1

Filed 9/27/21 In re J.S. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re J

. S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. BARBARA S., Plaintiff and Appellant ,
v. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Defendant and Respondent

. A1 62070
( Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JD

- 021451

- 0 3 )

Barbara S

. (mother) , adoptive mother of 15

- year
- old J. S., appeal s a n order after a 12

- month review hearing that terminat ed reunification services and limit ed her right to participate in educational decisions for J.S

. The juvenile court found that Alameda County Social Services Agency (the agency) had offer ed reasonable services , and held that it could not find a substantial probability that J.S. c ould return to mot her ’s custody within 18 months of removal

. She contend s that no substantial evidence support s th os e rul ing s , main ly because the agency prevented her from repairing her relationship with J.S. when it acquiesc ed in hi s refusal to visit. We disagree and will affirm.2 Factual and Procedural History J.S. was born in 2005 ; mother adopted him when he was 18 months old. Both are African

- American. Mother , who worked as a teacher “for most of
40 years” and deem ed herself a “senior citizen , ” lives with her adult son Gabe and teenage adopte d daughter P .S. ( The record does not specif y mother’s age, but the jurisdiction report indicates that in 2011 she described herself as
70 years old

. )
M other and J.S. had prior difficulties that led to a 2014 proceeding in which she s ai d that she could no longer care for him because of his aggressi on and that she would not seek reunification and would relinquish parental rights. However, t he two were reunited in 2015.
T he se proceedings began in October 20 19 when mother declined to pick J.S. up from Willow Rock mental health center , where he had been committed for approximately 1 4 days ( Welf . & Inst

. Code , 1 § 5150 ) after a n altercation in her home

. According to J.S., t he incident began when he refus ed mother’s demand to give her his laptop ; escalate d when Gabe tried to enforce the demand ; and culminated in J.S. kicking Gabe , Gabe bending back hi s finger , slamming him to the floor , and trying to take his musical instruments , and J.S. wav ing and throwing a knife at Gabe

. Mother denied that Gabe touc h ed J.S

. and said he on ly got near his instruments. Mother did not visit J.S. in Willow Rock and , upon his release, said that she did not think he could live safely in her home , given a history of violent incidents. Mother also sai d that J.S. had stolen from her and Gabe, was always angry, and insulted and disrespected her.

1 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3

For his part, J.S. , who has suffered depression and suicidal ideation , did
not want to return , saying he did not feel safe with mot her or Gabe and that she had called him “ stupid, crazy, and/or mental

. ” M other denied those allegations, but P .S. confirmed them. J.S. also sai d that Gabe physically abused him, which mother denied

. The agency placed J.S. in a f oster f amily a gency (FFA) home. A t a jurisdictional hearing on November 21, 2019, t he juvenile court found him a dependent (§ 300, subd

. (g) ) and ordered the agency to provide reunification services and to arrange visitation “as frequently as possible consistent with [J.S.] ’s well

- being.” It approved a case plan requir ing mother to “ work on building her relationship with [ J.S. ]” by asking about his day , offering to listen when he is upset and taking time before responding , and doing enjoyable activities together

. The plan called for J.S. and mother to attend family therapy to regain mutual trust. As no ted in an April 20, 20 2 0, report for the six

- month review hearing , mother refused referrals for individual or family therapy or therapeutic visits, insisting there was no need for her visits to be supervise d

. J.S. was willing to have one visit with mother , and a social worker told him she would arrange it

once he was ready

. Mother complained of the agency lett ing J.S. “call the shots” despite not know ing what is best for him. On March 5, the two had a supervised visit. J.S. stay ed as far away from mother as possible, asked why she wanted to visit after not visit ing in Willow Grove, and began yelling about ev ents from his childhood

. M other seemed not to u nderstand why J.S. said the things he did , stat ing repeatedly that she had done all she could to give him a good life. The social worker suggested that therapeutic v isits or family therapy might help the two understand one another, but mother refused. At the end of the visit , J.S. left quickly without saying goodbye.4

J.S. agree d to speak with mother by phone ; in six weeks after the March visit, they had two calls. The social worker ask ed that calls increase to weekly, with the goal of facilitating more visitation. J.S. insisted that he would not return to mother’s care, as he was very angry at her about how he was treated growing up, her failure to protect him from Gabe , and her having made him feel as if something were wrong with him. The report added that J.S. was struggling with motivation to do school work but was a talented musician active in a school band. On April 15 , t he report s tate s , mother again declined family therapy, as she did not trust a clinician who might be younger or from a nother cultural background to grasp the situation. ( At the hearing, mother denied this
statement

. ) On April 16, she agreed to attend a c hild

- and

- f amily

- t eam meeting the next day, but when the team called her repeatedly , she did not answer

. At the six

- month review hearing on May 12 , the court found that the agency had offered reasonable services and that mother had made minimal

progress and had not participated in court

- ordered treatment

. It set a
12

- month review hearing o n October 28

. On September 30 the agency filed a report recommend ing that services be terminated

. F or most of the period since April , i t stated , mother had refused individual t her apy

. In June, she and a social worker discussed arranging sessions with Cheryl Cranshaw , with whom mother had worked before

. M other thought Cranshaw w ould offer family therapy focused on J.S. ; the social worker expected her to provide individual therapy to prepare mother for joint therapy. When the miscommunication became clear, mother at first reiterated her refusal to have individual therapy but then , on June 30, agreed to do so

. However, s he did not beg i n sessions at that time

. Mother said in early June that calls with J.S. had been sporadic and that she felt he should call her; the social worker told her to call weekly “ to show5

that she is trying, even if [he] does not want to talk.” A sked t hree weeks later how th e calls were going, mother said “she needs to ask [P.S.] for [J.S.]’s number, and that she has not called in a while but will call him.” In July, mother attended a meeting about changing J.S.’s placement to

a n FFA home in Stanislaus County

. She refused to drive 86 miles to the Tracy FFA office for visit s

. FFA social worker Edward Lubembe offered to drive J.S. to Pleasanton for visits, but mother did not want Lubembe

— who m she called

“ Mr. La Boom Boom , ” and whose accent she mocked

— to supervis e her visits

. She asked that J.S. be moved to a group home in San Francisco , but was told that doing so would violate the agency’s policy of placing children in the least restrictive appropriate setting. On August 1, mother called J.S. to ge t his new address so s he could send money and items , including one of his musical instruments

. Mother left the social worker a message asking if she could visit the foster home but , without a wait ing a response or contact ing the foster family , had Gabe dr i ve her the r e

. Upon seeing Gabe, J.S

. became upset and refused to leave the house to see m other. Mother complain ed to the agency that J.S.’s foster mother had not let her see J.S. , and that J.S. was in a white community she found racist. She ask ed that he be put in a group home in Oakland. A social worker again explained the least

- restrictive

- setting policy and asked if mother could recommend local friend s or relative s for placement ; she could not

. O n August 11 mother refused to have supervised visit s or to work with a parent partner from J.S.’s mental health team

. But o n August 21 , she said she would work with Lubembe to arrange a supervised visit as soon as possible. As to the August 1 incident, mother said that Gabe had come to the foster home because she need ed him to drive her , but that if he did so again she

w ould ensure that h e w ould not be seen by J.S. Mother refused again to work with J.S.’s mental health team or to attend a team meeting that day

.6

O n August 27 , J.S. said he did not want to return to m other , that she “does not care about him , ” and that she will never change. J.S. also stated that mother had said , during a recent call, that if he did not stop being disrespectful he would “get slammed , ” and that mother had told him not to call her

. In a September 4 conversation with the social worker, M other denied making the “get slammed” comment and said that she wanted J.S. to call , but not because he is forced to do so

. The report states that the soc ial worker responded by telling mother that , while calls may have to be strongly encouraged at first, if mother is engaged and supportive, J.S. might begin to look forward to them

. Lubembe arranged a visit in a Pleasanton park on September 12. J.S.

was hesitant to go and disappointed that the first person he saw w as Gabe, who had driven mother. After Gabe left, J.S. engag ed in the visit but did not believe that mother was excited to see him and did not want further visit s

. In September , mother told the social worker that Cranshaw would not provide therapy , and the social worker referred her to another therapist , with whom she soon began individual sessions

. Mother told the social worker that the recent visit with J.S. had been “ great .” S he did not know why J.S. said he did not enjoy it and felt he should not be “running the show

. ” T he social worker re pli ed that if J.S. did not feel safe, she would not make him visit. Mother sai d that in the future Gabe would park a block away . T he social worker said that at an upc o ming child

- and

- family

- team meeting on September
25 , the team would discuss arranging “a bimonthly visit

. ” 2 Mother joined th e September 25 conference call meeting but up on learning that the agency would recommend terminat ing services, she left the call

.

2 While the report says “bimonthly visit , ” the social worker may have meant semimonthly (i.e., two visits per month).7

T he September 30 report stat ed , in conclusion, that mother “has not fully engaged in any supportive services such as therapy .

. . to examine how her behaviors have impacted ” her relationship with J.S. , and that she does not validate hi s experience or take his needs seriously, show an under standing of how her words affect him , or engage with his mental health
team . J.S. d id not feel secure with her or want to visit or talk significant ly

. He wished to stay in his placement, where his foster mother expressed commitment to him

. T he report recommended end ing reunification services and setting a permanent plan of guardianship , while not ing that a section 366.26 hearing would be premature , as J.S. and his c aregivers were still build ing a relationship

. On October 28, the court continu ed its existing orders and set a contested 12

- month

- review hearing on February 9, 2021. 3 On January 27, 2021, the agency filed a n addendum report. O n October 20 , it said, mother expressed concern over a phone call about a prescription for J.S

. ; when a social worker investigated, he learned tha t J.S. had recently broke n his foot playing with a pick ax

. J.S. told the social worker he did not want to visit with mother

. On October 27 , mother said she felt excluded from hi s life

. A social worker tol d her that s he is welcome at mental health meetings for J.S. and ur ged her to attend the next meeting on

3 The unreported October 28 hearing resulted in only a m inute order; it appears that when mother opposed the agency’s recommendation, the court simply continued the matter to a contested

- hearing calendar. Given the importance of settling children’s placements and the statutory mandate for

sem iannual review hear ings (§ 366), t he 13

- week delay of a hearing required by law to occur 12 months after the child entered foster care (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) is troubling. As a result, when the hearing finally occurred, only 10 weeks remained in the 18

- month period that is the outer limit , in most cases, of reunification services. ( § 366.21, subd. (g)(1); § 361.5, subds. (a)(3)

– (4).)8

November 18

. The social worker ’s supervisor said that a worker would soon visit J.S. to “ask if he is ready to have visits

. ” One did so, and on November 23 , J.S. said that he did not want to call or visit. On December 1, mother sai d that J.S.’s therapy was not working , as he was moving further from her, and that his mental health require s treatment by a doctor, not a therapist. She again complained of his placement , a dd ing that she had hoped he “ would’ve been taken to j uvenile h all to learn his lesson instead of being placed in foster care.” On December 10 , she asked if the agency could condition hi s ability to stay in his placement on hi s agreeing to visit; the supervisor said that “the a gency cannot force [J.S.] to visit with her , but [the social worker] works monthly with him to support him in visiting

. ” The supervisor ur ged mother to attend a mental health team meeting for J.S. that day. She said she would do so, but did not. On December 22, mother complained that she could not reach J.S. T he social worker called his foster mother, who said that J.S. ha d access to a house phone outside his door

. On December 10 and January 25 , J.S. also said that he did not want to visit mother

. I n December, t h e agency prepared an individualized education plan (IEP) letter to submit to J.S.’s school

. The report sai d that to avoid delaying an IEP assessment, the agency would ask the court to designat e J.S.’s foster mother to make educatio nal decisions in place of mother , who would not attend team meetings. On February 9, 2021, the court held a 12

- month review hearing

— two and a half months before the 18

- month

- review deadline

. Mother asked that the court continue reunification services to the 18

- month limit and issue “a more specific visitation order” so that visit s would occur. J.S. supported the termin ation of services. The court admitted into evidence the above

- described reports. Only m other testif ied

.9

Mother opined that J.S. needs medication from a psychiatrist, not talk therapy; described his use of medication for depression and ADHD; and said she had been “ in therapy with [ J.S. ]” since he was five years old

. 4 She had attended two meetings of hi s mental health team . O n the day in April the y called her for a meeting , she did not get the cal ls

. Asked what was discussed in
t he last meeting she attended , she said, “I can’t remember. They wanted me to

say something and I told them that I was grieving still the loss of my child and I just didn’t really feel into giving them a whole lot of information.” She claimed that, when she recently tol d J.S. that she would always love him and asked him to call, he had said, “I can’t.” Mother had participat ed in weekly individual therapy since September to discuss her feelings about the separation from J.S. S he could not identify any skills she had learned to cope with the situation

. A sked how visitation has been, she described her unannounced visit to the foster home , claim ing not to have known it was improper

. When asked about other efforts to visit , she sai d that she had “tried to call ” but could not get through, so she sent J.S. two letters

. She s ai d that “they [ presumably the foster family ] didn’t want me to talk to him.” A sked how visitation might affec t t he i r relationship, mother gave a nonresponsive answer that J.S. is taking out on her his ang er over his adoption , and that she c ould giv e him a car and private

- school education if he will follow her house rules.
M other testified that she is open to supervised visit s but, given her age , wants to visit “where it won’t be so far that I have to drive.” She opined that she and J.S. could make progress in joint therapy with a singl e therapist , bu t the agency had never arrange d such therapy.

4 It seems likely in context that mother meant that she had participated in J.S.’s psychiatr ic treatment, not in joint “talk therapy” with him.10

Mother also opposed an IEP . She believed that J.S. i s very intelligent and not “ two years behind, ” which she believed essential for an IEP , and added that she c an arrange any tutoring he need s

. She sai d that an IEP would stigmatize J.S. , as a Black student in a mostly W hite district. On cross
- examination by J.S.’s counsel , mother a dmitt ed having filed a law suit on hi s behalf based on side effects of a psychiatric drug , and she acknowledged that the experience might make him fear medication and prefer talk therapy. She admitted not having thought about the effect on J.S. of having Gabe take her to the foster home or the visit in the park. She denied having refused family therapy in April , saying she tried to arrange joint therapy with Ms. Cranshaw. When asked whether, a fter Cranshaw declined
to work with her , she ever told the social worker that she was open to joint therapy , her answer was non responsive. When a sked if she was request ing that the court return J.S. to her custody , mother said, “ I'm asking for a closer placement. [J.S.]

. . . has to decide if he wants to come home. I love him, but

. . . I ' m not going to

. . . force him to do something that he ’ s uncomfortable with. ” She added that she “ just
want [ed] him to be closer to home [so that] i f he wakes up one morning and

says, ‘Oh, I might like to see mom, ’

. . . he can come

. ” Mother’s counsel argued that the agency’s failure to ensur e visit ation had left her unable to make progress in heal ing the relationship, and that it

was wrong to focus on her delay in starting individual therapy since her case plan did not require it

. She cited cases holding tha t an agency must ensur e visitation unless it will be dangerous for the child and argued that the record did not show the agency d oing anything to encourage visit s beyond ask ing J.S. if he wanted to visit. She also opposed any limit ation of her educational rights , given her experience in the field and thoughtful concern s about an IEP

.11

J.S.’s attorney argued that J.S. “no longer wants to be obligated to visit with [mot her ] and feels incredibly strongly about not returning to her care.” He distinguished cases about a n agency’s duty to ensure visitation as involving much younger children

. He not ed that this was not the first time mother had relinquished responsibility for J.S

. , which left him unsure of her commitment

. J.S. also supported the request to reassign hi s educational rights, as mother’s failure to work with his mental health team had left her out of touch with his current needs. The court began its ruling by noting the p ast CPS involvement in J.S.’s life; mother’s prior relinquishment; and his anger, suicidal thoughts, and feelings of not being loved or supported. In that context, it held, the agency acted properly in handling vis itation with caution. After noting that mother at first flatly refused services and did not reach out to J.S. , but expected him to contact her, the court summarized its views: “Mother has never made efforts to try to bridge the gap here. Mother, as far a s I can tell, has not tried ever to go to [J.S.] ’ s level, to try to see life through [his] eyes. I think she chalks up his behavior to X, Y, and Z and she doesn ’ t have to do anything, it ’ s not her fault that he ’ s behaving this way, and she ’ s never tried to understand from his perspective. [¶] And I think that ’ s exactly what happened with these visits because the [ a ] gency made multiple offers to try to provide services so that these visits can happen. The Agency did try to encourage [J.S.] and did try multiple times to explain to mom that for these visits to happen, you ’ re going to have to be introspective here a little bit, you ’ re going to have to try to understand things from [ his ] perspective, and mother just flatly refused.” T he court concluded that “this is not a case involving a denial of visits. There were conditions placed on them appropriately to safeguard the emotional well

- being of [J.S.] and mother refused. So she rejected [services] .”12

The court found mother’s testimony “unconvincing ” and fo un d “t elling” her descri ption of a mental health team meeting in which “she just didn’t want to talk,” which reflect ed a pattern of her “flatly refusing to help .

. . and to try to think of ways to connect again with [J.S.].” The court found that having Ga be take her to the September visit after havi n g be en warned following his appearance at the foster home in August show ed “a very fundamental lack of understanding of [J.S.]’s needs.” Finding J.S. able to articulat e his desires and un interested in reunifi cation , the court held that it could not find a reasonable prospect of a
return by the 18

- month deadline. I t found that the agency had offer ed reasonable services; mother’s progress had been minimal; and services should end. The court found a compelling reason to de fer set ting a section 366.2 6 hearing , as J.S. was not a n adoption candidate and no one was ready to assume guardianship , but it stated that the permanent plan would be a guardianship.
It order ed continued visitation

. The court also ordered mother ’s educational decisionmaking rights limited in favor of J.S.’s foster caregivers because it was unreasonable not to conduct a n assessment to determine if J.S. was eligible for services.

- Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
1. The court did not err in terminating reunification services. At the outset of a dependency proceeding, the emphasis is on preserv ing the family , given parents’ “ strong fundamental interest

. . . in the care, custody, management and companionship of their children

. ” ( D.T. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1034

. ) But c hildren “ ‘ have compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to have a placem ent that is stable [and] permanent. ’ ” ( Ibid .) To balance these “ sometimes competing interests ,” dependency law “ shift [ s ] the emphasis ” from family preservation to promoting13

the child’s best interests “ if efforts at reunification produce unsatisfactory results or drag on too long. ” ( I bi d .) S ection 361.5 thus sets “ a series of time limitations ” on reunification services, “ with a 12

- month presumptive period for children age three or older, and an 18

- month maximum. ” ( Id. at pp. 1034

– 1035. ) If a child of J.S.’s age is removed from parental custody, the court must order reunification services for a period “beginning with the dispositional hearing and ending 12 months after the date the child entered foster care as provided in section 361.49” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A))

— which in this case was November 20, 2019. A t a 12

- month review or “permanency ” hearing , the juvenile court must order a child return ed to parental custody unless doing so

w ill create a “ substantial risk of detriment ” to the child’s “ safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being.” (§ 366.21) The court must also determine if reasonable services designed to help the parent overcome the problems that led to the removal “ have been provided or offered.” ( Id. , subd. (f)(1)(A).) If at a permanency hearing the parent has received the requisite period of services and the court can not order the child returned to his or her custody , it has three options : (1) e xtend reunification services until a n 18

- month review hearing ( § 366.21 , subd. (g)(1)); (2) schedule a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to terminate paternal rights and set a permanent placement ( § 366.21 , subd. (g)(4)); or (3) order that the child remain in foster care ( id. , subd. (g)(5)).
T o continue reunification services to the 18

- month mark , the option mother advocated , the court must either find that the agenc y has not provided reasonable services or find “ a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent .

. . and safely maintained in the home within the extended period

. ” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)

. ) To find a substantial probability of return, the court must make three subsidiary14

findings , namely, that the parent has (A) “consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child,” (B) “made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the child’s removal” and (C) shown the ability to complete their treatment plan and “provide fo r the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well

- being, and special needs

. ” ( Id

. , subd. (g)(1)(A)

– (C)

. ) M other challenges both the court’s finding that the agency offer ed reasonable services and its holding that it could not find a substantial probability of return

.

a. The evidence did not compel the juvenile court to find a substantial probability of return by the 18

- month deadline. Mother does not challeng e any finding made by the court but disputes its holding that it could not make the three findings required to exten d reunification services past 12 months . (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) While an agency bears the burden at a 12

- month hearing of proving that returning a child to a parent w ill “create a substantial risk of detriment” ( id. , subd. (f)(1)), if the agency bears that burden

— as the agency undisputedly did here

— the burden shifts to the parent seek ing further services to show a substantial probability of return by the 18

- month deadline . ( Id. , subd. (g)(1).) Because mother challenges the resolut ion of issues on which she bore the burden of proof, the question on appeal “becomes whether [her] evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a c haracter and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ( In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528 , disapproved on other ground by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, fn. 4 .) “Put another way, the issue is ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of [mother] as a matter of law.’ ” ( Valero v. Board of Retirement of Tulare County Employees’ Assn. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.) It is “ ‘almost impossible’ ” for a party who had the burden of proof below to satisfy that standard on appeal. ( Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017)15

8 Cal.App.5th 696, 734.) In this case , t he parties debate all th re e findings required to justify exten ding services past the 12

- month mark, but because mother must prevail on all three to succeed on appeal , we need discuss only

one to establish that she falls short. We think it clear that t he evidence d oes not compel a finding that mother proved an ability to complete her treatment plan and provide for J.S.’s safety, physical and emotional welfare, and special needs in the short period that remained before the expiration of 18 months . (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1 )(C).) The plan called for the two to engage in joint therapy to rebuild trust, and for
mot her to re pair her relationship with J.S. by offering to listen and taking time before responding when he is upset

. But f or the first seve n months of the
12

- month period, mother did not take significant steps to seek contact with J.S., besides a few phone calls and the unsuccessful supervised visit in March , at which she show ed a n ongoing inability to listen and respond effectively to hi s fee lings . M oreover, m other repeatedly refused to engage in joint therapy ,

or even in the individual therapy t he agency ask ed her to pursue to prepare for joint therapy. Mother did say in late June 2020 that she was open to family therapy focused on J.S. and that she understood that the agency wanted her to have individual therapy first, yet she only start ed such therapy in September, over nine months into the 12

- month period. When asked if she had learned skills in therapy to cope with J.S.’s departure, she said that she had not. S he now complains that the agency never set up family therapy , but she repeatedly declined invitations to participate in meetings of J.S.’s mental health team or
to work with a parent partner from that team

. She contend s that she tried to arrange joint therapy with Ms. Cranshaw , but she does not claim that after Cranshaw declined to provide therapy, or after mother began individual therapy with another provider in September, she ever tol d the agency that16

she wanted or was prepared to engage in joint therapy with J.S

. , or requested a referral

. Nor does t he record compel a finding that mother show ed the ability to provide for J.S.’s emotional welfare. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C).) She needed to learn to take hi s emotional needs seriously, consider his perspective, and listen supportively , but there is little evidence that she accepted or worked to satisfy that need. She admitted not having thought about the effect on J.S. of having Gabe present at their encounters . When cross

- examined about the effect on J.S. of statements like her remark that he should have been sent to juvenile hall, her testimony show ed a n ongoing inability or unwillingness to consider how her words affect J.S. or impair their relation ship. Having observed her testimony and demeanor, the court found that she “has not tried ever to go to [J.S.]’s level, to try to see life through [his] eyes , ” but “chalks up his behavior to X, Y, and Z

. . . and [has] never tried to understand from his

pe rspective.” Mother does no t cite uncontradicted evidence compelling a contrary finding.
T he record also does not compel a finding that she can provide for J.S.’s special needs. Mother notes that at the hearing she acknowledg ed his mental health problems and admitt ed

— albeit on cross
- examination

— that he might benefit more from talk therapy than medication , given his experience of side effects . S he also cites a meeting in October 2019 at which a summary indicates she stated that J.S. can benefit “from support services such as working with a therapist, a psychiatrist, and medication to help with [his] emotional well

being.” However, given her repeated refusal s to work wi th J.S.’s mental health team ; her com ment to a social worker that h e need s treatment by a doctor, not a therapist ; her testimony that “he needs to be on the constant medication and under the doctor’s care. Not in therapy, but

. . . a psychiatrist” ; and her refusal even to permit a determination of whether he is17

eligible for an IEP, the evidence she cites is far from “ ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached

. ’ ” ( In re I.W. , supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528) It certainly does not compel a finding that she is sufficiently flexible and open to expert advice to satisfy J.S.’s special needs. b. Substantial evidence supports the find ing of reasonable services

. “When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘ “In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” ’ ” ( In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 ( Alvin R. ).) 5
M other contends that while she admittedly refused individual therapy

or supervised visit s for the first seven to nine months after the disposition hearing , “ on August 21, 2020, almost six full months before the hearing in question, [she] called the agency to arrange visitation with [J.S.] as soon as possible” and agreed to work with Mr. Lubembe

. She contends that her

5 Citing section 366.21, subdivision (g), mother contends that the court was required to find reasonable services by clear and convincing evidence. But a court must make such a finding by clear and convi ncing evidence only as a prerequisite for setting a section 366.26 hearing (§ 366.21, subds. (g)(1)(C)(ii) & (g)(4)), not as a prerequisite for ordering that a child remain in foster care ( id. , subd. (g)(5)), as the court did in this case. However, the age ncy does not dispute the evidentiary standard, and we conclude that the court’s order must be affirmed regardless of whether it was required to find reasonable services by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cf. T.J. v. Su perior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1239 [ on appeal from finding of reasonable services in case involving section 366.26 hearing , “ ‘ [w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard ’ ”].)18

belated agreement to engage in supervised visits left the agency “nearly six months ” to ensure the visitation it was required to provide, and that its acquiesc ence in J.S.’s refusal to visit b ar s a finding of reasonable services. Initially, m other is mistaken about the duration of the period in which the agency failed to induce J.S. to visit. After she requested a supervised visit on August 21, the agency and Lubembe arranged one in Pleasanton on September 12 . That unsuccessful visit came nearly 10 months into the
12

- month period of mandatory services , which ended on November 19

. While the permanency hearing was delayed until February , the pertinent question is whether the agency’s failure to induce J.S. to engage in further visits between September 12 and November 19 preclu des a finding that it provided the requisite 12 months of reasonable services. The agency repeatedly urged mother to accept supervised visits and referrals for individual and joint therapy, but she refused to engage in therapy until the end of June, did not begin individual therapy until September, and did not agree to supervised visits until August 20, nine months into the
12

- month period. The agency repeatedly invited her to meetings of J.S.’s mental health team, and offered the help of a parent partner, but she attended only two meetings, one after the 12

- month period, and refused to work with a parent partner. Given the strength and consistency of J.S.’s unwillingness to visit, his age, and the damage done by mot her ’s earlie r failure to pursue contact and by Gabe’s presence when the two did meet , the court did not err in finding that the agency offer ed reasonable services tempered by appropriate caution about visitation

. The record contains neither expert testimony nor any other evidence suggesting that , under the circumstances , there were more strenuous measures the agency reasonably could or should have taken to overcome J.S.’s resistance to meeting with his mother.19

Mother cites Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.A pp.5th 659, in which the Fifth District issued a writ directing a juvenile court to vacate a finding of reasonable services , but t he case is distinguishable. A 13

- year
- old minor, C.C., alleged that her mother repeatedly beat her . ( Id. at pp. 663

– 664.) At the star t of the case, C.C.’s attorney told the court that C.C. did not want
to visit because of the abuse and the minor’s resultant fear of her mother . T he court found at the outset that visitation would be detrimental and directed that no ne occu r until further order. ( Id. at pp. 664

– 6 65.) Through lengthy proceedings end ing in a n 18

- month

- review hearing , the court never modified its detriment finding or authorized contact beyond letter and gift exchange s, despite the agency ’s desire to arrange therapeutic visitation , and despite evidence that C.C. had initiated positive , unauthorized phone and text
contacts with her mother and had vacillated about whether she want ed to visit. ( Id. at pp

. 665

– 6 70.) T he appellate court held that the denial of all
in

- person contact at some point became unreasonable , requir ing a further period of services. ( Id. at pp

. 677

– 6 78.) Here, the court never forb ade contact, and the agency encouraged visit s, offered numerous therapeutic services, and arranged two supervised visits. S erena M. does not suggest that its inability to ensure further visits in the
10

- week period after the September visit bar s a finding of reasonable services.
2. The court did not abuse its discretion regarding educational rights

. A juvenile court may limit a parent’s right to make educational decisions for a child under its jurisdiction , and appoint a responsible adult to do so, to the extent necessary to protect the child . (§ 361, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.649.) We review such orders for abuse of discretion. ( In re D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 58 .) Here, t he court did not abuse its discretion by find ing that mot her ’s refusal to permit J.S. to be evaluated for an IEP was an unreasonable overreaction to her concern about stigma . Because her failure to20

work with J.S.’s mental health team and lack of contact left her out of touch with J.S.’ s current needs, it was reasonable to conclude that it would serve his interests to have the caretakers with whom he was liv ing make future educational decisions. Disposition The chal lenged orders are affirmed.

POLLAK, P. J.

WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J. ROSS, J. *

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursu ant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.