arms from a trench system 150 yards short 

of the village, the tankers quickly silenced 

them. Some Germans threw up their 

hands without resistance. By midafternoon the infantry had reached the fringe 

of the village, while the tankers waited in 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the open to provide fire support without 

becoming involved among the streets and 

debris. 

By nightfall of 18 November, third day 

of the offensive, the tide had turned at 

Setterich, though the I 16th Infantry 

would require most of the next morning 

for mopping up and for gaining a crossing 

of the antitank ditch northeast of the 

village. The latter operation proved relatively simple because contingents of the 

I 15th Infantry had come in behind the 

ditch farther south and sent a combat 

patrol northward along the east bank. 

Not only at Setterich but also at Siersdorf and Bettendorf the 29th Division 

began to roll on 18 November. A clear 

day providing unobstructed observation 

for artillery and air support no doubt 

helped, but, much as it was at Setterich, 

the factor most directly affecting operations appeared to be the use of tanks. 

On the south wing, a company attacking Bettendorf lost 2 of 5 tanks to mines 

and another to mud, but with the help of 

the other 2 gained the first buildings. 

Having expended their ammunition, the 

tanks withdrew; yet already they had 

accomplished their mission of helping the 

infantry across the open ground. By 

midafternoon of 18 November, Bettendorf 

was free of Germans. A battalion each 

of the II5th and I75th Infantry Regiments had support from the 747th Tank 

Battalion, both in reaching Siersdorf and 

in clearing the village. Of two platoons 

of tanks, only two were lost, both to fire 

from antitank guns. 

At the coal mine north of Siersdorf, 

the impact of tank support was most 

markedly demonstrated. Here the I 15th 

Infantry's 2d Battalion attacked in concert 

with a platoon of mediums. For all the 

exposed ground leading to the coal mine, 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

the attack progressed satisfactorily until 

the tankers balked at German artillery 

fire and lost contact with the infantry. At 

this point the Germans began to spew 

small arms fire from trenches and foxholes 

near the mine. Just as were the earlier 

drives on the first two days of the offensive, this attack was stopped. Meanwhile, 

the 2d Battalion S-2, 1st Lt. James E. 

Ball, led the tanks into Siersdorf and 

directed an attack northward against the 

mine. As the tanks approached the 

enemy positions, Lieutenant Ball related, 

"They opened up with their 75-mm. guns 

and their .3o-caliber machine guns. The 

enemy fire from the emplacements ceased 

and the enemy riflemen and machine 

gunners moved down deep in their 

holes." 54 The Germans were" finished. 

After two days of halting, almost negligible, advance, the 29th Division had 

found itself. The day of 18 November 

had brought the first application of what 

proved to be the correct technique for 

fighting the battle of the Roer plain: 

determined infantry accompanied by close 

tank support and covered by mortars and 

artillery. 

General Gerhardt himself reflected a 

changed viewpoint. During the first two 

days he had been almost placid.55 On 17 

November, for example, he had cautioned the 17 5th Infantry commander 

against yielding to pressure "just to make 

us look good. Do it the way it ought to 

be," he said. "Don't want you pushing 

it before we are ready." But on 18 

November and for several days thereafter, 

General Gerhardt turned the telephone 

lines to his subordinates into his personal 

whiplash. "You've been doing nothing 

54 NUSA Opns, IV, B6. 

55 See LtL rerhardt to OCMH, 31 May 56. 

537 

at all there now," General Gerhardt told 

the 175 th Infantry commander in reference to Bettendorf. "We've got to do 

better . . .. We've got to quit fooling 

around." To another regimental commander he was equally insistent. "Corps 

6 [General McLain] was just here and 

the general impression was, what's the 

matter with us . . .. We've got to plan 

to go today, tomorrow, and the day after." 

Later General Gerhardt upbraided the 

same regimental commander again. 

"There's been a tendency in your outfit 

to argue about things . . .. I think it's 

just a stall. What we want to do is get 

down there. Change the mental attitude 

there if it needs it . . ., So pull up 

our socks now and let's get at it." 

No detail-from distribution of cigarettes to an unauthorized type of jacket 

worn by a company commander-was 

beyond General Gerhardt's province. He 

called an engineer commander to "give 

him the devil" for not getting engineers 

into one town. ,tI want to push patrolling/, he told another officer. "There 

seems to be a tendency to alibi it on 

somebody else." "That Fisher did a 

good job," he commented in another 

case; "put him in for a ribbon." 56 

Something-whether General Gerhardt's remonstrance or, more likely, 

simply co-ordination of the various facilities available to the division-had an 

effect. By the end of 18 November, the 

29th Division had broken the crust of the 

enemy's 246th Division and in taking 

Siersdorf and Bettendorf had broken into 

the outer defensive arc of J uelich. On 

19 November the division pushed into 

the next two villages, Duerboslar and 

Schleiden. Early on 20 November the 

56 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 16-21 Nov 44. 
538 

next village of Niedermerz fell to a battalion of the I75th Infantry, whereupon the 

regimental commander, Col. William C. 

Purnell, directed a two-pronged attack 

against the major road center of Aldenhoven. By nightfall of 21 November, 

Aldenhoven too was in hand. This meant 

that the second, or intermediate, defensive 

arc of J uelich was cracked. In the 

meantime, a battalion of the 1 16th 

Infantry had been committed along the 

29th Division's new boundary with the 2d 

Armored Division, which had come into 

effect after capture of Setterich. During 

three days, from 19 to 21 November, this 

battalion cleared three hamlets along the 

boundary and on 21 November seized the 

village of Engelsdorf, a mile northeast of 

Aldenhoven. This represented another 

break in the enemy's intermediate defensive arc and put the 29th Division 

within a mile and a half of the Roer River. 

Of all these attacks, none was more 

typical of the successful application of the 

techniques developed for assaulting the 

village strongpoints than was the I75th 

Infantry's conquest of Schleiden on 19 

November. Schleiden lies amid gently 

undulating fields less than a mile southeast of Siersdorf and a little more than a 

mile east of Bettendorf. Like most of 

the villages on the Roer plain, Schleiden is 

spread-eagled about a crossroads, a rambling, omnifarious collection of houses, 

barns, and shops made gray and grimy 

by the rain, mud, and dismal skies of 

November. 

The 175th Infantry's 3d Battalion 

under Lt. Col. William O. Blanford made 

the attack. Until the advance masked 

their fires, all the regiment's heavy machine guns and 81 -mm. mortars delivered 

support from nearby villages. A forward 

observer accompanying the leading inTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

fan try companies maintained artillery 

concentrations on the objective until the 

troops were within 300 yards of the 

westernmost buildings. Until the artillery was lifted, not a bullet or a round ()f 

German fire struck the infantry. 

The infantry advance began in a skirmish formation just at dawn on 19 November. At the same time a platoon of 

medium tanks from the 747th Tank 

Battalion paralleled the infantry some 350 

yards to the north so that shelling 

attracted by the tanks would not fall 

upon the infantry. The tankers maintained constant machine gun fire into 

German trenches and foxholes on the 

periphery of Schleiden and occasionally 

fired their 75's into the village. When 

the forward observer lifted the supporting 

artillery, the tankers quickly shifted their 

75-mm. fire to the trenches. I t was only 

a question of time before the infantry 

gained the first houses and mop-up 

began. By 1430 Schleiden was clear of 

Germans. 57 

After the unexpected stand of the 246th 

Volks Grenadier Division in Siersdorf, 

Bettendorf, and Sette rich, the Germans in 

Schleiden and the other villages provided 

few surprises. The bulk of the defenders 

were still.from the 246th Division, though 

the efforts of the LXXXI Corps commander, General Koechling, to provide 

help resulted in commitment of a battalion each from the 3d Panzer Grenadier 

and 12th Divisions. At Niedermerz the 

appearance of a company of the 116th 

Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battal-

,,7 Although air support was available on 19 

November, it was not used at Schleiden because 

"there was little need for it and it was too close 

for safety." NUSA Opns, IV, 120, citing 2d Lt 

William T. Callery, Co K. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

ion alerted the 29th Division G-2 for the 

coming of the entire division, but in 

reality this was no more than a portion of 

Panzer Group Bayer, which Koechling 

had managed to release from attachment 

to the 47th Division by shortening the 

front with staggered withdrawals. 58 

Though General von Zangen, the Fifteenth Army commander, frequently exhorted the LXXXI Corps to eliminate 

the 29th Division's penetrations, General 

Koechling of the LXXXI Corps had only 

inadequate resources with which to work. 

Basically, the only reserves available were 

hastily re-formed remnants of disorganized 

units. Bigger developments were reserved 

during this period for the sector of the 

X I I SS Corps farther north. The 

LXXXI Corps had to be content with a 

glimmer of hope for the future in word 

that came late on 19 November. This 

was that a volks grenadier division earmarked for the Ardennes offensive was en 

route to the front and would be used to 

back up the LXXXI Corps as an Army 

Group B reserve. 59 

Only in two instances was the LX X X I 

Corps able to mount genuine counterattacks against the 29th Division. The 

first was at Duerboslar on 19 November 

where the Germans committed twelve 

assault guns. Although bazooka teams 

either disabled or frightened away four 

guns which penetrated the village, it remained for fighter-bombers of the XXIX 

T AC to force the bulk of the guns to 

retire from a nearby hill from which they 

were making a misery of the 115th Infan58 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 

16-21 Nov 44. 

59 Ibid.; TWX, Gruppe von Manteuffel to 

LXXXI Corps, 2345, 19 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps 

KTB, Bet. H. Gr. u. Armee. 

539 

try's occupation of the village. The next 

day, after the I7 5th Infantry had moved 

into Niedermerz and Aldenhoven, a force 

of tanks variously estimated at from six to 

nine and accompanied by a hundred 

infantrymen counterattacked from the 

east. In this instance, credit for stopping 

the drive went to the artillery, which 

virtually annihilated the German infantry 

and prompted the tanks to wheel about in 

retreat. 

After two days of disappointment, the 

29th Division in four more days had 

reached the two-thirds mark in the drive 

to the Roer. In the process the division 

had incurred some 1,100 casualties, a 

figure that hardly could be considered 

disturbing in light of the fact that the 

Germans lost almost as many men as 

captives alone and in light of the kind of 

losses the divisions of the First Army's VII 

Corps were taking in the neighboring 

drive. 

As General Gerhardt on 2 I November 

directed his regiments to continue their 

attacks across the remaining mile and a 

half to the Roer, two major developments 

influenced his plans. First, the new 

boundary between the 29th and 30th Divisions had become effective, allotting a 

narrow portion on the southern part of 

General Gerhardt's former zone to the 

30th Division. Second, various indications pointed to a possible German withdrawal behind the Roer. Get going, 

General Gerhardt told his regiments, get 

patrols down to the river. Unfortunately, 

as the 29th Division was to learn as early 

as the next day, 22 November, the mile 

and a half to the river would contain a 

brier patch or two. As night came on 22 

November, the division's forward position 

would remain almost the same as the 

night before. 
540 

The Push to Gereonsweiler 

While the 29th Division on the third 

day of the offensive had been concocting a 

formula for overcoming the village strongpoints, General Harmon's 2d Armored 

Division still had been concerned with the 

9th Panzer Division. Although CCB had 

stopped the first thrusts by this major 

reserve on I7 November, General Harmon 

expected the panzers to come back in 

strength the next day. 

This was, in fact, what the Germans 

did. During the night of I7 November, 

Army Group B strengthened the armor 

by shifting the other component of the 

XLVII Panzer Corps, the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, to a position backing 

up the 9th Panzer Division. GO 

Even so, the counterattacks on 18 November were feeble in comparison to those 

on the preceding day. The most sizable 

thrust was a minor company-size counterattack against Task Force X on the 2d 

Armored Division's north wing at Immendorf. A rare day of good flying 

weather may have kept the Germans 

under cover; for the XXIX TAC's 

fighter-bombers roamed far and wide. 

The planes knocked out at least two 

German tanks, while tank destroyers accounted for three more, and the 2d 

Armored Division's 92d Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion took credit for another. 

For all the feebleness of the German 

strikes, General Harmon still needed a day 

of rest; first, to care for the wounds the 

panzers had inflicted; and second, to 

await access to Setterich in order to gain 

a main supply route and a crossing of the 

antitank ditch which was deterring commitment of a second combat command. 

What General Harmon did during 18 

GO OB WEST KTB, 18 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

November was to conceal his tank weaknesses and his desire for a day's respite by 

darting a swift jab toward a limited objective that had given trouble for two daysthe village of Apweiler near the division's 

northern boundary. 

Because of long-range fire from German 

tanks and self-propelled guns, the formula 

of attacking the Roer villages with closely 

co-ordinated tanks and infantry had not 

worked in this case. On 18 November, 

the CCB commander, General White, 

proposed a variation. He gave the task to 

Colonel Hurless, commander of the attached 406th Infantry, who was doubling 

in brass as commander of Task Force X. 

Colonel Hurless was to use an infantry 

battalion without tank support along a 

new route of approach to Apweiler from 

the west, from the direction of Immendorf. 

At the same time, a company of the 

67th Armored Regiment was to utilize a 

newly discovered draw to gain an open 

knoll southeast of Apweiler. The rest of 

CCB's armor was to silence long-range 

German fire. 

At 1400 Colonel Hurless sent his 3d 

Battalion, 406th Infantry, toward Apweiler under cover of an artillery preparation that began five minutes earlier. 

Crowding the artillery dangerously, the 

infantry was upon the German defenders 

before they could recover from the barrage. Not until the leading companies 

had gained an orchard on the western 

fringe of the village did the artillery lift. 

By 1445 Task Force X held Apweiler. 

Though General Harmon might have 

put his entire division on the offensive the 

next day, 19 November, he played it 

safe. 61 First he wanted to assure a firm 

61 The 2d Armored Division still had considerable tank strength. On 19 November the 

division had 154 medium and I 19 light tanks. 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

right flank for the main drive on Gereonsweiler by committing Colonel Collier's 

CCA to seize a spur of high ground between the villages of Ederen and Freialdenhoven, east of Puffendorf. Both of 

Colonel Collier's task forces were to attack: Task Force A from Puffendorf to 

traverse a newly discovered gap in the 

antitank ditch, Task Force B through 

Setterich to cross the ditch by means of 

the bridgehead established by the troops 

of the 29th Division. 

Before CCA could strike on I9 November, CCB got another taste of German 

reserves sufficient to justify General Harmon's foresight. Before daylight, a contingent of seven tanks and a battalion of 

infantry of the I Sf h Panzer Grenadier 

Division struck that part of Task Force X 

which was occupying Apweiler. Sgt. 

Stanley Herrin and the crew of his tank 

of Company I, 67th Armored Regiment, 

were largely instrumental in stopping one 

prong of the counterattack. Spotting the 

foremost German tank, Sergeant Herrin 

knocked off its track with his first round. 

A tank destroyer finished the job by 

blowing off the turret. Sergeant Herrin 

and his crew then accounted for two tanks 

which followed. 

Infantry alone took care of two other 

prongs of the German thrust. At one 

point, bazooka gunners knocked out 

three tanks, while an unidentified infantryman climbed atop the rear deck of a 

fourth and silenced the Germans inside by 

dropping hand grenades into the turret. 

At the other point, the Germans were 

without tank support and were stopped 

by a withering fusilade of small arms fire 

delivered at close range. 

Rpt of Liaison Office in I02d Div G-3 J nl, 1215, 

19 Nov 44. 

541 

When CCA's Task Force A attacked 

during the afternoon eastward fron'!. 

Puffendorf toward the gap in the antitank ditch, the Germans counterattacked 

again, this time against what they must 

have taken to be Task Force A's exposed 

left flank. Using about a hundred infantry supported by four tanks, they 

seemingly forgot that CCB's Task Force I 

still held Puffendorf. Catching the Germans in the flank, CCB's tank destroyers 

knocked out two of the tanks, while a 

Sherman mounting a 76-mm. piece caught 

a Panther broadside. The Panther went 

up in flames. That ended the threat. 

For all the help from Task Force I, 

CCA's Task Force A made only limited 

gains on I9 November. Enjoying excellent observation from Ederen, the 

Germans first stopped Task Force A's 

infantry, then the tanks, and subjected 

both to round after round of accurate 

shellfire. When darkness provided relief, 

engineers hurried forward with bulldozers 

to shave the banks of the antitank ditch 

so that the tanks might cross the next 

morning on a broader front. 

In the meantime, CCA's Task Force B, 

composed basically of a battalion of the 

66th Armored Regiment and an attached 

battalion of the I I9th Infantry, attacked 

at I245 from the bridgehead across the 

antitank ditch northeast of Setterich. In 

the face of the tanks, the German infantry fell back. Task Force B in less than 

an hour gained the GeilenkirchenAldenhoven highway only a few hundred 

yards short of Freialdenhoven. Here the 

attack stalled. Every attempt to advance 

ran into German mines which formed a 

barrier extending several hundred yards 

in either direction. Both the high ground 

about Freialdenhoven 'and the village it-
542 

self were denied until engineers might 

breach the mine field after night fell. 

Having recuperated for two days, CCB 

on 20 November was ready to resume the 

main drive to cover a remaining mile to 

Gereonsweiler. In ordering the attack, 

General Harmon directed also that CCA 

renew the push on Ederen and Freialdenhoven and assist CCB's attack, if need be. 

After a deluge of rain that began during 

the night and continued into the day of 

20 November, some wondered if at last 

November's erratic weather had not 

erased all hope of trafficability. For his 

part, CCB's General White was more perturbed that his tankers couldn't see. 

"The sights will get wet and fogged up/' 

he said. Yet General Harmon was reluctant to face postponement. "Don't 

want to call if off if possible as the corps 

commander is anxious to get it started," 

General Harmon said. This drive was 

the pay-off to the four days of /hard fighting that had preceded it. With Gereonsweiler in hand, the 2d Armored Division 

might award this sector to the XIII Corps 

and move to an assembly area behind the 

29th Division to prepare for crossing the 

Roer. 

They did not call it off. After delaying 

several hours in a vain hope of improved 

visibility, both CCA and CCB attacked in 

a driving rain. 

Moving first about midmorning, CCA 

quickly resolved the question of trafficability. Despite the mud, the tanks in 

Colonel Swift's Task Force A moving on 

Ederen soon outdistanced the infantry. 

In the attack on Ederen, Task Force A 

lost a tank destroyer and six tanks to 

antitank guns emplaced on the fringe of 

the village before good fortune gave an 

unexpected assist. Ignited by tracer bullets, four haystacks along the line of 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

march erupted in great swirls of smoke. 

A providential wind blowing perpendicular to the axis of attack turned the 

smoke into a first-rate screen. Advancing 

unseen, the tanks and infantry pounced 

upon the Germans in trenches near the 

skirt of the village and sent them streamin9" to the rear in captive bunches. 

At Freialdenhoven, CCA's Task Force 

B ran into the same mine field that had 

thwarted the attack on the village the 

day before. Until 1400, the commander, 

Colonel Hinds, delayed while engineers 

probed the field. At last he decided to 

commit his infantry and four attached 

British tanks, while withholding his organic tanks. The British tanks were from 

a squadron of the 1st Fife and Forfar 

Yeomanry, a unit equipped with flamethrowing Churchill tanks called Crocodiles. 

The four Crocodiles and the infantry 

were almost through the mine field and 

into the village before three of the tanks 

struck mines and the fourth bogged down. 

But already the Crocodiles had done what 

was expected of them. They had helped 

the infantry across the open field. Only 

the mop-up process remained in Freialdenhoven, and by late afternoon (20 November) the village was clear. 

In the main drive against GereonsweiIer, 

General White's CCB concentrated the 

power of all three of its task forces in 

contemplation that here the Germans 

would make their most determined stand. 

Paradoxically, Gereonsweiler turned out 

to be one of the easier targets on the Roer 

plain. 

At r roo on 20 November, General 

White sent three columns toward Gereonsweiler: Task Force I to move from Puffendorf to take the high ground astride 

the road to Gereonsweiler that had been 

relinquished four days earlier to the 9th 
THE ROER RIVER OFFENSIVE 

Panzer Division, thence east to high 

ground between Ederen and Gereonsweiler; Task Force 2 in the center to seize 

the southern part of Gereonsweiler; and 

Task Force X attacking from Apweiler to 

capture the northern half of Gereonsweiler. Two troops of Crocodiles were 

attached to Task Force X. 

Artillery officers prepared a detailed 

artillery fire plan, including heavy concentrations designed to isolate the village 

after capture. Beginning ten minutes 

before jump-off, six artillery battalions 

fired five rounds per gun into the western 

fringe of the village. During the next 

quarter hour, corps guns pounded commanding ground around the objective. 

Thereupon, the fire by the six battalions 

shifted from the fringe of the village to a 

rolling barrage that swept the entire 

objective. 

Without the loss of a man or a tank, 

Task Force I took the high ground along 

the Puffendorf-Gereonsweiler highway. 

Because Task Force 2 on more exposed 

ground ran into trouble from machine 

gun emplacements and long-range tank 

fire, General White directed Task Force I 

to abandon its next objective and swing 

instead against Gereonsweiler. The maneuver worked. Within forty-five minutes 

after the start of the attack, some 

contingents of both task forces were entering the village. 

In the meantime, Task Force X had 

been deterred by fire from self-propelled 

guns outside the corps sector to the north. 

When problems arose in getting clearance 

for artillery fire against the guns because 

of the reputed presence of troops of the 

XIII Corps, the task force commander, 

Colonel Hurless, turned a company of his 

tank destroyers against them. Though 

this cost the destroyers heavily, it was 

543 

successful in diverting the German fire. 

Preceded by the British Crocodiles, which . 

put the torch to everything in their path, 

the infantry of Task Force X moved 

rapidly into Gereonsweiler. 

Not until the next day, 2 I November, 

after CCB had pushed out to higher 

ground outside Gereonsweiler, did the 

Germans muster a counterattack. They 

concentrated against a particularly vulnerable infantry company of Task Force 

X-Company A, 406th Infantry-which 

was holding with exposed flanks on a rise 

a thousand yards north of Gereonsweiler. 

The first strike by a company of infantry 

in late afternoon was repulsed, but as 

darkness fell, three companies of the I I th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment dealt a cruel 

blow. Two platoons of Company A were 

almost obliterated as the company fell 

back some 300 yards to gain defilade 

against small arms fire. There, with the 

aid of another company rushed up to one 

flank, Company A held. When Colonel 

Hurless rushed tanks and tank destroyers 

to help, the infantry and armor together 

pushed back to the crest of the rise and 

restored the line. 

In the meantime, both task forces of 

CCA had been pushing eastward from 

Ederen and Freialdenhoven so that by 

nightfall of 2 I November they held a line 

just outside Ederen and at least a thousand yards beyond Freialdenhoven. The 

Roer was plainly visible little more than a 

mile and a half to the east. Here and on 

the hills at Gereonsweiler the 2d Armored 

Division was destined to hold for several 

days while the XIII Corps effected relief 

at Gereonsweiler. 

In six days, from 16 through 2 I N 0-

vember, the 2d Armored Division had 

moved approximately six ·miles in a limited 

objective attack through a strongly de-
544 

fended zone. This was a kind of attack 

far less attractive to armor than IS 

exploitation but a legitimate function of 

armor nevertheless. 

A notable feature of the attack was 

General Harmon's employment not only 

of his division but of major attachments, 

including a regiment of the 102d Division, 

the 406th Infantry, and one of two 

battalions of the I 19th Infantry; this in 

spite of a markedly narrow sector. 

Thereby General Harmon had upped the 

ratio of infantry to tanks in his division 

and had demonstrated that, in this instance, at least, a more balanced ratio 

was desirable. 

In six days the 2d Armored Division 

had sustained some 1,300 personnel casualties, including approximately 600 in the 

attached 406th Infantry. Of the divisions 

of the XIX Corps, the armor had been 

the only one to meet major German reserves, yet the casualty figures were 

roughly similar to those of the infantry 

divisions. As reflected by a figure of 

2,385 prisoners of war captured by the 

armored division during the entire month 

of November, German losses were considerably higher. Judging from subsequent activities of the 9th Panzer Division, 

that unit had been hard hit, and the 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division also had 

been stopped. German tank losses the 

2d Armored Division estimated at 86 for 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the entire month. Tank losses for the 

U.S. division might be estimated from 

figures provided for CCE. That combat 

command reported 18 medium tanks destroyed but noted that approximately 32 

mediums were damaged and temporarily 

out of action for varying periods during 

the month. 62 The entire 2d Armored 

Division to the end of the month probably 

incurred destruction or temporary damage 

to from 70 to 80 tanks, most of them in 

the first six days at Puffendorf, Apweiler, 

Immendorf, Ederen, Freialdenhoven, and 

Gereonsweiler. 

Like the 29th Division, the 2d Armored 

had only a short distance to go to the 

Roer. Indeed, with the arrival of the 

XIII Corps and adjustment of the corps 

boundary on 24 November, the armor 

would have only two more villages to 

occupy. Yet, like the 29th Division, the 

armor might discover that this short 

distance was not to be taken for granted. 

As of 22 November, the XIX Corps 

entered upon the final phase of the drive 

to the Roer. Already the 30th Division 

had completed clearing the Wuerselen 

industrial district and had pushed on 

abreast of the rest of the corps. Now 

all three divisions were to continue eastward side by side. Their mission was to 

penetrate the last defensive arc about 

JueIich. 

02 eeB S-3 Per Rpt, Nov 44. 
CHAPTER XXIII 

The Geilenkirchen Salient 

The town of Geilenkirchen on the Ninth 

Army's extreme left wing was more than a 

block severely restricting maneuver space 

at the line of departure for the November 

offensive. It also was the hard tip of a 

German salient-ot re-entrant-created 

and exaggerated by the advance of 

the XIX Corps northeastward toward 

Gereonsweiler. Following generally the 

course of the Wurm River as it winds 

northeastward between Geilenkirchen and 

the Roer, the salient formed a wedge 

between the Second British Army's 30 

Corps west of the Wurm and the XIX 

Corps between the W urm and the Roer. 

(See Map VII.) 

In devising the plan and securing 

British approval for the 30 Corps to take 

Geilenkirchen, the Ninth Army commander, General Simpson, had been 

motivated by the need for a two-pronged 

thrust against the town and by the problems which might have developed had 

headquarters of different nationalities 

tried to control the attack. Temporary 

attachment of the 84th U.S. Division to 

the 30 Corps had solved the problem. 

Knowledge that the British in November 

had greater stocks of artillery ammunition 

than had the Ninth Army also had mfluenced the arrangement. 1 

Scheduled originally for D plus I, the 

attack was postponed a day in the hope 

that additional time might drain some 

German strength from the salient to the 

1 Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, p. 83. 

front of the XIX Corps. As events 

developed, the delay prompted no shift of 

German troops actually in the line, but it 

did encourage the movement of part of the 

Army Group B reserve, the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division, to a point from which 

it might engage the XIX Corps.2 This 

did not negate use of the panzer grenadiers 

in the vicinity of Geilenkirchen, though it 

did delay their employment there. 

Flanked by clusters of West Wall pillboxes, Geilenkirchen sits astride the 

Wurm River, which is the only terrain 

feature distinguishing this sector from 

other portions of the Roer plain. In the 

valley of the Wurm and on undulating 

slopes on either side are to be found the 

same drab farming and mining villages 

and the same endless rows of stock beets 

and cabbages that characterize the greater 

part of the plain. An occasional patch of 

woods may be found in the valley. "At 

best," wrote one who was there through 

the dismal weather of November, 1944, 

"the Geilenkirchen area was not one of 

Germany's more attractive places." 3 

Two main highways in the salient 

laterally bisected the planned northeasterlv direction of attack. Though seconda~y roads connecting the villages were 

muddy, they were adequate for normal 

tactical purposes. The Aachen-Geilen2 OB WEST KTB, 18 Nov 44 .. 

3 Theodore Draper, The 84th Division in the 

Battle of Germany (New York: The Viking 

Press, 1946), a reliable unit history. 
546 

kirchen-Muenchen-Gladbach railroad follows the valley for several miles past 

Geilenkirchen before veering eastward at 

the village of Wuerm. 

Having assumed control of the seventeen-mile sector from the Maas River to 

the vicinity of Geilenkirchen, General 

Horrocks' 30 British Corps had positioned 

the 43d Infantry Division northwest of 

Geilenkirchen. South and southeast of 

the town, between Geilenkirchen and the 

left flank of the XIX Corps, a regiment 

of the 102d Division, the 405th Infantry, 

held a narrow sector which at this time 

was the only front-line responsibility of 

the XIII U.S. Corps. 

Operation CLIPPER 

Labeled Operation CLIPPER, the fight 

to eliminate the Geilenkirchen salient was 

to develop in four phases. Attached for 

operations to the British but still tied for 

other purposes to the XIII Corps, the 

84th Division was to make the main 

effort by passing through the 102d 

Division's narrow sector in early morning 

of the first day, 18 November, two days 

after the start of the Roer River offensive. 

Using but one regiment at first, the 84th 

Division was to take high ground east of 

Geilenkirchen and about Prummern, two 

miles to the northeast. 

A second phase was to begin about 

noon on the first day when the 43d 

British Division was to attack to gain 

high ground in the vicinity of Bauchem 

and Tripsrath, villages west and north of 

Geilenkirchen. In conjunction with the 

84th Division's first attack, this drive was 

designed to promote virtual encirclement 

of Geilenkirchen, whereupon the 84th 

Division was to launch a third phase by 

moving into the town and continuing a 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

mile and a half northward to Sueggerath 

in the valley of the Wurm. In the fourth 

phase, the 43d Division was to continue 

to clear the west bank of the Wurm as 

far as Hoven, three miles to the north of 

Geilenkirchen, while the 84th Division 

pushed beyond Sueggerath and Prummern 

to a trio of villages located near the point 

where the railroad veers away from the 

Wurm River. These villages~Muellendorf, Wuerm, and Beeck~are approximately three miles northeast of 

Geilenkirchen. 4 

Taking all these objectives would 

eliminate the German wedge between the 

British and Americans. The front line 

then would describe a broad arc from the 

Maas River near Maasbracht, southwest 

of Roermond, to the Wurm River at the 

trio villages, thence southeast to Gereonsweiler. The final boundary between the 

XIII and the 30 Corps (and thus between 

Second British and Ninth U.S. Armies 

and the 12th and 2 I Army Groups) was 

to follow generally the course of the 

Wurm to the villages, thence northeastward along the Aachen-MuenchenGladbach railroad. 

4 V nless otherwise noted, this chapter is based 

upon official records of the 84th and 102d 

Divisions and of the XIII Corps. See also 

Conquer-The Story of Ninth Army, pp. 55-94; 

Draper, The 84th Division in the Battle of 

Germany; NVSA Opns, IV. The British story 

is based upon British documents found in 

American files (e.g., 30 Corps intelligence summaries), plus liaison reports between the 30 

Corps and XIII V.S. Corps. Advance of the 

84th Division beyond Sueggerath and Prummern 

apparently was not directed until the eve of the 

attack. See Memo, XIII Corps G-3 Sec, 17 

Nov, sub: Time Schedule (Result of Conference 

of Commanders Concerned in Linnich Operation); Amendment 1 to XIII Corps FO I, dtd 

17 Nov. Both in XIII Corps G-3 Jnl file, 

17-20 Nov 44. 
THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 

A successful Operation CLIPPER combined with the 2d Armored Division's 

capture of GereonsweiIer would broaden 

the Ninth Army's maneuver space by 

some five to six miles. As this space 

became available, General Gillem's XIII 

Corps was to assume control of operations 

in the new sector. After relief of the 2d 

Armored Division at Gereonsweiler, General Gillem intended to send the I02d 

Division across a remaining two and a 

half miles to the Roer at Linnich, there to 

force a crossing. In the meantime, a 

special force, named Task Force Biddle 

and composed of the I 13th Cavalry 

Group strongly reinforced with additional 

tanks and artillery, was to protect the 

corps north flank. Task Force Biddle 

was to occupy the sector along the railroad between the trio of W urm villages 

and the Roer. Later, the 84th Division 

and the recuperated 7th Armored Division were to join the I02d Division in 

the Roer bridgehead at Linnich to make 

the final push to the Rhine. 5 

No immediate British participation, 

once Operation CLIPPER had been concluded, was planned, though the 30 Corps 

did contemplate a later local advance 

along the west bank of the W urm to high 

ground overlooking Heinsberg, seven miles 

north of Geilenkirchen near the confluence of the Wurm and the Roer. The 

British intended eventually to drive either 

southeast from Nijmegen or northward 

from Nijmegen, but extensive preparation 

and, reorganization were necessary before 

the drive could be undertaken. Other 

than Operation CLIPPER, the only British 

offensive action coincident with the November offensive was the continuing drive 

5 XIII Corps FO [, [3 Nov, XIII Corps G-2 

file, [4-[6 Nov 44; Amendment [ to XIII Corps 

FO I. 

547 

to clear the Peel Marshes west of the 

Maas River. As events developed, the 

fact that no large-scale offensive was 

launched by the British-not even a 

large-scale feint-worked to the detriment 

of the November offensive. It enabled 

the Germans to shift divisions from the 

front of the 2 I Army Group to oppose the 

First and Ninth U.S. Armies. 

Since virtually all German reserves in 

the West had been marked "untouchable" 

in preparation for the Ardennes counteroffensive, the Commander in Chief West 

could obtain reserves only by denuding 

fronts not considered immediately threatened. Hardly had Field Marshal von 

Rundstedt received the reports on 16 

November of the multiple strikes in the 

vicinity of Aachen before he divined the 

extent of the Allied offensive. He immediately ordered the shift of the loth 

SS Panzer Division from the Holland front 

to the extreme south wing of Army Group 

H where it could be committed quickly in 

support of Army Group B. He also took 

steps to prepare a volks grenadier and two 

infantry divisions for movement from 

Holland to the same sector.6 

On 17 November Rundstedt found 

justification for these moves in the intelligence that the I04th U.S. Division, 

identified earlier in the Antwerp fight, had 

been moved to participate in the new 

offensive. 7 By 18 November Rundstedt 

had gained even greater confidence in his 

situation estimate and his decisions: 

... To date [DB WEST noted] there are 

no indications for an equally strong British 

attack against the Maas' front [in Holland], 

coordinated with the present offensive. The 

GOB WEST KTB, [6 Nov 44. 

70B WEST KTB, [7 Nov 44. Though the 

Gennans named this division as the [84th, they 

obviously meant the [04th. 
548 

relatively feeble attacks against the Venlo 

Bridgehead [i.e., the Peel ~~:shes] even 

speaks against such a possibilIty. Hence 

. . . 0 B WEST orders the immediate transfer of 10th SS Panzer Division to Army 

Group B.8 

Subsequent events were to demonstrate 

even more clearly that the offensive was 

confined primarily to the American part 

of the front. During the course of the 

fighting west of the Roer, the Germ~ns 

were to move from Holland to actIve 

participation against the U.S. armies not 

only the 10th SS Panzer Division bu.t also 

the 3d Parachute Division and an mfantry and a volks grenadier division. . 

As to the immediate situation at Gellenkirchen on the eve of the 30 Corps attack, 

the German line-up was the same as it 

had been two days before when the November offensive began. Both Colonel 

Landau's 176th Division, northwest of 

Geilenkirchen, and General Lange's 18 3d 

V olks Grenadier Division, in and southeast of the town, had concentrated their 

greatest strength about Geilenkirchen. 

Here also General Biumentritt, commander of the XII SS Corps, had emplaced the 

bulk of his artillery. 

Attacking two days behind the main 

forces in the November offensive, the 30 

Corps could count upon little direct 

assistance from the big air bombardment 

of Operation QUEEN, though Linnich and 

Heinsberg were scheduled to be hit. The 

30 Corps counted instead upon a steady 

softening process by fighter-bomb~rs 

which began as early as 8 November WIth 

a napalm strike against Geilenkirchen. 

Assistance was to be provided by both the 

Second British Tactical Air Force and the 

Ninth Army's usual ally, the XXIX TAC. 

At least two groups of XXIX T AC 

8 OB WEST KTB, 18 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

fighter-bombers were to operate on 18 

November, D Day for Operation CLIPPER. 9 

In addition to artillery support to be 

expected from the 30 Corps, the 84th 

Division was reinforced by two U.S. 

battalions attached from the XIII Corps. 

Because position areas in the congested 

sector between the Maas and the W urm 

were at a premium, four other artillery 

battalions available in XIII Corps were 

not to participate. 

In its first combat experience, the 84th 

Division had two handicaps: inexperience 

and only two instead of its usual three 

regiments. (The third was attached to 

the 30th Division of the . XIX Corps at 

W uerselen. ) In the first step of the 

attack, the division was to be reinforced 

by a special British unit named Dre~­

force, which included two troops of flaIl 

tanks, and by a troop of the 357th Sear:hlight Battery, Royal Artillery, mannmg 

four giant beacons. A flail tank had a 

rotor in front to which were attached 

heavy chains that flailed the ground. as 

the rotor was driven by the tank engine. 

The searchlight provided "artificial moonlight" on dark nights by bouncing light 

off low-hanging clouds. 10 By light of the 

searchlights, the flail tanks before dawn 

on 18 November were to clear two paths 

through a thick mine field which the 84th 

Division had to cross. The mine field was 

southeast of Geilenkirchen, south of a 

spur railroad running from Geilenkirchen 

into the sector of the XIX Corps at 

Immendorf and Puffendorf and on to 

Juelich. Because the number of flail 

9 XIII Corps AAR, Nov 44, and Mtg on Air 

Support Plan with XXIX TAC, 15 Nov, XIII 

Corps G-3 Jnl file, 14-17 Nov 44. . 

10 For a detailed description of flail tanks, 

see NUSA Opns, IV, 103-04. Details on use of 

searchlights may be found in Searchlights in 

Battle, NUSA Opns, III. 
THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 549 

BRITISH FLAIL TANK beating the road to explode mines. 

tanks for piercing the mine field was 

limited, the division commander, Brig. 

Gen. Alexander R. Bolling, decided to use 

only one regiment at first. The 334th 

Infantry under Col. John S. Roosma was 

to capture high ground east of Geilenkirchen and at Prummern, whereupon on 

the second day, the 333d Infantry was to 

attack Geilenkirchen and proceed up the 

Wurm valley to Sueggerath. Both regiments presumably would combine for the 

final push into the trio of Wurm villages, 

Muellendorf, Wuerm, and Beeck. 

As D Day for Operation CLIPPER approached, the atmosphere as influenced by 

progress of the main forces in the November offensive was conducive neither to 

elation nor to discouragement. Early 

success of the adjacent 2d Armored 

Division, for example, had been tempered 

by arrival of the 9th Panzer Division. 

During the evening of I7 November, 

reports of tank concentrations near Geilenkirchen convinced the staff of the 84th 

Division that a prompt counterattack 

from the direction of Geilenkirchen was 

"very probable"; but the news failed to 

deter General Bolling from proceeding as 

scheduled. He might, he said, "beat the 

Germans to the punch." 11 

11 Ln Rpt at 2040 in I02d Div Jnl, 17 Nov 44; 

Ltr, Bolling to OCMH, n.d., but written early 

in 1956. 
550 

The Jump-off 

As British searchlights provided hazy 

illumination across the fields between 

Geilenkirchen and Immendorf, the flail 

tanks of Drewforce at 0600 on 18 November churned toward the German mine 

field. Because mud gummed the flail 

chains and lessened their effectiveness, 

engineers checked behind the tanks with 

mine detectors. Only desultory German 

fire interfered. 

An hour later, after a sharp five-minute 

artillery preparation, two battalions of the 

334th Infantry began moving through the 

two gaps in the mine field. Concealed 

by the fading darkness, neither unit encountered accurate fire while passing 

through the gaps. On the west, attached 

British tanks could not accompany the 

advance at first because of deep mud, but 

the zd Battalion nevertheless plodded 

ahead through use of marching fire and 

small unit maneuver. By midmorning 

the battalion had gained the high ground 

east of Geilenkirchen. On the regiment's 

right wing, the 1st Battalion was held up 

for a while along the spur railroad by a 

cluster of ten pillboxes, an intermediate 

objective en route to Prummern. The 

battalion commander, Lt. Col. Lloyd H. 

Gomes, moved among his platoon leaders 

encouraging them to urge their men 

forward. Once the men had overcome 

the temptation to court the protection of 

the railroad embankment, they used 

marching fire to advantage. When they 

had driven the Germans from trenches 

into the pillboxes, they discovered as had 

others before them that this was three 

fourths of the battle. 

Still concerned lest the Germans counterattack from Geilenkirchen, the regimental commander, Colonel Roosma, 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

delayed the final push to Prummern until 

he could send his reserve battalion to 

hold the high ground east of Geilenkirchen. Though an expected counterblow 

by the 9th Panzer Division had failed to 

develop, Colonel Roosma had another 

reason for concern. In midmorning, artillery observers of the 30 Corps had reported a force of 4,500 men in a column 

of tanks and vehicles stretching for three 

and a half miles en route south from 

Heinsberg in the direction of Geilenkirchen. These observers probably were 

correct in assuming this to be part of the 

15th Panzer Grenadier Division. That 

division was moving, however, not to 

Geilenkirchen but, in compliance with 

orders issued the night before, to back up 

the 9th Panzer Division opposite the XIX 

U.S. CorpsP 

To relieve the 84th Division of some 

concern, the XIII Corps commander, 

General Gillem, alerted two regiments of 

the lozd Division for possible commitment in event of a German blowY 

When by midday the Germans had not 

struck, the 334th Infantry resumed the 

attack in the direction of Prummern. 

The zd Battalion on the right aimed at 

the village, while the 1st Battalion moved 

toward Hill 101, west of the village. 

Routes to both these objectives were 

across exposed ground, and the Germans 

by this time obviously were alert. W orking with attached British Sherman tanks, 

both battalions nevertheless made steady 

progress. By late afternoon the 334th 

Infantry could report both Hill 101 and 

Prummern in hand, though some re12 Fragmentary Order, CG XIII Corps, 1030, 

18 Nov, XIII Corps G-3 Jnl file, 17-20 Nov 44; 

various messages in· XIII Corps G-2 Jnl· file for 

the same period; OB WEST KTB, 18 Nov 44· 

13 Fragmentary Order, 1030, 18 Nov. 
THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 

sistance still had to be eliminated in the 

village. The defenders of Prummern represented both the 183d Division and the 

9th Panzer Division's loth Panzer Grenadier Regiment. In a commendable operation, the novice 334th Infantry had 

taken its D-Day objectives, bagged 330 

prisoners, and reached a point almost on 

line with Task Force X of the 2d Armored 

Division, which during the day had 

occupied Apweiler, a mile and a half southeast of Prummern. American losses had 

been moderate: 10 killed and 180 

wounded. 14 

On the opposite side of Geilenkirchen 

and the Wurm River, the_ 43d British 

Division had attacked about noon on 18 

November. By the end of the day the 

British controlled Tripsrath and most of 

Bauchem, north and west of Geilenkirchen. The day's advances on both 

banks of the Wurm obviously had taken 

the starch out of the hard tip of the 

Geilenkirchen salient. Allied forces now 

looked down upon the town from three 

sides. 

Having learned much during their first 

day's combat, men of the 334th Infantry 

had another lesson in store as dusk 

approached. What is listed as a day's 

final objective, they were to discover, 

sometimes can change to an intermediate 

objective with surpnsmg abruptness. 

Even as the 1st and 2d Battalions were 

fighting for Hill 101 and Prummern, the 

division commander, General Bolling, directed that they continue past these 

objectives before stopping for the night. 

On the left, the I st Battalion was to push 

a company northwest along a nose of Hill 

101 to gain a position dominating Sueg14 Casualty figures from Msg, 30 Corps to 

XIII Corps, 1800, 18 Nov, XIII Corps G-3 Jnl 

file, 17-20 Nov 44. 

551 

gerath and the Wurm valley, while the 

2d Battalion was to seize high ground 

northeast of Prummern in the direction 

of Beeck, an objective known by the code 

name given it as Mahogany Hill (Hill 

92.5).15 

Out of context, this order must have 

been hard to understand; for as night 

approached, both battalions had incurred 

the disorganization inherent in a day of 

fighting, and the men were cold, muddy, 

and hungry. Yet, in the over-all pattern, 

taking advantage of the momentum of the 

day's advance to get these additional 

objectives before pausing made sense. 

The 30 Corps commander, General Horrocks, had directed during the afternoon 

that the 84th Division the next day 

combine the third and fourth phases of 

Operation CLIPPER. On 19 November 

the 84th Division was to take Geilenkirchen and Sueggerath and, on the same 

day, the trio of villages Muellendorf, 

Wuerm, and Beeck.16 Holding the tip of 

Hill 101 overlooking Sueggerath obviously 

would facilitate, advance of the 333d 

Infantry into Sueggerath and beyond 

against Muellendorf and Wuerm. Occupying Mahogany Hill would provide 

the 334th Infantry high ground between 

Prummern and Beeck that would improve 

the defense of Prummern and at the same 

time assist materially an attack upon 

Beeck. 

As night fell on 18 November, the 

attached British searchlight battery moved 

forward. The attack continued. 

A company of the I st Battalion made 

the move along the nose of Hill 101 with 

little real difficulty, but in Prummern the 

"84th Div. G-3 Jnl, 18 Nov 44. 

"Operation CLIPPER Tasks for 19 Nov, XIII 

Corps G-3 Jnl file, 17-20 Nov 44; NUSA Opns, 

IV, !O5. 
552 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

COLUMN OF BRITISH CHURCHILL TANKS on a road near Geilenkirchen. 

2d Battalion could not get an attack 

started against Mahogany Hill. Men of 

Colonel Gomes' battalion were too involved 

still with eliminating points of resistance 

within the village. 

Only a reconnaissance patrol moved 

toward Mahogany Hill during the night. 

Returning two hours after midnight, the 

patrol brought back disturbing news. 

The men had spotted six German tanks 

moving against Prummern from the north. 

The blow that followed was delivered 

by an estimated two companies of the 

9th Panzer Division's loth Panzer Grenadier Regiment, plus six tanksY 

17 Draper, The 84th Division in the Battle of 

Gtrmany, p. 30. 

Though the situation never reached critical 

proportions, the men in Prummern had 

their hands full the rest of the night and 

into the next day. 

The result was that no attack could 

be mounted against Mahogany Hill until 

an hour before noon the next day, 19 

November, when Colonel Roosma committed his reserve battalion to the task. 

Fire from three pillboxes atop the hill, 

from two pillboxes at a crossroads in the 

northeastern fringe of Prummern, and 

from field fortifications on the eastern 

edge of the village stymied this attack. 

For another day Mahogany Hill remained 

somewhat aloof from the fighting while 

the Americans tried to eliminate the last 

resistance from the fringes of Prummern. 
THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 553 

BRITISH FLAME-THROWING CROCODILE (MK-7) TANKS in action. 

This they finally accomplished late on 20 

November with the help of flame-throwing 

British Crocodile tanks, used against the 

pillboxes at the crossroads. Mahogany 

Hill itself was to fall two days later after 

only a token engagement as a company 

caught the Germans atop the hill by 

surprise. 

The nature of resistance at Prummern 

emphasized to the 84th Division commander, General Bolling, a concern which 

had begun to grow during the first day 

of Operation CLIPPER. IS Instead of the 

division's west flank opposite Geilen18 Note Records of Important Telephone Conversations, 1130 and 1140, 18 Nov, NUSA G-3 

Jnl file, 12-13 Nov 44. 

kirchen, the danger spot fast was beginning to look like the east flank between 

Prummern and the closest positions of the 

2d Armored Division a mile and a half to 

the southeast at Apweiler. "Our flank is 

sort of out in the breeze now," was the 

way General Bolling put it on 19 November after his second regiment had begun 

to attack up the Wurm valley. "Our 

chief concern. . . is our right flank. 

The 2d Armored Division has advanced 

only to Immendorf-Apweiler. I have 

pushed a salient up the river valley and 

they [the armor] haven't advanced." 19 

Though certainly aware of why the 2d 

Armored Division had not advanced19 NUSA Opns, IV, I I I. 
554 

because of the 9th Panzer Division's counterattacks and because a main supply 

route through Setterich still was not 

open-General Bolling's superiors apparently shared his concern. Early on 19 

November they provided help in the form 

of the 102d Division's 405th Infantry. 

The regiment was attached to the 84th 

Division with the proviso that it be committed "only in case of emergency." 20 

An Exercise in Frustration 

As this precaution was taken, the 

initiative remained with the Allies except 

for the local counterattack at Prummern 

and one or two minor forays out of the 

W urm valley against the British. Expected commitment of the 15th Panzer 

Grenadier Division against the XIII Corps 

still had n.ot developed. 

On 19 November the 84th Division's 

second regiment, the 333d Infantry, 

launched another phase of Operation 

CLIPPER at Geilenkirchen amid an aura of 

success. Advancing up the Wurm valley 

to seize successively Geilenkirchen, Sueggerath, Muellendorf, and Wuerm, the 

333d Infantry discovered early on 19 

November that Geilenkirchen was not the 

Gibraltar it was supposed to be. Already 

encompassed on three sides, the Germans 

in the town provided little more than a 

stiff delaying action. 

The biggest problem in the attack, 

explained the leading battalion commander, Lt. Col. Thomas R. Woodyard, was 

lack of artillery support. "After the 

artillery preparation for the jump off," 

Colonel Woodyard said later, "we received 

no artillery support because it was con20 Msg, 84th Div to XIII Corps, 0850, 19 Nov, 

XIII Corps G-3 file, 17-20 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

sidered that our own troops, on the flanks, 

were too close ... for safety in firing." 21 

Though two attached troops of tanks 

from the British Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry provided close support, they could 

not make up entirely for lack of artillery. 

While another battalion mopped up in 

Geilenkirchen, Colonel Woodyard's battalion continued northeast on either bank 

of the Wurm toward Sueggerath. Marked 

by increased shelling, resistance stiffened, 

but the battalion plodded ahead. Flamethrowing Crocodiles were a big help, 

especially against two pillboxes guarding 

the road into Sueggerath. "A few squirts 

from the flame-throwers," related an infantry company commander, Capt. James 

W. Mitchell, "and the Germans poured 

out . . .. The bastards are afraid of 

those flame-throwers and won't be caught 

inside a pillbox . . . ." 22 

Within Sueggerath, the Germans were 

not so easily cowed. Though one company pushed quickly through the village, 

bypassed strongpoints continued to hold 

out. As night came, Colonel Woodyard's 

battalion still was heavily engaged in 

Sueggerath. Because the village sits in a 

depression, Colonel Woodyard wanted to 

continue to high ground a few hundred 

yards to the northeast; yet he was concerned that the day's losses and disorganization had so weakened his battalion that 

he could not reach that objective alone. 

Not until near midnight was the regimental commander, Col. Timothy A. 

Pedley, Jr., able to get another battalion 

forward to help. An attack by both 

battalions in the darkness did the job. 

At the conclusion of this attack, the 

333d Infantry still was more than a mile 

short of the final objective of Wuerm. 

21 NUSA Opns, IV, 106. 

22 Ibid., p. 158. 
THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 

Nevertheless, the bulk of the Geilenkirchen 

salient had been eliminated. If the regiment could adjust its positions to tie in 

with the British to the northwest and 

with the 334th Infantry to the southeast, 

the 30 Corps could present a solid and 

fairly straight front line. Still concerned 

lest the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 

materialize against the 84th Division's 

southeastern flank, General Bolling told 

Colonel Pedley to take precautions against 

this possibility during the third day, 20 

November. In the meantime, the 334th 

Infantry was to clear the last dogged 

resistance from Prummern. Both regiments then might renew the attack on the 

fourth day against Muellendorf, Wuerm, 

and Beeck. 

On this fourth day, 2 I November, an 

exercise in frustration began. Through 

the preceding day and night, rain had 

fallen intermittently. Early on 2 I November it became a downpour that turned 

the loamy soil of the Wurm valley into a 

virtual quagmire. Because the road from 

Sueggerath toward Muellendorf and 

Wuerm obviously was mined, British 

tanks supporting the 333d Infantry would 

have to wade through the mud. Though 

the tankers tried to use an alternate road 

along the railroad, debris at a demolished 

underpass in Sueggerath blocked movement in that direction. 

The immediate problem facing Colonel 

Pedley's infantry was a nest of pillboxes 

on a gentle forward slope where the 

Germans could employ grazing fire with 

devastating effect. Attacking alone time 

after time through mud and rain, the 

infantry could get no place. "Christ!" 

exclaimed the battalion commander, Lt. 

Col. William S. Barrett; "I wish I could 

get some help . . .. Tell Colonel Pedley 

that these men are fighting and dying up 

555 

here. No one is lying down. But we 

gotta have power to do this thing." 23 

That night engineers tackled the underpass in Sueggerath with explosives while 

artillery officers worked out an elaborate 

fire plan. To protect infantry and tanks, 

whose movement in the mud would be 

snaillike at best, artillery of the 84th 

Division and the 30 Corps was to lay 

down a rolling barrage. The barrage was 

to begin even before the tanks left 

Sueggerath, because the tankers had 

several hundred yards of exposed ground 

to cross before reaching the infantry 

positions. 

Sometimes the best-laid battle plans can 

go awry for the want of a single piece of 

equipment. That happened on 22 November when a bulldozer failed to arrive 

to complete the task of clearing the 

underpass in Sueggerath so that the tanks 

might move. Not until midafternoon, 

after the infantry already had jumped off 

and run into much the same frustration 

as on the day before, did the tanks get 

forward. 

To the relief of all concerned, the tanks 

were all that was needed. As flame 

throwers on the Crocodiles went into 

action, the Germans emerged from the 

nest of pillboxes that had barred the way, 

hands high. Three pillboxes fell in rapid 

succession. 

This success was encouraging, but the 

objective of Muellendorf still was 500 

yards away. Because the heavy fuel 

wagons which the Crocodiles had to pull 

were bogging in the mud, the tank commander refused to go farther. When the 

riflemen tried to move alone into the 

village, they encountered the same kind of 

23 Ibid., p. I55, citing pates taken by Capt 

John O'Grady in Comd Post, 3d Bn, 333d Inf, 

2 I-23 Nov 44. 
556 

intense grazing fire that earlier had denied 

the pillboxes. As night came, one platoon broke into the village, only to be 

engulfed without trace in the darkness. At 

last the infantry dug in about the pillboxes, 

still a half mile short of M uellendorf. 

The change from half-hearted to stanch 

resistance was not confined to the Muellendorf sector alone. On both 2 I and 22 

November the 43d British Division also 

encountered opposition which denied the 

division's final objectives on the other side 

of the Wurm River northwest of Muellendorf. Likewise, in the sector of the 334th 

Infantry, frustration again was the keynote. A one-battalion attack from Prummern against Beeck was repulsed by the 

same sharp resistance and the same 

appalling conditions of mud. 

Though frustrating, the attacks as early 

as 2 I November did reveal an illuminating 

bit of intelligence information. Prisoner 

identifications all along the front of the 

30 Corps left no doubt that the iron 

which the Germans had added to their 

resistance was the 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Division. Having first employed the panzer grenadiers in counterattack against 

the XIX Corps, the Germans then had 

committed most of the division to fixed 

defense in front of the 84th Division. 

Concern about the 84th Division's 

southeastern flank alleviated by this identification, General Bolling sought permission to reinforce his attack with the 

regiment of the I02d Division which had 

been provided three days before for use in 

event of emergency. General Bolling 

wanted to send two battalions of this 

regiment to flank the village of Beeck by 

seizing high ground on the east and north, 

while the remammg battalion struck 

frontally and two battalions of the 84th 

Division provided fire support. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Approval gained, the I02d Division's 

405th Infantry attacked toward Beeck on 

22 November, only to discover as had 

the other regiments that a combination of 

mud and exposed ground was too much. 

The fight swung up and down the open 

slopes between Prummern and Beeck. 

Though several pillboxes were eliminated 

and forty Germans captured, no major 

gain could be registered. 

Before the attacks at Muellendorf and 

Beeck could be renewed, an organizational 

change took place. As early as 20 November, the two Allied divisions under the 

30 Corps had cleared the major portion 

of the Geilenkirchen salient, even though 

the final objectives still were denied. 

Coincidentally, the armor of the XIX 

Corps had captured Gereonsweiler. Thus 

the two requisites for providing a zone of 

action for the XIII Corps had been 

fulfilled. As of 23 November, the 84th 

Division and its attachments reverted to 

control of General Gillem's XIII Corps.24 

The 84th Division's attack at Muellendorf and Beeck continued through 23 

November, but to no avail. At the end 

of the day, General Gillem directed the 

84th to go over to the defensive. For 

five more days the 84th Division was to 

hold here while the I 13th Cavalry Group 

gradually took over to maintain contact 

with the British and while General Gillem 

prepared his XIII Corps for participation 

in the final phase of the drive to the Roer. 

In early plans, the XIII Corps was to 

have begun to attack on 23 November, 

but that obviously was illusory in the 

light of the hard fight experienced by the 

84th Division and of the scattered position 

of the regiments of the I02d Division. 

24 XIII Corps Ltr of Instrs 4, 22 Nov, XIII 

Corps G-3 Jnl file, 20-24 Nov 44. 
THE GEILENKIRCHEN SALIENT 

In clearing the Geilenkirchen salient, 

the two regiments of the 84th Division 

together had incurred approximately 

2,000 battle casualties, including 169 

killed and 752 missing. Nonbattle losses, 

primarily from trench foot, raised the total 

by another 500.25 

25 12th A Gp, G-1 Daily Summary, 26 Nov 44. 

557 

As a kind of temporary stalemate settled over this part of the Roer plain, the 

battlefield was a dreary spectacle. The 

sun seldom shone. A damp, grayish mist 

predominated. Sodden by rain, gashed 

by shells and tank tracks, the beet and 

cabbage fields were dismal and ugly. 

Drab enough at the start of the fighting, 

the villages now were desolate. 
CHAPTER XXIV 

Ninth Army's Final Push to the Roer 

In contrast to the frustration that by 

2 I November had begun to mark the 

84th Division's attack in Operation 

CLIPPER) optimism was the keynote with 

the other attacking force of the Ninth 

Army, General McLain's XIX Corps. 

After an arduous six days of fighting, the 

XIX Corps now appeared ready for a 

quick and easy final push to the Roer 

River. (See Map VII.) 

By nightfall of 2 I November, the 2d 

Armored Division's CCB held Gereonsweiler. As soon as high ground nearby 

was secure, the town was to be turned 

over to the XIII Corps. CCA had 

pushed to Ederen and beyond Freialdenhoven to within a mile and a half of the 

Roer, so that only two villages remained 

to be taken in the narrow zone that would 

be left the armor after adjustment of the 

corps boundary. Having seized Engelsdorf, the adjacent 29th Division was 

farther east, though equidistant from the 

Rocr. After having relinquished a sector 

about two miles wide on the south wing 

of the corps to the 30th Division, the 

29th had only three villages west of the 

Roer still to take. 

Having been scheduled at first only to 

clear the Ninth Army's inner wing near 

the original line of departure, the 30th 

Division at dark on 2 I November was 

about a mile and a half short of the 

easternmost of its neighbors. Yet the 

division might catch up quickly if a performance executed on 2 I November could 

be repeated. In rapid succession, the 

I20th Infantry and attached 743d Tank 

Battalion had overrun five villages.! As 

night came, the I20th Infantry's most 

advanced posltlOn encompassed Fronhoven, four miles from the Roer. 

The optimism that marked the beginning of operations the next day, 22 

November, was based primarily upon 

expectation of German withdrawal behind 

the river. "If they have pulled back 

... ," the 29th Division's General Gerhardt had remarked, "we want to develop 

it." 2 The 2d Armored Division had 

noted various indications of withdrawal. 

The 30th Division the day before had 

encountered only remnants and rear 

echelon troops of the same units which 

had been falling back steadily since the 

start of the November offensive. Even 

if the enemy planned no formal withdrawal, he hardly could make much of a 

fight of it with troops like these before a 

concentration of three American divisions 

on a front less than seven miles wide. 

It did not take long on 22 November 

for events to prove this kind of thinking 

wishful. Even if German commanders 

wanted to pull back behind the Roer, 

1 So impressed by this performance was the 

Ninth Army commander, General Simpson, that 

he later had it staged as an orientation demonstration for officers newly arrived at the front. 

Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 162. 

229th Div G-2-G-3 In I, 21 Nov 44. Unless 

otherwise noted, sources for this chapter are the 

same as for Chapter XXI. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 559 

they had to hold on as long as possible 

because of the coming counteroffensive in 

the Ardennes. Almost coincidentally with 

the renewal of the American drive, one of 

the steps the Germans had been taking in 

response to appeals for help from the 

Fifteenth Army (Gruppe von M anteuffel) 

began to produce reslllts. 

Originally scheduled to participate in 

the Ardennes, the 340th V olks Grenadier 

Division had been directed on I7 November to move to the Roer sector. On 19 

November Fifteenth /Army had ordered 

the division to assume a position near 

Dueren from which to back up the 

LXXXI Corps. The next day, when the 

threat to Linnich and Juelich became 

immediate, the army commander, General 

von Zangen, changed the order. He 

directed that two regiments move west of 

the Roer, one to Linnich, the other to 

J uelich. The third regiment was to assemble east of the river between the two 

towns as a reserve. The division was to 

assume responsibility for holding bridgeheads at Linnich and Juelich. 3 

Using the 340th Division in active combat before the Ardennes counteroffensive 

would appear at first glance to have been 

a violation of Hitler's strict order about 

the OKW Reserve. In reality, it conformed to a compromise which Hitler had 

been forced to accept because of a shortage of forces for the counteroffensive. 

Two or three of the new divisions created 

especially for the Ardennes would have to 

be used temporarily to relieve old divisions 

also earmarked for the Ardennes so that 

30B WEST KTB, 17 Nov 44; TWX, Cruppe 

von Manteuffel to LXXXI Corps 2345, 19 Nov 

44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Bet. H. C. u. Armee; 

Order LXXXI Corps to 340th Div, 2030, 20 Nov 

44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Betehle an Div. 

the old divisions might be rehabilitated. 4 

The first regiment of the 340th V olks 

Grenadier Division reached Juelich during 

the morning of 2 I November and that 

night began to relieve the 246th Division. 

It was high time the 246th got some rest. 

Two of its regiments were down to about 

350 men each, another to 120. 

To supplement the fresh regiment, 

General von Zangen committed to the 

Juelich-Linnich area two newly released 

volks artillery corps.5 He also inserted 

into the J uelich defensive arc a fresh 

infantry replacement battalion, 300 men 

strong, and a battalion of Jagdpanther 

assault guns. 6 

The Americans smacked into these reinforcements early on 22 November. On 

the XIX Corps south wing, the 30th 

Division's 120th Infantry took and held 

the village of Erberich, but two companies 

which gained the village of Lohn had to 

withdraw by infiltration after German 

guns denied passage for the tanks and 

tank destroyers needed to clear the objective. 

In the center of the XIX Corps, two 

platoons of the 29th Division's I7 5th 

Infantry which had slipped into Bourheim during the night were ejected 

unceremoniously before daylight by fresh 

troops of the 340th Division. Though, 

two battalions tried during the course of 

the day (22 November) to regain Bourheim, they could not force entry through 

4 Charles V. P. von Luttichau, The Ardennes 

Offensive, Planning and Preparations, Chapter 

I : The Preliminary Planning, p. 24, MS in 

OCMH. 

5 Order, Cruppe von Manteuffel to LXXXI 

Corps, 0010, 22 Nov 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, 

Bet. H. Cr. u. Armee. 

6 These identifications are from American 

sources. The Jagdpanther was a hybrid vehicle, 

a Mark V tank chassis mounting an 88-mm. gun. 
560 

small arms and mortar fire emanating 

from extensive field fortifications about 

the village. At Koslar, a mile to the 

north, the story was the same. Here the 

II6th Infantry fought all day to no avail. 

The 29th Division's positions at the end 

of 22 November remained virtually the 

same as on the day before. 

Koslar, Bourheim, and another village, 

Kirchberg, represented the final or inner 

defensive arc protecting J uelich. When 

the 29th Division's General Gerhardt 

heard that the Germans had thrown fresh 

troops into these villages, he admitted 

that an enemy withdrawal appeared unlikely. "Your boy Mansfield," said Gerhardt to a neighboring commander, 

"wants to know when we're going to 

move. It won't be soon. We have a war 

on again." 7 

In the zone of the 2d Armored Division, 

German reinforcements had not yet arrived, but the armor had to deal with 

contingents of the 246th Division led by 

a capable battalion commander, the same 

man who earlier had denied Setterich for 

so long. The going looked easy at first 

as a task force composed of a battalion of 

the 66th Armored Regiment, an attached 

battalion of the I 19th Infantry, and two 

Churchill and three Crocodile tanks made 

a two-pronged attack against the village of 

Merzenhausen. First sight of the flamethrowing Crocodiles produced white flags 

in abundance. Then German tanks 

knocked out the Crocodiles. From that 

point, the going was rough. 

As darkness approached, the task force 

at last gained entrance to Merzenhausen. 

"Think we lost 8 tanks in exchange for 

6 tanks," reported the CCA commander, 

Colonel Collier, "which is a fair swap 

7 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 22 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

because their tanks are the big babies." 8 

But that was hardly the whole story. A 

few minutes later two more German tanks 

emerged from hiding in the northeastern 

part of the village. Accompanied by men 

of the 246th Division, the tanks counterattacked a company of the 1 19th Infantry 

that was proceeding up the main street. 

Unaware in the deepening darkness of 

the proximity of other units, the infantry 

company fell back all the way to a crossroads on the southwestern fringe of the 

village. Though CCA sent a battalion of 

the 4 I st Armored Infantry to bolster a 

line formed at the crossroads, no resumption of the attack could be mounted 

before the next morning. Merzenhausen 

remained in German hands. Like the 

29th Division, the 2d Armored at the end 

of 22 November could point to no new 

gains. 9 

... In e eet we are t ere ... . fJ h JJ 

Abandoning the hope of enemy withdrawal, the XIX Corps on 23 November 

adopted a cautious, almost leisurely pattern of operations. "[MerzenhausenJ 

will have to be taken eventually," the 

corps commander told the 2d Armored 

Division, "as it's in line with the way 

you're going. [But I] would wait 'till 

you get ready to take Barmen too. Then 

you can make one big effort in that direction." 10 General Gerhardt told his 

regiments to "wait until the 30th Division 

gets up." He said, "Omar [General 

Bradley, I 2th Group commander] was in 

this morning and was very pleased. . . . 

Omar says in effect we are there, there's no 

8 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Nov 44· 

D LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 23 

Nov 44. 

10 2d Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov 44· 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 561 

sense pushing at it until the other people 

get up there." 11 

The "other people" were the First 

Army's V and VII Corps. Committed on 

2 I November, the V Corps two days later 

still had not penetrated the forested approaches to Huertgen. Part of the VII 

Corps also was bogged down in the 

Huertgen Forest with no immediate hope 

of breaking out. 

Despite close support from a company 

of tanks, a battalion of the 41st Armored 

Infantry was able on 23 November to 

gain only about half of Merzenhausen. 

Thereupon, the division commander, General Harmon, ordered consolidation. In 

keeping with the new boundary between 

the XIII and XIX Corps that would 

become effective on 24 November, the 2d 

Armored Division had begun to regroup. 

Not for several days would the division 

attempt to cover the remaining distance 

to the Roer. 

The 30th Division adopted a similar 

pattern: one day of attack followed by 

consolidation. Despite shellfire that inflicted thirty-five casualties on one company alone, a battalion of the 120th 

Infantry in little more than an hour fought 

back into Lohn. In the face of two 

counterattacks the battalion held. 

Deception played a role in the capture 

of Pattern, a mile northeast of Lohn. 

While a battalion of the I 19th Infantry 

moved into the 29th Division's zone to 

strike southeast against Pattern from 

Aldenhoven, a battalion of the 120th 

Infantry in Erberich opened fire. Their 

attention diverted to the apparent threat 

from Erberich, the Germans in Pattern 

were unprepared for attack from another 

quarter. A TOT by eleven battalions of 

11 29th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. 

artillery preceded the attack. Within 

less than an hour the men of the I 19th 

Infantry had seized the village without a 

casualty. 

Only Altdorf in the valley of the Inde 

River remained to be taken in the 30th 

Division's sector. Because exposed approaches and a clifflike drop in the ground 

near the village would complicate this 

task, the division commander, General 

Hobbs, asked a delay. He wanted to 

wait until neighboring divisions on north 

and south had taken adjacent objectives 

of Kirchberg and Inden. The corps 

commander, General McLain, approved. 

Not for another four days would the 30th 

Division attack. 

Unlike the other two units of the XIX 

Corps, the 29th Division found no pause. 

The explanation lay in the enemy's 340th 

V olks Grenadier Division. During 23 

November a second regiment of this 

division moved into the Juelich bridgeheadY 

After another grueling day of generally 

fruitless attacks across muddy, exposed 

ground about Bourheim, one of two attacking battalions of the 17 5th Infantry 

at last broke into the village late on 23 

November. If Bourheim was hard to 

take, it was even more difficult to hold. 

Beginning just after midnight, a severe 

fifteen-minute concentration of artillery 

and mortar fire heralded the first of what 

was to develop as a three-day seige of 

counterattacks. Almost all the enemy 

thrusts were preceded by intense shelling. 

In between, German guns on high ground 

beyond the Roer pounded the village. 

On 24 November, for example, the enemy 

fired an estimated 2,000 rounds into 

Bourheim. 

12 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 23 

Nov 44. 
562 

On the American side, artillery also 

played a basic role. Infantrymen were 

quick to credit the artillery with dispersing German infantry and in some cases 

German tanks. 13 Though hampered by 

ammunition shortages that in heavier calibers was acute, the artillery also conducted a program of interdictory and 

harassing fires to discourage further 

German build-up west of the Roer. On 

26 November XIX Corps artillery doubled 

its normal counterbattery program; 191 

counter battery missions were fired that 

day. This was accomplished in spite of 

ammunition restrictions that "placed a 

severe burden on artillery commanders, as 

it was necessary to carefully weigh all 

missions . . . before deciding whether 

. . . to fire them." 14 

The widespread use of artillery by both 

sides at Bourheim was in keeping with the 

general pattern everywhere during the 

November offensive. In many respects, 

the battle of the Roer plain was an 

artillery show. Opposite the LXXXI 

Corps alone the Germans estimated the 

average daily ammunition expenditure of 

American artillery at 27,500 rounds, a not 

unlikely figure. Artillery of the LXXXI 

Corps fired an average 13,410 rounds 

daily, an unusually large amount for the 

Germans. 1f> 

The village of Koslar came in for a 

share of the pounding. Just before daylight on 25 November, two companies of 

the I 16th Infantry broke into Koslar in a 

determined bayonet charge. "We moved 

out at a rapid run in waves with fixed 

bayonets, one following behind the other," 

13 See, for example, NUSA Opns, IV, 214, 

218- 19. 

14 XIX Corps Arty AAR, Nov 44. 

15 LXXXI Corps KTB, Arty.-Lage u. Art.-

Gliederungen. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

related a company commander, Capt. 

Daniel E. Kayes. "We jumped over the 

third row of trenches and in less than 10 

minutes were inside Koslar . . .. It was 

still dark and my greatest difficulty was 

in slowing down the company. The men 

scattered all over town." 16 

The strongest counterattacks at both 

Koslar and Bourheim came soon after 

dawn on 26 November. Thecommander 

of the LXXXI Corps, General Koechling, 

planned counterattacks on both villages 

as a co-ordinated major effort to reestablish the inner defensive arc about 

J uelichY Both the regiments of the 

340th Division that were in the Juelich 

bridgehead participated. They had the 

support of fourteen battalions of artillery 

and twenty-eight armored vehicles (the 

30 ISt Tiger Tank Battalion, the 34ISt 

Assault Gun Brigade, and four assault 

guns borrowed from the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division). 

Though the Germans lamented that 

their artillery was hamstrung by drastic 

ammunition shortages and that their tanks 

could not provide proper support in the 

narrow streets of the villages, few on the 

American side could have detected that 

the enemy had his problems. The Germans plowed through every American 

artillery concentration. Fighting moved 

into the streets of the villages. 

Hampered by a mounting shortage of 

arnmunition, the two battalions of the 

175 th Infantry in Bourheim appealed for 

help. The regimental commander rushed 

a company from his reserve into the village. Jeeps loaded with ammunition 

raced forward along a road blanketed 

1G NUSA Opns, IV, 220, citing Combat Interv 

with Kayes. 

17 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 

25 and 26 Nov 44. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 563 

by German shellfire. At 1030 fighterbombers only recently unleashed by improvement in the weather arrived. Not 

until noon was the situation brought under 

control. 

The Germans isolated the two companies of the I 16th Infantry in Koslar. 

They were not surrounded, insisted General Gerhardt; they were merely in close 

contact, "right up against the Krauts." 18 

In any event, patrols from other units of 

the I 16th Infantry could not reach them. 

During 26 November pilots of the 29th 

Division's artillery observation planes flew 

eleven missions over Koslar to drop sorely 

needed food, ammunition, and medical 

supplies. Out of eleven bundles, eight 

were recovered. Despite intense small 

arms fire, not a plane was lost. 

Before daylight on 27 November the 

I 16th Infantry sent a battalion to break 

through to the two companies. Though 

this battalion became involved in arduous 

house-to-house fighting, contact was made 

by late afternoon. When the rest of the 

I 16th Infantry entered the village the 

next morning, the enemy had gone. 

As this fight had developed, General 

Gerhardt had committed his third regiment to subdue Kirchberg, last of the 

three villages comprising the inner defensive arc about Juelich. Kirchberg lies 

near the confluence of the Inde and the 

Roer. On the assumption that the Germans would be alert to attack from the 

direction of Bourheim, where the conflict 

had waxed so hot for days, the regimental 

commander chose to strike instead from 

the vicinity of Pattern. The situation at 

this village in the 30th Division's zone 

had been static for several days. 

While a battalion in Bourheim made a 

feint by fire, another moved from Pattern 

18 29 th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 26 Nov 44. 

during the morning of 27 November without artillery preparation but behind a 

smoke screen. By this stratagem the 

I 15th Infantry achieved almost complete 

surprise. By late afternoon, Kirchberg 

was secure. For all practical purposes, 

the 29th Division had closed up to the 

Roer. Only two strongpoints in a small 

part of J uelich on the west bank of the 

river remained to be cleared. The 

enemy's 340th Division withdrew its two 

regiments to the east bank, leaving only 

a rear guard in the two strongpoints. 

Take your time in closing to the river, the 

American corps commander said. 

Though the American commander, 

General McLain, had sanctioned pauses 

in the attacks of the 2d Armored and 

30th Divisions, he had directed on 26 

November that the final push to the Roer 

be resumed all along the corps front. 

In conjunction with the 29th Division's 

attack on Kirchberr-, the 2d Armored 

Division was to con; llete capture of 

Merzenhausen and PUSl on to Barmen. 

The 30th Division was to take Altdorf. 

Though both the regimental and division commanders favored a night attack 

on Altdorf, they bowed to General McLain's desire to co-ordinate with the 29th 

Division's push on Kirchberg and a new 

attempt by the First Army's 104th Division to take Inden. In midmorning of 

27 November, a battalion of the 119th 

Infantry, attached to Colonel Purdue's 

120th Infantry, struck for Altdorf. As 

feared from information developed earlier 

by patrols, fire from at least twelve 

machine guns emplaced in a reverse slope 

defense 800 yards west of Altdorf forced 

the men of this battalion to the ground. 

Here the exposed plateau lying between 

Pattern and Altdorf drops off sharply; 

any force that somehow got this far 
564 

without detection n9 longer had a chance 

to escape observation. Deprived of tank 

support because of muddy ground, a 

dearth of roads, and the sharp grade near 

the village, men of this battalion had 

nothing readily at hand capable of eliminating the German machine guns. They 

had no recourse but to dig in. 

The regimental commander, Colonel 

Purdue, decided at length that a night 

attack was the only solution. Having 

desired a night attack from the first, he 

had a plan ready. Before daylight the next 

morning, he sent a battalion under Lt. Col. 

Ellis V. Williamson to move by stealth 

through the positions reached by the 

attached battalion of the r r 9th Infantry. 

As luck would have it, artillery of the 

r 04th Division began to shoot timed fire 

on the neighboring village of Inden 

soon after Colonel Williamson's battalion 

crossed the line of departure. Only 

momentarily, but long enough to alert the 

German gunners, the air bursts illuminated the men of the r 20th Infantry. 

For a moment the attack appeared 

doomed. Then a special attack formation Colonel Williamson had adopted 

paid dividends. He had positioned four 

squads in a line of skirmishers formation 

in front of the main body of his force. 

Each man in the skirmish line had a rifle 

grenade at the ready. As a German 

machine gun opened fire, some part of 

the skirmish line would silence it quickly 

with grenades. 

Having gained entrance to Altdorf by 

this method, Colonel Williamson's men 

faced a two-hour fight before they could 

label the village secure. The main difficulty came from seven enemy tanks which 

roamed the village in search of escape. 

Hasty mine fields that Colonel WilliamTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

son's men placed at every exit soon after 

gaining entry had turned the village into a 

cage. Two of the tanks eventually were 

destroyed-one by a white phosphorus 

grenade after the tank had blundered 

into a building, another by a bazooka. 

After one hair-raising cat-and-mouse episode after another, the others eventually 

escaped by breaking through a roadblock 

the Americans had established on a bridge 

across the Inde River. 

Except for a minor assignment of 

clearing a narrow triangle of land between the Inde and the Roer, which 

would be accomplished later without 

incident, the 30th Division by 28 November had completed its role in the drive to 

the Roer. The division could feel relieved 

that its casualty list, for nearly two weeks 

of fighting, was comparatively small: r60 

men killed, r,058 wounded. 

On the opposite wing of the XIX 

Corps, the 2d Armored Division in renewing the attack on Merzenhausen on 

27 November turned to a three-pronged 

attack. Discerning the key to Merzenhausen to be the elevations-Hills 100.3 

to the northwest and 98. r to the east-the 

CCA commander, Colonel Collier, assigned a battalion of infantry to each. 

Coincidentally, another battalion of infantry was to take the remaining half of 

the village. 

In this sector, the regiment of the 340th 

V olks Grenadier Division that was designated to hold a bridgehead about Linnich, 

a few miles to the north, had relieved 

the remnants of the 246th Division in and 

about Merzenhausen. Thereupon, the 

village had become· the southern anchor 

for the Linnich bridgehead. 19 

19 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AARs for 

22-27 Nov 44. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 565 

On Hill 98.1 a battalion of the 41St 

Armored Infantry, attacking on 27 November over soggy ground without tank 

support, ran into heavy fire near the 

crest. A counterattack followed. By 

utilizing trenches earlier cleared of Germans, the men managed to hold, but they 

could not push to the crest. 

Within Merzenhausen, the attached 2d 

Battalion, 11 9th Infantry, resumed tedious 

house-to-house fighting. Though a brace 

of tanks and tank destroyers tried to 

assist, mines and panzerfausts discouraged 

their use. It took the infantry all day to 

do the job alone, but they ended the 

assignment in a blaze of success with 

capture of the enemy commander and his 

entire staff. A driving force in the attack 

was 2d Lt. Harold L. Holycross, who as 

a sergeant had played a leading role In 

the 30th Division's West Wall assault In 

October. 

Of the three assignments, Colonel Collier considered that tanks were needed 

most against Hill IOO.3. Yet because of 

various obstacles, including an escarpment, a small stream, and an antitank 

ditch, he saw no way to employ them. 

In the end, he committed the attached 1 st 

Battalion, 11 9th Infantry, alone to the 

task, though he told the commander, Lt. 

Col. Robert H. Herlong, that if he found 

a defiladed route with reasonably good 

traction, tanks would join him. 

Concealed by early morning mists, 

Colonel Herlong's infantry got within 400 

yards of the crest of Hill 100.3 before 

discovery. To counteract intense small 

arms fire that followed, Colonel Herlong 

called for a rolling artillery barrage to 

precede a final assault. Though seemingly accurate, the artillery failed to silence 

the German fire. In a matter of minutes 

the battalion lost five killed and fifteen 

wounded and gained but fifty yards. 

In the meantime, someone had discovered a route along a railroad embankment whence tanks might proceed up a 

narrow draw onto the hill. Advised of 

this development, Colonel Collier immediately designated a company of the 66th 

Armored Regiment. An hour and a half 

later, the tanks reached the infantry 

positions. 

Effect on the enemy was marked. As 

the tanks advanced with infantry following at from 100 to 200 yards, German 

fire slackened, then ceased altogether. At 

least forty Germans were killed or 

wounded and an equal number captured. 

By late afternoon, Hill IOo.3 was secure. 

To make the day a complete success, 

Colonel Collier soon after dark committed 

a second battalion of the 41st Armored 

Infantry to the attack on Hill 98.1. A 

position that in daylight had failed to 

crack now dissolved rapidly. By midnight 

CCA held all three of the day's objectives. 

A tank-supported counterattack against 

Merzenhausen got no place in the face of 

accurate defensive artillery fires. Because 

the two hills near Merzenhausen overlooked the remaining objective of Barmen, 

capturing that village and pushing patrols 

another few hundred yards to the Roer 

was a routine task. It progressed without 

incident the next day, 28 November. 

Except for two German positions on 

the west bank of the Roer near J uelich 

in the zone of the 29th Division, the XIX 

Corps by 28 November had reached the 

river. Since no one considered capture 

of the two remaining points' either particulary difficult or pressing, the 29th Division 

was not to begin the task for several days. 

In the meantime, General McLain, his 
566 

staff, and his divisions turned to pl£lnning 

for crossing the river, though the shadow 

of the dams on the upper reaches of the 

Roer still loomed over all preparations.20 

A Hundred Men of the XIII Corps 

Not until the day after the XIX Corps 

reached the Roer did the Ninth Army's 

other component, General Gillem's XIII 

Corps, commence the push to the river. 

By nightfall of 24 November, General 

Gillem had assumed responsibility for 

about six miles of front from the Wurm 

River at Muellendorf to the new boundary 

with the XIX Corps below Ederen. 

Nevertheless, the hard fighting experienced by the 84th Division in Operation 

CLIPPER and the dispersion of the I02d 

Division's regiments made it impossible 

for the XIII Corps to be ready to attack 

until 29 November. At least one commander, the I02d Division's Maj. Gen. 

Frank A. Keating, thought even this was 

rushing things; not until twenty-four 

hours before the jump-off did the last of 

his regiments return to the fold. Though 

General Keating had yet to command his 

division as an entity in offensive combat, 

one regiment already had engaged in heavy 

fighting while attached to the 84th 

Division and another which had fought as 

the infantry component of the 2d Armored 

Division's Task Force X was markedly 

fatigued. 

The six-mile line which the XIII Corps 

held ran southeast from the Wurm near 

Muellendorf to a point about midway 

between Prummern and Beeck, thence 

east to a highway leading north from 

Gereonsweiler to the village of Lindern, 

20 Note various messages of concern about the 

dams in corps and division journals during this 

period. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

thence southeast in an arc extending a 

thousand yards east of Gereonsweiler to a 

point of contact with the 2d Armored 

Division southeast of Ederen. The 84th 

Division held the left half of the line, the 

I02d Division the right, while the 7th 

Armored Division still recuperated In 

corps reserve from the earlier fight in the 

Peel Marshes. 

High ground in the north along an 

extension of the XIII Corps boundary 

with the 30 British Corps was a primary 

consideration in attack planning. In a 

broad sense, the corps zone sloped gradually upward to this high ground, which is 

marked by the Aachen-GeilenkirchenMuenchen-Gladbach railroad and by the 

villages of Wuerm, Leiffarth, and Lindern. 

Even beyond a normal precaution of 

protecting the rear of a subsequent Roer 

crossing, General Gillem considered possession of this terrain vital. He was 

concerned lest the Germans commit the 

Sixth Panzer Army, which they reputedly 

were mustering between the Roer and the 

Rhine, in a counteroffensive against the 

corps north flank. 21 

Before Operation CLIPPER had revealed 

how determined the Germans were to 

hold this high ground, General Gillem had 

intended taking the bulk of it with Task 

Force Biddle, composed of the I 13th 

Cavalry Group reinforced by increments 

of medium tanks and artillery. Thereupon, the I02d Division was to have 

captured Linnich on the Roer and to have 

prepared to cross the river. The 7th 

Armored and 84th Divisions were to have 

been available to exploit a bridgehead. 

In the revised plan, General Gillem 

21 On 22 November, for example, the corps 

artillery commander, Brig. Gen. R. P. Shugg, had 

recommended that two additional tank destroyer 

battalions be attached to the corps to protect the 

north flank. XIII Corps Arty AAR, Nov 44. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 567 

displayed full appreciation of how hard it 

might be to take the high ground. Dissolving Task Force Biddle, he attached 

the I 13th Cavalry to the 84th Division, 

in order that the cavalry might hold some 

of the 84th Division's front opposite 

Muellendorf and Wuerm, and directed 

the 84th Division to make the corps main 

effort. Not Linnich but the high ground 

along the north boundary was to be the 

objective. Meanwhile the I02d Division 

was to stage limited objective attacks to 

protect the 84th Division's right flank and 

eventually was to reduce three villages 

near the corps south boundary, capture 

Linnich, and occupy high ground north of 

Linnich overlooking German supply routes 

through the Roer village of Brachelen.22 

The decision to send greater strength 

against the high ground stemmed in part 

from the contemporary intelligence picture. In addition to survivors of the 9th 

Panzer) 15th Panzer Grenadier) and 183d 

V olks Grenadier Divisions) which had 

opposed earlier attacks in this sector, 

American intelligence officers anticipated 

meeting the 10th SS Panzer Division) 

veteran of the MARKET-GARDEN fighting 

in Holland.23 Some took this as evidence 

that other SS divisions from the Sixth 

Panzer Army would be sent to this 

sector. 24 

German artillery, noted those who 

plotted the fires, was grouped in the 

north behind the high ground and to the 

northeast beyond Linnich and the Roer. 

It was "a potentially destructive weapon." 

22 NUSA Ltr of Instrs 8, 25 Nov, and XIII 

Corps FO 2, 27 Nov, both in XIII Corps G-3 

Jnl file, 24-28 Nov 44. 

23 Annex I to 84th Div G-2 Per Rpt 8, 25 

Nov, and XIII Corps G-2 Per Rpt 17, 25 Nov, 

both in XIII Corps G-2 Jnl file, 25-26 Nov 44. 

24 See, for example, XIX Corps G-2 Estimate, 

26 Nov, XIII Corps G-2 Jnl file, 27 Nov 44. 

As for tanks, the Germans were expected 

to employ only small groups, despite 

addition of the loth SS Panzer Division. 

Fortifications included pillboxes of the 

West Wall in the northwest near Muellendorf, Wuerm, and Beeck and elsewhere 

the usual extensive field fortifications that 

had come to typify the Roer plain. An 

antitank ditch extending more than a mile 

and a half from Beeck northeast to a point 

beyond Lindern was of particular note. 

Except that the projected Ardennes 

counteroffensive made the Sixth Panzer 

Army untouchable, the true enemy picture 

was much as American G-2'S divined it. 

After the unsuccessful commitment of the 

9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grenadier 

Divisions in counterattacks controlled by 

the XLVII Panzer Corps) these divisions 

had passed to the XII SS Corps. Thus 

General Blumentritt and the XII SS Corps 

again bore responsibility for the entire 

sector from the Maas River to the Roer 

near Flossdorf. The XLVII Panzer 

Corps apparently stood by as a headquarters temporarily without troops. 

The loth SS Panzer Division was the 

first unit to be alerted for movement early 

in the fighting when Field Marshal von 

Rundstedt had determined that the Allies 

intended no complementary attack in 

Holland. The division had begun to 

move southeastward on 20 November and 

three days later had started relieving the 

9th Panzer Division) which was to be 

rehabilitated for the Ardennes. 25 The 

front was strengthened by commitment 

of the 407th Volks Artillery Corps near 

Linnich, and a volks grenadier division 

earmarked for the Ardennes was moved to 

25 Order, Gruppe von Manteuffel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 2045 19 Nov 44, and TWX, 

Gruppe von Manteuffel to LXXXI Corps, 2225, 

23 Nov, both in LXXXI Corps KTB, Bef. H. Gr. 

u. Armee. 
568 

a position east of the Roer from which it 

might back up the XII SS Corps.26 

While the Germans made these moves, 

the XIII U.S. Corps was spending five 

days in reorganization and attack preparations. Both the 84th and I02d Divisions 

were strengthened with attachments, and 

the corps artillery was fleshed out with 

units transferred from the XIX Corps. 

Three battalions of XIX Corps artillery 

reverted to Ninth Army control, in order 

to facilitate their use in support of both 

corps; while eight battalions of the XIX 

Corps artillery passed directly to the XIII 

Corps. This increased General Gillem's 

corps artillery to thirteen battalions, of 

which two and a battery of self-propelled 

155-mm. guns were attached to the 84th 

Division. The bulk of artillery remaining 

under corps control was to give priority 

to the main effort of the 84th Division. 

In addition the British were capable of 

firing into the 84th's sector with a field 

regiment of 25-pounders, a battery of 

4'5-inch guns, and a regiment of 5.5-inch 

guns. Both the 84th and I02d Divisions 

received separate self-propelled tank destroyer battalions, the I02d a separat~ tank 

battalion, and the 84th a tank battalion 

attached from the 7th Armored Division.27 

To achieve the assigned mission, the 

84th Division needed to take five villages 

-Muellendorf, Wuerm, Beeck, Leiffarth, 

and Lindern-and an elevation northeast of Beeck which bore the code name, 

Toad Hill (87.9). Having attacked 

frontally and without success against three 

of these villages for three days in Opera26 TWX, Gruppe von ManteufJel to XII SS 

and LXXXI Corps, 0050, 25 Nov 44, LXXXI 

Corps KTB, Bet. H. Gr. u. Armee. 

27 XII and XIX Corps Arty AARs, Nov 44, 

and Annex 3 to XIII Corps FO 2, 27 Nov, XIII 

Corps G-3 Jnl file, 24-28 Nov 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

tion CLIPPER, the 84th Division commander, General Bolling, had no taste for 

a repeat performance. Flanking action 

to the right, he noted, "would not force 

attacking troops directly against pillboxes 

and villages that are of no particular 

tactical value." Instead of assaulting as 

before from the southwest against Muellendorf, Wuerm, and Beeck, he wanted to 

strike from the southeast and south to 

take first Toad Hill and Lindern, the 

latter because it occupies an elevation 

comparable to Toad Hill. These two 

points in hand, the division then might 

turn west and southwest to hit the other 

four villages from the rear.28 

To take both Toad Hill and Lindern, 

General Bolling designated the 335th Infantry, which had missed Operation 

CLIPPER because of a stint as an uncommitted reserve with the XIX Corps. 

The 333d Infantry was to support the 

attack by fire and, together with the 

I 13th Cavalry, to stage a frontal demonstration against Beeck. 

Because routes of attack toward both 

Toad Hill and Lindern were devoid of 

concealment, the 335th Infantry commander, Col. Hugh C. Parker, elected a 

night attack. From a line of departure in 

open fields southeast of Beeck, the 2 d 

Battalion under Maj. Robert S. Kennedy 

was to move toward Toad Hill while the 

3d Battalion under Maj. Robert W. Wallace guided on the Gereonsweiler-Lindern 

highway to take Lindern. The attacks 

were to begin without artillery preparation at 0630 on 29 November. Colonel 

Parker hoped that systematic artillery and 

fighter-bomber attacks for several days 

preceding 29 November would suffice as 

28 Memo to CG XIII Corps, 24 Nov, and 84th 

Div FO 7, 28 Nov, both in XIII Corps G-3 Jnl 

file, 24-28 Nov 44. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 569 

preparation fires. A company of the 

40th Tank Battalion was attached to each 

infantry battalion for close support.29 

An hour before dawn on 29 November 

there began an odyssey involving finally 

about a hundred men of Major Wallace's 

3d Battalion that was to have marked 

effect upon the push to the Roer. At 

that hour, Companies I and K moved 

northward through the darkness along 

either side of the Gereonsweiler-Lindern 

road. Stripped down to gas masks and 

essentials-rifle belts, two bandoleers of 

ammunition, and three bars of chocolate 

D ration per man-these companies were 

imbued with one idea: speed. Get across 

the mile of open ground to Lindern before 

daylight. 

German fire at first was hesitant. A 

flare here, a burp gun there, a mortar 

shell or two. Yet sometimes even one 

bullet can be fateful. That was the case 

when a stray bullet cut the aerial of 

Company K's SCR-300. Though the 

radio operator fell back to the end of the 

column to pick up a spare, no one saw 

him again. That incident was to assume 

more and more importance as the attack 

progressed. 

At the antitank ditch which stretched 

from Beeck to Lindern, two leading platoons of Company K and one of Company 

I ran, jumped, fell, crawled, and slithered 

across. Don't hold up in the ditch, their 

leaders had told them time after time; 

German mortars and artillery could ruin 

you there. 

These three platoons made it. Their 

companies did not. No sooner had the 

29 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the 

84th Division action is based upon official division and corps records; Draper, The 84th Division, pp. 50-74; and NUSA Opns, Vol. IV. 

The last contains rich combat interview material. 

leading platoons slipped through than the 

Germans in a main line of resistance centered on the antitank ditch came to life. 

With artillery, mortars, machine guns, and 

rifles, they drove back the remainder of 

Company K and inflicted serious losses on 

Company I. 

Accompanying the two platoons of 

Company K that crossed the antitank 

ditch was the company commander, 1st 

Lt. Leonard R. Carpenter. Though Lieutenant Carpenter knew that half his 

company had failed to get across, he 

hoped that Company I had fared better. 

The leader of the one platoon of Company 

I which actually had succeeded, 1st Lt. 

Creswell Garlington, Jr., trusted th~t 

Company K was intact. Neither force 

had any form of communication with the 

battalion commander. Company I's radios were with the company headquarters; 

Company K's radio operator had taken 

that company's SCR-300 to the rear after 

German fire had snapped the aerial. 

Though Lieutenant Carpenter had another radio, an SCR-509, it did not work. 

Deluded in the darkness about their 

combined strength, the three platoons 

pressed on toward Lindern. They reached 

the fringe of the village as day was breaking. Though uncertain at first whether 

they had come to the right objective, they 

nevertheless attacked. They had been 

told to avoid trouble, if possible; to leave 

mop-up to those who came behind. 

Racing through back yards and orchards, 

the men tossed an occasional grenade 

whenever some lone sentry opened fire. 

But for the most part, Lindern slept. 

At 0745 the three platoons were digging 

in beyond the railroad enbankment a few 

hundred yards north of Lindern. Only 

then did Lieutenants Carpenter and 

Garlington discover that together they had 
S70 

only about a hundred men. This little 

band had reached one of the 84th Division's primary objectives, yet nobody else 

on the American side knew about it. 

The Germans knew. In less than a 

quarter-hour three Tiger tanks approached the position. Someone fired a 

bazooka. The tanks retreated to the 

vicinity of two pillboxes not over 400 

yards away. Later, several truckloads of 

German infantry dismounted at the pillboxes. Still the Germans did not attack. 

Apparently they did not recognize how 

small the American force was. The two 

lieutenants had chosen to dig in on a 

gentle reverse slope where they were partially screened by a rise to the north and 

by the railroad enbankment at their 

backs. 

Though the situation was obviously 

precarious, the Americans were not too 

concerned at first. They expected relief 

momentarily. Yet the hours passed, and 

no relief came. At length, Lieutenant 

Carpenter sent volunteers back to the 

railroad where he had abandoned the 

SCR-sog after having despaired of getting it to function. After two hours of 

tinkering, they finally picked up faint 

voices emanating from radios of American 

tanks, but they could not transmit. As 

a last resort, four men volunteered to go 

back on foot in search of help. No one 

saw them again. 

The situation actually was more obscure than even Lieutenants Carpenter 

and Garlington realized. At the antitank 

ditch south of Lindern, the battalion 

commander had lost contact not only with 

the leading platoons but also with the 

rest of Companies I and K. Though the 

regimental commander, Colonel Parker, 

had committed his reserve battalion in 

midmorning to outflank Lindern from the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

west. communications to that unit too had 

failed. A company of the 40th Tank 

Battalion, which was to have followed the 

infantry to Lindern, waited in Gereonsweiler with no word that there was any 

infantry to follow. 

Perhaps because they had no other 

hope, the little band of men north of 

Lindern continued to tinker with the 

SCR-sog. About an hour past noon, 

someone suggested they tape an aerial 

from a little, short-range SCR-S36 to a 

high fence and run a telephone WIre 

from the fence to the SCR-sog. The 

expedient worked. Somewhere a radio 

operator in an American tank picked 

magic words out of the air: "We m~de a 

touchdown at 074S." 30 

The commander of the 40th Tank Battalion, Lt. Col. John C. Brown, acted 

. without hesitation. He ordered a company of tanks to Lindern. Behind a 

smoke screen fired by artillery, six Shermans made it. "It was about 1430 when 

we saw those six General Shermans," 

someone recalled later. "Boy! We figured the whole German army couldn't 

drive us out of there." 31 

As dusk fell, the rest of the company of 

tanks reached Lindern along with the 

reserve company of the 33Sth Infantry's 

3d Battalion, Company L. Soon thereafter, Colonel Brown ordered another 

tank company into the village. There the 

tankers fretted for an hour or so for lack 

of infantry protection, until at last the 

33Sth Infantry's reserve battalion arrived. 

Having been committed in midmorning, 

this battalion had swung in a wide arc to 

come upon the village from the west; but 

fire along the antitank ditch and from 

pillboxes had imposed telling delays. 

:<0 Draper, The 84th Division, p. 58. 

31 NUSA Opns, IV, 265. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 571 

The Germans had dallied too long in 

attempting to eliminate the two lieutenants 

and their hundred men. During the 

night of 29 November and through the 

next two days, they tried to remedy the 

situation, first with contingents of the 

10th SS Panzer Division and later with a 

Kampfgruppe recruited from the 9th Panzer Division and the 506th Tank Battalion. This Kampfgruppe was an Army 

Group B reserve controlled by the XLVII 

Panzer Corps.32 For several days the 

Americans had to supply their troops in 

Lindern along a route the tankers christened the "Blue Ball Express." But for 

all the violence of their reaction, the 

Germans were too late. They had lost 

Lindern to a little band of intrepid infantrymen who had gone where they had 

been told to go and had stayed there. 

The entire German position in this sector 

had been weakened materially. 

Why the Germans were slow at Lindern 

was hard to explain. Possibly they had 

been wary of the size of the American 

force. Perhaps more likely, they were 

occupied at many other points in this 

sector all through 29 November. About 

a mile southwest of Lindern, a regiment 

of the 84th Division and parts of the 

I 13th Cavalry had demonstrated with 

fire at Beeck, while another battalion of 

the 335th Infantry had attacked Toad 

Hill, northeast of Beeck. Though this 

battalion had tried a sneak night attack, 

the Germans had met them at daylight 

along the antitank ditch with fire from 

tanks emplaced in hull-down positions. 

::~ Opns Order for 30 Nov 44, Gruppe von 

Manteuffel to XII SS and LXXXI Corps, Q250, 

29 Nov 44, and Opns Order for 2 Dec 44, 

Gruppe von Manteu/Jel to XII SS, XLVII Pz, 

and LXXXI Corps, 0040, Q Dec 44, both m 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Bet. H. Gr. u. Armee. 

To the southeast, in the zone of the I02d 

Division, a regimental attack had been 

directed at high ground along the LindernLinnich highway near Crossroads 87 in 

order to protect the 84th Division's right 

flank. Here too the Germans had fought 

stubbornly, though the American commander, Col. Laurin L. Williams, maintained that he might have advanced 

farther had he not been concerned about 

tenuous contact with the 84th Division's 

335th Infantry.33 The breakdown of 

communications within the 335th Infantry may have been responsible. Even 

farther to the southeast, on the right wing 

of the I02d Division, the Germans had to 

contend with another attack, a successful 

limited objective maneuver by another 

regimen t of the 102 d Division to seize an 

efficacious line of departure for subsequent 

moves. 

A Shift in the Main Effort 

Late on 28 November, even before the 

84th Division had marched on Lindern, 

the XIII Corps Commander, General 

Gillem, had altered his corps plan. He 

directed that on the second day of the 

attack the main effort be shifted from the 

84th to the I02d Division, perhaps with 

an eye toward gaining quick control of 

bridge sites over the Roer to deny them 

to German reinforcements.34 The I02d 

Division's missions were to reach the Roer 

in the southeastern part of the corps 

sector at the villages of Roerdorf and 

Flossdorf, to secure the high ground along 

the Lindern-Linnich highway near Crossroads 87, and to occupy Linnich. By 

accomplishing these missions, the I02d 

33 NUSA Opns, IV, :278. 

H XIII Corps Ltr of Instrs 5, Q8 Nov, XIII 

Corps G-3 J nl file, 24-28 Nov 44. 
572 

Division would in the process protect the 

84th Division's right flank and thereby 

help to guarantee retention of Lindern. 

Even before the I02d Division's assignment to make the main effort became 

effective, the division commander, General Keating, decided that two regiments 

were insufficient to seize all his objectives.~~ Having intended originally to 

withhold his 406th Infantry, because that 

regiment already had fought hard as an 

attachment to the 2d Armored Division, 

General Keating late on 29 November 

decided to use the 406th to take Linnich. 

The 405th Infantry was to continue 

toward the high ground near Crossroads 

87 between Lindern and Linnich, while 

the 407th Infantry on the right was to 

take a preliminary objective, the village of 

\¥ elz, then Roerdorf and Flossdorf.3G 

The Germans in the I02d Division's 

sector represented both the loth SS Panzer Division> near Crossroads 87, and the 

regiment of the 340th V olks Grenadier 

Division which had been given responsibility for holding a bridgehead at Linnich. 

The terrain and weather in this sector 

were little different than elsewhere on the 

Roer plain: gradually sloping, exposed 

fields that could be raked with fire from 

automatic weapons and dug-in tanks; 

villages encompassed by a labyrinth of 

interconnected trenches and other field 

;)3 The corps commander apparently thought 

the same. If the I02d Division had not 

captured Linnich by 2 December, he directed, 

the 7th Armored Division was to be called upon. 

Ibid. 

30 102d Div FO 4, 29 Nov, XIII Corps G-3 

Jnl file, 29-30 Nov 44. Official records of the 

I02d Division are supplemented by Ninth U.S. 

Army Operations, Vol. IV, several combat interviews, and a good unit history, Allan H. Mick, 

With the I02d Infantry Division Through Germany (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 

1947), pp. 73-84. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

fortifications; dismal rain, mud, and 

bone-chilling cold. Nor did the fight go 

much differently. As elsewhere, the Germans fought stubbornly for each village. 

"We are in W elz doing a lot of plain and 

fancy mopping up and there are a lot of 

things to take out," reported General 

Keating in midafternoon of 30 November. 

"Weare partially in Flossdorf and there 

are a lot of things to take out there." 37 

There were a lot of things to take out 

everywhere. Not the least of the problems was German artillery fire from the 

east bank of the Roer, much the same 

difficulty encountered earlier by the XIX 

Corps. Forewarned by the experience of 

the XIX Corps, both divisional and eorps 

artillery had readied a detailed program 

of counterbattery fires that on occasion 

raised the day's total of rounds expended 

above the 20,000 mark. Supplementing 

this program were numerous strikes by 

XXIX T AC fighter-bombers 38 and prodigious use of smoke shells fired both by 

artillery and by attached chemical mortars. Nevertheless, shelling remained a 

real problem for several days until German 

batteries could be plotted accurately. In 

Welz and Linnich, particularly, German 

artillery turned what might have been 

routine mop-up tasks into costly and 

time-consuming projects. 

Welz was the first of the I02d Division's 

objectives to fall. This little village, a 

mile short of the Roer, was in the hands 

of the 407th Infantry at the end of 30 

November, with some opposition remain-

::7 I02d Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Nov 44. 

'!~ On 2 December, for example, the XXIX 

T AC flew 143 sorties and dropped ninety-seven 

tons of bombs, mostly on villages and artillery 

positions beyond the Roer .. On other days, bad 

weather and proximity of American troops to the 

river limited close support missions. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 573 

ing to be eliminated the next day. Although Flossdorf on the bank of the Roer 

was next on the 407th Infantry's agenda, 

German guns beyond the river knocked 

out six of eight supporting tanks to bring 

the attackers up sharply. A co-ordinated 

attack against both Roerdorf and Flossdorf on 2 December brought success at 

Roerdorf, but Flossdorf held out until the 

next day. 

In the center of the I02d Division's 

sector, the 406th Infantry made more 

rapid initial gains against Linnich. 

Though advance during the afternoon of 

30 November came in erratic spurts, a 

battalion had reached the fringe of the 

town by nightfall. The rest of the regiment built up against the town after dark, 

but the regimental commander, Colonel 

Hurless, decided to wait until morning 

before risking involvement in house-tohouse fighting. Linnich fell on I December, but into the next day the Germans 

maintained a path through the northeastern fringe to make matters unpleasant 

and enable some of the enemy to escape 

across a daIJlaged bridge to the east bank 

of the Roer. Tanks attached from the 

7th Armored Division at last managed to 

cross a drainage ditch south of Linnich, 

gain access to the town, and block this 

passage. 

The regiment of the 340th Division 

which had borne responsibility for Linnich fell back behind the Roer. Having 

been battered severely in the fighting for 

the Linnich and Juelich bridgeheads, this 

division was in process of relief by another 

unit moved down from Holland, the 363d 

Volks Grenadier Division, which in October had battered itself against the 10 I st 

U.S. Airborne Division north of Nijmegen. 

Since Linnich had gone by the board, the 

regiment scheduled to relieve at Linnich 

was instead attached to the 10th SS 

Panzer Division.39 

Entry into Linnich no doubt was eased 

by the 405th Infantry's conquest of the 

high ground near Crossroads 87. After 

two days of bitter and frustrating fighting 

on exposed ground where men and machines were naked to German fire, the 

regiment used a double-envelopment maneuver on December to carry the 

objective. 

Their right flank partially protected by 

the I02d Division's attack, troops of the 

84th Division in the meantime held onto 

Lindern and continued to fight for 

remammg objectives. Though General 

Bolling had intended taking the high 

ground of Toad Hill (87.9) before the 

ad jacent village of Beeck, the 10th SS 

Panzer Division's 22d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment made such a fight of it on 

Toad Hill that General Bolling ordered a 

simultaneous attack on Beeck. The village occupies a shallow hollow, but the 

Germans fought for it as if it were an 

elevation dominating the countryside. A 

battalion of the 335th Infantry fought all 

da y before gaining the village at nightfall 

on 30 November. 

Two days later resistance suddenly 

collapsed, both on Toad Hill and on high 

ground southeast of Lindern, where the 

334th Infantry had taken up the fight to 

make Lindern more secure. Presumably 

the collapse stemmed from an attempt to 

spare the SS troops pending relief by a 

swiftly rehabilitated 340th Volks Grenadier Division, a move scheduled for 8 

December. 40 Also on 2 December, a 

au LXXXI Corps Getechtsbericht, AAR for 2 

Dec 44; Opns Order for 6 Dec 44, Cruppe von 

ManteufJel to LXXXI Corps, 2100, 5 Dec 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Bet. H. Cr. u. Armee. 

40 Opns Order for 6 Dec. 44, Gruppe von 

ManteufJel to LXXXI Corps, 2IOO, 5 Dec 44. 
574 

battalion of the 334th Infantry followed 

preparation fires closely and marched into 

Leiffarth, northwest of Toad Hill. Within half an hour after crossing the line of 

departure, the 334th Infantry had Leiffarth. 

The 84th Division was nearing the end 

of its part in the final push to the Roer. 

German reinforcements in the form of the 

59t h Infantry Division (General Poppe), 

leaving Holland on 2 December, would 

arrive too late to do much good in this 

sector. 41 Of the 84th Division's original 

objectives, only Muellendorf and Wuerm 

remained to be taken. Because no crossing of the Roer appeared likely until the 

Roer River Dams were taken or neutralized, no one was in any particular rush in 

regard to these last two villages. Not 

until more than two weeks later, on 18 

December, would the 84th Division attack them. At this time there would be 

no more than a hint of the kind of 

resistance that had denied the villages 

during Operation CLIPPER. By midday 

on 18 December, both Wuerm and 

Muellendorf would be secure. 

Except for these two villages, all assignments of the XIII Corps in the drive to 

the Roer were completed by 4 December. 

In four days two infantry divisions had 

advanced about a mile and a half each. 

Yet this was hardly the whole story of 

XIII Corps participation in the battle of 

the Roer plain, for the role of the 84th 

Division and a regiment of the 102d 

Division in Operation CLIPPER and that 

of another regiment of the 102 d in the 

push to Gereonsweiler were rightfully part 

of the broader performance. During the 

four days when the two divisions fought 

under the aegis of the XIII Corps, they 

41 DB WEST KTB, 2 Dec 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

each incurred about a thousand battle 

casualties, including 176 killed in the 84th 

Division and r 42 in the 102d. The 84th 

listed 209 missing; the 102d, 104. Together the two divisions lost the services 

of another thousand men to combat 

fatigue and exposure. Indeed, for all the 

determination of German resistance on 

the Roer plain, the one aspect most men 

who fought there probably would recall 

most vividly was the abominable weather 

and the mud that went with it. 

Gut H asenfeld and the S portplatz 

Like the 84th Division at Muellendorf 

and Wuerm, the 29th Division of. the 

XIX Corps had two more assignments 

before the battle of the Roer plain could 

be termed at an end. These were to 

reduce two German outposts alongside the 

Roer opposite and northwest of Juelich, 

one a group of farm buildings called Gut 

Hasenfeld, the other a Sportplatz consisting of an elliptical concrete stadium and 

a covered swimming pool nearby. 

Before the event, reduction of these 

outposts looked like a minor assignment. 

Because delay in mounting a Roer crossing 

removed any real urgency in regard to the 

outposts and because the 29th Division 

commander wanted to maintain the bulk 

of his division intact for the crossing, only 

one regiment, the I r6th Infantry, was to 

do the job. 

Night had not fallen on the first day of 

attack (I December) before some measure 

of the difficulties that would be involved 

had become apparent. The ground 

about both Gut Hasenfeld and the 

S portplatz was flat, cruelly exposed to 

observation from higher ground a few 

hundred yards away on the east bank of 

the Roer. No concealment was available 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 575 

GUT HASENFELD 

near either objective except for a patch of 

woods south of the S portplatz. These 

woods, it developed, were literally abloom 

with antipersonnel mines. Nor did the 

Germans stint on the troops manning the 

defenses. Only the night before the first 

American attack the Germans had begun 

to relieve the fatigued remnants of the 

340th Division with fresh troops of the 

363d Volks Grenadier Division, one of the 

units moved from Holland. 42 

A dismal pattern that would prevail for 

six days was set on the first day. Concealed either by darkness or by elaborate 

42 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for I 

Dec 44. 

smoke screens maintained by 4.2-inch 

mortars of the 92d Chemical Battalion, 

troops of the I 16th Infantry would get 

within a few hundred yards of the objectives. Then they would run into mines. 

"A man would hit a trip wire and there 

would be a click, then the mine would 

spring out of the ground and explode 

five or six feet in the air, spraying metal 

splinters." 43 At first sound of exploding 

mines, the Germans would lay down final 

protective fires with machine guns, mortars, and artillery. If the men fell to 

earth to escape this fire, they might 

43 NUSA Opns, IV, 328, citing combat interv 

with 2d Lt Sears G. Sutton, Co I, I 16th Inf. 
576 

detonate more mmes. Some elected to 

renbin erect through intense shellfire 

rather than risk falling upon a mine. 44 

"Nothing was more feared than mines. 

They were insidious, treacherous things 

hiding in the deep grass and in the 

earth." 45 

On occasion, some compames approached as close as a hundred yards to 

one or the other of the objectives before 

being. repulsed. Yet no genuine threat to 

either Gut Hasenfeld or the Sportplatz 

could be developed. One of the more 

promising attacks during the night of 2 

December was thwarted when a bright 

moon suddenly emerged to bathe the flat 

ground in light and trigger the enemy's 

protective fires. 

Artillery and air support bombarded 

both objectives and the town of J uelich 

across the river but with no telling effect 

on the enemy's will to resist. Because this 

was the lone offensive action on the entire 

XIX Corps front, the corps artillery was 

free to concentrate its fires, including 

round after round from 8-inch howitzers. 

Later inspection was to reveal that these 

shells had done considerable damage; yet 

the Germans in both places had underground shelters which spared them major 

losses and, presumably, they reinforced 

the garrisons at night by ferrying troops 

across the Roer. On at least two occasions, fighter-bombers of the XXIX 

TAC pounded the objectives for fifteen 

minutes before attacks; yet as the infantry 

tried to close, Ger~an fire remained thick. 

Observation from across the Roer and 

ml)d deterred use of tanks. On one 

occasion, when three tanks of the 74 7th 

Tank Battalion tried to reinforce an 

44 Ibid., p. 331, citing combat interv with 1St 

Lt Elmer C. Reagor, Co K, I 16th Inf. 

4" Ewing, 29 Let's Go!, p. 195. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

infantry company near Gut Hasenfeld, 

German artillery quickly sent one up in: 

smoke. The others scurried back to 

cover among the buildings of Koslar. 

On 3 December General Gerhardt replaced the I 16th Infantry commander 

with one of the battalion commanders, Lt. 

Col. Sidney V. Bingham, Jr. Still the 

pattern of events remained unchanged. 

In early morning of 7 December, Colonel Bingham reported that further attacks 

by his regiment would be of no avail. 

In six days the 116th Infantry had lost 

250 men, including 15 killed and 64 missing. That was only part of the story: 

cold, rainy weather also had taken an 

inevitable toll, and the regiment had .been 

far from full strength when the operation 

started. His men, Colonel Bingham reported, were too exhausted to continue 

with any real chance of success.46 

Gone was the hope of keeping the bulk 

of the 29th Division fresh for crossing 

the Roer. Later that day General Gerhardt replaced Bingham's regiment with 

the I 15th Infantry. By midnight of 7 

December a fresh battalion was in position 

to attack both Gut Hasenfeld and the 

S portplatz. 

The success that crowned the I 15th 

Infantry's first efforts was attributable in 

part to fresh troops. Yet to a large 

extent it was based upon the I 16th 

Infantry's six days of futility, which had 

worn down the German defenders. In 

one instance, the I 15th Infantry extracted 

distinct advantage from the other regiment's experience: an analysis of the 

enemy's fires against the I 16th Infantry 

revealed a zone northwest of Gut Hasenfeld where no defensive shellfire had 

fallen; acting on the theory that the 

46 29 th Div G-2-G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 
NINTH ARMY'S FINAL PUSH TO THE ROER 577 

Germans had planned no final protective 

concentrations there, one infantry company took that route. It paid off. 

Because the 9zd Chemical Battalion 

maintained a dense smoke screen about 

Gut Hasenfeld, the Germans had to 

depend upon their "blind" final protective 

fires. The company that approached 

Gut Hasenfeld from the northwest went 

through almost unscathed. 

It was not easy, however, either at Gut 

Hasenfeld or at the Sportplatz. Attacking in early morning darkness, some companies ran into mine fields, much as had 

the men of the 116th Infantry, inadvertently awakened German fire, and got 

confused and lost. 

In the end, it was small unit maneuver 

that did the job. Eighteen men of 

Company I plunged through the smoke 

screen northwest of Gut Hasenfeld, found 

a hole in a wall about the farm, and 

caught the Germans inside cellars where 

they were awaiting end of a preparatory 

barrage. "All right, you sons of bitches, 

come on out!" 47 These eighteen men 

had broken the back of German defense 

at Gut Hasenfeld by the time greater 

strength arrived. Prisoners numbered 

eighty-five. 

Somewhat inexplicably, two platoons of 

Company B got through to the Sportplatz 

without setting off a single mine and 

without drawing any fire. Starting with 

a series of dressing rooms at the west side 

of the stadium, the men of Company B 

began methodically to eliminate enemy 

machine guns. By midmorning they had 

gained all but one corner of the arena, 

where two or three machine guns could 

be approached only across the open 

47 Ewing, :<9 Let's Go!, p. Ig8. 

playing field in the center of the stadium. 

Two noncommissioned officers, S. Sgt. 

Floyd Haviland and Sgt. Noah Carter, at 

last demolished this opposition by moving 

with daring into the open to take the 

enemy under fire with rifle grenades. By 

1500 resistance has ceased at the stadium. 

At the swimming pool several platoons 

had approached the position, but none 

could traverse the last few yards to open 

ground. The swimming pool was, in 

effect, a giant covered concrete foxhole. 

In midafternoon two I05-mm. assault 

howitzers dared dominant German observation to join the infantry. While the 

Germans cowered before fire from these 

guns, S. Sgt. Daniel Menkovitz led hjs 

platoon in an assault. When cornered, 

the Germans surrendered docilely. 

As night came, patrols pushed to the 

river bank. By dawn of 9 December the 

entire west bank of the Roer in the zone 

of the Ninth Army had been cleared. 

After twenty-three days of slow, plodding advance, the Ninth Army had 

reached the Roer-not the Rhine which 

had been the original objective, but a 

flood-threatened stream only six to twelve 

miles from the original line of departure. 

German defense never had cracked, despite Allied air and artillery superiority. 

The XXIX Tactical Air Command alone 

had dropped 1,500 tons of generalpurpose bombs and 22,200 gallons of 

napalm during November. Artillery of 

the XIX Corps during only the first four 

days of the offensive had expended 56,000 

rounds of light ammunition and 34,000 

rounds of medium. Yet the Germans 

had held with a patchwork assortment of 

divisions. They had inflicted upon the 

Ninth Army more than ten thousand 

battle casualties: 1,133 killed, 6,864 

wounded, and 2,059 missing. German 
578 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

E NTRANCE T O SWIM MING POOL adjacent to the Sportplatz. 

prisoners totaled 8,321; the Ninth Army 

actually buried 1,264 enemy dead and 

estimated that the Germans lost another 

5,000 killed. The Ninth Army lost 

eighty-four medium and fifteen light tanks 

destroyed, plus numerous others that were 

out of action for varying periods. 

Except for a small sector in the zone of 

the First Army, the battle of the Roer 

plain was over. It had been a lengthy 

and costly attempt to eliminate a checkerboard of villages that extensive field 

fortifications and inclement weather had 

strengthened. 

PART SEVEN 

CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER XXV 

The Approaches to Dueren 

By the end of the first week of December' three of the four attacking corps of 

the First and Ninth Armies had planted 

their standards on the west bank of the 

Roer River. The corps still with some 

distance to go was General Collins' VII 

Corps, which originally had been labeled 

"main effort." In this case, "main effort" 

was no empty term; the VII Corps had 

been provided greater strength than the 

others-an extra division and an extra 

regimental combat team, plus preference 

in artillery support. The corps also had 

been furnished a preponderance of tonnage in the air bombardment preceding 

the offensive. Under these circumstances, 

the VII Corps might have been expected 

to be among the first at the river. Yet 

labeling the corps attack the "main 

effort" had done nothing to eliminate the 

difficult and constricted terrain in front of 

it, particularly the Huertgen Forest. 

(Map VIII) 

By 28 November, when the neighboring 

XIX Corps had staked the first claim to 

the Roer's west bank, indications already 

were developing that at least one of 

Collins' four divisions might have to be 

replaced before the corps could reach the 

river. This was the 4th Division, reduced 

to near impotence by losses in the Huertgen Forest. By 3 December, when the 

XIII Corps gained the Roer, events at 

the village of Merode on the fringe of the 

forest had provided pointed evidence that 

the I st Division also needed replacement. 

By 7 December, when the V Corps for all 

practical purposes reached the river at 

the eastern end of the BrandenbergBergstein ridge, Collins had halted all 

offensive operations within the VII Corps 

and was involved in a detailed realignment of troops. The VII Corps .still had 

a little more than three miles to go to the 

Roer. 

On General Collins' north wing, the 

I04th Division remained in the line, tired 

from clearing the Eschwei1er-W eisweiler 

industrial complex and establishing bridgeheads across the Inde River at Inden 

and Lucherberg, but nevertheless capable 

of continuing to attack. Having seen but 

limited commitment, the 3d Armored 

Division also stayed with the corps. In 

the center, the veteran 9th Division replaced the 1st Division in a line running 

from the Aachen-Cologne autobahn at 

Luchem, southward through Langerwehe 

and Juengersdorf into the Huertgen Forest 

to a point south of Merode. Where the 

4th Division had stalled at the western 

skirt of the forest opposite the settlement 

of Hof Hardt and the village of Gey, the 

83d Division took over. This too was a 

veteran replacement which had seen action in Normandy and Brittany and for 

more than a month had rested with the 

VIII Corps in Luxembourg. To reinforce the corps right wing much as the 

3d Armored Division· strengthened the 

left, General Collins obtained the 5th 

Armored Division, minus one combat 
582 

command which had fought with the V 

Corps on the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge. 

General Collins ordered the attack to 

be resumed on 10 December.! On the 

left, the I04th Division was to clear a 

three-mile stretch of the Roer plain between the Inde and the Roer where three 

villages represent the only breaks in 

monotonously flat terrain. In the center, 

the 9th Division and a combat command 

of the 3d Armored Division were to 

operate "in close con junction" in a zone 

less than four miles wide that technically 

was assigned to the 9th Division. The 

two units were to clear the northwestern 

and western approaches to Dueren, the 

Roer town which had been the VII Corps 

objective since September. On the right, 

the 83d Division was to sweep the southwestern approaches to Dueren. After 

gaining additional roads on the fringe of 

the Huertgen Forest, the 83d Division was 

to relinquish the extreme right of the 

corps zone to the sth Armored Division so 

that the armor might bridge a gap between the infantry's objectives near 

Dueren and the point on the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge where the V Corps 

had reached the river. 

To supplement divisional artillery, General Collins had available considerably 

less corps artillery strength than in earlier 

stages of the drive to the Roer, yet a 

substantial force nevertheless: fourteen 

1 VII Corps FO 13, 8 Dec, VII Corps FO file, 

Dec 44. Unless otherwise noted, sources for this 

account include official corps and division records, unofficial unit histories as cited in previous 

chapters, and several valuable combat interviews 

with personnel of the 9th and 83d Divisions. 

Records of telephone messages in 83d Div G-2-

G-3 Jnl are particularly valuable. An 83d Division history, Thunderbolt Across Europe (Munich, Germany: 1945), is sketchy and of little 

historical value. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

battalions ranging from Ios-mm. howitzers to 8-inch howitzers and 4.S-inch guns, 

plus a separate battery of I ss-mm. selfpropelled guns. 2 Five battalions also 

were self-propelled. To each of his divisions Collins attached one battalion, 

leaving nine battalions under corps control. The separate battery he split 

between the 9th and I04th Divisions. 

Having seen ample evidence of the 

enemy's pertinacity in this sector, the VII 

Corps G-2, Colonel Carter, expressed no 

expectation that the successes of the 

adjacent corps might prompt German 

withdrawal. In effect, the Germans were 

maintaining a re-entrant bridgehead on 

the west bank of the Roer along the 

approaches to Dueren. The question, 

Colonel Carter noted, was not the intent 

to hold the bridgehead but "how long can 

the enemy continue his defense in the 

face of his present rate of losses and the 

new demand for troops in the south [to 

counter successes achieved by the Third 

U.S. Army]." 3 Colonel Carter correctly divined that the enemy's main 

strength was in his artillery arm. He 

estimated 20 light artillery battalions, S 

medium battalions, and I S to 20 selfpropelled guns, plus some 10 tanks and 

likely assistance from the guns of the SS 

divisions, which presumably were in reserve between the Roer and the Rhine. 

The enemy's order of battle had undergone several changes while the VII Corps 

was regrouping. Immediately north of a 

new corps boundary, which was adjusted 

to give full responsibility for Dueren to 

General Koechling's LXXXI Corps, was 

2 On 28 November the 32d Field Artillery 

Brigade had reverted to First Army control. The 

brigade at this time 'controlled three 24o-mm. 

howitzer battalions and two a-inch gun battalions. 

3 Annex 2 to VII Corps FO 13. 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

the 3d Parachute Division, which had 

arrived in late November to relieve 

Gruppe Engel (remnants of the 12th 

and 47th Volks Grenadier Divisions). 

Brought almost to full strength by replacements, the parachute division was 

directed to provide two battalions for the 

specific task of defending Dueren.4 North 

of the parachutists stood the 246th Volks 

Grenadier Division. Removed from the 

line in late November for rehabilitation, 

the 246th had been sent back only a few 

days later. It was not much of a rehabilitation. Not one of the eight infantry 

battalions could muster as many as a 

hundred men. 5 

Still opposing the southern wing of the 

VII U.S. Corps was General Straube's 

LXXIV Corps. For so long a component 

of the Seventh Army, the LXXIV Corps 

on the day the Americans resumed the 

offensive was to pass to control of the 

Fifteenth Army (Gruppe von Manteuffel) 

while Seventh Army headquarters moved 

south for its role in the Ardennes counteroffensive.6 

That part of the LXXIV Corps front 

which would be involved at first in the 

renewed fighting belonged to the 353d 

Infantry Division, which had come up 

from the Luxembourg front in midNovember. A few remnants of the 

344th Infantry Division, which like the 

40pns Order for I Dec 44, Fifteenth Army 

(Gruppe von ManteufJel) to Corps Group Blumentritt and LXXXI Corps, 0115, I Dec 44, 

LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle Heeresgruppe und 

Armee an Gen. Kdo., I.-3I.XII.44. 

5 LXXXI Corps Gefechtsbericht, AAR for 30 

Nov-I Dec 44; Weekly Strength Rpt, LXXXI 

Corps to Gruppe von ManteufJel, 0001, 26 Nov 

44, LXXXI Corps Ia KTB, Wochenmeldungen, 

22.IX·-3I.XII·44· 

6 Luttichau, Planning and Preparations, MS in 

OCMH. 

583 

353d had been rushed into the Huertgen 

Forest in mid-November, still were 

around, but these were destined to be 

pulled out in a few days so that the 

division might be rehabilitated for the 

counteroffensive. South of the 353d, opposite the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge, 

contingents of the 272d Volks Grenadier 

Division also were destined for relief in a 

few days for return to the Monschau 

Corridor. The relieving unit was to be 

the 85th Infantry Division, brought down 

from Holland. This division also was to 

relieve the 89th Infantry Division, south 

of the 272d; but in the merry-go-round 

of reliefs preceding the counteroffensive, 

the 89th was to be recommitted on the 

extreme south of the Fifteenth Army on 

15 December.7 

Because of the configuration of terrain, 

the fighting in the final push to the Roer 

was to fall into two categories-one akin 

to the battle of the Roer plain, the other 

to the battle of the Huertgen Forest. 

In general, the dividing line between the 

two followed the boundary between the 

9th and 83d Divisions. It ran from 

within the Huertgen Forest between 

Merode and Hof Hardt northeast to the 

Roer at Dueren. Almost from the outset, 

the engagements on either side of this 

line became replicas in miniature of the 

earlier campaigning on the plain and in 

the forest. 

On the Plain 

The script for the fighting north of the 

dividing line had been written and tested 

7 Shifts and counter shifts of German divisions 

in these last few days before the counteroffensive 

were common. The moves may be traced in 

detail in Luttichau, Progressive Build-up and 

Operations, MS in OCMH. 
584 

by the Ninth Army's XIII and XIX 

Corps. In adopting it, the 3d Armored, 

9th, and 104th Divisions made only . . . mInor reVIsIOns. 

As might have been expected, the 104th 

Division continued to exploit its proficiency in night attacks. Though used 

directly against but one of three villages 

still to be taken in the 104th Division's 

sector, night attack was the key that 

opened all three. 

The drive began conventionally early on 

10 December as a battalion of the 4 14th 

Infantry attacked from the Inde bridgehead east of Inden toward each of the 

two northernmost villages, Schophoven 

and Pier. As elsewhere on the Roer 

plain, the enemy (246th Division) had 

dug elaborate entrenchments about the 

villages. Fire from the fortifications at 

Schophoven pinned down one battalion. 

Behind a rolling artillery barrage, the 

other battalion penetrated the defenses at 

Pier, only to be forced out after nightfall 

by a counterattack supported by three 

self-propelled guns. Through the next 

day of I I December, the Germans continued to hold both Pier and Schophoven. 

Against the third village of Merken, 

which lies along the Roer near the 

Aachen-Cologne autobahn southeast of 

Schophoven and Pier, a battalion of the 

415th Infantry turned to the device of 

night attack. Moving before dawn on I I 

December, the men guarded surprise by 

advancing with empty rifles. Employing 

a carefully detailed plan developed in 

close liaison with the infantry, artillery 

boxed in the route of advance. As the 

infantry neared a hamlet several hundred 

yards northwest of Merken, artillery fired 

a white phosphorus marker. Thereupon, 

a platoon dropped off to clear the hamlet 

while the main body effected an abrupt 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

change of direction in the darkness to 

move southeast on Merken. Again' the 

artillery fired white phosphorus to guide 

the way. Both Merken and the hamlet 

succumbed quickly to surprise assaults. 8 

In advancing to Merken, the 415th 

Infantry had passed south of Pier, thereby 

opening a route for a flanking force to hit 

that village from the south. Early the 

next day, 12 December, while the bulk of 

a battalion continued to strike Pier from 

the west, a company of infantry supported by tanks approached from the 

south. Actually, the maneuver was anticlimactic; the Germans had begun to 

withdraw. Artillery of the 104th Division 

wreaked havoc on enemy infantry scrambling across the Roer on a bridge east of 

Pier. 

At Schophoven, the Germans proved 

more tenacious, but a flanking maneuver 

over the newly opened avenue from the 

south proved their undoing. 9 By midafternoon of 13 December, four days after 

renewal of the offensive, the I04ith Division had reached the Roer on a four-mile 

front. 

Elsewhere north of the dividing line 

between the plain and the forest, the 3d 

Armored and 9th Divisions developed a 

variation upon an old theme, close coordination between infantry and armor. 

A combat command first was to stage a 

limited objective attack into the left half 

8 In the process of reducing Merken, an 

artillery observer, 2d Lt. Paul H. Schafer, executed an unusual assignment. Spotting seventeen Americans marching across a field as 

prisoners of two German guards, he adjusted 

time fire beyond the group so that the guards 

had no choice but to turn back the column 

toward American positions. See I04th Div Arty 

AAR, Dec 44. 

9 An unusual aspect· of this maneuver was a 

smoke screen laid down by tank guns. See VII 

Corps AAR, Dec 44. 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

of the infantry division's zone, perhaps 

with a view to breaking any hard crust of 

resistance which might have formed while 

the VII Corps had been regrouping. 

Advancing two thirds of the distance to 

the Roer northwest of Dueren, the armor 

was to take three villages, Geich, Obergeich, and Echtz. After capture of 

Echtz, the 9th Division's 60th Infantry 

was to relieve the combat command, presumably as a prelude to taking two 

remaining villages close along the west 

bank of the river, though General Collins 

did not at first spell out a definite plan for 

these last objectives. In the right half of 

the 9th Division's zone, infantry alone was 

to attack but not until advance of the 

armor into Obergeich had bared one of 

the enemy's flanks. 

The difference between this tankinfantry attack and the usual was that 

neither command was subordinated to 

the other. Presumably, General Collins 

placed the onus of responsibility for coordination upon the infantry when he 

directed that the 9th Division attack "in 

close conjunction with" the armor. lO Yet 

in comparison with the usual method of 

attaching one unit to another, this was a 

somewhat loose command arrangement. 

As events developed, the feature of the 

drive to the Roer in this sector was the 

close co-ordination achieved by these 

separate units of infantry and armor 

without formal and distinct command 

curbs. Perhaps the explanation lay in 

acceptance from the first by the infantry 

commander, General Craig, that the drive 

on Geich, Obergeich, and Echtz was not 

a separate assignment for the armor but 

a joint responsibilityY 

10 VII Corps FO 13-

11 See 9th Div FO 45, 8 Dec 44, 9th Div AAR, 

Dec 44-

585 

On the first morning, 10 December, 

after the armor had run into trouble 

from a combination of mines and mud, 

General Craig sent a battalion of his 60th 

Infantry to assist. Together this battalion and a contingent of the 33d Armored Infantry Regiment pushed into the 

first objective of Obergeich. The same 

infantry battalion assisted the tanks and 

armored infantry in subduing the next 

village of Geich while General Craig sent 

another battalion of infantry to help a 

second contingent of armor take Echtz. 

By nightfall of the first day, all three 

initial objectives had fallen. 

On I I December, as General Collins 

decided on a definite plan for taking the 

two remaining villages west of the Roer, 

he varied from his arrangement of com~ 

mand by co-ordination to attach a battalion of the 60th Infantry to CCR (Col. 

Robert L. Howze, Jr.). The combined 

force was to take Hoven, northernmost of 

the two villages. The rest of the 60th 

Infantry was to take the other village of 

MariaweilerP 

As troops of the XIII and XIX Corps 

earlier had discovered, pinning the enemy 

to a small toehold west of the Roer was 

no guarantee of his collapse. During the 

night of I I December, for example, the 

Germans reinforced their garrisons in 

Hoven and Mariaweiler with two refitted 

companies of the 47th Volks Grenadier 

Division. The troops of the VII Corps 

also learned, as had others before them, 

that German observation from higher 

ground east of the Roer could be deadly. 

A first attack against Hoven on 1 I 

December recoiled in the face of German 

artillery fire that reduced the attacking 

infantry by a third. On 12 December a 

12 VII Corps Opns Memo 129, I I Dec, VII 

Corps Opns Memo file, Dec 44-
586 

battalion of the 60th Infantry moving on 

Mariaweiler took more than a hundred 

casualties from shellfire before gaining 

protection of the first buildings. On the 

same day a smoke screen enabled the 

armor and infantry to make good on a 

second try at taking Hoven. 

By nightfall of 12 December, despite a 

sharp counterattack supported by selfpropelled guns at Mariaweiler, CCR and 

the 60th Infantry could claim control of 

most of the west bank of the Roer northwest and west of Dueren. A few tenacious outposts remained, but these the 

infantry alone could deal with almost at 

leisure. The last, a factory between 

Mariaweiler and Dueren, would fall on 

14 December. 

In the meantime, while armor and 

infantry had been co-ordinating in the 

main push, the 39th Infantry had been 

attacking alone to clear three villages in 

the southern portion of the 9th Division's 

zone. These were Schlich, Derichsweiler, 

and Merode, the last the site where troops 

of the 1st Division had plunged out of 

the Huertgen Forest only to be annihilated by counterattack because they lacked 

a route for reinforcements. Perhaps in 

cognizance of this incident, the 39th 

Infantry commander, Colonel Bond, directed his battalions to delay until capture 

of Obergeich had bared the German north 

flank and provided good roads into all 

three objectives, including Merode. Colonel Bond also hoped by striking from the 

north to trap any Germans who remained 

in a promontory of the Huertgen Forest 

southwest of Merode. 13 

From the first the wisdom of Colonel 

Bond's decision was apparent. In late 

13 Combat Interv with Bond, 9th Div Combat 

Interv file, Dec 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

afternoon of the first day of the renewed 

offensive, 10 December, a battalion 'advanced southeast from Obergeich to take 

a hamlet from which to stage the big push 

the next day. The hamlet fell readily. 

A hundred Germans surrendered, members of the same 3d Parachute Division 

which had dealt the cruel blow to the 1st 

Division in Merode. 

After systematic fighting aided by an 

effective dive-bombing mission by P-38's 

of the 368th Group, both Schlich and 

'. Merode were cleared by nightfall of I I 

December. From this point, the going 

was relatively easy, for during the night 

the Germans had begun to replace the 

3d Parachute Division with the hurriedly 

and inadequately rehabilitated 47th Volks 

Grenadier DivisionY 

In the afternoon of 12 December, the 

39th Infantry established a firm grip on 

part of Derichsweiler and on 13 December 

completed the job. Because the 83d 

Division, attacking northeast out of the 

Huertgen Forest, would pinch out the 

regiment by passing diagonally across its 

front en route to the Roer at Dueren, the 

39th Infantry was not to continue to the 

river. Except for some assistance to be 

given the 83d Division, the regiment had 

completed its assignment. 

As elsewhere north of the dividing line 

between the Huertgen Forest and the 

Roer plain, the final push had taken 

most of four days. A dirty fight, lacking 

in both glamour and surprise, it had cost 

the 3d Armored, 9th, and 104th Divisions 

1,074 casualties, of which 179 were killed 

and 75 missing. 15 

14 LXXXI Corps Ge/echtsbericht, AAR for 12 

Dec 44. 

15 Figures compiled from VII Corps FO and 

Battle Casualties file, Dec 44. 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

In the Forest 

South of the dividing line between the 

9th and 83d Divisions lay both forest and 

plain. As in the sector east of St0lberg 

through which part of the VII Corps 

earlier had attacked, densely wooded hills 

reluctantly give way to larger and more 

frequent clearings. Within a mile of 

Dueren the highlands merge with the 

flatlands of the plain. In approaching 

the settlement of Hof Hardt, in occupying 

Grosshau, and in gaining positions overlooking Gey, the 4th Division technically 

had reached the edge of the Huertgen 

Forest before casualties had prompted replacement. Yet in many aspects, including some of terrain, the fighting to be 

experienced by the two units renewing the 

drive would be markedly similar to that 

which had occurred deep within the 

forest. 

The principal similarity had to do with 

a struggle for adequate roads. On the 

left wing of a four-mile zone which the 

83d Division inherited initially, one regiment, which was to take Hof Hardt and 

drive northeast alongside and eventually 

pinch out the 9th Division's 39th Infantry, 

had a good road, an extension of axial 

Route U which the 4th Division had used. 

But in the center and on the right wing, 

routes of communication were more potential than actual. Though the V Corps 

at Huertgen and Kleinhau and the 4th 

Division at Grosshau had made down 

payment on a good road net, another big 

installment would be required before clear 

title could be claimed. 

The road net problem facing the 83d 

Division centered about the two villages 

of Gey and Strass, both northeast of 

Grosshau. These villages gather in several roads and trails from the Huertgen 

587 

Forest, subject them to a minor multiplication process, then release them to the 

northeast, east, and southeast toward the 

Roer. To travel from Grosshau northeast toward Dueren, it is necessary to 

pass through Gey; to move east and 

southeast to the river, control of Strass is 

needed. The 83d Division commander, 

Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon, assigned 

one regiment to each village, the 330th 

Infantry on the right to Strass, the 331St 

Infantry to Gey. The third regiment, the 

329th Infantry, was to pursue the somewhat separate assignment of driving 

northeast along axial Route U on the 

division's left wing. 

After capture of Strass and Gey, the 

330th Infantry presumably was to revert 

to reserve and the 33 I st Infantry to 

continue northeast from Gey toward 

Dueren. At this point, both villages were 

to serve as jump-off bases for the 5th 

Armored Division (less CCR) in a sweep 

east and southeast to the Roer to clear 

the southeastern corner of the VII Corps 

zone. One combat command was to 

move through Gey, thence east to an 

elevation overlooking the Roer, Hill 2 I I. 

The other was to advance southeast from 

the vicinity of Strass to another height on 

the west bank of the Roer, the Hemgen 

Berg (Hill 253) .16 

The key to early success in this miniature battle of the Huertgen Forest obviously lay in quick seizure of Gey and 

Strass. That explained General Macon's 

decision to put a regiment on each objective. It also explained why the enemy's 

16 Both combat commands originally were to 

move through Strass. Subsequent complications 

at Strass prompted the change. See 1st Lt 

George M. Tuttle, Seizure of Gey and Strass, 83d 

Div Combat Interv file. 
588 

353d Division made the villages keystones 

of their defense. 

General Macon expected to take Gey 

and Strass in one swift stroke; indeed, the 

5th Armored Division was scheduled to 

join the operation before nightfall of D 

Day, 10 DecemberY Each regiment was 

to employ a battalion just before dawn, 

one to- advance astride a dirt road leading 

from the west into Gey, the other along 

another unimproved road winding northeast through a patch of woods, past the 

settlement of Schafberg, thence to Strass. 

Each regiment would have to depend at 

first upon a narrow, muddy supply route 

closely embraced at some points by woods. 

Veterans of earlier fighting at Merode, at 

Huertgen, and at Schmidt might have 

looked upon the prospect with some degree of alarm. 

Conscious of the need to get into Gey 

and Strass before daylight provided the 

enemy observation on open fields near 

the villages, the two attacking infantry 

battalions moved swiftly. On the left, 

troops of the 33 I st Infantry picked their 

way over deeply buried antitank mines, 

skirted unoccupied but booby-trapped 

trenches, and reached Gey shortly after 

dawn. The battalion of the 330th Infantry moved with equal success through 

the woods toward Schafberg, bypassed 

that settlement, and continued to Strass. 

Both battalions got into the villages. 

In Gey the Germans fought tenaciously 

from house to house so that reduction of 

the village became a slow, systematic 

proposition. In Strass, the occupants 

gave up more readily, but an hour later 

they counterattacked with about a company of infantry supported by tanks or 

assault guns. 

17 See messages in 83d Div G-2-G-3 JnI, 10 

Dec 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

y 

MEN OF THE 3 31sT I NFANTRY advance 

on Gey. 

In both Gey and Strass, the Americans 

needed tanks-in Gey to tip the balance 

between infantry forces of about equal 

size, in Strass to halt the counterattack. 

Complexity and vexation entered the 83d 

Division's operation when in midmorning 

of 10 December attached tanks of the 

744th Tank Battalion first tried to get 

forward. 

On the dirt road to Gey three tanks 

soon lost tracks in the antitank mine field 

through which the infantry had passed 

safely. They blocked the road. Through 

this day and the next engineers attempted 

to clear both this road and a main 

highway leading northeast from Grosshau 

into Gey. Observed German fire severely 

hampered the work. The dirt road was 

so full of shell fragments that mine 

detectors were of little use. On both 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

roads the engineers might deem a mine 

field cleared, only to watch in consternation as the lead tank would strike an 

undiscovered mine. The Germans in the 

meantime strengthened their garrison in 

Gey with infantry reinforcements. On 1 1 

December, the 331st Infantry commander, 

Col. Robert H. York, also sent infantry 

reinforcements. The result was a stalemate. 

First efforts to get tanks to Strass 

proved more successful. An entire tank 

company began the trip, but one platoon 

apparently took a wrong turn, ventured 

into enemy territory, and was annihilated. 

The rest made it. Yet in passing, the 

tank tracks cut deeply into the muddy 

dirt road so that many doubted if other 

vehicles would be able to follow. 

As night came on 10 December, Strass 

was secure, though the Germans remained 

in close contact at some points, particularly along a half-mile stretch between 

Strass and Gey where they denied any 

liaison between the Americans in the two 

villages. Because of "traffic problems," 

presumably in moving through the Huertgen Forest to Grosshau and Kleinhau, 

the 5th Armored Division commander, 

General Oliver, decided to wait until the 

next day before joining the push. 

After darkness, the Germans resorted 

to an old Huertgen Forest trick of infiltration. Along the wooded portion of the 

supply route to Strass, near Schafberg, 

they emplaced several antitank guns. 

Into Schafberg, which had not been 

cleared of Germans even though American tanks had passed through, they thrust 

infantry reinforcements. The American 

battalion in Strass was, in effect, cut off. 

The 83d Division commander, General 

Macon, insisted nevertheless that armor 

could move over the road to Strass on 1 1 

589 

December. "The road is about as open 

as we can get it," he told General Oliver. 

"We can't keep out the snipers." 18 A 

commander like General Oliver, who less 

than three weeks before along the 

Germeter-Huertgen highway had seen 

what premature commitment could do to 

one of his combat commands, could be 

excused a measure of trepidation about a 

situation that appeared to be shaping up 

the same way. He discussed the matter 

with the corps commander, General Collins. Having checked with General 

Macon, Collins assured the armored 

commander that the road was open. "I 

told General Oliver," the corps commander said, "to go on ahead." 

By daylight of II December, however, 

General Macon had decided, "We may 

have more to do than we anticipated." A 

new counterattack had hit Strass just 

before dawn; though contained, it made 

for intense fighting through much of the 

morning. More accurate reports of enemy strength along the road through 

Schafberg had prompted the 330th Infantry commander, Col. Robert T. Foster, 

to commit a fresh battalion to clear the 

road. The armored commander, General 

Oliver, decided nevertheless to proceed as 

planned. "Our going down there," he 

told General Macon,"ought to at least 

complicate their job of going in against 

you very severely [at StrassJ." 

Since no one even presumed that either 

a road to or a path through Gey was clear, 

no plans were made for immediate commitment of any but one combat command. This was CCB (Colonel Cole). 

The armor was to pass beyond Schafberg 

to a wooded knoll a mile to the east 

18 This and subsequent direct quotes are from 

8gd Div G-2-G-g Jnl, 10-11 Dec 44. See 

also Ltr, Macon to OCMH, 10 Aug 56. 
590 

(Hill 266), then to turn northeast against 

the village of Bergheim, and finally to 

occupy the Hemgen Berg (Hill 253) on 

the west bank of the Roer. The column 

actually was not to pass through Strass, 

though movement east from Schafberg 

obviously would be impossible if the 

enemy still held Strass. 

In recognition of the fluid situation 

along the route to Schafberg, mounted 

armored infantry led the column. The 

infantry still was several hundred yards 

short of Schafberg when small arms fire 

and contact with the battalion of the 

330th Infantry, which was attempting to 

clear the road, prompted an order to 

dismount. Though CCB's infantry joined 

an attack toward Schafberg, the Germans when night came still were holding 

the settlement and effectively blocking the 

road, The fight had cost CCB 150 

casualties. 

Meanwhile, in Strass, the Germans had 

counterattacked a third time. Again 

American infantry and tanks beat them 

off, but the small force in Strass obviously 

was in a bad way. In two days the 

infantry battalion had run through four 

commanders: one killed, one missing, and 

two wounded. About sixty casualties 

had accumulated and were badly in need 

of medical supplies. No one had food or 

water. Ammunition was running low. 

Only seven tanks remained. Though a 

ten-man patrol carrying a few supplies 

broke through to Strass during the night 

of I I December, the battalion in the 

village needed more help than that. 

To the River 

On the third day of the attack, on 12 

December, the two regiments at Gey and 

Strass renewed their efforts to clear roads 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

into the villages and enable the 5th 

Armored Division to move. In' the meantime, on the 83d Division's extreme left 

wing, more than a mile and a half 

northwest of Gey, a third regiment began 

to attack. 

This was the 329th Infantry, commanded by Col. Edwin B. Crabill, which 

did not complete relief of 4th Division 

troops in its sector until I I December. 

So removed from the rest of the 83d 

Division was this regiment at first that 

the corps commander contemplated attachment to the adjacent 9th Division, 

though later developments prompted reconsideration and instead a squadron of 

the 4th Cavalry Group was assigned to 

bridge the gap between the regiment and 

the rest of the division. 19 The 329th 

Infantry was to advance along axial Route 

U through Hof Hardt, northeast to the 

village of Guerzenich, thence east through 

another village, Roelsdorf, to the Roer at 

Dueren. 

Attacking through woods toward Hof 

Hardt in midmorning of 12 December, 

troops of the 329th Infantry quickly 

experienced some of the difficulties of 

Huertgen Forest fighting: tree bursts, 

extensive mine fields, and problems of 

control. The fresh regiment nevertheless 

gained Hof Hardt soon after midday and 

by dark had secured a line of departure 

along the skirt of the forest for continuing 

the attack to Guerzenich. 

On 13 December, behind an effective 

smoke screen, a battalion of the 329th 

Infantry gained Guerzenich by noon. 

Thereby the regiment had outpaced the 

adjacent gth Division's 39th Infantry in 

the neighboring village of Derichsweiler. 

So impressed by this success was the 

1983d Div AAR, Dec 44, and G-2-G-3 

Jnl, 13 Dec 44. 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

division commander, General Macon, that 

he directed the regiment to move the next 

day south against Birgel, a village that 

originally had been assigned to the 33 1st 

Infantry. 

In the meantime, at Gey and Strass, 

the situation had taken a slow tum for the 

better. Behind a flail tank borrowed 

from the 5th Armored Division, a covey of 

tanks from the attached 744th Tank 

Battalion finally gained Gey during late 

afternoon of 12 December over the main 

road from Grosshau. Reduction of the 

stubborn resistance in the village now 

could be but a question of time. On the 

road to Strass, the 330th Infantry maneuvered one company after another 

against the bottleneck of Schafberg. Constant pressure of infantry and artillery 

gradually relaxed the enemy's hold. 

By mid afternoon of 12 December 

Schafberg was clear, though reinforcements still could not reach Strass because 

German self-propelled guns controlled a 

portion of the supply route where it 

crossed open fields south of the village. 

The only relief afforded the Americans in 

Strass during daylight was provided by 

artillery liaison planes from which pilots 

dropped medical supplies and chocolate 

D rations. Yet this was a minor delay; 

for as night cut the enemy's observation, 

no time was lost in sending into the 

village reinforcements, supplies, and evacuation vehicles for the wounded. 

The condition of the battalion which 

had fought for Strass was indicative of 

another resemblance between fighting 

here and earlier combat deep within the 

Huertgen Forest. Slightly more than 

two reinforced rifle companies had reached 

Strass on IO December; when relief 

arrived the night of 12 December, I So 

men remained. In three days, the 83d 

591 

Division "had lost almost a thousand men, 

primarily in two regiments. Even CCB's 

brief commitment on I I December had 

cost ISO men. Perhaps the most surprising losses were those incurred by the 

330th and 331st Infantry Regiments even 

before start of the attack. During five 

days of relatively static warfare while 

awaiting D Day, the two regiments had 

taken 472 casualties. 

A road at last available through Schafberg to Strass, a second attempt to send 

the 5th Armored Division's CCB eastward 

toward the Roer now was possible. This 

time the armored commander, General 

Oliver, wanted to wait until his second 

combat command might attack simultaneously through Gey. During the afternoon of 13 December, he conferred with 

the corps commander, General Collins, 

and the 83d Divi~ion commander, General 

Macon, to co-ordinate plans for the next 

day. 

The entire southern half of the VII 

Corps zone was to come alive early on 14 

December with attacks by two infantry 

regiments and two combat commands. 

On the extreme left, the 329th Infantry 

was to continue to clear Guerzenich en 

route to the Roer while at the same time 

moving south against Birge!. The 331st 

Infantry was to attack northeast from 

Gey, cross-country in the direction of 

Berzbuir and Lendersdorf, which lie between Birgel and the Roer. With a battalion of the 33 I st Infantry attached, 

CCA was to move east from Gey to the 

village of Kufferath and eventually to 

Hill 2 I I on the west bank of the Roer. 

Augmented by a battalion of the 330th 

Infantry, CCB was to follow the original 

plan of attacking east from Schafberg and 

Strass against Hill 266; thence to Bergheim, and finally to the Hemgen Berg 
592 

(Hill 253). The average distance from 

lines of departure to the Roer was about 

two miles. 

On 14 December resistance varied in 

intensity in relation to the nature of the 

terrain. On the left, the 329th Infantry 

had put the Huertgen Forest behind and 

emerged on the Roer plain. By nightfall 

this regiment had cleared Guerzenich and 

occupied much of Birgel. 

At Birgel, surrender of a battalion of 

the 47th Volks Grenadier Division at the 

first shot created for the Germans a critical 

situation not recognized on the American 

side. The capitulation severed contact 

between the LXXXI and LXXIV Corps, 

thereby endangering the so-called Dueren 

bridgehead at the very moment when the 

final shifts and assemblies for the Ardennes counteroffensive were being made. 

To remedy the situation, General von 

Zangen, commander of the Fifteenth 

Army, widened the LXXXI Corps sector 

to include Birgel and ordered the village 

retaken. 20 

At dusk the Germans counterattacked 

at Birgel with infantry supported by six 

assault guns. A machine gun squad 

leader in Company M, Sgt. Ralph G. 

Neppel, was largely responsible for driving 

off one of the assault guns and twenty 

accompanying infantrymen. When a 

round from the assault gun wounded 

Sergeant Neppel's entire squad and 

severed one of his legs below the knee, the 

sergeant dragged himself back to his 

position on his elbows, remounted his gun 

and killed the remaining enemy riflemen. 

Stripped of infantry protection, the German vehicle withdrew. Sergeant Neppel 

20 LXXXI Corps, Befehle Gen. Kdo. an Diu., 

uom 1.-31.12.44; Erfahrungs berichte 23.10.-30. 

12.44; Befehle H. Gr. u. Armee, order, Fifteenth 

Army to LXXXI Corps, 0330, 14 Dec 44· 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

subsequently received the Medal of Honor. 

In the center of this portion of the· VII 

Corps zone, where patches of forest still 

existed but where the plain was becoming 

more evident, the 331st Infantry and 

CCA found the going somewhat more 

tedious; nevertheless, as night came, they 

held a sharp rise overlooking Berzbuir and 

had drawn up on three sides of Kufferath. 

On the right, in a sector of broken and 

constricted terrain more nearly like the 

Huertgen Forest, CCB ran into serious 

problems. 

Because of the muddy, deep-rutted 

road through the woods to Schafberg, 

CCB's tanks could not get into position 

during the night of 13 December for an 

early morning attack. Infantry alone 

was to strike for the first objective, Hill 

266, a mile east of Schafberg. Artillery 

first was to fire selected concentrations 

before H Hour, then to create a rolling 

barrage. Moving before dawn, CCB's 

15th Armored Infantry was to drive east 

from Schafberg while the attached battalion of the 330th Infantry pushed 

southeast from Strass. The battalions 

were to converge on the hill just at daylight with the specific mission of eliminating at least eight known German antitank 

guns. 

The infantry had not long to wait 

before discovering that the enemy on Hill 

266 was entrenched too deeply to be 

silenced by the artillery preparation. 

Further artillery concentrations, including 

a TOT in midmorning, were to no avail. 

A strafing and bombing mission in early 

afternoon also failed to help. Although 

tanks tried to get forward, they were too 

late to get the drive going again before 

nightfall. 

General Oliver· could not have been 

deeply concerned about CCB's inability to 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

advance, because CCA's push to Kufferath had provided an obvious opportunity 

to outflank the resistance from the north. 

This the Germans too must have noted, 

for on 15 December their defenses folded. 

Both the 5th Armored Division's combat 

commands encountered unexpectedly light 

opposition. CCA took Kufferath early 

and by 0830 held the high ground along 

the river. Its main losses were four tanks 

knocked out by self-propelled guns roaming near the river. On Hill 2D6, CCB 

found abandoned weapons and deserted 

trenches. Bergheim was in hand by dark, 

and the Hemgen Berg (253) fell early in 

the morning of 16 December. 

After a flurry of concern on 16 December about possible German counterattack 

in conjunction with the enemy's surprising 

move in the Ardennes, the armor and the 

83d Division the next day began a mop-up 

process to eliminate a few remaining 

pockets of resistance west of the Roer. 

Southeast of the 5th Armored Division's 

CCB, the 4th Cavalry Group lent assistance. In contrast to the collapse on 

15 December, the enemy now defended 

most of the pockets stanchly. As had 

been the case farther north on the Roer 

plain, enemy guns on higher ground east 

of the Roer were a constant menace. 

Nevertheless, by Christmas Day, the west 

bank of the river, from positions of the V 

Corps at the eastern end of the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge to outposts of the 

XIII Corps twenty-four air-line miles 

away at Linnich, would be free of the 

enemy. 

Though offensive action would continue at several points in the VII Corps 

zone through Christmas Day, the corpsand thus, the First Army-for all practical 

purposes had reached the Roer by the 

end of 16 December. It had taken 

593 

thirty-one days to move approximately 

seven miles. At one time or another, 

seven divisions (less one combat command of armor), representing an authorized strength of approximately 100,000 

men, had participated. During the 

course of the drive, the corps had incurred 

8,550 nonbattle casualties and 15,908 

battle casualties, including 2,448 killed.21 

The casualties of the V Corps, which 

fought for eighteen days to gain the Roer 

on a limited front, were also a part of the 

cost of the November offensive to the 

First Army. The V Corps employed actively an infantry division, a ranger battalion, and an armored combat command, 

a force representing an authorized 

strength of about 20,000 men. About 

2,800 of these were lost in battle, while 

1,200 became nonbattle casualties. Total 

losses for the First Army in the drive to 

the Roer thus reached approximately 

28,000 men. 

Artillery ammunition expenditures were 

high, despite scarcities in supply. During 

the period 1-16 December, for example, 

when artillery pieces available to the VII 

Corps were less than in earlier stages of 

the drive, divisional and corps artillery 

within the VII Corps fired 258,779 

21 See cumulative casualty statistics in VII 

Corps FO and Battle Casualties file, Dec 44. 

Breakdown by division: 

Battle Killed Nonbattle 

Total __ IS ,908 2,448 8,55 0 ._--

1St Div ________________ 3,408 354 2.216 

3d Armd Div ___________ 436 94 6r4 

4th Div ________________ 4,149 432 1,588 

5th Armd Div 

(-CCR) _____________ 575 70 223 

9th Div ________________ 1.180 183 1,050 

83d Div ________ 1.95 I 589 790 

I04th Div* _____________ 4,209 726 2,069 

* Only division of the seven to be committed 

actively during the entire thirty-one days. 
594 

rounds. Artillery strength was greatest 

during late November when the First 

Army employed 526 light guns, 156 

mediums, and 108 heavies, a total of 790 

field artillery pieces.22 

In armor, the First Army actively employed at one time or another during the 

course of the Roer drive two armored 

divisions and six separate medium tank 

battalions, a total of approximately 700 

tanks. Of these, 240 were listed as 

"losses." 23 

'Vhen the offensive had opened on 16 

November, the First Army had been 

looking beyond the Roer to the Rhine. 

A month later the troops and their commanders must have been gratified to gain 

the Roer, which originally had been an 

intermediate objective. Though full realization of the meaning of the enemy's 

stubborn resistance was not to come until 

later in December when the extent of the 

Ardennes counteroffensive became known, 

this had been a German defensive victory, 

or, perhaps more accurately, a successful 

delaying action on a grand scale. If the 

VII Corps or any corps in this region had 

achieved a breakthrough, the enemy 

either could not have launched his counteroffensive or would have been forced to 

a drastic alteration in plans. 

The fighting west of the Roer had not 

been without impact upon the counteroffensive, despite lack of a breakthrough. 

In pnsoners alone, for example, the 

22 Tabulation of rounds fired made from VII 

Corps AAR, Dec 44; Field Artillery Firing 16-23 

Nov, FUSA AAR, Nov 44. 

23 FUSA Rpt, Vol. 2, Annex 6, p. 158. 

Whether temporarily or permanently lost was not 

recorded. This figure covers the entire months 

of November and December, though most losses 

presumably occurred during the period 16 November-16 December. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Germans had lost to the First Army 

upwards of 13,000 men.24 Against the 

VII Corps they had found it necessary to 

commit progressively seven divisions, an 

impressive number even though their 

strengths averaged no more than about 

6,000 men. Hundreds of individual replacements and numbers of small units 

also were involved. Before start of the 

attack, for example, strength of the enemy 

opposite the VII Corps was estimated at 

13,300 men; by early December, despite 

battlefield attrition, the number had risen 

to an estimated 2 1,800. Though any 

estimate of enemy losses is hazardous, 

German battle and nonbattle casualties 

opposite the First Army during the period 

probably approximated those of the First 

Army-something like 28,000. 

As the First and Ninth Armies had 

been nearing the Roer, plans for clearing 

one remaining sector of the river's west 

bank still were under discussion. This 

sector was a British responsibility, a triangle of generally marshy land between 

the Maas and the Roer short of the 

confluence of the two rivers at Roermond. 

Because of the tedious process of clearing 

the Germans from the west bank of the 

Maas, the British to this point had been 

unable to develop their intentions in the 

triangle.25 Though Field Marshal Montgomery planned for the 30 Corps to begin 

the operation on 12 or 13 December, he 

saw no hope of getting started on time 

2{ 12th A Gp Weekly Intell Summaries, NovDec 44, 12th A Gp G-2 AAR. 

25 The intentions are evident from M-534, 2 I 

A Gp General Operational Situation and Directive, 2 Nov 44, 12th A Gp Military Objectives, 

371.3, II, and from Notes on the Operations of 

2 I Army Group, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945, Sec. 

6, p. 4 I, an official British document, copy in 

World War II Records Division, National Archives. 
THE APPROACHES TO DUEREN 

unless the ground dried out considerably.26 

Allied commanders at this point actually were less concerned about this minor 

operation than about renewing the push 

beyond the Roer to the Rhine. In a 

meeting attended by Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley at Maastricht on 7 

December, the commanders discussed a 

plan for continuing the main push about 

I January. The Second British Army 

was to drive southeastward from Nijmegen between the Maas and the Rhine 

while the First and Ninth Armies crossed 

the Roer and at least one of the two 

turned north to meet the British. The 

Third Army presumably was to be closing 

to the Rhine also, whereupon General 

Eisenhower would send two gigantic 

thrusts across the river: the 2 I Army 

Group and the Ninth Army north of the 

Ruhr and the First and Third Armies 

south of the Ruhr.27 

26 Notes on Meeting at Maastricht on 7.12. 

1944, dtd 8 Dec, filed 12 Dec, SHAEF SGS 

381, II. 

27 Ibid. See also, SHAEF G-3 to SHAEF 

595 

As the days passed and no prospect of 

dry ground appeared, it became increas'-

ingly evident that Montgomery might 

have to move the 30 Corps northward for 

the main drive between the Maas and the 

Rhine before clearing the triangle west of 

the Roer. It looked more and more as if 

the job would fall to the Ninth Army. 

Insisting on the need for another division, 

General Bradley nevertheless agreed to the 

assignment, though he estimated it would 

be 10 January before he could get around 

to it because of the need to take the Roer 

River Dams. Bradley suggested that the 

main attack would have to be postponed 

to 15 January.28 

As events developed, the entire discussion was for the moment academic. No 

decision had been made when on 16 

December the Germans struck III the 

Ardennes. 

CofS, sub: SCAEF Letter to General Bradley 15 

Dec 44; SHAEF G-3 to SHAEF CofS, sub: 

Future Operations, 12 Dec 44, both in SHAEF 

SGS 381, II. 

28 SHAEF G-3 to SHAEF CofS, sub: Future 

Operations, 12 Dec 44, SHAEF 381, II. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

Objective: the Roer River Dams 

The Neglected Objective 

While American troops were approaching the Roer in late November and early 

December, concern was mounting in 

command circles about the obstacle that 

remained before sizable forces might cross 

the river with reasonable safety. This 

obstacle was the neglected objective, the 

dams on the upper reaches of the Roer 

which the Germans might employ to 

produce flood waters to isolate any force 

that had crossed the Roer. 

By late November, tactical air headquarters had begun to dispatch reconnaissance flights over the dams almost 

daily.1 Intelligence officers pored over 

aerial photographs: any indication of 

demolitions? significant change in water 

level? marked increase in rate of discharge over the spillways? Message after 

message about the state of the dams 

reached headquarters at almost every 

echelon of command. Corps and division 

commanders warned their units to be 

prepared to evacuate low-lying portions 

of the Roer valley. Noting a sharp rise 

in the river, commanders in at least one 

instance feared the worst until a quick 

reconnaissance flight revealed that unusually heavy rainfall and not destruction 

of the dams was the cause. 2 

1 See FUSA G-3 Tac Jnl and file from about 

16 Nov through mid-Dec. 

2 Almost all corps and division journals for this 

period contain numerous references to the dams. 

The American command had indicated 

the first firm appreciation of the genuine 

value of the Roer River Dams to the 

Germans when on I I November both 

First and Ninth Army had directed no 

advance beyond the Roer "except on 

Army order." 3 Even at that point and 

not for almost a month thereafter was any 

scheme revealed for taking the dams by 

ground assault, despite the fact that the 

dams were a two-edged sword. If American hands had controlled the spillways, 

those Germans west of the Roer who 

subsequently made such a fight of it in the 

Huertgen Forest and on the Roer plain 

could have been denied reinforcement 

and supply and subjected to defeat in 

detail in the same manner that the Germans anticipated should American troops 

cross to the east bank. 4 

Perhaps the explanation for the sins of 

ommission that made the sobriquet "neglected objective" applicable to the dams 

lay in the great expectations that had 

accompanied start of the November offenSIve. Perhaps it was as chroniclers of 

Note in particular FUSA G-3 Tac file, 25-26 

Nov 44. 

3 On 18 December, when a six-man patrol 

crossed the Roer on a partially demolished bridge 

at Dueren, the 83d Division asked approval to 

reinforce the patrol, presumably to establish a 

bridgehead. Permission was refused. 83d Div 

G-2-G-3 J nl, 18 Dec 44, and AAR. 

4 The 12th Army Group engineer hints at this 

possibility in Summary of the Possibii'ities of the 

Military Use of the Roer River Reservoir System, 

2 Nov 44, 12th A Gp Misc Log. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 597 

the Ninth Anny put it later, that the 

American command anticipated a rapid 

advance which might produce capture of 

the dams in the natural course of events. 

"The progress made by First Anny ... did 

not measure up to expectations, however . . . . Since the dams were not 

quickly overrun, ... the possibility that 

the enemy would make good tactical use 

of the waters impounded by the dams 

became a matter for the most serious 

consideration." 5 

This explanation might well have been 

correct up to the point when it became 

obvious that the First and Ninth Armies 

were to achieve no rapid sweep to the 

Roer River. After that time, delay in 

launching a ground attack against the 

dams could be more correctly attributed 

to a hope that the dams might be 

breached from the air and the threat of 

controlled flooding thereby eliminated. If 

bombs could break the Urft Dam, upstream from the massive, earthen Schwammenauel Dam, the water level in the 

Schwammenauel reservoir might be raised 

to a point near the crest of the earthen 

dam, whereupon bombs might' dig deep 

enough into the earth to get a small flow 

of water moving across the top of the 

dam. Erosion would do the rest. 6 

This kind of thinking was not without 

precedent. During October General Patton's Third Army had faced a similar 

problem with a dam which impounded 

waters of the Etang de Lindre near Metz. 

The Etang de Lindre fed the Seille River, 

which ran through American lines. 

French engineers of the seventeenth century had built the dam as a cog in the 

defenses of Metz. In German hands this 

dam could have been used in much the 

5 NUSA Opns, IV, Pt. II, 206. 

6 Ibid. 

same manner as it was feared the Roer 

River Dams might be employed, that is, 

to flood the Seille and isolate American 

units east of the river. But on 20 October two squadrons of P-47's had achieved 

a fifteen-yard breach in the dam and 

removed the threat. Though the dam 

on the Etang de Lindre was considerably 

smaller than the Schwammenauel, key 

dam in the Roer system, it was of earth 

construction like the Schwammenauel. 7 

The chief proponent of the scheme to 

bomb the Roer River Dams was the 

ground commander most directly concerned with eliminating the dams, General 

Hodges. At least as early as 18 N ovember, the First Army commander began 

studying the dams with an eye toward 

air bombardment and on 22 November 

urged General' Bradley to support the 

plan. 8 When the G-3 for Air at 12th 

Army Group passed the request to 

SHAEF, the air officers at Eisenhower's 

headquarters allotted the project to the 

Royal Air Force, which specialized in the 

kind of low-level, precision bombing that 

would be required. The successful RAF 

attack on the Moehne Dam in the Ruhr 

in 1943, for example, came readily to 

mind. Yet apparently after consulting 

with the RAF, SHAEF air officers the 

next day, 23 November, reported the 

proposal impracticable. On the other 

hand, the air officers agreed that if the 

12th Army Group considered breaching 

the dams "of paramount importance," 

SHAEF Air would "reconsider the matter." 9 

7 See Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 295-

96. 

8 Msg, 1545, 18 Nov 44, FUSA G-3 Tac file, 

Nov 44; Sylvan Diary entry of 22 Nov 44· 

9 Tel Convs, G-3 Air 12th A Gp, with G-3 

Air NUSA, 22 and 23 Nov 44, NUSA G-3 Jnl 

file, 19-25 Nov 44. 
598 

A week later, on 30 November, General 

Hodges learned with immense satisfaction 

that the RAF had finally consented to try 

to blow the dams,10 but his hopes that 

this would solve the problem were dashed 

during the next few days by unfavorable 

weather. On 30 November and the first 

two days of December, planned attacks 

against the dams had to be canceled 

because of the weather/ 1 while on 3 

December 190 aircraft made the flight 

over the dams but failed to attack, presumably because of poor visibility. The 

next day 200 aircraft flew over the target, 

but only 25 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos actually attacked. Damage to 

the dams was discouragingly negligible. 

Another attack on 5 December was canceled because of poor visibilityP 

On 5 December SHAEF took another 

look at the question of breaching the dams 

from the air. The commander of the 

Royal Air Force Bomber Command, Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, objected to the project on the theory that 

irreplaceable personnel were being wasted 

in an effort foredoomed to failure. Yet 

so impressed by now with the importance 

of the target was the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, that he 

ordered the attacks to be pushed over all 

objections.13 

Three days later, on 8 December, 205 

aircraft dropped 797 tons of bombs on the 

10 Sylvan Diary, entry of 30 Nov 44; Msg from 

CG, FUSA, 30 Nov 44, FUSA G-3 Jnl file, 

Nov 44. 

11 Msg, CG NUSA, to CG FUSA, 30 Nov 44, 

FUSA G-3 Jnl file, Nov 44; Sylvan Diary, 

entries of 1 and 2 Dec 44. 

12 Sylvan Diary, entries of 3-5 Dec 44; Ltr, 

Bradley to Montgomery, 3 Dec 44, 12th A Gp 

Military Objectives, 371.3, III; NUSA Opns, pp. 

20 7-08. 

13 NUSA Opns, pp. 207-08; Eisenhower to 

CCS, S-69334, 3 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Drft and Schwammenauel Dams and on 

the regulating dam between the two, the 

Paulushof. Though two hits were registered on the Drft and 18 on the 

Schwammenauel, neither dam was broken. 

Yet for all the frustration and negligible 

results involved thus far, the First Army 

commander, General Hodges, remained 

firm in his belief that the dams could be 

broken from the air. A thousand bombers a day, Hodges believed, "should be 

sent over until the dam is broken." 14 

After another three-day wait occasioned 

by the weather, 230 Lancasters again 

attacked the dams. Of these, 178 concentrated against the D rft with 1,065 tons 

of bombs; but results again were discouragmg. The bombs cut the top of 

the dam at the south end, allowing some 

water to spill through, but not enough. 

Although the RAF consented to two more 

tries, on 13 and 14 December, weather 

again forced cancellation. The air effort 

had failed. 15 

Even while the air program continued, 

General Hodges, for all his insistence that 

the dams could be breached from the air, 

was making plans for a ground attack. 

Early in December he directed General 

Gerow's V Corps to seize the dams. 

General Gerow issued his field order for 

the attack on 7 December.16 The target 

date was 13 December. 

That the V Corps should make the 

attack to seize the dams was in keeping 

both with the geographical location of the 

corps and with the First Army's original 

14 Sylvan Diary, entry of 9 Dec 44. A detailed 

"first phase interpretation" of results of the 8 

December strike may be found in VII Corps G-2 

Per Rpt, 8 Dec 44, VII Corps G-2 file, Dec 44· 

15 NUSA Opns, pp. 207-08; Sylvan Diary, 

entries of 1 I, 13, and 14 Dec 44· 

1G V Corps FO 33, 7 Dec 44, V Corps G-3 

Jnl file, 8 Dec 44. 
OBJECTIVE: 

THE ROER RIVER DAMS 

V CORPS 13-15 December 1944 

nnTnTITnT U.S. LINE, 13 DEC 

~~,..... U.S. LINE, 15DEC 

WEST WALL 

Contour Interval 100 meters 

o 2 ~MfLES 

L...i..' ri ',,,,"r,+I---,...L-,---,,,.L' __ ...J' I 0 3 KIL.OMETERS 

MAP 9 

IJ. Holme5, J~ 
600 

broad plan for the November offensive. 

Holding a twenty-five-mile front from the 

Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge southwest, 

south, and southeast to a point beyond 

Camp d'Elsenborn, the V Corps was in 

a position to launch concentric attacks 

against the dams from three directions, 

from north, west, and southwest. (M ap 

9) Since General Hodges' order to the 

corps at the start of the November offensive had been to be prepared to drive 

northeast alongside the VII Corps to the 

Rhine at Bonn, a move to the dams would 

be a step in the right direction. The commitment of north-wing elements of the 

corps in late November to assist the VII 

Corps in clearing the Huertgen Forest 

and the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge had 

in no way altered the original broad plan 

for the V Corps. 

The terrain in front of the V Corps was 

as forbidding militarily as anything that 

had been encountered during the course 

of the Siegfried Line Campaign. Four 

good-size streams and numerous tributaries cut the sector into a complex quilt 

of sharply incised terrain compartments. 

Indeed, so precipitous are the hillsides 

and gorges in this region that terrain well 

may have been a major deterrent to earlier 

ground attack against the dams. A force 

moving against the dams from the north 

would have to cross the Kall River gorge 

and surmount the KommerscheidtSchmidt ridge, features already notorious 

as a result of the 28th Division's tragic 

experience in early November. Attacking 

from the west, troops would have to conquer two bands of pillbox defenses in the 

Monschau Corridor, which had stymied 

the overextended 9th Division in September. A force approaching the dams 

from the southwest would encounter another part of the West Wall secreted 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

within the Monschau Forest, a belt of 

woodland northeast of Camp d'Elsenborn, 

indistinguishable from the dreaded Huertgen Forest. 

Strength available to General Gerow 

for the attack seemed more than sufficient, despite defensive responsibilities 

involved in his elongated front. In the 

north, the 8th Division, 2d Ranger Battalion, and CCR of the 5th Armored 

Division were putting the finishing 

touches to capture of the BrandenbergBergstein ridge and held a line southwest 

along the Kall River into the Huertgen 

Forest at Deadman's Moor (Todten 

Bruch). The I02d Cavalry Group and a 

regiment of the Ist Division, the latter 

only temporarily attached to the corps in 

a defensive role, faced the Monschau 

Corridor. From the Hoefen-Alzen ridge 

near Monschau southeast through the 

Monschau Forest to the corps right 

boundary, a new division, the 99th (Maj. 

Gen. Walter E. Lauer), held a "quiet 

sector" about twelve miles wide with a 

series of battalion and company strongpoints. Made available specifically for 

the attack was another new division, the 

78th (Maj. Gen. Edwin P. Parker, Jr.), 

and the veteran 2d Division (Maj. Gen. 

Walter M. Robertson), which had been 

holding a portion of the inactive Ardennes 

front after having executed major assignments in Normandy and Brittany. A 

combat command of the inexperienced 

9th Armored Division subsequently was 

attached as a corps reserve. Beyond 

normal divisional artillery, General Gerow 

possessed thirteen corps field artillery battalions of almost all calibers ranging as 

high as 8-inch and 240-mm. howitzersP 

17 Unless otherwise noted, material at corps 

level is from V Corps Operations in the ETO, 

pp. 32 9-41. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 601 

In planning the corps maneuver, General Gerow decided to eschew the possibility of three concentric attacks at first in 

favor of a double envelopment by two 

divisions. The depleted condition of the 

8th Division in the north, which might 

have formed a third prong, and the fact 

that the fighting for the BrandenbergBergstein ridge had drawn enemy strength 

to the north no doubt influenced this 

decision. 

The north wing of the envelopment was 

to be formed by the 78th Division. Attacking through the Monschau Corridor, 

the 78th first was to clear the pillbox- and 

village-studded plateau which marks the 

start of the corridor, then to continue 

northeast along the Strauch-Schmidt 

highway through extremities of the 

Huertgen Forest to Schmidt. From 

Schmidt the 78th Division might come 

upon the Roer River Dams from the 

north. 

In the meantime, the 2d Division, 

as primary component of the south wing 

of the envelopment, was to attack northward into the Monschau Forest from 

twin Belgian border villages of KrinkeltRocherath, southeast of Camp d'Elsenborn. The 2d Division first was to break 

a West Wall strongpoint at a road junction marked by a customshouse and a 

forester's lodge named Wahlerscheid, 

thence to fan out in two directions, 

northwest to clear resistance opposite the 

Hoefen-Alzen ridge between the Wahlerscheid road junction and Monschau, and 

northeast along a higher ridge line, the 

Dreiborn ridge, which leads to the Roer 

River Dams. ls Perhaps III cognizance 

18 In FO 33 General Gerow directed that the 

2d Division first clear the sector opposite the 

Hoefen-Alzen ridge, then push northeast through 

Wahlerscheid along the Dreiborn ridge. The 

of the tribulations exposed flanks had 

wrought in the Huertgen Forest, General 

Gerow directed that a regiment of the 

99th Division make a limited objective 

attack within the Monschau Forest alongside the 2d Division's exposed right flank. 

The German troops holding the Monschau Corridor and the Monschau Forest 

were part of the LXVII Corps (General 

der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld), which had 

taken over the southern portion of the 

LXXIV Corps front under command of 

the Sixth Panzer Army in preparation 

for the Ardennes counteroffensive. The 

LXVII Corps sector covered some twenty 

miles from a point just south of Vossenack 

in the north to a point southeast of Camp 

d'Elsenborn in the south.19 

The Monschau Corridor was the responsibility of the 272d V olks Grenadier 

Division (commanded now by Generalleutnant Eugen Koenig). This division 

typified many of the problems the Germans faced in keeping units intact for the 

Ardennes counteroffensive. As the high 

command tried to do with all the new 

volks grenadier divisions, the 272d had 

been assigned a quiet sector while awaiting 

the call for the counteroffensive, but the 

assignment could not last. When the V 

Corps took the Brandenberg-Bergstein 

ridge, thereby threatening to cross the 

Roer, the 272d, then operating under the 

LXXIV Corps, had been the only unit at 

hand able to provide a force for counterattack. Having sent about two thirds of 

its infantry strength to Bergstein, the 

division would not get it back until 14 

plan was changed to that detailed above in a 

letter of instructions on 8 December (V Corps 

Operations in the ETO, p. 332), a logical step 

since seizure of Wahlerscheid would, in effect, 

outflank the Germans opposite the HoefenAlzen ridge. 

19 MSS # A-935, A-936, A-937 (Hitzfeld). 
602 

and 15 December, after heavy losses both 

at Bergstein and while helping deny the 

southwestern approaches to Dueren. As 

the Americans prepared to attack in the 

Monschau Corridor, the 272d was getting 

ready to regroup as the northernmost 

element of the Sixth Panzer Army and 

to participate in the counteroffensive.20 

The Hoefen-Alzen ridge and the Monschau Forest were defended by the 277th 

Volks Grenadier Division, which also was 

awaiting Ardennes action. Though the 

277th had been spared active commitment 

in the November fighting, its regiments 

were overextended after having been 

called on at intervals to extend their 

boundaries northward so that the greater 

concentration might be achieved in the 

Huertgen Forest.21 

The impending participation of both 

the 272d and 277th Divisions in the 

Ardennes counteroffensive was indicative 

of the state of flux affecting almost the 

entire front of the LXVII Corps at this 

stage in December. The target date for 

the counteroffensive was only three days 

away. On 13 December the 85th Infantry Division, a depleted unit from 

Holland, was to begin relief of that part 

of the 272d Division near Bergstein and 

the entire 89th Infantr)! Division in the 

vicinity of Vossenack, so that the latter 

might be' shored up for the counteroffensive. 22 

Like the Germans, but on a smaller 

scale, the V Corps took extraordinary 

precautions to maintain secrecy for the 

first blow, even to removing shoulderpatch insignia and obliterating unit ve20 The movements of this and other divisions 

may be traced in Luttichau, Progressive Build-up 

and Operations. 

21 ETHINT-S7 (Gersdorff). 

22 Ibid. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

hicular markings. Not until the night of 

I I December did the 78th Division relieve 

those troops which had been holding the 

face of the Monschau Corridor. Not 

until the very eve of the attack, in a 

blinding snowstorm, did the 2d Division 

arrive in assembly areas near Camp 

d'Elsenborn. On the assumption that 

secrecy had been preserved, none other 

than normal artillery fires were to precede 

the first blow. 

The Second Battle of the 

At onschau Corridor 

The leaves had been still on the trees 

when in September a regiment of the 9th 

Division first had tried to break the two 

bands of West Wall pillboxes in the 

Monschau Corridor. As the 78th Division prepared to attack across the same 

high plateau almost three months later, 

roads were icy and snow concealed 

many of the scars of the earlier fight. 

Here as much as anywhere the slow pace 

of the Siegfried Line Campaign was 

markedly evident. 

In the 78th Division's first combat 

action, only two regiments were available, 

for General Gerow had directed that the 

third shore up the adjacent 8th Division, 

in poor shape after gaining the Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge. The 78th Division's 

commander, General Parker, ordered both 

remaining regiments to participate from 

the first. On the north, the 3 loth 

Infantry was to send a battalion from 

Lammersdorf east to Rollesbroich, while 

the 309th Infantry, close alongside, was 

to move two battalions southeast from 

Hill 554 at Paustenbach to take first the 

village of Bickerath, then Simmerath. 

These two objectives in hand, the 309th 

Infantry was to mount part of a third 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 603 

battalion on attached tanks to seIze 

Kesternich, the next village to the east. 

These four villages-Rollesbroich, Bickerath, Simmerath, and Kesternich-represented the heart of the positions remaining 

to the enemy on the high plateau. Once 

these were taken, the 309th Infantry and 

an attached battalion of the 3 loth were 

to turn south and southwest to sweep 

that part of the plateau lying between 

Simmerath and the upper reaches of the 

Roer near Monschau. In the meantime, 

the 3 loth Infantry was to prepare to 

renew the assault from Rollesbroich to 

take two more villages, Strauch and 

Steckenborn, which guard the main highway runnmg northeast from the plateau 

to Schmidt.23 

As men of the 78th Division moved to 

the attack before day on 13 December, 

a soupy fog aided concealment. Under 

radio silence and without artillery preparation, they advanced almost without 

sound except for low-voiced orders and 

the crunch of snow underfoot. The early 

morning darkness was bitterly cold. 

One man stepped on a mine. Germans 

in a pillbox fired sporadically, then surrendered on the pretext that they had 

exhausted their ammumtIOn. German 

riflemen fired at isolated points along the 

line, but all in all the defense was halfhearted. A battalion of the 3 loth Infantry (Col. Earl M. Miner) had a firm 

foothold soon after daylight on a steep 

knoll overlooking Rollesbroich. Before 

noon the battalion was in the village, 

dealing with isolated resistance while 

dodging increasing shellfire as the enemy 

came to life. 

23 78th Div FO I, I I Dec 44, G-3 Jnl file, I I 

Dec 44. The story of this division is based upon 

official unit records and an accurate unit history, 

titled, after the division's nickname, Lightning 

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947). 

On the division's south wing, the story 

was much the same. Before noon one 

battalion of the 309th Infantry turned 

back the lower lip of the penetration by 

taking Bickerath, though mine fields and 

interlocking fire from pillboxes denied 

egress to higher ground south of the 

village. Despite mine fields and a stubborn strongpoint in a hamlet north of 

Simmerath, another battalion of the 309th 

Infantry gained Simmerath shortly after 

midday. 

The first objectives in hand, the 309th 

Infantry commander, Col. John G. Ondrick, mounted a company of his remaining battalion on attached tanks of the 

709th Tank Battalion and sent them 

beyond Simmerath to Kesternich. Only 

this time the enemy's machine gunners 

and mortarmen, the latter occupying 

defilade in deep draws beyond Kesternich, were fully alert. The tanks bogged 

in the soft mud while rounds from 

German antitank gU'ns cut ugly black 

patches in the snow about them. Though 

the infantrymen dismounted and fought 

forward alone, it took them all afternoon 

to gain the first houses of Kesternich. 

Because they were but one company, they 

hesitated to get involved in the sprawling 

village after dark. The rest of this company's parent battalion either had been 

held up by shellfire or had become involved with pillboxes off to the flanks. 

Though Kesternich remained out of 

reach, troops of the 78th Division on the 

night of 13 December could be encouraged by the results of their first day's 

fight. They had lost 238 men in their 

first day of battle,24 yet this was hardly 

surprising for a first fight, particularly 

when they had gained all initial objectives 

24 78th Div AAR, Dec 44. 
604 

and had registered advances up to a mile 

and a half. As expected, they had encountered the enemy's 272d V olks 

Grenadier Division. Their achievement 

of surprise against this force had been 

underscored by absence of counterattack 

all day. 

On the other hand, as the day had worn 

on, resistance had stiffened like a coil 

spring under compression. This was emphasized by the fact that in almost all 

instances the Americans controlled only 

the villages and not the pillbox-studded 

ground nearby, some of it commanding 

ground. The bulk of the two regiments 

would require most of the next two days 

for mop-up and consolidation. As others 

had learned from bitter experience, 

men of the 78th Division discovered 

early that the Germans were great ones for 

infiltrating back into captured pillboxes 

and villages. Not only that, the snow 

and cold turned the limited action into a 

battle for self-preservation. The insidious 

enemy called Trench Foot was quick to 

put in an appearance. 

While the bulk of the two regiments 

consolidated, the critical fight took place 

at the village of Kesternich. Here the 

309th Infantry commander, Colonel Ondrick, directed renewed attack on 14 

December by two battalions-his 2d 

Battalion, which had tried to get into the 

village on the first day, and the 2d 

Battalion, 3 loth Infantry, attached to the 

30 9th. 

First one, then the other, of these battalions essayed the German strongpoint. 

Attacking from the northwest, the 2d 

Battalion, 309th Infantry, failed even to 

regain the first houses which one company 

had held briefly the night before. German mortars and artillery pieces in the 

draws beyond Kesternich were particuTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

larly troublesome. Attacking from the 

west, the 2d Battalion, 3 loth Infantry, 

encountered much the same resistance. 

A platoon of accompanying tanks withdrew I after antitank fire knocked out the 

lead vehicle. Though the infantry per,-

sisted alone and at last gained the first 

houses, here the Germans stood and increased their fire. Again as night came 

the Americans were forced to withdraw. 

Apparent antidote for the German 

shelling was not lacking, for the 78th 

Division was well fixed with artillery support. In addition to normal divisional 

artillery and corps guns in general 

support, the corps commander had attached to the division two battalions of 

105-mm. howitzers (one self-propelled) 

and the bulk of a battalion of selfpropelled I 55-mm. guns.2~ Nor was the 

artillery slothful in responding to requests 

for fire. At one point eight battalions 

of divisional and corps artillery massed 

their fires on the draws beyond Kesternich. Afterward, the infantry could hear 

screams of German wounded, but the 

mortars were ready to cough again when 

the attack was renewed.26 

During the night artillerymen laid detailed plans for a concentrated fifteenminute barrage against Kesternich the 

next morning. Guns of the 709th Tank 

and 8g3d Tank Destroyer Battalions were 

to add their fire, as were the infantry 

weapons of the 2d Battalion, 309th 

Infantry, northwest of the village. The 

assault role fell to the 2d Battalion, 3 loth 

Infantry. 

At 0700 men of the 3 loth Infantry 

attacked under a noisy curtain of shellfire. 

25 Annex 6, 8 Dec 44, to V Corps FO 33, and 

Changes to Annex 6, I I Dec 44, both in V Corps 

Operations in the ETO, pp. 332-33. 

26 Lightning, p. 5 I. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 605 

MEN OF THE 2D DIVISION move through the Monschau Forest. 

For all the fire support, advance was a 

dogged proposition. Nevertheless, by 

noon, Company E had bypassed a giant 

pillbox to break into the objective. Hugging the buildings alongside the streets to 

avoid grazing fire of German machine 

guns, men of this company pushed quickly 

through the village. Mop-up they left to 

others who were to follow. 

By 1300 Company E had gained the 

eastern edge of Kesternich. Hardly had 

the men dug in when a battalion of the 

272d Division's 980th Regiment counterattacked. Though Company E repulsed 

the enemy with timely help from supporting artillery, only a shell of the original 

company remained when the action subsided. In the meantime another company 

had dug in south of Kesternich, while a 

third tried to clean out the houses. 

Though the job was complete as night 

came, the condition of the 2d Battalion, 

310th Infantry, left much to be desired. 

No rifle company could muster more than 

forty men. 

Shortly after midnight the battalion of 

the 980th Regiment came back. This 

time the Germans penetrated the village 

by exploiting gaps between the American 

companies. "Grey figures were all about, 

firing burp guns, throwing grenades." 27 

Communications to the rear went out. 

Patrols sent from other units to reach the 

battalion returned with no information. 

The situation in Kesternich obviously 

was serious. Nor was there occasion for 

27 Ibid., p. 55. 
606 

complacency elsewhere, for in three days 

these two regiments of the 78th Division 

had lost almost a thousand men, 358 

nonbattle casualties-mostly vIctims of 

trench foot-and 609 battle casualties. 

These losses left gaps in the line that 

looked more and more disturbing when 

after nightfall on 15 December prisoner 

identifications revealed the presence nearby of a new, presumably fresh German 

unit, the 326th V olks Grenadier Division. 

This was but the first in a series of 

ominous developments that were to occur 

with increasing frequency the next day, 16 

December. 

Heartbreak Crossroads 

If these events on the north wing of the 

projected double envelopment ran a minor 

gamut of military experience-from early 

success at Rollesbroich, Simmerath, and 

Bickerath to apparent setback at Kesternich-those on the south wing during the 

same three days were remarkably unvaried. Here, in the Monschau Forest 

approximately eight miles south and 

southeast of the Monschau Corridor, the 

2d Division and a regiment of the 99th 

Division experienced three days of monotonous frustration. 

Aiming first at the Wahlerscheid road 

junction, the West Wall strongpoint deep 

within the forest at the meeting point of 

the Hoefen-Alzen and Dreiborn ridges, 

the 2d Division had but one road leading 

to the first objective. This was a secondary highway running north through the 

forest into Germany from the twin Belgian 

villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath. Faced 

with this restriction, the division commander, General Robertson, had little 

choice of formation for the first leg of the 

attack other than regiments in column. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

He directed the 9th Infantry (Col. Chester 

J. Hirschfelder) to attack astride the 

road, ta.ke the Wahlerscheid road junction, then swing northwest to clear those 

Germans opposite the Hoefen-Alzen ridge. 

Following in column as far as Wahlerscheid, the 38th Infantry (Col. Francis H. 

Boos) was to be committed northeast 

from the road junction along the Dreiborn 

ridge in the direction of the Roer River 

Dams. The 23d Infantry in division reserve was to remain near Camp d'Elsenborn.28 

That part of the Monschau Forest 

through which the 9th Infantry first was 

to push was a kind of no man's land of 

snow-covered firs, hostile patrols, mines, 

and roadblocks. Though the sector belonged within the 99th Division's defensive responsibilities, that division held 

such an elongated front that defense of 

some parts had been left more to patrols 

than to fixed positions. Not for several 

miles on either side of the forest-cloaked 

road to Wahlerscheid were there any 

friendly positions in strength. The gap 

on the right of the road was of particular 

concern because the southeastward curve 

of the 99th Division's line left the sector 

open to enemy penetration from the east. 

Approaching along forest trails, the 

Germans might sever the 2d Division's 

lifeline, the lone highway to Wahlerscheid. 

2R 2d Div FO 12, IO Dec, in 2d Div G-3 Jnl 

file, Bk 2, Incl 3, Dec 44. The 2d Division 

records are in general excellent, including a 

valuable G-3 message file. A unit history entitled Combat History of the Second Infantry 

Division in World War II (Baton Rouge: Army 

and Navy Publishing Company, 1946) is not 

always accurate. One of the Army's more 

famous regular units, the 2d Division had come 

ashore on D plus 1 in Normandy and fought with 

distinction in the push to St. La, then at Brest. 

The division's nickname of Indianhead stemmed 

from its shoulder patch. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 607 

This threat had been what had 

prompted General Gerow to order a 

limited objective attack by a regiment of 

the 99th Division close alongside the 2d 

Division's right flank. The assignment 

fell to the 395 th Infantry under Col. 

A. J. Mackenzie. Since one of Colonel 

Mackenzie's battalions still was defending 

the Hoefen-Alzen ridge, the division 

commander, General Lauer, attached to 

the regiment a battalion of the neighboring 393d Infantry. On D Day the three 

battalions were to attack to occupy 

wooded high ground about a mile and a 

half southeast of Wahlerscheid around the 

juncture of the Wies and Olef Creeks in 

a portion of the forest known as the 

Hellenthaler Waldo General Lauer himself added to the assignment by directing 

another battalion of the 393d Infantry to 

seize a hill off the battalion's left flank 

which provided the enemy a choice location for enfilading fire. 

Because the forested no man's land 

between Krinkelt-Rocherath and Wahlerscheid was some three miles deep, obtaining accurate intelligence information 

before the attack was difficult. About all 

the 2d Division knew was that the 

strongpoint at Wahlerscheid was held by 

troops of the 277th V olks Grenadier Division's 99lSt Regiment. Any real estimate of enemy strength at Wahlerschcid 

or any pinpoint locations of German 

pillboxes and other positions were missing. 

This situation made it particularly difficult to plan artillery fires in support of the 

attack. 29 The artillery tried to solve the 

problem by plotting checkpoint concentrations by map, which might be shifted on 

call from infantry and forward observers 

as trouble developed. The fact that no 

20 See 2d Div Arty AAR, Dec 44. 

preparation was to precede the attack 

also alleviated the problem of unspecific 

targets. 

Looking upon the 2d Division's attack 

as the main effort of the corps maneuver, 

the corps commander had provided strong 

fire support. Attached to the 2d Division was a battalion of I05-mm. howitzers, another of 4.5-inch rockets, a battery 

of 155-mm. self-propelled guns, a company of chemical mortars, the usual 

medium tank battalion, and two battalions of tank destroyers, one selfpropelled. In addition, the 406th Field 

Artillery Group with four battalions of 

field pieces of 155-mm. caliber or larger 

was to reinforce the division's fires. The 

corps reserve-CCB, 9th Armored DiVISIOn-was attached for possible exploitation of a breakthrough, so that the 

organic artillery of this combat command 

also was available. Artillery of the 99th 

Division was reinforced with a battery of 

155-mm. guns. 

The Monschau Forest was almost uncannily silent as troops of the 9th Infantry 

moved forward o~ foot in approach march 

formation an hour after daylight on 13 

December. Because the highway was 

known to be mined, the men had to plow 

through underbrush and snow drifts on 

either side. When a partial thaw set in, 

branches of fir trees heavy with snow 

dumped their wet loads upon the men 

beneath them. In some ravmes the 

ground was so marshy that icy water 

oozed over the tops of the men's overshoes. 

"A most taxing march," someone noted 

later. 30 It would have been taxing even 

without usual combat impedimenta, and 

these men were carrying more than the 

norm. So impressed had been their 

:lO 9th Inf AAR, Dec 44. 
608 

commanders with the misfortunes of the 

28th Division when depending upon but 

one supply road at Schmidt that they had 

ordered the men to carry enough rations, 

ammunition, and antitank mines to last 

for at least twenty-four hours without 

resupply. 

At 1240 the column neared the clearing about the Wahlerscheid road junction. 

"Both battalions have dropped packs," 

Colonel Hirschfelder reported; "contact 

imminent." 31 Though occasional mortar and artillery fire had struck the 

column en route, Colonel Hirschfelder 

nourished the hope that the forest had 

concealed the size of his force, that the 

Germans anticipated approach of no more 

than patrols. Still hoping to achieve surprise, he ordered assault against Wahlerscheid by two battalions abreast without 

artillery preparation. 

The 9th Infantry faced a formidable 

position that in some respects possessed 

the strength of a small fortress. Grouped 

compactly about the road junction and 

sited to provide interlocking fires were 

machine gun and rifle positions in and 

about four pillboxes, six concrete bunkers, a forester's lodge, and a custom home. 

The forest and deep ravines formed a kind 

of moat around the entire position. 

Where trees and underbrush had encroached upon fields of fire, the Germans 

had cut them away. In some places 

rows of barbed wire entanglements stood 

six to ten deep. The snow hid a veritable 

quilt of lethal antipersonnel mines. 

It took only a matter of minutes after 

the attack began for Colonel Hirschfelder 

to determine that his hope of surprise was 

empty. The road junction bristled with 

fire. Mortar and artillery shells burst in 

31 2d Div G-3 Msg file, 13 Dec 44. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

the treetops. Exploding mines brought 

down man after man. One' after another, eight men whose job was to clear 

a narrow path for the 1st Battalion were 

killed or seriously wounded by mines. 

Bangalore torpedoes set beneath the 

barbed wire failed to ignite because fuzes 

were wet. One platoon of the 2d Battalion nevertheless pressed through five 

aprons of barbed wire before enemy fire 

at last forced a halt; yet several more 

aprons of unbreached wire lay ahead. 

As night came the weather turned 

colder. Drenched to the skin, the men 

were miserable. Their clothing froze 

stiff. Through the night they tried to 

keep warm by painfully etching some 

form of foxhole or slit trench in the 

frozen earth. 

In the woods southeast of Wahlerscheid, experience of the 99th Division's 

395th Infantry roughly paralleled that of 

the 9th Infantry. Moving northeast 

through the forest in a column of battalions to protect the 9th Infantry's right 

flank, the 395th Infantry soon after noon 

struck a line of log bunkers deep in the 

woods near the juncture of the two 

streams that split the high ground the 

regiment sought to gain. Not a dent had 

been made in this position when night 

came. Like the men at Wahlerscheid, 

those deep in the forest set to work trying 

to scoop some measure of protection from 

the frozen ground.32 

When a misty, viscous daylight came at 

Wahlerscheid the next morning, 14 December, American artillery began a systematic effort to soften the German 

32395th Inf AAR, Dec 44. See also other 

official 99th Division records and a unit history, 

Maj. Gen. Walter E. Lauer, Battle Babies (Baton 

Rouge: Military Press of Louisiana, Inc., 1951). 

From its shoulder patch, the 99th was known as 

the Checkerboard Division. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 609 

positions as a prelude to a fifteen-minute 

preparation for a new assault in midmorning. Although Colonel Hirschfelder asked 

for air attack as well, poor visibility was 

to deny close support from the air 

throughout the Wahlerscheid operation. 

Even assistance from the artillery was not 

as effective as usual because of difficulties 

in registration attributable to the dense 

forest, clinging fog, and concomitant -lack 

of specific information on enemy positions 

and batteries. In at least one instance on 

14 December, artillery fires fell short upon 

troops of the 9th Infantry. 

Repeated attempts to assault and 

to outflank the Wahlerscheid position 

through the day of 14 December ended in 

failure. This prompted a directive from 

the division commander that set the tone 

for conduct of the next day's operation. 

"Base future operations," General Robertson said, "on thorough reconnaissance, 

infiltration, and finesse. Get deliberate 

picture, then act." 33 

During the afternoon, Colonel Hirschfelder pulled back his battalions several 

hundred yards into the forest to provide 

his artillery a clear field. Throughout 

the night, patrols probed for gaps in the 

mine fields and for passage through the 

barbed wire obstacles. The next day, 

big corps guns began a bombardment. 

An attached battery of I55-mm. selfpropelled guns inched up the lone highway through the forest to pour direct 

fire against the concrete fortifications. 

Expending 287 rounds, crews of the big 

guns claimed penetration of three pillboxes, though later investigation revealed 

no material damage. 34 

As darkness fell on 15 December, the 

2d Division after three days of attack 

33 2d Div G-3 Msg file, 14 Dec 44. 

34 Ibid., 15 Dec 44, and 9th Inf AAR. 

could point to no gain against the 

Wahlerscheid strongpoint. Though the 

adjacent 395th Infantry had achieved 

considerably more success in the pillbox 

belt southeast of the road junction, this 

was a subsidiary action geared in pace to 

the attack at Wahlerscheid and offered no 

real possibility of exploitation to assist the 

main attack. Both regiments had incurred heavy losses, as much from the 

cruel elements as from enemy action. Of 

737 casualties within the 9th Infantry 

during these three days, almost 400 were 

attributable to nonbattle causes. 

All might have been gloom that third 

night except for one thin hope which 

stirred one of the battalion commanders, 

Lt. Col. Walter M. Higgins, Jr. During 

the afternoon of the second day of attack, 

14 December, a squad of Company G 

had slithered under one after another of 

the enemy's barbed wire entanglements 

until all were behind. Another squad 

had cut the wire so that a narrow fourfoot gap existed. Yet neither squad had 

been in communication with the company 

headquarters; furthermore, their company 

commander had been wounded and 

evacuated. As a result, news of the 

breach had not reached the battalion 

commander, Colonel Higgins, until long 

after both squads had withdrawn. When 

the next night came and the 9th Infantry 

was as far as ever from cracking the 

defense of Wahlerscheid, Colonel Higgins 

saw an outside chance to exploit the 

narrow gap the two squads had forged 

the day before. 

Soon after dark on 15 December Higgins sent an eleven-man patrol equipped 

with sound-powered telephone to pass 

through the gap and report on German 

strength and alertness. Though wandering errantly until joined by one of the 
610 

men who had cut the wire the day before, 

the patrol at 2130 reported an electrifying 

development. We have surrounded a 

pillbox, the word came back. The Germans apparently were unaware that anything was afoot. 

That was all Colonel Higgins was 

waiting for. Within a matter of minutes 

Company F was plodding single file 

through the gap in the wire. Higgins 

himself followed with Company E and 

took such an active part in the fighting 

that he subsequently was awarded the 

Distinguished Service Cross. By midnight the 2d Battalion held a substantial 

bridgehead within the Wahlerscheid 

strongpoint and another battalion was 

filing silently through the gap. One battalion swung northwest, the other northeast. From one position to another, the 

men moved swiftly, blowing the doors of 

pillboxes with beehive charges, killing or 

capturing the occupants, prodding sleepy 

Germans from foxholes, and capturing 

seventy-seven at one blow at the customshouse. Two hours after daylight on 16 

December even mop-up was completed, 

and the 38th Infantry already was moving 

forward to pass through the 9th Infantry's 

positions and push northeastward along 

the Dreiborn ridge toward the Roer River 

Dams. The facility with which the 9th 

Infantry in the end had conquered 

Wahlerscheid was apparent from the 

regiment's casualty list for 16 December: 

1 man killed, 1 missing, 17 wounded. 

In no small way was the local success 

attributable to the enemy's preoccupation 

with his winter counteroffensive, for prior 

assignments in the counteroffensive had 

made it necessary to garrison Wahlerscheid 

on a catch-as-catch-can basis. The 326th 

Volks Grenadier Division, scheduled to 

attack in the counteroffensive under jurisTHE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

diction of the Sixth Panzer Army's LXVII 

Corps, had begun to relieve the 277th 

V olks Grenadier Division during the night 

of 14 December. The 277th then had 

begun to shift southward to attack under 

the Sixth Panzer Army's I SS Panzer 

Corps. 

The unit which took over at Wahlerscheid was a battalion of the 326th Division's 75ISt Regiment. The unfamiliarity 

of this battalion with the defensive 

positions was invitation enough to loss of 

the strongpoint, but the Germans had 

compounded it during the night of IS 

December even as Colonel Higgins' men 

were filing through the gap in the wire. 

So that the 75ISt Regiment might move 

along to its assigned role in the counteroffensive, the Germans had been replacing 

the battalion at Wahlerscheid with the 

326th Division's field replacement battalion. Caught in the process of relief, 

both units were ripe for annihilation. 35 

The Wahlerscheid road junction firmly 

in hand, General Robertson and others of 

the 2d Division now might give greater 

attention to other developments that, 

when dwelt upon, had disturbing connotations. Beginning two hours before 

daylight on 16 December, German artillery fire had been increasing with an 

ominous persistence. Counterbattery fire 

was particularly heavy. At 0747 the 

99th Division reported a slight penetration 

between two companies of the 393d Infantry. There also was an attack against 

the 394th Infantry, "using searchlights." 

"The strength is unknown," the 99th 

Division reported. "We are out of communications." 36 

35 This material from 2d Div G-2 Per Rpts, 

Dec 44, and Luttichau, Progressive Build-up and 

Operations. 

36 2d Div G-3 Msg file, 16 Dec 44. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIv.eR DAMS 611 

Something was in the air. Something 

disturbing. Perhaps something big. In 

little more than twenty-four hours after 

capturing the Wahlerscheid road junction, 

troops of the 9th Infantry would have a 

new name for it. They would come to 

know Wahlerscheid as Heartbreak Crossroads. 

Something in the Air 

That something was astir was apparent 

at several points along the V Corps front. 

In three places, at Wahlerscheid, in the 

Monschau Corridor, and on the HoefenAlzen ridge, identification had been made 

of the 326th V olks Grenadier Division. 

Indeed, the attack reported in early morning "in unknown strength" against the 

395th Infantry was by a battalion of the 

326th Division on the Hoefen-Alzen 

ridge. Though beaten back, this attack 

when viewed in the context of other blows 

along other portions of the 99th Division's 

elongated front prompted concern. By 

midmorning of 16 December the enemy 

had hit every regiment of the 99th Division, and in some cases the situation still 

was fluid. The unusual enemy tactic of 

using searchlights for illumination might 

have been construed to mean something 

special was in the offing. 

Full portent of these developments still 

was not appreciated, though all division 

commanders began to take precautions. 

General Lauer of the 99th Division, who 

had virtually no reserves, shifted his units 

to provide a company here and there to 

reinforce threatened sectors. General 

Robertson of the 2d sent medium tanks 

to Wahlerscheid to back up his infantry 

in the continuing attack up the Dreiborn 

ridge. General Parker of the 78th released a battalion from Simmerath to go 

to the aid of those of his men who had· 

been isolated the preceding night in 

Kesternich. Presumably at the instigation of the First Army and in light of 

recurring reports of serious attacks farther 

south against the adjacent VIII Corps, 

General Gerow at 1037 ordered the 9th 

Armored Division's CCB relieved from 

attachment to the 2d Division and sent 

south to reinforce the VIII Corps.37 

By noon on 16 December concern about 

the attacks against the 99th Division was 

growing by the minute. In the name of 

the corps commander, the V Corps G-3, 

Colonel Hill, directed the 2d Division 

commander, General Robertson, to place 

a battalion each of tanks and infantry at 

the disposal of the 99th Division "if the 

situation ... was such as to demand 

such action." Not long after, Robertson 

sent Lauer a battalion of his reserve regiment. General Gerow, in the meantime, 

attached the 2d Ranger Battalion to the 

78th Division to assist in the Monschau 

Corridor. At 1950 Robertson gave Lauer 

another battalion of his reserve. "Speed 

is essential," General Robertson told the 

regimental commander, "and for God's 

sake get those trucks married up, and the 

tanks and TDs are to follow." 38 

Before daylight on I7 December, a 

flight of JU-52's disgorged about 200 

German paratroopers in rear of the 78th 

Division's positions. The day was only 

beginning when a German armored column approached the village of Buellingen, 

near Krinkelt-Rocherath, where some of 

the 2d Division's service and engineer 

units had set up shop. At 0730 the 99th 

37 2d Div G-3 Msg file, 16 Dec 44. 

38 Ibid., and 99th Div AAR~ Dec 44. 
612 

Division began moving its command post 

a few miles to the rear. At 0800 enemy 

tanks and half-tracks appeared on a ridge 

overlooking the 2d Division's command 

post and artillery installations. At 10 I 5 

General Robertson alerted his 9th and 

38th Infantry Regiments near Wahlerscheid to be prepared to disengage and 

withdraw to Krinkelt-Rocherath. General Lauer did the same for his 395th 

Infantry. The integrity of these three 

units obviously was threatened. By seizing Buellingen, the enemy already had 

severed the main supply route but at a 

point where several secondary roads provided passage. If the twin villages of 

Krinkelt-Rocherath could be held and the 

road through the Monschau Forest maintained, then withdrawal still might be 

accomplished. By noon on 17 December the 9th and 38th had begun to pull 

back, and in late afternoon the 395th 

Infantry also had begun to withdraw. 

The first ground attack to be aimed 

specifically at the Roer River Dams was 

over, cut short by the winter counteroffensive. By nightfall on 15 December, 

before first manifestations of the counteroffensive began to appear, the attack 

against the Roer River Dams had cost the 

V Corps approximately 2,500 men. 39 

Almost half were nonbattle casualties. 

Losses of the 8th Division would raise the 

total figure by a thousand; for simply in 

mopping up and consolidating after conclusion of the fight for the BrandenbergBergstein ridge, the 8th Division had 

incurred as many losses as had either the 

2d or 78th Division in their full-scale 

attacks. 

3D Casualty figures from V Corps AAR, Dec 

44, are for the period 8-15 Dec. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

The VIII Corps in the Ardennes-Eifel 

The other part of the Allied front 

directly involved at the start of the counteroffensive was that held by the VIn 

U.S. Corps, south of the V Corps zone, 

in the Ardennes-Eifel region. This was 

the front eventually embracing eighty-eight 

miles which the VIn Corps had taken 

over from the V Corps in early October 

upon conclusion of the campaign in Brittany. The V Corps in turn had shifted 

northward in the First Army's attempt to 

achieve greater concentration near Aachen. 

The VnI Corps front in the Ardennes 

was at once the nursery and the old 

folks' home of the American command. 

To this sector came new divisions to 

acquire their first taste of combat under 

relatively favorable conditions. Here too 

came old divisions licking their wounds 

from costly fighting like the Brittany 

peninsula and the Huertgen Forest. 

The front ran from Losheim, between 

Camp d'Elsenborn and the northern end 

of the Schnee Eifel, southward generally 

along the Belgian and Luxembourgian 

borders with Germany. Eventually it 

stretched all the way to the southeastern 

corner of Luxembourg. It extended into 

Germany at two points: along the Schnee 

Eifel, where the 4th Division in September had pierced a thin sector of the West 

Wall, and near Uettfeld, where the 28th 

Division had driven a salient into the 

West Wall. The mission of the VnI 

Corps was to defend the long front in 

place, deceive the enemy by active patrolling, and make general plans and 

preparations for attacking to the Rhine.40 

40 VIII Corps AAR, Oct-Dec 44. This section is based primarily upon the corps and 

division AARs for the period. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 613 

GENERAL MIDDLETO N 

General Middleton's VIII Corps at first 

was under the Ninth Army and controlled 

but two divisions, the 2d and 8th. The 

front at this time was approximately fifty 

miles long, sufficient to tax the two divisions severelyY On I I October the 

83d Division was transferred from the 

Third Army to the VIII Corps but 

brought with it responsibility for the entire southern half of Luxembourg, thus 

enabling no shortening of the lines of the 

other divisions. The corps front then 

embraced about eighty-eight miles. 

Arrival of the inexperienced 9th Armored Division to join the corps on 20 

October did little to reduce frontages, for 

Middleton felt impelled to hold this force 

as a corps reserve. Some relief was af41 An infantry battalion from each division had 

been left in France to guard communications 

lines. 

forded on this date by attachment of the 

14th Cavalry Group with two squadrons, 

the 18th and 32d. Middleton attached 

one squadron to the 2d Division, the 

other to the 83d, each to screen a gap in 

the line, one of which was five miles long. 

Holding the line in the Ardennes was 

not always the cinch it might have appeared to a casual observer. It was true 

that the men enjoyed a few amenities 

usually denied in more active sectors: 

comparatively low casualties, more frequent visits to shower points and to 

division and co,,"ps rest centers, hot food 

for most meals, and bunker-type squad 

huts, dugouts, or cellars instead of foxholes to sleep in. It was also true that 

the Germans on the other side of the line 

were for the most part content to emulate 

the Americans in keeping the ~ctor 

relatively quiescent. As soon as the 

panzer and SS panzer divisions which had 

fought here in September could be replaced, the Germans manned the line 

with low-rated infantry divisions as widely . 

stretched in their defensive positions as 

were the American units . . 

Yet it was also true that some portions 

of the long line were perennial hot spots, 

and any point-even behind the lines, 

where German patrols often threaded 

their way past scattered outposts-might 

erupt at any time in violent little actions 

that were real and terrifying to the men 

involved in them. The 83d Division in 

November, for example, lost 201 men as 

battle casualties, including 25 killed, and 

550 to nonbattle causes. The 2d Division's 23d Infantry, occupying terrain 

near Uettfeld where a flame-throwing 

half-track had awed men of the 28th 

Division's I loth Infantry in September, 

was subjected to frequent and costly shelling and several night attacks, sometimes 
614 

in strength as great as two companies. 

There was no relief until the battalions 

finally blew up the West Wall pillboxes 

in an intricately planned and timed maneuver and withdrew on 2 November to 

positions of their own choosing a mile to 

the rear. Though the new positions contained gaps between companies sometimes 

greater than a mile, the withdrawal 

enabled General Robertson to withhold a 

battalion in reserve, thereby permitting 

gradual rotation of front-line units. 

The corps commander, General Middleton, used the armored infantry of the 

9th Armored Division to relieve battalions 

of other divisions temporarily, both to 

give the old units some rest and the new 

ones some battle experience. The bulk of 

the armored division's artillery backed up 

the 83d Division on the corps south wing. 

The men were not idle. You might 

not have to attack, but still you had to 

stand watch in mud that even duckboards in the bottom of foxholes did not 

eliminate entirely. You had to buck the 

wet, cold winds of the Ardennes heights. 

You had to fight trench foot. You had 

to patrol. You also had to keep improving your defenses constantly, stringing 

barbed wire, laying mine fields, roofing 

and sandbagging foxholes and squad huts, 

foraging for stoves, lanterns, fuel-these 

and myriad other tasks. 

On 20 October, the 83d Division staged 

simultaneous river crossing demonstrations 

at three points along the Sauer and 

Moselle Rivers, hoping to draw fire that 

would reveal enemy gun positions. It 

was partially effective. The 2d Division 

on the anniversary of the W orId War I 

armistice demonstrated by fire but evoked 

hardly a shot in return. In early December, the VIII Corps at the direction of 

the First Army used headquarters of the 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

23d Special Troops to imitate a build-up 

of strength in hope of drawing enemy 

units from the Aachen sector. Using the 

name, shoulder patches, and vehicular 

markings of the 75th Division, not yet 

committed to action, the special troops 

simulated arrival of the division by occupying billets, command posts, and assembly areas, employing vehicular sound 

effects, and executing fictitious radio and 

telephonic traffic. For a time this activity was reflected on German intelligence 

maps by a question mark, but the Germans soon became satisfied that no new 

division existed. 42 

For all the violence of the Ardennes 

terrain and for all the width of the division zones-sometimes as much as t\\;'entyfive miles for one division-the four 

divisions which made up the VIII Corps 

through October and much of November 

might have been a genuinely effective 

stumbling block to the counteroffensive 

had they still occupied the line. They 

were here for a long time, came to know 

the weak and the strong points of the 

terrain, organized their defenses with 

thoroughness and adroitness, and prepared elaborate but workable withdrawal 

and counterattack plans. Yet not one 

of the infantry divisions and only part of 

the armored division was on hand when 

the Germans struck. They had been 

replaced by two badly spent divisions 

from the Huertgen Forest and another 

fresh from the United States. 

On 19 November the 8th Division relinquished its zone to the 28th Division, 

a unit needing some 3,400 replacements. 

The 83d Division on 7 December gave 

42 See H. M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of 

the Bulge, a volume in preparation for the series 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 

II. 
OBJECTIVE: THE ROER RIVER DAMS 615 

way to the 4th, which required as many 

or more replacements than the 28th. On 

I I December the 2d Division moved to 

the Roer River Dams attack, making room 

for the green I06th Division. A combat 

command of the 9th Armored Division 

shifted coincidentally to provide a reserve 

for the V Corps. This was the situation 

when the Germans came out of the mists 

on 16 December. 
CHAPTER XXVII 

The End of the Campaign 

In the fact that the Germans and not 

the Allies wrote the end to the Siegfried 

Line Campaign rests a capsule summation 

of the entire campaign. Though the 

Germans never held the initiative, they 

more than the Allies had controlled the 

outcome. They had fought a large-scale 

delaying action with meager resources 

while at the same time building up a 

striking force to be used in the Ardennes. 

Although American patrols had crossed 

the border on I I September, the deepest 

penetration into Germany ninety-six days 

later was only twenty-two miles inside the 

frontier. (Map IX) 

This was not, of course, the whole 

story. While the First and Ninth Armies 

had fought in the Huertgen Forest and 

on the Roer plain, the Canadians had 

opened Antwerp, and the British, with the 

help of the First Allied Airborne Army, 

had cleared the Netherlands south and 

west of the Maas River. In the south the 

Third Army had conquered Lorraine and 

reached the West Wall along the Saar 

River, while the 6th Army Group had 

occupied almost all the west bank of the 

upper Rhine except for a big pocket 

hinged on the city of Colmar. The 

Allies had accomplished these things 

while fighting not only the Germans but 

the elements and an acute logistical crisis 

as well. In the process they had so occupied their adversary that Hitler's field 

commanders had begged their Fuehrer to 

scale down his grandiose scheme for a 

counteroffensive. 

Of the German divisions in the Aachen 

sector scheduled tD participate in the 

counteroffensive, only one, the loth SS 

Panzer Division, failed to make it; but 

this was hardly a true measure of the 

effect of the autumn fighting on the 

counteroffensive. The Siegfried Line 

Campaign had cost the Germans thousands of individual replacements who 

might have fought in the Ardennes, and 

it had worn out many of the divisions 

upon which Rundstedt was counting. 

In the Aachen sector alone, at least five 

panzer or panzer-type divisions had been 

reduced severely in strength and their 

rehabilitation dangerously delayed. One 

parachute and at least six volks grenadier 

divisions, the latter originally scheduled to 

have been spared active commitment 

before the counteroffensive, had been 

similarly affected. The Siegfried Line 

fighting also delayed use in the Ardennes 

of two corps headquarters and two assault 

gun brigades. 

Although any attempt to fix German 

losses on a numerical basis would be 

little better than a guess, personnel losses 

obviously were high. This is evident 

from the fact that at least 95,000 prisoners passed through First and Ninth Army 

cages during the Siegfried Line Cam-
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

paign.1 German tank losses probably 

were considerably below American losses, 

primarily because the Germans employed 

far fewer tanks. The First Army alone 

from 1 September to 16 December lost 

approximately 550 medium tanks. Entering the line in late September, the 

Ninth Army lost approximately a hundred. 2 

The First Army incurred 47,039 battle 

casualties during the Siegfried Line Campaign. This was approximately half the 

number of German prisoners taken. 

Killed __________________ 7,024 

Wounded------35, 1 55 

Missing and Captured ____ 4,860 

The Ninth Army's battle losses totaled 

approximately 10,000. 

Killed______ _____________ 1,133 

Wounded ________ _ 6,864 

Missing and Captured 

American units serving under British 

and Canadian command during the campaign incurred approximately 1 1,000 casualties, bringing total American losses to 

approximately 68,000.3 To this figure 

should be added the number of so-called 

nonbattle casualties-those evacuated be1 FUSA AARs, Sep-Dec 44; Conquer-The 

Story of Ninth Army, p. I 12. 

2 FUSA Rpt, Vol. 2, Annex 5; Conquer-The 

Story of Ninth Army, p. 113. FUSA's losses 

were almost double those of the Third Army for 

the same period. See Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 592. 

:1 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Annex I; Conquer-The 

Story of Ninth Army, p. I 12; 12th A Gp G-I 

Daily Summaries, 25 Sep-16 Dec 44. Ninth 

Army figures do not include the army's defensive 

phase between 4 October and 16 November. 

Though figures for this period are available in 

12th Army Group Daily Summaries, they apparently also include the latter stages of the 

campaign at Brest and thus are misleading. 

American losses under foreign command are 

noted above in Chapters VIII, IX, and X. 

617 

cause of fatigue, exposure, accidents, and 

disease. The First Army incurred 50,867 

nonbattle casualties; the Ninth Army, 

20,787.4 Thus the over-all cost of the 

Siegfried Line Campaign in American 

personnel was close to 140,000. 

The fact that most of these losses were 

incurred in the front-line units-the 

infantry and armor-meant that they had 

a particularly heavy impact on operations. 

The problem of replacements for the 

fallen, many of whom in this age of 

technical warfare were specialists requiring long hours of training, could never be 

fully solved. Contrary to experience 

among German artillery units, which were 

constantly on the defensive and thereby 

often subjected to direct attack, American 

artillery units incurred relatively few 

losses except among forward observer 

teams. 5 

Not only in these but in other aspects" 

the Siegfried Line Campaign was similar 

to the battle of Normandy. Instead of 

hedgerows, the Allies encountered pillboxes, dense forests, canals, urban snares, 

and defended villages, yet the effect on 

operations was much the same. It was 

exceedingly difficult to go very far very 

fast under these constricting conditions 

until overwhelming logistical and tactical 

strength could be built up or the enemy 

worn down by attrition. The campaign 

clearly had illustrated the problems that 

beset a military force weakened by lengthy 

pursuit, held in leash by taut supply lines, 

and confronted by an enemy that turns to 

fight behind strong natural and artificial 

barriers. The fact that the Allies approached the barriers in spread formation 

geared to pursuit did not help matters, 

4 12th A Gp G-I Daily Summaries, I I Sep16 Dec 44. 

5 See NUSA Opns, IV, 209. 
618 

for once deeply involved in operations it 

takes time to reorganize and redistribute 

a large tactical force and start all over 

agam. 

As in Normandy, the Americans had 

come up against obstacles for which they 

were at first ill prepared. They had had 

no specialized training against the hedgerows; neither were they prepared for the 

pillboxes. Though almost all units had 

undergone some training in the United 

States in attack against fortified positions, 

Normandy and the pursuit had made 

such inroads on trained personnel that 

almost all units had to learn again the 

hard way. Moving directly against the 

West Wall from the pursuit, American 

units had no time at first either to rehearse 

or to amass special assault equipment. 

The 28th Division's first performance 

against the pillboxes in mid-September, 

for example, was rudimentary when compared with the 30th Division's in October. 

Nor was the weather of any assistance. 

Perhaps the most dramatic example of 

the deleterious effect inclement weather 

could exercise was the outcome of the 

big airborne attack, Operation MARKETGARDEN. Yet the impact of unfavorable 

weather was marked elsewhere as well, 

particularly in the way it shackled supporting aircraft. It also added to the 

hardships of the front-line soldier and put 

muddy obstacles in the way of the men 

who were trying to supply him. Trench 

foot-the seriousness of which could be 

illustrated by the fact that in the first 

fifteen days of the Roer River offensive, 

trench foot cases constituted 8.2 percent 

of all medical admissions in the Ninth 

Army-was directly attributable to the 

wet and the cold.6 

6 NUSA Opns, IV, 209. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Inclement weather also accentuated a 

serious psychological situation arising from 

the fact that troops had to live under 

battle conditions for extended periods 

without relief. Though higher commanders were aware that prolonged exposure 

to combat conditions creates excessive 

fatigue, which in tum makes the soldier 

indifferent and careless, they had not 

sufficient troops to rotate units frequently.7 The system of individual replacements, although it has its virtues, 

contributed to the problem. A man who 

attacks day after day and fights off the 

enemy night after night with no prospect 

of relief other than through wounds 

eventually becomes sluggish. 

It was a tribute to the remarkable 

resilience of the American soldier that he 

could recover his morale so quickly after 

such an ordeal. Some of his resilience 

was pure resignation to the fact that a 

job had to be done, no matter how painful, as exemplified by the sergeant from 

the 4th Division who climbed from his 

foxhole and resumed the attack with the 

remark, "'VeIl, men, we can't do a ---

thing sitting still." The soldier's mind 

obviously had to make tremendous adjustment from the exhilaration of the 

pursuit to the depression of stabilized 

warfare, then to the optimism of the start 

of the November offensive and back 

again to the depression of the Huertgen 

Forest and the muddy Roer plain. That 

the American could do it is illustrated by 

the remarks set down during November 

in the diary of the First Army commander's aide-de-camp. The same man 

who before the start of the November 

offensive had revealed a genuine confidence that this might be the last big push 

7 See FUSA Rpt of Opns, [ Aug-22 Feb, Vol. 

[, pp. [67-68. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

of the war could, a mere week later, 

record the following divergent observation: "N 0 one but the most optimistic 

sky-gazers expected that we would crack 

the line in 24 hours and dash to the 

Rhine in the manner of the St. La 

breakthrough. There has been nothing 

but the stiffest kind of fighting and opposItIOn all along our front and the 

gains recorded consequently have satisfied 

everybody." 8 

The torpor that sometimes evidenced 

itself among the troops in the line, was a 

partial reflection of similar symptoms at 

the command level. Noting that a general fatigue existed at First Army headquarters, the First Army G-3 recalled 

after the war that General Hodges during 

this period "was pretty slow making the 

big decisions. He would study them for 

a long time and I often would have to 

press him before I got a decision." 9 If 

such a situation existed it could be understood in light of the fact that the Siegfried 

Line Campaign followed closely on a 

period that had been filled with momentous day-by-day decisions which taxed not 

only a commander's stamina but his 

ingenuity as well. 

To some, the conduct of operations 

during the Siegfried Line Campaign was 

disconcertingly and even unnecessarily 

slow and conservative. The boldest and 

most daring plan to emerge during the 

period, Operation IvIARKET-GARDEN, was 

in reality an outgrowth more of the pursuit than of the Siegfried Line Campaign. 

Even the gigantic air support program for 

the November offensive was not a new 

solution but for all its size, a conservative 

copy of similar programs in Normandy. 

Many a student of the campaign would 

8 Sylvan Diary, entry of 2 I Nov 44. 

9 Interv with Thorson, 12 Sep 56. 

619 

question whether the reasons for failing to 

give responsibility for the main effort of 

the November offensive to the Ninth instead of the First Army were sufficient in 

view of the difference in terrain confronting the two armies. Surely the approach 

to the question of the Roer River Dams 

was lacking in vigor and imagination. 

On the other hand, a supply situation 

which was not effectively alleviated until 

very near the close of the Siegfried Line 

Campaign was hardly conducive to boldness in operations. Neither was the 

shortage of reserve forces. Once the airborne divisions were committed to their 

lengthy fight in the Netherlands, even 

SHAEF had no real reserve. "You can't 

take chances without a reserve," the First 

Army G-3 believed. "The situation was 

that we had many times played our 

last card. All we could do was sit back 

and pray to God that nothing would 

happen." 10 

Perhaps the real difficulty lay in the 

fact that the First Army fought in the 

Aachen area in the first place. It was 

not, before the invasion, planned that 

way. The First Army originally was to 

have advanced south of the Ardennes in 

close conjunction with the Third Army. 

The shift had come as a compromise when 

Montgomery asked Eisenhower to send 

both the 12th and 2 I st Army Groups 

north of the Ardennes in a single powerful 

thrust into Germany. This Eisenhower 

had not agreed to, but he had shifted the 

First Army northward to protect Montgomery's flank for a push into Belgium 

to gain certain intermediate objectives, 

notably Antwerp. Montgomery, in turn, 

had oriented his forces through Holland, 

away from the time-honored route of the 

10 Ibid. 
620 

Aachen Gap, leaving that route to the 

First Army in what was at first a secondary 

effort. 

Would a more advantageous use of 

resources have been to send the First 

Army, protecting Montgomery's flank, 

through the Ardennes-Eifel, thus leaving 

the Aachen Gap to the British and thereby avoiding the pitfalls of terrain in the 

Netherlands? The Ardennes region-as 

the Germans had proved in 19 I 4 and 

1940 and were to demonstrate again in 

December 1944-is not the bugaboo it is 

commonly assumed to be. What is more, 

this region in September 1944 was almost 

devoid of Germans to defend it, perhaps 

the weakest-held sector along the entire 

Western Front. A lone U.S. armored 

division, the 5th, proved that point at 

Wallendorf, but the bulk of the First 

Army by that time already had been committed in the Aachen Gap. 

The result was a virtual stultification of 

First Army maneuver within an Aachen 

Gap which was almost as constricted as 

it had been in 1914 when the Imperial 

German armies respected Dutch neutrality. The Peel Marshes confined the U.S. 

forces on the north; on the south, they 

were confined by a reluctance to mount a 

big push through the Ardennes. 

Would the Siegfried Line Campaign 

have produced more far-reaching results 

-or would a slow, dogged campaign 

have been necessary at all-had the 

Ardennes-Eifel not been disregarded as a 

route of major advance? The question 

can be answered only by conjecture, but 

no analysis of the Siegfried Line Campaign can be complete unless it is at least 

considered. In a renewal of the offensive 

after the enemy's Ardennes attack, General Bradley's 12th Army Group turned 

this region to distinct advantage. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

The Siegfried Line Campaign had 

demonstrated, as did earlier and later 

fighting in Europe, the basic efficacy of 

the American infantry-tank-artillery team. 

Indeed, the campaign had underscored 

what was fast becoming accepted fact, 

that the long-standing infantry-artillery 

relationship badly needed in almost every 

instance the added power of the tank. 

The fighting around Aachen, in particular, had shown that neither side, German 

or American, could make substantial 

progress without tank support. The 

airborne troops in Operation MARKETGARDEN were at a tremendous disadvantage when the arrival of supporting 

armor was delayed. Those commanders 

in the Huertgen Forest who dared attempt 

a solution of the vexing problems involved 

in using tanks in the forest were amply 

repaid. 

The campaign, on the other hand, had 

provided few examples of what exponents 

of armor consider true armored warfare. 

In general, both Germans and Americans 

used their tanks in an infantry support 

role. Germans more than Americans employed them for this purpose singly or as 

roving single artillery or antitank pieces; 

but this was attributable more to limited 

numbers of tanks than to any predilection 

for the practice. 

Weapons of both sides had, in general 

borne up well under the rigors of the 

campaign. On the American side, the 

fighting had underscored the need for a 

higher velocity weapon on the M-4 

Sherman tank and the U.S. tank destroyer, both in light of the enemy's heavier 

tanks and the excellence of his dual 

purpose 88-mm. gun. But the campaign 

had done little to answer the question of 

whether the U.S. Army erred in depending on a medium tank, for all its ad-
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 

vantages in mobility, transportability, and 

ease of maintenance, to the virtual 

exclusion of a heavy tank. Though tanks 

more and more had assumed antitank 

roles, in addition to their other assignments, the self-propelled, lightly armored 

tank destroyer had in many instances 

proved its worth, despite a tendency of 

some commanders to misuse it as a tank. 

On many occasions commanders employed tank destroyers in battery to 

supplement divisional artillery. The destroyer clearly had shown up the general 

obsolescence of towed antitank pieces, 

particularly the 57-mm. gun, which many 

units by the end of the Siegfried Line 

Campaign were almost ready to discard. 

The short-barreled 105-mm. howitzer of 

the regimental Cannon Company also had 

contributed little in its normal role as 

artillery directly under control of the 

infantry regimental commander. Probably because the smooth-working relationship between the infantry regiment and 

divisional artillery made presence of the 

Cannon Company within the regiment 

unnecessary, many divisions shifted the 

company to the direct control of the 

divisional artillery to supplement its fires. 

A distinctly encouraging aspect of the 

campaign was the performance of new 

divisions. In Normandy it had become 

almost routine for a division in its first 

action to incur severe losses and display 

disturbing organizational, command, and 

communications deficiencies for at least 

the first week of combat indoctrination.ll 

Yet in no case was this tendency present 

to a similar degree among those divisions 

receIVlllg their baptism of fire during the 

Siegfried Line Campaign. General Col11 See Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 

passim. 

621 

lins might admonish the I04th Division 

at the Donnerberg "in no uncertain terms 

to get moving and get moving fast," but 

a division of similar experience in Normandy might have required sweeping 

organizational and command changes before achieving a creditable performance. 

In the case of the I04th, General Collins 

and other officers, after observing the 

division only a day or so longer, could pay 

it nothing but tribute. "General Hart 

[First Army artillery officer] says the 

whole artillery section functions beautifully according to the book and what the 

General [Hodges] particularly likes thus 

far of what he has seen of the I04th is 

their ability to button up tight and hold 

the place tight once they have taken it. 

There is no record yet of the I04th giving 

ground." 12 

New divisions, in general, entered the 

line during tne fall of 1944 under more 

favorable circumstances than existed during the summer. That obviously had 

something to do with improved early performance. Training based on actual 

battle experience and reduced cannibalization of units to serve as individual 

replacements also may have contributed. 

Another factor was the caliber of the 

personnel. Almost all the new divisions 

going into action during the Siegfried Line 

Campaign possessed a high percentage of 

men transferred from the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which 

had contained men of proved intelligence 

studying under army sponsorship in the 

nation's colleges and universities. 

The amount of time consumed by and 

the cost of the Siegfried Line Campaign 

were tremendous if one looks only at the 

relatively small amount .of territory taken 

12 Sylvan Diary, entries of 16 and 26 Nov 44· 
622 

during the campaign. On the other 

hand, what would have happened had the 

Allies suspended offensive operations at 

the German border and waited until they 

could have hit harder? How successful 

would the counteroffensive in the Ardennes have been under those circumstances? Given several months to get 

ready, could the Germans have held the 

West Wall? 

The fact is that the Siegfried Line 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Campaign, for all its terrible cost, paid 

off, not so much in real estate as in 

attrition of the German armies. Indeed, 

the Siegfried Line Campaign turned out 

to be primarily a battle of attrition, 

though it had not been intended that 

way. Just how effective the campaign 

was as a contribution to German defeat 

would be apparent only after the unfolding of action in the Ardennes and a 

renewed Allied drive toward the Rhine. 
u.s. Army 

None 

General of the Army 

General 

Lieutenant General 

Major General 

Brigadier General 

None 

Colonel 

Lieutenant Colonel 

Major 

Captain 

Captain ( Cavalry) 

First Lieutenant 

Second Lieutenant 

Appendix A 

Table of Equivalent Ranks 

German Army and 

Air Force 

Reichsmarschall 

Generalfeldmarschall 

Generaloberst 

General der Infanterie 

Artillerie 

Gebirgstruppen 

Kavallerie 

N achrichtentruppen 

Panzertruppen 

Pioniere 

Luftwaffe 

Flieger 

F allschirmtruppen 

Flakartillerie 

Luftnachrichtentruppen 

Generalleutnant 

Generalma jor 

None 

Oberst 

Oberstleutnant 

Major 

Hauptmann 

Rittmeister 

Oberleutnant 

Leutnant 

German Waffen-SS 

None 

Reichsfuehrer-SS 

Oberstgruppenfuehrer 

o bergruppenfuehrer 

Gruppenfuehrer 

Brigadefuehrer 

Oberfuehrer 

Standartenfuehrer 

Obersturmbannfuehrer 

Sturmbannfuehrer 

Haupsturmfuehrer 

o bersturmfuehrer 

Untersturmfuehrer 
Appendix B 

Recipients of the Distinguished 

Service Cross 

All who received the Medal of Honor 

for individual actions during operations 

described in this volume have been mentioned either in text or footnotes. Because of space limitations, similar mention 

of all who were awarded the Distinguished 

Service Cross could not be made. The 

following list of recipients of the DSC is 

as complete as possible in view of the fact 

that no single Army file listing DSC 

awards is maintained. Effort has been 

made to provide ranks as of the date of 

the action cited. (P) indicates a posthumous award. 

Adams, Pfc. John W. (P) 

Anderson, zd Lt. Roy L. (P) 

Bade, Sgt. Peter (P) 

Baum, Capt. Francis J. (P) 

Berlin, I st Lt. Walter I. 

Bieber, S/Sgt. Melvin H. 

Blakely, T/Sgt. Ewel (P) 

Blanton, T /Sgt. Benjamin T. 

Blazzard, Capt. Howard C. 

Booth, Capt. Everett L. 

Botts, Capt. Seth S. 

Bouchlas, Capt. Michael S. 

Brenner, Pvt. William E. 

Brohman, Pvt. Howard E., Jr. 

Bruns, T/S Raymond E. 

Bucci, Pfc. Joseph R. 

Burke, Ist Lt. Robert C. 

Burns, Sgt. George E. 

Burton, Lt. Col. William H., Jr. 

Cam bron, I st Lt. Joseph W. (P) 

Castro, Pfc. Luis F. 

Catanese, Pfc. Albert 

Chase, Pfc. Francis T., Jr. 

Chatfield, Capt. Henry H. 

Chenoweth, Pfc. Charles H., Sr. (P) 

Citrak, Pfc. Michael 

Clark, S/Sgt. Willard D. 

Clementi, T /Sgt. Vincent (P) 

Clinton, T /Sgt. ''''eldon D. 

Colombe, Pvt. David L. 

Cowden, zd Lt. Paul W. 

Crabtree, S/Sgt. William H. (P) 

Dew, zd Lt. Joseph H. 

Dickerson, Pfc. Harry S. (P) 

Dixon, TI3 Harold M. 

Dooley, Ist Lt. William E. 

Drennan, Capt. Fred O. (P) 

Dupas, I st Lt. James, II (P) 

Eells, zd Lt. Calvin E. 

Erbes, Capt. John 

Fairchild, S/Sgt. Robert L. 

Farmer, S/Sgt. Robert D. (P) 

Felkins, Capt. William G., J(. (P) 

Fesmire, Pvt. Albert H. 

Fiori, Pfc. N anti J. (P) 

Fitzpatrick, Ist Lt. James K. (P) 

Folk, Capt. George K. 
APPENDIX B 

Fontes, Pvt. Eugene A. (P) 

Ford, Pvt. Willis B. (P) 

Foster, S/Sgt. Leslie 'V. (P) 

Frazier, 1St Lt. Gael M. 

Free, 1st Lt. Charles A. 

Fretwell, Sgt. Thomas E., Jr. 

Funk, Pvt. Victor P. 

Gehrke, 2d Lt. Roy E. (P) 

Gilbrath, Pvt. Dwight 

Ginder, Col. Philip D. 

Glogau, 1st Lt. Donald (P) 

Golojuch, 1st Lt. Frank J. 

Gomes, Lt. Col. Lloyd H. 

Greene, S/Sgt. Thomas A. (P) 

Greer, Maj. Howard W. 

Grotelueschen, 1st Lt. Edgar W. 

Hackard, Capt. Clifford T. 

Hall, 1st Lt. Sanford F. 

Hall, T/5 Willis B. 

Hammonds, Pvt. Joseph J. 

Haney, Cpl. Manning G. (P) 

Harty, T/Sgt. Willard (P) 

Hauschildt, 1st Sgt. Edward W. 

Henley, S/Sgt. Robert M. 

Herin, S/Sgt. Ralph D. (P) 

Holland, Pfc. Robert H. 

Holman, Capt. Grady B. 

Hopes, S/Sgt. Robert D. 

Howard, Pfc. Wilbur 1. 

Jennings, Pvt. Sheldon D. 

Jett, Pfc. Arthur C. 

Johnson, Pvt. Albert L. 

Johnson, 1st Lt. Kenneth L. (P) 

Johnson, T/5 Martin E. 

Johnson, S/Sgt. Richard C. 

Justice, Pvt. Clyde E. 

Kalinowsky, Pfc. Henry J. 

Kelleher, Lt. Col. Gerald C. 

Kelley, S/Sgt. Brady O. 

Kessler, 1St Lt. Albert L. 

Kirk, Pfc. Owens L. (P) 

Kirksey, Sgt. Earnest L. 

Kudiak, Sgt. Tony 

Lackner, T /Sgt. Clarence 

Lanham, Col. Charles T. 

Lee, 1St Lt. Robert E. (P) 

Lester, 1St Lt. Vestal R. 

Littleton, S/Sgt. Walter J. 

Malone, Pfc. Henry A. 

Mathews, Pvt. James E. (P) 

McCaskey, 2d Lt. Charles 1., Jr. (P) 

McCully, 1st Lt. William C. (P) 

:McDaniel, Pvt. Doyle 'V. (P) 

Messer, Pfc. Allen B. 

Miccori, Pfc. Joseph A. (P) 

Miller, Capt. Jesse R., Jr. 

Mills, 2d Lt. Donald C. 

Mills, Lt. Col. Herbert M. (P) 

Moralez, Pfc. Frank (P) 

Moses, Sgt. Albert D., Jr. (P) 

Nietzel, Sgt. Alfred B. (P) 

Norris, T/4 Herman W. 

O'Connell, S/Sgt. Stephen W. 

Olsen, 1st Lt. John 

Palm, 2d Lt. Carl C. 

Parrish, Capt. Edward L. 

Parrow, S/Sgt. Peter J. (P) 

Pece, Pfc. James T. (P) 

Peebles, 1st Lt. Arthur F., Jr. (P) 

Pepe, Pfc. Salvatore 

Peso, 2d Lt. Frank L. (P) 

Polio, Pfc. James V. (P) 

Potter, Pvt. Phillip H. 

Quinlan, 2d Lt. James P. 

Rabreau, S/Sgt. John 

Rees, Capt. Roger S. 

Regan, 2d Lt. Dennis J. 

Rennebaum, 1st Lt. Leon A. 

Renteria, T / 4 Jess T. 

Rhode)" Capt. William A. 

Robey, S/Sgt. Paul 'V., Jr. 

Russell, Capt. William E. 

Sawyer, T/Sgt. Phillip F. (P) 

Schultz, T/5 George W., Jr. 

Searles, S/Sgt. James W. 

Singer, T/4 Leonard 

Single, T /Sgt. James C. 

Smelser, T /Sgt. Raymond B. 

625 
626 

Speer, Pfc. Harold J. 

Stevens, 1st Lt. Richard W. 

Stott, Pvt. Robert H. 

Swanberg, T /5 Bertol C. 

Tempesta, S/Sgt. Anthony A. 

Terry, Capt. John R., Jr. 

Terry, S/Sgt. Joseph 

Tester, 1st Lt. Perry 0., Jr. (P) 

Thayer, Pfc. Kenneth C. 

Thomas, 2d Lt. George 

Tipton, Pfc. Beverly 

Tucker, T /4 William I. 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Van Giesen, 1st Lt. George T. (P) 

Whidden, Sgt. Adolphaus W., Jr. 

Whitehouse, Sgt. Rempfer L. 

Whitley, Capt. Arthur N. 

Whitney, Capt. William B. 

Wild, Pfc. Joseph J. 

Wilson, S/Sgt. William R. 

Wise, Sgt. Alvin R. 

Wittkopf, Capt. Philip W. 

Wohner, Maj. John H. 

Wolf, Cpl. Alvin E. (P) 

Worrall, 1st Lt. William T. (P) 
Appendix C 

First Army Staff Roster as of 

11 September 1944 

Commanding General 

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges 

Chief of Staff 

Maj. Gen. William B. Kean 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Administration 

Col. Charles F. Williams 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations 

Col. Samuel L. Myers 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-I 

Col. Joseph J. O'Hare 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 

Col. Benjamin A. Dickson 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 

Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 

Col. Robert W. Wilson 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 

Col. Damon M. Gunn 

Adjutant General 

Col. Robert S. Nourse 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Col. Charles G. Patterson 

Artillery 

Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hart 

Armor 

Col. Peter C. Hains 3d 

Chaplain 

Col. Hamilton H. Kellogg 

Chemical 

Col. Frederick W. Gerhard 

Engineer 

Col. William A. Carter, J r. 

Finance 

Col. Grover A. Summa 

Inspector General 

Col. Rosser L. Hunter 

Judge Advocate 

Col. Ernest M. Brannon 

Ordnance 

Col. John B. Medaris 

Provost Marshal 

Col. William H. S. Wright 

Quartermaster 

Col. Andrew T. McNamara 

Signal 

Col. Grant A. Williams 

Special Services 

Col. William May 

Surgeon 

Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers 

Secretary of the General Staff 

Maj. Earl F. Pegram 
Appendix D 

Ninth Army Staff Roster as of 

4 October 1944 

Commanding General 

Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson 

Chief of Staff 

Maj. Gen. James E. Moore 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Col. George A. Millener 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-I 

Col. Daniel H. Hundley 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 

Col. Charles P. Bixel 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 

Brig. Gen. Armistead D. Mead, Jr. 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 

Brig. Gen. Roy V. Rickard 

Assistant Chief of Staff G-s 

Col. Carl A. Kraege 

Adjutant General 

Col. John A. Klein 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Col. John G. Murphy 

Artillery 

Col. Laurence H. Hanley 

Armor 

Col. Claude A. Black 

Chaplain 

Col. W. Roy Bradley 

Chemical 

Col. Harold Walmsley 

Engineer 

Brig. Gen. Richard U. Nicholas 

Finance 

Col. John L. Scott 

Inspector General 

Col. Perry L. Baldwin 

Judge Advocate 

Col. Stanley W. Jones 

Ordnance 

Col. Walter W. Warner 

Provost Marshal 

Col. Robert C. Andrews 

Quartermaster 

Col. William E. Goe 

Signal 

Col. Joe J. Miller 

Special Services 

Lt. Col. Kenneth K. Kelley 

Surgeon 

Col. William E. Shambora 

Secretary of the General Staff 

Col. Art B. Miller, Jr. 
Bibliographical Note 

Those who are familiar with the Army's 

records of World War II speak not in 

terms of file cabinets or linear feet but of 

mountains. The sheer bulk of these 

records and their generally high value are 

astounding. Yet one major element often 

is mIssmg: the "why" behind a commander's decision. Indeed, it is difficult 

in many instances to determine even who 

made the decision, for the Army has a 

disturbing habit of speaking in the passive 

voice behind the anonymity of an impersonal pronoun-"it was decided," 

"it was ordered." Compound this practice by giving a commander a jeep and a 

liaison plane, not to mention an effective 

system of telephone and radio communications, and it is a wonder that any 

record of his decisions and the reasons for 

them survives. 

From this situation has arisen perhaps 

the most serious research problem encountered in preparing The Siegfried Line 

Campaign. It will remain a problem to 

anyone who attempts further research in 

this period of combat operations; for the 

relatively . static nature of the warfare 

gave rise to frequent informal conferences 

between commanders, from which a 

written record rarely emerged. The worst 

offender in this regard was the First Army. 

Indeed, the First Army's records are below average, a fact that is hard to reconcile with the First Army's reputation as 

the most meticulous and most concerned 

with detail of any American army m 

Europe during World War II. 

A solution to this problem might be 

expected to be found in the hundreds of 

so-called combat interviews conducted by 

historians in uniform soon after most 

major actions; but in an attempt to fill 

a recognized gap at the fighting, smallunit level, the historians failed to pay 

sufficient attention to the command level. 

Postwar interviews and comments by 

participants on early drafts of the manuscript thus have represented the only 

approach to a genuine solution of this 

problem. More than fifty officers who 

participated in the campaign either were 

interviewed by the author or commented 

on all or parts of the manuscript. These 

include both the First and Ninth Army 

commanders. The immense value of their 

contributions can be fully apparent only 

to the author. On the other hand, 

memories have a way of failing the most 

co-operative of witnesses, so that command decisions and the "why" behind 

-them remains a lacuna of serious proportions. 

This would not be the case had the 

Army offered more encouragement to the 

kind of service performed by Maj. William 

C. Sylvan, senior aide to the First Army 

commander, General Hodges. With the 

approval of his commander, Major Sylvan 

kept a day-by-day diary dealing with 

General Hodges' activities. He has kindly 

made it available to the Office of the 

Chief of Military History. Not in all 

cases was Major Sylvan, in his position as 

aide-de-camp, privy to the discussions and 
630 

decisions at the First Anny level; but in 

those instances where he was present or 

aware of the events, his diary is invaluable. 

Official Records 

By far the most useful documentary 

sources for this, as for all operational 

volumes, are the official records of U.S. 

Army units in the theater. Each headquarters, from army down through regiment and separate battalion, submitted a 

monthly narrative after action report, 

accompanied by supporting journals, periodic reports, messages, staff section 

reports, and overlays. Though these records vary in quantity and quality, they 

are essential to any detailed study of 

operations. Those most valuable to the 

historian of combat operations are housed 

in the historical reports files in the World 

War II Records Division, National Archives. Other records of organizational 

elements are in the Federal Records Center 

Annex, Kansas City, Missouri. Almost 

none now carry security classification. 

The after action reports are in effect 

monthly compendiums of all the other 

documents, but the chance of error or the 

introduction of a commander's hindsight 

makes it imperative that these be checked 

carefully against the supporting documents. Where close attention was paid 

to preparation of journals, these are 

invaluable. In the manner of a ship's 

log, they of all the documents most nearly 

reflect the events and thinking in the 

headquarters at the time. Neither First 

nor Ninth Army journals, unfortunately, 

were prepared with care; they are virtually 

worthless to the historian. The same is 

true of almost all the corps journals for 

this period, with the exception of those of 

the XIX Corps, which sometimes include 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

telephone conversations. Fortunately, 

most of the division journals are better, 

particularly those of the 1st, 2d, 2d 

Armored, 28th, 29th, 30th, and 83d DiVISIOns. Particularly valuable telephone 

journals are to be found in 30th Division 

records. Indeed, had all divisions kept 

the kind of records preserved by the 30th 

Division, the value of the history of World 

War II would be markedly increased. 

Basically the same pattern of official 

records was followed at headquarters of 

the 12th Army Group, with the addition 

of a planning file. The file is cited in 

this volume as 12th Anny Group, Military 

Objectives, 371.3, Volumes I and II. 

In keeping with the theory of presenting the story of higher headquarters 

only as it affected tactical operations, no 

attempt has been made to study all 

SHAEF records. The basic SHAEF file 

used for this volume was the richest of 

the official SHAEF collection, that of 

the Secretary of the General Staff 

(SHAEF SGS, 38 I, Volumes I and II). 

In addition, the author has drawn on the 

definitive experience with the SHAEF 

records of Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, author 

of The Supreme Command. While preparing his volume, Dr. Pogue collected a 

vast amount of material, much of it 

transcripts or photostats of documents 

from General Eisenhower's wartime personal file. This material, cited as the 

Pogue files, is located in OCMH. Also 

falling under the category of SHAEF 

records are those of the airborne units. 

They are housed in World War II Records 

Division under the heading, SHAEF 

FAAA files. 

Though both British and Canadian 

army historical sections have co-operated 

extensively with the UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

their official wartime files are not immediately accessible to the American historian. Those official records of their 

armies used in preparation of this volume 

are copies found in American files, notably 

in the SHAEF SGS records. Where 

American units operated under British 

or Canadian command, copies of Allied 

documents applicable to U.S. operations 

are usually to be found in the records of 

the U.S. units. 

Three of the U.S. headquarters published official consolidated verSIOns of 

their after action reports for limited distribution. Two of these-the 12th Army 

Group Report of Operations and V Corps 

Operations in the ETO-provide in addition to the narrative report a convenient 

assimilation of pertinent orders, periodic 

reports, and other documents. The First 

Army Report of Operations, I August 

1944-22 February 1945, is more strictly 

narrative. In the case of the 12th Army 

Group and the First Army, the original 

after action reports should be consulted 

for material not included in the published 

verSIOns. 

The Department of the Air Force Historical Section co-operated closely with 

the author in his exploitation of records 

of U.S. air units. All air records used 

are located at the Research Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. 

Uno fficial Records 

Most records falling in the category of 

unofficial records are combat interviews 

conducted by teams of historical officers 

working under the European Theater 

Historical Section. In addition, there are 

narratives written by the field historians 

to accompany the interviews and occa631 

sionally field notes and important documents collected by the historical cifficers. 

In the case of units operating under the 

Ninth Army, combat interview material 

was arranged in narrative form in four 

mimeographed volumes. While little reason exists to question the general accuracy 

of these volumes, it is lamentable that the 

original combat interview material from 

which the volumes were written was 

destroyed. The footnotes in this volume 

should provide an adequate guide to the 

available combat interview material. The 

interviews and the four Ninth Army 

volumes are housed in the historical 

reports files in W orId War II Records 

Division. 

Soon after the end of the war in Europe, the historians in the theater wrote a 

preliminary narrative history of the Siegfried Line Campaign. Though these officers did not have access to much high 

level material or to official German records, their work provides a convenient 

check on documentary sources and has 

helped the author of this volume considerably in organizational matters. The 

manuscript is filed in OCMH. 

Unit Histories 

Since the end of the war, almost every 

division and some regiments have published unofficial unit histories. In many 

cases, these works are heavy on the side 

of unit pride, but some are genuinely 

useful. A brief analysis of each is included in this volume in the footnote 

where the work is first cited. In a special 

class is Conquer-The Story of Ninth 

Army (Washington: Infantry Journal 

Press, 1947) , a sober and invaluable 

volume. 
632 

German Sources 

The account of German operations has 

been based primarily on the eight monographs prepared in OCMH specifically to 

complement this volume by Mr. Lucian 

Heichler, plus three monographs prepared 

by Mr. Charles V. P. von Luttichau to 

complement a forthcoming volume in the 

World War II series on the Ardennes 

campaign. These monographs were based 

on two principal types of material: official 

German records captured or seized by the 

U.S. Army during and immediately after 

the war and a series of manuscripts 

prepared after the war by former German 

commanders working under the auspices 

of the U.S. Army. 

The contemporary German records are 

in the custody of World War II Records 

Division. There are numerous gaps attributable to wartime destruction and to 

the fact that many records fell into the 

hands of the Soviet Union. Yet enough 

remain to provide a remarkably clear 

picture of the operations, particularly 

when supplemented by the German officers' manuscripts. 

The most important of the official 

records are the daily war diaries of operations, Kriegstagebuecher (KTB), maintained by the forward echelons of all 

commands, together with supporting documents in annexes (Anlagen). The most 

complete records to be found of any 

headquarters involved in the Siegfried 

Line Campaign are those of the LXXXI 

Corps, which fought in the Aachen area. 

The German manuscripts, numbering 

more than two thousand, are filed in 

OCMH and have been adequately catalogued and indexed in Guide to Foreign 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Military Studies 1945-54, published in 

1954. The quality of the manuscripts 

varies, reflecting the fact that almost all 

are based only on the memories of the 

writers. Yet when used with caution and 

when checked against the official records, 

these postwar accounts make a considerable contribution to knowledge of the 

German side of the combat. 

Published Works 

In addition to the previously published 

volumes in the series UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II and unofficial unit histories, those published 

works of particular value in preparation 

of this volume are as follows: 

Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story. 

New York: Henry Holt and Co., 195I. 

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. The 

Brereton Diaries. New York: William 

Morrow and Co., 1946. 

de Guingand, Maj. Gen. Sir Francis. 

Operation Victory. New York: Charles 

Scribner's Sons, 1947. 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in 

Europe. New York: Doubleday and Co., 

1948. 

Montgomery, Field Marshal the Viscount of Alamein. Normandy to the 

Baltic. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948. 

Patton, George S. War As I Knew It. 

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947. 

Stacey, Charles P. The Canadian 

Army, 1939-1945. Ottawa: E. Cloutier, 

King's Printer, 1948. 

---. The Victory Campaign. Vol. 

III of the "Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War." 

Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 

1960. 
A Gp 

Abn 

ADSEC 

Admin 

Alarmbataillon 

Alarmeinheit 

Anlage 

AW 

Armd 

Arty 

BAR 

Bn 

Bomb 

Br 

Cav 

CCA 

CCB 

CCR 

CCS 

CG 

CinC 

CO 

Co 

CofS 

Comdr 

Conv 

Das Volk 

Dir 

DSC 

Dtd 

DUKW 

Ech 

EM 

Engr 

Ersatzheer 

ETO 

Evng 

Ex 

GLOSSARY 

Army group 

Airborne 

Advance Section 

Administrative 

Emergency alert battalion 

Emergency alert unit 

A ppendix or annex 

Automatic weapons 

Armored 

Artillery 

Browning automatic rifle 

Battalion 

Bombardment 

British 

Cavalry 

Combat Command A 

Combat Command B 

Combat Command Reserve 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Commanding general 

Commander in Chief 

Commanding officer 

Company 

Chief of Staff 

Commander 

Conversation 

German people 

Directive 

Distinguished Service Cross 

Dated 

2Y1-ton, 6 x 6 amphibian truck used for short runs 

from ship to shore 

Echelon 

Enlisted men 

Engineer 

Replacement Army 

European Theater of Operations 

Evening 

Executive 
634 

FA 

FAAA 

Feldheer 

FO 

Fuesilier battalion 

FUSA 

GHQ 

Heeresgruppe 

Hist 

Hq 

Ind 

Instrs 

Intel 

Interv 

IPW 

Jnl 

Kampfgruppe 

KTB 

Kurhaus 

Landesschuetzen battalion 

Ltr 

MEW 

Mng 

Msg 

Mtg 

NCO 

N ebelwerfer 

NUSA 

o 

OB WEST 

OCMH 

OKH 

OKL 

OKM 

OKW 

Opn 

Organization Todt 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Field Artillery 

First Allied Airborne Army 

Field Army 

Field order 

Separate infantry battalion performing both reconnaissance and support in German division 

First U.S. Army 

General Headquarters 

Army group 

Historical; history 

Headquarters 

Indorsement 

Instructions 

Intelligence 

Interview 

Interrogation of prisoner of war 

Journal 

German combat group of variable size 

Kriegstagebuch (war diary) 

Thermal bath establishment 

Home Guard battalion sometimes employed outside 

Germany 

Letter 

Mobile Early Warning 

Morning 

Message 

Meeting 

Noncommissioned officer 

Multiple rocket projector 

Ninth U.S. Army 

Officer 

Oberbefehlshaber West (Headquarters, Commander 

in Chief West [France, Belgium, and the N etherlands] ), highest German ground headquarters of 

the Western Front until May 1945 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High 

Command) 

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Navy High 

Command) 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces 

[Joint] High Command) 

Operation 

Paramilitary construction organization of the Nazi 

party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht. Named after 

its founder, Dr. Todt. 
GLOSSARY 

o st-Bataillon 

Panzerfaust 

Per 

Prcht 

Puppchen 

PWI 

RAF 

Rcd 

Rcn 

Regt 

Rpt 

S chuetzenpanzerwagen 

Schuh mine 

S-2 

S-3 

SCR 

Sec 

SHAEF 

Sitrep 

SP 

S jlOrt platz 

Sq 

SS 

Tac 

TIS 

Tel 

Topf mine 

TOT 

TUSA 

Vergeltung 

VHF 

WafJen-SS 

Wehrkreis 

Werfer 

WFSt 

Non-German volunteer troops from east-European 

countries 

Recoilless German antitank rocket, hand carried. A 

"one-shot" weapon. 

Periodic 

Parachute 

A two~wheeled bazooka 

Prisoner of war interrogation 

Royal Air Force 

Record 

Reconnaissance 

Regiment 

Report 

Armored half-track 

German antipersonnel mine 

Intelligence officer or section of regimental or lower 

staff 

Operations officer or section of regimental or lower 

staff 

Signal Corps radio 

Section 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 

Situation report 

Self -propelled 

Sports stadium 

Squadron 

S chutzstafJel (Elite Guard) 

Tactical 

Technician Fifth Grade 

Telephone 

German antitank mine 

Time on target, a method of timing artillery fire 

from various points to fall on a given target simultaneously 

Third U.S. Army 

Vengeance 

Very high frequency 

Combat arm of the SS (SchutzstafJel, Elite Guard) ; 

in effect a partial duplication of the German 

Army 

German Army administrative area, for the most part 

inside greater Germany 

Rocket projector 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operations 

Staff) 

635 
CLIPPER 

COMET 

GOODWOOD 

'MARKET-GARDEN 

NEPTL;NE 

OMAHA 

OVERLORD 

QUEEN 

UTAH 

Code Names 

Offensive by the 30 British Corps (including 84th 

U.S. Infantry Division) to reduce the Geilenkirchen salient. 

Plan to seize river crossings in the Netherlands near 

Arnhem along the projected axis of the Second 

British Army. 

British attack in Normandy, late July 19+4, preceding 

U.S. Operation COBRA. 

Combined ground-airborne operation intended to 

establish a bridgehead across the Rhine' in the 

Netherlands, September 1944. 

Actual operations within Operation OVERLORD. Used 

for security reasons after September I943 on all 

OVERLORD planning papers that refened to target 

area and date. 

Normandy beach assaulted by troops of U.S. V 

Corps, 6 June 1944. 

Plan for invasion of northwest Europe, spring I 944. 

12th Army Group operation on the Roer plain, 

November I944. 

Normandy beach assaulted by troops of U.S. VII 

Corps, 6 June 1944. 
Basic Military Map Symbols* 

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within 

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply 

point. 

Military Units-Identification 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Armored Command. 

Army Air Forces .. 

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery 

Cavalry, Horse 

Cavalry, Mechanized. 

Chemical Warfare Service. 

Coast Artillery 

Engineers 

Infantry. 

Medical Corps 

Ordnance Department. 

Quartermaster Corps. 

Signal Corps 

Tank Destroyer. 

Transportation Corps. 

Veterinary Corps. 

~ 

leJl 

El 

8 

!2J 

~ 

m 

rn 

IT] 

~ 

EE 

[[J 

[9J 

W 

ITDI 

~ 

!S21 

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing 

symbol with the arm or service symbol: 

Airborne Artillery. 

Airborne Infantry . 

'For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, s~ 

FM 21-30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken. 
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Size Symbols 

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or 

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying 

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization: 

Squad • 

Section. •• 

Platoon ••• 

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight I 

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron. . I I 

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) III 

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force 

Wing.. X 

Division or Command of an Air Force. XX 

Corps or Air Force XXX 

Army. XXXX 

Group of Armies. X:XXXX 

EXAMPLES 

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the 

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent 

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below 

boundarv lines designate the units separated bv the lines: 

Company A, 137th Infantry 

8th Field Artillery Battalion. 

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division. 

Observation Post, 23d Infantry 

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division 

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry 

Weapons 

Machine gun 

Gun. 

Gun battery 

Howitzer or Mortar . 

Tank 

Self-propelled gun 

A~137 

8 8 

AI~II 

A23 

~5 137 

-111-

138 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The War Department 

Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 

The Army and Economic Mobilization 

The Army and Industrial Manpower 

The Army Ground Forces 

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops 

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops 

The Army Service Forces 

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces 

The Western Hemisphere 

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The Fall of the Philippines 

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive 

Victory in Papua 

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul 

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls 

Campaign in the Marianas 

The Approach to the Philippines 

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines 

Triumph in the Philippines 

Okinawa: The Last Battle 

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy 

Salerno to Cassino 

Cassino to the Alps 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel Attack 

Breakout and Pursuit 

The Lorraine Campaign 

The Siegfried Line Campaign 

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge 

The Last Offensive 

The Supreme Command 
640 THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volu'me I 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II 

The Middle East Theater 

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia 

The China-Burma-India Theater 

Stilwell's Mission to China 

Stilwell's Com'mand Problems 

Time Runs Out in CBI 

The Technical Services 

The Chemical WG.1fare Service: Organizingfor War 

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratm)l to Field 

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Comb(i,t 

The Cmps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany 

The Cmps of Engineers: MilitG.1)l Construction in the United States 

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior 

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and }dinor 

Theaters 

The iVIedical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of operations 

The Ordnance Department: Planning iVIunitions for War 

The Ordnance Department: ProcuTement and Supply 

The Ordnance DepaTtment: On Beachhead and Battlefront 

The QuaTtermaster Corps: Organization, SUpPl)l, and Services, Volume I 

The Quartermaster Cmps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volu'me II 

The Quartermaster Cmps: operations in the WaT Against Japan 

The Quartermaster Cmps: Operations in the War Against Germany 

The Signal Cmps: The Emergency 

The Signal Cmps: The Test 

The Signal Cmps: The Outcome 

The Transpm'tation Cmps: Responsibilities, Organization, and operations 

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply 

The Transportation Cmps: Operations Overseas 

Special Studies 

Chronology: 1941-1945 

J\lIilitary Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945 

Rearming the French 

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt 

The Women's Army Cmps 

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governm's 

Buying AiTcraft: Materiel ProcuTement fm' the Army AiT Forces 

The Emplo),ment of Negro Troops 

Manhattan: The US. Army and the Atomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

The War Against Germany and Ital)l: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Germany: EUTope and Adjacent Areas 

The WaT Against Japan 
Index 

Aa River: 131, 145, 190 

Aachen: 8, 18, 28-31, 34, 36, 66, 68, 86, 129, 

135n, 200, 205, 227, 231, 240-41, 251, 283n, 

341, 377, 392,402,496, 518, 547, 619-20 

civilian evacuation: 71,81-82,307 

costly delay to U.S. troops: 317 

decision to bypass: 71-72 

encirclement of: 67, 77,80-81,90, 95-96, 112, 

253, 257, 274, 277-78, 280, 281-83, 283n, 

284-306,307,313,319n,498 

final assault: 304,307-20,340,378,519 

German defense of sector: 69-71, 75, 77, 81, 

103, 106, 127, 201, 257-59, 279, 295, 394, 

396-97,410-11,616 

Hitler's orders to defend: 281,307,314,315 

Rundstedt's view of danger: 18, 299n 

symbol of Nazi ideology: 281,285 

ultimatum and surrender: 289, 304, 307, 309, 

316-17 

Aachen Gap: 7,9, 29, 34, 38, 66, 69, 119, 251, 

620 

Aachen Municipal Forest: 67, 75,81 

Aachen-Cologne autobahn: 482,503,580,584 

Aachen-Cologne railroad: 309 

Aachen-Dueren railroad: 291, 479 

Aachen-Geilenkirchen-Muenchen-Gladbach railroad: 545-46,566 

Aachen-Juelich highway: 294-95 

Aachen-Juelich railroad: 485 

Aachen-Laurensberg highway: 315 

Aachen-Wuerselen-Linnich highway: 278, 305, 

306, 313, 524 

Adams, Pfc. John W.: 418n 

Adams, Capt. Jonathan E. Jr.: 164 

Aerial photographs: 26-27, 327, 345, 520, 596 

Air bases: 13,137,198,381,412,454 

Air Defense of Great Britain: 137-38 

Air forces: 5 

Air landing brigades: 170-72 

Air operations: 24, 64, 169n, 219, 228, 245, 381, 

572, 572n. See also Air-ground cooperation; 

Aircraft; Eighth Air Force; Glider operations; Ninth Air Force; QUEEN; Tactical Air 

Commands; Troop carrier operations. 

Aachen attacks: 290-92, 296, 299, 309, 309n, 

310 

air superiority: 17, 26-27, 94, 169n, 219, 318, 

577 

attacks on railroads: 11,281,284 

battlefield isolation: 345-46,357 

"blind bombing": 382 

bomb line marking: 405-06 

Air operations-Continued 

bombing and strafing errors: 254, 260, 348, 

382,404,405,412-13,424,428 

carpet bombing: 254-55,404,498,521,525 

German: 129, 138, 153, 172, 203, 276, 382, 

454. See also Luftwaffe. 

Huertgen Forest: 332, 343, 348,360-61. 446, 

449~50, 465, 490, 592 

low-level precision bombing: 597-98 

MARKET-GARDEN: 129-30, 137-39, 150, 169, 

179, 196. See also Troop carrier operations. 

psychological effects: 309n, 413-14 

Roer plain: 509,536, 538n, 576 

Roer River dams: 327,597-98 

target bombing: 498,517,520-21,525 

West Wall attack: 114, 253-55, 259-60, 260n, 

261, 278-79 

Air reconnaissance': 24, 26, 31, 135, 381, 596 

Air Squadron, 492d: 292 

Air supply: 13, 120, 129, 132, 134, 167, 172, 176, 

383, 386, 563 

Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion, 81st: 190 

Airborne Division, 17th: 128 

Airborne Division, 82d 

casualties: 159, 166-68, 176, 178, 182, 199, 

199n, 206, 206n 

command and organization: 152n, 155n 

fight for the Nijmegen bridge: 174, 179-84,247 

MARKET-GARDEN operation: 122, 128, 131-33, 

138-39, 142, 154-70, 174-76, 176n, 177-78, 

185, 193, 195, 199-200 

post MARKET-GARDEN fighting: 203-06 

Airborne Division, 10Ist 

casualties: 145, 199, 199n, 206, 206n 

command and organization: 143n, 152n 

fight for Hell's Highway: 142-54, 186-95 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN: 128, 131-32, 132n, 

133, 138-39, 156, 159-60, 167-68, 176n, 196, 

199-200 

post MARKET-GARDEN fighting: 203-05, 573 

Airborne operations: 101, 119-20, 132, 132n, 133, 

136,218, 218n, 620. See also MARKET. 

expected by Germans: 18, 120, 134-36, 240, 258 

German reaction to MARKET: 140-43 

Aircraft. See also Air operations. 

A-20's: 24, 254-55 

B-I7's: 137 

B-24's: 167 

B-26's: 24, 254 

bombers, heavy: 25n, 254, 403-04, 404-05n, 

412-13,498,520 

bombers, light: 404n 
642 

Aircraft-Con tin ued 

bombers, medium: 24-25, 254, 260, 381, 403-

04, 404n, 412-13,442,498, 500, 520, 525 

C-47's: 129,137 

fighter-bombers: 24, 106, 133, 240, 254-55, 

260, 278, 290, 299, 302-03, 310, 332-33, 343, 

381-82, 403-04, 405n, 412-13, 422, 426, 428, 

433, 449, 498, 500, 508, 525, 539-40, 548, 

563,568,572,576 

fighters: 137-39,404,412-13 

Lancasters: 137, 598 

Mosquitoes: 137,598 

night fighters: 343, 382 

P-38's: 24, 137,254,309,412,449,525,586 

P-47's: 24, 64, 137, 150, 196, 254, 292, 309, 

332-33, 381, 418, 436, 453-54, 525, 597 

P-51's: 24, 137, 169 

P-61's: 24, 382 

Spitfires: 137, 169 

Tempests: 137 

Typhoons: 179, 196, 228 

Aircraft, German: 137-38,154,412,454,611. See 

also Air operations. 

Air-ground cooperation: 24-25, 106, 130, 227-

28, 240, 287, 381-82, 403-05, 449-50, 453, 

457,459. See also Air operations; Aircraft. 

Air/Sea Rescue Service: 138, 154 

Albert Canal: 96, 98-103, 106-09, 115, 123-25, 

134, 208-29, 219, 258, 521 

Aldenhoven: 404, 498, 518, 520, 524-25, 538-39, 

561 

Allen, Lt. Col. Ray C.: 190 

Allen, Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa: 222-25, 424-

26,428,504-08,511 

Allgood, Lt. Col. James D.: 480-81 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force: 218n 

Alsace: 16, 395 

Alsdorf: 274, 279, 283-85, 294-97, 299, 302, 305, 

499 

Altdorf: 509,561,563-64 

Alzen. See Hoefen-Alzen ridge. 

Ambush: 339,361-62 

Ammunition: 13, 37, 57, 68, 86, 261, 272, 275, 

357, 380, 383, 545, 608. See also Shortages. 

Ammunition, German: 396, 427. See also Shortages. 

Amphibious operations: 221,228-29 

Amsterdam: 29 

Anderson, Col. Glen N.: 58-61, 63, 445-46, 450, 

459-60 

Anderson, Maj. Gen. Samuel E.: 24 

Antiaircraft, American: 27, 406, 454 

Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, 461st: 64n 

Antiaircraft defense, German: 129-30, 132, 137-

38,145, 147n, 159-60, 170,200,253-54,260, 

412 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Antiaircraft defense, of Antwerp: 230, 230n 

Antiaircraft (ground role): 27, 63-64, 1.65-67, 

180-81, 298, 315, 396 

Antitank defenses. See Obstacles. 

Antitank operations, German: 59, 67, 73, 175, 

238, 242, 274-75, 295, 422-24, 426, 445-46, 

450, 526-27, 530n, 533, 536, 542, 603-04 

Antitank weapons: 25, 27, 45, 122, 153-54, 190, 

301, 351, 514, 620-21. See also Bazooka. 

Antitank weapons, German: 15, 25, 31,45, 175, 

331, 519-20, 620-21. See also Antitank operations; Artillery support; Panzerfaust. 

Antwerp: 4, 6-8, 10, 19, 29, 99,123-25, 218-20, 

616,619 

opening of the port: 121, 200, 204-05, 207-15, 

222, 228-29, 241-42,377,383, 390-91 

V-bomb attacks: 229-30 

Antwerp-Breda highway: 222-23 

Antwerp-Turnhout Canal: 209, 220, 222 

"Antwerp X": 230n 

Apweiler: 526-27, 531-32, 540-41, 543-44, 551, 

553 

Ardennes: 7,9,28-30,40,379, 441n, 600, 620 

Ardennes counteroffensive: 55n, 136n, 244, 346, 

374, 378n, 474, 593-95, 611-12, 614-15, 620, 

622 

German buildup: 393-95,.397, 410-11, 427, 

431,460,487, 505, 539, 547, 559, 567, 583, 

592, 601-02, 610, 616 

Ardennes-Eifel: 29,65,251, 612-14, 620 

Argentan-Falaise pocket: 23, 142 

Armed Forces Command Netherlands: 125-27, 

135,140,142,171,193,395 

Armed Forces Operations Staff: 135 

Armenian troops: 220, 228n 

Armor. See also Tanks. 

Allied superiority: 5, 16, 18, 94, 308 

"armor attracts armor": 518,530-33,539-41 

assist in Roer plain push: 482-85,523-25,529 

commitment in a confined bridgehead: 269-70 

defensive role: 460 

dependence on roads and bridges: 107-08, 148, 

185, 238, 244, 445 

limited-objective attack: 543-44 

organization of U.S. division: 72n 

shock role: 65,529,534-35 

superior enemy observation: 421-24 

use in Siegfried Line campaign: 620 

use in West Wall attacks: 39-40,46,52,62,71-

72, 258, 278, 285 

use in woods fighting: 333-34, 349-52, 355, 

359-60, 431, 620 

West Wall campaign armored duel: 318 

Armor, German: 5, 16-17, 20, 122, 143n, 156-

57, 162, 168-69,,200, 394-95, 620. See also 

Tanks. 

Armored Divisions. See also Combat Commands. 
INDEX 

Annored Division, 2d: 23, 36 

casualties: 272, 276, 279, 279n, 530, 533, 544 

command and organization: 72n, 107n 

Roer offensive: 400, 516-18, 521-27, 529-36, 

540, 54 On, 541-44, 547, 549, 551, 553, 558, 

560-61,563-65,572 

West Wall attack: 96, 99, 101, 107-12, 114, 

233, 236, 252-53, 257, 269-80, 285, 294, 296, 

302-03 

Armored Division, 3d: 20, 23, 36, 339 

casualties: 492n, 586, 593n 

command and organization: 72,72n 

drive to the Roer: 580-82,584-86 

November offensive: 409, 415, 417, 422-26, 

464,475,480,483-85,492 

West Wall reconnaissance: 66-68, 72-80, 82-

83,86, 86n, 88-90, 286, 292, 314 

Armored Division, 5th: 3, 24, 36, 383 

casualties: 65, 446, 450, 450n, 463, 493, 590-91, 

593n 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 408, 429, 438, 440-

42,448-55,457-63,471,492-93,600 

Monschau Corridor attack: 341-42,370 

Roer drive: 580-82, 587-93 

West Wall attack and Wallendorf bridgehead: 

39-41,44,46,52-53,56-65, 291n, 620 

Annored Division, 7th: 213, 232, 238n, 252, 400-

403,517,547,566,568, 572n, 573 

casualties: 238, 240, 280n 

command Changes: 238, 246-47 

Peel Marshes fight: 233-48,267,384,392 

Annored Division, 9th: 379, 600, 607, 611, 613-

15 

Armored Engineer Battalions 

17th: 533 

22d: 453 

Armored Field Artillery Battalions 

56th: 462 

92d: 540 

95th: 61 

400th: 63n 

Armored Infantry Battalions 

15th: 592 

46th: 473,493 

47th: 455,461-62 

Armored Infantry Regiments 

33d: 585 

41st: 533,560-61,565 

Armored Regiments 

66th: 533, 536, 541, 560, 565 

67th: 526-27,540-41 

Army, First: 3-4,6,8-9,16,18-19,28-29,34,94, 

119, 122n, 134, 213n, 252, 377n, 379, 380. 

See also Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H. 

Aachen encirclement: 96, 129, 142, 201, 227, 

242,252,285,294,302-03,314,318 

643 

Army, First-Continued 

boundary adjustments: 232-33, 241, 251-52, 

319, 340-41, 373, 378-79,429, 440-41, 452, 

612 

clearing west of the Maas: 231-35,240 

command and organization: 20-24 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 248, 252, 323, 341-

43, 347-48, 373,431,438-39,464,474,493, 

561 

initial plans for Ruhr advance: 36-37, 203, 205, 

210-13,215,232-34,240-41,280 

November offensive: 411-15,488,496-98,517-

18,520-·21, 525, 529, 547, 578~80, 582n, 593-

95,611,614,618-19 

planning for November offensive: 341,366,373, 

388, 390-92, 394-409 

plans for Rhine crossing: 595 

and Roer River dams: 326-28, 342, 406, 463, 

596-600 

summary of losses: 378,493,593-94,617 

summary of Siegfried Line campaign: 616-20 

supply situation:111-13, 37, 62, 129, 230, 233, 

259, 341, 383-8~ 521 

West Wall penetrations: 37-40, 42, 55-56, 62-

63, .. 96, 113-15, 121, 127, 233, 252-53, 280, 

377-78 

Army, First Allied Airborne: 119, 121, 127-30, 

135n, 204, 218, 616 

Army, Third: 4, 6, 18, 20-21, 34, 36-40, 42, 

56, 62-63, 112, 115, 232, 251, 346, 380, 382, 

388, 399n, 597, 613, 619. See also Patton, Lt. 

Gen. George S., Jr. 

appraisal of German situation, August: 18-19 

approval to resume attack: 36 

November offensive drive from Metz: 391-92, 

402,582,616 

planned Rhine crossing: 595 

preparations to resume advance: 8-10, 36, 211, 

378 

supply situation: 8-13,134,380,384-85 

Army, Fourth: 379 

Army, Seventh: 4, 381 

Army, Ninth: 4,251,318-19,327,341,388,394, 

395, 399n, 613, 616. See also Simpson, Lt. 

Gen. William H. 

command and organization: 379-80 

final push to the Roer: 558, 577-78, 580, 584, 

594, 596-97 

November offensive: 390-92, 399-404, 406-07, 

409-12, 414, 419, 425, 428, 463, 475, 487-88, 

496-98, 516-19, 521-22, 525, 545-48 

"phantom" army: 522 

planned Rhine crossing: 595 

summary of Siegfried .Line campaign: 617, 619 

supply situation: 384-86, 389, 400, 521-22, 545 

transfer to the north wing: 378-79, 378-79n 
644 

Army Group, 6th: 4, 6, 243, 380, 387-88, 391, 

402, 616 

Army Group, 12th: 8, 25, 121, 129, 204, 213, 

231, 241, 243, 377-78, 388, 391, 394, 410, 

548, 619-20. See also Bradley, Gen. Omar N. 

command and organization: 4 

and the Roer River dams: 327,597 

supply situation: 12-13,62,259,384-86,389 

Army Group, 21st: 6,28,36, 121, 129, 204, 213, 

546-47. See also Montgomery, Field Marshal 

Sir Bernard L. 

command and organization: 3-4 

Maas River operations: 227, 231, 246, 248 

and opening of Antwerp: 210, 212, 214-15, 

377 

and Ruhr thrust: 7-8,112-13,198,205,211-12, 

215, 378, 390, 595, 619 

Army Group B. See German Army units. 

Army Group G. See German Army units. 

Army Group H. See German Army units. 

Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP): 

621 

Arnhem: 113, 120-22, 126-27, 130-32, 131n, 134, 

136, 136n, 138, 140-42, 154, 166, 169-70, 

174,185-86,188,191,200,212,241 

fight for the bridge: 164, 170-73, 179, 185-86, 

195-,98, 201 

Arnold, General Henry H.: 119, 121 

"Artificial moonlight". See Battlefield illumination. 

Artillery. See also Artillery support. 

against tanks: 448, 562 

airborne: 144, 154, 167 

attacks without preparatory fire: 433, 490, 563, 

568-69, 603, 607 

"blackout" and counterflak missions: 253, 255, 

382,406,449,524 

Cannon Company under division artillery control: 621 

casualties in units: 617 

concentrated artillery shoot: 481 

counterbattery fire: 48, 57, 224, 253, 276, 288, 

524-25, 562, 572 

fire direction centers: 26 

harassing fire: 169, 562 

interdiction fire: 109,266,452,481, 562 

marching fire: 550 

massed fire: 269, 276, 604 

neutralization fire: 253, 345 

prepared concentrations: 88, 291, 482, 524, 

526, 543, 574, 592, 607, 609 

protective fire: 575-77 

registration difficulties: 336,609 

rolling barrage: 254, 262, 273, 543, 555, 565, 

584, 592 

"short" fires: 271, 609 

time fire: 419,424,504,508,564, 584n 

TOT: 303, 418, 442, 481, 490, 504, 561, 592 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Artillery-Con tin ued 

tree bursts: 52, 332-33, 336, 349,420,444, 462, 

467,476, 590, 608 . 

unobserved fire: 45 

Artillery, American: 13, 20-22, 25-27, 620-21 

Artillery fire plan: 253, 293, 524, 543, 555 

Artillery, German: 15-17,25-26,28,31,620 

Artillery liaison planes: 13, 26-27, 64, 443, 563, 

591 

Artillery support 

Aachen final assault: 77, 308-10, 312-13, 318 

assault crossing of rivers: 179-80, 226 

Donnerberg attack: 425-27 

V Corps in Roer River Dams attack: 600, 602, 

604-05, 607-09 

First Army drive to the Roer: 409,414-16, 580, 

582,592-94 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 94, 333-34, 343, 348, 

355, 363, 420, 44~-43, 446, 452-53, 462, 465, 

467,479,481-82,489-90 

MARKET-GARDEN: 178-80,191,194,197 

Ninth Army and lhe Roer plain: 499, 502, 

504, 506, 508-09, 511, 513-14, 521, 524-26, 

530-532, 537-40, 543, 547-48, 550, 554, 556, 

561-62, 565, 568, 572, .574, 576-77, 584 

Peel Marshes: 238-39 

West WaH and Aachen attacks: 45,55,57,60-

61, 89, 253-55, 258-59, 261, 270, 276, 287, 

291-92,296, 299, 301-02, 305-06 

Artillery support, British: 133, 148, 197, 246,568 

Artillery support, German 

Aachen defense: 81,283-84,308,318,410 

Albert Canal: 99-100 

Huertgen Forest: 330-31, 337, 358, 361, 364-

65, 368, 432, 434-38, 442-44, 452, 459, 465-

66, 481, 484-85, 490-91 

MARKET-GARDEN defense: 125, 143, 165, 175-

76, 180-81, 185, 189 

opposing the November offensive: 396-97, 411, 

413-14, 419n, 427, 519-20 

Peel Marshes: 242-43, 245 

Roer plain: 509-10, 519-20, 526, 530, 561-62, 

567, 569, 574-76, 582, 585-86 

Stohlberg Corridor: 422-24 

West Wall and Aachen encirclement: 42-43, 

51, 54-55, 58, 64, 83, 87, 257, 263-64, 273-

74, 276, 280, 288, 303, 305 

Asch: 108 

Assault boats: 101-02, 106, 174, 176, 179-81, 

196-98,224, 226-27, 229, 255 

Assault guns. See Guns, German, SP. 

Assault teams: 262,287, 310 

Asten: 191,243-46 

Asten-Meijel road: 244 

Attacks. See also :N"ight operations; River crossings. 

"Cannae" maneuver: 187 
INDEX 

Attacks-Continued 

concentric: 177,270,359,365,600-01 

converging: 466 

diversionary: 266-67,304-06,332,561 

double-envelopment: 573,601,606 

flanking maneuver: 85,471-72,478,568,584 

frontal: 71-72,372,493,496,516,529,568 

limited--<Jbjective: 94, 187, 253, 306, 469, 524, 

540,567,571,585,601,607 

method used in Huertgen Forest: 430-31 

"pressure": 425-27, 503 

spoiling. See Peel Marshes. 

Austrian troops: 111 

Baesweiler: 278,518,523-24,528-29 

Baesweiler-Setterich highway: 535 

Balck, General der Panzertruppen Hermann: 395 

Balkans: 15 

Ball, 1st Lt. James E.: 537 

Ballard, Lt. Col. Robert A.: 189-90 

Balloons: 406 

Bane, Capt. Frank P.: 367 

Bangalore torpedoes: 287,433,608 

BAR. See Browning automatic rifle. 

Bardenberg: 297-99, 300-01 

Barmen: 560,563,565 

Barrett, Lt. Col. WiIliam S.: 555 

Barton, Maj. Gen. Raymond 0.: 49,-51-53, 55, 

428, 430, 432-34, 436-37, 440, 464-65, 467-

72,474 

Bass, Capt. Hubert S.: 175 

Battle fatigue. See Combat exhaustion. 

Battlefield illumination: 548, 550, 564, 611 

Bauchem: 546,551 

Baum, Capt. Francis J.: 450 

Bayonet: 88, 181, 335, 511, 562 

Bazooka: 25, 148, 153, 160, 167, 226, 263-64, 

267, 299, 318, 331, 351, 356-58, 368, 419, 

486-87, 539, 541, 564, 570 

Beacons: 138,406 

Beeck: 546,549,551,555-56,566-69,571,573 

Beehive charges. See Demolition charges. 

Beek: 162, 167, 176, 178, 193 

Beeringen: 96, 101, 108, 124-25 

Beggendorf: 256, 269, 272-73, 277-78, 518-19, 

523 

Belfort Gap: 7n 

Belgian troops: 208n, 232n. See also British Army 

units. 

Belvedere (tower): 165 

Berg en Dal (hotel): 155, 157-58, 162, 165, 167, 

174,176-78 

Bergheim: 590-91,593 

Bergrath: 506 

Bergstein: 442,453-55, 453n, 457, 459-63, 601-02 

Berlin: 6,210-11,522 

Berzbuir: 591-92 

Best: 144-47,150,152,187,189,192 

Bestebreurtje, Capt. Arie D.: 184 

Bettendorf: 528, 535-38 

Bettingen: 59,61 

645 

Beyer, General der Infanterie Dr. Franz: 42-43, 

56-57, 64 

Bickerath: 602-03, 606 

Bicycles: 15, 100,284 

Biddle, Col. William S.: 101,103,237 

Bieber, S. Sgt. Melvin H.: 301, 301n 

Biesdorf: 59-60 

Billingslea, Lt. Col. Charles: 193 

Bingham, Lt. Col. Sidney V., Jr.: 576 

Birgel: 591-92 

Birk: 297-301 

Birkengang: 426-27 

Birks, Col. Hammond D.: 102-03, 107, 294n 

Bitburg: 40,42, 56-57, 60-62 

Bittrich, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der 

Waffen-SS Willi: 127, 142, 164, 170, 182, 

185, 188, 193,201-02 

Bixel, Col. Charles P.: 379,518,520 

Blanford, Lt. Col. William 0.: 538 

Blanton, Col. William L.: 44 

Blaskowitz, Generaloberst Johannes: 6 

Blazzard, Maj. Howard C.: SOn, 434, 472-73 

Bleialf: 49 

Bleialf-Pruem highway: 50,53 

"Blue Ball Express": 571 

Blumentritt, General der Infanterie Guenther: 

519-20,548,567 

Boehme, 1st Lt. William: 307,317 

Boeree, Col. Th. A.: 136n 

Bogeyman Hill. See HiIl 697 

Bois Ie Duc Canal: 243 

Bolling, Brig. Gen. Alexander R.: 549, 551, 553-

56,568,573 

Bolton, 1st Lt. Cecil H.: 226 

Bombardment Division, IX: 24-25, 254, 260n, 381 

Bomber Group 48th: 292 

Bombs. See also Napalm bombs. 

500-pound: 292 

fragmentation: 404, 412 

tonnage dropped in Aachen: 309 

tonnage dropped in MARKET: 137 

tonnage dropped in QUEEN: 412-13 

tonnage dropped in Roer drive: 577 

tonnage dropped on Roer River Dams: 598 

Bond, Lt. Col. Van H.: 85, 338-39, 586 

Bonn: 37, 212, 214, 252, 399, 44~ 600 

Booby traps: 350, 445, 588 

Boos, Col. Francis H.: 606 

Bork, Generalleutnant Max: 411· 

Borton, 1st Lt. Don A.: 261,263,295 

Bouchlas, Capt. Michael S.; 301 

Boudinot, Brig. Gen. Truman E.: 73, 422-23 

Boulogne: 204, 208-09 
646 

Bourg-Leopold: 130 

Bourheim: 559-63 

Bovenberg: 480-82 

Bovenberger Wald: 480, 484 

Boyer, Lt. Col. Howard E.: 455 

Braakman (inlet): 209,215 

Brachelen: 567 

Bradley, Gen. Omar N.: 4, 7-8, 13, 20-21, 23, 

36-37,40,120,129,213,369, 377n, 560, 620. 

See also Army Group, 12th. 

and boundary adjustments: 231-32, 251, 378-

79 

and the November offensive: 391-92, 400-01, 

403, 406, 409, 498 

relief of commanders: 246-47, 319 

and Roer River Dams: 327, 342,597 

and Ruhr double-thrust drive: 9-10, 112-13, 

211,595 

and supply allocations: 12, 62, 259, 384-86, 

388-89 

and US troops under British command: 233, 

241, 378 

Brand: 72, 76 

Brandenberg: 451-55, 453n, 457, 459 

Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge: 344-45, 349, 358, 

364,373,440,446,451-60,582-83,592,600-

02, 612 

Brandenberger, General der Panzertruppen Erich: 

42, 63, 69, 87-88, 91, 93, 98, 103, 109, 273, 

277, 290, 300, 330, 334, 337, 353, 359, 394-

95, 460 

Brandscheid: 40, 52-54 

Breakthrough possibilities: 49, 51-53, 56, 86, 133, 

234-35, 332, 421, 467, 475, 492, 594, 607 

Breda: 224-25 

Bree: 113,231 

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H.: 127-30, 128n, 132, 

136-37, 154, 196, 199,204,218n 

Breskens Pocket: 215,218-21,227-28 

Brest: 4, 115, 232, 251, 378, 380, 441n, 606n 

Bridgeheads. See also Meuse-Escaut Canal; River 

crossings; Wallendorf. 

XIX Corps in West Wall: 262-280,496,517-18 

Bridges. See also Engineers; and rivers and canals 

(by name). 

air attack of: 346,381,525 

Bailey: 108,150,153,187,226 

demolished: 3,12,52,57,65,70,73,75-76,84, 

101, 106, 148, 150, 152, 162, 200, 224, 436, 

509,511-12,555 

flood effect on: 326, 522 

footbridges: 101,148,255,261,264,266 

ground attack of: 64,144-48,150,152-53,160-

61, 181-82, 187, 190, 224. See also Arnhem; 

Nijmegen. 

importance to Operation GARDEN: 131-32, 136, 

154-57 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Bridges-Continued 

improvised: 256-57, 265-66, 446, 533. 

ponton: 525 

shortage for supply: 521-22 

treadway: 60, 103, 226, 264-66, 533 

trestle: 60 

Briles, S. Sgt. Herschel F.: 480n 

British Army units. 

Army, Second: 4, 11, 113-14, 120, 122n, 133-

34, 135n, 157n, 196, 204-05, 207-08, 212-13, 

215, 220-22, 232, 241-42, 391, 404n, 545-

46, 595 

Battery, 357th Searchlight (Royal Artillery): 

548, 551 

Brigade, 1st Belgian: 232-35, 232n, 237-38, 

241, 246 

Brigade, 1st Polish Parachute: 128, 131-32, 

172-73, 186, 195-98, 203 

Brigade, 4th Armoured: 246 

Brigade, 32nd Guards: 191 

Corps, 1st: 4,208, 221-23, 225, 227 

Corps, 1st Airborne: 121-22,128,132,136,199, 

204 

Corps, 8: 113, 120, 133, 187, 191, 195, 199n, 

202,236,241-42,248 

Corps, 12: 120, 133, 153, 187, 192, 202-03, 

220-21, 247-48 

Corps, 30: 96, 101, 113, 120, 128, 131, 133, 

148-50, 154-56, 168-70, 172, 174, 186-87, 

191, 195-200, 199n, 203, 248,403,516,521-

22,545-48,551,555-56,566, 594-95 

Division, 1st Airborne: 128, 131n, 132-33, 138, 

140, 170-74, 179, 185-87, 196-99, 201, 203 

Division, 1st Polish Armored: 224-25, 227 

Division, 3d Infantry: 242 

Division, 6th Airborne: 128n 

Division, 11 th Armoured: 242 

Division, 15th Infantry: 246 

Division, 43d Infantry: 133, 185-86, 195-98, 

546,551,556 

Division, 49th Infantry: 222,224 

Division, 50th Infantry: 133, 195 

Division, 52d Lowland (Airportable): 128, 132, 

196 

Division, 53d Infantry: 246 

Division, Guards Armoured: 133, 148-50, 157n, 

174-75, 177-78, 185, 196,208 

Drewforce: 548, 550 

Group, Cold stream Guards: 178, 185, 196 

Regiment, Dorsetshire: 197-98 

Yeomanry, 1st Fife and Forfar: 542 

Yeomanry, Sherwood Rangers: 554 

British forces: 5, 617. See also British Army units. 

casualties in MARKET-GARDEN: 198-99, 199n 

delay in Operation GARDEN: 199-200 

role in November offensive: 401,520,545,547 

Brittany: 4,8, 11, 115,379,522,580,600,612 
INDEX 

"Broad front" policy: 6,199-201,210-11 

Broichweiden: 294-95, 501-02 

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan: 214 

Brooks, Maj. Gen. Edward H.: 65, 107n 

B,own, Capt. Bobbie E.: 287n 

Brown, Lt. Col. John C.: 570 

Browning, Lt. Gen. F. A. M.: 128, 136, 138, 157, 

157n, 159, 168-69, 172, 196-97,203 

Browning automatic rifle: 25, 181 

Bruges: 208-09 

Bruns, Generalmajor Walter: 359,368 

Brussels: 4, 8, 29, 205,210, 213, 218, 232n, 377, 

390-91 

B uellingen: 611-12 

Buesbach: 76, BO 

Buildings (as cover): 309n, 310-12, 333, 36B, 

41B-19, 453, 455, 4Bl, 4B4-B7, 50B, 511-14, 

520, 520n, 532, 577, 604-05 

Bulgarian troops: 15 

Bulldozers: 352, 541, 555 

Bunkers: 31, 35, 43, 73, 253, 255, 316, 331, 333, 

372,432,442,60B,613 

Burp gun: 15, 27-2B, 491, 605 

Burt, Capt. James M.: 303n 

Burton, Lt. Col. William H. Jr.: 473n 

Caen: 142,404n 

Calais: 204, 20B-09 

Camouflage: 31,35,45,259,264,432 

Camp d'Elsenborn: B4, 251, 314, 340, 399, 600-

02, 606, 612 

Canadian Army units 

Army, First: 4, 204-05, 20B-l0, 20Bn, 212-15, 

220-22,227, 22Bn, 405n 

Corps, 2d: 220-21 

Division, 2d: 220 

Division, 3d: 221 

Canadian forces: 5, 229, 617. See also Canadian 

Army units. 

Canal de la Derivation de la Lys: 209,215 

Cannon Company: 621 

Carpenter, 1st Lt. Leonard R.: 569-70 

Carr, 1st Lt. Oliver B. J r.: 175 

Carter, Col. Leslie D.: 6B, 409, 5B2 

Carter, Sgt. Noah: 577 

Cassell, Lt. Col. Harold A.: 535 

Cassidy, Lt. Col. Patrick F.: 146,153,193 

Castle Hill (Burg-Berg). See Hill 400.5. 

Casualties: 276, 417, 469-70, 4B4, 621. See also 

• Combat exhaustion; Evacuation; Losses, 

summary of; Officers; Trench foot; and entries under numbered units. 

Allied forces: 4-5, 3BB, 388n 

British forces: 198-99, 198n, 199n 

Canadian and attached forces: 229 

caused by friendly fire: 254, 260, 348, 412-13 

German: 4-5, 14, 26, 89, 95, 152, 168, 182, 

Casualties-Continued 

German-Continued 

647 

198, 229, 293, 317, 317n, 339-40, 340n, 374, 

39~ 45~48~ 507, 514, 544, 57~ 617 

nonbattle: 429, 438, 455-57, 474, 492, 557, 

593-94, 593n, 606, 609, 612-13, 617 

specialists: 26, 617 

V-weapon attacks: 230 

Cavalry Groups 

4th: 23, 36, 92, 328, 347, 590 

14th: 613 

102d: 24,41,600 

113th: 23, 36, 101-03, 107, 114, 232-33, 235-

38,400-02,517,547,556,566-68,571 

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons 

4th: 477 

18th: 613 

32d: 613 

85th: 3 

87th: 244 

Channel coast: 119, 204 

Channel Islands: 5 

Channel ports: 4-5, 12, 204-05, 208-09, 218, 388 

Chaplains: 371 

Chappuis, Lt. Col. Richard D.: 244-45 

Chappuis, Lt. Cot Steve A.: 150-51 

Charlemagne (Emperor): 29,281 

Charleroi: 8, 381, 384 

Chartres: 36,39,62 

Chatfield, Lt. Col. Lee W.: 84,92-93,333-35 

Chemical Mortar Battalion, 92d: 524,575 

Cherbourg: 8, 23, 49n, 383 

Chill, Generalleutnant Kurt: 124 

Christiansen, General der Flieger Friedrich: 126, 

135, 140, 142, 395 

Churchill tanks. See Tanks. 

CISCO: 260n 

Civilians: 12-13,125 

Aachen evacuation: 71,81-82 

assistance to military forces: 102, 148, 162-64, 

168-69, 184 

casualties and losses: 153,230,260 

Dutch reaction to airborne landings: 140, 145, 

150, 160, 165,206 

rail reconstruction work: 12, 384 

work on defense of Aachen sector: 34,410 

Clark, T. Sgt. Francis J.: 49n 

CLIPPER, 546-58, 566, 568, 574 

Clothing, winter: 14, 25, 383-84, 386,444 

Coal mines: 496,510-11,528,536-37 

Coastal "fortresses." See Channel ports. 

Cochran, Col. John H.: 224, 226, 505, 507, 511, 

514 

Cole, Col. John T.: 61,589 

Cole, Lt. Col. Robert G.: 147,150 

Collier, Col. John H.: 108-09,533,541,560,564-

65 
648 

Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton: 23, 36-39, 66-68, 

71,75,78,86,89-92,95,284,286,292,313-

14, 323-24, 326n, 327, 330, 342n, 364, 381, 

399-400, 408-09, 421, 425-26, 474-76, 481-

83, 490, 492, 498, 505, 507, 515, 580, 582, 

585,589,591,621. See also Corps, VII. 

Colmar: 616 

Cologne: 29, 37, 142, 203, 212, 232-33, 241, 

252, 308, 391, 394, 399 

Cologne plain: 7, 399, 496 

Combat Command Hickey. See CCA, 3d Armored 

Division. 

Combat Commands of Armored Divisions 

CCA, 2d: 108-10,278, 279n, 523, 532-33, 541-

44, 558, 560, 564-65 

CCE, 2d: 108-10, 269-278, 279n, 280, 523-24, 

526-27, 530n, 532-33, 540-44, 558 

CCA, 3d: 72n, 74-77, 79-80,88,90,483-84 

CCE, 3d: 72-74, 76-80, 88-91,422-24 

CCA, 5th: 56, 65, 471-73, 591-93 

CCE, 5th: 46,56,60-61,63-65,589-93 

CCR 5th: 56-61, 63-65, 408, 429, 440, 442, 

445-55, 457, 459-63, 466, 471, 493, 585-86, 

600 

CCA, 7th: 238-40,244 

CCE, 7th: 238-40, 242, 244-46 

CCR, 7th: 238,240,244-45 

CCE, 9th: 607,611 

Combat exhaustion: 54, 289, 346, 358, 360-61, 

364,371-72,429,438,443-45,455,463,467, 

474,492-93,574,576,617-18 

Combat indoctrination: 612-14,621 

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 3 

COMET: 120, 129, 131n 

Command 

in new divisions: 621 

tank-infantry command by co-ordination: 585-

86 

Commando operations: 228-29 

Communications: 26, 293, 334. See also Radio. 

problems of: 148, 166, 169-70, 172-73, 291, 

350,491,569-71,605,609-10 

Communications, German: 245, 405 

problems of: 26,34,316,338,413,459 

Communications Zone: 11-13,126,383-85,389 

Concentration of forces: 55-56, 177, 211, 251, 

273-74, 32~ 378-79 

Congressional Medal of Honor. See Medal of 

Honor. 

Cook, Sgt. Ezra: 272 

Cook, Maj. Julian A.: 179, 181-82 

Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H.: 23, 96, 98, 100-

01, 108, 112-15, 233, 235, 240, 252, 258-59, 

269-70,278-79,285,294,302-03,319,319n, 

320. See also Corps, XIX. 

Corley, Lt. Col. John T.: 309-16,421 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Corman, Cpl. Daniel L.: 151 n 

Corps, V: 3, 36,. 98, 251-52, 302, 314, 378, 409, 

428, 430, 611-12. See also Gerow, Maj. Gen. 

Leonard T. 

casualties: 593, 612 

command and organization: 23-24, 107n 

November offensive: 373, 396-97, 399, 408, 

438-43, 449, 451-55, 461, 464, 467, 469, 

471,561,580-82,587,593,601 

Roer Dams attack: 327, 327n, 342, 342n, 406, 

463,598-602,615 

second attack on Schmidt: 340-43, 346, 348, 

352, 366, 400 

Wallendorf bridgehead: 56-65, 114-15,251 

West Wall reconnaissance attacks: 37-66 

Corps, VII: 29-30,252,261,319,327, 327n, 340-

41. See also Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton. 

Aachen encirclement and assault: 96, 98, 101, 

103, 107, 109, 112, 114-15,235,252-53,257, 

274,277-80,285,291,297,304,309,318,498 

casualties: 586, 593 

command and organization: 23, 36 

final attack to the Roer: 580-83, 585-86, 591-

94, 600 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 92, 323-.24, 348 

initial penetration of West Wall: 37-38, 41, 

66-68, 71-72, 75, 80, 82, 86-87, 89-90, 95, 

251, 283n 

November offensive: 364, 366, 373, 395, 397, 

399-400, 403-04, 408-15, 421-22, 424-25, 

428, 440, 442, 451, 463-64, 468, 471, 474-

75, 481, 487, 498, 500, 502, 504, 507, 510-

11,515,529, 561 

Corps, VIII: 251, 373, 379, 396-97, 399, 441n, 

474,580,611-15 

Corps, XIII: 400, 40 On, 401-03, 516-17, 523-24, 

542-44, 546-48, 550, 554, 556, 561, 566-68, 

571-72,574,580,584-85,593 

Corps, XVIII (Airborne): 128 

Corps, XIX: 29-30,36-38,95,115,124,189,212, 

252. See also Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H.; 

McLain, Maj. Gen. Raymond S. 

clearing west of the Maas: 114, 231, 233-35, 

237, 252 

command and organization: 23, 319-20 

final push to the Roer: 544, 558-66, 568, 572, 

574, 576-77, 580, 584-85 

November offensive: 341, 378-79, 400-402, 

498-500, 502-03, 507, 516-20, 522-26, 529-

32, 534, 537, J45-46, 548, 550, 556 

and Roer River Dams: 327 

West Wall attacks north of Aachen: 67,69, 72, 

81, 91, 96-98, 100~{)1, 106, 110, 112-15, 240-

41, 251-53, 257-59, 261, 266, 276-79, 283-

86, 288, 290, 293-95, 298, 300, 302, 304, 313, 

318,330,386,519 
INDEX 

Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 44-45, 44n, 47-48, 

55, 343-44, 346-47, 350-52, 355, 358, 360, 

362, 367-69,373 

Cotton, Lt. Col. Hugh W.: 302 

Counterattacks, German: 274, 317, 430-31, 478. 

See also Ardennes counteroffensive. 

Cox, Lt. Col. William C.: 275-78,298,301,305-

06 

Crabill, Col. Edwin B.: 590 

Craig, Maj. Gen. Louis A.: 83-84, 86, 90, 92-94, 

323, 326n, 328, 331-32, 336, 338, 585 

Crerar,. Lt. Gen. Henry D. G.: 208, 220 

Crocker, Lt. Gen. Sir John T.: 221-25,227 

Crocodile tanks. See Tanks. 

Cross, Col. Thomas].: 447-48 

Crossroads 87: 571-73 

Crucifix Hill. See Hill 239. 

"Culverts": 256-57,264-65 

Cushman, 1st Lt. Robert P.: 262-63 

Czechoslovakia: 31 

Czechoslovakian troops: 208n, 229 

Daddow, 1st Lt. Elwood G.: 103-04 

Dahl, Sgt. Sverry: 74 

Daley, Col. Edmund K.: 360, 362, 365 

Daniel, Lt. Col. Derrill M.: 309-10, 314-15, 420-

21,490-91 

Daser, Generalleutnant Wilhelm: 219, 228-29 

Davis, Brig. Gen. George A.: 358, 361, 365, 368, 

370, 372 

Davison, Lt. Col. Floid A.: 47-48 

Dawson, Lt. Col. Joe: 291-93,418,420 

De Groote Barrier: 125, 133,208 

De Groote Peel: 247 

De Ploeg: 163 

Deadman's Ford: 59-61 

Deadman's Moor: 93-94, 323, 328, 332, 600 

Deception: 258, 393-95, 410, 465-66, 561, 614. 

See also Ardennes counteroffensive. 

Decker, Maj. Lawrence L.: 332-33 

Defense 

blocking position: 53 

in depth: 351,364, 

linear: 100,313 

perimeter: 94, 144, 172, 186, 191, 195-96 

reverse slope: 563 

screen: 190, 195, 200 

static: 187 

Defilade: 275, 452, 459, 532, 543, 603 

DeLille, Lieutenant: 3n 

Demolition charges: 45-47, 102, 160-61, 164, 183, 

203, 255, 262-64, 275, 287, 310, 310n, 350, 

359-60, 555, 596, 619. See also Bangalore 

torpedoes. 

Dempsey, Lt. Gen. Miles C.: 114, 122n, 133, 196, 

208, 232, 241 

Denkert, Generalmajor Walter: 290-91,410,502 

Denmark: 135 

Derichswei1er: 586, 590 

Deurne: 231,237,241-42,244-46 

Deurne Canal: 241-46 

Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.: 4 

Devil's Hill. See Hill 75.9. 

Dew, 2d Lt. Joseph H.: 46, 46n 

Dickson, Col. Benjamin A.: 23 

Diekirch: 42,46 

Dieppe: 4,208 

Diestel, Generalleutnant Erich: 220 

649 

Disney, Col. Paul A.: 272, 526-27, 531-32 

Distinguished Service Cross: 46n, SOn, 53n, 63n, 

64n, 279, 299n, 301n, 312n, 339n, 366n, 

368n, 418n, 424n, 473n, 610 

Diven, Cpl. Ralph F.: 3n 

Divisions. See Airborne Divisions; Armored Divisions; British Army units; Canadian Army 

u.nits; German Army units; Infantry DiviSIOns. 

Doan, Col. Leander LaC.; 74 

Doherty, Capt. Henry R.: 361-62, 365 

Dommel River: 131, 145-46, 149 

Donnerberg. See Hill 287. 

Dortmund: 28 

Dowdy, Lt. Col. John: 53 

Dreiborn ridge: 601,606,610-11 

Dreilaenderbach Dam: 325-26 

Driel: 186, 195-96, 198 

Driscoll, Lt. Col. Edmund F.: 416-18 

Drop zones: 130, 136n, 137-39, 144-47, 159-60, 

170-72, 186, 196,200 

"Drowned earth" policy: 327 

Druon Antigon: 207 

"Duck bills": 518 

Duerboslar: 537, 539 

Dueren: 30, 66-67, 78, 80, 83, 85, 258, 325, 327, 

330-31, 333-34, 346, 397, 404, 408, 412-14, 

428, 431, 451, 465, 469, 471-73, 488, 496, 

515,518,520,559,582-83,586-87,590,592, 

596n, 602 

Duerwiss: 505-06 

Duesseldorf: 28, 113, 252, 517 

Dugouts: 398,613 

Duisberg: 113 

DUKW's: 196 

Dummy parachute drops: 138 

Dunkerque: 204, 208 

"Dunkerque" operation: 219 

"Dutch Panhandle": 29, 36, 96 

Dutch troops: 208n. See also Resistance forces. 

Dwyer, Col. Philip R.: 303 

Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C.: 405 

Eastern Front: 14-16 

Eberding, Generalmajor Kurt: 219,221 

Eberich: 559,561 
650 

Echternach: 40,56-57,59,251 

Echtz: 404,585 

Ederen: 533, 541-44, 558, 566 

Eerde: 145, 189-92 

Eifel: 29-30, 34, 38, 40-41, 62n, 69, 393-94, 399, 

408. See also Ardennes-Eifel; Schnee Eifel 

Eighth Air Force: 137-38, 169n, 196,403-06,412 

Eilendorf: 76-77, 80-81, 86, 88, 284, 286, 288, 

290-91,304,313-14 

Eilendorf-Verlautenheide road: 287 

Eindhoven: 113, 120, 122-23, 125, 130-31, 133-

34, 137, 140, 142-44, 146, 148-50, 152-53, 

168, 174, 187, 189, 199-200, 206, 231, 233, 

401 

Eindhoven-Grave road. See Hell's Highway. 

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.: 3, 5, 134-35, 387-

88. See also Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). 

and air attack of Roer River Dams: 598 

and Berlin as ultimate goal: 210-11 

"broad-front policy": 6-7, 9-10, 36-37, 199-

201,210-11,390-91,619 

conferences of top commanders: 8, 10, 36, 62, 

128,205,210-14,231,369,377,387,390-91, 

595 

and conquest of the Ruhr: 6-7, 36-37, 205, 

211-12, 391, 595 

decision for the November offensive: 390-91 

and importance of opening Antwerp: 207, 

209-11, 214-15, 218,218n 

and the logistical situation: 8, 62, 207, 380, 

382, 384 

and MARKET-GARDEN: 113,119-22,128-29,214 

and Montgomery and the command situation: 

8,213-15, 213n, 231, 378,619 

and release of MARKET airborne troops, 20 I, 

204-05 

and relief of General Corlett: 319, 319-20n 

and shortage of replacements: 388-89 

Ekman, Col. William E.: 158,161-62 

Elst: 195-96 

Elverfeldt, General Harald Freiherr von: 24'4,530 

Engel, General: 410-11, 488 

Engel, Col. Gerhard: 88-89, 283 

Engelsdorf: 538, 558 

Engineer Combat Battalions 

20th: 351-52,360,362,365 

146th: 365-66 

254th: 60, 64n 

294th: 347 

298th: 328, 337-38 

1340th: 365,367 

Engineer Combat Groups 

1104th: 302 

II 06th: 286-87, 309, 310n, 314-16 

lI71st: 343,360,362, 365 

Engineer support: 47,60,64,74,76,78, 102, 108, 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Engineer support-Continued 

150, 203, 226, 267, 305, 333, 347-48, 351-

52, 355, 359-62, 365-67, 435-38, 445-46, 

453,455,467,541-42,550,555,588-89 

Envelopment maneuver: 85,109,211-12,268-69, 

275,426 

Erdmann, Generalleutnant Wolfgang: 125 

Erft River: 29 

Erlekom: 193 

Erp: 189 

Escaut River: 28 

Eschweiler: 66-67, 72, 76-77, 88, 413-14, 425, 

496, 503, 505 

Eschweiler woods: 422, 424-28, 464, 503 

Eschweiler-Weisweiler industrial triangle: 399, 

403, 408, 412, 422, 424-25, 475, 480, 482, 

492, 498, 580 

Essen: 28 

Etang de Lindre dam: 597 

Euchen: 298-300,499, SOl 

Eupen: 36,67,84, 377n, 454 

Evacuation 

ordered at Aachen: 71,81-82 

of wounded: 311,343,371-72,444,467,591 

Evans, Cpl. James L.: 147n 

Evans, Lt. Col. Robert F.: 286,421 

Ewell, Lt. Col. Julian J.: 193 

Farmer, S. Sgt. Robert D.: 418n 

Farwick Park (Aachen): 307,309,311-13,315 

Fascines: 518,526 

Feldt, General der Kavallerie Kurt: 126-27 

Field Artillery Battalions 

118th: 269 

258th: 259n 

991st: 332n 

Field Artillery Brigade, 32d: 582n 

Field Artillery Group, 406th: 607 

Fighter Groups 

365th: 64, 332 

366th: 446, 453, 453n, 459 

368th: 24n, 586 

370th: 24n 

404th: 24n,332 

474th: 24n, 449 

Finnish troops: 15 

Five Points: 434-35 

Flail tanks. See Tanks, Scorpion. 

Flak. See Antiaircraft defense, German. 

Flak wagons: 166, 169 

Flamethrowers: 45, 48, 221, 255, 262-63, 275, 

287,310,613. See also Tanks, Crocodile. 

Flanders: 7-8,29,131 

Flank security: 84, 92, 107, 112-15, 231-32, 294-

95, 339, 401, 420, .434-38, 464, 493, 553, 

566-67, 566n, 601 

Flares: 292, 459 
INDEX 

Fleig, 1st Lt. Raymond E.: 355,357-58,360 

Fleming, Pvt. Roy 0.: 47 

Flood, Lt. Col. Albert: 350-52,355,357,368 

Floods and flooding: 102, 198, 215, 227-29, 522, 

597 

tactical flooding of the Roer: 326-28, 342, 406, 

596-97 

Flossdorf: 567,571-73 

Floverich: 526-27,532 

Flushing: 228-29 

Foote, 1st Lt. Theodore: 263 

Ford, Maj. James C.: 46 

Ford, Col. Thomas J.: 41 

Forest fighting. See Woods fighting. 

Fort Eben Emael: 101-02 

Fort Hof van Holland: 181 

Fortifications. See also Huertgen Forest Pillboxes; 

Roer plain; West Wall. 

field: 260, 265, 275, 331, 350, 416-18, 432, 

452, 482, 510, 520, 535-38, 550, 552, 560, 

567,572,578,608 

Foster, Col. Robert T.: 589 

Foxholes: 225, 305, 331, 336, 358, 360, 373, 398, 

432, 437, 465, 476-77, 520, 577, 608, 613-14 

Frankland, Lt. Col. Robert E.: 261-62, 264 

Freialdenhoven: 541-44, 558 

Frelenberg: 272, 278 

French, Sgt. Dennis D.: 532 

French forces: 4-5, 208n, 381 

Frenz: 509, 513 

Frenzerburg (castle): 482-87, 489, 511 

Fronhoven: 558 

Frost, Lt. Col. J. D.: 171-72,179,185-86 

Frostbite: 372,456-57 

Fuehrer Reserve: 427,488 

Gangelt: 111 

Garcia, Pfc. Marcario: 469, 469n 

GARDEN: 120, 131, 133. See also MARKET-GARDEN. 

Garlington, 1st Lt. Creswell" Jr.: 569-70 

Gavin, Maj. Gen. James M.: 156, 156n, 157, 157n, 

158, 158n, 159, 162-63, 165, 167-69, 174, 

176, 178-79, 183-84, 193, 200, 205 

Gay creek: 59-61 

Gehrke, 2d Lt. Roy E.: 63n 

Geich: 585 

Geilenkirchen: 34, 109-112, 114, 252-53, 257-58, 

266,273-74,277-78,315,401-03,414,516-21 

clearing the salient: 545-57. See also CLIPPER. 

Geilenkirchen-Aachen highway: 269-272 

Geilenkirchen-Aldenhoven highway: 527, 532-33, 

541-42 

Geisberg. See Hill 228. 

Gernert: 189 

Gemuend: 324 

651 

Gereonsweiler: 516, 523, 526-27, 531-33, 540-

44, 556, 558, 566, 570, 574 

Gereonsweiler-Lindern highway: 568-69 

Gerhardt, Maj. Gen. Charles H.: 523-24, 527-

35, 535n, 537, 539, 558, 560, 563, 576 

German Army 

outlook in September 1944: 14-19 

resurgence in fall 1944: 122,377,392-93 

German Army units 

Alarm units: 42, 57-58,127,258,507 

Army Groups 

B: 6, 18,42-43, 57, 63, 87, 100, 104, 107-

08, 110, 112, 125, 127, 134-35, 140-41, 

197, 219, 237, 240-41, 243, 247, 277, 

289-90, 304, 353, 358, 394-95, 530, 540, 

545,547,571 

G: 6,42,57,60,243,394-95 

H: 395,547 

Student: 247 

Armies 

Ersatzheer (Replacement Army): 15, 393 

Feldheer (Field Army): 15 

First: 6, 42-43, 57, 60-63 

First Parachute: 6, 19, 69, 98-100, 103, 

106, 108-11, 123-27, 135-36, 140-42, 

146, ISO, 153, 188, 193, 201-02, 219, 

235-36, 247, 267, 394-95,410 

Fifth Panzer: 6, 127, 247, 353, 394-96, 

410. See also Gruppe von Manteuffel. 

Sixth Panzer: 394, 566-67, 601, 610 

Seventh: 6, 19, 43, 45, 57, 63-64, 69, 82-

83, 87-88, 93, 98-99, 103-04, 108-12, 

125, 127, 218, 247, 273, 283, 290, 300, 

330, 334, 346, 353, 358-59, 394-96, 410, 

437,448,460,465,583 

Fifteenth: 6, 8, 19, 99-100, 123, 125-27, 

134, 136, 150, 193, 198, 202, 218-19, 

222-23, 242, 245-47, 539, 592. See also 

Gruppe von M anteufJel. 

Nineteenth: 6 

Corps 

Feldt: 127, 142, 164, 166, 176-77, 193, 

247 

Volks artillery: 393, 396 

I SS Panzer: 41-42, 42n, 43, 56, 61, 69, 

284,289,300,314,610 

II Parachute: 142, 177, 188, 193,202-03 

II SS Panzer: 127, 135-36, 141-42, 142n, 

164, 170, 172, 185, 188, 193,200-01 

XII SS: 201, 318n, 394, 410, 419, 519, 

539,548,568 

XLVII Panzer: 243-45, 247, 397,410,518-

19,530,540,567,571 

LXVII: 219-20,601-02,610 

LXXIV: 69, 83, 87,91-92, 273, 330, 333, 

339, 346, 353, 358, 431, 583, 592, 601 

LXXX: 42-43, 56-57, 60-61, 63-64 
652 

German Army units~Continued 

Corps~Continued 

LXXXI: 69-70, 75, 79, 83, 87, 91-93, 98, 

105, 107, 110, 112, 257-59, 267, 273, 

276--77,283-84,290,300,314, 318n, 330, 

396,410,417,419, 419n, 427, 431, 487-

88, 499-500, 502, 509, 519-20, 538-39, 

559, 562, 582, 592 

LXXXVI: 188, 193, 195,235-37,240,247 

LXXXVIII: 123-25, 188-89, 192, 195 

388th Volks Artillery: 245,519 

403d Volks Artillery: 488 

407th Volks Artillery: 567 

Divisions 

Panzer Lehr: 42, 59, 63-64 

Parachute Training Erdmann: 124-25, 188, 

235-37 

von Tettau: 142, 171-72, 193 

Yolks grenadier: 15, 393, 601, 616 

1st SS Panzer: 300n, 301, 304 

2d Panzer: 42-43,45,47,61,63, 127,243 

2d SS Panzer: 41--43, 50-51, 53 

3d Panzer Grenadier: 284, 287, 290, 292-

93,295,300,304,313-14,396,410,427, 

499-500,502-03, 510,519,538,562 

3d Parachute: 488-90, 492, 509-10, 514, 

548, 583, 586 

5th Parachute: 42, 59, 63 

6th Parachute: 124n, 177 

7th Parachute: 125n 

9th Panzer: 18, 69-70, 75-79, 87, 91, 95, 

98, 201-02, 243-44, 247, 304, 313, 397, 

518, 530, 533-34, 540, 542--44, 549-54, 

567,571 

9th SS Panzer: 122, 127, 142-43, 164, 171 

10th SS Panzer: 110, 122, 127, 142-43, 

164,171,189,547-48,567,511-73,616 

12th Infantry: 71, 79, 87-90, 92, 95, 109, 

111, 25~ 273-7~ 277, 279, 283, 28~ 295 

12th SS Panzer: 30an 

12th VG: 411, 413-14, 417, 423, 425-27, 

475, 482, 484, 488, 492, 503, 507-08, 

538,583 

15th Panzer Grenadier: 243-45, 247, 396, 

518, 530, 540-41, 544-45, 550, 554-56, 

567 

19th VG: 60, 63 

39th Infantry: 64 

47th VG: 411, 414, 417-21, 424, 460, 475-

77, 479-80, 484, 487-89, 492, 502, 508, 

539,583,585,592 

49th Infantry: 98-104, 107, 110-12, 253, 

257-58, 266, 270, 273, 275-77, 279, 283, 

295-97,314, 318n, 500 

59th Infantry: 125, 136, 142, 146, 150, 

152-53,189,192,200,219,574 

64th Infantry: 219, 221 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

German Army units~Continued 

Divisions~Continued 

70th Infantry: 219-20, 227-28 

85th Infantry: 124,583,602 

89th Infantry: 83-85, 333, 346, 352-54, 

356n, 359, 361, 367-68, 372-73, 431, 

583, 602 

116th Panzer: 68-71,75,77,81-82,87,91, 

95,98, 103, 127,201-02,245, 257, 283-

84, 287, 289-90, 295, 300-01, 303-04, 

306, 313-14, 353-54, 358-59, 362-63, 

365-67,372,417,419,431,437,465,538 

176th Infantry: 99-101, 106, 108-09, 111-

12,114,124,188,236-37,519-20,548 

180th Replacement Training: 189, 236 

183d VG: 91, 109-12,253,257-58,266-67, 

270,273,277,283, 295, 318n, 519, 530, 

548,551,567 

245th Infantry: 125,219 

246th VG: 91, 258, 270, 273-74, 277, 279, 

283-84, 286, 288, 295-97, 301, 307-08, 

314, 411, 499-500, 502, 510, 519, 537-

38, 559-60, 564, 583-84 

272d VG: 352, 359, 460-62, 583, 601-02, 

604 

275th Infantry: 91, 98-105, 107, 110-12, 

253, 257, 273, 286, 330-31, 333, 338, 

346, 352, 359, 372, 410, 431-32, 437, 

442, 465 

277th VG: 602, 607, 610 

326th VG: 606, 610-11 

340th VG: 559,561-63,572-73,575 

344th Infantry: 427, 439, 442, 465, 469, 

583 

346th Infantry: 220, 223 

347th Infantry: 83 

353d Infantry: 70, 75-76, 87, 92-93, 330, 

437,469,583,588 

363d VG: 201-03,573,575 

406th (Landesschuetzen): 126, 142, 166, 

176 

7]] th Infantry: 220, 223 

719th Infantry: 123-26,219 

Brigades 

Volks-werfer: 393, 396 

I02d Assault Gun: 87 

lO5th Panzer: 68, 70, 76 

lO7th Panzer: 142-43, 153, 187-89, 236, 

239 

lO8th Panzer: 63-64, 283-84, 295-300 

280th Assault Gun: 143 

341st Assault Gun: 562 

394th Assault Gun: 70, 74-75, 81 

667th Assault Gun: 489 

Regiments 

von Fritzschen: 284, 295-97, 500 

Wegelein: 337-39, 343, 347, 353 
INDEX 

German Army units-Continued 

Regiments-Continued 

2d Parachute: 124, 124n, 192 

5th Parachute: 489-90 

6th Parachute: 124, 124n, 125, 192-95, 

221 

8th Panzer Grenadier: 291-92 

8th Parachute: 510, 514 

9th Parachute: 489 

10th Panzer Grenadier: 531, 551-52 

lIth Panzer Grenadier: 531, 543 

12th Artillery: 87 

16th Panzer: 353, 356, 359, 368, 419n 

22d SS Panzer Grenadier: 573 

27th Fusilier: 87-88, 90-91, 482, 484, 488 

29th Panzer Grenadier: 290 

48th Grenadier: 87-89, 93, 417-18 

60th Panzer Grenadier: 300-01, 303-04, 

354, 358, 361, 365 

89th Grenadier: 87-89, 423 

103d, 47th VG Division: 414, 480, 484, 

488 

104th, 47th VG Division: 419-20, 475, 

477-78, 480, 488-89 

1I5th Infantry: 420, 476, 479, 488 

148th Infantry: 98-99, 258, 275 

149th Infantry: 99, 258 

156th Panzer Grenadier: 306, 359, 365-66, 

465 

253d Infantry: 330 

330th, 183d VG Division: 257,530 

343d Grenadier: 273-74, 277 

352d Infantry: 284 

404th Grenadier: 273-74, 277, 284, 297, 

312-13, 499-500 

689th Infantry: 284 

751st, 326th VO Division: 610 

980th, 272d VG Division: 460, 60'S 

983d Infantry: 330, 333, 346 

984th Infantry: 99, 330, 346 

985th Infantry: 330,-346 

991 st, 277th VG Division: 607 

1055th Infantry: 85, 352-55, 359, 361 

368 

1056th Infantry: 84, 359, 368 

Kampfgruppen 

Bayer: 487, 539 

Chill: 124-25, 124n, 142, 192,200 

Diefenthal: 300-01, 305, 312 

Eisenhuber: 484 

Engel: 488-90, 508-09, 583 

Heinke: 189 

Huber: 189-92 

von Manteuffel: 395-96, 410, 417, 488, 

501,518-19,530,559,583 

Walther: 124-25, 124n, 188-92, 236, 238-

39 

German Army units-Continued 

Battalions 

Bucher: 305 

Jungwirth: 194 

Rink: 301, 312-13 

2d Landesschuetzen: 305 

12th Fusilier: 87, 418 

31st Machine Gun: 448 

105th Panzer Grenadier: 95 

147th Engineer: 477 

275th Fusilier: 330, 333 

301st Tank: 520, 562 

653 

506th Tank: 283, 290, 296-97, 301, 530, 

571 

559th Assault Gun: 520 

Miscellaneous 

"Ear battalions": 100, 127 

Feldjaegerkommando z. b. V.: 395 

"Fortress" battalions: 16, 75, 273, 286, 

334,372 

Garrison troops: 42 

Grenadier training units: 81, 83, 85 

Heeres units: 16 

Landesschuetzen (local security) battalions: 70, 75-77, 83, 258, 273-74, 277, 

286,330 

Military government troops: 124 

Mobile interceptor units: 135 

NCO Training School Dueren: 273-74, 

277 

NCO Training School Juelich: 273-74, 

277 

Ost (East) battalions: 83, 220 

Replacement units: 111,153,258,330,610 

"Security" units: 99, 258 

"Stomach" units: 83, 83n, 127,220 

"Straggler" battalions: 258 

Werter units: 15-16 

German Navy: 15-16,124,126,393,411 

Germeter: 93, 323, 331-34, 336-39, 343--45, 347, 

349, 352-53, 357-58, 361, 366, 372-73, 399, 

431, 438, 464-65 

Germeter-Huertgen highway: 388, 347--49, 358, 

428, 440, 442--47, 452, 589 

Germeter-Vossenack ridge. See Vossenack ridge. 

Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T.: 23, 36-37, 39-41, 

44,46,48--49, 51, 55-57, 59-63, 65-66, 341, 

343,347,364,366,369-70,372,440-41,451 

455,461, 598-602, 607, 611. See also Corps, 

V. 

Gersdorff, Col. Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von: 

110 

Geul River: 105-07, 109-10 

Gey: 399, 408, 412, 430, 433, 436, 469, 472-74, 

580,587-91 

Ghent: 208 

Gibb, Col. Frederick W.: 291-92,418 
654 

Gibney, Col. Jesse L.: 92-94 

Gillem, Maj. Gen. Alvan C., Jr.: 400, 40 On, 516-

17, 547, 55~ 556, 566, 56~ 571 

Glider Field Artillery Battalion, 907th: 192, 194 

Glider Infantry Regiments 

325th: 176, 193 

327th: 152, 152n, 190-91 

401st: 152n 

Glider Operations: 129, 132n, 133, 137-39, 147-

48, 152, 154, 159, 166-67, 170, 176, 176n, 

185, 198-99, 199n 

Glotzbach, Capt. Charles: 508 

Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 141 

Gomes, Lt. Col. Lloyd H.: 550, 552 

GOODWOOD: 404n 

Gottberg, Obergruppenfuehrer und General der 

Waffen-SS Curt von: 201 

Grantham: 137 

Grave: 120, 131, 154, 157n, 158, 160, 174, 184, 

196, 202, 206 

Grave-Nijmegen highway: 158, 161 

Greer, Maj. Howard: 299, 299n 

Grenades: 85, 147, 151, 178, 181, 262-64, 26'" 

310, 315, 366, 418, 444-45, 453, 481, 486, 

487,511,541,564,577 

Gressenich: 72, 79-80, 89, 409, 417 

Groesbeek: 155, 158, 161-62, 165, 167, 174, 177, 

202 

Groesbeek ridge: 155-57, 157n, 158, 161-62, 166, 

174,177 

Groesbeekscheweg: 163 

Grosshau: 408, 430, 432-34, 437, 450, 465-69, 

471-73, 587, 58~ 591 

Grosshau-Gey highway: 472-73,588,591 

Grosskampenberg: 44-45 

Guerzenich: 590-92 

Guingand, Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de: 211n, 212 

Gulpen: 107 

Gunn, Col. Damon M.: 23n 

Gunn, Lt. Col. Frank L.: 337-38 

Guns. See also Artillery; Howitzers; Mortar fire; 

Tank destroyers; Tank guns; Weapons. 

75-mm: 159 

90-mm: 27 

155-mm: 259,287,312-13, 316,609 

8-inch: 481-82 

Guns, German 

railroad: 64 

SP: 15-16, 50, 74, 76-77, 79, 87n, 109, 266, 

272, 275, 277, 301, 313, 331, 336, 356, 438, 

450,460-61,472,487,501-02,506,514,520, 

539-40, 543, 559, 559n, 584, 586, 591-93 

88-mm: 27-28, 50, 148-49, 175, 226, 559n, 620 

Gut Hasenfeld: 574-77 

Gut Merberich: 489 

Gut Schwarzenbroich: 430,432,437,464-65,467-

68,477 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Haaren: 288-89,291,309-10 

Hackard, Capt. Clifford T.: 368, 368n 

Half-tracks: 48, 298, 419, 450, 453, 612-13 

Hall, 1st Lt. Stanford F.: 64n 

Hallahan, Capt. F. J.: 514 

Halsdorf: 59,61 

Hamberg, Lt. Col. William A.: 449-50, 452-54 

Hamich: 4M, 416-19, 421, 475-77, 479-80, 487 

Hamich ridge: 399, 404, 408-09, 412, 415-18, 

422-24,464,475-76,479-80,529 

Hand-to-hand fighting: 180-81,193, 437n 

Hansen, Maj. Harold D.: 302 

Hansen, Pvt. Henry E.: 263 

Hardage, Maj. Quentin R.: 335-37,339 

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N.: 107-08, 107n, 

278, 518, 522-24, 532-35, 540-42, 544, 561 

Harper, Col. Joseph H.: 152,190-91 

Harris, Ai, Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T.: 598 

Harrison, Maj. Willard E.: 161, 179, 181 

Harscheidt: 352-56 

Harspelt: 3n 

Hart, Brig. Gen. Charles E.: 22, 621 

Hasbrouck, Brig. Gen. Robert W.: 238, 244-47 

Hasenfeld: 325, 345 

Hasselt: 96, 98-100, 108, 124, 204, 231 

Hastenrath: 404, 409, 422-24 

Haswell, Pfc. James B.: 316 

Hatert: 158, 161-63, 168, 174 

Hatzfeld, Lt. Col. Theodore S.: 349, 358, 364-66, 

368 

Hauptbecken Reservoir: 325 

Haviland, S. Sgt. Floyd: 577 

Hazlett, Maj. Robert T.: 351, 357, 368 

Heartbreak Crossroads. See Wahlerscheid. 

Heckhuscheid: 46 

Heerlen: 111 

Heeswijk: 187 

Heeze: 113 

Hehlrath: 499, 503-04 

Heimbach Dam: 325 

Heinsberg: 30,404,412,496,498,520, 525, 547-

48, 550 

Heistern: 477-79,484 

Heitrak: 244-45 

Helgeson, Capt. Thomas B.: 161 

Hellen thaler Wald: 607 

Hellerich, S. Sgt. Harold: 89 

Hell's Highway: 143-46, 148, 150, 152-54, 187-

95 

Helmond: 191 

Hemgen Berg. See Hill 253. 

Hemmeres: 3 

Henbest, Lt. Col. Ross C.: 59-61, 64 

Henley, S. Sgt. Robert M.: 473n 

Henry, Pvt. Robert T.: 490n 

Herbach: 256, 269, 275, 278 

Herenthals: 208 
INDEX 

Herlong, Lt. Col. Robert H.: 565 

Herrin, Sgt. Stanley: 541 

Herscheid: 54 

Hertogenwald: 66, 84 

Heumen: 158, 160-61, 167, 178 

Heveadorp: 173, 185-86 

Heydte, Lt. Col. Friedrich-August Freiherr von 

der: 124-25, 192-93,221 

Hickey, Brig. Gen. Doyle 0.: 74,76-77 

Higgins, Brig. Gen. Gerald J.: 152 

Higgins, Lt. Col. Walter M. Jr.: 609-10 

Hill, Col. John G.: 611 

Hill 64: 165-66 

Hill 75.9: 176, 193 

Hill 77.2: 158,161,178,193 

Hill 81.8: 161 

Hill 87.9: 568,571,573-74 

Hill 92.5: 551-53 

Hill 98.1: 564-65 

Hill 100.3: 564-65 

Hill 101: 550-51 

Hill 154: 506-08 

Hill 167: 480-81,506 

Hill 187: 480-82,506 

Hill 194: 305-06, 313 

Hill 203: 478-79, 484, 489 

Hill 207: 478 

Hill 211: 587, 591 

Hill 228: 77,79-80 

Hill 231: 286-89, 295, 297, 304-06, 309, 313-14, 

314n,499 

Hill 232: 416-20,422,424,475-77,481-82 

Hill 239: 286-290, 287n 

Hill 253: 287, 590, 592-93 

Hill 266: 590-93 

Hill 283: 79-80,88,91 

Hill 287: 91,422,424-28,464,503, 529 

Hill 400.5: 454,459,461-63 

Hill 401: 448,451-53 

Hill 401.3: 450,472-73, 473n 

Hill 407: 59,61,63-64 

Hill 520: 54 

Hill 553: 46-48 

Hill 554: 92, 602 

Hill 559: 48 

Hill 560: 47 

Hill 568: 48 

Hill 655: 53 

Hill 697: 50 

Hillyard, Lt. Col. Harry L.: 532 

Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich: 141 

Hinds, Col. Sidney R.: 272, 542 

Hirschfelder, Col. Chester J.: 606, 608-09 

Hirson: 383 

Hitler, Adolf: 6,218,320, 377n, 390 

and Aachen evacuation and defense: 71, 82, 

281,307,314-15,320 

655 

Hitler, Adolf-Continued 

and airborne/seaborne invasion: 135-36 

and Antwerp and the Schelde: 19, 123, 215, 

218, 223, 227-28 

and Ardennes counteroffensive: 136n, 393, 395, 

397, 505,559,616 

assumption of complete military command: 16-

17 

build-up of West forces: 15-16 

and the Luftwaffe: 143,153 

order to defend Fort Eben Emael: 101 

orders to hold "to the last": 12,18,307,314-15 

reaction to MARKET-GARDEN: 141, 167, 201 

and West Wall defense: 87 

and West Wall impregnability: 18,30-31 

and withdrawal actions: 223, 505 

Hitler Youth: 410 

Hitzfeld, General der Infanterie Otto: 601 

Hobbs, Maj. Gen. Leland S.: 101, 106-07, 109-

11, 114, 253-54, 258-59, 266, 270, 279, 285, 

293-305, 500-503, 561 

Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H.: 22-23, 379, 619. 

See also Army, First. 

and Aachen encirclement: 285, 302, 319n 

biography: 20-21 

and Huertgen Forest attacks: 431, 441, 451-

52,461,493 

and November offensive: 341, 348, 399-400, 

405,411,429,438-39,440,464,600 

and operations west of the Maas: 231-35, 240 

optimism for Rhine breakthrough: 14, 38, 233-

35,409,421,618-19 

postponement of West Wall assault: 115,231 

and protection of First Army left flank: 114 

and the Roer River dams: 326, 342, 342n, 406, 

597-98 

and Schmidt operation: 364, 369, 373 

and supply priorities: 36-37,62 

and West Wall reconnaissance and attacks: 37-

40, 55-56, 278 

Hoefen-Alzen ridge: 84-86, 92, 328, 600-602, 

606-07, 611 

Hof Hardt: 474,580,583,587,590 

Hoffman, Lt. John R.: 74 

Hogan, Lt. Col. Samuel M.: 91 

HoheVenn: 30 

Holy Roman Empire: 281 

Holycross, 2d Lt. Harold L.: 275, 305, 565 

Holzinger, S. Sgt. Warner W.: 3,57 

Hongen: 499-502 

Honinghutje: 158, 158n, 161-62 

Hontheim: 50,52,54 

Horner, Lt. Col. Charles T. Jr.: 418-19 

Horner, S. Sgt. Freeman V.: 501n 

Horrocks, Lt. Gen. Brian G.: 133-34,149,174, 

186,191,196-97,200,403,546,551 

Horses: 15, 1 7, 219 
656 

Hospitals: 147, 186 

Hostages: 513 

Hostrup, Capt. Bruce M.: 351,355,359-60,363 

House-to-house fighting: 148, 175, 181, 264, 269, 

310-11,417-18,453,505,508,562-63,565, 

573, 588, 604-05 

Houston, Maj. Jack A.: 326, 328 

Hoven: 546, 585-86 

Hoverhof: 272 

Howitzers 

German: 25, 25-26n, 107 

75-mm pack: 154, 178 

105-mm: 25, 25-26n, 86, 154, 192, 261, 318, 

577 

155-mm: 25, 25-26n, 481 

240-mm: 481 

8-inch: 576 

Howze, Col. Robert L., Jr.: 585 

Huber, Major: 189-91 

Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R.: 72, 81, 285-

86, 288-89, 291-92, 308-09, 313-15, 408, 

415-16,475,477,479,481,494 

Huecheln: 476,481-84,507-08 

Huertgen: 90, 92, 94, 331, 337, 341, 343, 347-

48, 352, 354, 370, 372, 408, 412, 414, 417, 

428-29, 433, 438, 441, 443, 445--48, 450-51, 

456, 464, 466-67, 587-88 

Huertgen Forest: 66, 68, 87, 90, 94, 248, 252, 

257, 273, 323-24, 328, 338, 341, 377, 395, 

399--400, 409, 451, 474, 496, 529, 561, 583, 

596, 600-602, 612 616. See also Infantry Divisions (lst; 4th; 8th; 9th; 28th; 83d). 

American method of attack: 430-31, 431n 

German impression of American troops: 334 

summary of American action: 492-93,618,620 

terrain and defenses: 92, 94, 330, 332-33, 345-

46, 349-5~ 41~ 42~ 432, 452, 475, 580, 583, 

587 

Huertgen-Kleinhau road net: 323 331 341 343 

399, 448 ' , , , 

Huissen: 164, 179 

Huling, Capt. George W., Jr.: 292 

Hundley, Col. Daniel H.: 380n 

Hungarian troops: IS 

Hunner Park: 165, 175, 181 

Hurless, Col. Bernard F.: 531,540,543,573 

Hurley, Sgt. William: 446 

IJssel River: 141, 170 

IJsselmeer: 120,131,134,377 

Immendorf: 526-27,531,540,544,548,550,553 

Inde River: 66, 72, 408-09, 415-16, 424-25, 475-

76,480,482, 484, 496, 499, 506-15, 561, 564, 

580, 582, 584 

Inden: 499,509-12, SIS, 561, 563-64, 580, 584 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

"Indian" fighting: 144, 152, 154 

Infantry 

airborne troops used in line: 176,201,204 

Huertgen Forest an infantry battle: 420 

riflemen casualties: 93-94,302 372 417 438 

shortage of: 166,362,365-67,'388-89,455,460 

Infantry Battalion, 99th: 113-14 302 305 313 

Infantry Division, 1st: 23, 36, 68, lC)3, 222, 424-

25, 498, 580 

Aachen encirclement and assault: 66-67, 72, 

74-75,77,81,90,285-93,299,304,306-18 

casualties: 293, 318, 417, 421, 478, 481, 484, 

492, 492n, 593n 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 415-21 430 464 468 

475-79,490-93,580,586 ' , , , 

November offensive: 400, 408-09, 412, 414, 

422,479-90,506-08,511,600 

Infantry Division, 2d: 379, 600-602 606 606n 

607-15 ' , , 

casualties: 609-10, 612 

Infantry Division, 4th: 3, 24 36 41 60 341, 

615,618 ' , , , 

casualties: 53-55, 429, 433-35, 437-38, 464, 

466, 469-74, 580, 593, 593n 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 366 370 373 408 

428-40,447,450-51,464-75,477, 490: 492~ 93, 580, 587, 590 

Schnee Eifel attack: 44,49-55,612 

Infantry Division, 8th: 373,379,614 

casualties: 443-45,450, 450n, 463, 612 

Huertgen Forest attacks: 440-63,493. 600-601 

Infantry Division, 9th: 23, 36 66-68 72 76 82n 

294n, 326, 326n, 408, 492~93 ' , , , 

casualties: 93-94, 332, 334, 340, 585-86, 593n 

Huertgen Forest first fight: 90, 92-94, lIS, 323, 

328, 431 

Huertgen Forest second fight: 252, 285, 324, 

327-28, 330-40, 345--46, 350, 353, 431 

Monschau Corridor battle: 82-86 342-43 600 

602 " , 

Roer Rivet final push: 580-87, 590 

Stolberg Corridor fight: 77-80, 82, 89 

Infantry Division, 28th: 3, 3n, 24 36 40-41 44n 

314, 461n, 614-15, 618 " , , 

casualties: 48, 63, 349-50, 361, 364, 372-74, 

474, 493 

Eifel attack: 44-50,52,55,60,612-13 

Schmidt and the Huertgen Forest: 340-41, 

342n, 343-74, 386, 397, 399-400, 406, 411, 

428-29, 431, 438, 440-41, 451, 455, 474, 493, 

600, 608 

Infantry Division, 29th 

casualties: 539,576 

Maas River-West Wall flank protection: 232-

33, 252-53, 258, 266-67, 274, 278-79, 294, 

302 
INDEX 

Infantry Division, 29th-Continued 

Roer plain attacks: 400, 498, 503, 517-18, 523-

25, 527-29, 534-40, 542, 544, 558-63, 565, 

574-77 

Infantry Division, 30th: 23, 36, 96, 99, 102n, 

233, 320 

advance to the West Wall: 101-04, 106-112, 

114-15 

casualties: 269, 271, 279, 279n, 295-96, 302, 

306, 318, 500-502, 564 

encirclement of Aachen: 285, 288, 292-306, 

313,315,317-18, 318n, 498 

November offensive: 400,498-503,506-07,509, 

516-17, 522-23, 529, 539, 544, 548, 558-61, 

563-65 

West Wall set attack: 252-80,618 

Infantry Division, 75th: 614 

Infantry Division, 78th: 600-606,612 

Infantry Division, 83d: 379, 399n, 474, 492, 

580-83, 586-93, 596n, 613-15 

casual ties: 590-91, 593n, 613 

Infantry Division, 84th: 399n, 401-03, 499, 524 

casualties: 551,557,574 

final attack to Roer River: 567-74 

Geilenkirchen attack: 516-17, 545-58, 566 

Infantry Division, 90th: 320, 320n, 448 

Infantry Division, 94th: 388 

Infantry Division, 99th: 397, 600-601, 606-12 

Infantry Division, 102d: 400-402, 517, 523-24, 

544,546-47, 550, 554, 556, 566-68, 571-74 

Infantry Division, 104th: 388, 392, 397, 399-401, 

403,547,621 

casualties: 227, 227n, 426, 506-07, 510, 515, 

586, 593n 

drive to the Maas: 213,222-27 

Eschweiler-Weisweiler and Roer River drive: 

408, 412, 416, 422, 424-28, 464, 475-76, 

480-84, 488, 490, 498-99, 502-15, 563-64, 

580-82, 584, 586 

Infantry Division, 106th: 614-15 

Infantry Regiments. See also Glider Infantry 

Regiments: Parachute Infantry Regiments. 

8th: 49, 52-53, 430, 432-33, 435-39, 464-69, 

469n, 474, 477 

9th: 606-12 

12th: 49-53, 366, 370, 372-73, 428-30, 435, 

438-39, 441, 447n, 466, 469, 474 

13th: 447-48,450, 450n, 451-52, 457, 463 

16th: 67, 72, 74-75, 77, 81, 88, 286, 290-93, 

304,313,416-21,475,477,479-80,484,489-

90, 490n, 492n 

18th: 75, 81, 95n, 286-91, 293-94, 297, 306, 

309, 313, 416, 475-80, 484,489,492n 

22d: 3, 49-50, 52-55, 430, 432-39, 464-69, 

471-74,493 

23d: 613 

657 

Infantry Regiments-Continued 

26th: 74-75,80-81,91,286,289, 291, 307-16, 

318,416,420-21,430,475-78,490-92 

28th: 451-53,457-59,462-63 

38th: 606, 610, 612 

39th: 83-86, 92-94, 328, 331-34, 336-40, 586-

87, 590 

47th: 76-80,82-83,86,89-90,92-93,328,338-

40, 408-09, 415-17, 422, 424-25, 475-76, 

479-89,492-93,506,511 

60th: 84-86, 92-94, 323, 328, 331-37, 339-40, 

350, 585-86 

109th: 3, 44-47, 49, 347-49, 352-54, 358-59, 

361, 366-68, 370-73, 428-29 

1l0th: 3n, 44-49, 314-15, 347, 349-50, 352, 

354-55, 361, 363-64, 367-68, 372, 613 

112th: 40-41,56-57,59-61,63-65,347,349-74 

115th: 525,527-29,535-37,539,563,576-77 

116th: 278-79, 294, 302-03, 305-06, 313, 535-

36, 535n, 538, 560, 562-63, 574-77 

117th: 102-03, 106, 111, 255-56, 260-64, 266-

71, 274-75, 277-79, 285, 294-97, 299, 305-

06, 500-502 

119th: 101,103,106-07,109,111,256-57,260, 

264-71, 275-79, 285, 295, 297-99, 301-02, 

304-05,500-501, 501n, 523, 541, 544, 560-61, 

563-65 

120th: 102-03,107,110-11,253,258,266,277, 

279-80, 285, 294-302, 305, 500-502, 558-59, 

561, 563-64 

121st: 441-48, 4:l0-53, 450n, 455-62 

175th: 525, 527-Q9, 535-39, 559-63 

309th: 602-06 

31 Oth: 602-06 

329th: 587, 590-92 

330th: 587-92 

331st: 587-92 

333d: 549,551,554-57,568,571 

334th: 549-53,555-57,573-74 

335th: 548,568-71,573 

393d: 607, 610 

394th: 610 

395th: 607-09,611-12 

405th: 546,554,556,572-73 

406th: 523,527,531-32,540,543-44,572-73 

407th: 572-73 

413th: 223,225-26,425,503-07,509-11 

414th: 223-24, 226-27, 425-28, 503, 505-09, 

511,515,584 

415th: 223-26, 426-27, 503, 505-07, 511-15, 

584 

Infantry-tank-artillery team: 106, 537, 620 

Infiltration: 358,465,477,559,589,604,609 

Intelligence: 31, 38, 41, 61, 68, 121-22, 148, 

175,199-200, 228n, 235, 243-44, 257, 286-87, 

290,295,328-30,332,337,346, 394,409-10, 

421,567,582,596 
658 

In telligence-Con tin ued 

from captured papers: 80, 103-04, 106, 122, 

141-42,200,501 

from prisoners: 46, 80, 160, 226, 327, 352, 

414,419,512,556,606 

German: 134-36, 167, 240-41,258-59,547-48, 

614 

Irsen creek: 44-45 

Jackson, Lt. Col. Langdon A., Jr.: 433 

.Jaegerhaus: 94, 332, 335 

Jagdpanther. See Guns, German, SP. 

Jedlicka, Pvt. Joseph: 180 

Jeeps: 311,362 

Jenkins, Pvt. Willis: 262-63 

Jennings, Pvt. Sheldon D.: 64n 

Jeter, Col. John R.: 441-44,446-47, 447n 

Jodi, Generaloberst Alfred: 135 

Johnson, Col. Howard R.: 145-46, 153, 188-89, 

191-92 

Johnson, 1st Lt. Kenneth L.: 418n 

Johnson, Col. Walter M.: 102, 106, 256, 260, 

264, 269, 275, 294-97, 500-501 

Jones, Capt. Robert E.: 146-47 

Juelich: 80, 88, 258, 288, 327, 397, 402, 404, 

412-13, 488, 498, 516-18, 520, 523-25, 529, 

537-38, 544, 548, 559-63, 565, 573-74, 576 

Juengersdorf: 403,408,415-16,420,475-76,489-

90,580 

Juliana Canal: 108,237 

Kading, Pfc. Ken: 307 

Kaiserslautern: 7 

Kalinowsky, Pfc. Henry J.: 366n 

Kall River operations: 323, 331, 336, 343-47, 

349-52, 355-72, 457, 463, 600 

Kall Valley Dam: 325 

Kalterherberg: 84 

Kampfgruppen: 59, 69-70, 110, 112, 346, 352. 

See also German Army units. 

Kappel, Capt. Carl W.: 180 

Karwell, S. Sgt. Frank A.: 306 

Kasteel (chateau): 145-46 

Kayes, Capt. Daniel E.: 562 

Kean, Maj. Gen. William G.: 23, 342 

Keating, Maj. Gen. Frank A.: 566,572 

Keesee, Lt. Col. Morris J.: 447-48,450,457 

Keizer Karel Plein: 163-64, 166 

Kelley, S. Sgt. Brady 0.: 473n 

Kemper Steimerich Hill. See Hill 560. 

Kennedy, Maj. Robert S.: 568 

Keppler, General der Waffen-SS Georg: 41-43, 

56, 284, 300 

Kerkrade: 112,253,266,277,279,285,295,302 

Kesfeld: 45-47 

Kesternich: 603-04, 611 

Kettenkreuz. See Hill 655. 

Kettlehut, 1st Lt. Howard K.: 462 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Kiekberg. See Hill 77.2. 

Kimbacher, Col. Josef: 477-78 

Kiner, Pvt. Harold G.: 264 

King, Lt. Col. Roswell H.: 73, 75-76 

Kinnard, Lt. Col. Harry" W. O. Jr.: 145-46, 187-

88 

Kinzweiler: 499,502-04 

Kirchberg: 560-61, 563 

Kleinhau: 90, 92, 408, 430, 433, 437, 439, 447-

52,457,464,466,471-72, 587, 589 

Kleinhau-Brandenberg highway: 451 

Kleinsteiber, Lt. George: 453 

Kleve: 30, 34, 122, 156 

Kleve-Nijmegen highway: 162, 167, 176 

Klundert: 224 

Knobelsdorff, General der Panzertruppen Otto 

von: 42, 59-60, 63 

Koblenz: 37, 39-40, 252, 399 

Koechling, General der Infanterie Friedrich J. 

M.: 91, 257-59, 267, 270, 273-74, 267-77, 

284, 288, 296, 312, 487-88, 502, 520, 538-

39,562 

Koenig, Generalleutenant Eugen: 601 

Koerte, Colonel: 519 

Koettnich: 409, 422 

Koevering: 194-95 

Kohlscheid: 305 

Kommerscheidt: 343, 345, 349-52, 354-64, 367-

72, 429 

Kommerscheidt-Schmidt ridge: 345, 358, 452, 

454, 600 

Kornelimuenster: 72, 75 

Koslar: 560, 562-63, 576 

Kossmala, Col. Eugen: 460 

Krauss, Pvt. Edward: 306,313-14 

Kreider, T/4 James A.: 361-62 

Krinkelt: 601,606-07, 611-12 

Kufferath: 591-93 

Kunzig, Lt. Col. Henry B.: 448 

Kurhaus: 309, 312-13, 315 

Kyll River: 40,52,69 

Lafley, 1st Lt. Cedric A.: 307, 317 

Lamersdorf: 509,511,513-14 

Lammerding, SS-Brigadefuehrer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Heinz: 51 

Lammersdorf: 85,90,92,94,325,341,602 

Lammersdorf-Huertgen highway: 92-94 

Lanaye: 102-03 

Landau, Col. Christian: 100, 108-11, 124, 236, 

519,548 

Landing craft: 135 

Landing fields: 120 

Landing zones: 127, 130-31, 137, 139, 144, 146, 

148, 154, 158, 163, 165-67, 171-72, 190,200 

Lange, Generalleutnant Wolfgang: 111-12, 258-

59,266-67,270,273,519,548 
INDEX 

Langerwehe; 408, 412-13, 415-16, 420, 475-79, 

484-85,489-90,492, 510, 580 

Lanham, Col. Charles T.: 49-50, 50n, 54, 430, 

432,434-36,438-39,464-67,471-73 

LaPrade, Maj. James L.: 147-48 

Lathbury, Brig. G. W.: 171n 

Latimer, Maj. Robert B.: 54 

Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de: 381 

Lauer, Maj. Gen. Walter E.: 600,607,611-12 

Laufenberg (castle): 421,475-76 

Launches: 138 

Laurensberg: 314-15 

Le Havre: 4, 207-09, 383 

Leaflets: 307, 318 

Lee, Lt. Robert E.: 526 

Leiffarth: 566,568,574 

Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford: 

218n 

Lendersdorf: 591 

Leonard, Lt. Col. Henry G. Jr.: 287-88 

Leonard, 1st Lt. Turney W.: 363n 

Leopold Canal: 209,215,221 

Leyhcrr, Lt. Col. Maximilian: 286, 307 

Liaison planes. See Artillery liaison planes. 

Liege: 4, 7-8, 12,36,81,96,98-99, 101-03, 119, 

230, 383-84, 398, 405 

Liesel: 245-46 

Limburg. See "Dutch Panhandle." 

Lind, Capt. Ralph E. Jr.: 367 

Lindern: 566-73 

Lindern-Linnich highway: 571 

Lindquist, Col. Roy E.: 158,161-63,165-66 

Lindsey, T. Sgt. Jake W.: 418, 418n 

Lindsey, Pvt. Thomas G.: 148 

Lines of communication: 7, 613n 

Linnich: 258, 402, 404, 498, 516-20, 525, 547-

48,559,564,566-67, 571-73, 593 

Lippe River: 135n 

Locke, T/5 Coy T.: 3n 

Logistics: 7-14, 62, 121, 259, 377, 380, 382-91, 

521-22, 616-17, 619-20. See also Shortages; 

Supply. 

Lohn: 506-07,559,561 

Long, Maj. Talton W.: 177-78 

Lorrach: 30 

Lorraine: 7,16,34,38,42,395,616 

Losenseifen Hill. See Hill 568. 

Losheim: 52,612 

Losheim Gap: 41,52 

Losses, summary of. See also Casualties. 

Aachen battle: 317-18 

Antwerp approaches: 229 

German eq uipmen t and transport: 14-15 

Huertgen Forest: 373-74,492-93 

MARKET-GARDEN: 138, 154, 159, 170, 198-

200, 199n, 206 

November offensive 577-78,593-94 

Losses, summary of-Continued 

Roer plain battle: 577-78 

Roer River Dams attack: 612 

Siegfried Line campaign: 616-17 

West Wall penetrations: 378 

Lousberg: 309,311-12,314-15 

Lousberg Strasse (Aachen): 316 

Lovelady, Lt. Col. William B.: 73, 79 

Loverich: 519,526,535-36 

Lower Rhine. See Neder Rijn. 

Luchem: 404,485,490,580 

Luchcrberg: 510-15,580 

Luckett, Col. James S.: 49,428-30,441, 447n 

Luerken: 499-500,525 

659 

Luettwitz, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich 

Freiherr von: 45,243--44,397,518 

Luetzelen Castle: 511 

Luftlotte 3: 6 

Luftwaffe: 6, 15-16, 126, 138, 143, 153, 246, 

260, 276, 299, 308, 382, 393, 454. See also 

Air operations. 

Luftwaffe troops: 58, 70, 75, 81, 83, 100, 124, 

127, 177, 286,411 

Luxembourg: 4, 28, 36, 43, 56-57, 60, 319, 328, 

341,378,441,474,522,580, 58S, 612-13 

M4 tanks. See Tanks, medium. 

Maas Rivn: 29,96, 105-06, 108-09, 113-14, 120, 

126, 131, 134, 154-58, 168, 198, 207, 401, 

517,519-21,546,548,567. See also Meuse 

River. 

bridges: 155-58, 158n, 160, 162, 174, 176, 

521-22 

clearing the west bank: 212-14, 220-22, 227, 

231-48, 252, 346, 377, 390-92, 547,594,616 

Maas-Scheldt. See Meuse-Escaut Canal. 

Maas-Waal Canal: 131, 156-58, 160-62, 168, 

176-79 

Maasbracht: 546 

Maashees: 231-32 

Maastricht: 8, 14, 29, 36, 96, 98-100, 103-09, 

113, 124-25, 231-33, 330, 379, 381, 398, 

400, 522, 595 

Maastricht-Aachen highway: 105 

Maastricht Canal: 108-09, 113 

Maastricht island: 102,104-06,108-09 

Mabry, Maj. George L., Jr.: 437n 

Macaulay, 1st Lt. J. A.: 446 

McAuliffe, Brig. Gen. Anthony C.: 131n, 190-92 

McCrory, Sgt. James M.: 153-54 

McDaniel, Pvt. Doyle W.: 366n 

McDaniel, Col. Edward H.: 529 

McDowell, Lt. Col. Samuel T.: 271,274,296 

McGraw, Pfc. Francis X.: 420-21 

Machine guns: 25,27-28,31 

Macholz, Generalleutnant Sigfrid P.: 98-99, 101, 

110,258-59,266 
660 

Macht, 1st Lt. Walter D.: 276 

McKee, Col. Richard G.: 430, 436-39, 464-67, 

474 

Mackenzie, Col. A. J.: 607 

McLain, Maj. Gen. Raymond S.: 320, 320n, 

498-500, 503, 507, 522-24, 529-30, 534, 537, 

561,563,565-66. See also Corps, XIX. 

McNeal, Pfc. George F.: 3n 

Macon, Maj. Gen. Robert C.: 587-89,591 

McWaters, 1st Lt. William L.: 485-87 

Maginot Line: 31 

Mahogany Hill. See Hill 92.5. 

Maintenance: 20,132,386,518,521 

Mainz: 37 

Malden: 158,160-61 

Malmedy: 36 

Maltzahn, Major Freiherr von: 142, 153 

Maness, Lt. Col. Lewis E.: 482-87 

Mann, Pfc. Joe E.: 151, 151n 

Mannheim: 37 

Manteuffel, General der Panzertruppen Hasso 

von: 247,394-95,410, 417n 

Map exercise: 353 

Maps: 26, 80, 255, 336, 501 

Marcum, 1st Lt. Warren E.: 54-55 

Maria Plein: 165 

Mariadorf: 294-97, 499-502 

Mariaweiler: 404,585-86 

Marienberg: 253,255-56, 264-69, 277 

Mark IV tank. See Tanks, German. 

Mark V tank. See Tanks, German. 

Mark VI tank. See Tanks, German. 

Mark River: 223-27 

Marker boats: 138 

MARKET: 120-21, 128-29, 132-33, 132n, 134-39, 

200. See also MARKET-GARDEN. 

MARKET-GARDEN: 

achievements and cost: 198-201, 211-12, 377, 

618-20 

American operations: 143-95 

British operations: 170-73, 195-98. See also 

GARDEN. 

defense of the salient: 201-06, 213, 219-22, 231, 

236, 239-41,243 

flight from England: 136-39 

German forces opposing: 123-27, 174 

German intelligence concerning: 134-36, 136n, 

140-41 

German reaction to airborne invasion: 136n, 

140-43 

planning for: 113,119-23,127-34,208-09,214, 

383 

Marokus, Sgt. Leon: 513 

Marr, Col. Richard S.: 471 

Marshall, Gen. George C.: 21,119,214, 320n 

Martin, Cpl. Russell: 263-64 

Mastrobattista, Pvt. Alexander: 501 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Mathews, Pvt. James E.: 339n 

Maubeuge: 7-8 

Mausbach: 76, 79,88 

Mead, Col. Armistead D. Jr.: 379-80 

Medal of Honor: 49n, 95n, 151 n, 182n, 226, 

264, 287n, 299n, 303n, 314n, 363n, 418n, 

421, 433n, 437n, 442n, 469n, 480n, 487n, 

490n, 501n, 592 

Medical aid: 357,362,371-72 

Mediterranean Theater: 205, 380 

Meerssen: 109-1 ° 

Meijc1: 241, 243-48 

Meijel-Deurne highway: 244-45 

Meindl, General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugen: 

142,177,188,193,202 

Mendez, Lt. Col. Louis G., Jr.: 165-67, 178 

Menkovitz, S. Sgt. Daniel: 577 

Merken: 584, 584n 

Merkstein: 279 

Merode: 475-77,488,490-92,510,580,583,586, 

588 

Mcrzenhausen: 560-61, 563-65 

Mettendorf: 40, 57, 59 

Metz: 4, 7-8, 14, 115, 200, 238, 346, 377, 380, 

384, 397, 597 

Meuse River: 9-10,28-30,36-37,62,96, 101-03, 

106, 119, 326. See also Maas River. 

Meuse-Escaut Canal: 106, 113, 120, 122, 125, 

133,142, 192,208,236 

MEW (Mobile Early Warning): 382 

Michaelis, Col. John H.: 144-47, 150, 152, 187-

88 

Middelburg: 229 

Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.: 20n, 251, 613 

Millener, Col. George A.: 380n 

Miller, Col. Art B., Jr.: 380n 

Mills, Lt. Col. Herbert N.: 76, 422-24, 424n 

Mine detectors: 436, 500-501, 550, 588 

Mine fields. See Mines, use of. 

Miner, Col. Earl M.: 603 

Mines 

antilifting devices: 435 

cleared by flail tanks: 548-50 

Schuh mines: 433,500,503 

sea mines: 212, 229 

To pi mines: 500 

use of: 89, 195, 238-39, 289, 348, 351, 356, 

410, 422-24, 432, 434, 452-53, 455, 500-501, 

536,564,575-77,588-89 

Minick, S. Sgt. John W.: 442n 

"Miracle of the West": 392 

Mitchell, Capt. James W.: 554 

Mobiliza tion, German: 19 

Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter: 6, 16-18, 

87, 101, 105, 107-12,125, 127, 135-36, 136n, 

140-42, 164, 179, 182, 188, 193, 197 200-203 
INDEX 

Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter-Continued 

237, 243, 245, 277, 289-90, 297, 300, 304, 

353,392,395,418,420 

Moehne Dam: 597 

Moerdijk: 227 

Mon creek: 54-55 

Mons: 4, 20, 23 

Monschau: 30, 66, 84-86, 90, 251, 324, 342, 601, 

603 

Monschau Corridor: 66, 68, 72, 76, 82-86, 90, 

92, 252, 323-24, 328, 331, 341-49, 352-53, 

359, 363, 370, 372, 399, 455, 460, 583, 600-

606,611 

Monschau Forest: 600-602, 606-610, 612 

Monschau-Huertgen-Dueren highway: 331 

Montgomery, Field Marshall Sir Bernard L.: 3-4, 

7-8, 246, 594-95. See also Army Group, 21st. 

and Army Groups boundary: 231-33,241 

and British role in November offensive: 391-92, 

401 

and changes in command situation: 213-15, 

213n, 378-79, 378n 

and importance of capturing Ruhr: 207, 209-

14,231-32,242,248,595,619-20 

and MARKET-GARDEN: 113, 120-22, 128-29, 

133,187,196,199-200,204-05 

"one thrust policy": 9-10, 123, 200-201, 210-

11, 619-20 

and opening of Antwerp: 204, 207, 209-10, 

212-15, 220-21, 242, 383 

and Ruhr feint: 112-13 

Mook: 156,161-62,167,177-78,193 

Moore, Brig. Gen. Bryant E.: 426 

Moore, Brig. Gen. James E.: 379 

Moore, Capt. Robert D.: 469n 

Morale: 5,230,328,330,361,441,462,488,519, 

618 

Morris, Maj. James S.: 535-36 

Mortain: 23, 269, 301 

Mortar fire: 74,144,178,261,269,287,310,312, 

368, 416, 433, 442, 482, 485, 514, 521, 528, 

530n, 531, 537-38. See also Artillery support; N ebelwerfer; Smoke. 

Moselle River: 4, 30, 39, 238, 380, 614 

Mud: 386, 406, 432, 435-36, 444, 467, 574, 589, 

618. See also Tanks, effect of mud on. 

Muellendorf: 546-49, 551, 554-56, 566-68, 574 

Mueller, Generalmajor Gerhard: 75-76,78,87 

Muenster: 135n 

Muensterbusch: 90 

Munich: 281 

Murphy, Maj. John R.: 64n 

Namur: 8 

Napalm bombs: 254-55,260,449,548,577 

Nazi party: 16,71,81-82,125,281,284,488 

N ebelwerfer: 27-28 

661 

Neder Rijn: 10, 14, 29, 112, 120, 121, 130-31, 

142, 157n, 164, 173, 182, 185, 197-201,203 

Nederweert: 233,241-42,244,246-47 

Nederweert-Wessum Canal: 233, 235-37, 241-42, 

246-48 

Needham, Maj. Fred E.: 224-25 

Nelson, Col. Gustin M. 370-71, 370n 

Neppel, Sgt. Ralph G.: 592 

Netherlands: 28-29, 38,120-22,130-31,198,616 

Netherlands Interior Forces: 169, 184 

Newbury: 137 

Nideggen: 345,459 

Niedermerz: 538-39 

Niedersgegen: 59-61 

Nietzel, Sgt. Alfred B.: 418n 

Night operations: 129-30, 223-24, 226, 285, 287, 

428,460-61,472,484, 503-04, 507-09, 511-

12, 554, 563-65, 568-69, 571, 575-76, 584, 

613 

Nijmegen: 113, 120-22, 126, 131, 134, 138, 142, 

153-58, 157n, 162-69, 173-77, 179-86, 188, 

191, 193, 200, 203, 205, 212, 214, 241, 247-

48,377,391,547,595 

Nijmegen-Arnhem highway: 181 

Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway: 163 

Nijmegen-Mook highway: 162 

Ninth Air Force: 5, 24-25, 128, 137, 384, 404, 

412,520 

Noorder Canal: 241,243,246-47 

Normandy: 7, 11, 20, 72n, 102n, 107n, 130, 143n, 

144, 155n, 177,218,222,254,383,461,580, 

600, 606n 

comparison with Siegfried Line· campaign: 269, 

377, 404-06, 404-05n, 411, 413, 523, 528-29, 

617-19,621 

North Beveland: 229 

North German Plain: 29,120 

North Wuerselen: 295,297-301 

Norwegian troops: 208n 

Nothberg: 408,476,480-82,506 

Novak, Capt. Frank J.: 165,175 

November offensive: 390-92, 411, 619. See also 

Army, First; Army, Ninth. 

a German defensive victory: 594 

lack of large-scale British offensive: 547 

optimism concerning: 522,524,596-97,618 

German reaction to: 392-93, 520, 547-48 

Nuenen: 188 

Nuetheim: 74-76 

Nugent, Brig. Gen. Richard E.: 380,498,520 

Nuremberg: 281 

Nussbaumer Hardt: 57 

OB WEST: 5-6, 5n, 16-18, 60, 109, 135, 141, 

245, 289, 393-94, 397., 460, 505, 518, 530, 

547-48. See also Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von. 
662 

Ober Forstbach: 72,74-75 

Obergeich: 585-86 

Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH): 16, 82, 141 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW): 16, 18, 

100, 182,393,488,559 

Obermaubach Dam: 325 

Observation: 73, 90, 180, 345, 358, 360, 416, 

422-24,426, 445,454, 504, 508-09,541, 564, 

576, 585. See also Air reconnaissance; Artillery liaison planes. 

air and ground observers: 253, 301, 436, 438, 

617 

posts: 34, 107,296,478-79,482 

restricted by terrain and weather: 55, 131, 265, 

348, 420, 442 

Observatory Hill. See Lousberg. 

Obstacles. See also Bridges, demolished; Mines; 

Roadblocks. 

antitank defenses: 29, 34-35, 410, 520, 533-36, 

540-41,565,567,569-71 

craters: 76,419,445--46 

dragon's teeth: 34,44-46,48,67-68,73-75,85 

felled trees: 332,466,481 

H- and I-beams: 34,47 

wire: 34, 89, 261, 331, 350, 372, 410, 426, 

432-33,436,442,452,503,608-10,614 

Obstfelder, General der Infanterie Hans von: 188, 

193,195,235-37,247,267 

O'Connor, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard N.: 241-42, 244, 

246 

Officers 

casualties: 54, 238, 272, 364, 372, 434, 435, 

438,444,466-67,470-71,474,481, 508, 590 

German: 19,82,328,337 

relief of: 47, 82, 91, 238, 246-47, 319, 319n, 

370n, 430,444, 447, 576 

O'Hare, Col. Joseph J.: 23n 

Oidtweiler: 278,518,524,528 

Olef Creek: 607-08 

Oliver, Maj. Gen. Lunsford E.: 56-57, 60-61, 

6~ 431n, 58~ 591-93 

Olsen, 1st Lt. John J.: 512 

Orner River: 409 

Ondrick, Col. John G.: 603-04 

"One-thrust" theory: 10,210-11 

Oosterbeek: 140-41,170-71,173,185,195-97 

Oploo: 237-38 

Organization Todt: 410 

Ormont: 40 

Ostend: 204, 208, 228 

Our River: 3,30,40,44,56,57 

Overloon: 235,238-41 

Padgett, S. Sgt. Ewart M.: 316 

Palast-Hotel Quellenhof: 307, 309, 312-13, 315 

Palenberg: 256, 260, 264, 267, 276 

Palenberg-Rimburg road: 262-63 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Panel markers: 106,405-06 

Panic: 47, 50, 70-71, 81, 147, 167, 357, 364-65 

Pantazopulos, Pfc. Gus: 263 

Panther tanks. See Tanks, German. 

Panzerfaust: 25, 46, 74, 238, 288, 311, 331, 362-

63,424,445,460,527, 530n, 536, 565 

Parachute Infantry Regiments 

501st: 145-46,153,187-89,191,193 

502d: 144-47, 150-54, 187-88, 194-95 

504th: 158, 158n, 160-61, 168, 174, 176-77, 

179-82, 184-85, 193 

505th: 158, 161-62, 165-70, 174-75, 177-78, 

181-82,193 

506th: 143n, 144, 147-50, 152-53, 189-92, 195 

508th: 155n, 158-59, 158n, 161-68, 174, 176, 

178,193 

Para troops, German: 611 

Paris: 12-13, 20, 24, 49n, 383 

Parker, Maj. Gen. Edwin P., Jr.: 600,602,611 

Parker, Col. Hugh C.: 568,570 

Parker, 1st Lt. Warne R.: 275 

Pas de Calais: 8, 208, 218 

Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.: 381 

Pathfinders: 137, 145 

Patrol actions: 146-47,150-51,203,255,609-10 

Pattern: 561, 563 

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr.: 9-10, 9n, 21, 23, 

36, 380, 392, 597 

Paulushof Dam: 325,598 

Paustenbach: 602 

Pedley, Col. Timothy A., Jr.: 554-55 

Peel Marshes: 231, 233, 235-36, 238, 247, 251-

52,267, 280n, 377, 384, 391-92,401-03,517-

19, 548, 566, 620 

German spoiling attack: 242-46, 397 

Pendleton, S. Sgt. Jack J.: 299, 299n 

"People's Court": 82 

"People's" labor: 31 

Pepc, Pvt. Salvatore: 279 

Perry, Lt. Col. Collins: 226 

Peterson, Lt. Col. Carl L.: 347, 349, 351, 358, 

363-64, 369, 370n 

Pier: 584 

Pillboxes: 27,46,53,56-57,63, 74, 112,617-18. 

See also West Wall. 

air attacks against: 255,260, 381 

arrangement and construction: 31, 34-35, 44, 

73, 84 

effect of artillery on: 45, 253, 259, 261-62, 272, 

609 

interlocking fire: 286,555, 603, 608 

method of attack: 45-47, 50, 85, 92, 94, 255, 

261-65, 272, 275-76, 287-88, 294, 305, 550, 

552-55, 568, 609-1~ 614, 618 

Pinto, Oreste: 136n 

Piron, Colonel: 232n 

Plaisted, Lt. Col. Mark S.: 226 
INDEX 

Planning. See also Strategy. 

for employment of airborne. troops: 119-23, 

127-34, 199, 619 

for January Rhine crossing: 595 

for November offensive: 390-92, 397-407 

pr!linvasion: 4, 4n, 6, II, 207 

Platt, Col. Washington: 235, 253, 257, 295, 520 

POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants): 13, 230. 

See also Shortages. 

Pole charges. See Demolition charges. 

Police, German: 71,81,308,334 

Polish troops: 5, 208n, 222. See also British Army 

units. 

Poppe, Generalleutnant Walter: 125, 136, 146, 

150,152-53,219,574 

Ports, lack of: 5, 7-8, 11-12, 207, 210-11, 383. 

See also Antwerp. 

Position warfare: 90 

Prisoners, Allied: 198, 276, 361, 373, 455, 508, 

509, 584n, 617 

Prisoners, German: 4, 152, 168, 187, 227, 229, 

279, 316-17, 334-35, 338, 340, 340n, 374, 

448, 450, 474n, 478, 484, 491, 501-02, 507, 

514, 530, 539, 544, 578, 594, 610, 616-17 

See also Intelligence. 

Pronsfeld: 60 

Propaganda: 31, 58n, 285 

Provisional companies: 13 

Proximity fuze:·390 

Pruem: 40, 50, 54, 60 

Pruem River: 40, 49, 59, 61, 63 

Pruem State Forest: 49, 53, 55 

Prummern: 531, 545-46, 549-56, 566 

Puetzlohn: 506-10 

Puffendorf: 526, 529-34, 541-44, 548 

Puppchen (bazooka): 299 

Purdue, Col. Branner P.: 294-95, 301, 500-501 

563-64 

Purnell, Col. William C.: 538 

Pursuit warfare: 4, 41, 45, 106,617,619 

QUEEN: 403-07,409,411-14, 412n, 416, 425, 492, 

498,517,520-21,524-25,548,580,619 

Que,ada, Maj. Gen. Elwood R.: 24, 64 

Quinn, Lt. Col. Daniel W.: 268 

Rabenheck. See Raven's Hedge ridge. 

Radio: 148, lSI, 163, 172, 185-86, 191,196,366, 

382, 406, 444, 453, 470, 485, 491, 512, 569-

70, 603, 614 

Radio Luxembourg: 307 

Radscheid: 49 

Raffelsbrand: 334-35, 343, 345, 347, 349-50, 355, 

361, 372 

Rafts: 196 

Railroads: 11-12,29-30, Ill, 129, 167,255,281, 

284, 381, 383-84 

663 

Ramsey, Admiral Sir Bertram H.: 212 

Ranger Battalion, 2d: 455, 461-63. 493, 593, 600, 

611 

Ratchford, 2d Lt. William D.: 315 

Rations: 13,134,233,398,569,591,608,613 

Ravels Hill (Ravelsberg). See Hill 231. 

Raven's Hedge ridge: 432-35 

Ray, 1st Lt.. Bernard J: 433, 433n 

Reconnaissance. See also Air reconnaissance: 

Cavalry. 

in force: 37,39,44,49,55,66-68,75 

sea: 135 

Reconnaissance Troop, 1st: 81 

Red Ball Express: 12-13,383 

Red Cross: 398 

Reichert, Generalleutnant Josef: 220 

Reichswald: 156-58, 162, 166-69, 177-79, 200, 202 

Reinhard, General der Infanterie Hans: 123-25, 

188-89, 192, 195 

Relief in place: 428-29,488,610 

"Reluctant Dragon": 296 

Remagen: 252 

"Remote-control robot assault guns": 273, 283 

Renkum: 197 

Renn Weg: 436,466-67 

Rennebaum, 1st Lt. Leon A.: 63n 

Replacements: 334, 336, 388, 429, 438, 455, 467, 

469-71, 469n, 474, 617-18, 621 

Replacements, German: 100, 126-27, 222, 258, 

393, 594, 616 

Reserves: 24, 89-90, 119-21, 134-35, 201, 338, 

355,397,431,455,473,475,493,619 

Reserves, German: 6, 15-16, 31, 62n, 69, 111, 

114, 121, 136, 143, 257, 273, 284, 289, 295, 

334, 348, 353, 358, 393, 427, 488, 530, 547, 

559 

Resistance forces: 122, 154, 156, 161, 169, 183-

84, 187-90, 232n 

Ressen: 185-86 

Rest and rehabilitation: 398, 456, 522, 612-14, 

616 

Rex Cinema (Antwerp): 230 

Rhine River: 30, 68, 198, 215, 331-32, 496, 520, 

577,616,619,622. See also Neder Rijn. 

planned crossings: 9, 14, 37, 113, 120-21, 123, 

13~ 207, 21~ 214, 595 

planned drive to: 115, 203, 235, 247, 251-

52,280,324,327, 327n, 341, 377-78, 390-91, 

400,402,493,517,547,594-95,600,612 

Rhineland: 14, 30 

Ribbentrop, Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von: 

141 

Richardson, Lt. Col. Walter B.: 483-85 

Richelskaul: 331-38, 347, 349, 351, 353, 368 

Richmond, Sgt. Leroy·: 181 

Rickard, Col. Roy V.: 380n 

Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B.: 128 
664 

Riethorst: 155,158,161-62,177-78,193 

Rifle, .30-cal. M1: 25 

Rifle, 7.92-mm (Mauser): 25 

Riflemen. See Infantry. 

Rijsbergen: 224 

Rimburg: 112, 114, 253, 255-57, 264, 267-68, 

277 

Rimburg Castle: 256-57,264,266,268 

Rimburg woods: 260, 265, 267-69, 271, 274-77 

Ripple, Lt. Col. Richard W.: 351,362-63,369 

Ritchie, Maj. William D.: 64n 

Rivet crossings: 120, 198 

Albert Canal: 96-98, 101-03, 107-09, 124 

demonstrations: 614 

Geul: 107, 109 

Inde: 511-15 

Leopold Canal: 221 

Maastricht Canal: 109,113 

Mark: 224-26 

Meuse: 96-98, 101-03, 106 

Neder Rijn: 196-98 

plans for Roer River: 516-17 

Pruem: 61,63,255-56 

Sauer: 57,60-61,64-65 

Vicht: 76 

Waal: 176-77,179-82 

Wurm: 261-62,264-67,269-70 

Road Junction 471: 335-37,339 

Roadblocks: 89, 145, 160, 162, 167, 178, 289, 

298, 313, 328, 339, 347, 432, 450, 462, 564 

Roadblocks, German: 47, 52, 66-67, 75-77, 101, 

108, 175,335 

Roads 

deteriorating: 386,402,404,588-89 

importance of road nets: 29, 90, 92, 96, 346, 

471,496,518,523,534,586-87 

lack of: 29-30, 55, 131, 134, 200, 233, 350, 

359, 416, 420, 432, 434, 436, 490, 492, 564, 

606 

Roads V-V-W-X-Y-Z (Huertgen Forest): 432-

38,444,464-67,477,587,590 

Robertson, Maj. Gen. Walter M.: 600, 606, 609-

12, 614 

Robey, S. Sgt. Paul W. Jr.: 418n 

Rocherath: 601,606-07,611-12 

Rocket launcher, 2.36-inch. See Bazooka. 

Rocket launcher, 4.5-inch: 28 

Rodwell, Col. James S.: 49,52-53 

Roehe: 503-04 

Roe1sdorf: 590 

Roer plain: 30, 283n, 328, 399,409,415-16,425, 

428, 469, 473, 475-77, 482, 484, 489, 515, 

519,530,537,562,582,593,596,616,618 

terrain and defenses: 480,496-98,501-02,504-

07, 510, 517-18, 520-24, 528-29, 534, 538, 

557,564,567,568,572,574,578,583 

Roer River: 29-30,66-68,80,90, 111, 112,253, 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Roer River-Continued 

278, 285, 323-24, 341, 344-46, 369, 393, 394, 

397, 399, 402, 403, 406, 408, 415-16, 428, 

430, 451, 457, 459, 461, 465, 472, 482, 492, 

496-98,503,507,509,510,516-17,522,523--

24, 525, 538, 539, 542, 544, 545, 547, 548, 

556,558,559,561-68,571-74,576,577,580, 

582-86, 587, 590-96, 596n 

Roer River Dams: 30, 324-28, 331, 342-43, 342n, 

346, 374, 406-07, 410, 451, 463, 493, 517, 

566, 566n, 574, 595-601, 606, 610, 612, 615, 

619 

Roerdorf: 571-73 

Roermond: 134, 235-38, 346, 395, 520, 546, 594 

Roesler, Colonel: 83, 85 

Roesslershof Castle: 479-80, 484-85 

Roetgen: 67,69-70,72,78,83,325,492,528 

Roetgen Forest: 66,72,78,85,87,90,94 

Rogers, Col. Thomas DeF.: 286 

Rollesbroich: 85, 92, 602-03, 606 

Roosendaal-Breda highway: 224 

Roosma, Col. John S.: 549-50, 552 

Roscheid: 44-47 

Rose, Maj. Gen. Maurice: 72, 72n, 80, 89,91,423 

Rosebaum, Col. Dwight A.: 238 

Rotation of troops: 398,612,614,618 

Roth: 52 

Rothe Erde: 309 

Rother Weh Creek: 331,432-33,436 

Rott: 72-73, 76 

Rotterdam: 29,210, 210n 

Roush, Pfc. Luther: 78 

Rowboats: 148, 171 

Royal Air Force: 137-38, 199n, 228, 404, 412, 

520, 597-98 

Tactical Air Force, 2d: 5, 138, 169n, 196,548 

Troop Carrier Group, 38: 128 

Troop Carrier Group, 46: 128 

Royal Navy: 214 

"Rubble pile": 455,457 

Rudder, Lt. Col. James E.: 461n 

Ruhr: 6-7, 18,28-29,36, 113, 120-21, 134, 198, 

203, 205, 208, 210-15, 231-33, 240-41, 248, 

377, 391, 595, 597 

Ruhrberg: 324-25 

Rumors: 141,162 

Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von: 5-6, 

15-18, 43, 60, 63, 69, 82, 87-88, 135, 143, 

201, 222-23, 243, 245-46, 273, 284, 289, 

299n, 314, 397, 427, 530, 547, 567, 616. See 

also OB WEST. 

Ryan, Col. John L., Jr.: 240 

's Hertogenbosch: 146,152,221 

Saar Basin: 7, 135n. 

Saar River: 31,34,616 

Sabotage: 11 
INDEX 

Saeffeler Creek: 237 

St. Antonis: 195 

St. J oeris: 502-03 

St. La: 20,384,413,619 

St. L6-Periers road: 254,404-05n 

St. Oedenrode: 131, 144-46, 150, 152-53, 188, 

194-95, 206 

St. Vith: 3,30,36,41,491,251 

Salvatorberg: 309, 311, 315 

Sand tables : 255-56, 500 

Satchel charges. See Demolition charges. 

Sauer River: 30,56-60, 64-65, 614 

Saverne Gap: 7n 

Schack, Generalleutnant Friedrich Aagust: 69-

71, 75, 77-78, 83, 87, 91, 98, 103-05, 107, 

110, 112,257 

Schaefer, S. Sgt. Joseph E.: 95n 

Schafberg: 587-92 

Schafer, 2d Lt. Paul H.: 584n 

Scharnhorst Line: 68,72-73,75-77,81,84-85 

Schaufenberg: 296-97 

Schelde estuary: 6, 16, 130, 207 

clearing the banks: 210,212-22,227-29,377 

German control of: 99, 123, 125, 127, 150, 

207,212,215 

Scherpenseel: 404, 409, 422-24 

Schevenhuette: 80, 86-89, 91-93, 328-30, 338, 

340, 399, 408, 415-16, 427-28, 430-32, 464, 

475,477,492 

Schevenhuette-Langerwehe highway: 421-22 

Schierwaldenrath: 267 

Schijndel: 187-91 

Schill Line: 68,70,75-78,80,88,90 

Schleiden: 537-38, 537n 

Schlich: 586 

Schmidt: 323-25, 328, 330-32, 336, 340-58, 360-

61, 363-64, 367-68, 373-74, 377, 399-400, 

429, 431, 440, 451, 455, 463, 588, 601, 603, 

608 

Schmidt, Generalleutnant Hans: 99, 101, 103, 

103n, 105-07, 110-11, 330-31, 333, 337-39, 

346 

Schmidt-Lammersdorf road: 352 

Schmidthof: 67,72-73,75-76 

Schnee Eifel: 30, 34, 40-44, 49-55, 55n, 68-69, 

341,399,612 

Schoenberg: 52 

Schoenthal: 478 

Schophoven: 584 

Schuetzenpanzerwagen. See Half-tracks. 

ScHultz, Capt. Robert H.: 47-48 

Schwammenauel Dam: 30, 324-25, 325n, 328, 

342, 345, 597-98 

Schwarzer Mann. See Hill 697. 

Schwerin, Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf von: 

70-71, 75, 81-82, 91, 283, 320 

Scorpion (flail) tanks. See Tanks. 

SCR-300: 569 

SCR-509: 569-70 

SCR-536: 350, 570 

SCR-584: 382 

"Screeming Meemie." See N ebelwerfer. 

Seaborne invasion: 135,201 

665 

Searchlights: 138, 610-11. See also Battlefield 

illumination. 

Sedan: 56n 

Seely, Col. Theodore A.: 44, 47-48, 347, 349-

50, 372 

Seille River: 597 

Seine River: 8, 11-13, 121 

Seitz, Col. John F. R.: 309, 312-13, 420-21, 

475-77,491 

Sellerich: 53-54 

Setliffe, Lt. Col. Truman H.: 367 

Setterich: 518, 523-26, 528-29, 534-38, 540-41, 

554, 560 

Sevenig: 3, 44 

SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. 

Shea, Brig. Gen. George D.: 524 

Shelters: 312,576 

Sheridan, Pfc. Carl V.: 486-87, 487n 

Sheridan, 1st Lt. David: 512-13 

Sherman tanks. See Tanks, medium. 

Shesniek, S. Sgt. Paul: 509 

Shipley, 1st Lt. John: 513 

Shortages 

ammunition, 37, 45, 55-56, 68, 86, 95, 114, 

172,214,259,276, 341, 383, 386, 521, 562, 

593 

antifreeze: 387 

food: 172, 186 

gasoline: 4, 11-13, 29, 36-37, 57, 62, 72, 96, 

115 

medical supplies: 186 

replacements: 388-89 

spare parts: 385-86 

tanks: 86, 386, 521 

transport: 4,7,11,13,213,381,383-84 

Shortages, German 

ammunition: 26,43,63,150,331,562 

equipment: 26 

fuel: 63-64, 296 

signal equipment: 100 

small arms: 331 

transport: 100 

war industry: 392-93 

weapons: 331 

Shower points: 398,613 

Shugg, Brig. Gen. R. P.: 566n 

Sibbald, Capt. George H.: 306· 

Siegfried Line (Siegfriedstellung): 30, 30n. See 

also West Wall. 
666 

Siegfried Line Campaign 

a battle of attrition: 622 

comparison with Normandy: 523, 528-29, 617-

19, 621 

German delaying action: 594,616 

slow pace of: 602 

summary of gains and losses: 616-22 

Siersdorf: 528, 535-38 

Sievers, Generalleutnant Karl: 123, 125 

Silvester, Maj. Gen. Lindsay McD.: 237-38, 

240-41, 244, 246-47 

Simmerath: 602-03,606,611 

Simmons, Capt. Ross Y.: 298 

Simonds, Lt. Gen. G. G.: 220, 228 

Simonskall: 349-50,352,355,359,361 

Simpelveld: 110 

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.: 251, 318-19, 379, 

400-403, 406, 498-99, 516, 521-23, 545, 

558n. See also Army, Ninth. 

Sims, Lt. Hugo, Jr.: 203 

Sink, Col. Robert F.: 144, 148, 152-53, 189-90, 

195 

Sirokin, Pvt. Martin: 263, 267 

Sittard: 108-09,113-14,236-37,241,253 

Slag piles: 496, 510 

Slave labor: 393 

Small unit actions: 47, 146-47, 150-51, 160-61, 

179-81,261-64,291-93,453-54,461-62,471-

72, 479, 481, 485-87, 490-91, 512-14, 528, 

550, 56~ 569-71, 576-77, 610 

Smith, Col. George A., Jr.: 287-88,291,477-79 

Smith, 1st Lt. James J.: 175 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter B.: 122,129 

Smoke, tactical use of: 91, 179-80, 254, 260, 305, 

309, 332, 336, 446, 449, 465, 473, 481, 482, 

509, 526, 528, 542, 563, 570, 572, 575, 577, 

584n, 586, 590 

Smythe, Col. George W.: 78, 89, 480-82, 485 

Snipers: 335, 350, 589 

Soissons: 12 

Sonnefield, Lt. Col. J. E.: 360 

Sosabowski, Maj. Gen. S.: 186,195 

Sound and flash: 57, 276, 336, 443 

Sound effects: 614 

South Beveland: 123,209,215,219-22,227-28 

Spa: 24 

Special Forces teams: 184 

Special Troops, 23d: 614 

Spielmannsholz Hill. See Hill 559. 

Sponheimer, General der Infanterie Otto: 219-20 

Sportplatz: 574-77 

Stalzemburg: 3,57 

Standdaarbuiten: 224-26 

Steckenborn: 603 

Stockem: 59,61 

Stockigt: 60-61 

Stokes, Lt. Col. William M., J r.: 113 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Stolberg: 66, 72, 75-77, 80, 88-91, 98, 114,286, 

290, 295, 309, 399-400, 408, 425-26, 475, 

499, 502-03, 506, 587 

Stolberg Corridor: 29-30, 66, 68-69, 82, 258, 399, 

408,416 

first battle: 71-80, 90-91, 109, 111, 115, 283, 

285,330,410 

November offensive attacks: 421-24, 475, 480, 

496 -

Strasbourg: 391 

Strass: 587-92, 587n 

Strategy, Allied: 6-10. See also Planning. 

Straube, General der Infanterie Erich: 69, 83, 87, 

330, 333, 337, 353, 372 

Strauch: 603 

Strauch-Schmidt highway: 601 

Street fighting. See House-to-house fighting. 

Strickler, Lt. Col. Daniel B.: 347, 349, 352, 358, 

366 

Stroh, Maj. Gen. Donald A.: 441, 444-45. 417--

48 

Student, Generaloberst Kurt: 100-101, 109-10, 

123-25, 135, 140-42, 146, 150, 153, 188, 193, 

200-203, 235-36, 247, 395 

Stumpf, Lt. Col. R. H.: 336-39 

Sueggerath: 546, 551, 554-55 

Summers, Lt. Col. William M.: 510 

Supply: 129, 134, 199, 200, 214, 230, 233, 532, 

540, 554, 571, 596. See also Air supply; 

Logistics; Ports; Shortages; Woods fighting. 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Forces (SHAEF): 6-8, 16, 119,121-22,214, 

388,619. See also Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D. 

Air Priorities Board: 383 

and Roer River dams: 327,374,597-98 

Surprise: 91, 136n, 140, 170, 243, 245, 266, 333, 

362, 394, 426, 433, 466, 525-26, 531, 553, 

561, 563, 584, 602-04, 608 

Sussman, Pvt. Morris: 470 

Sutherland, Col. Edwin M.: 101, 256-57, 264, 

266, 268, 275, 279, 295, 297-99, 304-05, 500 

Swanberg, Cpl. Bertol C.: 418n 

Swift, Col. Ira P.: 533-34 

Swimmers: 203 

Swinden: 137 

Tactical Air Commands 

IX: 5, 24, 24n, 254, 278, 299, 309, 332, 343, 

381-82,404,412,418,446,449,508 

XIX: 5,382 

XXIX: 380-81, 404, 412, 498, 500, 520, 525, 

532,539-40,548, 572, 572n, 576-77 

Tactical Reconnaissance Group, 67th: 24n 

Tactics. See Night operations; Pillboxes; Small 

unit actions; Surprise; Tank-infantry tactics; 

Woods fighting. 
INDEX 

Tank Battalions 

10th: 446, 449-50 

40th: 569-70 

70th: 472 

707th: 351,362 

709th: 448,453,603-04 

743d: 279,296,502,558 

744th: 237,588,591 

745th: 479 

747th: 536,538,576 

750th: 510 

Tank Destroyer Battalions 

628th: 63n 

771st: 531 

893d: 360, 462, 604 

899th: 480n 

Tank Destroyers: 27,275,287-88,291,293,296, 

312, 347, 359-60, 363, 368, 374, 480n, 500-

501,514,527, 566n, 620-21. See also Artillery 

support; Tank-infantry tactics. 

Tank dozers: 264 

Tank guns 

75-mm: 27,46,436,461,532,538 

76-mm: 27,461,532,541 

90-mm: 27,487 

Tank-infantry tactics: 50, 85, 89, 91, 106, 175, 

181-82,195-96,268-69,272,310-12,357-38, 

363, 417-18, 422-24, 436, 448, 449-50, 452-

53,455,459,472-73,483-84,487,491,500-

501, 526-27, 536-37, 538, 540, 544, 555, 

584-86, 588-90, 603-04, 620 

German: 225, 275, 290-93, 296, 298-99, 301, 

353-58, 368, 419, 460-61, 514, 531-32, 539, 

541,552 

ineffective coordination: 276, 303, 466, 534-35 

Tank retrievers: 446,491,533 

Tanks. See also Armor; Tank guns; Tankinfantry tactics. 

captured: 63, 291 

Churchill: 223, 560 

Crocodile (flame-throwing) : 542-43.553-55,560 

disabled: 295, 355, 359-60, 369, 446, 491, 527n, 

544, 578 

effect of mud on: 257, 264-65, 288, 305, 422-

23, 443, 479, 484, 510, 518, 526, 530n, 535-

36, 542, 550, 555, 592, 603 

heavy: 27n, 621 

light: 434, 436, 443 

losses: 65, 65n, 67,73-74,77,79,91, 199,239-

40, 271, 272, 275, 280, 288, 336, 363, 368, 

374, 422-24, 434, 450, 452, 472, 484, 485, 

487, 510, 514, 526-27, 530, 530n, 532, 533, 

542, 544, 560, 573, 578, 588-89, 593-94, 

594n, 617 

medium: 16,27,620 

Scorpion (flail): 74, 548, 550, 591 

667 

Tanks-Continued 

support strength: 20-21, 68, 86, 86n, 247,386, 

409, 524, 540n, 594 

traction expedients: 518, 526 

Tanks, German: 76, 79, 121, 153, 186, 187, 239, 

242, 243n, 270, 360, 418, 438, 509, 571, 611-

12 

losses: 64,245,296,298-99,301-02,318, 318n, 

357-58, 374, 419, 448, 514, 531-32, 540-41, 

544,560,564,617 

Mark IV: 27,53,59,296,363,450 

Mark V (Panther): 16, 27, 73, 78, 153, 195, 

357,363,422,531-32,541,559n 

Mark VI (Tiger): 27, 290-91,491,530-32 

support strength: 51, 81, 87, 121, 236, 243, 

283, 284, 303, 308, 397, 410-11, 519-20, 562, 

567,582 

Task Forces (Combat Teams) 

1: 271-73,526,531-32, 541-43 

2: 272,275,527,532,542-43 

A: 533-34,541-42 

B: 541-42 

X: 527,531-32,540-41,543,551,566 

Biddle: 547,566-67 

Boyer: 455, 457 

Davis: 367-68 

Doan: 74-75 

Hamberg: 449-50,452-55,457 

Hogan: 91,314-15 

King: 73-76 

Lovelady: 73-74, 76, 78-79,91,422 

Mills: 76,91,422-24 

Quinn: 268-69 

Richardson: 483-85, 492n, 508 

Ripple: 362-64, 367-68 

Stokes: 113-14 

Taylor, Brig. Gen. George A.: 55,316 

Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 144-48, 152-54, 

186-9~ 192, 203, 205 

Telephones: 224,272,570,609,614 

Terneuzen: 221 

Terrain: 19, 26, 28-30, 200, 248, 408, 409, 480, 

500,617,619,620 

forest barriers: 40, 53, 55, 57, 66, 72, 82-·83, 

90, 600, 606. See also Huertgen Forest. 

high ground: 131,155-56,170,323 

marshes and waterways: 96, 108, 130-31, 133, 

148,187,215,233,238,244,247 

the Roer plain: 496, 511, 517-18, 530, 545, 

572, 583, 587 

Tettau, Generalleutnant Hans von: 142 

Teveren: 112 

Thompson, Lt. John S.: 160 

Thompson, Sgt. Max: 314n 

Thompson, Lt. Col. Oscar H.: 85, 92-94, 333-

34,336-38 

Thorson, Brig. Gen. Truman C.: 23, 400, 493 
668 

Tiefen Creek: 373,451-53,457 

Tiger tanks. See Tanks, German. 

Tilburg: 136,142,146,150,200,219,221 

Toad Hill. See Hill 87.9. 

Todt, Dr. Fritz: 31 

Todten Bruch. See Deadman's Moor. 

Touart, Col. Anthony J.: 224, 227,425-28, 506-

09,511 

Tournai: 119 

Towle, Pvt. John R.: 182n 

Traffic control: 134, 185, 186, 186n, 190-92, 

402.:..03 

Training: 255-56,262, 469n, 618, 621 

Trai tors: 136n 

Transportation: 11-13,17,68,129,383-84,411. 

See also Shortages. 

Travis, Pvt. Ben J.: 509 

Trench foot: 360, 372-73, 429, 438, 455, 474, 

557,604,606, 614, 618 

Trenches. See Fortifications. 

Trier: 14,30,34,42,57 

Tripsrath: 546, 551 

Troop Carrier Command, IX: 128, 199n 

Troop carrier operations: 120, 128, 129-30, 132-

33, 132n, 136-40, 144-45, 154, 157, 170, 172, 

186, 196, 199-200, 199n. See also MARKETGARDEN. 

Troop strength 

Allied (September 1944): 3-5, 20, 23-24, 36 

Allied (October 1944): 378-79, 387-88, 387n 

MARKET-GARDEN: 128, 133, 139, 159, 170 

November offensive: 397, 400-403, 409, 440, 

516-17, 521, 568, 580-82, 593, 600 

21st Army Group problems: 204-05, 213 

Troop strength, German 

Aachen and West Wall sectors: 69-71, 75, 81, 

91, 109, 111, 257-58, 273-74, 277, 283-84, 

286-87, 289-90, 296, 300, 308, 314 

Albert Canal line: 98-101, 123-24 

Antwerp approaches: 218-20 

Ardennes counteroffensive buildup: 393-95,616 

holding before the West Wall: 41-43, 51, 57, 

60,63 

Huertgen Forest: 93, 95, 330-31, 337, 346, 

353-54, 359, 417-18, 431-32, 437, 465, 487-

88 

Monschau Corridor: 83,86-87, 601-02 

opposing MARKET-GARDEN: 126-27, 135-36, 

142-43,164,170,176-77,188-89,193,201-

02 

opposing November offensive: 395-97, 409-11, 

499-500, 530, 559, 567, 582-83, 594 

September 1944: 5-6, 15-18 

west of the Maas: 235-37,243,247 

Truman, President Harry: 418n 

Tucker, Col. Reuben H.: 158,160-61,174,176 

Tufts, Lt. William C.: 225 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Turner, Lt. Col. Robert G.: 113 

Turnhout: 222 

"Type-1944 Infantry Division": 15, 87 

U den: 188-94 

Uebach: 256, 267, 269-78, 523 

Uettfeld: 44-48,612,613 

Ulmer, 1st Lt. Arthur A.: 513 

Urft Dam: 30,324-25, 326n, 327, 597-98 

U rft River: 325-26 

Urquhart, Maj. Gen. R. C.: 172-73,185-86,198 

UTAH Beach: 23, 49n 

"V-I3": 310n 

V-weapons: 8, 208, 229-30 

Valburg: 195, 197 

Valkenburg: 98, 107, 109 

Valkenswaard: 133,149 

van Hoof, Jan: 184n 

Van Houten, Col. John G.: 335 

Vanderheid, Sgt. Linus: 487 

Vandervoort, Lt. Col. B. H.: 174, 177, 181-82 

VARSITY: 132n 

Veghel: 131, 145-46, 152-53, 160, 187-92, 194-

95, 201,203, 206, 236 

Ven~: 156, 238, 242, 243, 247-4~ 548 

Venlo-Nijmegen highway: 167 

Vcnray: 231,235,238,242,248 

Verlautenheide: 80, 88, 284, 286-91, 297, 300, 

304,309,425,499,504 

Versailles: 211 

Verviers: 36,66,72,398 

Vianden: 40, 43, 56-57 

Vicht: 72, 78, 80 

Vicht River: 66,72,75,76,78,90,325 

Village strongpoints. See Roer plain. 

Vise: 99, 101, 105 

Vortum: 238 

Vosges Mountains: 381 

Vossenack: 323, 331, 336-39, 341, 343-47, 349-

51,353-55,357-59,361-68,371,372-73,400, 

429, 438, 441, 451, 453, 455, 457, 465, 601-

02 

Vossenack ridge: 336-37, 344-45, 347, 349-50, 

358, 361, 364-66, 370, 372-73, 455 

Vught: 140 

Waal River: 29, 120, 126, 131, 134, 142, 154-58, 

166, 174-75, 179-82, 193, 198,200-201,203 

Wadden Islands: 135 

Wa/Jen-SS: 15-16,126 

Wahlcrscheid: 601, 606-12 

Walcheren Island: 123, 209, 212, 215, 218-21, 

228-29 

Waldenburg, Generalmajor Siegfried von: 353-54, 

359, 365, 374 

Wallace, Maj. Robert W.: 568-69 
INDEX 

Wallendorf: 43, 56-65, 115, 251,620 

Walther, Colonel: 124-25,188-89,191-92 

Waltz, Col. Weleome P.: 223,225,503,507,509-

10 

War production: 12, 25 

War production, German: 6,31,390,392-93 

Warden: 499,502 

Warren, Lt. Col. Shields, Jr.: 162-67 

Warsaw: 141 

Waurichen: 273,278,518,523,526 

Weapons. See also entries for various types of 

weapons. 

Allied numerical superiority: 5 

comparison of U.S. and German: 25-28 

performance in Siegfried Line Campaign: 620-

21 

psychological effects: 260, 262-63, 309n, 334, 

413-14,444-45,455,489, 575-76 

Weasels (Cargo Carrier M-29): 311, 343, 351, 

352, 355, 359-60, 371 

Weather: 13, 19, 35, 121, 129, 210, 214, 219, 

221, 364, 377, 381, 392, 400, 403, 405-07, 

411-12, 475, 504, 518, 521, 522, 557, 572, 

57~ 578, 598, 61~ 618 

effect on tactical operations: 13, 24, 52, 55, 57, 

61, 86, 88, 95, 106, 115, 132, 136-37, 154, 

169n, 172, 176, 186, 190, 192, 196, 224, 227, 

229, 243, 257, 259-60, 270, 274, 276, 278, 

288, 302, 332, 340, 344-46, 347-48, 351, 352, 

357, 360, 363-64, 372, 373, 382, 402, 418, 

420-22, 441-44, 453-54, 455-57, 467, 479, 

492, 506, 508, 525, 532, 534, 540, 542, 555, 

563, 572n, 576, 604, 607-09 

and failure of MARKET-GARDEN: 199-200, 618 

Weaver, Brig. Gen. Will aim G.: 448, 451-52, 455, 

457, 461-63 

Weert: 231, 246 

Wegelein, Colonel: 337-39, 343, 347, 353 

Weh Creek: 416, 419-20, 432-33, 464, 475, 477-

EO, 484, 510 

Wehrkreis VI: 126-27, 142, 164, 193 

Wehrkreis X: 189 

Weissenberg: 422 

Weissenberg (hill). See Hill 283. 

Weisser Weh: 92-93, 331-39, 347, 428-29, 432-

38, 442, 444-45, 464 

Weiswampach: 3 

Weisweiler: 482, 484, 505-09. See also EschweilerWeisweiler industrial triangle. 

Weisweiler-Langerwehe highway: 475, 480, 484-

85,489 

Welz: 572 

Wenau: 477-78, 4BO 

Wenau Forest: 66, 6B, 72, 75, 7B-BO, B7, 90, 94, 

399 

Werth: 409, 422 

Wesel: 113, 122n, 134, 13B 

Wessum: 233,235,237,241 

West, Col. Gustavus W.: 522 

West Stellung: 106 

669 

West Wall: 6, 12, 16, 1B, 29, 41-43, 4B, 94-95, 

119-21, 208, 211, 2B1, 283n, 31B, 332, 342, 

390, 401-02, 600, 616, 61B, 622 

attacks north of Aachen: 96, 107-15, 205, 231, 

233, 240-41, 251-BO, 2B3, 2B3n, 2B4-B6, 293, 

29B, 302, 314, 319n 

construction and defenses: 30-35, 3B, 40, 44-

47, 50, 56-57, 66-69, 72-75, 77, B4, 95, 103, 

115, 520n, 60 1. See also Pillboxes. 

defended for political reasons: 38,41,68 

"impregnability": 1B, 31, 34-35, 51 

MARKET-GARDEN failure to turn north flank: 

19B, 212, 377 

race for: 41-43, 111 

reconnaissance in force penetrations: 37-41, 44-

95, 2B3n, 2B7, 612 

Westkapelle dike: 22B-29 

Westphal, General Siegfried: 62n, 143n 

Wettlingen: 61, 63 

White, Brig. Gen. Isaac D.: 10B-09, 523, 526, 532, 

540, 542-43 

White phosphorus, tactical use of: 179-BO, 511, 

521,5B4 

Whitis, Pvt. Evan: 306, 313-14 

Wierzbowski, Lt. Edward L.: 146-47,150-52 

Wies Creek: 607-0B 

Wijbosch: 1B9, 191-92 

Wijk: 106-0B 

Wilek, Col. Gerhard: 283-B4, 307-0B, 312-16,410, 

519 

Wilhelmina Canal: 131, 144-4B, 150, 152-53, 

1B7, 200 

Wilhelmshoehe: 476,479, 481-B4, 507-0B 

Willems Canal: 131,145, 1BB, 190-91 

Williams, Maj. George S.: 461-63 

Williams, Lt. Col. John: 2B7-BB 

Williams, Col. Laurin L.: 571 

Williams, Maj. Gen. Paul L.: 12B 

Williamson, Lt. Col. Ellis V.: 564 

Wilson, Col. Robert W.: 23n 

Windmills: 52B-29 

Winterhilfswerk (Winter Relief Project): 316 

Winterization: 3B3-B4, 3B6-B7 

Winton, Lt. Col. Walter F., Jr.: 156,167 

Wise, Sgt. Alvin R.: 312, 312n 

Withdrawal operations: 91, 166, 196-9B, 225, 

306,357,370-72,444,532,612,614 

Withdrawal operations, German: 99, 104-06, lOB, 

112, 124, 21B-19, 222-23, 505, 50B, 55B, 560, 

563, 5B4 

Wittkopf, 1st Lt. Phillip W.: 53, 53n 

Wittscheidt: 331,334,336-39, 347-4B 

Woensdrecht: 220-21, 227 

Wolfheze Station: 171 
670 

Wolpert, T. Sgt. Howard: 263 

Woods fighting: 52-53, 78, 92, 94, 323, 332-34, 

336, 339, 344-50, 366-68, 371, 420, 431-32, 

436-37,441-45,465-67,469-70,476-77,587, 

590, 607-09. See also Huertgen Forest; 

Monschau Forest. 

supply problems: 333, 335, 351, 360, 361-62, 

367, 432, 434-38, 444, 465, 467, 476, 478, 

588,590-91,608 

Woodyard, Lt. Col. Thomas R.: 554 

World War 1: 25, 30, 99, 323,392 

Wuerm: 546,551,554-55,566-68, 574 

Wuerselen: 253, 279, 284-85, 294-95, 297, 299-

300, 303-06, 308, 313, 399, 402, 408, 424, 

496-501,516,519,522,529, 544,548 

Wuestwezel: 222 

Wurm River: 29-30, 111, 252-61, 264-71, 277-

78, 295, 302-03, 304-05, 496, 516, 517, 519, 

520, 523, 532, 545-56, 566 

THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 

Wyler: 155, 158, 166, 176-78, 193 

York, Col. Robert H.: 589 

Youenes, Pvt. Brent: 262 

Zangen, General der Infanterie Gustav von: 125, 

193, 218-19, 223, 395, 410, 417-18, 539, 559, 

592 

Zeebrugge: 215, 221 

Zeglien, Pvt. Harold: 263 

Zon: 131, 144, 146-48, 150, 152-53, 174, 187, 

189, 200, 206 

Zonsche Forest: 146-48,150, 151n, 152 

Zuider Zee. See IJsselmeer. 

Zundert: 222-24 

Zweibruggen: 272 

Zweifall: 72, 78,90,92, 94 

t? u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 333-165 

PIN 070567-000 
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.\lAP VIII 
THE SIEGFRIED LINE 

CAMPAIGN 

II Seplembu-15 December 1944 

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.1IAP IX