79–006 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 115–593 

STRESS TEST IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2017 

MARCH 13, 2018.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HENSARLING, from the Committee on Financial Services, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 4293] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 4293) to reform the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and 

Review process, the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test process, and for 

other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended 

do pass. 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stress Test Improvement Act of 2017’’. 

SEC. 2. CCAR AND DFAST REFORMS. 

Section 165(i) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 

Act (12 U.S.C. 5365(i)) is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (1)— 

(A) in subparagraph (B)(i)— 

(i) by striking ‘‘3 different’’ and inserting ‘‘2 different’’; and 

(ii) by striking ‘‘, adverse,’’; and 

(B) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(C) CCAR REQUIREMENTS.— 

‘‘(i) LIMITATION ON QUALITATIVE CAPITAL PLANNING OBJECTIONS.—In 

carrying out CCAR, the Board of Governors may not object to a company’s capital plan on the basis of qualitative deficiencies in the company’s capital planning process. 

2 

‘‘(ii) CCAR DEFINED.—For purposes of this subparagraph and subparagraph (E), the term ‘CCAR’ means the Comprehensive Capital 

Analysis and Review established by the Board of Governors.’’; and 

(2) in paragraph (2)— 

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘semiannual’’ and inserting ‘‘annual’’; 

and 

(B) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking ‘‘3 different sets of conditions, including baseline, adverse,’’ and inserting ‘‘2 different sets of conditions, including baseline’’. 

SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 

The amendments made by this Act may not be construed to prohibit an appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)) from— 

(1) ensuring the safety and soundness of an entity regulated by such an appropriate Federal banking agency; and 

(2) ensuring compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and supervisory 

policies, and the following of appropriate guidance, by an entity regulated by 

such an appropriate Federal banking agency. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

Introduced by Representative Lee Zeldin on November 7, 2017, 

H.R. 4293, the ‘‘Stress Test Improvement Act of 2017’’ improves the 

stress testing processes mandated by both Title I of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘‘DoddFrank’’) (P.L. 111–203) and the Federal Reserve for bank holding 

companies by requiring certain bank holding companies to conduct 

company-run stress tests once each year rather than semiannually. 

This bill would also reduce the number of supervisory scenarios 

from three to two—the baseline and severely adverse scenario, do 

away with mid-year stress tests, and prohibit the Federal Reserve’s 

objection to a bank holding company’s capital plan based solely on 

qualitative deficiencies. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (‘‘Federal 

Reserve’’) administers a set of ‘‘stress tests’’ to determine the ability 

of U.S. bank holding companies to withstand periods of economic 

turmoil. The Federal Reserve administers contemporaneously two 

stress tests, the Comprehensive Capitol Analysis and Review 

(CCAR) and the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST) which together constitute one of the greatest expansions of the Federal Reserve’s powers in recent history. 

The Federal Reserve’s stress tests have become a type of ‘‘catand-mouse’’ exercise whereby Federal Reserve supervisory staff 

and bank compliance officers attempt to outwit one another in a 

game without either rules or transparency. The secrecy which surrounds the stress test regime makes it difficult for Congress and 

the public to assess either the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s 

regulatory oversight or the integrity of the findings yielded by the 

tests. 

Academics have identified multiple problems which arise from 

the lack of transparency in the stress-testing process. In testimony 

before the Financial Services Committee on July 23, 2015, Columbia University Professor Charles Calomiris described the stress test 

process as a ‘‘Kafkaesque Kabuki drama in which regulators punish banks for failing to meet standards that are never stated (either in advance or after the fact). This makes stress tests a source 

3 

of uncertainty rather than a helpful guide against unanticipated 

risks.’’ Professor Calomiris went on to question how such a secretive and opaque process could be squared with basic American constitutional precepts: 

In addition to the stress test’s economic costs and questionable 

contributions to financial stability, it is hard to believe that the 

stress tests’ current structure could occur in a country like the 

United States, which prizes the rule of law and adherence to due 

process. The current stress test regime is objectionable as regulators at the Federal Reserve not only impose unstated quantitative standards for bank holding companies to meet certain 

stressed scenarios, but also retain the option of simply deciding 

that banks fail on the basis of a qualitative judgment unrelated 

even to their own model’s criteria. 

Former Senator and Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee Chairman Phil Gramm, testified at a July 28, 

2015, Financial Services Committee hearing, and echoed these concerns: ‘‘What does the stress test test? Not only does no one know, 

but the regulators see that as a virtue. The Fed’s Vice Chairman 

has stated that giving banks a clear road map for compliance might 

make it easier to game the test.’ But isn’t the fact that compliance 

is easier when you know what the law says the whole point of the 

rule of law?’’ 

Indeed, the non-partisan Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) agrees with former Senator Gramm. A November 2016 report by the GAO, commissioned by Financial Services Committee 

Chairman Jeb Hensarling, underscored these concerns. For example, the GAO found that: (1) the Federal Reserve has not always 

followed its own guidance or principles; (2) the Federal Reserve 

cannot be reasonably assured that small adjustments to its stress 

scenario variables would produce outcomes that neither amplify 

nor dampen economic cycles; and (3) the Federal Reserve has limited its perspective and has not always followed its own guidance 

for banking institutions on model-risk management practices. The 

report highlighted the lack of transparency in the process: 

The fundamental flaws in the Federal Reserve’s stress test methodology were also laid bare by an October 29, 2015, report issued 

by the Federal Reserve’s own Office of Inspector General (OIG), 

which examined the extent to which the model risk management 

practices the Fed uses in its supervisory stress testing program are 

‘‘consistent with supervisory guidance on model risk management’’ 

that the Fed applies to the banking organizations it oversees. The 

report found significant deficiencies related to the Federal Reserve’s model validation and broader governance practices. 

In addition, the OIG report noted that ‘‘similar findings identified at institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve have been 

characterized [by the Fed] as matters requiring immediate attention or as matters requiring attention.’’ The stress tests thus perfectly encapsulate the double standard that is the hallmark of the 

modern regulatory state: one set of rules for the bureaucratic elites 

and another for the entities they regulate. 

Transparency is a key feature of accountability and this limited 

disclosure about the stress tests may hinder understanding of the 

CCAR program, limit public and market confidence in the program, 

and the extent to which the Federal Reserve can be held accountVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:54 Mar 14, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR593.XXX HR593
4 

able for its decisions in its conduct of the stress tests. The Federal 

Reserve also has not regularly updated guidance to firms about supervisory expectations and peer practices related to the qualitative 

assessment. Bank holding companies that must meet these expectations annually may face challenges from the irregular timing of 

communications, which could limit the Federal Reserve’s achievement of its CCAR goals. 

Not only academics, but regulators have recognized a need for 

many of the reforms set forth in this bill—most notably from the 

Federal Reserve itself. For example, in a June 16, 2017, letter to 

Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer (MO), then-Federal Reserve Chair Janet 

Yellen committed to provide more details on how the Federal Reserve conducts the annual stress tests, to include the qualitative 

part of the tests. During testimony before the Senate Banking 

Committee on June 22, 2017, Federal Reserve Governor Jerome 

Powell stated ‘‘[t]he Federal Reserve is committed to increasing the 

transparency of the stress testing and CCAR processes. We will 

soon seek public feedback concerning possible forms of enhanced 

disclosure.’’ 

Other regulators have recognized the need for some form of regulatory reform regarding CCAR/DFAST stress tests, even if those reforms were only to reduce the number of financial institutions subject to the stress tests. For example, during testimony before the 

Senate Banking Committee on June 22, 2017, FDIC Chairman 

Martin Gruenberg stated: 

‘‘[s]ome EGRPRA commenters suggested raising the $10 

billion in total assets threshold for conducting annual 

stress tests set forth in Section 165(i)(2) of the Dodd-Frank 

Act. The FDIC agrees with these commenters, and supports legislative efforts to increase the threshold from $10 

billion to $50 billion. However, the FDIC also believes it 

is important to retain supervisory authority to require 

stress testing if warranted by a banking organization’s risk 

profile or condition.’’ 

And, as part of former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo’s 

departing remarks in April 2017, he acknowledged that: 

‘‘there are clearly some changes that can be made without endangering financial stability. Foremost among these 

are the various bank size thresholds established in the 

Dodd-Frank Act or in agency regulations for the application of stricter prudential requirements . . . . Similarly, the 

$10 billion asset threshold for banks to conduct their own 

required stress tests seems too low. And the fact that community banks are subject at all to some of the Dodd-Frank 

Act rules seems unnecessary to protect safety and soundness, and quite burdensome on the very limited compliance 

capabilities of these small banks.’’ 

In fact, in following a 2016 public comment period, the Federal 

Reserve took steps to limit the reach of the qualitative element of 

CCAR. The law firm of Davis Polk analyzed the change to 2017 

CCAR process and found: 

‘‘while in previous years all U.S. BHCs subject to CCAR 

faced the possibility of a qualitative objection to their capVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:54 Mar 14, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR593.XXX HR593
5 

ital plans, a Federal Reserve amendment to the capital 

plan and stress test rules issued in early 2017 has limited 

the qualitative assessment to the subset of CCAR BHCs 

with $250 billion or more in total consolidated assets, $75 

billion or more of total nonbank assets or $10 billion or 

more in on-balance-sheet foreign exposures (large and complex BHCs), which currently comprises the 13 largest 

BHCs. For other BHCs subject to CCAR (large and noncomplex BHCs), the Federal Reserve will assess the qualitative aspects of these firms’ capital planning processes as 

part of . . . its normal supervisory process, without the 

possibility of a qualitative objection, through a targeted 

Horizontal Capital Review.’’ 

While these modest changes made by the Federal Reserve do not 

go far enough to improve the stress test regime, the changes demonstrates that the regulators recognize the problems with qualitative assessments in stress testing. 

In June 2017, the Treasury Department published a report entitled A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: 

Banks and Credit Unions, that sets forth its recommendations for 

regulatory relief for banks and credit unions in furtherance of 

President Trump’s February 3, 2017 Executive Order 13772 on 

Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System. 

The June 2017 report recommended reforms to the existing stress 

testing regime, which overlap with this bill’s reforms in many significant regards. Like this legislation, the June 2017 report recommended the elimination of the mid-year DFAST cycle and the alteration of no longer allowing qualitative CCAR element to be the 

sole basis for the Federal Reserve’s rejection of capital plans, and 

reducing the number of DFAST supervisory scenarios. The June 

2017 report also suggested going further by raising the DFAST 

threshold from $10 billion to $50 billion, raising the CCAR threshold to match the revised enhanced prudential standards threshold, 

subjecting stress-testing and capital review to public notice and 

comment process, allowing leeway for the company to determine 

the appropriate number of models for DFAST, reassessing CCAR 

assumptions, modeling according to firms unique risk profiles, providing firms an accurate understanding of the capital buffers they 

would have under the severely adverse scenario. 

On November 7, 2017, Federal Reserve Vice Chair of Supervision, Governor Randall Quarles, announced that the Federal Reserve will soon propose providing more granular information about 

the central bank’s expectations for loss rates on particular portfolios of loans and will seek public comment on the proposal in the 

near future. In addition, the proposal will seek comment on the assumptions which underlie the stress tests. 

In an effort to inject badly needed accountability, transparency, 

and targeted relief into the stress test processes, this legislation introduced by Congressman Zeldin, and amended by Congressman 

David Scott (D–GA), makes a number of important reforms. H.R. 

4293 would overhaul the current regime for stress testing banks 

and would make the company-run stress test an annual exercise, 

reduce the number of supervisory scenarios from three to two—the 

baseline and severely adverse scenario,—and extend the Federal 

6 

Reserve’s regulatory relief from CCAR’s qualitative assessment to 

all banks. 

HEARINGS

The Committee on Financial Services held a hearing examining 

matters relating to H.R. 4293 on April 26, 2017 and April 28, 2017. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on November 14, 2017, and November 15, 2017, and ordered H.R. 4293 

to be reported favorably to the House as amended by a recorded 

vote of 38 yeas to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC–115), a quorum 

being present. Before the motion to report was offered, the Committee adopted an amendment offered by Mr. Scott by voice vote. 

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion 

to report legislation and amendments thereto. The first recorded 

vote was a Motion to Table Mr. Perlmutter’s appeal of the ruling 

of the Chair on the question of germaneness on the Perlmutter 

amendment. The motion was agreed to 28 yeas to 14 nays. (Record 

vote no. FC–102), a quorum being present. The second and final recorded vote was on a motion by Chairman Hensarling to report the 

bill favorably to the House as amended. The motion was agreed to 

by a recorded vote of 38 yeas to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC–115), 

a quorum being present. 

7 


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Insert graphic folio 9 HR593.002

Representative 

Mr. Hensarling--------------- Mr. McHenry _______________ __ 

Mr. King ---------------------

Mr. Royce (CA) ---------------

Mr. Lucas 

Mr. Pearce-------------------

Mr. Posey __________________ __ 

Mr. Luetkemeyer _____________ _ 

Mr. Huizenga .............. .. 

Mr. Duffy -------------------- Mr. Stivers _________________ __ 

Mr. Hultgren ________________ _ 

Mr Ross---------------------

Mr. Pittenger-----------------

Mrs. Wagner _______________ __ 

Mr. Barr ---------------------

Mr. Rothfus ------------------

Mr Messer ____ ------------- Mr. Tipton __________________ __ 

Mr. Williams ________________ _ 

Mr. Poliquin ________________ __ 

Mrs. Love--------------------

Mr. Hill ----------------------

Mr Emmer-------------------

Mr. Zeldin .................. . 

Mr. Trott---------------------

Mr louderm1lk ---------------

Mr. Mooney (WV)__ ___________ _ 

Mr. MacArthur ---------------

Mr. Davidson _______________ __ 

Mr. Budd -------------------- Mr. Kustoff (TN)___ __________ __ 

Ms. Tenney-------------------

Mr. Hollingsworth ____________ _ 

Yea 

Record vote no. FC-115 

Nay Present Representative 

Ms. Maxine Waters {CA) ______ 

Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney {NY)__ 

Ms. Velazquez ________________ 

Mr. Sherman ----------------- Mr. Meeks ------------------- Mr. Capuano-----------------

Mr. Clay---------------------

Mr. Lynch--------------------

Mr. David Scott {GA) __________ 

Mr. AI Green (TX) -------------

Mr. Cleaver ------------------ Ms. Moore ------------------- Mr. Ellison ------------------- Mr. Perlmutter --------------- Mr. Himes ------------------- Mr Foster -------------------- Mr. Kildee -------------------- Mr. Delaney------------------

Ms. Sinema 

Mrs. Beatty------------------

Mr Heck --------------------- Mr. Vargas-------------------

Mr Gotthe1mer --------------- Mr. Gonzalez (TX) _____________ 

Mr Cnst --------------------- Mr. Kihuen -------------------

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9 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in 

the descriptive portions of this report. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee states that H.R. 4293 will reform the living wills submission process to make it more transparent, responsive, and efficient for submitting bank holding companies. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX

EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate provided by 

the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, March 9, 2018. 

Hon. JEB HENSARLING, 

Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4293, the Stress Test Improvement Act of 2017. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sarah Puro. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, Director. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 4293—Stress Test Improvement Act of 2017 

Summary: Twice a year, large financial intuitions prepare reports for federal financial regulators regarding their ability to withstand financial stress. Under H.R. 4293 those institutions would 

prepare annual reports instead. The bill also would prohibit the 

Federal Reserve from using its qualitative assessment of a financial institution’s ability to withstand financial stress as a basis for 

objecting to that institution’s plan to draw down capital. 

10 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4293 would increase the deficit by $14 million over the 2018–2027 period. That figure includes 

an increase in direct spending of $16 million and an increase in 

revenues of $2 million. Because enacting the bill would affect direct 

spending and revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4293 would not increase net 

direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $2.5 billion in 

one or more of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 

2028. 

H.R. 4293 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary effect of H.R. 4293 is shown in the following table. The costs 

of this legislation fall within budget function 370 (commerce and 

housing credit). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2018– 

2022 

2018– 

2027 

INCREASES IN DIRECT SPENDING 

Estimated Budget Authority 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 16 

Estimated Outlays ............. 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 16 

INCREASES IN REVENUES 

Estimated Revenues .......... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 

NET INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT FROM INCREASES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES 

Effect on the Deficit .......... 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 6 14 

Basis of estimate: The estimated budgetary effects of H.R. 4293 

stem from the small chance that the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC) would incur additional costs to resolve failed financial institutions. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill 

will be enacted near the end of 2018. 

CBO’s estimate for H.R. 4293 is based on the analysis underlying 

its projections for banking programs in its June 2017 baseline. 

Those projections incorporate the small probability of a financial 

crisis in each year during the projection period and the more likely 

scenario of an average number of bank and credit union failures in 

any given year. As a result, the estimated cost represents a weighted probability of different outcomes for future failures of financial 

institutions. Some of those outcomes have a very low probability of 

occurring but if they do, the costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund 

(DIF) or the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF) are very large. Costs 

incurred by the DIF are recovered over time by assessments on insured depository institutions. Fees paid to recover costs incurred by 

the OLF are classified in the budget as revenues. Both of those 

funds are administered by the FDIC. 

The estimated costs result from provisions that would prohibit 

the Federal Reserve from using its qualitative assessments of the 

ability of large banking intuitions to withstand financial stress as 

a basis for objecting to a financial institution’s plan to draw down 

capital. According to the major private credit-rating agencies and 

other financial analysts, the Federal Reserve’s quantitative and 

qualitative stress tests have improved the financial strength and 

11 

1See Office of Financial Research, Capital Buffers and the Future of Bank Stress Test, Brief 

7–20 (February 2017), www.financialresearch.gov/briefs; Government Accountability Office, Federal Reserve: Additional Actions Could Help Ensure the Achievement of Stress Test Goals, GAO– 

17–49 (November 2016), www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-48; and Moody’s Investors Service, ‘‘Fed 

Stress Testing Has Strengthened Banks’ Capital and Risk Management (June 21, 2016), http:// 

tinyurl.com/yd7uhz7r. 2Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Federal Reserve, ‘‘Next Steps in the Evolution of Stress Testing’’ (speech at the Yale University School of Management Leaders Forum, New Haven, Conn., 

September 26, 2016), https://go.usa.gov/xnJZc. 

resiliency of large banking institutions.1 Companies typically resolve shortcomings identified by the tests by strengthening internal 

controls and reducing the portion of equity used for dividends and 

stock repurchases, which increases the capital held by the company. 

Since 2013, only a few financial institutions have been cited for 

qualitative shortcomings, and most of those cases were resolved 

quickly. The actions required by the Federal Reserve were relatively minor, in part because those institutions were still recovering from the financial crisis.2 Based on those actions of the Federal Reserve, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 4293 would 

reduce the average amount of capital held by all large, systemically 

important banking institutions by less than 1 percent. 

Changes in the amount of capital that a financial institution 

holds may affect both that institution’s likelihood of failure and the 

costs incurred by the OLF or DIF to resolve failed assets. Most of 

the costs from enacting the legislation would primarily be incurred 

by the OLF. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would increase the deficit by $14 million, or by roughly 0.02 percent of that 

baseline’s projection of the FDIC’s programs over the next decade. 

That total consists of an increase in direct spending of $16 million 

and an increase of revenues of $2 million. CBO expects that most 

of the costs over the 2018–2027 period under the bill would be offset after 2027 by an increase in fees paid to the FDIC by financial 

institutions. 

Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act 

of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures 

for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net 

changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-asyou-go procedures are shown in the following table. 

CBO ESTIMATE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO EFFECTS FOR H.R. 4293, THE STRESS TEST IMPROVEMENT 

ACT OF 2017, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

ON NOVEMBER 15, 2017 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2018– 

2022 

2018– 

2027 

NET INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT 

Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Impact ............... 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 6 14 

Memorandum: 

Changes in Outlays .......................... 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 16 

Changes in Revenues ....................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 

Increase in long-term direct spending and deficits: CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase net direct 

spending or on-budget deficits by more than $2.5 billion in any of 

the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028. 

12 

Mandates: H.R. 4293 contains no intergovernmental or privatesector mandates as defined in UMRA. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Sarah Puro and Kathleen 

Gramp (for the FDIC) and Nathaniel Frentz (for the Federal Reserve); Mandates: Rachel Austin. 

Estimate approved by: H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

This information is provided in accordance with section 423 of 

the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. 

The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain 

Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has determined that the bill does not impose a Federal intergovernmental 

mandate on State, local, or tribal governments. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of the section 102(b)(3) of the 

Congressional Accountability Act. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of the bill do not 

contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited 

tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule. 

DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision 

of the bill establishes or reauthorizes: (1) a program of the Federal 

Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program; 

(2) a program included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public 

Law 111–139; or (3) a program related to a program identified in 

the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, published 

pursuant to the Federal Program Information Act (Pub. L. No. 95– 

220, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98–169). 

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING

Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, (115th Congress), the following statement is made concerning directed rule makings: The 

Committee states that the bill requires two directed rule makings. 

The rulemaking directs the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve) to provide for at least 3 different sets of conditions under 

which the evaluation required by this subsection shall be conducted, including baseline, adverse, and severely adverse, and 

13 

methodologies, including models used to estimate losses on certain 

assets, and the Board of Governors shall not carry out any such 

evaluation until 60 days after such regulations are issued; and provide copies of such regulations to the Comptroller General of the 

United States and the Panel of Economic Advisors of the Congressional Budget Office before publishing such regulations. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title 

This section cites H.R. 4293 as the ‘‘Stress Test Improvement Act 

of 2017.’’ 

Section 2. CCAR and DFAST reforms 

This section amends 165(i) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to require the Federal Reserve 

Board’s (Federal Reserve) Comprehensive Capitol Analysis and Review (CCAR) be conducted once each year, rather than semiannually. This section also reduces the number of supervisory scenarios 

from three to two by striking the adverse scenario, and prohibits 

the Federal Reserve’s objection to a bank holding company’s capital 

plan based solely on qualitative deficiencies. 

Section 3. Rule of construction 

This section clarifies that the amendments made by this Act may 

not be construed to prohibit an appropriate Federal banking agency 

from ensuring the safety and soundness of an entity regulated by 

such an appropriate Federal banking agency, and ensuring compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and supervisory policies. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 

PROTECTION ACT 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE I—FINANCIAL STABILITY 

* * * * * * * 

14 

Subtitle C—Additional Board of Governors 

Authority for Certain Nonbank Financial 

Companies and Bank Holding Companies 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 165. ENHANCED SUPERVISION AND PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS 

FOR NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUPERVISED BY 

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND CERTAIN BANK HOLDING COMPANIES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.— (1) PURPOSE.—In order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the 

material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of 

large, interconnected financial institutions, the Board of Governors shall, on its own or pursuant to recommendations by 

the Council under section 115, establish prudential standards 

for nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of 

Governors and bank holding companies with total consolidated 

assets equal to or greater than $50,000,000,000 that— 

(A) are more stringent than the standards and requirements applicable to nonbank financial companies and bank 

holding companies that do not present similar risks to the 

financial stability of the United States; and 

(B) increase in stringency, based on the considerations 

identified in subsection (b)(3). 

(2) TAILORED APPLICATION.— (A) IN GENERAL.—In prescribing more stringent prudential standards under this section, the Board of Governors 

may, on its own or pursuant to a recommendation by the 

Council in accordance with section 115, differentiate 

among companies on an individual basis or by category, 

taking into consideration their capital structure, riskiness, 

complexity, financial activities (including the financial activities of their subsidiaries), size, and any other risk-related factors that the Board of Governors deems appropriate. 

(B) ADJUSTMENT OF THRESHOLD FOR APPLICATION OF

CERTAIN STANDARDS.—The Board of Governors may, pursuant to a recommendation by the Council in accordance 

with section 115, establish an asset threshold above 

$50,000,000,000 for the application of any standard established under subsections (c) through (g). 

(b) DEVELOPMENT OF PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.— 

(A) REQUIRED STANDARDS.—The Board of Governors 

shall establish prudential standards for nonbank financial 

companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank 

holding companies described in subsection (a), that shall 

include— 

(i) risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits, unless the Board of Governors, in consultation 

with the Council, determines that such requirements 

are not appropriate for a company subject to more 

stringent prudential standards because of the activiVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:54 Mar 14, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR593.XXX HR593
15 

ties of such company (such as investment company activities or assets under management) or structure, in 

which case, the Board of Governors shall apply other 

standards that result in similarly stringent risk controls; 

(ii) liquidity requirements; 

(iii) overall risk management requirements; 

(iv) resolution plan and credit exposure report requirements; and 

(v) concentration limits. 

(B) ADDITIONAL STANDARDS AUTHORIZED.—The Board of 

Governors may establish additional prudential standards 

for nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board 

of Governors and bank holding companies described in 

subsection (a), that include— 

(i) a contingent capital requirement; 

(ii) enhanced public disclosures; 

(iii) short-term debt limits; and 

(iv) such other prudential standards as the Board or 

Governors, on its own or pursuant to a recommendation made by the Council in accordance with section 

115, determines are appropriate. 

(2) STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN FINANCIAL COMPANIES.—In applying the standards set forth in paragraph (1) to any foreign 

nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors or foreign-based bank holding company, the Board of 

Governors shall— 

(A) give due regard to the principle of national treatment and equality of competitive opportunity; and 

(B) take into account the extent to which the foreign financial company is subject on a consolidated basis to home 

country standards that are comparable to those applied to 

financial companies in the United States. 

(3) CONSIDERATIONS.—In prescribing prudential standards 

under paragraph (1), the Board of Governors shall— 

(A) take into account differences among nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and 

bank holding companies described in subsection (a), based 

on— 

(i) the factors described in subsections (a) and (b) of 

section 113; 

(ii) whether the company owns an insured depository institution; 

(iii) nonfinancial activities and affiliations of the 

company; and 

(iv) any other risk-related factors that the Board of 

Governors determines appropriate; 

(B) to the extent possible, ensure that small changes in 

the factors listed in subsections (a) and (b) of section 113 

would not result in sharp, discontinuous changes in the 

prudential standards established under paragraph (1) of 

this subsection; 

(C) take into account any recommendations of the Council under section 115; and 

16 

(D) adapt the required standards as appropriate in light 

of any predominant line of business of such company, including assets under management or other activities for 

which particular standards may not be appropriate. 

(4) CONSULTATION.—Before imposing prudential standards or 

any other requirements pursuant to this section, including notices of deficiencies in resolution plans and more stringent requirements or divestiture orders resulting from such notices, 

that are likely to have a significant impact on a functionally 

regulated subsidiary or depository institution subsidiary of a 

nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a), 

the Board of Governors shall consult with each Council member that primarily supervises any such subsidiary with respect 

to any such standard or requirement. 

(5) REPORT.—The Board of Governors shall submit an annual 

report to Congress regarding the implementation of the prudential standards required pursuant to paragraph (1), including the use of such standards to mitigate risks to the financial 

stability of the United States. 

(c) CONTINGENT CAPITAL.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsequent to submission by the Council of 

a report to Congress under section 115(c), the Board of Governors may issue regulations that require each nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors and bank 

holding companies described in subsection (a) to maintain a 

minimum amount of contingent capital that is convertible to 

equity in times of financial stress. 

(2) FACTORS TO CONSIDER.—In issuing regulations under this 

subsection, the Board of Governors shall consider— 

(A) the results of the study undertaken by the Council, 

and any recommendations of the Council, under section 

115(c); 

(B) an appropriate transition period for implementation 

of contingent capital under this subsection; 

(C) the factors described in subsection (b)(3)(A); 

(D) capital requirements applicable to the nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors or 

a bank holding company described in subsection (a), and 

subsidiaries thereof; and 

(E) any other factor that the Board of Governors deems 

appropriate. 

(d) RESOLUTION PLAN AND CREDIT EXPOSURE REPORTS.— 

(1) RESOLUTION PLAN.—The Board of Governors shall require 

each nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of 

Governors and bank holding companies described in subsection 

(a) to report periodically to the Board of Governors, the Council, and the Corporation the plan of such company for rapid 

and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure, which shall include— 

(A) information regarding the manner and extent to 

which any insured depository institution affiliated with the 

company is adequately protected from risks arising from 

the activities of any nonbank subsidiaries of the company; 

17 

(B) full descriptions of the ownership structure, assets, 

liabilities, and contractual obligations of the company; 

(C) identification of the cross-guarantees tied to different 

securities, identification of major counterparties, and a 

process for determining to whom the collateral of the company is pledged; and 

(D) any other information that the Board of Governors 

and the Corporation jointly require by rule or order. 

(2) CREDIT EXPOSURE REPORT.—The Board of Governors shall 

require each nonbank financial company supervised by the 

Board of Governors and bank holding companies described in 

subsection (a) to report periodically to the Board of Governors, 

the Council, and the Corporation on— 

(A) the nature and extent to which the company has 

credit exposure to other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding companies; and 

(B) the nature and extent to which other significant 

nonbank financial companies and significant bank holding 

companies have credit exposure to that company. 

(3) REVIEW.—The Board of Governors and the Corporation 

shall review the information provided in accordance with this 

subsection by each nonbank financial company supervised by 

the Board of Governors and bank holding company described 

in subsection (a). 

(4) NOTICE OF DEFICIENCIES.—If the Board of Governors and 

the Corporation jointly determine, based on their review under 

paragraph (3), that the resolution plan of a nonbank financial 

company supervised by the Board of Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a) is not credible or 

would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the company under 

title 11, United States Code— 

(A) the Board of Governors and the Corporation shall notify the company of the deficiencies in the resolution plan; 

and 

(B) the company shall resubmit the resolution plan within a timeframe determined by the Board of Governors and 

the Corporation, with revisions demonstrating that the 

plan is credible and would result in an orderly resolution 

under title 11, United States Code, including any proposed 

changes in business operations and corporate structure to 

facilitate implementation of the plan. 

(5) FAILURE TO RESUBMIT CREDIBLE PLAN.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—If a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a) fails to timely resubmit 

the resolution plan as required under paragraph (4), with 

such revisions as are required under subparagraph (B), the 

Board of Governors and the Corporation may jointly impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any subsidiary thereof, until 

such time as the company resubmits a plan that remedies 

the deficiencies. 

(B) DIVESTITURE.—The Board of Governors and the Corporation, in consultation with the Council, may jointly diVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:54 Mar 14, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR593.XXX HR593
18 

rect a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board 

of Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a), by order, to divest certain assets or operations 

identified by the Board of Governors and the Corporation, 

to facilitate an orderly resolution of such company under 

title 11, United States Code, in the event of the failure of 

such company, in any case in which— 

(i) the Board of Governors and the Corporation have 

jointly imposed more stringent requirements on the 

company pursuant to subparagraph (A); and 

(ii) the company has failed, within the 2-year period 

beginning on the date of the imposition of such requirements under subparagraph (A), to resubmit the 

resolution plan with such revisions as were required 

under paragraph (4)(B). 

(6) NO LIMITING EFFECT.—A resolution plan submitted in accordance with this subsection shall not be binding on a bankruptcy court, a receiver appointed under title II, or any other 

authority that is authorized or required to resolve the nonbank 

financial company supervised by the Board, any bank holding 

company, or any subsidiary or affiliate of the foregoing. 

(7) NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—No private right of action 

may be based on any resolution plan submitted in accordance 

with this subsection. 

(8) RULES.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Board of Governors and the Corporation shall jointly issue final rules implementing this subsection. 

(e) CONCENTRATION LIMITS.— 

(1) STANDARDS.—In order to limit the risks that the failure 

of any individual company could pose to a nonbank financial 

company supervised by the Board of Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a), the Board of Governors, by regulation, shall prescribe standards that limit such 

risks. 

(2) LIMITATION ON CREDIT EXPOSURE.—The regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors under paragraph (1) shall 

prohibit each nonbank financial company supervised by the 

Board of Governors and bank holding company described in 

subsection (a) from having credit exposure to any unaffiliated 

company that exceeds 25 percent of the capital stock and surplus (or such lower amount as the Board of Governors may determine by regulation to be necessary to mitigate risks to the 

financial stability of the United States) of the company. 

(3) CREDIT EXPOSURE.—For purposes of paragraph (2), ‘‘credit 

exposure’’ to a company means— 

(A) all extensions of credit to the company, including 

loans, deposits, and lines of credit; 

(B) all repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase 

agreements with the company, and all securities borrowing 

and lending transactions with the company, to the extent 

that such transactions create credit exposure for the 

nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of 

Governors or a bank holding company described in subsection (a); 

19 

(C) all guarantees, acceptances, or letters of credit (including endorsement or standby letters of credit) issued on 

behalf of the company; 

(D) all purchases of or investment in securities issued by 

the company; 

(E) counterparty credit exposure to the company in connection with a derivative transaction between the nonbank 

financial company supervised by the Board of Governors or 

a bank holding company described in subsection (a) and 

the company; and 

(F) any other similar transactions that the Board of Governors, by regulation, determines to be a credit exposure 

for purposes of this section. 

(4) ATTRIBUTION RULE.—For purposes of this subsection, any 

transaction by a nonbank financial company supervised by the 

Board of Governors or a bank holding company described in 

subsection (a) with any person is a transaction with a company, to the extent that the proceeds of the transaction are 

used for the benefit of, or transferred to, that company. 

(5) RULEMAKING.—The Board of Governors may issue such 

regulations and orders, including definitions consistent with 

this section, as may be necessary to administer and carry out 

this subsection. 

(6) EXEMPTIONS.—This subsection shall not apply to any 

Federal home loan bank. The Board of Governors may, by regulation or order, exempt transactions, in whole or in part, from 

the definition of the term ‘‘credit exposure’’ for purposes of this 

subsection, if the Board of Governors finds that the exemption 

is in the public interest and is consistent with the purpose of 

this subsection. 

(7) TRANSITION PERIOD.— (A) IN GENERAL.—This subsection and any regulations 

and orders of the Board of Governors under this subsection 

shall not be effective until 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act. 

(B) EXTENSION AUTHORIZED.—The Board of Governors 

may extend the period specified in subparagraph (A) for 

not longer than an additional 2 years. 

(f) ENHANCED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES.—The Board of Governors 

may prescribe, by regulation, periodic public disclosures by 

nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors 

and bank holding companies described in subsection (a) in order to 

support market evaluation of the risk profile, capital adequacy, and 

risk management capabilities thereof. 

(g) SHORT-TERM DEBT LIMITS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to mitigate the risks that an overaccumulation of short-term debt could pose to financial companies and to the stability of the United States financial system, 

the Board of Governors may, by regulation, prescribe a limit on 

the amount of short-term debt, including off-balance sheet exposures, that may be accumulated by any bank holding company described in subsection (a) and any nonbank financial 

company supervised by the Board of Governors. 

(2) BASIS OF LIMIT.—Any limit prescribed under paragraph 

(1) shall be based on the short-term debt of the company deVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:54 Mar 14, 2018 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR593.XXX HR593
20 

scribed in paragraph (1) as a percentage of capital stock and 

surplus of the company or on such other measure as the Board 

of Governors considers appropriate. 

(3) SHORT-TERM DEBT DEFINED.—For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘short-term debt’’ means such liabilities with 

short-dated maturity that the Board of Governors identifies, by 

regulation, except that such term does not include insured deposits. 

(4) RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.—In addition to prescribing regulations under paragraphs (1) and (3), the Board of Governors 

may prescribe such regulations, including definitions consistent 

with this subsection, and issue such orders, as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. 

(5) AUTHORITY TO ISSUE EXEMPTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS.— 

Notwithstanding the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 

U.S.C. 1841 et seq.), the Board of Governors may, if it determines such action is necessary to ensure appropriate heightened prudential supervision, with respect to a company described in paragraph (1) that does not control an insured depository institution, issue to such company an exemption from 

or adjustment to the limit prescribed under paragraph (1). 

(h) RISK COMMITTEE.— (1) NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUPERVISED BY THE

BOARD OF GOVERNORS.—The Board of Governors shall require 

each nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of 

Governors that is a publicly traded company to establish a risk 

committee, as set forth in paragraph (3), not later than 1 year 

after the date of receipt of a notice of final determination 

under section 113(e)(3) with respect to such nonbank financial 

company supervised by the Board of Governors. 

(2) CERTAIN BANK HOLDING COMPANIES.— (A) MANDATORY REGULATIONS.—The Board of Governors 

shall issue regulations requiring each bank holding company that is a publicly traded company and that has total 

consolidated assets of not less than $10,000,000,000 to establish a risk committee, as set forth in paragraph (3). 

(B) PERMISSIVE REGULATIONS.—The Board of Governors 

may require each bank holding company that is a publicly 

traded company and that has total consolidated assets of 

less than $10,000,000,000 to establish a risk committee, as 

set forth in paragraph (3), as determined necessary or appropriate by the Board of Governors to promote sound risk 

management practices. 

(3) RISK COMMITTEE.—A risk committee required by this subsection shall— 

(A) be responsible for the oversight of the enterprisewide risk management practices of the nonbank financial 

company supervised by the Board of Governors or bank 

holding company described in subsection (a), as applicable; 

(B) include such number of independent directors as the 

Board of Governors may determine appropriate, based on 

the nature of operations, size of assets, and other appropriate criteria related to the nonbank financial company 

supervised by the Board of Governors or a bank holding 

company described in subsection (a), as applicable; and 

21 

(C) include at least 1 risk management expert having experience in identifying, assessing, and managing risk exposures of large, complex firms. 

(4) RULEMAKING.—The Board of Governors shall issue final 

rules to carry out this subsection, not later than 1 year after 

the transfer date, to take effect not later than 15 months after 

the transfer date. 

(i) STRESS TESTS.— (1) BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS.— (A) ANNUAL TESTS REQUIRED.—The Board of Governors, 

in coordination with the appropriate primary financial regulatory agencies and the Federal Insurance Office, shall 

conduct annual analyses in which nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and bank 

holding companies described in subsection (a) are subject 

to evaluation of whether such companies have the capital, 

on a total consolidated basis, necessary to absorb losses as 

a result of adverse economic conditions. 

(B) TEST PARAMETERS AND CONSEQUENCES.—The Board 

of Governors— 

(i) shall provide for at least ø3 different¿ 2 different 

sets of conditions under which the evaluation required 

by this subsection shall be conducted, including 

baselineø, adverse,¿ and severely adverse; 

(ii) may require the tests described in subparagraph 

(A) at bank holding companies and nonbank financial 

companies, in addition to those for which annual tests 

are required under subparagraph (A); 

(iii) may develop and apply such other analytic techniques as are necessary to identify, measure, and monitor risks to the financial stability of the United 

States; 

(iv) shall require the companies described in subparagraph (A) to update their resolution plans required under subsection (d)(1), as the Board of Governors determines appropriate, based on the results of 

the analyses; and 

(v) shall publish a summary of the results of the 

tests required under subparagraph (A) or clause (ii) of 

this subparagraph. 

(C) CCAR REQUIREMENTS.— 

(i) LIMITATION ON QUALITATIVE CAPITAL PLANNING

OBJECTIONS.—In carrying out CCAR, the Board of 

Governors may not object to a company’s capital plan 

on the basis of qualitative deficiencies in the company’s 

capital planning process. 

(ii) CCAR DEFINED.—For purposes of this subparagraph and subparagraph (E), the term ‘‘CCAR’’ means 

the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review established by the Board of Governors. 

(2) BY THE COMPANY.— (A) REQUIREMENT.—A nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors and a bank holding company described in subsection (a) shall conduct øsemiannual¿ annual stress tests. All other financial companies 

22 

that have total consolidated assets of more than 

$10,000,000,000 and are regulated by a primary Federal financial regulatory agency shall conduct annual stress 

tests. The tests required under this subparagraph shall be 

conducted in accordance with the regulations prescribed 

under subparagraph (C). 

(B) REPORT.—A company required to conduct stress tests 

under subparagraph (A) shall submit a report to the Board 

of Governors and to its primary financial regulatory agency at such time, in such form, and containing such information as the primary financial regulatory agency shall require. 

(C) REGULATIONS.—Each Federal primary financial regulatory agency, in coordination with the Board of Governors 

and the Federal Insurance Office, shall issue consistent 

and comparable regulations to implement this paragraph 

that shall— 

(i) define the term ‘‘stress test’’ for purposes of this 

paragraph; 

(ii) establish methodologies for the conduct of stress 

tests required by this paragraph that shall provide for 

at least ø3 different sets of conditions, including baseline, adverse,¿ 2 different sets of conditions, including 

baseline and severely adverse; 

(iii) establish the form and content of the report required by subparagraph (B); and 

(iv) require companies subject to this paragraph to 

publish a summary of the results of the required 

stress tests. 

(j) LEVERAGE LIMITATION.— 

(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Board of Governors shall require a 

bank holding company with total consolidated assets equal to 

or greater than $50,000,000,000 or a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors to maintain a debt 

to equity ratio of no more than 15 to 1, upon a determination 

by the Council that such company poses a grave threat to the 

financial stability of the United States and that the imposition 

of such requirement is necessary to mitigate the risk that such 

company poses to the financial stability of the United States. 

Nothing in this paragraph shall apply to a Federal home loan 

bank. 

(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In making a determination under this 

subsection, the Council shall consider the factors described in 

subsections (a) and (b) of section 113 and any other risk-related factors that the Council deems appropriate. 

(3) REGULATIONS.—The Board of Governors shall promulgate 

regulations to establish procedures and timelines for complying 

with the requirements of this subsection. 

(k) INCLUSION OF OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ACTIVITIES IN COMPUTING

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any bank holding company 

described in subsection (a) or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors, the computation of capital 

for purposes of meeting capital requirements shall take into account any off-balance-sheet activities of the company. 

23 

(2) EXEMPTIONS.—If the Board of Governors determines that 

an exemption from the requirement under paragraph (1) is appropriate, the Board of Governors may exempt a company, or 

any transaction or transactions engaged in by such company, 

from the requirements of paragraph (1). 

(3) OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ACTIVITIES DEFINED.—For purposes 

of this subsection, the term ‘‘off-balance-sheet activities’’ means 

an existing liability of a company that is not currently a balance sheet liability, but may become one upon the happening 

of some future event, including the following transactions, to 

the extent that they may create a liability: 

(A) Direct credit substitutes in which a bank substitutes 

its own credit for a third party, including standby letters 

of credit. 

(B) Irrevocable letters of credit that guarantee repayment of commercial paper or tax-exempt securities. 

(C) Risk participations in bankers’ acceptances. 

(D) Sale and repurchase agreements. 

(E) Asset sales with recourse against the seller. 

(F) Interest rate swaps. 

(G) Credit swaps. 

(H) Commodities contracts. 

(I) Forward contracts. 

(J) Securities contracts. 

(K) Such other activities or transactions as the Board of 

Governors may, by rule, define. 

* * * * * * * 

(24) 

MINORITY VIEWS 

One of the most important policy developments following the 

largest financial crisis since the Great Depression was the enactment of stress testing for our nation’s largest banks. H.R. 4293 

would make several harmful changes to the current bank stress 

test regime, specifically the stress tests required by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act as well as 

the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) program 

administered by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System. 

While it is appropriate for Congress to examine the effectiveness 

of enhanced prudential standards, and how they are applied and 

tailored to our largest banks, H.R. 4293 would make a series of 

one-sided changes that weaken oversight of Wall Street banks. 

Although the bill was modestly narrowed during the Committee’s 

markup, H.R. 4293 still makes it harder for regulators to object to 

a deficient capital plan submitted by a megabank, and reduces the 

frequency of company-run stress tests required for the nation’s 

largest bank holding companies. U.S. banks added more than $700 billion in capital to absorb potential losses since the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Even though 

banks are well capitalized today, we should not let complacency 

allow us to overlook how unexpected risks can quickly materialize 

and tank our economy. We should also not forget the lessons of the 

financial crisis and how costly and painful that was for our constituents and the country. 

Furthermore, we would highlight testimony the Committee received warning about the dangers of rushing to rollback stress testing requirements. Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Barr, testified that, ‘‘stress testing is a central and innovative 

risk management tool used since the financial crisis by both regulators and practitioners. Unlike fixed capital ratios, of either the 

risk-based or leverage ratio type, stress testing seeks to understand 

how macro shocks would deplete capital. It would be a serious mistake to . . . hamstring stress testing by the Fed.’’ 

Mr. Barr’s fears were also echoed by Ms. Emily Liner, Senior Policy Advisor at Third Way. She testified that, ‘‘eventually, there will 

be another economic downturn, and we need to be certain that our 

largest financial institutions can weather the storm so that we can 

return to growth, we can return to strong markets, and we can prevent massive investor losses far more quickly. If we had had stress 

tests before the financial crisis, we could have been prepared to 

take action before the chain reaction of bank failures unfolded.’’ 

For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 4293. 

MAXINE WATERS. 

KEITH ELLISON. 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO. 

25 

VICENTE GONZALEZ. CAROLYN B. MALONEY. DANIEL T. KILDEE. WM. LACY CLAY. STEPHEN F. LYNCH. AL GREEN. 

Æ