U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

National Institute of Justice 

National Institute of Justice 

Assessing and Responding to the 

Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 

Richard Rosenfeld 

University of Missouri – St. Louis 

Shytierra Gaston 

Indiana University 

Howard Spivak 

National Institute of Justice 

Seri Irazola 

National Institute of Justice 

November 2017 

This paper was prepared with support from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 

U.S. Department of Justice, under contract number 2010F_10097. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or 

recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 

those of the Department of Justice. 

NCJ 251067 
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Office of Justice Programs 

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David B. Muhlhausen, Ph.D. 

Director, National Institute of Justice 

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Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................iii 

Documenting the Increase...................................................................................... 1 

Explaining the Increase........................................................................................... 9 

Research Directions ............................................................................................... 22 

Federal Support: National Institute of Justice...................................................... 27 

Appendix ................................................................................................................ 30 

References .............................................................................................................. 34 

Data Sources........................................................................................................... 40 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States i 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Executive Summary 

Big-city homicides rose in 2015 and again in 2016, although not all cities experienced a large 

increase, and homicides fell in some cities. We consider two explanations of the homicide 

rise as guides for future research: (1) expansion in illicit drug markets brought about by the 

heroin and synthetic opioid epidemic and (2) widely referenced “Ferguson effects” resulting 

in de-policing, compromised police legitimacy, or both. 

Larger increases in drug-related homicides than in other types of homicide provide 

preliminary evidence that expansions in illicit drug markets contributed to the overall 

homicide rise. The current drug epidemic is disproportionately concentrated in the 

white population, and homicides have increased among whites as well as among AfricanAmericans and Hispanics. We surmise, therefore, that the drug epidemic may have had an 

especially strong influence on the rise in homicide rates among whites. 

Current evidence that links de-policing to the homicide rise is mixed at best. Surveys 

of police reveal widespread concerns about increased police-community tensions and 

reductions in proactive policing in the aftermath of widely publicized deadly encounters 

between the police and African-Americans. Increases in homicide followed decreases in 

arrests in Baltimore and Chicago, although it is not known whether the same was true in 

other cities. Nationwide, arrest-offense ratios and arrest clearance rates decreased in 2015, 

but they had been declining for several years when homicide rates were falling. The extent 

of de-policing and its possible connection to the recent homicide rise remain open research 

questions. 

Survey evidence reveals greater discontent with the police among African-Americans than 

among whites. Alienation from the police can result in a decreased willingness to contact 

them when a crime occurs or to cooperate in police investigations and, some studies 

suggest, an increase in criminal behavior. One study has shown that calls for police service 

fell after a controversial violent encounter between the police and an unarmed AfricanAmerican in Milwaukee. The reduction in calls for service was greater in African-American 

neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. The rate at which the police are contacted is 

only one of several indicators needed to measure any connection between diminished police 

legitimacy and the recent rise in homicides. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States iii 
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We emphasize the provisional nature of 

these hypotheses regarding the recent 

homicide rise. We recommend using cityand neighborhood-level case studies to 

further refine the hypotheses and develop 

new ones, and quantitative studies of 

larger samples of cases should follow. We 

discuss several key empirical indicators 

to measure changes in drug markets, 

policing, and police legitimacy and offer 

several suggestions for future research. 

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) will 

play an important role in facilitating the 

necessary research. 

U.S. homicide rates rose substantially in 

2015 and 2016. These increases were much 

larger than was typical of yearly homicide 

fluctuations over the past several decades, 

so they merit close attention. This paper 

extends a previous analysis (Rosenfeld 

2016) by documenting the homicide rise 

in 2015 with more complete data and 

presenting data for large cities in 2016. 

The paper then considers two explanations 

for the recent homicide increase. The 

first explanation ties the increase to the 

expansion of illicit drug markets resulting 

from the heroin and synthetic opioid 

epidemic in the United States. The second 

explanation is the widely referenced 

Ferguson effect on crime rates, which 

attributes the homicide increase to reduced 

proactive policing, community alienation 

from the police, or both (Mac Donald 2016; 

Rosenfeld 2016). The paper concludes with 

recommendations for future research on 

the recent homicide rise. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States iv 
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Assessing and Responding to the 

Recent Homicide Rise in the United 

States 

Documenting the Increase 

According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, 15,696 criminal 

homicides took place in the United States in 2015 — 1,532 more than during the previous 

year.1 The homicide rate rose from 4.4 to 4.9 homicides per 100,000 population from 2014 to 

2015, an 11.4-percent increase and the largest one-year percentage rise in the U.S. homicide 

rate since 1968 (see Figure 1). In cities with 250,000 or more residents, the focus of the 

current report,2 homicides rose by 15.2 percent between 2014 and 2015 (see Appendix). By 

any reasonable standard, these are noteworthy increases, especially because they involve the 

most serious and reliably measured criminal offense. 

Homicide continued to increase in 2016. The nationwide homicide rate rose to 5.3 

homicides per 100,000 population, an increase of 8.2 percent over 2015. The number 

of homicides in the big cities increased by 10.8 percent between 2015 and 2016 (see 

Appendix).3 

The Big Cities 

Most, but not all, large cities experienced homicide increases in 2015 and 2016, and some 

cities experienced sizable declines. Figures 2 and 3 display the percentage change in 

homicides in cities with more than 250,000 residents during those years. In order to avoid 

1. The nationwide and city homicide data presented in this report are from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports 

(https://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-publications). 

2. Hereafter, we refer to these cities as “big” or “large” cities. 

3. The 10.8-percent increase includes the 49 deaths from the mass shooting at an Orlando, Florida, night club 

in June 2016 (http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/). Excluding those killings, 

homicides in the big cities would have risen by 10.0 percent in 2016. 

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Figure 1. Year Over Year Percentage Changes in U.S. Homicide Rate, 1961-2015 

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

misleading percentage changes based on 

small homicide counts, only cities with at 

least 30 homicides in 2014 are shown. 

Homicides rose by 17.2 percent on average 

in 2015 in large cities with appreciable 

(more than 30) homicide counts. The 

increase was more than 25 percent in 14 

cities and more than 50 percent in nine 

cities. The following year, homicides 

increased by 12.1 percent on average in 

these cities. Twelve cities saw increases of 

more than 25 percent in 2016, while just 

four cities experienced increases exceeding 

50 percent. Not only did the big-city 

homicide rise decrease somewhat over 

the two years, different cities led the way 

each year. Cleveland, Nashville, Denver, 

Baltimore, and Oklahoma City had the 

five largest percentage increases in 2015. 

Austin, Chicago, San Antonio, San Jose, 

and Louisville topped the list in 2016. We 

should expect some “mean reversion” in 

cities that experience large changes in 

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Source: UCR 

homicide (i.e., large increases in one year 

followed by smaller increases or reductions 

the next year, and vice versa). But if large 

increases in homicide are time-limited, it 

may also suggest that the factors driving the 

increases are themselves relatively shortlived. We consider that possibility below. 

Figure 4 summarizes the percentage change 

in homicides in large cities during 2015 

and 2016. The figure displays a scatterplot 

in which each dot represents a city’s 

percentage change in homicide in 2015 (the 

vertical axis) and 2016 (the horizontal axis). 

As an example, the number of homicides 

in Omaha rose by 50 percent between 2014 

and 2015 and then dropped by 40 percent 

between 2015 and 2016. The cities shown 

are again limited to those with at least 30 

homicides in 2014. 

Only two cities, Miami and Tucson, 

experienced a decrease in homicide in both 

years. Homicide increases in two cities, 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 2 
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Figure 2. Percentage Changes in Homicide Between 2014 and 

2015 in Large Cities With 30 or More Homicides in 2014 (N = 46) 

Mean = 17.2% 

32 Cities Up 

14 > 25%

 9 > 50% 

14 Down or Flat 

Buffalo 

Boston 

Austin 

Tucson 

Pittsburgh 

Fresno 

San Antonio 

Miami 

Columbus 

San Jose 

Memphis 

Phoenix 

Detroit 

Stockton 

Jacksonville 

Atlanta 

Las Vegas 

New York 

Oakland 

Los Angeles 

Indianapolis 

New Orleans 

Cincinnati 

Newark 

Philadelphia 

San Diego 

Chicago 

Dallas 

San Francisco 

St. Louis 

Fort Worth 

Tulsa 

Houston 

Charlotte 

Kansas City 

Albuquerque 

Louisville 

Omaha 

Minneapolis 

Washington 

Milwaukee 

Oklahoma City 

Baltimore 

Denver 

Nashville 

Cleveland 

-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 

Source: UCR 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 3 
 

 =

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Figure 3. Percentage Changes in Homicide Between 2015 and 

2016 in Large Cities With 30 or More Homicides in 2014 (N = 46) 

Mean = 12.1% 

27 Cities Up

 12 > 25%

 4 > 50% 

19 Down or Flat 

Omaha 

Miami 

Minneapolis 

Washington 

Cincinnati 

Baltimore 

New York 

Newark 

Oklahoma City 

Tucson 

Milwaukee 

Philadelphia 

Houston 

Pittsburgh 

Fresno 

Stockton 

Oakland 

Indianapolis 

St. Louis 

Detroit 

Los Angeles 

New Orleans 

Buffalo 

San Francisco 

Denver 

Jacksonville 

Charlotte 

Nashville 

Cleveland 

Fort Worth 

Atlanta 

Columbus 

Kansas City 

Las Vegas 

Dallas 

Boston 

Phoenix 

Tulsa 

San Diego 

Albuquerque 

Memphis 

Louisville 

San Jose 

San Antonio 

Chicago 

Austin 

-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 

Source: UCR 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 4 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot of Percentage Changes in 

Homicide in Large Cities, 2015 2016 (N = 46) 

Omaha 

-60 -40 -20 0 

20 

40 

60 

80 

-40

-20

0 

20 

40 

2016 

2015 

60 

80 

100 

Miami 

Tucson 

Austin 

Chicago 

Louisville 

Source: UCR 

Albuquerque and Louisville, exceeded 40 

percent during both years, but most of the 

cities that registered very large homicide 

increases in 2015 (e.g., Cleveland, Nashville, 

Denver, Baltimore) experienced decreases 

or far smaller increases the following 

year. After increasing at about the average 

rate for the sample in 2015, Chicago’s 

homicide count grew by 60 percent in 2016. 

Widespread media attention and pointed 

political commentary made Chicago the 

poster child of the big-city homicide rise 

(Ford 2017; Fox 2017). 

The Big Contributors 

Another way to assess the homicide rise 

in 2015 and 2016 is to focus on the places 

that made the greatest contribution to the 

total homicide increase in big cities during 

each year. This approach directs attention 

to those cities with the greatest number 

of homicides in addition to those with the 

largest proportionate increases in homicide. 

Tables 1 and 2 list the largest contributors 

to the overall increase in homicide in 

large cities. Just two cities, Baltimore and 

Chicago, accounted for about one-quarter 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 5 
 

 

 

 

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Table 1. Cities With Largest Absolute Homicide Increases in 2015 

City Increase 

Cumulative 

Increase 

Cumulative 

% Increase 

Baltimore 133 133 16.2% 

Chicago 67 200 24.4% 

Houston 61 261 31.9% 

Cleveland 57 318 38.8% 

Washington 57 375 45.8% 

Milwaukee 55 430 52.5% 

Philadelphia 32 462 56.4% 

Nashville 31 493 60.2% 

Kansas City 31 524 64.0% 

St. Louis 29 553 67.5% 

Source: UCR 

Table 2. Cities With Largest Absolute Homicide Increases in 2016 

City Increase 

Cumulative 

Increase 

Cumulative 

% Increase 

Chicago 287 287 46.0% 

Memphis 61 348 55.8% 

San Antonio 55 403 64.6% 

Louisville 38 441 70.7% 

Dallas 35 476 76.3% 

Phoenix 34 510 81.7% 

Las Vegas 31 541 86.7% 

Kansas City 20 561 89.9% 

Albuquerque 18 579 92.8% 

Tulsa 17 596 95.5% 

Source: UCR 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 6 
 

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of the total increase in homicide in large 

cities in 2015. Ten cities accounted for twothirds of the 2015 big-city homicide rise 

that year. Chicago contributed just under 

half of the big-city homicide increase in 

2016, and 10 cities accounted for nearly all 

of the increase in 2015.4 

Is the Crime Drop Over? 

If not wholly unprecedented, the recent 

homicide increase in the United States 

was relatively large, especially in several of 

the nation’s big cities. Because it arrived 

on the heels of a long-term crime drop, it 

is reasonable to ask whether the homicide 

rise erased what has been termed “the great 

American crime decline” since the early 

1990s (Zimring 2007). As shown in Figure 

5, the answer is clearly no, or at least not 

yet. The national homicide rate was 35.4 

percent lower in 2016 than in 1995 and the 

homicide rate in big cities was 45.7 percent 

lower. Even at the elevated rates of increase 

in 2015 and 2016, it would take about five 

more years for the U.S. national and bigcity homicide rates to return to the levels 

of the early 1990s. Despite the recent rise 

in homicide rates not erasing the national 

decline, the abrupt increase in homicide 

rates over the past two years is a cause for 

concern. 

Race and Ethnicity 

A final and significant question about the 

homicide rise, especially for explanatory 

purposes, is how widespread it was across 

different population groups. Knowing 

the demographic composition of crime 

victims and offenders is essential for 

evaluating the cogency and relevance of 

explanations of changes in crime rates 

over time. For example, explanations 

Figure 5. Homicides per 100,000 Population, 1995-2016 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

Source: UCR 

4. Orlando is omitted from the data for 2016.

Big Cities

 (-45.7%) 

National

 (-35.4%) 

1995 2000 2005 2010 2016 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 7 
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that attribute the recent homicide rise to 

tensions between the police and AfricanAmerican communities, or to less vigorous 

police enforcement in those communities, 

imply that the increase in homicide should 

be limited primarily to African-Americans 

(e.g., Mac Donald 2016). Data are available 

from the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention’s (CDC’s) National Vital 

Statistics System (NVSS) and the FBI’s 

Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) to 

evaluate this presumption. 

Figure 6 displays the yearly percentage 

change in rates of homicide victimization 

by race and ethnicity from 2010 through 

2015.5

 After falling slightly for a few 

years, the non-Hispanic black homicide 

victimization rate rose 15.3 percent between 

2014 and 2015. But non-Hispanic white 

and Hispanic victimization rates also rose 

at the same time, and those increases 

were comparatively large. For example, 

the growth in the non-Hispanic white 

victimization rate was greater than in any 

year since the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attack. Moreover, the increase among whites 

was not limited to homicide victimization. 

As shown in Figure 7, the number of white 

homicide offenders also increased between 

2014 and 2015.6

 The rise in homicide 

victimization and offending among AfricanAmericans is consistent with the narrative 

of increased tension between the police 

and African-American communities. The 

increase in other groups, especially nonHispanic whites, fits less easily with that 

explanation and suggests that other factors 

may be implicated in the homicide rise. 

Figure 6. Year Over Year Percentage Changes in 

Homicide Victims by Race and Ethnicity, 2011-2015 

Black 

(+15.3%) 

White 

(+8.2%) 

Hispanic 

(+9.2%) 

-10

-5

0 

5 

10 

15 

20 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

Source: NVSS 

5. The figure is based on NVSS data accessed through the Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting

System (WISQARS). The NVSS data and the remaining data presented in this report are limited to 2015, the most

recent year of data available for the analyses shown.

6. Figure 7 is based on SHR “known offender” data from the FBI. In 2015, 31.2 percent of offenders in the SHR

data were of unknown race.

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Figure 7. Year Over Year Percentage Changes in 

Known Homicide Offenders by Race, 2011-2015 

10 

8 

6 

4 

2 

0 

-2

-4

-6

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

Source: SHR 

Black 

(+8.6%) 

White 

(+6.2%) 

Explaining The Increase 

The recent homicide increase in the 

United States was not only large, it was 

also relatively sudden and unforeseen. The 

sheer abruptness of the increase makes 

it especially difficult to explain. We do 

not offer a definitive explanation of the 

homicide rise. Instead, we assess a few of 

the leading explanations with available 

data and identify what we consider to be 

productive directions for future research. 

We begin by setting forth some general 

guidelines for assessing explanations 

of change over time in crime rates (see 

Baumer, Vélez, and Rosenfeld forthcoming, 

and Rosenfeld and Weisburd 2016 for 

related discussions). 

Some changes in crime rates over time are 

relatively slow and continuous. Explanations 

of such changes typically direct attention 

to causal factors that are themselves subject 

to gradual movement over time. Examples 

include crime rate changes associated with 

temporal variation in the age composition 

of a population or, except during severe 

recessions, in economic conditions such as 

inflation and unemployment (Raphael and 

Winter-Ebmer 2001; Rosenfeld and Levin 

2016). 

Other changes in crime rates are very 

rapid and discontinuous; they often seem 

to appear “out of nowhere.” These sudden 

and unexpected fluctuations in crime rates 

are usually associated with “exogenous 

shocks” to the community and policy 

conditions that otherwise keep crime 

rates within a relatively narrow range of 

variation over time.7

 A good example is the 

abrupt increase in youth firearm violence 

associated with the crack cocaine epidemic 

of the late 1980s (Blumstein and Wallman 

2006). Another, we suggest, is the recent 

upsurge in U.S. homicide rates. 

7. In economics, an exogenous shock is an unexpected or unpredictable external event or condition that affects

the economy (see, e.g., Black, Hashimzade, and Myles 2009).

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 9 
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Thus, an immediate analytical task when 

seeking to explain sudden increases in 

crime is to identify the corresponding 

exogenous shocks. Two plausible candidates 

for explaining the recent homicide rise are 

the heroin and synthetic opioid epidemic 

and widely publicized incidents of the 

use of force by the police against AfricanAmericans, and ensuing protests and civil 

unrest in many cities. Both have precedents 

in contemporary American history. The 

crack cocaine epidemic, as noted, sparked 

a rise in youth violence three decades ago. 

Allegations of police brutality and violent 

confrontations between police and AfricanAmericans precipitated widespread civil 

unrest in American cities during the 1960s 

(National Advisory Commission on Civil 

Disorders 1968; National Commission on 

the Causes and Prevention of Violence 

1969). Some analysts attribute the steep 

crime rise beginning in the mid-1960s to 

a crisis of institutional legitimacy brought 

on, in part, by conflict over the civil rights 

movement and urban unrest (LaFree 1998; 

Roth 2009). 

We regard illicit drug markets and social 

unrest as possible “proximate causes” 

(Roth 2009) of the homicide rise that act in 

tandem or interact with other factors that 

underlie the gradual movement of crime 

over time (Rosenfeld 2011). Some of these 

comparatively slow-moving factors may 

actually serve to limit the crime increases 

that might otherwise take place in response 

to the more immediate crime triggers. 

An emphasis on the role of precipitating 

conditions, therefore, does not imply that 

other contributors to crime rate changes 

are unimportant. On the contrary, as 

discussed below, future research should 

focus on the extent to which the effects 

on the homicide rise of crime triggers, 

such as expanding drug markets and 

police-community tensions, are conditioned 

by the economic and social characteristics 

of local communities, which influence 

crime rates over the long run. 

Expanding Drug Markets 

Like any commodity market, legal or 

otherwise, the market for illicit drugs 

is governed by the dynamics of supply 

and demand. Growing demand for illicit 

drugs attracts more sellers into the 

market. Disputes inevitably arise between 

sellers over customers and territory and 

between buyers and sellers over price, 

purity, quantity, and other terms of trade. 

Because these conflicts cannot be taken 

to the police, courts, or other legitimate 

authorities for settlement, they sometimes 

end in violence (Goldstein 1985; Reuter 

2009). The demand for heroin and 

synthetic opioids has grown enormously in 

recent years (Rosenfeld 2016). The question 

is whether the demand has contributed to 

the U.S. homicide increase by intensifying 

illicit drug market activity. In short, have 

more buyers led to more sellers and more 

drug market violence? 

Arrests for drug law violations are one 

indicator of illicit drug market activity. 

The total number of drug arrests in the 

United States has declined somewhat in 

recent years. In contrast to the crack era, 

policymakers and law enforcement officials 

alike have viewed the heroin and synthetic 

opioid epidemic as more of a public health 

than a criminal justice problem (Cohen 

2015). Arrests for sale or possession of 

heroin or cocaine fell by 9.2 percent, from 

370,379 to 336,234, between 2010 and 2013, 

even as heroin use rates were rising ( Jones 

et al. 2015).8

 Arrests then rose by 12.5 

percent, to 378,132, in 2015. The timing of 

the increase coincides with the 2014-2015 

homicide rise (see Figure 8). 

8. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports combine heroin and cocaine in a single drug arrest indicator. National 

survey data show no increase in cocaine use in the United States (https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/ 

drugfacts/nationwide-trends). Therefore, we can be reasonably certain that the recent increase in heroin and 

cocaine arrests primarily reflects the growth in demand for heroin. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 10 
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Figure 8. Drug Arrests in the United States, 2010-2015 

1,800,000 

1,600,000 

1,400,000 

1,200,000 

1,000,000 

800,000 

600,000 

400,000 

200,000 

0 

Source: UCR 

A speculative but plausible reason for the 

increased police attention to heroin in 

recent years is growing violence in and 

around illicit drug markets. The FBI’s SHR 

code the circumstances (when known) of 

homicide incidents, including whether 

the homicide was associated with the 

violation of “narcotic drug laws.” Figure 

9 shows the yearly percentage change 

in drug-related homicides, other felonyrelated homicides (e.g., those connected 

to robberies or burglaries), and nonfelonyrelated homicides from 2011 to 2015. After 

dropping, albeit at a diminishing rate, drugrelated homicides increased by 21.2 percent 

between 2014 and 2015. By contrast, other 

felony homicides increased by 4.7 percent 

and nonfelony homicides grew by just 3.2 

percent during the same period. 

We can use the SHR data to roughly gauge 

the contribution of drug-related homicides 

to the overall homicide increase between 

2014 and 2015. There were a total of 8,089 

homicides with known circumstances in 

Total Drug Arrests 

Percent of Heroin-Cocaine Arrests 

Heroin-Cocaine Arrests 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

26.0% 

25.5% 

25.0% 

24.5% 

24.0% 

23.5% 

23.0% 

22.5% 

22.0% 

21.5% 

21.0% 

20.5% 

2015 and 7,717 in 2014, an increase of 372 

incidents. The number of drug-related 

homicides went up by 82, from 386 in 2014 

to 468 in 2015. Therefore, the increase in 

drug-related homicides accounted for 22 

percent of the total increase ((82/372) x 

100). 

It is important not to overstate the precision 

of these figures. Like all UCR crime data, 

they are based on the classification of 

homicide events by local law enforcement 

agencies, and crime classification criteria 

and procedures can differ across agencies 

or within the same agency over time. Even 

more importantly, the SHR data displayed 

in Figure 9 omit homicides with unknown 

circumstances. The circumstances of fully 

39.9 percent of homicides were unknown 

to law enforcement officials in 2015. Drugrelated homicides are less likely than those 

unrelated to illicit drugs to be cleared with 

an arrest of one or more suspects, reducing 

the chances that the circumstances of 

the homicide will become known to law 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 11 
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Figure 9. Year Over Year Percentage Changes 

in Homicide Circumstances, 2011-2015 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

-5

-10

-15

-20

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

Source: SHR 

Drug 

(+21.2%) 

Other Felony 

(+4.7%) 

Nonfelony 

(+3.2%) 

enforcement (Wellford and Cronin 1999). 

Consequently, the contribution of drugrelated homicides to the recent homicide 

increase is likely to be greater than the 

estimate above, based only on homicides 

with known circumstances. 

A final reason the heroin and synthetic 

opioid epidemic merits attention is that 

it may help to explain the increase in 

homicide among non-Hispanic whites. A 

key indicator of the extent of drug abuse 

in a population is the fatality rate from 

drug overdose. In 2015, the heroin-related 

overdose death rate was 74 percent higher 

among non-Hispanic whites than among 

non-Hispanic blacks and 135 percent higher 

than among Hispanics. The corresponding 

racial and ethnic differences in overdose 

fatality rates for synthetic opioids were 

even larger (Rudd et al. 2016). Given the 

disproportionate concentration of the 

drug epidemic in the non-Hispanic white 

population, it would not be surprising 

if increased drug market violence were 

pushing up white homicide rates. 

Commentators have devoted less 

attention to drug-market expansion as an 

explanation of the homicide rise than to 

one or another version of the Ferguson 

effect (but see Kennedy and Abt 2016). 

The sheer magnitude of the nation’s 

heroin and synthetic opioid epidemic, the 

growth in drug-related homicides, and the 

unheralded increase in homicides among 

whites should prompt greater research 

interest in expanding drug markets as an 

explanation for the U.S. homicide rise. 

Ferguson Effects 

The dominant narrative surrounding the 

recent homicide rise attributes increased 

crime to de-policing. Dubbed the 

Ferguson effect, the basic idea is that, in 

the aftermath of controversial and heavily 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 12 
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publicized incidents of police use of force 

against minorities, particularly AfricanAmericans, the police have pulled back 

from proactive enforcement strategies that 

can reduce crime, including making arrests 

and stopping and questioning suspicious 

people on the street. Police officers are 

worried about increased legal liability 

or having their identities disclosed on 

social media, according to this argument, 

and so avoid taking actions that would 

expose them to criticism during a time of 

heightened police-community tension and 

social unrest. Less policing, in turn, leads to 

more crime (Mac Donald 2016). 

Rosenfeld (2016) proposed another, 

less prominent version of the Ferguson 

effect. This account redirects attention 

from de-policing to the alienation of 

disadvantaged minority communities from 

the police as a likely source of the homicide 

rise. In this scenario, a police “legitimacy 

crisis,” activated by controversial incidents 

of police use of force against minorities, 

has reduced reliance on the police for 

protection and increased “self-help” (Black 

1983) in communities already experiencing 

elevated levels of violent crime. In essence, 

this version of the Ferguson effect 

attributes homicide increases not to police 

disengagement from certain communities 

but to community disengagement from the 

police. 

As Rosenfeld (2016) pointed out, 

one advantage of the Ferguson effect 

explanation of the homicide rise, in either 

version, is its consistency with the timing 

of the increase. After dropping for two 

decades, U.S. homicide rates began to 

increase in the immediate aftermath of the 

killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson in the 

summer of 2014, the killing of 12-year-old 

Tamir Rice by a police officer in Cleveland, 

the death of Freddie Gray while being 

transported in a police van in Baltimore, 

and other controversial deadly encounters 

between the police and African-Americans 

in late 2014 and 2015 (Cleveland Plain 

Dealer 2014; Knezevich and Anderson 2015; 

New York Times 2015). But good timing is 

not sufficient evidence to confirm either 

version of the Ferguson effect. We need 

evidence of changes in police behavior, 

community behavior, or both, before we can 

conclude that de-policing or community 

alienation contributed to the homicide 

rise. We begin by examining some available 

indicators of police behavior for evidence 

related to the claim that changes in policing 

contributed to increases in homicide. 

Community Unrest and 

De-Policing 

One way to find out if the police changed 

their behavior in response to Ferguson and 

related incidents is to ask them. In 2016, the 

PEW Research Center conducted a national 

survey of nearly 8,000 police officers from 

departments with 100 or more officers 

(Morin et al. 2017). PEW asked the officers 

how members of their department had 

reacted to the recent high-profile use-offorce incidents involving the police and 

African-Americans. Selected survey results 

are presented in Figure 10. 

More than 90 percent of the officers in the 

PEW survey said that recent encounters 

between the police and African-Americans 

had made officers in their department 

more concerned about their safety. Threequarters of the officers reported that their 

colleagues were more reluctant to use 

force when appropriate and that tensions 

had increased between the police and 

African-Americans. More than 70 percent 

said officers were less willing to stop 

and question suspicious persons. Taken 

at face value, these survey results are 

consistent with the argument that police 

behavior has changed in response to widely 

publicized use-of-force incidents involving 

African-Americans. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 13 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Figure 10. Percentage of Police Officers Saying 

Each Has Happened in Their Department 

93% 

76% 

72% 

75% 

0 20 40 60 80 100 

High-profle incidents involving 

police and blacks have made: 

Offcers more concerned 

about their safety 

Offcers more reluctant to 

use force when appropriate 

Interactions between police 

and blacks more tense 

Offcers less willing to stop and 

question suspicious people 

Source: Morin et al. (2017) 

Survey data on police perceptions are a 

useful but incomplete indicator of police 

behavior. The officers in the PEW survey 

were asked to report on the behavior of 

other officers in their department. It is not 

known whether they would have responded 

similarly if they had been asked about their 

own behavior. In addition, if the survey had 

been conducted before the recent series of 

high-profile use-of-force incidents, sizable 

proportions of police officers may well have 

reported comparable concerns about safety, 

police-community tensions, and reduced 

enforcement — these are not new issues 

in American policing. In other words, the 

absence of a pre-Ferguson baseline makes it 

difficult to evaluate post-Ferguson changes 

in police perceptions. The most important 

shortcoming of data on perceptions for 

evidence about behavior, however, is that 

they may be subject to distortions, biases, 

faulty information, and other limitations 

that make them unreliable behavioral 

indicators. It is important, therefore, to 

supplement the survey data with direct 

measures of police enforcement activity. 

Apprehending and arresting suspects 

are enforcement actions that can reduce 

crime by taking active offenders off the 

street and by signaling to others that 

criminal behavior will be punished. By the 

same logic, decreases in arrests may spur 

increases in crime. Arrests fell in Baltimore 

in 2015 after the Freddie Gray incident, and 

in Chicago in 2016 after the delayed release 

of a video of a controversial police shooting 

there (Morgan and Pally 2016; University of 

Chicago Crime Lab 2017). The reduction 

in arrests was followed by an increase in 

homicide in both cities. It remains to be 

seen whether comparable decreases in 

arrests preceded increases in homicide 

elsewhere. Here we present available UCR 

data on trends in arrest rates in large cities. 

All else being equal, the police will make 

fewer arrests as crime rates decrease and 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 14 
-

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Figure 11. Violent Crimes and Arrests for Violent Crimes 

per 100,000 Residents of Large Cities, 2010-2015 

900 

800 

700 

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

0 

Source: UCR 

more arrests as crime rates increase. As 

a result, criminologists use the ratio of 

arrests to offenses as an indicator of change 

in police enforcement activity over time. 

Figure 11 displays the violent crime rate 

and the arrest rate for violent crimes in 

large cities between 2010 and 2015.9 It also 

shows the arrest-offense ratio for violent 

crimes (arrests for violent offenses/violent 

offenses) in large cities during the same 

period. The arrest-offense ratio for violent 

crimes dropped, albeit modestly, between 

2014 and 2015 when homicides were 

increasing in large U.S. cities. But the ratio 

was shrinking as far back as 2011, several 

years before Ferguson, when homicide rates 

were declining. That complicates the claim 

that the recent homicide rise resulted from 

diminished police enforcement, at least as 

reflected in aggregate arrests for violent 

crime. 

A related enforcement indicator is 

the arrest clearance rate, which is the 

Violent Crime Rate 

Arrest-Offense Ratio 

Violent Crime Arrest Rate 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

0.37 

0.36 

0.35 

0.34 

0.33 

0.32 

0.31 

proportion of crimes that result in an 

arrest of one or more suspects. Some 

observers attribute high levels of violence 

in disadvantaged minority communities 

to low clearance rates for violent crimes 

(e.g., Leovy 2015). Figure 12 displays 

recent trends in the arrest clearance rate 

for homicide and aggravated assaults 

committed with a firearm in large cities. 

The arrest clearance rate for homicide 

hovered around 60 percent between 2010 

and 2015, declining somewhat both before 

and after the Ferguson incident in 2014. 

The clearance rate for firearm assaults 

was fairly flat before falling from about 34 

percent in 2013 to 29 percent in 2015. The 

latter decrease coincided with the homicide 

rise. 

Most arrests are for relatively minor 

offenses. The order-maintenance or 

“broken windows” movement in policing 

is based on the assumption that arrests 

for minor crimes can lead to reductions 

9. UCR violent crimes include murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 15 
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National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Figure 12. Percentage of Homicides and Firearm Assaults 

Cleared by Arrest in Large Cities, 2010-2015 

65 

60 

55 

50 

45 

40 

35 

30 

25 

Source: UCR 

in more serious crimes (Kelling and Coles 

1996; Kelling and Wilson 1982). Figure 

13 shows that arrest rates for three minor 

offenses (simple assaults, disorderly 

conduct, and weapons offenses) fell in 

large cities between 2010 and 2015. As with 

the indicators of arrest for more serious 

offenses, these reductions occurred during 

the period when homicides were decreasing 

as well as when they increased in 2015. 

If the drop in arrests for minor offenses 

caused homicides to increase in 2015, why 

did it not have the same effect during the 

preceding four years? 

In summary, the UCR arrest data for 

large cities provide ambiguous support, 

at best, for the de-policing version of the 

Ferguson effect. Arrests for both serious 

and minor offenses decreased in 2015 when 

homicides were increasing, but they also fell 

several years earlier, when homicides were 

decreasing. What explains the several-year 

lag between the enforcement changes and 

the homicide rise? It is possible that the 

timing of changes in other enforcement 

indicators, such as pedestrian or vehicle 

Homicide Clearance Rate 

Firearm Assault Clearance Rate 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

stops, is more consistent with a Ferguson 

effect. Moreover, data for cities other than 

Chicago and Baltimore may yield a different 

picture than the aggregate data currently 

available on the relationship between police 

enforcement and homicide. A reasonable 

conclusion from the available data, however, 

is that the case for linking the homicide rise 

to de-policing remains open. 

We now turn to the other version of the 

Ferguson effect, which redirects emphasis 

from changes in police behavior to changes 

in community behavior regarding the 

police. This explanation of the homicide 

rise is not as well known, although it is 

informed by a sizable body of theory 

and research in the social sciences on 

the relationship between crime and 

institutional legitimacy. We first summarize 

the relevant literature and, as we did with 

the de-policing explanation, draw on 

available data in a preliminary assessment 

of whether growing community alienation 

and declining police legitimacy contributed 

to the recent homicide rise. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 16 
-

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Figure 13. Arrests per 100,000 Residents 

of Large Cities by Offense Type, 2010-2015 

500 

450 

400 

350 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

Source: UCR 

Crime and Police Legitimacy 

A long tradition of theory and research 

suggests that the recent homicide rise may 

be attributable to compromised police 

legitimacy. This body of scholarship has 

identified legitimate authority as central 

to inducing voluntary compliance and 

cooperation from followers in a variety of 

social settings (Beetham 2013; Milgram 

1974; Tyler 1990; Weber 1968[1922]). In 

recent years, scholars have drawn from this 

rich tradition to study the legitimacy of 

the police and its influence on a range of 

outcomes, including crime. 

Police legitimacy is the belief among 

citizens that officers deserve deference, 

should be obeyed, have the right to 

constrain their behaviors, and are honest 

and trustworthy (Hurd 1999; Kelman 

and Hamilton 1989; Tyler 1990; Tyler and 

Jackson 2014). When people view the police 

Simple Assaults 

Disorderly Conduct 

Weapons 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

as legitimate, they voluntarily obey legal 

rules and defer to police authority (Tyler 

and Huo 2002). Perceptions of police 

legitimacy stem from citizens’ direct and 

vicarious experiences with the police. 

Those experiences, in turn, become the 

basis for the belief that officers either do 

or do not behave in accordance with the 

tenets of procedural justice. Procedural 

justice encompasses a set of expectations 

regarding how the police should treat 

people. Citizens expect the police to value 

them and their concerns, treat them with 

dignity and respect, uphold their rights, 

and use fair and unbiased procedures in 

their enforcement practices (Tyler 1990). 

Procedural justice is a key antecedent to 

police legitimacy (Tyler and Jackson 2014; 

Tyler, Fagan, and Geller 2014; Wolfe et al. 

2016). 

Police legitimacy is crucial to maintaining 

social order and controlling crime in 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 17 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

democratic societies. Sir Robert Peel, 

founder of the London police in 1829, 

understood this well, as his principles 

underscored the need for police to gain 

the public’s approval and respect in order 

to garner their voluntary cooperation and 

obedience to the law in return (Mayhall 

1985). Modern researchers concur: “When 

legal authority is legitimate, people 

more broadly help to co-police their 

communities. They report crime and 

identify criminals. They also are more 

willing to act as witnesses and jurors. 

They go to neighborhood meetings and 

participate in neighborhood watch. All of 

these behaviors help the police to do their 

jobs” (Tyler, Goff, and MacCoun 2015: 83). 

Some studies have found police legitimacy 

to be a stronger crime inhibitor than 

deterrence, the threat of punishment 

(Tyler, Goff, and MacCoun 2015). It follows 

that perceptions of police illegitimacy 

may weaken the normative basis on which 

compliance and cooperation are attained 

(Reisig and Lloyd 2009; Tankebe 2009; 

Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq 2010). Research 

has shown that people who view the law 

and legal authorities as illegitimate are less 

inclined to obey traffic laws, drug laws, and 

regulations against buying illegal items 

(Fagan and Piquero 2007; Gottfredson et al. 

2007; Jackson et al. 2012; Reisig, Tankebe, 

and Mesko 2014). Some studies have linked 

compromised legitimacy to serious law 

violations, including violent crime (Kane 

2005; Lafree 1998; Papachristos, Meares, 

and Fagan 2012; Roth 2009). 

In addition to directly influencing criminal 

behavior, police illegitimacy inhibits a 

range of public actions that help the police 

fight crime. People who distrust the police 

would rather avoid contact with them. 

They are less inclined to report a crime, 

cooperate with the police in neighborhood 

problem-solving tasks, identify criminals, 

act as witnesses, or participate in lineups 

and trials (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 

and Fagan 2008). Finally, people who 

distrust the police are less likely to call 

them when they have conflicts with others 

and are more willing to resolve disputes on 

their own by means of “private vengeance” 

(Tyler, Goff, and MacCoun 2015; see also 

Anderson 1999 and Kubrin and Weitzer 

2003). To the extent that distrust of the 

police is pervasive in a community, violent 

crime rates can increase (Leovy 2015). 

Recent research also suggests that police 

illegitimacy erodes collective efficacy, 

the form of social cohesion that enables 

communities to self-regulate against 

violent crime. Where collective efficacy 

is strong, neighborhood residents abide 

by shared prosocial norms, participate 

in neighborhood organizations, share 

information about the neighborhood 

with one another, and “intervene on 

behalf of the common good” (Sampson, 

Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). People who 

view the police as unjust and illegitimate 

are prone to disengage from their 

communities. As a result, they are less likely 

to exert the kinds of informal social control 

that reduce crime, such as monitoring 

youth, questioning strangers, reporting 

suspicious activities, and participating in 

neighborhood watch activities (Kochel 

2012). 

However, there is reason to believe that the 

criminogenic effect of police illegitimacy 

is not universal and varies across 

geographic areas. Places characterized 

by high levels of structural disadvantage 

may be especially susceptible to the 

effect of compromised police legitimacy 

on violent crime. Kane (2005) found 

that indicators of compromised police 

legitimacy (police misconduct and both 

over- and underpolicing) led to increases in 

violent crime rates in highly disadvantaged 

New York City neighborhoods, but not 

in communities with less disadvantage. 

Similarly, a recent investigation of whether 

a Ferguson effect spurred crime increases 

in large cities found little evidence of an 

overall effect but found some indication of 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 18 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

homicide increases in cities with high levels 

of structural disadvantage (Pyrooz et al. 

2016). 

In summary, police legitimacy is 

undermined when people believe officers 

treat citizens disrespectfully, demonstrate 

a disregard for their humanity or rights, or 

engage in discriminatory or biased policing. 

Recent controversial incidents of police use 

of lethal force against African-Americans 

may have ignited a longstanding “reservoir 

of discontent,” reduced reliance on and 

cooperation with the police, and spurred 

homicide increases in some AfricanAmerican communities (Rosenfeld 2016). 

Like the version of the Ferguson effect that 

attributes the homicide rise to de-policing, 

the variant focusing on a police legitimacy 

crisis has not been subjected to rigorous 

empirical evaluation. We discuss some 

preliminary evidence below and conclude 

with recommendations for future research 

on the homicide rise. 

Reservoir of Discontent 

African-Americans have registered more 

negative views of the police than have 

whites since national surveys of attitudes 

toward the police began a half century ago 

(Weitzer 1999). That is hardly surprising 

in light of the police role in the history of 

racial oppression in the United States — 

from the slave patrols to the indifference of 

the police to, or their active participation 

in, lynchings of black citizens by white 

mobs during Reconstruction and Jim 

Crow, and their enforcement of racially 

discriminatory segregation laws and 

practices until well into the 1960s (Walker 

1997; Websdale 2001). Unlike attitudes of 

whites, those of African-Americans toward 

the police generally, and their views of 

recent police killings in particular, have 

been shaped by a long history of racial 

subjugation and harassment that the term 

“procedural injustice” does not adequately 

capture. “Against this backdrop,” Desmond, 

Papachristos, and Kirk (2016: 872) have 

written, “a violent episode carried out by 

the police is registered as proof and product 

of a violent heritage, rendering victim and 

perpetrator actors in a larger historical 

drama.” 

Figure 14 displays the percentages of black 

and white Americans who had a favorable 

view of their local police in 1970 and 2016. 

Despite the 46 years separating them, 

the two national surveys yielded nearly 

identical responses. In both, roughly 60 

percent of blacks and 30 percent of whites 

held unfavorable views of their local police, 

and both surveys were conducted in the 

aftermath of significant racial unrest 

triggered by confrontations between blacks 

and police officers. Research shows that 

confidence in the police generally erodes 

after controversial policing incidents 

are heavily publicized (Kaminski and 

Jefferis 1998; Lasley 1994; Weitzer 2002). 

Nonetheless, a sizable and remarkably stable 

racial gap in attitudes toward the police has 

existed for as long as such attitudes have 

been systematically measured (Newport 

2016a). The question is how the generally 

negative views of the police held by AfricanAmericans might have contributed to the 

increase in homicides after Ferguson. 

Recent research indicates that views of 

the police among both blacks and whites 

became even more negative after the widely 

publicized killings by police in Ferguson, 

Staten Island, Cleveland, and elsewhere in 

2014 and 2015. That was true at the national 

level ( Jones 2015) and in the St. Louis area 

surrounding Ferguson (Kochel 2015a). 

Within about a year, both national and 

local confidence in the police returned to 

pre-Ferguson levels (Kochel 2015b; Newport 

2016b). Prior research has found that 

public perceptions of the police rebound to 

pre-incident levels within three years after 

a controversial policing incident (Weitzer 

2002). These results suggest that crime 

increases tied to shifts in police legitimacy 

may be temporary. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 19 
 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Figure 14. Percentage of Americans With Favorable 

View of Local Police by Race, 1970 and 2016 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

■

Source: Elkins (2016); Hindelang (1974) 

Much speculation, but little empirical 

research, exists regarding the mechanisms 

linking police legitimacy, as reflected in 

public attitudes and perceptions, to crime 

rates. One study found a relationship 

between Google searches for phrases 

related to police violence (e.g., Black Lives 

Matter, police shootings, police brutality) 

and increases in monthly violent and 

homicide rates in U.S. cities between July 

2014 and June 2016 (Gross and Mann 2017). 

Although this is the first study to document 

variation across cities in public concern 

with police use of force after Ferguson, it 

does not specify how that concern provoked 

increased violence. Some evidence has 

begun to emerge, however, connecting 

controversial incidents of police use of 

force and the public’s reliance on and 

cooperation with the police. 

Desmond et al. (2016) found that calls 

for police service dropped significantly 

White 

67% 

43% 

68% 

40% 

1970 2016

■ Black 

after the police beat and badly injured 

an unarmed black man in Milwaukee; 

the decline was especially large in 

predominantly black neighborhoods. 

Their study also produced some evidence 

that widely publicized violent encounters 

between police and African-Americans 

elsewhere in the nation also reduced calls 

for service in Milwaukee. The researchers 

concluded that the decrease in calls for 

police service undermined public safety. In 

line with this interpretation, they reported 

that homicides, which are not likely to be 

affected by a reduction in calls for service, 

rose sharply after the police beating in 

Milwaukee. 

One advantage of the Desmond et al. (2016) 

study of the social response to perceived 

police misconduct is its reliance on 

behavioral indicators rather than opinion 

surveys (or internet searches) to measure 

police-community relations. As we noted in 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 20 
 

 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

our discussion of a recent national survey 

of police officers, surveys are a useful way 

of capturing collective perceptions and 

attitudes but they may not be a reliable 

indicator of social behavior. Desmond et 

al. (2016: 858-859) put the issue succinctly 

with regard to public involvement with 

the police: “When it comes to relying on 

and cooperating with the police, what one 

does might not resemble what one says 

one will do. ... People’s attitudes toward 

the criminal justice system might be poor, 

even misleading, indicators of their real-life 

dealings with the police.” 

This insight helps to explain a final result of 

the Desmond et al. (2016) Milwaukee study. 

Calls for police service returned to the 

level that prevailed prior to the beating by 

police within about a year of the incident, 

although it took somewhat longer for call 

levels to rebound in predominantly black 

communities. The authors pointed out 

that, despite a long history of distrust and 

antagonism, the black community needs 

the police for protection against crime and 

violence (see also Leovy 2015). As the shock 

and anger associated with perceived police 

misconduct wear off, community residents 

resume “normal,” if unsatisfactory, relations 

with the police. 

This basic fact of modern urban life also 

helps to explain two other facts about 

the complicated relationship between 

the black community and the police in 

the United States that might otherwise 

seem at odds with longstanding survey 

evidence of suspicion and mistrust. Black 

Americans want greater police presence 

on their streets than do whites, and blacks 

are just as likely as whites to report crimes 

to the police. A Gallup poll conducted 

during the summer of 2015, with expanded 

samples of blacks and Hispanics, found 

that 38 percent of blacks and 30 percent of 

Hispanics, compared with only 18 percent 

of non-Hispanic whites, wanted a larger 

police presence than currently exists in 

their local community. Few respondents 

wanted a smaller police presence, 

regardless of race or ethnicity (Swift 2015). 

With respect to reporting crimes to the 

police, studies have found that blacks are 

no less likely than whites to notify the 

police when they are victims of a crime 

(Baumer 2002; Baumer and Lauritsen 2010; 

Xie and Lauritsen 2012). National Crime 

Victimization Survey data do not show 

appreciable racial or ethnic differences in 

reporting violent crimes to the police in 

the years leading up to and including the 

period of unrest in many cities over police 

use of force against African-Americans (see 

Figure 15). This national result does not 

necessarily conflict with the evidence of 

community alienation from the police that 

Desmond et al. (2016) found in Milwaukee. 

City- or neighborhood-level data may be 

necessary to detect relatively transitory 

and localized changes in the relationship 

between urban communities and their 

police departments. 

The picture that emerges from prior 

research on procedural justice, police 

legitimacy, public reliance on and 

cooperation with the police, and 

controversial incidents of police use of 

force — and the extent to which any or 

all of these conditions explain recent 

homicide increases in U.S. cities — is 

complex and uncertain. The relatively 

modest post-Ferguson decrease in public 

confidence in the police cannot, by itself, 

explain homicide increases of 25 percent 

or more in big cities during the past 

few years. We have intriguing evidence 

from Milwaukee that perceived police 

misconduct reduces public reliance on the 

police, but it is not yet known whether the 

decrease in calls for police service observed 

in Milwaukee occurred in other cities 

after Ferguson, nor the degree to which 

reduced reliance on the police results in 

increases in homicide or other crimes, even 

in Milwaukee. It is likely that communities 

with high and persisting levels of economic 

disadvantage and racial segregation are 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 21 
 

-

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Figure 15. Percentage of Serious Violent Crimes Reported to 

the Police by Race and Ethnicity of Victims, 2010-2015 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

Non-Hispanic White ■ Non-Hispanic Black ■ Hispanic

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

■

Source: National Crime Victimization Survey 

especially prone to whatever criminogenic 

consequences that compromised police 

legitimacy may have (see Desmond et 

al. 2016; Gross and Mann 2017; Kane 

2005; Pyrooz et al. 2016). But exactly how 

decreases in legitimacy produce increases 

in violence, even in the most vulnerable 

communities, remains to be determined in 

future research. 

What is certain is that African-Americans 

have much less confidence in the police 

than do whites. Compromised police 

legitimacy (what sociologists call “legal 

cynicism”) is an institutionalized feature of 

disadvantaged urban black communities; 

it helps to explain the persistence of 

relatively high levels of violence in those 

communities (Kirk and Papachristos 

2011; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). But, 

despite a long history of mistrust, AfricanAmericans have not given up on the police, 

as reflected in their continued willingness 

to report crimes and their desire for more 

and better police protection. An important 

objective of future policy-relevant research 

is to learn how to mobilize these persisting 

commitments to formal social control in the 

service of boosting confidence in the police 

and reducing crime in U.S. cities. 

Research Directions 

This paper builds on a previous study of the 

recent abrupt and unexpected increase in 

homicide rates in U.S. big cities (Rosenfeld 

2016). We offer two hypotheses to explain 

the homicide increase: (1) the expansion 

of illicit drug markets in the wake of the 

opioid epidemic and (2) a deterioration 

in police-community relations stemming 

from controversial incidents of police use 

of force. The latter hypothesis has two 

variants: police withdrawal from proactive 

enforcement activities and community 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 22 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

alienation from the police. We do not offer 

definitive conclusions regarding either of 

these explanations of the homicide rise. 

Instead, we provide some preliminary 

evidence intended to set the stage for future 

research on the homicide rise and, more 

generally, on crime increases brought about 

by exogenous shocks. In this section, we 

outline several recommendations for the 

directions that research should take. 

Units of Analysis and Research 

Strategies 

With few exceptions, the descriptive 

results presented in this paper apply to the 

nation as a whole. National-level data are 

helpful at the beginning stages of research; 

subsequent research on the homicide rise, 

however, should be based on cities and 

neighborhoods as units of analysis. As we 

have seen, most large cities experienced 

homicide increases during the past two 

years, but homicide declined in some 

cities, and in others the increases were 

quite modest. Variation of this kind in the 

outcome of interest motivates the search for 

factors that can help to explain it. In the 

present case, therefore, we should ask why 

some cities experienced greater increases 

in homicide than others. The research 

needed to address this question should be 

carried out in case studies and multivariate 

quantitative analyses. 

Case Studies 

An important first step in the research 

process is to conduct strategic case studies of 

the phenomenon of interest. This involves 

sampling on the dependent variable, that 

is, selecting cases to study that differ on 

the outcome. With respect to the recent 

homicide rise, an investigator might select 

one or two cities where homicides increased 

markedly, and one or two others where the 

increases were small or where homicide 

declined. For example, the investigator 

might choose Nashville or Denver as cases 

where homicides grew sharply in 2015, 

and Austin or Atlanta where homicides 

dropped or the increase was smaller. The 

same could be done for the homicide 

changes that occurred the following year. 

The investigator might also focus on cities 

that experienced a large homicide increase 

in 2015 and a decline in homicide the 

following year (e.g., Oklahoma City), or vice 

versa (e.g., Memphis; see Figures 2 and 3). 

The case study is an exploratory research 

method. It is part of the process of 

hypothesis discovery rather than hypothesis 

verification (Hanson 1971), but exploratory 

research is not aimless. The investigator 

begins, or should begin, with provisional 

hypotheses to orient the research. We 

recommend the hypotheses presented 

in this paper as a starting place for case 

studies of the recent homicide rise. The 

hypotheses call attention to how the cases 

selected for analysis should be similar to 

one another and how they should differ. 

Ideally, the cases will be identical in all 

relevant respects except for the outcome. 

That, of course, is easier said than done. 

As much as possible, however, the cities 

chosen for case studies of the homicide 

rise should be at least roughly comparable 

in demographic contours, socioeconomic 

characteristics, police force size, and 

other conditions known to be related to 

homicide. That way, the investigator has 

some confidence that the observed changes 

in homicide rates are not attributable to 

differing pre-existing conditions of the 

cases selected for analysis. The search then 

begins for explanatory factors that differ 

across the cases, such as differences in illicit 

drug markets and tensions between the 

police and the communities they serve. 

The best way to ensure that cities are 

similar in pre-existing conditions that may 

be related to homicide is to use each city 

as its own control. That means studying 

changes over time in homicide and the 

hypothesized explanatory factors in one or 

more cities. Such within-city case studies 

are just as important as the between-cities 

analyses for gaining a sense of the cogency 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 23 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

of the ingoing hypotheses, for refining 

them, and for discovering new hypotheses. 

The within-city assessment should begin by 

placing the current homicide change in the 

context of prior changes and should then 

focus on the timing of the current change. 

The explanatory events or conditions must 

have preceded the homicide change or 

taken place at about the same time. If they 

occurred well before homicides began 

to rise (or fall), it is incumbent on the 

investigator to explain the time lag. For 

example, we have noted that, at the national 

level, the opioid epidemic began several 

years before homicide rates began to rise 

in the big cities. But cities almost certainly 

have varied in the timing of the epidemic 

and its effect on local drug markets. That 

is a key reason why carefully constructed 

city-level case studies are essential for 

explaining the recent homicide rise. 

Within-city analyses can also include a 

comparative dimension. Cities can be 

compared with respect to their homicide 

trajectories and temporal changes in 

selected explanatory indicators. In addition, 

trends in homicide and explanatory factors 

should be compared across neighborhoods 

within cities. Urban neighborhoods differ 

greatly in their levels of lethal violence 

(Peterson and Krivo 2010; Sampson 2012). 

The neighborhood differences in homicide 

in many cities far exceed homicide 

differences across cities. As we explain 

below, neighborhoods also are suitable or 

superior units of analysis for several of the 

explanatory indicators we have proposed to 

study the homicide rise. 

Neighborhood-level case studies should 

follow the same research directions we have 

outlined for city-level studies: selection 

on the dependent variable, betweenunits comparisons, within-unit analyses, 

and selection to decrease pre-existing 

differences. The same logic of analysis also 

holds. The objective of neighborhood case 

studies is to refine initial hypotheses and to 

discover new ones that can be evaluated in 

research based on larger samples of cities 

and neighborhoods. 

Panel Studies 

Case studies are the fundamental building 

blocks of social research, especially 

investigations of issues that lack extensive 

prior research and strong theoretical 

guidance, which is certainly true of 

research on large and abrupt changes in 

crime rates (Baumer, Vélez, and Rosenfeld 

forthcoming). Researchers often err 

by moving directly into multivariate 

quantitative research on such topics without 

having conducted strategic case studies. But 

it is usually necessary, if not always feasible, 

to move beyond case studies and conduct 

research on larger samples with quantitative 

methods. 

Case studies produce indispensable, 

close-up knowledge of social processes 

that is typically gained through qualitative 

research methods. However, they are 

limited by the same features that make 

them so essential in social research. They 

provide intensive knowledge of a research 

problem, but they rarely can tell us how 

extensive the problem is or whether the 

cases selected as strategic observation 

points are representative of some 

meaningful population of cases. For that, 

quantitative methods are needed that can 

accommodate many representative cases. 

For the problem at hand, cross-section 

time-series methods — panel studies — 

are best. 

Panel studies are ideally suited for the study 

of change over time in social phenomena 

across many social units.10 A sample of 

cases (the “panel”) is followed over time, 

10. For econometric treatments of panel models, see Hsiao (2003) and Wooldridge (2010). See Phillips and 

Greenberg (2008) for a criminological application. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 24 
 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

and changes in the outcome related to 

the explanatory variables are estimated. 

Depending on the number of observations 

(the number of panel units times the 

number of time periods), panel models 

can accommodate many explanatory 

variables. Panel models also enable the 

investigator to control for the influence 

on the outcome of unobserved variables 

that change over time and across the panel 

units. Panel studies can be used to study 

more or less continuous changes or abrupt, 

discontinuous changes in the outcome of 

interest. Ideally, a panel study of homicide 

rates would follow a sample of cities or 

neighborhoods over time and estimate 

the effects of the explanatory variables of 

primary interest (e.g., indicators of illicit 

drug markets, police activity, and police 

legitimacy) on homicide, controlling for 

observed and unobserved influences. 

There are many technical challenges to 

panel studies, but the most important 

impediment the investigator must overcome 

concerns the validity and reliability of the 

explanatory variables chosen to represent 

the underlying causal processes of interest. 

Including variables in the model that 

are poor proxies for the corresponding 

theoretical concepts or are not reliably 

measured will produce misleading or 

erroneous results. We turn next to a 

discussion of key empirical indicators for 

evaluating the provisional hypotheses 

we have presented to explain the recent 

homicide rise in U.S. cities. 

Key Indicators 

The basic challenge to future research 

on the homicide rise is to locate valid 

and reliable indicators for the conditions, 

events, and processes thought to influence 

change over time in homicide generally, 

and the recent increase in particular. 

We have proposed, for example, that 

expansions in illicit drug markets resulting 

from the opioid epidemic have resulted 

in homicide increases in the big cities, 

and perhaps especially among whites. To 

evaluate this hypothesis, investigators will 

need racially disaggregated city-level homicide 

data from the SHR. As an indicator of the 

severity of the opioid epidemic, opioidrelated overdose deaths, by race, can be 

obtained from public health sources; this 

may require contacting city public health 

agencies directly. 

A more difficult challenge is to find suitable 

indicators to measure the expansion of 

local drug markets. Drug arrests can be 

used, but they are a product of both police 

enforcement and criminal conduct. Cities 

in which the police department decides to 

focus on drug crimes may show an increase 

in drug arrests even if drug crimes have not 

increased or have decreased. There appears 

to be little way around this measurement 

dilemma, although prior research has 

reported strong correlations between drug 

arrests and indicators of drug use, such 

as drug-related fatalities and admissions 

to emergency departments for drug 

overdose (Rosenfeld and Decker 1999). 

The drug arrest indicator should be racially 

disaggregated to determine whether, as 

expected, whites have entered local drug 

markets in greater numbers over time as 

both buyers and sellers. 

Finally, the key indicator of the 

consequences of drug market expansion for 

homicide is the drug-related homicide rate, 

by race, available from the SHR. Drugrelated homicides should be measured as a 

proportion of all homicides as well as a per 

capita rate. As noted earlier, missing data 

pose a significant challenge to the reliability 

of this indicator. Imputation methods can 

be used to provide estimates of the missing 

data in the SHR (Fox 2004; Regoeczi and 

Riedel 2003). At the very least, investigators 

should include a measure of the proportion 

of missing cases in drug-related homicides 

as a control variable in panel models of 

homicide rates. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 25 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Locating valid and reliable indicators for 

changes in police activity, police legitimacy, 

and community alienation — also referred 

to as the Ferguson effects — poses 

additional measurement challenges. 

One measure of police activity already 

discussed is the arrest rate. Large drops 

in arrests, especially for violent offenses, 

can precipitate increases in crime, as may 

have occurred in Chicago and Baltimore 

after controversial and deadly policecitizen encounters in those cities (Ford 

2017; Morgan and Pally 2016; University of 

Chicago Crime Lab 2017). City-level arrest 

data can be obtained from the UCR. 

The impact of arrests on homicide should 

also be examined at the neighborhood 

level. As noted, homicide rates vary 

substantially across urban neighborhoods. 

Arrests do as well. Commentary on police 

disengagement from vigorous enforcement 

activity (e.g., Mac Donald 2016) and surveys 

of police officers (Morin et al. 2017) 

suggest that police disengagement should 

be particularly pronounced in AfricanAmerican communities. Therefore, if 

the disengagement hypothesis is correct, 

investigators should expect to observe 

a stronger relationship between arrest 

decreases and homicide increases in these 

communities than in others. 

Arrests are not the only indicator of 

police enforcement activity. Big-city 

police departments require their officers 

to log numerous enforcement activities 

(sometimes termed “self-initiated” 

enforcement), including pedestrian 

checks, occupied and unoccupied 

vehicle checks, building checks, field 

interviews, and problem-solving activity. 

These are the kinds of activities that 

constitute proactive policing. The police 

disengagement hypothesis proposes that 

proactive enforcement should decrease 

in the aftermath of public criticism and 

unrest associated with controversial useof-force incidents. Reductions in proactive 

enforcement, in turn, should be associated 

with heightened levels of crime, including 

homicide. The relationship between 

proactive policing and homicide should 

be especially strong in African-American 

communities. Data on proactive policing 

activities will have to come directly from 

local police departments. 

Arrests and proactive enforcement can 

decrease for reasons, such as budget cuts, 

that may have little to do with public 

criticism or community unrest related to 

police use of force. If police disengagement 

results from controversial incidents of 

police use of force, investigators should 

expect to observe greater disengagement in 

cities where those incidents have occurred 

and where they have sparked significant 

community protest and unrest. The 

requisite data can be obtained from press 

accounts and social media traffic (Gross 

and Mann 2017). 

Locating suitable indicators for the effect 

on homicide of police legitimacy and 

community alienation from the police is an 

especially onerous measurement challenge 

(Rosenfeld 2016). Police legitimacy is 

revealed through measures of individual 

attitudes and beliefs obtained from opinion 

surveys. It is prohibitive to carry out 

representative surveys across numerous 

cities or neighborhoods, and it is impossible 

to survey past attitudes and beliefs, which 

would be necessary to measure change over 

time in police legitimacy, except through 

respondent recollections of doubtful 

reliability. For the time being, it appears 

that strategic case studies and one- or twotime snapshot surveys will have to suffice 

(e.g., Kochel 2015a, 2015b). 

Two empirical indicators used to measure 

community alienation from the police 

are citizen calls for police service and 

complaints against the police. Both can be 

obtained from most large police agencies, 

although some departments may be 

unwilling to release the complaint data. 

If the community alienation hypothesis 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 26 
 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

is correct, investigators should expect to 

observe a reduction in calls for service 

and an increase in complaints in cities 

where controversial use-of-force incidents 

and outbreaks of community unrest have 

occurred, particularly in African-American 

communities (Desmond et al. 2016). 

Increases in homicide, other things being 

equal, should be greater in those cities and 

communities than in others. 

These are just a few of the key indicators 

needed to evaluate the hypotheses 

presented in this paper to explain the 

recent homicide rise in U.S. cities. Creative 

researchers are sure to find others. The 

indicators discussed here constitute a 

starting point for future research on the 

homicide rise. Some of the indicators are 

available from secondary sources such 

as the UCR, SHR, and vital statistics. 

However, to locate many of the indicators, 

investigators will need to contact police 

and public health sources directly to obtain 

local data. 

Federal Support: National 

Institute of Justice 

This paper documents and explores 

potential explanations for the rapid and 

sudden spike in homicides and identifies 

directions for future research. It was 

produced in collaboration with NIJ, which 

is dedicated to improving knowledge and 

understanding of crime and justice issues 

through science. As a science agency, NIJ 

provides independent knowledge and tools 

to inform decision-making in the criminal 

justice community and to advance justice. 

NIJ supports this paper and its findings, 

as they were produced objectively, the 

implications are timely, and the issue is 

well aligned with the priorities of the U.S. 

Department of Justice (DOJ). 

Given the aforementioned increases in 

violent crime and homicide, and the 

necessity to understand such spikes within 

certain communities, NIJ has focused 

several agendas on investigating these 

incidents and trends. As examples of this 

commitment, three NIJ programs are 

highlighted below: (1) Drugs and Crime, 

an issue that may have contributed to the 

homicide spike; (2) Policing Strategies, 

which addresses proactive policing and 

community interaction with police; and 

(3) Safety, Health, and Wellness, which 

provides support to the law enforcement 

personnel who are first responders and 

are responsible for combating homicide, 

as well as supporting members of violent 

communities. 

Drugs and Crime 

As noted in this paper, drugs — particularly 

opioids and heroin — may be a key 

contributor to the increase in homicides 

and community instability. Like other 

federal agencies, NIJ has been focusing on 

this growing epidemic by supporting the 

Drugs and Crime program (see https:// 

www.nij.gov/topics/drugs/Pages/welcome. 

aspx). This program includes many 

components: participation in a federal 

working group, collaborations across DOJ 

and other agencies (e.g., the Department 

of Health and Human Services, National 

Institute on Drug Abuse), intramural 

research, and extramural research (i.e., 

competitive solicitations). 

In 2016, in support of DOJ’s crime 

prevention and law enforcement objectives, 

NIJ released a competitive grant solicitation 

for research to examine the feasibility, 

impact, and cost efficiency of criminal 

justice tools, protocols, and policies 

designed to address drug trafficking, 

markets, and use, and the effects of drug 

legalization and decriminalization on law 

enforcement. Although NIJ’s work in this 

area dates back to the late 1990s, it has 

recently been reintroduced as competitive 

research in collaboration with two of NIJ’s 

program offices that support behavioral 

science and investigative forensics. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 27 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

In 2017, as a result of the growing heroin 

and synthetic opioid epidemic and the 

need for research on such trends, NIJ 

narrowed the investigator-initiated call 

for proposals to focus on these two drug 

types. In compliance with the current 

Administration’s priorities to combat 

the opioid epidemic, NIJ is committed 

to supporting research on crime (in 

particular, homicide) and to support law 

enforcement and prosecutors by providing 

information and data. 

Policing Strategies 

To explain the increase in homicide, this 

paper explores variables that include 

possible reductions in proactive policing 

and increases in community alienation from 

the police. NIJ is particularly interested in 

understanding proactive policing, other 

policing strategies, and officer decisionmaking approaches to respond to and 

reduce violent crime and homicides in 

communities. As part of its multifaceted 

Policing Strategies program, NIJ released 

two solicitations in 2017: (1) Research to 

Support Officer Decision-Making and 

(2) Understanding the Impacts of Policing 

Strategies and Practices. With these 

solicitations, NIJ may be able to further 

explore the hypotheses and variables 

discussed in this paper. 

For the first solicitation, NIJ sought to 

study the interactions between an officer 

and community members, specifically the 

instances where the officer, the citizen, or 

both were under stress, with little time to 

make a decision that could result in death 

or injury. Ultimately, the objective was to 

provide knowledge that can be applied to 

support officer decision-making, thereby 

enhancing outcomes in police-citizen 

interactions. This research is particularly 

important as the number of homicides 

increases. 

The goal of the second solicitation was 

to examine strategies, training, and 

practices and to assess their impact 

on crime reduction and other positive 

or negative outcomes. NIJ intends to 

produce research on (1) the collateral 

consequences associated with a strategy 

or practice for individuals, communities, 

and police organizations; (2) the degree 

to which strategies or practices can be 

effective in reducing crime with minimal 

negative collateral consequences; and 

(3) the measures to be used to assess a 

policing strategy or practice, taking into 

consideration crime reduction and the 

impact of the broad spectrum of collateral 

consequences on the individual, the 

neighborhood, communities, and the police 

organization. 

In addition to the two policing solicitations, 

NIJ recently published a five-year plan on 

policing that includes research related to 

homicide and violent crime, and policing 

responses and interaction with community 

members. This plan and subsequent 

research will complement the findings 

in this paper (see https://nij.gov/about/ 

strategic-plans/Pages/policing-strategicresearch-plan.aspx). 

Safety, Health, and Wellness 

With the increase in homicides and 

violence in communities, it is critical to 

provide research that supports the law 

enforcement personnel who are combating 

and responding to these issues. In 2016, 

NIJ produced a five-year plan to address 

research on Safety, Health, and Wellness 

in the criminal justice system. The 

purpose of this strategic plan is to describe 

NIJ’s current and projected efforts to 

promote the safety, health, and wellness of 

individuals affected by or employed within 

the criminal justice system. This document 

will be of interest to researchers (academic, 

government, and industry); federal, state, 

local, and international government 

partners; and justice policymakers and 

practitioner communities (see https://www. 

ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250153.pdf). 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 28 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

As part of this plan, in 2017 NIJ released 

its first competitive solicitation on safety, 

health, and wellness. The scope of the 

solicitation includes (1) law enforcement 

personnel, who combat homicide and 

violent crime; (2) correctional officers, who 

are responsible for overseeing offenders 

once they are detained; and (3) individuals 

who live in violent communities and are 

exposed to the violence. This solicitation 

supported several of the plan’s objectives, 

which promote a common theme of 

research aimed at improving the physical 

and mental health of individuals who 

work in the criminal justice profession 

and routinely respond to violence. The 

research resulting from this component 

of the solicitation is intended to reduce 

stress-related mental and physical health 

symptoms in justice personnel and 

community members who are exposed to 

violence and homicide. Because it is wellestablished that high stress can have a 

negative impact on an individual’s health, 

the research funded under this solicitation 

will support better tools and responses for 

criminal justice personnel and community 

members who are exposed to frequent 

homicides and other violent crimes. 

NIJ remains committed to these agendas 

and to supporting law enforcement and 

communities in reducing homicides 

and other violent crimes in the United 

States. Progress in promoting safer 

communities will be made by advancing 

the understanding of the impact of the 

opioid and heroin epidemic on rates of 

homicide and violent crime, furthering 

the understanding of the impact of various 

policing strategies on crime rates and 

other collateral consequences, and better 

addressing the safety and wellness of 

police officers and other criminal justice 

personnel who work under these high-stress 

conditions. The findings from this paper 

highlight the importance of continued 

research on homicide, violent crime, and 

changing crime trends. NIJ will continue to 

support such efforts to reduce violent crime 

and improve public safety. 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 29 
National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Appendix. Homicides in Cities 

With 250,000 or More Residents, 

2014-2016 

Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 30 

City Population 2014 2015 Diff 

% 

Diff 2016 Diff 

% 

Diff 

1 Aurora 353,108 11 24 13 118.2% 22 -2 -8.3% 

2 Anchorage 301,010 12 26 14 116.7% 28 2 7.7% 

3 Orlando 262,372 15 32 17 113.3% 84 52 162.5%* 

4 Fort Wayne 258,522 12 25 13 108.3% 43 18 72.0% 

5 Cleveland 389,521 63 120 57 90.5% 135 15 12.5% 

6 Nashville 644,014 41 72 31 75.6% 81 9 12.5% 

7 Denver 663,862 31 53 22 71.0% 57 4 7.5% 

8 Baltimore 622,793 211 344 133 63.0% 318 -26 -7.6% 

9 Oklahoma City 620,602 45 73 28 62.2% 70 -3 -4.1% 

10 Durham 251,893 21 34 13 61.9% NA 

11 Milwaukee 599,642 90 145 55 61.1% 141 -4 -2.8% 

12 Long Beach 473,577 23 36 13 56.5% 33 -3 -8.3% 

13 Washington 658,893 105 162 57 54.3% 138 -24 -14.8% 

14 Sacramento 485,199 28 43 15 53.6% 41 -2 -4.7% 

15 Minneapolis 407,207 31 47 16 51.6% 35 -12 -25.5% 

16 Omaha 446,599 32 48 16 50.0% 29 -19 -39.6% 
Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 31 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Appendix (continued)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

City Population 2014 2015 Diff 

% 

Diff 2016 Diff 

% 

Diff 

17 St. Paul 297,640 11 16 5 45.5% 19 3 18.8% 

18 Louisville 677,710 56 81 25 44.6% 119 38 46.9% 

19 Albuquerque 557,169 30 43 13 43.3% 61 18 41.9% 

20 Kansas City 470,800 78 109 31 39.7% 129 20 18.3% 

21 Henderson 277,440 3 4 1 33.3% 10 6 150.0% 

22 Charlotte 856,916 47 61 14 29.8% 67 6 9.8% 

23 Bakersfield 368,759 17 22 5 29.4% 32 10 45.5% 

24 Anaheim 346,997 14 18 4 28.6% 7 -11 -61.1% 

25 Houston 2,239,558 242 303 61 25.2% 301 -2 -0.7% 

26 Colorado Sp 445,830 20 25 5 25.0% 24 -1 -4.0% 

27 Mesa 464,704 13 16 3 23.1% 19 3 18.8% 

28 Tampa 358,699 28 34 6 21.4% 29 -5 -14.7% 

29 Tulsa 399,682 46 55 9 19.6% 72 17 30.9% 

30 Portland 619,360 26 31 5 19.2% 14 -17 -54.8% 

31 Fort Worth 812,238 47 56 9 19.1% 66 10 17.9% 

32 St. Louis 317,419 159 188 29 18.2% 188 0 0.0% 

33 San Francisco 852,469 45 53 8 17.8% 57 4 7.5% 

34 Dallas 1,281,047 116 136 20 17.2% 171 35 25.7% 

35 Chicago 2,722,389 411 478 67 16.3% 765 287 60.0% 

36 San Diego 1,381,069 32 37 5 15.6% 50 13 35.1% 

37 Greensboro 282,586 23 26 3 13.0% NA 

38 Philadelphia 1,560,297 248 280 32 12.9% 273 -7 -2.5% 

39 Newark 280,579 93 105 12 12.9% 100 -5 -4.8% 

40 Jersey City 262,146 24 27 3 12.5% 24 -3 -11.1% 
Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 32 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Appendix (continued)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

City Population 2014 2015 Diff 

% 

Diff 2016 Diff 

% 

Diff 

41 Virginia Beach 450,980 17 19 2 11.8% 21 2 10.5% 

42 Cincinnati 298,165 60 66 6 10.0% 57 -9 -13.6% 

43 New Orleans 384,320 150 164 14 9.3% 174 10 6.1% 

44 Indianapolis 848,788 136 148 12 8.8% 148 0 0.0% 

45 Los Angeles 3,928,864 260 282 22 8.5% 293 11 3.9% 

46 Oakland 413,775 80 85 5 6.3% 85 0 0.0% 

47 New York 8,491,079 333 352 19 5.7% 335 -17 -4.8% 

48 Las Vegas 1,530,899 122 127 5 4.1% 158 31 24.4% 

49 Wichita 388,413 26 27 1 3.8% 31 4 14.8% 

50 Atlanta 456,002 93 94 1 1.1% 111 17 18.1% 

51 Jacksonville 853,382 96 97 1 1.0% 106 9 9.3% 

52 Stockton 302,389 49 49 0 0.0% 49 0 0.0% 

53 Plano 278,480 4 4 0 0.0% 5 1 25.0% 

54 Toledo 281,031 24 24 0 0.0% 37 13 54.2% 

55 Chandler 254,276 1 1 0 0.0% 4 3 300.0% 

56 Detroit 680,250 298 295 -3 -1.0% 303 8 2.7% 

57 Phoenix 1,537,058 114 112 -2 -1.8% 146 34 30.4% 

58 Memphis 656,861 140 135 -5 -3.6% 196 61 45.2% 

59 San Jose 1,015,785 32 30 -2 -6.3% 47 17 56.7% 

60 Raleigh 439,896 16 15 -1 -6.3% NA 

61 Columbus 835,957 83 77 -6 -7.2% 91 14 18.2% 

62 Miami 430,332 81 75 -6 -7.4% 55 -20 -26.7% 

63 San Antonio 1,436,697 103 94 -9 -8.7% 149 55 58.5% 

64 Seattle 668,342 26 23 -3 -11.5% 19 -4 -17.4% 
Assessing and Responding to the Recent Homicide Rise in the United States 33 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

Appendix (continued)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

City Population 2014 2015 Diff 

% 

Diff 2016 Diff 

% 

Diff 

65 Chula Vista 260,988 7 6 -1 -14.3% 1 -5 -83.3% 

66 Riverside 319,504 12 10 -2 -16.7% 10 0 0.0% 

67 Fresno 515,986 47 39 -8 -17.0% 39 0 0.0% 

68 Pittsburgh 305,412 69 57 -12 -17.4% 57 0 0.0% 

69 Tucson 527,972 38 31 -7 -18.4% 30 -1 -3.2% 

70 El Paso 679,036 21 17 -4 -19.0% 17 0 0.0% 

71 Lexington 310,797 20 15 -5 -25.0% 24 9 60.0% 

72 St. Petersburg 253,693 19 14 -5 -26.3% 20 6 42.9% 

73 Austin 912,791 32 23 -9 -28.1% 39 16 69.6% 

74 Boston 655,884 53 38 -15 -28.3% 49 11 28.9% 

75 Buffalo 258,703 60 41 -19 -31.7% 44 3 7.3% 

76 Santa Ana 334,909 18 12 -6 -33.3% 23 11 91.7% 

77 Corpus Christi 320,434 27 17 -10 -37.0% 24 7 41.2% 

78 Arlington 383,204 13 8 -5 -38.5% 21 13 162.5% 

79 Laredo 252,309 14 8 -6 -42.9% 12 4 50.0% 

80 Lincoln 272,996 7 1 -6 -85.7% 10 9 900.0% 

Total 58,998,956 5,401 6,220 819 15.2% 6,892 672 10.8% 

* Includes the 49 deaths from the mass shooting at an Orlando night club in June 2016. 

Source: Uniform Crime Reports; U.S. Census Bureau 
 

 

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov 

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