alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2006177EN.01003001.xml

| 29.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 177/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 177/30

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.4265 — Philips/Avent)

(2006/C 177/09)

(Text with EEA relevance)

| 1. | On 20 July 2006, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 and following a referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (‘Philips’, Netherlands) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Avent Holdings Limited (‘Avent’, UK) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 20 July 2006, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 and following a referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (‘Philips’, Netherlands) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Avent Holdings Limited (‘Avent’, UK) by way of purchase of shares.

1

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for Philips: baby-care products; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for Philips: baby-care products;

| — | for Avent: baby-care products. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Avent: baby-care products.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4265 — Philips/Avent, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| B-1049 Brussels |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4265 — Philips/Avent, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

B-1049 Brussels

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004 p. 1.

1

---
#### § 39.160 Does ISEF provide supplemental funding for extraordinary costs related to a school's geographic isolation?

Yes. Havasupai Elementary School, for as long as it remains in its present location, will be awarded an additional cost factor of 12.5 WSU.
152 So.2d 155

#### Robert Moody SPARROW v. A. H. EVANS, Jr., et al.

2 Div. 436.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 11, 1963.

Joe Thompson and W. H. Lindsey, Jr., Butler, for appellant.

Franklin C. Evans, Butler, for appellees.

HARWOOD, Justice.

Supreme Court Rule 24 requires that the organization of the court be shown at the beginning of the transcript for an appeal. A form for such showing is set forth in said rule.

Where the record fails to show the organization of the court, such deficiency is jurisdictional and this court must take notice thereof ex mero motu. McPherson v. Stallworth, 262 Ala. 367, 78 So.2d 924; Barnes v. Salter, 270 Ala. 110, 116 So.2d 748; West v. Camp, 264 Ala. 644, 89 So.2d 170; Tidwell v. State, 41 Ala.App. 296, 130 So.2d 206.

The record in this appeal fails to show the organization of the court.

We have examined the original record in Barnes v. Salter, supra. The statements in that record as to the proceedings below, and which were considered insufficient to show the organization of the court, are to all intents and purposes, the same as the statements in the present record. Of necessity, therefore this appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and MERRILL, JJ., concur.
#### § 293.17 May a compact or amendment include provisions addressing the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the Tribe and the State?

Yes. A compact or amendment may include provisions allocating criminal and civil jurisdiction between the Tribe and the State necessary for the enforcement of the laws and regulations described in § 293.16.
# C_2006178EN.01001701.xml

| 29.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 178/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 178/17

---

Appeal brought on 4 May 2006 by Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV against the judgement of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 23 February 2006 in Case T-282/02: Cementbouw Handel & Industrie B.V. v Commission of the European Communities

(Case C-202/06 P)

(2006/C 178/27)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV (represented by: W. Knibbeler, O. Brouwer and P.J. Kreijger, lawyers)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Commission of the European Communities

Other party to the proceedings:

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgement of the Court of First Instance of 23 February 2006 by which it:






  a) | dismissed the action brought by the Appellant |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgement of the Court of First Instance of 23 February 2006 by which it:

a)

dismissed the action brought by the Appellant

| b) | ordered the Appellant to pay the costs of the proceedings |
| --- | --- |

b)

ordered the Appellant to pay the costs of the proceedings

| — | if considered appropriate, refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for judgment; |
| --- | --- |

—

if considered appropriate, refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for judgment;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs, including the costs incurred by eventual intervening parties. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs, including the costs incurred by eventual intervening parties.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant maintains that the Court of First Instance in its judgement of 23 February 2006:

| a. | misinterpreted and misapplied Articles 1, 2 and 3(1) of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 (the Merger Regulation) (1) and: |
| --- | --- |

a.

misinterpreted and misapplied Articles 1, 2 and 3(1) of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 (the Merger Regulation) (1) and:

1

| b. | violated the principle of proportionality and misinterpreted and misapplied Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

b.

violated the principle of proportionality and misinterpreted and misapplied Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation;

which led it wrongly to dismiss the Appellant's application and to uphold the decision of the Commission in so far as it rejected the first set of commitments offered by the Appellant and Haniel as insufficient.

---

(1)  OJ L 180, p. 1.

1

---
§ 26.12 Who provides the Job Placement and Training? The Bureau or a tribal service provider may enter into contracts or agreements to provide facilities and services required for vocational training programs with: ( a ) Indian tribal governing bodies or, when approved by the tribal service provider, other provider of meaningful training programs not currently operated by the tribe;
( b ) Appropriate Federal, State, or local government agencies;
( c ) Public or private schools with a recognized reputation in vocational education and successfully obtaining employment for graduates;
( d ) Education firms that operate residential training centers; and
( e ) Corporations and associations or small business establishments with apprenticeship or on-the-job training (OJT) programs leading to skilled employment.
# C_2006165EN.01000102.xml

| 15.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 165/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 165/1

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 4 May 2006 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the House of Lords (United Kingdom)) — Diane Barker v London Borough of Bromley

(Case C-290/03) (1)

1

(Directive 85/337/EEC - Assessment of the effects of certain projects on the environment - Crystal Palace development project - Projects falling within Annex II to Directive 85/337 - Grant of consent comprising more than one stage)

(2006/C 165/02)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

House of Lords

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Diane Barker

Applicant:

Defendant: London Borough of Bromley

Defendant:

Intervener: First Secretary of State

Intervener:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — House of Lords — Interpretation of Articles 1(2) and 2(1) of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment — No assessment before the grant of consent for a project likely to have effects on the environment — Obligation to subject the project to subsequent assessment — Development of the Crystal Palace site for leisure purposes

Operative part of the judgment

| 1. | Classification of a decision as a ‘development consent’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment must be carried out pursuant to national law in a manner consistent with Community law. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Classification of a decision as a ‘development consent’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment must be carried out pursuant to national law in a manner consistent with Community law.

| 2. | Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of Directive 85/337 are to be interpreted as requiring an environmental impact assessment to be carried out if, in the case of grant of consent comprising more than one stage, it becomes apparent, in the course of the second stage, that the project is likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia of its nature, size or location. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of Directive 85/337 are to be interpreted as requiring an environmental impact assessment to be carried out if, in the case of grant of consent comprising more than one stage, it becomes apparent, in the course of the second stage, that the project is likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia of its nature, size or location.

---

(1)  OJ C 213, 6.9.2003.

1

---
#### Gulbransen-Dickinson Company *v.*Larrew.

[No. 12,113.

Filed April 2, 1925.]

1. New *Trial.—Assigning as cause for a new trial that a specified. finding (of the court’s special findings) is not sustained by, evidence presents no*question.—Assigning as a cause for a new trial that a specified finding (of the court’s special findings) is not sustained by sufficient evidence.presents no question on appeal, p. 620.

2. *Appeal.—Erroneous conclusion of law which is the basis of judgment for appellee requires reversal of*judgment.—An erroneous conclusion of law which is the basis for another conclusion of law which amounts to a finding in favor of appellee requires the reversal of the judgment, p. 620.

From Starke Circuit Court; *William C. Pentecost,*Judge.

*620Action by the Gulbransen-Diekinson Company against William C. Larrew, in which the latter filed a cross-complaint. From a judgment on the cross-complaint, the plaintiff appeals.

*Reversed.*

*Orville W.*Nichols, for appellant.

*James C. Fletcher*and *Charles Hamilton Peters,*for appellee.

Nichols, J.

1. by appellant against appellee on account for the purchase price of a player-piano. Appellee, by cross-complaint, demanded damages of appellant for breach of an exclusive sales contract. There was judgment for the difference between the amount due on the complaint, and the damages on the cross-complaint in favor of appellee. The only reasons for a new trial which appellant seeks to present are that finding No. 1 is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and that it is contrary to law. This presents no question. *Scott*v. *Collier*(1906), 166 Ind. 644, 78 N. E. 184; *Hamrick*v. *Hoover*(1908), 41 Ind. App. 411, 84 N. E. 28.

2. It appears by special finding No. 1 that the contract of agency between appellee and appellant was entered into on March 10, 1921, in which contract appellee was given the exclusive agency of Starke and Pulaski counties, with the agreement by appellant that it would protect such territory in the spirit of fair play. By finding No. 5, it appears that theretofore, to wit: on February 26, 1921, one Miller took an order for a player-piano, of appellant’s manufacture, from one Hite, which order was forwarded to appellant, but the piano was not delivered to Hite until March 16, 1921, six days after appellee’s agency contract. We hold, however, that by the spirit of fair play, appellee was not entitled to the commission on this sale as held in conclusion of law No. 2, and that therefore such *621conclusion was error, and that automatically conclusion of law No. 3, holding that appellee was entitled to judgment for the difference between the commission and the amount due on the complaint, was also error.

Judgment reversed, with instruction to the court to enter judgment in harmony with this opinion.
# C_2006261EN.01002502.xml

| 28.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 261/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 261/25

---

Action brought on 5 September 2006 — Cabrera Sánchez v OHIM — Industrias Cárnicas Valle (El charcutero artesano)

(Case T-242/06)

(2006/C 261/48)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Miguel Cabrera Sánchez (Móstoles, Spain) (represented by: J. A. Calderón Chavero and T. Villate Consonni, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Industrias Cárnicas Valle SA

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

| — | annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 June 2006 in Case R-790/2005-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 16 June 2006 in Case R-790/2005-1;

| — | annul Decision 2239/2005 in opposition No 637 647; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Decision 2239/2005 in opposition No 637 647;

| — | order the Opposition Division to refuse in full registration of the mark concerned; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Opposition Division to refuse in full registration of the mark concerned;

| — | order OHIM to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order OHIM to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: Industrias Cárnicas Valle SA

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: Figurative colour mark EL CHARCUTERO ARTESANO (Application No 2 823 193) for goods in Class 29

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The applicant

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: National figurative mark (No 2 047 511) EL CHARCUTERO for goods in Class 29

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Rejection of the opposition and registration of the mark applied for

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Misapplication of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark

Pleas in law:

---
### §8019. General Counsel

(a) There is a General Counsel of the Department of the Navy, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) The General Counsel shall perform such functions as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.

(Added Pub. L. 99–433, title V, §511(c)(4), Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1047, §5019; amended Pub. L. 100–456, div. A, title VII, §703(a), Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 1996; renumbered §8019, Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title VIII, §807(a)(1), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 1834.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 8019 was renumbered section 9019 of this title.

Another prior section 8019 was renumbered section 9038 of this title.

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–232 renumbered section 5019 of this title as this section.

1988—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100–456 inserted ", by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" before period at end.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2018 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 115–232 effective Feb. 1, 2019, with provision for the coordination of amendments and special rule for certain redesignations, see section 800 of Pub. L. 115–232, set out as a note preceding section 3001 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1988 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–456 applicable to appointments made under this section on and after Sept. 29, 1988, see section 703(c) of Pub. L. 100–456, set out as a note under section 7019 of this title.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-76,998-03

IN RE PAUL RAY DESILETS, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 08-12-11262-CR-I, II IN THE 359 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant

to the original jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in the 359 District Court of Montgomery County, that more than 180 days have th

elapsed, and that the application has not yet been forwarded to this Court. Relator contends that the

district court entered an order designating issues on November 26, 2014.

Respondent, the Judge of the 359 District Court of Montgomery County, shall file a

th

response with this Court by having the District Clerk submit the record on such habeas corpus

application. In the alternative, Respondent may resolve the issues set out in the order designating
2

issues and then have the District Clerk submit the record on such application. In either case,

Respondent’s answer shall be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order. This application

for leave to file a writ of mandamus will be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted his

response.

Filed: July 29, 2015

Do not publish
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
AR TUR O DE JESUS AGUIR REFLORE S, Pe titione r, v. ER IC H. HOLDER , Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R

e sponde n t . No. 13-71528 Age n c y No. A029-255-866 M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Subm itte d August 13, 2014 ** B e fore : SC HR O EDER , THOM AS, and HUR W ITZ, C i rc uit Judge s . Arturo De Je sus Aguirre -Flore s, a nat ive an d c itiz e n of El Sa lva dor, pe titions pro se for re vie w of a

B oa rd of Im m i gration Appe a ls orde r dism issing his a ppe a l from an im m igration judge ’ s de nia l of Aguirre -Flore s’ m otion to re ope n de porta tion proc e e dings c onduc te d in a bse ntia . W e have jurisdic tion unde r 8



# F IL ED AUG 15 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).U.S.C . § 1252. W e re v ie w for a buse of disc re tion thede nia l of a m otion to re ope n. Urbina-Ose

jo v . IN S , 124 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th C ir. 1997). W e de ny the pe tition for re vie w. The a ge n c y

did not a b u se its disc re tion by

de ny ing Aguirre -Flore s’ m otion to re ope n be c a

use he did not de m onstra

t e re a sona ble c a use for fa i ling to a

tte nd his 1990 de porta

t i on he aring. Se e i d. (m otion to re ope n in a bse ntia de p ortation he aring c ould be grante d only if a lie n de m onstra

te d re a s ona b le c a u se for m issing the h e aring). PE T IT IO N FO R RE V IE WDE NIE D.

1 3
- 7 1 5 2 8 2
§ 162.579 What are the consent requirements for a sublease of a WSR lease? ( a ) Unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee must notify all Indian landowners of the proposed sublease.
( b ) The Indian landowners, or their representatives under § 162.013, must consent to a sublease in the same percentages and manner as a new WSR lease under § 162.012, unless the lease: ( 1 ) Provides that individual Indian landowners are deemed to have consented where they do not object in writing to the sublease within a specified period of time following the landowners' receipt of the sublease and the lease meets the requirements in paragraph (c) of this section;
( 2 ) Authorizes one or more representatives to consent to a sublease on behalf of all Indian landowners; or
( 3 ) Designates us as the Indian landowners' representative for the purposes of consenting to a sublease.
( c ) If the lease provides for deemed consent under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, it must require the parties to submit to us: ( 1 ) A copy of the executed sublease or other documentation of any Indian landowners' actual consent;
( 2 ) Proof of mailing of the sublease to any Indian landowners who are deemed to have consented; and
( 3 ) Any other pertinent information for us to review.