Fiscal Year 2015

Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan

Report to Congress

April 2014

United States Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page i 

Message from the Secretary 

This report is the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Fiscal Year 2015 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. It addresses the statutory requirements of Title 50 of 

United States Code section 2523 and related congressional requests. This year’s Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan is a summary plan and is intended to provide updates to the Fiscal Year 2014 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

In order to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries as long as nuclear weapons exist, the 

United States must sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and seeks to do so without 

underground nuclear explosive testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration continues to work 

closely with the Department of Defense, through the Joint Department of Defense/Department of 

Energy Nuclear Weapons Council, to modernize the stockpile through timely execution of approved life 

extension programs, as outlined in this report. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s technical 

scoping studies, cost and risk analysis, and resource allocation modeling of alternatives have informed 

this plan and support the Nuclear Weapons Council process. Thus, with close collaboration between the 

Department of Defense and Department of Energy, this plan continues to support the Nuclear Weapons 

Council’s “3+2” strategy for the stockpile with some schedule adjustments. 

To sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, the Administration has, for the fifth consecutive 

year, increased the budget request for Weapons Activities. If adopted by Congress, this budget request 

will increase funding by 6.9 percent over the previous year. This increase will not only enable the 

important life extensions called for in the Nuclear Posture Review Report, but will also support the 

research, development, testing, evaluation, and manufacturing capabilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise. These capabilities underpin our ability to conduct stockpile stewardship and solve the 

technical challenges of verifying treaty compliance, combating nuclear terrorism and proliferation, and 

guarding against the threat posed by nuclear technological surprise. Finally, this continued commitment 

by the Administration is intended to energize the people at our national security laboratories, nuclear 

weapons production facilities, and Nevada National Security Site, whose intellect and commitment allow 

the Department of Energy to advance the President’s vision to move toward a world free of nuclear 

weapons. 

Pursuant to the statutory requirements, this report is being provided to the following members of 

Congress: 

 The Honorable Barbara Mikulski 

 Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

 The Honorable Richard C. Shelby 

 Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

 The Honorable Carl Levin 

 Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services 

 The Honorable James M. Inhofe 

 Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services 

 

 The Honorable Dianne Feinstei

 Chairman, Subcommittee on En

 Senate Committee on Appropri

 The Honorable Lamar Alexande

Ranking Member, Subcommitte

Senate Committee on Appropri

 The Honorable Mark Udall 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Str

Senate Committee on Armed Se

 The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Ranking Member, Subcommitte

Senate Committee on Armed Se

 The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Chairman, House Committee on

 The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Ranking Member, House Comm

 The Honorable Howard P. McK

Chairman, House Committee on

 The Honorable Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Comm

 The Honorable Michael Rogers

Chairman, Subcommittee on Str

House Committee on Armed Se

 The Honorable James Cooper 

Ranking Member, Subcommitte

House Committee on Armed Se

 The Honorable Mike Simpson 

Chairman, Subcommittee on En

House Committee on Appropria

 The Honorable Marcy Kaptur 

Ranking Member, Subcommitte

House Committee on Appropria

If you have any questions or need add

Assistant Secretary for Congressional an

 

 

Department of Energ

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management

n 

nergy and Water Development 

ations 

er 

ee on Energy and Water Development 

ations 

rategic Forces 

ervices 

ee on Strategic Forces 

ervices 

n Appropriations 

mittee on Appropriations 

Keon 

n Armed Services 

mittee on Armed Services 

rategic Forces

ervices 

ee on Strategic Forces 

ervices 

nergy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

ations 

ee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Ag

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ditional information, please contact me or Mr. Brad

nd Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450. 

 Sincerely, 

 

Ernest J. Moniz 

gy | April 2014 

 Plan | Page ii 

gencies 

dley Crowell, 

 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page iii 

Executive Summary 

This Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2015 SSMP) is a statutorily 

required summary of the changes that have occurred since the publication of the Fiscal Year 2014 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2014 SSMP). The FY 2014 SSMP remains the 25-year 

strategic program of record for nuclear weapons stockpile management except where it is updated by 

this document. This plan covers all programs that are funded by Congress in the Weapons Activities 

account. 

The FY 2014 SSMP introduced the Nuclear Weapons Council’s approved “3+2” strategy.1

 This strategy 

implements 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2010) guidance in support of two enduring 

commitments to the American public: first, to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for 

America and, second, to prudently base that deterrent on a safer, smaller, and more cost-efficient 

stockpile of nuclear weapons. 

The FY 2015 SSMP continues to support the 3+2 strategy, with budget-driven schedule adjustments. 

Through a deliberate interagency process, these schedule adjustments balance mission requirements 

with the impact of sequestration (which reduced the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 

[NNSA’s] budget in fiscal year (FY) 2013 by approximately 900 million dollars) and the caps on defense 

spending mandated under the Bipartisan Budget Agreement. The following graphs show the adjusted 

life extension program of record from FY 2014 to FY 2015, which levels the warhead modernization 

requirements in today’s budget environment while maintaining the vision of the 3+2 strategy. 

 

 

1 A stockpile composed of three interoperable ballistic missile warheads and two interoperable air-carried warheads.
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page iv | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

The most significant adjustment to the strategy is the decision to move the first production unit of the 

first interoperable warhead out 5 years to FY 2030. That decision was based on assessments of the 

current state of the stockpile, including that the W78 is aging gracefully; interoperable warhead cost 

estimates; and the priorities of the Nuclear Weapons Council. This adjustment will provide more time to 

study the implementation of interoperability as required by the Nuclear Posture Review Report. Other 

necessary adjustments include delaying to FY 2020 the first production units of the B61 life extension 

program and the W88 Alteration 370, and delaying by up to 3 years the first production unit of the 

cruise missile warhead. NNSA will complete or begin a life extension for every system that is part of the 

3+2 strategy as part of the long-term plan described in this SSMP. 

We continue to work to deliver an infrastructure that supports our uranium, plutonium, non-nuclear, 

and high-explosive manufacturing capabilities. The IW-1 schedule adjustment and our knowledge of 

plutonium aging more gracefully will allow NNSA to take a more deliberate and cost-effective approach 

to addressing modernization of plutonium capabilities. NNSA is planning for a pit production capability 

of 30 pits per year by FY 2026 to better align with the planned life extension program activity and 

delivery system schedule, and will support the modular acquisition of additional capability to support 

production beyond the 30-pit-per-year level. Regarding uranium, this FY 2015 SSMP is based on a lower 

spending profile for the Uranium Processing Facility that allows the project to continue but focuses on 

an initial phase to move crucial functions out of an aged building by FY 2025. The uranium capability 

modernization plan applies lessons learned from our plutonium strategy and includes two subsequent 

phases after completion of the initial phase. 

The 3+2 strategy is enabled by the research, development, testing, and evaluation activities and the 

critical infrastructure that supports the assessment, surveillance, and maintenance of the stockpile and 

the analysis to specify options for the life extension programs of particular weapon systems. The 

premiere tools of stewardship are now providing the critical data for developing these options and 

assessing the stockpile. This FY 2015 SSMP relies heavily on high-performance computing and models 

validated by experimental data that are applicable to the environments in which the weapons are 

required to function without error. The level of activity in this plan will continue to provide technically 

challenging work that will sustain the skills required to implement the 3+2 strategy and inspire the next 

generation of stockpile stewards. 

Execution of the FY 2015 SSMP will depend on improved governance. The Department is working to 

incentivize mission-effective and cost-efficient solutions to the highest risk nuclear security challenges 

facing our country. Since the FY 2014 SSMP, the Secretary has reorganized the Department to elevate 

Management and Performance to one of three Under Secretary positions. Within this framework, the 

NNSA is committed to effectively managing its major projects and has been driving continued 

enhancements to contract and project management practices through a reorganized Office of 

Acquisition and Project Management. We have realigned the lines of responsibility and accountability 

between headquarters and the field, Federal managers and our management and operating partners; 

this is exemplified through our security reforms, where we have clarified the chain of command. All of 

these elements affect NNSA’s ability to deliver a robust stockpile stewardship and management program 

that is effective, efficient, and ensures improved nuclear security. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page v 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP 

AND MANAGEMENT PLAN

Table of Contents 

List of Figures .................................................................................................................................... ix 

List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................... xi 

List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................. xiii 

Legislative Language ........................................................................................................................ xv 

Chapter 1 Weapons Activities – Central to the Nuclear Security Enterprise ......................................1-1 

1.1 An Update of the Policy Framework and Mission Definition .................................................................. 1-1 

1.2 Partnership with the Department of Defense: The “3+2” Strategy ....................................................... 1-2

1.3 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Planning ................................................................................ 1-4 

1.4 Stockpile Management ........................................................................................................................... 1-5 

1.5 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Activities ................................................................... 1-5 

1.6 Nuclear Test Readiness ........................................................................................................................... 1-5 

1.7 Physical Infrastructure ............................................................................................................................ 1-5 

1.8 Federal and Contractor Workforce ......................................................................................................... 1-6 

1.9 Security of the Nuclear Security Enterprise ............................................................................................ 1-6 

1.10 Overview of Projected Budgetary Requirements and Management Processes and Procedures ........... 1-6 

1.11 Additional Information ........................................................................................................................... 1-6 

Chapter 2 Stockpile Management ...................................................................................................2-1 

2.1 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile .................................................................................................................... 2-1 

2.2 Stockpile Assessments, Surveillance, and Significant Finding Investigations ......................................... 2-1 

2.3 Annual Assessment Report to the President .......................................................................................... 2-3 

2.4 Maintenance of the Stockpile ................................................................................................................. 2-4 

2.5 Stockpile Services Subprogram ............................................................................................................... 2-4 

2.6 Sustaining the Stockpile through Life Extension Plans ........................................................................... 2-4 

2.7 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition ............................................................................................. 2-8 

2.8 Integrated Surety Solutions for Transportation...................................................................................... 2-8 

2.9 Summary of Significant Stockpile Accomplishments and Plans .............................................................. 2-9 

2.9.1 Recent Major Stockpile Management Accomplishments ....................................................... 2-9 

2.9.2 Stockpile Management Activities, Milestones, and Key Annual Deliverables ...................... 2-10 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page vi | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Chapter 3 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Activities ..............................................3-1 

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 3-1 

3.2 Management and Planning ..................................................................................................................... 3-1 

3.2.1 Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning .......................................................... 3-1 

3.2.2 Component Maturation and Technology Development ......................................................... 3-2 

3.2.3 General Requirements for Predictive Science Planning .......................................................... 3-3 

3.3 Technology Development and Component Maturation for Stockpile Sustainment .............................. 3-5 

3.4 Predictive Science of Assessment and Certification ............................................................................... 3-5 

3.5 Experimental and Computational Resources ......................................................................................... 3-5 

3.5.1 Experimental Resources .......................................................................................................... 3-5 

3.5.2 Facility and Infrastructure Planning ........................................................................................ 3-6 

3.5.3 Computational Resources ....................................................................................................... 3-6 

3.6 Ensuring U.S. Leadership in Science and Technology for National Nuclear 

Security Administration and Broader National Security Missions .......................................................... 3-6 

3.7 Structure of Campaigns and Programs to Meet the Requirements of Stockpile 

Sustainment and Deterrence .................................................................................................................. 3-6 

3.7.1 Science Campaign ................................................................................................................... 3-6 

3.7.2 Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign .................................................................... 3-7 

3.7.3 Engineering Campaign ............................................................................................................ 3-7 

3.7.4 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign ............................................. 3-8 

3.8 Milestones, Objectives, and Future Planning ......................................................................................... 3-8 

3.9 Summary of Recent Accomplishments ................................................................................................... 3-9 

Chapter 4 Nuclear Test Readiness ...................................................................................................4-1 

Chapter 5 Revitalize Physical Infrastructure ....................................................................................5-1 

5.1 Capability-Based Approach to Infrastructure Investment ...................................................................... 5-1 

5.2 Sustainment of Existing Facilities and Infrastructure ............................................................................. 5-5 

5.3 Construction ........................................................................................................................................... 5-6 

5.3.1 Approved and Proposed Line-Item Construction Projects ...................................................... 5-8 

5.3.2 Approved and Proposed Security and Capital Equipment Projects ........................................ 5-9 

5.4 Reliance on Non-DOE-Owned Facilities and Infrastructure .................................................................. 5-11 

5.5 Disposition of Excess Facilities .............................................................................................................. 5-11 

5.6 Capabilities for Post-2039 Weapons Infrastructure ............................................................................. 5-12 

5.7 Site Stewardship ................................................................................................................................... 5-12 

5.8 Key Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans ...................................................................................... 5-12 

Chapter 6 Sustaining the Workforce ...............................................................................................6-1 

6.1 The Nuclear Security Enterprise Workforce ........................................................................................... 6-1 

6.2 Workforce Planning for the Nuclear Security Enterprise ....................................................................... 6-1 

6.2.1 Strategic Workload Drivers ..................................................................................................... 6-2 

6.2.2 Federal Workforce Planning ................................................................................................... 6-2 

6.2.3 Management and Operating Contractor Workforce Planning ............................................... 6-3 

6.2.4 The Non-Management and Operating Contractor Workforce ............................................... 6-3 

6.3 Workforce Sustainment Programs and Strategies .................................................................................. 6-4 

6.3.1 Recruiting Programs ................................................................................................................ 6-4 

6.3.2 Development Programs .......................................................................................................... 6-4 

6.3.3 Compensation and Benefits .................................................................................................... 6-4 

6.3.4 Challenges ............................................................................................................................... 6-4 

6.4 Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 6-4 
 Department of Energy | April 2014

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page vii 

Chapter 7 Security ..........................................................................................................................7-1 

7.1 Secure Transportation Asset Program .................................................................................................... 7-1 

7.1.1 Core Components of the Secure Transportation Asset Program ............................................ 7-1 

7.1.2 Major Organizational Efforts of the Secure Transportation Asset Program ........................... 7-1 

7.1.3 Secure Transportation Asset Program Goals .......................................................................... 7-2 

7.1.4 Secure Transportation Asset Program Strategy ...................................................................... 7-2 

7.1.5 Secure Transportation Asset Program Challenges .................................................................. 7-2 

7.1.6 FY 2013 Accomplishments ...................................................................................................... 7-2 

7.2 Defense Nuclear Security Program ......................................................................................................... 7-2 

7.2.1 Offices of the Defense Nuclear Security Program (NA-70) ..................................................... 7-3 

7.2.2 Defense Nuclear Security Program Goals ............................................................................... 7-4 

7.2.3 Defense Nuclear Security Program Strategy ........................................................................... 7-5

7.2.4 Defense Nuclear Security Program Challenges ....................................................................... 7-5 

7.3 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program............................................................................ 7-5 

7.3.1 Information Technology .......................................................................................................... 7-5 

7.3.2 NNSA Network Vision ............................................................................................................. 7-6 

7.3.3 Transformation of Information Technology Architecture ...................................................... 7-6 

7.3.4 Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center ................................................................................ 7-6 

7.3.5 Cyber Sciences Laboratory ...................................................................................................... 7-6 

7.3.6 Subprograms of Information Technology and Cyber Security ................................................ 7-7 

7.3.7 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Goals .................................................. 7-8 

7.3.8 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Strategy ............................................. 7-9 

7.3.9 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Challenges ......................................... 7-9 

7.4 Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans ............................................................................................... 7-9 

7.4.1 Secure Transportation Asset Program Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans .................. 7-9 

7.4.2 Defense Nuclear Security Program Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans ..................... 7-10 

7.4.3 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Milestones, Objectives, 

and Future Plans ................................................................................................................... 7-10 

Chapter 8 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget, Requirements Estimates, and 

Operations and Effective Business Practices ....................................................................8-1 

8.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget ..................................................................................... 8-1 

8.2 Directed Stockpile Work Budget ............................................................................................................. 8-3 

8.3 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Budget and Readiness Campaign Budget ................ 8-4 

8.3.1 Science Campaign ................................................................................................................... 8-4 

8.3.2 Engineering Campaign ............................................................................................................ 8-4 

8.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign ............................................. 8-5 

8.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign .................................................................... 8-5 

8.3.5 Readiness Campaign ............................................................................................................... 8-6 

8.4 Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities .............................................................................................. 8-6 

8.5 Secure Transportation Asset Budget ...................................................................................................... 8-7 

8.6 Other Weapons Activities Budget........................................................................................................... 8-8 

8.7 Other Fiscal Issues .................................................................................................................................. 8-8 

8.7.1 Pension Cost Growth and Alternative Mitigation Strategies .................................................. 8-8 

8.8 Estimates of Requirements Beyond the Future Years Nuclear Security Program .................................. 8-8 

8.8.1 Stockpile Sustainment........................................................................................................... 8-10 

8.8.2 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations ................................................................... 8-11 

8.8.3 Results of Differential Analysis of FY 2011 SSMP Strategy and 

3+2 FY 2015 SSMP Strategy .................................................................................................. 8-17 

8.8.4 Construction Costs ................................................................................................................ 8-18 

8.9 Estimates for Stockpile Management ................................................................................................... 8-19 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page viii | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

8.10 Operations and Effective Business Practices ........................................................................................ 8-19 

8.10.1 International Organization for Standardization Management Systems Standards .............. 8-19 

8.10.2 Governance Model ............................................................................................................... 8-20 

8.10.3 Wireless Technology ............................................................................................................. 8-21 

8.10.4 One Identification Access Control ......................................................................................... 8-21 

8.10.5 NNSA Network Vision ........................................................................................................... 8-21 

8.10.6 Business Management Advisory Council .............................................................................. 8-21

8.10.7 Defense Programs Enterprise Portfolio Analysis Tool .......................................................... 8-21 

8.10.8 Defense Programs Work Breakdown Structure .................................................................... 8-21 

8.10.9 NNSA Operations Council ..................................................................................................... 8-22 

8.10.10 Builder Sustainment Management System........................................................................... 8-22 

8.10.11 Expansion of Strategic Procurements ................................................................................... 8-22 

8.10.12 Generation 2 Program Management System ....................................................................... 8-23 

Chapter 9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 9–1 

Appendix A Requirements Mapping .............................................................................................. A-1 

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to Statutory Reporting Requirements 

and Related Requests ............................................................................................................................ A-1 

A.2 Ongoing Requirements .......................................................................................................................... A-2 

A.3 Other Requirements ............................................................................................................................ A-11 

Appendix B Science, Technology, and Engineering Campaigns Subprograms ................................... B-1 

Appendix C Nuclear Test Readiness ............................................................................................... C-1 

Appendix D Physical Infrastructure Updates .................................................................................. D-1 

Appendix E Site Workforce Data ..................................................................................................... E-1 

Appendix F Exascale Computing ..................................................................................................... F-1 

F.1 Mission Need .......................................................................................................................................... F-1 

F.2 Technical Hurdles.................................................................................................................................... F-1 

F.3 Objectives to Overcome Technical Hurdles ............................................................................................ F-2 

F.4 Progression of Platform Procurements to Achieve Objectives ............................................................... F-3 
 Department of Energy | April 2014

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page ix 

List of Figures 

Figure 1–1. 3+2 strategy .......................................................................................................................................... 1-3 

Figure 2–1. Historical number of significant finding investigations opened and closed during 

calendar years 2001 to 2013 and the number that resulted in an impact to the stockpile 

(This figure updates Figure 2–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................................... 2-3 

Figure 2–2. National Nuclear Security Administration life extension activities 

(This figure updates Figure 2–8 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................................... 2-4 

Figure 2–3. Schedule for irradiation of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods to meet post-Nuclear 

Posture Review Report requirements 

(This figure updates Figure 2–9 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................................... 2-7 

Figure 2–4. Schedule for supplying unobligated low-enriched uranium fuel to the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor 

(This figure updates Figure 2–10 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ....................................................................... 2-8 

Figure 3–1. Research, development, testing, and evaluation enables the National Nuclear 

Security Administration to meet the broad range of activities essential to 

nuclear security mission requirements ................................................................................................. 3-2 

Figure 3–2. Version 2.0 of the Predictive Capability Framework, identifying major efforts required to 

advance stockpile assessment, sustainment, and certification capabilities 

(This figure updates Figure 3–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................................... 3-4 

Figure 5–1. Facility Condition Index measurements and deferred maintenance .................................................... 5-6 

Figure 5–2. Integrated Priority List .......................................................................................................................... 5-7 

Figure 5–3. Nominal schedule and cost of current and proposed NNSA security projects ..................................... 5-9 

Figure 5–4. Nominal schedule and cost of capital equipment projects ................................................................. 5-11 

Figure 6–1. National Nuclear Security Administration workforce for Weapons Activities 

by occupational series functions 

(This figure updates Figure 6–2 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................................... 6-2 

Figure 7–1. New Defense Nuclear Security alignment to provide clarity in safeguards and security ..................... 7-3 

Figure 7–2. Conceptual Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center framework to 

improve communications and enhance cyber security ........................................................................ 7-7 

Figure 8–1. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power — fiscal years 2001 through 2019 ........................... 8-2 

Figure 8–2. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ................................... 8-3 

Figure 8–3. Science Campaign funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ............................................. 8-4 

Figure 8–4. Engineering Campaign funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ...................................... 8-4 

Figure 8–5. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ....................................................................................................... 8-5 

Figure 8–6. Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ....................................................................................................... 8-5 

Figure 8–7. Readiness Campaign funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ......................................... 8-6 

Figure 8–8. RTBF funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

(This figure updates Figures 8–8 and 8–9 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................... 8-7 

Figure 8–9. Secure Transportation Asset funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

(This figure updates Figure 8–10 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ....................................................................... 8-7 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page x | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 8–10. Other Weapons Activities funding schedules for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

(This figure updates Figure 8–11 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ....................................................................... 8-8 

Figure 8–11. Estimate of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities of the NNSA 

in then-year dollars 

(This figure updates Figure 8–12 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ....................................................................... 8-9 

Figure 8–12. Detail of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities of the NNSA 

in then-year dollars 

(This figure is new for the FY 2015 SSMP.) .......................................................................................... 8-10 

Figure 8–13. Estimate of warhead specific sustainment costs 

(This figure updates the sustainment portion of Figures 8–13 through 8–19 

in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......................................................................................................................... 8-11

Figure 8–14. B61-12 life extension program cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates the life extension program portion of Figure 8–13 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......... 8-12 

Figure 8–15. W76-1 life extension program cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates the life extension program portion of Figure 8–14 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ......... 8-13 

Figure 8–16. W88 Alt 370 cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates the major alteration portion of Figure 8–19 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ................... 8-13 

Figure 8–17. IW-1 life extension program cost FY 2020 – FY 2039 

(This figure updates Figure 8–20 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ..................................................................... 8-14 

Figure 8–18. Cruise Missile Warhead life extension program cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates Figure 8–21 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ..................................................................... 8-14 

Figure 8–19. IW-2 life extension program cost FY 2014 – FY 2039 

(This figure updates Figure 8–22 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ..................................................................... 8-15 

Figure 8–20. IW-3 life extension program cost FY 2014 – FY 2039 

(This figure updates Figure 8–23 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ..................................................................... 8-16 

Figure 8–21. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs for fiscal years 2014 

through 2039 (then-year dollars) 

(This figure updates Figure 8–25 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ..................................................................... 8-17 

Figure 8–22. Life extension program annual cost ranges in FY 2014 dollars in millions for FY 2014 – FY 2039 

(This figure is new for the FY 2015 SSMP.) .......................................................................................... 8-18 
 Department of Energy | April 2014

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xi 

List of Tables 

Table 2–1. Fiscal year 2013 actual and fiscal year 2014 baseline major Directed Stockpile Work Program 

stockpile evaluation activities (as of February 28, 2014) 

(This table updates Table 2–2 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ........................................................................... 2-2 

Table 2–2. Major surveillance evaluations completed in fiscal year 2013 and baselined for 

fiscal year 2014, as well as planning requirements for the Future Years Nuclear Security 

Program (fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2019) (as of February 28, 2014) 

(This table updates Table 2–3 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ........................................................................... 2-2 

Table 2–3. Pit development timeline to achieve 30 pits per year 

(This table updates Table 2–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ........................................................................... 2-6 

Table 5–1. Infrastructure management strategy to sustain National Nuclear Security Administration 

functions and mission capabilities ........................................................................................................ 5-2 

Table 8–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget for Weapons Activities 

in fiscal years 2014 through 2019 ......................................................................................................... 8-2 

Table 8–2. Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2019 

(This table updates Table 8–3 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ........................................................................... 8-3 

Table 8–3. Estimated tritium readiness resource requirements 

(This table updates Table 8–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) ........................................................................... 8-3 

Table 8–4. Total estimated cost for B61-12 life extension program .................................................................... 8-12 

Table 8–5. Total estimated cost for W76 life extension program ........................................................................ 8-13 

Table 8–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alt 370 ................................................................................................. 8-13 

Table 8–7. Total estimated cost for IW-1 life extension program ........................................................................ 8-14 

Table 8–8. Total estimated cost for cruise missile warhead life extension program ........................................... 8-15 

Table 8–9. Total estimated cost for IW-2 life extension program ........................................................................ 8-15 

Table 8–10. Total estimated cost for IW-3 life extension program ........................................................................ 8-16 

Table 8–11. Life extension program cost comparison of FY 2011 SSMP and 

FY 2015 SSMP life extension program strategies ................................................................................ 8-18 

Table 8–12. Total cost and average annual cost of construction for fiscal years 2020–2039 ................................ 8-19 

Table 8–13. Efficiency initiatives ............................................................................................................................ 8-20 

 
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Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xiii 

List of Acronyms 

2NV NNSA Network Vision 

Alt Alteration 

ASC Advanced Simulation and Computing 

ATS Advanced Technology System 

BSMS Builder Sustainment Management System 

CDNS Chief of Defense Nuclear Security 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CMF Component Maturation Framework 

CMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

CMRR-NF Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility 

CSL Cyber Sciences Laboratory 

CTO Chief Technology Officer 

DAF Device Assembly Facility 

DARHT Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test 

DM Deferred Maintenance 

DNS Defense Nuclear Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

DSW Directed Stockpile Work 

EA Enterprise Architecture 

EPAT Enterprise Portfolio Analysis Tool 

FCI Facility Condition Index 

flop Floating Point Operations per Second 

FTF Freeze the Footprint 

FY Fiscal Year 

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

G2 Enterprise Management Information System Generation 2 

HASC House Armed Services Committee 

HED High Energy Density 

HPC High Performance Computing 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IDC Integrated Design Codes 

IHE Insensitive High Explosive 

IPRO Integrated Production Planning and Execution System 

IT Information Technology 

IW Interoperable Warhead 

JASPER Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research 

JC3 Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center 

KCP NSC Kansas City Plant National Security Campus 

KCRIMS Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure, Manufacturing and Sourcing 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

LAR License Amendment Request 

LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 

LEP Life Extension Program 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page xiv | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

M&O Management and Operating 

MC Mission Critical 

MDNC Mission Dependent Not Critical 

MGT Mobile Guardian Transporter 

Mod Modification 

NCTIR Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

New START New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

NIF National Ignition Facility 

NMD Not Mission Dependent 

NMMSS Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System 

NMSSUP Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrade Project 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPM Other Program Money 

Pantex Pantex Plant 

PCF Predictive Capability Framework 

PF-4 Plutonium Facility 

PIDAS Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System 

PPD Presidential Policy Directive 

RAMP Roof Assessment Management Program 

RAT Replacement Armored Tractor 

RDT&E Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 

RLUOB Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building 

RTBF Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities 

SAR Selected Acquisition Report 

SFI Significant Finding Investigation 

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 

SSMP Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

STA Secure Transportation Asset 

STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command 

TBSTP Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning

TPBARs Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods 

TRIM Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications 

U.S.C. United States Code 

WEPAR West-end Protected Area Reduction 

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex 

Z Z Facility 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page xv

Legislative Language 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is required to report on how it plans to maintain 

the nuclear weapons stockpile. Specifically, Title 50 of United States Code section 2523 (50 U.S.C. 2523), 

requires that “The Administrator,[1] in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate 

officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually update 

a plan for maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile 

stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile surveillance, program direction, infrastructure 

modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness.” Pursuant to previous statutory 

requirements, NNSA was required to submit reports on the plan. Except in 2012,2

 a version of the 

document has been submitted to Congress annually since 1998. However, starting in 2013, reports on 

the plan are only required every odd-numbered year, with summaries of the plan provided in evennumbered years. 

The Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is a summary of the plan, 

including a discussion of updates to the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

The SSMP is captured in a single, top-level, unclassified document. In addition, one classified Annex to 

the FY 2015 SSMP is also provided. The Annex contains supporting details concerning U.S. nuclear 

stockpile and stockpile management issues and describes the research, development, testing, and 

evaluation base for the stewardship and management of the stockpile. 

 

 

1

 The term ‘Administrator’ means the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

2

 In 2012, an FY 2013 SSMP was not submitted to Congress because analytic work conducted by the Department of 

Defense/NNSA to evaluate the out-year needs for nuclear modernization activities across the nuclear security enterprise was 

ongoing and not yet finalized. 

 Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-1 

Chapter 1 

Weapons Activities – Central to the 

Nuclear Security Enterprise

1.1 An Update of the Policy Framework and Mission 

Definition 

This chapter, renamed from the Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

(FY 2014 SSMP), discusses the President’s National Security Strategy (White House 2010), which 

emphasizes the importance of reducing the Nation’s nuclear arsenal while ensuring the reliability and 

effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. On June 19, 2013, at the Brandenburg Gate nearly 50 years after 

Kennedy made his famous Cold War speech, President Obama announced a new Presidential Policy 

Directive (PPD-24) that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. The 

President’s new guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear stockpile mission: 

 affirms that the United States will maintain a credible deterrent, capable of convincing any 

potential adversary that the adverse consequences of attacking the United States or our allies 

and partners far outweigh any potential benefit they may seek to gain through an attack; 

 modifies the principles for hedging against technical or geopolitical risk, which will lead to more 

effective management of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and 

 reaffirms that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, 

and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and our allies and 

partners. 

The President has supported significant investments to modernize the nuclear security enterprise and 

maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. The Administration will continue seeking congressional 

funding support for the nuclear security enterprise. 

The President also said, 

...[W]e can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible 

strategic deterrent, while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic 

nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.... At the same time, 

we’ll work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical 

weapons in Europe. 

The policy framework for the stockpile has not changed since the FY 2014 SSMP. The National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) continues to support the requirements set forth in the Nuclear Posture 

Review Report (DOD 2010) and the PPD-24, as well as the limits imposed by the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (New START). New START was negotiated with Russia in 2010, was ratified and went 

into force in February 2011, and its central treaty limits must be met 7 years later in 2018. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 1-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

1.2 Partnership with the Department of Defense: The “3+2” 

Strategy 

The most significant change in the FY 2014 SSMP was the introduction of the “3+2” strategy. The 

Nuclear Weapons Council adopted this consolidated strategic vision for stockpile modernization in 

January 2013 (see Figure 2–8 on page 2-18 of the FY 2014 SSMP). This Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2015 SSMP) describes in more detail the history, adjustments, 

goals, and objectives of that strategy. This updated plan continues to require applying the science, 

modernizing the infrastructure, and sustaining the stockpile to provide a safe, secure, and effective 

deterrent. In addition, Chapter 8 analyzes the costs associated with implementing and executing 

that plan. 

In 2010 a number of policy guidance documents were published: the Nuclear Posture Review Report 

(DOD 2010) in April, the National Security Strategy (White House 2010) in May, the Section 1251 report 

to Congress in May as part of the process to ratify New START, and the first SSMP (the FY 2011 SSMP) 

in June. Combined, these documents defined the policy for the Nation’s nuclear deterrent and laid out 

the initial strategy to implement that policy. In the almost 4 years since then, a number of refinements 

have accumulated in terms of strategic planning. None of these individually or in total represents a 

change in policy direction as much as an opportunity to provide more specificity and economy to the 

strategy that supports the policy decisions communicated in spring of 2010. 

Since the spring of 2010, NNSA has made adjustments on how to implement the initial strategy. Some 

of these adjustments have further leveled the workload at the three national security laboratories, the 

four nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site. These adjustments 

have increased efficiency while retaining and challenging the workforce. Recognizing the President’s 

policy to reduce the nuclear arsenal and the reliance on nuclear weapons, NNSA worked with the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to develop approaches to hedge against technological and geopolitical 

surprise with a smaller stockpile. NNSA also made adjustments to the plans for modernizing the 

infrastructure to enhance safety and security while reducing costs. Finally, NNSA continued to apply the 

latest technical data and cost analysis to enable the Nuclear Weapons Council to prioritize its 

requirements. 

These adjustments to the initial strategy of 2010 were made in coordination with the Nuclear Weapons 

Council and resulted in the 3+2 strategy. The adjustments were driven by three factors: efficiency, 

maturing studies and designs, and improved science. The most basic driver for updating the 2010 

strategy was the continuing effort to operate a more efficient and less costly nuclear security enterprise. 

Another driver involved the options made available as infrastructure designs and weapon studies 

continued to improve and more detailed cost estimates became available. The final driver was the 

previous investments in science and surveillance, which provided a better understanding of the effects 

of stockpile aging and implementation of new infrastructure capabilities. 

The goal of the 3+2 strategy is to meet the military and policy objectives of a smaller stockpile with 

fewer weapon types based on a modernized and responsive nuclear security enterprise that is more 

responsive to technological and geopolitical surprise. The current size of the stockpile is the smallest 

since the Eisenhower Administration. It consists of twelve warhead or bomb variants within seven 

deployed warhead families: two submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads, two 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warheads, and three air-delivered warheads or bombs. As each 

of these weapons enters a life extension program (LEP), the 3+2 strategy (Figure 1–1) will move the 

Nation toward a stockpile consisting of three interoperable ballistic missile warheads deployed on both 

the SLBM and ICBM legs of the Triad and two air-delivered warheads or bombs. Making warheads 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-3 

interoperable on different delivery platforms can reduce the number of different systems that must be 

maintained and serviced, while still providing sufficient diversity among deployed systems. Three 

interoperable ballistic missile warheads with similar deployed numbers will allow for a greatly reduced 

technical hedge for each system to protect against a single warhead failure. The priority for 

interoperability is for ballistic missile warheads; interoperability for the air-delivered warheads is not 

likely to be pursued within the planning period of this document. This approach reduces the production 

quantities required of the LEPs, and it meets the President’s policy guidance to reduce the size of the 

hedge stockpile. To support the 3+2 strategy, NNSA must have a responsive infrastructure capable of 

the full range of activities to produce the future stockpile and to enable a smaller hedge. Finally, none 

of this will be possible without a predictive scientific capability that evaluates options based on previous 

life extension designs and responds to technical challenges without requiring new underground nuclear 

testing. 

Figure 1–1. 3+2 strategy 

As a high priority, NNSA will continue to deliver on the production of the W76-1 LEP with completion 

in fiscal year (FY) 2019. The W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 project to deliver critical upgrades to key systems 

on the other SLBM warheads will have a first production unit in FY 2020. These activities sustain the 

current stockpile during early implementation of the 3+2 strategy. 

The first warhead life extension effort of the 3+2 strategy currently in progress is the B61-12 LEP. This 

program is critical to modernizing the nuclear gravity weapon stockpile while ensuring the sustainment 

of the Nation’s strategic and non-strategic air-delivered nuclear deterrent capability. The B61-12 LEP 

will refurbish nuclear and non-nuclear components, resulting in the replacement of four current B61 

strategic and non-strategic weapon designs. It will allow NNSA to pursue retirement of the B83 gravity 

bomb, once confidence in the B61-12 stockpile is gained (see Table 2–1 on page 2-2 of the 

FY 2014 SSMP). By the end of FY 2024, completion of the B61-12 LEP will result in a large reduction in 

the number of air-delivered gravity weapons (active and inactive) and a large reduction in the total mass 

of nuclear material used by air-delivered gravity weapons. The result will be a significant reduction in 

the total nuclear yield (in megatons) possible from air-delivered gravity weapons. All of this will be 

accomplished while meeting military requirements. Finally, the development activities of the 

B61-12 LEP will be highly leveraged in subsequent life extension activities. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 1-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

The next warhead to begin life extension is an air-delivered cruise missile warhead. The Nuclear 

Weapons Council has identified the W80 or W84 cruise missile warheads as candidates for reuse-based 

life extension. The funding profile in the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) supports a first 

production unit date of FY 2027. At this early stage of the project, that date could be accelerated by as 

much as 2 years with an increased funding rate and adjusted profile that could meet a first production 

unit date of FY 2025. 

The first ballistic missile warhead LEP in the 3+2 strategy is the W78/88-1 warhead, now referred to as 

the interoperable warhead (IW)-1. The Nuclear Weapons Council’s objective is to deploy an 

interoperable nuclear explosive package for use in the Mk21 ICBM aeroshell1

 and the Mk5 SLBM 

aeroshell, with adaptable non-nuclear components. Hence, this LEP is also referred to as the first 

interoperable warhead option, the IW-1. Interoperable warheads, together with the B61-12 and the Air 

Force cruise missile warhead, lead to a reduction in both the overall stockpile numbers and the number 

of warhead types. These activities will be consistent with the DOD requirements in the Nuclear Posture 

Review Report (DOD 2010). 

NNSA just completed construction of infrastructure improvements that are an enabling component 

of nuclear weapon sustainment and modernization. NNSA will move into a modern production facility 

in Kansas City this year and will complete construction of a new High Explosives Processing Facility at the 

Pantex Plant (Pantex) by the end of FY 2016. NNSA has also developed a plutonium strategy that 

supports the scheduled LEPs while effectively maintaining the Nation’s plutonium capability. A critical 

element of the plutonium strategy is the timing of the pit production capability, which will increase to 

30 pits per year by FY 2026, ultimately reaching a capacity of 50-80 pits per year by FY 2030. Pit 

reacceptance and reuse functions will augment pit production to ensure necessary quantities are readily 

available to satisfy future stockpile requirements. The Uranium Processing Facility will provide 

capabilities for highly enriched uranium that are now performed in aging facilities to be replaced by 

FY 2025. As a result, NNSA plans to have in place the requisite physical infrastructure required to 

support the 3+2 strategy and satisfy military requirements. Even with all the above improvements in 

the NNSA infrastructure, efforts and resources must be allocated to continue to support the 

NNSA mission. 

1.3 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Planning 

During the past year, NNSA has continued to improve the methods for stockpile stewardship and 

management planning. As reflected in Chapter 8, NNSA has refined its cost models, particularly for LEPs. 

NNSA has also updated and revised the approach for the Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation 

Planning (TBSTP) for current stockpile systems and planned LEPs. The TBSTP defines the required 

components and the dates needed for maturation of different technologies. The revised TBSTP 

approach provides a prioritized list of technologies recommended by the national security laboratories 

for the Component Maturation Framework (CMF). The CMF is now being used as a portfolio 

management tool to inform decisions on investment for technology maturation for future stockpile 

acquisitions. The major strategic goals, or pegposts, of the Predictive Capability Framework (PCF) have 

been redefined to better reflect the requirements for addressing technical drivers such as certification 

and assessment when implementing the strategic vision of the SSMP. These changes to the key 

planning methodologies are described in Chapter 3. 

 

1 A heat-resistant shell to protect a vehicle during reentry into the atmosphere. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 1-5 

1.4 Stockpile Management 

Chapter 2 covers the updates to the FY 2014 SSMP for stockpile management activities. These activities 

include assessments, surveillance, and maintenance of active weapons systems, LEPs, and 

dismantlement and disposition of retired weapons. The chapter includes two important schedule 

changes to the previous year’s plan. 

In FY 2013, work on the IW-1 was accelerated to enable an early focus on the preferred design concept. 

As part of this effort, a joint certification nuclear design team, consisting of Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) personnel, proposed an early pit 

downselect. The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Air Force, and NNSA all supported the early pit downselect, which was briefed to the Nuclear Weapons 

Council. The remainder of the Phase 6.2/6.2A activity will be delayed to align the IW-1 first production 

unit in FY 2030. 

Based on the importance of the follow-on air-launched cruise missile warhead development, NNSA has 

worked with the Nuclear Weapons Council to reduce the options to either the W80 or the W84 warhead 

families for the replacement cruise missile. Although the replacement cruise missile warhead first 

production unit could be as early as FY 2025, the current funding is for a first production unit in FY 2027. 

1.5 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 

Activities 

In the FY 2014 SSMP, Chapter 3 was named Science, Technology, and Engineering. In this FY 2015 SSMP, 

the chapter is renamed Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Activities to reflect more 

accurately the activities described in the chapter. The chapter summarizes the updates to the research, 

development, testing, and evaluation efforts related to stockpile stewardship and management. It 

includes a brief section on an initial strategy to develop a ten-year plan, as requested recently by 

Congress, to acquire exascale computing, which is a thousand times faster than NNSA’s current 

capability for advanced simulations. It also summarizes recent accomplishments of the Science, 

Engineering, Inertial Confinement Fusion, and Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaigns and 

introduces enhanced capabilities being pursued for future subcritical experiments. 

In FY 2013, the three national security laboratories supported plans to develop the Air Force cruise 

missile warhead and delivered on a series of short-term warhead option studies for other LEPs. Design 

data were also provided to support the W87 legacy pit engineering development unit fabrication. 

1.6 Nuclear Test Readiness 

The NNSA no longer maintains a “test readiness program,” but maintains test readiness by the collateral 

exercise of related capabilities at the three national security laboratories and the Nevada National 

Security Site. The plans in Chapter 4 to ensure nuclear test readiness are unchanged from the 

FY 2014 SSMP. 

1.7 Physical Infrastructure 

Chapter 5 summarizes updates to the plans to sustain and modernize the physical infrastructure of the 

nuclear security enterprise. These updates include a new FY 2015 Integrated Priority List, updated from 

the FY 2014 list (see Figure 5–2 on page 5-10 of the FY 2014 SSMP), and illustrate potential increased 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 1-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

risk from delays or deferrals of capital construction projects that resulted from FY 2013 and FY 2014 

budget constraints, such as sequestration and the lapse in funding appropriations. In addition, NNSA 

has revisited and re-prioritized construction projects for the FY 2015 – FY 2019 FYNSP period. Chapter 5 

also reflects the delay of a number of NNSA security projects, as compared to the FY 2014 SSMP 

(see Figure 5–3 on page 5-11 of the FY 2014 SSMP). 

1.8 Federal and Contractor Workforce 

Chapter 6 describes the updates to planning for a skilled and diverse Federal and contractor workforce. 

In particular, the chapter summarizes the findings of two workforce management studies completed in 

FY 2013. Moreover, the field offices were realigned in FY 2013 under the Office of the Administrator in 

order to improve the oversight and effectiveness of the management and operating (M&O) workforce. 

1.9 Security of the Nuclear Security Enterprise 

Chapter 7 summarizes the changes in programs to ensure the security of the Nation’s weapons, special 

nuclear material, security infrastructure, and sensitive information. The Secure Transportation Asset 

Program realigned its resources in FY 2013 to address several critical stockpile needs: the design, 

fabrication, and testing of the Mobile Guardian Transporter, the conversion to all Federal pilots, and the 

restoration of Federal agent strength levels. The responsibility for developing and overseeing the 

safeguards and security programs for nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, classified information, 

infrastructure, and personnel has been transferred back to the Office of Chief Defense Nuclear Security. 

A new wide-area network (OneNNSA Network), a unified, agency-wide collaborative network 

(OneVoice), and state-of-the-art cloud architecture (YOURcloud) were also established in FY 2013 by the 

Chief Information Officer Activities Program, which restructured its subprograms to align more closely 

with the DOE Office of the Chief Information Officer. 

1.10 Overview of Projected Budgetary Requirements and 

Management Processes and Procedures 

Chapter 8 graphically summarizes the projected budgetary requirements of the Weapons Activities 

account as a result of the new out-year budget numbers subsequent to the FY 2014 SSMP. Improved 

cost estimates for all planned LEPs are also shown against the FY 2014 SSMP schedule for the 

implementation of the 3+2 strategy. The chapter also reviews the updates to NNSA’s business practices 

for increasing efficiencies, reducing costs, and prioritizing the efforts of the nuclear security enterprise in 

sustaining the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. 

1.11 Additional Information 

The conclusions to the FY 2015 SSMP are in Chapter 9. Appendix A contains the statutory reporting 

requirements and related congressional requests and maps these to specific chapters or sections of 

chapters. There are no changes to the information in Appendices B, C, D, and E of the FY 2014 SSMP. A 

new appendix, Appendix F, discusses the need for exascale computing, describes NNSA’s approach to 

advancing high performance computing for stockpile stewardship, and discusses the strategy to develop 

a ten-year plan to acquire that capability. The classified Annex contains updates to Chapters 1, 2, and 3 

of the FY 2014 classified Annex. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-1 

Chapter 2 

Stockpile Management 

Stockpile Management encompasses the Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) activities for assessment, 

surveillance, and maintenance of active weapons systems, for LEPs and alterations, and for weapons 

dismantlement and disposition. This chapter, in conjunction 

with Chapter 2 in the classified Annex, provides updates to 

the status and plans for these activities since the 

FY 2014 SSMP was submitted.

2.1 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

The baseline for stockpile planning is the FY 2011 – 2017 

Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan, which the President signed 

in July 2011; the FY 2011 – 2024 Requirements and Planning 

Document, authorized and amended by the Nuclear 

Weapons Council; and the President’s FY 2015 budget 

request to Congress. The information regarding current 

U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery platforms 

provided in Table 2–1 of the FY 2014 SSMP is unchanged. 

Chapter 2 in the classified Annex contains updated details 

about stockpile quantities and related information. 

2.2 Stockpile Assessments, Surveillance, and Significant 

Finding Investigations 

The descriptions of methods and information to determine that the stockpile is safe and effective are 

unchanged from the subsections under Section 2.2 of the FY 2014 SSMP. Workload projections for 

major DSW surveillance evaluations in FY 2014 and during the FY 2015 FYNSP are updated in Tables 2–1

and 2–2 of this FY 2015 SSMP; these two tables are updates to Tables 2–2 and 2–3, respectively, in 

Section 2.2 of the FY 2014 SSMP. Figures 2–1, 2–2, and 2–3 in Section 2.2 of the FY 2014 SSMP are 

unchanged. Figure 2–1 below is an update of the FY 2014 SSMP’s Figure 2–4 of historical significant 

finding investigations (SFIs), with the FY 2013 data added. Updates to key activities and milestones in 

weapon assessment and surveillance in Figure 2–14 of the FY 2014 SSMP are summarized in the text 

in Section 2.9.2. 

FY 2013 Stockpile Management 

Accomplishments 

 Completed Annual Assessment on 

schedule. 

 Instituted resource-loaded schedule and 

earned value management system for 

B61-12 LEP. 

 Completed a downselect to W87-like pit 

for IW-1 and briefed the Nuclear 

Weapons Council. 

 Completed first production unit for W87 

neutron generator. 

 Completed cruise missile 90-day study 

and follow-on study. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 2-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Table 2–1. Fiscal year 2013 actual and fiscal year 2014 baseline major Directed Stockpile 

Work Program stockpile evaluation activities (as of February 28, 2014) 

(This table updates Table 2–2 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

Warheads 

D&Is

JTA 

Flights

Test Bed 

Evaluations Pit NDE

Pit 

D-Tests CSA NDE

CSA 

D-Tests

GTS 

Tests

DCA 

Tests

Program

Totals

Fiscal Year 

13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 13 14 

B61 10 12 8 8 6 6 30 31 1 1 10 4 0 4 16 4 21 19 102 113 

W76-0 0 10 3 3 8 0 0 13 1 1 0 14 0 1 7 15 0 0 19 77 

W76-1 7 26 3 6 2 15 45 40 0 1 1 0 2 3 14 6 18 4 92 145 

W78 2 11 4 3 8 0 31 49 2 3 9 7 2 0 10 11 0 8 68 116 

W80 6 12 5 4 4 8 24 27 1 0 0 0 1 1 9 8 0 8 50 86 

B83 5 4 3 2 0 4 17 36 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 10 0 8 29 72 

W84 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

W87 8 10 2 2 0 7 8 27 0 1 0 0 1 1 13 8 4 4 36 80 

W88 5 8 3 6 0 6 9 13 1 1 0 7 0 1 14 20 14 7 46 83 

Totals 43 93 31 34 28 46 164 236 7 10 20 32 7 13 85 82 57 58 442 772 

Key: 

CSA = canned subassembly 

D&I = disassembly and inspection 

DCA = detonator cable assembly 

D-tests = destructive tests 

GTS = gas transfer system 

JTA = Joint Test Assembly 

NDE = nondestructive evaluation 

a Although the W84 is no longer deployed, limited surveillance is being conducted to ensure its continued safety. 

Note: FY 2014 Baseline is the workload associated with the FY 2014 President’s Budget level of program funding. 

Table 2–2. Major surveillance evaluations completed in fiscal year 2013 and baselined for 

fiscal year 2014, as well as planning requirements for the Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

(fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2019) (as of February 28, 2014) 

(This table updates Table 2–3 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

Major 

Activity 

FY 2013 

Actual 

FY 2014 

Baseline 

FY 2015 

Requirements 

FY 2016 

Requirements 

FY 2017 

Requirements

FY 2018 

Requirements 

FY 2019 

Requirements

FYNSP 

Total 

D&I 43 93 78 75 75 69 67 364 

JTA Flight 31 34 27 32 26 26 26 137 

Test Bed 

Evaluation 28 46 53 44 47 43 44 231 

Pit NDE 164 236 200 a 200 a 200 a 200 a 200 a 1,000 

Pit D-Test 7 10 8 11 9 8 11 47 

CSA NDE 20 32 42 35 48 31 47 203 

CSA D-Tests 7 13 16 15 13 13 21 78 

DCA Test 57 58 75 84 77 83 73 392 

GTS Tests 85 82 76 71 71 71 70 359 

TOTALS 442 604 575 567 566 544 559 2,811 

Key: 

CSA = canned subassembly 

D&I = disassembly and inspection 

DCA = detonator cable assembly 

D-tests = destructive tests 

FY = fiscal year 

FYNSP = Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

GTS = gas transfer system 

JTA = Joint Test Assembly 

NDE = nondestructive evaluation a Pit NDE requirements projected for FY 2015 through FY 2019 have not been fully issued by the national security laboratories 

for the four specific types of diagnostics employed. 

Note: FYNSP forecasted quantities do not reflect reductions that may result from the lowering of stockpile readiness proposed 

for certain weapons. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-3 

Figure 2–1. Historical number of significant finding investigations opened and closed during 

calendar years 2001 to 2013 and the number that resulted in an impact to the stockpile 

(This figure updates Figure 2–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

2.3 Annual Assessment Report to the President 

The FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) became Public Law 113-66 on 

December 26, 2013. Section 3122 of the FY 2014 NDAA amended 50 U.S.C. 2525, changing the due date 

of the joint DOE and DOD memorandum to the President from March 1 to February 1. In addition, the 

following requirements were added: 

 The Laboratory Directors’ letters shall include “a concise summary of any SFI (initiated or active) 

during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial 

responsibility.” 

 The STRATCOM letter shall include 

– “a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory 

measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of 

the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify 

any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types” and 

– “a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active 

and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles.” 

 If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required (under paragraph 2, 

dated March 15) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in 

subsection (b) [The head of each national security laboratory and Commander STRATCOM] shall 

provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the 

report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e) (letters to the 

Secretary of Energy and Defense). 

Also, since the submission of the FY 2014 SSMP, the Directors of the national security laboratories and 

NNSA completed the Annual Assessment, Cycle 18, on schedule. 

Figure 2–5 on page 2-11 of the FY 2014 SSMP is unchanged. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 2-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

2.4 Maintenance of the Stockpile 

The near-term maintenance activity update is: 

 Support neutron generator production at a rate of 800 to 900 components per year 

from FY 2015 to FY 2019. These revised numbers reflect updated requirements in the 

December 18, 2013, Neutron Generator Enterprise Integrated Program Plan. 

Updates to key activities and milestones in weapon maintenance in Figure 2–14 of the FY 2014 SSMP are 

summarized in the text in Section 2.9.2. 

2.5 Stockpile Services Subprogram 

The activity described as the Enterprise Modeling Consortium in the FY 2014 SSMP has been renamed 

the Enterprise Modeling and Analysis Consortium to reflect the additional scope of the subprogram. 

Figure 2–6 of the FY 2014 SSMP is unchanged. 

2.6 Sustaining the Stockpile through Life Extension Plans 

As noted in the FY 2014 SSMP, insensitive high explosives (IHEs) will replace conventional high 

explosives when feasible. IHEs improve safety during all stages of a warhead’s life cycle, including 

during assembly and disassembly. Use of IHEs also improves throughput at Pantex by enabling more 

options for workspaces (such as facilitating multi-unit processing, common-load transport, increased 

staging capacity, etc.). Figure 2–7 on page 2-16 of the FY 2014 SSMP is unchanged. Figure 2–2

illustrates the life extension activities to implement the 3+2 strategy; this is an update to Figure 2–8 on 

page 2-17 of the FY 2014 SSMP. 

Figure 2–2. National Nuclear Security Administration life extension activities 

(This figure updates Figure 2–8 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-5 

W76-1 LEP 

Production problems stemming from a very conservative, but necessary, approach to safety at Pantex 

resulted in lower than planned production figures for the W76-1 in FY 2013, but deliveries still met Navy 

requirements. New plans for FY 2014 project a recovery in production quantities by the end of the year 

to enable completion of the W76-1 by FY 2019. 

W88 Alt 370 

Sequestration impacts during FY 2013 required changing the planned first production unit date to 

December 2019 (FY 2020) from December 2018. 

B61-12 LEP 

Sequestration impacts during FY 2013 required changing the first production unit date to March 2020 

(FY 2020) from March 2019. 

IW-1 LEP 

In FY 2014, the Phase 6.2 study team adjusted the study schedule to align with budget priorities and 

focused on narrowing scope to a preferred design. LANL and LLNL established a joint certification team. 

The planned first production unit date has changed from FY 2025 to FY 2030. The IW-1 team will use 

available funds in FY 2014 to complete a study of alternatives and archive the results for a pending 

restart as late as FY 2020. 

Cruise Missile Warhead 

In early FY 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council removed the B61 warhead family from consideration as a 

potential cruise missile warhead. A warhead family downselect decision is anticipated at the end of the 

Concept Assessment Phase, currently projected in the third quarter of FY 2015. An official Phase 6.1 

study is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of FY 2014. The planned first production unit date has 

been delayed 1–3 years from FY 2024 based on funding. Current planning in this FY 2015 SSMP assumes 

a first production unit in FY 2027, but NNSA may adjust the first production unit to be sooner if sufficient 

funding is available; a key factor for the decision to move the first production unit forward would be 

better alignment with the Air Force development of the next-generation nuclear cruise missile. 

An updated summary of the LEP and alteration plans endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council that 

have since been modified includes the following: 

 W88 Alt 370 

– Complete development to support a first production unit no later than December 2019 

(FY 2020). 

– Complete production no later than the end of FY 2024. 

 B61-12 LEP 

– Complete Phases 6.3 through 6.5 to support a first production unit planned for March 2020 

(FY 2020). 

– Complete production no later than the end of FY 2024. 

 Cruise Missile Warhead 

– B61 family was removed from consideration. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 2-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

– Complete Phases 6.1 through 6.5 to support a first production unit in FY 2025–2027. 

– Complete production by FY 2032–2034. 

 IW-1 LEP 

– Complete Phase 6.2/6.2A through 6.5 to support a first production unit no earlier than 

FY 2030. 

– Complete production by FY 2040. 

Updates to key activities and milestones in LEP planning and execution in Figure 2–15 of the 

FY 2014 SSMP are summarized in the text in Section 2.9.2. 

Plutonium Sustainment and Pit Production 

The FY 2015 FYNSP for the Plutonium Sustainment Program includes the following major activities: 

 Complete the reconstitution of a power supply production capability. 

 Continue to acquire and install pit production equipment that replaces old, end-of-service-life 

equipment. 

 Build up to four W87-like pits per year over the FY 2015 FYNSP to facilitate process 

development, equipment configuration, and limited pit certification. 

The NNSA must balance requirements with plutonium and pit production capabilities to meet national 

policy goals, stockpile requirements, and LEP planning. In response to budget priorities and changed LEP 

requirements, the pit production schedule has changed from the FY 2014 SSMP. The first War Reserve 

W87-like pit to support the current IW-1 schedule is planned for FY 2024, with a ramp up to 30 pits per 

year capability no later than FY 2026. A notional pit development timeline is shown in Table 2–3 below, 

which is an update to Table 2–4 on page 2-22 of the FY 2014 SSMP. Current plans call for pit production 

capability of 50 – 80 pits per year by FY 2030. 

Table 2–3. Pit development timeline to achieve 30 pits per year 

(This table updates Table 2–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

Type 

Fiscal Year 

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 

Pit Production Series Development Builds Process Prove-in Builds Qualification Builds War Reserve Builds 

Number of Builds 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 10 20 30 

 

Tritium Supply 

NNSA’s current tritium production plan is illustrated in the schedule shown in Figure 2–3, which is an 

updated version of Figure 2–9 on page 2-24 of the FY 2014 SSMP. In October 2012, a total of 

544 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) were loaded into the Watts Bar Nuclear Power 

Plant Unit 1. Budget reprioritization in FY 2013 and FY 2014 impacted completion of analyses necessary 

to support a License Amendment Request (LAR) in FY 2014. These TPBARs are scheduled to be removed 

in April 2014 and replaced with the next production cycle of 704 TPBARs. The LAR is required to achieve 

greater than 704 TPBARs in a reactor cycle. This delay will result in the FY 2016 TPBAR quantities being 

reduced from the planned 1,024 TPBARs to 704 TPBARs. 
F

Figure 2–3. Schedule for irra

to meet post-Nuc

(This figure up

To meet future requirements, the num

the FY 2019 timeframe. Although the

because of the LAR delays, options a

ramping up at a faster rate in FY 201

budget projections include the addition

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through 2030 and possibly to the mid

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mid FY 2015. From mid FY 2015 throug

contracts signed by DOE, the United

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planned inventory amounts. However,

the mid 2020s. 

When the Depleted Uranium Enrichm

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shown in Figure 2–4, which is an update

Figure 2–11 on page 2-27 under Section

Department of Energ

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Pl

adiation of tritium‐producing burnable absorber rod

clear Posture Review Report requirements 

pdates Figure 2–9 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

mber of TPBARs must increase to approximately 1,700

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re being developed to mitigate the impacts. Opt

7 or limited production in a second reactor. NNSA

al TPBARs starting in FY 2014. 

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d States Enrichment Corporation, Energy Northwe

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April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 2-8 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewa

Figure 2–4. Schedule for

to t

(This figure upd

2.7 Weapons Dismantle

For 2013, Pantex did not meet its base

facility down-times, infrastructure re

However, Pantex made significant prog

more than 75,000 components in the 

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Annex contains the most recent dis

program planning reflects FY 2015 - 20

dismantling all weapons retired prior to

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recommended by the Governm

2.8 Integrated Surety S

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will be addressed in the FY 2016 SSMP. 

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r supplying unobligated low-enriched uranium fuel 

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dates Figure 2–10 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

ement and Disposition 

eline dismantlement requirement because of issues w

epairs, safety enhancements, and software impl

gress in reducing legacy component inventories by 

fiscal year. The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y

mantlement rates for several systems. Y-12 also h

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mantlement data. Weapons Dismantlement and 

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 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-9 

2.9 Summary of Significant Stockpile Accomplishments 

and Plans 

2.9.1 Recent Major Stockpile Management Accomplishments 

The FY 2013 stockpile management accomplishments include: 

 Closed five SFIs using the newly implemented laboratory peer review process. 

 Completed assessments of neutron generators and gas transfer systems and made 

recommendations to support decision making. 

 Used the LLNL Site 300 to support hydrodynamics testing. 

 Instituted a resource-loaded, integrated master schedule and earned value management system 

across the nuclear security enterprise for the B61-12 LEP. 

 Completed a downselect to the pit type for the first interoperable warhead, IW-1. 

 Achieved first production unit for the small ferroelectric neutron generator for the W87. 

 Completed assembly of four engineering development pits as part of the Plutonium Sustainment 

Program. 

 Fabricated first set of non-nuclear subassemblies developed for the Plutonium Sustainment 

Program, demonstrating the capability and a rapid, cost-effective response. 

 Delivered all hardware to support flight tests for the W88 Alt 370 Critical Radar Arming Fuzing 

Test, which is scheduled for FY 2014. 

 Attained $30 million in cost avoidance for the W88 Alt 370 by qualifying the reuse of sensors in 

integrated accelerometer units. 

 Delivered W76-1 components on schedule, while performing the largest industrial move project 

in North America under the Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure, Manufacturing and Sourcing 

(KCRIMS) project. 

 Disposed of more than 75,000 legacy components resulting from prior year dismantlements. 

 Implemented a new Integrated Production Planning and Execution System (IPRO) at Pantex. 

IPRO singly replaces a number of aged software systems, including CAS/MRPII, IRIS, Track Right, 

and Primavera. 

 Completed measurements on a stockpile nuclear explosive-like assembly and numerous 

enduring stockpile pits over a 12-week period. This activity was sponsored by the NNSA Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Warhead Measurement Campaign. The work improves NNSA’s 

understanding of technical options applicable to future nuclear non-proliferation objectives. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 2-10 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

2.9.2 Stockpile Management Activities, Milestones, and Key Annual 

Deliverables 

Figure 2–14 on page 2-32 of the FY 2014 SSMP is unchanged except as noted on page 2-5 regarding 

neutron generator production quantity plans. 

Figure 2–15 on page 2-32 of the FY 2014 SSMP is updated with the following adjustments: 

 Establishing capability for production of a second legacy pit has changed to FY 2024 

from FY 2019. 

 W88 Alt 370 first production unit date has changed from December 2018 to December 2019 

(FY 2020). 

 B61-12 LEP first production unit date has changed from FY 2019 to March 2020 (FY 2020). 

 Cruise missile warhead first production unit date has changed from FY 2024 to FY 2025–FY 2027. 

 IW-1 LEP first production unit date has changed from FY 2025 to FY 2030. 

 IW-2 first production unit date has changed from FY 2031 to FY 2034. 

 IW-3 first production unit date has changed from FY 2037 to FY 2041. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-1 

Chapter 3 

Research, Development, Testing, and 

Evaluation Activities 

This chapter, renamed from the FY 2014 SSMP, discusses the essential research, development, testing, 

and evaluation (RDT&E) activities that underpin stockpile stewardship. 

3.1 Introduction 

RDT&E provides the tools to analyze, compare, 

evaluate, and recommend modernization options to 

extend the stockpile life while improving safety and 

security and addressing broader national security 

requirements. 

3.2 Management and Planning 

The tools and approaches NNSA uses to address 

RDT&E are unchanged from the FY 2014 SSMP. 

NNSA continues to improve its planning processes by 

aligning activities with programmatic elements and 

recent stockpile decisions. Moreover, an additional 

approach is being developed to align qualification 

and certification activities that support component 

maturation and technology development with the 

Science, Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC), 

Engineering, and Inertial Confinement Fusion 

Campaigns. The FY 2016 SSMP will provide an indepth discussion of changes to the TBSTP, the CMF, 

and the PCF. 

Figure 3–1 summarizes the capabilities that RDT&E 

provides. These capabilities facilitate the assessment of the stockpile condition by revealing anomalies, 

the evaluation of impacts of anomalies on warhead performance, and the implementation of solutions. 

In addition, RDT&E also supports the broader national security issues by providing capabilities to avoid 

technological surprise and to provide confidence in system performance. 

3.2.1 Technical Basis for Stockpile Transformation Planning 

The TBSTP report was updated in September 2013. No other significant changes have been made to this 

section. 

FY 2013 Research, Development, Testing, and 

Evaluation Activities Accomplishments 

 Executed Pollux subcritical experiments with 

plutonium that provided unprecedented ability to 

compare predictive models to data from an 

imploding weapon-relevant system at scale. 

 Set records for number of stockpile stewardship 

shots and for neutron yield on the National 

Ignition Facility. 

 Executed seven dynamic behavior of plutonium 

experiments on the Joint Actinide Shock Physics 

Experimental Research (JASPER) two-stage gas 

gun to improve phase-aware plutonium equation 

of state. 

 Converted Sequoia, the world’s third-fastest 

computer on the Top 500 list, to classified 

operations. 

 Fully supported the Cycle 18 Annual Assessment 

Review Process, provided reports and 

presentations to Project Officer Groups, the 

U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group 

Stockpile Assessment Team, and the Secretary 

of Energy.
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 3-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 3–1. Research, development, testing, and evaluation enables 

the National Nuclear Security Administration to meet the broad range 

of activities essential to nuclear security mission requirements 

3.2.2 Component Maturation and Technology Development 

The process to develop technologies and the associated component maturation for insertion into the 

stockpile continues to progress. CMF is a portfolio management tool with integration, risk, schedule, 

and status information on primarily pre-Phase 6.3 activities on program-of-record technologies that 

support LEPs, Alts, and modifications (Mods). The CMF focuses on five goals facilitating inter-site 

integration and communication on programmatic priorities: 

 Determining resource requirements and identifying funding sources 

 Linking component maturation and technology development activities with the respective LEP 

integrated master delivery schedules 

 Tracking maturation of selected technologies through the nine technology and manufacturing 

readiness levels to meet specified first production unit dates 

 Integrating with RDT&E to design, develop, and qualify components 

Figure 3–3 in the FY 2014 SSMP, the planning framework for component maturation and technology 

development activities, is not being revised at this time. A new version will be incorporated in the 

FY 2016 SSMP. 

The United States House Armed Services Committee (HASC FY 2014 NDAA HR 1960) directed the NNSA 

to provide a briefing on NNSA’s Advanced Manufacturing roadmap. A classified briefing was provided 

during February 2014 that included advanced manufacturing processes adaptable for NNSA’s mission 

and potential cost savings and reductions in waste, floor space requirements, and production time. 

Timelines for development and scale up of these manufacturing technologies and associated benefits 

and challenges were also provided. Additive Manufacturing is an advanced manufacturing technology 

that has the potential to revolutionize product realization on a global scale. The roadmap provides an 

overview in terms of the weapons components that can be manufactured using additive manufacturing; 

the roadmap also identifies components with immediate near-term impact. Many of the benefits of 

additive manufacturing can be realized now for components that have lower qualification requirements, 

and as additive manufacturing technology evolves, it can potentially be applied to support a much 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-3 

broader range of manufacturing requirements. To rapidly realize the benefits of additive manufacturing 

to its missions, NNSA Defense Programs has established an “Additive Manufacturing Implementation 

Team” to provide additional focus. This team is planning to identify the key Defense Programs additive 

manufacturing focus areas for the next 5-10 years and funding requirements for implementation. 

3.2.3 General Requirements for Predictive Science Planning 

This section replaces Section 3.2.3 of the FY 2014 SSMP in its entirety. 

As the weapons in the stockpile age, materials can undergo physical changes that may negatively impact 

the ability for a weapon to perform its intended function. These changes include, for example, 

formation of gaps and cracks, changes in mechanical properties (e.g., the loss of ductility, elasticity, or 

strength) and corrosion resulting from the warhead atmosphere. Advanced tools and diagnostic 

capabilities are then required to assess the impact of such changes on weapons performance. Similarly, 

as weapons are refurbished, a combination of reused, remanufactured, and replacement components 

are incorporated, thereby shifting the weapons further from as-built and nominally as-tested states. 

Advanced tools and capabilities are required to ensure the performance of these modified weapons. 

Both the assessment of the state of the stockpile and the certification of stockpile modifications rely on 

sound scientific connections to (1) original and reanalyzed data from legacy underground nuclear and 

non-nuclear testing, (2) established physics, and (3) data from new experiments. “Predictive science” 

seeks to grow the domain of established weapons physics, to provide increasingly more sophisticated 

subcritical experimental capabilities, and to broaden the breadth of scientific connections through 

advances in weapon simulation codes. These predictive science activities focus on filling the knowledge 

gaps and thus expand our assessment and certification capabilities. 

In the last decade, NNSA and the national security laboratories formulated a framework to guide and 

communicate targeted advancements under the pursuit of “predictive science.” The Predictive 

Capability Framework, or PCF, projects where weapon science will be heading through the early to 

mid 2020s. The pegposts were developed based on a desire to replace legacy-code-based weapons 

simulation calibrations with first-principles capabilities and on advancements that could be reasonably 

projected based on anticipated near-term and mid-term weapon science research. The pegposts are 

also informed by the known, out-year needs for stockpile maintenance and LEPs. 

In 2013, NNSA reviewed the state of weapons science and the needed advances to steward the nuclear 

deterrent over the next 10 years. Aspects included (1) evolution in out-year needs of DSW, 

(2) observance of the significance and pace of weapons science advances over the previous 7 years, 

(3) improved insight into outstanding weapons science problems, and (4) better clarity as to what to 

pursue over the next 10 years. The mission of the nuclear security enterprise will include the following 

major areas: 

 Assessment of the existing, aging stockpile, including SFIs 

 Design, implementation, and certification of system alterations 

 Design, implementation, and certification of LEP options 

 Support of key technology and component maturation activities 

Moreover, technical questions are emerging from the examination of future nuclear force structures 

(as the 3+2 strategy is implemented) and the constraints of today’s nuclear weapon production 

infrastructure. For instance, given the reduced number of total warheads and systems, NNSA must 

address what constitutes appropriate weapon and weapon component diversity and what is the most 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 3-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

effective approach to perform surveillance on a significantly smaller stockpile. Since Stockpile 

Stewardship Program capabilities are essential and are frequently used for broader national security 

programs, these programs also require some capability development. 

NNSA has identified the mission drivers and key knowledge and capability gaps over a large range of 

topical focus areas. These items have been grouped into four broad categories of weapons physics, 

weapons engineering, cross-cutting topics, and enabling capabilities. The topical areas within weapons 

physics essentially follow the time sequence of the operation of a nuclear explosive package. The 

weapons engineering areas are characterized by component design and general functioning, operation 

through the stockpile-to-target-sequence environments, and operation in hostile encounters and in 

abnormal environments. The cross-cutting topics include stockpile surveillance and stockpile and 

component diversity. 

Finally, a host of enabling capabilities supports the advances in weapons science and engineering, 

including experimental facilities and computational tools. Major advances expected over the next 

decade have been identified and captured in a revised PCF chart. The result is 13 pegposts or points 

grouped under four lines or “strands” of activity: Primary Physics, Secondary Physics, Weapon 

Engineering, and Safety and Security, as illustrated in Figure 3–2. This revised PCF chart replaces 

Figure 3–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP. 

Figure 3–2. Version 2.0 of the Predictive Capability Framework, identifying major efforts required to 

advance stockpile assessment, sustainment, and certification capabilities 

(This figure updates Figure 3–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-5 

Each pegpost along the lines in Figure 3–2 represents a major effort that integrates the contributions to 

stockpile assessment or certification. The pegposts are equivalent to “objectives,” as used elsewhere in 

this SSMP, and support the main DSW drivers, as indicated at the top of the figure. Achieving these 

pegposts is critically dependent upon advances in the enabling capabilities. The predictive capabilities 

represented by the pegposts are demonstrated through computational simulations of increasing 

complexity, which will require improvements in both the capability and capacity of high performance 

computing. The validation of simulation models, as well as advances in understanding nuclear weapon 

performance, is achieved via the NNSA experimental facilities, such as the Dual Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the Z facility (Z), and several platforms 

at the Nevada National Security Site such as the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research 

(JASPER) gas gun and at U1a. Diagnostic upgrades such as the Advanced Radiographic Capability on the 

NIF, higher penetration flash radiography, and a new capability for diagnosing neutron reactivity in 

subcritical experiments at U1a are an essential part of PCF planning. 

Near-term examples of PCF pegposts in 2015 and 2016 are the primary and secondary assessments for 

the reuse of nuclear components. These assessments are driven by the need to ensure predictive 

capabilities are in place to determine the most likely design options for the cruise missile warhead and 

the IW-1, including pit reuse recertification and secondary reuse. The out-year pegposts build upon 

these capabilities by developing common models to quantify uncertainties in predictions, as well as 

models to assess the impact of variability caused by engineering, aging, or manufacturing features. The 

culmination of all these advances will support the delivery of high-fidelity, full-system weapon outputs 

and the characterization of their impact on the surrounding environment. 

These management and planning tools will be used to coordinate activities to assess and sustain the 

stockpile; evaluate LEP options; develop new capabilities, technologies, and components; and certify 

life-extended weapons. These tools will also contribute to solving diverse national security challenges. 

3.3 Technology Development and Component Maturation for 

Stockpile Sustainment 

No significant changes have occurred to this section. Work on technology development and component 

maturation is progressing and will be updated in the FY 2016 SSMP. 

3.4 Predictive Science of Assessment and Certification 

Work on predictive science is progressing and will be updated in the FY 2016 SSMP. 

3.5 Experimental and Computational Resources 

3.5.1 Experimental Resources 

While no significant changes have occurred to fielded experimental capabilities since the FY 2014 SSMP, 

a mission needs statement is in preparation for enhanced capabilities to the subcritical experiment 

program in areas of deep penetrating flash radiography and neutron diagnosed (reactivity) experiments 

on plutonium in U1a. The mission needs statement highlights the current gap in capabilities to diagnose 

plutonium behavior in the late stages of a primary implosion. Implementation of the capability to fill 

this gap will involve the selection of an enhanced radiographic system, proof-of-principle demonstration 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 3-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

for reactivity, enhanced U1a infrastructure requirements, and enhanced authorization basis for 

experiments at a larger scale using Hazards Category II levels of special nuclear materials. 

3.5.2 Facility and Infrastructure Planning 

No significant changes have occurred to this section since the FY 2014 SSMP. 

3.5.3 Computational Resources 

Over the next few decades, NNSA will execute a number of complex LEPs that require unparalleled 

computational capability. To meet stockpile requirements without underground testing, increased 

simulation fidelity is required. The computing capabilities enabled by advanced technology systems are 

critical to support the certification of the stockpile and the schedule of LEPs as discussed in Chapter 2. 

Two new advanced technology systems are planned to address these needs. Trinity, the first system, is 

in the vendor selection phase; Sierra, the second system, will follow Trinity by 2.5 years. The request for 

proposals has been developed and released. An in-depth description of these systems will be in the 

FY 2016 SSMP. In addition, Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation is a new ASC 

subprogram to target exascale computing and mitigate the disruption to the stockpile stewardship 

mission resulting from the direction industry is moving in computational architectures. Additional 

information on this new subprogram is provided in Section 3.7.2 and then in more detail in Appendix F. 

With the exception of the activities summarized in this subsection, no significant changes have occurred 

to the Computational Resources section since the FY 2014 SSMP. 

3.6 Ensuring U.S. Leadership in Science and Technology for 

National Nuclear Security Administration and Broader 

National Security Missions 

No significant changes have occurred to this section since the FY 2014 SSMP. 

3.7 Structure of Campaigns and Programs to Meet the 

Requirements of Stockpile Sustainment and Deterrence 

3.7.1 Science Campaign 

No significant changes occurred to the structure or descriptions of the Science Campaign and its five 

subprograms. The FY 2013 accomplishments are highlighted in the sidebar at the start of the chapter 

and in Section 3.9 of this chapter. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-7 

3.7.2 Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign 

The ASC Campaign has created a new subprogram, Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation, 

to develop a strategy to acquire the advanced computing technologies to support stockpile stewardship. 

This strategy fully recognizes the need for exascale computing1

 capabilities to support our out-year 

requirements in computational assessments, although the stewardship mission will continue to be 

accomplished with the available computational resources until such systems are available. Even without 

the technological advances required to achieve effective, power-efficient exascale, other market and 

technology forces are disrupting the computing ecosystem in a manner that is not conducive to scientific 

computing. These changes—multi-core nodes, decreased memory capacity, and decreased memory 

bandwidth (which support cell phone and gaming type applications)—will impact the full spectrum of 

high performance computing (HPC) used by NNSA for scientific computing. As a result, the continued 

viability of the current generation of multi-physics integrated design codes (IDCs), produced during an 

era of relative stability in HPC technologies, is threatened unless action is taken in anticipation of the 

arrival of the disruptive technology in order to influence its development. While ASC’s approach to 

advancing HPC technologies contributes to the foundation of plans to accelerate delivery of an exascale 

supercomputer for the Nation, the approach outlined in this FY 2015 SSMP does not accelerate such 

deliveries. It addresses the need to adapt current IDCs and to build new IDCs to use the looming 

disruptive technologies, engage in co-design ventures with industry to evolve operating systems and 

other support software, and work with HPC vendors to deploy technologies useful for the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. 

Congress recently2

 (on December 24, 2013) requested a ten-year plan to acquire exascale computing to 

support stockpile stewardship and the incorporation of that plan in the SSMP. Given the quick response 

required to meet the FY 2015 SSMP schedule and the current flux in DOE planning for the exascale 

initiative, in lieu of a complete plan, Appendix F in the FY 2015 SSMP discusses the need for an exascale 

capability and describes ASC’s approach to advancing HPC for the stockpile. The FY 2016 SSMP will 

include a plan for achieving exascale computing, a list of the intermediate milestones, an assessment of 

the required supporting infrastructure, a description of how the effort will be coordinated with other 

agencies and private industry, and an estimated cost. 

Figure 3–8 in the FY 2014 SSMP, which illustrates the subprograms of the ASC Campaign, will be updated 

in the FY 2016 SSMP. The FY 2013 accomplishments are highlighted in the sidebar at the beginning of 

the chapter and in Section 3.9 of this chapter. 

3.7.3 Engineering Campaign 

No significant changes have occurred to the structure or descriptions of the Engineering Campaign and 

its four subprograms. The FY 2013 accomplishments are highlighted in the sidebar at the beginning of 

the chapter and in Section 3.9 of this chapter. 

 

1 An exascale computer would perform 1018 floating point operations per second, more than 50 times faster than the current 

petascale-class computers that are currently the backbone of NNSA’s advanced simulation and computing. Petascale computers 

perform 1015 floating point operations per second. 2 See Public Law 113-66, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Sec. 3129, Plan for developing exascale 

computing and incorporating such computing into the stockpile stewardship program.
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 3-8 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

3.7.4 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign 

No significant changes have occurred to the structure or descriptions of the Inertial Confinement Fusion 

Ignition and High Yield Campaign and its six subprograms. The FY 2013 accomplishments are highlighted 

in the sidebar at the beginning of the chapter and in Section 3.9 of this chapter. 

3.8 Milestones, Objectives, and Future Planning 

Except for the following, no significant changes have occurred to this section since the FY 2014 SSMP. 

These adjustments are caused by either changes in available funding (resulting in changes to completion 

dates), new technical information (resulting in changes to objectives), or new priorities (resulting in new 

milestones and cancellations of others). 

 The adjustments to Figure 3–11 of the FY 2014 SSMP are: 

– Delivery of national integrated capabilities for nuclear explosive package safety, analysis of 

hardened deeply buried targets, diagnostics, and radiation effects on electrical systems will 

occur in FY 2015 instead of FY 2014. 

– The full-system safety assessment will be in FY 2016 instead of FY 2014. 

– The FY 2015 HPC platform delivery will not be 100x petascale; it will be closer to 

50x petascale. 

– The FY 2017 HPC platform delivery will be at reduced scale (100x or less petascale) because 

of funding constraints. 

 The adjustments to Figure 3–12 of the FY 2014 SSMP are: 

– Figure 3–12 will be revised to align with the new PCF pegposts in Figure 3–2 of this 

FY 2015 SSMP. Key milestones associated with Global Nuclear Security Applications will 

remain. 

 The adjustments to Figure 3–13 of the FY 2014 SSMP are: 

– In FY 2014, add milestone “Complete 120-day study on improving efficiency at NIF and begin 

implementing results.” 

– In FY 2014, add milestone “Complete 60-day study of 3-year plan for ignition and nonignition experiments on NIF.” 

– In FY 2014, delete milestone “Finalize target designs and user optics required for an FY 2017 

Advanced Ignition Platform.” 

– Move “Complete remaining NIF-ARC3

 beamlines” from FY 2014 to FY 2015. 

– Remove the word “defect” and move “Measure the effect of shell mixing on deuteriumtritium burn” from FY 2015 to FY 2016. 

– Move “Complete NIF advanced diagnostic suite” from FY 2016 to FY 2017. 

 

3 ARC is the Advanced Radiographic Capability for the National Ignition Facility.
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-9 

– In FY 2017, modify milestone “Demonstrate advanced non-ignition concepts on the ICF HED 

Facilities” to “Demonstrate a deuterium-tritium burn platform that meets the needs of 

the Stockpile Stewardship Program.” 

– In FY 2017, delete milestone “Assess the viability of fast ignition as an ignition alternative.” 

 There are no changes to Figure 3–14 of the FY 2014 SSMP. 

3.9 Summary of Recent Accomplishments 

Additional FY 2013 accomplishments not described in the sidebar on page 3-1 are listed below. 

 Conducted over 700 stockpile stewardship experiments on high energy density facilities 

(NIF, Omega, and Z), including a record neutron yield of about 1015 neutrons on the NIF and 

dynamic material property measurements on Z. 

 Executed hydrodynamic experiments at DARHT on pit reuse concepts. 

 Obtained first validation data for computer models to predict impulse from hostile x-ray 

radiation using new argon gas puff capability at Z. 

 Eliminated historical discrepancies between the simulated and measured yield on a W78 

underground test based on high-fidelity simulations with modern computer codes. 

 Improved the age-aware equation of state of plutonium based on aging studies in support of 

pit reuse. 

 Made significant progress on developing high energy density and hydrodynamic experiment 

designs to improve understanding of plutonium strength, phase stability, and other weapons 

science issues. 

 Demonstrated cost savings of $4 million and cycle time savings up to 75 percent using additive 

manufacturing techniques for producing new tooling, fixtures, and encapsulation molds. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-1 

Chapter 4 

Nuclear Test Readiness

The status of test readiness is unchanged from the FY 2014 SSMP. NNSA no longer maintains a “test 

readiness program,” but maintains test readiness by the exercise of capabilities at the national security 

laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site. 

Examples of these capabilities include: diagnostic 

development; the ability to fabricate samples, test 

objects, and war reserve components with real and 

surrogate materials; high explosive characterization 

and testing; hydrodynamic testing; ongoing reanalysis 

of underground nuclear testing based on analysis of 

prompt diagnostics and radiochemistry samples; and 

activities executed employing formality of nuclear 

operations. These include operations at the Nevada 

National Security Site such as the Device Assembly 

Facility (DAF), which is used to support JASPER, 

subcritical experiments, and the critical experiments 

facility; subcritical experiments at U1a; and plutonium 

experiments at the JASPER gas gun. In general, the 

research, development, testing, and evaluation 

activities described in Chapter 3 are all exercising the 

capabilities of test readiness. In the FY 2016 SSMP, the 

contents of Chapter 4 will be included in Chapter 3. 

FY 2013 Nuclear Test Readiness 

Accomplishments 

 Performed eight successful hydrodynamic 

experiments at the Dual Axis Radiographic 

Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, including 

the sixth Livermore shot, and performed 

one hydrodynamic experiment at the 

Contained Firing Facility. 

 Completed the Gemini subcritical 

experimental series at U1a and data 

analysis; exercised nuclear and 

underground teaming operations. 

 Routinely operated advanced diagnostics 

such as gamma reaction history, neutron 

imaging, and x-ray temperature at the 

National Ignition Facility and Z facility. 

 In adding more underground nuclear tests 

to the primary validation suite, developed 

enhanced underground nuclear test data 

analysis algorithms that improve historical 

data capture from original media and 

assign error bars that contribute to error 

analysis. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-1 

Chapter 5 

Revitalize Physical Infrastructure 

NNSA maintains a capability-based infrastructure that responds to deterrent requirements while 

balancing risk and cost. This chapter reflects updates to the NNSA plans to sustain and modernize the 

infrastructure in support of specific capabilities to design, manufacture, certify, maintain, and assess the 

Nation’s stockpile regardless of its size and composition. 

NNSA is committed to major capability improvements 

for plutonium and uranium. In particular, the 

plutonium strategy has been refined to meet 

currently defined programmatic requirements. An 

increase in the allowable plutonium inventory in the 

Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building 

(RLUOB) and reconfigured floor space in portions of 

the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) will allow equipment 

upgrades and streamlined processing. Meanwhile, 

the phased approach to complete the Uranium 

Processing Facility1

 is continuing, with the start of site 

readiness construction. To address cost growth and 

budget constraint issues, the NNSA Acting 

Administrator has directed an independent review of 

the Uranium Processing Facility to evaluate 

alternative mission delivery scenarios. NNSA 

continues to execute its balanced infrastructure investment strategy to sustain the existing 

infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise, replace or refurbish inefficient and unreliable facilities, 

and deactivate and dispose of excess facilities. 

5.1 Capability-Based Approach to Infrastructure Investment 

Table 5–1 summarizes the physical infrastructure that supports design, qualification, and assessment of 

the stockpile and the links between mission capabilities and the infrastructure condition. Some changes 

have occurred in Table 5–1 since the FY 2014 SSMP. In the table, the performance status of three 

mission capabilities has improved from yellow to green. These changes are attributed to the completion 

of two projects, and the demonstration of weapons design performance. 

 

1 The Uranium Processing Facility was previously called the Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project.

FY 2013 Physical Infrastructure 

Accomplishments 

 Installed equipment in RLUOB and prepared for 

“cold” start-up of analytical chemistry 

operations. 

 Completed construction and achieved 

Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 

(LEED) Gold Certification for the new National 

Security Campus in Kansas City, Missouri. 

 Initiated Site Readiness activities to support the 

start of construction for the Uranium Processing 

Facility. 
Page 5-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Table 5–1. Infrastructure management strategy to sustain National Nuclear Security Administration functions and m

Existing infrastructure is estimated to be sufficient for post-Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2010) mission capabilitExisting infrastructure may not be sufficient or is inefficient or unreliable for post-Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2Existing infrastructure is not sufficient for post-Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2010) mission capabilities. Function Mission Capability Current Limitation of Capability Capability Requirement Infrastructure Manageme

and Sustain Re

Plutonium RDT&E Aged, seismically deficient, and inefficient facility Modernize and sustain existing facilities An updated plutonium strategy t

closure of CMR is presented in se

Pit production < 10 pits per year 50-80 pits per year capacity  Implement RLUOB inventory inc

investments to achieve 30 pits p(was by FY 2021 in the FY 2014 S

 Continue to support strategy rea

capability

Storage of components Insufficient capacity, dispersed 

locations 

Consolidate and sustain existing facilities 

Continue mitigation strategy 

Radioactive waste disposition 

Consent agreement to close one location and upgrade waste processing system 

Sustain existing facilities with some new construction 

Continue mitigation strategy 

Uranium 

HEU and CSA RDT&E Aged, inefficient and dispersed 

facilities 

Efficient R&D facility Continue mitigation strategy

CSA production 160 CSAs per year and aged, 

fragile, inefficient facilities 

Approximately 80 CSAs per year Continue mitigation strategy 

Storage of components Satisfactory Sustain HEUMF No change Radioactive waste disposition 

Satisfactory Sustain existing facilities No change 

Tritium 

RDT&E Satisfactory Sustain existing facilities No change 

Manufacturing Satisfactory; TVA reactors 

sufficient through FY 2030 

940 metric tons of unrestricted and unobligated LEU for one reactor 

No change 

704 TPBARs per cycle sufficient through mid FY 2017. 

1,700 to 2,500 TPBARs per reactor per cycle by 2019 

The number of TPBARs has changeyear changed to support loading cysupports the tritium needed pendiCommission review and approval oincrease production to required lev

Aged and inefficient facilities Consolidate operations into existing 

newer facilities 

Implement TRIM Program and HAthrough combination of expense 

Storage Satisfactory Sustain existing facilities No change 
 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-3 Function Mission Capability Current Limitation of Capability Capability Requirement Infrastructure Manageme

and Sustain Re

High Explosives RDT&E Aged and inefficient facility Maintain leading-edge energetic materials R&D capability HE Component Fabrication and Q

from HE Production mission capaRDT&E Production 1,000 pounds per year Up to 2,500 pounds per year Continue mitigation strategy 600 hemispheres per year – fragile, inefficient facilities Up to 600 hemispheres per year – modernize and consolidate facilities Storage Satisfactory Sustain existing facilities No change Disposition Satisfactory Sustain existing facilities No change Weapons Assembly and Disassembly Assembly cells and bays, weapon surveillance, NDE, and disassembly Obsolete and aged cell and bay operational sub-safety systems Sufficient cells and bays to support all weapon operations 

 Upgrade fire alarm panels in nu Continue fire protection buildin Continue other mitigation strat

Nonnuclear Components 

RDT&E Microelectronics for LEPs Keep equipment and tooling to 

near-industry capabilities 

Continue mitigation strategy 

Production Satisfactory facilities at 

laboratories 

2 to 3 phased LEPs No change 

Satisfactory facilities at production plant (Yellow to Green change)

KCP personnel and equipment reFY 2014 changed capability from “satisfactory” 

Special Nuclear Material 

Transportation Satisfactory Sustain existing facilities No change 

Security protection and storage 

Plutonium: TA-55 PIDAS - new(Yellow to Green change)

Sustain new PIDAS NMSSUP Phase II PIDAS complet

“old & reached end of design life

Plutonium: Superblock supported at Security CAT III 

SNM supported at Security CAT III No change 

SNM staging and DAF storage Sustain existing infrastructure  Continue DAF Lead-in Piping pr

mitigation strategy 

 Execute Argus Upgrade project 

Security protection and staging for Zone 4 & 12 approaching end of life 

Efficient and right-sized PIDAS No change 

PIDAS for uranium is old, and inefficient and reaching end of design life 

20-acre PIDAS campus  Completed construction of Sec

 WEPAR cancelled as subprojec Consider PIDAS Security Upgra

the PIDAS from 150 to 80 acres 

 Consider Final PIDAS Reduction 

project that coupled with UPF support PIDAS reduction from 

 Consider Argus Balance of Plan
Page 5-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Function Mission Capability Current Limitation of Capability Capability Requirement Infrastructure Manageme

and Sustain Re

RDT&E Design, Certification, Experiments, and Surveillance Life extension design support 2 LEPs (Yellow to Green change) Design support for 2 to 3 LEPs The national security laboratorie

changed the capability from “1 L

Certifications, surveillance, and assessments of warheads Up to 7 warheads types Assessment of up to 7 warhead types Continue mitigation strategy Computational science Inadequate infrastructure to support more than petaflops Sustain infrastructure support for petaflops and begin planning for exaflops capability Implement infrastructure moder

Technology Systems in support oof Advanced Simulation and Com

Testing and experiments to support stockpile certification and surveillance Aging environmental testing and experimental equipment and infrastructure for LEPs Sustain stockpile certification and surveillance test capabilities Continue mitigation strategy Inadequate radiography and advanced diagnostics for larger scale subcritical experiments at the Nevada National Security Site Sustain radiography infrastructure, including diagnostic equipment to support hydrodynamic experiments Continue mitigation strategy Enabling Infrastructure Utility services including HVAC, electrical, fire main, etc. Inadequate electrical services and distribution systems, old and inefficient operations centers, fire protection, seismic upgrades, and support facilities Upgrade and sustain utilities and infrastructure for modern capabilities Continue mitigation strategy Key: CAT = Category CMR = Chemistry and Metallurgy Research CSA = canned subassembly DAF = Device Assembly Facility 

HANM = H-Area New Manufacturing HE = high explosives HEU = highly enriched uranium HEUMF = Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility HVAC = heating, ventilation, and air conditioning IW = interoperable warhead KCP = Kansas City Plant 

LEP = life extension program LEU = low-enriched uranium NDE = nondestructive evaluation NMSSUP Phase II = Nuclear Materials Safeguard and Security 

Upgrade Project Phase II 

NSC = National Security Campus PF-4 = Plutonium Facility PIDAS = Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System R&D = research and development RDT&E = research, development, testing, and evaluation RLUOB = Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building 

SNM = special nuclSRS = Savannah RivSSMP = Stockpile StTA-55 = Technical ATPBARs = tritium-pTRIM = Tritium Res

Modifications 

TVA = Tennessee VUPF = Uranium ProWEPAR = West-end 

a The infrastructure projects in the column entitled “Infrastructure Management Strategy to Mitigate Risk and Sustain Required Capability” represe

the Integrated Priority List as shown in Figure 5–1. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-5 

Accomplishments in Capability-Based Infrastructure Investment 

This new subsection summarizes improvements to the physical infrastructure that have occurred within 

the last year since publication of the FY 2014 SSMP. 

 Equipment was installed in RLUOB and “cold start” analytical chemistry operations2 have 

commenced to support readiness and special nuclear material operational startup in FY 2015. 

 Phases A and B of the Technical Area 55 Reinvestment II Project have been completed at LANL. 

The improvements include upgraded glove boxes and other safety systems (e.g., criticality 

alarms and uninterruptable power). Phase C will be completed in FY 2017. 

 Phase II of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrade Project (NMSSUP) was 

completed in mid 2014, thereby providing an effective, robust, physical security system for the 

Technical Area 55 plutonium area. 

 Construction at the Kansas City Plant National Security Campus (KCP NSC) was completed in 

FY 2013, and the General Services Administration lease was executed. Relocation of equipment 

and personnel is approximately 75 percent complete and is on track for completion by 

August 2014. 

 Phase II of the Test Capabilities Revitalization Project was completed in mid FY 2014 to enable 

an integrated experimental strategy to develop, validate, and apply models to perform weapons 

system qualifications. 

 The Pantex Wind Project achieved 50 percent construction completion. This project supports 

installation of five turbines with 11.5 megawatts to power more than 60 percent of Pantex. The 

initiative is being funded using an energy savings performance contract. 

 Construction of the High Explosive Pressing Facility project was 81 percent complete at the end 

of FY 2013 and is on schedule for completion by FY 2016. 

 Execution of the strategic Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications (TRIM) Program 

continues and supports the relocation and right-sizing functions from legacy facilities into more 

modern facilities to reduce the cost, footprint, and infrastructure risk. The TRIM capital project, 

in Figure 5–2 is scheduled to begin in FY 2017 and supports the TRIM Program. 

 The Site Readiness subproject activities were initiated to support the start of construction for 

the Uranium Processing Facility, including the utility and Bear Creek road reroutings. 

5.2 Sustainment of Existing Facilities and Infrastructure 

NNSA prioritizes the infrastructure using a defined set of facility classifications, namely Mission Critical 

(MC), Mission Dependent Not Critical (MDNC), and Not Mission Dependent (NMD). NNSA evaluates 

risks according to mission need and industry standards, such as Facility Condition Index (FCI) goals, and 

determines the priorities for infrastructure recapitalization and refurbishment accordingly. 

 

2

 Cold start analytical chemistry operations support initial testing of the operation without special nuclear materials. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 5-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 5–1, which replaces Figure 5–1 in the FY 2014 SSMP, projects the deferred maintenance (DM) and 

FCI for FY 2013 through FY 2019. As currently projected, NNSA facilities are deteriorating at an 

increasing rate with a commensurate risk to mission, the environment, and safety. The total DM will 

exceed $4 billion in FY 2019, a $370 million increase from the FY 2018 out-year projection in the 

FY 2014 SSMP. The condition of MC and MDNC facilities will continue to degrade and the overall 

projections for the FY 2015 FYNSP are up 1 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively, as compared to the 

FY 2014 FYNSP. The FCI for MC and MDNC facilities indicates an increasing level of DM, which increases 

risks to meeting the mission. 

Figure 5–1. Facility Condition Index measurements and deferred maintenance 

5.3 Construction 

NNSA continues to execute line-item construction projects to meet mission requirements. Within the 

FY 2015 – FY 2019 FYNSP, several projects have been delayed or deferred because of budget constraints. 

Figure 5–2 shows the new Integrated Priority List, with significant changes identified from the 

FY 2014 SSMP Figure 5–2. The Defense Programs programmatic projects and the Infrastructure and 

Operations infrastructure projects are combined and presented in the Integrated Priority List. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-7 

Figure 5–2. Integrated Priority List 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 5-8 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

5.3.1 Approved and Proposed Line-Item Construction Projects 

Two new subsections have been added in this chapter to emphasize the importance of the safety, 

security, and performance of the stockpile in modernizing the Nation’s plutonium and uranium 

capabilities. 

5.3.1.1 Modernization of Plutonium Capabilities 

NNSA is working toward ceasing programmatic 

operations in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

(CMR) facility by the end of 2019. In 2013, NNSA 

further developed the plutonium strategy to include 

major elements that follow a three-step approach that 

supports using and repurposing the existing facilities, 

as well as possible future construction. The first two 

steps support vacating CMR for programmatic 

operations by FY 2019. The third step will be necessary 

to address future capacity demands and reduce 

operational risk in PF-4. The three steps are: 

1. Maximize use of RLUOB. With the increase in 

the allowable mass limit inventory for 

radiological facilities, the RLUOB can 

accommodate more plutonium work. The strategy maximizes use of the RLUOB for additional 

analytical chemistry and material characterization scope originally planned for the Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF). 

2. Repurpose laboratory space in PF-4. PF-4 has a flexible architecture; repurposing under-utilized 

space is cost-effective. New construction may be required in order to achieve production rates 

greater than 30 pits per year. The modified reused space will house capabilities intended for the 

CMRR-NF that the RLUOB cannot accommodate. 

3. Construct modular additions to PF-4 network. NNSA continues to evaluate an approach to 

expand the capacity for high-risk operations by constructing small laboratory modules. These 

modules would accommodate additional plutonium operations, as an alternative to the 

CMRR-NF construction of a ‘big box’, and would provide continuity of capabilities essential for 

manufacturing and characterization requirements. Modular additions are in the preconceptual design phase and this third step would likely occur beyond the FYNSP. 

5.3.1.2 Modernization of Uranium Capabilities 

The Uranium Processing Facility is needed to ensure the long-term viability, safety, and security of the 

Nation’s enriched uranium capability. Without an ability to produce uranium components, NNSA cannot 

sustain the stockpile. NNSA is concerned about the cost growth and budget constraints facing the 

Uranium Processing Facility Project. In January 2014, the Acting NNSA Administrator chartered a team, 

led by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director, to develop and recommend alternative approaches 

to the Uranium Processing Facility Project, including phased approaches and a smaller facility. As one of 

the charter’s objectives, the alternative approach must deliver Building 9212 capabilities within the 

original cost range and no later than FY 2025. Results of this alternatives analysis will be used to inform 

Uranium Process Facility decision-making that will be reflected in DOE/NNSA’s FY 2016 budget request. 

Significant increase in plutonium allowable 

in the RLUOB 

 In November 2011, NNSA issued “Guidance 

on Using Release Fraction and Modern 

Dosimetric Information Consistently with 

DOE STD 1027-92,” which applies to all 

NNSA nuclear facilities operating after 

January 1, 2016. 

 The new guidance permits up to four times the 

previous laboratory limit with a new limit of 

up to 38.6 grams of plutonium-239 equivalent 

material. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-9 

5.3.2 Approved and Proposed Security and Capital Equipment Projects 

Figure 5–3, which replaces Figure 5–3 in the FY 2014 SSMP, lists approved and proposed security 

projects. The figure reflects the Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) Program budgetary position for line 

item funding through the FY 2015 FYNSP and proposed post-FYNSP projects. Currently, DNS continues 

to evaluate and prioritize the near-term FYNSP line-item projects. The schedule adjustments reflect 

budgetary constraints and the need to evaluate and prioritize these projects. 

Figure 5–3. Nominal schedule and cost of current and proposed NNSA security projects 

The cancellation of the West-End Protected Area Reduction (WEPAR), a proposed subproject of the 

Uranium Processing Facility, has impacted the DNS project strategy. That subproject would have 

reduced the protected area at Y-12 from 150 acres to about 80 acres. As a result, the DNS Program 

must readdress the security infrastructure of the entire Y-12 site. DNS is evaluating a number of security 

project alternatives to compensate for the cancellation of the WEPAR and support other continuing 

security needs across the nuclear security enterprise. 

The DNS Program’s more significant project changes are listed below: 

 The Figure 5–3 title changed from “Nominal schedule and cost of security projects” to “Nominal 

schedule and cost of current and proposed NNSA security projects”. 

 The NMSSUP Phase II project was completed in mid FY 2014 rather than in late FY 2013. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 5-10 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

 The Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) Security Upgrades is a new 

proposed project alternative under consideration that supports the reduction in the protected 

area at Y-12 from 150 acres to 80 acres. This scope was previously going to be addressed by the 

WEPAR. 

 The PIDAS Sensor Modernization project was cancelled, and its scope was incorporated into the 

PIDAS Security Upgrades project. 

 The Argus Balance of Plant Implementation is a new project that uses the Argus backbone 

executed through a completed Security Upgrades Project and will provide integrated intrusion 

detection, alarm monitoring, and access control at key Y-12 facilities. 

 The Central Alarm Station Relocation project schedule was adjusted to support the Uranium 

Processing Facility schedule. 

 The Final PIDAS Reduction and Entry Control Facilities project name has changed from the Entry 

Control Facilities project in the FY 2014 SSMP. It will complete the PIDAS reduction from 80 to 

20 acres and is dependent on completion of all three phases of Uranium Processing Facility. 

Figure 5–4, which replaces Figure 5–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP, lists approved and proposed capital 

equipment projects. The schedule adjustments are reflective of the budgetary constraints and the 

evaluation and prioritization of programmatic requirements. The significant changes to the DNS 

projects are listed below. 

 The name of the Enhanced Radiography Equipment project in the FY 2014 SSMP is now the 

Enhanced Radiography and Advanced Diagnostics Equipment. In addition, the total project cost 

of less than $100 million presented in the FY 2014 SSMP has changed with the new range 

between $100 million and $500 million. Therefore, the project’s bar color changed from blue to 

green. 

 The “Exascale project” cited in the FY 2014 SSMP is a reference to a proposed DOE-level 

Exascale Computing Initiative (see Appendix F for more details). The Initiative’s mission, if 

pursued and adequately resourced, would accelerate the availability of a more powerful 

computing capability to resolve numerous stockpile issues. In current plans, platforms to 

support stockpile stewardship will seek to achieve the best balance between floating point 

operations, memory capacity, and data movement, rather than maximizing the floating point 

operations, thereby achieving the best possible system for weapons applications. In the 

absence of a focused Exascale Computing Initiative, ASC will continue to be responsible for 

delivering high-performance simulation and computing services to the nuclear security 

enterprise and will do so by acquiring the Trinity Advanced Technology System (ATS) and the 

Sierra ATS over the next 5 years. The change to the SSMP equipment figure reflects ASC’s 

requirement to deliver platforms per the plan of record, independent of the existence or pace of 

any future exascale proposals. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 5-11 

Figure 5–4. Nominal schedule and cost of capital equipment projects 

5.4 Reliance on Non-DOE-Owned Facilities and Infrastructure 

The KCP NSC is the newest commercially developed, federally leased facility in the nuclear security 

enterprise. Relocation of personnel and equipment to this Leadership in Energy and Environmental 

Design (LEED) Gold-certified non-nuclear manufacturing facility is roughly 75 percent complete and is on 

track to be completed in FY 2014 under the KCRIMS project. 

There are no other changes to Section 5.4. 

5.5 Disposition of Excess Facilities 

A summary of the more significant changes in disposition of excess facilities follows. 

In March 2013, NNSA initiated an annual effort to determine which of its facilities pose a risk to mission, 

workers, public, or the environment, as a result of delayed disposition plans. The risk information 

provided by the individual sites is being analyzed to determine those risks that must be accepted by 

NNSA and to develop plans to address the most urgent funding needs associated with these excess 

facilities. 

The Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum on March 14, 2013, to freeze each 

agency’s total square footage of domestic office and warehouse inventory as compared to an FY 2012 

baseline. This “Freeze the Footprint” (FTF) policy is part of the President’s commitment to cut waste in 

Federal Government spending. The FTF baseline consists of facilities predominantly used for offices and 

warehouses and includes DOE’s FY 2012 Federal Real Property Profile submission of DOE-owned and 

DOE-leased offices and warehouses. In FY 2013, NNSA was in compliance with FTF by not exceeding the 

FY 2012 baseline. 

A conceptual disposition plan has been developed for the Kansas City Plant’s Bannister facility following 

the KCRIMS Project. This plan outlines the actions to comply with applicable rules and regulations 

regarding the disposition of real and personal property, as well as to deal with permit issues that may 

arise as part of the process. A third-party development planning partner has been selected and work is 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 5-12 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

continuing to define a real property agreement for economic redevelopment that is expected to yield 

significant cost savings over the normal asset disposition process. 

There are no other changes to Section 5.5. Figure 5–5, NNSA deactivation and disposition projections, 

has not changed since the FY 2014 SSMP. 

5.6 Capabilities for Post-2039 Weapons Infrastructure 

There are no changes to Section 5.6. 

5.7 Site Stewardship 

The Site Stewardship Program ensures the overall health and viability of the nuclear security enterprise 

and focuses on environmental compliance, nuclear materials disposition, and developing the needed 

skills and talent for NNSA’s workforce at the national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production 

facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site. Site Stewardship will be restructured in FY 2015 to 

include only Environmental Projects and Operations, Nuclear Materials Integration, and Minority Serving 

Institution Partnership Program. In FY 2015, Corporate Project Management will be transferred from 

Site Stewardship to the NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses Appropriation (formerly in the Office of the 

Administrator), consistent with the explanatory statement accompanying Public Law 113-76, 

Consolidated Appropriation Act for 2014, which directs the NNSA to include future funding requests for 

corporate project management in NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses. 

5.8 Key Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans 

Key milestones, objectives, and future plans involving physical infrastructure revitalization that have 

changed in Figure 5–6 of the FY 2014 SSMP are summarized below. 

 The WEPAR subproject was descoped from the Uranium Processing Facility due to funding 

constraints. Therefore, the FY 2014 SSMP schedule to achieve the Y-12 interim PIDAS reduction 

from 150 acres to 80 acres is no longer valid. The new proposed PIDAS Security Upgrades 

project alternative as part of the DNS Program will support the 70-acre PIDAS reduction, with a 

change in the tentative schedule from FY 2020 to FY 2028. 

 The Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project is now renamed the Uranium Processing Facility 

in Figure 5–6 of the FY 2014 SSMP. 

 Phases II and III of the Uranium Processing Facility schedule (formerly the Uranium Capabilities 

Replacement Project schedule) now extends beyond FY 2038 to FY 2039. The Uranium 

Processing Facility Project is not baselined; therefore, the schedule range in Figure 5–2 is a 

rough order of magnitude and was adjusted by 1 year. 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-1 

Chapter 6 

Sustaining the Workforce 

A skilled and diverse workforce is essential at the national security laboratories, the nuclear weapons 

production facilities, the Nevada National Security Site, the seven field offices, and NNSA Headquarters 

to ensure the Nation retains a safe, secure, and effective 

deterrent. The ability to recruit, develop, and maintain the 

right skills and to refresh those skills is an ongoing 

requirement. 

Each site has a unique approach to hiring and maintaining 

essential skills. NNSA will update the reporting and data 

collection on sustaining the workforce in the FY 2016 SSMP. 

6.1 The Nuclear Security Enterprise 

Workforce 

There are no updates to this section. 

6.2 Workforce Planning for the 

Nuclear Security Enterprise 

The M&O workforce is sufficient, with increases in focused categories, to maintain essential skills 

and account for attrition, and to support the 3+2 strategy. However, congressional and NNSA funding 

decisions for Weapons Activities will largely dictate staffing levels, hiring decisions, and the scope of work 

that can be accomplished. 

The NNSA and DOD joint study to support the FY 2014 FYNSP identified potential workforce prioritization 

savings totaling $1.537 billion over FY 2014 – FY 2018 to be generated within the Weapons Activities 

account by realignment of existing M&O contractor staff with the highest priority stockpile work. The 

subsequent FY 2014 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) passback directed NNSA to conduct a 

workforce management study to determine how NNSA would accomplish this workforce action, what 

programs would be affected, and how the savings would be achieved. The study concluded that the 

resulting workforce prioritization program cannot assure the safety, security, or effectiveness of the 

stockpile and endangers our future ability to do so. 

NNSA also commissioned an independent business analysis that resulted in a second report, DOE NNSA 

M&O Contractor Essential Skills Workforce: Assessment of Essential Skill Staffing Capabilities of NSE 

Sites to Support NNSA Weapons Programs. That independent report concluded that the sites can satisfy 

the FY 2014 – FY 2018 essential skills staffing requirements to modernize and sustain the Nation’s 

stockpile. More specifically, the M&O contractors can meet the workforce requirements by transfers of 

essential skill personnel already working within the weapons or other programs, direct external hires, or 

reallocation of personnel supporting Work for Others projects. 

FY 2013 Sustaining the Workforce 

Accomplishments 

 Completed workforce management 

study on impact of imposing 

$1.537 billion in savings over FY 2014 

FYNSP. NNSA concluded that the 

workforce prioritization program, as 

defined, cannot be responsibly executed. 

 NNSA concluded that the sites can staff 

both the capped and total programs. 

 An independent study also concluded 

that the M&O workforce could meet the 

FY 2014 FYNSP essential skills needs by 

internal transfers or external hires. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 6-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

6.2.1 Strategic Workload Drivers 

There are no updates to this section. 

6.2.2 Federal Workforce Planning 

In FY 2012, Federal staff in NNSA’s field offices was realigned under the Associate Principal Deputy 

Administrator in the Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. The reporting relationship to the 

top organization within NNSA was designed to improve the oversight and effectiveness of the 

Government-owned, contractor-operated national security laboratories, the Nevada National Security 

Site, and the nuclear weapons production facilities. 

Staff levels for all NNSA organizations are constantly being reviewed not only because of the current and 

projected budget constraints, but to ensure that limited resources are dedicated to the highest priority 

activities at the field offices and Headquarters operations. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013 capped the total number of Federal employees at 1,825 by October 1, 2014, in the Office 

of the Administrator appropriation, not including the Offices of Secure Transportation Asset or Naval 

Reactors. On-board Federal staff totaled 1,644 as of March 2014. The FY 2014 budget request called for 

1,817 full-time equivalents. The field offices have experienced a decline of about 14 percent in staff over 

the past several years; that downward trend can be traced to initiatives such as the new governance 

model for oversight of M&O contractors and efforts to leverage resources across the field offices. The 

Federal workforce for Weapons Activities is comprised of the Office of the Administrator and the Secure 

Transportation Asset. Figure 6–1 shows the FY 2014 composition of the Federal workforce in the Office 

of the Administrator, the NNSA field offices, and the Secure Transportation Asset. 

Figure 6–1. National Nuclear Security Administration workforce for Weapons Activities 

by occupational series functions 

(This figure updates Figure 6–2 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)
Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-3 

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 encouraged use of the Voluntary Separation 

Incentive Program to continue reshaping the workforce. NNSA used this authority in FY 2013 to help 

right-size the Federal workforce. New talent is essential to the long-term success of the stockpile 

stewardship and management mission; student and entry-level hiring and training programs have been 

implemented to integrate new hires into the existing workforce.

6.2.3 Management and Operating Contractor Workforce Planning 

NNSA’s M&O contractors align their staff to perform the highest priority work as defined by NNSA. The 

contractors augment staffing needs by hiring or shifting essential skill employees from non-Weapons 

Activities programs. In the FY 2014 SSMP, the total M&O contractor projections for essential skills 

positions were 19,934 for executing the scope of work in FY 2014. In comparison, as of the beginning of 

FY 2014, the total for essential skills onboard is 17,350 for Weapons Activities, which is 2,584 personnel 

below the forecast. At the beginning of FY 2014, over 400 vacancies were reported across the nuclear 

security enterprise. Funding uncertainties, including continuing resolutions, government shutdown, and 

sequestration, affect the ability of the site to conduct workforce planning and fill essential skills 

vacancies. The sites reported they are staffed to support stockpile modernization work and to balance 

their workforce based on the stability of funding commitments. 

The successful implementation of NNSA’s nuclear weapons modernization requires a cadre of highly 

skilled personnel. NNSA commissioned an independent business analysis to assess the ability of the 

eight M&O contractors to staff essential skills positions and to develop and retain that staff 

commensurate with the planned upgrades, as identified in the FY 2014 SSMP. The independent 

assessment, titled DOE NNSA M&O Contractor Essential Skills Workforce: Assessment of Essential Skill 

Staffing Capabilities of NSE Sites to Support NNSA Weapons Programs, concluded that the overall staffing 

challenge is greatest in the engineer, scientist, technician, and operator categories for essential skills 

positions. The report also added that the increasing attrition and retirement eligibility rates challenge 

the future ability to staff essential skills positions even though the sites have taken effective action to 

reconstitute and actively maintain their recruiting capability and infrastructure. The report also 

mentions that the supply of candidates with science, technology, engineering, or mathematics degrees 

is sufficient, but NNSA and the M&O contractors will need to continue to develop and train specialized 

nuclear scientists and engineers. According to the report, M&O contractors can meet these workforce 

requirements through transfers of essential skills personnel already working within Weapons Activities 

or other programs, direct external hires, or reallocation of personnel supporting Work for Others 

projects. The delays in the cruise missile warhead and the IW-1 LEPs may create challenges and gaps in 

sustaining essential skills such as weapon physics designers, weapon engineers, radiochemists, and 

weapon material scientists. Special attention to workload leveling will substantially optimize the use of 

the workforce and minimize new hiring actions, therefore facilitating stability in site resources. 

This ability of the M&O contractors to meet the requirement for essential skills and essential support 

personnel is enabled through use of effective workforce planning models, which project programmatic 

requirements, assess them against existing resources (normalized for attrition rates), and identify 

projected gaps. According to the report, the sites will continue to maintain their performance levels and 

work quality if budgets and requirements stabilize. However, challenges to staffing levels and skills mix 

adjustments in a dynamic program environment have been created by sequestration, lapses in Federal 

funding, and continuing resolutions. 

6.2.4 The Non-Management and Operating Contractor Workforce 

There are no updates to this section. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 6-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

6.3 Workforce Sustainment Programs and Strategies 

There are no updates to this section.

6.3.1 Recruiting Programs 

Intern, entry-level, and outreach programs will serve as tools to maximize our recruitment efforts to 

attract, develop, and retain talented and career-oriented workers. NNSA conducts an annual 

assessment to determine the qualifications, educational backgrounds, and special skills that are needed 

to meet the short-term demand and long-term strategies of the nuclear security enterprise through a 

suite of programs. 

Government-wide changes to student program regulations like the Pathways Program aim to improve 

recruiting, clear paths to Federal internships for students at all educational levels, and implement 

meaningful training and career development opportunities for individuals who are at the beginning of 

their Federal service. In addition, plans to increase the number of excepted service positions through 

specialized employment programs will enable NNSA to improve its return on investment for entry-level 

hiring. Leveraging success with Historically Black Colleges and Universities outreach efforts through the 

Minority Serving Institutions Program and the Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program will 

help to expand NNSA efforts to other underserved populations. These programs are useful tools for 

pipelining high-quality, diverse candidates into specialized employment programs and directly into 

permanent positions. 

6.3.2 Development Programs 

There are no updates to this section. 

6.3.3 Compensation and Benefits 

There are no updates to this section. 

6.3.4 Challenges 

There are no updates to this section. 

6.4 Summary 

Attracting and retaining a highly skilled workforce is essential within the nuclear security enterprise to 

ensure the Nation retains a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. NNSA must continue to balance—and 

rebalance when necessary—its workforce, to develop and maintain essential skills, and to execute the 

3+2 strategy while supporting stockpile modernization and surveillance activities consistent with the 

Nuclear Posture Review Report (DOD 2010). Maintaining the capability to develop the necessary skills 

and to refresh those skills continuously over time is required. 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-1 

Chapter 7 

Security 

Three NNSA programs ensure the security of the Nation’s nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, 

infrastructure, and sensitive information. These are Secure Transportation Asset, Defense Nuclear 

Security, and Information Technology and Cyber Security. Two 

other programs, the Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident 

Response (NCTIR) Program and the Counterterrorism and 

Counterproliferation, play leadership roles in defending the 

Nation from the threat of nuclear terrorism. NCTIR ensures 

capabilities are in place to respond to any emergency at a 

DOE/NNSA site and to a nuclear or radiological incident or 

emergency anywhere in the United States and abroad. 

Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation develops 

capabilities to address terrorist incidents involving nuclear 

threat devices. Details about these two nuclear terrorismrelated programs will be described in the FY 2016 SSMP. 

7.1 Secure Transportation Asset 

Program 

In FY 2015, the Secure Transportation Asset (STA) Program will continue to implement asset 

modernization and workforce capability initiatives begun in 2013, namely, the design, fabrication, and 

testing of the Mobile Guardian Transporter (MGT) system prototype(s), phased deployment of the 

Advanced Radio Enterprise System, the first production unit of the upgrade to the Trailer 

Communications System, the continued replacement of vehicles and tractors, and restoration of Federal 

Agent strength levels. In addition, the STA Program will ensure all transport systems remain efficiently 

integrated to support Defense Programs. 

The Trailer Communication System project is a life cycle system upgrade, replacing sunset systems 

technologies, that supports mission-critical classified communications. The project encompasses 

replacing current analog radio devices with digital equipment, providing compliance with National 

Telecommunications and Information Administration directives. 

7.1.1 Core Components of the Secure Transportation Asset Program 

There are no changes to this section or its subsections. 

7.1.2 Major Organizational Efforts of the Secure Transportation Asset 

Program 

There are no changes to this section or its subsections. 

FY 2013 Security Accomplishments 

 Explicitly clarified security chain of 

command. 

 Deployed secure, wide-area network 

and agency-wide network for 

collaboration of NNSA employees. 

 Began mission transport operations 

with Boeing 737 aircraft and 

completed conversion to Federal 

pilots. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 7-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

7.1.3 Secure Transportation Asset Program Goals 

There are no changes to this section or its subsections. 

7.1.4 Secure Transportation Asset Program Strategy 

There are no changes to this section or its subsections. 

7.1.5 Secure Transportation Asset Program Challenges 

The STA Program has realigned its resources to address immediate stockpile needs. The challenges are: 

 Begin replacing the trailer fleet in 2018. 

– Conduct critical design and testing phase of the MGT during 2015 to maintain the timeline 

for production startup in 2018. The MGT, like its predecessor, the Safeguards Transporter, 

may be in service for 20 years. 

– The Safeguards Transporter fleet must be retired beginning in 2018 because of expiring 

certifications, age-related phenomena, and unavailability of key critical components. 

– If MGT production does not begin in 2018, the mission capacity could be reduced. 

 Maintain the Federal Agent strength to meet mission requirements. 

7.1.6 FY 2013 Accomplishments 

 Completed 109 shipments without compromise or loss of nuclear weapons or components or 

release of radioactive material. 

 Began operating with Boeing 737 aircraft and completed conversion to Federal pilots. 

 Validated that the STA Program’s Safeguards Security Plan meets the requirements of the 

Graded Security Protection Policy. 

7.2 Defense Nuclear Security Program 

In 2013, the DNS program made a calculated transformation to address corrective actions stemming 

from the 2012 Y-12 incursion. That transformation is in its final phases and, following the Acting NNSA 

Administrator’s guidance, the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security (CDNS) will resume the authority and 

responsibility previously transferred to the Office of Infrastructure and Operations. After completing 

the transformation, the CDNS will exercise clearer lines of authority and responsibility to develop the 

program, planning, budget, and execution of safeguards and security to protect nuclear weapons, 

nuclear material, classified information, and NNSA facilities and infrastructure and personnel. 

The CDNS issues implementation guidance to be executed through the Assistant Managers of 

Safeguards and Security to the M&O contractor. The new alignment to allow the CDNS to exercise clear 

authority and responsibility is illustrated in Figure 7–1 and is consistent with 50 U.S.C. 2422. 

The CDNS manages the physical, information, and personnel security of the NNSA national security 

laboratories, the nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site. The DNS 

program is designed to protect NNSA assets from theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, unauthorized 

access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may impact national security, program continuity, and 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-3 

security of employees. The six subprograms responsible for implementing the DNS program are 

Program Management, Protective Force, Physical Security Systems, Information Security, Personnel 

Security, and Materials Controls and Accountability. 

Figure 7–1. New Defense Nuclear Security alignment to provide clarity 

in safeguards and security 

7.2.1 Offices of the Defense Nuclear Security Program 

The Office of the Associate Administrator for the Defense Nuclear Security program is structured so that 

it serves as a line management organization. The five offices within DNS are Resource Management, 

Security Operations and Programmatic Planning, Classification and Special Access, Nuclear Materials 

Integration, and Personnel and Facility Clearances. The roles and responsibilities of the Office of Nuclear 

Material Integration and the Office of Personnel and Facility Clearances are unchanged by this latest 

reorganization.

7.2.1.1 Office of Resource Management 

The Office of Resource Management manages the DNS program budgets and provides the office 

management functions (e.g., human resources, logistics, and facilities) for DNS. The Office establishes 

strategic requirements that incorporate security-related national, departmental, and administration 

guidance; leads security-related NNSA strategic planning; and oversees the Operational Security FS-20 

budget resource requirements and allocations. 

7.2.1.2 Office of Security Operations and Programmatic Planning 

The Office of Security Operations and Programmatic Planning establishes the operational direction of 

the NNSA security program; evaluates the execution of the Operational Security program requirements; 

and ensures line management evaluation programs are rigorous and provide high confidence that 

contractor security programs are operating in an effective manner. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 7-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

7.2.1.3 Office of Classification and Special Access 

The Office of Classification and Special Access serves as the primary point of contact with internal 

organizations and external organizations and agencies and oversees the nuclear security enterprise-wide 

Classification and Controlled Information Program. Additionally, the Office exercises the Special Access 

Program security oversight review; concurs on NNSA classification guidance; and oversees the 

management of the NNSA Special Access Program Classified Matter Protection Control program. 

7.2.1.4 Office of Nuclear Materials Integration 

The Office of Nuclear Materials Integration focuses on management, allocation, and forecast of supplies 

of nuclear materials in support of national security, nuclear energy, and science programs. The Office 

plays a key role in department-wide efforts to integrate, stabilize, consolidate, and disposition nuclear 

materials. In cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Office operates the 

Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), which accounts for inventories of 

nuclear materials at DOE/NNSA and NRC-licensed sites. NMMSS also performs a critical function in 

support of U.S. nonproliferation objectives through management of peaceful use obligations placed on 

nuclear materials in the DOE’s inventories. The Office ensures integration of its activities through its 

role as chair of the Nuclear Materials Advisory Board, which includes senior-level representatives from 

the DOE Headquarters organizations that manage ‘accountable’ nuclear materials.

7.2.1.5 Office of Personnel and Facility Clearances 

The Office of Personnel and Facility Clearances provides direction, support, and guidance on personnel 

security policy and manages the access authorization portion of the personnel security program in 

support of approximately 50,000 cleared Federal and contractor personnel at NNSA sites, NNSA 

Headquarters, and some DOE elements. It ensures that individuals meet the personnel security 

requirements before accessing special nuclear materials or classified and sensitive information. 

7.2.2 Defense Nuclear Security Program Goals 

The DNS provides the infrastructure and programs to protect assets vital to execution of long-range 

plans for the stockpile. This program ensures protection, control, and accountability of materials, 

including special nuclear material, as well as implementation of policy and integration of responsibilities 

to manage the life cycles of ‘accountable’ nuclear materials throughout the nuclear security enterprise. 

Specific DNS goals, as refined, are summarized below. 

 Establish comprehensive implementation guidance for all safeguards and security subprograms. 

 Provide security leadership and management excellence for the nuclear security enterprise. 

 Provide assurance of effective and efficient performance. 

 Ensure a functional and sustainable security workforce and protection program. 

 Establish a highly reliable organization adaptive to a dynamic security environment. 

 Establish a life cycle planning process for Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation. 

 Employ risk-based decision making to achieve a balanced and defensible allocation of resources, 

and manage risks through innovative safeguards and security approaches that are responsive to 

evolving threats and requirements. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-5 

 Ensure an environment characterized by a responsive and modernized security systems 

infrastructure, effective risk management, operational efficiencies, and advanced technologies. 

 Provide technological security systems for the protective force with the capability of countering 

a wide range of defined threats. 

7.2.3 Defense Nuclear Security Program Strategy 

The DNS program establishes safeguards and security requirements to eliminate or mitigate problem 

areas across the nuclear security enterprise. This strategy involves providing additional training of 

protective forces, acquiring updated weapon systems and support equipment, improving and 

modernizing the security systems’ infrastructure, improving physical barrier systems and standoff 

distances, and reducing targets of interest. 

7.2.4 Defense Nuclear Security Program Challenges 

DNS has focused objectives to meet the challenges that were summarized in Section 7.2.4 of the 

FY 2014 SSMP. The more pertinent of these objectives are: 

 Promote standardization to achieve effective and efficient performance of DNS Safeguards and 

Security methods across the nuclear security enterprise. 

 Continually improve the enterprise-wide, mission-essential task-list-based approach that 

maintains an armed protective force capable of advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures 

centered on mission accomplishment. 

 Establish an enterprise-wide life-cycle management plan for physical security systems. 

 Collaborate with DOD, NRC, the United Kingdom, and other agencies in an in-depth assessment 

of the required protection programs. 

 Improve the effectiveness of the Contractor Assurance System and Federal oversight and 

awareness at all levels. 

7.3 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program 

The name of the NNSA Chief Information Office Activities Program changed to the Information 

Technology and Cyber Security Program since the publication of the FY 2014 SSMP. As a result, the title 

of this section has been changed to Information Technology and Cyber Security Program. Other than 

this name change, the activities of the program have not changed significantly from the FY 2014 SSMP. 

7.3.1 Information Technology 

In FY 2013, the Cyber Security Program was integrated with information technology (IT) under the new 

program entitled Information Technology and Cyber Security. The Office of the Chief Information 

Officer (OCIO) will continue to focus on transforming the computing environment to support the vision1

of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security via these objectives: the NNSA Network Vision (2NV) and 

the NNSA Classified Network Vision (C2NV) and the Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (JC3), with 

 

1 That vision is a smaller, safer, more secure, and less expensive nuclear security enterprise that leverages the scientific and 

technical capabilities of the workforce to meet all NNSA national security requirements.
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 7-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

the DOE Chief Information Officer (CIO). 2NV and C2NV will provide a secure, mobile, agile, and 

adaptive IT infrastructure. JC3 will provide understanding of the ‘health’ of the computing environment 

from a cybersecurity and network operations perspective. 

7.3.2 NNSA Network Vision 

There are no updates to this section. 

7.3.3 Transformation of Information Technology Architecture 

In FY 2013, the Program made progress in supporting the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security’s vision. 

The OCIO deployed a new, secure, wide-area network (OneNNSA Network), which is a first-of-its-kind 

federated identity management solution and a critical step to full HSPD-12 implementation. The OCIO 

also provided a unified communications solution and an agency-wide social network for the 

collaboration of more than 45,000 employees (OneVoice) and a state-of-the-art cloud services broker 

(YOURcloud). 

The OCIO will build on these achievements and make progress on the three objectives of its integrated 

strategy. 2NV will consolidate data centers using YOURcloud; modernize applications to reduce legacy 

IT costs and enable a mobile workforce; and consolidate the intranets, websites, and file servers using 

common platforms to reduce costs. The OCIO will improve classified network monitoring capabilities, 

monitor 2NV investments, and strengthen the partnership with DOE for unclassified JC3 capabilities. 

7.3.4 Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center 

Under the direction of the DOE CIO and the NNSA CIO, JC3 is operational with implementation of the 

NNSA Security Operation Center/Network Operation Center for classified and unclassified mission IT 

monitoring and DOE Computer Emergency Response Team situation awareness standup. JC3 (the 

Information Assurance Response Team and Computer Emergency Response Team) provides information 

sharing and safeguarding activities for DOE, as directed by the National Security Council Staff. It 

consolidates disparate cyber response functions and streamlines information sharing, reporting, incident 

handling, and access to technical resources while preserving the unique requirements of the individual 

DOE and NNSA organizations. As shown conceptually in Figure 7–2, JC3 draws from the wisdom of 

internal and external stakeholders to create a framework that combines information sharing, reporting, 

and incident response requirements and practices to improve communications and enhance 

cybersecurity response capabilities. 

7.3.5 Cyber Sciences Laboratory 

There is no funding for this activity in FY 2015. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-7 

Figure 7–2. Conceptual Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center framework to improve 

communications and enhance cyber security 

7.3.6 Subprograms of Information Technology and Cyber Security 

In FY 2013 the NNSA Office of Associate Administrator for Information Management was restructured to 

more closely align with the DOE OCIO. That restructure resulted in the following subprograms. 

 Enterprise Architecture. Enterprise Architecture (EA) provides the foundation for business and 

IT modernization across NNSA by aligning organizational strategies, business processes, and 

technologies. EA helps align resources to the NNSA mission, strategic goals, and objectives. Its 

guiding principles include business transformation to improve performance, delivery of services, 

communications, collaborations, and partnerships. EA leverages the DOE EA governance 

framework and collaborates with NNSA program and site offices to develop a strategic path to 

implement EA across the nuclear security enterprise. 

 Office of Cyber Security and IT Operations. The Office of Cyber Security and IT Operations 

directs the implementation and maintenance of cyber security and IT assets within the NNSA 

classified and unclassified domains. The Office provides an enterprise-wide cyber security 

posture and assists with the detection, analysis, and mitigation of cyber security threats and 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 7-8 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

incidents. It coordinates and supports DOE functions, including the JC3, Telecommunications 

Electronics Material Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmissions/Protected Transmission 

System, and Special Access Program activities in NNSA in addition to serving as the Computer 

Network Defense Service Provider for the Classified Environment/Secret Networks. It directs 

the design, development, and maintenance of all aspects of NNSA computing, including but not 

limited to application, integration, and deployment; application hosting; desktop, voice, and 

data resources; and video teleconferencing. The Office also oversees all IT processes and 

services for NNSA staff. 

 Office of Policy and Governance. The Office of Policy and Governance provides leadership, 

policy, direction, guidance management, integration, and governance to support the CIO and 

other NNSA senior managers on the strategic use of IT and cyber security resources. It focuses 

on development, dissemination, and oversight of NNSA’s IT and cyber security policies, 

standards, and procedures for internal and external needs. The Office uses an industry standard 

governance model to provide oversight to ensure investments deliver the desired results within 

cost and schedule thresholds and comply with applicable regulations and best practices. 

 Chief Technology Officer. The NNSA Chief Technology Officer (CTO) provides technology 

strategy and direction as the foundation for IT modernization by aligning organizational 

strategies and business processes with enabling technologies. The CTO leads IT and cyber 

research and development, engineering, EA, and technology evaluation processes to enable 

NNSA strategic goals and objectives. The CTO guiding principles include technology 

transformation to improve performance and reduce costs; delivery of measurable 

improvements in IT and cyber services; delivery of next-generation architectures to enhance 

cyber security policies for emerging technologies; infrastructure to enable shared services; and 

collaboration with NNSA sites, industry, academia, and other government agencies. The CTO 

aligns with the DOE EA and the governance framework, national drivers, and industry trends to 

develop and implement strategies for technology transformation across the nuclear security 

enterprise. 

7.3.7 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Goals 

To support the NNSA mission and objectives, the Office of the Associate Administrator for Information 

Management has the following goals as a result of the restructuring in FY 2013. 

 Ensure delivery of high-quality IT and cyber solutions that meet DOE/NNSA customers’ needs 

and enable their mission by 

– Improving delivery of nuclear security enterprise IT and cyber solutions 

– Implementing cloud-based solutions to enhance performance by integrating networks and 

services 

– Deploying innovative IT and cyber security capabilities 

 Safeguard NNSA resources through cost-effective management of IT and cyber solutions by 

– Improving interoperability and strengthening performance via EA, policy, and standards 

– Improving and enhancing decision making by strengthening governance processes 

– Improving project and program management skills and knowledge of the workforce 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-9 

 Protect data integrity and confidentiality and strengthen NNSA’s cybersecurity posture by 

– Implementing Federal requirements for security 

– Developing and implementing cutting-edge technologies to support security architecture 

– Implementing security training requirements 

7.3.8 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Strategy 

The OCIO is the principal organization for information management, IT, and cyber security for NNSA. It 

is responsible for fostering a culture of information sharing and ensuring IT investments and projects are 

coordinated, have cyber security protection, and align with the NNSA Strategic Plan and DOE needs and 

objectives. The OCIO ensures IT is acquired and information resources are managed in a manner that 

implements legislative policies and procedures, including the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Clinger 

Cohen Act, the E-Government initiative of the President's Management Agenda, and the priorities of the 

NNSA Administrator and the DOE Secretary of Energy. The OCIO is fully responsible for all aspects of 

NNSA cyber security, including but not limited to policy and planning, Federal and congressional 

reporting, and daily operations of classified and unclassified networks and systems. 

7.3.9 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Challenges 

There are no updates to this section. 

7.4 Milestones, Objectives, and Future Plans 

7.4.1 Secure Transportation Asset Program Milestones, Objectives, and 

Future Plans 

To stabilize operating budgets and move to steady-state production, STA adjusted its out-year 

production plans for all escort vehicles and armored tractors and reevaluated its plans to deploy a highfrequency communication system. Changes to Figure 7–2 of the FY 2014 SSMP are as follows. 

 High-frequency requirements and deployment options will be evaluated in 2016. The actual 

change to Figure 7–2 is to delete “Begin HF (ALE) deployment” (in 2015). 

 Escort vehicle light chassis production will transition to refurbishments and steady-state 

production in 2017. A new model will be introduced in the out years based on actual life cycles. 

The actual changes to Figure 7–2 are four deletions: “Complete EVLC production” (in 2016), 

“Begin EVLC refurbishments to extend life-cycle” (in 2017), “Begin EVHC-2 production” (in 2027), 

and “Begin EVLC-2 production” (in 2031). 

 Replacement Armored Tractor (RAT) production will transition to steady-state production 

in 2019. A new model will be introduced based on actual life cycles. The actual changes to 

Figure 7–2 are three deletions: “Complete RAT production” (in 2019), “Begin next RAT 

production” (in 2025), and “Complete next RAT production” (in 2029). 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 7-10 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

7.4.2 Defense Nuclear Security Program Milestones, Objectives, and 

Future Plans 

In addition to the activities and projects in Figure 7–3 of the FY 2014 SSMP, the following DNS efforts are 

ongoing: 

 Continue to improve the Safeguards and Security Program. 

 Assess security implementation efforts by reviewing and updating security plans and

performance testing, reviewing vulnerability assessments, and revising threat and vulnerability

analyses. 

 Transition to and implement the Joint Nuclear Security Collaboration Initiative to provide

greater consistency between DOE/NNSA and DOD regarding nuclear weapons and material 

protection strategies and practices. 

 Complete reviews of classified and sensitive information at NNSA Headquarters and field offices. 

 Focus on standardizing technologies to provide operational efficiencies for security programs. 

 PIDAS Security Upgrades is a new project that supports reducing the protected area at Y-12 from 

150 acres to 80 acres. PIDAS Sensor Modernization scope (previously addressed by the WEPAR) 

has now been incorporated into PIDAS Security Upgrades. 

 The PIDAS Reduction and Entry Control Facilities project has been delayed and will be complete 

when all three phases of the Uranium Processing Facility are complete. 

7.4.3 Information Technology and Cyber Security Program Milestones, 

Objectives, and Future Plans 

In July – August 2013, a cyber security breach of the DOE unclassified network occurred. The DOE OCIO 

is orchestrating the response to this incident. The DOE OCIO, with the assistance of the NNSA OCIO, is 

implementing procedures to confirm the identities of all human and non-human components that 

attempt access and to prevent unauthorized access. Non-human components include computing and 

communication devices, networks, information systems, applications, and data. Procedures are also 

being implemented to ensure the security of classified networks and responsible sharing and 

safeguarding of classified information per Executive Order 13587 (October 2011). In addition, the NNSA 

OCIO is implementing specific activities such as the NNSA Application Modernization Strategy to 

minimize the creation of disparate business and mission-support IT applications in favor of a platformbased approach to reduce hardware, software, and labor costs and to cultivate enterprise-wide 

adoption of shared capabilities. 

Most Committee on National Security Systems activities have been pushed to the right in Figure 7–4 in 

the FY 2014 SSMP for full operating capability because of budget constraints (e.g., continuous 

monitoring of classified networks). Enterprise Secure Network enhancements and normal equipment 

refresh have also been delayed by budget constraints. Specific changes to the Figure 7–4 timeline are: 

 Fully implement Identity, Credential, and Access Management project at NNSA Headquarters 

and the sites in FY 2015. 

 Implement and coordinate Public Key Infrastructure and Committee on National Security 

Systems requirements in FY 2016. 

 Continue to leverage 2NV to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of NNSA IT services 

from FY 2014 to FY 2017. 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-1 

Chapter 8 

Future Years Nuclear Security 

Program Budget, Requirements Estimates, 

and Operations and Effective 

Business Practices 

Chapter 8 provides an overview of the key elements in the Weapons Activities budget for the 

FY 2015 FYNSP and includes figures that display budgetary information for specific activities associated 

with these key elements and with projected weapon system life-cycle costs for 20 years beyond the 

FYNSP. To quantify the decision by the Nuclear Weapons Council to implement the 3+2 strategy as 

described in the FY 2014 SSMP and this FY 2015 update, a new section has been added to Chapter 8. 

The new section, Section 8.8.3, compares the cost of the 3+2 strategy with the cost of the life extension 

strategy envisioned in the FY 2011 SSMP. Chapter 8 also updates the initiatives NNSA is taking to 

improve the effectiveness and reduce the cost of its operations and business practices. 

8.1 Future Years Nuclear Security Program Budget 

Table 8–1 shows the FYNSP budget for Weapons Activities. The budget structure aligns with the FY 2014 

appropriation; explanations of changes to program funding levels from FY 2014 to FY 2015 can be found 

in the FY 2015 President’s Budget Request. 

Table 8–2 on page 8-2 in the FY 2014 SSMP displayed savings targets for workforce prioritization and 

management efficiencies for FY 2014 – FY 2018. Following the submission of the FY 2014 President’s 

Budget Request, NNSA conducted studies (as summarized in Chapter 6 of this FY 2015 SSMP) on the 

workforce prioritization. The studies demonstrated that the underlying assumption of limited hiring 

capacity was invalid and that realigning the workforce would be imprudent. These savings were 

incorporated into planning the resource levels for the FY 2015 President’s Budget Request. The target 

level of $80 million in management efficiencies savings for FY 2014 was achieved and briefed to 

congressional staff in February 2014. In the future, NNSA will pursue other management efficiencies as 

described in Section 8.10. 

Figure 8–1 shows how this level of funding in the FY 2015 President’s Budget Request over the FYNSP 

compares with Weapons Activities purchasing power (in 2010 dollars) in prior years. 

Figures 8–2 through 8–10 display the pie charts for the FY 2015 budget and the tables that detail the 

FY 2015 FYNSP breakdown and the reference year FY 2014. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Table 8–1. Overview of Future Years Nuclear Security Program budget for Weapons Activities 

in fiscal years 2014 through 2019 a

Activity 

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions) 

2014

Enacted 

2015

Request 

2016

Request 

2017

Request 

2018

Request 

2019

Request 

Directed Stockpile Work 2,442.0 2,746.6 2,833.5 2,969.5 3,325.7 3,408.8 

Science Campaign 369.7 456.4 525.0 526.4 530.6 539.3 

Engineering Campaign 149.9 136.0 138.2 133.6 147.7 154.9 

Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 

High Yield Campaign 514.0 512.9 517.6 509.5 512.2 512.7 

Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign 569.3 610.1 651.0 648.9 667.1 709.3 

Readiness Campaign 55.4 125.9 135.1 86.9 56.0 61.5 

Secure Transportation Asset 210.0 233.8 243.0 255.1 259.7 264.9 

Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities 2,067.4 2,055.5 2,458.9 2,770.4 2,645.4 2,764.4 

Site Stewardship 87.3 82.4 84.4 84.5 84.5 85.2 

Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response 228.2 173.4 165.4 169.5 173.6 177.7 

Counterterrorism/Counterproliferation Programs 0 76.9 82.1 84.2 86.2 88.2 

Defense Nuclear Security 665.0 618.1 652.8 663.1 675.4 689.2 

Information Technology and Cyber Security b 145.1 179.6 151.7 153.4 155.5 158.7 

Legacy Contractor Pensions 279.6 307.1 268.7 206.5 157.1 87.4 

Domestic Uranium Enrichment Research, 

Development and Demonstration 62.0 0 0 0 0 0 

Adjustments c (64.0) 0 0 0 0 0 

Weapons Activities Total 7,781.0 8,314.9 8,907.2 9,261.4 9,476.6 9,702.3 

a

 Totals may not add due to rounding. 

b

 Formerly Chief Information Officer Activities. 

c

 Adjustments include rescissions and use of prior year balances. 

Figure 8–1. Weapons Activities historical purchasing power — fiscal years 2001 through 2019 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-3 

8.2 Directed Stockpile Work Budget 

Figure 8–2. Directed Stockpile Work funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

The Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services budget lines in Figure 8–2 include Surveillance Program 

funding in the amounts shown for FY 2014 through 2019 in Table 8–2. Table 8–2 updates Table 8–3 of 

the FY 2014 SSMP. 

Table 8–2. Surveillance Program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2019 

(This table updates Table 8–3 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

Fiscal Year (Dollars in Millions) 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 

Surveillance Program 

Funding 181 239 239 217 225 236 246 260 269 291 

In the FY 2014 appropriation, funding for the Tritium Readiness subprogram was transferred from the 

Readiness Campaign to Stockpile Services under Directed Stockpile Work. Table 8–3, which replaces 

Table 8–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP, shows the estimated costs to support the projected increase in tritium 

requirements. 

Table 8–3. Estimated tritium readiness resource requirements 

(This table updates Table 8–4 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions) 

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015–2019 

Requirements 80.0 140.1 107.4 126.7 140.1 120.4 634.7 

President’s Budget/Future Years 

Nuclear Security Program 80.0 140.1 107.4 126.7 140.1 120.4 634.7 

Surpluses/shortfalls 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewa

8.3 Research, Developm

and Readiness Cam

This section has been renamed from t

which is Research, Development, Testin

8.3.1 Science Campaign 

Figure 8–3. Science Campaig

8.3.2 Engineering Campa

Figure 8–4. Engineering Campa

rdship and Management Plan

ment, Testing, and Evaluation Bu

mpaign Budget 

he FY 2014 SSMP, consistent with the new name fo

ng, and Evaluation. 

gn funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 201

aign 

aign funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2

 

udget 

or Chapter 3, 

19 

2019
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-5 

8.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign 

Figure 8–5. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

8.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign 

Figure 8–6. Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign funding schedule 

for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

The Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign created a new subprogram, Advanced Technology 

Development and Mitigation, to develop a strategy to acquire the advanced computing technologies 

needed to support stockpile stewardship. This strategy, which recognizes the need for exascale 

computing capabilities, is described in Section 3.7.2 of Chapter 3 and in Appendix F of this FY 2015 

SSMP. 

8.3.5 Readiness Campaign 

In the FY 2014 SSMP, the Nonnuclear Readiness subprogram of the Readiness Campaign was called the 

Component Manufacturing Readiness subprogram to allow for expansion of the scope of its activities to 

encompass manufacturing development for all components. The FY 2014 appropriation provided 

funding under Nonnuclear Readiness and this convention is continued in the FY 2015 budget structure 

and this FY 2015 SSMP. With the transfer, which is also in the FY 2014 appropriation, of the Tritium 

Readiness Program from the Readiness Campaign to Stockpile Services in Directed Stockpile Work, the 

Readiness Campaign is now 100 percent Nonnuclear Readiness. 

Figure 8–7. Readiness Campaign funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

8.4 Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities 

This section has been renamed Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF), consistent with the 

reconsolidation of Nuclear Programs and Site Stewardship Program infrastructure operations and 

construction activities in the FY 2014 appropriation. In the FY 2014 SSMP, this section was named 

Nuclear Security Enterprise Infrastructure and Operations. Figure 8–8 below replaces Figures 8–8 

and 8–9 in the FY 2014 SSMP. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-7 

Figure 8–8. RTBF funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

(This figure updates Figures 8–8 and 8–9 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

8.5 Secure Transportation Asset Budget 

Figure 8–9. Secure Transportation Asset funding schedule for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

(This figure updates Figure 8–10 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-8 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

8.6 Other Weapons Activities Budget 

Figure 8–10. Other Weapons Activities funding schedules for fiscal years 2014 through 2019 

(This figure updates Figure 8–11 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

8.7 Other Fiscal Issues

8.7.1 Pension Cost Growth and Alternative Mitigation Strategies 

The Administration’s FY 2015 Budget Request will continue to cover the total pension reimbursement 

and legacy contractor pension costs, which are estimated to be about $866 million for NNSA in FY 2015. 

This represents a $24 million increase from the estimated payments for FY 2014 ($842 million). 

8.8 Estimates of Requirements Beyond the Future Years 

Nuclear Security Program 

For the cost projections beyond the FYNSP, other than LEPs and other specific projects, an escalation of 

2.11 percent per year is assumed (based on numbers provided by OMB for 2013) after FY 2019.1

 For 

LEPs and other specific projects, cost projections use currently available planning data. Figure 8–11

shows the Weapons Activities funding in the FY 2015 President’s Budget and estimates for budget 

requirements for FY 2020 – FY 2039. 

 

1

 Projection of budget requirements for these efforts in this way assumes the continued manageability of whatever risks are 

present during the FYNSP at the same level of effort. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-9 

Figure 8–11. Estimate of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities 

of the NNSA in then-year dollars 

(This figure updates Figure 8–12 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

The “RTBF: Construction (without Uranium Processing Facility Phase I)” total shown in Figure 8–11 

includes all construction other than Uranium Processing Facility Phase I (which is shown as a separate 

funding wedge).2

 Funding for the Uranium Processing Facility Phases II and III and for long-term 

plutonium capability are included in this total but are not displayed as separate wedges because of the 

immaturity in planning for these efforts. The high versus low lines on the figure reflect uncertainties in 

the estimated budget requirements for LEPs and the construction projects included in “RTBF: 

Construction (without UPF Phase I)”. While these two categories of activities constitute only 

approximately 22 percent of total Weapons Activities over FY 2020 – FY 2039, they have the greatest 

uncertainty. The figure also displays a blue line representing the total shown in the FY 2014 SSMP so 

that a comparison can be made between Figure 8–11 in this chapter and Figure 8–12 in the 

FY 2014 SSMP. The dashed black line in Figure 8–11 is the FY 2015 President’s Budget for FY 2013-2024 

and the FY 2024 total escalated at the same 2.11 percent as used in the estimates for FY 2025-2039 to 

evaluate the out-year affordability of the total Weapons Activities account. Figure 8–12 in this section 

shows greater detail of the uncertainties of the out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities. 

 

2

 In January 2014 the Acting NNSA Administrator asked the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director to lead a team to consider 

an alternative approach to the Uranium Processing Facility Project. See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1.2. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-10 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 8–12. Detail of out-year budget requirements for Weapons Activities 

of the NNSA in then-year dollars 

(This figure is new for the FY 2015 SSMP.)

The nominal cost of the overall program for FY 2020 – FY 2039 in Figure 8–12 falls within +/- 2 percent of 

the escalated (dashed black) FY 2019 line, significantly less than the variation in the FY 2014 SSMP 

Weapons Activities cost of up to +/- 11 percent. This allows the conclusion that it is, as planned, 

generally affordable and more executable than the program proposed in the FY 2014 SSMP. However, 

the uncertainty over this period does vary by +/- 5 to 8 percent per year and therefore constitutes a 

potentially significant risk to accomplishing the planned program for Weapons Activities. 

Four new subsections of Section 8.8 have been added in the FY 2015 SSMP to explain in more detail the 

cost basis for significant elements in Figure 8–12 above. These are Stockpile Sustainment 

(Section 8.8.1), Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations (Section 8.8.2), Results of Differential 

Analysis of FY 2011 SSMP Strategy and FY 2015 3+2 strategy (Section 8.8.3), and Construction Costs 

(Section 8.8.4). 

8.8.1 Stockpile Sustainment 

Sustainment costs include assessment activities, limited life component exchanges, required and routine 

maintenance, safety studies, periodic repairs, resolution and timely closure of SFIs, military liaison work, 

and surveillance to assure the continued safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. These costs are 

incurred every year that a weapon is in the active stockpile. 

Figure 8–13 shows the annual sustainment cost for FY 2015 – FY 2039 that can be attributed to 

a particular warhead and the average cost over FY 2003 – FY 2014. This figure consolidates and updates 

the warhead sustainment costs that were in Figures 8–13 through 8–19 in Section 8.9 of the 

FY 2014 SSMP. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-11 

Figure 8–13. Estimate of warhead specific sustainment costs 

(This figure updates the sustainment portion of Figures 8–13 through 8–19 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

The costs for FY 2020 through FY 2039 incorporate a preliminary assessment of the additional 

sustainment costs to be incurred during the transition to a 3+2 stockpile. See Section 8.8.3 for further 

discussion. 

8.8.2 Life Extension Programs and Major Alterations 

LEPs, which are not part of stockpile sustainment, are undertaken as needed to extend the life of a 

warhead for an additional 20 to 30 years or more. Major alterations make component changes to 

warheads that have a major total cost. Both LEPs and major alterations may be subject to Selected 

Acquisition Report (SAR) requirements to Congress. 

Figures 8–14 through 8–20 show the estimated cost to NNSA for LEPs or major alterations for the 

FY 2014 – FY 2039 period. (Figures 8–13 through 8–23 in Section 8.9 of the FY 2014 SSMP displayed 

both the sustainment and LEP costs, as applicable. In particular, Figures 8–14 through 8–16 in this year’s 

SSMP update the estimated costs of the LEPs or major alterations in Figures 8–13, 8–14, and 8–19 in 

Section 8.9 of the FY 2014 SSMP, and Figures 8–17 through 8–20 in this year’s SSMP update the 

estimated LEP costs in Figures 8–20 through 8–23 in Section 8.9 of the FY 2014 SSMP.) The high and low 

lines on each LEP cost figure (if included) reflect the uncertainties in the cost for conducting an assumed 

point-solution executed under current Administration guidance such as the Nuclear Posture Review 

Report (DOD 2010) rather than the variation in the cost of a range of work scope alternatives. 

High and low planning independent cost estimates3

 were developed for all LEPs. The independent cost 

estimate model methodology is based on: W76-1 actual costs to date for RDT&E and Procurement; a 

standard work breakdown structure with comparisons of RDT&E scope/complexity by LEP program 

 

3

 The Defense Program’s Office of Cost Policy and Analysis is responsible for preparation of these estimates. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-12 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

office experts; estimates of Other Program Money (OPM) and DOD costs by program office experts; 

RDT&E, OPM, and DOD costs distributed using standard, well-known Rayleigh profiles; and Production 

costs distributed using the non-linear cost growth profile exhibited by the W76-1 actual cost-quantity 

relationship. The nominal estimates (reflected in the bars on these figures) are the costs from either the 

Weapon Design and Cost Report, the most recent SAR, or, if the LEP has not yet generated such 

estimates, based on the mid-point between the high and low model values for the effort. The high and 

low model-based cost curves have been included on some of the graphs with the Weapon Design and 

Cost Report and SAR based on nominal values to emphasize that, for those efforts, some amount of cost 

uncertainty still exists in their execution. 

For each figure, an associated table displays the high, low, and nominal estimated total cost to NNSA 

and DOD4

 in both constant FY 2014 and then-year dollars. These are Tables 8–4 to 8–10. The total 

estimated cost is provided since a number of these efforts fall outside the 25-year window for the 

FY 2015 SSMP. While the figures are in then-year dollars, the total estimated cost in FY 2014 constantyear dollars is provided in order to compare the costs for LEPs scheduled over different timeframes. 

Figure 8–14. B61-12 life extension program cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates the life extension program portion of Figure 8–13 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

Table 8–4. Total estimated cost for B61-12 life extension program 

FY 2009–FY 2025 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

High 8,785 9,524 205 274 

Low 7,181 7,783 205 274 

SAR Value a 6,857 7,344 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR 

a The B61-12 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) values are reported in FY 2012 dollars. Those values are converted for this 

table to FY 2014 dollars. Also, SAR values do not include OPM costs. However, the FY 2013 B61-12 SAR did report a total 

of $811 million in then-year dollars for multi-systems costs with the B61-12 as first user (i.e., OPM) that should be added 

to the SAR then-year dollars totals for NNSA to make them comparable. 

 

4

 The DOD costs are for weapon components for which the DOD is responsible, such as arming and fuzing. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-13 

Figure 8–15. W76-1 life extension program cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates the life extension program portion of Figure 8–14 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

Table 8–5. Total estimated cost for W76 life extension program 

FY 1999–FY 2020 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

SAR Value a 4,117 3,697 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR 

a W76-1 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) values are reported in FY 2002 dollars. Those values are converted for this table 

to FY 2014 dollars. 

Figure 8–16. W88 Alt 370 cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates the major alteration portion of Figure 8–19 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

Table 8–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alt 370 

FY 2012–2024 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

High 1,805 1,965 999 1,009 

Low 1,368 1,472 983 1,045 

SAR Value a 1,373 1,452 Not in NNSA SAR Not in NNSA SAR a The W88 Alt 370 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) is reported in FY 2013 dollars. Those values are converted for this table 

to FY 2014 dollars. Also, SAR values do not include OPM costs. The original Weapons Design Concept Report for the effort 

reported approximately $95 million in then-year OPM costs. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-14 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 8–17. IW-1 life extension program cost FY 2020 – FY 2039 

(This figure updates Figure 8–20 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

Table 8–7. Total estimated cost for IW-1 life extension program 

FY 2013–2014, FY 2019–2041 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

High 8,963 12,551 834 1,187 

Low 7,231 10,228 625 898 

Budget Requirement N/A 11,390 N/A 1,042 

Figure 8–18. Cruise Missile Warhead life extension program cost FY 2014 to completion 

(This figure updates Figure 8–21 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-15 

Table 8–8. Total estimated cost for cruise missile warhead life extension program 

FY 2015 – 2033 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

High 6,054 7,645 205 261 

Low 4,605 5,871 205 263 

Budget Requirement N/A 6,758 N/A 262 

Figure 8–19. IW-2 life extension program cost FY 2014 – FY 2039 

(This figure updates Figure 8–22 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

Table 8–9. Total estimated cost for IW-2 life extension program 

FY 2023 – 2051 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

High 9,897 15,828 834 1,364 

Low 8,283 13,424 625 1,035 

Budget Requirement N/A 14,626 N/A 1,200 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-16 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 8–20. IW-3 life extension program cost FY 2014 – FY 2039

(This figure updates Figure 8–23 in the FY 2014 SSMP.)

Table 8–10. Total estimated cost for IW-3 life extension program 

FY 2023 – 2051 

(Dollars in Millions) 

NNSA DOD 

FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2014 Dollars Then-Year Dollars 

High 11,861 21,768 834 1,588 

Low 9,419 17,629 625 1,207 

Budget Requirement N/A 19,699 N/A 1,398 

Figure 8–21, an update to Figure 8–25 in the FY 2014 SSMP, is a one-chart summary of the total 

projected nuclear weapons life extension costs from FY 2014 through FY 2039 based on the LEP 

schedule reflected in Figure 2–2 of the FY 2015 SSMP. Figure 8–21 includes both the direct LEP costs 

and OPM, both of which are incremental to an adequately funded, operationally essential set of base 

activities. The dotted line shows the LEP cost reflected in the FY 2014 SSMP. The principal differences 

between the FY 2014 and FY 2015 estimates are the adjusted timing of the cruise missile and 

interoperable warheads, the adjustment in the escalation factor from the 3.4 percent value used in the 

FY 2014 SSMP estimates to the OMB-recommended level (2.11 percent), and improvements in the cost 

models for future life extensions.
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-17 

Figure 8–21. Total U.S. projected nuclear weapons life extension costs 

for fiscal years 2014 through 2039 (then-year dollars) 

(This figure updates Figure 8–25 in the FY 2014 SSMP.) 

8.8.3 Results of Differential Analysis of FY 2011 SSMP Strategy and 

3+2 FY 2015 SSMP Strategy 

After the FY 2014 President’s Budget Request was submitted, NNSA conducted a study to quantify the 

difference in the total long-term cost between the 3+2 strategy described in the FY 2014 SSMP and the 

LEP strategy envisioned in the FY 2011 SSMP. The analysis included both the cost of the first cycle of 

LEPs (for all warheads to be retained in the stockpile) and the sustainment costs. The cost estimates 

were generated using the same cost estimating model used to produce the LEP cost estimates in 

Section 8.8.2 above and produced both high and low estimates based on the uncertainty in the 

complexity factors used in the model. 

The conclusion of the analysis at that time, and now updated based on adjustments described in this 

SSMP, is that the 3+2 strategy reduces the total long-term NNSA costs through decreased LEP costs. 

This reduction is driven in part by greater efficiency in hedging with the 3+2 stockpile, which reduces the 

number of warheads to be refurbished even though the size of the active stockpile is the same for both 

strategies.5

 These savings are partially offset by increased sustainment costs (about $70 million per year 

in FY 2014 dollars, as shown in Figure 8–13) during the period of transition to a 3+2 stockpile when both 

the original and the new interoperable warheads are being sustained. Figure 8–22 shows the high 

versus low cost ranges for the FY 2011 SSMP refurbishment-only strategy compared to the FY 2015 

SSMP implementation of the 3+2 strategy over the period FY 2014 to FY 2039. 

 

5

 A portion of the savings also comes from the avoidance of a B83 LEP since, under the 3+2 strategy, the B83 could be retired 

after confidence in the B61-12 has been demonstrated, and no such decision had been made as of the FY 2011 SSMP. The cost 

of this LEP contributes $7.5–9.5 billion to the difference in LEP costs shown in Table 8–11. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-18 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Figure 8–22. Life extension program annual cost ranges in FY 2014 dollars in millions 

for FY 2014 – FY 2039 

(This figure is new for the FY 2015 SSMP.)

The LEP cost (in FY 2014 dollars) for FY 2014 – FY 2039 and in total (LEP start to completion) for the low 

versus high ranges for each of these strategies is shown in Table 8–11 below. 

Table 8–11. Life extension program cost comparison of FY 2011 SSMP and 

FY 2015 SSMP life extension program strategies 

Millions of FY 2014 Dollars Cost FY 2014 – FY 2039 Total Cost 

FY 2011 SSMP Low 46,859 56,066 

3+2 High 36,036 45,857 

3+2 Minimum Reduction 10,823 10,208 

FY 2011 SSMP High 56,431 66,571 

3+2 Low 28,478 37,965 

3+2 Maximum Reduction 27,953 28,606 

8.8.4 Construction Costs 

The budget requirement estimate for construction in FY 2020 and beyond, as part of the RTBF total 

included in Figure 8–11, is based on the set of projects in the NNSA Integrated Priority List (shown in 

Chapter 5, Figure 5–2). Because of the preliminary planning status for many of these projects, they have 

been binned into one of three cost ranges. For those projects estimated to cost greater than 

$500 million, upper bounds were estimated based on the best available data. Table 8–12, new for the 

FY 2015 SSMP shows the low, high, and mid point total cost for executing projects on the Integrated 

Priority List that are scheduled for FY 2020 and beyond. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-19 

Table 8–12. Total cost and average annual cost of construction for fiscal years 2020–2039 

FY 2014 Dollars in Millions Low High Midpoint 

Total Cost 5,690 18,925 12,308 

Cost per year over 20 years 285 946 615 

The midpoint value, escalated to then-year dollars ($693 million), is used in the RTBF total in 

Figure 8–11. This represents a significant increase over the figure used in the FY 2014 SSMP 

($306 million). Much of this increase results from the inclusion of funding for the long-term plutonium 

strategy and the Uranium Processing Facility Phases II and III. The low and high average annual costs 

were used along with the low and high costs for LEPs to generate the low and high lines on that same 

figure in order to introduce some sense of the uncertainty in the total budget requirements, based on 

these two components of the construction costs for which there is the greatest uncertainty. 

8.9 Estimates for Stockpile Management 

In the FY 2014 SSMP, the cost estimates for annual stockpile sustainment and life extension of weapons 

in the active stockpile were in Section 8.9 of Chapter 8. In this FY 2015 SSMP update to the FY 2014 

SSMP, the text and figures that update those estimated costs are contained in Sections 8.8.1 and 8.8.2 

of Section 8.8, respectively. For a general discussion of the life-cycle costs of weapons in the stockpile, 

see the first three paragraphs in Section 8.9 of the FY 2014 SSMP. 

8.10 Operations and Effective Business Practices

This section replaces Section 8.10 in the FY 2014 SSMP. NNSA is formalizing, prioritizing, and

implementing a number of initiatives for improved management systems, IT, and business and project 

management tools. A major objective is to reduce indirect and overhead costs to enable NNSA to 

focus more of its human and financial resources on its core mission. An example is a new acquisition 

strategy being used to merge the Pantex and Y-12 M&O contracts. Such efforts will continue to 

streamline the governance and organizational structure. Moreover, best practices developed by the 

sites and contractors will be applied to the entire nuclear security enterprise.

The efforts listed in Table 8–13 reflect NNSA’s overall commitment to identify specific efficiencies

wherever possible in addition to other efforts to identify cost savings. 

8.10.1 International Organization for Standardization Management 

Systems Standards 

This is the last year to be reported. There are no other updates to this section. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-20 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

Table 8–13. Efficiency initiatives 

Efficiency Initiative Name Targeted Savings Schedule Change/Comment(s) 

NNSA ISO Standards Efficiency not quantified N/A This is the last year to report on ISO Standards. 

Governance Model Efficiency not quantified FY 2014 A congressionally driven panel will develop an FY 2014 

report. Other changes are presented in 

Section 8.10.2. 

Wireless Technology Up to $280 M Paused Project is on hold because of funding constraints. 

One Identification Access 

Control 

$3.75 – $7.5 K 

(in FY 2012 dollars) 

FY 2014 Pilot phase is underway. Savings will be realized when 

the project is fully implemented. 

NNSA Network Vision (2NV) Estimated average 

annual $185 M benefit 

Multi-year Requires implementation of a suite of information 

technology initiatives to realize annual benefit. See 

Section 8.10.5 for additional details. 

Business Management 

Advisory Council (BMAC) 

Efficiency not quantified N/A BMAC was replaced by the NNSA Operations Council. 

This is the last year to report on BMAC. 

DP Enterprise Portfolio 

Analysis Tool (EPAT) 

Efficiency not quantified N/A EPAT enhancements from FY 2014 SSMP have been 

implemented, e.g., EPAT integration with the DOE 

Standard Accounting and Reporting System (STARS). 

This is the last year to report on EPAT. 

Defense Programs Work 

Breakdown Structure 

Efficiency not quantified N/A No change. This is the last year to report on Defense 

Programs Work Breakdown Structure. 

NNSA Operations Council $80 M FY 2014 New – See Section 8.10.9. 

Builder Sustainment 

Management System (BSMS) 

Efficiency not quantified N/A New – See Section 8.10.10. 

Expansion of Strategic 

Procurement 

Efficiency not quantified N/A New – See Section 8.10.11. 

Generation 2 Program 

Management System 

Efficiency not quantified N/A New – See Section 8.10.12. 

ISO = International Organization for Standardization 

8.10.2 Governance Model 

The NNSA governance model is being examined and revamped, where appropriate. As part of the effort 

to create stable, repeatable processes and standardize how business is done across the nuclear security 

enterprise, NNSA has begun to implement a series of IT initiatives, such as automated management of 

program direction funds, which will allow the field offices and Headquarters to operate in a common 

environment. NNSA also created the Nuclear Production Office to replace the separate Amarillo, 

Texas, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, offices. This new office will provide a management structure 

appropriate for the forward-leaning strategy of a single contractor to operate both nuclear weapons 

production facilities. These are key examples of how NNSA is streamlining its governance model 

and moving from ‘initiatives’ to actions and continuous improvement. The Strategic Program 

Evaluation Plan is implementing the collective governance and oversight reform principles as expressed 

by the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA Administrator and is defining the most important NNSA 

objectives. As a result, the governance model:

 Establishes priorities through five standardized performance objectives; 

 Promotes a strategic Governance and Oversight framework based on prudent management of 

risk, accountability, transparency, and trust; 

 Increases contractor accountability to demonstrate performance through compelling evidence; 

and 

 Applies a consistent nuclear security enterprise-wide approach to evaluating contractor 

performance. 

There are no other updates to this section. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-21 

8.10.3 Wireless Technology 

The project is on hold because of funding constraints. There are no other updates to this section. 

8.10.4 One Identification Access Control 

A visitor registration and physical access solution that integrates clearance and General Services 

Administration credential data with site-specific human resource data was successfully piloted. NNSA 

will continue the pilot stage with a plan to have initial operating capability by May 2014 and full 

operating capability by the summer of 2014. Savings will be realized when the project is fully 

implemented.

There are no other updates to this section. 

8.10.5 NNSA Network Vision 

NNSA Network Vision (2NV) requires implementing a suite of IT initiatives to realize the annual benefit. 

2NV will provide a state-of-the-art technology infrastructure supporting shared services across the 

nuclear security enterprise. The initiative will create a new architecture for NNSA’s IT environment to 

provide a secure set of capabilities, including unified networking, federated identity services, agile cloud 

infrastructure, and next-generation collaboration services. 

2NV will provide utility services that can be leveraged by future Federal or contractor investments to 

improve the security of sensitive unclassified NNSA data and to lower IT costs. In addition, 2NV will 

provide a dramatic step forward in collaboration capabilities by delivering a federated, unclassified, 

unified communications capability and deploying a secure, agency-wide, internal social network. 

There are no other updates to this section. 

8.10.6 Business Management Advisory Council 

The Business Management Advisory Council was discontinued and replaced by the NNSA Operations 

Council (see Section 8.10.9). This is the last year to report the Business Management Advisory Council. 

There are no other updates to this section. 

8.10.7 Defense Programs Enterprise Portfolio Analysis Tool 

Enterprise Portfolio Analysis Tool (EPAT) enhancements from FY 2014 SSMP have been implemented, 

e.g., EPAT integration with the DOE Standard Accounting and Reporting System. This is the last year to 

report on EPAT. 

There are no other updates to this section. 

8.10.8 Defense Programs Work Breakdown Structure 

There are no updates to this section. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 8-22 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

8.10.9 NNSA Operations Council 

The NNSA Operations Council was established in 2013 to evaluate ideas for achieving efficiencies within 

NNSA while minimizing impacts on mission deliverables. The NNSA Operations Council includes the 

Chief Operating Officers from each of NNSA’s M&O partners and senior Federal leaders from NNSA. At 

the September 2013 meeting, the Council identified specific options to achieve cost savings in FY 2014 

totaling approximately $80 million. These savings consisted, for example, of staffing reductions at 

several nuclear security enterprise sites and reductions in M&O travel. 

8.10.10 Builder Sustainment Management System 

NNSA is implementing the Builder Sustainment Management System (BSMS) to assess and track the 

condition of its infrastructure at the nuclear security enterprise level. BSMS is a knowledge-based 

management system as recommended in the National Academy of Sciences’ most recent report on 

Federal infrastructure, Predicting Outcomes of Investments in Maintenance and Repair of Federal 

Facilities, and as recently directed by DOD for all defense agencies and military services. BSMS will 

augment NNSA’s financially based understanding of projected infrastructure conditions by adding a 

quantified, risk-informed analysis that is easily correlated to mission commitments. NNSA will integrate 

BSMS with existing site condition assessment systems to the greatest extent possible. BSMS will enable 

NNSA to quantify and communicate more clearly the risks it accepts at current levels of direct and 

indirect funded maintenance and to project those risks forward for different budget scenarios. BSMS 

will support risk-informed allocation of limited direct and indirect infrastructure funding and identify 

opportunities to use direct and indirect funds in targeted acquisition strategies and programmatic 

efforts. 

8.10.11 Expansion of Strategic Procurements 

The Roof Asset Management Program (RAMP) is an example of a model for strategic NNSA-wide 

procurement. RAMP is a unique, corporate approach to manage roofs across the nuclear security 

enterprise. By treating roofs at multiple sites as an aggregate portfolio and earmarking a reliable 

funding stream, attracting the technical expertise of ‘best of class’ national roofing consultants and 

contractors, NNSA is achieving greater consistency of condition assessments and economies of scale in 

roof repairs and replacements. Through this program, resources have been directed to the most 

compelling roofing deficiencies, resulting in significant savings and enhancement of the value added to 

the facilities portfolio through optimal repairs. The program has executed timely assessment and repair 

of major storm damages at Pantex, and the shared lessons learned have improved safety and scheduling 

and reduced overhead at all participating sites. Because of the effectiveness of the partnership among 

Headquarters, the field offices, and the M&Os, the RAMP contract has been renewed with a nationally 

recognized contractor. Economies of scale and overhead savings are achieved by directing the work for 

all participating sites to that contractor through a single site M&O. NNSA’s goal is to apply the RAMP 

model to other common acquisitions to achieve greater efficiency in numerous infrastructure 

procurements that are currently made via individual contracts at each site. 
 Department of Energy | April 2014 

 Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-23 

8.10.12 Generation 2 Program Management System 

The Program Executive Office is in the early stages of applying the Enterprise Management Information 

System Generation 2 (G2) to improve select business processes and efficiencies. Initially developed 

in 2007 as a tool to manage projects and programs for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, G2 now 

serves as a vehicle to manage workflow, track financial performance, and provide reports to the NNSA 

Office of Infrastructure and Operations on operational initiatives and the status of some infrastructure 

activities. The system will ultimately be used by the Office of Infrastructure and Operations and the field 

offices to pilot methods to improve activities such as federally funded travel, executive site status 

reports, project schedules, and contractor performance evaluations. G2 allows NNSA to track and 

forecast performance objectively and consistently against requirements to prioritize the investment of 

scarce resources. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 9-1 

Chapter 9 

Conclusion 

This FY 2015 SSMP, including its classified Annex, captures the activities to be conducted across the 

programs and organizations of the nuclear security enterprise over the next 25 years. This 

FY 2015 SSMP is a summary of the plan, including a discussion of updates to the Fiscal Year 2014 

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. Its purpose is to define the strategy to ensure the 

Nation’s nuclear deterrent continues to be safe, secure, and effective without underground nuclear 

tests. Along with its predecessor, the FY 2014 SSMP, this year’s plan comprises the total Stockpile 

Stewardship Program. It was produced by NNSA’s Federal workforce in collaboration with the national 

security laboratories, the nuclear weapons production facilities, and the Nevada National Security Site, 

whose workforce will execute the technical activities. Also, it was closely coordinated with the 

Department of Defense1

 (DOD) via the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

The plan balances the capabilities (1) to assess, surveil, and maintain the stockpile, conduct life 

extension programs, and dismantle retired weapons; (2) to conduct research, development, testing, and 

evaluation using experimental facilities and simulation codes to understand weapons performance and 

the effects of anomalies, material property changes, and component aging and to develop leading edge 

technologies; (3) to certify with confidence all changes to the stockpile owing to alterations, 

modifications, and life extension programs; and (4) to sustain and modernize the infrastructure that 

supports design, qualification, assessment, and production of the stockpile. To balance these four 

elements, NNSA must continue to recruit new stockpile stewards and to develop, maintain, and refresh 

the essential skills of its Federal and contractor workforce; must ensure safety and security of the 

Nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, infrastructure, personnel, and sensitive data; and must 

identify and implement business efficiencies to increase the focus of its resources on the core stockpile 

mission. Moreover, NNSA must be mindful of the need to mitigate the effects of technological 

obsolescence. Obsolescence results in legacy weapon components that can no longer be manufactured. 

In addition, advances in high performance computing are moving beyond the massively parallel 

processing technology on which predictive, integrated weapon simulation codes have relied since 1995. 

Technological obsolescence also presents numerous challenges with regard to infrastructure 

sustainment and modernization. 

Through the Nuclear Weapons Council, DOE and DOD are continuing to implement the 3+2 strategy. 

This comprehensive strategy puts the Nation on the path to a smaller stockpile with fewer weapon types 

to be maintained and serviced. Since the 3+2 strategy includes interoperability on different delivery 

platforms, it will still provide sufficient performance diversity. The strategy for stockpile modernization 

requires applying predictive science, modernizing the physical infrastructure, employing a highly skilled 

workforce, and sustaining the stockpile. This strategy will reduce the 12 distinct warhead types to three 

interoperable warheads deployed on both the submarine-launched and the intercontinental ballistic 

missile legs of the Triad and to two interoperable air-delivered weapons (one bomb type and one cruise 

missile type). The 3+2 strategy with respect to the B61-12 will, for example, greatly reduce the number 

 

1

 DOD establishes the military requirements; designs, tests, and produces the delivery systems; secures and maintains weapons 

in its custody; and is accountable for operating weapons systems. 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page 9-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

and types of bombs in the air leg of the Triad and will allow the option to retire the B83. The long-term 

strategy for the Nation’s stockpile will also incorporate new safety and security features (e.g., the use of 

insensitive high explosives, which are much less sensitive to inadvertent initiation as a result of 

unintended shock and heat exposure and to unauthorized detonation) and will allow for a decreased 

stockpile hedge without increasing the risk. 

The policy framework for the stockpile has not changed since the FY 2014 SSMP. Completion of the 

W76-1 production to replace aged warheads is on schedule for 2019. However, a number of changes 

have occurred that reflect the reality of budget constraints. The date for the first production unit of the 

W88 Alt 370 to modernize the arming, fuzing, and firing system and improve surety has slipped from 

FY 2019 to FY 2020. The first production unit for the B61-12, which will consolidate and replace the 

B61-3, -4, -7, and -10, has moved from FY 2019 to FY 2020, with completion of production at the end of 

FY 2024.2

 The first production unit for the W78/88-1 (the first interoperable warhead, the IW-1) has 

shifted to FY 2030, in deference to the Air Force cruise missile warhead, with the FY 2014 and FY 2015 

IW-1 activities being focused on congressionally directed alternative studies. The first production unit 

for the cruise missile warhead (also known as the ‘long range standoff’ system) is planned for FY 2027, 

although a change to the funding profile would allow this to occur up to 2 years earlier. Both the IW-1 

and the cruise missile warhead life extension programs will make use of the non-nuclear technologies 

designed and developed for the B61-12. The first production unit for the IW-2 and IW-3 are tentatively 

scheduled for FY 2034 and FY 2041, respectively. Furthermore, the schedules for the Integrated Priority 

List for capital construction (Figure 5–2) and the Defense Nuclear Security Projects (Figure 5–3) have 

been updated to reflect delays or deferrals. Budget constraints will delay the completion of several 

approved projects on the Integrated Priority List by 1–3 years. In addition, the delay of several projects 

for a number of years will potentially increase the cost and risk and impact the availability of unique 

mission-required capabilities. 

NNSA is assessing a methodical, revised approach to the plutonium strategy to end operations by 2019 

in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility (which was built in 1952) and to optimize the 

plutonium capability. This revised plutonium strategy includes a three-step approach that maximizes 

use of the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) for analytical chemistry work, 

repurposes laboratory space in the Plutonium Facility (PF-4), and may construct modular additions to 

PF-4 for high-risk plutonium operations. This approach would result in a cost-effective solution to 

enhancing the plutonium capability and an alternative to constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF). The approach is also responsive to planned life 

extension programs such as the IW-1 that delays the need to ramp up to 30 pits per year until FY 2026. 

Until the analysis is complete, NNSA has postponed the start of two approved projects: the construction 

of a tunnel from PF-4 to RLUOB and the construction of CMRR-NF. 

A significant addition to the FY 2015 SSMP since last year’s SSMP is initiation of a strategy to develop a 

ten-year plan, as requested by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 

in order to acquire an exascale computing capability, which will be a thousand times faster than NNSA’s 

present capability. Appendix F discusses the need for such a capability and NNSA’s initial approach to 

developing a strategy to acquire advanced computing technologies to support stockpile stewardship. In 

addition, a mission needs statement was prepared to enhance the capabilities to diagnose plutonium 

behavior in the late stages of a primary implosion using deeper-penetrating flash radiography and 

neutron reactivity on subcritical experiments in Nevada. 

 

2

 There will be component production and closeout activities in FY 2025. 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 9-3 

With these updates, NNSA has a fully coordinated, long-term plan for a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing. The stockpile portion of this plan supports all 

DOD requirements. While managing increased risk in the infrastructure, this plan takes steps forward in 

achieving a responsive infrastructure. The science of stewardship is supported at a level sufficient for 

the immediate requirements of the stockpile, but stewardship activities may need to increase in the 

future to provide options to address stockpile requirements. While this plan will almost certainly have 

to be adjusted in the future, it currently represents the best combined judgment of the experts who 

manage the Nation’s stockpile. Equally important, it provides exciting and incredibly challenging work 

for the people who have devoted a significant part of their lives to providing a safe, secure, and effective 

deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-1

Appendix A 

Requirements Mapping 

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to 

Statutory Reporting Requirements and Related Requests 

The FY 2015 SSMP consolidates a number of statutory reporting requirements and related congressional 

requests. This appendix maps the statutory and congressional requests to their respective SSMP 

chapter and section. 

FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 113-66, Sec. 3129 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates

SEC. 3129. PLAN FOR DEVELOPING EXASCALE COMPUTING AND INCORPORATING 

SUCH COMPUTING INTO THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop and 

carry out a plan to develop exascale computing and incorporate such computing 

into the stockpile stewardship program under section 4201 of the Atomic Energy 

Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of 

the enactment of this Act.

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5.3, 

3.7.2; Appendix F 

(b) MILESTONES.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include major 

programmatic milestones in— 

(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile 

stewardship program; and 

(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale 

computing. 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5.3, 

3.7.2; Appendix F

(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.—In developing the plan required by 

subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate, as appropriate, with the Under 

Secretary of Energy for Science, the Secretary of Defense, and elements of the 

intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))). 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.7.2

(d) INCLUSION OF COSTS IN FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.—The 

Administrator shall— 

(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations 

reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under 

section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 

2453) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the costs of— 

(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing 

into the stockpile stewardship program; and 

(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to 

exascale computing; and 

(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description 

of the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of 

Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry. 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3.4
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page A-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 113-66, Sec. 3129 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates

(e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Administrator shall submit the plan 

required by subsection (a) to the congressional defense committees with each 

summary of the plan required by subsection (a) of section 4203 of the Atomic 

Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523) submitted under subsection (b)(1) of that 

section during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 

Act. 

N/A 

(f) EXASCALE COMPUTING DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘exascale 

computing’’ means computing through the use of a computing machine that 

performs near or above 10 to the 18th power floating point operations per 

second. 

N/A 

A.2 Ongoing Requirements 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2521 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates

Sec. 2521. Stockpile stewardship program 

(a) Establishment 

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, 

shall establish a stewardship program to ensure – 

(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the 

United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system 

integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and 

certification; and 

(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without 

the use of underground nuclear weapons testing. 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3 

Classified

Chapters 2, 3 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3 

Classified

Chapters 2, 3 

(b) Program elements 

The program shall include the following: 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3 

(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to 

enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with 

respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such 

as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, 

and materials research. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4, 3.8.1, 

3.8.2 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4, 3.8.1, 

3.8.2 

(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the 

experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced 

hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for 

above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects. 

Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Section 5.1, 5.3.1, 

Table 5-1, 

Figure 5-2 

Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Section 5.1, 5.3.1, 

Table 5-1, 

Figure 5-2 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-3

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2521 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates

(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced 

experimental facilities of the United States, including - 

(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;

(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory; 

(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and 

(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site. 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4, 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with production 

and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the safety, security, 

and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including - 

(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and 

(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national 

security laboratories. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6.4; 

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.1, 5.2, 

5.3, Figure 5-2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.4.2, 

2.4.3 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6; 

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.1, 5.2, 

5.3, Figure 5-2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.4.2, 

2.4.3 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2522 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

Sec. 2522. Report on stockpile stewardship criteria 

 (a) Requirement for criteria 

The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging 

whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for 

determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are 

performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty 

that the stockpile is safe and reliable. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2 

(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense 

The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), 

shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.2 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

Sec. 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and infrastructure 

plan weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and infrastructure plan

 

 (a) Plan requirement 

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other 

appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal 

Government, shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the 

nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile 

stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile surveillance, program 

direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test 

readiness. The plan shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical 

requirements of the most recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile 

Memorandum. 

 

(b) Submissions to Congress 

(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each evennumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a). 

 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page A-4 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each oddnumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a). 

 

(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted in 

unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 

 

‘(c) ELEMENTS OF BIENNIAL PLAN SUMMARY.—Each summary 

of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a minimum, 

the following: 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 

6, 8 

(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the 

number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each 

warhead type. 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3, 

2.6 

(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life 

extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace 

warhead types. 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.4, 

2.6, 2.7; Chapter 8 

(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of 

science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information. 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 3.2.3, 

3.5, 3.7 

(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including 

programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of human 

capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules. 

N/A Unclassified 

Chapter 5; 

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.2, 6.2.2, 

6.2.3, 6.3.1 

(5) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b). 

N/A Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 

6, 7, 8; Appendix F 

(6) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate. N/A Chapter 1 

(d) ELEMENTS OF BIENNIAL DETAILED REPORT.—Each detailed report on the 

plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall include, at a minimum, the 

following: 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 

6, 8 

Classified 2, 3 

(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship and management— 

(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age 

of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.1, 

2.2.2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2, 

2.3, 2.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2, 

2.3, 2.4 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-5

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the 

date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of 

the report— 

 (i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and 

inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and 

 (ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of 

nuclear weapon; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.3, 2.6, 

2.6.4; Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.8, 8.9 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.2 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.3, 2.6; 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.8, 8.9 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.2 

(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension 

programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead 

types; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2, 

2.4, 2.6 ; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.3; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.9 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2, 

2.4, 2.6 ; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.1, 

3.2.2, 3.2.3 ; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.9 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6 

(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the 

lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the nuclear 

and non-nuclear 

components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the 

nuclear weapons stockpile; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3, 

2.6; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 3.3, 

3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3, 

2.6; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 3.3, 

(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and 

reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3, 

Figure 2-5; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2.3, 3.4 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.3 

 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the 

Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the 

nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2 

Classified 

Chapter 2 

(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and 

modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as 

needed; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.4, 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2, 3.3 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.5 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.4, 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.5 

(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for 

carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 2524 of 

this title, including information relating to the aging of materials and 

components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or 

substitution of materials; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2.3, 

2.6.3; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3, 3.4.3 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.6 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page A-6 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions 

for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production facility, 

including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the 

carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and mechanisms to 

ensure the retention of skilled personnel;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6.4; 

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.2.1, 

6.2.3, 6.3, 6.3.2; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.10.2; 

Appendix E 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6; 

Chapter 6, 

Section 6.2.3; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.9.2 

(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full and 

complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review process 

to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile required under section 2525;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2.2 

No updates

(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile 

management program required by section 4204, including allocations of 

funds by weapon type and facility; and 

Unclassified

Chapter 5; 

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.1, 8.9, 

Table 8-1 

Unclassified

Chapter 5; 

Chapter 8 

(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report 

is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program 

required under section 2524.

Unclassified

Chapter 8 

Unclassified

Chapter 8 

(2) With respect to science-based tools— 

(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear 

weapons stockpile is safe and reliable; 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in 

subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information 

and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on the 

criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) of this title; and 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.1; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.3.1; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including any 

updates to such criteria).

 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-7

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 

(a) of this title by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the 

national security laboratories, which shall set forth— 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3 

Unclassified

Chapters 2, 3 

(A) an identification and description of— Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 2.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4

 (i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; 

and 

(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear 

testing; 

(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory to 

ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable 

without the use of nuclear testing;

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.4, 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced simulation 

and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory that exist at 

the time of the assessment compared with the science-based tools expected 

to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security 

program; and 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4, 3.8.1, 

3.8.2 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4, 3.8.1, 

3.8.2 

(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies required 

to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program and other 

weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the Administration, 

including—

Unclassified

Chapter 6 

Unclassified

Chapter 6 

 (i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, 

required to maintain such competencies; and 

Unclassified

Appendix E 

No updates

 (ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the 

time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist during 

the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program. 

Unclassified

Appendix E 

No updates

(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure— Unclassified

Chapters 1, 5 

Unclassified

Chapters 1, 5 

(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the 

Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed 

in— 

Unclassified

Chapter 5 

Unclassified

Chapter 5 

 (i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the 

most recent national security strategy report of the President under 

section 404a of this title if such strategy has been submitted as of the 

date of the plan; 

Unclassified

Chapter 5 

Unclassified

Chapter 5 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page A-8 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

(ii) the most recent quadrennial defense review if such strategy has not 

been submitted as of the date of the plan; and 

Unclassified

Chapter 5 

Unclassified

Chapter 5 

 (iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan; Unclassified

Introduction; 

Chapter 5 

Unclassified

Introduction; 

Chapter 5 

(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under subparagraph 

(A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan; and 

Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Section 5.3.1, 

Figure 5-2 

Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Section 5.3.1, 

Figure 5-2 

(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines 

necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), 

including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which such 

estimated levels of annual funds are based.

Unclassified

Chapter 8 

Unclassified

Chapter 8 

(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States— Unclassified

Chapters 2, 4; 

Appendix C 

No updates 

(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the 

Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once 

directed by the President to conduct such a test; 

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1, 4.2, 

4.3; Appendix C, 

Section C.1 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2 

No updates

(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate; 

Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1, 4.4; 

Appendix C, 

Section C.1 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2

No updates

(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National 

Security Site; 

Unclassified

Appendix C, 

Section C.2.1, 

Tables C-2, C-3, 

C-4 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.2 

No updates

(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National 

Security Site; and

Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.1, 5.2, 

Table 5-1; 

Appendix E 

Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.1, 5.2, 

Table 5-1 

(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities 

described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants 

described in subparagraph (D). 

Unclassified

Appendix C, 

Section C.2.1 

No Updates
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-9

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2523 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates 

(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile 

and stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the 

following: 

Requirement for 

Biennial Detailed 

Report 

(FY 2016 SSMP) 

Requirement for 

Biennial Detailed 

Report 

(FY 2016 SSMP) 

(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand 

plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured 

and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries. 

N/A N/A

(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium at 

elemental and bulk conditions. 

N/A N/A

(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for plutonium 

and plutonium components. 

N/A N/A

(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance under 

static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and nonmanufactured 

conditions. 

N/A N/A

(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments 

described in subparagraphs (A) through (D). 

N/A N/A

(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, 

and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period 

covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 2453 of 

this title. 

N/A N/A

(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified under 

subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security 

program. 

N/A N/A

(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the 

integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship 

needs. 

N/A N/A

(7) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

Unclassified

Introduction; 

Chapter 1 

Unclassified

Introduction; 

Chapter 1 

(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(1) The term ‘budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that 

fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 

1105(a) of Title 31. 

(2) The term ‘future-years nuclear security program’ means the program 

required by section 2453 of this Title. 

(3) The term ‘nuclear security budget materials’, with respect to a fiscal year, 

means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support 

of the budget for that fiscal year. 

(4) The term ‘quadrennial defense review’ means the review of the defense 

programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years 

under section 118 of Title 10. 

(5) The term ‘weapons activities’ means each activity within the budget 

category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration. 

(6) The term ‘weapons-related activities’ means each activity under the 

Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons 

technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to— 

(A) nuclear nonproliferation; 

(B) nuclear forensics; 

(C) nuclear intelligence; 

(D) nuclear safety; and 

(E) nuclear incident response.’’ 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page A-10 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2524 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates

Sec. 2524. Stockpile management program 

(a) Program required 

 

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear 

Security and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a 

program, in support of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the 

effective management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, 

including the extension of the effective life of such weapons. The program 

shall have the following objectives: 

 

(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile of the United States. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground 

nuclear weapons testing. 

Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Classified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

No updates

(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.3, 2.6 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.3, 2.6 

(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the 

stockpile. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6.3; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3.3, 

3.4.2 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.5.2; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4.2 

No updates

(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a 

person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its 

allies. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.8; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.3.3; 

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.2 

Classified

Section 3.4.2 

Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.2 

Classified

Section 3.4.2 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-11

50 U.S. Code Sec. 2524 FY 2014 

Response 

FY 2015 

Response/Updates

(b) Program limitations 

In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the 

Secretary of Energy shall ensure that - 

 

(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the 

objectives identified in subsection (a); and 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.5, 2.6 

(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall - 

(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, 

to the maximum extent feasible, components that are well 

understood or are certifiable without the need to resume 

underground nuclear weapons testing; and 

(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident 

in the nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission 

requirements of the existing stockpile. 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3, 3.4 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6 

Classified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.6; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.4 

(c) Program budget 

In accordance with the requirements under section 2529 of this Title, for each 

budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of 

Title 31, the amounts requested for the program under this section shall be 

clearly identified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress 

in support of that budget. 

Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.1, 

Table 8-1 

Unclassified

Chapter 8 

A.3 Other Requirements

No additional requirements for this FY 2015 SSMP.

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page B-1

Appendix B 

Science, Technology, and Engineering 

Campaigns Subprograms 

There are no updates to this appendix. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page C-1

Appendix C 

Nuclear Test Readiness 

There are no updates to this appendix. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-1

Appendix D 

Physical Infrastructure Updates 

There are no updates to this appendix. 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-1

Appendix E 

Site Workforce Data 

There are no updates to this appendix. 

 

Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page F-1

Appendix F 

Exascale Computing 

The ASC Campaign has created a new subprogram to develop a strategy to acquire the advanced 

computing technologies needed to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the future. This 

appendix discusses the need for an exascale capability and the strategy for advancing HPC for the 

stockpile. 

F.1 Mission Need 

The ASC Campaign’s mission is to provide the simulation capabilities—that is, HPC, multi-physics IDCs, 

and physics and engineering models—required by NNSA for current and future stockpile work. The 

simulation capabilities developed by the ASC Campaign in the form of IDCs are a key integrating element 

used for weapon physics and engineering assessments of the Nation’s stockpile. IDCs support design 

studies, maintenance analyses, the Annual Assessment Reports, LEPs, SFIs, warhead safety assessments, 

and weapons dismantlement. Much of the experimental data obtained by NNSA since the 1992 nuclear 

test moratorium, together with legacy underground nuclear tests and the accumulated experience of 

the DSW community, are embodied in IDCs and in the models, algorithms, and related physical 

databases developed for those codes and validated by high energy density experiments. IDCs are 

therefore a foundational and critical component for accomplishing the stockpile stewardship mission. 

ASC fully recognizes the need for technological advances to acquire exascale computing capabilities, 

although that goal must currently be met within available programmatic resources. The present 

predictive capability of IDCs is sufficient for today’s mission. However, as the life of the stockpile is 

extended and changes caused by aging, alterations, or LEPs move the stockpile further from the data 

collected in underground tests prior to 1992, maintaining the stockpile will require IDCs to be more 

predictive. Predictive capability is currently limited by insufficient fidelity in physics models (and hence 

requires additional data and theoretical insights) or by the spatial scale of simulations (and hence 

requires greater computational capabilities). These limitations drive the need to increase the 

complexity of codes and the number of simulations that, in turn, may ultimately require exascale-class 

computing. 

F.2 Technical Hurdles 

The simulation of nuclear weapons has evolved through three eras of computing: mainframe serial 

processing (1955–1979), vector processing (1979–1995), and the current massively parallel processors. 

The transitions for HPC and IDCs between these periods were challenging and occasionally turbulent. 

Each era required rethinking the models and algorithms, as well as adapting to dramatic changes in 

hardware architectures. 

Since the dawn of massively parallel processors, IDCs have benefitted from a predictable evolution in 

computer technologies suitable for HPC. Unfortunately that era is rapidly ending. For the first time, the 

nuclear security enterprise’s IDCs are at risk of performing more poorly on individual processors in a 

new computer than on individual processors of the computer it replaced; as a result, processors could 
April 2014 | Department of Energy 

Page F-2 | Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

be starved for data. This change is a result of continued applicability of Moore’s Law (the observation 

that transistor density on integrated circuits increases at a geometric rate) and the end of Dennard 

Scaling (the progressive increase in the operating frequency of those transistors). Consequently, to 

continue to increase the peak capability of computers, multiple cores are being put onto a single chip. 

Unfortunately, memory systems are not keeping pace. The HPC industry is using millions of these 

multiple-core, memory-starved chips, often augmented by heterogeneous accelerators, in an attempt to 

achieve continued performance gains. However, the rate at which data can move from memory to 

cores is insufficient to keep the cores busy, resulting in a computing speed that is severely diminished 

relative to its theoretical peak. The decrease in single-processor performance will require purchasing 

significantly larger computers with more processors than would otherwise have been needed had the 

technology not significantly changed. This phenomenon is now so severe that, while peak speeds are 

increasing, the computing speeds are stagnating. NNSA’s IDCs must be either redesigned or replaced to 

run efficiently on these new architectures; otherwise, the predictive capability to address stockpile 

stewardship requirements will be significantly impacted. 

Two additional issues accompany this new era: electrical power consumption and the mean time to 

failure. The power required to store and move data from the file system to memory, and from memory 

to processors, has not decreased rapidly enough to keep pace with peak system performance. Various 

strategies such as memory hierarchies and algorithms are being investigated to minimize data 

movement and reduce power consumption. In addition, as the system scales to billions of components 

the fault tolerance becomes difficult to maintain. System software and IDCs will require modification to 

account for increased faults. 

Without fundamental changes to the IDCs, execution run times will continue to deteriorate on the 

computer architectures that are coming to market. In short, progress in simulations, and hence in 

improving the quality of the results necessary to sustain the stockpile, will stall. 

F.3 Objectives to Overcome Technical Hurdles 

Given the issues above for increasing the IDC performance and sustaining a virtual testing capability, 

ASC must focus its effort on navigating the technology changes currently being driven by industry. The 

end of the massively parallel processor era has brought four key technical challenges to the forefront: 

 Exploit exponentially growing parallelism. 

 Reduce data movement. 

 Manage power from component to system levels. 

 Increase resiliency for faults at unprecedented scales. 

ASC will focus on these four technical challenges through the following highly coordinated objectives: 

 Build new algorithms and adapt IDCs to the new-era platforms. 

 Work with industry to develop novel solutions for stewardship applications. 

 Work with vendors to introduce new technology solutions into the platforms. 

Based on past experience with transitions between different computing eras, NNSA must work closely 

with industry to ensure current IDCs will function on the new architectures, even if initially only at 

minimally efficient levels, until a new generation of IDCs is developed. While IDC development activities 

have traditionally involved interaction with vendors, NNSA will employ a more formal, encompassing 
Department of Energy | April 2014 

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page F-3

approach going forward. Co-design centers will work with vendors to provide a comprehensive 

understanding of problems and potential solutions since the path forward is not clearly defined. 

Technical challenges will be addressed by the new ASC subprogram, Advanced Technology Development 

and Mitigation, in the absence of a national exascale initiative. This subprogram will focus the efforts of 

the nuclear security enterprise on developing a strategy to acquire the advanced computing 

technologies. Within the Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram, an effort on 

next-generation codes will seek to accelerate development and implementation of new codes and 

algorithms that take advantage of emerging HPC architectures and trends. Similarly, a next-generation 

systems effort will work with vendors to influence and accelerate the introduction of features in future 

HPC systems for nuclear security missions. Some existing ASC efforts, notably co-design and Fast 

Forward/Design Forward will be moved into the new subprogram. Also, some non-recurring 

engineering1

 for future HPC platforms will also be included within this focus area. 

Because of the disruptive changes to HPC resulting from this fourth epoch in computing, the Advanced 

Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram will be a priority. If necessary, other ASC efforts 

will be scaled back or sacrificed so these technical challenges can be met. 

In the coming year, ASC will also develop a 10-year plan to achieve exascale computing for the stockpile. 

Given the magnitude of the exascale challenge, this plan will be coordinated with the DOE Office of 

Science in consultation with other Federal agencies. 

F.4 Progression of Platform Procurements to Achieve 

Objectives 

Since the start of the original ASC Initiative, advances in HPC have been predictably exponential, based 

on ever-increasing floating point operations per second (flops) as measured by the Top 500 list. 

Platforms to support stockpile stewardship in the future will seek to achieve the best balance between 

flops, memory capacity, and data movement, rather than to maximize flops, thereby achieving the best 

possible system for IDCs. As the relative cost of flops drops, memory capacity and power consumption 

will become the dominant considerations in procurements. Consequently, for the essentially fixed 

investments made by ASC, the historical mandate to seek a growth in flops is abating. In current plans, 

Sequoia is likely the last system that will compete at the top of the Top 500 list. Trinity, a platform to 

replace Roadrunner and Cielo in 2015, will have a theoretical peak between 60 and 100 petaflops. 

Sierra, the Sequoia replacement, will likely be between 80 and 160 petaflops in 2017. These values 

are well below those projected even 2 years ago. If these trends continue, a system delivered in the 

2019–2020 timeframe for stockpile stewardship should be in the range of 120–250 petaflops. But it 

must have sufficient memory and low power consumption to deliver on the required mission. 

 

1

 Non-recurring engineering is a mechanism by which ASC will accelerate the introduction of technology in platform acquisitions 

beyond what is currently on the vendor’s roadmaps. 


National Nuclear Security Administration

National Nuclear Security Administration

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585

DOE/NA-0021

A Report to Congress

Fiscal Year 2015 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

April 2014