NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS

NNSA Needs to 

Determine Critical 

Skills and 

Competencies for Its 

Strategic Materials 

Programs

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2017

GAO-18-99

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-99, a report to 

congressional committees

November 2017

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NNSA Needs to Determine Critical Skills and 

Competencies for Its Strategic Materials Programs

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) manages strategic materials programs for uranium, plutonium, tritium, 

and lithium—materials that are critical to national security. NNSA has set 

program requirements that each of the programs must follow and has 

established the roles and responsibilities of the program managers. NNSA has 

defined these requirements in two documents:

• Program Execution Instruction (2016). Outlines requirements for program

management documents, such as a program plan, cost and schedule

estimates, and an integrated master schedule that includes the entire scope

of work for successful execution.

• Program Management Policy (2017). Outlines the program managers’

authority and requirements for managing the strategic materials programs,

such as managing risk, and requires each program to develop documents,

such as a mission strategy and technology development plan.

NNSA officials reported that the agency is making progress implementing the 

requirements outlined for each of the strategic materials programs, although 

some of the programs are farther along than others. For example:

• The uranium and domestic uranium enrichment programs established in

2014 are the furthest along and have developed the documents needed to

meet strategic program requirements.

• The plutonium program has met some of the requirements, such as

developing a program plan, work breakdown structure, and decision

analysis, but does not yet have an integrated master schedule.

• The tritium program met the requirements during the course of GAO’s

review.

• The lithium program, which is the newest, has made the least amount of

progress and to date has developed only a mission strategy, a mission

requirements matrix, and a technology development plan.

According to NNSA officials, shortage of staff assigned to the strategic materials 

programs has been the primary reason hampering progress in implementing the 

program requirements. For example, a lithium program manager has not yet 

been assigned, and all the other programs have identified the need for additional 

staff beyond the one or two staff currently assigned to each. According to 

officials, competing agency priorities and perceived staffing limits are the primary 

impediments to assigning more staff to these programs. However, GAO also 

found that NNSA has not determined the critical skills and competencies needed 

for these programs. GAO’s prior work has identified certain activities or practices 

that can help an agency strategically manage its human capital. These activities 

include determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to 

achieve the program’s mission and developing strategies to address gaps in the 

number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed. By determining the critical 

skills and competencies needed for the strategic materials programs and using 

this determination to develop strategies to address any gaps in the number, 

deployment, and alignment of program staff, NNSA may have the information it 

needs to better justify increased staffing levels for the programs.

View GAO-18-99. For more information, 

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA is responsible for ensuring a 

sustainable supply of strategic 

materials critical to the nation’s nuclear 

security missions, as well as the 

capability to process these materials. 

NNSA estimates that strategic 

materials management activities will 

cost about $7.7 billion over the next 5 

years. 

The House Report accompanying H.R. 

4909, a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 

included a provision for GAO to review 

NNSA’s management of its strategic 

materials programs. This report 

examines (1) the extent to which 

NNSA has, for these programs, 

defined requirements, including 

program manager roles and 

responsibilities, and (2) the progress of 

NNSA’s implementation of those 

program requirements.

GAO reviewed NNSA program 

management policies and documents 

related to its strategic materials 

program manager positions and 

interviewed NNSA officials and 

program managers.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA

determine the critical skills and 

competencies that will be needed for

the strategic materials programs and 

use this determination to develop 

strategies for addressing any gaps

related to the number, deployment,

and alignment of program staff. NNSA 

agreed with GAO’s recommendation.
Page i GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Letter 1

Background 4

NNSA Has Defined Strategic Materials Program Requirements, 

Including Roles and Responsibilities for Program Managers 8

NNSA Officials Reported Progress in Meeting Strategic Materials 

Program Requirements but Challenges from Staffing Shortages 10

Conclusions 14

Recommendation for Executive Action 15

Agency Comments 15

Appendix I Strategic Nuclear Materials Managed by the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) 17

Appendix II Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 20

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 22

Related GAO Products 23

Table

Table 1: National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) 

Estimated Strategic Materials Program Costs, Fiscal 

Years (FY) 2017-2021 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Abbreviations

CMRR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

UPF Uranium Processing Facility

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Page 1 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 14, 2017

The Honorable John S. McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Certain materials—such as uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium—are 

critical to the nuclear security missions of the Department of Energy 

(DOE). These missions include ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable 

nuclear deterrent; achieving designated reductions in the nuclear 

weapons stockpile; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation 

efforts. Managing these missions is the responsibility of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency 

within DOE. To carry out this responsibility, NNSA must ensure a 

sustainable supply of these materials, which NNSA calls strategic 

materials.1 For example, NNSA is seeking to establish a new capability to 

enrich uranium—a capability that it lost with the 2013 closure of the aging 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky—to sustain the production 

of tritium.

NNSA has established programs for ensuring the supply of each of these 

four strategic materials, as well as a separate strategic materials program 

specifically to develop the new domestic uranium enrichment capability.2

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs, responsible for implementing 

NNSA’s stockpile mission, in 2014 and 2015 named federal program 

managers to oversee the uranium, domestic uranium enrichment, 

 1

NNSA’s effort to ensure the supply as well as the related handling and processing of 

these materials is referred to as “sustainment.”

2 See app. I for further information on individual strategic materials managed by NNSA.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

plutonium, and tritium programs and has designated a lead point of 

contact for the lithium program.3 As we reported in November 2016, 

program managers play key roles in the federal government, including 

overseeing contracts to help agencies get what they need at the right time 

and at a reasonable price.4

The strategic materials program managers and lithium lead point of 

contact are responsible for complex programs that may take decades and 

cost billions of dollars to execute and that often include the design and 

construction of major projects (i.e., those with an estimated cost of $750 

million or greater). Such projects include the Uranium Processing Facility 

(UPF), which is under construction in Tennessee to replace and 

modernize a portion of NNSA’s enriched uranium capabilities, and a 

variety of activities to replace the capabilities of the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Facility—built in the 1950s—in New Mexico for 

conducting plutonium analysis. NNSA estimated that it would cost about 

$1.4 billion in fiscal year 2018 to carry out its annual activities associated 

with its strategic materials programs.

The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying H.R. 4909, 

a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 

included a provision for us to review NNSA’s management of its strategic 

materials programs.5 This report examines (1) the extent to which NNSA 

has, for its strategic materials programs, defined program requirements, 

including program manager roles and responsibilities; and (2) the 

progress of NNSA’s implementation of those program requirements.

To examine the extent to which NNSA has defined program requirements 

for its strategic materials programs, we reviewed NNSA directives on 

 3

Lithium sustainment activities are still in the early stages of development. NNSA has 

recognized the need to establish a lithium program and appoint a program manager and 

plans to do so following pending senior NNSA leadership decisions. According to NNSA 

officials, the lithium lead point of contact has full decision authority and serves as the 

functional, acting lithium program manager with the ability to plan and execute the overall 

lithium mission strategy. See also GAO, DOE Project Management: NNSA Should Ensure 

Equal Consideration of Alternatives for Lithium Production, GAO-15-525 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 13, 2015). 

4

GAO, Program Management: DOE Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Policy and

Training Program, GAO-17-51 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2016).

5

H.R. Rep. No. 114-537, at 397-8 (2016).
Page 3 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

program management, including its 2016 Program Execution Instruction.

6

To review NNSA’s definition of strategic materials program manager roles 

and responsibilities, we reviewed the NNSA memorandums that created 

and described strategic materials program manager positions, where 

applicable, as well as NNSA’s 2017 Program Management Policy for 

Weapons and Strategic Materials Programs. To examine NNSA’s 

progress toward implementing program requirements for its strategic 

materials programs, we obtained and reviewed all of the documents that 

NNSA programs had completed as of June 2017 in response to 

requirements contained in NNSA’s 2017 Program Management Policy for 

Weapons and Strategic Materials Programs. In addition, we obtained and 

reviewed documents for a nonprobability sample of 22 of the 65 total 

requirements that strategic materials programs must implement based on 

NNSA’s 2016 Program Execution Instruction. This sample included key 

documents such as program plans and the work breakdown structures for 

all of the strategic materials programs. The results of our review of this 

sample of requirements are not generalizable but represent illustrative 

examples of NNSA’s progress. NNSA also identified a number of 

documents that were still being developed in response to both sets of 

requirements. We interviewed all four of NNSA’s appointed strategic 

materials managers and the lithium lead point of contact, as well as other 

NNSA officials to better understand the steps NNSA had taken as of 

September 2017 to implement these requirements. We also reviewed 

NNSA’s budget requests for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018 and other 

relevant agency documents, such as strategies and implementation plans 

for the strategic materials programs.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2016 to November 2017 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 6

NNSA institutionalizes policies, requirements, responsibilities, and procedures through 

NNSA Policy Letters in the form of NNSA Policies, Supplemental Directives, and Business 

Operating Procedures. See National Nuclear Security Administration, Supplemental 

Directive 251.1, Policy Letters: NNSA Policies, Supplemental Directives, and Business 

Operating Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2013).
Page 4 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

NNSA’s strategic materials programs include a broad range of activities. 

The programs often include (1) building unique new facilities, (2) 

modifying and repairing existing facilities and equipment, and (3) 

developing and deploying new technologies for processing and producing 

strategic nuclear materials. The programs may involve multiple NNSA 

and DOE sites and multiple facilities at a given site. For example, since 

the days of the Manhattan Project, a large portion of the nation’s uranium 

mission has been executed at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee, with uranium production and associated operations 

housed in several nuclear facilities within the complex. These facilities are 

in some cases more than 60 years old. NNSA’s uranium program is 

coordinating efforts to build the UPF, invest in the infrastructure of

existing facilities to extend their lives, and develop and deploy several 

new technologies that are expected to increase the efficiency and 

effectiveness of uranium processing. Collectively, these uranium program 

activities may take more than 2 decades to implement and cost several 

billion dollars.

NNSA’s 2017 future-years nuclear security program estimate projected 

that NNSA would need about $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2018 to carry out 

its annual activities associated with the management of these strategic 

materials programs (see table 1). NNSA documents indicate that the 

agency expects to spend about $7.7 billion over the next 5 years on 

activities related to managing its strategic materials. This spending, which 

would represent about 12 percent of the approximately $63 billion NNSA 

expects to spend on all weapons activities over this same time period, 

includes:

• $4.8 billion for costs related to construction of facilities and other 

capital equipment purchases that will be used to support the strategic 

materials mission; and

• $2.9 billion for program costs related to general activities such as 

reducing risk and ensuring sufficient supply, as well as the 

consolidation, disposition, tracking, and accounting of nuclear 

materials.

Background
Page 5 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Table 1: National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Estimated Strategic Materials Program Costs, Fiscal Years (FY) 

2017-2021

Dollars in millions

Construction costs FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 Total

Uranium Processing Facility 575.0 663.0 722.0 735.0 740.0 3,435.0 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement Facility

150.6 180.9 236.0 239.6 274.0 1,081.1 

Lithium Production Facility 1.6 0.0 30.4 37.5 56.0 125.5 

Tritium Production Capability 3.0 9.8 28.5 52.5 16.0 109.8 

Subtotal 730.2 853.7 1,016.9 1,064.6 1,086.0 4,751.4 

Other program costsa 

Uranium 21.0 20.6 24.3 29.3 30.3 125.4 

Domestic Uranium Enrichment 50.0 60.0 70.0 110.0 112.5 402.5 

Plutonium 185.0 153.4b 169.0 191.0 194.4 892.8 

Tritium 109.8 157.2c 120.4 122.9 125.2 635.5 

Strategic Materials Sustainmentd 179.1 172.5 168.7 175.8 180.7 876.8 

Subtotal 544.9 563.6 552.5 629.0 643.1 2,933.1 

Total 1,275.1 1,417.3 1,569.4 1,693.6 1,729.1 7,684.5 

Source: Department of Energy and NNSA data.   |  GAO-18-99

a

Other program costs are associated with activities such as reducing risk and ensuring sufficient 

supply, as well as technology development and deployment, modernization of existing facilities, and 

the consolidation, disposition, tracking, and accounting of nuclear materials.

b

NNSA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request for plutonium sustainment is $210.4 million.

c

NNSA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request for tritium sustainment is $198.2 million. According to NNSA 

officials, current estimates are being revised and could be higher for fiscal years 2019 to 2023.

d

This item includes some material recycle, recovery, and storage processes as well as approximately 

$17.8 million for lithium over the next 5 years. Additional lithium program funding comes from 

production support, weapons dismantlement and disposition, and other sources.

Program managers are an important part of the federal government’s 

workforce. They interact with the managers of individual projects to 

provide support and guidance on those projects but also must take a 

broad view of the overall objectives of programs and an agency’s 

organizational culture. According to leading practices outlined by the 

Project Management Institute, organizations develop program plans, 

capture and understand stakeholder needs, and establish processes for 
Page 6 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

maintaining program management oversight, among other activities.7

Recognizing the importance of improving program management, in 

December 2016 the President signed the ‘‘Program Management 

Improvement Accountability Act” that required the Office of Management 

and Budget to, among other things, adopt and oversee implementation of 

government-wide standards, policies, and guidelines for program and 

project management for executive agencies and assess the quality and 

effectiveness of program management for these agencies.8 We have 

previously reported on DOE’s and NNSA’s program management 

challenges.

• In March 2009, we found that NNSA and the Department of Defense 

(DOD) established unrealistic schedules, did not establish consistent 

cost baselines, and did not effectively manage technical risks in some 

of their nuclear weapon life extension programs.9 These problems 

resulted in delays, additional expenditures, difficulties tracking the 

cost of the programs, and difficulties in meeting all of NNSA’s and 

DOD’s technical objectives. We recommended that NNSA develop 

and use consistent budget assumptions and criteria for the baseline to 

track costs over time, among other actions. NNSA agreed with our 

recommendations and made changes to its cost estimating 

procedures.

• In November 2014, we found that the lack of requirements for 

programs meant that DOE could not ensure that it was developing 

fully credible cost estimates for programs.10 We recommended that 

DOE revise its program management directives to require that 

programs develop life-cycle cost estimates in accordance with our 12 

 7

See Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management, Third 

Edition 2013. The Project Management Institute is a not-for-profit association that provides 

global standards for, among other things, project and program management. These 

standards are utilized worldwide and provide guidance on how to manage various aspects 

of projects, programs, and portfolios.

8

Pub. L. No. 114-264, 130 Stat. 1371 (2016) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 503, 1126 (2017)).

9

GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the Stockpile 

Life Extension Program, GAO-09-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009). Life extension 

programs entail refurbishing or replacing weapon components to extend the lives of 

weapons such as the B61 bomb. These programs may also enhance safety and security 

characteristics of weapons.

10GAO, Project and Program Management: DOE Needs to Revise Requirements and 

Guidance for Cost Estimating and Related Reviews, GAO-15-29 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 

25, 2014).
Page 7 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

cost-estimating best practice steps. DOE agreed with our 

recommendation but has not yet incorporated the best practice steps 

into its program management directives.

• In February 2016, we found that the B61-12 life extension program, 

the most complex such program NNSA has undertaken to date, faces 

ongoing management challenges in some areas, including staff 

shortfalls and an earned value management system that has yet to be 

tested.11 We did not make any recommendations but reiterated 

previous recommendations such as those already mentioned.

• In November 2016, we found that DOE and NNSA had not 

established organization-wide policies or practices addressing leading 

practices related to program management, and we recommended that 

DOE do so.12 DOE did not agree or disagree with this 

recommendation. NNSA, however, in late 2016 instituted a training 

program for program management.

NNSA’s stockpile stewardship program has established strategic 

materials as one of the major elements to sustain the nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile. According to NNSA budget documents, the strategic 

materials programs help ensure the sustainment of nuclear material 

processing capabilities and fund the stabilization, consolidation, 

disposition, tracking, and accounting of nuclear materials. Strategic 

materials are generally not available, or are available only in limited 

quantities, from commercial suppliers because of their specific properties 

and use in nuclear weapons or for other national security purposes. 

NNSA named strategic material program managers in 2014 and 2015 to 

integrate, oversee, plan, and execute material strategies for uranium 

(including domestic uranium enrichment), plutonium, and tritium.

In addition to the general program management challenges highlighted 

above, we have also reported previously on challenges facing NNSA’s 

strategic materials programs:

• In July 2015, we found that NNSA had identified various challenges in 

its lithium production strategy that may impact its ability to meet 

 11GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Has a New Approach to Managing the B61-12 Life 

Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and Other Risks Remain, GAO-16-218 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2016).

12GAO-17-51.
Page 8 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

demand for lithium in the future.13 These challenges included 

insufficient supply of lithium material and constraints facing NNSA’s 

efforts to replace the aging lithium production facility. We 

recommended that NNSA objectively consider all alternatives, without 

preference for a particular solution, as it proceeds with its analysis of 

alternatives process. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our 

recommendation but did undertake a formal analysis of alternatives in 

2017, according to NNSA officials.

• In August 2016, we found that NNSA had not documented important 

requirements for its plutonium program at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory in New Mexico.14 We recommended that, among other 

things, NNSA should update its program requirements. NNSA outlined 

actions taken and planned to address this recommendation.

NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs has set program requirements for 

the strategic materials programs and has established the roles and 

responsibilities of the programs’ managers. NNSA defined these program 

requirements in two documents issued in 2016 and 2017. Collectively 

these documents set documentation requirements as well as established 

the roles and responsibilities of the strategic materials program 

managers. According to NNSA officials, these requirements apply to each 

of the programs, including the lithium program. These requirements are 

outlined below.

• Program Execution Instruction (2016) – In January 2016, NNSA 

approved a Program Execution Instruction that defines requirements 

for carrying out NNSA defense programs, such as the strategic 

materials programs.15 This instruction outlines a series of 

requirements that vary based on the categorization—and therefore 

the rigor—of management applied to a program. Of the four 

categories outlined in the instruction—Standard Management, 

Enhanced Management A, Enhanced Management B, and Capital 

Acquisition Management—NNSA has generally designated the

strategic materials programs as “Enhanced Management B,” the most 

rigorous designation applicable to this type of program, according to 

 13GAO-15-525.

14GAO, DOE Project Management: NNSA Needs to Clarify Requirements for Its Plutonium 

Analysis Project at Los Alamos, GAO-16-585 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 2016).

15National Nuclear Security Administration, “DP Program Execution Instruction: NA-10 

Program Management Tools and Processes,” Rev. 1 (Oct. 15, 2015).

NNSA Has Defined 

Strategic Materials 

Program 

Requirements, 

Including Roles and 

Responsibilities for 

Program Managers
Page 9 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

NNSA officials.16 The “Enhanced Management B” programs are 

required to have the following elements documented: a program plan, 

a work breakdown structure that details the work elements necessary 

to organize the total work scope with cost estimates, a decision 

analysis, an integrated master schedule that includes the entire scope 

of work required for the program’s successful execution, a 

performance management approach, and a lessons learned/best 

practices review.17 According to the instruction, if the scope, cost, and 

schedule of a program are more complex, moving to a more rigorous 

program management category is often required. According to the 

instruction, when enhanced complexity and risk are associated with a 

program, among other things, “Enhanced Management B” is the 

appropriate designation. The instruction also allows for programs to 

“tailor,” or modify, the application of certain requirements depending 

on risk and other factors.

• Program Management Policy for Weapons and Strategic 

Materials Programs (2017) – NNSA issued a program management 

policy in January 2017 that defines general roles and responsibilities 

for all four strategic materials program managers.18 This policy 

broadly outlines the managers’ authority and responsibilities for 

managing the strategic materials; these responsibilities include 

developing program documentation and managing risk. According to 

NNSA officials we interviewed, the policy is based on NNSA’s 

experience in implementing the uranium program in 2014. The policy 

requires each of the strategic materials programs to develop a 

number of guidance documents, including a mission strategy, mission 

requirements, and a technology development plan. For each program, 

the policy also requires the formation of a strategic materials mission 

 16NNSA designated the lithium program as a “Standard Management” program, which 

entails a slightly less rigorous set of requirements.

17The instruction includes additional required documents not listed here because, 

according to the instruction, they may be included in the program plan.

18National Nuclear Security Administration, “Program Management Policy for Weapons 

and Strategic Materials Programs,” BOP-06.07 (Jan. 17, 2017). Since NNSA has not yet 

appointed a manager for the lithium program, this policy only applies to the other four 

materials programs.
Page 10 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

working group that is comprised of the key stakeholders involved in 

the program.19

NNSA officials told us that they are making progress in implementing the 

program requirements outlined for each of the strategic materials 

programs, although some are further along than others. However, these 

officials said that relatively few staff had been assigned to these 

programs, which has challenged implementation efforts.

For its two strategic materials programs established in 2014—uranium 

and domestic uranium enrichment—NNSA officials told us that they are 

generally meeting the strategic materials program management 

requirements outlined in the Program Execution Instruction and the 

Program Management Policy for Weapons and Strategic Materials.20

NNSA officials identified documents for each program, including mission 

strategy, mission requirements, program plan, and work breakdown 

structure. For the other programs, according to agency officials, NNSA is 

still working to meet these requirements, though the tritium program met 

all requirements during the course of this review. More specifically, 

according to agency officials:

 19Prior to the issuance of this policy, in July and October of 2014, the NNSA Administrator 

issued specific memorandums for the uranium and domestic uranium enrichment program 

managers. These memorandums assigned oversight and coordination roles to those 

program managers and listed their responsibilities. For example, the uranium program 

manager’s memorandum lists responsibilities such as the creation of a uranium strategy. 

The domestic uranium enrichment program manager’s memorandum lists responsibilities 

such as overseeing existing enrichment technology, determining budget requirements, 

and assessing legal issues. According to agency officials, NNSA has not issued similar 

detailed memorandums for the other strategic materials programs and does not have 

plans to do so, given the more broadly applicable program management policy that it 

issued in January 2017.

20NNSA officials said that the Program Execution Instruction applies only to the 

sustainment activities within each strategic materials program.

NNSA Officials 

Reported Progress in 

Meeting Strategic 

Materials Program 

Requirements but 

Challenges from 

Staffing Shortages

Progress Reported in 

Implementing Program 

Requirements
Page 11 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

• The plutonium sustainment program has met some of the Program 

Execution Instruction requirements to date, including having in place a 

program plan, work breakdown structure, and decision analysis, but 

not an integrated master schedule (although one is being developed, 

according to agency officials). The plutonium program also has a 

mission strategy in place, as called for by the Program Management 

Policy for Weapons and Strategic Materials, but has not yet met the 

other strategic materials program management requirements. 

According to agency officials, those requirements are being 

developed.

• The tritium sustainment program has recently met the Program 

Execution Instruction requirements as well, including having a 

program plan, work breakdown structure, integrated master schedule, 

and performance management approach in place. Additionally, the

program recently updated documentation to meet the Program 

Management Policy requirements including revising its Strategic 

Material Mission Working Group in 2017, according to agency 

officials.

• The lithium program is early in its development, and no program 

manager has been appointed yet, pending senior NNSA leadership 

decisions. NNSA has a lithium mission strategy, a mission 

requirements matrix, and a technology development plan in place, as 

required by the Program Management Policy for Weapons and 

Strategic Materials, but the rest of the strategic materials program 

management requirements are still in the process of being developed, 

according to agency officials. NNSA officials said that even though the 

lithium program is not subject to the same requirements, they intend 

for it to meet all of the same requirements as the other strategic 

materials programs.

Officials from the Office of Defense Programs, including the strategic 

materials program managers themselves, said that a shortage of staff has 

presented a challenge in terms of implementing the requirements of the 

strategic materials programs and meeting their missions. According to 

NNSA officials, all of the strategic materials programs have been 

assigned relatively few federal staff to implement the programs. The 

officials also said that while they plan to have all five strategic materials 

programs fully meet the requirements and operate as cohesive programs, 

the lack of staff has hampered their efforts to do so. For example, the 

plutonium manager said more staff were needed to successfully 

implement the program, and the lithium lead point of contact said that at 

least two full-time staff members would be required to accomplish the 

Staffing Challenges 

Reported
Page 12 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

work needed to make the lithium program meet program requirements. 

Specifically, according to agency officials as of October 2017, in addition 

to contractor support:

• the uranium program had the program manager and two federal 

staff assigned;

• the domestic uranium enrichment program had the program 

manager and one federal staff assigned;

• the plutonium program had the program manager and one federal 

staff member;

• the tritium program had the program manager and no dedicated 

staff, relying instead on staff in other programs such as a federal 

program manager from a different program who acts as staff for this 

program; and

• the lithium program had the lead point of contact and no dedicated 

staff, although a contracted senior technical advisor provides some 

support.

NNSA officials cited competing agency priorities and current perceived 

staffing limits as the primary impediments to assigning more staff to these 

programs. First, according to agency officials, the relative newness of the 

strategic materials programs and competing agency priorities to 

modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and modernize and extend 

the lives of current nuclear weapons have meant that federal staff are in 

high demand across the agency. This concern is consistent with issues 

we have identified in our past work as well. For example, in April 2017, 

we noted NNSA’s ambitious, costly, decades-long effort to modernize the 

nation’s nuclear security enterprise.21 In addition to ongoing and planned 

infrastructure modernization, some of which is associated with the 

strategic materials programs, this modernization includes four ongoing 

expensive weapons refurbishments and efforts to improve the agency’s 

research, development, testing, and evaluation capabilities by, for 

example, continuing efforts in advanced modeling, simulation, and 

computing. Similarly, we found in September 2016 that the competing 

agency priorities for infrastructure modernization and weapons 

 21GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Action Needed to Address Affordability 

of Nuclear Modernization Programs, GAO-17-341 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2017).
Page 13 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

refurbishments had negatively affected another NNSA program: the 

Enhanced Surveillance Program.22

Second, NNSA officials said that they have limited flexibility when it 

comes to increasing federal staff levels. Specifically, in each year that the 

total number of federal employees at NNSA exceeds 1,690, the 

Administrator is required by law to submit to the congressional defense 

committees a report justifying such excess.23 In the NNSA Administrator’s 

testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development in June 2017, he stated that since 2010, NNSA’s 

program funding had increased 28 percent, while its federal staffing levels 

had decreased by 17 percent. He said that initial results from a yet-to-becompleted study by the Office of Personnel Management in support of the 

Reform of Government Initiative indicate the need for a 20 percent 

increase in federal staff at NNSA.

We have also previously reported that staffing shortages have affected 

NNSA’s efforts to improve management capability. For example, we 

reported in October 2014 that NNSA determined that inadequate levels of 

federal staff had contributed to management problems with the UPF 

project.24 As a result, NNSA increased staffing levels for the UPF project 

office from 9 full-time equivalents in 2012 to more than 50 as of January 

2014.25 According to NNSA officials, the additional staff enabled NNSA to 

conduct more robust oversight of the contractor’s design efforts than was 

previously possible. Similarly, in 2016, we found that the B61-12 life 

extension program, the most costly and complex such program 

undertaken to date, successfully requested that NNSA enlarge its 

program office staff from 3 to 8 full-time equivalent staff to provide more 

 22GAO, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Should Evaluate the Role of the Enhanced Surveillance 

Program in Assessing the Condition of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, GAO-16-549 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2016). The Enhanced Surveillance Program develops 

computational models to predict the impact of stockpile aging, identifies signs of aging, 

and develops diagnostic tools.

2350 U.S.C. § 2441a (2017). NNSA projects a total federal workforce of 1,715 by the end 

of fiscal year 2018.

24GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Some Actions Have Been Taken to Address Challenges with 

the Uranium Processing Facility Design, GAO-15-126 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2014). 

NNSA determined that it needed more federal staff to oversee its contractors.

25According to NNSA officials, during this period the NNSA staffing level increased to 11 

with the balance of the full-time equivalents (roughly 39) comprised of United States Army 

Corps of Engineers personnel, support subcontractors, and technical experts.
Page 14 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

management capability.26 However, we found that even with this increase 

in federal staff, some NNSA and DOD officials said that they believe that 

NNSA needs two to three times more personnel in the federal program 

manager’s office to ensure sufficient federal management and oversight.

One area that we noted in this review is that with regard to the strategic 

materials programs, NNSA has not conducted a workforce needs 

assessment. Strategic materials program officials acknowledged that they 

had neither specifically assessed the number or skills of staff needed to 

manage the strategic materials programs, nor did they have current plans 

to do such an assessment. Our prior work on strategic human capital 

management has identified certain activities or practices that can help an 

agency strategically manage its human capital.27 These activities include 

determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to 

achieve the programs’ missions and developing strategies to address 

gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed. NNSA 

officials said that individual offices have attempted over time to assess 

resource and skill needs but that these efforts have been hampered by, 

among other things, a lack of staff. By determining the critical skills and 

competencies needed to achieve each strategic material program’s 

mission and using this determination to develop strategies to address any 

gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed, NNSA 

may find it has better information to justify increased staffing levels for its 

strategic materials programs.

Since 2014, NNSA has taken steps to establish programs to maintain and 

modernize the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, including appointing 

federal program managers for four of the five strategic materials 

programs, as well as steps to establish and organize the programs 

according to internal program management requirements. This is a 

significant step given the importance, cost, and complexity of these 

strategic materials programs. However, NNSA has made varying 

progress implementing these strategic materials programs, in part 

because these programs may not have been allotted staff and 

management capacity commensurate with their cost and scope of work. 

 26GAO-16-218.

27See, for example, GAO, Human Capital: Strategies to Help Agencies Meet Their 

Missions in an Era of Highly Constrained Resources, GAO-14-168 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 7, 2014), and GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce 

Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

Conclusions
Page 15 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Although strategic materials program officials acknowledged staffing 

limitations, they have not determined the critical skills and competencies 

that will be needed to meet program requirements and, ultimately, 

achieve the programs’ missions.

28 By determining the critical skills and 

competencies needed to achieve each strategic materials programs’

missions and using that determination to develop strategies to address 

any gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed, 

NNSA may find it has more information to justify increased staffing levels 

for its strategic materials programs.

The NNSA Administrator should determine the critical skills and 

competencies that will be needed for the strategic materials programs 

and use this determination to develop strategies for addressing 

challenges, if any, related to the number, deployment, and alignment of 

program staff (Recommendation 1).

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and NNSA for their review and 

comment. NNSA provided written comments, which are reproduced in full 

in appendix II, as well as technical comments, which we incorporated in 

our report as appropriate. In its comments, NNSA agreed with our 

recommendation and stated that the recommendation is consistent with 

the programs’ current evolution. NNSA further stated that it recognizes 

the need to define the range of skills and competencies necessary to 

execute the programs' critical missions and that it plans to identify the 

complete set of core competencies needed for these programs by 

December 31, 2018.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, and other interested parties. In addition, 

the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

 28 In its response to this report, NNSA noted that it has begun a study (in connection with 

the Office of Management and Budget) of its federal staffing levels and has also launched 

an effort to outline competencies needed for program managers across the agency.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Page 16 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Strategic Nuclear Materials 

Managed by the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA)

Page 17 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

NNSA has established programs for ensuring the supply of each of the 

following strategic materials as well as the capability to process them:

• Uranium – National security needs for uranium are met using a large 

existing inventory of previously enriched uranium.1 Although NNSA 

has estimated that stocks are sufficient for projected needs, existing 

uranium needs to be purified, machined, and recovered from existing 

operations. The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, is the NNSA site for conducting enriched uranium 

activities, producing uranium-related components for nuclear 

warheads and bombs, and processing feedstock for nuclear fuel for 

the U.S. Navy. In 2004, NNSA decided to construct a new Uranium 

Processing Facility (UPF) that consolidated the functions of four 

separate uranium facilities into a single building. In 2014, NNSA, on 

the advice of a peer review team, decided to pursue a uranium 

program that includes a smaller UPF and, among other program 

elements, modifications to existing uranium buildings and capabilities 

to include several new uranium processing technologies. Construction 

on the UPF continues at the Y-12 site, and NNSA continues to 

request funds for that project.2 Fiscal year 2018 funds are to be used 

for construction of some related subprojects. According to NNSA 

officials, the UPF is expected to be complete by 2025 and cost no 

more than $6.5 billion. NNSA estimates that additional investments 

needed to upgrade existing uranium facilities will cost about $20 

million per year for the next 20 years.

• Domestic Uranium Enrichment – To produce tritium, the Tennessee 

Valley Authority (TVA) must use unobligated uranium in certain 

nuclear reactors, under an interagency agreement between 

Department of Energy (DOE) and TVA. The United States has not 

had a sustained uranium enrichment capability since the 2013 closure 

of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which was originally 

constructed in 1952. In 2014, NNSA created the domestic uranium 

enrichment program manager position with responsibility to sustain 

the agency’s supply of low-enriched uranium for tritium production. 

 1

According to Department of Energy officials, the department’s current uranium inventory 

allocations are sufficient to meet national security demands through 2064, based on 

several assumptions, including no reallocation of non-excess uranium to downblending 

operations in support of tritium production. 

2

The UPF consists of processing capabilities for enriched uranium casting, oxide 

production, and salvage and accountability operations. The UPF project includes a Main

Process Building, a Salvage and Accountability Building, a Mechanical Electrical Building, 

and various support facilities.

Appendix I: Strategic Nuclear Materials 

Managed by the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA)
Appendix I: Strategic Nuclear Materials 

Managed by the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA)

Page 18 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

We currently have ongoing work reviewing the program’s plan to 

ensure supply through 2060. NNSA estimated that over the next 5 

years alone, these activities will likely cost more than $400 million.

• Plutonium – A set of aging facilities at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory provides the backbone of NNSA’s plutonium work, such as 

certifying the safety of existing nuclear weapons’ plutonium pits and 

producing new pits to extend the life of nuclear weapons in the 

stockpile.3 NNSA conducts plutonium analysis in the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research facility, which was built in the 1950s, but NNSA 

plans to cease programmatic operations in this facility by 2019 

because of its aging infrastructure and because it sits on a seismic 

fault line. NNSA produces pits and conducts pit surveillance in the 38-

year-old high-hazard, high-security Plutonium Facility 4 at Los 

Alamos. Other important plutonium activities, such as NNSA’s 

plutonium disposition efforts and the processing of plutonium used to 

provide heat sources for space missions, are not included in the 

plutonium manager’s portfolio because other program offices are 

responsible for these activities, according to NNSA officials. Officials 

said that these program offices coordinate capability and facility needs 

with the plutonium program manager.

In August 2014, DOE cancelled plans to construct the nuclear facility 

that was part of the overall Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement (CMRR), which was approved in 2005 to replace the 

aging Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility. In its place, DOE 

approved the implementation of the first part of NNSA’s new 

plutonium strategy: the revised CMRR project, which includes a 

subproject to remove contaminated equipment no longer in use in 

Plutonium Facility 4, install new plutonium analysis equipment, and 

modify an existing building to handle higher quantities of plutonium. 

NNSA estimated that the CMRR project would cost from $2.4 billion to 

$2.9 billion and be completed by 2024. In addition, in November 2015, 

DOE approved the mission need for the implementation of the second 

part of the strategy: building modular nuclear facilities to add highhazard, high-security laboratory space at Los Alamos (the Plutonium 

Modular Approach) to meet plutonium pit production requirements. 

NNSA estimated that the Plutonium Modular Approach could cost 

from $1.3 billion to $3.0 billion and be completed by the end of 2027.

 3

A “pit” is the central core of a nuclear weapon that is commonly produced using 

plutonium. 
Appendix I: Strategic Nuclear Materials 

Managed by the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA)

Page 19 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

• Tritium – NNSA has relied on tritium produced many years ago; 

recycling and recovery of existing tritium is currently the source of 

most of the tritium in the stockpile, according to NNSA officials. 

However, tritium decays relatively rapidly,4 and in 2015 NNSA 

identified a need to produce additional tritium. To produce tritium, 

lithium target rods—called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods—

are irradiated in TVA’s reactors. The irradiated rods are transported to 

DOE’s Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site in South 

Carolina, where they are processed in a specialized facility to extract 

and then prepare the tritium for nuclear warheads. NNSA requested 

$9.8 million in design funds in fiscal year 2018 for construction of a 

new tritium production capability. In its fiscal year 2018 budget 

request, NNSA estimated that this facility would cost about $425 

million and be approved for operations in 2027.

• Lithium – Lithium is a key component of nuclear weapons and is 

essential for their refurbishment.5 NNSA has a sufficient supply of 

enriched lithium-6 (the isotope used in refurbishments and for tritium 

production), but that lithium is stored in another form and must 

undergo complex processing before it can be used for these 

purposes. NNSA halted certain aspects of its lithium processing 

operation—conducted at its Y-12 site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee—in 

May 2013 due to the condition of the site’s 72-year-old lithium 

production facility. Currently, NNSA is relying on a less complex but 

also less efficient process that results in a loss of approximately 50 

percent of material. In 2013, NNSA developed a lithium production 

strategy that proposed a new lithium production facility, which the 

agency estimated would cost more than $500 million. NNSA plans to 

request $30.4 million in fiscal year 2019 for construction of this facility. 

This strategy includes sustaining current infrastructure and deploying 

new technologies to sustain lithium production.

 4

Tritium has a relatively short half-life—the time it takes for the radioactivity to decay by 50 

percent—of about 12 years and decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year. 

5

DOE/NNSA also provides lithium for nuclear reactors, radiation detectors, and other 

purposes. 
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 20 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Nuclear Security Administration

Page 21 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials
Appendix III: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov

In addition to the contact above, Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), Alisa 

Beyninson, Antoinette Capaccio, Jeff Larson, Cynthia Norris, and Kiki 

Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 23 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: A Complete Scope of Work 

Is Needed to Develop Timely Cost and Schedule Information for the 

Uranium Program. GAO-17-577. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2017.

Program Management: DOE Needs to Develop a Comprehensive Policy 

and Training Program. GAO-17-51. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 

2016.

DOE Project Management: NNSA Needs to Clarify Requirements for Its 

Plutonium Analysis Project at Los Alamos. GAO-16-585. Washington, 

D.C.: August 9, 2016.

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA’s Budget Estimates 

Increased but May Not Align with All Anticipated Costs. GAO-16-290. 

Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2016.

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Increased Its Budget 

Estimates, but Estimates for Key Stockpile and Infrastructure Programs 

Need Improvement. GAO-15-499. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2015.

DOE Project Management: NNSA Should Ensure Equal Consideration of 

Alternatives for Lithium Production. GAO-15-525. Washington, D.C.: July 

13, 2015.

DOE and NNSA Project Management: Analysis of Alternatives Could Be 

Improved by Incorporating Best Practices. GAO-15-37. Washington, D.C.: 

December 11, 2014.

Project and Program Management: DOE Needs to Revise Requirements 

and Guidance for Cost Estimating and Related Reviews. GAO-15-29. 

Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2014.

Nuclear Weapons: Some Actions Have Been Taken to Address 

Challenges with the Uranium Processing Facility Design. GAO-15-126. 

Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2014.

Nuclear Weapons: Technology Development Efforts for the Uranium 

Processing Facility. GAO-14-295. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2014.

Plutonium Disposition Program: DOE Needs to Analyze the Root Causes 

of Cost Increases and Develop Better Cost Estimates. GAO-14-231. 

Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2014.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 24 GAO-18-99 Strategic Nuclear Materials

Nuclear Weapons: Information on Safety Concerns with the Uranium 

Processing Facility. GAO-14-79R. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2013.

Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading to Cost Increases with the Uranium 

Processing Facility. GAO-13-686R. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2013.

Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its 

Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and 

Technology Readiness. GAO-11-103. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 

2010.

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