# C_2016289EN.01009301.xml

| 9.8.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 289/93 |
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9.8.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 289/93

---

P8_TA(2014)0062

The powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions *

European Parliament legislative resolution of 26 November 2014 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions (10896/2014 — C8-0090/2014 — 2014/0807(CNS))

(Consultation)

(2016/C 289/18)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to the recommendation of the European Central Bank (10896/2014 –ECB/2014/19), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the recommendation of the European Central Bank (10896/2014 –ECB/2014/19),

| — | having regard to Articles 129(4) and 132(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Articles 34.3 and 41 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C8-0090/2014), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Articles 129(4) and 132(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Articles 34.3 and 41 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C8-0090/2014),

| — | having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A8-0028/2014), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A8-0028/2014),

| 1. | Approves the draft proposed in the recommendation of the European Central Bank as amended; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Approves the draft proposed in the recommendation of the European Central Bank as amended;

| 2. | Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

| 3. | Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the draft proposed in the recommendation of the European Central Bank; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the draft proposed in the recommendation of the European Central Bank;

| 4. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the European Central Bank and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the European Central Bank and the Commission.

Amendment 1

Amendment 1

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Recital 6

Recital 6

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (6) | The ECB should publish decisions imposing administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields
  , unless such
  publication would be disproportionate, considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking,
  or jeopardise the stability of financial markets
  . |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

(6)

The ECB should publish decisions imposing administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields
  , unless such
  publication would be disproportionate, considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking,
  or jeopardise the stability of financial markets
  .

, unless such

or jeopardise the stability of financial markets

| (6) | The ECB should
  as a general rule
  publish
  without undue delay
  decisions imposing administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields
  . Where the ECB deems that immediate
  publication
  of a decision
  would
  jeopardise the stability of financial markets or
  be disproportionate, considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking,
  it should have the discretion to delay the publication of the decision until three years after the date on which the decision was taken, or until all legal means of appeal have been exhausted. Upon request the ECB should hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament concerning such cases. The ECB should provide a justification for the delay in an annex to the published decision
  . |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The ECB should
  as a general rule
  publish
  without undue delay
  decisions imposing administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields
  . Where the ECB deems that immediate
  publication
  of a decision
  would
  jeopardise the stability of financial markets or
  be disproportionate, considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking,
  it should have the discretion to delay the publication of the decision until three years after the date on which the decision was taken, or until all legal means of appeal have been exhausted. Upon request the ECB should hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament concerning such cases. The ECB should provide a justification for the delay in an annex to the published decision
  .

as a general rule

without undue delay

. Where the ECB deems that immediate

of a decision

jeopardise the stability of financial markets or

it should have the discretion to delay the publication of the decision until three years after the date on which the decision was taken, or until all legal means of appeal have been exhausted. Upon request the ECB should hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament concerning such cases. The ECB should provide a justification for the delay in an annex to the published decision

Amendment 2

Amendment 2

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Recital 6 a (new)

Recital 6 a (new)

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (6a) | Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 states that the ECB shall act with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage and that no action, proposal or policy of the ECB shall, directly or indirectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of Member States as a venue for the provision of banking or financial services in any currency. In this regard, the ECB should act with a view to preventing a comparative advantage that promotes unfair competition. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

(6a)

(6a)

Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 states that the ECB shall act with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage and that no action, proposal or policy of the ECB shall, directly or indirectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of Member States as a venue for the provision of banking or financial services in any currency. In this regard, the ECB should act with a view to preventing a comparative advantage that promotes unfair competition.

Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 states that the ECB shall act with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory arbitrage and that no action, proposal or policy of the ECB shall, directly or indirectly, discriminate against any Member State or group of Member States as a venue for the provision of banking or financial services in any currency. In this regard, the ECB should act with a view to preventing a comparative advantage that promotes unfair competition.

Amendment 3

Amendment 3

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Recital 9

Recital 9

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| (9) | Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 lays down the principle of separation, whereby the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. In order to bolster this principle of separation, a Supervisory Board has been established pursuant to Article 26, which, inter alia, is responsible for preparing draft decisions for the Governing Council of the ECB in the supervisory field. In addition, the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB are, under the conditions laid down in Article 24 thereof, subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review. Taking account of the principle of separation and the establishment of the Supervisory Board and the Administrative Board of Review, two distinct procedures should apply: (a) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of administrative penalties in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB based on a complete draft decision from the Supervisory Board and subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review; and (b) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of sanctions in the exercise of its non-supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Executive Board of the ECB and subject to review by the Governing Council of the ECB. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

(9)

Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 lays down the principle of separation, whereby the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. In order to bolster this principle of separation, a Supervisory Board has been established pursuant to Article 26, which, inter alia, is responsible for preparing draft decisions for the Governing Council of the ECB in the supervisory field. In addition, the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB are, under the conditions laid down in Article 24 thereof, subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review. Taking account of the principle of separation and the establishment of the Supervisory Board and the Administrative Board of Review, two distinct procedures should apply: (a) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of administrative penalties in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB based on a complete draft decision from the Supervisory Board and subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review; and (b) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of sanctions in the exercise of its non-supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Executive Board of the ECB and subject to review by the Governing Council of the ECB.

| (9) | Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 lays down the principle of separation, whereby the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks.
  In order to avoid conflicts of interest, this principle is to be followed without restriction in all tasks carried out by the ECB.
   In order to bolster this principle of separation, a Supervisory Board has been established pursuant to Article 26, which, inter alia, is responsible for preparing draft decisions for the Governing Council of the ECB in the supervisory field. In addition, the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB are, under the conditions laid down in Article 24 thereof, subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review. Taking account of the principle of separation and the establishment of the Supervisory Board and the Administrative Board of Review, two distinct procedures should apply: (a) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of administrative penalties in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB based on a complete draft decision from the Supervisory Board and subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review; and (b) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of sanctions in the exercise of its non-supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Executive Board of the ECB and subject to review by the Governing Council of the ECB. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 lays down the principle of separation, whereby the ECB carries out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks.
  In order to avoid conflicts of interest, this principle is to be followed without restriction in all tasks carried out by the ECB.
   In order to bolster this principle of separation, a Supervisory Board has been established pursuant to Article 26, which, inter alia, is responsible for preparing draft decisions for the Governing Council of the ECB in the supervisory field. In addition, the decisions taken by the Governing Council of the ECB are, under the conditions laid down in Article 24 thereof, subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review. Taking account of the principle of separation and the establishment of the Supervisory Board and the Administrative Board of Review, two distinct procedures should apply: (a) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of administrative penalties in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB based on a complete draft decision from the Supervisory Board and subject to review by the Administrative Board of Review; and (b) where the ECB contemplates the imposition of sanctions in the exercise of its non-supervisory tasks, decisions to this effect are taken by the Executive Board of the ECB and subject to review by the Governing Council of the ECB.

In order to avoid conflicts of interest, this principle is to be followed without restriction in all tasks carried out by the ECB.

Amendment 4

Amendment 4

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Recital 10 a (new)

Recital 10 a (new)

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (10a) | In light of the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should, in association with the competent authorities of participating Member States, establish a regular dialogue with supervisors outside the Union to foster international coordination and to agree on shared principles in the imposition and enforcement of sanctions. The dialogue should include a common understanding on the implications of diverging sanctions policies on market access and competition, and should aim to improve the international level playing field. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

(10a)

(10a)

In light of the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should, in association with the competent authorities of participating Member States, establish a regular dialogue with supervisors outside the Union to foster international coordination and to agree on shared principles in the imposition and enforcement of sanctions. The dialogue should include a common understanding on the implications of diverging sanctions policies on market access and competition, and should aim to improve the international level playing field.

In light of the globalisation of banking services and the increased importance of international standards, the ECB should, in association with the competent authorities of participating Member States, establish a regular dialogue with supervisors outside the Union to foster international coordination and to agree on shared principles in the imposition and enforcement of sanctions. The dialogue should include a common understanding on the implications of diverging sanctions policies on market access and competition, and should aim to improve the international level playing field.

Amendment 5

Amendment 5

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 1 — point a

Article 1 — point 1 — point a

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 1 — point 6

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| ‘periodic penalty payments’ shall mean amounts of money which, in the case of a continued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either as a punishment, or with a view to forcing the persons concerned to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and decisions. Periodic penalty payments shall be calculated for each day of continued infringement (a) following notification of the undertaking of a decision requiring the termination of such an infringement in accordance with the procedure laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1); or (b) when the continued infringement falls under the scope of Article 18(7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (*) in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4b of this Regulation; | (6) | ‘periodic penalty payments’ shall mean amounts of money which, in the case of a continued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either as a punishment, or with a view to forcing the persons concerned to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and decisions. Periodic penalty payments shall be calculated for each
  complete
  day of continued infringement (a) following notification of the undertaking of a decision requiring the termination of such an infringement in accordance with the procedure laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1); or (b) when the continued infringement falls under the scope of Article 18(7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (**) in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4b of this Regulation; |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

‘periodic penalty payments’ shall mean amounts of money which, in the case of a continued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either as a punishment, or with a view to forcing the persons concerned to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and decisions. Periodic penalty payments shall be calculated for each day of continued infringement (a) following notification of the undertaking of a decision requiring the termination of such an infringement in accordance with the procedure laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1); or (b) when the continued infringement falls under the scope of Article 18(7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (*) in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4b of this Regulation;

*

(6)

(6)

‘periodic penalty payments’ shall mean amounts of money which, in the case of a continued infringement, an undertaking is obliged to pay either as a punishment, or with a view to forcing the persons concerned to comply with the ECB supervisory regulations and decisions. Periodic penalty payments shall be calculated for each
  complete
  day of continued infringement (a) following notification of the undertaking of a decision requiring the termination of such an infringement in accordance with the procedure laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1); or (b) when the continued infringement falls under the scope of Article 18(7) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (**) in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4b of this Regulation;

‘

complete

**

Amendment 6

Amendment 6

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 2

Article 1 — point 2

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 1a — paragraph 3

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 3.   The ECB
  may
  publish any decision imposing on an undertaking administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields
  , whether such decision has been appealed or not
  . The ECB shall carry out
  such
  publication in accordance with relevant Union law, irrespective of any national law or regulation and, where relevant Union law is composed of Directives, of any national legislation transposing those Directives. | 3.   
  After notification to the undertaking concerned,
  the ECB
  shall, according to a transparent procedure and rules which it shall make public,
  publish,
  as a general rule without undue delay,
  any decision imposing on an undertaking administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields,
  provided that all legal means of appeal against such a decision have been exhausted
  .
  Where the ECB considers that immediate publication of a decision would jeopardise the stability of financial markets or be disproportionate considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking, it
  shall
  have the discretion to delay the publication of the decision until three years after the date on which the decision was taken. Upon request the ECB shall hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament concerning such cases. The ECB shall provide a justification for the delay in an annex to the published decision.
  The ECB shall carry out publication
  in the cases and
  in accordance with
  the conditions set out in
  relevant Union law, irrespective of any national law or regulation and, where relevant Union law is composed of Directives, of any national legislation transposing those Directives. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

3.   The ECB
  may
  publish any decision imposing on an undertaking administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields
  , whether such decision has been appealed or not
  . The ECB shall carry out
  such
  publication in accordance with relevant Union law, irrespective of any national law or regulation and, where relevant Union law is composed of Directives, of any national legislation transposing those Directives.

may

, whether such decision has been appealed or not

such

3.   
  After notification to the undertaking concerned,
  the ECB
  shall, according to a transparent procedure and rules which it shall make public,
  publish,
  as a general rule without undue delay,
  any decision imposing on an undertaking administrative pecuniary penalties for breaches of directly applicable Union law and sanctions for breaches of ECB regulations or decisions, both in the supervisory and non-supervisory fields,
  provided that all legal means of appeal against such a decision have been exhausted
  .
  Where the ECB considers that immediate publication of a decision would jeopardise the stability of financial markets or be disproportionate considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking, it
  shall
  have the discretion to delay the publication of the decision until three years after the date on which the decision was taken. Upon request the ECB shall hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament concerning such cases. The ECB shall provide a justification for the delay in an annex to the published decision.
  The ECB shall carry out publication
  in the cases and
  in accordance with
  the conditions set out in
  relevant Union law, irrespective of any national law or regulation and, where relevant Union law is composed of Directives, of any national legislation transposing those Directives.

After notification to the undertaking concerned,

shall, according to a transparent procedure and rules which it shall make public,

as a general rule without undue delay,

provided that all legal means of appeal against such a decision have been exhausted

Where the ECB considers that immediate publication of a decision would jeopardise the stability of financial markets or be disproportionate considering the degree of severity of the administrative pecuniary penalty or sanction imposed on an undertaking, it

have the discretion to delay the publication of the decision until three years after the date on which the decision was taken. Upon request the ECB shall hold confidential oral discussions behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the competent committee of the European Parliament concerning such cases. The ECB shall provide a justification for the delay in an annex to the published decision.

in the cases and

the conditions set out in

Amendment 7

Amendment 7

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 2

Article 1 — point 2

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 1a — paragraph 3 a (new)

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 3a.
     
  Without prejudice to their other specific competences derived from national law, the competent national authorities shall remain competent to impose administrative penalties but shall impose such penalties on credit institutions directly supervised by the ECB only where the ECB requires them to initiate proceedings for that purpose. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

3a.
     
  Without prejudice to their other specific competences derived from national law, the competent national authorities shall remain competent to impose administrative penalties but shall impose such penalties on credit institutions directly supervised by the ECB only where the ECB requires them to initiate proceedings for that purpose.

3a.

Without prejudice to their other specific competences derived from national law, the competent national authorities shall remain competent to impose administrative penalties but shall impose such penalties on credit institutions directly supervised by the ECB only where the ECB requires them to initiate proceedings for that purpose.

Amendment 15

Amendment 15

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 4 — point a a (new)

Article 1 — point 4 — point a a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 3 — paragraph 9

| Present Text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | (aa) | paragraph 9 is replaced by the following: |

Present Text

Present Text

Amendment

Amendment

(aa)

(aa)

paragraph 9 is replaced by the following:

paragraph 9 is replaced by the following:

9.   The proceeds from sanctions imposed by the ECB shall belong to the ECB.

| | ‘9.   The proceeds from sanctions imposed by the ECB shall belong to the ECB.
  The proceeds from sanctions imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, including the collection of statistical information, shall belong to the Single Resolution Fund.’; |
| --- | --- |

‘9.   The proceeds from sanctions imposed by the ECB shall belong to the ECB.
  The proceeds from sanctions imposed by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, including the collection of statistical information, shall belong to the Single Resolution Fund.’;

Amendment 8

Amendment 8

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 4 — point b

Article 1 — point 4 — point b

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 3 — paragraph 10

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| If an infringement relates exclusively to a task entrusted to the ESCB or the ECB under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, an infringement procedure may be initiated only on the basis of this Regulation, irrespective of the existence of any national law or regulation which may provide for a separate procedure. If an infringement also relates to one or more areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB, the right to initiate an infringement procedure on the basis of this Regulation shall be independent of any right of a competent national authority to initiate separate procedures in relation to such areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB. This provision shall be without prejudice to the application of criminal law and of national law relating to prudential supervisory competencies in participating Member States, in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. | 10.   If an infringement relates exclusively to a task entrusted to the ESCB or the ECB under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, an infringement procedure may be initiated only on the basis of this Regulation, irrespective of the existence of any national law or regulation which may provide for a separate procedure. If an infringement also relates to one or more areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB, the right to initiate an infringement procedure on the basis of this Regulation shall be independent of any right of a competent national authority to initiate separate procedures in relation to such areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB. This provision shall be without prejudice to the application of criminal law and of national law relating to prudential supervisory competencies in participating Member States, in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
  Furthermore, the proceeds accruing from the sanctions referred to in Article 2 of this Regulation shall remain at the disposal of the ECB provided that it specifies a purpose for those proceeds other than financing current expenditure, and provided that it reports on their use to the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

If an infringement relates exclusively to a task entrusted to the ESCB or the ECB under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, an infringement procedure may be initiated only on the basis of this Regulation, irrespective of the existence of any national law or regulation which may provide for a separate procedure. If an infringement also relates to one or more areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB, the right to initiate an infringement procedure on the basis of this Regulation shall be independent of any right of a competent national authority to initiate separate procedures in relation to such areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB. This provision shall be without prejudice to the application of criminal law and of national law relating to prudential supervisory competencies in participating Member States, in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.

10.   If an infringement relates exclusively to a task entrusted to the ESCB or the ECB under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, an infringement procedure may be initiated only on the basis of this Regulation, irrespective of the existence of any national law or regulation which may provide for a separate procedure. If an infringement also relates to one or more areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB, the right to initiate an infringement procedure on the basis of this Regulation shall be independent of any right of a competent national authority to initiate separate procedures in relation to such areas outside the competence of the ESCB or the ECB. This provision shall be without prejudice to the application of criminal law and of national law relating to prudential supervisory competencies in participating Member States, in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
  Furthermore, the proceeds accruing from the sanctions referred to in Article 2 of this Regulation shall remain at the disposal of the ECB provided that it specifies a purpose for those proceeds other than financing current expenditure, and provided that it reports on their use to the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors.

Furthermore, the proceeds accruing from the sanctions referred to in Article 2 of this Regulation shall remain at the disposal of the ECB provided that it specifies a purpose for those proceeds other than financing current expenditure, and provided that it reports on their use to the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors.

Amendment 9

Amendment 9

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 4 a (new)

Article 1 — point 4 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 4 — paragraph 1

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a. | Article 4(1) is replaced by the following: |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

4a.

4a.

Article 4(1) is replaced by the following:

1.   The right to take the decision to initiate an infringement procedure, as provided for in this Regulation, shall expire one year after the existence of the alleged infringement
  first
  became known either to the ECB or to the national central bank of the Member State in whose jurisdiction the alleged infringement occurred and, in any case,
  five
  years after the infringement
  occurred,
  or in the case of a continued infringement,
  five
  years after the infringement was terminated.

first

five

occurred,

five

| | ‘1.   The right to take the decision to initiate an infringement procedure, as provided for in this Regulation, shall expire one year after the existence of the alleged infringement became known either to the ECB or to the national central bank of the Member State in whose jurisdiction the alleged infringement occurred and, in any case,
  three
  years after the
  date on which the decision to initiate an
  infringement
  procedure was taken
  or, in the case of a continued infringement,
  three
  years after the infringement was terminated.’ |
| --- | --- |

‘1.   The right to take the decision to initiate an infringement procedure, as provided for in this Regulation, shall expire one year after the existence of the alleged infringement became known either to the ECB or to the national central bank of the Member State in whose jurisdiction the alleged infringement occurred and, in any case,
  three
  years after the
  date on which the decision to initiate an
  infringement
  procedure was taken
  or, in the case of a continued infringement,
  three
  years after the infringement was terminated.’

Amendment 10

Amendment 10

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 5

Article 1 — point 5

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 4c — paragraph 1

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 1.   By way of derogation from Article 4, the right to take a decision to impose an administrative penalty, with regard to infringements relating to relevant directly applicable acts of Union law as well as to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, shall expire five years after the infringement
  occurred
  or, in the case of a continued infringement, five years after the infringement ceased. | 1.   By way of derogation from Article 4, the right to take a decision to impose an administrative penalty, with regard to infringements relating to relevant directly applicable acts of Union law as well as to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, shall expire five years after the
  date on which the decision to initiate an
  infringement
  procedure was taken
  or, in the case of a continued infringement, five years after the infringement ceased. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

1.   By way of derogation from Article 4, the right to take a decision to impose an administrative penalty, with regard to infringements relating to relevant directly applicable acts of Union law as well as to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, shall expire five years after the infringement
  occurred
  or, in the case of a continued infringement, five years after the infringement ceased.

occurred

1.   By way of derogation from Article 4, the right to take a decision to impose an administrative penalty, with regard to infringements relating to relevant directly applicable acts of Union law as well as to decisions and regulations adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks, shall expire five years after the
  date on which the decision to initiate an
  infringement
  procedure was taken
  or, in the case of a continued infringement, five years after the infringement ceased.

date on which the decision to initiate an

procedure was taken

Amendment 11

Amendment 11

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 5

Article 1 — point 5

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 4c — paragraph 2

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| 2.   Any action taken by the ECB for the purposes of the investigation or proceedings with respect to an infringement shall cause the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be interrupted. The limitation period shall be interrupted with effect from the date on which the action is notified to the supervised entity concerned. Each interruption shall cause the time limit to recommence. However, the time limit shall not exceed a period of
  ten
  years after the infringement
  occurred
  or, in the case of a continued infringement,
  ten
  years after the infringement ceased. | 2.   Any action taken by the ECB for the purposes of the investigation or proceedings with respect to an infringement shall cause the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be interrupted. The limitation period shall be interrupted with effect from the date on which the action is notified to the supervised entity concerned. Each interruption shall cause the time limit to recommence. However, the time limit shall not exceed a period of
  seven
  years after the
  date on which the decision to initiate an
  infringement
  procedure was taken
  or, in the case of a continued infringement,
  seven
  years after the infringement ceased. |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

2.   Any action taken by the ECB for the purposes of the investigation or proceedings with respect to an infringement shall cause the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be interrupted. The limitation period shall be interrupted with effect from the date on which the action is notified to the supervised entity concerned. Each interruption shall cause the time limit to recommence. However, the time limit shall not exceed a period of
  ten
  years after the infringement
  occurred
  or, in the case of a continued infringement,
  ten
  years after the infringement ceased.

ten

occurred

ten

2.   Any action taken by the ECB for the purposes of the investigation or proceedings with respect to an infringement shall cause the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be interrupted. The limitation period shall be interrupted with effect from the date on which the action is notified to the supervised entity concerned. Each interruption shall cause the time limit to recommence. However, the time limit shall not exceed a period of
  seven
  years after the
  date on which the decision to initiate an
  infringement
  procedure was taken
  or, in the case of a continued infringement,
  seven
  years after the infringement ceased.

seven

date on which the decision to initiate an

procedure was taken

seven

Amendment 12

Amendment 12

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 5

Article 1 — point 5

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 4c — paragraph 4 a (new)

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 4a.
     
  Actions which interrupt the running of the limitation period shall include in particular the following: |
| | (a) | a written request for information by the ECB or by a competent national authority of a Member State; |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

4a.
     
  Actions which interrupt the running of the limitation period shall include in particular the following:

4a.

Actions which interrupt the running of the limitation period shall include in particular the following:

(a)

(a)

a written request for information by the ECB or by a competent national authority of a Member State;

a written request for information by the ECB or by a competent national authority of a Member State;

| (b) | written authorisations to conduct inspections issued to officials by the ECB or a competent national authority of a Member State; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

(b)

written authorisations to conduct inspections issued to officials by the ECB or a competent national authority of a Member State;

written authorisations to conduct inspections issued to officials by the ECB or a competent national authority of a Member State;

| (c) | the initiation of proceedings for infringement by a competent national authority of a Member State. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

(c)

the initiation of proceedings for infringement by a competent national authority of a Member State.

the initiation of proceedings for infringement by a competent national authority of a Member State.

Amendment 13

Amendment 13

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 5 a (new)

Article 1 — point 5 a (new)

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 5

| Present text | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 5a. | Article 5 is replaced by the following: |

Present text

Present text

Amendment

Amendment

5a.

5a.

Article 5 is replaced by the following:

Article 5

| | ‘Article 5 |
| --- | --- |

‘Article 5

Judicial review

| | Judicial review |
| --- | --- |

Judicial review

The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty
  over the review of final decisions whereby a sanction is imposed.

The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty

| | As stated in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have unlimited jurisdiction
  over the review of final decisions whereby a sanction is imposed.’ |
| --- | --- |

As stated in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have unlimited jurisdiction
  over the review of final decisions whereby a sanction is imposed.’

As stated in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have unlimited jurisdiction

Amendment 14

Amendment 14

Draft regulation

Draft regulation

Article 1 — point 5 b (new)

Article 1 — point 5 b (new)

Regulation (EC) No 2532/98

Article 6 a (new)

| Draft of the European Central Bank | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| | 5b. | The following Article is inserted: |

Draft of the European Central Bank

Draft of the European Central Bank

Amendment

Amendment

5b.

5b.

The following Article is inserted:

| | ‘Article 6a |
| --- | --- |

‘Article 6a

‘Article 6a

| | International Dialogue |
| --- | --- |

International Dialogue

International Dialogue

| | Pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 the ECB shall establish a regular dialogue with supervisory authorities outside the Union to work towards a coherent application of sanctions and sanction mechanisms on the international level.’ |
| --- | --- |

Pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 the ECB shall establish a regular dialogue with supervisory authorities outside the Union to work towards a coherent application of sanctions and sanction mechanisms on the international level.’

Pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 the ECB shall establish a regular dialogue with supervisory authorities outside the Union to work towards a coherent application of sanctions and sanction mechanisms on the international level.’

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(*)  OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63.

*

(**)  OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63.

**

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