Fiscal Year 2022

Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan

Report to Congress

March 2022

National Nuclear Security Administration

United States Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585
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Message from the NNSA Administrator

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has the mission to

protect the American people by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile; by 

advancing nuclear nonproliferation and reducing global nuclear threats; and by providing nuclear 

propulsion systems for the U.S. Navy.

DOE/NNSA’s largest responsibility is our nuclear weapons program. Nuclear deterrence has been and 

remains the cornerstone of the Nation’s security posture, and its credibility serves as the ultimate 

insurance policy against a nuclear attack. DOE/NNSA holds the unique obligation to maintain the 

capabilities – people, infrastructure, and tools – to design, produce, and certify the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile. Our nuclear deterrence work is conducted in a distributed enterprise consisting of 

federal employees and specialized technical talent in government-owned, contractor-operated national 

laboratories, production facilities, and security sites. Since the days of the Manhattan Project, the highly 

talented people of the nuclear security enterprise have responded to an ever-evolving global security 

environment. 

The Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) describes DOE/NNSA’s plans to 

maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise. 

DOE/NNSA also publishes the annual Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global 

Nuclear Threats report to Congress that describes the vital companion missions to advance nuclear 

nonproliferation and reduce global nuclear threats. In keeping with our commitments to Congress and 

the public, updated versions of these reports are published each year. 

The fiscal year (FY) 2022 SSMP describes the active work across DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise

to achieve program requirements, including producing 80 plutonium pits per year and achieving the first 

production unit for the W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) and W87-1 Modification Program. The major 

activities in other weapon and infrastructure modernization work, science programs, and supporting 

functions are also discussed. 

DOE/NNSA completed production of the W76-1 LEP, provided the W76-2 low-yield ballistic missile 

warhead for initial deployment in FY 2020, and completed first production unit delivery of both the B61-12 

LEP and W88 Alteration 370 warheads in FY 2021. Also in FY 2021, the Los Alamos Pit Production Project

and the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility each completed the Critical Decision 1 acquisition 

milestone and both continued design and project baseline analyses in preparation for Critical Decision 2.

The nuclear security enterprise is at its busiest since the Cold War and our ability to innovate and 

accelerate delivery is front and center in all our programs. 

DOE/NNSA’s ability to continue to execute its mission depends on a modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear 

security infrastructure. This SSMP reflects continued investments in refurbishment and recapitalization 

of the national laboratories, production facilities, and security sites that are crucial to delivering on the 

Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting our workforce. Together with continued support from 

Congress, DOE/NNSA will advance its effort to realize the responsive, agile infrastructure needed fortoday 

and tomorrow. 

President Biden has committed to exploring options to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national 

security strategy, while still ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that 
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our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. At the same time, the 

geopolitical environment today amplifies the need to retain a robust nuclear deterrent program and the 

associated infrastructure as we pursue these longer-term goals. The Nuclear Posture Review now 

underway will inform NNSA programs and our future requests and reports to Congress. 

For over 75 years, the nuclear security enterprise has met every challenge, keeping the country safe and 

leading incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries. DOE/NNSA is fully committed 

and intensely focused on maintaining our tradition of delivering a safe, secure, and effective stockpile for 

the American people.

Pursuant to statute, this FY 2022 SSMP is provided to: 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy

Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Richard Shelby

Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Jack Reed

Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Jim Inhofe

Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable John Kennedy

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development

Senate Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Angus King

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Deb Fischer

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Senate Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro

Chairwoman, House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Kay Granger

Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations 

The Honorable Adam Smith

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

The Honorable Mike Rogers

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 
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The Honorable Marcy Kaptur

Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Mike Simpson

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Appropriations

The Honorable Jim Cooper

Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

The Honorable Doug Lamborn

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

House Committee on Armed Services 

Should you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Mr. Jason Miller, 

Acting Associate Administrator for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-8368. 

Sincerely,

Jill Hruby

Under Secretary for Nuclear Security

Administrator, NNSA
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Message from the Secretary

At the Department of Energy (DOE), we are committed to protecting the American people and working 

seamlessly with the Department of Defense to maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile. DOE’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) plays a critical role in our Nation’s nuclear deterrence by 

stewarding the science and technology needed to certify the stockpile without nuclear explosive testing, 

delivering nuclear weapons life extension and modernization programs, and renewing our infrastructure 

to attract and retain the Nation’s top talent. Through these activities, DOE/NNSA is prepared to flexibly 

address today’s dynamic global security environment.

DOE is steadfast in its support of the people of the NNSA Enterprise. The extensive NNSA work plan 

presented in this report requires a national commitment. DOE, NNSA, and our entire nuclear security 

enterprise are prepared to do the hard work required over the next decade and beyond to responsibly

achieve the agile and resilient enterprise needed for this generation and those to come. The Nation has 

placed a somber and unique responsibility on our enterprise, and we will provide innovative solutions to 

deliver.

We await the detailed planning being finalized in this Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, but we 

know DOE/NNSA will continue to have a pivotal role in providing nuclear deterrence. With the continued 

support of Congress, this program will revitalize and reinvigorate the nuclear security enterprise and 

ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent for today and tomorrow. 

Sincerely, 

Jennifer Granholm

Secretary of Energy
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Executive Summary

This Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), including its classified annex,

describes the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) program for 

maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile over the next 25 years. 

DOE/NNSA publishes the SSMP annually, either in full report form or as a summary, in response to 

statutory requirements to support the President’s Budget Request to Congress for Weapons Activities. 

This fiscal year (FY) 2022 SSMP is a detailed report. This annual plan provides a single, integrated picture 

of current and future nuclear security enterprise activities and capabilities funded by the Weapons 

Activities account in support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent and is developed to be consistent with the 

Nuclear Weapons Council Strategic Plan for FY 2019 – 2044 while maintaining flexibility for the outcomes 

of the ongoing Biden-Harris Administration Nuclear Posture Review.

This SSMP reflects a rigorous mapping of the military requirements and nuclear security enterprise needs 

to assure an effective deterrent and meet the Nation’s nuclear deterrent objectives. DOE/NNSA and the

Department of Defense (DoD) are inextricably linked. The DoD and DOE/NNSA partnership manages 

weapons modernization needs from concept assessment to full-scale production and finally to retirement. 

With four major warhead modernization activities underway, DOE/NNSA is executing an unprecedented 

variety of complicated component development and production projects through this process and 

continues to make progress across all four warhead programs. DOE/NNSA and DoD remain in complete 

schedule alignment. 

Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile is one of several DOE/NNSA enduring 

missions, which also include reducing global nuclear threats and providing the Navy’s submarines and 

aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. To accomplish these missions, DOE/NNSA 

must maintain a range of flexible nuclear capabilities that can only be realized through a world-class 

scientific and engineering workforce operating in a modern, resilient, and responsive nuclear 

infrastructure. Highlights of near-term and out-year mission milestones and accomplishments for these 

mission priorities are:

Maintain the Safety, Security, and Effectiveness of the Nation’s Nuclear Deterrent

With several warhead modernizations underway, DOE/NNSA is executing an unprecedented variety of 

complex component development and production work. Despite the challenges imposed by coronavirus 

disease-2019 (COVID-19)-related restrictions, DOE/NNSA has not missed any major deliverables or 

milestones.

Near-Term and Out-Year Mission Goals:

◼ Deliver the B61-12 gravity bomb.

◼ Deliver the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 (with a refresh of the conventional high explosive).

◼ Achieve the first production unit of the W80-4 warhead life extension program (LEP) and ensure 

alignment with the DoD Long Range Standoff cruise missile replacement program.

◼ Support fielding the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent and advance the W87-1 Modification 

Program (formerly called the W78 Replacement Warhead).

◼ Sustain the B83-1 unit until a suitable replacement is identified.
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◼ Provide the enduring capability to produce 80 plutonium pits per year by expanding plutonium 

pit production capabilities.

◼ Assure a continuous and reliable supply of strategic nuclear weapon components and the key 

materials that make up the components, including plutonium, uranium, lithium, tritium, and high 

explosives (HE).

◼ Provide experimental and computational capabilities to support annual assessment and 

certification of the stockpile.

Key Accomplishments:

Sustaining the Stockpile

◼ In 2020, DOE/NNSA delivered all scheduled limited life components (LLCs) for the B61, W76, W78, 

W80, B83, W87, and W88. 

◼ Completed calibration services of over 1,200 critical equipment calibrations on time in support of 

production activities. 

◼ Sustained base capabilities for multi-system operations and maintenance support to meet all LLC 

exchange gas transfer system (GTS) fills and GTS Surveillance DOE/NNSA deliverables to DoD.

◼ DOE/NNSA conducted surveillance activities for all weapon systems using data collection from 

flight tests, laboratory tests, and component evaluations to assess stockpile reliability without 

explosive nuclear testing, which culminated in completion of all annual assessment reports and 

generation of laboratory director letters to the President.

◼ Throughout 2020, the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) maintained its spotless record of 

accomplishing 100 percent of assigned missions safely and securely, with no mission degradation 

despite the operational challenges inherent during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

◼ OST conducted the Mobile Guardian Transporter Test Article - 1 crash test. This highly successful 

endeavor proved the design and production process to date has been both rigorous and efficient.

Weapons Modernization

◼ The B61-12 LEP entered Phase 6.5, First Production, and achieved the system-level first 

production unit in November 2021.

◼ The W88 Alt 370 entered Phase 6.5, First Production, and achieved the system-level first 

production unit in July 2021.

◼ Successfully completed all Conceptual Design Reviews for the W80-4 and aligned assets to 

support first production unit development and Air Force planned initial operational capability.

◼ Finalized and documented W87-1 Modification Program surety architecture down-select, 

completed Customer Requirements Review with the Air Force, and coordinated flight test 

requirements with the Air Force.

Strengthen Key Science, Technology, and Engineering Capabilities

Nuclear weapons stockpile and key nonproliferation activities are supported by the technical expertise 

resident in DOE/NNSA’s Federal and management and operating (M&O) partner workforces. DOE/NNSA 

cultivates technical expertise at the cutting edge in manufacturing, diagnostics, evaluation, and other 

areas at the plants and sites. DOE/NNSA maintains unparalleled scientific and engineering capabilities at 

the three national security laboratories that execute science-based stockpile stewardship.
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Near-Term and Out-Year Mission Goals:

◼ Advance the innovative experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, and computational 

capabilities necessary to ensure stockpile safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness:

– Achieve exascale computing by delivering an exascale-capable machine and modernizing the 

nuclear weapons code base

– Develop an operational enhanced capability (advanced radiography and reactivity 

measurements) for subcritical experiments

– Quantify the effects of plutonium aging on weapon performance over time

– Assure an enduring, trusted supply of strategic radiation-hardened microsystems

◼ Maintain state-of-the-art manufacturing technologies in support of production operations.

◼ Continue implementation of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to fully exercise the workforce 

and capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise.

◼ Nurture Strategic Partnership Programs that support other relevant needs while advancing the 

long-term capabilities and workforces ofthe national security laboratories, production plants, and 

sites.

Key Accomplishments:

◼ In May 2020, the Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment Project at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) reached Critical Decision-4 (CD-4), Project Completion, 10 months ahead of 

schedule and $20 million under budget. 

◼ Applied Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) computing expertise to accelerate 

scientific discovery related to the COVID-19 virus; developed rapid, accurate diagnostic 

technologies; and supported rapid discovery of potential medical countermeasures.

◼ COVID-19-related research and development (R&D) work at LANL included a team that studied 

the virus’ genetic sequence found that it originated from animals.

◼ Shot 4,000 was achieved by Sandia National Laboratories’ (SNL) Cygnus Dual Axis Radiographic 

Source at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Cygnus, a key diagnostic capability for 

subcritical experiments, was originally expected to be used for just a few hundred shots.

◼ Executed the Nightshade A plutonium subcritical experiment as part of the Red Sage series to 

examine the spall behavior of new and aged materials.

◼ R&D World magazine named 13 DOE/NNSA projects led by LLNL, LANL, NNSS, and SNL as winners 

in the annual R&D 100 Awards, which honor the 100 most innovative technologies and services 

of the past year.

Modernize the Nuclear Security Infrastructure

DOE/NNSA continues to revitalize and reinvigorate the facilities and corresponding infrastructure that 

make up the nuclear security enterprise. These upgrades are necessary to create a responsive and 

resilient nuclear enterprise that can meet national security missions today and into the future. 

Near-Term and Out-Year Mission Goals:

◼ Recapitalize existing infrastructure to implement a plan to produce 80 pits per year. The 

recommended strategy is a two-site solution: 
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– Produce 30 pits per year at the Plutonium Facility at LANL during 2026

– Repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as part 

of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) to produce 50 pits per year as 

close to 2030 as possible

◼ Enable phasing out mission dependency on Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex 

(Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by relocating the facility’s enriched uranium processing 

capabilities into existing facilities and the Uranium Processing Facility and extending the 

operational lifetime of key existing facilities into the 2040s.

◼ Assure long-term actinide chemistry and materials characterization and deliver the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement Project.

◼ Modernize lithium facilities.

◼ Modernize tritium facilities.

◼ Increase production of tritium using two reactors to meet stockpile needs.

◼ Recapitalize the HE and nuclear weapons assembly infrastructure.

◼ Provide new laboratory space and equipment within the U1a Complex to support the Enhanced 

Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments portfolio through the U1a Complex Enhancements Project 

and the Advanced Sources and Detectors Major Item of Equipment. 

◼ Provide modern office and laboratory spaces to support the world-class workforce needed to 

maintain capabilities of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Key Accomplishments:

◼ Pit Production: Executing activities to support fulfilling the requirement to produce not less than 

80 pits per year. Began engineering evaluations of production processes at LANL to qualify those 

processes for the first production unit and completed the CD-1, Approve Alternative Selection and 

Cost Range, package for the SRPPF. 

◼ Tritium: Completed irradiation of 1,584 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) in 

Fuel Cycle 16 in May 2020 at Watts Bar Unit 1 in Tennessee and commenced irradiation of 1,792 

TPBARs in Fuel Cycle #17 at Watts Bar Unit 1 in June 2020. Commenced irradiation of 544 TPBARs 

during Fuel Cycle 4 in Watts Bar Unit 2 in November 2020 (first ever insertion of TPBARs into this 

unit). 

◼ HE: In 2020, DOE/NNSA achieved CD-0, Approve Mission Need, for the Energetic Materials 

Characterization Facility, which will provide a modernized capability to conduct HE research, 

development, test, and evaluation; HE safety testing; development and production of detonators 

to support annual assessments; LEPs/Alt work; surveillance; future HE technology insertion; and 

detonator production.

◼ Lithium: In September 2020, DOE/NNSA re-established and qualified lithium reactor operations 

that had previously shut down in 2012. 

◼ Uranium: Y-12 produced the first test button using the new electrorefining technology that will 

replace the current high-hazard enriched uranium purification process in the Manhattan Projectera Building 9212. Operators produce purified enriched uranium metal in a disc-like shape, called 

a button, so that it can be safely stored until it is used to produce a weapons component. This 
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new technology will be safer, more efficient, and is a major step toward allowing DOE/NNSA to 

reduce mission dependency on Building 9212. 

◼ DOE/NNSA finished the exterior structure and reached beneficial occupancy of Building 225 at 

LLNL, which will house the future LLNL-Kansas City National Security Campus Polymer Enclave.

Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

DOE/NNSA and DoD together deliver the capabilities that will provide the Nation with the ability to adapt 

and respond to a dynamic security environment, emerging strategic challenges, and geopolitical and 

technological changes. Executing a much-increased scope of activities centered around warhead 

modernizations in an aged enterprise has resulted in several operational adjustments and critical 

equipment being operated at significantly increased rates. This has required some innovative adaptation 

of current capabilities and the development of just-in-time capabilities. Weapons Activities capabilities 

are the foundational mechanisms for achieving mission deliverables and priorities. DOE/NNSA must 

continue to invest in advancing existing capabilities and developing emerging capabilities to assure a 

strong nuclear deterrent now and into the future. Recent budget increases will enable continued 

execution of the weapons modernization programs as well as reverse decades of deterioration of critical 

DOE/NNSA infrastructure and loss of capability. With continued support, DOE/NNSA will ensure that the 

nuclear deterrent has the responsive, agile infrastructure needed to meet requirements. 
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship 

and Management Plan

Table of Contents

Legislative Language ....................................................................................................................... xix

Chapter 1 Introduction and Strategic Context for Managing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.............1-1

1.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................1-2

1.2 Policy Framework Summary ....................................................................................................1-3

1.3 The DOE/NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise............................................................................1-3

1.3.1 National Security Laboratories..................................................................................1-4

1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities.....................................................................1-4

1.3.3 Nevada National Security Site ...................................................................................1-4

1.4 Introduction to the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile .....................................................................1-5

1.5 Overall Strategy, Objectives, and Prioritization of Weapons Activities...................................1-6

1.6 Partnership with the Department of Defense .......................................................................1-10

1.7 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan .........................1-10

Chapter 2 Stockpile Management....................................................................................................2-1

2.1 Stockpile Sustainment..............................................................................................................2-2

2.1.1 Stockpile Surveillance................................................................................................2-2

2.1.2 Assessing the Stockpile..............................................................................................2-5

2.1.3 Stockpile Maintenance ..............................................................................................2-7

2.2 Stockpile Major Modernization ...............................................................................................2-9

2.2.1 Phase X Process (Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle) .......................................................2-10

2.2.2 B61-12 Life Extension Program ...............................................................................2-12

2.2.3 W88 Alteration 370 Program...................................................................................2-12

2.2.4 W80-4 Life Extension Program................................................................................2-13

2.2.5 W87-1 Modification Program ..................................................................................2-14

2.2.6 W93 Program...........................................................................................................2-14

2.2.7 W80-4 Alteration (Sea-Launched Cruise Missile)....................................................2-15

2.2.8 Future Warheads.....................................................................................................2-15

2.3 Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition..............................................................................2-15

2.3.1 Status.......................................................................................................................2-15

2.4 Production Operations...........................................................................................................2-16

2.4.1 Status.......................................................................................................................2-16

Chapter 3 Production Modernization...............................................................................................3-1

3.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................3-1

3.2 Primary Capability Modernization ...........................................................................................3-2

3.2.1 Plutonium Modernization .........................................................................................3-2
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3.2.2 High Explosives and Energetics Modernization.........................................................3-6

3.3 Secondary Capability Modernization.....................................................................................3-10

3.3.1 Uranium Modernization ..........................................................................................3-10

3.3.2 Depleted Uranium Modernization ..........................................................................3-12

3.3.3 Lithium Modernization ............................................................................................3-14

3.4 Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment.................................................3-17

3.4.1 Tritium Modernization ............................................................................................3-17

3.4.2 Domestic Uranium Enrichment ...............................................................................3-20

3.5 Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization .................................................................................3-21

3.5.1 Status.......................................................................................................................3-22

3.5.2 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................3-23

Chapter 4: Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering ..........................................................4-1

4.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................4-1

4.2 Strategic Program Goals...........................................................................................................4-2

4.2.1 Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule ................................................................4-3

4.2.2 Enduring Drivers for Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering...................4-4

4.3 Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering Elements and Status.................................4-7

4.3.1 Assessment Science...................................................................................................4-8

4.3.2 Engineering and Integrated Assessments ...............................................................4-11

4.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion ....................................................................................4-14

4.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing .....................................................................4-18

4.3.5 Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation.............................................4-22

4.3.6 Academic Programs.................................................................................................4-26

4.4 Nuclear Test Readiness..........................................................................................................4-29

Chapter 5: Security.........................................................................................................................5-1

5.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................5-1

5.2 Secure Transportation Asset....................................................................................................5-1

5.2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................5-1

5.2.2 Status.........................................................................................................................5-2

5.2.3 Challenges and Strategies..........................................................................................5-4

5.3 Defense Nuclear Security.........................................................................................................5-4

5.3.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................5-4

5.3.2 Status.........................................................................................................................5-6

5.3.3 Sustainment Investments..........................................................................................5-7

5.3.4 Challenges and Strategies..........................................................................................5-8

5.4 Information Technology and Cybersecurity.............................................................................5-9

5.4.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................5-9

5.4.2 Ongoing NNSA OCIO Activities ................................................................................5-12

5.4.3 Planned NNSA OCIO Activities.................................................................................5-12

5.4.4 Status.......................................................................................................................5-14

5.4.5 Challenges and Strategies........................................................................................5-15

Chapter 6 Infrastructure and Operations.........................................................................................6-1

6.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................6-1

6.1.1 Challenges and Strategies..........................................................................................6-3

6.2 Infrastructure Planning and Asset Management.....................................................................6-5

6.2.1 Area Planning.............................................................................................................6-6
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6.2.2 Weapons Activities Line Item Planning Integration ..................................................6-7

6.2.3 Critical Decision Acquisition Milestone Process........................................................6-8

6.3 Acquisition Through Line Item Construction ...........................................................................6-9

6.3.1 Programmatic Construction ......................................................................................6-9

6.3.2 Mission Enabling Construction ................................................................................6-22

6.4 Modernization Through Minor Construction and Recapitalization.......................................6-25

6.4.1 Recapitalization Program.........................................................................................6-25

6.4.2 Site-Directed Minor Construction Investments.......................................................6-27

6.4.3 Defense Nuclear Security Recapitalization and Minor Construction ......................6-28

6.5 Sustainment...........................................................................................................................6-28

6.5.1 Infrastructure Operations and Sustainment ...........................................................6-28

6.5.2 Programmatic Facility Sustainment.........................................................................6-30

6.5.3 Site-Directed Sustainment Investments..................................................................6-31

6.5.4 Real Estate and Leased Facilities.............................................................................6-31

6.6 Disposition of Excess Facilities...............................................................................................6-32

6.7 Modernization of Programmatic Equipment.........................................................................6-32

6.7.1 Programmatic Equipment Investments...................................................................6-33

6.7.2 Capabilities- Based Investments..............................................................................6-34

6.7.3 Production Operations Equipment Investments.....................................................6-35

6.7.4 Infrastructure Operations, and Maintenance Equipment Investments..................6-36

6.7.5 Site-Directed Equipment Investments ....................................................................6-36

6.8 Leveraging Weapons Activities Investments Across DOE/NNSA...........................................6-36

6.8.1 Support of Nonproliferation Efforts........................................................................6-36

6.8.2 Support of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation and Emergency 

Operations Efforts ...................................................................................................6-39

6.9 Management and Performance.............................................................................................6-41

Chapter 7 Workforce.......................................................................................................................7-1

7.1 Overview ..................................................................................................................................7-1

7.2 Workforce Composition...........................................................................................................7-2

7.2.1 Federal Workforce.....................................................................................................7-2

7.2.2 Management and Operating Workforce ...................................................................7-2

7.2.3 Non-Management and Operating Workforce ...........................................................7-3

7.3 Status .......................................................................................................................................7-3

7.3.1 Approaches and Programs.........................................................................................7-3

7.3.2 Workforce Demographics..........................................................................................7-6

7.3.3 Unique Set of Skills for Nuclear Weapons Work .....................................................7-12

7.4 Workforce Challenges and Strategies....................................................................................7-12

7.4.1 Recruiting and Hiring ...............................................................................................7-13

7.4.2 Developing, Retaining, and Sustaining the Workforce............................................7-14

7.4.3 Training and Knowledge Transfer to the Next Generation .....................................7-15

7.5 Workforce Accomplishments.................................................................................................7-16

Chapter 8 Budget and Fiscal Estimates.............................................................................................8-1

8.1 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation ...............................................................8-1

8.2 Portfolio Management.............................................................................................................8-2

8.3 Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget ........................................................................................8-3

8.4 Stockpile Management............................................................................................................8-3

8.4.1 Budget........................................................................................................................8-3
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8.4.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget..............................8-4

8.4.3 Key Milestones ..........................................................................................................8-5

8.5 Production Modernization.......................................................................................................8-6

8.5.1 Budget........................................................................................................................8-6

8.5.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget..............................8-7

8.5.3 Key Milestones ..........................................................................................................8-8

8.6 Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering.................................................................8-12

8.6.1 Budget......................................................................................................................8-12

8.6.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget............................8-13

8.6.3 Key Milestones ........................................................................................................8-14

8.7 Infrastructure and Operations...............................................................................................8-15

8.7.1 Budget......................................................................................................................8-15

8.7.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget............................8-15

8.7.3 Key Milestones ........................................................................................................8-17

8.7.4 Infrastructure Maintenance and Recapitalization Investments..............................8-18

8.8 Other Weapons Activities......................................................................................................8-19

8.8.1 Budget......................................................................................................................8-19

8.8.2 Secure Transportation Asset ...................................................................................8-19

8.8.3 Defense Nuclear Security ........................................................................................8-20

8.8.4 Information Technology and Cybersecurity ............................................................8-22

8.8.5 Legacy Contractor Pensions and Settlement Payments..........................................8-23

8.9 Budget Projections Beyond FY 2022 ......................................................................................8-23

8.9.1 Basis for Budget Projections....................................................................................8-23

8.9.2 Stockpile Major Modernization...............................................................................8-24

8.9.3 Construction ............................................................................................................8-35

8.10 Affordability ...........................................................................................................................8-37

8.10.1 Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs ......................................................8-37

Chapter 9: Conclusion ....................................................................................................................9-1

Appendix A: Requirements Mapping ............................................................................................. A-1

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to Statutory Reporting 

Requirements and Related Requests...................................................................................... A-1

A.2 50 U.S. Code § 2523 ................................................................................................................ A-1

A.3 H.R. 116-449............................................................................................................................ A-8

A.4 H.R. 244................................................................................................................................... A-8

A.5 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2521............................................................................... A-9

A.6 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2522............................................................................. A-10

A.7 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2524............................................................................. A-10

A.8 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2538b........................................................................... A-11

Appendix B: Weapons Activities Capabilities.................................................................................. B-1

B.1 Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing ...................................................................B-1

B.2 Weapon Component Production.............................................................................................B-2

B.3 Weapon Simulation and Computing........................................................................................B-2

B.4 Weapon Design and Integration..............................................................................................B-3

B.5 Weapon Science and Engineering............................................................................................B-3

B.6 Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition.............................................................B-5

B.7 Transportation and Security ....................................................................................................B-6
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Appendix C: Exascale Computing ................................................................................................... C-1

C.1 Challenges................................................................................................................................C-2

C.2 Approaches and Strategies......................................................................................................C-2

C.3 Collaborative Management .....................................................................................................C-4

C.4 Milestones................................................................................................................................C-4

C.5 Conclusion................................................................................................................................C-5

Appendix D Stockpile Responsiveness Program .............................................................................. D-1

D.1 Program Establishment, Purpose, and Early Execution.......................................................... D-1

D.2 Planned Budget....................................................................................................................... D-2

D.3 Governance and Priorities ...................................................................................................... D-2

D.4 Approach to Responsiveness, Risk Management, Safety, and Security ................................. D-3

D.5 Execution of the Technical Program....................................................................................... D-4

D.5.1 Major Technical Effort 1: Future Threats, Technology Trends, and 

Opportunities............................................................................................................ D-5

D.5.2 Major Technical Effort 2: Challenge Problems........................................................ D-5

D.5.3 Major Technical Effort 3: Prototyping, Testing, and Flight Testing ......................... D-7

D.5.4 Major Technical Effort 4: Technologies for Production Responsiveness ................ D-8

Appendix E: Workforce and Site-Specific Information......................................................................E-1

E.1 National Nuclear Security Administration ...............................................................................E-2

E.1.1 Federal Workforce.....................................................................................................E-2

E.2 National Security Laboratories.................................................................................................E-7

E.2.1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.................................................................E-7

E.2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory..............................................................................E-17

E.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories ..................................................................................E-32

E.3 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities.................................................................................E-46

E.3.1 Kansas City National Security Campus ....................................................................E-46

E.3.2 Pantex Plant.............................................................................................................E-58

E.3.3 Savannah River Site .................................................................................................E-66

E.3.4 Y-12 National Security Complex ..............................................................................E-79

E.4 The National Security Site......................................................................................................E-88

E.4.1 Nevada National Security Site .................................................................................E-88

Appendix F: Glossary......................................................................................................................F-1

Appendix G: List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ...........................................................................G-1

Appendix H: List of Figures and Tables........................................................................................... H-1
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Legislative Language

Title 50 of United States Code Section 2523 (50 U.S. Code § 2523), requires that:

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials 

of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually update 

a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile 

stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program 

direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan shall 

be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent annual 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. 

Pursuant to previous statutory requirements, the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 

Administration (DOE/NNSA) has submitted reports on the plan to Congress annually since 1998, with the 

exception of 2012.

1

 

The Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is a detailed report of 

DOE/NNSA’s 25-year program of record to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear 

stockpile and is primarily captured in this single, unclassified document. A classified annex to the SSMP

contains supporting details concerning the U.S. nuclear stockpile and stockpile management. 

1

In 2012, a Fiscal Year 2013 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan was not submitted to Congress because analytical work 

conducted by the Department of Defense and NNSA to evaluate the out-year needs for nuclear modernization activities across 

the nuclear security enterprise had not yet been finalized. 
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Chapter 1

Introduction and Strategic Context for 

Managing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The U.S. nuclear deterrent is the foundation of the national defense, and its credibility serves as the 

ultimate insurance policy against a nuclear attack. While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons 

has been an aspiration for generations, the reality of today’s evolving and uncertain international security 

environment must be recognized. China and Russia are advancing their nuclear capabilities, which 

challenges U.S. advantages directly. The United States must respond to the increasing desire of state and 

non-state actors to reshape the world in their favor, at the expense of the Nation, its allies, and partners 

and, at times, in contravention of international norms and rules.

The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) are inextricably linked in 

achieving the nuclear deterrent mission. To execute the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons programs, DOE/NNSA, in partnership with DoD through the Nuclear 

Weapons Council, conducts activities in a joint nuclear weapons acquisition 

process known as the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process. DoD and 

DOE/NNSA use this process to manage weapons sustainment and

modernization needs from concept assessment to full scale production, and 

finally to retirement. Progress continues to be made across the four current 

major warhead programs as the DOE/NNSA continues to execute an 

unprecedented variety of complicated component development, qualification, 

system integration, and production activities. While DOE/NNSA remain in 

complete schedule alignment, sustained funding and support are critical to 

remain in alignment while meeting milestone and delivery targets. 

The weapons comprising the U.S. nuclear stockpile are assessed to be safe, 

reliable, effective, and secure. DOE/NNSA’s scientific infrastructure is currently 

adequate to support stockpile actions. The DOE/NNSA plans to address nearterm gaps in required scientific capabilities by deploying the DOE/NNSA’s first 

exascale computing platform in fiscal year (FY) 2023 and by improving 

capabilities to conduct subcritical experiments through the Enhanced 

Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments project by FY 2026. DOE/NNSA’s 

production infrastructure has atrophied to the point of an increased risk to the 

mission. DOE/NNSA is executing a number of production facility and capability modernization activities 

with completion dates designed to minimize potential impacts to the continued operational effectiveness 

of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Further, modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile and recapitalizing the supporting infrastructure 

needed to produce and maintain the stockpile are critical to maintaining necessary deterrent capabilities. 

Many of DOE/NNSA’s facilities are beyond their life expectancy, and many others are in poor condition. 

Assessments of facilities throughout the enterprise have identified numerous potential single-point 

The W80-4 and W87-1 

are making more 

significant changes than 

any life extension 

program in the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program 

era, which stresses 

stewardship tools in 

significant and 

unprecedented ways.
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failures. If not appropriately addressed, the age and condition of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure will put its 

deterrence mission, as well as the safety of its workforce, the public, and the environment, at risk. 

DOE/NNSA is undertaking a risk-informed, complex, and time-constrained modernization and 

recapitalization effort to ensure continued mission success. Details of many of these plans are contained 

in the following chapters.

1.1 Overview

DOE/NNSA draws authority for managing the Nation’s nuclear stockpile from the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954 (42 United States Code [U.S. Code] § 2011 et seq.) and, more specifically, the National Nuclear 

Security Administration Act (50 U.S. Code § 2401 et seq.). DOE/NNSA’s broad set of enduring missions are 

to protect the Nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing 

global nuclear threats; and providing the Navy’s submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective 

nuclear propulsion. Activities related to DOE/NNSA’s conduct of the stockpile mission are referred to in 

this document as Weapons Activities.

DOE/NNSA’s annual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) has two primary purposes:

◼ The SSMP documents DOE/NNSA’s plans to:

– Maintain the current stockpile

– Modernize the stockpile as needed to respond to evolving deterrent needs

– Employ science-based stockpile stewardship to enhance the potential performance of and our 

understanding of the stockpile’s aged, modified, or modernized nuclear weapons

– Maintain and modernize the supporting infrastructure

– Sustain DOE/NNSA’s highly skilled workforce necessary for this work

◼ The SSMP provides DOE/NNSA’s formal response to multiple statutory reporting requirements, 

which can be found in Appendix A, “Requirements Mapping,” and, among others, include:

– Annual Life Extension Program reporting required under the Explanatory Statement 

accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31)

– Status of programs, projects, and activities within the Stockpile Responsiveness Program 

requested through language in the House Report accompanying the Energy and Water 

Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021 (H. Rept. 116-449)

This FY 2022 SSMP serves as the annual plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile required by 

statute. The 25-year strategic plan was developed to be in line with strategic guidance, the Nuclear 

Weapons Council’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2019 – 2044, FY 2020 – 2025 Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile Plan, and other policy directives (see Section 1.2). The plan requires close coordination with 

DoD. 

Consistent with the past two transition year budgets (FY 2018 and FY 2010), the FY 2022 President’s 

Budget does not include program-based defense budget levels beyond the budget year. Instead, the 

defense estimates for FY 2023-2026 simply reflect inflated FY 2022 levels, not policy judgments. The 

Administration will include outyear defense program funding levels in the FY 2023 Budget, in accordance 

with strategy documents currently under development. The FY 2023 President’s Budget will be 

accompanied by a Future Years Nuclear Security Program that reflects this Administration’s policy 

judgments through the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review.1

1 See 50 U.S. Code § 2453, Future-years nuclear security program, for a detailed description.
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1.2 Policy Framework Summary

The National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S. Code § 2401, et seq.) directs DOE/NNSA “To 

maintain and enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 

including the ability to design, produce, and test, to meet national security requirements.” 

Other policy documents reinforce the requirement for a nuclear weapons infrastructure that is flexible, 

responsive, and resilient enough to meet changing geopolitical challenges while providing direction and 

guidance to DOE/NNSA on accomplishing the nuclear weapons mission. The 2021 Interim National 

Security Strategic Guidance states that the U.S. will “take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 

our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective 

and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.”

1.3 The DOE/NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise

The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise (Figure 1–1) consists of DOE/NNSA Headquarters (located in 

Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and Albuquerque, New Mexico); the DOE/NNSA field offices;

the three national security laboratories (two of which have production missions); the four nuclear 

weapons production sites; and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). DOE/NNSA implements the 

overall nuclear weapons strategy, in collaboration with its management and operating (M&O) partners,

and oversees and coordinates activities to ensure they are accomplished in an efficient, fiscally 

responsible manner.

Figure 1–1. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise
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1.3.1 National Security Laboratories

Three national security laboratories are devoted to nuclear weapons design and data interpretation:

◼ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California

◼ Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico

◼ Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California

The primary mission of these nationalsecurity laboratories is to research, develop, sustain, and implement

nuclear weapons design, simulation, modeling, and experimental capabilities and competencies to ensure 

confidence in the current and future stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. All three laboratories 

are Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs).2 The national security laboratories 

engage in long-term research, development, test, and evaluation activities for the nuclear weapons 

missions and apply science, technology, and engineering to solve other national security challenges, such 

as nuclear threat reduction. Other DOE national laboratories also support the Weapons Activities and 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs.

1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

The four nuclear weapons production sites conduct a range of stockpile management activities:

3

◼ The Kansas City National Security Campus in Kansas City, Missouri, produces non-nuclear 

components.

◼ The Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, manufactures and tests high explosive (HE) components, and 

assembles, disassembles, and refurbishes stockpile weapons and components.

◼ The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, manufactures uranium components 

and dismantles and stores highly enriched uranium.

◼ The Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina, extracts, recycles, and loads tritium into 

gas transfer systems.

4

In addition to Weapons Activities work, these facilities also support DOE/NNSA’s nuclear 

nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism missions. 

1.3.3 Nevada National Security Site

NNSS near Las Vegas, Nevada, works with the national security laboratories to provide facilities, 

infrastructure, and personnel to conduct unique nuclear and non-nuclear experiments that are essential 

to maintaining the stockpile. It is the primary location where experiments with radioactive and other 

high-hazard materials are conducted and is the only location where HE-driven plutonium experiments can 

be conducted at weapon-scale with weapon-relevant amounts of special nuclear material. NNSS also 

2 FFRDCs are unique nonprofit entities sponsored and funded by the U.S. Government to meet special long-term research or 

development needs that cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor resources. FFRDCs are operated, 

managed, and/or administered by either a university or consortium of universities, another not-for-profit or nonprofit 

organization, or an industrial firm either as an autonomous organization or an identifiable separate operating unit of a parent 

organization.

3 Some production capabilities also exist at LANL and SNL. LANL manufactures pits, detonators, detonator cables, and 

radioisotope thermoelectric generators. SNL manufactures neutron generators, power sources, explosive components and 

energetic materials, surety technologies, and strategic, radiation-hardened microsystems such as custom application-specific 

integrated circuits. 

4 DOE’s Savannah River National Laboratory at SRS also conducts research and development in support of tritium processing and 

gas transfer system design and certification activities.
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develops and deploys state-of-the-art diagnostics and instrumentation, analyzes data, stores 

programmatic materials, conducts criticality experiments, and supports other DOE/NNSA activities.

1.4 Introduction to the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The size and composition of the nuclear stockpile continues to change in response to U.S. national security

needs. The average age of weapons in the stockpile remains high. Many weapons are considerably past 

their original design life and require stockpile management to assess their condition and perform 

additional maintenance and enhanced surveillance to ensure operability and extend weapon lifetimes. 

With four major warhead modernization activities underway, DOE/NNSA is making significant progress

toward reducing the average warhead age. The change over time in the size and age of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile is illustrated in Figure 1–2.

Figure 1–2. Size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2020

The current stockpile consists of active weapons, which are maintained to meet military requirements, as 

well as inactive weapons, which are used to augment or replace warheads in the active stockpile as 

necessary. Retired weapons are not included in the count of stockpile weapons. Table 1–1 reflects the 

major characteristics of the Nation’s current stockpile, which is composed of two types of submarinelaunched ballistic missile warheads, two types of intercontinental ballistic missile warheads, several types 

of bombs, and a cruise missile warhead.

The classified annex to this plan includes specific technical details about the stockpile by warhead type.
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Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems

Warheads—Strategic Ballistic Missile Platforms

Type

a

Description Delivery System Laboratories Mission Military

W78 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W87-0 Reentry vehicle warhead Minuteman III intercontinental 

ballistic missile

LLNL/SNL Surface to 

surface

Air Force

W76‐0/1/2 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwaterto 

surface

Navy

W88 Reentry body warhead Trident II D5 submarine‐

launched ballistic missile

LANL/SNL Underwaterto 

surface

Navy

Bombs—Aircraft Platforms

B61‐3/4 Non‐strategic bomb F‐15, F‐16, certified

NATO aircraft

LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force/Select 

NATO forces

B61‐7 Strategic bomb B‐2 bombers LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B61‐11 Strategic bomb B‐2 bomber LANL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

B83‐1 Strategic bomb B‐52 and B‐2 bombers LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

Warheads—Cruise Missile Platforms

W80‐1 Air‐launched cruise 

missile strategic weapons

B‐52 bomber LLNL/SNL Air to surface Air Force

LANL = Los Alamos National Laboratory NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory SNL = Sandia National Laboratories

a The suffix associated with each warhead or bomb type (e.g., “-0/1/2” for the W76) represents the modification associated 

with the respective weapon.

1.5 Overall Strategy, Objectives, and Prioritization of Weapons 

Activities

DOE/NNSA continues to execute its long-standing nuclear modernization efforts in conjunction with DoD

delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons required for those platforms, and the DOE/NNSA infrastructure 

needed to produce and maintain those weapons. This will ensure the necessary flexibility for future policy 

decisions related to nuclear modernization as the United States adjusts to the changing international 

threats facing the United States. The nuclear weapons stockpile is currently safe, secure, and militarily 

effective. However, the legacy stockpile systems are aging, and DOE/NNSA’s production infrastructure 

has atrophied considerably. The United States must invest in the weapons and infrastructure 

modernization programs to provide the capabilities needed to ensure the deterrent’s viability into the 

future. Due to long lead times, the United States will not have the weapons and infrastructure in place to 

support the nuclear arsenal unless DOE/NNSA re-establishes these capabilities now. 

The need to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile and recapitalize the supporting infrastructure 

needed to produce and maintain that stockpile has reached a key juncture. Approximately 60 percent of 

DOE/NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and more than 50 percent are in poor condition. Recent 

increases in operational needs have stressed these facilities and highlighted the need for upgrades to 

ensure capacities can be met. Assessments of facilities throughout the enterprise have identified 

numerous single-point failures. Production capabilities allowed to lapse are needed once again, and reestablishing these capabilities is both a priority and a challenge. If not appropriately addressed, the age 

and condition of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure will put at risk DOE/NNSA’s missions, as well as the safety of 

its workforce, the public, and the environment. 
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The FY 2022 budget for Weapons Activities includes funding 

for several nuclear modernization programs with the goal of 

maximizing the President’s decision space during the NPR:

◼ Retain the B83-1. On August 28, 2018, the Nuclear 

Weapons Council authorized the retention of the 

B83-1 gravity bomb past its planned retirement date 

to support military needs. DOE/NNSA completed the 

planning, scheduling, and budgeting required to 

maintain the B83-1 through the Nuclear Weapons 

Council-determined retirement date.

◼ Define the Capability to Effectively Engage and 

Defeat Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets. The 

Nuclear Weapons Council established a joint 

NNSA/DoD Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat Team, coordinated through the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Chemical and Biological Defense Programs/Office of Nuclear 

Matters, to determine future options for defeating such targets.

◼ Begin a Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program. Feasibility studies of this capability are being

coordinated by a joint DoD-DOE/NNSA working group led by DoD’s Office of Nuclear Matters. 

The Nuclear Weapons Council issued notice of a preferred warhead solution, a W80-4-like variant, 

to minimize impacts to the strategic nuclear stockpile. However, the final selection will be 

determined at the conclusion of the Analysis of Alternatives.

◼ Advance the W87-1 Modification Program. The W87-1 Modification Program will replace the 

aging W78 warhead using a modification of the existing legacy W87-0 design and will deploy new 

technologies that improve safety and security, address material obsolescence, and improve 

warhead manufacturability. In FY 2020, DOE/NNSA:

– Evaluated warhead technologies

– Progressed the maturity of select technologies

– Conducted a feasibility study of design options

– Continued program management and control implementation

– Established formal risk reporting and management

– Conducted requirements analysis and completed a customer requirements review that was

integrated with Air Force acquisition programs

– Conducted systems engineering

– Began early system test and qualification planning.

◼ Develop the W93. The W93/Mk7 is a new program of record being established to meet 

requirements set by DoD. Anchored on previously tested nuclear components, the W93 will 

incorporate modern technologies to improve safety, security, and flexibility to address future 

threats. It will be designed for ease of manufacturing, maintenance, and certification. All of its 

key nuclear components will be based on currently deployed and previously tested nuclear 

designs, as well as extensive stockpile component and materials experience. It will not require 

additional nuclear explosive testing to be certified.

Carrying out the W93 program is also vital for continuing our longstanding cooperation with the 

United Kingdom, which is also modernizing its nuclear forces. As an allied but independent 

Major Goals of Weapons Activities

• Ensure that the nuclear weapons 

stockpile continues to meet DoD deterrent 

requirements while enhancing warhead 

safety and security

• Modernize production capabilities and 

nuclear security enterprise facilities

• Provide experimental and computational 

capabilities to support annual assessment 

and certification of the stockpile

• Recruit, train, and retain a highly skilled 

and diverse workforce to meet mission 

deliverables
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nuclear power that contributes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s nuclear deterrent 

posture, the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent is critical to U.S. national security. 

In summary, the United States must continue its ability to maintain and certify a safe, secure, and 

effective nuclear arsenal. Synchronized with DoD replacement programs, DOE/NNSA will sustain and 

deliver on time the warheads necessary to support the Nation’s strategic and non-strategic nuclear 

capabilities by:

◼ Completing the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP).

◼ Completing the W88 Alteration (Alt) 370.

◼ Synchronizing DOE/NNSA’s W80-4 warhead with DoD’s Long Range Standoff cruise missile 

program and completing the W80-4 LEP by FY 2031.

◼ Exploring future ballistic missile warhead options to meet the required military characteristics 

based on the threats and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries. These options include the 

possibility of common reentry systems for Air Force and Navy systems.

Achieving this strategy requires modernization activities to address issues such as aging, the unavailability 

of replacement parts, evolving threats, and different weapon system flight characteristics due to changes 

in DoD delivery platforms. DOE/NNSA extends the service life of weapons that have reached the end of 

their original design life through LEPs. Other modernization efforts include Alts, which do not change the 

weapon’s operational capabilities, as well as modification programs, which do change the weapon’s 

operational capabilities. DOE/NNSA also conducts surveillance and assessments to confirm that weapons 

currently in the stockpile remain safe, secure, and reliable and reports on findings through the annual 

assessment process. 

DOE/NNSA modernizes and sustains the stockpile through a joint acquisition process for nuclear weapons, 

in partnership with DoD and coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council. This acquisition process 

includes the entire weapon life cycle and addresses DoD and DOE/NNSA warhead modernization needs 

from concept assessment to full-scale production to retirement or storage. With several concurrent 

warhead modernization activities underway, DOE/NNSA is implementing an unprecedented variety and 

volume of complex technology development and production work and continues to make progress across 

all warhead programs. DOE/NNSA and DoD coordinate weapon modernization and sustainment efforts 

to synchronize with nuclear weapon delivery system programs. 

DOE/NNSA uses several major strategies to sustain and maintain the stockpile and support the DOE/NNSA 

mission priorities to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent; 

strengthen key science, technology, and engineering capabilities; and modernize the national security 

infrastructure: 

◼ Assess the stockpile annually through science-based stockpile stewardship:

– Assess whether the safety, reliability, and performance of the current and future nuclear 

stockpile can be assured in the absence of underground nuclear testing.

– Renew, develop, and enhance science capabilities to assess effects of aging, remanufacture

and material options, and evolving threat environments on warhead performance.

– Develop modern materials and design and manufacturing options to enable a more modern 

and efficient production complex.

– Maintain a nuclear test capability as a safeguard.
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◼ Extend the life of the nuclear deterrent through modernizations:

– Replace obsolete technology.

– Enhance stockpile safety and security.

– Meet military requirements.

◼ Assure the capabilities to support the nuclear deterrent in the near- and long-term (NOTE: These 

capabilities are discussed in the FY 2022 SSMP in Chapter 3, “Weapons Activities Capabilities that 

Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise”):

– Renew and sustain critical production, manufacturing, and research capabilities.

– Assure a stable, reliable, and trusted domestic supply chain for nuclear weapon components 

and subsystems.

◼ Advance innovative experimental platforms, diagnostic equipment, and computational 

capabilities:

– Keep technical expertise and capabilities at the cutting edge to support a responsive and 

resilient enterprise.

◼ Provide safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and special nuclear 

materials to meet mission requirements.

The Integrated Stockpile Model in Figure 1–3 shows how the main activities of the stockpile cycle — plan, 

modernize, maintain, assess, and certify — link these strategies to sustain the stockpile and support 

mission priorities.

Figure 1–3. Integrated stockpile model
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1.6 Partnership with the Department of Defense

DOE/NNSA and DoD work collaboratively to maintain and modernize the stockpile and delivery systems. 

DOE/NNSA’s role is to ensure that nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable, while DoD’s role is 

to provide a range of delivery options that can be tailored to meet the desired objectives. These 

complementary efforts are coordinated through the congressionally-mandated Nuclear Weapons Council. 

This is a joint DoD and DOE/NNSA coordinating body established by Congress to facilitate the alignment 

of requirements and to establish priorities as the two Departments fulfill their shared responsibility for 

providing the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

The Nuclear Weapons Council’s current structure and business processes ensure coordination. Seniorlevel attention is focused on the capabilities and capacities needed to maintain and modernize an effective 

nuclear weapons stockpile that meets the requirements of an increasingly challenging international 

security environment. The Nuclear Weapons Council regularly convenes to synchronize efforts between 

DoD and DOE/NNSA on the vision, strategy, and execution of the nuclear program aligned with the 

National Defense Strategy. The Nuclear Weapons Council also reviews costs and schedules for options 

related to the nuclear stockpile, driving DOE/NNSA and the Services to meet requirements in ways that 

are both cost-effective and timely. The Nuclear Weapons Council fully supports DOE/NNSA’s efforts to 

establish a responsive and resilient nuclear security enterprise to meet U.S. deterrence and assurance 

needs. 

1.7 Challenges in Executing the Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan

DoD has embarked on the first recapitalization of the triad5since the end of the Cold War, and this effort

cannot be accomplished alone. The partnership between DoD and DOE/NNSA continues to thrive through 

the interagency Nuclear Weapons Council, which has made tremendous progress to align priorities, 

schedules, and investments between the Departments to ensure the future viability of the Nation’s 

nuclear deterrent.

Nearly all of the systems that comprise the current nuclear deterrent are well beyond their original service 

lives and further life extensions in an effort to meet future requirements are no longer cost-effective. DoD 

is addressing challenges within its aging nuclear command, control, and communications system; delivery 

systems; and platforms, and DOE/NNSA is facing similar challenges as the nuclear warheads in the 

stockpile continue to age. Additionally, much of the DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons production 

infrastructure requires near- and longer-term investments to provide a safe, secure working environment 

with the required capabilities and capacities. As a result, the community faces the challenge of executing 

concurrent acquisition and fielding of modern replacement systems in each leg of the triad while also 

investing in an updated nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure. 

One of the most critical challenges that DOE/NNSA must address is the modernization and recapitalization 

of existing infrastructure in parallel with increasing mission requirements. DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure has 

long been overdue for the upgrades necessary to create a modern, responsive, and resilient nuclear 

security enterprise that can meet national security missions today and into the future. This is particularly 

5 A compilation of platforms and weapons, the three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad (land, sea, and air) serve as the backbone of 

America’s national security (https://www.defense.gov/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/).
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critical for the production facilities and strategic material production capabilities and capacities within the 

nuclear security enterprise. 

DOE/NNSA must re-establish a number of full-rate production capabilities to meet planned DoD warhead 

deliveries. If any of these facilities experience operational shutdowns due to mounting age-associated

issues, stockpile maintenance and warhead deliveries will be affected. Considering that it can take a 

decade or more to plan and complete facility replacement projects, it is crucial to address shortfalls now 

to assure facility availability when needed for mission deliverables and to proactively maintain the existing 

facilities until the replacements are online. 

DOE/NNSA has a plan to renew the essential time-critical manufacturing capabilities prioritized to meet 

DoD near- to intermediate-term warhead deliveries and to maintain workforce safety. This plan focuses 

on five areas:

◼ Establishing a production capability of 80 pits per year.

◼ Re-establishing HE synthesis, formulation, and production capabilities.

◼ Modernizing and enhancing the facilities and capabilities needed to meet near- to long-term 

needs for tritium.

◼ Modernizing the production capabilities for secondary assemblies, radiation cases, and 

replacement of the current lithium production facility.

◼ Modernizing and enhancing non-nuclear component research, development, testing, and 

production capabilities.

Figure 1–4 shows the timeline necessary to meet warhead needs. 

Figure 1–4. Timeline for key infrastructure and capability investments for future warheads
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Failure to meet these timelines may increase the risk to the deterrent and personnel safety, reduce 

operational efficiency, increase operating costs, and hinder recruitment and retention of the workforce. 

The condition of the facilities in the nuclear security enterprise imposes a risk to the mission. Accordingly, 

DOE/NNSA prioritizes strategies to address infrastructure challenges across the enterprise to assure 

continuity of mission by planning for both recapitalization of the existing infrastructure and the future 

needs of the enterprise.

While infrastructure is at the forefront of DOE/NNSA’s key challenges, DOE/NNSA is also addressing other 

current and emerging challenges:

◼ The current stockpile program of record represents a continued increase in scope, including 

restarting production operations that have been dormant for decades and increasing the overall 

production rates of many components. DOE/NNSA is restoring capabilities and increasing

capacity at the production plants to address current stockpile needs and to prepare for future 

uncertainty. 

◼ The nuclear weapons stockpile needs updated technologies that require investment in new 

processes, technologies, and tools to design, qualify, certify, and produce warheads in accordance 

with stringent and evolving stockpile specifications and requirements. The increased number of 

concurrent weapon system builds entails three requirements:

– Maturing new options with shortened development cycles

– Advancing the ability to predict weapon performance in configurations that were not tested 

underground

– Evaluating the impact of new materials and processes, reusing aging components in future 

systems, and enhancing production throughput

◼ DOE/NNSA must continue efforts to develop and exercise the capabilities required to support all 

phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, transfer knowledge and skills to the newer 

generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers, accelerate and enhance the weapon life 

cycle, and strengthen integration between DoD and DOE/NNSA. This continued focus is reflected 

in the addition of a new Appendix D to report on the programs, projects, and activities of the 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program. 

◼ The availability and trustworthiness of the nuclear weapons supply chain must be sustained to 

assure industrial base viability and guard against potential counterfeit and sabotage. DOE/NNSA 

has also implemented several initiatives through the Nuclear Enterprise Assurance program to 

assure supply chain protection. For example, DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise provides 

the tools and capabilities needed for trusted radiation-hardened silicon microelectronics. To 

assure continued capability, DOE/NNSA is installing new tooling and planning recapitalization 

efforts to extend the life of key and critical facilities. DOE/NNSA is also interacting and 

collaborating with partners to establish research and development efforts that could serve as a 

future production capability. 

COVID-19 

The COVID-19 pandemic presented a series of unprecedented challenges for the nuclear security 

enterprise and its workforce. The health and safety of our employees is the Department’s main focus. 

Due to its critical national security missions, DOE/NNSA could not and cannot temporarily cease 

operations and wait until the crisis is over. 
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DOE/NNSA adopted a policy of maximum telework and social distancing to safeguard the health and 

welfare of our workforce, while also identifying a number of mission-critical activities that could not be 

performed remotely and needed to continue on-site. DOE/NNSA worked with its sites to set priorities 

and relied on them to make decisions based on the local situation and regulations to protect the 

workforce. 

The crisis created significant disruptions, but the workforce adapted and remained productive. Thanks to 

the steadfast commitment and perseverance of the nuclear security enterprise, DOE/NNSA has not 

missed any deliverables to its DoD partners and customers during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, 

despite the impact of the pandemic on international travel, DOE/NNSA has maintained strong 

relationships with foreign partners through the implementation of virtual engagements for technical 

exchanges, training, and coordination to further enhance international nuclear security and 

nonproliferation efforts. Any significant changes to individual programs or activities will be addressed in 

the appropriate section.

Workforce Recruiting and Retention

The nuclear security enterprise has many retirement-eligible employees who are expected to leave the 

workforce in the near future. To prepare for these retirements, new hiring initiatives are necessary to 

recruit, train, and retain high-quality individuals capable of obtaining security clearances and to provide 

new personnel with opportunities that establish the experience and expert judgment necessary to sustain 

the stockpile. DOE/NNSA has undertaken an enterprise-wide corporate approach to recruiting and 

retaining the next-generation workforce to maintain a world-class workforce now and into the future. 
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Chapter 2

Stockpile Management

This chapter describes the manner in which the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA) accomplishes the part of its Weapons Activities

mission that more directly involves the stockpile warheads.

These activities include: sustaining, modernizing, and 

dismantling nuclear weapons; maintaining and modernizing 

production operations; and optimizing the scientific tools that 

underpin these efforts.

DOE/NNSA manages the stockpile through four major 

program areas, coordinating and planning with the 

Department of Defense (DoD) for the current and future 

stockpile:

◼ Stockpile Sustainment performs single-system and 

multi-system sustainment activities (i.e., assessment, 

surveillance, maintenance, and response to emerging 

issues) for all weapons systems in the stockpile. 

Stockpile Sustainment includes limited life 

component (LLC) exchanges, surveillance activities, significant finding investigations (SFI), 

weapons reliability reporting, and annual assessments that provide a comprehensive 

understanding of the health of the stockpile.

◼ Stockpile Major Modernization includes life extension programs (LEPs), modification programs

(Mods), and major alterations (Alts) that extend the life of weapons in the stockpile, enhance

system security and safety features, and address issues related to aging or component 

obsolescence. It also includes modernization programs that do not constitute an LEP, Mod, or Alt, 

but provide a modernized warhead capability (e.g., the W93).

◼ Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) handles dismantlement of retired weapons and 

disposition of weapon components and provides components and materials for weapons 

activities and other DOE/NNSA mission areas.

◼ Production Operations provides DOE/NNSA with a manufacturing-based program that drives site 

production base capabilities for warhead modernization activities, weapon maintenance, 

surveillance, weapon assembly and disassembly, and weapon reliability and safety testing.

Production Operations encompasses sustainment of all weapon systems capabilities that enable 

weapon production and are not specific to one material stream. It works closely with Production 

Modernization, which focuses on the special nuclear materials and components (such as 

plutonium and uranium), as well as non-nuclear component modernization, discussed in 

Chapter 3. 

The remainder of Chapter 2 is organized around these four major areas, as depicted in Figure 2–1. 

Stockpile Management Accomplishments

• Delivered all scheduled limited life 

components (LLCs) for the B61, W76, W78, 

W80, B83, W87, and W88.

• Obtained authorization for Phase 6.5, First 

Production, for the B61-12 and the W88 

Alt 370.

• Completed W88 Alt 370 first production unit 

in July 2021.

• Completed B61-12 first production unit in 

November 2021.

• Completed Cycle 25 of the Annual 

Assessment process.

• Dispositioned site component programs and 

kept legacy piles from growing despite 

COVID-19.
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Figure 2–1. Major Stockpile Management Programs

Managing the stockpile requires comprehensive planning for all stockpile elements to integrate these 

activities with each other and with production capabilities. This chapter documents these planning and 

execution activities; however, these activities alone cannot sustain the nuclear deterrent. Managing the 

stockpile also depends on a strong set of enabling capabilities covering the necessary science, technology, 

design, production, materials, and processes, as well as a workforce with the requisite skill set to execute 

these activities. These individual capabilities and the linkages to stockpile management are described at 

length in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapters 6 and 7 of this report address two specific elements of these 

capabilities, infrastructure and workforce, across all capabilities at an enterprise level, further reinforcing 

the need to sustain the health of capabilities in support of the stockpile mission work. 

2.1 Stockpile Sustainment

Stockpile sustainment activities are responsible for the day-to-day health of the stockpile. These activities 

include surveillance, annual assessments, and routine maintenance to ensure weapons remain safe, 

secure, and reliable over the projected life cycle. Weapons that remain in the stockpile are eventually 

updated through modernization programs to address any anomalies and meet updated safety and 

security standards. These modernization activities (LEPs, Mods, and Alts) are addressed through the 

Stockpile Major Modernization activities discussed in Section 2.2.

2.1.1 Stockpile Surveillance

Surveillance activities provide data to evaluate the safety, reliability, and performance of weapons in the 

stockpile in support of annual assessments. The cumulative body of this data supports future stockpile 

decisions regarding weapon LEPs, Alts, Mods, or other weapon systems not in those categories. The 

surveillance program has six goals: 
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◼ Identify manufacturing and design defects that could affect safety, security, performance, or 

reliability.

◼ Assess risks to the safety, security, and performance of the stockpile.

◼ Determine the margins between design requirements and performance at the system, 

component, and material levels.

◼ Identify aging-related changes and trends at the subsystem, component, and material levels.

◼ Further develop capabilities for predictive assessments of stockpile components and materials.

◼ Provide critical data for the annual Weapons Reliability Report and the Report on Stockpile 

Assessments.

DOE/NNSA conducts stockpile surveillance through weapon disassembly and inspection, stockpile flighttesting, stockpile laboratory testing, component testing, material evaluation, and test equipment. 

DOE/NNSA continually refines planning requirements for stockpile evaluation activities based on new 

surveillance information, deployment of new diagnostic tools, annual assessment findings, and analysis 

of historical information using modern assessment methodologies and computational tools. Figure 2–2

depicts the nominal flow of stockpile surveillance activities.

Figure 2–2. Flow of stockpile surveillance activities
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2.1.1.1 Disassembly and Inspection (D&I)

Weapons sampled from the production lines or returned from DoD custody are inspected during 

disassembly. Weapon disassembly is conducted in a controlled manner to identify any abnormal 

conditions and preserve the components for subsequent evaluations. These inspections may detect 

anomalies that furnish important clues to the state of health of the weapons while also advancing 

inspection technologies and techniques that enhance knowledge and understanding of the stockpile.

2.1.1.2 System, Flight, Laboratory, and Component Testing

A subset of weapons that have undergone D&I are reassembled into Joint Test Assembly (JTA) 

configurations to represent the original build to the greatest extent possible. Select non-nuclear 

components from weapon systems are used directly in the JTA, while nuclear materials are replaced with 

surrogate materials and custom diagnostic equipment. JTAs may contain extensive telemetry 

instrumentation to provide detailed information on component and subsystem performance during flight 

environments. JTA units are delivered to and flown by the DoD operational command responsible for the 

system. For each weapon system, JTAs are flown on delivery platforms to gather the information required 

to assess the effectiveness and reliability of the weapon, the launch or delivery platform, and the 

associated crews and procedures. System-level flight tests are conducted jointly with the Air Force and 

Navy.

After D&I, certain components of selected weapons are reassembled into test bed configurations using 

parent unit parts. Stockpile laboratory tests conducted at the subsystem or component level assess major 

assemblies and components and, ultimately, the materials that comprise the components (e.g., metals, 

plastics, foams, ceramics). This surveillance process enables detection and evaluation of the onset of 

aging, trends, and anomalous changes at the component or material level.

Components and materials from the D&I process undergo further evaluations to assess component

physical configuration, functionality, performance margins and trends, material behavior, and aging 

characteristics. The testing can involve both nondestructive and destructive evaluation techniques.

2.1.1.3 Testing Equipment

Testers are complex systems that can be applied to systems, subsystems, major components, and 

processes. Testers perform two key functions. First, they provide the mechanical, electrical, and 

radiofrequency stimuli to the system in a specified sequence to evaluate component functionality relative 

to requirements. Second, the testers simultaneously collect data on the performance of components and

subsystems and for product acceptance. The data collected are used as input to assess the performance 

and assert the continuation of the certification of the weapon system as safe, secure, and reliable.

2.1.1.4 Anomaly Investigative Process

When anomalies that could significantly affect weapon safety, security, reliability, or performance arise 

in surveillance data or are identified or reported to DOE/NNSA by DoD, a science and engineering analysis

is conducted to determine whether observations are serious enough to open an SFI to address specific 

weapon or component issues. SFIs are also opened for anomalies discovered anywhere in the stockpile 

when unexpected phenomena are observed. Such occurrences are investigated by the design agency 

responsible for the anomalous component. Investigations can include modeling of historical data, focused 

materials experiments, research and studies, major system test replication, and subsystem and 

subcomponent tests. These SFIs can continue through several annual assessment cycles. SFIs are closed 

once the impacts to system performance or safety have been assessed and follow-up actions are 

determined, if necessary. A tracking and reporting system monitors SFI progress from the discovery of an 
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anomaly through to its closure report and the status of any corrective actions. Most SFIs close with little 

to no impact to safety and reliability.

2.1.1.5 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–1 provides a high-level summary of Surveillance challenges and the strategies to address each.

Table 2–1. Summary of Surveillance challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Health of legacy testers limiting component 

surveillance and JTA assembly.

Working toward improved imaging 

technologies with new sources and 

developing understanding of 

fundamental aging processes.

Development of a proactive longterm tester sustainment plan and 

pursuit of appropriate funding.

Develop techniques for real-time data 

collection and rapid triage of issues 

through shelf life units with sensors, 

field-deployable diagnostics, and 

complete digitization of all build data.

Implement advanced digital 

technologies such as digital twin 

methodology and manufacturing 

process-aware sensor suites.

2.1.2 Assessing the Stockpile

The status of the stockpile is evaluated through continuous, multilayered assessments of the safety, security, reliability, and military

effectiveness of each U.S. nuclear weapon system. The annual 

stockpile assessment process evaluates the state of the stockpile by 

conducting physics and engineering analyses, experiments (such as 

hydrodynamic and subcritical tests), and computer 

simulation/modeling. Assessments may also evaluate the effects of 

aging on performance and quantify performance thresholds, 

uncertainties, and margins. They assemble a body of evidence to 

assess performance at the part, component, subsystem, and system 

levels to determine whether all of the required performance 

characteristics are met. The processes combine data, theories, and 

expert judgment with simulations to develop a final evaluation of the 

stockpile.

2.1.2.1 Annual Assessment

The Directors of the three national security laboratories conduct 

independent annual assessment reviews on the state of all stockpile

systems for which they are responsible. The Commander of the U.S. 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is also required by statute

(50 U.S. Code 2525) to assess the stockpile each year based in part 

on inputs from the national security laboratories. This process is not 

a recertification of the weapons in the stockpile; it is an assessment 

of each system’s existing certification basis, considering information generated by the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Program in the past year. Each annual assessment builds on previous 

years’ experience with each weapon system and incorporates new information from stockpile 

maintenance, surveillance, experiments, simulations, and other sources to update the technical basis of 

each weapon system. 

Using modeling and simulation, 

Sandia National Laboratories worked 

with Los Alamos National Laboratory 

to provide predictions of B61-12 

nuclear safety timelines used to 

quantify system safety. Thermal 

analysis models were applied by the 

B61-12 project to predict weapon 

nuclear safety for credible accident 

scenarios and weapon configurations 

not considered in qualification testing 

because of schedule and cost 

constraints. The abnormal thermal 

environment qualification and nuclear 

safety arguments were presented by 

systems engineering during B61-12 

system final design review. 
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The assessments and conclusions in the Annual Assessment Reports are subject to inter-laboratory peer 

review by Red Teams and subject matter experts appointed by each laboratory’s director, program 

managers, and senior laboratory management. This effort culminates in a written summary and 

conclusion of the assessments from each laboratory director and the USSTRATCOM Commander, which 

are included as unabridged attachments to the statutorily required Report on Stockpile Assessments, 

which is prepared annually by the Nuclear Weapons Council for formal endorsement by the Secretaries 

of Energy and Defense and submitted to the President annually.

2.1.2.2 Weapon Reliability

Each September, DOE/NNSA publishes the Weapons Reliability Report, which provides an updated

summary of reliability and yield characteristics of all weapons in the stockpile. The purpose of the report 

is to communicate with stakeholders assessed reliability, reliability risks, and the effects of test limitations. 

The report is the principal DOE/NNSA report on weapon systems reliability that USSTRATCOM uses for 

strategic planning actions and targeting. The Annual Assessment Review process informs this report, 

which incorporates data from surveillance activities.

2.1.2.3 Advanced Certification and Qualification

Advanced certification activities improve the methodology and physics-based capabilities used to ensure

the stockpile will operate as intended. These activities deliver matured technologies, diagnostic 

techniques, data analysis methods, and design options for future stockpile needs. Advanced certification

activities also preserve and reanalyze legacy nuclear test data and conduct simulations of data to validate 

simulation codes and models. These activities enhance DOE/NNSA’s understanding of a weapon system’s

performance and possible failure modes, improve the quantification of margins and uncertainties, and 

improve the fidelity and agility of certification methodologies.

DOE/NNSA concentrates on developing and qualifying nuclear weapons components, subsystems, and 

integrated systems to meet military characteristics across the stockpile-to-target sequence (STS) 

environmental requirements (i.e., normal, abnormal, and hostile environments). These activities are 

defined in qualification plans and use experimental data, modeling, simulation capabilities, and

production data to ensure system functionality. Experimental capabilities include, but are not limited to,

flight tests, shock and vibration tests, thermal environment tests, multi-environment tests, and exposure 

to various forms of radiation. Modeling and simulation are used to interpolate and extrapolate into 

regions not addressed by testing and experiments. 

Advanced certification and qualification activities promote the development of design for ease of 

manufacture and production. Close coordination between development of materials and components 

between design and production agencies enables design for manufacture. Additional information for 

Advanced Certification and Qualification is discussed in Chapter 4 of this report. 

2.1.2.4 Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties

Assessing weapon performance through predictive capabilities requires the integration of many sources

of data and expertise. Performance is gauged through the quantification of margins and uncertainties 

methodology, which evaluates the degree to which the operation of a weapon is within the bounds of 

specified operating characteristics or requirements. This methodology supports nuclear stockpile 

decision-making and enables risk-informed decisions. Its prediction of the performance factor is the ratio 

of margin (M) to uncertainty (U), or M/U. Margin is the difference between the expected value and the 

minimum value of a parameter to insure proper performance of some aspect of warhead functioning. 

Uncertainty is the degree to which these values are known. Stockpile Research, Technology, and 

Engineering activities (also referred to as Stockpile Stewardship activities) evaluate approaches to
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increase margin when possible and to quantify uncertainties by performing experiments in areas such as 

material properties to provide data for improving the fidelity of the models and experimental platforms

used to simulate operation of the warhead. In summary, quantification of M/U increases confidence in 

stockpile performance. 

2.1.2.5 Responsiveness

The Stockpile Responsiveness Program develops and exercises the capabilities required to support all 

phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, transfers knowledge and skills to the newer 

generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers, and strengthens integration between DoD and 

DOE/NNSA. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program is covered in detail in Appendix D, “Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program.” 

2.1.3 Stockpile Maintenance

Maintaining the current stockpile comprises many ongoing activities:

◼ LLC exchanges of gas transfer systems (GTSs), power sources, and neutron generators require 

periodic replacement to sustain system functionality.

◼ Responses to emerging issues that do not rise to the level of a major Alt or LEP through 

maintenance, minor repairs and rebuilds, incorporation of surety features, and other changes.

◼ Maintaining production authorization by conducting periodic nuclear explosives safety studies.

◼ Maintaining specialized support equipment, such as custom tooling, for stockpile operations.

◼ Provisioning for spare and replacement parts that are consumed in stockpile operations.

2.1.3.1 Limited Life Components

Weapons contain LLCs that require periodic replacement to sustain system functionality and 

performance. Age-related changes affecting these components are predictable and well understood, and 

surveillance is conducted to ensure the components continue to meet performance requirements 

throughout the projected lifetime. Periodic LLC exchanges replace these components at defined intervals

throughout a weapon’s lifetime. DOE/NNSA produces LLCs and collaborates with DoD to jointly manage 

component delivery and installation. These components include GTSs, power sources, and neutron 

generators. 

Gas Transfer Systems

GTSs are designed, produced, filled, and delivered to DoD for existing weapon systems. Modern GTS 

designs extend LLC intervals and increase weapon performance margins, thereby improving maintenance 

efficiency and enhancing weapon safety and reliability. Function-testing life storage units and 

development hardware validate performance characteristics and provides research and development 

(R&D) to inform current and future GTS designs. New GTS designs are evaluated to verify that the GTSs 

may be loaded in the production facilities and meet weapons systems performance characteristics. In 

parallel to these R&D efforts, production facilities are maintained for gas-loading operations, GTS 

surveillance, and tritium recovery from end-of-life GTSs. 

2.1.3.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–2 provides a high-level summary of GTS challenges and the strategies to address each.
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Table 2–2. Summary of Gas Transfer System challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Integration of maintenance with a changing 

delivery schedule

Close coordination between 

DOE/NNSA, management and 

operating partners, and DoD.

Work with design agencies, 

DOE/NNSA, and DoD to determine 

GTS pre-fill options.

Power Sources

Current and future planned nuclear weapons require compact, highly specialized power sources that meet 

stringent reliability and performance requirements. Requirements for size, weight, active life, 

responsiveness, and output are unique to nuclear weapon applications and are not readily available from 

commercial suppliers. This capability supports nuclear weapon and other national security missions, 

including prototyping and parts development, the full life-cycle requirements of power source 

components through early-stage R&D and modeling, technology maturation, design and development, 

production, surveillance, and disassembly. 

2.1.3.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–3 provides a high-level summary of power sources challenges and the strategies to address each.

Table 2–3. Summary of Power Sources challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Supply availability raises production capability 

risk, and facility inadequacies put R&D, test 

and evaluation, and production capabilities at 

an elevated risk of not meeting the mission.

DOE/NNSA completed an analysis of 

alternatives for a line item-sized 

investment and is now conducting 

activities needed to achieve Critical 

Decision-1, Approve Alternative 

Selection and Cost Range. 

Modernize/recapitalize equipment 

and infrastructure in order to meet 

long-term, full life-cycle 

requirements for power sources. 

The facility housing the power sources 

capability is beyond its design life and does 

not meet evolving mission needs or modern 

building code requirements. It has been 

repurposed many times and was not originally 

built to house the power source capability. 

Corrective measures and modifications have 

been employed to convert the facility to 

adjust to mission requirements, but the 

investments are not cost-effective, resulting in 

the need for an alternative solution.

Neutron Generators

Neutron generators are highly complex LLCs integral to nuclear weapon function. Sandia National 

Laboratories’ (SNL) neutron generator enterprise, which is an integrated design and production agency, 

manages the neutron generators’ entire life cycle to meet DOE/NNSA’s commitments, including scientific 

understanding through design, development, qualification, production, surveillance, dismantlement, and 

disposal.

2.1.3.4 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–4 provides a high-level summary of neutron generators challenges and the strategies to address 

each.
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Table 2–4. Summary of Neutron Generators challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Aging facilities, infrastructure, equipment, 

and materials are the primary challenges to 

sustaining neutron generator production.

Near-term investments will focus on 

sustainment through ongoing 

recapitalization of existing facilities, 

infrastructure, and equipment, while 

making incremental improvements in 

process efficiency.

Formal planning to establish longterm capabilities that will ensure that 

mission deliverables are met while 

allowing consolidation, increased 

flexibility, improved efficiency, and 

expanded capabilities.

2.1.3.5 Minor Alterations

Weapon Alts are required to improve the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons. While major 

Alts might rise to the level of creating a program (such as the W88 Alt 370), other Alts are routinely 

incorporated into nuclear weapons as a maintenance activity to respond to emerging issues, including 

issues identified during surveillance activities. Other Alts are scheduled on a priority basis, depending on 

their impact to the nuclear weapons stockpile.

2.1.3.6 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–5 provides a high-level summary of minor alterations challenges and the strategies to address 

each.

Table 2–5. Summary of Minor Alterations challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Minor alterations are in competition with 

modernization programs (major Alts, Mods, 

etc.) at the Kansas City National Security 

Campus for resources (capacity, personnel, 

funding, floor space, etc.). 

Formal planning to establish longterm capabilities that will ensure that 

mission deliverables are met while 

allowing consolidation, increased 

flexibility, improved efficiency, and 

expanded capabilities.

Integrate stockpile modernization and 

stockpile maintenance plans to 

ensure adequate capacity.

2.2 Stockpile Major Modernization

Stockpile Major Modernization activities are performed 

through a series of planned LEPs, Mods, and Alts 

supported by a strong set of science, technological, and 

engineering capabilities. Figure 2–3 displays these 

plans, which fully reflect the priorities established and 

formally authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

Future activities are notional and reflect the current 

planning situation, which is subject to review as plans 

shift and circumstances change. 

Currently, the long-term vision for the nuclear weapons 

stockpile seeks to build additional flexibility for the 

Nation to enable rapid response to unforeseen 

contingencies while incorporating features and 

technologies that enhance safety and security as 

appropriate and practicable. DOE/NNSA will 

DOE/NNSA Warhead Modernization Activities

DOE/NNSA is currently executing the following

warhead modernization activities:

• LEPs refurbish warheads of a specific weapon 

type to extend the service life of a weapon while 

increasing safety and security.

• Mods change a current weapon type’s operational 

capabilities. It may enhance margin against 

failure, increase safety, replace LLCs, etc.

• Alts are material changes to a nuclear weapon or 

major assembly that does not alter operational 

capability, but are sufficiently important to the user 

in terms of assembly, maintenance, storage, or 

test operations.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-10

incorporate flexibility-enabling design strategies and an advanced digital enterprise that promotes system 

modernization activities, as well as exercise capabilities through the Stockpile Responsiveness Program.

These improvements will enhance the Nation’s ability to counter adversaries’ capabilities, stockpile aging, 

and variables associated with supporting U.S. hedge capabilities.

Figure 2–3. DOE/NNSA warhead activities

To meet requirements for the resilience of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, qualification- and certificationready options for materials, components, and systems must be developed and matured ahead of time to 

be viable for consideration and available when needed to support Nuclear Weapons Council down-select 

decisions, development, and production. The activities that lead to this state of readiness depend on 

advanced scientific and engineering capabilities that support design, qualification and certification 

processes and improve the responsiveness of the nuclear security enterprise in terms of cycle time and 

digital design tools. These science-based supporting efforts are described in Chapter 4, “Stockpile 

Research, Technology, and Engineering.”

2.2.1 Phase X Process (Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle)

The responsibilities of DoD and DOE/NNSA for the development, testing, and production of proposed 

nuclear weapons were originally established through the 1953 agreement between the Atomic Energy 

Commission and DoD, which introduced the concept of weapon acquisition phases. The original 

agreement was supplemented over the years to clarify various areas of joint departmental cooperation. 

However, as a result of the United States’ decision to halt underground nuclear testing in 1992, the joint 

agreement was no longer updated on a routine basis. Emerging DoD requirements for future systems 

necessitated updated procedural guidelines defining the full seven phase nuclear weapons lifecycle. This 

was accomplished through the recently implemented Phase X Process, which updates the existing 

agreement and provides joint DoD and DOE/NNSA procedures governing the full life cycle for nuclear 

weapons.

The Phase X Process guidelines also supplement the existing Nuclear Weapons Council-approved

Procedural Guidelines for the Phase 6.X Process, which define the framework for nuclear weapon 

Key:

Studies and Engineering Production Alt = Alteration CHE = conventional high explosive

Analysis of Alternative and Other Initial Studies FPU = first production unit LEP = life extension program

FY 2022 SSMP (DRAFT)

Submarine Launched Warhead

(Enables replacement of the W76-1/2)

W87-1 Modification Program

 (formerly W78 Replacement Warhead)

W93

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead

Future Strategic Land-Based Warhead (FSLW)

(Enables replacement of W87)

Future Strategic Sea-Based Warhead (FSSW)

(Enables replacement of W88)

Future Air-Delivered Warhead (FAW)

B61-12 LEP

Tactical/Strategic Bomb

W88 Alt 370 / CHE Refresh

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead

W80-4 LEP

Cruise Missile Warhead

Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM)

(Activities at Pantex and Y-12) 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Phase 6.X Process and the

Stockpile Modernization Program

21 22 23

6.2-6.2A 6.3-6.5 

6.3-6.5

FPU

FY 2022

FPU

FY 2030

Notional FPU

2034-2036

FPU

FY 2025

FPU

FY 2021

Fiscal Years

Analysis of Alternatives Notional FPU

FY 2029

Notional FPU

2036-2038

Threat Assessments

&

Design Activities including

Commonality, Diversity, etc.

Notional FPU

To Be Determined

Notional FPU

2037-2039

Notional FPU

2037-2039
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-11

refurbishment activities. The Phase X Process includes procedures for program study, development, 

production, sustainment, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons systems. The seven phases are, in 

sequential order: Concept Assessment; Feasibility Study and Design Options; Development Engineering; 

Production Engineering; First Production; Full-Scale Production/Sustainment; and Retirement, 

Dismantlement, and Disposal. 

Joint DoD-DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons life cycle guidelines, including those under the Phase X and the 

Phase 6.X Processes, support increasing emphasis on modernization activities to sustain U.S. nuclear 

deterrence priorities and capture DoD-DOE/NNSA agencies’ best practices for nuclear weapons

acquisition and sustainment. The Nuclear Weapons Council’s Procedural Guidelines for the Phase 6.X 

Process provide the framework for nuclear weapon refurbishment activities and will continue to be used, 

even with the establishment of the Phase X Procedural Guidelines updating information on Phase 1-7 

nuclear weapon design, development, production, sustainment, and dismantlement activities. 

2.2.1.1 Phase 6.X Process

Nuclear weapons have been historically developed, produced, maintained, retired, and dismantled in a 

process known as the Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle (now Phase X Process). This process has not been 

exercised in its entirety since the end of the Cold War, with the United States executing only Phases 6 and 

7 in recent decades. DOE/NNSA’s Major Stockpile Modernization activities have instead been guided by 

the Phase 6.X Process, which was developed for non-routine Alts, Mods, and LEPs and starts from an 

existing warhead design, rather than being used to develop and field a complete warhead. The phases of 

this process are very similar to stages 1-6 of the life cycle. These phases, and the relation of the Phase 6.X

Process to the Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle, are shown in Figure 2–4.

Figure 2–4. Phase X and the Phase 6.X Process
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-12

2.2.2 B61-12 Life Extension Program

The B61-12 LEP addresses multiple components that are nearing end 

of life, in addition to military requirements for reliability, service life, 

field maintenance, safety, and use control. The life extension scope

includes refurbishment of nuclear and non‐nuclear components and 

incorporates component reuse where possible. With the addition of 

an Air Force-procured tail kit assembly, the B61‐12 LEP will 

consolidate and replace the B61-3, -4, and -7 bomb variants in the 

active stockpile. 

2.2.2.1 Status

The B61-12 received authorization to enter Phase 6.5, First 

Production, in fiscal year (FY) 2021, and completed the first 

production unit in November 2021. The B61-12 LEP required replanning to allow re-qualification of base metal electrode (BME)-

affected components,1similar to the W88 Alt 370. The requalification 

efforts were completed in the first quarter of FY 2021, in accordance 

with the re-baselined plan. 

2.2.2.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–6 provides a high-level summary of B61-12 LEP challenges and the strategies to address each.

Table 2–6. Summary of B61-12 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Sustaining Steady State Production. Close coordination between the 

design agency and production agency.

Continued process improvements 

within production modernization; 

address vendor/supplier fragility and 

supply chain challenges.

2.2.3 W88 Alteration 370 Program

The W88 warhead has been deployed for more than three decades, and several updates are required to 

address aging and to maintain readiness. The W88 Alt 370 Program modernizes the arming, fuzing, and 

firing subsystem; improves surety; replaces the conventional high explosive and associated materials; and 

incorporates a lightning arrestor connector, trainers, joint test assemblies, and associated handling gear. 

The W88 Alt 370 conversion is scheduled to run concurrently with LLC exchanges of GTSs and neutron 

generators.

2.2.3.1 Status

The W88 Alt 370 received authorization to enter Phase 6.5 in FY 2021 and completed the first production 

unit in July 2021. The W88 Alt 370 required re-planning to allow re-qualification of BME-affected 

1 “In FY 2019 – FY 2020, DOE/NNSA experienced technical issues associated with a limited number of electrical components that 

affected some production component schedules. This BME issue led to re-planning of the schedules for both the B61-12 LEP and 

the W88 Alt 370 programs.”

An F-35A opens its bomb bay 

doors and drops a mock B61-12 

at Sandia National Laboratories’ 

Tonopah Test Range. It was the

first of a testing series that will 

conclude with full-weapon 

systems demonstrations 

designed to increase confidence 

the bomb will always work when 

needed and never under any 

other circumstances.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-13

components, similar to the B61-12. Requalification efforts were completed in the third quarter of FY 2021, 

in accordance with the re-baselined plan. 

2.2.3.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–7 provides a high-level summary of W88 Alt 370 Program challenges and the strategies to address 

each.

Table 2–7. Summary of W88 Alteration 370 Program challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Sustaining Steady State Production. Close coordination between the 

design agency and production agency.

Continued process improvements 

within production modernization; 

address vendor/supplier fragility and 

supply chain challenges.

2.2.4 W80-4 Life Extension Program

The W80-4 LEP will deploy with the Air Force’s Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile. This integrated 

program will replace the aging AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile and the W80-1 warhead. The LRSO 

will improve the Air Force’s capability to defeat adversary Integrated Air Defense Systems by improving 

the bomber force’s delivery and survivability capabilities.

2.2.4.1 Status

In FY 2019, the Nuclear Weapons Council directed entry of the W80-4 LEP into Phase 6.3, Development 

Engineering. During this phase, weapon system design will continue to be refined. There are four primary 

deliverables:

◼ Baseline design, which will advance production engineering processes.

◼ Preliminary Design Review and Acceptance Group Review, which will indicate DoD acceptance of 

the baseline design and its associated plan for certification.

◼ Baseline Cost Report.

◼ Nuclear Weapons Council approval of the military characteristics and STS.

The W80-4 program office coordinated with DOE/NNSA’s management and operating partners to develop 

standardized Earned Value Management practices and schedules across the sites. This allows

implementation of a software tool to expedite Earned Value Management System data analysis. 

2.2.4.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–8 provides a high-level summary of W80-4 LEP challenges and the strategies to address each.

Table 2–8. Summary of W80-4 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Executing a coordinated DoD/NNSA 

development program.

Integrated milestones and 

streamlined oversight body. Increased teaming with DoD. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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2.2.5 W87-1 Modification Program

The W87-1 will be deployed alongside the W87-0 on the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). It will 

replace the aging W78 warhead by modifying the existing legacy W87-0 design. Once the B61-12 achieves 

initial operational capability, the W78 warhead will become the oldest weapon system in the stockpile

and the only system to have not received a major refurbishment or upgrade. Critical W78 components 

continue to age, while the military requirements for the safety and security features of the W78 warhead 

have changed since the W78 entered the stockpile in 1979. The W87-1 Modification Program will meet 

DoD and DOE/NNSA requirements for performance, safety, and security and is slated to deploy as part of 

the GBSD by 2030. 

2.2.5.1 Status

The Nuclear Weapons Council authorized a restart of Phase 6.2, Feasibility Study and Design Options, in 

September 2018. The program remains on track to deploy with the GBSD by 2030. DOE/NNSA established 

a W87-1 Federal program office along with the requisite staff, program plans, and management 

documents. In 2019, the Nuclear Weapons Council selected a single surety architecture for the W87-1, 

and DOE/NNSA continues to evaluate component features through feasibility and trade studies. The 

W87-1 Modification Program has started Phase 6.2A, Design Definition and Cost Study, activities and will 

seek Nuclear Weapons Council approval to enter Phase 6.3, Development Engineering, in the fourth 

quarter of FY 2022.

2.2.5.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–9 provides a high-level summary of W87-1 Modification Program challenges and the strategies to 

address each.

Table 2–9. Summary of W87-1 Modification Program challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

All new manufacture of components. Early manufacture of key components to 

mitigate risk of infrastructure delays.

Close engagement between design agencies 

and production agencies to implement 

producibility reviews in design.

Establish Inter-program requirement 

agreements between the W87-1 

Modification Program and production 

modernization programs.

Timely installation of required 

production equipment.

Risk mitigation for single-point 

failures in the manufacturing process.

Develop a pit reuse backup plan and 

strategy. 

Executing a coordinated DoD/NNSA 

development program.

Integrated milestones and streamlined 

oversight body.

Increased teaming with DoD 

contractor.

2.2.6 W93 Program

The W93 will address future Navy ballistic missile requirements. It will incorporate modern technologies 

to improve safety, security, and flexibility to address future threats and will be designed for ease of 

manufacturing, maintenance, and certification. All key nuclear components will be based on currently 

deployed and previously tested nuclear designs, as well as extensive stockpile component and materials 

experience. It will not require additional nuclear explosive testing to certify. The program will use the 

Nuclear Weapon Phase X Life Cycle Process for integrated nuclear weapons system acquisition, rather 

than the Phase 6.X Process (see Section 2.2.1 for additional information regarding these life cycle 

processes). Work in support of the W93 Program will include Phase 1, Concept Assessment, which
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-15

evaluates warhead architectures and available technologies against a potential range of desired 

attributes, draft military characteristics, and known constraints. It will also inform DoD’s program 

activities for the associated Mk7 reentry body within which the W93 would be deployed. 

2.2.7 W80-4 Alteration (Sea-Launched Cruise Missile)

DoD is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives on an employment platform and a delivery platform for a 

nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile. To meet schedule requirements and fit within the existing 

nuclear security enterprise production footprint, the Nuclear Weapons Council issued notice of a 

preferred warhead solution, a W80-4-like variant, to minimize impacts to the strategic nuclear stockpile. 

However, the final selection will be determined at the conclusion of the Analysis of Alternatives. This 

program would need to start in FY 2022 with a Phase 6.2/6.2A-like effort to integrate with the W80-4. 

Major objectives in FY 2022 include assisting the Navy in defining operational requirements and 

translating those requirements into specific warhead performance characteristics that will define the 

extent of the warhead alteration.

2.2.8 Future Warheads

DOE/NNSA is coordinating with DoD to define the appropriate ballistic missile warheads to support 

threats anticipated in 2030 and beyond. These warheads currently include the Future Strategic LandBased Warhead, the Future Strategic Sea-Based Warhead, the Future Air-Delivered Warhead, and a 

Submarine-Launched Warhead (for the W76-1/2) that will be needed in the 2040s. These plans are 

notional and may be subject to change.

2.3 Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition

WDD activities disassemble retired weapons into major components.

Those components are then assigned for reuse, storage, surveillance, 

or disposal. The dismantlement schedule for retired nuclear weapons 

is planned to provide the material and components required for the 

stockpile (in particular, LEPs, Mods, and Alts). WDD also maintains the 

proficiency of technicians and balances work scope at the production 

sites. Dismantlement rates are affected by many factors, including 

appropriated program funding, logistics, legislation, policy, directives, 

weapon system complexity, and the availability of qualified personnel, 

equipment, and facilities. DOE/NNSA’s current 5-year Dismantlement 

Plan balances these constraints while maintaining strict adherence to 

legislative, policy, and directive guidance. The WDD work scope 

includes management of retired nuclear weapon systems (e.g., 

managing safety concerns), characterization of weapon components, 

disassembly of weapons and components, and final component 

disposition (e.g., component reuse and material recycle and recovery). 

WDD activities occur across all sites in the nuclear security enterprise. 

2.3.1 Status

DOE/NNSA continues to make significant progress on dismantling 

weapons and component disposition. WDD is on pace to completely

dismantle the weapons that were retired at the end of FY 2008 by the 

WDD Accomplishments

• Trained production technicians at 

Consolidated Nuclear Security, 

LLC for future LEP work by 

providing experience with 

programs in dismantlement. 

• Developed and refined canned 

subassembly dismantlement 

schedules at Y-12 to meet the 

material and component reuse 

demands of the B61-12, W80-4 

LEPs, and highly enriched 

uranium program.

• Dismantled weapons on schedule 

and program remains on pace to 

eliminate the weapons that were 

in retirement at the end of 

FY 2008.

• Kept the size of legacy excess 

component inventories from 

growing and reduced storage 

constraints at the Pantex Plant.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-16

end of FY 2022. In addition, DOE/NNSA has developed return schedules to remove retired weapons from 

DoD facilities while meeting DoD operational requirements. WDD continues to characterize components 

coming off the dismantlement line, and sites are eliminating excess component inventories on schedule.

2.3.1.1 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–10 provides a high-level summary of WDD challenges and the strategies to address each.

Table 2–10. Summary of Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Increase component disposition at each 

site.

WDD is operating with no impact to 

stockpile operations.

Leverage the processing capabilities 

at each site and ensure other sites 

use these capabilities.

2.4 Production Operations

Production Operations provides the base capabilities to enable 

weapon operations (assembly, disassembly, and production) 

planned for the warhead modernization, stockpile systems, and the

WDD program’s Production Operations’ goal is to maintain the base 

capability required to sustain a responsive and resilient stockpile 

through robust management and production process engineering, 

manufacturing, and production technology capacity. The program 

accomplishes this goal by maintaining the tools and personnel 

necessary for supporting major manufacturing, assembly, 

disassembly, maintenance, and production data management for all 

nuclear weapons in the stockpile and modernization efforts.

At individual enterprise sites, Production Operations facilitates the 

capability and capacity to sustain the nuclear security enterprise’s 

production mission, mainly through sustaining and expanding the 

multi-program enabling workforce. The base labor capacity the 

program provides is essential to preventive and corrective 

maintenance, calibrations, quality assurance, supply chain

maintenance and qualification, production logistics, manufacturing 

execution systems, process flow, and scheduling activities. Production Operations also maintains critical 

multi-weapon system supporting equipment at certain sites and select programmatic infrastructure. 

Production Operations also serves as the demand signal for the modernization of production capabilities 

and capacity to improve efficiency and maintain manufacturing operations that will meet future 

requirements. The program requires close coordination with the Production Modernization and 

Advanced Manufacturing Development programs, which are charged with development and initial 

deployment of new or replacement manufacturing capabilities. It also heavily depends on required 

infrastructure modernizations (as discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.4, and throughout Chapter 6) to 

ensure base capabilities with adequate capacities, space, and equipment are in place.

2.4.1 Status

Production Operations is expanding the nuclear security enterprise’s base capability sustainment capacity 

to meet a significant increase in demand associated with the ramp up in warhead modernization activities 

and Production Modernization projects. 

Production Accomplishments

• Sustained base capabilities for 

multi-system operations and 

maintenance support to meet all 

LLC exchange GTS fills and 

surveillance deliverables

• Completed calibration services of 

over 1,200 critical equipment 

calibrations in support of production 

activities.

• Supported 240 LLNL engineering 

authorizations, 340 enterprise 

engineering authorizations, and 

180 Product Realization Team

meetings. 

• Accepted over 79,000 SNL 

components at a 100 percent 

acceptance rate.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 2-17

As the Production Support program evolved into Production Operations within the Office of Stockpile 

Production Integration, it has taken on additional scope in enterprise capacity modeling and planning. 

This nascent function aligns well with Production Operations’ role as a demand signal for nuclear security 

enterprise production capability modernization and capacity expansion.

2.4.1.1 Challenges and Strategies

Table 2–11 provides a high-level summary of Production Operations challenges and the strategies to 

address each.

Table 2–11. Summary of Production Operations challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Increasing production demand and 

expanding/modernizing manufacturing 

capacity causing increased demands on 

Production Operations base capabilities.

Production Operations supporting the 

Kansas City National Security Campus 

expansion, Pantex Plant projects to 

increase efficiency of operations, and 

Y-12 modernization efforts. 

Supporting site hiring.

Coordination of programmatic 

equipment replacement and

maintenance requirements across 

Defense Programs so sustainment and 

modernization needs and shortfalls are 

well understood along with attendant 

risks and opportunities.

Need for expanded and improved 

enterprise capacity modeling and 

planning.

Production Operations maintains the 

Office of Stockpile Management’s 

main modeling and analysis capability 

for enterprise capacity modeling, the 

Enterprise Modeling and Analysis 

Consortium.

Development of advanced and 

increasingly automated modeling to 

ensure capabilities are in place to meet 

current and future stockpile 

requirements.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-1

Chapter 3

Production Modernization

3.1 Overview

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is focused on 

manufacturing nuclear weapons components of strategic interest that need replacement, revitalization, 

or modernization to meet stockpile requirements and maintain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. Some of 

these components, or their fabrication materials, can be obtained through managed supply chains while 

others must be uniquely produced by the nuclear security enterprise. Production of some of these

components was reduced or stopped during the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. As DOE/NNSA

continues to sustain the stockpile through warhead modernization activities, there is a greater emphasis 

on a responsive manufacturing infrastructure that improves production capability or existing capacity. 

New methods, approaches, and technologies will enhance throughput and efficiency. Production 

Modernization concentrates on the production capabilities of nuclear weapons components critical to 

weapon performance, including primaries, secondaries, radiation cases, and non-nuclear components, of 

which the manufacturing of such components has very tight tolerances. 

Production Modernization encompasses four major subprograms, as illustrated in Figure 3–1, that sustain 

the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile: (1) Primary Capability Modernization, (2) Secondary Capability 

Modernization, (3) Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment, and (4) Non-Nuclear 

Capability Modernization.

Figure 3–1. Production Modernization major subprograms
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-2

3.2 Primary Capability Modernization

The Primary Capability Modernization Program is responsible for restoring and increasing manufacturing 

capabilities for primary-stage nuclear materials to meet required levels in the nuclear security enterprise. 

Primary Capability Modernization consolidates the management of this material processing into two 

subprograms: (1) Plutonium Modernization and (2) High Explosives and Energetics Modernization.

3.2.1 Plutonium Modernization

The United States is restoring the capability to produce new 

primaries for nuclear weapons, including plutonium 

subcomponents such as pits. In May 2018, the NNSA 

Administrator provided Congress with DOE/NNSA’s 

recommended alternative to produce no fewer than 80 pits per 

year (ppy) as required by the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2018. This recommended alternative was 

endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council. DOE/NNSA’s 

recommended approach to meet pit production requirements is 

twofold:

◼ Continue to invest in the Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL) to produce 30 ppy and

◼ Repurpose the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication 

Facility (MFFF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) as the 

Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) to 

produce 50 ppy.

This two-pronged approach will restore a critical production 

capability central to maintaining the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

Operating two geographically separated plutonium pit 

production facilities provides resilience and adaptable options to mitigate 

against shutdowns, incidents, or other risks that may affect operations at a 

single site. 

Recapitalizing the Nation’s pit production capability to enable production 

of no fewer than 80 ppy addresses two major drivers:

◼ Department of Defense (DoD) and DOE/NNSA requirements to 

enhance warhead safety and security and

◼ Risk mitigation against plutonium aging through deliberate, 

methodical replacement of older existing plutonium pits with 

newly manufactured pits.

3.2.1.1 Status

Prior to completion of CD-1 analysis for SRPPF, the Nuclear Weapons Council certified1that DOE/NNSA 

remained on schedule to: 

1 Public Law 115-232, § 3120(e) requires the Chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council to annually certify to Congress that the 

DOE/NNSA plutonium pit production plan meets DoD military requirements and remains on track to achieve all milestones and 

deliverables as of the last certification in 2021.

Plutonium Modernization 

Major Accomplishments

• Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory and LANL completed 

engineering evaluations for analytical 

chemistry processes in fiscal year

(FY) 2020.

• Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production 

Project and SRFFP achieved CD-1 

approval in FY 2021.

• Savannah River National Laboratory 

and LANL established a Knowledge 

Transfer Program to begin building the 

pit production knowledge base at SRS.

• Kansas City National Security Campus 

for the first time supplied process provein non-nuclear parts to LANL to support 

FY 2020 pit builds.

A small disk of plutonium metal 

at TA-55.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-3

◼ Meet the military requirement of no fewer than 80 pits per year; and

◼ Produce 30 pits per year at LANL.

DOE/NNSA conducted a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review of the recommended two-site 

solution described above. The NEPA strategy articulated a three-tiered approach to address the 

environmental impact of pit production activities, site-specific environmental impacts, and programmatic 

actions across the nuclear security enterprise. On November 5, 2020, a Record of Decision for the Final 

Environmental Impact Statement for Plutonium Pit Production at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina

(DOE/EIS-0541) and the amended Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental 

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0236-S4) were issued. 

In addition to dedicated pit production infrastructure efforts at LANL and SRS, DOE/NNSA is recapitalizing 

existing facilities through a series of reinvestment projects, including several line-item projects, to replace 

the current aging infrastructure that supports the capability to manufacture and certify pits. These 

projects include the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, which maintains continuity 

in analytical chemistry and material characterization capabilities by transitioning these activities from the 

Cold War-era Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility to newer facilities. Programs are also 

conducting risk reduction activities in material recycle and recovery by removing the nuclear material 

inventory currently housed in the CMR facility. 

3.2.1.2 LANL Plutonium Modernization

A modern, responsive, and resilient capability to process 

and handle plutonium is essential to assess and maintain 

the nuclear weapons stockpile. A responsive plutonium 

infrastructure requires proper storage facilities, safe and 

secure disposal pathways, and unique facilities for

research and development (R&D) and design realization 

activities. Manufacture and surveillance of plutonium 

components, as well as experiments and analysis of 

plutonium, currently occur at LANL’s Plutonium Facility

(PF-4). Most plutonium processing for the nuclear

weapons program (e.g., recovery, characterization, 

component fabrication, nondestructive analysis, and 

surveillance), as well as basic and applied research on plutonium, are conducted in this facility. 

Modernization activities concentrate on initiatives within PF-4, such as recapitalization of the equipment 

needed to restore PF-4’s ability to produce War Reserve (WR) pits. PF-4 is currently the only DOE/NNSA 

facility authorized to produce pits for the enduring stockpile. Ongoing activities include projects funded 

by the Plutonium Modernization Program and line-item programs, such as the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit 

Production Project, which will increase the pit manufacturing capability to 30 ppy and maintain LANL as 

the Nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence for R&D. 

Primary goals for Plutonium Modernization include:

◼ Maintain and modernize Technical Area 55 (TA-55) PF-4 to provide reliability and continued 

compliance with all relevant safety requirements.

◼ Reconfigure TA-55 PF-4 for efficient pit production by completing the ongoing equipment 

installations and facility modification to optimize the pit production process flow and establish 

the capacity for a reliable 30 ppy production rate.

Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at LANL.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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◼ Increase the workforce required for the pit production mission to 

manufacture pits; maintain and operate facilities; provide 

security for pit production activities and materials; and provide a 

broad range of support functions. 

◼ Provide acceptable components and support for the experiments 

and evaluations specified by LLNL in the Pit Certification Plan.

◼ Advance the science and engineering required to mature 

production processes to meet Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory (LLNL) design agency specifications for plutonium pit 

production.

To meet these goals, workforce increases are needed. Therefore,

DOE/NNSA must hire, train, qualify, and retain additional pit production 

personnel to meet the requirements. This increased workforce will need 

additional support, such as infrastructure investments for operations 

support, waste management, offices, parking, training, etc. 

To support pit production and other vital plutonium missions, DOE/NNSA 

will transition to 24/7 facility availability at PF-4 to enable enhanced execution of programmatic work, 

facility maintenance, equipment installation, and construction activities. DOE/NNSA will also continue 

modernizing LANL’s reliable waste management capabilities to safely and efficiently disposition

radioactive waste. 

Plutonium Modernization also supports manufacturing of precision plutonium devices for science-related 

evaluation. The data collection and analysis from this evaluation supports sustaining an overall healthy 

feedstock supply chain that will support plutonium processing for the nuclear weapons program as 

necessary to maintain a ready nuclear deterrent. 

3.2.1.3 SRS Plutonium Modernization

The former MFFF, is a Security Category 1/Hazard Category 2 structure that provides an opportunity to 

achieve pit production in an existing facility designed to meet stringent security and safety requirements 

for plutonium operations. Initial modernization activities include repurposing and transitioning the MFFF 

into a safe, secure, compliant, and efficient pit production facility, the planned SRPPF. Development of 

new facilities and security infrastructure, as well as establishment of a new program office at SRS to 

sustain an enduring pit production goal of 50 plutonium ppy, are also underway. Enhanced conceptual 

design efforts for the proposed SRPPF are continuing to use knowledge gained from LANL, LLNL, and other 

sites. The Critical Decision (CD)-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) package detailing the 

conceptual design and estimated cost range was approved in fiscal year (FY) 2021.

There are several key steps to completing the SRPPF project and establishing an enduring mission:

◼ Complete five inter-related construction subprojects;

◼ Hire and train the workforce necessary to establish and sustain the SRS pit production mission;

◼ Begin production operations upon CD-4 (Approve Start of Operations) to enable delivery of a first 

production unit pit;

◼ Establish the institutional systems at SRS necessary to build WR pits;

◼ Establish and manage SRS pit production interfaces across the nuclear security enterprise; and

◼ Re-establish a secure supply chain to support the SRS pit production mission.

Glovebox work in the TA-55 

machining area.
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The SRPPF project is supported by a Plutonium Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) completed in 

October 2017 and the Plutonium Pit Production Engineering Assessment completed in April 2018. Both 

efforts informed DOE/NNSA’s selection of a preferred alternative on May 10, 2018, to continue to invest 

in LANL for the capability to produce 30 ppy in 2026, and to repurpose existing facilities at SRS to produce 

a capability of 50 ppy. Based on information developed to support the CD-1 milestone, DOE/NNSA has 

determined that the required 50 WR ppy production rate at SRS will not be achieved by 2030. 

Pending future acquisition milestones, three factors are needed to further inform the achievable date for 

50 WR ppy capacity at SRPPF. First, DOE/NNSA must better define the timeframe to accomplish CD-4. 

DOE/NNSA must then identify the amount of time it will take for SRPPF to produce the first WR pit at the 

facility after achieving CD-4. Finally, DOE/NNSA must establish the period necessary for SRPPF to achieve 

the required production capacity of 50 WR ppy after demonstrating the ability to produce WR quality pits. 

The following milestones and activities will inform the dates associated with the factors above and allow 

DOE/NNSA to narrow down potential timelines for 50 WR ppy at SRPPF: 

1. Completion and approval of SRPPF’s CD-2 (Approve Performance Baseline) acquisition milestone. 

This indicates that the project’s design is 90 percent complete and will identify when CD-4 can be 

achieved.

2. Continuing coordination with LLNL, LANL, and the ongoing W87-1 Modification Program’s Pit 

Production Realization Team to find ways to reduce the time needed to produce the first WR pit 

at SRPPF after CD-4, based on knowledge gained at LANL from parallel production efforts at PF-4.

3. Capture efficiencies and use lessons from production experience at LANL as they ramp from 1 WR 

ppy to 30 WR ppy to inform how best to minimize the time required for SRPPF to scale from 1 WR 

ppy to 50 WR ppy.

Additionally, further design activities conducted in support of CD-2 may identify multiple opportunities to

accelerate achieving the required production capacity. Establishing required SRPPF pit production 

capacity as close as possible to 2030 remains a high priority and is required for sustaining the effectiveness 

of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

The proposed pit production mission will need a skilled workforce at the site. Estimates indicate that 

design and construction activities will require approximately 2,000 staff. Manufacturing 50 ppy at SRS will 

require more than 1,600 production staff. These early estimates will continue to be refined as the 

project’s design matures. 

A multi-year training and qualification process will be undertaken to ensure the necessary people, 

processes, procedures, and commodities are in place to meet the minimum 50 ppy requirement at SRS. 

Essential to this process will be the transition of an existing facility into the SRS Training and Operations 

Center, beginning with design work in FY 2021. The Training and Operations Center will enable 

unclassified and classified training in a safe environment, as well as high-fidelity surrogate material 

training aimed to qualify the personnel and procedures ultimately used to build and handle pits in the 

SRPPF. The Training and Operations Center will also advance final design by serving as a test bed for 

selected engineering equipment and to demonstrate systems integration. LANL and LLNL are supporting 

the training rotation pipeline for the SRS pit production mission through a knowledge transfer program 

initiated in FY 2020 with Savannah River National Laboratory. This knowledge transfer program will form 

the foundation of the Training and Operations Center knowledge and experience base.
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3.2.1.4 Enterprise Plutonium Support

DOE/NNSA manages numerous facilities that house plutonium handling, processing, R&D, 

characterization, experimentation, and storage facilities that must be sustained. A responsive plutonium 

infrastructure requires proper storage facilities, safe and secure disposal pathways, and unique 

equipment and facilities for R&D and design realization activities.

Enterprise Plutonium Support includes activities that enable programmatic objectives across the 

enterprise, including production of non-nuclear components, certification activities, management of the 

Product Realization Team, material management activities, radioisotope thermoelectric generator 

production and surveillance, subcritical plutonium experiments, and pit certification.

3.2.1.5 Challenges and Strategies 

Table 3–1 provides a high-level summary of Plutonium Modernization challenges and the strategies to 

address them. 

Table 3–1. Summary of Plutonium Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Timely integration of infrastructure and 

workforce investments in alignment with 

W87-1 pit Production Realization Team

schedule to re-establish required pit 

production capabilities and capacity. 

Continue to invest in LANL plutonium facilities 

to meet pit production milestones – achieving 

the first production unit milestone in 2023, 

then completing the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit 

Production Project to increase production 

capacity to 30 ppy. 

Streamline engineering 

evaluations and certification 

activities to support this 

schedule. 

Repurposing of the former Mixed Oxide 

Fuel Fabrication Facility at SRS to achieve 

a production rate of 50 ppy.

Implement a tailored approach for the SRPPF

project to achieve CD-1, CD-2, and CD-3A 

(Long Lead Procurements), in order to support 

producing 50 WR ppy.

Use knowledge transfer from LANL and LLNL 

subject matter experts to support workforce 

development at SRS to achieve pit production 

mission objectives. 

Re-establish the supply chain for 

weapons-related components 

and commodities needed to 

support the 50 ppy mission.

Executing environmental testing/surety/ 

qualification of plutonium pits without 

nuclear test.

Use and expand thermal and mechanical 

testing capabilities to evaluate newly 

manufactured and legacy pits in the stockpileto-target sequence normal environments. 

Establish equipment, experimental platforms, 

and systems to evaluate additional normal and 

abnormal environments that pits could 

experience.

Leverage the ongoing 

investment in the Enhanced 

Capabilities for Subcritical 

Experiments Program to 

demonstrate the certification 

uncertainty achieved with onepoint and multi-point safety.

3.2.2 High Explosives and Energetics Modernization

The High Explosives and Energetics Modernization program addresses the modernization of high 

explosives (HE) science and production facilities and the qualification of explosive, pyrotechnic, and 

propellant materials for the nuclear security enterprise. This program is not only responsible for HE 

materials, but also the network of associated activities, such as the HE and Energetics business processes, 

infrastructure, production, and supply chain. This network and its subsequent critical energetic materials 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-7

are utilized across five management and operating 

(M&O) sites: the Pantex Plant (Pantex), Sandia 

National Laboratories (SNL), LANL, LLNL, and the

Nevada National Security Site. Each site maintains 

multiple dispersed facilities engaged in Stockpile

Research, Technology, and Engineering and 

Production Operations.

Energetic materials are an enduring requirement for 

each weapon system in the existing stockpile. In 

addition to existing stockpile sustainment needs, 

currently planned warhead modernization activities, 

such as limited life component (LLC) exchanges, and 

future modernization activities will continue to have 

a substantial demand for energetics. DOE/NNSA 

meets HE demands for nuclear weapon sustainment 

and modernization through investment in 

development of reliable production capabilities, such 

as safe and secure facilities, integrated infrastructure,

effective logistics (handling, storage, and delivery), 

and ensuring a reliable supplier base. 

3.2.2.1 Status

Most of the current facilities in the HE enterprise 

were built more than 70 years ago. These aging facilities lack the 

electrical infrastructure needed to meet mission requirements and 

have safety and security limitations. 

DOE/NNSA is currently planning three major programmatic lineitem construction projects for HE:

◼ The HE Science and Engineering Facility at Pantex will 

consolidate 15 aging facilities into three new, efficient 

facilities to conduct science, technology, engineering, and 

production activities in weapons assembly/disassembly 

and HE. It will hedge against current HE production and 

testing capability gaps.

◼ The HE Synthesis, Formulation, and Production project at 

Pantex will address challenges at the supplier’s 

formulation facility and the difficulty meeting DOE/NNSA 

production requirements. Areas to be addressed include 

explosive and mock formulation operations to support 

multiple weapon programs; technology development for 

future programs; and support for strategic partners that 

will hedge against current HE production and testing 

capability gaps. 

High Explosives Science and Engineering 

Facility Conceptual Design

High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and 

Production Conceptual Design

High Explosives and Energetics Modernization

Accomplishments

• Implementing projects to modernize production and 

design facilities (HE Science and Engineering; HE

Synthesis, Formulation, and Production; and Energetic 

Materials Characterization).

• Completing qualification and production of development 

batches to support life extension program HE 

production schedules and demands

• Developed supply chain continuity of operations models 

and risk registers to inform risk mitigation decisions.

• Enhanced safety and viability of storage and shipping 

energetic materials, including testing to characterize 

hazards for Department of Transportation compliance

• Continued to identify and address risks to non-nuclear 

energetic material supply chains

• Re-establishing production capability and processes for 

critical energetic materials

• Updated IHE Qualification definitions to provide 

consistency across nuclear enterprise

• Provided subject matter expertise for DoD HE supplier 

with installation of stainless steel filter press and 

environmental mitigation upgrades 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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◼ The Energetics Material Characterization Facility at 

LANL will consolidate 18 inadequate and outdated 

facilities to analyze and periodically qualify HE parts 

going into or coming from stockpile systems. This

critical capability will identify solutions for problems 

with HE identified through stockpile returns and 

aging studies. It will also produce energetic materials 

for detonator assemblies and advance the 

development of HE formulation and explosive 

components for the future stockpile. The facility will 

create a single capability for the evolution of 

components and materials from early concept and 

prototype design to high-volume production within 

a single location and provide internal production 

capability for mark-quality non-nuclear explosive 

components and materials to augment the 

commercial supplier base. 

◼ Additionally, ongoing investment in Light-Initiated 

High Explosive capabilities at SNL and LLNL will provide the ability to conduct testing of mockup

devices with live main charges in safe and effective modern facilities. These investments provide 

HE qualification capability to hostile impulse requirements. 

Future infrastructure investments may include consolidation and modernization of existing facilities 

critical to providing required HE R&D capabilities for main charges, boosters, and detonators in a modern,

enhanced safety and security environment. DOE/NNSA will continue to pursue projectsto mitigate known 

issues with the limited commercial component supplier base and provide onsite production of energetic 

materials and components in the stockpile (actuators, igniters, detonators, timers, rocket motors). 

HE and Energetics Modernization activities will also include the following:

◼ Manage the HE and energetics supply chain risk portfolio to ensure a healthy infrastructure exists 

to maintain, manufacture, and deploy mark-quality HE and energetics in support of weapons 

production. 

◼ Provide guidance for energetics surveillance, weapon response, transportation, containers, and 

explosive/electrical environments.

◼ Define and monitor the qualification standards of HE and energetic material. 

◼ Support the future of HE and energetics development, production, component design and 

manufacturing, testing, and qualification. 

Experienced and knowledgeable personnel are needed for the proper care and handling of hazardous 

components. Recruitment of skilled professionals and extensive safety training are imperative for safe 

operations. With an increased workload and the attrition or retirement of senior personnel, DOE/NNSA 

must actively develop a sustainable workforce to perform these operations competently and safely in the 

future. More detail on DOE/NNSA’s workforce strategies can be found in Chapter 7 of this report.

3.2.2.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–2 provides a high-level summary of HE and Energetics Modernization challenges and the 

strategies to address them. 

Material Characterization and Aging

DOE/NNSA laboratory researchers have recently 

confirmed that the explosive called PETN 

(Pentaerythritol tetranitrate), when stabilized with 

a polysaccharide coating, is resistant to changes 

in particle shape, size, and structure that can 

degrade detonator performance over time. 

PETN is a common initiating explosive used 

extensively in commercial detonators and in the 

U.S. nuclear stockpile, but batch-to-batch 

variability has made it difficult for us to definitively 

show how it responds to aging. When stabilized 

with a polysaccharide coating, it exhibits little to 

no change in powder characteristics during aging 

at elevated temperatures, in both free-flowing 

powder as well as when pressed into low- density 

commercially prepared detonator pellets. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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Table 3–2. Summary of High Explosives and Energetics Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Controlling risks posed by aging HE 

facilities and equipment awaiting 

upgrades or replacements across the 

nuclear security enterprise needed to 

support warhead modernization and 

emerging weapons program needs. 

Coordinate with the Infrastructure and 

Operations Program and the 

Programmatic Recapitalization 

Working Group to improve energetic 

readiness. 

Keep aging equipment available for 

warhead modernization and current 

stockpile systems through rigorous 

maintenance programs and integrated 

equipment recapitalization planning 

across the nuclear security enterprise. 

Find creative solutions to maintain 

facilities past their useful life.

Make short- to medium-term 

recapitalization investments where 

reasonable.

Construct the HE Synthesis, 

Formulation, and Production building, 

the High Explosives Science and 

Engineering Facility, the Energetic 

Materials Characterization Facility and 

the Energetic Manufacturing Science 

and Technology Facility.

Employ creative methods to mitigate 

obsolescence issues, such as using 

additive manufacturing to produce 

parts.

Stand up production enclaves at design 

laboratories to enable more efficient 

response to the emerging deterrent.

Maintaining qualified vendors for lowvolume, high-quality outsourced 

components to sustain a viable and 

reliable domestic supplier base.

Establish clear requirements for 

Nuclear Enterprise Assurance. 

When necessary, use in-house 

capabilities to restore mission 

schedules at risk.

Exercise suppliers to maintain 

proficiency on a more frequent 

schedule between procurement and 

continued technical exchanges.

Strategic joint-agency collaboration to 

identify systemic industrial base 

solutions to strengthen domestic 

supplier base options.

Explore novel synthesis routes and 

manufacturing techniques to enable 

U.S. manufacture of explosive 

precursors.

Developing sufficient supply chain 

capacity for energetic materials in 

current and future life extension 

programs and alterations.

Exercise initiatives within the Defense 

Programs for Energetic Materials. 

Refresh HE formulation, synthesis, and 

machining capabilities at Pantex. 

Identify, assess, and perform riskinformed activities to understand, 

characterize, and develop better 

methods to produce and qualify 

materials more fully.

Analyze and apply lessons learned 

from Defense Programs initiatives for 

energetic materials for broader 

implementation across the enterprise 

along lines of effort such as design for 

manufacturing, and requirements and 

capacity integration.

Ensuring that requirements for energetic 

materials are adequately identified,

preserved, and documented. 

Document the detailed processes 

necessary for the synthesis and 

formulation of energetic materials for 

a repeatable material specification that 

yields the required engineering and 

performance requirements through 

efforts with the NNSA Energetics 

Coordinating Committee.

Document the technical basis for 

future process parameter choices and 

rationale for specific requirements in 

the specifications.

Improve understanding and control 

over material specifications and 

manufacturing to improve reliability 

and repeatability and increase lot 

acceptance. Develop techniques to 

computationally assess manufacturing 

with computational fluid dynamics, 

computational chemistry, machine 

learning, and artificial intelligence.

Develop techniques to reprocess outof-spec material to meet requirements.
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Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Planning for material shortfalls for legacy 

WR HE due to a lack of robust plans and 

processes to control inventories. 

Collaborate with DoD and industrial 

partners to institute a more routine 

process to exercise synthesis and 

formulation of energetic materials.

Completion of TATB/PBX-9502 

specification will improve plans and 

processes to enhance inventory 

control. 

Preserve and enhance in-house 

production for items such as WR

detonator powder production.

3.3 Secondary Capability Modernization

The Secondary Capability Modernization Program is responsible for restoring and increasing 

manufacturing capabilities for the secondary stage to required levels in the nuclear security enterprise. 

This includes ensuring the availability of strategic materials and other sub-component streams necessary 

for the secondary stage, as well as modernizing the facilities and operations required to process these 

materials, fabricate them into parts, and assemble the final components. The areas of focus include:

(1) Uranium Modernization; (2) Depleted Uranium Modernization; and (3) Lithium Modernization.

3.3.1 Uranium Modernization

Uranium Modernization upgrades enriched uranium 

operations to ensure the delivery of secondary components 

needed to maintain the stockpile and support Naval Reactors 

and Nonproliferation programs. To execute this mission, 

Uranium Modernization is phasing out mission dependency 

on Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12)

by the end of 2025 through:

◼ Relocating Building 9212’s enriched uranium 

capabilities into existing facilities as well as the new 

Uranium Processing Facility;

◼ Leveraging these relocations to develop and deploy 

new technologies into existing facilities and the 

Uranium Processing Facility to reduce cost, improve 

worker safety, and enhance manufacturing processes 

for nuclear weapon materials; and

◼ Investing in the reliability of key systems to sustain 

casting, machining, metal purification systems, 

assembly, and analytical chemistry capabilities.

3.3.1.1 Status

DOE/NNSA manages and operates Y-12, which is home to the Nation’s primary uranium processing and 

storage infrastructure, including a laboratory that supports uranium activities. Building 9212 contains the 

most hazardous enriched uranium operations but does not meet modern nuclear safety and security 

standards because it is more than 70 years old. As part of the aforementioned relocation strategy, new 

production technologies will be deployed, and existing processes will be simplified or eliminated to 

Uranium Modernization Achievements

• Achieved the “In the Dry” milestones for 

Uranium Processing Facility’s Salvage 

and Accountability Building and the 

Personnel Support Facility Building.

• Completed Casting Parameters 

Optimization Plan for casting parts.

• Met purified highly enriched uranium metal 

production goal.

• Produced the first production-quality 

uranium metal “button” using a depleted 

uranium surrogate on the newly installed 

electrorefining demonstration system.

• Approved Critical Decision 2/3, 

established the cost and schedule 

baseline and start of installation for the 

Calciner project. 
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-11

increase the overall safety and efficiency of enriched uranium operations. During the transition period, 

efforts to reduce material-at-risk will continue.

The Uranium Processing Facility will replace Building 9212 capabilities for highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

casting, special oxide production, chemical recovery, decontamination, and assay. HEU casting and special 

oxide production will be housed in the Uranium Processing Facility’s Main Process Building, while chemical 

recovery, decontamination, and assay will take place in the Uranium Processing Facility’s Salvage and 

Accountability Building. A third building, the Uranium Processing Facility’s Mechanical/Electrical 

Equipment Building, will provide utilities and other support systems. 

While the Uranium Processing Facility is constructed and undergoes startup activities, Y-12’s Process 

Technology Development Department will relocate processes and deploy new technologies that will fully 

enable phasing out mission dependency on Building 9212. New technology deployments will include 

electrorefiner, calciner, and direct chip melt projects, which will reduce cost and improve manufacturing 

processes for nuclear weapon materials. These new technologies will also improve existing capabilities in 

enduring facilities by reducing the number of production processes, reducing risks, and improving 

personnel safety. Ultimately, installation and operation of these systems in existing facilities will allow 

the current aqueous-based chemical purification and high-hazard metal conversion processes in Building 

9212 to be shut down. Early technology maturation, such as for direct electrolytic reduction, is funded by 

Uranium Modernization. When the technology is sufficiently mature, the development and deployment 

of equipment is pursued through capital line item acquisition and major item of equipment processes, as 

appropriate. This technology development and maturation process has generated three current major 

items of equipment acquisitions. The major items of equipment include:

◼ Electrorefining is an electrochemical metal purification system designed to provide a replacement 

capability for the current metal purification process. This capability, located in Building 9215, 

along with the calciner process in Building 9212 (see below), will replace the current high hazard 

wet chemistry process located in Building 9212.

◼ A calciner uses a dry thermal treatment process to convert low-equity enriched uranium liquids 

to a dry stable form for storage. This capability will process remaining material in Building 9212 

before operations there are shut down. The calciner, located in Building 9212, along with the 

electrorefining capability in Building 9215 (see above), will enable the shutdown of the current 

high-hazard wet chemistry process in Building 9212.

◼ Direct Chip Melt is the recovery of enriched uranium machine tool chips/turnings by collecting 

and remelting them in furnaces. This capability, located in Building 9215, will replace the current 

high-hazard practices of transferring chips to Building 9212, then cleaning, briquetting, and 

storing them there.

Note: DOE/NNSA has already relocated its 2MeV radiography capability from Building 9212 to another 

location.

DOE/NNSA will perform its enriched uranium metal purification in Building 9215 using the electrorefining 

process, which will come online in the 2023 timeframe. Uranium Modernization will continue to fund the 

purification of metal in Building 9212 until the electrorefining process is fully operational, at which point 

the hazardous wet chemistry, conversion, and reduction operations in Building 9212 will be shut down. 

Uranium Modernization continues to optimize Y-12’s Building 9212 resources to supply the current 

stockpile with purified enriched uranium metal through 2024. The program provides a comprehensive 

storage capability to support a steady supply stream of material through peak production periods. It also 

enables enriched uranium material de-inventory activities to increase safety, establish target working 
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inventory levels for the production facilities, and optimize composition of the inventory. The program, 

partnering with DOE/NNSA’s Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations, is sustaining uranium

facilities with an Extended Life Program. These efforts allow safe and secure continuation of operations, 

including those relocated from Building 9212, in existing facilities through 2040 and into the future. 

Uranium Modernization is proactively removing equipment that is no longer needed from these enduring 

facilities through its Flexible Production Capacity Initiative to improve Y-12’s responsiveness and 

resiliency. 

3.3.1.2 Challenges and Strategies 

Table 3–3 provides a high-level summary of Uranium Modernization challenges and the strategies to 

address them. 

Table 3–3. Summary of Uranium Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Integrating new technologies into 

operations.

Operate full-scale prototype systems 

in development before operations.

Use Operational Release Plans to 

identify issue and streamline the 

transition to operations.

Executing process relocations with multiple 

timelines without interruption to 

operations.

Develop integrated schedule, risk 

plan, and life-cycle cost estimate.

Bridge key capability gaps through 

partnership with commercial vendors

and partnerships with other DOE 

national laboratories.

Preparing Building 9212 for disposition and 

demolition in shortest achievable timetable.

Begin deactivating systems and 

removing material immediately and 

maintain a 15+ year schedule.

3.3.2 Depleted Uranium Modernization

DOE/NNSA has a long-term, increasing requirement for highpurity depleted uranium (HPDU) feedstock to meet national 

security needs. The capability to produce, process, and handle 

depleted uranium supports several key missions within the 

nuclear security enterprise, from providing components for life 

extension programs (LEPs) to downblending HEU to lowenriched uranium (LEU).

Depleted uranium is required for nuclear component 

production to maintain and modernize the stockpile through 

modernization programs. Depleted uranium is manufactured 

into precision components through complex processes that 

must meet stringent requirements. Key processes include 

casting, rolling, swaging, forming, forging, machining, 

assembly, and inspection. 

Depleted uranium is also required for stockpile surveillance. Nondestructive and destructive testing are

performed for depleted uranium components in full assembly and part forms as part of surveillance data 

collection for ensuring confidence in the stockpile. Depleted uranium is also used as a surrogate material 

for component testing, such as flight and ground tests, that would otherwise be too hazardous.

Depleted Uranium Modernization 

Achievements

• Restarted binary rolling operations at Y-12

• Completed primary and secondary melts 

at the off-site development VAR, with inspecification results

• Restarted the depleted uranium weld box

• Completed 60 percent design of depleted 

uranium tetrafluoride (DUF4) conversion 

line for new high-purity depleted uranium

production

• Completed Depleted Uranium Capability 

Study
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3.3.2.1 Status

Depleted Uranium Modernization was established in FY 2021 by consolidating the depleted uranium

portions of the previous Uranium Sustainment program and other programs of interest. Depleted 

uranium capabilities include feedstock procurement, restarting and maintaining both alloying and 

manufacturing processes, and investing in new key technologies. In the early 2000s, the reuse of 

materials, low-demand signals, and prioritization of other activities caused these capabilities to lapse. The 

Depleted Uranium Modernization program enables the restart of these capabilities so that DOE/NNSA will 

meet imminent mission requirements. Even though much of this work was previously performed under 

multiple programs, steady-state production demands a dedicated Depleted Uranium Modernization 

program to execute a comprehensive strategy to ensure that DOE/NNSA can meet programmatic 

requirements. 

DUF6 Conversion Processes

The Depleted Uranium Modernization program’s goal is to reestablish a reliable supply of HPDU before 

the current inventory is exhausted by developing a uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) to uranium tetrafluoride 

(DUF4) conversion line at the DOE’s Office of Environmental Management Portsmouth site DUF6

Conversion Facility. The Depleted Uranium Modernization program is also restarting depleted uranium

alloying capabilities and maintaining existing manufacturing processes. This includes restarting alloying 

production equipment at Y-12, modernizing component and machining capabilities, training operators, 

developing procedures, and supporting LANL and LLNL with process qualification activities. Collectively, 

these activities enable successful manufacturing of binary components.

Along with the wrought and machining capability issues, Y-12’s current alloying process is inefficient and 

leads to large amounts of material waste and excessive costs. DOE/NNSA is developing new technologies 

to replace these aging capabilities and provide a more efficient and cost-effective means of producing 

binary components and allowing DOE/NNSA to meet future production demands. For example, Direct 

Casting, intended to replace current alloying component manufacturing activities, significantly reduces

risks of equipment failure, decreases material waste, and improves process efficiency. The Depleted 

Uranium Modernization program is also pursuing new technologies for material reuse and recycling, such 

as electron beam cold hearth melting and additive manufacturing of uranium alloys. These new 

technologies will significantly reduce risks to the production of depleted uranium and depleted uraniumalloyed components in the future stockpile.

DOE/NNSA’s Manhattan Project-era facilities continue to experience age-related failures that present 

significant risk to mission delivery and personnel safety. Restarting and sustaining depleted uranium

processing capabilities requires targeted resources to address the risk associated with aging equipment. 

Sustaining these capabilities necessitates continued training and development of subject matter experts 

to produce components and resolve technical issues associated with these complex processes. 
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3.3.2.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–4 provides a high-level summary of Depleted Uranium Modernization challenges and the 

strategies to address them. 

Table 3–4. Summary of Depleted Uranium Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

There is currently no capability to produce 

HPDU, and a steady supply requires 

significant investments in long-term 

capabilities.

Purchase limited commercial HPDU 

supplies remaining and invest in 

feedstock capabilities to ensure a

steady stream of HPDU in the future.

Stand up a long-term HPDU 

conversion capability and invest in 

recycling technologies to reduce 

overall HPDU demand.

Depleted uranium alloying capabilities have 

lapsed and need to be restarted and 

modernized to support future stockpile 

needs.

Invest in maintenance of the legacy 

alloying processes. Plan to purchase 

additional equipment to reduce the 

strain on legacy equipment and 

processes.

Deploy new alloying production 

technologies to improve efficiency 

and recycling capabilities.

Current component manufacturing 

capabilities rely on aging equipment and 

have limited capacity to meet future 

stockpile needs.

Identify bottlenecks and develop 

bridging strategies to fulfill near-term 

mission requirements should new 

technology not be employed in the 

immediate future.

Invest in new component 

manufacturing technologies to 

produce component technologies 

more efficiently.

Current depleted uranium facilities have 

insufficient floor space to support future 

stockpile demand.

Identify opportunities to meet capacity 

within existing space using process 

improvements and upgraded 

equipment.

Evaluate long-term depleted 

uranium investment to meet future 

stockpile demands.

3.3.3 Lithium Modernization

DOE/NNSA requires specialized, weapon-specific forms of 

lithium for stockpile sustainment and is the sole-source 

provider for these materials. In addition to providing lithium 

for the nuclear weapon enterprise, it supplies the Department 

of Homeland Security, the DOE Office of Science, and other 

customers through the Strategic Partnership Program process.

DOE/NNSA manufactures lithium materials into precision 

nuclear weapon components that meet stringent 

specifications to support warhead modernization programs 

and joint test assembly requirements, as well as to support 

tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR) production 

for tritium modernization. 

Lithium Modernization activities include:

◼ Producing and maintaining the lithium material inventory to meet mission requirements and 

customer deliverables;

◼ Purifying and converting lithium materials to lithium hydride and/or lithium deuteride;

Lithium Modernization Achievements

• Completed qualification of reactor 

operations for B61-12 processing. 

• Completed planning and execution of 

additional bird bath installation. 

• Maintained the lithium material supply to 

meet Defense Programs mission and 

customer deliverables. 

• Continued Lithium Processing Facility 

design work and long lead procurement in 

preparation for CD-3A approval in 2022 

and CD 2/3 approval in 2025
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-15

◼ Recapitalizing process equipment and performing risk reduction activities to sustain process 

capabilities; and

◼ Developing, maturing, and deploying lithium purification and production technologies in support 

of the Lithium Processing Facility.

Lithium is currently provided via a recycling process that relies on retired weapons dismantlement 

feedstock to supply material for processing. Nondestructive and destructive testing are performed for 

lithium components in full assembly and part forms as part of surveillance data collection for ensuring 

confidence in the stockpile. 

3.3.3.1 Status

DOE/NNSA created a lithium strategy to ensure sufficient lithium processing capabilities (raw materials to 

finished assemblies) are available to meet near- and long-term requirements. The strategy includes:

◼ Sustaining the current Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and equipment until transition to the 

Lithium Processing Facility;

◼ Increasing the usable supply of lithium by dismantling and recycling lithium components using 

small-scale technologies to purify and convert lithium; and

◼ Designing and constructing the Lithium Processing Facility to house lithium processing capabilities 

by 2031.

A new facility is critical to the long-term strategy for lithium supply. Currently, aging infrastructure and 

antiquated equipment present risks to mission delivery that could affect the ability to meet stockpile 

requirements. The current lithium facility has housed lithium processing for more than 75 years. The 

historical processes are very corrosive in nature and have accelerated degradation of the facility. 

Structural issues due to chemical contamination pose safety and environmental concerns and must be 

replaced. 

In addition to being well beyond operational design life, the 

facility and its processes are oversized for today’s mission and

do not meet current codes/standards. The program will

execute recapitalization projects and risk reduction activities 

to ensure that the current lithium processing capability is 

sustained until the Lithium Processing Facility is operational. 

Modernization activities include developing the plan for

bridging operations and transitioning from the existing facility

to the new Lithium Processing Facility. 

DOE/NNSA periodically updates the Lithium Strategy Document 

and has also developed the Lithium Technology Maturation 

Plan. DOE/NNSA is maturing technologies that will make lithium purification and processing safer to 

workers, more efficient, and less impactful to surrounding infrastructure. For example, an Automated 

Lithium Electrolysis Cell will increase efficiency in lithium metal processing and reduce risk to workers by 

using better construction materials for the cell body and anodes (less maintenance), provide in-process 

purification methods (better quality), and improve remote salt feed and metal harvesting techniques 

(improved safety). These technologies will be included in the Lithium Processing Facility.

DOE/NNSA established a technology development laboratory support to expand lithium technology 

maturation. Technology Readiness Assessments will be conducted as needed to assess the strengths and 

weaknesses of identified technologies. 

Lithium Processing Facility Conceptual Design
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-16

DOE/NNSA will continue to work with operating partners to develop tailored, long-term staffing plans that 

anticipate critical skills shortfalls within this capability and properly forecast staffing levels based on the 

current program of record. Sustainment of capabilities will necessitate continued training and 

development of subject matter experts to produce lithium components and resolve technical issues 

associated with these complex production processes. 

3.3.3.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–5 provides a high-level summary of Lithium Modernization challenges and the strategies to 

address them. 

Table 3–5. Summary of Lithium Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Meeting manufacturing deliverables 

using existing aging and degraded 

facilities. 

Sustain current operations in the legacy 

lithium facility to meet near-term 

stockpile needs. 

Reestablish a small-scale purification 

capability and restart some legacy 

processing capabilities to supplement 

recycling activities. 

Plan and prioritize recapitalization 

projects and risk reduction activities to 

keep facilities and process equipment 

functional until the Lithium Processing 

Facility is operational. 

Design and construct the Lithium 

Processing Facility. Continue to 

maintain legacy processing lines of 

effort through identified facility 

lifecycle extension projects until the 

Lithium Processing Facility is fully 

operational.

Maintaining subject matter experts 

across the nuclear enterprise. 

Increase hiring to plan for multi-year 

training and clearance requirements. 

Transfer knowledge from subject matter 

experts near retirement age to new 

subject matter experts. 

Gather and collate knowledge from 

subject matter experts through 

documentation programs targeting 

critical knowledge areas.

Sustaining the supply of recycled lithium 

in the face of potential shortages. 

Restart a small-scale purification 

capability and legacy processing 

capabilities in the legacy lithium facility to 

provide additional feedstock material. 

Deploy a new material recycle cleaning 

station to provide additional capacity. 

Monitor and optimize weapons 

dismantlement schedule to provide 

feedstock as needed. 

Finalize development of Material Cell 

Equipment Refurbishment project to

recapitalize equipment that processes

salvage solutions, converts lithium 

chloride to lithium metal, and 

converts the metal to lithium hydride.

Sustaining lithium production with 

current inefficient processes. 

Develop and mature lithium process 

technologies to introduce efficiencies 

into the current process and prepare for 

insertion in process facilities.

Further develop small scale wet 

chemistry resulting in purifying legacy 

material not suitable for the Direct 

Materials Manufacturing process.

Continuing operations in aging facilities 

with increasing safety, security, and 

environmental requirements and 

maintaining them until their transition to 

newly deployed facilities. 

Make short- to medium-term 

recapitalization investments where 

reasonable.

Find adaptive solutions to maintain 

facilities past their useful lives. 

Future projects include electrical, 

utility upgrades, and other identified 

structural life extending efforts.

Optimize the design of Wet Chemistry 

setup for the Lithium Processing 

Facility.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-17

3.4 Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium 

Enrichment

Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment is responsible for producing tritium and 

supplying unobligated LEU to support national security needs. 

3.4.1 Tritium Modernization

Tritium is a strategic material and due to the rate of 

radioactive decay, must be replenished periodically via LLC

exchange. Tritium inventories are closely managed to meet 

replacement requirements and other national security needs. 

Since FY 2003, DOE/NNSA has produced tritium by irradiating

TPBARs in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1), which 

is operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). 

Beginning in FY 2020, tritium production activities expanded 

to include Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2). TPBARs that are 

irradiated in the WBN1 and WBN2 reactors use 

unencumbered and unobligated LEU as fuel (i.e., LEU that is 

free of peaceful use restrictions, as discussed in more detail in 

Section 3.4.2). Once the TPBARs are irradiated, they are 

transported to SRS, where the tritium is extracted, stored, and 

loaded into gas transfer system (GTS) reservoirs that meet 

weapon system military specifications, increase system 

margins, and support weapon system reliability. In addition 

to tritium produced at TVA, additional tritium is recovered 

from previously filled GTS reservoirs and returned to SRS 

where the contents are recycled. 

Long-term tritium production schedules based on detailed 

computational models and annual inventory reconciliations are carefully managed to ensure the tritium 

inventory is sufficient to meet the needs of the active stockpile as well as required reserve amounts. 

Production schedules also take into consideration the material that is regularly recovered and recycled 

from returned reservoirs, including those from weapon dismantlement.

While most of DOE/NNSA’s tritium capability activities focus on stockpile requirements, it also includes 

tritium gas processing R&D, GTS life storage, helium-3 recovery, and stockpile surveillance. 

3.4.1.1 Status

Tritium Production

The Tritium Modernization Program operates the national capability for producing tritium and must 

increase capacity to meet added national security requirements.

The tritium production goal, independently certified by the Nuclear Weapons Council in 2015 as requested 

by Congress, increasestritium production capabilities by nearly 65 percent at TVA by 2025. This increased 

production requirement necessitates the use of two reactors with 18-month operating cycles. WBN1 has 

produced tritium since 2003 and is operating at the maximum licensed TPBAR irradiation rate permitted 

by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In November 2020, WBN2 began its first-ever 18-month 

tritium production cycle and is expected to reach the maximum allowable rate in early FY 2024.

Tritium Modernization Achievements

• WBN1 began irradiation of the maximum 

allowable TPBAR quantity, as permitted by

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

license, in June 2020.

• WBN2 began its first-ever irradiation cycle 

of TPBARs in November 2020.

• TVA received Best Estimate Loss of 

Coolant Accident License Amendment 

Request approval from the NRC in 

February 2021, allowing more efficient and 

safer TPBAR core management.

• A new diffuser/stacking system at the 

Tritium Extraction Facility began operation, 

increasing capacity and decreasing waste 

gas processing.

• Contracts were awarded to begin site 

preparation and process building design for 

the Tritium Finishing Facility Project, which 

will replace the 1950’s-era facility that 

processes GTS.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-18

To support DOE/NNSA’s near- and mid-term tritium needs, as well as improving confidence that 

production targets will be met even in the event of unplanned reactor outages, TVA is preparing a 20-year 

license extension amendment that will increase the allowable production rates for both reactors.

2 While 

DOE/NNSA is confident that the TVA reactors will meet or exceed tritium production needs throughout 

their operating lifetime, the Tritium Modernization Program anticipates and plans for the long lead time 

required to establish new production methods. The Tritium Modernization Program is actively monitoring 

viable production alternatives, as well as trends in the civilian nuclear regulatory environment, to ensure 

supplies will continue to meet long-term needs.

As the demand for tritium continues to rise, DOE/NNSA must increase efforts to mitigate risk to 

production plans.

Tritium Processing at SRS

DOE/NNSA manages numerous facilities at SRS that support tritium handling, processing, and storage 

functions, including recovery, nondestructive analysis, and surveillance. In addition, DOE/NNSA is

implementing a plan to replace or recapitalize aging facilities. This plan also focuses on maintenance of 

the facilities as well as the need for supply chain management (e.g., vendors, tritium R&D capabilities, 

etc.). 

After being irradiated, TPBARs are transported to the Tritium Extraction Facility at SRS, where tritium is 

extracted by cutting and heating the rods. The processes to produce and extract tritium require unique, 

specialized equipment. Once the tritium gas is extracted, GTSs are then filled to meet DoD specifications. 

Figure 3–2 illustrates the overall tritium processing flow. To recycle tritium from returned GTSs, the gas 

content is unloaded and then processed to remove any impurities. Helium-3, a byproduct resulting from 

the naturally occurring radioactive decay of tritium, is separated from the remaining tritium contents. The 

recycled tritium gas partially replenishes tritium inventory and can be reused in future GTS fills. 

Figure 3–2. Tritium processing flow

Various tritium extraction and purification processes, along with supporting functions, are performed in 

the H-Area Old Manufacturing facility, H-Area New Manufacturing facility, and the Tritium Extraction 

Facility at SRS. The Tritium Finishing Facility is a capital line-item project to construct a modern facility to 

replace the H-Area Old Manufacturing facility. 

While DOE/NNSA has the tritium processing capabilities and capacity to meet foreseeable workload 

requirements, the facilities that house the processes were built in the 1990s. DOE/NNSA is currently 

monitoring the health of equipment, infrastructure, waste gas processing, and other facility attributes to 

2 Reactor operating lifetimes are regulated by the NRC. WBN1 is currently licensed to operate through 2035 and TVA WBN2 

through 2055.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-19

meet program deliverables and is developing a plan to maintain and recapitalize the facilities to meet 

processing requirements and other delivery schedules. The plan focuses on both the need to maintain 

the facilities themselves and the need to ensure maintenance of the supply chain, which includes unique 

vendors and tritium R&D capabilities. 

The Tritium Finishing Facility line-item project, along with 

several minor construction projects, will replace the 

critical capabilities of the existing 60-year-old 

manufacturing building that operates 24/7 for GTS 

operations. The Tritium Finishing Facility achieved CD-1 

in 2019, initiated design activities in 2020, and is on 

schedule to be completed by FY 2031. 

Tritium extraction operations at SRS are keeping up with 

the growing demand for tritium needs. DOE/NNSA has 

the workforce capability to meet planned workload and 

mission deliverables. 

3.4.1.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–6 provides a high-level summary of Tritium Modernization Program challenges and the strategies 

to address them.

Table 3–6. Summary of Tritium Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Maintaining a reliable tritium supply chain 

to meet tritium inventory and availability 

requirements to load GTSs on schedule.

Assess supply chain risks and 

opportunities. Investments are being 

made that will provide a high level of 

reliability, flexibility, and resiliency to 

the program.

Continue to monitor risks and 

opportunities to identify costeffective solutions and retain high 

reliability.

Planning for alternative tritium production 

technologies or methods due to the 

uncertainties associated with NRC approval 

of operating license renewal applications in 

2055 for the Watts Bar Units 1 and 2. 

Invest in studies that identify and 

monitor viable and emerging 

replacement methods and 

technologies as risk mitigation for 

long-term tritium production.

Monitor evolving technologies and 

invest in existing or new technologies 

as appropriate. 

Maintaining facilities and equipment to 

support stockpile deliverables and future 

alterations, modification programs, and 

LEPs, and reduce GTS delivery risks.

Construct the modern Tritium 

Finishing Facility on schedule to 

replace infrastructure critical to 

stockpile deliverables at SRS by 2031.

Monitor emerging needs and 

implement strategies and actions to 

mitigate risks.

Developing technologies that further 

enhance stockpile maintenance and 

evaluation and increase efficiency of 

processes throughout the tritium 

production life cycle. 

Invest in fundamental tritium science 

to include material property 

interactions and scientific research 

into the material properties and 

behaviors of TPBARs, GTSs, and 

tritium gas processing technologies.

Develop a strategy to acquire 

dedicated radiological tritium 

capabilities to address future 

technology needs without 

compromising mission schedule.

Planning for long (approximately 2-year) 

lead times to hire, clear, and train 

personnel.

Examine multiyear staffing needs 

appropriate to ensure a continuous 

influx of knowledge, skills, and 

abilities to sustain capabilities. 

Implement additional strategies to 

maximize knowledge retention and 

minimize workforce turnover. 

Proposed Tritium Finishing Facility at SRS.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-20

3.4.2 Domestic Uranium Enrichment

Enriched uranium contains higher concentrations of the fissile 

uranium-235 isotope than natural uranium. DOE/NNSA requires

enriched uranium at varied enrichment levels for tritium 

production, nonproliferation, and the Naval Reactors Program. 

The Domestic Uranium Enrichment program is responsible for 

ensuring a reliable supply of enriched uranium is available to 

support U.S. national security needs. Since the 2013 closure of the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Paducah, Kentucky, the 

United States has lacked the capability to produce enriched 

uranium free of peaceful use obligations (i.e., unobligated). While 

commercial LEU sources exist, they carry peaceful use obligations and are therefore unusable for defense 

missions.

Mission needs for enriched uranium are currently fulfilled via the United States’ remaining HEU stockpile

(including downblending HEU to produce LEU where needed), which is a finite and currently irreplaceable 

source. 

3.4.2.1 Status

Domestic Uranium Enrichment is implementing a three-pronged strategy to supply current enriched 

uranium needs and re-establish a domestic uranium enrichment capability for long-term enriched 

uranium needs:

◼ Downblend HEU to LEU to extend the tritium fuel need date to 2044. DOE/NNSA has identified 

existing unobligated and unencumbered material to power the TVA reactors through 2044. Much 

of the material is HEU “scrap,” which is unattractive for use by other programs. Downblending

activities will continue through FY 2025. This effort maintains continuous operations at the only 

commercial downblender, which would otherwise close in the absence of feed material. 

However, because the HEU inventory is finite and, at present, irreplaceable, downblending is a 

temporary solution. 

◼ Develop enrichment technology options. Following an analysis of available enrichment 

technologies, DOE/NNSA determined that centrifuge technologies have the highest technical 

maturity and lowest risk. DOE/NNSA is funding centrifuge R&D efforts at Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory. 

◼ Execute an acquisition process to deploy an enrichment technology. Because of the finite nature 

of the HEU inventory, the United States will eventually need a new uranium enrichment capability. 

DOE/NNSA approved CD-0 for this capability in December 2016. DOE/NNSA expects to conclude 

an AoA and make a final technology downselect in the mid-2020s.

3.4.2.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–7 provides a high-level summary of Domestic Uranium Enrichment challenges and the strategies 

to address them. 

Domestic Uranium Enrichment 

Major Accomplishments

• Identified additional unobligated LEU, 

extending the LEU need date to 2044

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

successfully operated its small 

centrifuge in a demonstration cascade 

configuration
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-21

Table 3–7. Summary of Domestic Uranium Enrichment challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Enrichment technologies are complex and 

difficult to develop and deploy.

DOE has invested in two centrifuge 

technologies to provide optionality 

and contingency.

DOE/NNSA continuously assesses its 

inventory to identify any additional 

unobligated enriched uranium that

may provide additional development 

time or margin to the LEU need date.

Continue developing multiple 

centrifuge technologies in order to 

provide additional operational data 

and reduce long-term deployment 

risks.

Sources of unobligated LEU are finite and 

limited.

DOE/NNSA continuously assesses its 

inventory to identify any additional 

unobligated enriched uranium. 

Recently identified materials have 

resulted in a 3-year extension of the 

LEU need date.

Establish a reliable source of 

unobligated enriched uranium.

3.5 Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization

The Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization program manages 

projects and executes strategies to modernize, monitor, and 

ensure enduring availability of DOE/NNSA’s non-nuclear 

capabilities and capacities that address strategic objectives across 

the nuclear security enterprise. The Non-Nuclear Capability 

Modernization program provides funding to modernize and

strengthen capabilities required for full product realization, 

including design development and qualification and production of

non-nuclear components for multiple weapon systems. Nonnuclear components and subsystems make up more than half the 

cost of each warhead modernization activity. This program 

consolidates management and oversight of strategic investments 

in technology, equipment, infrastructure, tools, and materials.

The Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization program manages a 

portfolio made up of the following component categories: 

◼ Cable Assemblies

◼ Electronic Assemblies

◼ GTSs

◼ Lightning Arrestor Connectors

◼ Mechanisms

◼ Microelectronics Packaging

◼ Neutron Generators

◼ Power Sources

◼ Polymers

◼ Radiation Hardened Microelectronics

◼ Testers

Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization 

Accomplishments

• Developed Federal Microsystems Plan 

to assure trusted microelectronics are 

available for integration into our 

systems.

• Executed initiation of DOE Order 

413.3b Capital Acquisition process for 

Power Sources Capabilities.

• Started Short-term Expansion Plan to 

increase development and production 

capacity of non-nuclear components

• Initiated COTS (Commercial Off-theshelf) Transformation Initiative to 

address commercial product 

integration challenges.

• Developing production enclaves to 

accelerate the transition of design to 

production for future programs.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-22

Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization activities include:

◼ Procurement of equipment to meet non-nuclear component design, qualification, and 

manufacturing capacity requirements;

◼ Efforts to increase in capacity and capability of non-nuclear component manufacturing within the 

nuclear security enterprise and extend and strengthen the trusted supplier base;

◼ Sustainment of DOE/NNSA’s capability to produce trusted microelectronics; 

◼ Recapitalization of critical capabilities for the design, production, and qualification of nuclear 

weapon electrical and mechanical systems;

◼ Modernization of capabilities with a fragile vendor base such as Power Sources program 

deliverables;

◼ Reduction of component manufacturing costs through introduction of modernized processes and 

technologies; and

◼ Development of a pre-qualified and trusted inventory of commercial parts to avoid delays in 

integrating commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components.

Subject matter experts at the production facilities work with the national security laboratories early in the 

design phase to provide production perspectives on material selections and designs to enhance 

producibility of components. The national security laboratories define the component testing 

requirements for acceptance through a variety of specialized procedures to ensure that (1) materials meet 

design specifications; (2) parts are manufactured within acceptable tolerances; and (3) assemblies 

function as intended. 

DOE/NNSA has made progress in developing rapid prototyping and advanced manufacturing capabilities 

that have the potential to accelerate design definition, manufacture, qualification, and acceptance while 

reducing production issues and space while delivering reliable products at lower costs. 

3.5.1 Status

Production sites are facing capacity shortfalls in production and 

development of components due to increased weapon 

modernization requirements and scope. The increased workload has 

resulted in a growth in the Kansas City National Security Campus

(KCNSC) M&O workforce from 2,200 to more than 5,000 employees 

since 2014. DOE/NNSA is adding additional production capacity 

through leasing at KCNSC, as well as shifting production to other 

DOE/NNSA sites while simultaneously increasing the supplier base for 

commercial component production. Off-site office space has been 

leased to meet the increased office employment. KCNSC is leasing an 

additional 275,000 square feet of space for manufacturing and is in 

the process of adding 175,000 square feet to meet the near-term 

weapon modernization mission. Additional space will be required for 

long-term manufacturing requirements. To accelerate the transition 

from design to production, LLNL and KCNSC have partnered on the development of a polymer enclave. 

Construction for the enclave started in FY 2020 and is expected to complete in FY 2022 

SNL is the Nation’s sole resource for nuclear weapon power sources research, development, testing, and 

evaluation. Current stockpile stewardship plans are forecasting a fourfold increase in workload for power 

sources production during the next decade. The facility at SNL that primarily houses the DOE/NNSA power 

Non-Nuclear Capability 

Production Success

SNL, which has both design agency 

and production agency roles in the 

nuclear security enterprise, delivered 

nearly 40,000 non-nuclear parts, 

components, and technologies in 

FY 2020 to support all stockpile 

system maintenance activities and 

LEPs. KCNSC continues to produce 

or procures the majority of nonnuclear components for the nuclear 

security enterprise. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-23

sources capability is a shipping/receiving warehouse 

converted in 1949. Severe degradation of this facility led 

to an AoA that determined the need for a long-term 

replacement while exploring use of other SNL facilities,

such as the Agile Facility, on a temporary basis. The same 

issues hold true for radiation-hardened microelectronics 

at SNL’s Microsystems Engineering, Science, and 

Applications (MESA) complex. The MESA facilities and 

existing equipment face obsolescence and are rapidly 

aging beyond fitness for mission use. MESA has an 

ongoing extended life program that must be fully funded 

to sustain MESA’s capabilities through 2040. In addition, 

plans are in development for sourcing and manufacturing

required microelectronics well past 2040. 

Aging equipment poses reliability and obsolescence 

issues resulting in greater risk to continuity of operations. 

DOE/NNSA is pursuing efforts to better understand 

current and future equipment needs across the nuclear 

security enterprise for all aspects of the nuclear weapons 

mission, including non-nuclear production through the 

Programmatic Recapitalization Working Group. This 

working group is a combination of participants from the Office of Defense Programs and the Office of 

Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations, as well as full participation from each of the DOE/NNSA sites. 

The concern with aging capabilities extends to major environmental test facilities utilized for the 

qualification and assessment of non-nuclear components in their extreme environments to high 

reliabilities not required for commercial products. The majority of these facilities, including the Annular 

Core Research Reactor, are decades old and, similar to production facilities, have suffered from 

obsolescence and deferred maintenance over the years. These facilities must remain operational to 

assure that the qualification of non-nuclear components does not become critical path for the 

modernization programs. 

DOE/NNSA is becoming increasingly dependent on internal production due to difficulty sourcing trusted 

sources for non-nuclear weapon components such as power sources, explosive components, cables, and 

radiation-hardened microsystems. As a result, increased investment in facilities, equipment, and 

infrastructure is needed for certain product lines. In the long term, capital reinvestment will be crucial to 

maintaining the suite of DOE/NNSA’s manufacturing and testing capabilities. Developing additional 

qualified commercial suppliers will help this effort, although commercial demand for these products, with 

less stringent production requirements, is creating competition and posing challenges throughout the 

supplier base. 

3.5.2 Challenges and Strategies

Table 3–8 provides a high-level summary of Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization challenges and the 

strategies to address them. 

Magnesium Oxide Development Addresses a 

Legacy Material Supply Challenge

Sustained R&D efforts at SNL have led to a 

mechanistic understanding of legacy magnesium 

oxide (MgO) performance within thermal batteries.

Legacy MgO has a unique nanoscale structure, 

critical to its function, and the supply is limited. In 

FY 2019, the team demonstrated the ability to 

design and synthesize MgO materials with similar 

nanoscale structures and demonstrated their 

function in prototype batteries.

Scanning electron micrograph of

microstructure in porous magnesium oxide
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 3-24

Table 3–8. Summary of Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Increased Scope and Complexity: 

Workload projections to produce nonnuclear components for the program of 

record exceed existing equipment and 

infrastructure capacity. Manufacturing 

space was sized for fewer, less-complex 

weapon systems.

DOE/NNSA will develop options for 

additional space or more efficient use 

of existing space. Capital acquisition 

planning is underway to determine 

the most prudent solutions to provide 

increased production capacity at both 

SNL (for Power Sources) and KCNSC.

Additionally, production enclaves at 

design laboratories allow increased 

capacity.

The MESA complex at SNL fulfills an 

enduring need for radiation-hardened 

microelectronics. A Federal Management 

Plan will implement processes to validate 

sustainment and modernization needs, 

identify potential funding gaps, and 

develop mitigation strategies to ensure 

MESA capabilities continue to meet 

stockpile sustainment and modernization 

needs through 2040.

Integration of New Technologies: As new 

manufacturing techniques are developed, 

qualified, and accepted, new production 

capabilities are required to support 

manufacturing involving different 

materials, multi-function machines, 

additive manufacturing, and other new 

approaches. Space for the new 

capabilities is required in addition to 

current equipment until legacy 

technologies can be retired.

The Capability-Based Investments 

program is providing interim relief for 

some of the critical equipment needs 

related to these key product lines. 

Additionally, funds are committed to 

bring new polymer advanced 

manufacturing capabilities online by 

FY 2022.

The Non-Nuclear Capabilities Program will

work continue collaborating with the 

Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation Program Office to identify 

promising technologies that could/would 

be committed to future modernization 

programs if sufficiently mature, and fund 

them to higher technology readiness levels

(TRL) and manufacturing readiness levels. 

Pushing these technologies across the 

“valley of death” (i.e., mid-range TRLs) will 

enable improvements in stockpile safety, 

security, use control, and reliability, while 

minimizing the schedule, performance,

and cost risk to the identified 

modernization program.

Material Availability: Some material 

supplies are limited to only those 

quantities remaining from legacy 

programs, yet continue to be in demand 

by weapons programs. Vendors have lost 

the capability, capacity, or interest to 

produce more of these of materials.

Current efforts for managing these

critical materials consist of 

establishing a central database for atrisk materials and providing 

transparency of the supply chain 

status by industry experts. 

Supply chain analysis and studies will 

examine supplier network risks for nonnuclear components and provide 

recommended policy actions, production 

activity practices, and material solutions to 

improve supply chain resiliency. These 

efforts also coordinate across DOE/NNSA 

to prioritize supplier risks, develop 

enterprise-wide mitigation strategies, and 

leverage available policy tools.

Vendor Implications: Risks in the 

available supplier base and the need to 

produce more classified components is 

driving a need for additional in-house 

production capability while continuing to 

identify and qualify additional suppliers.

The program will support the 

development and replacement of 

non-nuclear component material 

identified for use. The program will

then engage on activities to 

modernize DOE/NNSA’s industrial 

capacity for its implementation.

Early engagement with design 

requirements in order to research 

potential new qualified sources. 

Determine alternative contracting 

methods to purchase goods and services 

from qualified sources quicker and more 

efficiently. Baseline capabilities at the 

design agencies to quickly fulfill 

unexpected needs.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-1

Chapter 4

Stockpile Research, Technology, and 

Engineering

4.1 Overview

The Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering 

(SRT&E) Program is central to maintaining a credible 

deterrent and ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness 

of the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. SRT&E is responsible for 

research, development, qualification, certification, testing, 

and evaluation support to stockpile sustainment, stockpile 

modernization, warhead production, and the future nuclear 

security enterprise. The program also ensures the science, 

technology, and engineering proficiency of the Department 

of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA) workforce for the future and helps maintain the 

readiness of its infrastructure to support near-term and

future workloads. 

The drivers for SRT&E include (1) sustaining the deployed 

stockpile; (2) enabling the future nuclear deterrent;

(3) assessing and mitigating threats to the deterrent; and 

(4) developing modern materials and design and 

manufacturing options for the nuclear security enterprise. 

The science-based SRT&E program sustains the deterrent in 

the absence of nuclear explosive testing and advances 

DOE/NNSA’s understanding of nuclear weapon functionality 

through science, technology, and engineering research. 

Key activities such as advanced modeling and simulation 

capabilities, subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments, high 

energy density (HED) physics experiments, and test flights of 

high-fidelity simulators provide the capabilities to underwrite 

current and future nuclear stockpiles. Enhanced 

experimental and simulation capabilities are required to 

recreate, interrogate, and provide data on materials and 

physics at weapon-like conditions to address these focus 

areas. Capabilities developed under SRT&E provide data 

essential to stockpile modernization and production and help 

recruit, train, and retain the next generation of stockpile 

stewards. 

Major Stockpile Research, Technology, and 

Engineering Program Accomplishments

• Conducted first-of-its-kind radiography on a 

centrifuge to evaluate and validate novel 

design and surety technologies under high 

G-force loads expected in future weapon 

environments.

• Ported and demonstrated existing and nextgeneration Integrated Design Codes/

weapons performance codes on new 

architecture for the Sierra supercomputer in 

preparation for use on NNSA’s first exascale 

computer, El Capitan.

• Combined artificial intelligence with machine 

learning and high performance computing to 

expedite assessments of the National 

Ignition Facility Inertial Confinement Fusion 

Ignition and High Yield hydrotests for a life 

extension program. 

• Nightshade A, a subcritical experiment 

executed at the U1a facility, provided key 

data to underwrite the performance of the 

evolving stockpile.

• Measured material properties for newly cast, 

10-year, and 30-year naturally aged 

plutonium to inform updated pit lifetimes and 

pit production requirements. 

• Successfully executed a plutonium 

equation-of-state experiment at higher 

pressure and accuracy than previously 

possible at the Z pulsed power facility (Z).

• Used additive manufacturing to fabricate a 

high explosive that was transferred to the 

W87-1 program in FY 2021, leading to 

reduced costs and manufacturing times.

• Completed three-dimensional, end-to-end 

simulation of a warhead encountering 

combined hostile environments to assess 

effect on subsequent weapon performance. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-2

For more than 25 years, the program has pioneered, developed, and deployed capabilities to provide 

DOE/NNSA with important, high-fidelity data to maintain and modernize the stockpile and associated 

workforce. SRT&E’s world-class capabilities provide a hedge against prospective and unanticipated risks 

and prevent technological surprise, and it is critical to enabling technical assessment of the stockpile 

without nuclear explosive testing.

4.2 Strategic Program Goals

The initial Stockpile Stewardship Program established 20 years ago focused largely on nuclear explosive 

package experimental science and simulation, namely low energy density science (primaries), HED science 

(secondaries), modeling and simulation (making use of the experimental data), and high performance

computing (HPC) (to run the weapon models in the timeframes and detail needed). This approach can 

now be applied to the needs of the future nuclear security enterprise in warhead component production 

and timely non-nuclear component design and certification. While the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

has made great advances in nuclear weapon science, engineering, simulation, and computing, challenges 

still remain and grow with an uncertain geopolitical future, enduring and emerging threats, and the aging 

of the stockpile itself.

The strategic program goals of SRT&E are still applicable as DOE/NNSA embarks on the next 20 years of 

Stockpile Stewardship. SRT&E continues to apply Stockpile Stewardship Program capabilities to address 

present needs and prepare for the requirements associated with an uncertain future. SRT&E advances

capabilitiesfor improved understanding of weapon performance and demonstrates new technologies and 

production processes as viable options for the future stockpile. Development of these capabilities well 

before their needed insertion in the stockpile is required to understand risks that such insertions would 

introduce due to aging, changing legacy processes, and evolving threats. These capabilities:

◼ Drive program plans within SRT&E (Section 4.3).

◼ Align with the 10-year program outlook in the Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule (SCDS) 

(Section 4.2.2).

◼ Drive a new approach to Weapons Activities Line Item Planning (formerly capital acquisition 

planning) (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).

◼ Reaffirm the importance of Academic Programs to encourage weapon-relevant research and 

develop a pipeline research and development (R&D) scientists and engineers with weaponrelated education and training (Section 4.3.6). 

Looking to the future, SRT&E will continue to implement and develop capabilities to address issues facing 

the nuclear security enterprise. As part of an enterprise-wide strategy, SRT&E will take leadership in three 

areas:

◼ Fostering an environment of innovation aimed at improving our understanding of the stockpile 

and serving as the proving grounds for new ideas.

◼ Applying SRT&E capabilities to enable a more modern and efficient production complex.

◼ Investing in the next generation to lead the nuclear security enterprise by equipping them with 

the knowledge, judgment, and state-of-the-art scientific and computing capabilities to achieve 

the mission.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-3

Accomplishing these goals requires some fundamental changes in the way the nuclear security enterprise

is managed, including directly addressing three major obstacles to success: 

◼ Risk avoidance has become ingrained in the culture of the nuclear security enterprise due to the 

high-risk, high-consequence nature of DOE/NNSA’s mission. This has created an environment 

that can inhibit both innovation and attempts to do things differently, even if the changes would 

produce a more resilient and responsive nuclear security enterprise. 

◼ Prioritization is a persistent issue. Because modernizing production infrastructure is currently the 

highest priority to meet Department of Defense (DoD) requirements, SRT&E is deferring some 

investments.

◼ Lack of a common understanding of shared mission across the management and operating sites

is partly driven by the fact that sites are not incentivized to work together on common goals, as 

they are rated primarily on individual contributions through seven different prime contracts with 

DOE/NNSA. 

To advance an improved approach, SRT&E will employ internal and external outreach, communicate the

common vision for the future of the enterprise more effectively, codify strategies and plans, and enable 

appropriate risk-taking. 

4.2.1 Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule

The SCDS aligns SRT&E programs with mission objectives, coordinates efforts across Defense Programs, 

and communicates with internal and external stakeholders. DOE/NNSA and the national security 

laboratories, plants, and sites use the SCDS to guide capability development (Figure 4–1) in four key focus 

areas. These focus areas reflect the advances necessary for mission delivery, as well as what is required 

to achieve objectives in an integrated manner.

◼ Stockpile Sustainment guides the efforts that support the needs of the current U.S. nuclear 

stockpile, such as material aging studies and improving warhead assessment experimental, 

modeling, and simulation capabilities. 

◼ Future Deterrent develops responsive technologies, architectures, and processes that reduce 

cycle times for future weapon development. 

◼ Threat Mitigation develops and matures technologies and experimental capabilities to simulate 

and mitigate combined and emerging reentry and hostile environments that future weapons may 

encounter. 

◼ Modern Materials and Manufacturing develops advanced materials and ways to manufacture 

materials and components that are robust to hostile environments, extend lifetimes, minimize 

risk of material obsolescence, and reduce production life cycle time and cost. 

◼ New to the SCDS from its last appearance in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

(SSMP) is a milestone in FY 2022 under Modern Materials and Manufacturing that covers Special 

Materials. The topic area and timeframe needed were developed in conjunction with Production 

Modernization, allowing SRT&E to shift near-term focus to meet an enterprise need. The Hostile 

Survivability Baseline milestone was also delayed to the second quarter of FY 2021 due to the inperson work restrictions responding to COVID-19. The SCDS provides a guiding framework while 

still maintaining a flexible and dynamic look at the needs of the enterprise to revise objectives in 

consultation with internal and external stakeholders. Successful accomplishment of SCDS 

objectives requires strong partnerships across Defense Programs. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-4

Figure 4–1. Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule – the four key focus areas needed to 

address mission delivery

4.2.2 Enduring Drivers for Stockpile Research, Technology, and 

Engineering 

Responsible stockpile stewardship demands computational, 

experimental, and testing capabilities, as well as continuous 

development of a qualified workforce to implement these 

capabilities. They are essential for stewardship of the 

current stockpile and must be enhanced to improve 

understanding of nuclear weapons performance to support 

the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent into the future. 

Enhancing capabilities to prepare for the future also allows 

the nuclear security enterprise to remain responsive with an 

ability to adapt to changing geopolitical environments as 

needed, as well as attract, train, and retain the requisite 

stockpile expertise in the workforce. 

4.2.2.1 Sustaining and Assessing the Current 

Stockpile

The status of the current stockpile is monitored through 

continuous, multi-layered assessments of the safety, 

security, and effectiveness of each U.S. nuclear weapon 

system. As explained in Section 2.1.2.1, the annual stockpile 

assessment process evaluates the safety, performance, and 

reliability of weapons based on physics and engineering 

Advanced Technologies for Stockpile 

Surveillance

The Weapon Technology and Manufacturing

Maturation Program is developing sensor 

technologies and embedded sensor systems 

for in situ surveillance and enhanced future 

system capabilities. 

Some devices under development: 

• A low-power thermal sensor that provides 

temperature vs. time data to understand 

aging and overall system health. The 

data will be used in predictive aging 

models. 

• A pressure sensor and a displacement 

sensor for shock and vibration 

measurement that works with the 

embedded sensor processor electronics 

to understand the internal and external 

operational environments seen by the 

weapon system. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-5

analyses, experiments, and computer simulations. Assessments further evaluate the effect of aging on 

performance and quantify performance thresholds, uncertainties, and margins. These evaluations 

depend on all available sources of information, including surveillance, non-nuclear hydrodynamic tests, 

subcritical experiments, materials evaluation, modeling and simulation, and enhanced surveillance 

techniques. These assessments rely on new advances in tools, including computational and experimental 

advances. Continuous assessment involves assembling a body of evidence to assess performance at the 

part, component, subsystem, and system levels to determine whether all the required performance 

characteristics are met. The processes combine data and theories with simulations of nuclear weapons 

to inform expert judgement and arrive at conclusions. DOE/NNSA uses expert judgment to combine data, 

theory, experiment, and simulation and arrive at conclusions. This process is underwritten by extensive 

peer review. SRT&E brings together experimental and modeling tools to evaluate current performance 

and study uncertainties around those baselines. Some of the many sources of information derived from 

SRT&E activities are depicted in Figure 4–2. 

Figure 4–2. Weapon assessments rely on many sources of information from Stockpile Research, 

Technology, and Engineering

Weapons scientists and engineers are crucial to every aspect of the assessment process. The overall 

assessment philosophy and approach involves quantification of weapon characteristics and a deep 

understanding of the multi-physics mechanisms driving weapons performance under a variety of 

conditions. The laboratory teams responsible for each weapon system and its assessment are comprised 

of scientists and engineers who are deep technical experts in multiple physics areas relevant to weapons 

physics and who review both historical and new data. Several mechanisms exist to ensure that each 

national security laboratory has full and complete access to all relevant weapons data to support these 

assessments. These mechanisms include regular exchanges of electronic documents and databases 

between sites and several peer-to-peer data-sharing options. In addition, DOE/NNSA sites are 

consolidating and digitizing historical weapon data to ensure it is available to future weapon designers. 

The assessments and conclusions in the Annual Assessment Reports are reviewed by independent 

reviewers, federally mandated Red Teams (subject matter experts from the other national security 

laboratories who are appointed by their Laboratory Directors), program managers, senior laboratory 

management, and the Laboratory Directors. Specific results related to the stockpile systems are included 

in the latest Report on Stockpile Assessments.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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The assessment process can be at least, if not more, complicated than the initial certification process, as 

scientists and engineers must reconcile what was fielded in reality with what was intended in the design. 

4.2.2.2 Ensuring the Future Stockpile

The evolving international and increasingly cross-domain security environment, as well as the aging of the 

stockpile, drive requirements for life extension programs (LEPs) and potential modern replacements for 

existing stockpile systems. Ensuring the resiliency of the U.S. nuclear deterrent requires qualification- and 

certification-ready options, from materials through components to systems, to be matured and available 

when needed for down-select decisions, development, and production. This maturation demands 

advances in qualification and certification methodologies, improvements to the responsiveness of the 

nuclear security enterprise, improved integration with DoD, and development of new and emergent 

capabilities for the qualification and certification processes. 

4.2.2.3 Qualification

SRT&E collaborates with Stockpile Management to steward, 

advance, and qualify nuclear weapons components, 

subassemblies, and integrated systems to meet the military 

characteristics across the stockpile-to-target sequence (STS) 

environment requirements (e.g., normal, abnormal, and hostile 

environments specified in the STS). These qualification activities 

are defined in qualification plans and use experimental and 

modeling/simulation capabilities. Experimental capabilities 

include flight tests, shock and vibration tests, thermal 

environment tests, and exposure to various forms of radiation. 

Modeling and simulation are used to interpolate and 

extrapolate into regions not addressed by testing and 

experiments.

DOE/NNSA is developing a series of high-cadence technology 

development capabilities intended for full system testing in 

relevant environments that are cost-effective tools for 

technology maturation. These tools allow for more rapid 

development of future technologies and deployment of weapon 

systems. Initial data shows demonstrators help increase

TRL/MRL1 and are effective at transferring technology to the 

end users. DOE/NNSA is collecting additional data to confirm 

initial findings. Technology funded by the Advanced 

Manufacturing Development subprogram has benefited from 

demonstrators, and demonstrators have been particularly 

useful for growing the acceptance of additive manufacturing in 

the enterprise.

Current demonstrator projects provide opportunities for cross-enterprise collaboration and optimization. 

The Joint Technology Demonstrator (JTD) is a United States and United Kingdom strategic collaboration 

dedicated to the design and execution of joint, integrated system demonstrations supporting new safety, 

security, and advanced manufacturing technologies. The primary goal of the JTD collaboration is to build 

and sustain core capabilities throughout the United States and United Kingdom nuclear weapon 

1 TRL/MRL refers to Technology Readiness Level and Manufacturing Readiness Level, as defined in Appendix F. 

Enhanced Vibration Testing in 

Laboratory Supports Qualification

National security laboratory researchers 

have been rapidly progressing the state of 

the art in multi-axis and multi-input vibration 

testing. Technology maturation has resulted 

in increased test capabilities demonstrated 

on laboratory tests of High Operational 

Tempo Sounding Rocket Program (HOT 

Shot) payloads as well as mock RB system 

and subassembly hardware from the Joint 

Technology Demonstrator program. 

Advances made in 2019 and 2020 

milestones in multi-axis flight simulation has 

further increased capabilities by enabling 

new and improved test design methods. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-7

enterprises in the design, manufacture, ground testing, and assembly of flight‐ready hardware. The Air 

Force has realized the benefit of JTD and has created the opportunity for a flight test in FY 2022. This joint 

JTD follow-on demonstrator is called the Air Force NNSA Demonstration Initiative. 

DOE/NNSA achieves desired timelines by adopting flexible architectures for adaptability and agility, 

developing tight design agency/production agency collaboration from early activities for increased 

responsiveness, and applying advanced accelerated methods for qualification and certification.

Understanding what works and what does not are identified in the course of the “build, test, break” cycle.

As new manufacturing technologies are inserted into the production enterprise, qualification of complex 

components and materials produced presents new challenges. To ensure that advances in manufacturing 

do not result in complex, costly, and lengthy acceptance processes, new inspection technologies such as 

in-line metrology and born-qualified processes are being developed by the SRT&E program. In addition, 

new measurement techniques are being developed and deployed to more fully characterize products to 

enable predictive assessments of stockpile performance over time.

4.3 Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering Elements 

and Status

SRT&E elements play a major role in the full range of stockpile activities. The high-level FY 2021

accomplishments in the sidebar on page 4-1 are the result of using the program’s experimental, modeling, 

and simulation capabilities to design weapon subsystems and quantify their expected performance for 

the weapon program of record. These capabilities enable the nuclear survivability qualification of several 

components. The five major elements that enable Stockpile Stewardship are the Assessment Science 

program, the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Ignition and High Yield program, the Advanced Simulation 

and Computing (ASC) program, the Engineering and Integrated Assessments program, and the Weapon 

Technology and Manufacturing Maturation program. These elements are illustrated in Figure 4–3. 

Figure 4–3. Subprograms in Science, Research, Technology, and Engineering
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-8

4.3.1 Assessment Science

The Assessment Science program provides the knowledge, expertise, and experimental toolkits needed 

to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive testing. Capabilities 

developed and maintained by the Assessment Science program support the entire nuclear security 

enterprise providing (1) the scientific underpinnings required to conduct annual assessments of weapon 

performance and certification of LEPs; (2) the scientific insight necessary to inform our understanding of 

the effects of surveillance findings to assure that the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective; 

and (3) the core technical expertise required to be responsive to technical developments and geopolitical

drivers. Assessment Science also facilitates the assessment of current weapon and weapon component 

lifetimes, development and qualification of modern materials and manufacturing processes, concepts for 

component reuse, and modern safety concepts for sustainment.

This program performs experiments to obtain the materials and nuclear data required to validate and to 

understand the physics of nuclear weapons performance. Science program experiments and data 

analyses also facilitate evaluations of safety, security, and sustainment concepts without the need for 

additional nuclear explosive testing. These activities serve to develop, exercise, and maintain the 

expertise and competence of the nuclear weapon design, engineering, and assessment community. Each 

subprograms links to other areas within Weapons Activities. Those linkages are described in Figure 4–4.

Figure 4–4. Assessment Science linkages to Weapons Activities

Primary Assessment Technologies provides foundational capabilities for annual assessment of stockpile 

primaries, certification of future sustainment programs, improvements in primary safety and security, and 

resolution of significant finding investigations (SFIs). It also designs and executes subcritical experiments

that provide essential data to underwrite the performance of the evolving stockpile. This subprogram 

improves predictive ability by developing common models to quantify uncertainties in predictions; 

supports experimental platforms to validate weapons physics models; incorporates experimental data to 

improve modeling of boost, plutonium aging, and manufacturing variances; and enables threat-informed 

design and assessment advances. 

Dynamic Materials Properties develops and maintains the experimental capabilities needed to describe 

and predict the behavior of weapon materials in extreme environments. The subprogram provides the 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-9

experimental data and assessment of special nuclear material (SNM), metals, conventional/insensitive 

high explosives (HE), polymers, and foams under dynamic conditions. It furthers understanding of how 

fundamental material behavior affects nuclear weapon performance. The subprogram advances 

understanding of how plutonium aging and manufacturing methods of plutonium and HE impact weapon 

performance. It also maintains capabilities to expand pressure, temperature, and strain rate regimes and 

advances characterization methodologies of these high-interest materials, leading to reduction of 

uncertainties in performance models.

Advanced Diagnostics establishes tomorrow’s tools for delivering stockpile data that matter. It develops 

revolutionary diagnostics and methodologies for hydrodynamic, subcritical, gas gun, and other dynamic 

experiments that subject materials to strong shocks and high strain rates. It provides next-generation 

driver technologies that can create dynamic experimental conditions relevant to the stockpile. It also 

incorporates novel data analysis techniques that push the boundaries of what can be learned from 

dynamic experiments.

Secondary Assessment Technologies provides capabilities that increase confidence in the assessment of 

stockpile secondaries and enables a broad range of sustainment options and resolution of SFIs. It uses 

past nuclear explosive test data and a variety of experiments to develop and validate physical models, 

expand the domain of validity of modeling tools, and qualify experimental platforms to meet the needs 

of current and future modernization programs.

Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) closes a capability gap in the ability to certify 

changes to the stockpile, including aging, modern manufacturing technologies, modern materials, and 

evolving design philosophies. Data from the ECSE program helps underwrite certification of the W87-1 

Modification Program, as well as future annual assessments and modernization programs. Figure 4–5

shows one of the capital investment elements of ECSE, the Advanced Sources and Detectors “Scorpius” 

accelerator. The U1a Complex Enhancements Project line item is preparing the underground U1A 

Complex (U1A) to receive this major item of equipment in order to provide advanced diagnostics for 

subcritical testing. 

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiment Execution Support enables execution of prioritized 

experiments through the National Hydrodynamic Test Plan and the National Subcritical Plan to deliver 

critical data in support of modernization programs, stockpile maintenance, experimental science, and 

global security. The subprogram allows assessment of potential effects from design changes, material 

substitutions, or component changes associated with LEPs, alterations (Alts), or modification programs 

(Mods) on weapon performance and safety. 

4.3.1.1 Status

The Assessment Science program is increasing its resource allocation toward large-scale integrated 

experiments while preserving a balanced portfolio of focused experiments to underwrite the performance 

of the evolving stockpile. Enduring experimental priorities include hydrodynamic experiments and 

subcritical experiments that fully utilize ECSE upon delivery, as well as materials science platforms to 

investigate the effect of material changes on weapon performance. These priority experiments will also 

use new capabilities that leverage DOE’s investment in world-class advanced light sources2 and in situ 

aging and manufacturing experiments on hazardous and SNM at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center 

neutron diffraction and proton radiography facilities. These strategic priorities enable the assessment 

2 Advanced lights sources, such as synchrotrons and X-ray free-electron lasers operated by the DOE Office of Science, are devices 

designed to emit exceptionally brilliant and penetrating light that allow diagnostic imaging of nuclear weapon implosions and

other weapon-related phenomena. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-10

Figure 4–5. Advanced Sources and Detectors “Scorpius” Layout at U1a Complex

program to establish a robust, forward-leaning effort that considers potential future needs and 

investigates design concepts for potential new technologies. These efforts improve understanding of how 

manufacturing processes and subsequent material properties affect performance, which in turn help 

identify flexible capabilities to produce parts with better efficiency, reliability, flexibility, and control.

4.3.1.2 Challenges and Strategies for Assessment Science

Table 4–1 provides a high-level summary of Assessment Science challenges and the strategies to address 

them. 

Table 4–1. Summary of Assessment Science challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Meeting Evolving Stockpile 

Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence

Stewardship must provide the tools to 

promptly assess performance issues, 

including SFIs, aging, and evolving 

threat environments to underwrite the 

surety and effectiveness of the 

stockpile without underground nuclear 

tests. 

Provide capabilities to support stockpile 

assessments, LEP reuse, and surety decisions. 

Achieve a robust understanding of weapons’ 

physics supported by a full range of 

experiments, including boost; radiation 

transport; hydrodynamics; plasma, nuclear, 

and material properties; and platform and 

diagnostics development. 

Conduct subcritical experiments to inform 

LEP options, assess aging effects, inform 

safety choices, provide needed data on the 

hydrodynamics of implosions, and 

underwrite stockpile performance.

Conduct experiments and analyses 

to resolve the principal remaining 

uncertainties to achieve a 

predictive capability.

Enhance efficiencies in 

experimental operations to reduce 

fielding time and number of 

experiments required for 

assessment and certification.

Establish domestic and global 

partnerships to leverage strategic 

scientific investments to realize 

capabilities. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Modernizing Through Science and 

Engineering

Improve our understanding of how 

material aging and manufacturing 

processes affect system performance 

to identify material replacement 

requirements and flexible capabilities 

to produce parts with better efficiency, 

reliability, flexibility, and control.

Understand the effects of aging (in particular, 

aging plutonium) on weapon performance 

through execution of the National Plutonium 

Aging Strategy, studies on aging, canned 

subassemblies, and evaluations of new 

materials and processes through Production 

Science partnerships on plutonium, uranium, 

HE, and non-nuclear materials.

Deliver high-pressure materials property data 

at weapon-relevant regimes to understand 

how the manufacturing process and the 

subsequent material structure and properties 

affect performance to enable the broader 

enterprise to quickly adopt new technologies 

and improve material tolerances to increase 

efficiency of production. 

Deliver world-class experimental capabilities 

to support hydrodynamic testing, dynamic 

plutonium experiments, nuclear science, 

materials’ characterization, and HED physics.

Invest in production-oriented R&D 

testbeds to accelerate evaluation 

of cutting-edge technologies for 

the production mission.

Prepare for an Uncertain Future 

The 21st century threat environment is 

evolving rapidly; accurate assessment 

of the effect of these threats and 

development of mitigation options are 

key to a resilient U.S. nuclear 

deterrent. A responsive R&D 

enterprise includes the development 

of options for LEPs, modern 

replacements, and tailored deterrence 

options that are certification-ready. 

Invest in a core suite of flexible experimental 

capabilities that enable access to weaponsrelevant regimes at a variety of scales from 

small focused to large integrated 

experiments that provide weapon designers 

with the capabilities required to respond to a 

rapidly evolving threat environment.

Deliver certification-ready options 

for LEPs and the future stockpile to 

inform down-select decisions.

Enable assessment and certification 

of these options via sufficient range 

of experiments.

Increase coordination with other 

Government stakeholders to 

consider how potential new 

technology concepts would affect

the strategic deterrence balance.

4.3.2 Engineering and Integrated Assessments

The Engineering and Integrated Assessments Program is responsible for ensuring system-agnostic 

survivability in present and future STSs and ensures a responsive nuclear deterrent through collaborative 

partnerships, proactive integration, and assessments. This program supports four key mission areas 

(1) strengthening the science, technology, and engineering base by maturing advanced technologies for 

insertion in future weapon modernizations; (2) providing tools for qualifying weapon components and 

certifying weapons without nuclear explosive testing; (3) supporting annual stockpile assessments 

through improved weapons surveillance technologies and warhead component aging assessments; and 

(4) providing capabilities that accelerate the nuclear weapons acquisition process and strengthen the 

ability of the United States to respond to unexpected developments that could threaten nuclear security. 

Engineering and Integrated Assessments subprogram linkages to Weapons Activities are shown in 

Figure 4–6.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-12

Figure 4–6. Engineering and Integrated Assessments linkages to Weapons Programs

Archiving and Support preserves and maintains relevant historic records, data, and knowledge related to 

U.S. nuclear testing and Stockpile Stewardship, providing targeted studies, independent reviews, and 

multi-system assessments that support the annual assessment process. It maintains program 

management and the infrastructure needed to support R&D capabilities and activities across the 

enterprise.

Delivery Environments ensures weapon survivability in normal and abnormal environments for future 

and current stockpile to target sequences. In doing so, the Delivery Environments Program predicts and 

models system responses to future environments and delivery platforms while addressing failure and 

survivability margins. The Delivery Environments Program works closely with interagency partner such as 

DoD and the Intelligence Community to support informed mission execution.

Weapons Survivability develops and delivers the experimental and simulation-based tools and 

technologies needed to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent now and into the future can be designed, 

certified, and qualified to survive hostile environments. The scope includes developing scientific and 

engineering models for understanding radiation effects; improving laboratory radiation sources and 

diagnostics to support code validation and hardware qualification experiments; generating experimental 

data to validate scientific and engineering models; understanding radiation-hardened design strategies; 

and evaluating candidate and evolving stockpile technologies for radiation hardness capabilities in a 

generalized, weapon-relevant configuration.

Studies and Assessments funds all future budget requests for Phase One weapon development and 

scoping study activities, including the current Sea-Launched Cruise Missile study, Analyses of Alternatives, 

cost estimation, and schedule development. 

Aging and Lifetimes develops diagnostics, experimental capabilities, techniques, and models to predict 

the effects of weapon aging and ensure the weapons stockpile remains healthy through its required 

lifetime. It provides insight on the chemical compatibility of reused legacy materials and components 

with new materials introduced to modernization programs in non-nuclear components and materials, HE
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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in the nuclear explosive package, plutonium for pits, canned subassemblies and cases, and polymers and 

adhesives in the nuclear explosive package systems.

Advanced Certification and Qualification (ACQ) develops tools and methods to ensure that there is a 

certification path for stockpile systems and components in the absence of additional nuclear explosive 

testing. It does this by integrating computing, science, technology, and engineering advancements to 

facilitate certification of future life extensions and other warhead needs. ACQ has moved from 

understanding the certification basis for the legacy stockpile to developing certification methodologies 

for the evolving stockpile, including planned LEPs and potential future systems. Further, ACQ is exploring 

alternative paths to the qualification of components and systems to accelerate the introduction of newly 

developed technologies into LEP planning. 

Stockpile Responsiveness develops and exercises capabilities required to support all phases of the joint 

nuclear weapons life cycle process, transfers knowledge and skills to the newer generation of nuclear 

weapon designers and engineers, and strengthens integration between DoD and DOE/NNSA. This 

program explores the art of the possible by using potential responses to future threats to explore the 

acceleration of design, engineering, testing, production, and qualification methodologies that could 

increase responsiveness of the nuclear weapons complex. Detailed information on the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program can be found in Appendix D of the SSMP. 

4.3.2.1 Status

The tools, technologies, methods, and data developed within the Engineering and Integrated Assessments 

Program ensure the viability and success of ongoing modernization programs and the rapid certification 

and qualification of future weapon systems. Success depends on diverse, highly qualified staff throughout 

the complex; close coordination and cooperation between weapon designers, weapon engineers and 

production agencies; partnerships with ongoing modernization and surveillance programs, and close 

coordination with the programmatic and technical efforts ongoing throughout the SRT&E portfolio. 

The program continues to rapidly increase access to historical records and data that are imperative for 

the certification of new weapon designs without the benefit of underground nuclear testing by indexing 

and digitalizing existing records. In concert, the program continues to expand experimental and diagnostic 

capabilities to collect data that inform models being developed for lifetime predictions and ensure the 

survivability of weapon systems due to technical advancements of U.S. adversaries. 

As the United States begins potentially exploring new weapon capabilities, the nuclear security enterprise 

will be undertaking the first new weapon development program since the end of the Cold War through 

the W93’s Concept Assessment Phase. 

To ensure the success of new acquisition programs and reduce the associated time and cost, the 

Engineering and Integrated Assessments Program is developing methodologies, computational tools, and 

technology development capabilities to advance the technical readiness and manufacturability of weapon 

systems and components. These include ground and flight testing capabilities; tools to improve combined 

environment testing; facilities to evaluate hostile radiation exposures; quantification of uncertainties for 

engineering models; digital design; engineering and manufacturing tools; embedded sensing; and 

diagnostics. All of these will be available to the next generation of weapon designers and engineers.

4.3.2.2 Challenges and Strategies for Engineering and Integrated Assessments

Table 4–2 provides a high-level summary of Engineering and Integrated Assessments challenges and the 

strategies to address them. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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Table 4–2. Summary of Engineering and Integrated Assessments challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Experienced nuclear weapon design and 

production agency personnel, some going 

back to the underground nuclear test era, 

are leaving the workforce. Transferring 

knowledge and skills from one generation 

to the next must be done in the coming few 

years before staff turnover is complete.

Execute the Archiving and Data Management 

Program responsible for the preservation of 

knowledge and expertise derived from U.S. 

nuclear testing, Stockpile Stewardship efforts 

following the testing moratorium, and making 

past, present and future collections accessible 

to the nuclear security enterprise workforce of 

today and tomorrow.

Stockpile Responsiveness exercises will be used 

to develop expertise outside of the programs of 

record to address challenges and problems 

posed by DoD.

Complete archiving of national 

laboratory and production 

agency holdings in ways that 

make information searchable 

and useful for future stockpile 

stewards.

Conduct design/build/test 

cycles to exercise joint design 

and production agency teams 

outside of the modernization 

programs.

The nuclear weapon stockpile is aging and 

made of materials that may no longer be 

produced or are hazardous to handle. 

Newly produced weapons have anticipated 

lifetimes measured in decades. 

Execute the Aging and Lifetimes program to 

develop non-destructive evaluation (increase 

data on weapon materials of interest) to 

minimize effects to the stockpile, analyze 

materials of interest to modernization and 

surveillance stakeholders, and leverage 

relationships with other DOE/NNSA programs 

to obtain data and information as needs arise.

Establish a robust effort on 

embedded sensing to provide 

an opportunity to mitigate 

risks in a rapidly changing 

environment.

Environments associated with nuclear 

explosions cannot be completely replicated 

in the laboratory, and the number of 

nuclear tests that the United States 

conducted to understand these

environments is of diminishing relevance.

Determine weapon material effects by 

developing improved radiation and hostile 

environment experiments across a range of 

reactor, explosive, and HED facilities, improving

testing, modeling, and simulation capabilities

and developing technologies and system 

designs for enhanced survivability in evolving 

environments.

Establish a combined radiation 

effects experimental capability 

to provide a basis for high 

fidelity modeling and 

simulation.

Aging equipment, facilities, and 

infrastructure used to simulate the

environments nuclear weapons experience

(normal, abnormal, hostile, and combined 

environments) may not be sufficient to 

meet future STS needs.

Expand investment in new and existing test and 

experimentation facilities to support the 

current and future stockpile.

Fill the gap between what modeling and 

simulation can accomplish today with what it 

needs to do tomorrow, to include experimental 

validation and verification.

Develop modeling, simulation, 

and experimental capabilities 

to assess warhead 

performance as delivered.

4.3.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion

The ICF program delivers HED capabilities and expertise that support research and testing in the 

laboratory of materials and radiation under the extreme conditions produced inside a detonating nuclear 

weapon. Its twofold mission is to meet immediate and emerging needs for HED data on materials and 

properties under HED conditions to support the deterrent of today and advance the R&D capabilities 

necessary to meet those needs for the deterrent of the future. The ICF program enables access to and 

data delivery from the HED regime through: (1) the design and execution of complex physics experiments 

to improve our integrated, as well as, fundamental understanding of properties and processes in the HED 

regime; (2) the development of instrumentation to diagnose physics phenomena at the extreme 

temperature, pressure, and density conditions relevant to nuclear weapons performance; and (3) the 

development and operation of experimental facilities capable of reaching those conditions.
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The ICF program leverages its experimental design expertise, 

computational modeling capabilities, diagnostic technology, target 

engineering and fabrication infrastructure, and national HED facilities 

to ensure high-fidelity experimental capabilities and data are 

available to support a range of DOE/NNSA missions. Its capabilities 

are used by program partners to assess and certify the existing 

stockpile, inform design decisions for current LEPs, investigate hostile 

nuclear environments, and support DoD research.

The ICF program supports DOE/NNSA’s long-term R&D mission by 

developing the knowledge and capabilities necessary to reach 

controlled thermonuclear fusion in the laboratory. Reaching a 

burning plasma3 platform and eventually producing high fusion yield4

will open the door to a range of important weapons physics that has 

been unreachable since the cessation of underground nuclear testing,

with significant knowledge and capability development at each step 

along the path from burning plasma to ignition and high yield. This is 

among DOE/NNSA’s most high-risk, high-reward research efforts; not 

only does it attract, train, and challenge some of the Nation’s best 

physicists and engineers, it also represents an important component 

of DOE/NNSA’s preparation to meet the stockpile science challenges 

of the 2030s and beyond. ICF subprogram linkages to Weapons 

Activities are shown in Figure 4–7, followed by brief subprogram 

descriptions.

HED and Ignition Science for Stockpile Applications supports R&D in 

HED physics and maintains global preeminence in HED science by 

identifying, maturing, and delivering next-generation tools and 

experimental platforms to enable weapons science studies. It 

addresses immediate and future weapon science needs by developing platforms and delivering data for 

current certification and qualification efforts and prepares for future capability needs through advanced 

platform development. It pursues thermonuclear fusion and eventual high yield to provide access to 

weapons phenomena and energy densities that have been inaccessible since the cessation of 

underground testing. The subprogram develops expertise and tools for partner programs to 

experimentally measure dynamic material properties, fluid and plasma hydrodynamics, hydrodynamic 

instability-induced mix, burn, boost, and radiation transport. It produces unique environments relevant 

to nuclear weapon outputs and hostile radiation conditions. 

ICF Diagnostics and Instrumentation establishes new diagnostics, experimental capabilities, and support 

systems for use at the national HED facilities to execute experiments studying matter under extreme HED 

conditions. It develops and deploys transformational diagnostics, such as two-dimensional highresolution velocimetry and time-resolved neutron spectrometry, to acquire high-fidelity data during HED 

experiments. It also leverages advanced neutron and fast X-ray diagnostics from the National Ignition 

Facility (NIF), engineering them for enhanced capabilities within the Z environment. 

3 A burning plasma is one in which most of the plasma heating comes from fusion reactions involving thermal plasma ions. A 

plasma enters what scientists call the burning plasma regime when the self-heating power exceeds any external heating (DOE 

Office of Science website). 

4 High fusion yield is a release of fusion energy in excess of 100 megajoules from an ICF target. This is three orders of magnitude 

greater than today’s best performing experiments.

Cutaway Diagram – Z Beamlet 

Transport Tube

Key technologies developed and 

maintained at the national security 

laboratories for ICF and HED/pulsed 

power weapon science applications 

have been combined in recent 

experiments to achieve a recordbreaking, order-of-magnitude 

increase in neutron output on Z, a 

key standard by which fusion efforts 

are judged. By combining ICF and 

magnetic confinement fusion 

technologies, researchers have 

made giant strides towards one day, 

on an appropriate facility, reaching 

multi-Mega Joule fusion yields in the 

laboratory, a critical capability for 

science driven stockpile 

stewardship.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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Figure 4–7. Internal Confinement Fusion linkages to Weapons Activities

ICF Facility Operations operates and maintains national flagship HED facilities and conducts R&D for longterm sustainment of facilities and capabilities. 

4.3.3.1 Status

The ICF program is rebalancing its experimental 

portfolio to incorporate the findings and 

recommendations of two studies that were 

completed in FY 2020. DOE/NNSA’s ICF 2020 

review assessed the program’s proximity and 

scaling to ignition, and the congressionally

mandated JASON Defense Advisory Group review 

assessed the ICF program’s value to the 

stewardship mission. These studies reaffirmed 

the enduring need and value of HED and ignition 

research and concluded that the ignition 

threshold may be beyond current experimental 

capabilities. Recommendations included a 

research program focused on resolving key gaps 

in physics understanding to optimize scientific 

progress over the next decade. Taking these 

recommendations into account, the enduring 

priorities of the program are to enhance and 

deliver the HED capabilities needed to create and 

diagnose weapons-relevant conditions so that 

they may be used to address challenges in the nuclear modernization, assessment, and survivability 

missions, as well as to produce controlled thermonuclear fusion in the laboratory to meet the stockpile 

science challenges of the 2030s and beyond.

DOE/NNSA’s Flagship High Energy Density Facilities
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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4.3.3.2 Challenges, and Strategies for Inertial Confinement Fusion

Table 4–3 provides a high-level summary of ICF challenges and the strategies to address them. 

Table 4–3. Summary of Inertial Confinement Fusion challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Enable Sustainment and Modernization by 

Providing Access to Timely Experimental 

Data

Assessment, certification, LEPs, and Mods 

require access to high fidelity experimental 

data at extremes of pressure and

temperature to promptly address 

performance issues, resolve SFIs, and 

inform design decisions in the absence of

underground nuclear tests.

Execute experiments targeting key 

aspects of material properties and 

complex hydrodynamic flows in the 

HED regime using novel diagnostics to 

acquire data that benchmarks our 

models of the behavior between 

radiation and materials. 

Provide intense X-ray and neutron 

sources that can be used to support 

the design and qualification of 

components of U.S. systems to meet 

nuclear survivability requirements.

Develop and pursue an integrated 

investment strategy to sustain 

existing HED capabilities and provide 

ongoing and timely access to 

experimental HED needs by the 

program of record.

Meet Evolving Stockpile Requirements for 

Nuclear Deterrence 

Stewardship must invent and provide the 

tools to promptly assess performance 

issues, including SFIs, aging, and evolving 

threat environments to underwrite the 

surety and effectiveness of the stockpile 

without underground nuclear tests. 

Pioneer new diagnostic technologies, 

experimental platforms, and 

analytical tools to meet emerging 

assessment needs by making new and 

higher fidelity data available in HED 

regimes of interest.

Develop new driver technologies and 

facility capabilities to provide access 

to energy densities necessary to 

emerging radiation effects and 

assessment science needs.

Modernizing Through Science and 

Engineering 

Improve our understanding of how material 

aging and manufacturing processes affect 

system performance to identify material 

replacement requirements and flexible 

capabilities to produce parts with better 

efficiency, reliability, flexibility, and control.

Execute focused materials 

experiments at HED facilities to 

provide precision data on material

properties at regimes that were 

previously only accessible by theory 

or models to enable future 

assessments and certification of 

device performance in the absence of 

underground nuclear tests.

Generate the full range of nuclear 

weapon environments within 

experimental facilities, including 

sustainment and development of 

existing Office of Experimental 

Sciences facilities to reach the critical 

portions of the weapons physics 

parameter space, investment in nextgeneration facilities to reach weapons 

physics regimes beyond current 

capabilities, and development of 

novel facility instrumentation and 

advanced diagnostics to measure 

within these regimes with high 

fidelity.

Prepare for an Uncertain Future

The 21st century threat environment is 

evolving rapidly; accurate assessment of the 

effect of these threats and development of 

mitigation options are critical to a resilient 

U.S. nuclear deterrent. A responsive R&D 

enterprise includes the development of 

options for LEPs, modern replacements, and 

tailored deterrence options that are 

certification ready.

Develop an ignition platform to

achieve controlled thermonuclear 

fusion in the laboratory that access a 

range of important weapons physics

phenomena that have been 

unreachable since the cessation of 

underground testing to enable new 

design and certification capabilities. 

Develop HED capabilities to address 

potential changes in STS 

environments (i.e., outputs and 

effects, thermal and mechanical 

environments), including

development of experimental 

capabilities required for assessments,

with increasingly more realistic 

source environments. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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4.3.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing

The ASC program provides high-end simulation capabilities 

(e.g., modeling codes, computing platforms, and facility 

operational infrastructure) to meet the requirements of the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. Modeling the complexity of 

nuclear weapons systems is essential to maintaining 

confidence in the performance of our stockpile without 

additional nuclear explosive testing. The ASC program 

provides the weapon codes that provide the integrated 

assessment capability supporting annual assessment and 

future sustainment program qualification and certification of 

the stockpile. It is a foundational capability that underscores

the Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule described in 

Section 4.2.1. ASC provides critical capabilities that help 

inform decision-making related to the sustainment of the 

nuclear stockpile in support of U.S. national security 

objectives and develops the toolkit to integrate measured 

data and scientific understanding. While the focus remains 

on the U.S. nuclear weapons program, the program also 

enables the use of HPC and simulation tools to support 

nonproliferation, emergency response, nuclear forensics, 

attribution activities, and many DoD non-nuclear missions, 

coordinating within NNSA and with many other Government 

agencies, including the Intelligence Community. 

The ASC computing capabilities are the key integrating mechanism across the nuclear weapons program 

through the Integrated Design Codes (IDCs), which contain mathematical descriptions of the physical 

processes of nuclear weapons systems and functions. These IDCs use weapon-specific data as input to

high-fidelity physics models that simulate performance and safety behaviors. The output is used to carry 

out design studies, maintenance analyses, annual assessment reports, sustainment and modernization 

programs, SFIs, and weapons assembly and dismantlement activities – all without additional nuclear

explosive testing. The IDCs currently perform well for general mission-related activities. However, issues 

such as aging, potential new threats, and new manufacturing techniques require IDCs with enhancedfidelity physics models that are able to leverage the latest technologies in HPC. This has driven the need 

to adapt current integrated design codes and build new codes to efficiently utilize the hardware 

capabilities anticipated in next-generation HPC systems. 

ASC subprograms link to Weapons Activities as shown in Figure 4–8 below, followed by brief subprogram 

descriptions.

Integrated Codes produces large‐scale, validated IDCs that allow the performance of detailed nuclear 

weapons assessments without the need for additional explosive nuclear testing. IDCs and science codes 

are used for physics and engineering stockpile assessments to support concept studies, certification, 

maintenance analyses, LEPs, Alts, SFIs, and weapons dismantlement activities. This subprogram 

represents a repository of knowledge gained from experiments on DOE/NNSA’s wide range of facilities, 

legacy nuclear explosive tests, and enhancements made to support the Stockpile Management program. 

It enables nuclear forensics, foreign assessments, and device disablement techniques related to nuclear 

counter-terrorism efforts and the study of nuclear weapons behavior in normal, abnormal, and hostile 

environments. The Integrated Codes subprogram is responsible for maintaining selected legacy codes 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has 

installed a new artificial intelligence 

accelerator into the Corona supercomputing 

cluster, allowing DOE/NNSA laboratory

researchers to run scientific simulations for 

ICF and other high fidelity physics models very 

efficiently. The accelerator communicates with 

applications running on standard Corona 

nodes to train machine-learned models. 

These machine-learned models can then be 

employed in other simulations to efficiently 

replicate the original models. Initial results 

have indicated fivefold or more increases in 

processing speeds.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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and ancillary tools that support the weapons mission. It provides validated simulation capabilities that 

cover all of the relevant physics and maximize performance on existing and future computing 

architectures.

Figure 4–8. Advanced Simulation and Computing Linkages to Weapons Programs

Physics and Engineering Models provides the models and databases used in simulations supporting the 

U.S. stockpile. Models describe a wide variety of physical 

and engineering processes occurring in a nuclear weapon 

life cycle and are required for annual assessment; design, 

qualification, and certification of warheads in the stockpile; 

resolution of SFIs; and development of future stockpile 

technologies. The Physics and Engineering Models 

subprogram is closely linked to the Assessment Science 

program.

Verification and Validation brings the Integrated Codes and 

Physics and Engineering Models subprograms and the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program together to evaluate the 

capability of IDCs. It ensures that both science codes and 

IDCs are solving the equations accurately and that the 

models themselves are sufficiently precise for the intended 

application. It provides a technically rigorous and credible 

foundation for computational science and engineering 

calculations. The subprogram develops, exercises, and 

implements tools that provide confidence in simulations of 

high‐consequence nuclear stockpile problems; ensures the 

integrity of modified and new codes that address major 

modifications to the stockpile; and exercises critical skills to 

support high levels of confidence in the future.

Advanced Modeling of Explosive 

Phenomena Reveals Complex Behaviors 

in TATB

Scientists have discovered a new mechanism 

for ignition of high explosives that explains the 

unusual detonation properties of 

triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB), a form of 

insensitive high explosive. Current models

revealed discrepancies between initiation and 

detonation regimes, indicating a gap in 

understanding of the underlying physics, 

specifically in the localized performance of 

materials under extreme stress. Scientists 

turned to quantum-based molecular dynamics 

simulation approaches and HPC and found an 

explanation for the gap in understanding of the 

models. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation includes projects that support long-term simulation 

and computing goals relevant to exascale computing and the broad national security missions of the 

DOE/NNSA and builds new IDCs aligned with emerging technologies to rapidly respond to the 

architectures of the future. It addresses three major challenges: responding early on to the radical shift 

in computer architectures; maintaining current IDCs; and adapting current capabilities as evolving 

computer technologies become increasingly disruptive to the broad national security missions of 

DOE/NNSA.

This subprogram focuses on long-term investment in Next-Generation Code Development and 

Application, Next-Generation Architecture, and Software Development and Interagency Co-Design.

Computational Systems and Software Environment builds integrated, balanced, and scalable 

computational capabilities and provides the stability to ensure productive system use and protect 

DOE/NNSA’s investment in IDCs. It takes software developed by the Advanced Technology Development 

and Mitigation subprogram, reduces vulnerabilities by reducing the number of points at which an 

unauthorized user can enter or extract data, a process otherwise known as hardening, and prepares the 

software for larger-scale use in the ASC computing environment. It tracks future technologies beyond 

exascale – such as quantum, neuromorphic, and non-complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor-based 

computing techniques – and deploys testbeds for evaluation of potential hardware benefits to DOE/NNSA 

applications. It also provides the computational infrastructure, both hardware and software, necessary 

to support weapon applications. 

Facility Operations and User Support provides and manages the facilities and services required to provide 

nuclear weapons simulation, including physical space, power, cooling and other utility infrastructure; local 

area/wide area networking for local and remote access; system administration; cybersecurity; and 

operations services. The subprogram also provides computer center hotline and help-desk services, 

account management, web-based system documentation, system status information tools, user training, 

trouble-ticketing systems, common computing environment, and application analyst support.

4.3.4.1 Status

The ASC program is advancing several internal initiatives to leverage developing technologies and 

capabilities to support the sustainment of the nuclear stockpile. The Large-Scale Calculations Initiative 

(LSCI), which is currently underway, was initiated to determine the limitations and scaling potential of our 

current assessment capabilities. The LSCI is assessing what is achievable with current platforms, codes, 

and qualified personnel and what cannot be achieved with those capabilities. “Large-scale calculations,” 

as defined by this initiative, are impractical to perform on available capacity computing platforms due to 

size, run length, or a combination of the two. The initiative directs the national security laboratories to 

look beyond current computing abilities and ask how calculations on this scale enhance delivery of our 

mission. 

HPC platforms are also evolving in response to the computer industry’s movement toward heterogeneous 

computing, in which accelerators, such as graphics processing units, are combined with traditional central 

processing units to grow computing capacity. Recognizing the challenge that this evolution presents to 

current IDCs, several years ago DOE/NNSA started to design and develop a new generation of IDCs, 

requiring new capabilities in numerical methods, software design, and adaptable programming models to 

optimize the use of these emerging HPC technologies. The ASC program continues this work in 

preparation for DOE/NNSA’s first exascale system, El Capitan, to be deployed at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL) in FY 2023. DOE/NNSA continues to collaborate with the U.S. HPC technology 

sector to manage the effect of technological disruptions while delivering productive advances in 

computing for its own missions.
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In addition to utilizing heterogeneous architectures, the computing industry has evolved new technology 

paradigms that are more energy efficient and have developed artificial intelligence and cognitive 

simulation (Cog-Sim) capabilities and infrastructure that greatly magnify the capabilities of traditional 

simulation. In response, the ASC program has introduced an Advanced Machine Learning Initiative to 

expand the use of artificial intelligence or Cog-Sim capabilities to better manage complexity in physicsinformed simulations. This initiative willsignificantly increase efficiency, improve models to better match 

experimental data, and tighten the integration of multi-scale and multi-dimensional models, while 

addressing concerns with validation of these techniques and improved understanding of when new errors 

are introduced. The ASC program is driving efficiencies into the manufacturing process through ASC’s 

Production Simulation Initiative. Efforts such as the Simulation First or “SimFirst” initiative at the Kansas 

City National Security Campus incorporates physics-based simulation into production operations to 

optimize solutions prior to full-scale manufacture. 

As levels of detail increase in simulation codes, especially those with three-dimensional (3D) features, run 

times to reach solution increase dramatically. This presents an increasing challenge in providing timely 

support for mission and experimental needs. To address this challenge, DOE/NNSA continues to follow 

its clearly defined strategy of upgrading HPC platforms at regular intervals; however, evolution of these 

platforms creates increased demand on supporting infrastructure. Power, cooling, and mechanical 

requirements have grown dramatically with the introduction of exascale computing and are being 

addressed through minor construction projects and construction line items. The Exascale Computing 

Facility Modernization project is an example of such a construction line item that will upgrade the LLNL 

computing facility with increased power and cooling capability in preparation for the El Capitan system 

and subsequent exascale-class architectures. It will provide sufficient cooling and power to allow initial 

installation, as well as necessary overlap of the systems as they are sited and decommissioned. The 

nuclear security enterprise will continue to manage and coordinate code development and facility 

upgrades with system acquisitions to allow the use of HPC platforms for DOE/NNSA as the technology 

progresses into the exascale era. 

4.3.4.2 Challenges and Strategies for Advanced Simulation and Computing

Table 4–4 provides a high-level summary of ASC challenges and the strategies to address them. 

Table 4–4. Summary of Advanced Simulation and Computing challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

The changing stockpile is evolving away 

from as-tested designs through aging and 

LEPs.

Work with Stockpile Management,

Assessment Science, Engineering, and 

Integrated Assessments, and Weapons 

Technology and Manufacturing 

Maturation programs to understand the 

physics of these changes, establish 

requirements, and continue efforts to 

improve modeling.

The threat space is evolving, for which 

weapons must now be certified.

Coordinate with customers through the 

Nuclear Posture Review implementation 

to understand the new needs for threat 

response and to respond with credible 

simulation capabilities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 4-22

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Improving the rate at which new modeling 

and simulation capabilities are provided to 

the Stockpile Major Modernization and 

Stockpile Sustainment programs.

Enhancing the ability to simulate the 

effects of weapons effects, aging, and 

manufacturing changes.

Develop and implement a broader range 

of tools for rapid design, evaluation, and 

qualification of new materials.

Develop models and databases in 

conjunction with experiments to improve 

the performance, reliability, and safety of 

weapons.

Adapt weapon science codes to the most 

advanced computing architectures to 

reach time and spatial scales of greatest 

interest.

Run IDCs and supporting codes on more 

powerful platforms to allow quicker timeto-solution for applications of simulation 

enhancements.

Performing rapid evaluations of new 

materials and modeling additive 

manufacturing techniques requires 

advanced simulations.

Continue current efforts to model 

additive manufacturing processes and 

couple these with molecular dynamics 

and mesoscale modeling to enhance their

utility.

Develop machined-learned techniques 

that can capture these effects efficiently 

for routine use in part-scale simulations.

Working with IDCs that are not effectively 

using advances that have emerged in 

commercial HPC architectures.

Maintaining operation of current IDCs to 

deliver on near-term needs, while 

preparing the IDCs for future computing 

architectures.

Optimize current codes for advanced 

technology hardware.

Evolve HPC tools for a next 

generation of IDCs to achieve 

sophisticated programming models, 

software designs, and numerical 

algorithms. This will produce a more 

responsive simulation capability that 

responds more rapidly and 

efficiently to challenges.

Supporting exascale platforms with 

insufficiently structured and sized facilities 

and supporting infrastructure (space, 

power, and cooling).

Continue to execute the ASC platform 

strategy. Continually survey HPC 

vendors’ facility requirements, identify 

gaps, and proceed with modernization or 

new infrastructure solutions to meet the 

utility demands of HPC.

4.3.5 Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation

The Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation program is responsible for developing agile, 

affordable, assured, and responsive technologies and capabilities for nuclear stockpile sustainment and 

modernization to enable Defense Programs’ mission success and the future success of the nuclear security 

enterprise. 

Primary responsibilities of this program include: 

◼ Developing enhanced technologies that both minimize the probability of unauthorized use and 

maximize reliability for authorized use; 
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◼ Lead technology and system demonstration efforts, with various mission partners, to speed 

development and improve acceptance of advanced technologies and processes into the stockpile 

and nuclear security enterprise; and 

◼ Improve agility, effectiveness, safety, and efficiency in the design and manufacture of War 

Reserve components.

The Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation program comprises three subprograms, whose 

elements and linkages are illustrated in Figure 4–9.

Figure 4–9. Weapon Technology and Manufacturing linkages to Weapons Programs

Surety Technologies is dedicated to simultaneously minimizing the probability of unauthorized use and 

maximizing the reliability of authorized use of a U.S. nuclear weapon while maintaining the highest levels 

of safety. Surety Technologies creates, develops, and matures advanced safety, security, and use-control 

or denial technologies to minimize the probability of an accidental nuclear explosion, given exposure to 

an abnormal environment. In the unlikely event that security fails and unauthorized access is gained, the 

technologies developed by this subprogram reduce the risk of an unauthorized nuclear yield to the lowest 

possible level. 

Weapon Technology Development seeks to achieve an effective nuclear deterrent through proactive 

design and development of innovative weapon technologies. It develops technology insertion options to 

prepare the nuclear stockpile for changing global security environments and advances technologies from 

concept to a viable option ready for transition to a program of record.

Advanced Manufacturing Development designs, develops, demonstrates, and transitions improved 

production processes, including tools, fixtures, parts, and materials designed to ensure the safety, 

security, and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This development work benefits the nuclear 

security enterprise while maintaining the base capability to respond to emerging issues with the current 

stockpile and adapting new processes for follow-on use, with the objective to provide significant 

reductions in production time, material waste, and floor space. In accomplishing its mission, this program 

enables DOE/NNSA to meet DoD requirements while enhancing safety and security and remaining vigilant 

and responsive to evolving national security requirements. 
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4.3.5.1 Status

The tools, technologies, methods, and data developed within the 

Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation Program 

ensure the viability and success of ongoing modernization programs 

and the implementation of advanced manufacturing techniques 

that streamline production. Success depends on diverse, highly 

qualified staff throughout the complex; close coordination and 

cooperation between weapon designers, weapon engineers and 

production agencies; partnerships with ongoing modernization 

programs, and close coordination with the programmatic and 

technical efforts ongoing throughout the SRT&E portfolio. 

All advanced manufacturing technologies require rigorous scientific 

testing and development to ensure the components produced can 

meet requirements and perform throughout the entire life cycle of 

the weapon systems. To implement this, DOE/NNSA created a longterm Advanced Manufacturing Strategic Program Plan. The themes 

of this plan are laid out in Figure 4–10 and cover additive 

manufacturing, automation, intelligent production systems, and 

manufacturing processes to reduce production time, waste, and 

floor space requirements. Efforts across these themes directly 

improve the agility and responsiveness of DOE/NNSA’s 

manufacturing infrastructure and continue to develop the required 

manufacturing capabilities prior to the development engineering 

phase of a future weapon program, producing confidence in the 

schedules and cost estimates for those programs.

Figure 4–10. DOE/NNSA is pursuing advanced manufacturing areas for investments across 

capabilities that support a robust and resilient manufacturing capability

Emerging advanced technology solutions include an evolving, digital-based enterprise that uses a common 

set of trusted models throughout the entire product life cycle. Benefits include elimination of waste and 

errors, ability to simulate and predict outcomes for critical manufacturing processes, more rapid 

incorporation and propagation of requirements changes, and enhanced producibility, agility, and 

responsiveness.

Volumetric Additive Manufacturing 

(VAM)

A complex structure in thiol-ene resin 

using VAM

VAM is a new technology that can 

complete 3D objects in a single 

photocuring operation without layering 

defects, enabling 3D printed polymer 

parts with mechanical properties similar 

to bulk material counterparts. 

DOE/NNSA researchers recently 

demonstrated the application of VAM 

using a focused 3D light source applied 

to a photosensitive thiol-ene-based 

resin, which then solidifies. Thiol-ene 

materials are believed to have potential 

for adhesives, electronics, and other 

weapon-relevant areas. 
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DOE/NNSA sites are working collectively to rapidly advance 

additive manufacturing technology for nuclear deterrence 

applications. DOE/NNSA has established a multi-site Additive 

Manufacturing Coordinating Team to coordinate activities across 

the enterprise. Additive manufacturing is an emerging 

technology that requires additional work to apply and qualify 

additive manufacturing for weapon applications.

Technology maturation for advanced manufacturing must be 

aligned with current and future warhead modernization 

schedules to become responsive to future challenges and execute 

the current program of record. The Weapons Technology and 

Manufacturing Maturation Program is developing methodologies, 

procedures, and technology development capabilities to advance 

the technical readiness and manufacturability of weapon systems 

and components more rapidly, which helps the nuclear security 

enterprise hedge against an uncertain future.

4.3.5.2 Challenges and Strategies for Weapon 

Technology and Manufacturing Maturation

Table 4–5 provides a high-level summary of Weapon Technology 

and Manufacturing Maturation challenges and the strategies to address them. 

Table 4–5. Summary of Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Future warhead modernization efforts will 

require a range of components and materials 

to meet requirements not defined decades 

ahead of time.

Identify high-priority technologies in 

coordination with the end user and 

maintain frequent communication with

relevant partners.

Leverage resources from the United 

Kingdom, as authorized under the 

Mutual Defense Agreement, as well as

other DOE/NNSA programs.

HE and energetics need to be both safe and 

effective for future systems and are often 

challenging to produce in the quantities and 

qualities needed.

Collaborate with Stockpile Sustainment

to continue work as planned. Continue 

development of alternative insensitive

HE formulations based on new 

molecules.

Improve understanding and control 

over material specifications and 

manufacturing to increase 

reliability and reproducibility for 

higher lot acceptance.

Transitioning technology findings and benefits 

to other programs/end users.

Negotiate early and continually with 

program managers to ensure that 

interface requirement agreements are 

developed and approved, and the 

benefits are well understood.

The radiation-hardened microelectronics

infrastructure is aging and unsupported 

equipment likely will require investments to 

sustain the capability through 2040. This 

capability is needed to meet nuclear weapon 

requirements.

Address highest-risk infrastructure 

needs: already started 6- to 8-inch tool 

conversion to support production for 

future programs of record.

DOE/NNSA is addressing the 

strategic radiation-hardened

microelectronics capability options 

through an Extended Life Program 

to sustain the capability through 

2040 and beyond.

A laser interacting simultaneously with 

the melt pool and a large “spatter” of 

metal powder particles

This simulation shows a laser interacting 

simultaneously with the melt pool and a 

large “spatter” of metal powder particles. 

In this event, the laser power was above a 

threshold that expelled the spatter away 

from the scan track. This prevented 

formation of defects due to “laser 

shadowing,” in which melted metal powder 

can block or eclipse the laser. Simulation 

provides clues to reduce defects in 3D 

printing.
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4.3.6 Academic Programs

The challenges of modernizing the nuclear stockpile demand a strong and diverse base of national 

expertise and educational opportunities in specialized technical areas that uniquely contribute to nuclear 

stockpile stewardship. The Academic Programs of SRT&E are designed to support academic programs in 

science and engineering disciplines of critical importance to the nuclear security enterprise, such as 

nuclear science, radiochemistry, materials at extreme conditions, HED science, advanced manufacturing, 

and HPC. The role of the Academic Programs is threefold: 

◼ Develop the next generation of highly trained technical workers able to support its core mission.

◼ Maintain technical peer expertise external to the nuclear security enterprise for providing 

valuable oversight, cross-check, and review.

◼ Enable scientific innovation to enhance the nuclear security enterprise missions to strengthen the 

basic fields of research relevant to the DOE/NNSA mission.

Academic Programs enable diverse research and science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)

educational communities through a variety of methods of support to achieve program goals. Investments 

in consortia and centers of excellence assemble collaborative groups to tackle large questions through 

multi-disciplinary approaches and leverage preeminent scientists in the field. Research grants and 

focused investigatory centers support individual principal investigators to foster a vibrant community that 

is responsive to new breakthroughs by providing flexibility for new ideas, diversity, and career growth. 

Specific support to minority- and tribal-serving institutions prepares a diverse workforce of world-class 

talent through strategic partnerships. Fellowships provide graduate students with key opportunities to 

connect with DOE/NNSA missions and give participants direct experiences at nuclear security enterprise

sites. User facilities open opportunities for academic partners to use DOE/NNSA's cutting-edge research 

facilities and push frontiers of current scientific understanding. Academic Programs comprises five 

subprograms illustrated in Figure 4–11.

Figure 4–11. Components of Academic Programs
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The Stewardship Science Academic Alliances (SSAA) Program supports scientific academic research 

programs to develop the next generation of highly trained technical workers to support its core mission 

and ensure a strong community of technical peers, external to the DOE/NNSA national security

laboratories, who are capable of providing peer review and scientific competition to strengthen the basic 

fields of research relevant to the DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise.

SSAA funds both collaborative centers of excellence and smaller individual investigator research projects 

to conduct fundamental science and technology research of relevance to stockpile stewardship. Current 

technical areas include studies of materials under extreme conditions, low-energy nuclear science, HED 

physics, and radiochemistry. SSAA funding supports research at approximately 80 universities, including 

training of over 200 graduate students and post-doctoral researchers. A key element of both centers of 

excellence and individual investigator awards is the connection of students with the nuclear security 

enterprise. These opportunities are focused in technical fields critical to stewardship science to build a 

field of talented researchers and committed doctoral students 

sharing a common desire to advance science while affecting 

national security. 

SSAA also funds the Stewardship Science Graduate Fellowship, 

the Computational Science Graduate Fellowship, and the 

Laboratory Residency Graduate Fellowship, with the goal of 

addressing workforce needs by directly connecting the highest 

caliber graduate students with the national security 

laboratories through providing financial support and ongoing 

scientific development opportunities to students pursuing a 

Ph.D. in fields of study that solve complex science and 

engineering problems critical to stewardship science.

DOE/NNSA’s Minority Serving Institution Partnership 

Program (MSIPP) mission is to create and foster a sustainable 

STEM-pipeline that prepares a diverse workforce of world class 

talent through strategic partnerships between Minority 

Serving Institutions and the nuclear security enterprise. MSIPP 

supports Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic 

Serving Institutions, and Tribal Colleges and Universities. 

MSIPP aligns investments in university capacity and workforce 

development with the DOE/NNSA mission to develop the 

needed skills and talent for the nuclear security enterprise’s 

enduring technical workforce and to enhance research and 

education capacity at under-represented colleges and 

universities. 

This alignment is defined by the following crucial success 

factors: 

◼ Strengthen and expand minority- and tribal-serving 

institutions’ educational and/or research capacity in 

DOE/NNSA mission areas of interest;

◼ Target collaborations between minority- and tribalserving institutions and the nuclear security enterprise 
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that increase interactions to provide direct access to nuclear security enterprise resources for 

minorities and tribal citizens;

◼ Increase the number of minority-serving institution students who graduate with STEM degrees 

relevant to NNSA mission areas and have had exposure to career opportunities within the nuclear 

security enterprise; and

◼ Increase the number of minority graduates and post-doctoral students hired into the nuclear 

security enterprise’s technical and scientific workforce. 

HED states are central to many aspects of nuclear weapons; maintaining a strong HED academic 

community in this unique field is critical for future needs of a modern nuclear stockpile. The Joint Program 

in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas (HEDLP) is designed to steward the study of laboratory HED 

plasma physics by funding academic research of ionized matter in laboratory experiments where the 

stored energy reaches approximately 100 billion joules per cubic meter (i.e., pressures of approximately 

1 million atmospheres). 

The program has three primary elements: research grants, centers of excellence, and the National Laser 

User Facility Program. 

◼ Research Grants: DOE/NNSA partners with DOE’s Office of Fusion Energy Sciences to issue an 

annual joint solicitation for HED Laboratory Plasmas research. The coordination across agencies 

enables the support of a strong and broad academic presence in HED science, leveraging common 

interests while assuring that DOE/NNSA-specific interests in this area remain vibrant. 

Competitively awarded research grants are selected through the joint solicitation conducted in 

coordination with the DOE Office of Science. 

◼ Centers of Excellence: The Joint Program in HEDLP funding also supports the HED centers of 

excellence selected under the competitive SSAA Centers process. Centers of excellence are an 

integrated multi-institutional collaborative effort focused on a central problem or theme. These 

centers work closely with nuclear security enterprise scientists and maintain a core set of 

academic expertise in key technical areas.

◼ National Laser User Facility Program: The Program provides access to the Omega Laser Facility 

(Omega) and Omega-EP lasers for academic partners in an openly solicited, peer-reviewed 

program. In addition to applying DOE/NNSA’s unique tools to advance basic science, this and 

similar programs attract world-class scientists to DOE/NNSA through offering training to students 

in specific experimental skills, providing access to cutting edge facilities, and enabling innovative 

development of diagnostics and platforms by user facility partners.

For the three fellowship programs (the DOE/NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Graduate Fellowship, the 

DOE’s Computational Science Graduate Fellowship, and the DOE/NNSA’s Laboratory Residency 

Graduate), DOE/NNSA has a long-term goal to cultivate the next generation of scientists and engineers to 

support the ASC and the broader Weapons Activities missions through academic alliance activities. These 

efforts establish academic programs for multidisciplinary simulation and experimental science and,

through graduate fellowships, provide students an introduction to the national laboratories and their 

mission space, as well as build relevant experience for weapons code, science, and engineering

development through open science applications. All of the fellowship activities are currently managed by 

the Krell Institute (the Computational Science Graduate Fellowship is jointly funded with the DOE Office 

of Science’s Advanced Scientific Computing Research program.)

The Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program consists of participation by leading U.S. universities, 

focusing on the development and demonstration of technologies and methodologies to support effective 
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HPC in the context of science and engineering applications. The research performed by the universities 

in this program is discipline-focused to further predictive science and is enabled by effective extremescale computing. This focus on predictive science supports the DOE/NNSA need for expertise in 

verification and validation and uncertainty quantification for large-scale simulations. 

All these efforts establish academic programs for multidisciplinary simulation science and provide 

students the relevant experience for weapons code development through open science applications. 

4.3.6.1 Status

Academic Programs is a recent compilation of programs established in FY 2021 to bring together similar 

activities addressing the need for a strong and diverse base of national expertise and educational 

opportunities in specialized technical areas that uniquely contribute to nuclear stockpile stewardship. By 

combining these activities, DOE/NNSA gains coordination across programs, leverages strengths and

addresses the needs of DOE/NNSA through interactions with academic partners. 

4.3.6.2 Challenges and Strategies for Academic Programs

Table 4–6 provides a high-level summary of Academic Programs challenges and the strategies 

to address them. 

Table 4–6. Summary of Academic Programs challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Large numbers of retirements are expected 

across the nuclear security enterprise.

Attract and educate students through 

academic research in critical technical 

areas, graduate fellowships, and 

opportunities to conduct research on 

DOE/NNSA facilities.

Increased need for specialized, weaponrelevant skillsets in the nuclear security 

enterprise.

Deploy centers, consortia, and grants 

to focus on identified technical areas 

of need and maintain an academic 

community of expertise and an 

educational pipeline for trained 

graduates familiar with the nuclear 

security enterprise.

Increase efforts to attract 

undergraduate students to these 

technical areas.

Lack of diversity in current nuclear security 

enterprise workforce.

Diversity, equity, and inclusion is now 

a program goal for all subprograms 

within Academic Programs, leveraging 

existing relationships developed 

through MSIPP/TEPP and establishing 

new connections with academia.

Partner with other DOE/NNSA 

academic programs and workforce 

recruitment and retention programs 

to ensure the workforce reflects the 

American public.

4.4 Nuclear Test Readiness

The United States continues to observe the 1992 nuclear test moratorium. DOE/NNSA maintains the 

readiness to conduct an underground nuclear explosive test, if required, to ensure the safety and 

effectiveness of the Nation’s stockpile or if otherwise directed by the President. DOE/NNSA’s evaluation 

of the response time has changed over the years, and the fundamental approach taken to achieve test 

readiness has also changed. 
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Nuclear test readiness covers a broad range of potential activities. Assessments of nuclear test readiness 

require a clearly defined technical basis and well-understood assumptions. Key considerations include 

the following:

◼ DOE/NNSA is required to maintain the capability to conduct a nuclear test within the timelines 

identified in National security presidential memorandum (NSPM)-31.

◼ Nuclear test response time depends on the specific details of the test.

◼ Assuring full compliance with domestic regulations, agreements, and laws related to worker and 

public safety and the environment, as well as international treaties would significantly extend the 

time required for execution of a nuclear test. 

◼ DOE/NNSA assumes that a test would be conducted only when the President has declared a 

national emergency or other similar contingency and only after any necessary waiver of applicable 

statutory and regulatory restrictions. 

Since FY 2010, there has been no funding specific to nuclear test readiness as a separate program. 

DOE/NNSA maintains test readiness by exercising capabilities and workforce at the national security 

laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) through the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Test readiness is a product of a robust, technically challenging science-based Stockpile Stewardship 

Program that exercises essential underground testing elements at NNSS, such as mining, as well as

investments in both the personnel and infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise. 

Operations such as subcritical experiments at U1a are exercising some of the people, physical assets, and 

infrastructure required for an underground nuclear explosive test. These involve critical skills and 

formality of operations; including design, preparation, and fielding of advanced diagnostics; modern 

safety analysis; experimental execution; and recovery and analysis of the data. Subcritical experiments 

also exercise critical skills and concept of operations with respect to weapon design.

DOE/NNSA is continuing to leverage subcritical experiments for test readiness, as they are challenging, 

multi-disciplinary efforts that enhance the technical competency of the nuclear security enterprise 

workforce. DOE/NNSA will also leverage experiments on HED physics platforms such as NIF, Z, and Omega 

to preserve the capability for maintaining relevant measurement capabilities, such as prompt 

measurement of optical, X-ray, gamma-ray, and neutron flux from experiments with next-generation 

technologies similar to underground nuclear explosive test measurements. The Stockpile Responsiveness 

Program also contributes to ensuring the readiness of the workforce.

Some of the capabilities and technologies used during testing have been supplanted by newer 

technologies. It would be a significant challenge to regenerate some of the old technologies, as they are 

no longer available. The strategy to migrate to these technologies entails maintaining a key set of the 

historic capabilities to enable cross-calibration between the new capabilities and technologies available 

today. The test readiness strategy is to reconstitute underground testing elements when needed, rather 

than maintaining obsolete facilities and capabilities. DOE/NNSA assesses the current nuclear test 

readiness and complies with current Presidential directives and public law.
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Chapter 5

Security

5.1 Overview

This chapter covers several aspects of security within the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear 

Security Administration (DOE/NNSA): The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program, the Defense 

Nuclear Security (DNS) program, and the Information Technology (IT) and Cybersecurity program. 

Together, these programs provide the safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapon assets, security

of the Nation’s nuclear materials, physical infrastructure, workforce, and information assets at DOE/NNSA 

Headquarters and its field offices, national security laboratories, nuclear weapons production facilities, 

and the Nevada National Security Site. 

5.2 Secure Transportation Asset

5.2.1 Introduction

STA provides safe, secure transport of the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons, weapon components, and special nuclear material 

(SNM) throughout the nuclear security enterprise to meet 

national security requirements and support DOE/NNSA missions. 

Nuclear weapon warhead modernization, limited life component 

(LLC) exchanges, surveillance, dismantlement, nonproliferation 

activities, and experimental programs rely on STA’s safe and 

secure transport. STA is Government-owned and operated 

because of the control and coordination required and the 

potential security consequences of material loss or compromise.

STA’s highest priority is Weapons Activities missions. It also 

provides secure transport for other DOE/NNSA programs and 

offices, such as the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program, Office of Naval Reactors, 

and the Office of Nuclear Energy, as well as the Department of Defense (DoD) and other Government 

agencies. STA has a record of 100 percent safe and secure shipments without compromise, loss of 

components, or release of radioactive material. This record is enabled by the core components of the STA 

security concept of specialized vehicles, secure trailers, specially trained Federal Agents, and leading-edge 

communication systems. To maintain that exemplary record, STA 

must continue to modernize the transportation assets and 

communication systems for convoy safety and security, and recruit 

and retain the Federal Agent and program staff workforce to meet 

mission capacity and customer requirements. While the 

Safeguards Transporter (SGT) fleet is beyond its original design life, 

STA is sustaining the capability through implementation of a riskreduction initiative that is extending the life of the SGT until the

replacement, known as the Mobile Guardian Transporter (MGT), 

becomes operational. 

Secure Transportation Asset 

Accomplishments

• Completed more than 167 safe and 

secure deliveries.

• Completed the Test Article 1 Side Crash 

Test and delivered Test Article 2 for the 

Mobile Guardian Transporter.

• Executed vehicle sustainment efforts to 

ensure mission vehicles are upgraded

and maintained to provide reliable 

mission support.

Mobile Guardian Transporter (Test Article)
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5.2.2 Status

STA supports the workload by adjusting to unforeseen demands and changes in the security posture while 

maintaining a workforce and vehicle fleet capable of responding to the full security continuum. STA is 

investigating the integration of unmanned aerial and ground-based technologies to enhance secure 

operations by increasing awareness during emergency or off-normal events involving critical STA assets. 

This section discusses the various assets and personnel elements that comprise STA. 

5.2.2.1 Vehicles

Modernizing and sustaining STA’s vehicle assets require an integrated, strategic plan and a substantial 

investment for life cycle replacement. The STA strategy includes steady-state initiatives such as 

eliminating outdated vehicles, refurbishing operational vehicles to extend their useful life, and procuring 

new vehicles.

The process of identifying, designing, procuring, and manufacturing these vehicles takes several years. 

The current armored tractor and escort vehicle are being replaced by the Next Generation Armored 

Tractor (T4) and Escort Vehicle (EV4). STA continues to assess and refurbish vehicles to extend life cycles 

until replacements are available. Evaluating demands on vehicles is a continuous effort to keep pace with 

operational requirements.

5.2.2.2 Trailers

The trailer fleet is a critical asset for transporting nuclear cargo on public highways. The design, 

engineering, testing, production, and use of these trailers can span several decades. The design and 

construction features address public safety, unique cargo configurations, and protection systems. The 

SGT fleet began reaching its end-of-design life cycle in FY 2018, years before the first MGT will enter 

production. STA implemented risk-reduction initiatives to sustain its capability until the new MGTs are 

produced and operational. 

In FY 2020, MGT accomplishments included the 

development of an Integrated Master Schedule 

that incorporated the System Integrator, design 

agency, and production agency; completion of 

Test Article 1 Side Crash Test; and delivery of Test 

Article 2. The data from the MGT crash test

performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)

(photo on right) will be used for qualification of 

the transporter and to better understand cargo 

response in accident scenarios for years to come. 

Major planned activities for FY 2022 include 

delivery of the pre-production unit rolling chassis, 

completion of Test Article 2 assembly, and start of the pre-production unit assembly. The first production 

unit is scheduled for delivery in FY 2026. 

5.2.2.3 Aviation

The fleet of Government-owned aircraft provides for the efficient and flexible airlift of LLCs, nuclear 

incident response elements, Federal Agents, joint test assemblies, training assemblies, and personnel and 

equipment associated with national emergencies and disasters. STA is required to maintain an aircraft on 

continuous alert with a six-hour response time to nuclear incidents. STA must also support evacuation 

and relocation of key personnel to maintain the continuity of Government operations. 

Mobile Guardian Transporter Crash Test

t
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These emergency response aircraft support the Nuclear 

Emergency Support Teams, which include the Joint Technical 

Operations Team, the Accident Response Group, and the 

Radiological Assistance program. The procurement of a third 737 

aircraft, scheduled for delivery in FY 2022, will replace an aging 

DC-9 aircraft. STA’s current fleet of two Boeing 737 aircraft are 

over 30 years old. A Business Case Analysis completed in FY 2018 

recommends lifecycle replacement to ensure continued mission 

capacity. STA’s goal is to begin replacement of these two 737 

aircraft in FY 2027 and FY 2032, respectively. 

5.2.2.4 Communications

Reliable, secure, real-time communication is crucial to STA mission success. Essential communications 

include information that is obtained, analyzed, and disseminated for mission planning; continuous 

monitoring and updating of that information during mission execution; and continuous communication 

during convoy operations. These various tiers of communication must be executed seamlessly in real 

time, while balancing the evolving need for cybersecurity to ensure system reliability and integrity. STA 

is continually evaluating risk, researching emergent technologies, and implementing new tools and 

practices to keep up with on-going and developing threats. STA has shifted to a prioritized mobile network 

and is exploring solutions for the use of mobile classified communications in mission vehicles.

5.2.2.5 Training

Federal Agents receive training in full-scale emergency and tactical 

operational scenarios, tactical driving techniques, and a variety of weapons 

and explosives. Each Federal Agent Command has facilities and staff to 

refresh primary skills and accomplish the majority of qualification training. 

The Training Command at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, supports basic to advanced 

training, including special weapons, tactical scenarios, and other general 

training covering all aspects of convoy operations, as well as an initial Nuclear 

Material Courier Basic training program for Federal Agent candidates. The 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, at Glynco, Georgia, provides a 

follow-on course for Federal Agents, emphasizing legal authorities and law 

enforcement concepts. Federal Agent law enforcement authority and specialized training are continually 

evaluated to respond to the dynamic operational environment. 

STA continues to recruit and retain the Federal Agent workforce to meet mission capacity and customer 

requirements. During the COVID-19 pandemic, STA’s mission did not cease. STA’s ability to effectively 

meet customer requirements proved STA to be highly dynamic and adaptable to the ever-changing 

environment.

5.2.2.6 Safety and Security

Validation Force-on-Force exercises are assessments designed to test STA’s Active Security Doctrine and 

determine system effectiveness for the STA’s Site Security Plan. The vulnerability assessment team 

designs, performs, evaluates, and documents the conduct of these assessments; the training and logistical 

staff support the execution of Validation Force-on-Force exercises and integrate them with the emergency 

command and control elements to provide the most realistic convoy scenarios possible. STA also executes 

safety studies and safety engineering for the Safety Basis, Nuclear Explosive Safety, and over-the-road 

safety issues. The Site Security Plan and the Documented Safety Analysis outline compliance with security 

and safety orders and regulations as related to nuclear operations within DOE/NNSA.

New OST Logo

Boeing 737-400
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5.2.2.7 Liaison

STA maintains a liaison program with agencies and organizations that may be in contact with a convoy or 

must respond to an STA emergency. This interface extends across the United States, with a focus on 

primary and secondary convoy routes. The scope of the liaison function includes Federal, State, Tribal, 

and local agencies and involves interactions with law enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency and 

hazardous materials responders, dispatchers, and military personnel. 

5.2.3 Challenges and Strategies

Table 5–1 provides a high-level summary of STA challenges and the strategies to address them.

Table 5–1. Summary of Secure Transportation Asset challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

The SGT fleet is beyond its design life and 

sustaining the SGT fleet involves challenges 

such as unavailable or obsolete parts, 

difficulty finding new manufacturers, the high 

cost of limited-run production, and meeting 

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study requirements.

Develop the MGT to replace the aging 

SGT. Work with partners to identify 

mitigation strategies, address Nuclear 

Safety Study requirements, and sustain 

the SGT capability. Support SGT riskreduction program.

Continue to evaluate, update, and 

replace STA assets as required to 

meet mission.

5.3 Defense Nuclear Security

5.3.1 Introduction

DNS leads, develops, and implements the 

DOE/NNSA security program to enable 

DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise 

missions. DNS provides protection for 

DOE/NNSA personnel, facilities, nuclear 

weapons, and materials from a full spectrum 

of threats, ranging from minor security 

incidents to acts of terrorism, across all the 

sites of the nuclear security enterprise. In 

addition, DNS provides nuclear security 

expertise for a broad set of 21st-century 

national security needs, such as those in 

defense nuclear nonproliferation, homeland 

security, and intelligence, in line with its core 

mission. Employing more than 2,500 

protective force officers, DNS secures SNM, 

classified materials, and more than 4,400 

buildings in addition to protecting more than 

62,000 personnel. The major elements of the 

DNS program are illustrated in Figure 5–1. 

Defense Nuclear Security Accomplishments

• Completed the upgrade of the security access system for the 

Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site.

• Launched the fully developed Center for Security Technology, 

Analysis, Response, and Testing (CSTART) web portal, 

designed to better integrate the security community.

• Completed Interagency Acquisition to standardize the long gun 

(M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle) across the NNSA nuclear 

security enterprise.

• Reduced the personnel security clearance inventory by over 

75 percent from more than 5,000 clearance actions to a daily 

average of approximately 1,300 clearance actions in less than 

6 months (accomplished while implementing 100 percent 

telework operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic).

• Implemented the Uncleared HSPD-12 Program for all 

DOE/NNSA sites, granting 1,921 Personal Identity Verifications 

for Uncleared Contractors since September 3, 2019.

• Developed a Design Basis Threat Implementation Strategy that 

captures action items, risk acceptance, and site 

recommendations on risk acceptance/mitigation.

• Created a risk management framework strategy to mitigate and 

manage DOE/NNSA security risks.

• Ensured the ability of security operations to support all 

DOE/NNSA requirements through the COVID-19 pandemic by 

facilitating numerous contracts, policy, and logistical 

modifications.
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Figure 5–1. Defense Nuclear Security Program elements (excludes construction)

Dedicated and specially trained security professionals using an array of weapons and technologies address 

general and site-specific threats and carry out the physical security mission at each field location. Physical 

security includes the safeguards and security programs that provide the day-to-day secure environment 

necessary to implement DOE/NNSA’s national security mission. DNS also provides facility clearances for 

contractor organizations that perform both classified and unclassified work; administers the classification 

program to ensure information is properly identified for appropriate handling and protection; and 

provides personnel security clearance processing and adjudication for the nuclear security enterprise. 

Table 5–2 provides a brief description of each of these program elements for DNS. 

Table 5–2. Defense Nuclear Security Program elements

DNS Element Description

Protective Force Protective Force officers are an integral part of a site’s security posture and are 

trained in tactics and techniques necessary to protect NNSA sites. These forces are 

each site’s primary front-line protection and consist of armed, uniformed officers. 

Physical Security Systems Physical Security Systems oversees counter unmanned aircraft systems, intrusion 

detection and assessment systems, performance testing and 

certification/recertification, access control systems, barrier and delay mechanisms, 

canine explosive detection programs, and tactical systems.

Information Security Information Security provides classification guidance, technical surveillance 

countermeasures, operations security, classified matter protection and control, and 

administration of special access programs.

Personnel Security Personnel Security includes access authorizations, badging, portions of the Human 

Reliability Program, classified and unclassified visits, and foreign national 

assignments. Encompasses administrative support for the site clearance process, 

including security clearance determinations at each site.
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DNS Element Description

Material Control and Accountability Material Control and Accountability controls and accounts for special and alternate 

nuclear materials through measurements, quality assurance, accounting, 

containment, surveillance, and physical inventory. Management of the Local Area 

Nuclear Material Accountability Software application, as well as training and 

operational support, is provided to DOE/NNSA sites and facilities.

Security Programs Operations and 

Planning

Security Program Operations and Planning manages development of budgets; 

responses to audits and information requests; review of Site Security Plans; security 

planning and assessment, including vulnerability/risk assessments; and performance 

testing and assurance. It also includes security incident and reporting management, 

security surveys and self-assessments, activities related to deviation requests, and 

control of security technology transfer activities and supports facility clearance 

processing and Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence determinations for security 

contracts.

5.3.2 Status

5.3.2.1 Center for Security Technology, Analysis, Response, and Testing (CSTART) 

This initiative uses a team approach working with SNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), other DOE national laboratories, DoD, and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) to achieve enterprise-wide solutions to security challenges. CSTART developed a 

comprehensive on-line portal allowing and improving critical information sharing across the entire 

physical security program and to collaborate with other Government agencies in identifying additional 

opportunities for improvement and joint initiatives. 

5.3.2.2 Counter Unmanned Aircraft System

DNS is focused on addressing the threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems and the need for effective 

countermeasures, which is among DOE/NNSA’s top security priorities. DOE/NNSA’s first counter 

unmanned aircraft system (CUAS) platform (the first within DOE) was deployed at LANL in December 2017

and achieved full operational capability on October 31, 2018. Remaining Category I1facilities are actively 

working to deploy the CUAS platform. The Nevada National Security Site achieved initial operating 

capability in September of 2020. DNS continues to work closely with Departmental security counterparts 

and interagency partners, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation 

Administration, DoD, the Department of Justice, and appropriate congressional stakeholders to maintain 

an effective CUAS capability. 

5.3.2.3 Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program

The Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP) addresses physical security infrastructure across 

DOE/NNSA, identifying a prioritized list of physical security refreshes and upgrades as part of a life cycle 

management plan across the nuclear security enterprise. SIRP project requirements were derived from 

the data obtained during a detailed condition assessment completed at each DOE/NNSA facility. The 

condition assessment identified the oldest systems and systems with the highest risk for failure and 

assessed these systems’ contributions to the overall security posture. Condition assessment surveys were 

used to calculate risk values that established a baseline and demonstrated reduction in risk based on

proposed upgrades. This provided a method by which to compare various upgrade options that support 

cost-effective implementation decisions across the enterprise. 

1 A Category I facilities store or process Category I quantities of SNM or credible rollup quantities of SNM to a Category I quantity. 
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5.3.2.4 Design Basis Threat Implementation

DOE Order 470.3, Design Basis Threat, establishes the baseline threat characterization against which the 

NNSA security program is developed and implemented. The design basis threat (DBT) draws on 

information from a variety of sources, including the Intelligence Community’s Nuclear Security Threat 

Capabilities Assessment. An update to the DBT required NNSA to assess its security posture and make 

appropriate adjustments. DNS, in coordination with DOE/NNSA management and operating (M&O)

contractor partners and field offices, developed an implementation plan and completed the analysis in

December 2020. DNS is leading the effort to develop a comprehensive risk management framework that 

outlines physical protection for all DOE/NNSA assets and a risk mitigation plan for the nuclear security 

enterprise. 

5.3.2.5 Departmental Collaboration

DNS participates in the Capital Acquisition process, the Integrated Planning Group, the Management 

Council, the Chief Security Officer Committee, and the Insider Threat Steering Committee to maintain 

close collaboration with other NNSA and DOE entities. Under one of the Security Roadmap initiatives, 

DNS revitalized collaboration with the NRC, Department of Homeland Security, the United Kingdom’s 

Ministry of Defence, and DoD to identify opportunities for collaborating on respective nuclear security 

programs. 

5.3.2.6 Personnel Security

DNS assumed responsibility for 98 percent of NNSA’s clearances by transferring clearances held by the 

DOE Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Security and the Savannah River Site. Despite 

implementing full telework operations due to the COVID 19 pandemic, DNS also reduced the personnel 

security clearance inventory backlog significantly. In addition, DNS recently upgraded its web-based 

program, the Clearance Action Tracking System (CATS), to enhance workflow and manage cases from 

cradle to grave. This system has been adopted by the Department as the adjudication system of record 

for clearance activities. As part of its paperless initiative, over 50,000 paper files are being scanned and 

uploaded into CATS. Clearance documentation received prior to CATS is being integrated into the system 

by contract partners. 

5.3.3 Sustainment Investments

DNS has a process in place for funding operations and sustainment of safeguards- and security-related 

infrastructure, equipment, and facilities. During the annual programming process, M&O partners submit 

requests for funding these requirements, which include upgrades to/replacement of security 

infrastructure, security systems, equipment, and facilities. This routine Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) process, accomplished in close coordination with NNSA’s Office of 

Management and Budget, is essential to the protection of NNSA’s critical missions. The FY 2022 Budget 

Request supports increased security needs associated with known mission growth in weapons programs 

across the NNSA nuclear security enterprise, including Pit Production at LANL; Kansas City National 

Security Campus floor space; updating and replacing proprietary security systems throughout the 

enterprise; and initial efforts to implement additional security requirements resulting from completed 

DBT analysis. This request includes funding for continued efforts to recapitalize security infrastructure 

through SIRP projects, which address high-priority security systems and related security infrastructure and 

equipment refresh needs. It also requests funding for the West End Protected Area Reduction project at 

the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), which will install a new Perimeter Intrusion Detection and 

Assessment System (PIDAS) section while eliminating a much larger PIDAS section, reducing the Y-12 

protected area by approximately 50 percent. In addition, DNS allocated funding for numerous equipment 

purchases related to security equipment modernization. These approvals funded weapons, ammunition, 
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body armor, vehicles, radios, electronic security system components, software system upgrades, tactical 

casualty care kits, and other security-related purchases to improve, modernize, and maintain operations. 

Additional project information is available in Chapter 6, Section 6.5, and further funding information is 

available in Chapter 8, Section 8.8.

5.3.4 Challenges and Strategies

A major challenge for NNSA, as well as the Government more broadly, is identifying and addressing new 

and emerging security threats. Each threat is assessed and prioritized according to national security 

importance, taking into consideration the effectiveness of existing security measures. Through tactical 

and strategic planning and collaboration with counterparts, DOE/NNSA has developed several programs 

to meet these security challenges. As systems age and technology advances, meeting current and future 

challenges will remain an area of focus. In addition to these new threats, Table 5–3 provides a high-level 

summary of various DNS challenges and the strategies developed to address them.

Table 5–3. Summary of Defense Nuclear Security Program challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Conversion of Personnel Security 

Files to electronic media.

Contract awarded to vendor to complete 

scanning and validation of files.

DNS must balance its workload, 

reviewing scanned files as other actions 

are completed on a case, and determine 

a funding source to purchase equipment 

(i.e., “high volume” scanners). Efforts 

are needed for a project team, through 

the execution of a Charter, to develop 

project scope, identify project tasks, and 

track/monitor milestones. 

Address aging security systems and 

related critical security infrastructure 

and equipment.

Continuing support for recapitalization of 

the security infrastructure through critical 

SIRP projects.

Develop a life cycle management plan 

and incorporate it within the fiscal year 

PPBE process. 

Implement modern security 

technologies, systems, analysis, 

testing, and response forces 

designed to address evolving 

national security threats.

Collaborating with other Government 

agencies, the NNSA Security Community, 

CSTART, and Physical Security Center of 

Excellence to identify ways to modernize

the security program.

Develop and implement a security 

technology modernization plan designed 

to incorporate updated security 

technologies that enhance our 

capabilities across the NNSA nuclear 

security enterprise. Continue to 

collaborate with other agencies to 

modernize security technology to 

effectively address evolving threats.

Implementation of Trusted 

Workforce 2.0 a

Coordination across DOE to develop policy 

and implementation plans for the 

constantly changing investigative and 

adjudicative landscape. 

As the Government moves to a more 

real-time vetting and adjudication 

model, there is a need for DNS and DOE 

to adjust to meet the needs of the 

changing landscape.

a Trusted Workforce 2.0 is a joint initiative between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, DoD, and the Office of 

Personnel Management focusing on the “continuous vetting” of security clearance holders.

Increased weapons requirements have led to mission growth across the nuclear security enterprise, 

especially in the areas of weapon modernization and infrastructure investment and recapitalization. This 

mission growth drives increased security program resource requirements across every security discipline. 

For example, increases in site staffing result in additional personnel clearance action, and increases in 

square footage require additional personnel and physical security infrastructure; protective force support;
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classified material protection and control; technical surveillance and countermeasures; classification 

program support; and programmatic management. Figure 5–2 illustrates these requirements.

Figure 5–2. Increased weapons requirements

5.4 Information Technology and Cybersecurity

5.4.1 Introduction

DOE/NNSA’s Office of the Associate Administrator for Information Management and Chief Information 

Officer (NNSA OCIO) is responsible for Federal information management, IT, and enterprise-wide 

cybersecurity for the NNSA. The IT and Cybersecurity program ensures and enables the availability of a 

secure infrastructure for mission activities and information sharing for DOE/NNSA and its partners within 

classified and unclassified environments to support mission activities throughout the entire nuclear 

weapon life cycle and across the entire nuclear security enterprise. The program is NNSA’s primary 

method of implementing Executive Order 14028, “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” which makes 

prevention, detection, assessment, and remediation of cyber incidents a top priority. Services are 

provided through three offices: Cybersecurity, Policy and Governance, and Information Technology. 

These offices work in tandem to:

◼ Increase organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

◼ Protect classified and unclassified information assets.

◼ Enhance communication with internal and external partners.

◼ Ensure continuous monitoring, and support effective incident response.
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◼ Ensure information is protected from unauthorized access and malicious acts that would 

adversely affect national and economic security.

◼ Comply with statutory requirements governing classified data protections and information 

assurance. 

The IT and Cybersecurity program uses a risk 

management approach to protect information 

and information assets in the complex, global 

environment to ensure prudent prioritization of 

resources. Well-informed management decisions 

incorporate a systematic understanding of the 

risks inherent in the use of information systems. 

Full integration of risk into management 

processes will provide greater degrees of security, 

privacy, reliability, and cost-effectiveness for core 

missions and business functions. 

The NNSA OCIO must maintain and plan for an 

appropriately skilled and trained workforce to 

meet current and future mission needs. 

Recruiting, developing, and retaining top talent 

has been a continuing challenge in a competitive 

market for IT and cyber professionals. Many of 

the strategies described in Chapter 7 with respect 

to the workforce of the nuclear security 

enterprise are also deployed by the NNSA OCIO to 

continue to meet mission-driven demands for IT 

and cybersecurity services. 

Along with other activities and initiatives, ongoing 

and planned projects in IT and cybersecurity are 

critical to the overall effectiveness of the nuclear 

security enterprise. The remainder of the section 

describes a few of those many efforts. 

5.4.1.1 Transformations to Ensure Information Security and Cybersecurity Throughout the 

Nuclear Security Enterprise

Digital Transformation: The NNSA OCIO has embarked on a digital transformation effort that will:

◼ Improve, upgrade, and enhance the mission unclassified and classified logical infrastructure;

◼ Enable Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning; and

◼ Perform IT and application modernization. 

The goal of the transformation is to ensure that sufficient management, operational, technical operation, 

and safeguards are implemented throughout the nuclear security enterprise to maintain adequate 

protection of information and information assets. The digital transformation program has several 

responsibilities:

IT and Cyber Accomplishments

• Assumed responsibility and oversight for IT and 

cybersecurity for the Emergency Communication Network.

• Implemented Phase I of the IT Modernization Project by 

working closely with the Department and element CIOs 

and IT Managers to move to Windows 10 and Microsoft 

365.

• With DOE Chief Information Officer (CIO), implemented 

Phase I – IT Modernization Project.

• Completed IT and cybersecurity budget re-baseline 

activities to ensure vital projects are funded appropriately.

• Developed and implemented services and solutions to 

provide operational connectivity during COVID-19.

• Coordinated with the IT services provider to deploy 

equipment and ensure telework capability for a remote 

workforce.

• Built the foundation to leverage cloud technologies.

• Upgraded and enhanced NNSA security and operations 

capabilities.

• With DOE CIO, established DOE’s Enterprise Architecture 

Framework, and Control System Working Group.

• Oversaw restoration of three enterprise network monitoring 

sensors at both the Pantex Plant and Y-12.
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◼ Ensuring that IT investments and projects across NNSA are coordinated, have the necessary 

cybersecurity protection, and are in alignment with the NNSA Strategic Plan, DOE requirements 

and objectives, and national policies and standards.

◼ Ensuring that IT is acquired and information resources are managed in a manner that implements 

the policies and procedures of legislation, including the Paperwork Reduction Act, Clinger-Cohen 

Act, Federal Information Security Management Act, E-Government Initiative of the President’s 

Management Agenda, and Federal Information Technology Acquisition and Reform Act (FITARA).

◼ Execute the priorities set forth by the President, the Secretary of Energy, and the NNSA 

Administrator, related to providing classified and unclassified services and associated cyber 

protections across the nuclear security enterprise, coordinate with external agencies, and 

collaborate with international partners.

Enterprise Transformation: Building on past organizational successes to modernize and strengthen an 

aging infrastructure, NNSA is also implementing an enterprise transformation initiative that will deliver a 

modern, reliable, comprehensive, secure computing environment that supports the enterprise and aligns 

with current and future IT service delivery models. With the managed services model, NNSA’s networks 

will benefit from industry best practices and receive ongoing patching and monitoring. They will

incorporate hardened configurations from a security perspective, fine-tuned settings for performance, 

and dynamic configurations to meet evolving business environments. 

5.4.1.2 IT and Cybersecurity Program Elements and Initiatives

The IT and Cybersecurity program provides commodity IT, unified communications, collaboration, mission 

applications, and security tools. The program focuses on the development of integrated IT initiatives that 

provide an effective technology infrastructure and support to the NNSA nuclear security enterprise shared 

services. These initiatives will fundamentally redesign the IT and cybersecurity environments to provide 

a more secure and agile set of capabilities, including unified communication, agile cloud infrastructure, 

and next-generation collaboration services across the nuclear security enterprise. The major elements of 

the IT and Cybersecurity program are illustrated in Figure 5–3.

Figure 5–3. Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program elements

Table 5–4 provides a brief description of each of these program elements.
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Table 5–4. Elements of the Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program

NA-IM Element Description

Information Technology 

Modernization

An enterprise transformation initiative that will grow cloud services over time and 

deliver a modern, well-managed, secure computing environment that will eliminate 

many of the inefficiencies and performance degradations currently experienced by the 

workforce.

Logical Infrastructure To improve and enhance the classified infrastructure for its Enterprise Secure Network.

Application Modernization To perform application rationalization for mission IT applications. This evaluation of 

applications will be used to determine the best method of migration for current 

applications onto the modernized classified network.

Operational Technology Assurance A methodology to secure the operational technology used in nuclear weapons 

production, testing, and facility control capabilities across the enterprise.

Enterprise Secure Network Increases the capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the DOE classified 

infrastructure in direct support of the NNSA mission and the statutory requirements 

governing classified data protections and information assurance.

Restricted Data Working collaboratively with other Government agencies (such as DoD and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation) to identify interagency needs and opportunities for accessing, 

sharing, and leveraging Restricted Data (RD).

Federal IT Acquisition Reform Act 

(FITARA)

OMB Memorandum M-15-14, Management and Oversight of Federal Information 

Technology. The NNSA FITARA Implementation Framework, approved in September 

2019, provides details on how NNSA will implement the Act in accordance with the 

OMB memorandum.

Collaboration Efforts with DOE 

Partners

Physical Security Systems – The application of technology to improve physical security.

Integrated Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (iJC3) – provides 24/7 situational 

awareness of evolving cybersecurity threats, operational status, and associated risks to 

DOE mission essential functions.

TEMPEST Management – To evaluate and mitigate technical risks to systems in support 

of its risk management oversight and control authorities.

5.4.2 Ongoing NNSA OCIO Activities

NNSA’s OCIO continues to manage IT and cybersecurity projects designed to help reduce risks. Note that, 

while these efforts are projectized, they are not managed under the same acquisition policies as the lineitem construction or minor construction projects discussed in Chapter 6. Figure 5–4 illustrates a sampling

of ongoing and completed IT and cybersecurity projects.

5.4.3 Planned NNSA OCIO Activities

NNSA’s OCIO is planning the following activities in FY 2022:

◼ Modernizing the cybersecurity programs at the national security laboratories, plants, and sites.

◼ Strengthening the M&O cybersecurity operations along the defense-in-depth approach.

◼ Providing software and hardware enhancements and upgrades to the NNSA Security and Network 

Operation Center.

◼ Bolstering the enterprise network security posture by continuing to address known critical 

capability gaps at the Information Assurance Response Center.

◼ Initiating a modern cross-domain solution to replace the last legacy gateways currently in 

production.

◼ Expanding the application of Digital Rights Management/Data Loss Protection Technology.
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Figure 5–4. Ongoing and recently completed information technology and cybersecurity projects

◼ Providing assistance to the operation of classified IT services and solutions, support weapons 

design and development.

◼ Deploying IT enhancements, including commodity IT services and solutions, that facilitate 

effective collaboration and information sharing necessary for NNSA Federal employees and 

support contractors to carry out the NNSA’s mission.

◼ Overseeing the implementation of hardware and software licensing, maintenance, and refresh.

◼ Supporting field office IT services provisioned by M&O partners and overseeing the M&O 

partners’ unclassified IT programs.

◼ Implementing the application modernization project and enterprise Voice over Internet Protocol 

(VoIP) as a service.

◼ Providing oversight of activities related to, and ensure agency compliance with, the provisions of 

FITARA.

◼ Enabling IT operations and maintenance of the critical infrastructures and networks.
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5.4.4 Status

5.4.4.1 Significant Changes Since the Last Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

The NNSA OCIO has inherited the responsibility for the Emergency Communications Network from the 

Emergency Operations subprogram of the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program and

other classified networks, as well as full-scope enhancements to the Enterprise Secure Network 

infrastructure, and additional IT modernization, with an emphasis on addressing risks related to software 

assurance and supply chain management. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the IT and Cybersecurity 

program had to adapt and rapidly pivot to accommodate a large portion of the workforce working from 

home and for extensive videoconferencing, including classified videoconferencing.

5.4.4.2 The Current and Future Anticipated Mission Requirements

In addition to the details provided in the introduction section, emphasis is needed for agility, as the 

required responses to the cyber environment require constant monitoring and response and demand 

increasingly advanced technology to protect information.

5.4.4.3 Current State of the Infrastructure

The infrastructure and related initiatives described in the introduction are aimed at modernizing the 

infrastructure to provide the best possible protection of information at the best level of service.

5.4.4.4 Current State of the Workforce

The NNSA OCIO acknowledges the challenges of recruiting and retaining top talent due to competition for 

IT and cybersecurity resources, especially in a pandemic situation. It will continue its efforts to meet 

current and future workforce needs by analyzing job requirements to meet the evolving needs of the 

mission. By doing so, the NNSA OCIO it will continue to be a competitive employer that can recruit, 

develop, and retain top talent in the IT and cybersecurity workforce.

5.4.4.5 Technologies Deployed to Address Cybersecurity Threats

NNSA’s IT and Cybersecurity program maintains management, operations, and technical security 

safeguards throughout the nuclear security enterprise for adequate protection of information assets. The 

workforce that develops, deploys, and uses the security tools listed in Table 5–5 provides the first lines of 

defense against known adversaries and emerging threats. 

Table 5–5. Technologies deployed or to be deployed to address Information Technology and 

Cybersecurity threats

Cybersecurity Framework 

Core Function Technology

Identify

Enterprise Governance, Risk, and Compliance

Center of Excellence Sensor Platform for Cybersecurity Intelligence 

Vulnerabilities Asset Management

Supply Chain Management Center Solution

Protect

Multifactor Authentication Identity and Access Control Management Solution

Encryption

Firewalls

Intrusion Prevention System

Detect

Network Monitoring

Configuration Management
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Cybersecurity Framework 

Core Function Technology

Respond

Incident Response

Enterprise Forensics

Recover The nuclear security enterprise maintains overlapping cybersecurity technology capabilities 

that ensure defense-in-depth and continuity of operations at alternate locations.

5.4.5 Challenges and Strategies

The highly complex and global nature of the NNSA enterprise, coupled with limited resources, makes it 

critically important that information and information assets are secured, managed, and protected using a 

risk-management approach. As the cybersecurity threat landscape constantly evolves, it is critical for 

NNSA OCIO to keep up and adapt with the ever-changing IT and cybersecurity landscape and have the 

ability to respond rapidly to the evolving and most sophisticated threats. 

Table 5–6 provides a high-level summary of the IT and Cybersecurity challenges and the strategies 

developed to address them. 

Table 5–6. Summary of Information Technology and Cybersecurity challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Ensuring purchased equipment is from 

the manufacturer, as designed, 

without modification.

Move toward centralized purchasing and 

equipment review before issuing equipment 

to the field will address current supply chain 

and software assurance issues.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Insider Threat. Work with counterintelligence on 

implementation of an insider threat 

program, concentrating first on the 

classified arena.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Network Aging Infrastructure/IT 

Support.

• Improve network infrastructure by 

updating and enhancing networking 

equipment through public/private cloud 

services, managed services, software,

and hardware enhancements.

• Mature capabilities of aging 

infrastructures enterprise-wide to 

identify and alert concerning emerging 

threats.

• Ensure faster development and 

implementation of these capabilities to 

counter such threats.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Current network monitoring services 

restrictions.

Upgrade sites across the enterprise through 

deployment of new cybersecurity solutions.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Not all buildings support network 

speeds that are fast enough for today’s 

scientific computing and, with 

technology’s reliance on computers, 

capacities are being exceeded across 

the NNSA complex.

Continued investment is needed in network 

communications systems and in the central 

networking and telecommunications 

facilities.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Fill critical cybersecurity and IT 

vacancies across the enterprise.

Hiring a workforce that has the skillsets is 

included in NNSA’s OCIO strategic principles 

in the 2017-2019 Strategic Plan:

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 
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Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

“Principle 6: Invest in employee 

development to cultivate a high-performing 

workforce that will support NNSA’s mission 

today and into the future.”

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Fulfill OMB guidance to consider and 

use cloud solutions in a secure 

manner.

Modernize current services by capitalizing 

on cloud technology to increase 

performance and strengthen security.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.

Accommodate current and future 

teleworking needs across the NNSA 

complex.

Developed and implemented services and 

solutions to provide operational 

connectivity during COVID-19.

Continue planning efforts to ensure 

services and solutions are available to 

enable operational connectivity 

beyond COVID-19.

Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning • Develop an artificial intelligence/

machine learning strategy.

• Improve supply chain security processes 

using business intelligence.

• Unlock the power of data to make riskbased decisions.

• Set policy for artificial intelligence and 

machine learning for the enterprise.

• Seek technical applications to meet 

business/mission requirements.

The current strategy is sufficient. 

However, ongoing threat analysis will 

determine whether further strategies 

needed.
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Chapter 6

Infrastructure and Operations

6.1 Overview

Infrastructure modernization is necessary to ensure a safe, 

secure, and effective stockpile; reduce the risk to mission; 

and improve employee, public, and environmental safety. 

The increased demand on the existing infrastructure due to 

multiple concurrent stockpile modernization programs and 

the need to advance science, technology, and engineering 

(ST&E) activities presents many complex challenges, 

particularly with an aging infrastructure that is failing at 

increasing rates. Despite these challenges, the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA) has made significant progress in modernizing

its infrastructure, eliminating excess facilities, and 

improving management practices. DOE/NNSA, with 

congressional support, has also increased the resources 

allocated to improving the condition and functionality of the 

infrastructure and disposing of unneeded facilities.

Figure 6–1 illustrates the size and scope of the DOE/NNSA 

nuclear security enterprise infrastructure that drive the challenges and strategies discussed in this 

chapter. Comprehensive asset management of this enterprise requires continuous, multi-level planning 

across the entire spectrum of asset types, resulting in balanced enterprise investment decision-making 

across the entire life cycle of asset management, as shown in Figure 6–2. Planning initiates the life cycle 

of an asset, followed by acquisition through new construction, lease, or purchase. The majority of an 

asset’s life is spent in continuous sustainment through maintenance, repairs, and replacements-in-kind, 

with periodic recapitalizations to upgrade and extend the service life of the asset prior to disposition. 

These life cycle asset management activities are presented in the rest of this chapter.

Chapter 6 begins with a set of high-level, enterprise-wide challenges to lay the foundation for subsequent 

discussions. More specific challenges are contained in the discussions for each subsection, as appropriate. 

The asset management life cycle model shown in Figure 6–2 is used to frame the discussion for different 

types of investments across a variety of funding sources and sponsoring programs. Sections 6.2 through 

6.6 each reflect the activities within the asset management model. Infrastructure planning and asset 

management, described in Section 6.2, enables effective operations by estimating future repair of and 

modernization investments in facilities as they age, forecasting facility replacement schedules, planning 

for new and replacement acquisitions, and anticipating the disposition needs and costs of excess facilities 

for completion in a timely manner. Sections 6.3 through 6.5 describe the different acquisition strategies 

and funding approaches necessary to build long-term infrastructure modernization programs, and 

Section 6.6 addresses the disposition of excess facilities. Programmatic equipment is discussed in 

Infrastructure and Operations Major 

Accomplishments

• Completed the Expand Electrical Distribution 

System line item under budget, providing 

reliable, efficient electrical distribution to at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

• Completed construction of the Dual-Axis 

Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Weather 

Enclosure, one of the first minor construction 

projects completed using DOE/NNSA’s 

increased $20 million threshold for minor 

construction.

• Completed construction of the Z pulsed 

power facility and Technical Area 4 Support 

Facility at Sandia National Laboratories to 

provide modern office and laboratory 

facilities.
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Figure 6–1. DOE/NNSA infrastructure size and scope

Section 6.7, rounding out the discussion of the Weapons Activities capability element that consists of 

facilities, infrastructure, and equipment.1 Section 6.8 provides a discussion of how the DOE/NNSA 

programs outside the direct nuclear weapons mission areas benefit from Weapons Activities investments

for their own national security mission needs. Section 6.9 concludes the chapter with a discussion on 

management and performance.

Within Sections 6.2 through 6.6, the various funding strategies and acquisition approaches provide the 

organizing framework for discussion. The wide range of programs, processes and funding types discussed 

are testament to the complexity of the task of aligning investment needs to funding sources. Facility 

acquisition occurs through line item projects, minor construction, purchase, or leasing. Operating, 

maintaining, and revitalizing existing facilities are funded through minor construction, Recapitalization, 

Maintenance, and other programs. The funding strategy to support any given type of project can vary 

greatly due to the budget structure, the scale of the project, and other factors.

In addition to modernizing DOE/NNSA’s physical infrastructure, continuous investments are required to 

sustain and modernize critical physical security and cybersecurity elements across the nuclear security 

enterprise. Specific construction and recapitalization activities related to security are included in 

Sections 6.3 and 6.4. Additional physical security and information technology/cybersecurity activities are 

described in Chapter 5, Security.

1 The Weapons Activities capability elements were introduced in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, in the Fiscal Year 2021 Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2021 SSMP).
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Figure 6–2. Asset management life cycle

6.1.1 Challenges and Strategies

In order to enable the nuclear deterrent mission, DOE/NNSA develops and implements infrastructure 

modernization strategies to meet significant challenges:

◼ The need to address the poor condition of DOE/NNSA facilities

◼ Continue improvement of comprehensive, enterprise-wide life cycle asset management

◼ The need for a more responsive, resilient enterprise

◼ The need for more efficient, effective execution

More than half of DOE/NNSA facilities are in insufficient condition to serve mission needs (e.g., poor or 

very poor condition). Nearly one-third are in fair condition and must be vigilantly maintained to avoid 

degradation. Only one-fifth of facilities are in good or very good condition (see Figure 6–3). Nearly 

60 percent of facilities are more than 40 years old. Nearly 30 percent of facilities were constructed during 

the early Cold War era, and 9 percent are deemed excess to mission needs. The success of DOE/NNSA’s 

unique national security mission depends on safe, reliable, and modern infrastructure. However, the 

current state of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure poses risk to the availability, capacity, and reliability of 

Weapons Activities capabilities. 
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Figure 6–3. Asset condition by replacement plant value percentage

The Need for Enterprise-Wide Life Cycle Asset Management

Though the Uranium Processing Facility and other major production investments have received strong 

support, DOE/NNSA must appropriately prioritize sustainment of all capabilities that enable Weapons 

Activities programs throughout the life cycle of those capabilities. Going forward, DOE/NNSA must 

balance execution of a handful of high-visibility megaprojects needed to produce strategic materials and 

recapitalization of the many smaller facilities necessary for the design, production, and qualification of

U.S. nuclear weapons components.

DOE/NNSA’s assets include over 5,000 facilities, including major programmatic, office and laboratory 

buildings, electrical distribution systems, and security infrastructure that average over 40 years old. 

Upgrading or replacing aging infrastructure will require significant and sustained investment. By 

addressing infrastructure needs, DOE/NNSA can improve the overall condition of the physical 

infrastructure, increase efficiency of operations, and improve worker morale the ability to attract and 

retain the next-generation workforce.

A More Responsive, Resilient Enterprise

Supporting multiple concurrent warhead modernization programs requires a more responsive and 

resilient infrastructure. The modern nuclear security enterprise lacks resiliency, and aging facilities and 

equipment present a risk to mission execution. Further, the enterprise is not sufficiently responsive for 

the missions anticipated in the future; the existing infrastructure lacks the capacity in some areas to meet 

emerging mission requirements.

To meet expected future demands, DOE/NNSA’s challenge is to transform the infrastructure so it is

responsive and resilient enough to enable development and deployment of new weapon designs and 

refurbishments more rapidly and at lower risk than is currently possible. In addition to infrastructure 

planning, DOE/NNSA and its management and operating (M&O) partners are implementing a Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program to improve responsiveness via the full life cycle spectrum of nuclear weapon 

conceptualization, development, design, manufacture, and retirement to face technological surprise and 

potential geopolitical shifts in the future. See Appendix D for more information on the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program.
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More Efficient, Effective Execution

DOE/NNSA is taking steps to arrest the declining state of infrastructure through enhanced and optimized

resources, including employment of innovative management tools to facilitate a data-driven, riskinformed planning process to guide investment decisions. Sites are also making investments to 

recapitalize facilities and equipment in support of multiple capabilities. The nuclear security enterprise

demands best-in-class safety and physical security practices, emergency preparedness and response, and 

enhanced cybersecurity to counter the unexpected. Additional investments in these areas ensure that 

those demands are met.

The remainder of the chapter describes how DOE/NNSA is resolving these challenges through continuing 

improvements in data-driven long-term planning and project execution.

6.2 Infrastructure Planning and Asset Management

Infrastructure planning and asset management covers the 

planning phase for both operational and capital investment 

needs. Operational planning involves the maintenance, repair, 

and operation of facilities, utilities, and equipment at the sites, as 

well as strategic investment planning for major system upgrades 

and replacement. Capital investment planning involves 

identifying needs for the future and anticipation of emerging 

needs in the weapons programs, as well as science and 

technology investments to support those missions into the 

foreseeable future. Operational and capital investment planning 

must work in tandem to achieve the desired balance and costeffectiveness that reflects capable asset management.

DOE/NNSA has undertaken considerable action over the last 

5 years to better understand the long-term strategic investment needs of the nuclear security enterprise. 

Previous capital investment planning efforts were limited to the 5-year budget view represented by the 

Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP). This provided a realistic picture from an affordability 

perspective, but gave insufficient consideration to the long-term needs for infrastructure in both 

sustainment/renewal of existing assets and future needs tied to emerging capabilities and anticipated 

future workloads. DOE/NNSA’s most recent integrated strategic planning efforts have yielded a much 

more realistic and time-critical picture of out-year 

infrastructure needs to support the mission and long-term 

sustainment of capabilities for the future. The processes for 

identifying and planning for these long-term needs is now 

greatly improved and expanded.

Direct mission needs have been better integrated with routine 

infrastructure sustainment and renewal processes to create a 

clearer, more comprehensive plan for long-term investments. 

An example of these integrated planning efforts is shown in 

Figure 6–4. Bottom-up planning across the nuclear security 

enterprise has been improved through area planning, described below, and deep dive reviews. The 

implementation of asset management software has provided accessible data for earlier planning of 

maintenance and sustainment needs. Because of this expanded, more integrated planning, DOE/NNSA 

has a more comprehensive understanding of the state of its physical assets and the actions needed to 

acquire, sustain, recapitalize and dispose of its assets, aligned much more closely with industry standards.

Infrastructure Deep Dives 

DOE/NNSA holds biennial meetings with 

each M&O site to discuss mission 

requirements, related infrastructure needs, 

asset condition and life cycle management, 

and proposed investment plans. 

Deep dives lay the foundation for prioritized, 

integrated area plans and a Master Asset 

Plan for the nuclear security enterprise.
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Figure 6–4. Integrated mission and infrastructure planning is crucial to the success of DOE/NNSA 

missions, as illustrated by this example from Weapons Simulation and Computing

The biennial infrastructure planning “deep-dive” reviews are held at each site to improve long-term 

planning and integrate mature project proposals into the overall plan prior to receiving funding. The deep 

dive meetings have been conducted virtually due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, with successful meetings 

held with the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC), Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), 

Pantex Plant (Pantex), and Savannah River Site (SRS) in FY 2020. The deep dives and other planning efforts 

emphasize facility life cycle management, resulting in better investment decisions based on 

understanding the overall condition, capabilities, capacity, readiness, and reliability of DOE/NNSA’s 

infrastructure.

The asset management life cycle, shown in Figure 6–2, is the basis for all investment planning within 

DOE/NNSA. It can be applied to a single facility or, as applied to numerous facilities, it can be used to 

organize the way the infrastructure program operates. The elements of the cycle must work together in 

balance to keep the nuclear security enterprise assets healthy. While the model appears straightforward, 

the processes employed to achieve that balance across multiple facilities for the purpose of meeting 

multiple competing priorities are not. In the DOE/NNSA environment, decision-making is complicated by 

the multiple funding mechanisms, guidance, and requirements. In order to understand these intricacies, 

the next several sections include some definitions of terms and background to aid in understanding the 

broad extent of investment planning and execution in the nuclear security enterprise.

6.2.1 Area Planning

Area plans are the newest element of DOE/NNSA’s planning process, connecting plans to projects for 

achieving DOE/NNSA’s strategic vision for the future nuclear security enterprise. They provide detailed 
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information on the life cycle management strategies of a portfolio of co-located or functionally similar 

facilities, buildings, and other structures. See Figure 6–5 for an example area plan.

Figure 6–5. Area plan example

Area plans are part of an integrated planning process that flows from high-level requirements to 

interdependent project plans. Frequent communication among stakeholders at all levels through 

infrastructure deep dives and other forums keeps the planning process in alignment with DOE/NNSA 

mission needs. Area plans blend multiple funding sources and are regularly updated to reflect the latest 

developments and priorities.

DOE/NNSA and its M&O partners have developed 66 area plans during FY 2021, representing assets and 

associated capabilities across the nuclear security enterprise. These area plans showcase important 

elements of each capability’s long-term infrastructure plans and span both direct mission and missionenabling capabilities (see Section 6.2.2 for additional details). They cover a myriad of topical areas, from 

flagship experimental facilities and weapon components to utilities and emergency services. When 

viewed collectively, area plans provide a roadmap for modernizing DOE/NNSA infrastructure to deliver on 

the mission.

6.2.2 Weapons Activities Line Item Planning Integration

The Weapons Activities line item planning integration process (previously the Capital Acquisition Process) 

establishes procedures to consolidate the line item data collection process and synchronize infrastructure 

planning across Weapons Activities programs. The integrated planning process is conducted in 

collaboration with the DOE/NNSA laboratories, plants, and sites to identify and prioritize major line item

construction projects for Weapons Activities programs. This prioritization informs near-and long-term 
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planning efforts for programmatic and mission-enabling construction projects. It also informs the FYNSP 

programming and budgeting process as projects reach appropriate milestones.

Programmatic infrastructure investments are linked to 

mission-specific functions within Weapons Activities, such 

as plutonium modernization. They address investment 

needs for direct programmatic infrastructure, including

facilities, computers, diagnostic equipment, weaponrelated production facilities and equipment, or anything 

else that enables the nuclear security enterprise to carry out 

research, testing, production, and sustainment activities to 

meet its national security missions. In contrast, missionenabling infrastructure provides support for programmatic 

activities, including general purpose office buildings, sitewide support facilities, utilities, and equipment. Both types 

of investments are required to sustain Weapons Activities 

capabilities in the near term and for the foreseeable future.

The consolidation of line item investment proposals combines multiple current data collection processes 

and ensures a consistent, repeatable planning process for all line item construction projects. The 

comprehensive review of project proposals by program offices ensures that all current and proposed line 

item construction projects (detailed in Sections 6.3.1 – 6.3.3), represent investments that support the 

program of record. The cost estimation process for proposals within capital acquisition is described in 

Chapter 8, Section 8.10.1.

6.2.3 Critical Decision Acquisition Milestone Process

A basic understanding of DOE’s Critical Decision (CD) acquisition milestone process is integral to 

understanding the next several sections that discuss current and planned line item construction projects. 

DOE Order 413.3B, Chg 6, outlines a series of staged approvals for line item projects, each of which is 

referred to as a CD. Each CD stage requires specific deliverables prior to and during the process in order 

to progress to the next stage, which may be tailored based on the size or risk posed by the project. 

Figure 6–6 shows the four phases of the CD process (Initiation, Definition, Execution, and Closeout), along 

with their corresponding CD stages.

CD-0 (Approve Mission Need) and CD-1 (Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) bracket the

Definition Phase and are prerequisites to commencing the Execution Phase, consisting of CD-2 (Approve 

Performance Baseline) through CD-3 (Approve Start of Construction).2 CD-4 (Approve Start of Operations 

or Project Completion) is the achievement of project completion based on previously determined criteria 

and the approval of transition to operations. DOE/NNSA Supplemental Directive 413.3 provides further 

guidance on this process including the fact that DOE/NNSA typically combines CD-2 and CD-3. This marks 

the shift from Execution Phase into Closeout Phase. The approval of CD-4 is predicated on the readiness 

to operate and/or maintain the system, facility, or capability. Transition and turnover does not necessarily 

terminate all project activity. In some cases, it marks a point at which the operations organizations 

assume responsibility for operating and maintaining the new facility.

2 See DOE Order 413.3B for details regarding projects requiring long-lead procurement. If long-lead procurements are executed 

prior to CD-3 approval for the project, this is designated as CD-3A and requires an additional stand-alone critical decision by the 

Project Management Executive.

DOE/NNSA Capital Construction Levels

Line item – a capital project >$20 million, so 

called because it has its own line in the Federal 

budget

Minor Construction – a construction project 

<$20 million 

Institutional General Plant Project – a minor 

construction project that addresses an 

institutional, multi-program, general site need 

rather than a specific program need, using 

funding derived from indirect cost pools
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Figure 6–6. Critical Decision process

6.3 Acquisition Through Line Item Construction

In 2020, DOE/NNSA assets included over 5,000 facilities with an 

average age of over 40 years. Many of the largest and most 

complex of those facilities will require line item construction 

projects to accomplish modernization or replacement. Since 

aging facilities represent increasing risk to mission execution and 

line item projects often require significant coordination and 

funding over multiple years, DOE/NNSA continues to evaluate 

line item construction project proposals as a part of the overall 

25-year plan for Weapons Activities.

DOE/NNSA’s line item construction portfolio requires consistent, 

stable, and timely funding. In addition, the sizes and complexities 

of these projects present several program and project 

management challenges, as outlined in Section 6.1.1. In spite of 

these challenges, DOE/NNSA has demonstrated success: 

DOE/NNSA is no longer on the Government Accountability Office High-Risk List for the management of 

line item projects under $750 million. However, the complexity of the DOE/NNSA acquisition processes 

still presents a challenge to meeting enterprise needs in a responsive and timely manner.

This section discusses the current and planned line items for the nuclear security enterprise. 

Programmatic line items are presented by Weapons Activities capability portfolio, followed by missionenabling line items.

6.3.1 Programmatic Construction

Since aging facilities represent increasing risk to mission execution, DOE/NNSA is implementing a line item

portfolio solution to ensure infrastructure is in place to meet program requirements, while improving 

DOE/NNSA’s facility condition and reducing the average facility age to a sustainable level. Figure 6–7

demonstrates the historical average age growth of DOE/NNSA’s major programmatic facilities and the 

planned reduction in average age after completing the projects identified through the Weapons Activities 

line item planning integration process. 
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Figure 6–7. Historical and projected average age of major DOE/NNSA programmatic facilities

Programmatic construction projects are categorized according to the Weapons Activities capability 

portfolios introduced in the FY 2021 SSMP. Sections 6.3.1.1 – 6.3.1.7 describe current and proposed line 

item projects within each capability portfolio, including their projected schedules and cost ranges. Project 

proposals (Pre-CD-0) represent identified mission gaps as known and emerging requirements across the 

nuclear security enterprise, but require additional vetting before the gap is considered for satisfaction by

a line item, another materiel solution, or deemed redundant if mission need is met through a different 

project. The projected schedules and cost ranges shown represent one potential planning scenario and 

may change in future SSMPs as stockpile and enterprise requirements are refined.

6.3.1.1 Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing

Line item projects in the Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing portfolio are related to the 

packaging, processing, handling, and/or manufacture of plutonium, uranium, tritium, energetic and 

hazardous materials, lithium, and other metal and organic materials needed for nuclear weapons. Current 

planning estimates and schedule dates for projects in this portfolio are listed in Figure 6–8.

DOE/NNSA is currently executing multiple programmatic line item projects in the Weapon Material 

Processing and Manufacturing portfolio that are past CD-1. Cost and schedule estimates for these projects 

vary in maturity from conceptual design-based estimates to baselined project estimates.

◼ The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project will maintain continuity in 

enduring analytical chemistry and materials characterization capabilities for DOE/NNSA actinidebased missions in support of pit production and Plutonium Center of Excellence missions. Active 

subprojects are reconfiguring space in the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building and 

Plutonium Facility (PF-4) and installing additional analytical chemistry and materials 

characterization equipment.
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Figure 6–8. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing

◼ The Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) will support plutonium pit production 

at LANL. The LAP4 project replaces aging/outdated equipment with pit manufacturing equipment 

in PF-4 to increase the throughput from 1 pit per year to 30 pits per year in 2026. LAP4 achieved 

CD-1 in FY 2021.

◼ The Uranium Processing Facility project will ensure the long-term viability, safety, and security of 

DOE/NNSA’s enriched uranium capability. It will provide a modernized capability to manufacture 

weapon subassemblies containing enriched uranium components and convert excess enriched 

uranium into forms suitable for safe, long-term storage and reuse. The new facility will support 

the majority of Y-12’s enriched uranium processing operations, which are currently housed in 

numerous aging, inefficient buildings in poor condition that pose multiple risks to meeting the 

mission. The oldest building supporting this capability, 9212, does not currently meet codes and 

standards, is costly to operate, and has many operating issues. This project will complete the first 

phase of the Uranium Mission Strategy.

◼ The Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility will support the treatment of transuranic liquid waste, 

which is a key support capability for DOE/NNSA operations at PF-4. The current facility that treats 

liquid waste is past its useful life and does not meet current codes requirements. The Transuranic 

Liquid Waste Facility is designed to receive up to 29,000 liters of liquid waste annually from PF-4 

operations, which produces pits for the Nation’s enduring stockpile.

◼ The TA-55 Reinvestments Project (Phase 3) will support design and construction of new fire alarm 

systems in PF-4 at LANL and removal of the old system. The main fire alarm panel and supporting 

devices represent a single-point failure risk.
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◼ The Lithium Processing Facility will construct a new facility to replace Y-12 Building 9204-2. At 

75 years old, the current lithium facility is one of the oldest operating facilities in the nuclear 

security enterprise. Until the new Lithium Processing Facility is operational and qualified, much 

of the risk to lithium sustainment is associated with the age and degradation of the existing 

facility.

◼ The Tritium Finishing Facility project will construct two new processing buildings and relocate the 

vulnerable reservoir-related capabilities from the current facility to the newer, centralized 

facilities. This alternative will significantly reduce operational risk and increase facility reliability,

compared to continuing operation in the current facility for an additional 20 years.

◼ The Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) will support plutonium pit production

by repurposing the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Facility (MFFF) into a safe, secure, compliant, and 

efficient pit production facility. The former MFFF is a Security Category I/Hazard Category II3

structure that provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in a facility designed to meet 

stringent security and safety requirements for plutonium operations. The SRPPF will provide a 

sustained production capacity of no fewer than 50 War Reserve pits per year at SRS. The project 

achieved CD-1 in FY 2021.

◼ The High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production Facility project will establish high 

explosives (HE) production capability within the nuclear security enterprise to address the

inability of current domestic HE supply to meet DOE/NNSA production requirements. This project 

will consolidate limited legacy facilities that are inadequate for the mission need and will ensure 

the required capability and capacity is available to meet the future HE workload and mission 

requirements. Areas to be addressed include explosive and mock formulation operations to 

support multiple weapon programs, technology development for future programs, and support 

for strategic partners.

The Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing portfolio has one line item project in the Definition 

Phase of the CD process (CD-0 to CD-1):

◼ The Domestic Uranium Enrichment project will analyze options for (and if necessary establish) a 

reliable and economic supply of enriched uranium to support U.S. national security needs. The 

U.S. Government does not currently have the capability to enrich uranium.

3 A Security Category I facility is one designed to contain certain quantities of strategic special nuclear materials that trigger the 

most rigorous level of security protections. Hazard Category II facilities are those for which a hazard analysis shows the potential 

for significant off-site consequences in the event of an accident. 

Manhattan-era building 9212 at Y-12 (left) and construction on its replacement, the Uranium Processing Facility (right)
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In addition to projects in the Definition and Execution Phases, DOE/NNSA is considering a number of 

programmatic line item proposals in the Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing portfolio (PreCD-0). These project proposals are in the planning process but should not be considered a part of the 

program of record until they achieve appropriate approvals:

◼ The Consolidated Depleted Uranium Manufacturing Capability project will consolidate several 

processes required to meet customer needs. These processes include special materials, depleted 

uranium, and general manufacturing. Updating the processing methods and right-sizing the 

facility for current and foreseeable production needs will mean a significant reduction in the 

footprint defined by the existing facilities. This project will assure continued mission availability 

and reduce annual operating costs.

◼ The Tritium Development Laboratory project will reestablish the radiological research and 

development (R&D) capability required for maturation and de-risking of new tritium and gas 

transfer system (GTS) processing technologies to meet mission requirements, address 

obsolescence, increase efficiency, and maintain core competencies.

◼ The High Explosive Component Assembly Facility project will support weapons assembly, 

disassembly, and stockpile surveillance. The facility is required to fabricate parts for current 

weapon rebuilt units, future nuclear weapon assembly and rebuilds, and Joint Test Assemblies. 

These existing component assembly facilities support all current weapons systems subassembly, 

weapons surveillance subassembly, and main charge dismantlement activities under the current 

production, surveillance, and dismantlement Production Control Document schedule. Facility 

capacity must equal the assembly and disassembly rates required for future workloads.

6.3.1.2 Weapon Component Production

Line item projects in the Weapon Component Production portfolio support the research, design, 

development, qualification, surveillance, manufacturing and production for all non-nuclear components 

and systems for weaponization of the nuclear explosive package. Current planning estimates and 

schedule dates for projects in this portfolio are listed in Figure 6–9.

Figure 6–9. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Component Production
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The Weapon Component Production portfolio has one line item project in the Definition Phase of the CD 

process (CD-0 to CD-1):

◼ The Power Sources Capability project will support all current and planned nuclear weapon 

systems that require power source research, development, design, qualification, production, and 

surveillance activities. Requirements for these power sources are unique to nuclear weapons, 

and commercial suppliers are not viable for this work. The current facility cannot meet 

anticipated mission requirements due to both increasing workload and poor facility condition, 

which poses increasing risks to meeting weapon program deliverables. DOE/NNSA also supplies 

advanced power sources for other national security mission needs that cannot be commercially 

sourced. This project will mitigate risk by exploring options for a robust, agile, and reconfigurable 

facility that is adaptable to changing needs; enables engagement with supply chain partners; 

supports technology development; and fosters innovation. Scope options under consideration 

include dedicated dry room, battery testing, and chemistry/wet laboratories, as well as

specialized spaces for rapid product realization, destructive testing, X-ray analysis laboratories, 

and hazardous storage.

In addition to the project in the Definition Phase, DOE/NNSA is considering a number of programmatic 

line item proposals in the Weapon Component Production portfolio (Pre-CD-0). These project proposals 

are in the planning process but should not be considered part of the program of record until they achieve 

appropriate approvals:

◼ The Non-Nuclear Component Capability project will support weapon modernization in several 

production programs during the mid-2030s. The Non-Nuclear Component Capability project 

approach may leverage current facilities, utilize new manufacturing and testing technologies, 

coordinate with existing commercial manufacturing facilities, and plan for new-build facilities on 

existing DOE/NNSA land to meet increasing demand.

◼ The Integrated Technology for Advanced Manufacturing Campus (ITAMC) project will create 

modern infrastructure with capabilities for development of advanced assembly system 

technologies (robotics and automation, welding, inspection, etc.) to accelerate deployment. 

ITAMC will collocate a number of capabilities, including manufacturing, assembly, computing, 

characterization, and inspection expertise, in an open, collaborative space with the ability to 

elevate to secure, when needed.

◼ The Neutron Generator Enterprise Consolidation (NGE+) project will optimize manufacturing by 

consolidating existing facilities for neutron generator operations that are currently conducted in 

several buildings across multiple sites. Additionally, modernizing aging infrastructure and 

providing flexible-use space is needed to accommodate agile responses to advancing 

requirements and technology, develop material and personnel flows, improve efficiency, 

consolidate processes, and reduce redundancies, waste, and risks to mission work.

◼ The Advanced Manufacturing Process Development Sustainment project will provide high-bay 

laboratory space to accommodate advanced additive manufacturing research and productioncapable manufacturing tools while also addressing electrical and fabrication laboratories in a 

reconfigurable space that facilitates agile and rapid product realization. Improving these facilities 

also ensures continued support to the DOE/NNSA initiative to reduce weapon development cycle 

times and addresses anticipated obsolescence of manufacturing technologies and materials used 

today in the nuclear weapons program.

◼ The new Applied Technologies Laboratory will replace the aging development facilities with a 

smaller, modernized facility designed for technological advancement. These improvements are 
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critical to flexibility in accommodating DOE/NNSA design agency requirements, improving 

productivity, reducing operating costs, and protecting workers and the public.

6.3.1.3 Weapon Simulation and Computing

Line item projects in the Weapon Simulation and Computing portfolio enable high performance 

computing (HPC) and development of the weapons codes, models, and data analytics used to design and 

assess the behavior of nuclear weapons systems and components. Current planning estimates and 

schedule dates for projects in this portfolio are listed in Figure 6–10.

Figure 6–10. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Simulation and Computing

DOE/NNSA recently completed one project in the Weapon Simulation and Computing portfolio:

◼ The Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment (EC3E) project nearly doubles the highly 

efficient, warm-water cooling capability in the LANL Strategic Computing Complex and enables 

the facility operational support for current and upcoming supercomputers. The project provides

warm-water cooling for LANL’s next advanced-architecture supercomputer, Crossroads, which is 

scheduled for delivery in FY 2022. In May 2020, the project reached CD-4, 10 months ahead of 

schedule and $20 million under budget.

DOE/NNSA is currently executing one programmatic line item project in the Weapon Simulation and 

Computing portfolio that is past CD-1. Cost and schedule estimates for these projects vary from 

conceptual design-based estimates to baselined project estimates.

◼ The nearly-completed Exascale Computing Facility Modernization (ECFM) project modifies the 

existing HPC center at LLNL to accommodate the increased infrastructure demands of exascale 

computing platforms, including upgrades to the electrical and mechanical capabilities of the 

facility. The existing cooling tower complex was expanded for additional cooling, and the 

electrical system was upgraded to allow additional power for HPC.

There are no current programmatic line item proposals in the Weapon Simulation and Computing 

portfolio (Pre-CD-0).

Cooling Towers and Tower Piping installed during the EC3E project at LANL
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-16

6.3.1.4 Weapon Design and Integration

Line item projects in the Weapon Design and Integration portfolio support the capabilities needed to 

research, design, test, analyze, qualify, and integrate components and subsystems into weapon systems 

that will meet all military requirements and endure all predicted environments. Current planning 

estimates and schedule dates for projects in this portfolio are listed in Figure 6–11.

Figure 6–11. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Design and Integration

The following programmatic line item project in the Weapon Design and Integration portfolio is in the 

Definition Phase of the CD process (CD-0 to CD-1):

◼ The Combined Radiation Environments for Survivability Testing (CREST) Complex project will

provide an advanced radiation environmental test capability to fill a mission gap for R&D, 

qualification, and certification data in combined survivability/threat environments. The Annular 

Core Research Reactor’s (ACRR) current capability provides high-fidelity neutron and gamma-ray 

environments that emulate nuclear weapon environments in support of weapons development 

and certification. The existing ACRR facility is aging and nearly 60 years old, was not designed to 

house a nuclear reactor, and does not meet modern codes or standards. The age and condition 

of the facility have resulted in inefficiencies that have reduced test operations to only 3 or 4 days 

per week. Nearly every weapon component in the stockpile undergoes testing at the ACRR, and

demand is increasing. The proposed CREST project will explore options to provide a replacement 

facility into which the existing reactor fuel could be relocated. One option under consideration is 

to combine the current ACRR capabilities with an independent gamma-ray irradiation capability 

in a safe, purpose-built facility. Other scope options include new or improved nuclear material 

storage, handling, and processing space and associated laboratories, offices, and other 

infrastructure.

In addition to projects in the Definition and Execution Phases, DOE/NNSA is considering a number of 

programmatic line item proposals in the Weapon Design and Integration portfolio (Pre-CD-0). These 
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-17

project proposals are in the planning process, but should not be considered part of the program of record 

until they achieve appropriate approvals:

◼ The Next-Generation Life Extension Program Research and Development Component 

Fabrication Facility (NextGen Fabrication Facility) is a joint design agency-production agencyowned collaborative space and testbed that can assess, develop, tailor, and transition new 

manufacturing technologies and designs that will enable DOE/NNSA to accelerate the 

development and production of non-nuclear components for future modernization programs.

◼ The California Environmental Test Revitalization project is intended to improve the efficiency, 

effectiveness, agility, and responsiveness of the California environmental test capabilities through 

structural upgrades to aging facilities to meet modern security standards and current energy 

codes.

◼ The Gas Transfer Systems and Surety Laboratory project is needed to meet GTS and Surety 

mission requirements in the future. The future GTS and Surety project will provide a modern, 

lower-maintenance structure capable of meeting the expanded, future demands of the program. 

Work areas and equipment will be upgraded with an efficient layout and current, state-of-the-art 

technology to meet current and specific testing requirement needs.

◼ The Heterogeneous Integration Facility (HIFac) project is intended to provide additional modern, 

cleanroom space to ensure the delivery of critical strategic radiation-hardened microsystems 

meet system safety, security, and reliability requirements to reduce currently unacceptably high 

levels of risk.

◼ The Environmental Test Complex project consolidates multiple aged environmental testing 

operations to a single location closer to future assembly and radiography capabilities. The 

objective of this project is to provide an integrated environmental testing capability to support 

nuclear weapons-related testing for the Nation’s current and future nuclear weapons stockpile.

◼ The Consolidated Environmental Test Facility project aims to upgrade, modernize, and 

consolidate environmental testing capabilities in support of stockpile modernization programs 

and limited life components associated with enduring the stockpile. 

◼ The Electromagnetic Sensor Technologies Capability proposed project is a replacement of the 

current facility to accommodate new programmatic equipment. Supporting infrastructure is to 

be constructed near the current location to facilitate integration with related engineering and 

design activities and provide a low electromagnetic interference environment.

◼ The Shock Thermodynamic Applied Research (STAR) Replacement Facility project involves 

replacing the previous, over 50-years-old STAR Facility to both maintain current capabilities and 

expand ability and performance of scientific and science-based engineering research.

◼ The Weapons Environmental Testing Replacement Capability project aims to relocate and 

construct new facilities to consolidate and modify current environmental testing activities. These 

facilities will need to meet current and future requirements, such as being rated for explosives 

operations, cooling systems to handle testing, and ducting to accommodate external thermal 

condition units. 

◼ The Full Spectrum Anechoic Chamber facility would provide improved experimental capabilities 

that would address design and qualification gaps. The facility would provide data to enable 

electromagnetic radiation application-code model validation and would provide better 

understanding of design margins. 
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◼ The High Bay project aims to replace aging infrastructure to meet advancing requirements, 

including seismic stabilizing needs. 

◼ The Test Capability Revitalization – Thermal Shock (TCR, Phase 3) and TCR – Vibration Blast (TCR, 

Phase 4) projects focus on large subsystem- and system-level test facilities in thermal, fire, 

acceleration, impact, shock, and other environments. TCR, Phases 3 and 4, will renovate or 

replace existing capabilities and/or develop new capabilities at current facilities.

6.3.1.5 Weapon Science and Engineering

Line item projects in the Weapon Science and Engineering portfolio encompass the suite of physical 

sciences and engineering disciplines that comprise the theoretical and experimental capabilities necessary 

to assess the current nuclear stockpile and design and certify future stockpile weapons. Current planning 

estimates and schedule dates for projects in this portfolio are listed in Figure 6–12.

Figure 6–12. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Science and Engineering

DOE/NNSA is currently executing one major item of equipment (MIE)4 project, Advanced Sources and 

Detectors (ASD), in the Weapon Science and Engineering portfolio that is past CD-1.

◼ The Advanced Sources and Detectors project will fill the pulsed x-radiography capability gap 

through development of a four-pulse linear induction electron accelerator. The scope includes 

design, fabrication, testing, installation, commissioning, and execution of readiness at the U1a 

Complex.

4 MIEs are capital equipment with a cost that exceeds $5 million. In most cases, capital equipment is installed with no construction 

cost. However, in cases where the equipment requires provision of supporting construction, the associated construction activities 

must be acquired through a line item construction project or a minor construction project if the cost is below the minor 

construction threshold established by Congress. MIEs follow a similar CD process as line item capital asset projects. See DOE 

Order 413.3B for additional details.
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DOE/NNSA is currently executing two programmatic line item construction projects in the Weapon 

Science and Engineering portfolio that are past CD-1. Cost and schedule estimates for these projects vary 

from conceptual design-based estimates to baselined project estimates:

◼ The High Explosive Science and Engineering (HESE) Facility will construct three new buildings to 

provide technology development laboratory and office space for technical staff. HESE will replace 

15 current Manhattan-era facilities at Pantex, support the HE Center of Excellence for 

Manufacturing mission for DOE/NNSA, and help sustain high-quality scientific staff. The average 

age of the facilities to be replaced is 68 years old. The HESE facility will be approximately 73,000

square feet. Project design is complete, and the project received CD-3A approval in FY 2020. Site 

preparation and long-lead procurement activities started at the beginning of FY 2021.

◼ The U1a Complex Enhancements Project (UCEP)

will provide infrastructure modifications to the 

U1a Complex at the Nevada National Security 

Site (NNSS) to house and field multi-pulse 

radiography. This includes structures, systems, 

and components necessary for deployment of 

the Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical 

Experiment ASD Project’s pulsed X-ray 

radiography equipment and potential future 

neutron-diagnosed subcritical experiments 

technology, which will produce valuable data on 

the phenomena associated with the final stages 

of a weapon implosion.

The following programmatic line item project in the Weapon Science and Engineering portfolio is in the 

Definition Phase of the CD process (CD-0 to CD-1):5

◼ The Energetic Materials Characterization project will support R&D to advance predictive 

capabilities for safety and performance assessments and qualification and surveillance; evaluate 

material responses to all phases of the stockpile-to-target sequence; resolve significant finding 

investigations (SFIs); provide technical data on which to base annual weapon assessments; and 

develop new/replacement materials in support of evolving HE technical requirements. The 

project will consolidate 18 structures into a single modern facility to reduce operating costs. 

Current structures are prone to sudden, unexpected failures and do not meet current design or 

safety standards.

In addition to projects in the Definition and Execution Phases, DOE/NNSA is considering seven 

programmatic line item proposals in the Weapon Science and Engineering portfolio (Pre-CD-0). These 

project proposals are a part of the planning process but should not be considered as a part of the program 

of record until they achieve appropriate approvals:

◼ The Radiological Science Capability project will consolidate and relocate the aging radiological 

facilities that support LANL weapons and global security mission requirements. The planned 

replacement facility will support critical missions including weapons programs, nuclear forensics, 

and nonproliferation programs, as well as broad science capabilities (e.g., actinide separation and 

synthetic chemistry).

5 The previously reported Dynamic Mesoscale Materials Science Capability project has been canceled.

U1a dual-headed mining breakthrough: Two mining 

crews working over 960 feet underground finish 

tunneling toward each other to meet in the middle.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-20

◼ The National Ignition Facility (NIF) Laser and Experimental System Revitalization project will 

update NIF, which was constructed in the 2000’s and remains the Nation's premier high energy 

density (HED) facility and the world’s largest laser. With over 10 years in operation and over 

25 years since design and construction, many of NIF’s systems are obsolete and are becoming 

unreliable and difficult to maintain. Many components are no longer available in industry and, in 

some cases, new technologies can replace obsolete systems to improve reliability and 

performance. This project would complete the required maintenance, refurbishment, and 

recapitalization work to keep NIF delivering for stockpile stewardship through the 2030s. 

◼ The High Explosives Test and Evaluation Facilities (HETEF) Addition project integrates the 

synthesis, formulation, and explosives testing in one facility. Major stockpile modernization 

programs will require additional HE research capacity and capabilities to ensure the safety, 

security, and certification of warhead systems. The project includes construction for scientific and 

laboratory space utilized for explosives experimentation. The proposal approach is to leverage 

an existing large investment by DOE/NNSA by adding the HETEF to the High Explosives Application 

Facility (HEAF) to capitalize on the existing structure, equipment, and workforce.

◼ The Increased Laser Power and Energy on NIF project would close gaps in understanding boost, 

materials properties in extreme conditions, and nuclear weapon’s vulnerabilities and hardness. 

The project has the potential to enable higher-yield experiments that further increase the fidelity 

of weapons physics experiments and enable the continued progress in support of ignition. This 

project includes modifications to the NIF and its support facilities to provide a 20-30 percent 

increase in power and energy to support the stockpile stewardship objectives described above. It 

is part of a broader effort to sustain and improve NIF as a vital HED physics tool for stockpile 

stewardship.

◼ The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) Modernization Project would replace the 

entire front-end accelerating structures of the LANSCE accelerator and thereby extend the 

longevity of LANSCE. The LANSCE accelerator was commissioned in 1972 and is in danger of 

suffering a catastrophic failure. The front-end systems are large and difficult to maintain primarily 

due to the unavailability of obsolete components.

◼ The High Explosives Manufacturing and Experimentation project aims to modernize capabilities, 

including modernizing or refurbishing infrastructure, to manufacture legacy and new HE materials 

at pilot scale for weapons design and prototyping efforts.

◼ The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamics Test (DARHT) Facility Modernization project will 

modernize the DARHT accelerators, control systems, and building safety systems, and will be 

phased to follow and leverage experience with the Scorpius hydrodynamic capability being built 

at NNSS. The Weapons Program needs high-quality, reliable, reproducible DARHT data at the rate 

of 10 to 15 full-scale hydro tests per year. Currently, aging accelerator, control, and safety systems 

must be brought up to modern standards to support design community requirements and assure 

uninterrupted delivery of data to support concepts of a flexible and responsive stockpile. 

6.3.1.6 Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition

Line item projects in the Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition portfolio support the safe 

and secure assembly, storage, testing, and disposition of weapon components and warheads. Current

planning estimates and schedule dates for ongoing and proposed projects in this portfolio are listed in

Figure 6–13.
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-21

Figure 6–13. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition

DOE/NNSA is not currently executing any programmatic line item projects in the Weapon Assembly, 

Storage, Testing, and Disposition portfolio. The following programmatic line item project in this portfolio

is in the Definition Phase of the CD process (CD-0 to CD-1):

◼ The Material Staging Facility at Pantex will provide a new safe, secure, and sustainable belowgrade facility adjacent to Zone 12 South Material Access Area that meets weapon and special 

nuclear material (SNM) component staging capacities for the next 75-100 years. The facility will 

house weapons, pits, SRS surplus plutonium material (as/if needed) and Hanford Unirradiated 

Fuel Packages. It will include shipping and receiving docks for SNM and weapons transported in 

both Mobile Guardian Transporter and Safe Secure Transport. In April 2021 DOE/NNSA placed 

this project on hold.

In addition to the project in the Definition Phase, DOE/NNSA is considering one programmatic line item

proposal in the Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition portfolio (Pre-CD-0). This project 

proposal is in the planning process but should not be considered as part of the program of record until it 

achieves appropriate approvals:

◼ The Radiography/Assembly Capability Replacement (RACR) project will consolidate the existing 

assembly and radiography complex, consisting of over 17 World War II era buildings, into a

modern facility. Safety, security, schedules, and quality assurance will all improve due to RACR, 

while risk to the public, workers, and program will be decreased. RACR will position the 

DOE/NNSA nuclear weapons program for nuclear explosive package assembly and radiography 

capability for the next 40-50 years for all site and surveillance mission assignments.

6.3.1.7 Transportation and Security

Line item projects in the Transportation and Security portfolio support the protection of all aspects that 

are critical to the function of the nuclear security enterprise. The Secure Transportation capability within 

this portfolio has no current or proposed line item projects. The projects listed below support the Physical 

Security capability, which protects all nuclear materials, infrastructure assets, and the workforce at 

DOE/NNSA sites that are involved in Weapons Activities programs and operations.

6

 Current planning 

estimates and schedule dates for projects in this portfolio are listed in Figure 6–14.

6 The Physical Security line item construction projects are funded under Defense Nuclear Security, not Infrastructure and 

Operations. They are included here to provide a complete overview of Weapons Activities line item projects. See Chapter 5, 

Security, for complete description of Defense Nuclear Security activities.
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 6-22

Figure 6–14. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Transportation and Security

DOE/NNSA recently completed one project in the Transportation and Security portfolio:

◼ The Device Assembly Facility (DAF) Argus Project at NNSS supported installation of new security 

system elements in the DAF Building and around the perimeter.

DOE/NNSA is currently executing one programmatic line item construction project in the Transportation 

and Security portfolio that is past CD-1. Cost and schedule estimates for this project varies from 

conceptual design-based estimates to baselined project estimates:

◼ The West End Protected Area Reduction project will reduce the size of the protected area at Y-12

from 150 acres to approximately 90 acres. This project will have two beneficial outcomes. First, 

a new Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System will protect the sensitive facilities 

remaining within the now reduced perimeter, which will reduce security and operating costs. 

Second, DOE Environmental Management cleanup activities for facilities previously encompassed 

by the larger protected area may proceed more efficiently and cost-effectively because those 

facilities will no longer be in a protected area. This project has completed design and received 

CD-2/3 approval in FY 2021. Project completion is planned for FY 2025.

6.3.2 Mission Enabling Construction

DOE/NNSA also funds mission-enabling infrastructure line items that provide site-wide utilities, office and 

laboratory space, and other services thatsupport the nuclear deterrence mission (see Figure 6–15). These 

projects are required to meet day-to-day operational needs across the nuclear security enterprise.

The mission enabling projects listed below are currently in the Execution Phase of the CD process. This 

includes four pilot projects (Y-12 Fire Station and the three Emergency Operations Centers at Y-12, LLNL, 

and SNL). The pilot projects present an opportunity to acquire commercial-like facilities using an approach 

that is novel for DOE/NNSA, but is common in commercial construction. The pilot plan will use existing, 

successful minor construction program management processes, certified Federal Project Directors, and 

widely-used commercial construction practices to appropriately streamline the delivery of these small, 

lower risk projects. The intent is to challenge the current norms to the greatest extent possible in order 

to create a new, streamlined process for this class of commercial-like, low-risk, low-cost construction. 

◼ The Technical Area 3 (TA-3) Substation Replacement at LANL will provide increased distribution 

capacity, improved reliability, reduced maintenance, support for greater operational flexibility, 

and increased worker safety. It will provide separate power feeds to both LANL and Los Alamos 

County.
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Figure 6–15. 25-year mission-enabling line item schedule

◼ The Albuquerque Complex Project is under construction on DOE property in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, adjacent to Kirtland Air Force Base. The current DOE/NNSA Albuquerque Office Complex 

is beyond its design life and does not meet DOE/NNSA’s mission needs. Construction was 

completed in FY 2021 on a 333,000-square-foot building to house approximately 1,200 

employees. The new building is designed to Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Gold 

Standards.

◼ The Emergency Operations Center at Y-12 will provide a centralized, comprehensive emergency 

management capability for the development, coordination, control, and direction of emergency 

planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, response, and recovery actions. The current facility 

is not compliant with DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System. This 

project has been delegated to the Alternative Construction Pilot Program for acquisition and 

construction. Construction began in FY 2021 and is planned for completion in FY 2022.

◼ The Emergency Operations Center at LLNL provides a new permanent Emergency Operations 

Center with comprehensive emergency management capabilities for the development, 

coordination, control, and direction of emergency planning, preparedness, readiness, assurance, 

response, and recovery actions. The 20,000-gross-square-foot building will allow an occupancy 

rate needed during an emergency event that the current Emergency Operations Center cannot 

accommodate; provide additional parking; and contain or interface with approximately 

60 systems, including closed-circuit television, metrology, site fire and life safety alarms, radio 

communication, emergency services disaster dispatching, etc.
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◼ The Fire Station project at Y-12 provides a single-story building (approximately 35,000 square 

feet) to meet all emergency response requirements including firefighting, emergency medical 

treatment and transport, hazardous materials spill mitigation, and technical rescue responses for 

all events within the site emergency response boundary at the Y-12 site. The new facility will be 

built to meet all safety standards and building codes to support 24-hour, 7-days-a-week 

operations under all environmental conditions. The facility will accommodate a workforce and a 

fleet of large fire apparatus vehicles, ambulances, emergency response vehicles, and other 

support vehicles. This project has been delegated to the Alternative Construction Pilot Program 

for acquisition and construction. Construction began in FY 2021 and is planned for completion in

FY 2022.

◼ The Emergency Operations Center at SNL will provide a facility that meets DOE/NNSA and SNL 

standards and requirements, to include personnel parking, computing, communications, building 

systems, and fuel and water storage sufficient to mitigate all potential emergency 

operations/management response capabilities.

◼ The 138kV Power Transmission System Replacement project will replace a 55-year-old 138-

kilovolt (kV) power transmission system in the NNSS Mission Corridor in Mercury, Nevada, to

provide the site with reliable power and communications to mission-critical facilities. The project 

will design and construct a new 138-kV power transmission system to replace and upgrade 23 

miles of the degraded existing power transmission system. It will also upgrade the collocated 

fiber optic lines to meet vital national security mission requirements.

◼ The Electrical Power Capacity Upgrade at LANL will address projected increases in the capacity 

and distribution of the electrical transmission and distribution system at LANL to reliably support 

demand for multiple program activities being performed at the site. By 2024, power demand for 

all programs is expected to exceed the capacity and performance requirements of LANL’s existing 

transmission and distribution system. This electrical upgrade will support critical Weapons 

Activities requirements for stockpile modernization programs, SFIs, ongoing stockpile 

stewardship programs, and other work.

The following mission enabling project is in the Definition Phase of the CD process:

◼ The Digital Infrastructure Capability Expansion project at LLNL will provide safe, secure, resilient, 

reliable, flexible, and sustainable infrastructure for LLNL’s networking and telecommunications 

digital infrastructure needs. The project will expand capabilities to meet growth projections for 

the next 40 years.

There are multiple proposals for new mission enabling projects that are planned over the next 10 to 25 

years, some of which include:

◼ The Multi-Purpose Office Space at LANL will provide secure, safe, sustainable office/light 

laboratory facilities to conduct increasing operations at LANL. 

◼ The Maintenance Facility at Y-12 will replace the antiquated maintenance facilities that supports 

all Y-12 production missions and support preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance 

across the site. The new facility will consolidate maintenance processes and eliminate square 

footage of aging facilities in a more optimized, efficient location. 

◼ The New Nuclear Weapons R&D Complex at LLNL will collocate dispersed, end-of-life Weapons 

Program office buildings into a more centralized location and will enable optimization of space 

utilization. This project will also permit the backfilling and collocation of employees relocated 

from other poor quality offices. 
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◼ The Weapon Engineering Science and Technology Laboratory at SNL/California will integrate the 

Materials Science and Engineering capabilities across materials development and engineering 

design. The primary existing facility is in poor condition, is functionally unfit for advanced 

materials science R&D, and lacks sufficient capacity to meet the current and projected demand. 

The modernized infrastructure will ensure that world-class instruments operate at the highest 

level of performance and lead to the development of breakthrough materials to solve enduring 

and emerging national-security challenges. 

◼ The Northwest Las Vegas New Office Space at NNSS would provide sustainable infrastructure 

that supports the health, safety, and welfare of NNSS employees, the public, and the 

environment. As NNSS moves toward a smaller, safer, more secure, and less expensive 

enterprise, consolidation of functions into newer and fewer facilities at the site is necessary to 

align with DOE and DOE/NNSA Strategic Plans.

6.4 Modernization Through Minor Construction and 

Recapitalization

Minor construction and recapitalization projects provide an 

important vehicle for DOE/NNSA to sustain major facilities and 

replace smaller capital assets below the minor construction 

threshold. These projects are an effective method for making 

improvements to increase DOE/NNSA’s mission performance and 

lower operating costs. They can be completed much faster than line 

item construction, and they enable DOE/NNSA to be responsive to 

emerging infrastructure issues and changing stockpile requirements.

Modernization of the nuclear security enterprise is accomplished 

through formal recapitalization programs planned and funded at the 

DOE/NNSA level, as well as through site-directed investments and

Institutional General Plant Projects. This section describes planned and current projects for 

modernization through all of these vehicles.

6.4.1 Recapitalization Program

The Recapitalization program executes prioritized minor construction and recapitalization investments to 

improve the condition, reliability, efficiency, and capability of infrastructure to meet mission 

requirements. The program plans and executes replacement, installation, upgrades, and minor 

construction projects to revitalize existing facilities or construct new facilities and additions below the

$20 million minor construction threshold. Examples of such projects are the completed New Polymers 

and Engineering Facility at LLNL, SM-39 Classified Machine Shop Upgrade at LANL, and the 50-Year 

Sprinkler Head Replacements Portfolio at Y-12. This investment method is used in conjunction with line 

item construction to provide timely, appropriately sized, and integrated infrastructure solutions. 

In addition to supporting the enterprise through strategic minor construction investments, the 

Recapitalization program sustains and modernizes DOE/NNSA infrastructure by improving the state of

obsolete support and safety systems. The program provides funding to revitalize assets that are beyond 

the end of their design life and improve the safety, reliability, and capability of infrastructure to meet 

mission requirements. Recapitalization investments also achieve operational efficiencies; reduce risks to 

safety, security, environment, and programs; and improve the quality of the workplace. 
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Recapitalization program investments are evaluated and prioritized using an enterprise-wide, risk-based 

assessment of program and safety effects,sustainability, return on investment, and deferred maintenance 

reduction to obtain optimal benefits within the available budget. DOE/NNSA has also incorporated

enhanced project management practices that have increased transparency, reporting accuracy, project

definition and readiness, and overall program performance.

In FY 2020, DOE/NNSA completed 63 recapitalization projects. This performance reflects the effect of 

advanced planning based on detailed data and the use of the improved reporting tools and processes. 

Several completed projects demonstrate that DOE/NNSA has directed many infrastructure investments 

to address risks identified through facility and mission assessments:

◼ Building 3 Area Modification for Production Security Verification at KCNSC

◼ CMR Wing 2 and 3-Hot and Cold Labs Disassembly and Contamination Hazard Reduction at LANL

◼ Superblock Electrical Building System Upgradeat LLNL

◼ Applied Materials and Engineering Capabilities 

Modernization Facility at LLNL

◼ U1a New Air Supply Borehole at NNSS

◼ Building 12-31 heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

(HVAC) replacement at Pantex

◼ 20th and G Intersection Relocation at SNL

◼ New Z pulsed power facility (Z) and TA-4 Missions Support 

Facility at SNL

◼ 234-7H Air Handling Units Replacement at SRS

◼ Building 9204-2E 815 Switchgear Replacement at Y-12

6.4.1.1 Current Recapitalization Projects

DOE/NNSA currently has over 190 active recapitalization projects. The majority of these projects are 

below $10 million. There are more than a dozen projects ranging between $10–20 million. Projects are 

placed into portfolios, which are used to highlight significant multi-year investment in a common attribute 

or area at a particular site. Below are some examples of DOE/NNSA’s ongoing Recapitalization portfolios 

and projects. 

$10-20 Million Project Examples

◼ PF-4 Power and Communications Systems Upgrade at LANL

◼ New Nondestructive Evaluation Building at LLNL

◼ New Mercury Building 23-461 at NNSS

◼ New Advanced Fabrication Facility at Pantex

◼ New Explosives Manufacturing Science and Technology Facility at SNL

Project Portfolio Examples

◼ Building 2 Mechanical Component Manufacturing Revitalization at KCNSC

◼ CMR Initial Projects to Prepare for Closure Portfolio at LANL

Completed DARHT Weather Enclosure

at LANL
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◼ High-Level Radiochemistry Gloveboxes Laboratory Revitalizations at LLNL

◼ U1a Complex New Refuge Chamber Drift Installation at NNSS

◼ Bay and Cell Safety System Upgrades Portfolio at Pantex

◼ Obsolete Glovebox Oxygen Monitors Replacement Portfolio at SRS

◼ Diesel Generator Replacement at SRS

◼ Nuclear Facility Electrical Modernization Portfolio at Y-12

6.4.1.2 Recapitalization Program Planning Improvements

DOE/NNSA is improving understanding of long-term programmatic capability and associated capacity 

throughput requirements to better evaluate infrastructure options. Additionally, more front-end 

planning studies are being initiated to ensure that DOE/NNSA can integrate multiple Federal and M&O 

site organizations while designing multi-project plans to address complex infrastructure challenges. These 

efforts strengthen DOE/NNSA’s modernization plans by ensuring that projects are fully scoped, wellintegrated, and executed on time and within budget.

6.4.2 Site-Directed7 Minor Construction Investments

DOE/NNSA’s contracts with various consortia for management and operation of its sites contain 

requirements for M&O partners to plan for and manage DOE/NNSA assetsfor current and future missions. 

Sites fulfill these responsibilities in part by making minor investments in facilities and infrastructure from 

funds controlled at each site. The sources for these investments can be direct programs (as discussed in 

the previous sections) or indirect funding pools, depending on the nature of the asset and whether the 

site has a multi-mission program portfolio. 

Many DOE/NNSA M&O partners use indirect funding to address high-priority needs at each site. On multimission program sites, indirect funding pools may be created through institutional assessments or other 

similar mechanisms. These pools are used to fund maintenance, utilities, and operations; some funding 

is set aside for site-wide investments. In all cases, expenditure of these funds aligns with accounting 

standards for demonstrating a causal-beneficial relationship, i.e., indirect funds are used for multi-mission 

program functions and purchases that deliver benefits across programs. M&O partners are also 

responsible for maintaining Weapons Activities capabilities to meet mission needs and often use portions 

of their budgets to fund minor investments in facilities, infrastructure, and equipment to meet those 

responsibilities. 

Examples of indirect expenditures include Institutional General Plant Projects (IGPPs) at multi-mission 

program sites, especially the laboratories. These IGPPs are often limited refurbishments of legacy facilities 

or new, moderately sized buildings to accommodate growth at the site and enable prudent space 

management for the institution to maintain facilities in good condition and replace worn-out assets. IGPPs 

can also provide upgrades/replacements for institutional services such as parking structures, cafeterias, 

or medical facilities.

Site-directed investments over $1 million are reported through the DOE/NNSA Program Management 

Information System, Generation 2 (G2). Providing this information to one centralized system increases 

transparency and coordination for all infrastructure investments (both direct and indirect). Capturing the 

details of these projects in G2 ensures that indirect infrastructure investments align with DOE/NNSA’s 

strategic priorities; enhances integration between direct- and indirect-funded infrastructure investments; 

7 Another term for “site-directed” investments is “indirect-funded” investments.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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improves reporting to understand total infrastructure recapitalization costs across the enterprise; and 

ensures the capability to prioritize and plan for DOE/NNSA’s long-term stewardship responsibilities. 

6.4.3 Defense Nuclear Security Recapitalization and Minor 

Construction

The Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP) was created by DOE/NNSA’s Office of Defense 

Nuclear Security (DNS) to assure the strength of the physical security infrastructure supporting the 

DOE/NNSA mission at the eight sites now and into the future. DNS developed and submitted to Congress 

the 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan to outline and guide the scope of the SIRP effort. This 

plan contains a comprehensive condition assessment of the security infrastructure at each site and a 

nuclear security enterprise-wide prioritized listing of the required upgrades. 

The 10-Year Physical Security Systems Refresh Plan identifies and prioritizes security infrastructure 

investments critical to revitalization efforts throughout the nuclear security enterprise. 

DNS minor construction project status for FY 2021:

◼ TA-72 Outdoor Range Upgrades Project, LANL (completed FY 2021)

◼ Range Classroom Facility Replacement, LLNL (funded FY 2019, construction completed FY 2021)

◼ Vehicle Barrier, Y-12 (funded FY 2020, estimated completion FY 2024)

6.5 Sustainment

This section describes how DOE/NNSA maintains and operates 

existing infrastructure in support of the nuclear security mission. 

DOE/NNSA, in partnership with the M&O partners, sustains its 

assets to enable mission success and readiness; ensure 

operational safety and security; safeguard the workforce, public 

and environment; and, meet mission needs more efficiently and 

cost- effectively.

6.5.1 Infrastructure Operations and 

Sustainment

The Operations of Facilities under Infrastructure and Operations 

program is responsible for operating DOE/NNSA facilities in a safe and secure manner and includes 

essential support such as water and electrical utilities, safety systems, lease agreements, and activities 

associated with Federal, state, and local regulations associated with the environment and worker safety

and health.

The Maintenance and Repair of Facilities program provides direct-funded maintenance activities across 

the nuclear security enterprise for the recurring day-to-day work required to sustain and preserve 

DOE/NNSA facilities and equipment in a condition suitable for their designated purpose. These

sustainment activities are executed through a combination of innovative tools that provide data for risk 

analyses that inform infrastructure management decisions. These decisions dedicate critical resources to 

maintaining facilities already in good condition and repairing the highest risks in DOE/NNSA assets. One 

of these tools is BUILDER, a web-based software tool that enables decisions concerning when, where, and 

how to best maintain, repair, and recapitalize infrastructure. DOE/NNSA’s goal is to collect all condition 

assessment data in BUILDER and use it as an auditable, consistent sole source of information on the 
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condition of DOE/NNSA’s physical infrastructure. DOE/NNSA’s deployment of BUILDER is an ongoing 

multi‐year effort. Upon full implementation, DOE/NNSA will continue working to integrate each site’s 

computerized maintenance management system with BUILDER to capture data for long‐term 

sustainment. Integration of BUILDER with DOE/NNSA’s Infrastructure Management programs, including 

the Recapitalization Program, will enhance the decision‐making process by making use of risk-informed 

data.

Maintenance and repair activities sustain an acceptable condition of real property assets to perform their 

designated purpose or to mitigate risks posed by excess assets until their disposition. These efforts 

support the recurring day‐to‐day work needed to sustain plant, property, assets, systems, roads, and 

equipment in a condition suitable for its designated purpose. Efforts include required maintenance 

through surveillance and predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities to maintain 

facilities, property, assets, systems, roads, equipment, and vital safety systems. Maintenance funding can

be used for sustainment efforts or to respond to unexpected/urgent issues that require immediate 

correction to ensure safe, compliant, and reliable operations. In most cases, the funding does not have 

discrete cost, scope, and schedule milestones attached.

Deferred maintenance is defined as any maintenance activities that were not performed when they 

should have been or were scheduled. As a result, they are rolled over as a continued expected expense 

to subsequent fiscal years until the maintenance can be completed. Repair needs are the repairs required 

to ensure that a constructed asset is restored to a condition that is substantially equivalent to the most 

recently configured designed capacity, efficiency, or capability. In FY 2019, DOE/NNSA began its transition 

to BUILDER data to determine total deferred maintenance and repair needs. Importantly, this transition 

to a standardized, structure-based approach provides DOE/NNSA with increased transparency and 

deferred maintenance data accuracy across the enterprise. In FY 2020, DOE/NNSA conducted an in-depth 

analysis of FY 2019 calculations and implemented a few minor enhancements to ensure a more accurate 

reflection of the true condition of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure.

As a result, DOE/NNSA’s deferred maintenance backlog increased from $4.78 billion in FY 2019 to 

$5.84 billion in FY 2020. This increase does not fundamentally change the physical condition of 

DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure, but more accurately represents DOE/NNSA’s deferred maintenance backlog. 

In fact, a vast majority of our facilities are in the same condition as they were in FY 2019. High deferred 

maintenance is a sign of infrastructure in poor condition and in need of modernization. Revitalizing 

DOE/NNSA infrastructure requires grappling with a $116 billion enterprise in which more than half of 

DOE/NNSA facilities are in insufficient condition to serve mission needs (e.g., poor or very poor condition).

Addressing this legacy while building for the future requires significant, sustained, and timely funding; 

robust planning and execution; and close collaboration across all stakeholders. DOE/NNSA remains 

committed to continuous improvement of our management practices and transparency in stewarding 

taxpayer resources as we work to modernize our nation’s nuclear infrastructure.

The Asset Management Program repairs and replaces major building systems that are common across the 

DOE/NNSA enterprise (e.g., roofs; HVAC systems; etc.).

DOE/NNSA’s Roof Asset Management Program (RAMP) uses supply chain management strategies and 

economies of scale to increase purchasing power and improve the timeliness of procurements. RAMP 

prioritizes the highest-risk roofs across the enterprise and has repaired or replaced more than 6 million 

gross square feet of roofs since its inception in FY 2004. The Cooling and Heating Asset Management 

Program (CHAMP) uses systems engineering and supply chain management strategies to quickly and 

economically address HVAC issues, achieve economies of scale, and increase purchasing power. CHAMP 

provides reliable HVAC systems that are vital for maintaining precise temperature, humidity, and 

ventilation requirements for the production of mission-critical components. 
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6.5.2 Programmatic Facility Sustainment

In some instances, the nature of core mission areas leads to direct programmatic sustainment funding for 

certain operations. For example, the Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) program 

is responsible for the HPC capabilities needed for stockpile stewardship in modeling, simulation, and 

experiments conducted at various facilities and experimental capabilities such as inertial confinement 

fusion. Within SRT&E, operational costs at facilities are directly supported and budgeted within the 

Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) and Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Programs. The ICF 

Facility Operations and Target Production subprogram supports efficient operations at NIF, Omega Laser 

Facility (Omega), Z, and the Trident and NIKE facilities (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3, for more information 

on NIF, Z, and Omega). Similarly, the ASC Facility Operations and User Support subprogram provides the 

facilities and services required to execute nuclear weapon simulations. Facility Operations include 

physical space, power, and other utility infrastructure; local area/wide area networking for local and 

remote access; and system administration, cybersecurity, and operations services for ongoing support. 

Programmatic operations must be responsive to the safety and health of workers and the protection of 

the environment, regardless of the funding source. As part of DOE/NNSA’s efforts for a more sustainable 

enterprise, Z was awarded an environmental management award of excellence for significantly reducing 

emissions of the powerful greenhouse gas, sulfur hexafluoride. 

ASC is the primary user and chief programmatic advocate for 

the facilities and services required to run nuclear weapons 

simulations and operate Commodity Technology and 

Advanced Technology systems. Each laboratory’s 

computing capability comprises not only HPC systems, but 

also ancillary physical components such as space, power, 

storage, file systems, local area/wide area networking for 

local and remote access, and a host of system 

administration, cybersecurity, and operations services for 

ongoing support of HPC system and support equipment. 

There are also specific user services associated with items 

such as a computer center hotline and help-desk services, 

account management, web-based system documentation, 

system status information tools, user training, trouble-ticketing systems, common computing 

environment, and application analyst support that are included in the fiduciary responsibilities of the 

program. As such, each center’s footprint can physically span multiple buildings.

ASC manages the costs associated with each laboratory’s current computing centers and considers multiyear budget planning to deliver future systems based on programmatic need. The funding necessary to 

operate and modify the computing centers comes from a combination of direct programmatic funding 

from the ASC and other DOE/NNSA programs, which may use the same buildings, or indirect overhead 

charges brought in by the laboratories directly. Within Weapons Activities, the Infrastructure and 

Operations Program provides capabilities and SNM infrastructure for the nuclear security enterprise, but 

is not responsible for maintenance and operations of the ASC computing centers themselves.

Sulfur hexafluoride reclaiming system being used 

on SNL’s Z 
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6.5.3 Site-Directed Sustainment Investments

At multi-program sites, indirect pools may be created to pay for maintenance and operations. These funds 

are then used to pay utility bills; provide preventive, predictive, and corrective maintenance to facilities 

and equipment; and replace equipment associated with facilities and infrastructure. These funds may 

also cover various site-wide services. Site-directed investments are reported through G2. Providing this 

information to one centralized system increases transparency and coordination for all infrastructure 

investments (both direct and indirect). Capturing the details of these investments in G2 ensures that 

indirect infrastructure investments align with DOE/NNSA’s strategic priorities; enhances integration 

between direct- and indirect-funded infrastructure investments; improves reporting to understand total 

infrastructure recapitalization costs across the enterprise; and ensures the capability to prioritize and plan 

for DOE/NNSA’s long-term stewardship responsibilities.

6.5.4 Real Estate and Leased Facilities

Leases are an important real estate strategy to 

address short-term needs. DOE/NNSA is 

streamlining its process and refining its strategy to 

make better use of leasing as a tool for addressing 

temporary mission needs, while ensuring that 

longer-term needs are addressed in the most cost 

effective manner. Leases provide the flexibility 

needed to deal with surges in mission work, but 

can be more costly than construction and 

ownership if not well structured or if used as final 

solutions. 

DOE/NNSA is implementing a range of innovative 

tools and processes related to our leasing 

strategies. DOE/NNSA executed its first “option 

purchase” acquisition in June 2020 and is 

preparing to pursue the purchase of other leased 

facilities across the enterprise. The inaugural 

purchase of 103 Palladium, a 73,000-square-foot 

facility on a 21-acre campus in Tennessee, will set 

the stage for future purchases. All will use existing 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorities to acquire 

facilities that are under $20 million. Additionally,

the lease scoring system rolled out in early 2019 is 

driving better decision-making by offering an 

objective metric for evaluating a lease’s risk and 

comparing it within DOE/NNSA’s broader leasing 

portfolio. This system helped improve the terms 

and conditions in leases, minimize tenant improvements, and ensure that exit strategies are in place for 

new leases. Scoring is also normalizing soliciting for space to encourage better rates and conducting site 

visits to improve usage and ensure lessor is delivering per the lease.

Kansas City Short Term Expansion Project

Since the consolidation of operations in 2014 from the original 

Bannister Road facilities to the leased facility on Botts Road, 

KCNSC has seen a significant increase in workload in support 

of the nuclear stockpile modernization. The activities 

supporting the growth in workload have consumed all 

KCNSC’s factory space at the Botts Road facility and have 

driven KCNSC to address this shortfall by executing a bridge 

lease on a nearby facility, KCNSC East. The Kansas City 

Short Term Expansion Project (KCSTEP) is a series of multiyear projects that will provide for KCNSC East infrastructure 

upgrades, relocation of specific manufacturing capabilities to 

KCNSC East, and expansion and rearrangement of other 

manufacturing capabilities remaining at the Botts Road main 

campus. While efforts continue to assess a long-term facility 

expansion strategy, KCSTEP will provide increased factory 

capacity to support the B61-12 life extension program and W88 

Alt 370, as well as partially filling needs for the W80-4 and 

W87-1 programs.

KCNSC Botts Road Main Campus
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6.6 Disposition of Excess Facilities 

DOE/NNSA infrastructure that is no longer needed must be 

dispositioned to minimize risks to workers, the public, the 

environment, and the mission. 

Approximately 10 percent of assets located on DOE/NNSA’s sites are 

designated as excess. DOE/NNSA’s highest disposition priorities are 

to stabilize degraded facilities, characterize hazards and conditions, 

remove hazardous and flammable materials, and place facilities in the 

lowest acceptable risk condition possible until they can be 

dispositioned. If facilities are process-contaminated then the 

responsibility to disposition resides with DOE’s Office of 

Environmental Management. The DOE/NNSA Disposition Strategic 

Plan outlines the details of how DOE/NNSA plans to address these 

excess facilities. 

DOE/NNSA’s FY 2019 budget included more than $50 million to continue reducing the risks posed by 

excess facilities and to decontaminate and demolish buildings. 

From 2016 through 2020, DOE/NNSA demolished a total of 374 assets representing over 5 million gross

square feet, which included 14 assets identified as high-risk excess facilities. Although most of the highrisk facilities will remain until DOE Environmental Management demolishes them, DOE/NNSA has made 

progress in reducing its overall footprint.

6.7 Modernization of Programmatic Equipment

Facilities and infrastructure are just one of the three aspects of sustainment that must be managed in 

support of the mission; equipment and people are also critical to mission performance. The workforce 

aspects are discussed in Chapter 7. This section focuses on the equipment aspects of sustainment. 

DOE/NNSA manages and funds equipment procurement across the nuclear security enterprise through 

multiple programs such as stockpile modernization programs or the Engineering Program. These 

programs selectively fund mission-related equipment procurement to meet their schedule or new 

requirements. In addition to these, a number of other programs maintain nuclear security enterprise 

capabilities through equipment refurbishment and replacement. Those programs include CapabilitiesBased Investments (CBI), Production Operations, Non-Nuclear Component Modernization, Operations of 

Facilities, and Maintenance and Repair of Facilities. Furthermore, the organization that initially funds 

procurement of a piece of equipment will most likely not be the only organization benefiting from the 

acquisition in the future, which adds complexity to the task maintaining and replacing equipment. Part 

of the responsiveness of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure is defined by the ability to maintain and find new or 

improved uses for existing equipment. 

While each program focuses on its own respective responsibilities and requirements, the integrated 

nature of nuclear weapons work creates natural mission overlap across programs. In these cases the 

Programmatic Recapitalization Working Group works with the M&O sites to capture the current inventory 

of capital equipment items as well as future needs across the FYNSP to allow DOE/NNSA to better plan 

and program capital equipment needs amongst the appropriate funding program offices. This allows 

better alignment of planning and programming activities across relevant DOE/NNSA programs. 
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Equipment modernization, replacement, and refurbishment planning will enable DOE/NNSA to 

recapitalize the nuclear security enterprise’s infrastructure and provide an effective, responsive, and 

resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure. It is also crucial to the maintenance of the nuclear security 

enterprise’s current capability. The investment strategies described in the following sections presents a 

variety of programs focused on investing in programmatic equipment, as well as certain equipmentrelated sustainment activities funded by Infrastructure and Operations. Together, they provide the 

baseline activities essential to maintaining a functional and efficient nuclear security enterprise.

6.7.1 Programmatic Equipment Investments

Equipment investments by mission-specific programs are dictated by programmatic need.

For the weapons programs (Stockpile Major Modernization and Stockpile Sustainment), equipment 

purchased might include radiography machines, shaker tables, blast tubes, centrifuges for qualification, 

certification, and surveillance activities that are specific to a weapon system. A weapon program might 

also require specific capabilities in production equipment, such as specialized mills and lathes, to produce 

component designs and would cover these costs, as the requirements for that equipment would be tied 

directly to their program. For example, the W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) has funded programmatic 

equipment such as the digitizers needed for hydro shot diagnostics, a computer numerical controlled mill 

and lathe for both HE and radiological materials to meet integrated weapon experiment deliverables, and 

inspection equipment to validate that machines’ experimental components meet weapon engineerspecified requirements.

Weapon programs also invest in equipment and infrastructure necessary to maintain their schedule. 

Often these investments are split among weapon programs that could benefit from such procurements in 

the future. For instance, the W88 Alt 370 benefited from investments made by the W76 and B61-12 LEPs. 

Where multiple stockpile modernization programs can benefit, CBI (described in Section 6.7.2) is also a 

major source of funding. 

SRT&E investments cover a range of highly specialized and common equipment that is essential to the 

high-tech work of stockpile stewardship. SRT&E equipment might provide or facilitate environments for 

testing and experimentation, produce data from those experiments, or help synthesize the data from the 

experiments to inform research, design, production, qualification, and surveillance activities across 

multiple different weapon systems and programs. Examples include next generation computing 

platforms, diagnostic equipment tied to subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments, and accelerators 

associated with advanced radiography. Given the specialized nature of these types of equipment, 

investments can be quite costly. New equipment is procured by SRT&E programs as mission needs arise, 

equipment becomes technologically obsolete, emerging technologies demand investment in new 

capabilities, or new facilities or capabilities come on line. In addition, as urgent needs arise, CBI and NonNuclear Component Modernization makes investments in equipment for SRT&E missions that are tied to 

LEP schedules.

The Additive Manufacturing and Component Manufacturing Development programs make equipment 

investments aimed at validating production and qualification processes that are vital to the future 

stockpile, with a long-term goal of reducing required production floor space and attendant infrastructure. 

While these programs may purchase one to two pieces of equipment with advanced capabilities, the 

weapon programs, CBI, or appropriate modernization offices would be expected to purchase the 

remaining equipment needed to realize the Additive Manufacturing and Component Manufacturing 

Development-provided capability at full production scale. In some cases, the initial investment by these 

programs could fulfill production requirements, and the responsibility for the operations and 
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maintenance of that equipment would transfer to the appropriate program, such as Production 

Operations. Examples of equipment procured through these programs include a variety of additive 

manufacturing machines, advanced testers, and other supporting equipment.

6.7.2 Capabilities- Based Investments

The CBI program focuses on modernization via capital 

investment in equipment, tools, supporting facilities and 

infrastructure directly related to enduring, multi-program 

weapon activity capabilities, mission deliverables, and 

management of programmatic risk across the nuclear security 

enterprise.

Over the years, DOE/NNSA’s manufacturing capabilities have 

been lost or degraded due to aging, damaged, or outdated 

equipment and supporting systems. The investments 

supporting core programmatic requirements address needs 

beyond any single facility, campaign, or weapon system that

are essential to achieving program mission objectives. 

Additional warhead programs, new organizational structures,

and changes to other programs’ funding strategies have all 

contributed to changes and evolutions in CBI activities in

FY 2021 and beyond. The increase in the number of active warhead programs will add to the overall 

workload of the nuclear security enterprise, which will challenge existing capacities and accelerate 

existing issues related to aging and condition. Under the new budget structure introduced with the 

FY 2021 request, some scope has shifted out of CBI into other programs (e.g., High Explosives and 

Energetics and Non-Nuclear Component Modernization), which affords some opportunities to focus on 

mission needs that may have been underserved in previous years. CBI is participating in the Programmatic 

Recapitalization Working Group to better identify, analyze, and coordinate equipment repair, 

replacement, and recapitalization needs. In coordination with changes in how other programs approach 

their funding priorities, CBI will make adjustments to address resulting gaps in programmatic equipment 

investments as needed. 

Table 6–1 provides a high-level summary of CBI challenges and strategies.

Table 6–1. Summary of Capabilities-Based Investments challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Environmental testing equipment is aging 

more rapidly than sustainment and recap 

efforts can manage.

Investigate preprioritization of 

equipment recap needs to ensure 

environmental testing equipment is 

available and operational as needed.

Continue monitoring status of testing 

capabilities and coordinate prioritized 

needs with the Office of Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation 

and the Office of Stockpile 

Management.

Programmatic equipment investments and 

recapitalization are not keeping up with the 

increasing amount of equipment required 

to support the various modernization 

efforts.

The Non-Nuclear Components 

program within Defense Programs 

was established beginning in FY 2021, 

with responsibility to allocate 

resources for this issue in 

coordination with the Office of 

Stockpile Management and the Office 

Incorporate enterprise modeling and 

Programmatic Recapitalization 

Working Group data to inform 

programmatic equipment resource 

allocation and coordinate resourcing 

across program offices.

CBI Accomplishments

• Replaced PF-4 trolley control cabinets, 

LANL

• Established metal additive manufacturing 

capability, Y-12

• Established Laser Powder Bed Fusion 

Capability, KCNSC

• Supported new Design Agency/Production 

Agency integrated Polymer Enclave, LLNL

• Re-constituted DARHT confinement vessel 

production capability, LANL

• Completed design for new Weapons 

Evaluation Test Laboratory High-G 

centrifuge, SNL
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Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

of Safety, Infrastructure, and 

Operations.

The increase in weapon modernization 

efforts is putting increased strain on 

existing equipment throughout the nuclear 

security enterprise.

Non-Nuclear Components, CBI, Office 

of Safety, Infrastructure, and 

Operations, and the Office of 

Stockpile Management are jointly 

working with the sites to understand 

the highest priorities to allocate 

limited resources.

Prioritize recapitalization based on 

Programmatic Recapitalization 

Working Group data analysis and 

program of record requirements to 

sustain and modernize the stockpile.

6.7.3 Production Operations Equipment Investments

Production Operations provides site-specific base capabilities to enable assembly, disassembly, and 

production activities funded by Stockpile Major Modernization, Stockpile Sustainment, or Weapons 

Dismantlement and Disposition (refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.4, for additional information on Production 

Operations). The Production Operations program also maintains specific multi-weapon base production 

capabilities for critical nuclear weapon components, such as neutron generators at SNL and detonators at 

LANL. 

The program addresses a range of base capability replacements or repairs with a focus on multi-weapon 

system support and the nuclear security enterprise’s production agencies. Equipment procurement and 

installation within Production Operations has traditionally addressed items ranging from greater than 

$5 million MIEs to equipment below $100,000. With the reorganization of Defense Programs, Production 

Operations’ equipment scope is more focused on sustainment through refurbishment, maintenance, and 

in some cases, replacement of existing equipment. Within this revised mission space, Production 

Operations must increase its ability to respond to unplanned failures of key equipment.

Typical investments funded by Production Operations include:

◼ Multi-weapons system base capability sustainment in component manufacturing, assembly, and 

disassembly, including gloveboxes, mills, and lathes

◼ Sustainment through refurbishment, maintenance, and in some cases, replacement of existing 

equipment for moving product

◼ Sustainment through refurbishment, maintenance, and in some cases, replacement of existing 

equipment for the production of multi-weapon system tooling and the qualification of materials 

to be used in production 

◼ Multi-weapon system capabilities for the qualification and surveillance of weapon components 

and materials

◼ Simulation capabilities, including HPC equipment and qualified analysts, to support improved 

manufacturing process reliability (thus decreasing waste and costs), and accelerate timeline for 

production activities, including the use of advanced manufacturing techniques
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6.7.4 Infrastructure Operations, and Maintenance Equipment 

Investments

The Operations of Facilities program funds some existing scientific and/or process equipment that 

provides the nuclear security enterprise with the capabilities needed to accomplish programmatic 

milestones and activities:

◼ Costs associated with staffing to manage and support the equipment/capability 

◼ Activities required to run the equipment/capability in a safe, secure, reliable, and “ready for 

operations” manner (calibration, surveillance)

◼ Equipment/capability utilization analysis, modification and upgrade analysis, and the technical 

operations and staffing necessary for the equipment/capability to function effectively 

◼ Training required to operate the equipment/capability in a safe, secure, and effective manner

The Maintenance program funds activities to sustain and preserve equipment in a condition suitable to 

perform its purpose.

6.7.5 Site-Directed Equipment Investments

As with facilities and infrastructure, sites may make investments in equipment for activities that support 

weapons and other site missions(multi-program), and these investments may either be made using direct 

funds or include indirect cost pools. The cost of programmatic equipment that supports multiple 

programs should be allocated to those programs in accordance with the benefits received.

6.8 Leveraging Weapons Activities Investments Across 

DOE/NNSA

Several other DOE/NNSA programs (e.g., Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Counterterrorism and 

Counterproliferation, and Emergency Management Programs) rely on infrastructure funded by Weapons 

Activities and other DOE program offices. These programs are described in DOE/NNSA’s Prevent, Counter, 

and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2022 – FY 2026).

6.8.1 Support of Nonproliferation Efforts

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Global Material Security Program relies on infrastructure maintained 

by other DOE/NNSA offices, as summarized below.

◼ TA-5 at SNL conducts nuclear security training for the International Atomic Energy Agency and 

bilateral partners.

◼ The DOE/NNSA National Training Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, will, on a limited basis, 

provide bilateral partners with Protective Force training.

◼ The Y-12 Alarm Response Training facility conducts radiological security training for domestic 

and international security forces, health and safety personnel, and local law enforcement to 

effectively respond to the theft of radioactive sources.

◼ SNL and LANL provide technical expertise, testing equipment, and SNM sources that are critical in 

the evaluation and characterization of commercial detection equipment.
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Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation’s R&D program relies on supportive capabilities at a number of 

laboratories, plants, and sites that enable mission-relevant R&D activities, as summarized below. 

◼ NNSS hosts several experimental and applied test beds to demonstrate next-generation 

nonproliferation technologies for detecting foreign nuclear weapons development activities, 

which will result in new capabilities at the national security laboratories.

◼ The DAF hosts and facilitates detection experiments for university and laboratory projects.

◼ SNL, LANL, LLNL, and NNSS provide critical expertise and infrastructure to support a number of 

weapons-related experimental campaigns, to include U1a and Big Explosives Experimental 

Facility.

◼ The Microsystems Engineering, Sciences, and Applications Complex at SNL provides resources to 

develop beyond leading-edge trusted microsystems technologies that enable space-based 

detonation detection capabilities.

◼ SNM irradiation experiments are conducted at the National Criticality Experiments Research 

Center at NNSS, where criticality assembly machines provide the capability for research to 

improve precision measurements of nuclear fission product yields and other nuclear data 

parameters.

◼ HPC is used for a broad range of modeling and simulation research across multiple research areas 

at SNL, LANL, and LLNL.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program relies heavily 

on the infrastructure maintained by other DOE/NNSA offices. Effects of the aging infrastructure on the 

implementation of key nonproliferation programs are summarized below. 

◼ Conversion Program

– Y-12’s uranium facilities perform downblending and casting activities that produce lowenriched uranium-molybdenum (LEU-Mo) material that will allow conversion of the U.S. highperformance research reactors from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to LEU. Aging casting 

furnaces at Y-12 are a programmatic risk to production of future LEU-Mo material. To address 

the aging facility issues, Y-12 is working to construct a new facility that will use new 

technologies. In the future, M3 will shift to using BWX Technologies, Inc., for its alloy casting 

capability instead of Y-12. M3 will still rely on Y-12 for production of LEU metal feedstock. 

This shift is planned to begin in FY 2025 and fully transition by FY 2028. 

– The Sigma facility at LANL develops and optimizes LEU-Mo fuel fabrication processes. 

◼ Material Disposition Program

– PF-4 at LANL disassembles nuclear weapon pits and converts the resulting plutonium metal 

into an oxide form using the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System. While this 

is a Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program, this equipment set is also used to support pit 

surveillance and other Defense Programs activities.

– The K Area Complex at SRS stores surplus plutonium that will be dispositioned. The K Area 

Complex is a DOE Environmental Management facility; however, DOE/NNSA plans to install 

equipment for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program under the Dilute and Dispose 

strategy, and completed construction of a transuranic waste storage pad and loading 

capability for shipping diluted plutonium oxide to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).
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– Under the proposed Dilute and Dispose strategy, WIPP is the permanent disposal site for 

diluted plutonium oxide, along with waste generated by Defense Programs and other 

nonproliferation activities. 

– The Material Disposition program relies on resources, facilities, and support from Pantex and 

KCNSC to support the Dilute and Dispose strategy.

– DOE/NNSA’s Secure Transportation Asset Program will provide resources to ship Security 

Category I quantities of SNM within the nuclear security enterprise in support of the Surplus 

Plutonium Disposition Program under the Dilute and Dispose strategy.

– The H-Canyon at SRS will be used to disposition portions of the plutonium inventory returned 

to the United States through the Nuclear Material Removal Program. The Savannah River 

National Laboratory provides R&D and implements technical solutions for a variety of 

material disposition activities.

– Enriched uranium operations at Y-12 allow analysis, processing, and packaging of materials to 

be downblended or properly disposed. The Material Disposition program also provides 

inventories of HEU for research reactor and other uses. The Material Disposition program 

recognizes the same risks listed by the Conversion Program above. Additionally, completion 

of Material Disposition work at Y-12 is heavily leveraged in the low-equity discards work, 

which relies on the waste management infrastructure managed by Defense Programs at Y-12, 

as well as disposal sites.

◼ Nuclear Material Removal Program

– DOE/NNSA’s Secure Transportation Asset Program provides resources for multiple material 

removal campaigns. The DOE/NNSA Office of Secure Transportation facilitates these projects 

by providing safe and secure transport of nuclear material within the territory of the 

United States.

– The L-Reactor basin at SRS, a DOE Environmental Management facility, receives enriched 

uranium from the Removal Program and stores the material pending disposition.

– The K Area Material Storage facility receives enriched uranium and plutonium from the 

Removal Program and stores the material pending disposition.

– Savannah River National Laboratory operates the Mobile Plutonium Facility in support of 

international removal activities and provides other critical support to the Removal Program.

– Oak Ridge National Laboratory (supported by the Y-12 National Security Complex) operates 

the Mobile Uranium Facility in support of international removal activities and provides other 

critical support to the Removal Program.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) Program also relies on the 

infrastructure maintained by other DOE/NNSA offices, as summarized below. 

◼ NPAC relies on the availability of Category I, II, and III SNM standards and sealed sources for 

detector and system development, as well as facilities for testing prototype radiation detection 

monitoring and safeguards equipment and for training U.S. personnel in equipment use and 

foreign partner personnel in the fundamentals of safeguards and material measurement. While

the health of the facility and SNM infrastructure remains sufficient at this time, downsizing over 

the last decade has required programsto use less Category I and II materials and more Category III 

and IV materials for detector development and training. As DOE/NNSA recapitalizes facilities that 
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are critical to the NPAC mission, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation offices will work with the 

appropriate program managers to ensure NPAC goals are incorporated as resources allow.

◼ NPAC uses NNSS as a training ground to develop a U.S. capability to perform field verification 

activities for suspected nuclear explosions. Focused training and exercise events for the Test Site 

Verification Team will coordinate with other programs’ activities as appropriate and are expected 

to begin at NNSS in FY 2022 – FY 2023, with the goal of an integrated field exercise, potentially at 

NNSS, in FY 2022 – FY 2023 to assess the readiness of the team, equipment, and procedures in a 

realistic field setting. Out-year efforts will focus on regular team training and targeted 

development to improve the capability, depending on needs and priorities.

◼ NPAC relies on facilities and operational expertise at Pantex and Y-12 to test warhead monitoring 

and verification capabilities, and to assess the feasibility of equipment deployment at weapons 

facilities. Demonstrations and evaluations at operational nuclear weapons facilities are essential 

for developing potential long-term solutions to the technical challenges of verifying nuclear 

weapon reductions. They support the U.S. ability to engage technically with partner countries 

under initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. 

◼ NPAC relies on access to nuclear weapons design information and access to weapons activities 

subject matter experts to help evaluate potential nuclear warhead monitoring and verification 

capabilities and ensure U.S. weapons design information will be protected as part of any future 

monitoring initiative.

◼ NPAC and various U.S. agencies work with DOE/NNSA Defense Programs to support transparency 

initiatives in fulfilling the Nation’s Article VI commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty.

◼ NPAC uses KCNSC, LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NNSS to conduct seminars on proliferation-sensitive 

commodities and technologies, particularly those subject to export controls and related to nuclear 

weapons and associated delivery systems. These seminars and workshops provide the U.S. 

agencies with knowledge of these commodities that is available nowhere else. Participants can 

apply what they learn in their jobs in nonproliferation policy, export licensing, export 

enforcement, and other functions related to preventing weapons of mass destruction 

proliferation.

6.8.2 Support of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation and 

Emergency Operations Efforts 

The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP) heavily leverages infrastructure primarily 

used for stockpile stewardship. These invaluable assets ensure that CTCP is able to execute its missions 

to counter nuclear threats, respond to nuclear incidents and accidents, and deliver an emergency 

response and consequence management capability for the U.S. Government. CTCP is further able to 

harness these resources to inform U.S. Government policies and deliver nuclear and radiological 

emergency preparedness training for the U.S. Government and its foreign partners. 

◼ Nuclear Counterterrorism (NCT) Assessment Program

– LANL, LLNL, and SNL support the NCT Assessment program by maintaining and advancing the 

U.S. Government’s ability to assess potential nuclear threat devices, including improvised 

nuclear devices or foreign nuclear devices out of state control. To do so, CTCP leverages 

DOE/NNSA infrastructure originally developed for stockpile stewardship to enable 

computational assessment of nuclear threat devices through expansion of the HPC code 
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capabilities. This understanding of nuclear threat devices is used to inform broader U.S. 

Government material security, nuclear incident response, and international nuclear threat 

reduction efforts.

– CTCP conducts focused and integrated experiments at all DOE/NNSA national security 

laboratories and several DOE Office of Science and Engineering laboratories for the 

refinement and validation of predictive models. 

– In order to understand materials not traditionally studied by the U.S. stockpile, LLNL, LANL, 

and SNL execute foundational science programs to characterize nuclear materials and 

explosives on similar platforms. For example, CTCP uses diamond anvil cell facilities, gas guns, 

and other high-pressure facilities to evaluate nuclear materials. Specific unique facilities 

supporting stockpile stewardship are also used to improve NCT Assessment activities, 

including TA-55 and proton radiography at LANL, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experiment 

Research gas gun (JASPER) and HEAF at LLNL, Z at SNL, etc. These activities are informed by 

foundational science that yields a broad understanding of nuclear material behavior in various 

pressure regimes and explosive performance, mechanical, and thermal response and reaction 

violence. Data from these nuclear materials or explosives experiments are used to improve 

material models then used in computational codes used across DOE/NNSA programs.

– LANL, LLNL, and SNL support the development and validation of predictive modeling in 

support of nuclear incident response, as well as training to the interagency weapons of mass 

destruction defeat community. Facilities such as DARHT at LANL, the Site 300 Global Security 

Campus Facility (Building 850), Contained Firing Facility at LLNL, as well as multiple explosives 

testing sites across LANL, LLNL, and SNL, support CTCP experimental validation efforts.

– In cooperation with LANL, LLNL, and SNL, NNSS provides unique facilities and infrastructure 

to support NCT Assessment integrated experimental validation efforts. Capabilities at NNSS

allow experimental efforts on hazardous materials or at threat-representative scale.

◼ Nuclear Forensics Program

– Technical nuclear forensics performance depends on the core capabilities developed during 

the U.S. nuclear weapons development and testing program. Weapons design expertise and 

the simulation tools, manufacturing base, and experimental capabilities required for 

Weapons Activities provide a strong foundation for the technical nuclear forensics mission. 

Weapons Activities supports much of the expertise, facilities, nuclear material handling 

infrastructure, and historic knowledge necessary to perform technical nuclear forensics, 

including the National Nuclear Material Archive. DOE/NNSA’s Secure Transportation Asset

provides safe and secure transportation of nuclear material in the United States and supports 

the CTCP response teams, including technical nuclear forensics. The technical nuclear 

forensics mission also relies on DOE’s broader ST&E capabilities, including laboratories 

maintained by DOE’s Offices of Science and Nuclear Energy.

◼ Nuclear Incident Response Program

– CTCP provides operational support, training, and equipment for major public events and 

emergencies, both foreign and domestic. CTCP is able to draw upon these activities to aid in 

the development of effective public policies, medical procedures, and tabletop and field 

exercises that guarantee a robust multilateral incident preparedness and response for 

countering nuclear and radiological incidents, accidents, and terror threats.
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– To support the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) Technical Reachback and training to 

build international capacity, as well as the U.S. Government’s effective response to a nuclear 

or radiological incident or emergency, CTCP relies on a diverse base of rapidly deployable 

assets, including specialized facilities, vehicles, and equipment. These assets include the 

Radiological Assistance Program, based at 11 DOE locations around the Nation; the Aerial 

Measuring System stationed at the Radiation Sensing Laboratories at Joint Base Andrews 

(Washington, DC) and Nellis Air Force Base (Las Vegas, Nevada); the National Atmospheric 

Release Advisory Center at LLNL; the Nuclear Response Group Readiness Operations Center 

located on Kirtland Air Force Base; and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training 

Site at the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The NEST

Technical Reachback Home Teams are a virtually connected capability that has static nodes 

located at and operated by LANL, LLNL, SNL, Pantex, and both Remote Sensing Laboratory 

locations (NNSS and Nellis Air Force Base). When activated, Home Teams provide the 

necessary remote technical assistance to the deployed NEST assets of the Joint Technical 

Operations Team; the Accident Response Group; regional Stabilization Teams; Render Safe 

Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense (DoD) National Mission 

Force; DoD custodial organizations; NNSA OST; and specific international partners; as well as 

the Nuclear Incident Team at DOE Headquarters Forrestal building and its alternate location 

at the DOE facility in Germantown, Maryland. These infrastructure elements help ensure that 

the U.S. Government has dedicated resources that are capable of quickly responding to 

nuclear or radiological incidents worldwide and the emergency management infrastructure 

required to coordinate the response effort.

DOE/NNSA’s Office of Emergency Operations is DOE/NNSA’s primary office of interest in Continuity of 

Operations Planning and relies on the infrastructure maintained by other DOE/NNSA offices, as 

summarized below. 

◼ “Alternate Operating Facilities” is a term used to refer to alternate sites where essential functions 

are continued or resumed and where organizational command and control of essential functions 

occurs during a catastrophic emergency. An Alternate Operating Facility is sufficiently distanced, 

but within the same region from the primary facility used to conduct continuity operations, and 

is staffed by deployed Emergency Relocation Group members. The Primary Alternate Operating 

Facility for DOE/NNSA is the DOE Germantown Facility, located in Germantown, Maryland.

◼ Devolution planning supports continuity planning and addresses continuity events, catastrophes, 

and “notice” and “no notice” events. These events could render DOE/NNSA leadership and staff 

unavailable or incapable of providing control and direction to organizations performing essential 

functions. Devolution should be used when the Primary Operating Facility and Alternate 

Operating Facility are not viable or available. The primary DOE/NNSA Headquarters devolution 

of operations site is the DOE/NNSA Albuquerque Complex in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

6.9 Management and Performance

Since 2011, DOE/NNSA has delivered approximately $2 billion in projects, a significant portion of 

DOE/NNSA’s total project portfolio, under budget. DOE/NNSA is committed to encouraging competition 

and increasing the universe of qualified contractors by streamlining major acquisition processes. 

DOE/NNSA will continue to focus on delivering timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all programs 

and projects, by using a tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that are appropriate for 

the special missions and risks at each site. DOE/NNSA continues to: 
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◼ lead improvements in contract and project management practices; 

◼ provide clear lines of authority and accountability for program and project managers; 

◼ improve cost and schedule performance; and 

◼ ensure that Federal Project Directors and Contracting Officers possess the appropriate skill mix 

and professional certifications to manage DOE/NNSA’s work.
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Chapter 7

Workforce

7.1 Overview

The Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA’s) workforce1is the 

nuclear security enterprise’s most critical asset. DOE/NNSA’s ability to meet its nuclear security missions 

requires a unique, diverse, and highly skilled workforce of nearly 50,000 people with expertise across a 

broad array of disciplines, including computer science, physics, materials science, chemical engineering,

and mechanical engineering. The technical staff and 

managers working in these areas possess advanced 

science, technology, engineering, and math degrees, with 

years of experience working directly for DOE/NNSA or its 

management and operating (M&O) partners. The need to 

recruit, develop, and retain this workforce will continue to 

grow, given DOE/NNSA’s major modernization programs 

and current workforce demographics.

DOE/NNSA and its M&O partners devote extensive effort 

to recruiting, training, sustaining, and revitalizing the 

workforce that supports the nuclear deterrent. 

Workforce-related activities are driven by current mission 

needs and designed to anticipate future developments that may require new skills to address emerging 

challenges. 

President Biden signed an Executive Order on June 25, 2021, to advance diversity, equity, inclusion, and 

accessibility (DEIA) in the Federal workforce. In response, DOE/NNSA plans to release a DEIA Strategic 

Plan in March that is data-driven by a DEIA Climate Assessment that highlights strengths and identifies

areas of improvement. DOE/NNSA’s Senior Leadership is committed to this effort and will create 

actionable initiatives across the organization.

Despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, DOE/NNSA’s workforce has adapted its 

operations, performed its national security missions with additional safety precautions, and met major 

milestones and deliverables, especially in maintaining confidence in the active stockpile, pushing forward 

on major modernization programs, and maintaining secure transportation. This is a testament to the 

workforce, its flexibility and responsiveness, and its commitment to U.S. national security. 

This chapter provides an overview of the composition, status, and demographics of the workforce. It also 

covers challenges, strategies used to address those challenges, and accomplishments. Appendix E of this 

report, (Workforce and Site-Specific Information),” covers the missions, capabilities, and workforce data 

for each of the eight nuclear security enterprise laboratories, plants and sites.

1 This workforce discussion is primarily speaking for the Weapons Activities account.

Workforce Snapshot (Enterprise-Wide)

(October 1, 2019–September 30, 2020)

• Total Headcount: 49,059

• Average Age: 46

• Average Years of Service: 11

• Average Retirement-Eligible Population: 25.6%

• Hires (as of September 30, 2020): 5,158

• Separations (as of September 30, 2020): 2,960

• Net Change (as of September 30, 2020): 2,198
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7.2 Workforce Composition

DOE/NNSA’s workforce has three components: the Federal workforce, the eight M&O partner-operated 

sites,2 and a wide variety of non-M&O entities that provide crucial support to DOE/NNSA’s missions. 

7.2.1 Federal Workforce

The Federal workforce is situated at DOE/NNSA Headquarters 

in Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, as well as field offices located across the nuclear 

security enterprise.

The Federal workforce is responsible for program and project 

management, as well as Federal contractor assurance and

oversight of the national security missions across the 

enterprise. They are responsible for performing inherently 

governmental functions such as:3 planning activities, fiduciary 

oversight, risk prioritization, product acceptance, supply chain 

management, legal, human resources, acquisition, and 

environmental, safety, and health oversight duties. This 

workforce comprises of highly educated and experienced civil 

servants from a variety of backgrounds. Included in the 

Federal workforce are the agents responsible for the secure 

transport of stockpile weapons as discussed in Chapter 5 and 

several active-duty military officers on rotational assignments. 

Recent legislation has increased the limit on full-time 

equivalent (FTE) personnel, providing DOE/NNSA more 

flexibility in handling its slate of warhead modernization 

activities.

7.2.2 Management and Operating

Workforce

The M&O workforce is situated at the eight governmentowned or leased nuclear security enterprise laboratories, 

plants, and sites discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 of this 

report. The laboratories partner closely with both the Federal 

workforce and the non-M&O workforce to address challenges 

across the science and engineering spectrum from basic 

science questions through weapons design and production.

The production plants produce most of the designed weapon 

components and assemble warheads. Some laboratories, e.g.,

LANL and SNL, host production missions for a limited number 

of components in addition to their roles as design agencies and Federally Funded Research and 

Development Centers. The M&O workforce contains the bulk of the enterprise’s scientists, engineers, 

operators, technicians, and crafts and labor personnel whose scientific, engineering, and technical 

2 M&O partners are consortia of industrial and academic contractors. More detail on these contractors may be found in 

Appendix E.

3 As defined in Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, Public Law 105-270, these are functions that are so 

intimately related to the public interest that they require performance by Federal Government employees. 

An Integrated Workforce

DOE/NNSA’s workforce consists of three 

essential integrated components, forming one 

team to accomplish DOE/NNSA’s nuclear 

security missions.

• The Federal workforce leads planning, 

programming, budget formulation (and 

execution), and evaluation activities for 

DOE/NNSA’s national security programs, 

and provides other supporting roles. It 

provides a strategy to accomplish the 

mission that the sites implement.

• The M&O partners perform the full spectrum 

of technical activities in support of 

DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security missions 

while the Federal workforce provides 

oversight. The M&O and Federal 

workforces partner to develop and 

implement strategic planning for the nuclear 

security enterprise. 

• Non‐M&O partners enable mission success 

by providing materials, components, and 

specialized services; access to 

supplemental experimental assets; and use 

of academia’s R&D resources. In several 

areas, DOE/NNSA is becoming more reliant 

on the non-M&O workforce, including 

vendors, subcontractors, and other service 

providers, to meet the mission 

requirements.

• The effectiveness of this integrated 

workforce is enhanced by personnel 

exchange and embedding programs that 

foster deepening understanding of partner 

roles and mission critical contributions while 

strengthening communication lines within 

and between partner organizations.
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expertise supports the nuclear deterrence mission. The M&O workforce is integral to achieving 

DOE/NNSA’s national security missions as it performs the surveillance, design, and production of the 

warheads and their components. This workforce is instrumental in defining the technical requirements 

for success in stockpile stewardship and management.

7.2.3 Non-Management and Operating Workforce

The non-M&O workforce consists of a variety of entities that assist DOE/NNSA in fulfilling its national 

security missions across the enterprise and are critical to success. This workforce includes, but is not 

limited to, support service contractors providing advisory and technical support and services to the 

Federal workforce; the supply chain entities providing specific materials and components necessary to 

fulfill key production and research and development (R&D) missions; and academic institutions that 

support DOE/NNSA through the academic alliances and partnerships integral in providing a pipeline of 

highly skilled and educated talent into the enterprise.

7.3 Status

DOE/NNSA must have a sufficient workforce with the right capabilities to ensure that it can execute 

warhead modernization activities and carry out the full scope of DOE/NNSA’s missions. DOE/NNSA is 

currently balancing the B61-12 and W80-4 Life Extension Programs, the W87-1 Modification program, and 

the W88 Alt 370 Program, while planning for systems that will be needed in the 2030s and 2040s as 

detailed in Chapter 2. The workforce must also simultaneously manage surveillance, warhead 

maintenance, technology exploration and maturation, R&D, supply chain management, and acquisition, 

among other responsibilities. Given this workload, attracting and retaining the right talent is critical.

DOE/NNSA faces several challenges in keeping the nuclear security enterprise appropriately staffed, such 

as lengthy training periods for new hires and replacing retiring personnel who leave with specific technical 

knowledge. Over one-quarter of the workforce is retirement-eligible. New staff must be hired to replace 

separated employees in the early career demographic to meet future technological advances and 

challenges. In addition, the level and type of expertise required to fulfill DOE/NNSA’s mission is often 

learned on the job over a significant period of time. DOE/NNSA and its M&O partners require a sufficient 

number of experienced personnel to transfer knowledge and skills with respect to stockpile technologies 

and processes to newly hired personnel who need time to develop these skills. All of these factors make 

maintaining a cleared, qualified, and technically trained workforce a complicated challenge. Recruitment 

and long-term retention of the workforce is therefore critical to the development, growth, and 

maintenance of scientific, engineering, and technical competencies. 

7.3.1 Approaches and Programs

DOE/NNSA is addressing its workforce challenges and reinforcing its scientific, technical, engineering, and 

program management capabilities. NNSA’s Administrator launched a Nuclear Security Enterprise

Workforce Strategy Team in 2018 to devise effective methods to attract and retain the best and brightest 

from colleges, universities, trade schools, community colleges, and industry. The workforce strategy is 

informed by several factors necessary to attract and retain a high-caliber workforce. These factors

include:

◼ Facilitating understanding of the mission and each individual/organization’s role in accomplishing 

it, as detailed in DOE/NNSA’s Governance and Management Framework

◼ Highlighting the ability to work with state-of-the-art experimental, computational, and 

manufacturing capabilities 
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◼ Employing modern and more efficient business and operating systems

◼ Working in modern workspaces with state-of-the-art equipment

◼ Providing ample career development opportunities

DOE/NNSA is pursuing an aggressive hiring strategy to add thousands of employees to the enterprise on 

an annual basis, most of whom are filling M&O personnel needs. To accomplish this strategy, the 

Workforce Strategy Team uses multiple approaches including coordinating job fairs and collaborating with 

M&O partners through “Nuclear Security Enterprise Days” at U.S. universities. These job fairs expedite 

applications, allow applicants to see each of the enterprise’s locations, and provide opportunities for 

applicants to directly speak with hiring managers and HR personnel. DOE/NNSA, through its Enterprise 

Days has recruited motivated candidates at several education levels for Federal and contract positions at 

headquarters, field offices, and the M&O sites.

Figure 7–1. Management and operations net change during fiscal year 2020

DOE/NNSA is retaining and developing its workforce through succession planning, knowledge 

preservation, and training. Each M&O partner has several established programs aimed at improving

retention. Since there are usually many employees with 0-5 years of experience or service, these 

retention programs are critical to maintaining workforce capabilities and managing risk to the mission. 

Examples of these programs include: 

◼ Critical skill retention programs that provide pay incentives for hard-to-fill critical positions

◼ Employee leadership development programs 

◼ Increased employee support and engagement through employee resource groups, career 

conversations, career development tools, workshops, and mentoring

◼ Educational opportunities and assistance to encourage career growth

◼ Flexible work schedules and other family-friendly workplace options

◼ Rotational assignments to diversify experience

As detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.6, several academic programs are essential to providing a pipeline of 

prospective employees in critically important scientific and engineering academic disciplines. These 

disciplines include, but are not limited to, radiochemistry, plasma physics, high performance computing, 
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and advanced manufacturing. The academic programs include: the Stewardship Science Academic 

Alliance, Stewardship Science Graduate Fellowship, Computational Science Graduate Fellowships, the 

Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program, the Joint Program in High Energy Density Laboratory 

Plasmas, and the Minority-Serving Institution Partnership Program (MSIPP). For example, MSIPP, 

highlighted in Section 4.3.6, is designed to build a sustainable STEM pipeline that prepares diverse, toptier talent through strategic partnerships between minority-serving educational institutions and the 

nuclear security enterprise. MSIPP aligns investments in university capability and workforce development 

with DOE/NNSA mission areas to cultivate a more diverse technical workforce and to enhance research 

and education capabilities at these minority-serving institutions through STEM grants, engagement, and 

internships. The Computational Science Graduate Fellowship program, through graduate fellowships, 

provides students the relevant experience for weapons code development through open science 

applications. These programs locate institutions and develop pathways to train a wide variety of students 

with the critical skills and disciplines required in the DOE/NNSA workforce and hire those familiar with the 

enterprise. 

Laboratory Directed Research and Development, Plant Directed Research Development, and Site Directed 

Research and Development programs also have a significant role in the development of the workforce. 

These programs fund high-risk and potentially high-payoff research projects aimed at developing science 

and technology tools and capabilities to meet future national security challenges. This creates a vibrant 

R&D community that is attractive to high caliber personnel, including both new recruits and experienced 

researchers. Subsequently, DOE/NNSA benefits not only from the expertise of the individuals, but also 

the establishment of long-term relationships with future recruits and the academic institutions at which 

they study. These programs have developed postdoctoral paths that help transition in-demand 

researchers to full-time career employees and provide opportunities to introduce new hires to the nuclear 

security enterprise. In FY 2019 alone, the Laboratory Directed Research and Development program 

supported over 700 postdoctoral researchers, representing over 50 percent of all postdoctoral employees

at the labs. These programs pave the way for early career scientists and engineers to find a lifelong 

professional home where their knowledge will be immediately utilized in impactful, mission-relevant 

research. 

Finally, the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program has been administered by Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory for 25 years with a goal of identifying and developing the next generation of leaders to 

strengthen the nation through nuclear security work. The program routinely brings in top talent and 

provides several opportunities for fellows to work alongside experts, support major events, and engage 

in professional development opportunities. The fellows are assigned to work with a program office, field 

office, M&O partner, or other agency involving nuclear issues for a one-year term. The program has 
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steadily grown over the years and has over 500 alumni. About 85 percent of the NNSA Graduate 

Fellowship Program fellows continue to serve the Nation in a national security capacity.

7.3.2 Workforce Demographics

As of September 30, 2020, the nuclear security enterprise consisted of nearly 50,000 Federal and M&O 

employees.4 The nuclear security enterprise added over 5,000 employees during FY 2020 and over 11,500 

employees since the last detailed workforce data reported in the FY 2020 SSMP.

5 During FY 2020, the 

enterprise experienced just under 3,000 separations, slightly more than FY 2019 numbers reported in the 

FY 2021 SSMP.

6

 Consistent with what has been reported in previous SSMPs, there is a continuing, 

significant voluntary separation rate for those classified as having five or fewer years of service. This will

continue to require monitoring to maintain DOE/NNSA’s scientific, engineering, and technical 

competencies. 

Federal Workforce

As of September 30, 2020, DOE/NNSA’s Federal workforce had a headcount of 2,297 employees. This

number does not include support service contractors and Naval Reactors, but does contain several

categories of personnel within the Office of Secure Transportation. Figure 7–2 represents headcount 

rather than FTEs.

7 Of the 2,297 employees, approximately 1,200 are directly working on, or playing a 

supporting role in, the Weapons Activities programs discussed throughout this plan. The rest are involved 

in areas such as Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and the budget, human resources, general counsel, 

external affairs, and field offices. The Federal workforce tends to skew heavily towards the general 

management labor category, although engineers and physicists are represented as well. 

Figure 7–2. Management and operating and Federal share of total Weapons Activities workforce

4 This number does not contain the Naval Reactors workforce, or Support Service Contractors. 

5 Data for the FY 2020 SSMP was collected as of September 30, 2018.

6 The FY 2021 SSMP contains a focused summary of separations and retention data, different from the detailed information 

required in even-year documents.

7 Headcount includes every individual employee counted as “1” body. Full-Time Equivalent counts focus on hours worked rather 

than individual employees, and can be calculated by dividing the number of regular hours worked by employees by the number 

of compensable hours in a year (usually 2,080). On a smaller scale, if there are two employees working part-time (for example,

20 hours per week), they add up to 1 FTE, while the headcount value would be 2.
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The average age of the Federal workforce is 48 years old, with approximately 16 percent eligible for 

retirement. The average employee has roughly fifteen years of service. DOE/NNSA hasfocused on shifting 

age, years of service and retirement demographics by hiring more entry-level employees. Attrition has 

remained consistent at just under 9 percent. Projected needs over the next 5 years are stable, topping 

out at a headcount of 2,646. 

M&O Workforce

DOE/NNSA’s M&O partners reported 46,762 employees at the end of the fiscal year on September 30,

2020. The national security laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site reported 31,773 

employees, while the production plants reported 14,989 employees. Similar to Federal headcount, not 

all employees are fully engaged in Weapons Activities work. Almost half of the M&O workforce has five 

or fewer years of service;retention of those personnel is vital to maintain DOE/NNSA’s weapons expertise.

Growth in many of the labor categories is expected across the FYNSP. However, these projections are 

based on current plans and are subject to change based on resource allocation and policy changes.

Figure 7–3. Management and operating partner workforce projections by Common Occupational 

Classification System (as of September 30, 2020)

Age, Years of Service, and Separations

The enterprise workforce, when viewed in total, has a fairly even distribution across age groups. A review 

of Figure 7–4 displays a slightly more even age distribution for the production sites, especially in terms of 

younger personnel, while the national security laboratories have a slightly higher number of older 

employees. This is influenced by the population of both of those groups. There are no significant

anomalies in the total age distribution shown in Figure 7–5, but more significant insights appear in the 

years of service and separation data.

 

1 

2 

 

4 

 

6 

F 2 22 F 2 2 F 2 24 F 2 2 F 2 26

Number of Employees

 ra s Engineers eneral Administra on

 aborers eneral Management rofessional Administrators

Operators Scien sts Technicians
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Figure 7–4. Workforce breakdown of national security laboratories,

8

the

Nevada National Security Site, and weapons production facilities9, 10

by Common Occupational Classification System11 (as of September 30, 2020)

Figure 7–5. Workforce breakdown of national security laboratories,

the Nevada National Security Site, and weapons production facilities

by age group (as of September 30, 2020)

8 The national security laboratories include LANL, LLNL, and SNL.

9 The weapons production facilities include KCNSC, Pantex, SRS, and Y-12.

10 This does not account for production functions at SNL and LANL. While these site sites have significant production missions,

they are included with the National Security Laboratories for the purpose of consistent SSMP data reporting.

11 From Environmental Restoration/Waste Management Activities Common Occupational Classification System (COCS), 

Revision 2, May 1996 by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Federal and M&O workforce data are reported in the 

standardized COCS categories to allow consistent comparison among the sites. These categories are not completely descriptive 

of the functions within each category. For example, the broad O S category “ eneral Management” also includes technical and 

scientific management functions, and the “ rofessional Administrators” category includes technical analysis and drafting design 

functions.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-9

Figure 7–6. Total management and operating partner headcount distribution by age

(as of September 30, 2020)

Figure 7–7. Workforce breakdown of national security laboratories, the Nevada National

Security Site, and weapons production facilities by years of service

(as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-10

The previously described hiring push, combined with retirement and separations trends, has resulted in 

significant changes in the years-of-service data. The plant and laboratory workforces are heavily 

concentrated in the 0-5 years-of-service category. 61 percent of the workforce has 10 or fewer years of 

service. This necessitates acceleration of knowledge transfer activities and training for younger and/or 

less experienced personnel before specialized knowledge is lost due to retirements and separations.

Comparatively, the Federal workforce is a more even distribution, with many personnel having 11-15 

years of service.12 While trends are similar, the Federal Government has a clearer opportunity to manage 

risk while less experienced personnel develop in their careers. It should be noted that less experience 

does not necessarily equate to younger age groups and individuals considered “mid-career” may be new 

to the enterprise and applying expertise from a previous industry to specialized nuclear weapons work.

For separations, many of those in older age groups are retiring, as expected. As previously noted, most 

non-retirement, voluntary separations are in the 0-5 years of service category. These voluntary 

separations are spread out among several age groups, yet they are concentrated in the level of experience 

needed to offset retirements and maintain the enterprise’s levels of technical expertise. This trend holds 

for both the Federal and M&O workforces. DOE/NNSA’s workforce strategies, as discussed in Section 7.4,

are addressing this issue. 

Figure 7–8. Management and operating partner workforce

years of service at current site (as of September 30, 2020)13

12 Federal workforce data can be found in Appendix D.

13 Please note that this is years of service in the nuclear security enterprise. Although an employee may have fewer years in the 

enterprise, they may have several years of experience elsewhere before application to nuclear weapons work. Or, if in case of a 

lateral transfer, an enterprise veteran may have several years of service at a different site and be counted as having one year at 

their current site.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-11

Figure 7–9. Total management and operating separations by age group

(as of September 30, 2020)

Figure 7–10. Total management and operating separations by years of service

(as of September 30, 2020)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31+

Number of Employees

Years of Service Group

Retired Voluntarily Involuntarily
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-12

7.3.3 Unique Set of Skills for Nuclear Weapons Work

Successful execution of the nuclear weapons mission requires essential, specialized skillsets. DOE/NNSA 

and the M&O partners monitor and manage the workforce to ensure that a minimum skillset is 

maintained. However, much of the enterprise’s essential expertise is developed through specialized 

applications of fundamental technical knowledge and understanding that is only obtained through 

weapons-specific work experience. In many areas, these skills cannot be learned in the classroom and are 

not directly transferable from other industries. 

Areas in which specialized knowledge/experience is required include, but are not limited to, electrical 

engineering, systems engineering, toolmakers, nuclear criticality safety engineering, high explosives 

manufacturing and surveillance, weapons design, radiation effects sciences, radiological control 

technicians, quality control and assurance personnel, data scientists and high performance computing, 

cybersecurity professionals, welding, radar, and optics. This unique specialization of the enterprise

workforce means that high retention rates, beyond what may be standard or desired in private industry, 

is essential for workforce and capability continuity. 

7.4 Workforce Challenges and Strategies

Building and retaining a workforce capable of maintaining the current stockpile, while also planning for 

and responding to future requirements, is a complex task. Workforce planning efforts are focused on 

both the near- and long-term challenges of managing increased workload necessary to support weapons 

modernization. Bolstering the workforce’s depth and breadth in required skill areas and transferring 

institutional knowledge is critical as a significant number of employees retire. The same is true for 

retaining individuals who possess those skill sets and cultivating career paths that enable development of 

enterprise specializations. These challenges are articulated for specific disciplines and areas of expertise 

in the challenges and strategy sections throughout this SSMP.

Through a variety of approaches and strategies, the Federal, M&O, and non-M&O partners ensure a 

sustained world-class workforce that will provide the knowledge, skills, and experience needed to 

maintain the current and future stockpile through a standard talent management approach.

Figure 7–11. A simplified model of the talent management life cycle
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-13

7.4.1 Recruiting and Hiring

DOE/NNSA and its M&O partners continue to increase hiring to meet mission requirements set forth by 

the Nuclear Weapons Council. As stated above, DOE/NNSA is pursuing an aggressive hiring strategy to 

add thousands of new hiresto the nuclear security enterprise each year. Each site employs strategies that 

address its unique recruiting and hiring challenges. Table 7–1 provides a non-exhaustive summary of 

these approaches.

Table 7–1. Summary of Recruitment and Hiring challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Maintain the scientific, engineering, 

and technical capabilities of the 

enterprise workforce.

Enterprise workforce needs are in 

high-demand STEM fields such as 

electrical engineering. US citizens 

earning degrees in these fields have 

many opportunities with which the 

enterprise must compete.

Competition for skill sets that can 

integrate across multiple disciplines

such as systems engineering, 

production science and engineering,

and highly technical project 

management controls. 

Pursue current hiring strategies to hire 

thousands into the enterprise each year.

Promote access to unique, world-class R&D, 

science, technology, and engineering 

capabilities and facilities.

Create developmental programs for highly 

skilled disciplines; work on adding non-exempt 

relocation benefits to allow national 

recruitment of high-demand/hard-to-find 

disciplines (e.g., toolmakers and technicians).

Emphasize stable employment, even during 

economic downturns, with long-term financial 

stability and higher quality of life.

Utilize university partnerships that leverage 

research contracts and relationships for toptier talent.

Negotiate offers and offer stronger benefits 

packages.

Emphasize flexible work schedules, paid 

parental leave, and work-from-home options. 

Develop postgraduate programs 

with opportunities to become career 

employees.

Continue current university strategy 

and efforts to build brand 

educational institutions and events.

Continue exploring telecommuting 

as a strategy for wider recruitment.

Expand partnerships with 

educational and trade institutions 

and develop specialized pipeline 

programs for critical-skills positions.

Encourage high school students to 

pursue STEM careers.

Expand diversity & Inclusion 

initiatives.

Remote geographic location of some 

sites, resulting in difficulty recruiting 

nationally.

Target willing candidates via university 

partnerships.

Increase emphasis on local hiring and training; 

focus greater emphasis on internships and 

apprenticeships to increase the local pool of 

workers.

Coordinate with DOE on community outreach 

to encourage students at middle schools and 

high schools to develop local workforces with 

strong STEM interests and education.”

Continue current efforts.14

Federal Positions are limited and must 

be balanced across a range of program 

offices.

Leverage lab opportunities and provide

temporary detail opportunities.

Utilize excepted service authority.

Salary may not match up with private 

sector for in-demand skills.

Current salaries, pay for performance, 

performance-based incentives.

COVID-19 Virtual interviews, career fairs, testing, 

onboarding, delayed relocations.

Increase virtual visibility with 

candidate sources. Continued 

flexibility from the Office of 

Personnel Management and

relocation leniency.

14 It is currently unknown how this may be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and potential long-term workplace changes that 

will be developed in response (e.g., work from home).
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-14

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Competition between M&O sites for 

similar skills.

Joint M&O presence at job fairs with a focus 

on jobs within NNSA, as opposed to specific 

sites.

Strengthen engagement between 

M&Os in recruitment and hiring 

processes to simplify applications.

7.4.2 Developing, Retaining, and Sustaining the Workforce

Many aspects of nuclear weapons work require the enterprise to “grow its own” workforce, which places 

a premium on retaining workers when they have successfully acquired relevant experience. As noted,

most non-retirement separations occur within the first five years of employment and represent a loss of 

the enterprise’s investment in developing 

fully capable employees. Today’s 

workforce leans toward being 

increasingly mobile and desires greater 

independence, more responsibility, and 

quicker advancement. These changes in 

expectations complicate approaches to 

keep new staff involved given lengthy 

security clearance wait times, multi-year 

training periods, and constantly-changing 

workloads and priorities. Retention will 

require continued focus on involvement, 

bench strength, succession planning, analytics, exit interview analyses, proactive planning, and an 

increased focus on career paths. These include areas such as enhanced individual development plans, 

learning and development to improve knowledge transfer, and increased diversity and inclusion 

strategies. Table 7–2 displays a non-exhaustive summary of enterprise approaches.

Table 7–2. Summary of Development, Retainment, and Sustainment challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

National Security missions require the 

ability to retain a resilient and 

responsive workforce.

Talent Development Initiatives for 

potential employees.

COVID-19 On-line Development, Virtual 

coaching, briefings, and meetings.

Strict adherence to health and safety 

protocols.

Continued On-line Development. Evaluate 

effectiveness of virtual development. Shift 

to wider video participation to increase 

engagement.

Salary Varied offers correspond to different 

levels of skill and education.

We must remain competitive in our 

ability to support employee work-life 

balance.

Current strategies include flexible 

work schedules, paid parental leave, 

and work from home.

Continue to explore flexible work 

arrangements and cost-effective benefits 

options that meet the needs of the

workforce. (e.g., expanded work from home 

policies, vacation front-loading, 

transportation and childcare solutions, 

aligning benefits to demographics). Explore 

career path variations that support desired 

work-life balance.

Continued attrition, employee 

skillsets in high demand.

Exit interviews to assess reasons for 

departure.

Strategies from evaluation of exit interview 

data.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-15

7.4.3 Training and Knowledge Transfer to the Next Generation

Implementing training and knowledge-transfer programs that are sufficient to mitigate the loss of 

expertise through the retirement of experienced personnel continues to be an area of emphasis for the 

enterprise. Heavy stockpile modernization workloads provide an opportunity for new employees 

to learn on the job. This must be in 

tandem with adequate mentoring 

and guidance to be an effective 

method of deep knowledge transfer. 

Many sites, especially the national 

security laboratories, have 

mentoring systems in place as part of 

an employee’s career development. 

These systems provide new 

employees opportunities to learn 

from experienced professionals 

while enabling experienced employees and retirees to transfer their knowledge.

Aside from active mentorship, the knowledge and expertise of seasoned employees approaching 

retirement must be documented and preserved for future weapon designers. The enterprise recognizes

that efforts to gather weapons knowledge prior to the retirement of late-career employees must continue 

to be improved by enhancing existing programs and developing additional programs. Table 7–3 provides 

a non-exhaustive list of enterprise approaches.

Table 7–3. Summary of Training and Knowledge Transfer challenges and strategies

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Significant increase in the number of 

employees with less than two years 

of experience across the business.

Created a workforce development program 

to accelerate time to proficiency.

Developed resources to increase knowledge 

and help new employees understand our 

customer, our business and exceed program 

management requirements.

Evaluate, adjust, and continue 

current efforts.

COVID-19 Online Development.

Strict adherence to health and safety 

protocols.

Continue Online Development and 

whenever possible, in-person 

development and learning 

opportunities.

The infrastructure needed to train a 

growing workforce are already near 

or at capacity, causing delays.

Institute smaller class size.

Leverage off-site locations and room-to-room 

virtual presentation.

Address inefficiencies in on-shift training, 

with special attention given to critical skills 

that require the longest duration for 

training/certification.

Acquire dedicated on-site training 

space for new hire and uncleared 

personnel.

Integrate needs for both training and 

execution spaces in future 

infrastructure investments. 

Leverage online training capabilities 

to support increased demand.

Engagement during clearance 

process.

Expedite clearances and integrate classroom 

and hands-on learning to maintain interest

while awaiting clearance.

Evaluate, adjust, and continue 

current efforts.

Adequate transfer of knowledge for 

new employees to replace tenured 

employees.

Use simulators, knowledge preservation 

management programs.

Provide leadership opportunities to high 

potential younger workers. Hire through 

internship and apprenticeship programs.

Evaluate, adjust, and continue 

current efforts.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-16

7.5 Workforce Accomplishments

The technical accomplishments of the nuclear security 

enterprise documented throughout this report are cuttingedge, far-ranging in scope and effect, and indicative of the 

uniquely talented, highly educated, and highly trained 

workforce. The talent and accomplishments of the workforce 

are also evident from the numbers of publications, awards, 

patents, and other recognitions that have been bestowed on 

members of this workforce. 

Collectively, the sites have had more than 4,000 technical, 

peer-reviewed journal articles published over the last 2 years. 

At least 30 employees have been granted fellowship in several 

prestigious technical societies, such as the American 

Association for the Advancement of Science, The American 

Physical Society, and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 

Engineers. Ten young researchers at the national laboratories

were recipients of the Presidential Early Career Awards in 

Science and Engineering. Over a dozen employees received 

accolades from technical diversity societies and other national 

technical honors. Members of the nuclear security enterprise 

also participated in several projects that won R&D 100 

awards, the Secretary of Energy’s Achievement Award, and 

other program office excellence awards. 

The innovation and intellectual capital of the enterprise is also 

apparent in the number of patents and invention disclosures

attributable to the nuclear security enterprise. Together, the 

sites were granted more than 600 patents in the last 2 years 

and filed applications for many times that number. These 

patents and innovations benefit not only the nuclear weapons 

enterprise but the broader R&D community. 

Workforce Accomplishments

(from 2019-2020)

• Journal Articles Published: approx. 4,000

• Patents Granted: approximately 600

• Technical Fellows: 30

• Presidential Early Career Awardees: 10

• Diversity Awards: 12

• John Dawson Award for Excellence in Plasma 

Physics Research

• Robert R. Wilson Prize in Particle Accelerators
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 7-17

Figure 7–12. Workforce achievements: using computers to fight COVID-19
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-1

Chapter 8

Budget and Fiscal Estimates

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 President’s Budget for Weapons Activities supports the nuclear stockpile and 

associated modernization programs. Consistent with the past two transition year budgets (FY 2018 and 

FY 2010), the FY 2022 President’s Budget does not include program-based defense budget levels beyond 

the upcoming budget year. Instead, the defense estimates for FY 2023-2026 simply reflect inflated 

FY 2022 levels, not policy judgments. The Administration will include out-year defense program funding 

levels in the FY 2023 Budget, in accordance with strategy documents currently under development. The 

FY 2023 President’s Budget will be accompanied by a Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) that 

reflects this Administration’s policy judgments.

The first part of this chapter displays budgetary information for the FY 2022 budget request based on the 

program of record described in this Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

(FY 2022 SSMP). Sections 8.4 through 8.8 compare the FY 2022 budget request to the FY 2021 enacted 

budget and present key milestones representing progress toward program goals. Key milestones beyond 

the next 5 years represent planned activities to meet DoD requirements and are contingent on future 

decisions. 

The second part of the chapter describes cost projections for selected programs beyond FY 2022, including

the basis of those cost projections used to estimate the potential long-term cost of the U.S. Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Weapons Activities program. Costestimating techniques supporting the budget request are consistent with Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) best practices and have been updated with current requirements for each weapon system. 

The chapter concludes with an overview of this 25-year plan and an analysis of the affordability of the 

Weapons Activities program. 

8.1 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation

DOE/NNSA employs a Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) process that is like

processes in use across the U.S. Government. DOE/NNSA’s PPBE process has four major phases for each 

budget cycle: 

◼ The Planning phase of the PPBE process considersthe full range of work in a manner that is fiscally 

informed, but not constrained, to ensure all requirements and mission needs are incorporated. 

This is attained by specifying strategic goals and objectives through Department-level and NNSAlevel strategic planning documents that are issued during each new Administration. These 

internal strategic documents must align with and support the mission priorities in the Interim 

National Security Strategic Guidance and any forthcoming national strategy documents, as well 

as priorities reflected in program-level plans and input from managing and operating (M&O)

contractor partners. Those priorities drive the development of a budget that allows timely 

execution of key mission priorities and enables DOE/NNSA to achieve its missions.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-2

◼ The Programming phase is the decision-making process to align available program resources with 

priorities resulting in a balanced, integrated, executable FYNSP1to be proposed by DOE to the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the basis for that year’s congressional budget 

request. This is primarily a Headquarters-driven process that allocates resources and integrates 

the funded activities to ensure accomplishment of the highest priority efforts.

◼ The Budgeting phase involves the production of a formal budget request and associated 

justifications to OMB. In coordination with program, field, and functional elements, DOE/NNSA 

develops OMB budget justification materials for the FYNSP2 that articulate work scopes and 

schedules commensurate with the funding request. The program elements approve these 

materials.

◼ Evaluation, which includes execution and performance, is the phase in which appropriated 

resources are distributed and controlled to achieve their approved purpose. The OMB 

apportionment process makes funds available to DOE for obligation and expenditure. 

Appropriation legislation and accompanying tables are the controlling documents for funds 

distribution and display the budgetary resources available. Performance is the assessment of 

progress made toward achieving identified performance measures at multiple levels within 

DOE/NNSA.

At any time, multiple PPBE phases for different budget cycles are ongoing.

8.2 Portfolio Management

DOE/NNSA is undertaking a risk-informed, complex, time-constrained modernization and recapitalization 

effort. The President’s Budget Request for Weapons Activities funds a set of programs (described in 

Chapters 2 through 6) based on the analysis of what is necessary to accomplish DOE/NNSA’s statutory 

mission to manage the current and future stockpile without nuclear explosive testing. DOE/NNSA uses a 

rigorous portfolio management approach to determine funding levels for Weapons Activities. During the 

programming process, funding levels are established at various levels of detail for the FYNSP period2to 

align anticipated resources with DOE/NNSA priorities. During the FY 2021 PPBE process, DOE/NNSA 

restructured the Weapons Activities budget to better align portfolios with resources, thereby improving

prioritization within those portfolios that have multiple programs and interdependencies.

As part of its portfolio management approach for Weapons Activities, DOE/NNSA continuously evaluates 

the health of the Weapons Activities capabilities described in Appendix B and further enumerated in the 

summary version of the SSMP.2 Weapons Activities capabilities are vital to the successful conduct of 

DOE/NNSA’s nuclear deterrence mission and are comprised of four elements:

◼ Human capital (experience, skill, people)

◼ Physical assets (facilities, infrastructure, equipment)

◼ Resources (resources, materials)

◼ Enabling processes (knowledge, technology, processes)

All four elements need to be sustained and modernized to meet current and future missions. If any of 

these elements are missing, the capabilities cannot function as a system. 

1 The FY 2022 budget request does not include program-informed budget levels beyond the budget year.

2 For additional information on Weapons Activities capabilities, see the FY 2021 SSMP, Chapter 3, “Weapons Activities Capabilities 

That Support the Nuclear Security Enterprise.”
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-3

DOE/NNSA must continue to invest in advancing existing capabilities and developing emerging capabilities 

for a strong nuclear deterrent in light of aging or emerging new production processes. These capabilities 

underpin the Weapons Activities portfolio and are managed by the Weapons Activities programs 

described in this document. 

8.3 Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget

Weapons Activities provides for maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to continue 

sustained confidence in their safety, reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific, 

engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable production and certification of the enduring 

nuclear weapons stockpile; and manufacture of nuclear weapon components. Weapons Activities also 

provides continued maintenance and investment in the nuclear security enterprise to be more responsive 

and resilient. A key priority is rebuilding the production capability and capacity to produce necessary 

warhead components. 

The FY 2022 President’s Budget for Weapons Activities is aligned with DoD requirements to ensure the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent continues to be safe, secure, and effective. Table 8–1 displays the FY 2021 enacted 

budget and program budget requests for Weapons Activities for FY 2022. The figures and narrative in 

Sections 8.4 through 8.8 describe the FY 2022 budget request in more detail. 

Table 8–1. Overview of FY 2022 President’s Budget for Weapons Activities 

Activity

Fiscal Year (dollars in millions)

2021

Enacted

2022

Request

2023

Request

2024

Request

2025

Request

2026

Request

Stockpile Management 4,290.2 4,632.7 

Estimates for the FY 2023 – FY 2026 budget for

DOE/NNSA do not reflect a policy judgment. 

Instead, the Administration will make a policy 

judgment on amounts for DOE/NNSA’s 

FY 2023 – FY 2027 topline in the FY 2023 

Budget Request, in accordance with ongoing 

policy reviews.

Production Modernization 2,547.9 2,911.0 

Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering 2,813.7 2,690.6

Infrastructure and Operations 4,087.5 3,586.4

Secure Transportation Asset 348.7 330.8

Defense Nuclear Security 789.1 847.6 

Information Technology and Cybersecurity 366.2 406.5 

Legacy Contractor Pensions and Settlement 

Payments 101.7 78.7 

Adjustments 0.0 0.0 

Weapons Activities Total 15,345.0 15,484.3 

a Totals may not add because of rounding. 

8.4 Stockpile Management

Stockpile Management encompasses four major subprograms that directly support the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons stockpile: (1) Stockpile Major Modernization; (2) Stockpile Sustainment; (3) Weapons 

Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD); and (4) Production Operations. Additional information about the 

Stockpile Management program can be found in Chapter 2, “Stockpile Management.”

8.4.1 Budget

The budget request for Stockpile Management increased 8 percent from the FY 2021 enacted budget and 

is illustrated in Figure 8–1. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-4

Figure 8–1. FY 2022 President’s Budget Request for Stockpile Management

8.4.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

8.4.2.1 Stockpile Major Modernization

Stockpile Major Modernization extends the lifetime of the nation’s nuclear stockpile while addressing 

required updates, replacing aging or obsolete components to ensure continued service life, and enhancing 

security and safety features. Stockpile Major Modernization includes: (1) B61 Life Extension Program

(LEP); (2) W88 Alteration (Alt) Program; (3) W80-4 LEP; (4) W80-4 Alteration (Sea-Launched Cruise Missile 

[SLCM]); (5) W87-1 Modification (Mod) Program; and (6) W93 Program (formerly W93). 

The budget request for Stockpile Major Modernization increased to support:

◼ W80-4 ramp-up for entrance to Phase 6.4 (Production Engineering) including readiness activities

◼ Start of Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and Design Options) and 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost 

Study) for the W80-4 Alteration for the Navy’s SLCM

◼ Continued planned ramp-up of the W87-1 Modification Program as transition occurs from 

Phase 6.2A to Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering)

◼ Continued planned ramp-up of the W93 Program including transition from Phase 1 (Concept 

Assessment) to Phase 2 

8.4.2.2 Stockpile Sustainment

Stockpile Sustainment directly executes maintenance, surveillance, assessment, surety, and management 

activities for all enduring weapons systems in the stockpile. The program includes the B61, W76, W78, 

W80, B83, W87, and W88 Stockpile Systems as well as Multi-Weapon Systems.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-5

The budget request for Stockpile Sustainment increased to support:

◼ Development and qualification for W76-1/2 Mk4B Shape Stable Nose Tip retrofit 

◼ Retaining the B83-1 past its planned retirement date

◼ An increase in Integrated Surety Architecture (ISA) activities, including development, 

qualification, and production for the Stockpile Systems and execution of ISA Hub Operations for 

Multi-Weapon Systems

◼ Increased joint test assembly activities

8.4.2.3 Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

WDD dismantles retired weapons and dispositions retired components from the stockpile. It provides an 

integrated program to safely dismantle and dispose of warhead components that have been retired, while 

some limited number of components from the dismantled warheads are preserved for potential reuse in 

stockpile modernization and safety testing programs.

The decreased budget request for WDD represents a reduction in disposition of legacy component 

inventories, while safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons and components remains level.

8.4.2.4 Production Operations

Production Operations provides the manufacturing-based program that drives individual site production 

capabilities for LEPs, limited life component exchanges, surveillance, and weapon assembly and

disassembly. Production Operations scope covers sustainment of all weapon systems capabilities that 

enable individual weapon production and are not specific to one material stream. 

There was no change to the budget request for Production Operations. DOE/NNSA will continue to 

prioritize production operation capabilities to ensure stockpile requirements are met.

8.4.3 Key Milestones

To sustain and modernize the stockpile, DOE/NNSA must meet the key Stockpile Management milestones 

illustrated in Figure 8–2.

3

 There were no substantive changes to the Stockpile Management milestones

from last year’s SSMP. Milestones from last year’s SSMP completed in FY 2021 are:

◼ Complete Phase 6.2 activities for the W87-1 Modification Program. Phase 6.2 is complete and 

Phase 6.2A began in the fourth quarter of FY 2021

◼ Deliver first production unit of the W88 Alteration Program. The W88 Alteration Program system 

level first production unit was achieved in July 2021.

◼ Conduct Phase 6.3 activities for the W80-4 LEP in support of the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise 

missile. Phase 6.3 activities are ongoing with Phase 6.4 anticipated in FY 2022.

3 These key milestones do not include key annual deliverables, such as completing the Annual Assessment Process culminating in 

the national security laboratory (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National 

Laboratories) Directors’ letters to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense by the end of each fiscal year; meeting Surveillance 

Program requirements as approved via the surveillance governance model; and updating system reliability estimates and issuing 

a Weapons Reliability Report.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-6

Figure 8–2. Key milestones for Stockpile Management

8.5 Production Modernization

Production Modernization focuses on the production capabilities of nuclear weapon components critical 

to weapon performance, including primaries, secondaries, radiation cases, and non-nuclear components. 

It consists of four major subprograms that sustain the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile: (1) Primary 

Capability Modernization; (2) Secondary Capability Modernization; (3) Tritium Modernization and 

Domestic Uranium Enrichment; and (4) Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization. Additional information 

about the Production Modernization program can be found in Chapter 3, “Production Modernization.”

8.5.1 Budget

The budget request for Production Modernization increased 14 percent from the FY 2021 enacted budget

and is illustrated in Figure 8–3. 

Figure 8–3. FY 2022 President’s Budget for Production Modernization
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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8.5.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

8.5.2.1 Primary Capability Modernization

Primary Capability Modernization consolidates management of primary stage material processing and 

component production capabilities in the nuclear security enterprise. The program includes: 

(1) Plutonium Modernization and (2) High Explosives (HE) and Energetics Modernization. Plutonium 

Modernization includes activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Savannah River Site (SRS), 

and across the nuclear security enterprise. The Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4) and 

the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) are currently included under Primary Capability 

Modernization to encompass the full scope of Plutonium Modernization. High Explosives and Energetics 

Modernization consists of activities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), LANL, the Nevada 

National Security Site, Pantex Plant (Pantex), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and DoD vendors.

The budget request for this program increased to support:

◼ Funding for design activities supporting LAP4 and SRPPF 

◼ Additional support for expanding plutonium pit production capabilities and process development

◼ Additional investments for the modernization of high explosives and energetics capabilities

8.5.2.2 Secondary Capability Modernization

Secondary Capability Modernization is responsible for restoring and improving manufacturing capabilities 

for the secondary stage of nuclear weapons in the nuclear security enterprise. This includes ensuring the 

availability of strategic materials and other sub-component streams necessary for the secondary stage, as 

well as modernizing the facilities and operations required to process these materials, fabricate them into 

parts, and assemble the final components. The program includes three subprograms: (1) Uranium 

Modernization (formerly Uranium Sustainment); (2) Depleted Uranium Modernization; and (3) Lithium 

Modernization. 

The budget request for Secondary Capability Modernization increased due to:

◼ New depleted uranium scope to meet near-team mission requirements and support future 

weapon systems

◼ Additional scope to supply the current stockpile with purified enriched uranium metal, as well as 

support the transition of new capabilities into new and enduring facilities

◼ Growth in Lithium Modernization scope and processing requirements to meet national security 

requirements

8.5.2.3 Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment

Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment consists of two parts: (1) Tritium 

Modernization, which produces, recovers, and recycles tritium to support national security requirements,

and (2) the Domestic Uranium Enrichment Program, which is responsible for establishing a reliable supply 

of enriched uranium to support U.S. national security and nonproliferation needs. 

The budget requests for Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment decreased, which 

reflects the absence of funding for the Uranium Reserve program. The decrease also reflects that highly 

enriched uranium downblending activities required advance funding provided in prior fiscal years, 

reducing the FY 2022 request level.
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8.5.2.4 Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization

Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization consolidates management and oversight of strategic investments 

to modernize capabilities for design, qualification, and production of non-nuclear components for 

multiple weapon systems.

The budget request for this program increased to support:

◼ Equipment procurements at the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC) that are necessary 

to modernize capabilities for development and production of non-nuclear components for 

multiple weapon systems

◼ Other Project Cost (OPC) activities for the Non-Nuclear Component Capacity and the Power 

Sources Capability Line Items and added OPC funding for the Heterogeneous Integration Facility 

project, which is needed to provide future trusted and strategic radiation-hardened 

microelectronics

◼ At-risk materials efforts to identify supply issues for those materials for which obsolescence, 

discontinuation, scarceness, or unavailability is likely to occur over the timeline for which it is 

needed or required

◼ Equipment for the neutron generator and power sources facilities at SNL 

◼ Continued development and implementation of an assurance system model for commercial offthe-shelf (COTS) parts to avoid delays in weapons modernization programs

◼ Development of a thermal spray production capability needed for the W87-1 Modification 

Program and future systems

8.5.3 Key Milestones

To properly support the current and future nuclear deterrent mission, DOE/NNSA must invest in reestablishing production capabilities and modernizing programmatic infrastructure.4

 Key milestones for 

Production Modernization are presented by program in Sections 8.5.3.1 – 8.5.3.4. 

8.5.3.1 Primary Capability Modernization

Key milestones for Primary Capability Modernization are illustrated in Figure 8–4. Major changes from 

last year’s plan related to Primary Capability Modernization are: 

◼ Based on information developed to support the Critical Decision 1 (CD-1) (Approve Alternative 

Selection and Cost Range) milestone for the SRPPF project, DOE/NNSA has determined that the 

required 50 War Reserve pits per year production rate at SRS will not be achieved in 2030.

Establishing required SRPPF pit production capacity as close as possible to 2030 remains a high 

priority and is required for sustaining the effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. As 

described in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.3, further design activities conducted in support of CD-2 

(Approve Performance Baseline) will identify multiple opportunities to achieve required 

production capacity closer to 2030.

◼ The FY 2025 milestone, Obtain CD-4 (Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion) for High 

Explosives Science and Engineering facility, is delayed to FY 2026 due to receiving no qualified bids 

to the original main works Requests for Proposals and the resulting need to go out for a rebid.

4 Although most programmatic construction projects are funded through Infrastructure and Operations, milestones for relevant 

projects are included in this section for transparency. Many of the capabilities depend on the completion of programmatic 

construction projects to execute the mission.
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◼ The FY 2025 milestone, Obtain CD-4 for High Explosives Synthesis Formulation and Production 

facility for future LEPs, is delayed to FY 2030 due to growth in the facility footprint following 

completion of conceptual design and a better understanding of process requirements through 

design evolution.

◼ The FY 2026 milestone, Obtain CD-4 for Energetic Materials Characterization, is delayed to 

FY 2028 based on its Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) results.

Three milestones from last year’s SSMP were completed in FY 2021:

◼ Obtain CD-1 for Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project

◼ Obtain CD-1 for Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

◼ Complete specification for triaminotrinitrobenzene – TATB/PBX-9502

Figure 8–4. Key Milestones for Primary Capability Modernization

8.5.3.2 Secondary Capability Modernization

Key milestones for Secondary Capability Modernization are illustrated in Figure 8–5. Major changes from 

last year’s plan related to Secondary Capability Modernization are: 

◼ The FY 2024 milestone, Obtain CD-2/3 (Approve Performance Baseline/Approve Start of 

Construction) for Lithium Processing Facility, has been updated to FY 2026 to reflect schedule 

contingency previously not incorporated into the associated milestone date reported in the 

project data sheet.

◼ The FY 2025 milestone, Start full scale conversion activities at Portsmouth, has been removed due 

to growth in project cost estimates that require further analysis of options.

One milestone from last year’s SSMP was completed in FY 2021:

◼ Install development direct cast furnace. Operations are expected to start in FY 2022.
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Figure 8–5. Key Milestones for Secondary Capability Modernization

8.5.3.3 Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment

Key milestones for Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment are illustrated in 

Figure 8–6. Major changes from last year’s plan related to Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium 

Enrichment are:

◼ The FY 2021 milestone, Obtain CD-3A (Approve Long Lead Item Procurements) for Tritium 

Finishing Facility, is delayed to FY 2024 as a result of the separation of site preparation work into 

a discrete subproject.

5

◼ The FY 2031 milestone, Obtain CD-4 for Tritium Finishing Facility, has a completion range of 

FY 2029 – FY 2031.

◼ The FY 2040 milestone, Obtain CD-4 for Domestic Uranium Enrichment Facility, is delayed to 

FY 2041 because additional unobligated low-enriched uranium was identified that extends the 

need date for a new enrichment capability.

One milestone from last year’s SSMP was completed in FY 2021:

◼ Begin irradiation of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) in a second reactor

5 No longer tied to site preparation work, the CD-3A milestone for the Tritium Finishing Facility was moved to better align with 

the overall schedule so that the procurement will be ready when needed.
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Figure 8–6. Key milestones for Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment

8.5.3.4 Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization

Key milestones for Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization are illustrated in Figure 8–7. There is one major 

change from last year’s plan related to Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization:

◼ The FY 2021 milestone, Obtain CD-1 for Power Sources Capability Facility, is now scheduled to be 

achieved in FY 2022.

One milestone from last year’s SSMP was completed in FY 2021: 

◼ Provide the tooling and equipment, facility, and infrastructure investments necessary to sustain 

the MESA complex

Figure 8–7. Key milestones for Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization
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8.6 Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering

Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E) provides the knowledge and expertise needed 

to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile without additional nuclear explosive testing. SRT&E

encompasses six major subprograms: (1) Assessment Science; (2) Engineering and Integrated 

Assessments; (3) Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF); (4) Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC);

(5) Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation; and (6) Academic Programs. Additional 

information about SRT&E can be found in Chapter 4, “Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering.”

8.6.1 Budget

The budget request for SRT&E decreased 4 percent from the FY 2021 enacted budget (comparable) and 

is illustrated in Figure 8–8. 

Figure 8–8. FY 2022 President’s Budget Request for Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering
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8.6.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

8.6.2.1 Assessment Science

Assessment Science provides the knowledge and expertise needed to maintain confidence in the nuclear 

stockpile in the absence of nuclear explosive testing. The program is comprised of six subprograms: 

(1) Primary Assessment Technologies; (2) Dynamic Materials Properties; (3) Advanced Diagnostics; 

(4) Secondary Assessment Technologies; (5) Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments(ECSE); and 

(6) Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiment Execution Support. 

The budget request for Assessment Science decreased to reflect a reallocation to higher priority 

DOE/NNSA programs and projects. This also includes a rebalancing within Primary Assessment 

Technologies to support a subcritical experiments schedule that fully utilizes the investment in ECSE.

8.6.2.2 Engineering and Integrated Assessments

Engineering and Integrated Assessments is responsible for ensuring system agnostic survivability in 

present and future stockpile-to-target sequences (STS) and ensures a responsive nuclear deterrent 

through collaborative partnerships, proactive integration, and assessments. This program includes seven 

subprograms: (1) Archiving and Support; (2) Delivery Environments; (3) Weapons Survivability (previously 

Nuclear Survivability); (4) Studies and Assessments; (5) Aging and Lifetimes; (6) Stockpile Responsiveness; 

and (7) Advanced Certification and Qualification. 

The decreased budget request for Engineering and Integrated Assessments reflects the current schedule 

of survivability experiments supporting the FY 2023 mission objective for Hostile Mitigation Capability6

and reduced high impact experiments in the Delivery Environments program. The decrease is offset by 

slight increases to qualification activities supporting improved methodologies, and the development of 

new approaches for designing, manufacturing, certification, and qualification to accelerate the nuclear 

weapons lifecycle process.

8.6.2.3 Inertial Confinement Fusion

ICF provides high energy density (HED) science capabilities and expertise that support research and testing 

across the breadth of stockpile stewardship. Its twofold mission is to meet immediate and emerging HED 

science needs to support the deterrent of today and to advance the research and development 

capabilities necessary to meet those needs for the deterrent of the future. The program includes three 

subprograms: (1) HED and Ignition Science for Stockpile Applications; (2) ICF Diagnostics and 

Instrumentation; and (3) Facility Operations.

The budget request for ICF decreased to reflect the forward funding in FY 2021 for acceleration of FY 2022 

scope.

8.6.2.4 Advanced Simulation and Computing

Advanced Simulation and Computing provides high-end simulation capabilities (e.g., modeling codes, 

computing platforms, and supporting infrastructure) to meet stockpile stewardship requirements. 

Advanced Simulation and Computing provides the weapon codes that provide the integrated assessment 

capability supporting annual assessment and future sustainment program qualification and certification 

of the stockpile. The program includes six subprograms: (1) Integrated Codes; (2) Physics and Engineering 

Models; (3) Verification and Validation; (4) Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation; 

(5) Computational Systems and Software Environment; and (6) Facility Operations and User Support.

6 For more information about mission objectives, see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.
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The budget request for Advanced Simulation and Computing increased to support pursuing new validated 

integrated design codes and advanced high-performance computing capabilities, including the El Capitan 

exascale system procurement.

8.6.2.5 Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation

Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation is responsible for developing agile, affordable, 

assured, and responsive technologies and capabilities for nuclear stockpile sustainment and 

modernization to enable the future success of the nuclear security enterprise. It is comprised of three 

subprograms: (1) Surety Technologies; (2) Weapon Technology Development; and (3) Advanced 

Manufacturing Development.

The decreased budget request for Weapons Technology and Manufacturing Maturation reflects a 

reallocation to address higher priority DOE/NNSA programs and projects. The decrease to Surety 

Technologies and Weapon Technology Development is partially offset by an increase in Advanced 

Manufacturing Development to address material obsolescence and develop new manufacturing 

diagnostic tools, production methods, and manufacturing techniques.

8.6.2.6 Academic Programs

Academic Programs support investments in science and engineering disciplines of critical importance to

the nuclear security enterprise. The program’s grants, centers, fellowships, and other funding options 

offer an introduction to the mission and people in the national laboratories to help establish a workforce 

pipeline to strengthen the future enterprise. Academic Programs includes five subprograms: 

(1) Stewardship Science Academic Alliance; (2) Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program; (3) Joint 

Program in High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas; (4) Computational Science Graduate Fellowships; 

and (5) Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program.

The decreased budget request for Academic Programs reflects a nonrecurring increase in FY 2021 to 

develop the National Laboratory Jobs ACCESS program.

8.6.3 Key Milestones

As described in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1, the Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule is used to align 

SRT&E programs with mission objectives, coordinate efforts across Defense Programs, and communicate 

with internal and external stakeholders. Key milestones for SRT&E are illustrated in Figure 8–9. Major 

changes from last year’s plan are:

◼ The FY 2021 milestone, Qualify and deploy a new scintillator for Confined Large Optical Scintillator

Screen and Imaging System (CoLOSSIS) I and II is delayed to FY 2022 due to scheduling needs for 

upgrades and authorization for use.

◼ The FY 2022 milestone, Complete Red Sage and Nimble subcritical experiment campaigns, is 

delayed to FY 2025 due to an added subcritical experiment to the Nimble series to inform the 

ongoing modernization program.

◼ The FY 2025 milestone, Complete assembly of a 7-megaelectronvolt neutron imaging machine at 

LLNL for plant installation has been removed due to a change in implementation.

One milestone from last year’s SSMP was completed in FY 2021:

◼ Obtain CD-3A for ASD-Scorpius
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Figure 8–9. Key milestones for Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering

8.7 Infrastructure and Operations

Infrastructure and Operations maintains, operates, and modernizes DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure in a safe, 

secure, and cost-effective manner to support all DOE/NNSA programs. Infrastructure and Operations 

efforts provide a comprehensive approach to modernizing DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure while maximizing 

return on investment, enabling program results, and reducing enterprise risk. The program also plans, 

prioritizes, and constructs state-of-the-art facilities, infrastructure, and scientific tools. It includes: 

(1) Operations of Facilities; (2) Safety and Environmental Operations; (3) Maintenance and Repair of 

Facilities; (4) Recapitalization; and (5) Construction. Additional information about Infrastructure and 

Operations can be found in Chapter 6, “Infrastructure and Operations.”

8.7.1 Budget

The budget request for Infrastructure and Operations decreased 12 percent from the FY 2021 enacted 

budget and is illustrated in Figure 8–10.

8.7.2 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

8.7.2.1 Operations of Facilities

Operations of Facilities provides the funding required to operate DOE/NNSA facilities in a safe and secure 

manner and is fundamental to achieving DOE/NNSA’s plutonium, uranium, tritium, lithium, HE, and other 

mission objectives. This program includes essential support such as water and electrical utilities; safety 

systems; lease agreements; and activities associated with Federal, state, and local environmental, worker 

safety, and health regulations. 

There was no change to the budget request for Operations of Facilities.
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Figure 8–10. FY 2022 President’s Budget for Infrastructure and Operations

8.7.2.2 Safety and Environmental Operations

Safety and Environmental Operations provides for DOE’s Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, Nuclear 

Safety Research and Development, Packaging subprogram, Long Term Stewardship subprogram, and 

Nuclear Materials Integration subprograms. These activities support safe, efficient operation of the 

nuclear security enterprise through the provision of safety data, nuclear material packaging, 

environmental monitoring, and nuclear material tracking.

There was no change to the budget request for Safety and Environmental Operations. 

8.7.2.3 Maintenance and Repair of Facilities

Maintenance and Repair of Facilities provides direct-funded maintenance activities across the nuclear 

security enterprise for the recurring day-to-day work required to sustain and preserve DOE/NNSA facilities 

and equipment in a condition suitable for their designated purpose. These efforts include predictive, 

preventive, and corrective maintenance activities to maintain facilities, property, assets, systems, roads, 

equipment, and vital safety systems.

The budget request for Maintenance and Repair of Facilities increased, reflecting the transfer of the Waste 

Solidification Building at SRS from the Material Management and Minimization’s Material Disposition 

subprogram within Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. 

8.7.2.4 Recapitalization

Recapitalization modernizes DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure by prioritizing investments to improve the 

condition and extend the life of structures, capabilities, and systems, thereby improving the safety and 

quality of the workplace. Recapitalization is comprised of the Infrastructure and Safety subprogram and 

the Capability Based Investments (CBI) subprogram. Funding is used to address numerous obsolete 
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support and safety systems; revitalize facilities that are beyond the end of their design life; and improve 

the reliability, efficiency, and capability of infrastructure to meet mission requirements. Recapitalization 

investments help achieve operational efficiencies and reduce safety, security, environmental, and 

program risk. The Recapitalization program includes minor construction projects, real property 

purchases, capital equipment, planning, OPCs for mission enabling infrastructure, and deactivation and 

disposal of excess infrastructure. 

The budget request for Recapitalization decreased as part of a realignment of resources to address higher 

Weapons Activities priorities, such as plutonium pit production support. Within CBI, the decrease reflects 

the transfer of Other Project Costs for LANL’s Technical Area 55 (TA-55) Reinvestment Project, Phase 3 

(TRP III) and Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility line item projects to Plutonium Modernization and transfer 

portions of the SNL CBI project scope to the new Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization program.

8.7.2.5 Line Item Construction

Line item construction projects and line item purchases are critical to revitalizing the infrastructure and 

program-specific capabilities that directly support the nuclear weapons programs. These projects will 

replace obsolete, unreliable facilities and infrastructure to reduce safety and program risk while improving 

responsiveness, capacity, and capabilities.

The budget request for Programmatic Construction includes funding in FY 2022 for: 

◼ 04-D-125 Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project, LANL

◼ 06-D-141 Uranium Processing Facility, Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12)

◼ 15-D-302 TRP III, LANL

◼ 17-D-640 U1a Complex Enhancements Project, Nevada National Security Site

◼ 18-D-650 Tritium Finishing Facility, SRS

◼ 18-D-690 Lithium Processing Facility, Y-12

◼ 21-D-510 HE Synthesis, Formulation, and Production, Pantex

◼ 22-D-513 Power Sources Capability, SNL

The budget request for Mission Enabling Construction includes funding in FY 2022 for:

◼ 22-D-514 Digital Infrastructure Capability Expansion, LLNL

Additional information on planned line item investments can be found in Chapter 6, “Infrastructure and 

Operations.” 

8.7.3 Key Milestones

Key milestones for Programmatic Construction are shown in the relevant program sections, as many of 

their capabilities depend on completion of line item projects to execute their designed mission. Schedules

for the highest priority Programmatic and Mission Enabling project proposals are displayed in 

Figures 6–8 through 6–15. Projects proposed in the near term have higher-fidelity estimates; some 

planned projects in the out-years may decide to use alternative strategies (other than a line item project)

once each respective AoA is completed. 

Per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, DOE/NNSA established the Infrastructure 

Modernization Initiative (IMI) program to reduce deferred maintenance (DM) and repair needs by no less 

than 30 percent by 2025. The IMI will be carried out under the current budget structure by the 
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Recapitalization: Infrastructure and Safety, Maintenance and Repair of Facilities, and Construction

programs. The initial plan was transmitted to Congress in September 2018.

8.7.4 Infrastructure Maintenance and Recapitalization Investments

As part of the IMI, DOE/NNSA has deployed BUILDER, a system developed by the Army Corps of Engineers 

and recognized by the National Academy of Sciences as a best-in-class practice for infrastructure 

management. The BUILDER system uses comprehensive inventory, life cycle, cost, and assessment data 

and risk-informed standards and policies to recommend repairs and replacements at the most opportune 

time, thus improving DOE/NNSA’s ability to pinpoint and prioritize investments. Historical approaches 

greatly underestimated the replacement plant value (RPV) of DOE/NNSA’s facilities. As depicted in 

Table 8–2, DOE/NNSA’s new calculated RPV is $116.3 billion based on end-of-year data. The DM backlog 

is tied to RPV (it costs more to repair a more expensive facility); therefore, as expected, DM increased 

with the deployment of our new, more accurate, data-driven approach from $2.5 billion as of FY 2018 to 

$5.8 billion as of FY 2020. The overall physical condition of DOE/NNSA’s infrastructure did not decline.

Table 8–2. DOE/NNSA deferred maintenance as a percentage of Replacement Plant Value

Metric FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020

RN $5.1B $8.9B $9.4B

DM $2.5B $4.8B $5.8B

RPV $55B $124.3B $116.3B

RN/RPV Ratio 9.27% 7.16% 8.08%

DM/RPV Ratio 4.63% 3.85% 4.99%

RN = Repair Needs

DM = Deferred Maintenance

RPV = Replacement Plant Value

In response to GAO recommendations, this information is provided to improve transparency in the 

budget. Table 8–3 compares investments in Maintenance and Recapitalization to benchmarks (based on 

the percentage of beginning of the year RPV) derived from the DOE Real Property Asset Management Plan 

and associated guidance. To address other high priority needs, DOE/NNSA has decreased recapitalization 

investments by $84.6 million from FY 2021 to FY 2022. Recapitalization continues to include deactivation 

and demolition of excess and underutilized facilities to reduce DOE/NNSA’s footprint. Maintenance 

investments reflect a flat funding level from FY 2021 to FY 2022. Overall funding for maintenance has 

grown significantly, but appropriately, over the last several years. This sustained funding level will support 

current maintenance staffing levels to maintain and preserve facilities in a condition that is suitable to 

meet an increasing mission demand. DOE/NNSA also continues to use targeted asset management 

programs that use supply chain management practices to increase purchasing power for common building 

components across the nuclear security enterprise (e.g., roofs and heating, ventilating, and air 

conditioning). 

Table 8–3. Projected FY 2022 DOE/NNSA infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization investments

FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022

Replacement Plant Value (RPV) ($B) 124.3 116.3 117.3

Maintenance 

Benchmark 

2 – 4% RPV

Infrastructure and Safety Maintenance Investments ($K) 456,000 667,000 670,000

Other NNSA Maintenance Investments (direct and indirect funded) ($K) 298,008 265,978 269,149

Total NNSA Maintenance Investments ($K) 754,008 932,978 939,149

Maintenance as % RPV 0.61% 0.80% 0.80%

Recapitalization 

Benchmark 

1%

Infrastructure and Safety Recapitalization Investments ($K) 447,657 573,717 508,664

Other NNSA Recapitalization Investments ($K) 135,341 289,933 264,374

Total NNSA Recapitalization Investments ($K) 582,998 857,650 773,038

Recapitalization as % RPV 0.47% 0.74% 0.66%
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8.8 Other Weapons Activities

8.8.1 Budget

The funding schedule for Other Weapons Activities is illustrated in Figure 8–11.

Figure 8–11. FY 2022 President’s Budget for Other Weapons Activities

8.8.2 Secure Transportation Asset

Secure Transportation Asset (STA) provides safe, secure transport of the Nation’s nuclear weapons, 

weapon components, and special nuclear material throughout the nuclear security enterprise to meet 

nuclear security requirements and support the broader DOE and NNSA operations. STA includes two 

subprograms: (1) Operations and Equipment and (2) Program Direction. Additional information about 

STA can be found in Chapter 5, “Security.”

8.8.2.1 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

The budget request for Operations and Equipment decreased as a result of one-time FY 2021 costs 

associated with the aircraft procurement, and completion of the Baseline Design Review, timeline, and 

testing results of Test Article 1 for the Mobile Guardian Transporter (MGT). FY 2022 funding supports 

delivery of the MGT’s Pre-Production Unit Rolling Chassis, completion of Test Article 2 assembly, and start 

of the Pre-Production Unit Assembly.

The budget request for Program Direction decreased as a result of additional workers’ compensation costs 

associated with a non-mission vehicle accident in FY 2018 and lower funding requirements in salaries due 

to cancelled Nuclear Materials Courier Basic courses in FY 2020 and FY 2021 as a result of COVID-19. 
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8.8.2.2 Key Milestones

Aging transportation assets must be replaced to meet and maintain convoy safety and security 

requirements. The STA milestones illustrated in Figure 8–12 will enable DOE/NNSA to support evolving 

transportation requirements for the current and future stockpile. Changes from last year’s plan include:

◼ The FY 2021 milestone, Design and begin production of the next generation armored tractor (T4) 

and escort vehicle (EV4), shifted to FY 2022 due to contracting delays.

◼ The FY 2025 milestone, Begin MGT production, is delayed based on the Integrated Master 

Schedule adjustments and COVID-19 effects resulting in delivery of the first production unit in 

FY 2026.

◼ The FY 2025 milestone, Replace first 737 aircraft, is delayed to FY 2027 based on the Business 

Case Analysis and STA requirements modifying the life cycle replacement schedule.

◼ The FY 2029 milestone, Replace second 737 aircraft, is delayed to FY 2032 based on the Business 

Case Analysis and STA requirements modifying the life cycle replacement schedule.

◼ The FY 2034 milestone, Complete MGT production, is delayed to FY 2037 based on full scale 

production beginning in FY 2027.

One milestone from last year’s SSMP was completed in FY 2021: 

◼ Begin procurement of a new aircraft to replace the aging DC-9 aircraft

Figure 8–12. Key milestones for Secure Transportation Asset

8.8.3 Defense Nuclear Security

Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) leads, develops, and implements NNSA’s security program to enable 

DOE/NNSA’s nuclear security enterprise missions. DNS funding provides protection for DOE/NNSA 

personnel, facilities, nuclear weapons, and materials from a full spectrum of threats, ranging from minor 

security incidents to acts of terrorism, at its national laboratories, production plants, processing facilities, 

and the Nevada National Security Site. Additional information about DNS can be found in Chapter 5, 

“Security.”

8.8.3.1 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

The budget request for DNS increased based on additional security needs associated with growth across 

the nuclear security enterprise, including:

◼ Plutonium pit production efforts and other mission growth

◼ Efforts to implement additional security requirements resulting from completed Design Basis 

Threat analysis 

◼ Support for highest priority milestones for the Caerus system, which replaces the aging Argus 

security system 
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Funding for the DNS construction project, 17-D-710, West End Protected Area Reduction (WEPAR) 

decreased due to use of carryover funding to cover FY 2022 requirements.

8.8.3.2 Key Milestones

The Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP) addresses the security systems across DOE/NNSA 

and is a primary driver to support enterprise physical security system upgrades and life cycle management 

at each DOE/NNSA laboratory, plant, and site. SIRP project requirements were derived from a detailed 

condition assessment that identified the oldest systems and systems with the highest risk for failure, and 

assessed these systems’ contributions to the overall security posture. The SIRP long-range plan is 

modified periodically based on DOE/NNSA’s budget, mission, and needs.

The DNS milestones illustrated in Figure 8–13 are directly linked to modernization of the national security 

infrastructure and will assure that DOE/NNSA mission requirements for the current and future stockpile 

are carried out in a safe and secure environment. Changes from last year’s plan are:

◼ The FY 2023 milestone, Complete Y-12 WEPAR, Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment 

System (PIDAS) modernization, and entry control facility upgrade, is delayed to FY 2024 to align 

with the baselined project.

◼ The FY 2024 milestone, Complete critical SIRP priorities, is delayed to FY 2027 due to COVID-19

effects and reprioritization within the DNS portfolio.

◼ The FY 2024 milestone, Complete LANL PIDAS, is delayed to FY 2032 as the currently planned 

plutonium Pit production ramp up and capital line item projects are not scheduled to be 

completed until FY 2027.

◼ They FY 2025 milestone, Complete SRS PIDAS, is delayed to FY 2030 due to the delay in obtaining 

CD-1 for SRPPF.

◼ The FY 2026 milestone, Complete Pantex PIDAS physical security system components and 

infrastructure refresh for Zone 12, is delayed to FY 2027 due to reprioritization within the DNS 

portfolio.

◼ The FY 2028 milestone, Complete Pantex PIDAS physical security system components and 

infrastructure refresh for Zone 4, is delayed to FY 2029 due to reprioritization within the DNS 

portfolio.

◼ The FY 2035 milestone, Complete first iteration of SIRP, is delayed to FY 2036 due to 

reprioritization within the DNS portfolio.

Figure 8–13. Key milestones for Defense Nuclear Security
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8.8.4 Information Technology and Cybersecurity

Funding for Information Technology (IT) and Cybersecurity is used to operate cyber infrastructure at 

DOE/NNSA sites, implement departmental policies and procedures, implement Committee on National 

Security Systems requirements for the classified computing environment, and execute IT services, 

software, and hardware solutions for both unclassified and classified computing environments. Additional 

information about IT and Cybersecurity can be found in Chapter 5, “Security.”

8.8.4.1 FY 2022 Budget Request Compared to FY 2021 Enacted Budget

The budget request for Cybersecurity appears as an overall increase compared to the FY 2021 level in part 

due to the transfer of operations and maintenance responsibilities for legacy classified network systems 

from other DOE/NNSA program offices to DOE/NNSA’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO). 

Therefore, additional funding is simply tied to this particular increase in scope. Additional budget 

increases reflect funding for remaining requirements for M&O cybersecurity infrastructure, including full 

scope enhancements to the Enterprise Secure Network infrastructure; recapitalizing aging logical 

infrastructure; strengthening inherited legacy networks, systems, and applications; and enhancing 

cybersecurity capabilities to detect, prevent, counter, and respond to emerging threats and 

vulnerabilities. 

The decreased budget request for IT reflects the implementation of Phase I requirements for the IT 

Modernization Project, development and implementation of services and solutions to provide operational 

connectivity during COVID-19, and launching Phase I for the IT infrastructure upgrades in coordination

with the DOE CIO and improving application development and implementation with updated tools and 

technologies. Specifically, IT funding will support the IT Infrastructure for DOE/NNSA to enable efficient 

collaboration and mission support across the nuclear security enterprise. This includes IT associated with 

the Classified Infrastructure to address risks related to software assurance and supply chain management. 

Also, IT includes requirements related to implementation of classified networks.

8.8.4.2 Key Milestones

The milestones in Figure 8–14 are necessary steps toward achieving a fully modernized IT infrastructure 

and cybersecurity posture for the nuclear security enterprise. One milestone from last year’s SSMP was 

completed in FY 2021:

◼ Complete the phase 1 security architecture of the wireless pit production network

The following milestones were anticipated to be completed in FY 2021 and are ongoing into FY 2022:

◼ Implement Phase II of DOE/NNSA’s IT Modernization Plan

◼ Begin development of the architecture of the classified wireless network for non-pit production 

facilities

◼ Deploy KCNSC hybrid cloud platform in support of Joint Technology Demonstrator project

◼ Perform cybersecurity program budget re-baseline site assessments

◼ Develop phase II system architecture for modernizing the Enterprise Secure Computing 

environment

◼ Implement special network access

◼ Implement the DOE/NNSA Application Modernization Strategy

◼ Implement a Telecommunications Security Program within DOE/NNSA

◼ Complete the modernization of the Information Assurance Response Center cybersecurity 

infrastructure
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Figure 8–14. Key milestones for Information Technology and Cybersecurity

8.8.5 Legacy Contractor Pensions and Settlement Payments

Starting in FY 2022, Legacy Contractor Pensions and Settlement Payments includes funding to reimburse 

the University of California for a portion of a settlement reached in 2019 with former University of 

California employees of LLNL related to health care plans, as well as funding for DOE/NNSA’s share of the 

unfunded liability of the Savannah River Nuclear Solutions pension plan. Benefits accrued by active 

employees during the year of execution will continue to be addressed through Savannah River Nuclear 

Solution’s indirect pools.

8.9 Budget Projections Beyond FY 2022

This section explains the cost estimation methodology that DOE/NNSA uses to create long-term budget 

projections. These projections are used to evaluate, over a longer timeframe than considered in the 

FYNSP and during programming activities, the total required resources to accomplish the program of 

record, how those resources are allocated, and the overall affordability of the program (see Section 8.10). 

8.9.1 Basis for Budget Projections

The FY 2022 budget request was generated as part of the DOE/NNSA planning and programming process 

and reflects a compilation of individual estimates developed interactively by Federal program managers 

and DOE/NNSA’s M&O partners using historical cost data, current plans for programs and projects, and 

expert judgment. Beyond FY 2022, the projected cost estimates for Stockpile Major Modernization 

programs are informed by the processes described in Section 8.9.2 and the major programmatic 

construction projects in Section 6.3.1. Some portions of the Weapons Activities portfolio are assumed to 

continue beyond the FY 2022 at the same level of effort.

7

 For these cost projections, an escalation factor

of 2.1 percent is used.

7 Projection of budget estimates for these efforts in this way assumes the continued manageability of whatever risks are present 

during FY 2022 at the same level of effort over the 25-year time period, as is typically represented by the funding level of the last 

year of the FYNSP.
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8.9.2 Stockpile Major Modernization

Stockpile Major Modernization programs have the goal of extending the lives of warheads for several

more decades and improving their safety and security as possible. Figure 2–3 in Chapter 2, “Stockpile 

Management,” provides a summary of planned Stockpile Major Modernization activities.

The next sections summarize cost estimates for Stockpile Major Modernization programs within the 

current 25-year period. The basis for the cost estimates varies from those using top-down cost models 

(such as analogy comparisons to past work completed, parametric relationships, and subject matter 

expert judgment) to those using bottom-up models (deterministic, unit cost, and activity-based), 

depending on where the warhead program is in the Phase X/6.X Process, reflecting the maturity of the 

process.

8.9.2.1 Cost Estimates across the Phase X/6.X Process

Figure 8–15 delineates the governing cost estimate type for each phase of the Phase 6.x Process and, as 

currently planned, the Phase X Process. DOE/NNSA works in conjunction with DoD and M&O partners to 

develop, refine, and update the estimates throughout these processes. 

Figure 8–15. Cost estimates across the Phase 6.X Process

The DOE/NNSA Office of Management and Budget, Office of Analysis and Evaluation develops and

publishes planning cost estimates for the SSMP. These cost estimates are initiated at very early design 

maturity, often well before Phase 6.1 (Concept Assessment), and are planning estimates for alternatives

analysis, early programming, and budget deliberations. These planning estimates for Stockpile Major 

Modernization are:

◼ Based on a known scope and cost uncertainty at the time and updated annually for the SSMP8

◼ Inclusive of both warhead modernization program (development and production) and nonwarhead modernization program line item costs that are critical to program success (namely 

Other Program Money and DoD costs)9

◼ Unconstrained by future budget availability, which may differ from future budget requests 

8 Planning estimates assume scopes that are in line with current policy objectives (such as a commitment to surety upgrades) in 

addition to extending the warhead life. The Nuclear Weapons Council approves the specific scope for the weapon modernization 

program based on the alternatives developed during Phase 6.2. The cost estimate range used in a planning estimate reflects the 

uncertainty in implementing a single assumed point solution, rather than the range of every possible design solution.

9

In estimating the cost of a warhead modernization program, the weapon programs depend on an adequately funded base of 

other DOE/NNSA capabilities, are incremental to that base, and reflect both each program’s budgeted line item and increments 

to other critical activities (such as early-stage technology maturation [called Other Program Money]). As the overall program 

integrator, the Federal Program Manager identifies the funding streams needed for the program to be successful.
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These cost estimates are enumerated in the SSMP until the Weapon Design and Cost Report (WDCR) is 

approved. The estimate methodology is described in more detail in Section 8.9.2.2.

The WDCR is developed by the program teams responsible for the warhead modernization programs and 

provides cost estimates for design, qualification, production, and life cycle activities. The WDCR includes 

detailed multi-site input and, although primarily performed using a bottom-up approach, may contain 

other methodologies (e.g., parametric, analogous, and subject matter expertise). The WDCR developed 

during Phase 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost Study) is a key input into the Phase 6.2A study report to the 

Nuclear Weapons Council and is required prior to entry to Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering). Once 

approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the WDCR becomes the basis for the Selected Acquisition 

Report (SAR) to Congress required upon entry into Phase 6.3.

The Baseline Cost Report (BCR), which is also developed by the program team, formally updates the WDCR 

based on late development and pre-production activities. The BCR is updated based on refined scopes

and schedule definitions (reflecting the increased maturity of the program) and represents a more 

definitive cost estimate than either the planning estimate or WDCR. The NNSA Administrator approves a 

program baseline, including the WDCR, prior to Phase 6.3. The BCR supersedes previous cost estimates 

and becomes the program of record, which is transmitted annually to Congress as part of the SAR. 

The DOE/NNSA Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation conducts an independent cost review 

prior to Phase 6.2A, and independent cost estimates prior to entry into Phase 6.3, Phase 6.4 (Production 

Engineering), and 6.5 (First Production).

8.9.2.2 DOE/NNSA Office of Management and Budget Cost Estimating Methodology

The DOE/NNSA Office of Management and Budget planning estimates for Stockpile Major Modernization 

programs are developed in the following manner:

◼ Performed using a “top-down” analogy method that is consistent with early-stage planning10

◼ Informed by ongoing and past program costs (such as the development of the W76-1, B61-12, 

W88 Alt 370, and production of the W76-1) and the evaluation of the relative complexities of 

future systems11

◼ Based on time-phased development costs using a standard profile,

12 as well as production costs 

using a nonlinear cost growth profile similar to that of the W76-1

◼ Based on technical and programmatic inputs from Federal Program Managers, Federal site offices, 

and subject matter experts across the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons 

production facilities

Cost ranges reflect the underlying technical and modeling uncertainties of the programmatic scope at the 

time. During the early stages of warhead acquisitions (Phases 1/6.1 and Phases 2/6.2), designs may 

experience scope changes due to ongoing down-select decisions regarding threshold and objective 

requirements, which may result in cost changes compared to those reported in previous SSMPs. These 

ranges will typically be greatest for earlier-stage programs and narrow over time. The cost estimates for 

10 Additional detail on the cost estimating methodology of DOE/NNSA’s Office of Management and Budget planning estimates 

can be found in the technical paper, “Planning for the Future: Methodologies for Estimating U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Cost” 

(Lewis et al. 2016; Cost Engineering, 58 [5], pp. 6-12).

11 These program and subject matter experts evaluate the relative scope complexity between the complete W76-1 and nearcomplete B61-12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 Program compared to each planned future warhead modernization program, which aids 

in providing a cost estimate range based on underlying technical and cost uncertainties.

12 See Lee, David. The Cost Analyst’s Companion, 3rd ed., McLean, VA: Logistics Management Institute, McLean, VA.
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future systems with little design definition were based on the W87-1 estimate with an expanded range 

due to uncertainty in scope and quantities and the escalation rate so far in the future.

8.9.2.3 Current Estimates

Figures 8–16 through 8–20 and Tables 8–5 through 8–14 provide cost estimates for each Stockpile Major 

Modernization program for the 25-year SSMP timeframe. Table 8–4 delineates the type of cost estimate 

for each of the warhead modernization programs included in the 25-year plan. Additional details on the 

basis for each estimate are provided for each individual program in Sections 8.9.2.4 through 8.9.2.12. 

Table 8–4. Cost estimates for Stockpile Major Modernization programs

within the 25-year program of record

13

Stockpile Major Modernization 

Program Type of Cost Estimate

Total Estimated Cost 

(FY 2021 dollars in billions)

Total Estimated Cost

(then-year dollars in billions)

B61-12 LEP BCR/SAR 8.6 8.3

W88 Alteration Program BCR/SAR 2.9 2.8

W80-4 LEP WDCR 9.9 11.0

W80-4 Alteration (SLCM) Planning Estimate 3.1 3.7

W87-1 Modification Program14 Planning Estimate 9.8 12.1

W93 Program15 Planning Estimate 9.4 14.0

Future Strategic Land-Based Warhead Planning Estimate 12.0 19.0

Future Strategic Sea-Based Warhead Planning Estimate 12.6 20.9

B61 Follow-On Planning Estimate 11.4 21.5

BCR/SAR = Baseline Cost Report/Selected Acquisition Report

WDCR = Weapon Design and Cost Report

A summary table with high, low, and nominal (proposed budget or BCR/SAR value) estimates for 

DOE/NNSA and DoD, in both constant FY 2021 and then-year dollars, is listed for each Stockpile Major 

Modernization program. Where appropriate, the tables also include pre-SAR values for pre-Phase 6.2 

costs.

16 The low estimates presented in the tables and graphs as the green line represent the mid-point 

(p50) of the cost estimate. The high estimates continue to represent the 85 percent (p85) for the B61-12, 

W88 Alt 370, and W80-4, but the estimate increased to the 90th percent (p90) for the W87-1 Modification 

Program to reflect the greater uncertainty.

For early-stage programs using planning estimates (such as the W87-1 Modification Program), the figures 

and tables reflect the current proposed FY 2022 budget and, for years beyond FY 2022, the midpoint 

between the high and low estimates. 

Items to consider when comparing estimates to one another:

◼ The constant-year cost totals in the tables are the most comparable because inflation effects 

become significant over warhead modernization activity timeframes. Consideration should also 

13 SAR and WDCR values are provided when available. For programs that only have a planning estimate, the proposed budget is 

provided; for programs pre-phase 1/6.1 the p90 value of a representative design and quantity is provided. Tables 8-5 through 8–

13 provide values for a high and low estimate range, in addition to the SAR, WDCR, or planning estimate totals. Due to the 

differing types of cost estimates, the accuracy of these total program cost estimates varies.

14 The total estimated costs for the W87-1 Modification program represent the midpoint between the p50 and p85 values.

15 For future systems, including the W93 Program, the p90 value is used due to uncertainties in scope and design.

16 DoD amounts reflect the costs for weapon components for which DoD is responsible, such as arming and fuzing. While not 

budgeted or executed by DOE/NNSA, these costs reflect the program’s best approximation and are published for transparency 

to better reflect anticipated all-in costs. The total estimated cost is provided because warhead modernization program profiles 

often have later portions that extend beyond the published 25-year SSMP timeframe.
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be given to the varying quantities of warheads being refurbished for each system. The FY 2022 

SSMP’s classified Annex provides additional information on production quantities.

◼ The then-year planning estimates in the tables and figures are derived from constant-year 

estimates using an escalation rate of 3.0 percent. This 3.0 percent rate represents an average of 

the individual site escalation rates as documented in current WDCR/BCR estimates. The WDCR 

and BCR program office estimates are developed at the site and component level and therefore 

use the escalation rates specific to each site and function rather than an average.

◼ Published estimate ranges are meant to reflect the underlying technical and cost uncertainty of 

the assumed scope. Early-stage programs, particularly those before Phase 6.3, may experience 

significant scope changes, as the Nuclear Weapons Council may update and/or down-select

design options that significantly affect the work scope and cost estimate.

◼ Only the planning estimates include pre-Phase 6.2 costs. The WDCR and BCR/SAR estimates do 

not include these costs. 

8.9.2.4 B61-12 Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

The B61-12 LEP is currently in Phase 6.5 and reached its first production unit in November 2021. 

Additionally, all COTS Base Metal Electrode (BME) capacitor components that experienced an issue in late 

2019 are either on or ahead of their revised schedule. The values for development and production costs 

in Figure 8–16 and Table 8–5 reflect DOE/NNSA’s FY 2020 BCR update issued in November 2020, with an 

overall cost estimate of $8.3 billion (then-year dollars), and are unchanged from last year’s SSMP. The 

B61-12 LEP is continuing to use Other Program Money for multi-system production process 

improvements. The costs of these related programs are estimated to be $648 million. 

Figure 8–16. B61-12 Life Extension Program cost from FY 2009 to completion17

17 The value for FY 2012 has been updated from previous SSMPs to represent the appropriate SAR value for that year. The SAR 

value represents money spent after Phase 6.3 approval in July 2012. 
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Table 8–5. Total estimated cost for B61-12 Life Extension Program

DOE/NNSA DoD18

Dollars in Billions FY 2021 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2021 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

Pre-SAR Cost 0.5 0.4 N/A N/A

FY 2012 – FY 2026

SAR Total 8.6 8.3 N/A N/A

SAR Other Program Money Total 0.7 0.6 N/A N/A

Planning Estimate (High)a 9.9 9.6 0.2 0.2

Planning Estimate (Low)

a 8.9 8.9 0.2 0.2

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

a

Including Other Program Money

8.9.2.5 W88 Alteration 370 Program Cost Estimate

The W88 Alt 370 Program is currently in Phase 6.5 and met the July 2021 first production unit. 

Additionally, all COTS BME capacitor components that experienced an issue in late 2019 are either on or 

ahead of their revised schedule. DOE/NNSA issued an updated BCR in September 2020, with an estimate 

of $2.8 billion (then-year dollars), and is unchanged from last year’s SSMP. The revised BCR was reconciled 

with the independent cost estimate performed by DOE/NNSA’s Office of Cost Estimating and Program 

Evaluation. The W88 Alt 370 Program is continuing to use other DOE/NNSA programs for multi-system 

production process improvements. The estimated costs of these related programs (Other Program 

Money) remain unchanged at $171 million. The numbers in Figure 8–17 and Table 8–6 reflect the changes 

that were in the BCR update.

Figure 8–17. W88 Alteration 370 Program (with conventional high explosive refresh)

from FY 2013 to completion

18 The DoD costs in this table represent funds provided by DoD for work by DOE/NNSA on specific components, per cost sharing 

agreements between DoD and DOE/NNSA, and does not include work done exclusively by DoD, such as the B61-12 tailkits.
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Table 8–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alteration Program

(with conventional high explosive refresh)

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2021 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

Pre-SAR Cost 0.1 0.1 N/A N/A

FY 2013 – FY 2026

SAR Total 2.9 2.8 N/A N/A

SAR Other Program Money Total 0.2 0.2 N/A N/A

Planning Estimate (High)a 3.3 3.2 1.1 1.1

Planning Estimate (Low)a 3.2 3.0 1.1 1.1

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

a

Including Other Program Money

8.9.2.6 W80-4 Life Extension Program Cost Estimate

In FY 2019, the W80-4 LEP completed its WDCR and entered Phase 6.3 where the design will continue to 

be refined. The W80-4 LEP is on track to support fielding of the LRSO cruise missile initial operational 

capability in FY 2030. The current cost estimate is displayed in Figure 8–18 and Table 8–7. 

Figure 8–18. W80-4 Life Extension Program cost from FY 2015 to completion
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Table 8–7. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Life Extension Program

FY 2015 – FY 2032 DOE/NNSA DoD

Dollars in Billions FY 2021 Dollars Then-Year Dollars FY 2021 Dollars Then-Year Dollars

SAR Total 9.9 11.0 N/A N/A

SAR Other Program Money Total 0.2 0.2 N/A N/A

Planning Estimate (High)a 11.0 11.9 0.2 0.3

Planning Estimate (Low)

a 9.8 10.6 0.1 0.1

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

a

Including Other Program Money

8.9.2.7 W80-4 Alteration (SLCM) Cost Estimate

To meet a FY 2029 first production unit and fit within the existing nuclear enterprise production footprint, 

the Nuclear Weapons Council issued notice of a preferred warhead solution, a W80-4-like variant, to 

minimize effects to the strategic nuclear stockpile. However, the final selection will be determined at the 

conclusion of the Analysis of Alternatives. The W80-4 Alteration program would need to start in FY 2022 

with a Phase 6.2/6.2A-like effort to integrate the Alteration with the W80-4. The major objectives in 

FY 2022 include assisting the Navy in defining operational requirements and translating those 

requirements into specific warhead performance characteristics, including the electrical and mechanical 

system interfaces. This will define the extent of the warhead alteration. DOE/NNSA funding assumptions 

are that this will be an alteration of the existing W80-4 with minimal change in design, size, or missile 

interface and that the military characteristics and STS are either identical or only slightly modified. The 

funding estimate is at a low level of maturity until the Navy determines the employment platform and 

delivery vehicle and develops draft military characteristics and STS as noted.19 The current cost estimate

is displayed in Figure 8–19 and Table 8–8.

19 Navy AoA for SLCM platform and delivery vehicle scheduled for completion in mid-FY 2021. Specific warhead choices, including 

deviation from W80-4 Alteration, could drive significant development/qualification costs.
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Figure 8–19. W80-4 Alteration (SLCM) cost from FY 2022 to completion

Table 8–8. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Alteration (SLCM)

8.9.2.8 W87-1 Modification Program Cost Estimate 

In February 2019, the Nuclear Weapons Council authorized a restart of Phase 6.2 activities for the W87-1 

Modification Program, and the program is on track to support fielding of the Ground-Based Strategic 

Deterrent by FY 2030. In 2019, the Nuclear Weapons Council reviewed a series of surety architecture 

design options; to include risk/benefit and cost analyses before selecting a single surety option for the 

W87-1 Modification Program. DOE/NNSA continues to evaluate other component design options and 

trades. In FY 2021, the W87-1 Modification Program will complete Phase 6.2 and enter Phase 6.2A. The 

cost estimate in Figure 8–20 represents the latest projected program cost reflecting downselect and trade 

studies completed in early Phase 6.2. The estimates in Figure 8–20 and Table 8–9 do not include costs 

associated with the production of plutonium pits for the W87-1 Modification Program after the capability 

FY 2022– FY 2034

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

Planning Estimate (High)a 3.2 3.9

Planning Estimate (Low)

a 2.9 3.5

Proposed Budget N/A 3.7

SAR = Selected Acquisition Report

a

Including Other Program Money
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to produce 30 pits per year is demonstrated at LANL and 50 pits per year at SRS. Those costs are contained

in Plutonium Modernization.

Figure 8–20. W87-1 Modification Program cost from FY 2019 to completion

Table 8–9. Total estimated cost for W87-1 Modification Program

8.9.2.9 W93 Program Cost Estimate

The W93 Program will mitigate future risk to the sea leg of the nuclear triad and address the changing 

strategic environment. DOE/NNSA is coordinating with DoD on specific requirements and design options 

for the W93 program of record and anticipate completing a Phase 1 study in early 2022. The W93 Program 

cost estimate (see Table 8–10) provides a planning estimate only. It is based on preliminary assumptions 

for the W93 design, with increased uncertainty. This estimate will change as requirements and schedules 

are refined and will be updated in future versions of the SSMP.

FY 2019 – FY 2037

(dollars in billions)

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

Planning Estimate (High)a 10.6 13.0 0.9 1.2

Planning Estimate (Low)

a 9.0 11.1 0.9 1.1

Proposed Budget N/A 12.1 N/A 1.1

a

Including Other Program Money
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Table 8–10. Total estimated cost for W93 Program

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

Planning Estimate (High) a 9.1 14.0 1.0 1.5

Planning Estimate (Low) a 8.0 12.0 0.9 1.4

Proposed Budget N/A 12.8 N/A N/A

a

Including Other Program Money

8.9.2.10 Future Strategic Missile Warhead Cost Estimates

DOE/NNSA is also coordinating with DoD to define the appropriate ballistic missile warheads to support 

threats anticipated through 2030 and beyond. The military capabilities required from the Future Strategic 

Land-Based Warhead and the Future Strategic Sea-Based Warhead, formerly referred to as Interoperable 

Warheads or Future Ballistic Missile Warheads, are being analyzed, and appropriate requirements are 

being developed to address emerging threats and aging concerns in candidate stockpile warheads. In 

addition to these warheads, a replacement air-delivered warhead and submarine-launched warhead (for 

the W76-1/2) will be needed in the 2040s. 

The Future Strategic Missile Warhead cost estimates (see Table 8–11 and Table 8–12) provide a planning 

estimate for notional systems based on an existing stockpile weapon scope with increased uncertainty in 

design scope and quantities, adjusted for out-year escalation. These estimates will change as 

requirements and schedules are refined and will be updated in future versions of the SSMP.

Table 8–11. Total estimated cost for Future Strategic Missile – Land-Based Warhead (FSLW)

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

Planning Estimate (High) a 12.0 19.0 1.0 1.6

Planning Estimate (Low) a 10.0 15.9 0.9 1.5

Proposed Budget 11.0 17.5 N/A N/A

a

Including Other Program Money

Table 8–12. Total estimated cost for Future Strategic Missile – Sea-Based Warhead

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

Planning Estimate (High) a 12.6 20.9 1.0 1.6

Planning Estimate (Low) a 10.4 17.3 0.9 1.5

Proposed Budget 11.5 19.1 N/A N/A

a

Including Other Program Money

8.9.2.11 B61 Follow-On Cost Estimate

The B61 Follow-On cost estimate (see Table 8–13) provides a planning estimate for a notional system 

based on the current B61-12 scope with increased uncertainty in design scope and quantities adjusted for 

out-year escalation. This estimate will change as requirements and schedules are refined and will be 

updated in future versions of the SSMP.
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Table 8–13. Total estimated cost for B61 Follow-On

Dollars in Billions

DOE/NNSA DoD

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

FY 2021

Dollars

Then-Year 

Dollars

Planning Estimate (High) a 11.4 21.5 0.2 0.4

Planning Estimate (Low) a 9.9 18.5 0.2 0.3

Proposed Budget 10.7 20.0 N/A N/A

a

Including Other Program Money

8.9.2.12 Summary of Cost Estimates

Figure 8–21 represents a summary of cost estimate ranges for all presently known warhead 

modernization programs from FY 2021 through FY 2046 based on schedule assumptions that are subject 

to change. Changes from the FY 2021 SSMP are the result of shifts in production schedules and the 

addition of the W80-4 Alteration Program (SLCM).

Figure 8–21. Total projected Stockpile Major Modernization costs for 

FY 2021 – FY 2046 with high and low estimates (then-year dollars)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-35

8.9.3 Construction

8.9.3.1 Cost Estimation for Capital Acquisitions

In FY 2020, DOE/NNSA began publishing cost estimates for early-stage capital acquisitions.20 These early 

planning estimates, published as long as a decade or more before a project’s initial mission approval, 

primarily inform long-term cost projections for programmatic construction and are supplemental to DOE 

acquisition requirements in DOE Order 413.3B.

Notably, these cost estimates are: 

◼ Performed by an organization separate from the Federal program office21

◼ Performed using a top-down parametric method that is consistent with early-stage planning22

◼ Based on historic DOE/NNSA project schedules, costs, and project phasing

◼ Based on current anticipated project scopes

◼ Based on affordability analysis with total construction funding constrained

◼ Updated annually for the SSMP

Once a project begins the acquisition process, the approved cost estimate ranges at the CD-0 milestone

(Approve Mission Need) supersede previous estimates and becomes the basis for resource planning. The 

project then progresses as described in DOE Order 413.3B (i.e., alternative selection and cost range at 

CD-1, performance baseline at CD-2, etc.). Per DOE Order 413.3B, the project cost estimates are 

reconciled with independent cost estimates or independent cost reviews performed by either the Office 

of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (pre-CD-2) or DOE’s Office of Project Management (post-CD-2).

The early-stage planning estimates use technical input based on an assumed scope. However, these 

assumptions do not predetermine the project’s actual acquisition strategy or the outcome of subsequent 

AoAs. The assumed scope should be considered notional until the project reaches and defines

performance baseline at CD-2.

The cost estimation professional society, American Association of Cost Engineering (AACE) International,

has published a cost estimate classification system23 based on the scope definition of the project. 

DOE/NNSA has mapped the AACE International cost estimate classes to their most common uses for 

capital acquisitions.

24 Table 8–14 summarizes the cost estimation classification system, including the level 

of project definition, the expected uncertainty range, and the corresponding DOE/NNSA capital 

acquisition milestones. Note that the estimate ranges and typical applications represent rough 

expectations and cannot simply be applied to an estimate to determine uncertainty.

20 Estimates developed independent of the program are a best practice identified by GAO and other professional organizations 

as a tool to objectively compare to program estimates and identify potential issues early.

21 The DOE/NNSA Office of Management and Budget, Office of Analysis and Evaluation, performs the cost estimates on behalf of 

Defense Programs.

22 GAO extolls the value of independent cost estimates using a different methodology and the potential benefit to decisionmakers in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.

23 AACE International Recommended Practice 18R-97, Cost Estimation Classification System as Applied in Engineering, 

Procurement and Construction for the Process Industries.

24 DOE Guide 413.3-21A, Cost Estimating Guide.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-36

Table 8–14. Capital Acquisition Cost Estimate Classification System 

Estimate 

Class

Primary 

Characteristic Secondary Characteristic

Maturity Level 

of Project 

Definition

(percent)

DOE Capital Acquisition 

Milestone

Typical Types of 

Estimate Methodology

Expected 

Accuracy Range

(percent)

Class 5 0 to 2 Mission Need (CD-0) Planning Estimate, 

Rough Order of 

Magnitude

Capacity factored, 

parametric models, 

judgment, or analogy

L: -20 to -50

H: +30 to +100

Class 4 1 to 15 Alternative Selection (CD-1) Analysis of Alternatives, 

Conceptual Design

Equipment factored 

or parametric models

L: -15 to -30

H: +20 to +50

Class 3 10 to 40 Project Baseline (CD-2)

(low-risk projects)

Preliminary Design Semi-detailed unit 

costs with assembly 

level line items

Low: -10 to -20

H: +10 to +30

Class 2 30 to 75 Start of Construction (CD-3)/ 

Project Baseline (CD-2)

(high-risk projects)

Final Design Detailed unit cost 

with forced detailed 

take-off

L: -5 to -15

H: +5 to +20

Class 1 65 to 100 Detailed unit cost 

with detailed take-off

L: -3 to -10

H: +3 to +15

8.9.3.2 FY 2022 through FY 2046 Estimates

The budget request for capital acquisitions in FY 2022 reflects the latest estimates for existing

construction projects. DOE/NNSA continues to execute the schedules of multiple ongoing major capital 

acquisition projects, such as the Uranium Processing Facility and U1a Complex Enhancements projects. A

list of major capital acquisition project proposals has been developed through the efforts of a series of 

working groups and deep dives with representatives from DOE/NNSA sites and responsible Federal 

offices. The schedule for the highest-priority project proposals is depicted by major capital acquisition 

projects and project proposals listed in Chapter 6, “Infrastructure and Operations.” This planning 

schedule will be updated annually. Changes will be made based on available funding and programmatic 

priorities.

The current program of record and the vetted programmatic construction project proposals included in 

Figures 6–8 through 6–13 are the basis for the aggregated cost estimates shown in Table 8–15.

25

 

Table 8–15 lists low and high estimate projections in then-year dollars for planned and proposed 

programmatic capital acquisition projects from FY 2022 through FY 2046. 

Table 8–15. Weapons Activities programmatic construction estimated costs, FY 2022 – FY 2046

Then-Year Dollars, in Billions Low a High b

Weapons Activities capital acquisition estimated costs 63.7 73.7

a The “Low” estimate reflects the base capital acquisition estimate captured in Figure 8–22. The low value is 

programmatically informed and represents the 70th percentile for the planned and proposed major construction 

projects listed in Section 6.3.1. 

b The “High” estimate represents the 85th percentile for the planned and proposed major construction projects listed in 

Section 6.3.1.

25 At this time, only programmatic construction cost estimates are included in the values shown in Table 8-15. It does not include 

mission enabling or DNS construction projects.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 8-37

The difference in the estimates as compared to the FY 2021 SSMP are a result of using the 70th percentile 

as the low for the cost estimates26 and the refinement of included project proposals to create a more 

affordable and executable infrastructure modernization plan.

27

8.10 Affordability

DOE/NNSA’s method for evaluating potential affordability is part of the Weapons Activities portfolio 

management approach while considering the level of uncertainty affecting the out-years. The projected 

cost of continuing the program beyond FY 2022 incorporates some amount of uncertainty in the out-year 

projects based on the uncertainties in Stockpile Major Modernization and construction project costs. 

These later plans and estimates are compared to external straight-line budget projections that have not 

been adjusted to be more predictive. Variances are managed as the out-years estimates move into the 

FYNSP window, and greater scrutiny and prioritization are applied throughout the programming and 

budget processes.

As described throughout this document, DOE/NNSA is undertaking a risk-informed, complex, and timeconstrained modernization and recapitalization effort in coordination with DoD. DOE/NNSA must make 

concerted investments now to make available the necessary capabilities and infrastructure to execute 

modernization programs to meet DoD timelines. If adjustments need to be made in future years, 

DOE/NNSA will work with DoD to consider and adjust schedule and/or scope to major activities, including 

potential effects to warhead modernization programs and infrastructure projects. 

8.10.1 Estimate of Weapons Activities Program Costs

Since the FY 2022 budget request does not include program-based defense budget levels beyond the 

budget year, the Weapons Activities budget projections are not available. The policy judgments reflected 

in the Administration’s upcoming Nuclear Posture Review and National Defense Strategy will inform the 

out-year budget estimates. Once policy judgments are completed, the projected out-year budget 

estimates will be updated in the following SSMP. 

26 In the FY 2021 SSMP, the “low” estimate represented the 85th percentile and the “high” estimate included additional SRT&E 

facility proposals as well as additional recapitalization costs for production facilities.

27 See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page 9-1

Chapter 9

Conclusion

This Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2022

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), together with its classified annex, is a key planning 

document for the nuclear security enterprise. This SSMP is the culmination of planning efforts from across 

numerous DOE/NNSA programs and organizations and documents the 25-year plan for ensuring the 

safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The FY 2022 SSMP also details efforts to

maintain the scientific and engineering tools, capabilities, and infrastructure that underpin the current 

and future nuclear deterrent. The SSMP was prepared by the DOE/NNSA Federal workforce in 

collaboration with DOE/NNSA’s management and operating partners and coordinated with the 

Department of Defense (DoD) through the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

The global threat environment continues to rapidly evolve and grow increasingly dangerous, complex, and 

uncertain. In response to this changing environment, the United States must have a modern, resilient, 

and flexible nuclear security enterprise in order to respond to these challenges by providing DoD with 

appropriate capabilities so that it can continue to execute its nuclear deterrent mission. Together with 

support from Congress, DOE/NNSA will ensure that our workforce has the resources and the responsive, 

agile infrastructure needed to steward the systems that comprise our deterrent today while preparing for 

the cutting-edge research and development that will inform the future national security mission solutions 

of tomorrow. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page A-1

Appendix A

Requirements Mapping

A.1 National Nuclear Security Administration Response to 

Statutory Reporting Requirements and Related Requests

The Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2022 SSMP) consolidates a number 

of statutory reporting requirements and related congressional requests. This appendix maps the statutory 

and congressional requirements to the respective chapter and section in the FY 2022 SSMP. 

A.2 50 U.S. Code § 2523

50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

§ 2523. Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness

plan

(a) Plan requirement

The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other 

appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, 

shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile 

management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program direction, 

infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan 

shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most 

recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum.

Unclassified

All Chapters

Unclassified

All Chapters

Classified Annex

(b) Submissions to Congress

(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than March 15 of each evennumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a summary of the plan developed under subsection (a). 

Unclassified

All Chapters

N/A

Classified Annex

(2) In accordance with subsection (d), not later than March 15 of each oddnumbered year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 

committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a). 

N/A Unclassified

All Chapters

(3) The summaries and reports required by this subsection shall be submitted 

in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Elements of biennial plan summary

Each summary of the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a 

minimum, the following:

(1) A summary of the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the 

number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each 

warhead type.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.2

N/A

Classified Annex
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

(2) A summary of the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life 

extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace 

warhead types.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Sections 1.3, 1.4; 

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1–2.4;

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.1;

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.1–5.7

N/A

(3) A summary of the methods and information used to determine that the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable, as well as the relationship of 

science-based tools to the collection and interpretation of such information.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.1.2; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.5–3.8

N/A

(4) A summary of the status of the nuclear security enterprise, including 

programs and plans for infrastructure modernization and retention of human 

capital, as well as associated budgets and schedules.

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.4; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.1–4.2; 

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.1–5.7

N/A

(5) A summary of the status, plans, and budgets for carrying out the stockpile 

responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title.

Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.1.5, 

2.2.9.2; Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.6.1.2, 

3.6.2.1; Chapter 5, 

Section 5.4.2.2

N/A

(6) A summary of the plan regarding the research and development, 

deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of technologies described in subsection 

(d) (7).

(7) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) regarding the 

execution of programs with current and projected budgets and any associated 

risks.

(8) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1 text box; 

Chapter 5, 

Section 5.1.1

N/A

(9) Such other information as the Administrator considers appropriate. N/A N/A

(d) Elements of biennial detailed report

Each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2) shall include, 

at a minimum, the following:

(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and 

stockpile responsiveness—

(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and 

age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead 

type;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.4; 

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 2.2
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

(B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the 

date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of 

the report—

(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and 

inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and

(ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of 

nuclear weapon;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.4, 8.9

(C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension 

programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead 

types;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.2, 

2.4; Chapter 8, 

Section 8.4

(D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the 

lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the 

nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and 

inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1; 

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3

(E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and 

reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.2, 

4.3

(F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the 

Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in 

the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads);

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.3.2, 

3.4.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2, 4.3

(G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and 

modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as 

needed;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1, 

2.2, 2.4; 

Chapter 3, 

Sections 3.2–

3.5; Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3

(H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for 

carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 2524 

of this title, including information relating to the aging of materials and 

components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or 

substitution of materials;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Sections 2.1.1, 

2.4; Chapter 3, 

Section 3.5; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3

(I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions 

for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production 

facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to 

ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and 

mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 1, 

Section 1.3; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.2.2; 

Chapter 7; 

Appendix E
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

(J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full 

and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review 

process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile required under section 2525 of this title;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.2

(K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile 

management program required by section 2524 of this title, including 

allocations of funds by weapon type and facility; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.3–

8.6, 8.9

(L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the 

program required under section 2524 of this title;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.3

(M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the 

stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3; 

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.4–8.6;

Appendix D

(N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the 

report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the 

program required under section 2538b of this title; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.4–8.6; 

Appendix D

(O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear 

weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national 

security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and 

development that includes separate comments on the plan from the 

Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.

N/A N/A

(2) With respect to science-based tools—

(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear 

weapons stockpile is safe and reliable;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1; 

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.2, 

4.3

(B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in 

subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information 

and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on 

the criteria developed pursuant to section 2522(a) of this title; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3

(C) the criteria developed under section 2522(a) of this title (including any 

updates to such criteria).

N/A N/A

(3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 

(a) of this title by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the 

national security laboratories, which shall set forth—

(A) an identification and description of—

(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; 

and

(ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear 

testing;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2, 4.3

(B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory 

to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable 

without the use of nuclear testing;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.3; 

Appendix E
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

(C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced 

simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory 

that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based 

tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 2, 

Section 2.1.2; 

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.2; 

Appendix E

(D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies 

required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program 

and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the 

Administration, including—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Sections 7.1, 

7.3; Appendix E

(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, 

required to maintain such competencies; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Sections 7.2, 

7.3; Appendix E

(ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the 

time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist 

during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security 

program.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 7, 

Section 7.4;

Appendix E

(4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—

(A) a description of the modernization and refurbishment measures the 

Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed 

in—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.3, 6.4

(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the 

most recent national security strategy report of the President under 

section 3043 of this title if such strategy has been submitted as of the 

date of the plan; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.3, 6.4

(ii) the most recent quadrennial defense review if such strategy has 

not been submitted as of the date of the plan; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.3, 6.4

(iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan; N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.3, 6.4

(B) a schedule for implementing the measures described under 

subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 6, 

Sections 6.3.1, 

6.3.2

(C) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines 

necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), 

including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which 

such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.7.1, 

8.9.3

(D) a description of—

(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the 

Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance 

and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and 

(II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on 

maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and

(III) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs 

complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of 

the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that 

such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement 

plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan 

for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise are being properly sustained.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Section 8.7.4
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

(5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—

(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the 

Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once 

directed by the President to conduct such a test;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.4

(B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.4

(C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site;

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.4

(D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are 

essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada 

National Security Site; and

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.4

(E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities 

described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants 

described in subparagraph (D).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Section 4.4

(6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and 

stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:

(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand 

plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured 

and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.3.1, 

4.3.2

(B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium 

at elemental and bulk conditions.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.3.1, 

4.3.2

(C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for 

plutonium and plutonium components.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1; 

Appendix E, 

Sections E.2.2, 

E.3.3

(D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance 

under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and 

nonmanufactured conditions.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.2.2,

4.3.1–4.3.4

(E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments 

described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 4, 

Sections 4.3.1–

4.3.4

(F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, 

and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period 

covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 2453 

of this title.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Section 8.5.1, 

8.6.1

(G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified 

under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years 

nuclear security program.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8,

Section 8.5.1, 

8.6.1

(H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the 

integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile 

stewardship needs.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle 

sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security 

enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal 

years following the date of the report, together with—

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 5

(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the 

technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats 

posed to that site; 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 5

(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used 

by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical 

and cybersecurity technologies; and 

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 5, 

Sections 5.3, 5.4

(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program 

element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the 

Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will 

help carry out that plan.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.8.3, 

8.8.4

(8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be 

executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks.

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8, 

Sections 8.9, 

8.10

(9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the 

previous summary or detailed report was submitted under subsection (b).

N/A Unclassified

Chapter 8

(e) Nuclear Weapons Council assessment 

(1) For each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(2), the 

Nuclear Weapons Council shall conduct an assessment that includes the 

following:

(A) An analysis of the plan, including—

(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security 

strategy of the United States or the most recent quadrennial defense 

review, as applicable under subsection (d)(4)(A), and the Nuclear 

Posture Review;

(ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described 

under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) and the schedule 

described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection are adequate to 

support such requirements; and

(iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program 

under section 2538b of this title in a manner that meets the objectives 

of such program and an identification of any improvements that may 

be made to the plan to better carry out such program.

(B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements 

for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security 

enterprise.

(C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not 

adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under 

subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure 

recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment 

with respect to—

(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; 

and

(ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile.

(2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits 

the plan under subsection (b)(2), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to 

the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment 

required under paragraph (1).

N/A N/A
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50 U.S. Code § 2523 

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

(f) Definitions – In this section:

(1) The term “budget”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for 

that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 

1105(a) of title 31.

(2) The term “future-years nuclear security program” means the program 

required by section 2453 of this title.

(3) The term “nuclear security budget materials”, with respect to a fiscal year, 

means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support 

of the budget for that fiscal year.

(4) The term “quadrennial defense review” means the review of the defense

programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years 

under section 118 of title 10.

(5) The term “weapons activities” means each activity within the budget 

category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration.

(6) The term “weapons-related activities” means each activity under the 

Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons 

technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—

(A) nuclear nonproliferation;

(B) nuclear forensics;

(C) nuclear intelligence;

(D) nuclear safety; and

(E) nuclear incident response.

A.3 H.R. 116-449 

H.R. 116-449 – ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED

AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2021, July 15, 2020, pp 141-142

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022 

Response

Stockpile Responsiveness Program

The NNSA shall submit to the Committee an annual report with the budget request 

that includes a detailed accounting and status of each program, project, and activity 

within the program. The Committee expects to receive timely updates on the status of 

any new and existing taskings, studies, and assessments.

N/A Unclassified

Appendix D

A.4 H.R. 244

H.R.244 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 115-31

FY 2021

Response

FY 2022

Response

SEC. 4. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.

The explanatory statement regarding this Act, printed in the House section of the 

Congressional Record on or about May 2, 2017, and submitted by the Chairman of the 

Committee on Appropriations of the House, shall have the same effect with respect to 

the allocation of funds and implementation of divisions A through L of this Act as if it 

were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

Congressional Record – House, Vol 163, No 76—Book II, page H3753, May 3, 2017

(Explanatory Statement to Accompany the FY 17 Omnibus Appropriations

[P.L. 115-31]]

Life Extension Reporting. – The NNSA is directed to provide to the Committees on 

Appropriations of both Houses of Congress a classified summary of each ongoing life 

extension and major refurbishment program that includes explanatory information on 

the progress and planning for each program beginning with the award of the phase 6.3 

milestone and annually thereafter until completion of the program.

Classified Annex Classified Annex
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A.5 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2521

50 U.S. Code § 2521

§ 2521. Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall establish a stewardship program to 

ensure –

(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, 

including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and 

certification; and 

(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons 

testing.

(b) Program elements

The program shall include the following:

1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling 

capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.

(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, 

inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.

(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United 

States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for aboveground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.

(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities of the United States, 

including -

(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;

(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory;

(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and 

(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.

(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that 

are necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including -

(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and

(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.

(1) With respect to exascale computing—

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall develop and carry out a plan to develop exascale 

computing and incorporate such computing into the stockpile stewardship program under section 4201 of the Atomic 

Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 

26, 2013]

(b) MILESTONES.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include major programmatic milestones in—

(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile stewardship program; and

(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.

(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.—In developing the plan required by subsection (a), the Administrator shall 

coordinate, as appropriate, with the Under Secretary of Energy for Science, the Secretary of Defense, and elements of 

the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003[4]).

(d) INCLUSION OF COSTS IN FUTURE-YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM.—The Administrator shall—

(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations reflected in each future-years nuclear 

security program submitted under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453) 

during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the costs of—

(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into the stockpile stewardship program; 

and

(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing; and

(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of the costs of efforts to develop 

exascale computing borne by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department 

of Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.
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50 U.S. Code § 2521

(e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Administrator shall submit the plan required by subsection (a) to the congressional 

defense committees [Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of Senate and the House of Representative] 

with each summary of the plan required by subsection (a) of section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 

(50 U.S.C. 2523) submitted under subsection (b)(1) of that section during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the 

enactment of this Act.

(f) EXASCALE COMPUTING DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘exascale computing’’ means computing through the use 

of a computing machine that performs near or above 10 to the 18th power floating point operations per second.

A.6 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2522

50 U.S. Code § 2522

§ 2522. Stockpile stewardship criteria 

(a) Requirement for criteria

The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging whether the science-based tools being used 

by the Department of Energy for determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are performing 

in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that the stockpile is safe and reliable.

(b) Coordination with Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall coordinate with the Secretary of 

Defense. 

A.7 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2524

50 U.S. Code § 2524

§ 2524. Stockpile management program

(a) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security and in consultation with the Secretary of 

Defense, shall carry out a program, in support of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective 

management of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the extension of the effective life of such 

weapons. The program shall have the following objectives:

(1) To increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States.

(2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing.

(3) To achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

(4) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile.

(5) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its 

vital interests, or its allies.

(b) Program limitations

In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—

(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be made to achieve the objectives identified in subsection (a); and 

(2) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—

(A) remain consistent with basic design parameters by including, to the maximum extent feasible, components 

that are well understood or are certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing; 

and

(B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear security enterprise to fulfill 

current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.

(c) Program budget

In accordance with the requirements under section 2529 of this title, for each budget submitted by the President to 

Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the amounts requested for the program under this section shall be clearly 

identified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget.
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A.8 Related Legislation: 50 U.S. Code § 2538b

50 U.S. Code § 2538b

§ 2538b. Stockpile responsiveness program

(a) Statement of policy

It is the policy of the United States to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities 

required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the 

nuclear deterrent of the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and responsive.

(b) Program required

The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry 

out a stockpile responsiveness program, along with the stockpile stewardship program under section 2521 of this title and 

the stockpile management program under section 2524 of this title, to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and 

continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and 

deploy nuclear weapons.

(c) Objectives The program under subsection (b) shall have the following objectives:

(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and 

technologies across the science, engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out all 

phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both the nuclear security enterprise and 

relevant elements of the Department of Defense.

(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with respect to all phases of the joint

nuclear weapons life cycle process from one generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following 

generation.

(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of capabilities required, including 

prototypes, flight testing, and development of plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.

(4) Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines to minimize the amount of time and costs 

leading to an engineering prototype and production.

(5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all relevant elements and processes of the 

Administration and the Department of Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness.

(6) The retention of the ability, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to assess and develop 

prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.

(d) Joint nuclear weapons life cycle process defined

In this section, the term “joint nuclear weapons life cycle process” means the process developed and maintained by the 

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of 

nuclear weapons.
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Appendix B

Weapons Activities Capabilities

This appendix describes the breadth of capabilities maintained by Weapons Activities programs in the 

Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) nuclear security enterprise

to execute the stockpile mission. These capabilities should not be viewed in isolation or as mutually 

exclusive, as many overlap and are complementary. They represent the underlying disciplines, activities, 

and specialized skills required to meet DOE/NNSA missions. In this document, the capabilities are 

presented as facets of seven interdependent portfolios, each containing a suite of capabilities that 

together address a particular aspect of Weapons Activities. In part, this appendix supports the legislative 

requirements listed in Appendix A.

B.1 Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing

The Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing portfolio covers the packaging, processing, handling, 

and/or manufacture of plutonium, uranium, tritium, energetic and hazardous materials, lithium, and 

other metal and organic materials needed for nuclear weapons.

Capability Definition

Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)

1

Handling, Packaging, and Processing 

(Plutonium and Uranium) 

Components that contain SNM (e.g., plutonium, enriched uranium) require 

special conduct of operations, physical security protection, facilities, and 

equipment to handle, package, process, manufacture, and inspect these 

components.

Tritium Production, Handling, and 

Processing

Tritium has a 12-year half-life and must be periodically replenished in gas transfer 

systems. Tritium is produced by irradiating tritium-producing burnable absorber 

rods (TPBARs) in Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar nuclear reactors. 

Handling and processing of tritium includes transporting the TPBARs to Savannah 

River Site and extraction of tritium from the TPBARS, as well as purifying, storing 

and loading the tritium into gas transfer system reservoirs and inspection of the 

reservoirs. Tritium is also recovered from returned gas transfer systems.

Energetic and Hazardous Material 

Handling, Packaging, Processing, 

and Manufacturing (High Explosives 

and Lithium)

Energetic and hazardous materials have the potential to harm humans, animals, 

or the environment. As a result, they require safe and secure handling, 

packaging, processing, manufacturing, and inspection. These materials include 

lithium, beryllium, mercury, explosives, propellants, and detonators.

Metal and Organic Material 

Fabrication, Processing, and 

Manufacturing

Specialized components and materials that are not commercially available must 

be produced within the nuclear security enterprise. This production requires 

synthesis of organic materials and processing, manufacturing, and inspection of 

metallic and organic products, based on knowledge of material behavior, 

compatibility, and aging. This would include, but is not limited to, polymer 

material and part manufacturing. 

1 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 defines SNM as all isotopes of plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotopes of uranium-233 

or uranium-235. Tritium is considered a Security Category III nuclear material. 
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B.2 Weapon Component Production

The Weapon Component Production portfolio includes the core capabilities for producing all of the 

components and systems required to arm, fuze, fire, and deliver nuclear weapons to their target. The 

Weapon Component Production portfolio includes the capabilities for producing all of the non-nuclear 

components and systems for weaponization of the nuclear explosive package. These functions enable the 

weapons to arm, fuze, and fire for the designed function when needed. This capability includes both 

internal and external manufacturing and a broad supply base, as well as identification and verification of 

trusted suppliers to provide materials and parts within the weapon product realization process.

Capability Definition

Non-Nuclear Component 

Production

Non-nuclear weapon components and assembly processes require special 

manufacturing, assembly, and inspection protocols. The components include, but 

are not limited to, cable assemblies; electronic assemblies; microelectronics 

packaging; gas transfer systems; arming, fuzing, and firing assemblies; lightning 

arrestor connectors; environmental sensing devices; radars; neutron generators; 

and power sources.

Weapon Component and Material 

Process Development

Process development of weapon components involves small-lot production, 

precise controls, and a deep understanding of the hazards of working with SNM

and other exotic materials. Component process development is needed 

whenever process changes are made to reduce cost or production time.

Weapon Component and System 

Prototyping

Development, qualification, and manufacture of high-fidelity, full-scale prototype 

weapon components and systems reduce the cost and life cycle time to develop 

and qualify new designs and technologies. This capability includes the ability to 

design, manufacture, and employ mockups with sensors to support laboratory 

and flight tests that provide evidence that components can function with 

Department of Defense delivery systems in realistic environments. 

Advanced Manufacturing Advanced manufacturing uses innovative techniques from industry, academia, or 

internal research and development to reduce costs, reduce component 

development and production time, improve safety and performance, and control 

waste streams. Examples include additive manufacturing, use of microreactors, 

microwave casting, and electrorefining.

B.3 Weapon Simulation and Computing

The Weapon Simulation and Computing portfolio includes high-performance computers, weapons codes, 

models, and data analytics used to assess the behavior of nuclear weapons and components. It must 

support calculations of sufficient resolution and complexity to simulate and assess the behavior of weapon 

systems, components, and fundamental science processes that are critical to nuclear weapon 

performance.

Capability Definition

High Performance Computing High performance computing (HPC) encompasses software, hardware, and 

facilities of sufficient power to achieve the dimensionality, resolution, and 

complexity in simulation codes to accurately model the performance of weapon 

systems and components and the fundamental physical processes that are critical 

to nuclear operation. This capability includes research and development in 

computer, information, and mathematical sciences to support developing and 

operating HPC.
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Capability Definition

Simulation Codes and Models Advanced computer codes, models, and data analytics are used to simulate and 

assess the behavior of nuclear weapons and their components. Codes range in 

application from design of systems to fundamental science processes. DOE/NNSA 

codes operate on computers ranging from desktop machines to the world’s 

largest high-performance supercomputers.

B.4 Weapon Design and Integration

The Weapon Design and Integration portfolio encompasses the capabilities needed to design, test, 

analyze, qualify, and integrate components and subsystems into weapon systems that will meet all 

military requirements and endure all predicted environments to validate and verify that they will always 

work as expected and never work when not intended.

Capability Definition

Weapons Physics Design and 

Analysis

Design and analysis of the nuclear explosive package is required to maintain 

existing U.S. nuclear weapons; modernize the stockpile; evaluate possible 

proliferant nuclear weapons; and respond to emerging threats, unanticipated 

events, and technological innovation. Elements of design capability include 

concept exploration; conceptual design; requirements satisfaction; detailed 

design and development; production; process development; certification; and 

qualification. Weapons physics analysis includes evaluation of weapons effects.

Weapons Engineering Design, 

Analysis, and Integration

Elements of weapons engineering include the following life cycle phases: concept 

exploration; requirements satisfaction; conceptual design; detailed design and 

development; production; certification; and qualification. This capability also 

encompasses systems integration, which includes understanding and developing 

the interfaces among the non-nuclear subsystems, between the non-nuclear 

components and the nuclear explosives package and between DOE/NNSA and 

Department of Defense systems.

Environmental Effects Analysis, 

Testing, and Engineering Sciences

Environmental effects analysis, testing, and engineering sciences use an array of 

test equipment, tools, and techniques to create stockpile-to-target sequence 

conditions and measure the ensuing response of materials, components, and 

systems. Examples of environmental testing (normal, hostile, and abnormal) 

include shock, vibration, radiation, acceleration, temperature, electrostatics, and 

pressure conditions. The engineering sciences that support this analysis include 

thermal and fluid sciences, structural mechanics, dynamics, aerodynamics, and 

electromagnetics.

Weapons Surety Design, Testing, 

Analysis, and Manufacturing

Weapons surety design, analysis, integration, and manufacturing employ a variety 

of safety and use control systems to prevent accidental nuclear detonation and 

unauthorized use of nuclear weapons to ensure a safe and secure stockpile. This 

knowledge, infrastructure, and equipment requires strict classification control 

and secure facilities.

Radiation-Hardened 

Microelectronics Design and 

Manufacturing

Research, design, production, and testing of radiation-hardened microelectronics 

is required for nuclear weapons to function properly in hostile environments. 

This capability requires a secure, trusted supply chain, including quality control of 

the materials used in the process and products.

B.5 Weapon Science and Engineering

The Weapon Science and Engineering portfolio includes the suite of physical sciences and engineering 

disciplines that comprise the theoretical and experimental capabilities necessary to assess the current 

nuclear stockpile and certify future stockpile weapons.
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Capability Definition

Nuclear Physics and Engineering Nuclear physics is the study of atomic nuclei and their constituents, and nuclear 

engineering is the translation of nuclear physics principles to the practical 

application of nuclear interactions, especially fission and fusion. The need to 

understand the design and function of the nuclear explosive package drives the 

requirement to improve understanding of both fission and fusion.

Radiochemistry Radiochemistry is the study of radioactive materials and their interactions. It is 

critical to evaluating data from legacy underground testing as well as modeling 

problems in nuclear forensics and attribution. Thermonuclear fusion experiments 

at the National Ignition Facility, Omega Laser Facility, and the Z pulsed power 

facility can use radiochemical tracers in their diagnostic suites.

Atomic and Plasma Physics Atomic physics is the study of atomic systems, such as a collection of atoms and 

electrons, and their interaction with X-rays. Plasma physics is the study of 

systems containing separate ions and electrons that exhibit a collective behavior. 

The extremely high temperatures of functioning nuclear weapons generate 

plasma and X-rays.

High Energy Density Physics High energy density (HED) physics is the study of matter and radiation under 

extreme conditions such as those in a functioning nuclear weapon and 

reproduced in high-temperature experiments. Facilities such as the National 

Ignition Facility, Omega Laser Facility, and the Z pulsed power facility generate 

HED states producing data exploring the physical processes that occur in plasma 

states to validate computational models.

Laser and Optical Science, 

Technology, and Engineering

Lasers are coherent light sources delivering intense beams of energy to localized 

regions to generate and probe HED conditions similar to those produced during 

nuclear weapon operation. A laser’s rapid energy delivery enables studies of 

fundamental properties of matter, radiation transport, hydrodynamics and 

turbulence, and thermonuclear ignition and burn, as well as outputs and effects. 

Advancements in these areas is important to qualifying new components and 

systems and improving performance assessments.

Accelerator and Pulsed Power 

Science, Technology, and 

Engineering

Accelerators use electromagnetic fields to accelerate charged particles to the 

velocities needed to generate high-energy X-rays, protons, or neutrons. The 

resulting emissions are sources for advanced imaging, investigating nuclear 

physics phenomena, or simulating weapons outputs and hostile environments. 

Pulsed power devices accumulate energy over long periods of time and release it 

rapidly to generate pressures, temperatures, and radiation conditions similar to 

those produced in or by nuclear weapons. Experiments and testing with these 

devices produce data that are critical to understanding physical phenomena, 

qualifying nuclear weapon components, and improving performance 

assessments.

Advanced Experimental Diagnostics 

and Sensors

Advanced diagnostics and sensors provide detailed measurements of materials, 

objects, and dynamic processes that are critical to weapon operation and other 

national security operations. Standard diagnostics provide lower-resolution data 

suitable for basic inquiries, but not for detailed part, process, or physics 

qualification; continued diagnostic and sensor development is important to 

addressing these limitations. An example of an advanced diagnostic is static or 

multi-frame dynamic radiography at high resolution. Radiography is an imaging 

technique that uses X-rays or subatomic particles (e.g., protons, neutrons) to view 

the internal structure of an object that is opaque to visible light. Static 

radiography of a stationary object is used during the post-fabrication inspection 

process to ensure that components are defect-free and meet exacting quality 

requirements. Dynamic radiography takes multiple images of a dynamic process 

to examine physical behavior in progress.
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Capability Definition

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical 

Experiments

Hydrodynamic experiments explore implosion physics and provide data on the 

behavior of full-scale dynamic systems. Subcritical experiments are driven by 

high explosives (HE) and contain SNM that never achieves a critical configuration 

and does not create nuclear yield. Both types of experiments provide data that 

are essential to validating models within multi-physics design codes and 

predicting nuclear weapon performance.

Chemistry and Chemical Engineering Chemistry studies the elemental composition, structure, bonding, and properties 

of matter. Chemical engineering is essential for purifying, synthesizing, 

processing, and fabricating materials at large scale. The stability of material 

properties and the nature of reactions and interactions are critical components of 

system aging studies. How materials and properties change with time must be 

understood to ensure reliability and safety of the stockpile.

High Explosives and Energetics 

Science and Engineering

HE and energetics science and engineering is the study of detonation and 

deflagration physics, shock wave propagation, and reaction initiation. It includes 

the design, synthesis, manufacture, inspection, testing and evaluation of HE and 

other energetic materials and components for specific applications. 

Understanding these materials is necessary to understand nuclear weapon 

performance.

Materials Science and Engineering Materials science, in the context of stockpile stewardship, is the study of how 

materials in a nuclear weapon behave under moderate to extreme conditions of 

temperature and pressure. Materials engineering involves the evaluation and 

selection of materials for these environments. Strength, aging, compatibility, 

viability, and damage mechanics are among the materials characteristics to be 

evaluated. Materials science and engineering play a key role in resolving 

stockpile and production issues, validating computational models, and developing 

new materials (e.g., materials produced through additive manufacturing).

B.6 Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition

After weapon components are produced, each requires assembly into complete warheads and temporary 

storage before delivery to the Department of Defense. Some of these warheads are removed from the 

stockpile on an annual basis for surveillance to provide data to evaluate the health of the stockpile. These 

surveillance activities (such as inspections, laboratory and flight tests, nondestructive tests, and 

component and material evaluations) provide data over time to predict, detect, assess, and resolve aging 

trends and any observed anomalies. This process requires disassembly and sometimes reassembly. At 

their end of life or for other reasons, nuclear weapons undergo disposition. The Weapon Assembly, 

Storage, Testing, and Disposition portfolio covers all of these capabilities.

Capability Definition

Weapon Assembly, Storage, and 

Disposition

This capability includes assembly and disassembly of all warheads, including 

components and subsystems contained within a device. This encompasses the 

breadth of national security enterprise capabilities requiring special conduct of 

operations, equipment, facilities, and quality control. Disassembly, inspection, 

and disposition of the warhead, components, and subsystems requires similar 

special conduct of operations, equipment, and facilities. Storage of weapons and 

sub-systems requires special safety and security processes and protocols.

Testing Equipment Design and 

Fabrication

Design and fabrication of special test equipment to simulate environmental and 

functional conditions ensure that products meet specifications. Data from test 

equipment provide evidence for qualification, certification, reliability, surety, and 

surveillance. 
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Capability Definition

Weapon Component and System 

Surveillance and Assessment

Surveillance enhances integration across test regimes to demonstrate 

performance requirements for stockpile systems by inspections, laboratory and 

flight tests, nondestructive tests, and component and material evaluations. 

Comparing data over time provides the ability to predict, detect, assess, and 

resolve aging trends and anomalous changes in the stockpile and address or 

mitigate issues or concerns. Assessment is the analysis, largely through modeling 

and simulation, of data gathered during surveillance to evaluate the safety, 

performance, and reliability of weapon systems and the effect of aging on 

performance, uncertainties, and margins.

B.7 Transportation and Security

The Transportation and Security portfolio involves DOE/NNSA’s capabilities for protecting the people, 

places, information, and other aspects that are critical to the function of the nuclear security enterprise.

Capability Definition

Secure Transportation Protection and movement of nuclear weapons, weapon components, and SNM

between facilities includes design and fabrication or modification of vehicles, 

design and fabrication of special communication systems, and training of Federal 

agents. 

Physical Security Physical security protects the Nation’s nuclear materials, infrastructure assets, 

and the workforce at DOE/NNSA sites involved in Weapons Activities. It protects 

assets from theft, diversion, sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, 

compromise, and other hostile or noncompliant acts that may adversely affect 

national security, program continuity, and employee security.

Information Technology and 

Cybersecurity

Information technology and cybersecurity provides infrastructure and protection 

for both classified and unclassified computing networks, secure communications, 

applications, systems, and logical environments. It ensures electronic information 

and information assets are operating nominally and are protected from 

unauthorized access and malicious acts that would adversely affect national and 

economic security.
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Appendix C

Exascale Computing

To maintain competitive advantage and the necessary capabilities for the annual assessment, the 

United States must retain state-of-the-art capabilities in high performance computing (HPC). HPC will also 

help ensure national security, economic prosperity, technological strength, and scientific and energy 

research leadership. Failure to address national security, science, and growing big data needs will open 

the door to other nations with a demonstrated commitment to HPC investment to take the lead in a 

number of areas. Risk would increase not only in high-end computing fields, but could also eventually rise 

in science, national defense, energy innovation, and the commercial computing market.

Figure C–1. Overview of the DOE/NNSA Exascale Computing Project

The National Strategic Computing Initiative (NSCI) was established as a Federal interagency campaign

in 2015 to maximize the benefits of HPC for U.S. economic competitiveness, scientific discovery, and 

national security. Other agencies with major responsibilities for the NSCI include the National Science 

Foundation, the Intelligence Community, and the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Justice, and 

Homeland Security. Major focus areas of the NSCI are the exploration and development of quantum 

computing, bio computing, and exascale computing. Within that initiative, the U.S. Department of Energy 
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(DOE), represented by a partnership between the DOE Office of Science and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), has the lead responsibility for focusing and implementing the joint Exascale 

Computing Initiative (ECI). This initiative focuses on advanced simulation that continues exploiting 

MOSFET1technology to emphasize sustained HPC to advance DOE/Office of Science and NNSA missions. 

The objectives and the associated scientific challenges define a mission need for a computing capability 

of 2 to 10 exaFLOPS2in the early to mid-2020s.

C.1 Challenges

To deliver the exascale computing capability for the nuclear security mission within the next decade while 

maintaining and modifying the integrated design codes (IDCs), NNSA will need to focus on six challenges:

◼ Developing HPC technologies and systems, in close partnership with computer vendors, that will 

provide at least an eight-fold increase in sustained application code performance over the 

currently largest NNSA supercomputer (a 125-petaFLOPS system)

◼ Addressing code performance on the current advanced architecture and next-generation 

systems, which employ heterogeneous architectures that are very different from the 

homogeneous computing environment we have experienced in the past two decades

◼ Advancing the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)-funded laboratory and open-source 

software stack to run efficiently on the new advanced architectures and to support emerging 

workflows

◼ Developing prototype systems to assess the viability of alternate HPC architecture paths for 

the ASC

◼ Improving remote computing infrastructure to facilitate access across the DOE/NNSA complex to 

exascale and other leading-edge platforms wherever each may be sited

◼ Modernizing NNSA computing facilities to prepare them for siting future petascale and exascale 

platforms through increasing structural integrity, power, and cooling capabilities

C.2 Approaches and Strategies

To achieve DOE/NNSA’s exascale goals, the U.S. Government has been interacting with industry in HPC 

technology development. Past partnerships between the U.S. Government and industry have led to 

development of innovative technologies that met both Federal and private sector objectives. NNSA is 

continuing its partnership with the DOE Office of Science on ECI, including investments in research and 

development (R&D) of hardware and systems technologies, software tools, and applications with 

computer vendors, the national laboratories, and universities. In addition, the two organizations 

collaborated on the joint April 2018 CORAL-2 procurement, which will deliver one exascale-class system 

to DOE’s Office of Science in FY 2021 – 2022 and another to NNSA in FY 2023. This joint procurement 

greatly supports the two organizations as they leverage each other’s critical non-recurring engineering 

development costs and jointly manage the technical progress of the two exascale system projects. 

1 MOSFET stands for metal-oxide semiconductor, field-effect transistor. This technology, which has been the incumbent 

technology associated with Moore’s law in microelectronics since the 1960s, theoretically begins failing significantly at speeds 

faster than exascale speeds.

2 1 exaFLOPS = 1018 floating-point operations per second.
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The FY 2022 spend plan for Exascale Computing Initiative elements is delineated in Table C–1. In FY 2022, 

the NNSA portion of the Exascale Computing Initiative spans across all of six ASC program elements:

Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation (ATDM), Integrated Codes, Physics and Engineering 

Models, and Verification and Validation, which fund the next-generation simulation technologies for the 

weapons mission; Computational Systems and Software Environment (CSSE) subprogram that procures 

the El Capitan system; and Facility Operation and User Support that funds the site installation work for 

the power-up of El Capitan. Future exascale investments will include improvements to remote tri-lab

computing infrastructure.

Table C–1. NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative funding schedule for FY 2022

Exascale Computing Initiative Elements

FY 2022 Request

(dollars in millions)

Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation 40

Defense Applications and Modeling 18

Computational Systems and Software Environment 20

Facility Modifications 1

El Capitan Procurement 125

Total, NNSA Exascale Initiative 204

Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation

A major portion of the ASC ATDM subprogram is designated as part of the DOE Exascale Computing Project 

(ECP), a jointly managed collaboration between NNSA and DOE Office of Science via DOE Order 413.3B 

(tailored). This portion consists of the following two focus areas. 

◼ ATDM/ECP Application Development: NNSA is responsible for determining the scope and 

management of the stockpile simulation application development that is in this focus area. 

Confidence in the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile relies on high-fidelity 

simulations of all of the physical processes occurring within a nuclear weapon and the processes 

that support the design, production, maintenance, and evaluation of the nuclear stockpile, 

including life extension programs and weapons dismantlement. The ASC IDCs model various 

aspects of nuclear weapons, and each has on the order of several million lines of code to 

accurately reflect the multi-scale, multi-physics phenomena occurring in a nuclear weapon. The 

accuracy of these IDCs underpins confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent and must be improved 

to ensure continued future confidence in the Nation’s stockpile. Exploiting the multi-level 

parallelism demanded by emerging architectures leading to exascale requires significant 

investment in the stockpile simulation code development over the next few years.

◼ ATDM/ECP Software Technology: ASC will make strategic investments in ECP software technology

to directly support its IDC development requirements, where appropriate. Funding will support 

further development of compilers, math libraries, and programming models for the NNSA suite 

of weapons codes that are aligned with the algorithms and approaches used in those codes. This 

focused research is needed to optimize the performance of the algorithms within the overall 

simulations that are the most time-demanding or require the highest control of precision in 

numerical approximations. Investments also will be made in various performance analysis tools 

and visualization techniques to aid code developers and users to navigate the new advanced 

architecture systems. The remainder of the ATDM portfolio includes funding that supports two

projects at the national security laboratoriesto work on the DOE/Office of Science-NNSA-National 

Cancer Institute Collaboration.
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Defense Application and Modeling – Next-Generation Application Development

In FY 2021, NNSA began transitioning the viable and validated ATDM next-generation code and associated 

capabilities into its Integrated Codes, Physics and Engineering Modeling, and Verification and Validation 

subprograms to support the annual assessment activities. 

Computational Systems and Software Environment – Next-Generation Computing Technologies

In FY 2021, NNSA started the process of transitioning its previously ATDM-funded computing technology 

activities to CSSE. NNSA will continue evaluating its next-generation IDCs’ performance portability on 

advanced architecture prototype systems. Funding will be for development, maintenance, and user 

support for the NNSA tri-laboratory software stack that will be required for the next-generation codes to 

run efficiently on these advanced technology systems. In addition, NNSA will continue investing in the 

application of advanced machine learning techniques, which are well suited to the imminent advanced 

architectures, to address stockpile stewardship challenges. 

Facility Modifications

NNSA will continue its investment in upgrading the structural, mechanical, and electrical capacities at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to prepare for the powering up and operation of El Capitan.

Computational Systems and Software Environment – El Capitan Procurement

NNSA is embarking on a multi-year collaboration with the selected system vendor and its subcontractors 

to work on non-recurring engineering and system integration to deliver El Capitan. The collaboration

focuses on system engineering efforts and software technologies to assure the 2023 exascale system will 

be a capable and productive computing resource for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

C.3 Collaborative Management

As the ECP spans across DOE/NNSA, its management equally involves both organizations’ Federal and 

laboratory personnel. The ECP overall management structure includes the Integrated Project Team in 

Figure C–2. The Integrated Project Team provides planning, execution, coordination, and communication 

for the ECP to ensure that the project’s objectives are achieved on schedule and within budget and are 

consistent with quality, environment, safety, and health standards. 

C.4 Milestones

DOE/NNSA has five milestones for FY 2022:

◼ Continue engagement with the El Capitan system vendor on non-recurring engineering activities

◼ Begin transition of selected NNSA ATDM application codes to the ASC Defense Applications and 

Modeling portfolio to support annual certification and assessment mission

◼ Begin transition of selected NNSA ATDM computing technologies to its CSSE portfolio

◼ Deploy El Capitan early access system-3 (EAS-3) nodes at LLNL

◼ Port ATDM application codes to EAS-3 nodes to analyze potential performance issues
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Figure C–2. Exascale Computing Project integrated project team

C.5 Conclusion

DOE/NNSA, through the ASC exascale computing effort, is investing in products and approaches that will 

respond directly to anticipated disruptive changes in the HPC ecosystem. Activities include R&D

partnerships with multiple HPC vendors, development of next-generation weapons codes with new 

simulation capabilities, advancing the tri-laboratory software stack, procuring an exascale system, 

deploying prototype systems to assess the viability of new computing technologies, and upgrading 

facilities to house future exascale and petascale systems. Collaboration projects with computer vendors 

has also led to significant advances in HPC software and hardware technologies. These activities have 

provided valuable lessons learned and delivered numerous software development tools and libraries that

many ASC applications now rely on. To complete this effort, more intensive research, development, and 

engineering effort is needed for DOE/NNSA to achieve the goal of deploying and fully utilize an exascale 

capability in 2023.
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Appendix D

Stockpile Responsiveness Program

This appendix is provided pursuant to 50 U.S. Code § 2523, which requires inclusion of plans for the 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. This appendix 

also addresses the request in House Report 116-449 – Energy And Water Development And Related 

Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021: “The NNSA shall submit to the Committee an annual report with the 

budget request that includes a detailed accounting and status of each program, project, and activity within 

the [Stockpile Responsiveness] program.” 

D.1 Program Establishment, Purpose, and Early Execution

The Stockpile Responsiveness Program was created by Congress in Section 3112 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (NDAA), which states, “It is the policy of the United States to 

identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, 

study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the nuclear 

deterrent of the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and responsive.”

The Act directs that the program be carried out by the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense. The five objectives for the program are:

1. Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the capabilities, infrastructure, 

tools, and technologies ... required to carry out all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle 

process.

2. Transfer knowledge to the next generation of scientists and engineers.

3. Demonstrate responsiveness including prototypes, flight testing, and development of plans for 

certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing.

4. Shorten design, certification, and manufacturing cycles and timelines to minimize the amount of 

time and costs leading to an engineering prototype and production.

5. Exercise relevant elements and processes with the Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure 

stockpile responsiveness.

Accompanying report language emphasized that the program was intended to respond to future threats 

to our nuclear deterrent through science and technology. Report language reiterated a key constraint 

that the acquisition of new or modified systems for the U.S. stockpile requires explicit congressional line

item appropriations. 

In February 2018, NNSA provided a report on the Stockpile Responsiveness Program, as requested in 

Senate Report 114-255, which requested identification of gaps in the ability of NNSA programs to meet

these five objectives and plans for addressing those gaps. The principal identified gap was the lack of 

experience in exercising integrated design capabilities against new requirements, which would be filled 

by exercising integrated system design capabilities through “Challenge Problems” (CPs) directed at future 

threats or new technological opportunities.
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Section 3118 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY 2018 NDAA) provided 

additional guidance on design and prototyping activities and directed NNSA “to exercise the full set of 

design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent, [by] develop[ing] and conduct[ing] the first in 

what the committee envisions to be a series of design competitions that integrate the full end-to-end 

process from novel design conception through engineering, building, and non‐nuclear testing of a 

prototype.” NNSA informed Congress that it would meet the requirements of this section of legislation

through the Stockpile Responsiveness Program.

In FY 2017, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program received a limited appropriation of $2 million, which 

enabled the program to engage with the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Strike Division 

(J87) to address options for future needs for hard and deeply buried target defeat. In mid-FY 2018, the 

program received an appropriation of $30 million, which constituted the true execution start of the 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program. In FY 2019, the appropriation was increased to $34 million. At this 

funding level, NNSA initially focused on filling the highest-priority gap through activities implemented with

the three nuclear weapons laboratories. 

In early FY 2020, Congress increased the funding to $70 million and NNSA immediately broadened its 

scope to the establishment of national security laboratory/production plant collaborations focused on 

accelerating the production process. 

D.2 Planned Budget

To accomplish the goal of improving enterprise responsiveness, DOE/NNSA programs the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program budget by site. This allows substantial participation of each of the relevant sites 

and encourages development of national security laboratory/production plant partnerships to accelerate 

design, production, and qualification of future nuclear weapons systems. To this end, substantial 

participation of each of the relevant sites is important. 

Site FY 2021 Enacted FY 2022 Request

Pantex Plant 3,975,000 3,975,000

Y-12 National Security Complex 3,625,000 3,625,000

Kansas City National Security Campus 5,397,600 5,498,000

Los Alamos National Laboratory* 19,500,000 19,233,000

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 18,000,000 17,733,000

Sandia National Laboratories 18,000,000 17,733,000

Headquarters 1,502,400 2,203,000

Total 70,000,000 70,000,000

* LANL's budget includes $1.5 million for the separate production agency Technical Area 55 to examine ways 

to enhance the responsiveness of pit production, especially through examining issues involving the rapid 

execution of a subcritical experiment based on the Stockpile Responsiveness Program's created design chosen 

to accelerate pit production issues.

D.3 Governance and Priorities

From the outset, NNSA has collaborated closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters on Stockpile Responsiveness Program execution. 

NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council agreed that the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety 

Committee would receive annual briefings on program accomplishments, and the Nuclear Weapons 

Council would approve plans for the upcoming year, including authorization of joint NNSA/DoD activities
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to execute the program. Additionally, the Nuclear Weapons Council would annually review and update 

the “Stockpile Responsiveness Capabilities Development Guidance,” which establishes priorities for the 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program. A joint Stockpile Responsiveness Program conference is held annually

to communicate accomplishments, issues, and opportunities among NNSA participants and relevant DoD 

elements.

The Nuclear Weapons Council’s FY 2020 guidance, which remains effective for FY 2021, established that 

the overarching priority for DoD was to demonstrate methods to reduce the time and cost of producing 

and qualifying nuclear weapons components and systems. This is consistent with the views expressed on 

page 309 of the House Armed Services Committee Report 116–442, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, which “encourages the Secretary of Defense and the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to focus some resources and effort toward 

reducing cost, risk, and difficulty of manufacturing and producing nuclear weapons.”

The Nuclear Weapons Council guidance directed the Stockpile Responsiveness Program to pursue this 

overarching priority in the context of two key issues: hard and deeply buried target defeat and Defended 

Target defeat. Section 3118 of the 2018 NDAA also directed the NNSA to execute a design competition 

to look at the challenge of holding defended targets at risk.

D.4 Approach to Responsiveness, Risk Management, Safety, and 

Security

Modernization is a radical departure from stewardship activities focused on maintaining the aging 

stockpile systems that are currently deployed. The past priority and focus has been to maintain 

confidence in the safety and reliability of the current deterrent. Modernization brings a new dimension 

to the task of stewardship. It requires new technologies in new systems to meet new military 

requirements to address emerging threats. The ability to maintain old technologies and materials is no 

longer practical or feasible. Surmounting the risk inherent in modernization requires accepting the 

existence of technical risk and the inevitability of failed experiments and demonstrations. In addition, 

successful new system development requires radically shortening the design-build-test cycle from years 

to a month or less to validate new technologies and materials for nuclear applications. 

Figure D–1. The traditional design-build-test cycle for weapon system development
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Historically, the ability to progress expeditiously through the design-build-test cycle has been key to the 

successful development of complex technological systems, such as the development of the SR-71 at 

Lockheed Martin’s Skunkworks; new launch technologies of SpaceX; or original development of the 

strategic systems in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. DOE/NNSA’s life extension programs (LEPs) and 

modernization programs today do not embody the rapid development principles in any of these examples. 

The system concepts that are being explored under the Stockpile Responsiveness Program CPs are vital

to setting the context for exercising and accelerating the design-build-test cycle in NNSA. They provide 

the opportunity to take a fresh approach, using modern technological capabilities, that is independent of 

the constraints of present or proposed LEPs. LEP execution prioritizes conformance to rigorous 

requirements with a high premium on cost and schedule certainty, with little tolerance for technical risk. 

For example, if a Stockpile Responsiveness Program activity were to interfere or conflict with an LEP 

activity, or if it produced an anomalous result that impacted confidence in a presently deployed system, 

it would attract increased scrutiny and oversight. Such reactions are in direct conflict with the rapid 

execution principles of the design-build-test cycle and the goal of accepting technical risk to provide 

learning opportunities.

Per the legislation establishing the Stockpile Responsiveness Program, the intended product is 

responsiveness: not to produce a new system, but to accelerate the process by which new systems, when 

authorized, will be designed and built. In demonstrating opportunities to sharply reduce timelines and

costs associated with producing nuclear weapons, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program is focusing on 

what can be done through accelerated technical activities while identifying administrative and process 

control burdens as technical programs are pursued. 

The Stockpile Responsiveness Program will not compromise personnel, facility, or nuclear safety or 

security requirements. But the Stockpile Responsiveness Program will in many cases seek to make these 

issues irrelevant by developing unclassified surrogates or using material surrogates that eliminate safety 

issues. This will maximize the rate at which information can be gained from testing, as well as maximize 

the extent to which the next generation of scientists and engineers can gain experience.

D.5 Execution of the Technical Program

NNSA has organized the program according to four major technical efforts (MTEs) aligned with the stated 

objectives of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program. All technical efforts rely upon seasoned mentors to 

transfer knowledge to less experienced technical staff, from threat assessments to system design to 

testing activities to development of individual technologies. Technology development teams provide 

leadership opportunities for early-career staff members. DoD connections are exercised throughout the 

Stockpile Responsiveness Program, from coordination with the Nuclear Weapons Council to technical 

exchanges with relevant Air Force and Navy material elements.

Table D–1 describes the approximate distribution of effort across the MTEs.

Table D–1. Distribution of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program budget across major 

technical efforts

MTE Subject Budget Fraction

1 Future threats, technology trends and opportunities 10%

2 Challenge Problems – Integrated system designs to address future threats 20%

3 Prototyping, testing and flight testing 30%

4 Technologies for production responsiveness 40%

MTE = major technical efforts.
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Exercising nuclear design capabilities, which is critical to developing stockpile responsiveness, is one part 

of the overall technical program to develop a responsive posture. The bulk of the technical effort is on 

other aspects of testing and production.

D.5.1 Major Technical Effort 1: Future Threats, Technology Trends, and 

Opportunities

Because the focus of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program is on improving the capability of the nuclear 

enterprise to respond to future threats, it is essential that the program participate in identification of 

those threats. Under this MTE, national security laboratory technical capabilities are applied to 

understanding and anticipating future challenges to the nuclear deterrent arising from foreign trends, 

evolving U.S. operational needs and employment doctrine, and emerging technology trends. The national 

security laboratories provide analytic capability in collaboration with field intelligence elements, the 

Intelligence Community more generally, and the military combatant commands, in particular U.S.

Strategic Command. 

One component of this is the Design for Effects” effort at The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (tri-laboratory). This 

effort uses the advanced analysis tools, especially computational tools and resources developed for 

stockpile stewardship to support the planning needs of the combatant commanders. For instance, highfidelity three-dimensional geophysics models are providing improved understanding of the offensive and 

defensive aspects of weapons effects. Specific analyses have included:

◼ Analysis of identified targets supporting NNSA and Defense Intelligence Agency/DRI-5 (Physical 

Vulnerability division) 

◼ Specific Analyses of Pill Sources versus High-Fidelity Sources Survey (LLNL, LANL, SNL)

◼ Cratering/Ground Shock Fluid/Structure coupling to finite element method/discrete element 

method code (LANL)

◼ Machine Learning approach for translating computer-aided design files to usable numerical model 

(LLNL)

◼ Development of higher resolution grids in TOPANGA E3 code for ionospheric-communication 

modeling (LLNL)

◼ Shock Fluid/Structure interaction for tree models – Non-Ideal Air Blast (SNL)

◼ Non-Ideal Air Blast analyses of four test problems (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

◼ Weaponeering Options for Contingencies (LANL)

D.5.2 Major Technical Effort 2: Challenge Problems

CPs are established by a joint agreement between DoD and NNSA and are posed as a method to exercise 

integrated system design capability against possible future threats. CPs enable the national security 

laboratories to rebuild/rediscover the skills needed to design integrated systems with new delivery 

vehicles, environments, and performance requirements. The CPs do not just exercise nuclear design 

capabilities, they also exercise the range of engineering and systems design capabilities required to 

integrate new technologies on new delivery platforms, while accelerating the weapons life cycle from 

manufacturing to certification and qualification. 
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CP teams include staff members of various skill and experience levels across multiple disciplines and 

professions, including design physicists, engineers, weapon effects scientists, diagnostic and testing 

specialists, and those who will have to prototype or produce the system. The major focus areas are 

training the next generation of technical staff, building multidisciplinary teams, and developing a 

responsive culture. Close collaborations with the production plants have been established so that the 

manufacturing and qualification impacts of design choices are understood by designers and become a 

factor in system optimization. 

Challenge Problem 1

CP1 is focused on hard target defeat, an objective identified in Nuclear Weapons Council taskings. 

Discussions among the tri-laboratory physics and engineering staff and DoD partners, especially 

USSTRATCOM and Navy Strategic Systems Programs, were held to understand needs. Concepts were 

developed with a range of performance, development, and manufacturing complexity. Some concepts 

were based on traditional approaches to the problem, while others proposed more innovative and 

technically challenging solutions. One specific concept, which revolved around a high level of responsive 

manufacturability, was down-selected based on strong interest from the military services and production 

plants. This down-selected hard target defeat concept has led to prototyping and testing activities 

reported in MTE 3. 

The work performed for the CP1 Design Exercise during the past year includes:

◼ Low-fidelity system concepts expected to be effective (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

◼ Evaluation of the set of concepts for technical feasibility, production feasibility, delivery platform 

compatibility, and relative time to deployment (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

◼ Preliminary weapons effectiveness assessment (Task 2 under Threats) (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

◼ A summary of concept assessments delivered to the Nuclear Weapons Council (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

◼ Technical gap analysis to identify the leading concept-spanning technical challenges (LANL, LLNL, 

SNL)

◼ Plans for hardware prototype development and testing activities for the leading technical 

challenges (LANL, LLNL, SNL)

Challenge Problem 2

CP2 was developed pursuant to the 2018 NDAA language to execute a design competition to address 

target defenses that could arise in the 2030s. The national security laboratories have executed this 

challenge by creating clean-sheet designs, unconstrained by existing LEPs, to deliver new capabilities if 

required by the Nuclear Weapons Council and authorized by Congress. CP2 emphasizes analysis of 

existing and emerging threats and development of designs that mitigate those threats in system-level 

models. 

The LANL approach to CP2 was to down-select quickly to a specific option and then concentrate on refining 

the design and taking it to prototyping, ground testing, and flight testing to gain early experience 

exercising the entire design-build test cycle. This design was used to demonstrate acceleration of 

hydrotesting, and LANL is pursuing options for rapid flight testing of engineering prototypes.

LLNL has focused on developing a process to design and assess design packages by developing a diverse 

portfolio of multi-purpose, modular, and flexible options. The designs in this portfolio can fly in multiple 

carriers, and LLNL is concentrating on those that can defeat prospective targets with a range of weights, 

yields, and other traits and are all designed with ease of manufacturing in mind. Each option can field 
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interchangeable parts or materials, including component reuse to simplify mitigation options. “Proof-ofprinciple” work has been completed on this portfolio, and designs can be fine-tuned against a range of 

emerging contingencies. In collaboration with other NNSA agencies, LLNL will prototype a down-selected 

option. 

D.5.3 Major Technical Effort 3: Prototyping, Testing, and Flight Testing

The ability to rapidly produce and test prototypes is integral to accelerating the nuclear weapons life cycle 

for new capabilities. In executing this statutory objective of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program, NNSA 

relies on the prototyping definition provided under the now eliminated 50 U.S. Code § 2660, Design and 

use of prototypes of nuclear weapons for intelligence purposes, which authorized within section (b)(2):

(A) Design and system engineering activities of full-scale engineering prototypes (using surrogate 

special nuclear materials), including weaponization features as required

(B) Design, system engineering, and experimental testing (using surrogate special nuclear materials) 

of above-ground experiment test hardware

(C) Design and system engineering of scaled or subcomponent experimental test articles (using 

special nuclear materials) for conducting experiments at the Nevada National Security Site

This prototyping authority is consistent with the prototyping direction of Section 3118 of the 2018 NDAA, 

which prohibits experiments that could produce a nuclear yield. 

The context established by CP1 inspired an ambitious prototyping and testing program executed through 

collaborations between LANL, LLNL, SNL, and the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC). SNL has 

fielded several experiments on the Davis Gun at White Sands Missile Range to examine ground 

penetration issues and shock mitigation techniques to validate codes in this harsh environment. 

Small, focused tests have been performed at LLNL and other external facilities. These will culminate in a 

hyper-velocity sled-track test at Holloman High Speed Test Track at Holloman Air Force Base. During 

FY 2020, LLNL added a target development test to an already established experiment for the Weapon 

Survivability subprogram. The data from this test led to a redesign of embedded wire diagnostics in a high 

explosives (HE) test. Equation-of-state data obtained from rapidly prototyped samples then led to a 

redesign of targets to be fielded in FY 2021. Lessons learned in each phase directly contributed to the 

successes of the following phase at a pace that would not have been possible if each test were designed 

to be “perfect.” Technical staff have gained experience in the realities of field testing where lack of 

immediate resources forces compromises to complete experiments satisfactorily in a constrained 

availability window. 

CP2 is driving rapid prototyping capabilities to demonstrate innovative technologies and processes. LANL 

is pursuing an effort to greatly decrease the time required to execute hydrotests. An initial demonstration 

was completed in 10 months, less than half the normal time. Ultimately, both LANL and LLNL are pursuing 

efforts to drive hydrotesting times down to a few months. It is also driving the development of new 

capabilities such as flash X-ray radiography on a centrifuge to measure displacements and deformations 

of an accelerated object in situ. In these demonstration activities, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program 

is accepting risk by fielding previously unproven diagnostics, technologies, fabrication methods, and 

assembly techniques in its hydrotesting program. LANL is pursuing commercially-provided flight services 

as platforms to enable rapid prototyping and testing of near full-scale engineering prototypes. This will

bring systems and technologies to maturity for future consideration in acquisition programs.
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The KCNSC Technology Integration Demonstrator uses digital engineering to design, simulate, fabricate, 

and test new components on a time frame of months rather than years. KCNSC then subjects payloads

containing these new componentsto real-world testing environments on sounding rockets. This fast cycle 

allows new materials to be developed and tested in real-world conditions and is generating data to 

improve simulation models. 

SNL prototyping and testing efforts include: 

◼ Re-establishing an aeroshell prototyping capability

◼ Advanced radar antenna prototyping and testing

◼ Prototyping and testing a next-generation fuze design

◼ Establish new ground test capability at the SNL Superfuge centrifuge facility to better encompass 

future mixed environments through the full stockpile-to-target sequence

D.5.4 Major Technical Effort 4: Technologies for Production 

Responsiveness

MTE 4 encompasses efforts specifically important to furthering production. This includes design for 

manufacturability, digital engineering techniques, novel approaches to materials production, advanced 

manufacturing processes, development of architectures that accelerate production and enhance 

maintainability, and efforts to accelerate qualification and acceptance of components and systems.

Digital Engineering. Stockpile Responsiveness Program prototyping activities use digital engineering 

capabilities to transfer data and design information across the nuclear security enterprise to the maximum 

extent possible. Model-based systems engineering and machine learning are also being adopted to 

accelerate design for manufacturability. 

Materials production technologies are pursued to provide new materials or materials production 

processes for critical and hard-to-produce products:

◼ HE production. LLNL and LANL have developed HE formulations with improved energy delivery

that could replace conventional HE (CHE) in future systems. The national security laboratories are 

working to accelerate scale-up of synthesis, formulation, and qualification of candidate insensitive 

HE (IHEs) to reduce the reliance on CHEs in future system designs. LLNL is accelerating the 

development of LX-22 as a new main charge formulation and LANL is working to scale up synthesis 

of the IHE DAAF [Diaminoazoxyfurazan] and formulate it into a new IHE, PBX 9701.

◼ Continuous flow process to support HE synthesis and production. In addition to working on 

component-level HE manufacturing technologies, LLNL is working on advanced synthesis and 

formulation methodologies to optimize control over the feedstock material, which also increases 

quality control and production yields and reduces costs and schedule risks. 

◼ Additive manufacturing of polymers. Additive manufacturing of polymers and polymer-based 

composite materials has been maturing quickly in the past few years. Under the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program, LLNL is leveraging these advances and using these technologies to 

rapidly produce bespoke components on a regular basis to accelerate testing. 

◼ Uranium alloys production. Electron Beam Cold Hearth Melting is a technology that significantly 

reduces waste and accelerates timelines in the alloying and recycling of uranium alloys, and LLNL 

is working to design and commission a system. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page D-9

Advanced manufacturing technologies

◼ Uranium component manufacture. Additive manufacturing of uranium components is being 

developed to enable rapid prototyping and production of parts for hydrotesting at the national 

security laboratory level, as well as production of some components at the production plants.

This effort is a collaboration between LLNL and Y-12 National Security Complex. 

◼ Additive manufacture of HE main charge. The manufacture and qualification of HE represents a 

significant fraction of the development and production effort. DOE/NNSA is developing and 

demonstrating new additive manufacturing technologies that will enable control of the properties 

of energetic material components. This will increase product quality control, increasing yield and 

reducing production schedules. This effort is a collaboration between LLNL and Pantex Plant.

◼ Digital Twins to accelerate production. Digital Twins are virtual representations of production 

machines that mimic the specific behavior of a piece of equipment. They can simulate new 

toolpath programming without risking equipment damage, explore tool capabilities, train new 

personnel, and explore the impact of programming on the product quality. The Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program is developing Digital Twin technology for additively manufactured 

polymers and HE. 

Ameliorating the qualification burden. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program joined with the Advanced 

Certification and Qualification program on an initiative to reduce the burden of qualification while 

maintaining confidence in the deterrent. An NNSA/national security laboratory/production plant 

workshop held in April 2020 explored issues and opportunities, and the Stockpile Responsiveness Program

has started several technical initiatives within this MTE. 

Rapid qualification with in-situ inspections. Qualification of materials and components is time-intensive 

at the production plants and can actually consume more resources than component manufacturing itself. 

On-machine inspections allow characterization of the material, parts, and components during 

manufacture. DOE/NNSA is developing and deploying optical- and spectroscopy-based on-machine 

inspection techniques for parts manufacturing. If all properties can be tested during manufacturing, a 

part or component would be “born qualified” and allow characterization of components that are too 

complex to be inspected in their completed configuration. These efforts are collaborations between LLNL, 

Pantex Plant (for additively manufactured HE), and KCNSC (for additively manufactured metals).
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-1

Appendix E

Workforce and Site-Specific Information

As detailed in Chapter 1, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA) has eight nuclear security enterprise sites, spread across the Nation, that possess the expert 

workforce and advanced capabilities to maintain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. These eight sites include 

three national security laboratories (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL], Los Alamos National 

Laboratory [LANL], and Sandia National Laboratories [SNL]), four nuclear weapons production facilities 

(Kansas City National Security Complex [KCNSC], Pantex Plant [Pantex], Savannah River Site [SRS], and 

Y-12 National Security Complex [Y-12]), and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Specific 

information is included in this appendix to elaborate on each site’s mission, weapon activities capabilities, 

the fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget request, recent accomplishments, and workforce data. 

Figure E–1. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-2

Critical Importance of Investing in Advanced Capabilities, Infrastructure, and the Workforce

Planning and investing in advanced capabilities, infrastructure, and, most importantly, the workforce are 

at the heart of achieving U.S. nuclear security objectives. These aspects are also interrelated.

◼ The nuclear deterrent must provide decision-makers with capabilities that are modern, robust, 

flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats. DOE/NNSA’s 

capabilities for weapons activities enable these characteristics. Advanced capabilities help meet 

evolving deterrence needs.

◼ Modern stockpile stewardship, including major modernization programs, requires specialized 

technologies and processes, as demonstrated by the capabilities that DOE/NNSA requires for 

mission success (see Appendix B, “Weapons Activities Capabilities”). These technologies and 

processes include but are not limited to, areas such as advanced manufacturing, processes that 

can produce and handle hazardous materials, materials science, and computer science.

◼ These special capabilities, technologies, and processes require specialized facilities that can 

successfully contain the necessary work, such as processing lithium or conducting experiments on 

plutonium. These facilities must ensure that the work can be done safely and on schedule.

◼ To successfully accomplish the mission, DOE/NNSA must attract, train, and retain a skilled and 

experienced workforce. The workforce provides the specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

operate specialized equipment, design and manufacture components, and understand how 

specialized materials interact, among other areas of knowledge. Without a safe and appropriate 

infrastructure, the ability to attract and grow the workforce would be limited. 

E.1 National Nuclear Security Administration

E.1.1 Federal Workforce

The Federal workforce plans, manages, and 

oversees the nuclear security enterprise and is 

accountable to the President, Congress, and the 

public. NNSA’s Federal workforce handles 

program and project management for 

DOE/NNSA’s major missions of maintaining the 

nuclear weapons stockpile, naval nuclear 

propulsion, and nuclear threat reduction through 

counterterrorism and nonproliferation. In 

addition to these functions, Federal employees 

also perform important missions in areas such as 

physical security, cyber security, management and human resources, logistics, infrastructure planning and 

budgeting, and strategic communications and public affairs. The Federal workforce operates out of 

Headquarters facilities in Washington, DC; Germantown, Maryland; and Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

Federal staff are dispersed throughout field offices located at each of the sites. These field offices employ 

subject matter experts in a wide variety of disciplines to provide oversight for each site’s diverse national 

security missions. NNSA’s Federal workforce, like its contracted management and operating (M&O)

partners and other non-M&O contractors, is composed of dedicated professionals working to promote 

the nuclear security mission. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-3

DOE/NNSA haslaunched a workforce strategy group to attract and retain the best talent to sustain current 

and future nuclear security missions. DOE/NNSA recognizes the need for effective leadership; 

performance measures; management consistency; an increased focus on training at the entry, middle, 

and executive levels; and increased flexibility and adaptability in the current staff; as well as the need for 

aggressive knowledge transfer programs. NNSA has implemented foundational competencies and began 

developing occupational competencies and career paths. These talent management initiatives will 

promote DOE/NNSA as an employer of choice, build the bench of talent needed at all levels, and foster 

sustained mission excellence. During FY 2020, DOE/NNSA enhanced current programs, products, and 

services, and developed additional new programs. Notably, DOE/NNSA focused on developing career 

paths for mission critical occupations. The career paths and competency models will strengthen 

employees’ levels of knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviors. 

At the end of FY 2020, NNSA had a Federal headcount of 2,297, which includes the Office of Secure 

Transportation and omits support service contractors and Office of Naval Reactors personnel. The 

average age of Federal employees is about 48 years; about 16 percent are retirement-eligible. The 

average years of service for Federal employees is about 15, and most Federal employees have between 

0 and 15 years of service. This is a reflection of aggressive hiring efforts now and in the past few years.

Most separations from the Federal workforce were retirements or voluntary separations, with 

retirements higher among experienced workers and voluntary separations higher among those with fewer 

years of service. The number of voluntary separations among those with 0-5 years of service is particularly 

noticeable and an enterprise-wide trend. For more detailed information on NNSA’s Federal workforce, 

refer to Chapter 7, Figures E–2 through E–5, and the accompanying notes.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-4

Notes:

The data set includes approximately 319 nuclear materials couriers who are, on average, younger than the rest of the 

workforce. 76 percent of the courier workforce is 20 to 45 years of age so those age categories are skewed slightly 

by that workforce. Many of the challenges associated with an aging workforce have been identified and are 

addressed in the same manner as with years of service challenges. 

In partnership with the sites, DOE/NNSA has also conducted focused recruiting events at Georgia Tech, Texas A&M 

University, Purdue University, the University of California Merced, University of Toledo, Case Western University, and 

University of Michigan.

Equally important to the DOE/NNSA staffing plan is succession planning. A projected 41 percent of the current 

DOE/NNSA Federal Salaries and Expense account (non- Office of Secure Transportation) workforce will be eligible to 

retire by FY 2025. Due to the unique nature of the nuclear security mission, NNSA has undertaken an aggressive 

talent management approach that includes employee development and knowledge transfer. 

Working with Office of Personnel Management experts, DOE/NNSA conducted a succession planning training session 

for all Senior Executive Service members in key roles to outline an approach to identify a leadership talent pool and 

develop a pipeline of successors whose strengths fit agency needs. A second, more extensive, 2-day training was 

held with Learning and Career Management and Human Resources personnel to concentrate resources on addressing 

talent management gaps to yield a greater return on the DOE/NNSA employee developmental investment. 

Figure E–2. Federal workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-5

Notes:

DOE/NNSA hiring efforts over the last 2 fiscal years are evident in the higher numbers of full-time equivalents (FTEs)

on the left side of the years of service graph. DOE/NNSA continues to have a somewhat bi-modal distribution, which 

can indicate some risk due to an “experience gap” in the valley between the two peaks. However, there are a 

significant number of experienced employees on the left side of the bi-modal distribution (809 employees with 6-15 

years of service), which represents an opportunity to manage the risk. To address these demographic challenges, 

during FY 2020, senior leadership funded $3.4 million of organizational training and travel costs/needs identified via 

the Annual Training Assessment to empower employees to refine skills and prepare for new DOE/NNSA mission 

growth in anticipation of the expanded DOE/NNSA mission. DOE/NNSA has also focused on shifting age, years of 

service and retirement demographics by hiring more entry-level employees. Avenues used in this regard include 

increased use of the NNSA Graduate Fellowship Program, the Pathways Program, and the Minority Serving Institute 

Partnership Program. 

DOE/NNSA recognizes the need for effective leadership; performance measures; management consistency; increased 

focus on training at the entry, middle, and executive levels; and increased flexibility and adaptability in the current 

staff; as well as the need for aggressive knowledge transfer programs. DOE/NNSA has implemented foundational 

competencies and began developing occupational competencies and career paths. These talent management 

initiatives will promote DOE/NNSA as an employer of choice, build the bench of talent needed at all levels, and foster 

sustained mission excellence. During FY 2020, DOE/NNSA’s Office of Learning and Career Management (LCM)

enhanced current programs, products, and services, and developed additional new programs. Notably, LCM focused 

on developing career paths for mission critical occupations. The career paths and competency models will strengthen 

employees’ levels of knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviors.

Figure E–3. Federal workforce distributed by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-6

Notes:

Retirements have represented a little over 60 percent of separations in the non-Office of Secure Transportation

workforce in the last few years. This presents a unique opportunity to reshape the workforce with more diverse 

people who are trained and positioned to address nuclear security challenges with new talent and new technologies. 

Figure E–4. Federal employee separation by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

In FY 2015-FY 2018, NNSA focused on shifting retirement eligibility demographics by using the excepted service 

authority to hire over 20 entry-level employees each year. 

Figure E–5. Federal workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced 

career (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-7

E.2 National Security Laboratories

E.2.1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

E.2.1.1 Mission Overview

DOE/NNSA sponsors the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California. 

As a Federally Funded Research and Development 

Center (FFRDC), LLNL is uniquely positioned to 

guide challenging research and development (R&D)

and deliver results on behalf of DOE/NNSA mission 

needs. This is accomplished by providing research, 

development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 

capabilities for the stockpile, as well as a broad 

range of national security needs integral to the 

mission and operation of DOE and other Federal 

agencies. LLNL is managed by Lawrence Livermore 

National Security, LLC.

◼ Locations: Main site, Livermore, California (Site 200); Experimental Test Site, Tracy, California

(Site 300)

◼ Total Employees: 7,274 (as of the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-program national security laboratory

◼ Website: www.llnl.gov

◼ Contract Operator: Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, a corporate subsidiary of Bechtel 

National; University of California; BWX Technologies, Inc.; the Washington Division of URS 

Corporation; and Battelle

◼ Responsible Field Office: Livermore Field Office

E.2.1.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source

(total LLNL FY 2022 request = $2,233 million)

LLNL split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($1,913 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-8

E.2.1.3 Site Capabilities

LLNL is a DOE/NNSA Center of Excellence for Nuclear Design and Engineering, with core competencies in 

high explosives (HE), high energy density (HED) physics, high performance computing (HPC), nuclear 

physics, materials science and engineering, and additive manufacturing. LLNL is the lead design agency 

for the W80-4 (the Air Force’s cruise missile warhead) life extension program (LEP) and the W87-1

Modification Program. LLNL has primary assessment responsibility for the W80-1, W87-0, B83, and W84, 

as well as review responsibility for other systems.

LLNL operates key DOE/NNSA flagship stockpile stewardship facilities such as the National Ignition Facility, 

Livermore High Performance Computing Center and Sierra – advanced technology computing system, 

High Explosives Applications Facility, Contained Firing Facility, Flash X-Ray, and Plutonium Superblock.

LLNL also sustains and advances the physical infrastructure and capabilities supporting R&D, science, and 

technology missions in weapons engineering, design, performance physics, advanced materials, HPC, and 

HED physics. 

LLNL capabilities related to design, development, and sustainment of stockpile systems with their 

associated challenges and strategies are described in Table E–1.

Table E–1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory capabilities

Weapons Physics Design and Analysis

LLNL scientists, engineers, and technical staff design and assess the performance of the nuclear explosive package through 

implementing and advancing the capability to certify the stockpile without nuclear testing. LLNL characterizes primary and 

secondary performance, HE, and material performance via physics design and analysis and maintains critical capabilities 

such as advanced diagnostics and sensors; laser, pulsed power, and accelerator technology; hydrodynamic and subcritical 

experiments; and weapons surety design, analysis, integration, and manufacturing.

Challenges Strategies

Improvements in key capabilities are 

required for LEPs, including 

operational risk reduction activities 

for dynamic radiography, increased 

experimental workloads, and 

investment in advanced diagnostics 

for nuclear explosive package 

performance certification.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

DOE/NNSA is investing in infrastructure 

support and recapitalization to modernize 

Site 300 capabilities, including firing sites at 

the Flash X-Ray and Contained Firing 

Facility, and in plutonium infrastructure 

and advanced diagnostics development to 

support weapons certification. Production 

enclave investment ensures RDT&E for 

new materials that support the stockpile.

Weapons Engineering Design, Analysis, and Integration

LLNL is responsible for weaponizing the physics package to ensure performance through the warhead stockpile-to-target 

sequence, and to support production engineering. Engineering design and analysis supplement the fundamental capability 

to certify the stockpile without nuclear testing through destructive and nondestructive surveillance evaluations as well as

reliability and condition assessments. This capability is also used to fabricate complex special nuclear material target 

assemblies to enable focused tests and experiments.

Challenges Strategies

LLNL will need continuous 

modernization of warhead test and 

evaluation capabilities and needs 

investment in and evaluation of 

disruptive manufacturing technologies 

such as advanced manufacturing.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

DOE/NNSA is making multi-year 

sustainment investments in weapons 

engineering capabilities, including 

fabrication and inspection, nondestructive 

evaluation, environmental testing, 

plutonium science, and radioactive 

material processing. 

Continue multi-year investments, 

including those focused on 

specialized Advanced 

Manufacturing Laboratory space 

and equipment
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-9

High Explosives Science and Engineering

LLNL’s HE RDT&E capabilities support stockpile stewardship, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear counterterrorism efforts 

via a multidisciplinary approach to synthesis, formulation, characterization, processing, and testing of energetic materials, 

components, and warhead subassemblies. LLNL characterizes HE performance and safety at device and laboratory scales. 

Modernization activities support LEP and warhead assessments in facilities and equipment for HE large charge pressing,

plot-scale synthesis, and formulation systems.

LLNL has demonstrated the first-known capability to additively manufacture three-dimensional (3D) HE structures and has

demonstrated their ability to detonate. LLNL holds three Records of Invention in HE additive manufacturing technology.

Challenges Strategies

LLNL is responsible for qualifying 

insensitive high explosives (IHE) for 

assigned U.S. stockpile systems. HE 

processing capabilities require 

modernization for LLNL to meet 

programmatic demands for additional 

prototyping of warhead HE systems

and support RDT&E capacities and 

throughputs. Infrastructure 

supporting HE pressing and machining 

capabilities needs continued condition 

assessment and recapitalization.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

DOE/NNSA is investing in the High 

Explosives Applications Facility and Site 300 

infrastructure through a 5-year program 

that addresses short- and long-term facility 

recapitalization for mission objectives. 

LLNL is currently implementing capabilitybased investments and minor construction 

project investments in scaled HE synthesis 

and large charge pressing capabilities.

Establishment of a Production 

Enclave focused on joint material 

development and handling with 

production agencies to deliver 

increased lot acceptance and 

improved first principles modeling 

with the goal of enhancing

performance and safety predictions 

with less experimental verification.

High Performance Computing

LLNL drives the Nation’s ability to field premier computing platforms. Multi-laboratory collaborations have been developed 

to achieve exascale-class computing. LLNL HPC support includes operating systems, architecture, and code development.

Challenges Strategies

LLNL must anticipate, develop, and 

deploy new computing architectures 

to support integrated design codes 

and weapons design and certification 

needs. 

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Planning for the exascale paradigm 

includes architecture, code-developing 

environments, operating systems, and 

physical infrastructure. DOE/NNSA plans

to focus investment on the utility backbone 

of the laboratory, including electrical and 

water systems. Investment in computing 

facilities will support deployment of the 

first U.S. exascale-class computing 

platform.

Partner with industry and academia 

to develop new hardware 

technologies.

High Energy Density Physics

LLNL designs and executes experiments to advance fundamental understanding of HED regimes, the state of matter a 

weapon is in when the majority of yield is produced. These experiments advance and validate computational tools

implemented to design and certify the stockpile. HED experiments at the National Ignition Facility produce data on high-Z 

material properties, burn physics, radiation transport, radiation hydrodynamics, and a mix of other topics.

Challenges Strategies

Experimental infrastructure is aging 

and is subject to increased usage and 

increased operational tempo. 

Although the United States has 

pioneered HED physics, nations 

around the world are advancing their 

own experimental capabilities that 

may soon be competitive with the 

previously unique capabilities of the 

United States.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

LLNL has developed a 3-year investment 

plan to consolidate target fabrication 

equipment for efficiency while supporting 

more than 400 shots per year at the 

National Ignition Facility. Infrastructure 

recapitalization and modernization are 

essential to realizing this plan.

LLNL must develop an enduring 

infrastructure capability base in 

target fabrication and be prepared 

to manage increased facility usage.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-10

Additive Manufacturing

LLNL must anticipate and develop appropriate materials and manufacturing processes to provide responsive options to 

meet design and production requirements. We have sought to drive advancements in manufacturing through fundamental 

understanding of the underlying science, leading to improvement of these processes and invention and development of new 

processes. We have sought to drive advancements in manufacturing to rapidly create and qualify novel materials, 

structures, and advanced manufacturing methods to meet the current and future needs for the stockpile and national 

security. Underlying this priority is the need to predictively understand materials processing, structure, property, and 

performance relationships using a combination of computational and experimental tools. Our efforts extend, build on, and 

integrate foundational capabilities at LLNL for validated predictive simulations, tailored materials synthesis, characterization 

and testing, design optimization, and precision and additive manufacturing. 

Challenges Strategies

LLNL manufacturing facilities and 

infrastructure are dispersed and 

aging. Maturation of additive and 

advanced manufacturing technologies 

requires collaboration between the 

design, engineering, materials, and 

production communities. 

Success also requires effective 

integration of capabilities in 

feedstocks, design, characterization 

and testing, and predictive 

simulations and performance 

modeling.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Exploit industry/academic/laboratory

collaborations at the Advanced 

Manufacturing Laboratory. 

Execute existing infrastructure investment 

plans, including the following: 

− Complete and exploit capabilities 

housed in the Applied Materials 

Engineering Facilities.

− Complete construction and make 

operational the Polymer Production 

Enclave.

− Complete renovations to the LLNL 

Manufacturing Complex, NonDestructive Evaluation facilities, and 

Mechanics of Materials facilities.

Realize infrastructure investments 

to build on existing capabilities, 

including facilities that integrate 

new feedstocks and manufacturing 

processes with automated 

processes, in-situ characterization,

and advanced data analytics 

approaches. Such investments 

include the Stockpile Materials 

Development Foundry and the Next 

Generation LEP R&D Component 

Fabrication Facility. In addition, 

deepen the collaborative 

innovation approaches 

demonstrated in the Polymer 

Production Enclave by successfully 

launching additional collaborative 

Production Enclaves as they are 

identified and prioritized.

HE = high explosives

HPC = high performance computing

RDT&E = research, development, test and evaluation

E.2.1.4 Accomplishments

◼ LLNL completed all deliverables for Cycle 25 of the Annual Assessment Review, including extensive 

peer review, as part of the Independent Nuclear Weapon Assessment Process. The laboratory 

also met the requirements for sustaining the W80, B83, W84, and W87 systems.

◼ LLNL’s Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments program delivered data to support certification 

and assessment activities for LLNL’s systems. Specifically, LLNL successfully conducted six 

hydrodynamic tests in support of stockpile systems, including four experiments for the W80-4 and 

one each for the B83 and W87.

◼ LLNL is fully engaged in the W80-4 LEP and the W87-1 Modification Program, working with the 

plants to bring modern, cost-efficient manufacturing processes into the NNSA complex. Both 

efforts are on schedule. The W80-4 LEP is about halfway through Phase 6.3 and the W87-1 team 

is maturing design options in Phase 6.2. 

◼ The Sierra supercomputer brought unprecedented capabilities to NNSA and is providing vital 

support to stockpile modernization efforts. With the extensive preparatory work done adapting 

codes to Sierra’s revolutionary architecture, the machine has made 3D simulations routine: one 

3D inertial confinement fusion simulation was completed in 60 hours rather than 30 days on 

Sequoia. Preparations are under way for El Capitan, NNSA’s first exascale supercomputer.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-11

◼ The National Ignition Facility performed the highest-pressure plutonium X-ray diffraction 

experiment to date. Experiments also supported SNL scientists with a series of code-validation 

tests; tested an important new diagnostic platform and a new hohlraum design; and progressed 

in identifying and understanding performance limitations to achieving ignition. 

◼ To meet national security and broader national needs, LLNL made significant progress in advanced 

manufacturing capabilities to develop specialized materials together with processes and systems 

for product manufacturing and qualification. In FY 2020, LLNL researchers achieved important 

successes in improving printing speed and product quality. The newly opened Advanced 

Manufacturing Laboratory at LLNL is working with industry to expand NNSA’s capabilities.

◼ LLNL has combined artificial intelligence and machine learning with HPC for many innovative 

applications: perfecting 3D printing at the nanoscale; identifying microscopic changes in aging 

materials; better diagnosing and treating diseases; designing and synthesizing new materials for 

special applications; detecting early signs of nuclear proliferation; and combining simulations with 

experimental data to expedite progress in inertial confinement fusion research. 

◼ LLNL applied HPC to accelerate scientific discovery related to the COVID-19 virus; developed rapid, 

accurate diagnostic technologies; and supported rapid discovery of potential medical 

countermeasures. Notable successes include early February release of predicted structures of a 

key COVID-19 viral protein; identification of an initial set of therapeutic antibody sequences; 

prototype development of a simple ventilator for easy assembly; and update of Lawrence 

Livermore Microbial Detection Array to detect the virus.

◼ LLNL completed the Expand Electrical Distribution System line-item project on time and under 

budget. The upgraded infrastructure has eliminated single points of failure at LLNL and SNL’s

California site. The expansion now supplies power on the laboratory’s east side, adds capability 

to the Livermore Computing Center, and contributes to increased serviceability and safety of the 

LLNL high-voltage system. 

◼ LLNL completed construction on the first two of four new buildings that are part of the Applied 

Materials and Engineering Area Plan. A 100-person office building and a polymers laboratory 

were completed in FY 2020 to replace capabilities currently housed in an aged facility with seismic 

risks, high deferred maintenance, and sustained contamination. The Applied Materials and 

Engineering facilities support the core weapons engineering capabilities required to execute LEPs, 

stockpile modernization, and annual assessments.

E.2.1.5 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Workforce

LLNL has 7,274 employees, with an average age of 47 years and an average of 12 years of service. 

Approximately 31 percent of LLNL’s employees are eligible to retire. Since the end of FY 2018, LLNL hired 

1,664 employees and experienced 812 separations, resulting in a net gain of 852. Retirement separations

are dispersed throughout many “years of service” groups. Non-retirement voluntary separations were 

most pronounced among employees with 5 years of service or less. Over the last 10 years, LLNL new hires

increased representation of the early-career workforce in the laboratory population. Over the same 

period, the advanced career population has remained consistent and the mid-career population has 

slightly increased. LLNL anticipates continued growth over the Future Years Nuclear Security Program 

(FYNSP) period, especially as the work scope increases for W80-4 LEP and W87-1 Modification Program

activities. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures E–6 through E–14.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-12

Notes:

Scientist and engineer Common Occupational Classification System (COCS) counts differ from previously reported 

numbers due to recategorization. 

Figure E–6. LLNL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)

Figure E–7. LLNL workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-13

Notes:

This graphic demonstrates the continuing pattern of retirements and new hires. In FY 2020, 43 percent of employees had 

5 years of service or less, an increase from 38 percent in FY 2019. Additionally, the average years of services was 11.4 in 

FY 2020, down from 12.2 in FY 2019.

Figure E–8. LLNL workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)

Figure E–9. LLNL net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-14

Figure E–10. LLNL employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

LLNL retirements are distributed across all years of service ranges, but retirement is the driving separation cause for 

employees with greater than 10 years of service. Voluntary separation is the primary driver for employees with 0-10 

years of service at LLNL. By far, the largest number of separations occurred among employees with 0-5 years of service. 

These separations, however, were not exclusive to early-career employees, but were distributed across multiple age 

ranges. 

As discussed in Chapter 7, high rates of turnover among employees in lower years of service ranges is a challenge for 

developing and honing the skills and knowledge base necessary to execute LLNL’s mission. These separations are spread 

out across a wide range of ages, suggesting that this trend is not entirely driven by generational changes in employment 

preferences.

Figure E–11. LLNL employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-15

Notes:

Recent hiring combined with consistent numbers of retirements have led to increasing proportions of early-participation 

(less than 35 years old) and mid-participation (35-40 years old) employees among the laboratory population.

Figure E–12. LLNL workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The peak in FY 2013 represents a laboratory budget reduction that resulted in a significant number of early retirements 

and some layoffs, which are defined as involuntary separations in the chart. In more recent years, involuntary 

separations have remained low and retirements have decreased. However voluntary separations have increased every 

year since FY 2016.

Figure E–13. LLNL employee separation trends
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-16

Notes:

FY 2022 to FY 2025 numbers are different from previously reported numbers due to a recategorization of scientist and 

engineer COCS codes. The change considers unconstrained planning headcounts. An increase of engineers in FY 2022 to 

FY 2024 will be needed to meet modernization program requirements.

Figure E–14. LLNL workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-17

E.2.2 Los Alamos National Laboratory

E.2.2.1 Mission Overview

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), initially known as Project Y, was organized in April 1943 during 

World War II for the design of nuclear weapons as part of the Manhattan Project. After nearly 80 years, 

LANL continues its service to the Nation through applications of scientific and engineering solutions to 

solve national and global security challenges. The laboratory relies on its skilled workforce, a complex 

portfolio of facilities, specialized equipment, and disciplined business practices to meet its missions and 

deliver solutions. These capabilities are exercised through four strategic objectives: nuclear security;

science, technology and engineering; mission operations; and community relations.

LANL’s Weapons Activities represent foundational elements of the DOE/NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan (SSMP). LANL designed five of the seven types of nuclear warheads in the deployed 

stockpile and is currently responsible for the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the B61 

gravity bomb, the W76 and W88 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile warheads, and the 

W78 intercontinental ballistic missile warhead. LANL is leading the B61-12 LEP and the W88 Alteration 

(Alt) 370 Program. LANL’s production agency responsibility includes the manufacturing of pits, 

detonators, detonator cables and radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs). LANL weapons 

programs provide design expertise, production expertise, and tools including: advanced experimental

capabilities; modeling and simulation; processing, prototyping and testing of weapons materials; and

components and warheads assemblies (without nuclear materials).

LANL’s national security mission requires a multidisciplinary approach to solve some of the Nation’s 

toughest science and engineering challenges. In addition to direct stockpile stewardship activities, the 

laboratory contributes to overcoming national security and economic challenges, including nuclear 

nonproliferation and counterterrorism, medicine and health sciences, energy, and advanced 

computation. LANL is also involved in strategic partnership and collaborations with other agencies.

Science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) capabilities consist of a diverse portfolio and execute 

laboratory missions through six scientific pillars. 

Science of Signatures

Weapons Systems

Complex Natural & Engineered Systems

Nuclear and Particle Futures

Materials for the Future

Information Science & Technology

Los Alamos science, technology, and engineering capability pillars
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-18

LANL’s leadership assembles a broad spectrum of operational expertise, resources, and processes to 

enable the readiness and excellence of the stockpile stewardship and ST&E missions. These operational 

functions address LANL’s broad capabilities in integration planning and execution, safety, security, 

efficiency, accountability, waste, business practices, workforce management/development, and 

community relations and service.

LANL operates a complex portfolio of nuclear, HE, and specialized facilities and physical infrastructure. 

Additional descriptions of laboratory assets and capabilities, and their current state are presented below.

◼ Location: Los Alamos, New Mexico

◼ Total Employees: 9,109 (as of the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-program national security laboratory

◼ Website: www.lanl.gov

◼ Contract Operator: Triad National Security, LLC, (Triad) is made up of three members: Battelle 

Memorial Institute, Texas A&M University, and the University of California

◼ Responsible Field Office: Los Alamos Field Office

E.2.2.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source

(total LANL FY 2022 request = $3,386 million)

LANL split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($2,976 million)

E.2.2.3 Site Capabilities

LANL is the lead design agency for the B61, W76, W78, 

and W88 systems and is also the production agency for 

pit, detonator, detonator cable, and RTGs. LANL 

contributes to nuclear design and physics capabilities in 

the nuclear security enterprise and is the Nation's 

Plutonium Center of Excellence for Research and 

Development. Core competencies at LANL include 

weapons physics design and analysis; weapons 

engineering and energetics, design, analysis, testing, and 

integration; stockpile component production and 

surveillance for pits, detonators, and RTGs; HED physics; 

materials science and engineering; and HPC. 

Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility

Hydrodynamic experiment device in

confinement vessel.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-19

LANL operates a complex set of HE, radiological, nuclear, and other 

specialized scientific facilities. Several weapons mission critical 

facilities include: the Nicholas Metropolis Center for Modeling and 

Simulation, the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility

(DARHT), the National Explosives and Engineering Weapons Campus, 

the Uranium R&D facility (Sigma), and Waste Handling Facilities. LANL 

operates several DOE/NNSA flagship user facilities, including the 

Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), Center for Integrated 

Nanotechnologies, and the National High Magnetic Field Laboratory. 

LANL’s core capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies 

are described in Table E–2. Additional information on Plutonium 

capability and LANL 30 pits per year (ppy) plan is also presented below.

Table E–2. Los Alamos National Laboratory capabilities

Weapons Physics Design and Analysis

LANL performs integrated experiments and simulations to enable design and assessment of the nuclear explosives package for 

both enduring and future weapons systems. Design and assessment capabilities encompass hydrodynamic and subcritical 

experiments; proton radiography, materials, and nuclear science experiments; HPC; HE RDT&E; weapons engineering, surety, 

radiography, and assembly; and accelerator technology. 

Challenges Strategies

Aging in weapons materials and components; 

an aging workforce with specialized weapons 

knowledge and experiments capabilities, lack 

of programmatic needs to transition to the 

next generation of designers and engineers; 

and degrading design and certification 

infrastructure.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Current warhead modernization activities

provide a near-term opportunity to 

reinvest in current capabilities and 

exercise the workforce. LANL is 

coordinating with DOE/NNSA to address 

aging enduring physical infrastructure and 

modernize specialized capabilities such as 

DARHT, LANSCE, Sigma, HPC, HE, and 

weapons engineering facilities. 

Continue coordination with 

DOE/NNSA. Several missioncritical facilities will need 

replacement, with planning 

required in advance.

See Chapter 7 for enterprise 

workforce strategies.

Plutonium (Special Nuclear Materials Handling, Packaging, and Processing)

The plutonium core capability consists of plutonium production and process R&D, manufacturing, and radioactive waste 

disposition. LANL provides the only fully functioning plutonium facility for R&D and the only pit manufacturing capability 

within the nuclear security enterprise. LANL is a consolidated Center of Excellence for plutonium R&D and manufacturing 

activities.

Challenges Strategies

Plutonium operations require increased 

capacity and modernized infrastructure.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

LANL’s plutonium strategy has been 

adopted by DOE/NNSA and endorsed by 

the Nuclear Weapons Council. The 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

facility is continuing a small set of 

operations, with the goal of ceasing all 

programmatic work in anticipation of 

transferring these capabilities to the 

Radiological Laboratory Utility Office 

Building and the Plutonium Facility.

Continued investments are being planned 

through the LAP4 line item project.

Continue implementation of 

current plutonium strategy.

Additive Manufacturing approach 

to advance stockpile production.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-20

High Performance Computing (HPC)

The HPC core capability provides the supercomputers, facilities, and computer science that enable simulations of weapons 

performance for all aspects of stockpile stewardship. HPC enables scientists to routinely use multi-dimensional simulations to 

increase understanding of complex physics, as well as improve confidence in the predictive capability for stockpile stewardship

for LEPs and significant finding investigations (SFIs). The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) leverages both 

the Advanced Technology System (ATS) and Commodity Technology System for this work.

Challenges Strategies

Near-term challenges, approximately 2026, 

include physical infrastructure modernization 

to accommodate the next-generation 

supercomputer (ATS-5) at LANL. 

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Planning is ongoing for both the nearterm and long-term HPC infrastructure. 

Trinity (ATS-1) will be replaced in FY 2022

by Crossroads, a next-generation 

supercomputer to be sited at LANL

(ATS-3). 

Insertion of ATS-5 and the 

supporting electrical and cooling 

infrastructure.

Weapons Engineering and Energetics

Weapons engineering and HE capabilities provide the materials, components, and assemblies for weapons work. This 

capability includes the experimental testing required to assess the current state of the stockpile; surveil the current stockpile 

and address SFIs; and provide qualified materials and HE for LEP and new options. Additional functions include modeling 

weapon performance, safety, engineering, and aging responses throughout their operating conditions and life cycle. 

Challenges Strategies

The primary challenge is aging physical 

infrastructure. A large number of the 

facilities were built in the 1950s and were 

optimized for the fabrication and engineering 

testing capabilities and processes of that 

time. 

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Several line item investments for 

consolidation and replacement of 

facilities are proposed over the next 

decade, with the highest priority 

being the Energetic Materials 

Characterization. 

Continued recapitalization 

investments will ensure the longterm viability of enduring facilities.

Continue coordination with 

DOE/NNSA. Several mission-critical 

facilities will need replacement, and

planning will be required in advance.

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments

Hydrodynamic and subcritical experimental capabilities supply data to weapon physicists and engineers to inform the annual 

assessment process and certification decisions, advance nuclear weapon science, refine weapon computational models, 

develop emergency response tools, assess foreign and terrorist designs, gauge technological surprise, and develop the skills 

and experience of weapon designers and engineers. 

Challenges Strategies

The hydrodynamic facilities and 

infrastructure are aging. Another challenge is

the lack of ability to study late-implosion 

dynamics of subcritical experiments with 

penetrating radiography and reactivity 

measurements. Finally, procurement of the 

confinement vessels used in both types of 

experiments has struggled to meet 

experimental needs. 

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

The Enhanced Capabilities for 

Subcritical Experiments project will 

deliver additional advanced 

diagnostics both at LANL and the 

Nevada National Security Site in the 

mid-2020s. Strategic investments 

are being planned and implemented 

to recapitalize DARHT, procure 

additional vessels, and modernize 

DARHT Axis I and II. 

Continued coordination required with 

DOE/NNSA.

Partnerships with laboratories and 

universities to reinforce development 

of future capabilities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-21

Neutron Science – Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE)

The protons and neutrons produced by the LANSCE accelerator deliver essential material science, nuclear physics, and dynamic 

radiography data needed for assessment of the current stockpile, qualification of advanced manufacturing techniques, 

certification of the future stockpile, and threat reduction. LANSCE data are used for SFI resolution, support of LEP, ALT, and 

MOD certification, and the continued development of advanced material models used to advance our predictive capabilities. 

Challenges Strategies

The LANSCE accelerator was commissioned in 

1972, and some components are starting to 

experience end-of-life failures. Deferred 

maintenance has reduced the reliability of 

other components.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

A modernization initiative, including 

the LANSCE Modernization Project 

(LAMP) line-item capital acquisition, 

is being considered. LAMP would 

replace obsolete elements at the 

front of the LANSCE accelerator. 

Continued recapitalization through 

Infrastructure and Operations 

investments are addressing facility 

condition issues in a risk-based 

manner.

Next generation facilities, 

infrastructure, and equipment will be 

required.

Uranium, Beryllium, Organics, and Inorganics

Outside of plutonium, high explosives, and tritium capabilities, the Sigma capability provides the rest of the materials and 

production science expertise for the weapons nuclear explosive package. These include facilities, equipment, and expertise to 

work with uranium, beryllium, and most of the organic and inorganic materials in the stockpile. The work provides low- to 

mid-TRL research, development, and manufacturing processes that can subsequently be turned over to the production 

agencies, as well as the capability to produce test hardware for qualification and certification. These capabilities further 

provide both a test bed for new materials and emerging technologies, as well as an understanding of the materials’ properties 

and their aging and performance behaviors. Additional capabilities include surveillance activity for legacy weapons systems 

and manufacturing science and production support at Y-12 and Kansas City plants.

Challenges Strategies

The Sigma complex, including its facilities, 

infrastructure and materials processing 

equipment, is aging. The late 1950’s facility 

and much of the equipment which dates back 

to the 1950s (or earlier) is reaching an age 

where facility/equipment downtime is an 

ongoing struggle and is negatively impacting 

Sigma’s ability to meet many milestones and 

related deliverables because of the frequency 

of equipment and facility down-time.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Investments that include facility 

revitalization and materials 

processing equipment are proposed 

within the next 5-10 years to 

decrease risk to high-impact, highvisibility deliverables and delivery of 

hardware needed for the LANL 

Annual Certification Program. 

Continued recapitalization 

investments will further reduce the 

risk to these programs.

Replacement facility for Sigma complex 

will be needed.

Alt = alteration

HPC = high performance computing

RDT&E = research, development, test and 

evaluation

TRL = technology readiness level

DARHT = Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

LANSCE = Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

Sigma = Uranium R&D Facility

LAP4 = Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-22

Plutonium Capability and 30 ppy Plan – In the next 5 years, LANL has a primary responsibility to 

modernize the Plutonium Center of Excellence and to deliver a 30 ppy capacity. Implementation of that 

plan has started. LANL has an experienced and skilled workforce, high-hazard nuclear facilities and 

associated infrastructure, and unique plutonium processing, fabrication, and experimental capabilities. 

In May 2018, DOE/NNSA directed LANL to deliver a minimum of 30 War Reserve ppy at an annual 

confidence level of 90 percent by 2026 to support the broader goal of meeting the military requirement 

to produce no fewer than 80 War Reserve ppy. Expanding pit production to this level will require 

significant resources. The plutonium missions at LANL will be integrated to successfully execute this 

expansion while still delivering on the other missions. To achieve national goals, LANL’s Plutonium Center 

of Excellence will recruit, hire, train, and retain a workforce to:

◼ Produce plutonium pits for the nuclear weapons stockpile

◼ Produce RTGs for the nuclear weapons stockpile

◼ Produce plutonium-238 heat sources for use by NASA in space exploration 

◼ Evaluate pits returned from the nuclear weapons stockpile to support annual assessments and 

inform future pit designs

◼ Produce plutonium components for assembly into devices used in subcritical experiments

◼ Perform fundamental science on plutonium aging and material properties 

◼ Process plutonium into forms suitable for disposition to support nonproliferation goals

◼ Recover americium for the DOE Office of Science

◼ Maintain nuclear and hazardous facilities and the associated utilities and infrastructure

◼ Manage environmental protection, safety, quality, and security programs and requirements

◼ Manage the disposition of waste onsite and its shipment off site

◼ Provide business, IT, and other support services to achieve the required plutonium mission

LANL performed a series of staffing analyses in FY 2019 that identified the staffing required for plutonium 

missions. The program staff at LANL will need to increase by approximately 1,700 FTEs (full-time 

equivalent positions) in the next 4-5 years to enable all plutonium missions to be successful and to deliver 

a minimum of 30 ppy starting in 2026. Indirect-funded staffing may increase by an additional 1,300 FTEs. 

Indirect-funded functions include human resources, information technology (IT), business services, 

emergency management, procurement, legal counsel, finance, and accounting. Increases in indirectfunded FTEs are driven by site-wide increases in staffing, facility footprint, and scope for the plutonium 

enterprise.

More than half of the planned pit production related staffing is required to support reliable facility 

operations, maintenance, waste operations, and support functions. These functions must be reliably 

staffed to operate and maintain LANL’s plutonium enterprise and to execute the program of record 

associated with all plutonium missions. LANL is pivoting to 24/7 operations for PF-4 to deconflict 

maintenance, construction, and other facility support functions from plutonium missions’ operations. 

Facility operations, maintenance, waste operations, and support functions must be reliably staffed to 

support all plutonium missions regardless of increases in scope for any one mission.

LANL will need to hire a large interim workforce to complete the many infrastructure investments to 

support the plutonium enterprise. As planning for infrastructure investments is refined, the associated 

staffing will be estimated using an integrated resource-loaded schedule.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-23

E.2.2.4 Accomplishments

Notable FY 2020 achievements include:

Stockpile Assessments, Design and Development

◼ LANL met all statutorily required deliverables for the annual assessment reporting process. 

Specifically:

– Annual assessment reports for the B61, W76, W78, and W88 were distributed in July 2020.

– The Director’s Red Team and LLNL’s Independent Nuclear Weapons Assessment Teams 

delivered briefings in August 2020.

– The Director’s annual assessment letter was signed out on September 17, 2020.

◼ LANL supported the B61-12 limited life component (LLC) exchanges and weapon and component 

deliveries to the Department of Defense (DoD) and ensured an adequate active stockpile by 

dispositioning several unsatisfactory reports. Following on the successful FY 2019 effort to design 

and certify the W76-2, the system has completed production; all three W76 modifications are in 

the maintenance phase. The W78 is also in the maintenance phase. Rebuild and maintenance 

activities for the W76-0, W76-1, W76-2, and the W78 were fully supported throughout FY 2020.

◼ The Weapons Program continues successful execution of the W88 Alt 370 Program, with first 

production unit achieved in the fourth quarter of FY 2021. Delays in the W88 Alt 370 caused by 

issues with base metal electrode capacitors impacted the logistics for LLC exchanges for the W88 

Program. New LANL LLC product definition changes were developed and implemented in 

3 months to maintain the active stockpile numbers.

◼ LANL is managing additional scope in support of the W88 Alt 940.

◼ LANL completed support activities for the W80-4 LEP and the W87-1 Modification Program.

◼ The Weapons Program contributed to trade studies for the W93.

◼ LANL completed the first 3D, end-to-end simulation of a warhead encountering radiation and 

blast hostile environments.

◼ LANL conducted a joint centrifuge test to evaluate a new Stockpile Responsiveness Program 

design and new surety technologies at high-g loadings. This was the first developmental test of 

its kind and included radiographic imaging and the successful performance of new surety 

technologies under these environments.

◼ Material properties were measured for newly cast, 10 year, and 30 year naturally aged plutonium.

These data are informing assessments of the effects of plutonium aging on weapons performance.

◼ LANL executed two series of experiments to support the qualification of the direct cast depleted 

uranium manufacturing process for the future stockpile.

◼ LANL executed three hubcap experiments to support qualification of the direct-cast 

manufacturing method for depleted uranium and the related FY 2021 Stewardship Capability 

Delivery Schedule L1 milestone. These experiments compare newly manufactured material with 

historic material.

◼ LANL analyzed static Neutron-Diagnosed Subcritical Experiment (NDSE) tests with special nuclear 

material (SNM) at the Nevada National Security Site to show that the subcriticality of a system 

can be extracted with only a ~0.3 percent uncertainty.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-24

◼ LANL provided performance qualification data on PBX 9502 lots supporting the B61-12 LEP, as 

well as PBX 9012 and PBX 9701, to inform HE reactive burn models for the current and future 

stockpile.

◼ LANL completed design, prototype assembly and alignment of Variable Field of View DARHT 

downstream transport regions of the accelerator and final assembly of the entire Variable Field 

of View system on the DARHT firing point, as part of the post-Weather Enclosure DARHT 

restoration.

◼ LANL completed 41 transuranic waste shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, containing 

1,233 waste containers; as of August 2020, the overall Triad transuranic inventory is below 1,500 

containers (a multi-year low). Triad also moved 1,390 containers out of Technical Area (TA-55) to 

exceed the milestone for FY 2020.

◼ Construction of the Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment (EC3E) Project was completed

ahead of schedule and under budget. EC3E will support the next generation of supercomputing 

at the laboratory for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, including Crossroads and other HPC

platforms.

◼ LANL completed two DOE/NNSA recapitalization projects: the DARHT facility weather enclosure 

and the Explosive Crystal Laboratory.

◼ As part of its knowledge transfer effort, LANL provided a range of services and tools for the 

workforce. The New Employee Training Program has implemented an in-depth onboarding 

program for new employees to increase retention and reduce time to job readiness. The National 

Security Research Center completed six new digitizing laboratories to speed up digitization of vast 

collections of weapons program material, including microfilm, microfiche, motion picture film and 

other at-risk media types.

Weapons Production

◼ LANL completed three pit builds; matured development activities as part of Process Prove-In; 

significantly increased the rate and yield of metal production and castings; and added a second 

shift in Plutonium Facility (PF-4) to enable continued execution of 24 construction and equipmentinstallation projects despite COVID-19 operational challenges.

◼ LANL partnered with LLNL to produce a new baseline for pit production first production units, 

resulting in a schedule where Qualification Evaluation Release will be completed at the end of 

FY 2022, allowing a full 12 months to build and diamond stamp the first production unit pit. This 

schedule optimizes engineering evaluations and mitigates risks to successful completion of final 

certification tests.

◼ In partnership with KCNSC, LANL improved the production yield of the 1E40 detonator cable 

assembly and helped with production of numerous W88 Alt 940 components.

◼ LANL delivered the Electronic Module Sub-Assembly components and all 12 development cables 

and five different types of cables to SNL; four of the cable types were fully manufactured at LANL.

◼ LANL partnered with SRS to support the 50 ppy planning effort and expertise to implement NNSA’s

pit production plan.

◼ LANL completed a pilot training/education program for weapons production in FY 2020. Key 

elements of this program include: 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-25

– Launching the New Employee Training Academy to provide orientation and training for 

Glovebox/Fissionable Material Handlers. The first 30-person pilot cohort and the majority of 

a second cohort have successfully advanced through this comprehensive program. The third 

cohort started and will be expanded to Savannah River National Laboratory operators.

– Securing a Memorandum of Agreement with Savannah River National Laboratory and SRS 

NNSA Capital Projects on July 22, 2020, to strengthen R&D capabilities and establish

collaborative interactions for engineering staff between LANL Plutonium and SRS programs.

– Establishing and expanding training and classroom spaces for new pit production operators 

and engineers. These include refurbishing the TA-35 Trident facility, renovating and 

repurposing 30,000 square feet of leased space in Los Alamos County.

– Developing a new certificate and Associate Degree program with the University of New 

Mexico-Los Alamos. The program received accreditation by the State Higher Education 

Department and will provide science, operations, and business education on all aspects of 

working in modern nuclear materials handling and processing facilities.

Science, Technology and Engineering

◼ The Alliance for Computing at Extreme Scale, a partnership between LANL and SNL, announced 

the contract award to deliver Crossroads. 

◼ LANL was chosen to serve as a lead partner in the Quantum Science Center and will lead one of 

three DOE major research thrusts to develop quantum technologies as part of the $115 million

Quantum Science Center. 

◼ A new fast-forward simulation algorithm was developed for current and near-term future 

quantum computers, opening the way for applications to run past strict time limits that restrict

many quantum calculations.

◼ LANL designed several scientific instruments, electronic components, and the radioisotope fuel 

pellets for NASA’s Perseverance Mars rover. 

◼ LANL successfully applied unique multi-variable modeling approaches to develop national and 

global COVID-19 models. A number of these models have been developed and delivered to local, 

state, and Federal entities to inform strategic decision making. For example, LANL provided

weekly updates to the Office of the Governor of New Mexico. In addition, LANL provided the Air 

Force Air Combat Command with pandemic statistics for almost 30 specific geographic areas that 

impact its mission. Finally, a number of quick response modeling efforts were completed to 

support the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and other national security agencies.

Operations and Community Relations

◼ LANL collaborated closely with the community and local stakeholders to establish broker pipeline 

programs with local institutions to provide the local training programs and workforce pipeline 

initiatives for machinists, engineering, and craft trades. TA-55 has benefited from a successful 

radiological control technician (RCT) training program to significantly mitigate the RCT shortage 

and enable smooth operation in PF-4. Triad has enacted additional workforce pipeline initiatives 

to meet the workforce needs for the 30-ppy deliverable and other mission needs.

◼ In response to COVID-19 challenges, LANL’s Continuity of Operations program strengthened the 

emergency response function (already in place) and established regular accountability drills. LANL 

leveraged a task force and infectious disease capabilities to create protocols for safe operations; 

redirected some of its R&D capabilities to help understand the virus and its mutations, 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-26

treatments, and vaccine development; and used its biological expertise to stand up testing for the 

workforce. The Laboratory applied lessons learned from the crisis to reinforce aspects of culture 

change. Other responses include adding the back shift at PF-4, implementing a new approach to 

telework, and modifying requirements (where essential mission needed) to improve operational 

flexibility.

◼ LANL successfully created a COVID-19 testing capability for employees and new modeling 

capabilities that the State of New Mexico relies on for forecasting. This partnership also enabled 

LANL to broker pipeline programs with local institutions.

◼ Triad initiated a telework pilot to explore possible benefit to the government of long-term 

telework. This pilot will also examine the potential of evolving LANL’s infrastructure to support 

turnaround or hub spaces. This effort has already provided much-needed space for high-priority 

mission activities and is considering establishing a footprint off the laboratory via an active 

Request for Information. To date, the pilot has already enabled transfer of certain office buildings 

to Weapons Production, immediately providing the program with space for an additional 285 

workstations.

◼ Triad continued progress addressing the RCT shortage, hiring 57 new RCTs in FY 2020. Several 

candidates came from multiple established pipelines, including – LANL Human Resources

targeting military candidates, the Northern New Mexico College program, and outreach to other 

Associate of Applied Science programs. In addition, new RCT retention strategies are paying off, 

decreasing projected attrition rates from 30 percent to less than 15 percent.

◼ LANL Human Resources successfully completed several initiatives, including its 2-year 

compensation project, which updated all job descriptions, matched them to market and internal 

alignment, and updated the salary bands for those unaligned positions, enabling better 

recruitment and retention of employees; a new talent acquisition strategy proactively addressing 

strategic needs in scientific areas; an offsite onboarding process allowing new hires to integrate 

more quickly to the Laboratory; a cloud-based Learning Management System that provides 

enhanced data security and is fully compliant with Federal Risk and Authorization Management 

Program requirements, improving cost predictability and reducing risk and liability; and 

introduction of multiple online training courses.

E.2.2.5 Los Alamos National Laboratory Workforce

LANL had 9,109 employees at the end of FY 2020, with an average age of 45 years and an average of 

11 years of service. Approximately 40 percent of LANL’s employees are eligible to retire. Since the end 

of FY 2018, LANL has hired 2,358 employees and experienced 1,204 separations, resulting in a net gain of 

1,154 employees. More than half of LANL’s employee separations came through retirements, while the 

remainder were mostly voluntary separations among those with 15 years of service or less. The number 

of early-career employees has been growing steadily the past few years, and mid-career employees have 

experienced a recent uptick after years of decline. Staffing planning for NNSA programmatic drivers 

indicates that, over the next 5 years, hiring is expected to accommodate workforce growth (e.g., for pit 

production) and anticipated attrition. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in 

Figures E–15 through E–23.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-27

Notes:

LANL continues to see growth in the total headcount to meet mission demands. Overall, LANL’s FY 2020 employee site 

count increased by 7.5 percent from FY 2019. Growth was seen in most categories, but the largest increases were in 

engineers, general management, and technicians.

Data includes only regular employees. LANL’s Common Occupational Classification System-coded laborers and most of 

its craft persons are Union Craft employees who are not considered “permanent career employees,” and so were not 

included in this data. There are over 1,000 craft persons on site.

Figure E–15. LANL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

LANL continues to concentrate on attracting and retaining young, new talent to fill the pipeline for retiring individuals. 

Consequently, the average age has continued to drop as has the percent eligible to retire decreases.

Figure E–16. LANL workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-28

Notes:

This graphic demonstrates the continuing pattern of retirements and new hires. In FY 2020, 43 percent of employees had 

5 years of service or less, an increase from 38 percent in FY 2019. Additionally, the average years of service was 11.4 in 

FY 2020, down from 12.2 in FY 2019.

Figure E–17. LANL workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

LANL saw a decrease in separations this past year due to decreases in both retirements and voluntary terminations. In 

FY 2020, there were 544 separations, down from 660 in FY 2019. The overall decrease in separations is suspected to be 

attributable in part to COVID-19 impacts.

Figure E–18. LANL net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-29

Notes:

A large proportion of workforce attrition is due to retirements in the 56-65 age range. Voluntary attrition rates are highest 

for individuals in the 26-30 and 41-45 age ranges.

Figure E–19. LANL employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Overall, attrition rates are highest for those with 36 to 45 years of service due to retirements. However, voluntary attrition 

rates are highest for new hires. Employees with less than 6 years of service separated at an attrition rate of 4.37 percent

which was 1.6 times higher than the rate for employees with 6-10 years of service. Additionally, the higher number of 

terminations among those with less than 6 years of service is largely due to the growing population of that service band.

Figure E–20. LANL employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-30

Notes:

LANL has been hiring in all age categories; however, the largest proportion of new hires is the less-than-35-years-old 

workforce participation group. The proportion of less-than-35-year-old-employees continued to grow in FY 2020,

increasing by approximately 1.5 percent from FY 2019. Over the past decade, this participation group has doubled. 

Inversely, the proportion of 35-years-old-and-over participation groups has decreased over the years. The proportion of

workforce participation over 50 years old for this fiscal year has remained similar to last fiscal year.

Figure E–21. LANL workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Retirements and voluntary separations have decreased for the second year in a row. The decrease from FY 2018 to FY 2019 

was primarily due to the contract transition to Triad. The decrease from FY 2019 to FY 2020 is suspected to be attributable 

in part to COVID-19 impacts.

Figure E–22. LANL employee separation trends
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-31

Notes:

The increase in headcount projections is attributable to the LANL pit production mission. Technician and Professional

Administration categories are expected to be required and, thus, grow in the next years.

Figure E–23. LANL workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-32

E.2.3 Sandia National Laboratories

E.2.3.1 Mission Overview

For over 70 years, Sandia National Laboratories 

(SNL) has delivered essential engineering, science,

and technology to resolve the Nation’s most 

challenging security issues. SNL began in 1945 as Z 

Division, the ordnance design, testing, and assembly 

arm of Project Y, which after World War II became 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Z Division was 

renamed Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and, in 1949, 

Sandia Corporation was established as an AT&T, 

Inc., subsidiary to manage the laboratory through a 

no-fee contract. In 1956, a second site was opened 

in California’s Livermore Valley. In 1979, Congress 

designated Sandia Laboratory as a DOE national laboratory. Since May 2017, SNL has been operated and 

managed by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC. As a multi-mission national

security laboratory and Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), SNL serves as an 

objective, independent, and trusted advisor, drawing upon a ST&E foundation to anticipate, innovate, 

create, and inform policy discussions for a broad range of decision-makers. SNL’s core purpose is to 

develop advanced technologies to ensure global peace. 

The nuclear deterrence mission exists at SNL within a framework of five interdependent portfolios that 

represent multiple missions. Most of these have a direct and symbiotic relationship with nuclear weapons 

work, and all strengthen SNL’s capability-based science and engineering foundation.

Together, these programs provide the Nation the best 

possible return on its national security investments. SNL’s 

activities for other Federal agencies and for non-Federal 

entities leverage, sustain, and strengthen the unique 

capabilities, facilities, and essential skills that support both 

the Defense Programs mission and broader national security 

needs. SNL’s national security work currently includes the 

following programs’ portfolios:

◼ Nuclear Deterrence

◼ Global Security

◼ National Security Programs

◼ Energy and Homeland Security

◼ Advanced Science and Technology 

SNL’s traditional, long-term nuclear deterrence mission 

includes nuclear weapons R&D, design, qualification, testing, certification, and systems integration of all 

components, subsystems and systems, to arm, fuze, and fire a weapon to military specifications and 

ensure safety and security. The integration role is evident in three key areas:

◼ Integration of all non-nuclear components, systems, and subsystems

◼ Integration between a weapon’s non-nuclear portion and its nuclear explosives package

◼ Integration of a weapon with its military delivery platform
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-33

The current warhead modernization activities constitute SNL’s largest, most complex design, 

development, and qualification work scope in the last 30 years. SNL is involved in all stockpile 

modernization programs currently underway (the B61-12 LEP, W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 Program, W80-4 

LEP, W87-1 Modification Program, W93, and Mk21 Fuze), and is responsible for designing the life 

extension of the Safeguards Transporter and its replacement design (the Mobile Guardian Transporter

[MGT]) for secure transport of nuclear weapon materials and components to DOE/NNSA partner sites and 

DoD customer sites. SNL also has production agency responsibilities for some weapon non-nuclear

components (e.g., power sources, neutron generators and trusted, strategic radiation-hardened 

microsystems).

Continuity in warhead modernization and rebalancing priorities in response to the global security 

environment and uncertain future threats are top priorities. The United States must maintain the range 

of flexible, responsive, and tailored nuclear capabilities to protect ourselves and our allies against nuclear 

or non-nuclear aggression. This strategy translates to the need to sustain SNL’s capability-based science 

and engineering foundation to prepare for this uncertain future. As an FFRDC, part of this service to the 

Nation is to scan the horizon for emerging national security issues and articulate the challenges 

anticipated for the country.

◼ Primary Sites: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Livermore, California; Tonopah Test Range, Nevada; 

Kauai, Hawaii

◼ Total Employees: 13,013 (as of the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-mission national security laboratory

◼ Web site: www.sandia.gov

◼ Contract Operator: National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly 

owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc. 

◼ Responsible NNSA Field Office: Sandia Field Office

E.2.3.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source

(total SNL FY 2022 request = $2,911 million)

SNL split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($2,419 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-34

E.2.3.3 Site Capabilities

SNL develops advanced technologies to ensure global peace and is responsible for developing and 

sustaining the science and engineering capabilities that provide the foundation of the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent portfolio. A strong capability-based science and engineering foundation can serve as a 

deterrent, guard against technological surprise, and enable a rapid response to an evolving set of mission 

requirements. 

SNL stewards a broad set of capabilities supporting national security needs. Both Defense Programs and 

other national security missions will require a pool of engineers and scientists with advanced degrees in 

specialized disciplines of electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, materials 

science and other disciplines to provide expertise for diverse applications such as hypersonics, 

electromagnetics, radiofrequency design, and exascale computing. These and other emerging technical 

fields will be essential to keep pace with evolving threat environments and avoid technological surprise. 

To enhance the recruiting pipeline in these areas, SNL is initiating targeted university partnerships and 

other innovative approaches to provide skill sets to support national security missions. 

Weapon Activities capabilities support an evolving set of mission requirements, are interdependent, and 

contribute across the entire weapons life cycle. Table E–3 describes and highlights a few select SNL

capabilities related to DOE/NNSA weapons activities, with associated challenges and strategies.

Table E–3. Sandia National Laboratories capabilities

Agile Component and Systems Design, Engineering, Production, Surveillance and Integration

Systems integration, engineering, and surveillance are the core capabilities of SNL’s nuclear weapons program. SNL designs, 

develops, qualifies, and assesses arming, fuzing, and firing systems, neutron generators, gas transfer systems, power sources, 

energetic components, and weapon surety and nuclear safety and security systems for Alts, Mods, and LEPs. This capability 

also includes production responsibility for several non-nuclear components and robust prototyping that is enabled by modelbased design and advanced manufacturing technologies. SNL partakes in surveillance evaluations and stockpile maintenance 

to assess nuclear weapon systems and detect or anticipate potential problems.

Challenges Strategies

The capabilities, programs, people, and 

equipment are scattered around the SNL 

New Mexico site in aging Cold War-era 

facilities. Housing these people and 

programs needs increased priority to 

continue meeting mission needs. SNL must 

also maintain R&D, production, and 

surveillance capabilities.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Proactively engage with NNSA to ensure 

an integrated approach that collocates 

related capability assets to improve 

efficiency and effectiveness, recapitalizes 

aging and inadequate facilities, and 

maintains facilities fit for mission use. 

Execute the Power Sources Capability 

line item.

Recapitalization or replacement of 

equipment and facilities will be 

needed to sustain long-term health.

Threats by adversaries are evolving rapidly 

and unpredictably. Traditional weapon 

product lifecycles (design, development, 

and production) are too long, impeding the 

ability to respond in a timely manner to 

emerging threats.

Seek ways to accelerate and more 

efficiently integrate the nuclear security 

enterprise-wide product realization 

process through improvement to 

technical, process, and cultural factors.

Intentionally focus on improving the 

digital engineering ecosystem to include 

common tools and standards, and 

advancing prototyping capabilities to

more quickly respond to emerging 

threats; participate in the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program.

Continue coordination with 

DOE/NNSA to define longer-term 

strategies and investments.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-35

Increasing supply chain risk to meet 

stringent non-nuclear component 

production requirements.

Seek opportunities to maintain current 

and develop new trusted supplier 

partnerships. Improve our sourcing 

methods to engage our suppliers more 

strategically.

Continue current efforts and assess 

opportunities for new technologies.

Manage the workforce as multiple LEPs and 

Alts transition from development to 

production. 

SNL has developed and implemented a 

planning tool to estimate and project 

staffing needs and attrition. 

Continue current efforts.

Competition is high for electrical engineers 

and computer scientists.

Leverage the existing recruiting program 

and initiate innovative on-campus 

research partnership, internships, and 

other creative mechanisms to develop a 

pipeline of future-generation warhead 

engineers. 

See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1, for 

enterprise recruitment and hiring 

challenges and strategies.

Major life extension activities have focused 

laboratory attention and resources on 

near-term deliveries, making maturation of 

new technologies and components difficult. 

Seek opportunities to advance 

technology development in a broad 

range of program venues, including the 

Strategic Partnership Projects, 

Laboratory-Directed Research and 

Development, and DOE/NNSA programs 

such as the Stockpile Responsiveness 

Program 

Continue coordination with 

DOE/NNSA to define longer-term 

strategies and investments.

Microsystems R&D and Manufacturing

Trusted, strategic, radiation-hardened advanced microsystems (i.e., nanoscale and microscale system ST&E.

Challenges Strategies

Trusted microsystems fabrication facilities 

are aging and past their design lives.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Work with NNSA in extended life 

planning to maintain the R&D capability 

and ensure an uninterrupted ability to 

produce trusted, strategic radiationhardened microsystems. 

Explore potential for line item 

construction, given continued risk 

with current investments.

Materials Science and Engineering and Advanced Manufacturing

Virtually all classes of non-nuclear materials, including metals, polymers, glasses, ceramics, and electronic and optical 

materials and their interfaces and interactions with their environments, are critical to the safety, security, and effectiveness 

of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. This capability at SNL includes (1) evaluation of materials for aging, compatibility, and 

model validation to resolve stockpile and production issues rapidly and (2) innovation to replace legacy materials and 

evaluate new materials for insertion into the stockpile. 

Challenges Strategies

SNL must support evaluating materials 

aging, compatibility, and model 

development/validation and sustain the 

innovation necessary to replace legacy 

materials and evaluate new materials for 

insertion into the stockpile.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

SNL must advance material science R&D 

for response to evolving threats and 

future needs. This includes creating new 

measurement and analytical capabilities

and conducting R&D to enhance our 

understanding of the structure and 

processing of materials to evaluate their 

behavior; capturing the phenomenology 

driving this behavior; defining and 

predicting performance in current and 

future stockpiles; and enabling

applications in additive manufacturing

with a science basis for qualification.

Expand/continue engagement with 

DOE/NNSA.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-36

The material science and engineering 

facility at SNL California does not meet 

modern seismic and other building code 

standards. SNL Albuquerque facility 

operations exceed the design intent and 

increased heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning capacity needed to enable 

mission-driven chemical operations.

Proactively engage with DOE/NNSA to 

ensure an integrated approach to 

resolving facility challenges. Develop an 

Integrated Facilities and Infrastructure 

Plan to capture infrastructure needs and 

define priorities. Commission studies to 

establish conditions and alternatives to 

best mitigate risk to the mission.

Continue coordination with 

DOE/NNSA.

The current generation of materials 

scientists is approaching the end of their 

careers. The number of students seeking 

advanced degrees in material disciplines 

who choose to enter and work within the 

nuclear security enterprise may not be 

sufficient to meet future workforce needs. 

Competition is high for scientists and 

engineers who are qualified in these 

disciplines.

Leverage existing recruiting programs 

and initiate innovative on-campus 

research partnerships, internships, and 

other creative mechanisms to develop a 

pipeline of a future generation of 

materials science specialists for SNL’s 

unique needs. 

See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1, for 

enterprise recruitment and hiring 

challenges and strategies.

Engineering Sciences and Testing, Radiation Effects and High Energy Density Sciences, and

Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors

These capabilities include evaluation of the effects of operational and abnormal environments on nuclear weapon systems 

and components using an array of engineering science test equipment (e.g., the Annular Core Research Reactor, Z, Saturn, 

and HERMES), diagnostic tools, and techniques, as well as research and testing to support design, qualification, and 

surveillance.

Challenges Strategies

The workload imposed by concurrent LEPs 

is stressing the capacity and capability of 

aging facilities and equipment and 

accelerating replacement needs. 

Experimental test capabilities to validate 

data models require more and higherfidelity data to enable stronger coupling 

with integrated design codes (IDCs).

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Select facility and equipment 

investments to ensure continuity of the 

engineering sciences capability. Support 

enhancement of the predictive capability 

by tightening the coupling and 

integration of modelers and the data 

necessary for model validation. Advance 

diagnostic capabilities to capture higherfidelity experimental data.

Research and technology from 

current strategies and efforts will be 

applied to next -generation pulsed 

power and accelerator facilities. 

Definition of new investments will 

likely emerge, alongside other 

opportunities.

Next-generation pulsed power 

experimental capabilities are needed to 

ensure models that validate safe, secure, 

and reliable performance of the Nation’s 

weapons.

Develop an experimental and theoretical 

basis to provide confidence that the 

next-generation pulsed power 

experimental capability will attain 

needed pressures and fusion yields.

The Annular Core Research Reactor delivers 

high-power, short bursts of neutron and 

combined neutron-gamma spectra to 

qualify designs under extreme combined 

radiation environments. The facility 

housing the reactor is older than 50 years 

and predates modern nuclear safety 

standards.

Proactively engage with NNSA to ensure 

an integrated approach to resolving this 

facility challenge. Develop an Integrated 

Facilities and Infrastructure Plan to 

capture infrastructure needs and define 

priorities.

Competition is high for certain specialists in 

radiation effects science.

Develop a pipeline of scientific and 

engineering expertise in radiation effects 

via current campus and diversity 

recruiting programs and initiate targeted, 

innovative on-campus partnerships, 

internships, and fellowships to secure 

highly talented graduates.

See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1, for 

enterprise recruitment and hiring 

challenges and strategies.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-37

High Performance Computing and Codes, Models, Data Analytics

These capabilities include modeling and simulation capabilities of physical phenomena.

Challenges Strategies

Enhance the predictive capabilities of IDCs 

to support design, development, 

qualification, and assessments of nonnuclear components and systems for 

normal, abnormal, and hostile

environments. 

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Participate in the DOE Exascale 

Computing Initiative; design and conduct 

experiments to support validation of 

IDCs that increase understanding of the 

physical phenomena and close the gap 

between models and the physical world. 

Investment will be required in 

computing and test capabilities.

Competition for high-demand disciplines, 

such as computational modeling with an 

emphasis on engineering analysis, makes 

recruiting, training, and retaining technical 

staff increasingly challenging.

Leverage campus and diversity recruiting 

programs to develop a pipeline of futuregeneration HPC scientists and engineers.

See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1, for 

enterprise recruitment and hiring 

challenges and strategies.

Alt = alteration

HERMES = High-Energy Radiation Megavolt 

Electron Source

HPC = high performance computing

IDC = integrated design codes

Z = Z pulsed power facility

E.2.3.4 Accomplishments

Directed Stockpile Work/Weapon Engineering and Production Focus

◼ Delivering on nuclear weapons modernization and development programs. SNL successfully 

executed a significant increase in the workload associated with warhead LEPs, Alts, and similar 

programs—the largest and most complex nuclear deterrence design, development, and 

qualification workload at SNL in almost 30 years. SNL met or exceeded critical cost, schedule, 

and technical performance milestones critical to the NNSA mission. 

◼ Abnormal shock test. Six drop tests comprised the successful completion of the Abnormal Shock 

Breach Phase 1 test series. The tests were conducted at SNL’s Tech Area-III Drop Tower Complex

in partnership with LLNL. This test series provides critical data for qualification teams to further 

understand W80-4 system response in abnormal mechanical environments.

◼ Production success. As part of SNL’s production agency role, SNL delivered nearly 40,000 nonnuclear parts, components, and technologies to support all stockpile system maintenance 

activities and LEPs. These deliverables included neutron generators, power sources, explosive 

components and energetic materials, surety technologies and strategic, radiation-hardened 

microsystems such as custom Application-Specific Integrated Circuits that deliver advanced 

capabilities needed to support the current and future stockpile.

◼ Tonopah Test Range testing. Executed nine Air Force Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

B61-12 surveillance tests in a short amount of time. Operating efficiently, the Tonopah Test 

Range completed all tests safely and accurately and collected critical data for Air Force

certification of the B61-12 and annual assessment for current B61 stockpile systems.

◼ P19 project execution. The P19 project represents SNL’s commitment to respond to critical 

national security challenges, including responding rapidly through contributing expertise in 

design, qualification, production, acceptance, and fielding to meet a tight deadline. The project 

capitalizes on SNL’s advanced capabilities and commitment to quality to deliver a solution to DoD 

and DOE/NNSA stakeholders within a highly compressed schedule. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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◼ Neutron Generator Enterprise (NGE) efficiencies. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, NGE

production did not stop, and exceeded the original neutron generator delivery plan by 

three percent. 

◼ MGT Prototype. SNL completed a full-scale crash test of MGT Prototype 1 at the Rocket Sled 

Track, the first of a transporter vehicle in almost 20 years. 

◼ Advanced surety technology activities. SNL completed several advanced surety technology 

activities that led to selection of a design that dramatically reduces cost, weight, and 

performance compared to currently deployed technology.

RDT&E/Weapon Science and Technology Focus

◼ Delivering foundational science and engineering capabilities to advance and sustain the 

Nation’s nuclear deterrent. SNL served as a leader in multiple weapon science and technology 

efforts, including an unprecedented number of experiments and improved yields and 

reproducibility on Z, and analysis of stockpile issues through numerical simulation that will have 

significant impact on future annual assessment reviews. 

◼ TABS (Thermally Activated Battery Simulator). The team received the 2019 DOE/NNSA/Defense 

Programs Award of Excellence (Defense Programs Awards of Excellence). The TABS model 

completely reinvented and shortened the battery production process.

◼ Microsystems Silicon Fabrication facility (SiFab) revitalization. SNL achieved substantial 

completion of this multi-project revitalization, significantly reducing the risks of process tool and 

site infrastructure failure in the SiFab.

◼ Stockpile Responsiveness Program. SNL successfully completed a series of tests using SNL’s 

unique 16” Mobile Davis Gun. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program team used the Davis Gun 

tests to provide valuable experimental data for comparison to computer simulations that model 

impact at high speeds.

◼ Hypersonic fluid, material response, trajectory coupling. SNL researchers completed an effort 

to tightly couple the trajectory analysis code, TAOS, to their computational fluid dynamics and 

ablation code, SPARC. The two-way coupled capability enables the prediction of hypersonic 

reentry flight physics from reentry to impact and reduces the reliance on empirical models that 

are currently built into SNL’s trajectory solvers. The work is part of an effort to develop a virtual 

flight test capability.

◼ Delivering next generation modeling od-simulation capability. Enabling rapid computer-aided 

design-to-analysis workflow and generating qualification evidence via simulation are the tenets 

of SNL’s Next Generation Simulation capability development project. Developed as part of 

NNSA’s Advanced Simulation and Computing Program, this cross-laboratory team is delivering 

automated simulation capabilities to greatly reduce the time to produce an analysis. 

Attract, Retain, and Develop Talent

◼ Jill Hruby Fellowship. The newly established Jill Hruby Fellowship, honoring SNL’s former 

Director who was NNSA’s first female Laboratory Director, attracted women in engineering and 

science interested in pursuing technical leadership careers in national security. SNL made one

offer, which was accepted. 

◼ Securing Top Academic Research and Talent with Historically Black Colleges and Universities 

(START HBCU) program. SNL launched the START HBCU program to establish partnerships for 

research collaborations, expose students to the work of a national laboratory, and increase SNL’s

awareness of each HBCU’s capabilities. The four universities selected for the inaugural program 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-39

include Florida A&M University, Norfolk State University, North Carolina A&T State University, 

and Prairie View A&M University.

◼ Weapon Intern Program technical professional development. Since 1998, SNL has sponsored 

the Weapon Intern Program to accelerate the process of providing training to technical 

professionals across the nuclear security enterprise in nuclear weapon development. With over 

450 program graduates, the Weapon Intern Program turns out about two dozen students each 

year from all sites in the nuclear security enterprise, NNSA, and DoD officers/civilians. Topics 

include various weapon technology, design, development, evaluation, production, operations, 

process, policy, and management areas.

◼ Military academic collaboration. The Military Academic Collaboration is a cooperative research 

program administered by NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs, through which cadets, 

midshipmen, and faculty are temporarily assigned to one of eight locations across the nuclear 

security enterprise. The Military Academic Collaboration program gives the opportunity to 

explore cutting-edge R&D in disciplines and technologies of mutual interest. SNL New Mexico

and SNL California sponsor approximately 40 cadets, midshipmen, and faculty each year from 

the 4 service academies. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in FY 2020 all onsite internships 

were transitioned to remote opportunities.

◼ National Security Leadership Development Program. SNL’s leadership participates in the SNL 

National Security Leadership Development Program, which is built on foundational leadership 

principles and SNL’s heritage; SNL attracted 27 executive leadership participants through this 

effort. 

Awards and Recognition. 

◼ SNL received six coveted R&D 100 awards in each of the last 2 years. SNL employees earned 10 

national technical awards, and 10 were named as fellows of national and international technical 

societies. In addition, 15 others received awards from diversity organizations and universities for 

outstanding technical accomplishments, leadership, and community service. SNL received the 

“Inclusive Leadership and Transformative Change” award from Profiles in Diversity Journal. The 

Journal recognized SNL as one of 14 of the world’s leading companies, and the only national 

laboratory, with programs and initiatives that take diversity and inclusion to a new level.

Infrastructure Investments.

◼ SNL managed 69 active capital projects with a total estimated cost of $241 million, 94 percent

within cost and 91 percent within schedule baselines. 

◼ DOE/NNSA selected SNL New Mexico as the preferred alternative for the Power Sources 

Capability capital acquisition project for conceptual design and Critical Decision 1 (CD-1) in 

accordance with DOE Order 413.3B. The project will be sited in Technical Area 2. This project 

will be the first construction project at SNL above the minor construction threshold in 

approximately 15 years and will consolidate Power Sources capabilities across the SNL New 

Mexico campus and will ensure sustainment of this capability for the future nuclear deterrent 

program.

Other DOE/NNSA Accomplishments

◼ Response training. SNL conducted over 90 trainings for more than 800 emergency responders 

across DOE to maintain response personnel skills and qualifications. The team maintained the 

Nation’s response capability by developing training materials that could be used in a virtual 

training environment and sending tailored teams to provide safe onsite training.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-40

◼ Oil Quality Assessment Program support for Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In response to a 

Presidential Directive to fill the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, SNL led short-turnaround 

development, integration, and documentation of an oil quality characterization program. The 

assessment provided specific, actionable recommendations to DOE on maximizing inbound 

crude oil compatibility with the current U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve inventory and 

maintaining operating requirements for both near-term oil volatility upon return to customers 

and long-term integrity of the reserve. This effort was key to the success of DOE’s crude oil 

exchange-for-fill program that supported the U.S. energy sector during the pandemic-related 

economic downturn.

◼ SNL COVID-19 monitoring, modeling, and analysis. SNL developed an integrated monitoring, 

modeling, and analysis capability to track COVID-19 pandemic surges and risks to help 

decisionmakers; eased the shortage of testing kits by developing reagents and detection 

platforms for COVID-19 diagnostics and detection; and developed protocols for sterilizing 

medical supplies using the Gamma Irradiation Facility, reducing the supply chain challenges for 

COVID-19 tests.

◼ COVID-19 Rapid Response. SNL responded rapidly to join the fight against COVID-19 to initiate 

34 short-term Laboratory Directed Research and Development projects, several of which had a 

significant impact or received follow-on funding. Examples include transforming 100 noninvasive 

respiratory machines into ventilators and creating auto-update sequence collection and 

processing software for all available coronavirus genomic sequences.

◼ Cyber Risk Framework supports national strategic planning. SNL developed a Cyber Risk 

Framework for the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 

Agency National Risk Management Center (NRMC). NRMC leadership adopted the framework to 

establish a risk architecture vision and goals for strategic planning through 2040. NRMC envisions 

the framework as the “operating system” it will use to identify, analyze, prioritize, and manage 

cyber risks to critical infrastructure.

◼ Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nonproliferation activities. SNL supports DPRK 

nonproliferation activities, engaging with 22 countries and 370 participants in FY 2020. To 

support a State Department program in International Security and Nonproliferation, SNL helps 

foreign governments increase their international sanctions compliance. During a training session 

with Honduran officials, the SNL team detected a Honduran vessel illegally present in DPRK 

waters, in violation of sanctions against the DPRK. Using an SNL-developed risk matrix, the 

Honduran team has since investigated, deregistered, and reported three additional vessels. This 

work strengthens NNSA’s export control monitoring capabilities.

E.2.3.5 Sandia National Laboratories Workforce

SNL has a headcount of 13,013 employees; the average age is approximately 45 years, and 17 percent of 

the population is eligible for retirement. The average years of service is 10.5 years, and the population is 

heavily concentrated among those with 1-10 years of service. Most separations involve retirements 

among those 51 years of age or older, but younger-aged groups have experienced many voluntary 

separations. Of the voluntary separations, 51.7 percent were clustered between ages 26 and 40. 

Retirements were higher among those with 21 to 45 years of service, while a significant number of 

voluntary separations occurred among those with 0-5 years of service. SNL expects a stable workforce 

over the FYNSP period. Figures E–24 through E–32 illustrate these SNL workforce demographics and 

others.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-41

Notes:

SNL uses a systems integration approach to workforce assignments across the laboratory. Employees are matrixed to 

support key mission areas, including the Strategic Partnership Projects. Approximately, 61 percent of SNL’s headcount is 

aligned with technical duties and responsibilities ranging from R&D to applied engineering to operations. Over 52 percent

of the workforce have advanced degrees: 16 percent have a Ph.D., and 36 percent have a Masters.

Figure E–24. SNL workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

A large proportion of the workforce is aged 56 and above (24 percent). Approximately 14 percent of the population is 

aged 30 or less. The remaining 62 percent is between the ages of 31 and 55. Based on the age distribution, an increase 

in retirement is anticipated in coming years. These open positions will require a significant increase of effort toward both

recruiting future talent and retaining current SNL employees. 

Figure E–25. SNL workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-42

Notes:

Over 74 percent of employees have 15 or less years of service and 43 percent have 5 or less years of service. These 

numbers reflect the hiring of 4,228 new regular employees over the past 5 years (FY 2016 through FY 2020). This strong 

hiring pursuit ensures that a substantial percentage of employees are in the earlier phases of their careers to replace 

those in later career phases. A hiring mix of both experienced and new college graduates assures that the necessary skills 

and capabilities are present to support SNL’s missions; however, this hiring approach will require an increased focus on 

knowledge transfer and training programs.

Figure E–26. SNL workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

SNL’s workforce growth is attributable to an expanding mission scope related to stockpile modernization through LEP 

activities. Other factors include the Strategic Partnership Programs. SNL actively manages the development and size of 

support organizations to maximize mission support within allocated budgets. 

Figure E–27. SNL net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-43

Notes:

Over 51 percent of voluntary separations are clustered between the ages of 26 and 40. A high number of retirements 

are reflected in the age groups between 56 and 65 years of age, representing 33 percent of separated employees during 

FY 2020. Departures for resignation and retirement are consistent within the laboratory workforce population. 

Resignations remain below 7 percent reflecting a generally stable workforce. 

Figure E–28. Age of SNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)

Notes:

Of the voluntary employee separations, 65 percent had 5 or less years of service; 93 percent had 0-10 years of service,

and 97 percent had 15 or less years of service. This data may reflect the external demand for technical skills in a highly 

competitive market where SNL competes for talent. These losses place increased importance on relevant and 

acknowledged employee value propositions to not only draw talent from the external market, but also retain current SNL 

employees. Efficient and effective support processes,such as an expedited clearance process, internal training programs,

and knowledge transfer programs, enable new staff to promptly engage and contribute to mission work.

Figure E–29. SNL employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-44

Notes:

The increase in headcount is in direct response to mission work and demands. The mix of staff by age group reflects the 

need for new talent in all three career participation groups. Each group brings a unique skillset to SNL, creating a balanced 

workforce. For employees over 50 years, the change over time has been heavily influenced by retirements, but has 

ultimately held steady. Due to the current age distribution, SNL expects an increase in retirements, which will contribute 

to a slight decrease the over-50-year workforce participation group in the coming years. For all other workforce 

participation groups, there has been a slight increase over time.

Figure E–30. SNL workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Retirements were higher in FY 2011 and FY 2012 because of announced pending changes in retiree benefits, which 

prompted some employees to leave early. The surge in retirement in FY 2011 and FY 2012 resulted in reduced 

retirements in FY 2013 and FY 2014. An increase in expected retirements occurred in FY 2015 through FY 2018 as SNL 

returned to historical retirement rates and workforce age distribution. While headcount has steadily increased over the 

past few fiscal years, total separations in FY 2020 declined to levels not seen since FY 2017. It is believed that the 

economic uncertainty caused by COVID-19 is the primary driver of this trend and that it will likely continue through the 

pandemic.

Figure E–31. SNL employee separation trends
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-45

Notes:

The SNL workforce has grown since the FY 2020 SSMP. SNL’s total workforce trend is expected to be flat over the next 

few fiscal years. SNL will monitor workload fluctuations and manage the stability of the workforce through leveraging 

Strategic Partnership Projects, temporary staffing options, cross-training within programs, and strategic hiring.

Figure E–32. SNL workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-46

E.3 Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities

E.3.1 Kansas City National Security Campus

E.3.1.1 Mission Overview

The Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC) in 

Kansas City, Missouri, employs advanced scientific 

capabilities, statistical controls, simulation and 

modeling, and materials expertise to manufacture 

and procure DOE/NNSA’s most intricate and 

technically demanding electronic, mechanical, and 

engineered materials components. This includes

radar systems, arming and fuzing systems, 

mechanisms, gas transfer systems (GTSs), secure 

transportation products, joint test assemblies (JTAs),

and specialty engineered material products. KCNSC 

actively manages an extended supplier base to ensure suppliers are qualified and is strategically 

establishing redundant capabilities to ensure DOE/NNSA requirements are met. KCNSC partners with the 

national security laboratories to evolve weapon concepts through design and development and into 

production and sustainment. The site is responsible for life cycle management of over 80 percent of the 

components in a nuclear weapon across all active and emerging nuclear stockpile systems. In addition to 

its Nuclear Weapon Programs mission, the site supports Nuclear Nonproliferation, Emergency 

Management, and Counterterrorism missions. The site also supports a Global Security mission that 

involves development and delivery of field-ready engineering solutions for other government agencies' 

national security missions.

◼ Locations: Kansas City, Missouri; Albuquerque, New Mexico

◼ Total Employees: 5,300 (as of end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-program nuclear weapons production facility

◼ Website: www.kcnsc.doe.gov

◼ Contract Operator: Honeywell Federal Manufacturing & Technologies, LLC

◼ Responsible Field Office: Kansas City Field Office

E.3.1.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source 

(total KCNSC FY 2022 request = $1,280 million)

KCNSC split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($1,234 million)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-47

E.3.1.3 Site Capabilities

KCNSC’s capabilities support both weapon systems currently in the stockpile and those being modernized 

via LEPs, Alts, and Mods. For legacy systems, these activities include Directed Stockpile Work in the 

management, production, processing, and delivery of hardware for LLC exchanges and flight test systems;

surveillance testing of components and materials; and maintenance and repair of weapons systems. For 

future stockpile systems, KCNSC’s work scope includes development and maturation of manufacturing 

processes and technologies, production of prototypesto support design development, and manufacturing 

of components and systems. 

KCNSC’s capabilities are used to research and develop new materials for legacy and future stockpile 

systems. Production capabilities include over 40 manufacturing technologies and manufacturing over 

1,000 unique product families, including arming, fuzing, and firing devices; safing devices; microcircuits;

machined parts; polymers; plastics; and other engineered materials. KCNSC also designs, develops, and 

produces associated support equipment, tooling, fixtures, and test equipment.

KCNSC provides capabilities integral to the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program. KCNSC’s primary capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies are 

described in Table E–4.

Table E–4. Kansas City National Security Campus Capabilities

Non-nuclear Weapon Component Manufacturing and Assembly

KCNSC is the primary site for manufacturing and procuring non-nuclear components including arming, fuzing, and firing

systems; gas transfer systems; environmental sensing devices; strong links; and structural components and cushions made 

from engineered materials. The capability to manufacture and inspect these items is highly dependent on specialized 

equipment and facilities (cleanrooms, environmentally controlled areas, etc.) and the ability to maintain them (i.e., calibration 

and metrology).

Challenges Strategies

• Balancing the growing maintenance needs of 

aging production equipment with the needs 

for emerging production technology for the 

LEPs.

• Availability of a cleared and ready labor 

force.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

• Continue programmatic and 

infrastructure-related investment 

projects.

• Hire hourly resources in advance of 

needs to allow time for clearance, 

training, and certification.

• Use expedited clearance 

methodologies.

• Maximize onboarding efficiencies 

with training, certification, and 

working on unclassified product.

• Continue current strategies.

• Be proactive in identifying and 

applying technologies and 

capabilities that offer solutions 

to enterprise issues.

• Consider options to deploy 

technology to increase 

responsiveness, reduce impact 

of producibility challenges, and 

provide design alternatives.

• See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3,

for enterprise workforce 

training and knowledge transfer 

challenges and strategies.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-48

Testing Equipment Design and Fabrication

KCNSC designs and produces test equipment to support its mission and that of the other sites within the nuclear security 

enterprise. Often, these test systems are integrated with various types of environmental conditioning equipment, such as 

thermal chambers or centrifuges, to perform automated testing for weapon environments. These test systems are vital to 

development, qualification, acceptance and long-term surveillance of weapon systems and components.

Challenges Strategies

A key challenge is the cyclical workload, which is 

very heavy during the development phases and 

lighter during the production phases.

• Complexity of test systems to meet program 

requirements

• Ability to staff appropriately in a dynamic 

business environment

• Production Agency/Design Agency 

coordination and availability of definition 

and early hardware to support tester 

development

• New capabilities required by emerging 

programs (e.g., shock, vibration, combined 

environments)

• Difficulty simulating realistic (combined) 

flight environments

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

To maintain the specialized workforce 

in this area, emphasize level loading of 

the workload to the extent possible, 

combined with providing flexibility in 

assignments. Opportunities for 

challenging work assignments include 

the Strategic Partnership Programs.

• Deploy Common Tester 

Architecture.

• Provide flexibility in assignment 

areas.

• Better plan and execute resourceloaded program schedules.

• Obtain appropriate funding to 

develop new capabilities.

• Ensure milestones for test 

definitions and early hardware for 

tester development are included in 

weapon development schedules

Use RASR [Research and Sounding 

Rocket] and HOTSHOT [High 

Operational Tempo Sounding Rocket 

Flight Test] rocket flight tests to 

simulate environments.

• Continue current strategies.

• Be proactive in identifying and 

applying technologies and 

capabilities that offer solutions 

to enterprise issues.

Fabrication and Support of Secure Transportation Assets

KCNSC prepares Secure Transportation Asset (STA) vehicles in its New Mexico facility, including fabrication, repair, and 

modification of tractors, trailers, and escort vehicles. KCNSC also supports design, fabrication, and maintenance of multiple 

system capabilities and facilitates safety engineering; technical documentation; and training of the Federal agents that perform 

STA functions. 

Challenges Strategies

• Manufacturability and sourcing limitations of 

future secure transportation programs, 

which could increase cost and schedule risks.

• Implementing modifications and upgrades to 

existing STA systems for compatibility with 

Integrated Surety Architecture systems.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

• Continue partnering with design 

agencies to ensure that, early in the 

process, the design work 

incorporates lessons learned from 

past trailer production and 

manufacturability reviews and 

facilitate multiple-sourcing 

capabilities to reduce risks and costs.

• Early collaboration with design 

agencies to ensure 

manufacturability/sourcing risks are 

minimized.

• Continue current strategies.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-49

Weapon Component Surveillance and Assessment

KCNSC supports surveillance and assessment of the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile through enhanced testing of various 

weapon components and materials, as well as production of telemetry, JTAs, and other hardware for laboratory and flight 

testing. The results from those tests are used to demonstrate continued performance of stockpile systems and predict, detect, 

assess, and resolve aging trends and anomalies in the stockpile. New testing and evaluation methods are also developed and 

implemented.

Challenges Strategies

• Long-term sustainment of testers to support 

weapon life cycle surveillance requirements.

• Engaging workforce in older technologies.

• Material availability due to sunset 

technologies for legacy JTA programs.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

• Development of a proactive longterm tester sustainment plan and 

pursuit of appropriate funding 

sources.

• Successfully execute hiring, 

retention, and knowledge 

preservation strategies.

• Periodically update designs and 

modernize technology for JTA 

systems.

• Continue current efforts.

• See Chapter 7, Sections 7.4.1-

7.4.3, for enterprise workforce 

strategies.

Metal and Organic Material Fabrication, Processing and Manufacturing

KCNSC performs R&D activities to identify candidate materials for potential use in stockpile applications. KCNSC partners with 

the national laboratories to evaluate, select, and qualify new materials for the stockpile, as well as studies and re-engineers

obsolete materials that are no longer available to support the legacy stockpile. The site also develops new manufacturing 

processes for material production and use.

Challenges Strategies

• Attracting and retaining individuals in specific 

technology areas.

• Materials are no longer available because of 

obsolescence or supplier interest.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

• Partner with universities to 

identify and develop a pipeline of 

qualified candidates for potential 

hiring.

• Re-engineer obsolete materials 

and use microreactors to produce 

specialty materials in the right 

quantities and improve safety.

• See Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1, for 

enterprise workforce recruitment 

and hiring strategies.

• Continue current strategies.

Site-Wide Challenges of the Workforce Associated with Multiple Capabilities

Challenges Strategies

• Recruitment and retention of a skilled, 

diverse, and effective workforce.

• Competitive salaries for employers across the 

region and competition for top talent remain 

strong.

• Extended clearance times.

• Limited flexibility due to consumption of 

office space or non-laboratory production 

space.

• Advanced technology development and 

emerging programs are driving the need for 

increased office and manufacturing space.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

• Develop innovative methods to 

shorten clearance times.

• Improve onboarding of new staff 

to meet critical needs.

• Implement succession planning 

and emphasize critical skills bench 

strength.

• Maintain a competitive Total 

Rewards package.

• Maximize the efforts of Career 

Path and Workforce Agility Teams.

• Expand the Manufacturing 

Innovation Center to prepare and 

• See Chapter 7.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-50

train hourly staff while awaiting 

clearances.

• Hire in advance of needs to allow 

time for clearance and training.

• Partner with university relations 

programs and third-party targeted 

recruiting services.

• Continue machinist and tool and 

die maker development program.

• Implement advanced 

manufacturing technologies to 

regenerate whitespace.

• Execute successful move of 

designated product lines to KCNSC 

East (Building 23) and subsequent 

realignment and expansion within 

current space (Building 2).

• Continued planning and analysis 

of alternatives for securing

needed additional workspace.

JTA = joint test assembly

E.3.1.4 Accomplishments

◼ The B61-12 LEP has completed 112 out of 112 first production units; and completed first 

production units on all six Respin components (S1 adapter, coded switch, radar, electronics 

assembly 1, nose bomb subassembly, weapon control unit and the firing control unit). The W88 

Alteration (Alt) 370 Program completed six first production units early or on time. 

◼ The W88 Alt 370 Program completed Final Design Review for the Missile Interface and Controller 

Module, delta Production Readiness Review for the Path Length Module, and six JTA first 

production units on time or early.

◼ The B61-12 LEP delivered 91,336 components, and the W88 Alt 370 Program delivered 58,101 

components in support of the Defense Programs mission. 

◼ Delivered over 258,900 Defense Programs items in FY 2020.

◼ Executed seamless 30-day transition of plant leadership with the arrival of the new FM&T 

president and new Integrated Supply Chain vice president. 

◼ The W76-1 LEP completed all U.S. Program Control Document Requirements, signifying closure of

the first major LEP.

◼ FM&T developed a Category (CAT) Milestone Tracker to monitor and execute NNSA L2 Milestones 

and CAT milestones. FM&T tracked and managed more than 11,000 CAT milestones in FY 2020 

for both stockpile and emerging programs to ensure compliance with customer requirements, 

increase visibility for critical milestones, and increase execution predictability.

◼ Achieved a record performance in annual Supply Chain Management Center (SCMC) cost savings 

and surpassed the $1 billion mark in total (2013–2020) SCMC savings.

◼ Successfully delivered a short turn request for production of a W78 Neutron Generator Monitor 

Kit in under 20 days, enabling a Minuteman III Test Flight.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-51

◼ Effectively executed B83 Stockpile Management prototype flex circuits shipment requests in 

under a four week turnaround time, enabling the Issue Resolution Group to meet the aggressive 

First Production Capability Unit schedule.

◼ Shipped 26+ H1514C containers supporting W88 Stockpile Management production at Pantex and 

supported the Alt 370 First Production Capability Unit.

◼ Implemented W80-4 New Product Introduction initiatives that validated FY 2020 cost avoidance 

at $10.5 million, with $4.2 million in cost avoidances from commercial off-the-shelf parts, and the 

remaining cost avoidances from cycle time reductions, defect reductions, and improved 

producibility.

◼ Completed 16 Conceptual Design Reviews, 28 Conceptual Design Gates, two Component 

Requirements Reviews, and two Baseline Design Reviews on time to support the FY 2020 highpriority items per DOE/NNSA’s “Getting the Job Done” list on the W80-4 Program. 

◼ KCNSC W87-1 team successfully executed Weapon Design Cost Report kickoffs incorporating 

several improvements and lessons applied, including Production Strategy and Design Definition 

Package templates, early milestone and funding alignment, reimbursable process improvements,

hardware traceability, and early demand visibility.

◼ FM&T completed Quality Evaluation Release for use of a microreactor process in production of 

the curing agent Hylene MP; a first for the nuclear security enterprise. The microreactor process 

was subsequently baselined for the W80-4, avoiding approximately one year of delay to the 

program.

◼ FM&T collaborated with a university partner to mature femtosecond (fs) laser machining 

technology. This laser-assisted technology enables highly accurate machining for gauges and 

parts to produce results that are unattainable by traditional manufacturing methods. FM&T 

evaluated new opportunities for combining fs laser-assisted machining capability with metal 

additive manufacturing, a combination with potential uses in marking soft materials like silicone 

pads and cushions.

◼ FM&T teamed with two university partners in the successful launch of six Research and Sounding 

Rockets (RASR) tests. The RASR program helped KCNSC lead the nuclear security enterprise to a 

more rapid, high-tempo, and digital future, enabling improved readiness for new technology 

insertions.

◼ Completed transition to the KCNSC North facility to support 300+ employees, per plan; initiated 

a Capital Lease in support of light manufacturing space at KCNSC East. 

◼ Executed 100 percent of Kansas City Short-Term Expansion Program CAT milestones planned for 

FY 2020; this program remains on-track with the budget and schedule.

◼ Achieved a Total Recordable Case rate of 0.25 and a Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred case 

rate of 0.12. The Total Recordable Case rate was a benchmark when compared to federal 

contractors and similar commercial industry.

◼ KCNSC increased its headcount by over 27 percent over the last two fiscal years to support 

production for the B61-12 LEP, W88 Alt 370 Program, and Mk21 fuse, as well as development of 

the W80-4 LEP, W87-1 Modification Program and other future programs.

◼ New Mexico Operations built hardware for the Test Article 2 for MGT, per DOE/NNSA’s “Getting 

the Job Done” list. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-52

◼ FM&T was assigned responsibility for the Integrated Surety Architecture Hub. New Mexico 

Operations completed lease for a new facility, developed a cost estimate for FY 2020-FY 2026, 

and developed a schedule for standing up the capabilities necessary to meet DOE/NNSA 

requirements for the Hub.

◼ FM&T fostered a strong culture of innovation and intellectual property development through 

transformative research results, including: 119 invention disclosures, 43 patent applications, and 

28 patents issued in FY 2020.

◼ FM&T manages a resilient supply base to support the mission. KCNSC onboarded eight new 

suppliers and held a virtual Supplier Summit attended by over 180 suppliers and leaders across 

the nuclear security enterprise. 

◼ Received four Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations Excellence awards for work at 

KCNSC and in support of NNSA’s mission at other nuclear security enterprise sites.

◼ Exceeded NNSA Integrated Milestone Schedule performance goals on the W80-4 for Milestone 

Matching (99.1 percent vs. 95 percent) and Target Date Alignment (96.2 percent vs. 95 percent).

◼ Participated in Science, Technology, Engineering, Math, and Manufacturing Outreach; to develop 

the next generation of diverse nuclear security enterprise leaders. FM&T awarded 38 scholarships 

for students in the Kansas City and Albuquerque communities. Recipient groups included Latinx, 

Black Achievers, Women in Engineering, and Honeywell Opportunity for Prosperity through 

Education scholars. 

E.3.1.5 Kansas City National Security Campus Workforce

KCNSC has 5,300 employees (census as of end of FY 2020), with an average age of 41.8 years. Two-thirds 

(67.3 percent) of the employees have 5 years or fewer years of service, and over three-quarters 

(77.8 percent) have 10 years or less of service. Approximately 16 percent of the KCNSC workforce is 

eligible to retire. In the past year, KCNSC has hired 637 new employees and experienced 319 separations 

for a net gain of 318 employees. Over half (56.74 percent) of the 319 separations involved employees 

with 5 years or fewer years of service, and many were voluntary. The number of early- and mid-career 

employees has continued to steadily increase since FY 2014. The number of advanced- career employees 

has continued to remain fairly flat, but the percentage of advanced-career employees of the total 

population has decreased from about 53 percent in FY 2014 to about 28 percent in FY 2020. KCNSC 

continues to add staffing to support the forecasted workload for legacy systems, LEPs, and Alts. 

Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures E–33 through E–41.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-53

Notes:

KCNSC has seen steady growth across all of the COCS codes as it continues transitioning into the production phase of 

B61-12 LEP, W88 Alt 370 Program and Mk21 Fuze. KCNSC is also continuing active development for the W80-4 and 

is beginning development of W87-1. Overall headcount is up 27 percent from FY 2018 (an increase of 1,144 

employees). Production operators continue to make up about 23 percent of the headcount, and engineers/scientists 

continue to make up about 30 percent.

Figure E–33. KCNSC workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The average age of plant employees continues to decrease from approximately 43 in FY 2018 to 42 in FY 2020. There 

has been a shift in employee count from employees in their early 30s and late 50s in FY 2018 to the late 20s and early 

30s in FY 2020. Retirement eligibility decreased from 23 percent in FY 2018 to 16 percent in FY 2020.

Figure E–34. KCNSC workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-54

Notes:

Over two-thirds (67.3 percent) of employees have less than 5 years of service, an increase compared to FY 2018 at

58 percent for the same years of service group. Average years of service increased to approximately 10 in FY 2020

from 8 in FY 2018.

Figure E–35. KCNSC workforce distributed by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

KCNSC hired 637 employees in FY 2020, but due to 319 separations, there was only a net increase of 318 employee.

Figure E–36. KCNSC net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-55

Notes:

Of the 319 separations in FY 2020, 40 percent were greater than 50 years of age and 36 percent were less than 

35 years of age, compared to FY 2018, when 48 percent of the 605 separations were greater than 50 years of age,

and 34 percent were less than 35 years of age. The possible influence of the COVID-19 epidemic may have impacted 

separation decisions. 

Figure E–37. KCNSC employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

More than half (57 percent) of the 319 separations were within the 0–5 years of service group in FY 2020, compared 

to 47 percent in FY 2018. Two-thirds (68 percent) of separations were employees with 10 years of service or less,

compared to 55 percent in FY 2018. The impacts of COVID-19 may have affected retirement and company transfer 

decisions.

Figure E–38. KCNSC employee separation by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-56

Notes:

The total number of employees in the over 50 years old participation group has remained relatively consistant, but 

the percentage of individuals in their advanced career is half what it was 10 years ago. This would seem to reflect

not only younger employee hiring needs being met, but also employee movement into the 35 to 50 year participation 

group as individuals over 50 years old retire. 

Figure E–39. KCNSC workforce participation trends by age category and percent advancedcareer (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The number of employees who left voluntarily continues on an upward trend, but is down from FY 2019. Retirements

have remained relatively consistent over the last 3 fiscal years.

Figure E–40. KCNSC employee separation trends
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-57

Notes:

Facilities and infrastructure are a limiting factor on workforce growth. Projections reflect early business cycle 

preliminary estimates. 

Figure E–41. KCNSC workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification 

System 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-58

E.3.2 Pantex Plant

E.3.2.1 Mission Overview

The Pantex Plant (Pantex) located outside of 

Amarillo, Texas, is the only DOE/NNSA site 

authorized to assemble or disassemble nuclear 

weapons and, as DOE/NNSA’s High Explosive 

Production Center of Excellence, has cradle-to-grave 

responsibilities for high explosive (HE) production. 

As a collaborative partner with the national security 

laboratories, Pantex provides capabilities to 

transition HE R&D from bench-scale to productionscale. In addition, Pantex collaborates and provides

capabilities to DoD, the United Kingdom, 

universities, and commercial vendors. Pantex also supports the reduction of global nuclear threats 

through its nonproliferation activities.

◼ Location: Amarillo, Texas

◼ Total Employees: 3,623 (as of the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Single-program nuclear weapons production facility

◼ Website: www.pantex.energy.gov

◼ Contract Operator: Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), a corporate subsidiary of Bechtel 

National, Leidos, ATK Launch Systems, and SOC, LLC1

◼ Responsible Field Office: NNSA Production Office

E.3.2.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source 

(total Pantex FY 2022 request = $1,016 million)

Pantex split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($1,009 million)

1 On November 29, 2021, DOE/NNSA announced that Nuclear Production One (NPOne), a limited liability company consisting of 

Fluor Federal Services and AECOM Energy and Construction, was selected as the new management and operating contractor for 

the Y-12 and Pantex production facilities. A four-month transition period will begin in December.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-59

E.3.2.3 Site Capabilities

Pantex’s mission capabilities include manufacture of specialty explosives; fabrication and testing of HE 

components; assembly, disassembly, refurbishment, maintenance, and surveillance of weapons and 

weapon components; dismantlement of retired weapons; sanitization and disposition of components 

from dismantled weapons; interim staging and storage of nuclear components from dismantled weapons; 

pit requalification; pit surveillance; and pit packaging (including container surveillances and 

recertification).

Pantex’s key capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies are described in Table E–5.

Table E–5. Pantex Plant capabilities

Weapons Assembly and Disassembly

Assembly and disassembly of nuclear explosive warheads and bombs, assembly and post-mortem analysis of joint test 

assemblies (JTAs), assembly and disassembly analysis of test bed units, and electrical and mechanical tests of weapons and 

weapon components.

Challenges Strategies

Development, establishment, and 

implementation of the Documented Safety 

Analysis process for new programmatic weapons

activities.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

While vast improvements have been 

made, continue to streamline the 

Documented Safety Analysis process 

methodology for efficiency and 

effectiveness.

Continue current strategy.

Weapons Assembly/Disassembly facilities 

continue to age and will require replacement at 

some point.

Continue modernizing the existing 

bays and cells. Conduct aging studies 

and develop strategy and required 

timing for replacement of the bays 

and cells with new, modern 

assembly/disassembly facilities.

Continue current strategies.

Surveillance

Nondestructive evaluation of pits and weapon components from stockpile units to support the Annual Assessment Reports 

and destructive and nondestructive evaluation of HE from stockpile units.

Challenges Strategies

Production downtime associated with aging pit 

surveillance equipment.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Develop and evaluate options for 

upgrading or acquiring replacement 

equipment.

Continue current strategy.

High Explosives

Pantex is responsible for HE pressing, assembly of mock HE for JTAs, assembly of conventional high explosives and insensitive 

high explosives for LEPs and stockpile rebuilds, and disassembly and disposition of HE from surveillance and dismantlement 

units.

Challenges Strategies

Programmatic infrastructure (i.e., equipment) is 

aging, and some of the general-purpose 

infrastructure (i.e., buildings) is Manhattan-era.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Planned projects, High Explosive 

Science and Engineering, HE 

Synthesis, Formulation, and 

Production, and the HE Component 

Assembly facilities are planning 

recapitalization of end-of-life 

equipment needs and establishing 

major modernization plans. Continue 

replacement of end-of-life HE 

machining equipment. 

Continue line item planning, and 

coordination with DOE/NNSA. 

Initiate construction of 

replacement HE facilities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-60

Special Nuclear Material Accountability, Storage, Protection, Handling, and Disposition

These capabilities involve requalification for pits for LEPs and storage of pits and weapons.

Challenges Strategies

Pit storage capacity to support future directed 

stockpile work and production downtime 

associated with aging pit requalification 

equipment.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Implement pit staging projects to 

reconfigure operational facilities to 

increase the site storage capacity to 

address near-term staging

constraints until the Material Staging 

Facility project is re-started. Deploy 

new requalification equipment for 

upcoming LEPs. Upgrade existing 

requalification equipment.

Continue implementation of pit 

staging projects and equipment 

upgrades.

E.3.2.4 Accomplishments

◼ Completed the W76-2, providing the Navy with a low-yield, sea-launched ballistic missile warhead 

capability.

◼ Delivered First Production Capability Units for both the B61-12 LEP and the W88 Alt 370 Program.

◼ Exceeded baseline deliverables on both the W80 Alt 369 (104 percent) and W87 limited life 

component exchange (104 percent) programs.

◼ Broke ground on the Flexible Support Facility; completed design on the High Explosive Science 

and Engineering Facility and received CD-3A approval; and submitted the CD-1 conceptual design 

package for the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production Facility.

E.3.2.5 Pantex Plant Workforce

Pantex’s headcount at the end of FY 2020 was 3,623. The average age is 46 years, with approximately 

24 percent of the employees being retirement-eligible. Most employees are between 31 and 65 years of 

age. The average years of service is 12.5 years, and most employees have 1-5 years of service. In FY 2020, 

Pantex had an overall increase of 132 employees. Retirement of older, advanced-career employees

accounted for most of the separations, while those with fewer years of service accounted for more 

voluntary separations. Since FY 2017, the percentage of advanced-career employees has declined, while 

early and mid-career employees have increased. Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed 

in Figures E–42 through E–50.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-61

Notes:

Total headcount increased from 3,491 at the end of FY 2019 to 3,623 at the end of FY 2020. Significant recruiting and 

hiring efforts replaced vacancies from attrition and built the technical skill base in preparation for the increased 

workload in FY 2021 and beyond. FY 2021 will focus on hiring in preparation of increasing weapons workload. This will 

include acquiring the necessary security clearances and developing new talent. The most significant increases were in 

engineers, security, professionals, and technicians. This as a positive change, enabling CNS to have the technical skills 

needed to fulfill mission work.

Figure E–42. Pantex workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The average age of the Pantex workforce is 46 years old. The percentage eligible to retire at Pantex dropped from

FY 2019 at 26.55 percent to 24 percent in FY 2020 due to increased hiring and replacement of retirees. Age diversity is 

well distributed. Many employees elect to work beyond their earliest eligibility retirement age. Pantex remains one of 

the best employers in the area. Crafts, labor, operators, technicians, and clerical staff are hired locally and tend to 

remain until retirement.

Figure E–43. Pantex workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-62

Notes:

The average years of service at Pantex is 12.5 down from 13.3 due to the increase in hires, as seen in the 0-5 years of 

service group. This indicates that Pantex is replenishing its workforce for future needs and offsetting attrition due to 

retirements and other separations. 

Figure E–44. Pantex workforce distributed by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

FY 2020 was a strong year for recruiting, with a net gain of 132 employees. Pantex and the Y-12 National Security 

Complex combined efforts for virtual recruiting during the COVID-19 pandemic. SuccessFactors, a new consolidated 

application system, was implemented, streamlining the application and hiring process and improving the overall 

candidate experience. CNS joined the nuclear security enterprise in joint virtual and in-person recruiting initiatives at

military bases and top schools pre-pandemic. Additionally, CNS contracted with Shaker Recruitment Marketing to 

enhance visibility nationally. Candidate sourcing was expanded to LinkedIn, Indeed, and Glassdoor. Competitive pay 

and benefits aid in offer acceptance and retention of talent.

Figure E–45. Pantex net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-63

Notes:

Those leaving under age 35 are typically engineers or professionals who are more mobile. Factors include location, 

electronics restrictions, security clearances, and national competition for these skills. A large proportion of employee 

separations over 60 years old is due to retirement.

Figure E–46. Pantex employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The majority of those leaving after from 0-5 years of service are engineers or professionals under age 35 who are early 

in their career and more mobile. There are several factors that impact retention for this group: (a) location and 

commute are less desirable than competition; (b) electronic restrictions for iPhones, iPads, etc.; (c) waiting for security 

clearances can cause professionals to lose interest; and (d) other high-tech industries compete for the same skilled 

professionals. To address these concerns, CNS increased teleworking for select positions; improved work 

environments; implemented talent management opportunities for career development; improved clearance 

processing cycle time by increasing investigators to address the volume of hiring; and re-designed compensation to 

attract and retain critical skills. Those separating after over 20 years of service are typically retiring.

Figure E–47. Pantex employee separation by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-64

Notes:

The total Pantex employee population grew specifically among employees less than 50 years old due to increased 

hiring and low attrition. Many employees over 50 years old are electing to work longer. For the first time in 10 years, 

workforce participation in the 35-to-50-years-old range surpassed employee participation in over 50 years old. 

Figure E–48. Pantex workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced 

career (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Just under half (43.75 percent) of separations are due to retirements. The average age of retirees is increasing as 

retirement-eligible employees are electing to work longer. Several factors may be considered for this shift such as 

better health, cognitive activity, opportunity to telecommute and uncertainty about the COVID-19 pandemic and the 

impact on travel, family and the economy. Those now turning 65 typically work until 66+ to receive full social security 

benefits. Pension plans were phased out for new hires around 2012 and replaced by enhanced 401(k) plans for 

retirement planning. This change removed the perceived retirement trigger (pension eligibility at age 55 with 10 years 

of service) for those hired after 2012. Retention efforts have been successful, which is a positive trend.

Figure E–49. Pantex employee separation trends
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-65

Notes:

The total estimated number of personnel needed to support work in the near term is relatively static. CNS anticipates

hiring for attrition replacement with emphasis on engineers, safety basis personnel, IT, technicians, and Security Police 

Officers. Technicians and Security Police Officers are usually filled from the local market and military. Engineers, IT, 

and safety basis personnel are being recruited from job fairs and universities. Internal realignment is used in some 

cases to fill critical vacancies. Plant attrition is expected to remain low, around 5 percent – 6 percent. Crafts, 

technicians and administration personnel typically have lower attrition, while engineers have higher attrition due to 

national demand. This is an ongoing concern, as other technology companies are competing for the limited market of 

engineering and technology skillsets. Based on current hiring/termination statistics, CNS anticipates gaps in 

engineering, safety basis, IT, risk management, and fire protection in the next 10 years. CNS is using national recruiting 

search engines and working closely with universities and military bases to help fill the pipeline for engineers and

technology for years to come.

Figure E–50. Pantex workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification 

System 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-66

E.3.3 Savannah River Site

E.3.3.1 Mission Overview

The Savannah River Site (SRS), which spans Aiken, 

Allendale, and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina, 

includes mission areas in tritium supply, stockpile 

maintenance, stockpile evaluation, tritium R&D, and 

helium-3 recovery. SRS is managed by the DOE Office 

of Environmental Management with DOE/NNSA as a 

tenant, making it unique across the nuclear security 

enterprise sites. Approximately 35 percent of the SRS

M&O workforce is dedicated to NNSA missions. 

DOE/NNSA pays its share of an indirect allocation for 

personnel to maintain infrastructure and services (e.g., 

roads, steam, fire water, electricity, medical, 

emergency services personnel). The scope of Defense 

Programs work resides in the Savannah River Tritium Enterprise1(SRTE), which is managed as a separate

entity within SRS, and through the Plutonium Sustainment Program and the proposed Savannah River 

Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF). 

◼ Location: Aiken, South Carolina

◼ Total Employees: 885 (82 Plutonium, 803 SRTE at the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-program site; DOE’s Office of Environmental Management is the SRS landlord; 

NNSA is a tenant on site

◼ Website: www.srs.gov and www.savannahrivernuclearsolutions.com

◼ Contract Operator: Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS; Fluor, Honeywell, Huntington 

Ingalls Industries)

◼ Responsible Field Office: Savannah River Field Office

E.3.3.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source 

(total SRS FY 2022 request = $2,860 million)

SRS split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($1,098 million)

1 SRTE is the collective term for the facilities, capabilities, people, and expertise at SRS related to tritium, and the SRTE umbrella 

extends beyond the tritium area to include vital mission-support functions. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this 

appendix will reference SRTE.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-67

E.3.3.3 Site Capabilities

SRS has unique capabilities related to nuclear weapon LLCs and the broader national security mission of 

reducing global nuclear security threats to the United States and its allies. Tritium is a critical component 

of the Nation’s defense systems and must be continually replenished to meet deterrent needs. SRS 

conducts large-scale tritium operations, and SRTE is the DOE/NNSA Center of Excellence Involving Large 

Quantities of Tritium. To sustain the tritium inventory, tritium is recovered from two sources: end-of-life 

GTS reservoirs that are returned to SRS and irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) 

received from the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

SRPPF will support plutonium pit production by repurposing the former Mixed Oxide Fuel Facility (MFFF) 

into a safe, secure, compliant, and efficient pit production facility. The former MFFF is a Security Category 

1/Hazard Category 2 structure that provides an opportunity to achieve pit production in a facility designed 

to meet stringent security and safety requirements for plutonium operations. As described in Chapter 3, 

Section 3.2.1.3, SRPPF will provide a sustained production capacity of no fewer than 50 War Reserve pits 

per year as close to 2030 as possible at SRS.

SRS’s key capabilities and associated challenges and strategies are described in Table E–6.

Table E–6. Savannah River Site capabilities

Tritium Recycling (Tritium Recycle and Recovery Program)

Systems for recovering and recycling tritium from returned GTS reservoirs.

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Tritium inventory systems contain LLCs, 

many of which are nearing life expectancy. 

Recovering the contents of the LLCs 

requires careful planning and coordination 

to avoid mission interruption. 

In the short-term, schedule 

replacement projects to maximize

efficiency and reduce impact on 

operating schedules. 

In the long-term, deploy new 

technologies to enhance system 

operating efficiency and reduce 

footprint. 

Tritium Extraction (Tritium Modernization Program)

Tritium extraction from irradiated TPBARs.

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

To meet supply requirements, SRTE 

requires additional workforce with training, 

qualifications, and proficiencies.

SRTE examines multi-year staffing 

needs and develops appropriate 

processes to ensure a continuous 

pipeline of knowledge, skills, and 

abilities to sustain tritium capabilities.

Continue to examine multi-year 

staffing needs and work on retention 

of current employees by leadership 

engagement and focus on career 

development.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-68

Replenishing Tritium in Gas Transfer System Reservoirs

Replenishing tritium in GTS reservoirs.

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Maintain facilities and equipment to 

support stockpile deliverables and future 

warhead modernization activities.

SRTE uses a strategic investment 

process and prioritizes its 

infrastructure needs to ensure 

mission continuity. Priorities are 

identified through engineering 

analysis and risk assessment, vetted 

by leadership teams, and captured on 

a strategic roadmap. This process 

also includes infrastructure and 

equipment improvements.

Revitalizing SRTE infrastructure 

includes (1) relocating and right-sizing

remaining operational functions from 

functionally obsolete facilities into 

existing and new space via the Tritium 

Responsive Infrastructure 

Modifications (TRIM) program and

(2) recapitalizing and sustaining

enduring facilities. 

TRIM consists of one line-item project 

(the Tritium Finishing Facility,) and a 

suite of minor construction and 

operating expense-funded projects. 

The Tritium Finishing Facility will 

replace the Cold War-era H-Area Old 

Manufacturing Facility. 

Addressing infrastructure needs in a highhazard area without interrupting the 

mission schedule while adapting for 

multiple, more complex operations.

SRTE is modifying the process and 

infrastructure equipment and 

executing a strategic investment 

process to ensure continuity. SRTE is 

also evaluating critical systems to 

ensure optimal product capacity 

while carefully planning the 

production outages to maximize 

benefit.

Continue current strategy.

Gas Transfer System Surveillance and Tritium Research and Development

SRTE function testing for GTS surveillance and tritium R&D.

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Maintain original function test equipment. SRTE is initiating R&D projects and 

transitioning to an extended schedule 

that will allow additional enhanced 

operations to eliminate the potential 

for capacity constraints.

Execute R&D projects.

SRS Plutonium Modernization

Proposed pit production mission at Savannah River.

Challenges

Strategies

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Repurposing of the former MFFF at SRS to 

achieve a production rate of 50 ppy as close 

to 2030 as possible.

Implement a tailored approach to 

achieve CD-1 (Approve Alternative 

Selection and Cost Range)/CD-2 

(Approve Performance Baseline) and 

CD-3A Long Lead Procurements, to 

support producing 50 War Reserve 

ppy as close to 2030 as possible.

Re-establish the supply chain for 

weapons-related components and 

commodities needed to support the 

50 ppy mission.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-69

E.3.3.4 Accomplishments

◼ Delivered all LLC exchanges, JTAs, and minor Alts on schedule. Accommodated 39 schedule 

changes inside 90-day window. 

◼ SRNS dedicated much of FY 2020 to SRTE infrastructure improvements to ensure robust plant 

operation, contributing to overall efficiency and the ability to meet future mission needs. SRNS 

increased operational capabilities and flexibility through completion of the Diffuser Stacking 

project. This provides a means to directly process waste gas out of the Tritium Extraction Facility

and eliminates dependency on H Area New Manufacturing as that facility transitions into higher 

production periods.

◼ Strong advance lead times, facilitated by DOE/NNSA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 

provided a buffer for process upsets and bolstered sprint capability. At the height of the 

pandemic, SRNS was asked to accelerate shipments to DoD. In one case, the entire finishing, 

assembly, and packaging process, which normally requires several weeks, was done in 7 days. 

◼ Supported DOE/NNSA completion of three environmental impact statements supporting 

plutonium pit production which earned SRNS employee inclusion among the National 

Environmental Policy Act Integrated Project Team that won an NNSA NA-50 Award of Excellence.

◼ Started a plutonium pit production Knowledge Transfer Program with LANL where SRS personnel 

will spend 2 years working with LANL personnel and then return to SRS to serve as subject matter 

experts and train others.

◼ Evaluated over 130 plutonium pit production process flowsheet technology elements, with 14 

down-selected as critical technology elements and hosted subject matter experts from across the 

enterprise in performing Technology Readiness Level evaluations of the critical technology 

elements. 

E.3.3.5 Savannah River Site Workforce

As of September 30, 2020, SRS reported a headcount of 885 personnel supporting DOE/NNSA programs. 

82 of those personnel are involved in the SRS portion of DOE/NNSA’s Plutonium Strategy. For the 

plutonium workforce, a multi-year training and qualification process will be undertaken to ensure the 

necessary people, processes, procedures, and commodities are in place to meet the minimum 50 ppy 

requirement at SRS as close to 2030 as possible. Essential to this process will be the transition of an 

existing facility into the SRS Training and Operations Center, beginning with design work in FY 2021. LANL 

and LLNL are supporting the training rotation pipeline for the SRS pit production mission through a 

knowledge transfer program initiated in FY 2020 with the Savannah River National Laboratory. This 

knowledge transfer program will form the foundation of the Training and Operations Center knowledge 

and experience base. SRS will support hiring and training through experience and programs with regional 

universities and trade schools.

The plutonium workforce has an average age of 47 years and average years of service of roughly 6 years. 

The tritium workforce has an average age of 44 and an average of 12 years of service. Most SRS employees 

are within the 0-5 years of service category. Similar to the other sites, a significant number of separations 

were also in this category. During FY 2020, SRS experienced 69 separations for personnel supporting 

DOE/NNSA programs, the majority of which were voluntary and, similar to the existing split between 

programs, were located in the tritium workforce. SRS expects significant growth, almost doubling the 

amount of personnel required to perform its share of the nuclear security mission.

Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures E–51 through E–59.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-70

Notes:

In FY 2020, hiring was focused on replacements for attrition and additions for increased work scope in small projects and 

engineering. SRTE ended FY 2020 at an actual headcount of 97 percent of that which was projected. The challenges in 

FY 2020 shifted to potential attrition related to new and increased NNSA missions on site. In FY 2020, SRTE managed 

retention by leadership engagement and focusing on career development of employees. The loss of workforce to the 

commercial nuclear industry has continued to diminish to almost nonexistent levels with attrition largely due to 

opportunities outside of the industry, as well as to other areas on site due increased DOE/NNSA missions.

Figure E–51. SRTE total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-71

Notes:

In FY 2020, the average age of the overall workforce remained at 44 years old, though it had been trending down. The 

average age in FY 2018 was 45, a decrease from 47 the previous year. The average age of personnel hired within the last 

5 years is 37, an increase of 1 year from FY 2019. The consistent SRNS and SRTE focus on hiring and the time necessary 

for clearance, training, and qualification has yielded positive results in having the workforce available for work to meet 

mission requirements. In addition, continued focus on employee-leader engagement, development and retention of new 

employees, and knowledge transfer and preservation has had a positive impact on retention and succession planning for 

bench strength of talent in the organization. SRNS-Tritium continues to develop its Knowledge Preservation Management 

Program and initiatives to retain legacy knowledge. Retirement eligibility remains steady. SRNS-Tritium remains focused 

on retention of key critical resources due to onsite competition for a skilled workforce. Retirement impacts are greater 

in some organizations than others. In general, 16 percent of the SRNS-Tritium workforce is fully retirement-eligible as of 

FY 2020. Employees hired after August 2008 were no longer eligible for pension, so retention of those employees is key. 

NNSA Operations and Programs measures retirement eligibility and risk through both Social Security Administration 

retirement eligibility and pension eligibility. SRNS-Tritium is expected to experience continued steady retirement over 

the next 5 to 8 years, with possible upticks to coincide with new missions, M&O turnover, and impacts related to national 

events/disease. 

Figure E–52. SRTE employees by age (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-72

Notes:

The SRNS-Tritium workforce is in transition. Currently, 57 percent of the workforce has between 0-5 years of service. 

That is an increase of 2 percent over FY 2019, and that percentage continues to increase. 29 percent have 21+ years of 

service. That is a 5 percent decrease from FY 2019. SRNS-Tritium continues to manage hiring with a focus on replacement 

for attrition and increased work scope. The previous years’ targeted recruiting efforts for candidates with a military 

background and those with nuclear industry experience have provided SRTE with competent employees who have been 

able to advance in their careers and provide the organization with excellent operations leadership. With the projected 

increase in mission scope, anticipated retirement, and onsite competition, SRTE has continued to hire ahead of need to 

allow adequate time for onboarding and qualification. This strategy has yielded positive results. SRNS-Tritium has 

worked creatively to decrease the onboarding process, such as the use of an unclassified simulator and a restructured 

training program. To prepare in advance for anticipated continued steady attrition and increased mission requirements, 

an overlap in staffing might be hindered by budgetary constraints. Adequate and timely funding to allow hiring in advance 

is crucial. Partnerships with the Nuclear Workforce Initiative organization, Aiken Technical College, the University of 

South Carolina–Aiken, and regional universities continue. The SRNS Engineering Leadership Development Program 

continues to attract and hire new talent. Corporate reach-back and restructured recruiting practices will become a focus 

for external sources of experienced personnel. SRNS-Tritium will face steady retirements over the next 5 to 8 years with 

a possible uptick near the end of the contract. As experienced employees leave the organization, the focus has shifted 

to development and retention of new employees and achieving and maintaining mission essential staffing levels.

Figure E–53. SRTE employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-73

Notes:

Hiring for the SRNS-Tritium organization continued to meet its strategic staffing plan in terms of numbers and exceed 

expectations in terms of quality of new hires. Following an uptick in hiring over the past 5 years, hiring leveled in FY 2019 

and FY 2020 to reflect replacements for attrition and focus on the increased work scope and mission expansion. Attrition 

continued to remain steady. Most workers left for retirement, followed by SRNS business need and 

development/promotional opportunities within the site. External competition for employees with regional nuclear 

companies remains low due to a slowdown in the commercial nuclear industry. The greatest challenge is to retain talent 

by focusing on engagement and career development opportunities in SRTE. Leadership remains focused on employee 

engagement and linking work to the mission. With discontinuation of the retirement program, SRNS-Tritium has found 

other ways to motivate, recognize, and compensate employees, including a Savings Investment Plan and corporate 

matching, leadership engagement, certification stipends, meaningful work, and career development opportunities within 

the organization. SRNS-Tritium continued its New Employee Orientation, which introduces new hires to leadership, 

emphasizes that people are our most important asset, and enhances knowledge of the facility. The New Employee 

Orientation has been well received, and an overall focus on the importance of the Mission to National Security has led to 

greater employee engagement in the work they are performing

Figure E–54. Change in last 2 fiscal years at SRTE (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-74

Notes:

At SRNS-Tritium, attrition has increased slightly, but remained steady. Retirement accounted for 33 percent of 

all attrition in FY 2020 and remains steady. Overall, retirements and voluntary and involuntary attrition have 

remained steady. Twenty-five of the 41 voluntary transfers out of SRNS-Tritium to SRNS were related to new 

mission scope and developmental/promotional opportunities elsewhere on site. The remainder were for 

outside opportunities related to family relocation, other opportunities outside the nuclear industry, and 

personal reasons. Exit interviews did not implicate workplace issues of concern. This is attributed to greater 

leadership focus and engagement with the workforce, as well as the culture centered around mission and 

national security. Attrition is expected to remain steady and may increase as the end of the contract 

approaches and new opportunities arise on site. Over the past 5 years, an aggressive hiring strategy was 

deployed, and we are now largely sustaining current workforce levels. The main areas of focus will be design 

agency, design engineering, electrical engineering, and hires related to increased small projects, including the 

Tritium Finishing Facility. SRNS and SRNS-Tritium continued to enhance the screening, hiring, and onboarding 

processes to early-identify and align employees to the work that is performed. Over the past 3 years,

continuous improvements have resulted in better quality hires and levels of staffing in SRTE that allow us to 

meet the mission. 

Figure E–55. Age of SRTE employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-75

Notes:

SRNS-Tritium continued to experience a steady level of retirements occurring in the 31-35 years of service 

range. This is consistent with FY 2018 and FY 2019. No concerning trends were detected. Employees retiring 

and leaving voluntarily and involuntarily also remained steady. Those who left within the 0-5 year category 

were primarily related to new mission requirements, promotional opportunities on site, and opportunities 

outside the nuclear industry. Outliers included employees moved to other roles on site for business needs due 

to the new/expanded mission at SRS. The focus continues on retention strategies for employees hired under a 

restructured benefits plan that features the portability of a Savings Investment Plan as opposed to a pension 

plan. Engagement initiatives, including New Employee Orientation, a focus on the national security mission, 

and leadership development, are succeeding in creating a compelling place to work and are having a positive 

impact on retention.

Figure E–56. Years of service of SRTE employees who left service

(October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-76

Notes:

Increased and sustained hiring combined with career development, succession, and other retention efforts 

have led to an increase in the early-career and mid-career populations at SRNS-Tritium. A steady level of 

retirement and transfer or promotions to other opportunities at SRS have led to a decrease in advanced-career 

workers. The mid-career population will continue to be monitored to help ensure career development 

opportunities are available to retain and grow the workforce. This, combined with compelling workplace 

improvements, should impact all career groups in a positive way.

Figure E–57. SRTE trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-77

Notes:

Workforce retirement is expected to remain steady over the next 5 years. Voluntary separations increased as 

a result of promotional opportunities on site and mission-related business needs. SRNS-Tritium continues to 

plan and execute workforce growth commensurate with mission requirements to recapitalize process 

equipment and surrounding infrastructure, increasing GTS work scope due to the LEPs, and expected 

retirements of personnel requiring clearance and training processes. The goal is to remain aware of the 

constantly changing business conditions and environment, continue to hire for replacements and increased 

work scope, and to retain new employees by providing meaningful work, leadership engagement, development 

opportunities and a compelling place to work.

Figure E–58. SRTE employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-78

Notes:

We expect mission growth primarily due to the Tritium Extraction Facility tritium supply production increase;

the plutonium mission; increased project activity (Tritium Finishing Facility Program line item and minor 

construction projects); a growing effort to reduce the maintenance backlog on facilities and infrastructure; and 

implementation of Nuclear Enterprise Assurance requirements. SRTE will also experience some growth in 

reservoir processing and surveillance due to increases in workload complexity due to the new LEPs. This will 

increase housing requirements, including the need for new office space. In addition to mission increases, SRNSTritium will continue to manage steady attrition (retirements and resignation) and employee retention. 

Figure E–59. Total projected SRTE workforce needs by Common Occupational 

Classification System (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-79

E.3.4 Y-12 National Security Complex

E.3.4.1 Mission Overview

Every weapon in the U.S. nuclear stockpile has 

components manufactured, maintained, or 

dismantled at the Y-12 National Security Complex 

(Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Y-12 is DOE/NNSA’s 

Uranium Center of Excellence and the Nation’s only 

source for enriched uranium components for 

nuclear weapons. For the legacy stockpile, Y-12 

manufactures uranium components for nuclear 

weapons, cases, and other weapons components 

and evaluates and tests these components. 

Through LEP activities, Y-12 produces refurbished, 

replaced, and upgraded weapon components to 

modernize the enduring stockpile. Y-12 also serves as the main storage facility for Category I/II quantities 

of highly enriched uranium (HEU); conducts dismantlement, storage, and disposition of HEU; and supplies 

HEU for use in naval reactors. 

◼ Location: Oak Ridge, Tennessee

◼ Total Employees: 6,603 (Total, includes Weapons Activities, as of the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-program nuclear weapons production facility

◼ Website: www.y12.doe.gov

◼ Contract Operator: Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), a corporate subsidiary of Bechtel 

National, Leidos, ATK Launch Systems, and SOC, LLC1

◼ Responsible Field Office: NNSA Production Office 

E.3.4.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source 

(total Y-12 FY 2022 request = $2,109 million) 

Y-12 split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($2,064 million)

1 On November 29, 2021, DOE/NNSA announced that Nuclear Production One (NPOne), a limited liability company consisting of 

Fluor Federal Services and AECOM Energy and Construction, was selected as the new management and operating contractor for 

the Y-12 and Pantex production facilities. A four-month transition period will begin in December. The Uranium Processing Facility

will continue under CNS.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-80

E.3.4.3 Site Capabilities

Key mission capability areas at Y-12 are primarily in three areas: uranium and canned subassembly 

production; lithium; and material and process R&D. Key to all of these capabilities is the supporting 

infrastructure that provides power, water, and other critical services. Y-12’s key capabilities and their 

associated challenges and strategies are described in Table E–7.

Table E–7. Y-12 National Security Complex capabilities

Uranium and Canned Subassembly Production Capability

Y-12 produces uranium weapon components to refurbish the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. Y-12 also recycles and reprocesses 

the Nation’s existing supply of enriched uranium. The recycled metal serves as feedstock for the Navy’s nuclear-powered 

submarines and aircraft carriers, for commercial power reactors that generate U.S. electricity, for medical isotope production, 

and for some domestic and foreign research reactor programs. Y-12 also helps recover and secure at-risk nuclear materials 

around the globe. The Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 houses the Nation’s cache of weapons-grade 

uranium. The Uranium Processing Facility now under construction will be a state-of-the-art facility for the enriched uranium 

operations that are currently performed in Building 9212. 

Challenges Strategies

To continue supporting all uranium missions, Y-12 

must address its aging infrastructure. Current 

facilities are aging, necessitating sustainment through 

the Extended Life Program. Enriched uranium 

capabilities must be maintained while the Uranium 

Processing Facility is being constructed. Maintaining 

this capability necessitates relocation of enriched 

uranium functions to other Y-12 facilities and startup 

and proving of replacement technologies before 

uranium programmatic operations cease in current 

facilities by 2025. Y-12 must also complete reduction 

of material-at-risk quantities in current processing 

facilities by consolidating storage into the Highly 

Enriched Uranium Materials Facility.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

The Uranium Processing Facility will 

replace most of the HEU production 

functions currently performed in 

Building 9212. The uranium strategy 

also includes upgrades and advanced 

technologies that will be started in 

existing facilities.

Additional replacement 

facilities will be needed and 

are currently planned for the 

late 2030s and 2040s.

Depleted Uranium operations produce and maintain a 

reliable inventory of depleted uranium, depleted 

uranium alloy, and other non-nuclear industrial 

material components and tooling through a variety of 

metalworking processes in support of LEPs, JTAs, and 

other national security and government programs. 

Depleted uranium infrastructure is also aging, and 

Increased throughput and capacity is required for 

future programs, which requires both additional 

equipment and personnel.

Purchase the limited commercial 

high-purity depleted uranium (HPDU)

supplies and investment in feedstock 

capabilities to ensure steady stream 

of HPDU in the future.

Invest in maintenance of the legacy 

alloying processes. Plan to purchase 

additional equipment to reduce the 

strain on legacy equipment and 

processes.

Identify bottlenecks and develop 

bridging strategies to fulfill near-term 

mission requirements should new 

technology not be employed in the 

immediate future

Replace depleted uranium 

and fabrication/

manufacturing functions in 

current facilities with the 

Depleted Uranium 

Manufacturing Capability.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-81

Lithium Capability

Y-12 provides material purification, material preparation, component fabrication and inspection, salvage operations, and 

storage for lithium operations to support LEPs, JTAs, and complementary work. Without enriched lithium, the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent could not be maintained. 

Challenges Strategies

Current lithium capabilities are housed in a 

Manhattan Project-era facility with infrastructure well 

beyond its expected life and rapidly deteriorating. 

The process equipment is inefficient for its current

mission scope, is rapidly deteriorating, and has far

exceeded its life expectancy. Current Lithium 

production capabilities will be placed under additional 

strain because of material supply issues and the

projected increase in mission scope. Combined, these 

challenges represent significant risk to the mission.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

DOE/NNSA’s lithium strategy 

necessitates sustainment of the 

current infrastructure; sustainment of

the supply to meet customer demand;

and maturation and deployment of 

technologies to replace hazardous 

processes.

Design and construct the Lithium 

Processing Facility.

Continue to maintain legacy 

processing lines of effort 

through identified facility 

lifecycle extension projects 

until the Lithium Processing 

Facility is fully operational.

Future projects to maintain 

capability include electrical, 

utility upgrades, and other 

identified structural life 

extending efforts.

Material and Process Research and Development Capability

Y-12’s Development Division serves as the focal point for development and preservation of uranium and lithium materials 

sciences and manufacturing technologies. R&D activities include material and metallurgical synthesis, forming, evaluation 

techniques and processes, material purification, and material characterization. Advanced technologies have been developed 

and are at varying stages of deployment readiness for enriched uranium and lithium. 

Challenges Strategies

Development is essential to Y-12’s production

mission, providing a ready pool of subject matter 

experts to tackle production problems, developing 

new technology to meet future production 

requirements, and performing strategic partnership 

projects as needed to support global security 

missions. Aging electrical, cooling water, and other 

process support systems in Y-12’s infrastructure 

increase risk to mission work as the infrastructure 

ages. 

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

The current strategy for development 

includes acquisition of an off-site 

facility and implementing electrical and 

cooling water system recapitalization 

projects to address infrastructure 

concerns, until replacement facilities 

are available.

The development strategy 

ultimately results in a new 

line item replacement 

facility to consolidate all 

development capabilities 

back at Y-12. 

E.3.4.4 Accomplishments

◼ Completed 102 percent of FY 2020 baseline production deliverables.

◼ Produced 329 kilograms of purified uranium metal, exceeding the COVID-19-adjusted annual goal 

of 315 kilograms.

◼ Produced the first production-spec purified metal button using the Electrorefining Development 

Glovebox system.

◼ Completed the full binary alloy production cycle, using both onsite and offsite equipment, in 

support of mission-critical binary production restoration.

◼ Fabricated two enriched uranium safety blocks for the White Sands Missile Range Fast Burst 

Reactor Upgrade project.

◼ Performed computed tomography scans of High-Flux Isotope Reactor fuel elements, including one 

ahead of schedule at Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s request, to avoid disrupting the reactor’s 

critical COVID-19-related experiments.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-82

◼ Completed 50-year sprinkler replacements, an 8-year effort that replaced nearly 10,000 sprinkler 

heads in six different Y-12 production facilities, enabling those facilities to continue adherence to

fire protection requirements.

◼ Continued progress on Uranium Processing Facility construction in FY 2020, including:

– Completed second-floor structural steel installation and all first and second elevated deck 

placements on the Salvage and Accountability Building. 

– Completed structural steel erection and reinforced concrete walls on the East and West side, 

and began placement of reinforced concrete floors of Main Process Building.

– Completed foundation piling, started formwork, rebar, and placed first steel for the Process 

Support Facility.

E.3.4.5 Y-12 National Security Complex Workforce

Y-12 had 5,263 employees as of September 30, 2020. The Y-12 workforce’s average age is around 48 years 

old, with 31 percent retirement-eligible. Y-12 is replenishing its workforce for future needs, and more 

than half of the population has 10 or less years of service. The average number of years of service is 

11 years. Most separations in FY 2020 were retirements, with about 66 percent of separations occurring 

at age 56 and above. A large number of voluntary separations occurred among those with 0-5 years of 

service. Since FY 2017, the early-career population has increased because of increased hiring. Workforce 

demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures E–60 through E–68.

Notes:

Total headcount increased from 5,063 at the end of FY 2019 to 5,263 at the end of FY 2020. Significant recruiting and 

hiring efforts replaced vacancies from attrition and built the technical skill base in preparation for the increased 

workload in FY 2021 and beyond. FY 2021 will focus on hiring in preparation of increasing weapons workload. This will 

include acquiring the necessary security clearances and developing new talent. The most significant increases were in 

engineers, security, professionals, and technicians to provide CNS with the technical skills needed to fulfill mission work.

Figure E–60. Y-12 workforce by Common Occupational Classification System

(as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-83

Notes:

The average age of the Y-12 workforce is approximately 48 years old. The percentage eligible to retire is 31 percent. 

Increased hiring and replacement of retirees is gradually lowering the average age of the workforce. Age diversity is 

well distributed. Many employees elect to work beyond their earliest eligibility retirement age. Y-12 remains one of 

the best employers in the area. Crafts, labor, operators, technicians, and clerical skill groups are hired locally and tend 

to remain until retirement.

Figure E–61. Y-12 workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The average years of service at Y-12 is approximately 11.6 down from 12 due to the increase in new hires in the 0-5 

group. This indicates that Y-12 is replenishing its workforce for future needs and offsetting attrition due to retirements 

and other separations.

Figure E–62. Y-12 workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-84

Notes:

FY 2020 was a strong year for recruiting, with a net gain of 200 employees. Pantex and Y-12 combined efforts for virtual 

recruiting during the COVID-19 pandemic. SuccessFactors, a new consolidated application system, was implemented, 

streamlining the application and hiring process and improving the overall candidate experience. CNS joined the nuclear 

security enterprise in joint virtual and in-person recruiting initiatives at military bases and top schools pre-pandemic. 

Additionally, CNS contracted with Shaker Recruitment Marketing to enhance visibility nationally. Candidate sourcing 

was expanded to LinkedIn, Indeed, and Glassdoor. Competitive pay and benefits aided in offer acceptance and retention 

of talent.

Figure E–63. Y-12 net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Those leaving under age 35 are typically engineers or professionals who are more mobile. Factors include location, 

electronics restrictions, security clearances, and national competition for these skills. The large number leaving over

age 60 are retiring.

Figure E–64. Y-12 employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-85

Notes:

The majority of those leaving from 0-5 years of service are typically engineers or professionals under age 35 who are 

early in their career and more mobile. There are several factors that impact retention for this group: (a) location and 

commute are less desirable than competition; (b) electronic restrictions for iPhones, iPads, etc.; (c) waiting for security 

clearances can cause professionals to lose interest; and (d) other high-tech industries compete for the same skilled 

professionals. To address these concerns, CNS has increased teleworking for select positions, improved work 

environments, implemented talent management opportunities for career development, improved clearance processing 

cycle time by increasing investigators to address the volume of hiring, and redesigned compensation to attract and 

retain critical skills. Those leaving with over 20 years of service are typically retirees.

Figure E–65. Y-12 employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-86

Notes:

Total population grew due to increased hiring in the workforce participation group less than 35 years and low attrition. 

Many workforce participants over 50 years old are electing to work longer.

Figure E–66. Y-12 workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Over half of separations are due to retirements. The average age of retirees is increasing as more retirement-eligible 

employees are electing to work longer. Several factors may be considered for this shift, such as better health, cognitive 

activity, opportunity to telecommute, and uncertainty about the pandemic and the impact on travel, family, and the 

economy. Those turning 65 typically work until 66+ to receive full social security benefits. Pension plans were phased 

out for new hires around 2012 and replaced by enhanced 401(k) plans for retirement planning. This change removed 

the perceived retirement trigger (pension eligibility at age 55 with 10 years of service) for those hired after 2012. 

Retention efforts have been successful and are viewed as a positive trend.

Figure E–67. Y-12 employee separation trends
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-87

Notes: 

The total estimated number of personnel needed to support the work in the near term is relatively static. CNS

anticipates hiring for attrition replacement with emphasis on engineers, safety basis personnel, IT, technicians, and 

Security Police Officers. Technicians and Security Police Officers are usually filled from the local market and military. 

Engineers, IT, and safety basis personnel are being recruited from job fairs and universities. Internal realignment is used 

in some cases to fill critical vacancies. Plant attrition is expected to remain low between 5 percent–6 percent. Crafts, 

technicians and administration typically have lower attrition while engineers have higher attrition due to national 

demand. This is an ongoing concern as other technology companies are competing for the limited market of engineering 

and technology skills. Based on current hiring/termination statistics, CNS anticipates gaps in Engineering, safety basis, 

IT, risk management, and fire protection in the next 10 years. CNS is utilizing national recruiting search engines and 

working closely with universities and military bases to help fill the pipeline for engineers and technology for years to 

come.

Figure E–68. Y-12 workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-88

E.4 The National Security Site

E.4.1 Nevada National Security Site

E.4.1.1 Mission Overview

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), located

outside of Las Vegas, Nevada, is the primary location 

within the DOE/NNSA complex where high-hazard 

experiments with radiological and other high-hazard 

materials are conducted. It is the only location in the 

United States that is authorized to conduct subcritical 

experiments with weapons-relevant geometries and 

quantities of both high explosives (HE) and plutonium.

◼ Location: Las Vegas, Nevada

◼ Additional Operating Capabilities: Offices at 

LANL, LLNL, and SNL; Remote Sensing 

Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base and Andrews Air Force Base; and the Special Technologies 

Laboratory in Santa Barbara, California

◼ Total Employees: 2,377 (as of the end of FY 2020)

◼ Type: Multi-program experimental site

◼ Website: www.nnss.gov

◼ Contract Operator: Mission Support and Test Services LLC, a joint venture between Honeywell 

International, Inc.; Jacobs Engineering Group; and Huntington Ingalls Industries Nuclear, Inc.

E.4.1.2 Funding

FY 2022 request – site funding by source 

(total NNSS FY 2022 request = $666 million)

NNSS split for the FY 2022 Weapons Activities

President’s Budget Request ($517 million)

E.4.1.3 Site Capabilities

NNSS supports stockpile stewardship through plutonium experiments in collaboration with LANL, LLNL, 

and SNL; data analyses from those experiments; diagnostic R&D; and reanalysis of legacy underground 

test data.

NNSS’ capabilities and their associated challenges and strategies are described in Table E–8.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-89

Table E–8. Nevada National Security Site capabilities

Hydrodynamic and Subcritical Experiments at Weapon’s Relevant Scales

NNSS performs subcritical experiments at the U1a Complex (U1a), enabling characterization of early explosion-time 

hydrodynamic behavior of plutonium, plutonium surrogates, and other relevant materials in weapon-relevant geometries. NNSS, 

LLNL, LANL, and SNL plan to enhance U1a to enable well-diagnosed, early- and late-time radiographic and neutron reactivity 

measurements on hydrodynamic tests. These new data will inform efforts to assess the effects of aging and manufacturing 

processes on stockpile weapons.

Challenges Strategies

Increase the tempo, flexibility, and sophistication of 

subcritical experiments by exploring major efficiency 

improvements in experiment and U1a operations.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Implement a multi-user U1a operating 

model and an integrated, logic-linked 

framework schedule to optimize critical 

path contributors. Invest in U1a, the 

Device Assembly Facility (DAF), 

diagnostics, and transportation for 

future subcritical experiments.

Ensure operational 

sustainability for all 

necessary radiographic 

capabilities in U1a.

Enhance efficiencies in 

experimental operations to 

reduce fielding time and the 

number of experiments 

required for assessment and 

certification.

Field next generation 

diagnostics to meet stockpile 

experimentation needs.

Weapons Science Experiments Using High-Hazard Materials

Activities include maturing capabilities in shock and compression experiments; dynamic phase change studies; capture of 

thermodynamic and constitutive properties; platform and source development; and materials diagnostic R&D on the Joint 

Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility (JASPER), the Dynamic Science Launcher, Z pulsed power facility; and a 

variety of shock physics platforms at NNSS and the Special Technologies Laboratory. JASPER is a two-stage light gas gun for 

studying the behavior of plutonium and other materials at high pressures, temperatures, and strain rates. Material property 

data are obtained on a wide variety of national security materials of interest in various phases and compositions owing to 

differences in manufacturing processes, surface preparations, and ages.

Challenges Strategies

Breakthroughs in materials science are limited by the 

rate of experimentation, staffing constraints, the 

range of dynamic conditions that are available to 

DOE/NNSA, as well as the need for higher-precision 

diagnostics that can measure phase changes, 

temperature, density, and two-dimensional

displacement/velocity-fields at very short time scales 

and very high temperatures, pressures, and densities.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

NNSS is seeking efficiencies in 

operations to increase scientific 

throughput at its many shock physics 

platforms. Some of these efficiencies 

are realized through increased 

recruitment activities and development 

of newer, higher-precision diagnostics.

NNSS will leverage sitedirected, R&D-initiated new 

diagnostics; mature these 

diagnostics; and optimize 

them for multi-platform use 

(e.g., hydrodynamic 

experiments, subcritical 

experiments, and JASPER) 

interferometry, 

diffractometry, radiography, 

pyrometry, and other 

spectroscopic techniques. 

Device Assembly Facility

DAF supports nuclear weapon experimental capabilities and is one of two facilities in the nuclear security enterprise that allows 

collocation of HE and SNM, including staging of large quantities of SNM in independent buildings, and provides the backbone to

support various missions using those materials in conjunction. For Stockpile Stewardship, the facility’s glovebox, downdraft 

table, and radiography capabilities support assembly of SNM targets for JASPER, as well as SNM and HE packages for subcritical 

experiments at U1a. DAF also hosts the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), a unique national asset. 

NCERC supports a mix of critical and subcritical benchmark quality experiments, detector development, inspector and first 

responder training, criticality safety training, and handling of damaged nuclear weapons. NCERC has the largest collection of 

nuclear critical mass assembly machines in the western hemisphere.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-90

Challenges Strategies

DAF has a wide range of unique capabilities. As 

demand for these capabilities grows across 

DOE/NNSA, space and scheduling challenges can be 

expected to grow.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

Current capabilities will be maintained 

to meet U.S. Government needs. 

Options to increase these capabilities 

on a timescale complementary to 

anticipated experimental needs will 

need to be explored (e.g., enhanced 

surveillance and storage).

Enhance efficiencies in 

experimental operations to 

reduce fielding time and 

number of experiments 

required for assessment and 

certification.

Field next-generation 

diagnostics to meet stockpile 

experimentation needs.

Advanced Experimental Diagnostics and Sensors

NNSS’ core capabilities, in addition to fielding high-value, high-risk experiments in the national interest, include developing the 

next generation of high-precision, transformational diagnostics for subcritical, hydrodynamic, and dynamic materials

experiments. Some of the groundbreaking diagnostics that have been developed with NNSS’ collaboration and efforts include 

photon Doppler velocimetry; optical ranging (i.e., broadband laser ranging); surface imaging; soft X-ray radiography; holography;

dynamic pyrometry and emissivity; dynamic X-ray diffraction; prompt neutron and X-ray detectors; and advanced radiography 

sources for subcritical experiments (now approaching an $800 million cost) and other hydrodynamic platforms.

Challenges Strategies

◼ Advanced diagnostics and sensors provide detailed 

measurements of materials, objects, and dynamic 

processes critical to weapon operation. Standard 

diagnostics provide lower-resolution data that are 

suitable for basic inquiries, but not detailed part, 

process, or physics qualification. Continued diagnostic 

and sensor development is critical to addressing these 

limitations.

Current Strategy Being Implemented Future Strategies Needed

NNSS will involve nuclear security 

enterprise laboratories in defining 

and prioritizing diagnostic needs for 

future experiments at NNSS and 

other facilities.

Continue current strategy.

Field next generation 

diagnostics to meet stockpile 

experimentation needs

E.4.1.4 Accomplishments

◼ Nightshade A, the first subcritical experiment in the Red Sage series; provided ejecta data from 

multiple plutonium samples under conditions relevant to the stockpile. The successful 

experiment followed a confirmatory preparatory experiment run by NNSS that resulted in 

100 percent data return. This experimental series is led by LANL and executed by NNSS. NNSS 

also executed the Red Sage confirmatory experiment, Iris, with LANL on March 3, 2020, with 100-

percent data return. Iris verified the experimental, diagnostic, and testbed improvements for the 

Red Sage series, allowing the series to proceed.

◼ Diagnostic development – NNSS delivered next-generation diagnostic R&D to national 

laboratories to support stockpile experiments. Investments will provide control systems, 

software, detectors, instruments, and camera systems in 2 to 5 years. NNSS developed an 

experiment-quality Kraken imager and built a series of Kraken cameras, a 5-year development 

effort. The eight-frame camera improves image quality and sensitivity and provides solutions for 

visible and radiographic imaging applications. Ejecta diagnostics have focused on source term 

ejecta characteristics and transport in a gas.

◼ JASPER Experimental Program – NNSS completed nine JASPER experiments with LLNL in FY 2020,

collecting temperature to support stockpile surveillance and enhance predictive plutonium

models for pit lifetime and qualification assessments. NNSS also executed the first two 

40-millimeter two-stage experiments for velocity ranging of the larger projectile capability. 

◼ North Las Vegas Dense Plasma Focus (NLV DPF) – NNSS continued to execute experiments using 

the NLV DPF pulsed energy source. Using the NNSS and NLV DPF to improve methods for 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-91

subcritical experiments and refine measurement techniques for the U1a.03 drift NDSE capability. 

NNSS improved its neutron generation technology with a second-generation diamond detector 

and paddle detector to measure neutron input signals; data will influence detector design for 

electromagnetic interference shielding and reduce low-frequency noise in the U1a.03 testbed. 

This work was pivotal in developing a major new diagnostic tool as a mainstay of subcritical 

experiments. Neutron diagnosis will allow investigation into several new areas of physics that are 

important to DOE/NNSA, including dynamic internal temperature measurement, neutron 

reactivity rates, and neutron radiography. NNSS also deployed an advanced neutron radiographic 

imaging system to evaluate source spot size with NLV DPF for consideration on the Excalibur 

subcritical experiment series, resulting in high-energy neutron images. 

◼ NNSS completed the Argus line-item project at DAF with Nevada Enterprise partners. CD-4 was 

approved 5 months early in August and $900,000 under budget. The Argus security system is now 

fully operational, eliminating the risk of process equipment control system failure. This meets the 

critical commitment made to NNSA in 2017.

◼ Nevada completed the DOE/NNSA Office of Emergency Operations Emergency Communications 

Network migration to Switch on schedule and under budget while employing COVID-19 protocols. 

The project culminated in a ribbon cutting in September with the DOE/NNSA Administrator. NNSS

is analyzing Switch capabilities for future upgrades to support national security assets.

E.4.1.5 Nevada National Security Site Workforce

NNSS had 2,377 employees at the end of FY 2020.

3 The age of the workforce is concentrated between 

the ages of 51 and 65 years, and the average age of 49 years. The percent of employees eligible for 

retirement is 27 percent. The average years of service is around 10 years, while the population is 

concentrated below 20 years of service. The largest experience group consists of those with 1–5 years of 

service. Involuntary separations were the largest overall category of separations during FY 2020 and were 

spread among several age groups. They were greatest among those with 1–5 years of service. About 

22 percent of separations in FY 2020 were retirements, and another 23 percent were involuntary 

terminations, many of which resulted from contract transition. Since FY 2018, early- and mid-career trend 

populations have slowly increased, while the overall percentage of advanced-career employees declined. 

Workforce demographics are illustrated and discussed in Figures E–69 through E–77.

3 A large portion of the security workforce is not managed by the M&O contractor and is not included in the Site headcount (or 

subsequent charts). The security contractor has over 300 employees that are funded by Weapons Activities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-92

Notes:

Total site headcount decreased by approximately 5 percent in FY 2020. All COCS categories experienced a decrease 

in headcount except for general management and professional administration. Overall, bargaining unit personnel4

decreased by approximately 18 percent in FY 2020. Several bargaining unit personnel were laid off due to lack of 

work, as no new projects were projected at the time.

Figure E–69. NNSS total workforce5 by Common Occupational Classification System (COCS)

(as of September 30, 2020)

4 Bargaining unit personnel are identified as those employees in the crafts, laborers, and operators COCS.

5 A large proportion of the security workforce is not managed by the M&O contractor and is not included in the site headcount 

(or subsequent charts). The security contractor, SOC, has an additional 328 employees that are funded by Weapons Activities.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-93

Notes:

The average age of the workforce increased slightly from 48 in FY 2019 to 49 in FY 2020. The percent of retirementeligible employees decreased from 29 percent to 27 percent. Approximately 50 percent of the NNSS workforce is 

51 years or older. This explains both the high average age and high percentage of retirement-eligible employees. 

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, much of the workforce has relied on teleworking to meet mission needs. With an

increased availability to work from home, more retirement-eligible employees are electing to continue working past 

retirement.

Figure E–70. NNSS employees distributed by age (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

The average years of service of the workforce increased from 9.5 in FY 2019 to 10.1 in FY 2020. This change can be 

attributed to a decrease in hiring due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other issues within an unpredictable job 

market. The most significant decrease in years of service occurred in the 0-5 years range (8 percent). Voluntary and 

involuntary terminations (see Figure E–74) and movement into a higher years of service category attributed to this 

decrease.

Figure E–71. NNSS employees distributed by years of service (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-94

Notes:

NNSS experienced a negative net change with a 44 percent loss of employees for in FY 2020. As the site continues 

to make strategic organizational changes and analyze hiring needs, new employment opportunities will be available. 

Figure E–72. NNSS net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Total separations decreased 5 percent from last year. The number of involuntary terminations were greater than 

last year due to significant layoffs among bargaining unit personnel. Retirements and voluntary terminations 

decreased from last year due to less employee retirement and/or job transitions and the increase in ability and 

approvals to work from home.

Figure E–73. NNSS employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-95

Notes:

Over 60 percent of terminations occurred within the 0-5 years of service group. This percentage is due to the large 

number of involuntary terminations and layoffs expected in a bargaining unit environment where seniority is a 

career factor. Layoffs constituted 58 percent of all bargaining unit employee terminations; 26 percent were

resignations. Among non-bargaining employees, approximately 41 percent of all terminations were due to 

retirement, and approximately 18 percent were due to career advancement opportunities.

Figure E–74. NNSS employee separations by years of service group

(as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

While employees over 50 years old continue to make up almost 50 percent of the workforce, there was a slight 

increase in employees less than 35 years old for FY 2020.

Figure E–75. NNSS workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced 

career6(as of September 30, 2020)

6 The percentage of advanced-career workers is calculated by taking the ratio of employees over the age of 50 years and total 

workforce participation. The over 50 years of age group assumes the minimum age for retirement eligibility and captures the 

minimum retirement age for most Federal employees.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page E-96

Notes:

Approximately 58 percent (80 employees) of bargaining unit employee terminations were due to layoffs. 

Retirements and voluntary turnover went down in FY 2020, which was expected due to the pandemic impacts on 

the economy and job market. NNSS will continue tracking the reasons for all terminations, analyzing for trends, and 

focusing on attracting, retaining, and growing employees, especially in the early and mid-career positions.

Figure E–76. NNSS employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2020)

Notes:

Workforce needs are fairly consistent across the near-term with minor increases anticipated in FY 2023 for engineers 

and technicians to support Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments. There is also a minor reduction in 

craft resource needs starting in FY 2024 after completion of the U1a Complex Enhancements Project line item 

project.

Figure E–77. NNSS workforce projection needs by Common Occupational

Classification System 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page F-1

Appendix F

Glossary

3D printing—Also known as additive manufacturing, which turns digital three-dimensional models into 

solid objects by building them up in layers.

abnormal environment—An environment, as defined in a weapon’s stockpile-to-target sequence and 

military characteristics, in which the weapon is not expected to retain full operational reliability, or an 

environment that is not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and associated activities. 

additive manufacturing—A manufacturing technique that builds objects layer by layer, according to 

precise design specifications, compared to a traditional manufacturing technique in which objects are 

carved out of a larger block of material or cast in molds and dies. 

advanced manufacturing—Modern technologies necessary to enhance secure manufacturing capabilities 

and provide timely support for critical needs of the stockpile.

alteration (Alt)—A material change to, or a prescribed inspection of, a nuclear weapon or major assembly 

that does not alter its operational capability, yet is sufficiently important to the user regarding assembly,

maintenance, storage, or test operations to require controlled application and identification. 

annual assessment process—The authoritative method to evaluate the safety, reliability, performance, 

and military effectiveness of the stockpile by subject matter experts based upon new and legacy data, 

surveillance, and modeling and simulation. It is a principal factor in the Nation’s ability to maintain a 

credible deterrent without nuclear explosive testing. The Directors of the three national security 

laboratories complete annual assessments of the stockpile, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic 

Command provides a separate assessment of military effectiveness. The assessments also determine

whether underground nuclear explosive testing must be conducted to resolve any issues. The Secretaries 

of Energy and Defense submit the reports unaltered to the President, along with any conclusions they

deem appropriate.

arming, fuzing, and firing system—The electronic and mechanical functionsthat ensure a nuclear weapon 

does not operate when not intended during any part of its manufacture and lifetime, but also ensure the

weapon will operate correctly when a unique signal to do so is properly activated. 

artificial intelligence—Computer systems able to perform tasks intelligently, similar to humans, such as 

visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translating between languages.

B61—An air-delivered gravity bomb.

B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP)—An LEP to consolidate three variants of the B61 bomb in the active 

stockpile into one and improve the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the U.S. arsenal.

B83-1—An air-delivered gravity bomb.

boost—The process that increases the yield of a nuclear weapon’s primary stage through fusion reactions.
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burning plasma—A burning plasma is one in which most of the plasma heating comes from fusion 

reactions involving thermal plasma ions. A plasma enters the burning plasma regime when the selfheating power exceeds any external heating.

calciner—A dry thermal treatment process to convert low-equity enriched uranium liquids to a dry stable 

form for storage. 

canned subassembly—A component of a nuclear weapon that is hermetically sealed in a metal container. 

A canned assembly and the primary make up a weapon’s nuclear explosive package.

certification—The process whereby all available information on the performance of a weapon system is 

considered and the laboratory directors responsible for that system certify, before the weapon enters the 

stockpile, that it will meet, with noted exceptions, the military characteristics within the environments 

defined by the stockpile-to-target sequence.

component—An assembly or combination of parts, subassemblies, and assemblies mounted together 

during manufacture, assembly, maintenance, or rebuild. In a system engineering product hierarchy, the 

component is the lowest level of shippable and storable entities, which may be raw material, procured 

parts, or manufactured items.

continuous monitoring—A strategy that enables information security professionals and others to see a 

continuous stream of near real-time snapshots of the state of risk to their security, data, network, end 

points, and even cloud devices and applications.

controlled thermonuclear fusion—Thermonuclear fusion that is achieved in the laboratory, as opposed to 

during underground nuclear explosive testing. 

conventional high explosive (CHE)—A high explosive that detonates when given sufficient stimulus by a 

high-pressure shock. Stimuli from severe accident environments involving impact, fire, or electrical 

discharge may also detonate a CHE. See also “insensitive high explosive.”

critical decision (CD)—The five levels a DOE project typically progresses through, which serve as major 

milestones approved by the Chief Executive for Project Management. Each CD marks an authorization to 

increase the commitment of resources and requires successful completion of the preceding phase. These 

five phases are CD-0, Approve Mission Need; CD-1, Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range; 

CD-2, Approve Performance Baseline; CD-3, Approve Start of Construction/Execution; CD-4, Approve Start 

of Operations or Project Completion.

cybersecurity—The physical, technical, administrative, and management controls for providing the 

required and appropriate levels of protections of information and information assets against unauthorized 

disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction, whether accidental or intentional. Cybersecurity also 

ensures the required and appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability for 

the information stored, processed, or transmitted on electronic systems and networks.

defense-in-depth—The security approach whereby layers of cybersecurity and information assurance 

solutions are used to establish an adequate security posture. Implementation of this strategy is 

recognized due to the highly interactive nature of various systems and networks. For example, 

cybersecurity defense-in-depth must be considered within the context of the shared risk environment,

given that any single system cannot be adequately secured unless all interconnected systems are 

adequately secured.
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depleted uranium (DU)—Uranium from which most of the fissile isotope uranium-235 has been removed. 

It is required for nuclear component production to maintain and modernize the stockpile through life 

extension, modification, and limited life component exchange programs. 

design life—The length of time, starting from the date of manufacture, during which a nuclear weapon is 

designed to meet its stated military requirements.

deuterium—An isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains one neutron and one proton.

direct chip melt—The recovery of enriched uranium machine tool chips and turnings by collecting and 

remelting them in furnaces. 

dismantlement and disposition—Disassembling retired weapons into major components that are then 

assigned for reuse, storage, surveillance, or disposal.

downblending—Processing highly enriched uranium into a uranium byproduct that contains less than 

20 percent uranium-235.

down-select—The process of narrowing the range of design options during the Phase 6.X Process,

culminating in a final design (normally exercised when moving from Phase 6.1 to 6.2, from Phase 6.2 to 

6.2A, and from Phase 6.2A to 6.3). Down-selecting involves analysis of the option’s ability to meet military 

requirements, and assessment of schedule, cost, material, and production impacts. 

electrorefining—An electrochemical metal purification system designed to provide a replacement 

capability for the current metal purification process.

encryption—Technical controls to protect information as it passes throughout a network and resides on 

computers. These methods protect sensitive information during storage and transmission and provide 

functionality to reduce the risk of both intentional and accidental data compromise and alteration.

enriched uranium—Uranium that contains higher concentrations of the fissile uranium-235 isotope than 

natural uranium. It is required at varied enrichment levels for national security and medical isotope 

production. 

enterprise forensics—The performance of real-time, remote inspections at the binary level of all data on 

a given computer system. The inspections include operating memory, physical storage devices, and 

virtualization mechanisms on any machine at a given time. 

Enterprise Governance, Risk, and Compliance—The official corporate and enterprise program used to 

conduct continuous performance monitoring and reporting of information security program 

management, operations, and technical controls (e.g., authority-to-operate packages, deviations, incident 

management reporting).

Enterprise Information System—Information systems within NNSA for which the authorization boundary 

covers multiple sites and multiple local Authorization Official jurisdictions.

exascale computing—Computing systems capable of at least 1 exaFLOPS, or a billion billion calculations 

per second. Such capacity represents a thousand-fold increase over the first petascale computer that 

came into operation in 2008. See also “floating point operations per second (FLOPS).”
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Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)—A public-private partnership that conducts 

research and development, study and analysis, and/or systems engineering and integration for the 

Federal Government. Typically, FFRDCs are operated by consortia of universities and industrial 

corporations.

firewalls—Systems that can be implemented in hardware and/or software that are designed to prevent 

unauthorized access to or from private networks connected to the Internet. 

first production unit—The first system, subsystem, or component manufactured and accepted by NNSA 

as verifiably meeting all applicable quality and qualification requirements. The first production unit for a 

weapon is a production milestone. For milestone completion, two events must occur: (1) DoD or the 

Nuclear Weapons Council accepts the design and (2) DOE/NNSA verifies that the first produced weapon 

meets the design specifications. 

fiscal year (FY)—The Federal budget and funding year that starts on October 1 and goes to the following 

September 30.

fission—The process whereby the nucleus of a particular heavy element splits into (generally) two nuclei 

of lighter elements, with the release of substantial energy.

floating point operations per second (FLOPS)—The number of arithmetic operations performed on real 

numbers in a second; used as a measure of the performance of a computer system.

fusion—The process whereby the nuclei of two light elements, especially the isotopes of hydrogen 

(i.e., deuterium and tritium), combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element with the release of 

substantial energy and a high-energy neutron.

Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP)—A detailed description of the program elements (and 

associated projects and activities) for the fiscal year for which the annual budget is submitted and the four 

succeeding fiscal years.

gas transfer system (GTS)—A warhead component that enables tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, 

to boost the yield of a nuclear weapon. 

general plant project (GPP)—A miscellaneous minor construction project of a general nature, for which 

the total estimated cost may not exceed the congressionally established limit. GPPs are necessary to 

adapt facilities to new or improved production techniques, to effect economies of operations, and to 

reduce or eliminate health, fire, and security problems. These projects provide for design, construction, 

additions, and/or improvements to land, buildings, replacements or additions to roads, and general area 

improvements.

general purpose infrastructure—The buildings, equipment, utilities, roads, etc., that support operation of 

the nuclear security enterprise, but are not-focused on a particular program. 

high energy density (HED) physics—The physics of matter and radiation at very high energy densities, i.e.,

extreme temperatures and pressures. 

high explosives—Materials that detonate, with the chemical reaction components propagating at 

supersonic speeds. High explosives are used in the main charge of a weapon primary to compress the 

fissile material and initiate the chain of events leading to nuclear yield. See also “conventional high 

explosive” and “insensitive high explosive.”
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high fusion yield—A release of fusion energy in excess of 100 megajoules from an inertial confinement 

fusion target. This is three orders of magnitude greater than today’s best performing experiments. 

high performance computing—The use of supercomputers and parallel processing techniques with 

multiple computers to perform computational tasks. 

ignition—The point at which a nuclear fusion reaction becomes self-sustaining—that is, more energy is 

produced and retained in the fusion target than the energy used to initiate the nuclear reaction.

Information Assurance Response Center—The NNSA facility that continuously monitors all activity going 

through the nuclear security enterprise computer firewall system, to provide intrusion detection and 

event forensics.

information system—A combination of information, computer, and telecommunications resources and 

other information technology and personnel resources that collect, record, process, store, communicate, 

retrieve, and display information. 

information technology—The equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment used in 

the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, 

interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information. Information technology includes 

computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware, and related procedures, services, and resources. 

Information Technology Infrastructure—The shared technology resources that provide the platform for 

the specific information system applications at a site or NNSA/DOE-wide. It consists of a set of physical 

devices and software applications that are required to operate the entire nuclear security enterprise.

infrastructure—For the purposes and scope of the SSMP, infrastructure refers to the comprehensive 

inventory of facilities, structures, utilities, equipment, and other physical assets required to operate the 

national security enterprise in service to its national security missions. 

insensitive high explosive—A high explosive substance that is so insensitive that the probability of 

accidental initiation or transition from burning to detonation is negligible.

integrated design code (IDC)—A simulation code containing multiple physics and engineering models that 

have been validated experimentally and computationally. An IDC is used to simulate, understand, and 

predict the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear components and nuclear weapons under normal, 

abnormal, and hostile conditions.

intrusion prevention system—A network security device that monitors network activities for malicious 

activities such as security threats or policy violations. The main function of an intrusion prevention system 

is to identify suspicious activity, log the information, and report it. 

Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (JC3)—The cybersecurity incident response coordination, 

reporting, and tracking element for the entire DOE enterprise. JC3 provides computer security support to 

collect, analyze, and share cybersecurity information for all of DOE, including DOE’s Energy Information 

Administration and Power Marketing Administration, as well as NNSA’s national security laboratories, 

nuclear weapons production facilities, and Nevada National Security Site. JC3 is managed and operated 

by the DOE Chief Information Officer.
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Joint nuclear weapons life cycle process—Nuclear weapons are conceptually designed, developed, 

produced, and maintained in the stockpile, and then retired and dismantled. This sequence of events is 

known as the nuclear weapons life cycle. DOE, through NNSA, and in partnership with DoD (through the 

Nuclear Weapons Council) conducts activities in a joint nuclear weapons life cycle process to manage 

weapons sustainment and modernization needs from concept assessment to full scale production, and 

finally to retirement. 

Joint Technology Demonstrator (JTD)—A United States and United Kingdom strategic collaboration 

dedicated to the design and execution of joint, integrated system demonstrations supporting new safety, 

security, and advanced manufacturing technologies. 

joint test assembly (JTA)—(1) An electronic unit that contains sensors and instrumentation that monitor 

weapon hardware performance during flight tests to ensure that the weapon components will function 

as designed. (2) An NNSA-developed configuration, based on NNSA-DoD requirements, for use in the 

flight test program.

life cycle—The series of stages through which a component, system, or weapon passes from initial 

development until it is consumed, disposed of, or altered in order to extend its lifetime.

life extension program (LEP)—A program that refurbishes warheads of a specific weapon type to extend 

the service life of a weapon. LEPs are designed to extend the life of a warhead by 20 to 30 years, while 

increasing safety and security.

lightning arrestor connector—Advanced interconnected nuclear safety devices designed to limit voltage 

during lightning strikes and in other extreme, high-voltage, high-temperature environments.

limited life component (LLC)—A weapon component or subsystem whose performance degrades with age 

and must be periodically replaced. Examples are gas transfer systems, power sources, and neutron 

generators.

line item project—A distinct design, construction, betterment and/or fabrication of real property for which 

Congress will be requested to authorize and appropriate specific funds. 

lithium—A soft, light-weight, silvery-white alkali metal (symbol: Li) used as a target element in nuclear 

weapons. Lithium reacts with a neutron to produce tritium. It is considered a strategic material in nuclear 

weapon manufacture. 

machine learning—A type of artificial intelligence characterized by computer algorithms that improve 

automatically through experience, so the computer learns without being explicitly programmed.

Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)—A means of communicating the degree to which a component or 

subsystem is ready to be produced. MRLs represent many attributes of a manufacturing system 

(e.g., people, manufacturing capability, facilities, conduct of operations, and tooling). There are nine 

MRLs, with the lowest being product development and the highest being steady-state production.

Mark-quality—Weapon or weapon-related material that is certified by DOE/NNSA or its prime contractor 

quality organization to meet all applicable design requirements, drawings, and known design intent;

sometimes called “Diamond-Stamp.”
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military characteristics—Required characteristics of a nuclear weapon upon which depend its ability to 

perform desired military functions, including physical and operational characteristics, but not technical 

design characteristics. 

modernization—The changes to nuclear weapons or infrastructure due to aging, unavailability of 

replacement parts, or the need to enhance safety, security, and operational design features. In the 

context of the physical infrastructure that support the nuclear security missions, modernization refers to 

recapitalization and refurbishment investments to restore and refresh aging facilities, structures, utilities, 

equipment, and other physical assets to a state that fully supports mission functionality and underpins 

key Weapons Activity capabilities into the future.

modification (Mod)—A program that changes a weapon’s operational capabilities. A Mod may enhance 

the margin against failure, increase safety, improve security, replace limited life components, and/or 

address identified defects and component obsolescence. 

multilayered malware protection—Commercial software that guards against multiple threat vectors such 

as viruses, spyware, and Trojans. The software searches a hard disk or other media for known threat 

vectors and removes any that are found.

national security laboratories—Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These laboratories guide research and development on behalf 

of DOE/NNSA Mission needs and address science and engineering challenges, from basic science 

questions through weapons design and production. They also support nuclear counterterrorism and 

counterproliferation.

national security system—Any telecommunications or information system operated by the 

U.S. Government whose function, operation, or use involves intelligence activities, cryptologic activities 

related to national security, command and control of military forces, or equipment that is an integral part 

of a weapon or weapons system or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions. 

The term excludes any system used for routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, 

finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). 

network—In relation to information technology and cybersecurity, a network is composed of a 

communications medium responsible for the transfer of information and all components attached to that 

medium.

network monitoring—The use of a system that constantly monitors a computer network, providing

vulnerability management and policy compliance tools; operating system, database, and application logs; 

and compilation of external threat data. A key focus is monitoring and managing user and service 

privileges, directory services, and other system configuration changes. Network monitoring also provides

log auditing and review of incident responses.

NNSA Information Technology System—An information system that is owned and/or operated by NNSA 

or by contractors on behalf of NNSA to accomplish a Federal function. Regardless of whether NNSA 

Federal employees have access, this does not include information systems operated by management and 

operating partners unless such systems’ primary purposes are to accomplish Federal functions.

non-nuclear components—The parts or assemblies designed for use in nuclear weapons or in nuclear 

weapons training that do not contain special nuclear material; such components (e.g., radiation-hardened 

electronic circuits or arming, fuzing, and firing components) are not available commercially.
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nuclear explosive package—An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials, as well as the 

main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation. 

nuclear forensics—The investigation of nuclear materials to find evidence for the source, trafficking, and 

enrichment of the material. 

nuclear security enterprise—The physical infrastructure, technology, and workforce at the national 

security laboratories, the nuclear weapons production sites, and the Nevada National Security Site, that 

sustain the research, development, production, and dismantlement capabilities needed to support the 

nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Nuclear Weapons Council—The joint DOE/DoD Council composed of senior officials from both 

Departments who recommend the stockpile options and research priorities that shape national policies 

and budgets to develop, produce, surveil, and retire nuclear warheads and weapon delivery platforms,

and who consider the safety, security, and control issues for existing and proposed weapons programs.

nuclear weapons production site—The Kansas City National Security Campus, Pantex Plant, Y-12 National 

Security Complex, and Savannah River Site. Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National 

Laboratories also perform some specific weapons production activities beyond their design 

responsibilities and may be referred to as production sites on occasion. 

nuclear weapons stockpile—Both active and inactive nuclear warheads. Active warheads include strategic 

and non-strategic weapons maintained in an operational, ready-for-use configuration, ready for possible 

deployment within a short timeframe, with logistics spares. 

neutron generator—A limited life component that provides neutrons at specific times and rates to initiate 

weapon function. 

Other Program Money—Funding that is found outside of a life extension program (LEP) funding line (in 

other program lines), but is directly (uniquely) attributed to an LEP. Such funding would not be needed 

were it not for the LEP, although the activity or effort might still be done at some future point along a 

different timeline.

out-years—The years that follow the 5-year period of the Future Years Nuclear Security Program. 

Phase 6.X Process—A time and organizational framework to manage the existing nuclear weapon systems 

that are undergoing evaluation and implementation of refurbishment options to extend their stockpile 

life or enhance system capabilities. The Phase 6.X Process consists of sub-phases that correspond to 

Phases 1 through 6 of the nuclear weapons life cycle.

physical security—The physical or technical methods that protect personnel; prevent or detect 

unauthorized access to facilities, material, and documents; protect against espionage, sabotage, damage, 

and theft; and respond to any such acts that occur.

pit—The critical core component in the primary of a nuclear weapon that contains fissile material.

power source—Power sources for current and future planned nuclear weapons and life-extended 

warheads are compact, specialized, limited-life components that fulfill power requirements for weapons. 

primary—The first stage of a two-stage nuclear weapon.
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production sites—(Sometimes also referred to as production facilities, plants, and agencies) Savannah 

River Site, Y-12 National Security Complex, Kansas City National Security Campus, and Pantex Plant. These 

facilities produce most of the designed weapon components and assemble weapons. 

programmatic infrastructure—Specialized experimental facilities, computers, diagnostic instruments, 

processes, and capabilities that allow the nuclear security enterprise to carry out research, testing, 

production, sustainment, and other direct programmatic activities to meet national security missions. 

Protected Distribution Systems—Wireline or fiber optic distribution systems used to transmit and protect 

unencrypted classified signal and data lines that exit secure areas and traverse through areas of lesser 

classification or security control. 

qualification—The process of ensuring that design, product, and all associated processes are capable of 

meeting customer requirements. Qualification authorizes the listed items for an intended use (i.e., War 

Reserve, Training, Evaluation, etc.), and it generally includes national security laboratory (design) review 

of production and inspection processes. Qualified items are reviewed for possible requalification after a 

significant process change or if production is inactive for 12 months.

quantification of margins and uncertainties—The methodology used in the post-underground-nuclearexplosive-testing era to facilitate analysis and communicate confidence in assessing and certifying that 

stockpile weapons will perform safely, securely, and reliably. Scientific judgment of experts at the national 

security laboratories plays a crucial role in this determination, which is based on metrics that use 

experimental data, physical models, and numerical simulations. 

quantum computing—The area of study focused on developing computer technology based on the 

principles of quantum-mechanical theory, which explains the nature and behavior of energy and matter 

on the atomic and subatomic level.

radiation case—A vessel that confines the radiation generated in a staged nuclear weapon.

radioisotope thermoelectric generators—A type of lightweight, reliable nuclear battery with no moving 

parts that uses an array of thermocouples to convert the heat released by the decay of plutonium-238 

into electricity. 

Recapitalization—In the context of physical infrastructure that supports nuclear security missions, 

recapitalization refers to investments in existing facilities, structures, utilities, equipment, and other 

assets that upgrade, renew, or otherwise improve and extend the usable life of the asset.

reservoir—A vessel containing deuterium and tritium that permits its transfer as a gas in a nuclear 

weapon.

restricted data—All data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons,

(2) production of special nuclear material, and (3) use of special nuclear material in the production of 

energy.

Safeguards Transporter (SGT)—A highly specialized trailer designed to safeguard nuclear weapons and 

special nuclear materials while in transit.

secondary—The second stage of a two-stage nuclear weapon that provides additional energy release in 

the form of fusion and is activated by energy from the primary.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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security—An integrated system of activities, systems, programs, facilities, and policies to protect classified 

matter, unclassified controlled information, nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon 

components, and DOE’s and its contractors’ facilities, property, and equipment.

security area—A defined area containing safeguards and security interests that requires physical 

protection measures. The types of security areas used by DOE/NNSA include property protection areas, 

limited areas, exclusion areas, protected areas, material access areas, and functionally specialized security 

areas such as sensitive compartmented information facilities, classified computer facilities, and secure 

communications centers.

security system—The combination of personnel, equipment, hardware and software, structures, plans 

and procedures, etc., used to protect safeguards and security interests.

service life—The duration of time that a nuclear weapon is maintained in the stockpile from Phase 5/6.5 

(First Production) to Phase 7 (Retirement, Dismantlement, and Disposition). Service life can include the 

terms “stockpile life,” “deployed life,” and “useful life.” 

significant finding investigation (SFI)—A formal investigation by a committee, chaired by an employee of 

a national security laboratory, to determine the cause and impact of a reported anomaly and to 

recommend corrective actions as appropriate.

special nuclear material (SNM)—Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes 

uranium-233 or uranium-235. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines three categories of quantities 

of SNM according to the risk and potential for its use in the creation of a fissile explosive. Category I is 

the category of the greatest quantity and associated risk; Category II is moderate; Category III is the 

lowest.

Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule (SCDS)—A planning framework for delivery of high‐level science, 

technology, and engineering capabilities for mission application. The SCDS identifies the complex set of 

interlinked computational, experimental, and technology maturation activities needed for stockpile 

annual assessment, resolution of significant finding investigations, qualification and certification of life 

extension programs, and identification of options for the future deterrent.

stockpile assessment—Continuous, multi-layered evaluations of the safety, security, and military 

effectiveness of each U.S. nuclear weapon system making up the stockpile, conducted to evaluate the 

stockpile’s status.

stockpile sustainment—The activities responsible for the day-to-day health of the stockpile, including

surveillance, annual assessments, and routine maintenance, to ensure weapons remain safe, secure, and 

reliable for their projected lifecycle. 

stockpile-to-target sequence—The order of events involved in removing a nuclear weapon from storage 

and assembling, testing, transporting, and delivering it to the target. The term also refers to a document 

that defines the logistical and employment concepts and related physical environments involved in 

delivering a nuclear weapon to a target.

subcritical experiment—An experiment specifically designed to obtain data on nuclear weapons for which 

less than a critical mass of fissionable material is present and, hence, no self-sustaining nuclear fission

chain reaction can occur, consistent with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
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surety—The assurance that a nuclear weapon will operate safely, securely, and reliably if deliberately 

activated and that no accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations will occur. Factors contributing 

to that assurance include model validation for weapon performance based on experiments and 

simulations, material (e.g., military equipment and supplies), personnel, and execution of procedures.

surveillance—Activities that provide data for evaluation of the stockpile, giving confidence in the Nation’s 

deterrent by demonstrating mission readiness and assessment of safety, security, and reliability

standards. These activities may include laboratory and flight testing of systems, subsystems, and 

components (including those of weapons in the existing stockpile, newly produced weapons, or weapons 

being disassembled); inspection for unexpected wear or signs of material aging; and destructive or 

nondestructive testing.

sustainment—An NNSA program to modify and maintain a set of nuclear weapon systems (see stockpile 

sustainment). In the context of physical infrastructure that supports the nuclear security missions, 

sustainment refers to the set of activities over an asset’s lifetime that provide for maintaining, operating, 

refurbishing, upgrading, and recapitalizing that asset until retirement and disposition. 

technology maturation—Advancing laboratory-developed technology to the point where it can be 

adopted and used by U.S. industry. 

Technology Readiness Level (TRL)—A measurement system to assess the maturity level of a particular 

technology that includes nine levels, where TRL 1 is the lowest (the associated scientific research is 

beginning) and TRL 9 is the highest (a technology has been proven through successful operation). 

test readiness—The preparedness to conduct underground nuclear explosive testing if required to ensure 

the safety and effectiveness of the stockpile, or if directed by the President for policy reasons. 

threat information—Any information related to a threat that might help an organization protect itself 

against a threat or detect the activities of a bad actor. Major types of threat information include 

indicators; tactics, techniques, and procedures; security alerts; threat intelligence reports; and tool 

configurations.

tractor—A modified and armored vehicle to transport the Safeguards Transporter trailer.

transuranic waste—Waste containing chemical elements heavier than uranium, often plutonium. It is 

primarily discarded equipment and soils contaminated with certain radioactive material. 

tritium—A radioactive isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus contains two neutrons and one proton. It is 

produced in nuclear reactors by the action of neutrons on lithium nuclei.

uranium—A naturally occurring radioactive, metallic element (symbol: U) that is found in the earth as a 

mineral ore. It has three primary isotopes: uranium-238, -235, and -234. It is a strategic material, with 

several uses related to nuclear weapons and therefore is critical to national security.

uranium enrichment—The process of increasing the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope in a sample 

of uranium by separating it from uranium-238.
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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verification and validation (V&V)—Independent procedures that are used together for checking that a 

product, service, or system meets requirements and specifications, and that it fulfills its intended purpose. 

For example, in the context of software testing, verification provides evidence of the correctness of 

computer codes in solving pertinent equations, while validation assesses the adequacy of the physical 

models used to represent reality. V&V is also applied to nuclear weapons to ensure that they fulfil their 

intended function with sufficient precision to meet military and other specifications. 

W76-1 LEP—A life extension program for the W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, 

delivered by a Navy Trident II.

W78—An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, delivered by an Air Force Minute Man III LGM-30.

W80-4 LEP—A life extension program for the W80 warhead aboard a cruise missile, delivered by the 

Air Force B-52 bomber and future launch platforms.

W88—A submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, delivered by a Navy Trident II.

W88 Alteration (Alt) 370—An Alt of the W88 warhead to replace the arming, fuzing, and firing components

and to refresh the conventional high explosive main charge.

W87-1—An intercontinental ballistic missile warhead designed to replace the W78 and support the 

Air Force’s ground-based strategic deterrent missile system planned to replace the Minuteman III.

warhead—The part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition that contains either the 

nuclear or thermonuclear system intended to inflict damage.

War Reserve—Nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon material intended for use in the event of war.

Weapons Activities—Sustaining, modernizing, and dismantling nuclear weapons; maintaining and 

modernizing production operations; and optimizing the scientific tools underpinning these efforts. The 

term also refers to the portion of the NNSA budget covering these activities. 
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page G-1

Appendix G

Acronyms and Abbreviations

3D three dimensional

AACE American Association of Cost Engineering

ACRR annular core research reactor

ACQ Advanced Certification and Qualification

Alt alteration

AoA analysis of alternatives

ASC Advanced Simulation and Computing

ASD Advanced Sources and Detectors

ATDM Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation

ATS Advanced Technology System

BCR Baseline Cost Report

BME base metal electrode

CATS Clearance Action Tracking System

CBI Capabilities Based Investments

CD Critical Decision

CHE conventional high explosive

CMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

CNS Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC

COCS Common Occupational Classification System

COTS commercial off-the-shelf

COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019

CP Challenge Problem

CSSE Computational Systems and Software Environment

CSTART Center for Security, Technology, Analysis, Response and Testing

CTCP Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Program

CUAS counter unmanned aircraft systems

DARHT Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

D&I disassembly and inspection

DAF Device Assembly Facility

DBT design basis threat

DEIA diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility

DM deferred maintenance

DNS Office of Defense Nuclear Security

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DPF Dense Plasma Focus

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

EAS-3 El Capitan early access system-3

EC3E Exascale Class Computer Cooling Equipment

ECP Exascale Computing Project
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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ECSE Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Centers

FITARA Federal Information Technology Acquisition and Reform Act

FM&T Federal Manufacturing and Technologies, LLC

FY fiscal year

FYNSP Future Years Nuclear Security Program

G2 DOE/NNSA Program Management Information System, Generation 2

GAO Government Accountability Office

GBSD ground-based strategic deterrent

GPP General Plant Project

GTS gas transfer system

HE high explosives

HED high energy density

HESE High Explosives Science and Engineering

HEU highly enriched uranium

HPC high performance computing

HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning

ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion

IDC integrated design code

IHE insensitive high explosive

IMI Infrastructure Modernization Initiative

IT Information Technology

JASPER Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

JTA joint test assembly

JTD Joint Technology Demonstrator

KCNSC Kansas City National Security Campus

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANSCE Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

LAP4 Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project

LEP life extension program

LEU low-enriched uranium

LLC limited life component

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LRSO Long Range Standoff

M3 Material Management and Minimization

M&O management and operating

MESA Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications

MFFF Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

MgO magnesium oxide

MGT Mobile Guardian Transporter

MIE major item of equipment

Mod modification

MSIPP Minority Serving Institution Partnership Program

MTE major technical efforts

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCERC National Criticality Experiments Research Center

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NEST Nuclear Emergency Support Team
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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NIF National Ignition Facility

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NNSS Nevada National Security Site

NPAC Nonproliferation and Arms Control

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSCI National Strategic Computing Initiative

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OST Office of Secure Transportation

Pantex Pantex Plant

PF-4 Plutonium Facility

PIDAS Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation 

ppy pits per year

R&D research and development

RACR Radiography/Assembly Capability Replacement

RASR Research and Sounding Rocket

RCT radiological control technician

RDT&E research, development, test and evaluation

RPV replacement plant value

SAR Selected Acquisition Report

SCDS Stewardship Capability Delivery System

SFI significant finding investigation

SGT Safeguards Transporter

SIRP Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program

SLCM Sea-Launched Cruise Missile

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SNM special nuclear material

SRNL Savannah River National Laboratory

SRPPF Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

SRS Savannah River Site

SRT&E Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering

SRTE Savannah River Tritium Enterprise

SSAA Stewardship Science Academic Alliances

SSMP Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

ST&E science, technology, and engineering

STA Secure Transportation Asset

STEM science, technology, engineering, and mathematics

STS stockpile-to-target sequence

TA Technical Area

TABS Thermally Activated Battery Simulator

TATB triaminotrinitrobenzene

TCR Test Capability Revitalization

TPBAR tritium-producing burnable absorber rod

Triad Triad National Security, LLC

TRL technology readiness level

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

U1a U1a Complex
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page G-4

U.S. United States

U.S. Code United States Code

USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command

WBN1 Watts Barr Nuclear Unit 1

WBN2 Watts Barr Nuclear Unit 2

WDCR Weapon Design and Cost Report

WDD Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

WR War Reserve

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex

Z Z pulsed power facility
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page H-1

Appendix H

List of Figures and Tables

List of Figures

Figure 1–1. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise ........................................................................................1-3

Figure 1–2. Size and age of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2020........................................................1-5

Figure 1–3. Integrated stockpile model..................................................................................................................1-9

Figure 1–4. Timeline for key infrastructure and capability investments for future warheads.............................1-11

Figure 2–1. Major Stockpile Management Programs.............................................................................................2-2

Figure 2–2. Flow of stockpile surveillance activities...............................................................................................2-3

Figure 2–3. DOE/NNSA warhead activities...........................................................................................................2-10

Figure 2–4. Phase X and the Phase 6.X Process....................................................................................................2-11

Figure 3–1. Production Modernization major subprograms..................................................................................3-1

Figure 3–2. Tritium processing flow .....................................................................................................................3-18

Figure 4–1. Stewardship Capability Delivery Schedule – the four key focus areas needed to address 

mission delivery ...................................................................................................................................4-4

Figure 4–2. Weapon assessments rely on many sources of information from Stockpile Research, 

Technology, and Engineering...............................................................................................................4-5

Figure 4–3. Subprograms in Science, Research, Technology, and Engineering......................................................4-7

Figure 4–4. Assessment Science linkages to Weapons Activities...........................................................................4-8

Figure 4–5. Advanced Sources and Detectors “Scorpius” Layout at U1a Complex ..............................................4-10

Figure 4–6. Engineering and Integrated Assessments linkages to Weapons Programs.......................................4-12

Figure 4–7. Internal Confinement Fusion linkages to Weapons Activities...........................................................4-16

Figure 4–8. Advanced Simulation and Computing Linkages to Weapons Programs............................................4-19

Figure 4–9. Weapon Technology and Manufacturing linkages to Weapons Programs........................................4-23

Figure 4–10. DOE/NNSA is pursuing advanced manufacturing areas for investments across capabilities 

that support a robust and resilient manufacturing capability ...........................................................4-24

Figure 4–11. Components of Academic Programs .................................................................................................4-26

Figure 5–1. Defense Nuclear Security Program elements (excludes construction)................................................5-5

Figure 5–2. Increased weapons requirements .......................................................................................................5-9

Figure 5–3. Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program elements........................................................5-11

Figure 5–4. Ongoing and recently completed information technology and cybersecurity projects....................5-13

Figure 6–1. DOE/NNSA infrastructure size and scope............................................................................................6-2

Figure 6–2. Asset management life cycle ...............................................................................................................6-3

Figure 6–3. Asset condition by replacement plant value percentage ....................................................................6-4

Figure 6–4. Integrated mission and infrastructure planning is crucial to the success of DOE/NNSA 

missions, as illustrated by this example from Weapons Simulation and Computing..........................6-6
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page H-2

Figure 6–5. Area plan example ...............................................................................................................................6-7

Figure 6–6. Critical Decision process......................................................................................................................6-9

Figure 6–7. Historical and projected average age of major DOE/NNSA programmatic facilities.........................6-10

Figure 6–8. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Material Processing and Manufacturing .............................................................................6-11

Figure 6–9. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Component Production.......................................................................................................6-13

Figure 6–10. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Simulation and Computing..................................................................................................6-15

Figure 6–11. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Design and Integration........................................................................................................6-16

Figure 6–12. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Science and Engineering .....................................................................................................6-18

Figure 6–13. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Weapon Assembly, Storage, Testing, and Disposition.......................................................................6-21

Figure 6–14. 25-year programmatic line item schedule for ongoing and proposed projects related to 

Transportation and Security ..............................................................................................................6-22

Figure 6–15. 25-year mission-enabling line item schedule ....................................................................................6-23

Figure 7–1. Management and operations net change during fiscal year 2020 ......................................................7-4

Figure 7–2. Management and operating and Federal share of total Weapons Activities workforce.....................7-6

Figure 7–3. Management and operating partner workforce projections by Common Occupational 

Classification System (as of September 30, 2020)...............................................................................7-7

Figure 7–4. Workforce breakdown of national security laboratories, the Nevada National Security Site, 

and weapons production facilities, by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2020) .................................................................................................................7-8

Figure 7–5. Workforce breakdown of national security laboratories, the Nevada National Security Site, 

and weapons production facilities by age group (as of September 30, 2020) ....................................7-8

Figure 7–6. Total management and operating partner headcount distribution by age 

(as of September 30, 2020) .................................................................................................................7-9

Figure 7–7. Workforce breakdown of national security laboratories, the Nevada National Security Site, 

and weapons production facilities by years of service (as of September 30, 2020)............................7-9

Figure 7–8. Management and operating partner workforce years of service at current site 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................7-10

Figure 7–9. Total management and operating separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020) ...............7-11

Figure 7–10. Total management and operating separations by years of service (as of September 30, 2020) ......7-11

Figure 7–11. A simplified model of the talent management life cycle ...................................................................7-12

Figure 7–12. Workforce achievements: using computers to fight COVID-19.........................................................7-17

Figure 8–1. FY 2022 President’s Budget Request for Stockpile Management .......................................................8-4

Figure 8–2. Key milestones for Stockpile Management .........................................................................................8-6

Figure 8–3. FY 2022 President’s Budget for Production Modernization ................................................................8-6

Figure 8–4. Key Milestones for Primary Capability Modernization........................................................................8-9

Figure 8–5. Key Milestones for Secondary Capability Modernization..................................................................8-10

Figure 8–6. Key milestones for Tritium Modernization and Domestic Uranium Enrichment ..............................8-11

Figure 8–7. Key milestones for Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization ..............................................................8-11

Figure 8–8. FY 2022 President’s Budget Request for Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering ............8-12

Figure 8–9. Key milestones for Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering..............................................8-15

Figure 8–10. FY 2022 President’s Budget for Infrastructure and Operations.........................................................8-16

Figure 8–11. FY 2022 President’s Budget for Other Weapons Activities................................................................8-19
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page H-3

Figure 8–12. Key milestones for Secure Transportation Asset...............................................................................8-20

Figure 8–13. Key milestones for Defense Nuclear Security ....................................................................................8-21

Figure 8–14. Key milestones for Information Technology and Cybersecurity........................................................8-23

Figure 8–15. Cost estimates across the Phase 6.X Process.....................................................................................8-24

Figure 8–16. B61-12 Life Extension Program cost from FY 2009 to completion ....................................................8-27

Figure 8–17. W88 Alteration 370 Program (with conventional high explosive refresh) from 

FY 2013 to completion.......................................................................................................................8-28

Figure 8–18. W80-4 Life Extension Program cost from FY 2015 to completion.....................................................8-29

Figure 8–19. W80-4 Alteration (SLCM) cost from FY 2022 to completion .............................................................8-31

Figure 8–20. W87-1 Modification Program cost from FY 2019 to completion.......................................................8-32

Figure 8–21. Total projected Stockpile Major Modernization costs for FY 2021 – FY 2046 with high 

and low estimates (then-year dollars)...............................................................................................8-34

Figure B–1. Exascale Computing Project integrated project team ........................................................................ B-4

Figure C–1. Overview of the DOE/NNSA Exascale Computing Project .................................................................. C-1

Figure C–2. Exascale Computing Project integrated project team ........................................................................ C-5

Figure D–1. The traditional design-build-test cycle for weapon system development ......................................... D-3

Figure E–1. The DOE/NNSA nuclear security enterprise ........................................................................................E-1

Figure E–2. Federal workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)...........................................E-4

Figure E–3. Federal workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) .......................E-5

Figure E–4. Federal employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ........................E-6

Figure E–5. Federal workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) .................................................................................................................E-6

Figure E–6. LLNL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-12

Figure E–7. LLNL workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020) .............................................E-12

Figure E–8. LLNL workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ..........................E-13

Figure E–9. LLNL net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)..............................................................E-13

Figure E–10. LLNL employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020).............................................E-14

Figure E–11. LLNL employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ...........................E-14

Figure E–12. LLNL workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-15

Figure E–13. LLNL employee separation trends.....................................................................................................E-15

Figure E–14. LLNL workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System.........................E-16

Figure E–15. LANL total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-27

Figure E–16. LANL workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020).............................................E-27

Figure E–17. LANL workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) .........................E-28

Figure E–18. LANL net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020) .............................................................E-28

Figure E–19. LANL employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020) ............................................E-29

Figure E–20. LANL employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ..........................E-29

Figure E–21. LANL workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-30

Figure E–22. LANL employee separation trends.....................................................................................................E-30

Figure E–23. LANL workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System ........................E-31

Figure E–24. SNL workforce by Common Occupational Classification System (as of September 30, 2020) ..........E-41
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Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan | Page H-4

Figure E–25. SNL workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)...............................................E-41

Figure E–26. SNL workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ...........................E-42

Figure E–27. SNL net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................E-42

Figure E–28. Age of SNL employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018)..........................E-43

Figure E–29. SNL employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020) ..............................................E-43

Figure E–30. SNL workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-44

Figure E–31. SNL employee separation trends.......................................................................................................E-44

Figure E–32. SNL workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System...........................E-45

Figure E–33. KCNSC workforce by Common Occupational Classification System (as of September 30, 2020) .....E-53

Figure E–34. KCNSC workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020) ..........................................E-53

Figure E–35. KCNSC workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020).......................E-54

Figure E–36. KCNSC net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020)...........................................................E-54

Figure E–37. KCNSC employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020)..........................................E-55

Figure E–38. KCNSC employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020)........................E-55

Figure E–39. KCNSC workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-56

Figure E–40. KCNSC employee separation trends..................................................................................................E-56

Figure E–41. KCNSC workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System......................E-57

Figure E–42. Pantex workforce by Common Occupational Classification System (as of September 30, 2020) .....E-61

Figure E–43. Pantex workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)..........................................E-61

Figure E–44. Pantex workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ......................E-62

Figure E–45. Pantex net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020) ..........................................................E-62

Figure E–46. Pantex employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020) .........................................E-63

Figure E–47. Pantex employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) .......................E-63

Figure E–48. Pantex workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-64

Figure E–49. Pantex employee separation trends..................................................................................................E-64

Figure E–50. Pantex workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System......................E-65

Figure E–51. SRTE total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-70

Figure E–52. SRTE employees by age (as of September 30, 2020).........................................................................E-71

Figure E–53. SRTE employees by years of service (as of September 30, 2020)......................................................E-72

Figure E–54. Change in last 2 fiscal years at SRTE (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2020) ...............................E-73

Figure E–55. Age of SRTE employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2020) ........................E-74

Figure E–56. Years of service of SRTE employees who left service (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2020) .....E-75

Figure E–57. SRTE trends by career stage (as of September 30, 2020)..................................................................E-76

Figure E–58. SRTE employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2020)....................................................E-77

Figure E–59. Total projected SRTE workforce needs by Common Occupational Classification System (as of 

September 30, 2020) .........................................................................................................................E-78

Figure E–60. Y-12 workforce by Common Occupational Classification System (as of September 30, 2020) .........E-82

Figure E–61. Y-12 workforce distributed by age group (as of September 30, 2020)..............................................E-83

Figure E–62. Y-12 workforce distributed by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020............................E-83

Figure E–63. Y-12 net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020) ..............................................................E-84

Figure E–64. Y-12 employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020) .............................................E-84

Figure E–65. Y-12 employee separation by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ...........................E-85

Figure E–66. Y-12 workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-86

Figure E–67. Y-12 employee separation trends......................................................................................................E-86
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Figure E–68. Y-12 workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System .........................E-87

Figure E–69. NNSS total workforce by Common Occupational Classification System (COCS) (as of 

September 30, 2020) .........................................................................................................................E-92

Figure E–70. NNSS employees distributed by age (as of September 30, 2020) .....................................................E-93

Figure E–71. NNSS employees distributed by years of service (as of September 30, 2020) ..................................E-93

Figure E–72. NNSS net change for fiscal year (as of September 30, 2020) ............................................................E-94

Figure E–73. NNSS employee separations by age group (as of September 30, 2020) ...........................................E-94

Figure E–74. NNSS employee separations by years of service group (as of September 30, 2020) ........................E-95

Figure E–75. NNSS workforce participation trends by age category and percent advanced career 

(as of September 30, 2020) ...............................................................................................................E-95

Figure E–76. NNSS employment separation trends (as of September 30, 2020)...................................................E-96

Figure E–77. NNSS workforce projection needs by Common Occupational Classification System........................E-96
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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List of Tables

Table 1–1. Current U.S. nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.........................................................1-6

Table 2–1. Summary of Surveillance challenges and strategies............................................................................2-5

Table 2–2. Summary of Gas Transfer System challenges and strategies ..............................................................2-8

Table 2–3. Summary of Power Sources challenges and strategies .......................................................................2-8

Table 2–4. Summary of Neutron Generators challenges and strategies...............................................................2-9

Table 2–5. Summary of Minor Alterations challenges and strategies...................................................................2-9

Table 2–6. Summary of B61-12 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies............................................2-12

Table 2–7. Summary of W88 Alteration 370 Program challenges and strategies...............................................2-13

Table 2–8. Summary of W80-4 Life Extension Program challenges and strategies ............................................2-13

Table 2–9. Summary of W87-1 Modification Program challenges and strategies..............................................2-14

Table 2–10. Summary of Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition challenges and strategies ..........................2-16

Table 2–11. Summary of Production Operations challenges and strategies.........................................................2-17

Table 3–1. Summary of Plutonium Modernization challenges and strategies......................................................3-6

Table 3–2. Summary of High Explosives and Energetics Modernization challenges and strategies .....................3-9

Table 3–3. Summary of Uranium Modernization challenges and strategies ......................................................3-12

Table 3–4. Summary of Depleted Uranium Modernization challenges and strategies.......................................3-14

Table 3–5. Summary of Lithium Modernization challenges and strategies ........................................................3-16

Table 3–6. Summary of Tritium Modernization challenges and strategies.........................................................3-19

Table 3–7. Summary of Domestic Uranium Enrichment challenges and strategies............................................3-21

Table 3–8. Summary of Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization challenges and strategies ...............................3-24

Table 4–1. Summary of Assessment Science challenges and strategies.............................................................4-10

Table 4–2. Summary of Engineering and Integrated Assessments challenges and strategies............................4-14

Table 4–3. Summary of Inertial Confinement Fusion challenges and strategies ................................................4-17

Table 4–4. Summary of Advanced Simulation and Computing challenges and strategies..................................4-21

Table 4–5. Summary of Weapon Technology and Manufacturing Maturation challenges and strategies.........4-25

Table 4–6. Summary of Academic Programs challenges and strategies .............................................................4-29

Table 5–1. Summary of Secure Transportation Asset challenges and strategies..................................................5-4

Table 5–2. Defense Nuclear Security Program elements......................................................................................5-5

Table 5–3. Summary of Defense Nuclear Security Program challenges and strategies........................................5-8

Table 5–4. Elements of the Information Technology and Cybersecurity Program .............................................5-12

Table 5–5. Technologies deployed or to be deployed to address Information Technology and 

Cybersecurity threats.........................................................................................................................5-14

Table 5–6. Summary of Information Technology and Cybersecurity challenges and strategies.........................5-15

Table 6–1. Summary of Capabilities-Based Investments challenges and strategies...........................................6-34

Table 7–1. Summary of Recruitment and Hiring challenges and strategies........................................................7-13

Table 7–2. Summary of Development, Retainment, and Sustainment challenges and strategies .....................7-14

Table 7–3. Summary of Training and Knowledge Transfer challenges and strategies........................................7-15
Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | March 2022

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Table 8–1. Overview of FY 2022 President’s Budget for Weapons Activities........................................................8-3

Table 8–2. DOE/NNSA deferred maintenance as a percentage of Replacement Plant Value.............................8-18

Table 8–3. Projected FY 2022 DOE/NNSA infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization investments.........8-18

Table 8–4. Cost estimates for Stockpile Major Modernization programs within the 25-year 

program of record..............................................................................................................................8-26

Table 8–5. Total estimated cost for B61-12 Life Extension Program ..................................................................8-28

Table 8–6. Total estimated cost for W88 Alteration Program (with conventional high explosive refresh)........8-29

Table 8–7. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Life Extension Program...................................................................8-30

Table 8–8. Total estimated cost for W80-4 Alteration (SLCM)............................................................................8-31

Table 8–9. Total estimated cost for W87-1 Modification Program.....................................................................8-32

Table 8–10. Total estimated cost for W93 Program .............................................................................................8-33

Table 8–11. Total estimated cost for Future Strategic Missile – Land-Based Warhead (FSLW)............................8-33

Table 8–12. Total estimated cost for Future Strategic Missile – Sea-Based Warhead..........................................8-33

Table 8–13. Total estimated cost for B61 Follow-On ............................................................................................8-34

Table 8–14. Capital Acquisition Cost Estimate Classification System....................................................................8-36

Table 8–15. Weapons Activities programmatic construction estimated costs, FY 2022 – FY 2046 ......................8-36

Table C–1. NNSA Exascale Computing Initiative funding schedule for FY 2022 ................................................... C-3

Table D–1. Distribution of the Stockpile Responsiveness Program budget across major technical efforts ......... D-4

Table E–1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory capabilities........................................................................E-8

Table E–2. Los Alamos National Laboratory capabilities.....................................................................................E-19

Table E–3. Sandia National Laboratories capabilities..........................................................................................E-34

Table E–4. Kansas City National Security Campus capabilities............................................................................E-47

Table E–5. Pantex Plant capabilities....................................................................................................................E-59

Table E–6. Savannah River Site capabilities ........................................................................................................E-67

Table E–7. Y-12 National Security Complex capabilities .....................................................................................E-80

Table E–8. Nevada National Security Site capabilities ........................................................................................E-89
A Report to Congress

Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan

March 2022

U.S. Department of Energy

National Nuclear Security Administration

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585

DOE/NA-0115