U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

79–469CC 2002

A REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT’S RECOMMENDATION TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2002

Serial No. 107–99

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

GREG GANSKE, Iowa 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

ED BRYANT, Tennessee 

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

TOM SAWYER, Ohio 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana 

JANE HARMAN, California 

DAVID V. MARVENTANO, Staff Director 

JAMES D. BARNETTE, General Counsel 

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

Vice Chairman 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

GREG GANSKE, Iowa 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

ED BRYANT, Tennessee 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

— — (Vacancy) 

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana 

(Ex Officio) 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

TOM SAWYER, Ohio 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

(Ex Officio) 

(II) 

2

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Testimony of: 

Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary, Department of Energy ......................... 32

Berkley, Hon. Shelley, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Nevada ........................................................................................................... 22

Chappelle, Hon. Laura, Chairwoman, Michigan Public Service Commission ................................................................................................................. 206

Cohon, Jared L., Chairman, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board ......... 189

Colvin, Joe F., President and CEO, Nuclear Energy Institute ..................... 210

Dicus, Hon. Greta Joy, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ................................................................................................................. 181

Dushaw, Jim, Director, Utility Department, International Brotherhood 

of Electrical Workers .................................................................................... 215

Ensign, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada ...................... 26

Gibbons, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada ................................................................................................................ 17

Holmstead, Hon. Jeffrey R., Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ............................................ 186

Jones, Gary, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Team, U.S. 

General Accounting Office ............................................................................ 194

Additional Material Submitted for the Record: 

Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary, Department of Energy, responses 

for the record ................................................................................................. 273

Cohon, Jared L., Chairman, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 

responses for the record ............................................................................... 287

Dicus, Hon. Greta Joy, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responses for the record ...................................................................... 281

Holmstead, Hon. Jeffrey R., Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, responses for the record . 291

Jones, Gary, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Team, U.S. 

General Accounting Office, responses for the record ................................. 284

(III) 

(1)

A REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT’S RECOMMENDATION TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR 

WASTE REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, 

NEVADA 

THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Barton (chairman) 

presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Barton, Burr, Whitfield, 

Ganske, Norwood, Shimkus, Wilson, Shadegg, Pickering, Bryant, 

Buyer, Radanovich, Bono, Walden, Tauzin (ex officio), Boucher, 

Hall, Sawyer, Wynn, Doyle, Waxman, Markey, Rush, McCarthy, 

Strickland, Barrett, Luther, and Dingell (ex officio). 

Staff present: Dwight Cates, majority professional staff; Sue 

Sheridan, minority counsel; and Rick Kessler, minority professional 

staff. 

Mr. BARTON. The subcommittee will come to order. As soon as 

our last members of the audience find their seat, we’re going to 

begin the hearing. 

Would the gentleman of Louisiana, the full committee chairman, 

wish to go first with his opening statement? 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you 

for holding this most important hearing. In my opinion, we’re going 

to consider today one of the most important public health and safety issues the committee will consider this year. 

Mr. BARTON. Do you have your microphone on? 

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes. The development of a centralized and 

permanent geologic disposal site for the country’s nuclear waste. 

Today, the high level nuclear waste is spread out at 77 sites in 

more than 30 States and every region of the country and most of 

these waste sites are located near nuclear power plants where 

spent nuclear fuel is carefully stored. Several other nuclear waste 

sites were created due to weapons production activities of the DOE 

facilities like the Hanford site where liquid radioactive wastes are 

stored in tanks. Every one of these waste sites shares one common 

aspect, they were designed for temporary storage of these dangerous wastes, not for long-term storage. 

There are many negative risks posed by the failure to develop a 

single centralized disposal site for nuclear waste and currently 

2

more than 161 million Americans live within 75 miles of a nuclear 

waste storage site. These waste sites are located near 20 major waterways which supply household water for more than 30 million 

Americans, and moreover, although these sites are well protected 

and secure, they could pose an attractive target, obviously, for terrorist attack. 

So for the sake of long-term public health and safety and our national interest and security, it is absolutely necessary and critical 

that we move to develop Yucca Mountain. The Yucca Mountain site 

is located 90 miles away from Las Vegas. It is an isolated site on 

remote Federal land at the Nevada test site, 14 miles away from 

the closest residents and it is safe and it is secure. The waste there 

will be stored 1,000 feet underground and 500 feet above the water 

table. The waste will be placed in steel containers and the containers will be placed under titanium shields. Furthermore, not 

only is the air space around Yucca already restricted, but an existing security force at the Nevada test site will be available and will 

be charged with protecting the area. This is a comprehensive defense-in-depth approach. 

In its January letter to Congress the Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board underscored this fact, stating ‘‘eliminating all uncertainty associated with estimates of repository performance would 

never be possible at any repository site. Policy makers will decide 

how much scientific uncertainty is acceptable at the time the various decisions are made.’’ On February 15, 2002, the President recommended on the advice 

of DOE’s Secretary Spencer Abraham that Congress approve the 

Yucca Mountain site even if the State of Nevada objects as we 

know it has. Based on my review, and the understanding of DOE’s 

extensive scientific work at the Yucca Mountain site, I am prepared 

to support this important policy decision as I hope this subcommittee and the full Committee on Energy and Commerce are 

prepared to do and to recommend the site for approval by the full 

House. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. W.J. ‘‘Billy’’ Tauzin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

ENERGY AND COMMERCE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. In my opinion, we 

will consider this morning one of the most important public health and safety issues 

the Subcommittee will consider this year—the development of a centralized and permanent geologic disposal site for the country’s nuclear wastes. 

Today, high-level nuclear wastes are spread out at 77 sites in more than 30 states 

in every region of the country. Most of these waste sites are located near nuclear 

power plants, where spent nuclear fuel is carefully stored. Several other nuclear 

waste sites were created due to weapons production activities at DOE facilities like 

the Hanford site, where liquid radioactive wastes are stored in tanks. 

Every one of these waste sites shares one common aspect: They were all designed 

for temporary storage of these dangerous wastes—not long-term disposal. 

There are many negative risks posed by the failure to develop a single centralized 

disposal site for nuclear wastes. Currently, more than 161 million Americans live 

within 75 miles of a nuclear waste storage site. These waste sites are located near 

20 major waterways, which supply household water for more than 30 million Americans. Moreover, although these sites are well protected and secure, they could pose 

an attractive target for terrorist attack. 

So for the sake of long-term public health and safety, and our national security 

interests, it is absolutely critical that we move to develop Yucca Mountain. 

3

The Yucca Mountain site is located 90 miles away from Las Vegas. It is isolated 

on remote federal land at the Nevada Test Site, 14 miles away from the closest residence—and is safe and secure. 

The wastes will be stored 1,000 feet underground, and 500 feet above the water 

table. The wastes will be held in steel containers, and the containers will be placed 

under a titanium shield. Furthermore, not only is the airspace around Yucca already restricted, but an existing security force at the Nevada Test Site will protect 

the area. This is a comprehensive defense-in-depth approach. 

In its January letter to Congress, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board underscored this fact, stating: ‘‘eliminating all uncertainty associated with estimates 

of repository performance would never be possible at any repository site. Policymakers will decide how much scientific uncertainty is acceptable at the times various decisions are made...’’. 

On February 15, 2002, the President recommended—on the advice of DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham—that Congress approve the Yucca Mountain site, even if 

the State of Nevada disapproves. 

Based on my review and understanding of DOE’s extensive scientific work at the 

Yucca Mountain site, I am prepared to support this important policy decision. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Tauzin. We would now hear from 

Mr. Sawyer with an opening statement. Oh, you want me to make 

mine first? Well, then we’ll recognize the chairman for an opening 

statement. 

Today the subcommittee will review a Presidential decision that 

has long been coming, In the 1970’s and the 1980’s, the Department of Energy studied more than a dozen potential nuclear waste 

repository sites. In 1987, Congress designated Yucca Mountain as 

the single site to be studied by the Department of Energy for longterm geological disposal of the Nation’s high level radioactive 

waste. The DOE study of that site has been concluded. The President has agreed with the Secretary of Energy’s decision to recommend the site to Congress. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act has a specific process for making 

this decision and for its review by Congress and the State of Nevada. 

I want to welcome all of the witnesses here today and thank 

them for coming. I am particularly pleased that the Secretary of 

Energy, the Honorable Spencer Abraham of Michigan will be representing the Department of Energy. I know that there have been 

many demands on his time and there continue to be demands including many of the international energy situations of which we’re 

all aware on a daily basis. 

I appreciate him being here. Of course, he’s not here yet, but 

when he gets here I will appreciate him being here. 

I also want to welcome our newest member of the subcommittee, 

the Honorable Steve Buyer of Indiana. Not only is he here, he was 

here on time and that is a very good record to begin with. 

We also have a new vice chairman of the subcommittee, the Honorable John Shimkus of Illinois and he is here also. And so I want 

to welcome him with his new duties. 

I want to thank my good friend, Rick Boucher of Virginia who 

is due very shortly. He is a co-sponsor of this resolution, H.J. 87. 

I want to thank the full committee chairman, Mr. Tauzin, for his 

sponsorship; Mr. Dingell, the ranking member on the minority side 

for his help, establishing a good bipartisan process for the review 

of this important decision. 

4

I came to Congress in 1985. For my entire career, the Department of Energy has been studying the suitability of Yucca Mountain. I have been surprised and disappointed by the continual 

delays not related necessarily to site characterization, but to all the 

various aspects of the project. I have been pleased with what we 

have begun to hear finally from the scientists. I want to applaud 

the President and the Secretary of Energy for their decision and 

the employees of the Department of Energy for the comprehensive 

statement that serves as the basis of the opinion recommendation 

before us. 

We absolutely have to have a place where spent nuclear fuel can 

go and be safe for 10,000 years. I strongly believe that for the longterm safety and the security of the American people, we must consolidate nuclear waste in one well-studied, well-protected repository. It should not remain forever at more than 100 facilities scattered throughout the Nation as it is today. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act gives the Governor of the State 

where the repository is to be located, in this case, the Governor of 

the State of Nevada, a chance to object to the President’s decision. 

The Governor of Nevada has exercised his rights under the law and 

objected. Foreseeing that possibility, the Act gives the Congress an 

opportunity to review the decision and the objection and make a 

nationally oriented decision. The Act lays out a fast track process 

for consideration of the objection as if to say that Congress knew 

then that we might be in this place that we are today. 

That’s the purpose of this hearing. 

I have scheduled subcommittee consideration next Tuesday of 

H.J. Res. 87, the specific one sentence resolution called for in the 

Act that would override the veto of the Governor of Nevada. I expect this hearing will reaffirm my confidence in the suitability of 

Yucca Mountain and the appropriateness of deciding once and for 

all that Yucca Mountain is the site that the Department of Energy 

should attempt to license. 

I must point out that the Department still maintains the burden 

in getting Yucca Mountain ready to accept waste. It must submit 

a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The 

NRC, an independent body, must review that application and determine whether it meets all of the protections in the law including 

those that have been recently promulgated by the Environmental 

Protection Agency. Action today does not mean that high level nuclear waste will go to Yucca Mountain tomorrow. It simply means 

that DOE is now allowed to take the next step in the NRC licensing process, that DOE can work on a transportation plan to transport the waste and that we can begin to move forward. 

I intend to work with the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State of Nevada and interested 

stakeholders in making sure that as we go forward all interests are 

protected and all due process requirements are met. 

I want to especially thank Congressman Gibbons for his tremendous work on behalf of his District and his state. He has been a 

noble and honorable adversary, if that’s the correct term and it’s 

probably not adversary, I should say an advocate for his position 

and his state’s position and we’re delighted that you’re going to be 

5

here to present your case to the subcommittee in a very few minutes. 

I look forward to the testimony of yourself, Congressman, and 

the other witnesses before us. With that, I’d like to welcome Mr. 

Sawyer for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY

AND AIR QUALITY

Today, the Subcommittee will review a Presidential decision that has been a long 

time coming. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Department of Energy studied more than 

a dozen potential nuclear waste repository sites. In 1987, Congress designated 

Yucca Mountain as the single site to be studied by the Department of Energy (DOE) 

for long-term geologic disposal of the Nation’s high-level radioactive waste. 

The DOE study of that site has concluded, and the President agreed with Secretary Abraham’s decision to recommend the site to Congress. The Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act has a specific process for making this decision, and for its review by Congress and the State of Nevada. 

I welcome all of the witnesses here today, and thank you for coming. I particularly 

want to thank Secretary Abraham of the Department of Energy. I know there are 

many demands on his time, including disrupted international energy supplies, disagreements with the Governor of South Carolina, and floor consideration of the energy bill in the other body. I appreciate you being here. 

I also want to welcome the newest Member of the Subcommittee, Congressman 

Steve Buyer of Indiana. I look forward to working with him and know that he is 

very capable in dealing with energy and air quality issues. 

Before we begin, I want to thank my good friend Rick Boucher, the Subcommittee 

Ranking Member, for his help on this hearing and his cosponsorship of H.J.Res. 87. 

I also thank full Committee Chairman Tauzin and Ranking Member Dingell for 

helping establish a good process for the review of this important decision. 

I came to Congress in 1985. For all of my career, the Department of Energy has 

been studying the suitability of Yucca Mountain. I have been surprised by continual 

delays not related to site characterization, but I have been pleased with what I have 

heard from the scientists. I applaud the President and Secretary Abraham for their 

decision, and the employees of the Department of Energy for the comprehensive 

statement that serves as the basis of the recommendation. 

We need a place where spent nuclear fuel can go and be safe for 10,000 years. 

I strongly believe that for the long-term safety and security of the American people, 

we must consolidate nuclear waste in one well-studied repository. It should not remain forever in more than one hundred facilities throughout the Nation. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act gives the Governor of Nevada a chance to object 

to the President’s decision, and he has. Foreseeing that possibility, the Act also 

gives Congress the opportunity to review the decision and the objection, and make 

a Nationally-oriented decision. The Act lays out a fast-track process for consideration of the objection, as if to say that Congress knew then that we would be in 

exactly this place right now. 

I have scheduled subcommittee consideration next Tuesday of H.J.Res. 87, the 

specific one-sentence resolution called for in the Act. I expect that this hearing will 

reaffirm my confidence in the suitability of Yucca Mountain, and the appropriateness of deciding once and for all that Yucca Mountain is the site that DOE should 

try to license. 

I must point out that the Department of Energy maintains a burden in getting 

Yucca Mountain ready to accept waste. The DOE must submit a license application 

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC, an independent body, must 

review the application and determine whether it meets all of the protections in the 

law, including those recently promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA). 

Action today does not mean waste gets shipped to Yucca Mountain tomorrow. It 

means that DOE can take the next step in the NRC process, that DOE can work 

on a transportation plan to continue our Nation’s excellent record of transporting 

nuclear waste, and that the Federal Government can work with Nevada to make 

sure the State is ready, and well-compensated for, its hosting of this very necessary 

site. 

I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.

6

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a lot of complex, technical issues involved in the designation of Yucca Mountain. We’re going to explore some of those today. But ultimately, in 

my view, this boils down to a question of how many sites we want 

to have. I have heard our Chairman talk about 77 sites. I’ve heard 

of 103, 104. My staff tells me we’re now talking about 131 sites 

that would be eligible for transportation to Yucca Mountain. It 

really does boil down to Mark Twain’s advice. With a name like 

Tom Sawyer, I hear about Mark Twain every day of my life, so it’s 

with care that I cite him, but he suggested that you’re well served 

to put all your eggs in one basket and then watch that basket. That 

may well apply here as well as anything I can think of in terms 

of risk, danger and management of our long-term safety concerns. 

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board will be extremely 

helpful in that task. Since 1987, this Board of independent scientists has been charged with evaluating DOE’s work on the Yucca 

project. In its report of January 24, the Board described important 

issues that are in need of further evaluation by DOE, especially the 

advantages of low temperature design. I would urge the Department to continue a rigorous scientific investigation of the site to resolve outstanding questions using scientific approaches recommended by the Board. 

I also urge the NRC, the DOT and the Department of Energy to 

step up their planning process for the transportation of waste. 

Waste shipments have had a safe record for the last 30 years, but 

Yucca is a much larger project, much more complex involving many 

more routes than the government has handled to date. DOE estimates that over the next 40 years if this plan is adopted there will 

be between 50 and 300 transportation accidents of varying degrees 

of risk during the lifetime of this undertaking. There are critical 

decisions that have to be made to make the transportation of waste 

as safe as possible. Right now, armed guards for the waste are only 

required in urban centers, but that’s clearly not sufficient after 

what we witnessed in September. In addition, it seems to me that 

railroad shipments of waste should be made by trains dedicated to 

that task. The waste itself is not explosive, of course, but we cannot 

afford the risk of shipping it with other materials and chemicals 

that if caught on fire could burn hotter than the temperature that 

the waste casks can withstand. 

There have been no full scale tests of the casks that the NRC has 

approved. Given the large number of shipments we can expect if 

Yucca is approved it would seem like a wise investment to require 

full scale tests of the equipment that we will depend upon for our 

safety. 

It also seems to me that population should be a significant factor 

in determining routes and methods of transportation. It doesn’t 

make any difference whether you live in a rural area or an urban 

area. Lives are important wherever you are, but when you have 

dense concentrations of life around transportation routes, it seems 

to me that’s a critical question. 

These are the kinds of issues to which I’ll be paying attention if 

the project moves forward. Trying to design a repository that will 

last longer than human beings have been recording their history is 

an unprecedented scientific challenge. The fact is, we can never be 

7

absolutely certain. Congress will have to rely on the NRC to resolve 

important questions in coming years and license the safest repository possible. But right now enough is known, I believe, to move 

ahead. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentleman and would recognize the 

gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Norwood for an opening statement. 

Mr. NORWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and I do 

appreciate this opportunity to be here today and let me start by 

commending you for your critical leadership on this issue. 

I believe that Yucca Mountain and its selection as a permanent 

waste repository for this country’s spent nuclear fuel is probably 

one of the most important issues that this Congress can face. 

The United States has over 45,000 metric tons of spent nuclear 

fuel scattered across some 70 plus sites in this country and as a 

result of passive and ongoing commercial nuclear power plants 

alone with more spent nuclear fuel waste waiting on a permanent 

home as a result of the U.S. defense activities. 

Now Mr. Chairman, this issue may not be on the radar screen 

of every single American citizen, but let me assure you it is very 

important to a great many of my constituents, particularly those 

who live in Augusta and work at DOE, Savannah River site just 

across the Savannah River in Aiken, South Carolina. 

In addition, Yucca Mountain is important to the folks who live 

within my District in Burke County, Georgia, home of Plant Vogtle, 

operated by Georgia Power, which includes two separate reactors 

at approximately 1200 megawatts each. 

Congress, many years before I came here, had the foresight to 

put into motion a deliberate and meticulous plan for the development of a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel and high 

level radioactive waste. This process began with a Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act of 1982 and was followed in 1987 by the single site characterization of Yucca Mountain. 

The Department of Energy has estimated that at roughly $6.7 

billion has already been spent on characterization and development 

activities at Yucca Mountain which much of this money coming 

from fees collected from currently operating commercial reactors 

paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund and Georgia ratepayers now 

have contributed over $460 million alone to this project. 

Consequently, having been to Yucca Mountain to see for myself, 

I believe leveraged dollars and extensive research have yielded 

sound science that warrants moving to the next step within this 

carefully crafted process of selecting Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository. 

I believe a permanent repository is tantamount to a coherent and 

comprehensive national energy policy that goal, I feel certain, of everyone on this committee, therefore I look forward to hearing more 

reasons from the witnesses today on why we should continue our 

course toward selecting a single permanent home to spent nuclear 

fuel in this country. 

Now I’d like to add, Mr. Chairman, that although I totally agree 

with the policy, I’m very disappointed with the delay. I feel strongly that you need to urge the Energy Department and others to let’s 

get this job done, primarily for the sake of the Nation, but second 

8

for the sake of the members of this subcommittee. My good friend 

from Nevada has browbeat us to a considerable extent at this 

point. I wouldn’t call him an adversary, but I’d call him very effective and if we can get this done and get Mr. Gibbons off of us it 

would be a big help. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I would point out if any of you want to go to 

a golf tournament, Congressman Norwood’s got a little tournament 

has got a little tournament down in his District called the Masters 

and he tells me he’s got lots of tickets for next year’s tournament. 

Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Chairman, careful here. I think you have to 

tell the truth. 

Mr. BARTON. I’m not under oath at this time. 

The distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia is recognized for an opening statement. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

extend a welcome to our many witnesses at the hearing today and 

a special welcome to our colleagues from Nevada, Senator Ensign 

and Representatives Shelley Berkley and Jim Gibbons. I also want 

to thank the Secretary of Energy, former Senator Spencer Abraham, for his time and for his participation in our hearing today. 

The bill which is pending before the subcommittee takes the next 

necessary step in the statutorily prescribed process for establishing 

a site for the permanent disposal of high level nuclear waste and 

I want to commend Chairman Tauzin of the full committee and 

Chairman Barton of the subcommittee for their diligence in taking 

this step. I’m a co-sponsor with them of the legislation which will 

move this process forward. 

A permanent secure site for the disposal of high level nuclear 

waste must be established. Forty-five thousand metric tons of 

waste now reside onsite at nuclear reactors in 72 locations around 

the Nation. This temporary siting of spent fuel at reactor sites 

poses both a security threat and an environmental threat. In my 

view, arguments that the permanent disposal of waste in dry cask 

storage at these 72 dispersed sites as an alternative to the establishment of a secure, central permanent repository holds far less 

credence after September 11 than before. I think we really have no 

alternative to the development of a central disposal site. 

While arguments will be made that more could be learned about 

the proposed Yucca Mountain site, I would note that the recommendation of the Secretary of Energy that came forward in February of this year, that Yucca Mountain be chosen for permanent 

waste disposal is based on 20 years of scientific investigation of the 

Yucca Mountain site. The site characterization work required in 

Section 113 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act has been carried out. 

The public hearings focusing on the Yucca Mountain site required 

in Section 114 of the Act have been completed and have been held. 

If Congress passes the legislation now pending before the subcommittee which overrides the disapproval of the President’s site 

designation issued by Governor Guinn of Nevada on April 8, construction activities could not commence on the site until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission completes a full technical and scientific review of the site and the proposed disposal methods and 

then issues a license for construction. 

9

No site will ever be found to be perfect for the disposal of high 

level nuclear waste, but I’m persuaded that these studies and the 

NRC review which is still to come provides sufficient assurances 

about the appropriate nature of the Yucca Mountain site to justify 

approval of the legislation that is now pending before the subcommittee. 

Today’s hearing provides an opportunity for the subcommittee to 

review and examine the basis for the Secretary’s recommendation 

followed by the President’s designation of the Yucca Mountain site. 

Those actions follow the consideration of the scientific findings, the 

national security concerns and the environmental consequences either of designating Yucca Mountain or of declining to do so. 

I look forward to the testimony today concerning those various 

matters. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to note that the Energy and Commerce Committee has a long tradition of addressing many of our 

Nation’s most important and challenging public policy matters in 

a thoughtful and bipartisan fashion. Nowhere has that bipartisan 

cooperation been more in evidence than in our efforts to resolve nuclear waste disposal problems and I again commend the committee’s leadership for moving expeditiously on this pending matter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Congressman Boucher. At the beginning of the hearing, Congressman Sawyer was kind enough to let 

Chairman Tauzin and I go consecutively, so I’m going to give Congressman Dingell the opportunity, if he would wish, to go consecutively after Mr. Boucher, if the gentleman from Michigan would 

like to be recognized for an opening statement. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I thank you and commend you for holding this hearing today to examine the basis for 

the President’s recommendation of Yucca Mountain. And I also 

commend you for holding the hearing. It is a question that needs 

to be looked into by the Congress to ascertain whether, in fact, it’s 

a scientifically suitable site for the construction of a permanent underground repository for high level nuclear waste. 

Many of us have been critical for the Department’s slow pace in 

carrying out the job we first gave them in 1982. Under the 1987 

amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE was directed 

to narrow its search for a suitable site to Yucca Mountain with the 

goal of opening a repository in 1998, some 4 years ago. 

Meanwhile, waste continues to be stored onsite at nuclear reactors long past the point when shipments to a repository should 

have begun and defense waste continues to be stored at unlicensed 

DOE defense facilities in a number of States. These events indicate 

a certain high level of danger to the public and to the national security. Billions of dollars of ratepayers monies have been expended 

in characterizing the site, at last count, according to my information, something like $11 or $12 billion. Lawsuits continue to threaten the funds needed to move forward with the project. 

I wholeheartedly support the Act’s original purpose of constructing a permanent underground repository for nuclear waste 

and I believe that Secretary Abraham’s finding that Yucca Mountain is a scientifically suitable place is good news. It is important, 

however, to acknowledge that the vast majority of Members of ConVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
10

gress are not qualified to pass judgment on the specifics of the Secretary’s findings on which the President’s recommendation is 

based. That is why the Act requires DOE to obtain a license from 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, not the Congress. 

And it is the Commission that must determine whether or not 

the combination of the site and DOE’s repository design will protect 

the public and the environment. This is a process which will begin 

in some time and it is not one which the Congress should at this 

time intrude into or to delay. 

The Act provides Nevada the right to object to the President’s 

recommendation. Governor Guinn has done so. This requires the 

Congress to make a decision as to whether DOE should be permitted to go forward with an application to NRC. I believe it 

should. I commend the chairman for holding this hearing and particularly for including as witnesses, critics as well as supporters of 

DOE’s findings. That will enable us to get the fairest picture of all 

of the circumstances associated with this matter. It is important for 

members to hear Nevada’s concerns as well as those such independent entities as the General Accounting Office, the Nuclear 

Waste Technical Review Board, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency, again, to have the benefit of divergent views. 

Mr. Chairman, in dealing with the nuclear waste disposal, we 

have never found it to be easy. But over the years you have handled it fairly and with thoroughness. In the past years, you and I 

have labored diligently, if not necessarily successfully, to reform 

the budget rules so as to ensure that the tax payers and ratepayers 

funds collected for this project are restored and are fairly treated 

and properly expended. 

DOE acknowledges that this funding problem will begin to pinch 

by the year 2003 and it will have to be addressed sooner, rather 

than later or the repository program will grind to a halt. That battle is, however, for another day. I wish to thank you for your attention to it and remind my colleagues that the problem is still unresolved. I also remind them that the inquiry which we make today 

is in to a question which needs to be addressed to allow the licensing process to go forward and I would note to all that the licensing 

process and program will consider all questions associated with 

this matter, not just some narrow portion of the questions. 

I want it to be very clearly understood that this is a necessary 

part of a fair process and I will therefore enthusiastically support 

the legislation before us today. 

I also want to thank one of our witnesses, Laura Chappelle, the 

Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission for her recognition that this is an important funding issue. I thank my colleagues, I thank the witnesses and Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SHIMKUS [presiding]. The gentleman yields back his time 

and we thank the ranking member. I will now recognize myself for 

5 minutes. I too want to recognize my friend Jim Gibbons, and we 

fought many battles together. He is a forceful advocate for his 

state. He also understands that I have to be a forceful advocate for 

mine. And it’s under those circumstances that no one in this room 

does not know my position and I think this is an important thing 

that we must do. 

11

As you all know, Illinois has quite a bit interest in this issue, 

particularly since we receive more electricity from nuclear energy, 

have more operating and closed nuclear facilities and have more 

spent nuclear fuel in temporary storage than any other state. So 

I applaud the President’s decision to move on this and hope we can 

pass legislation quickly. 

I would like to address one specific aspect of this debate that 

tends to get a lot of attention and that is the fear of transporting 

the spent waste. The truth is concerns over transportation of spent 

waste are misguided. You can’t argue with the fact that almost 

3,000 safe shipments of used nuclear fuel have taken place without 

any release of radioactive material. That’s right. On some 3,000 occasions, used fuel has traveled by truck or rail across the country, 

including almost 500 in my home State of Illinois. And the reason 

you probably haven’t heard about this is because not one of these 

shipments has threatened the environment or public safety. States 

like Illinois have gone to great lengths to set up a system that ensures safe transportation of nuclear waste through the State and 

across State lines. Even opponents of this bill will say that Illinois 

has set up a safe and reliable system for transporting the waste 

through the state. Local authorities are contacted and consulted. 

An emergency plan is in place and State employees track the waste 

as it moves through the state. And I would be happy to help facilitate State to State conversations on how it is done in Illinois. 

Transporting spent nuclear materials is safe. It has been proven 

to be safe and there is no reason to doubt that it will remain safe 

even with a large increase in shipments. And with that, I yield 

back my time and I will recognize the gentlewoman from the State 

of Missouri, Ms. McCarthy for 5 minutes. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and I’m happy to 

hear of the success of my neighboring state, Illinois. That has not 

been the case in my State of Missouri. The Energy Department has 

estimated that projected rail and truck shipments of nuclear waste 

could pass through the Kansas City area as often as twice a day. 

In past legislation, we have adopted language to address concerns 

of emergency responders and communities affected and given authority to Governors to weigh in on some of these transportation 

issues, but let me tell you that last year the first cross country 

shipment of nuclear waste traveled from South Carolina through 

Missouri, headed to an Idaho lab via the trucks and Governor 

Holden of Missouri discussed and agreed upon specific guidelines 

for the shipment of this waste with the U.S. Department of Energy. 

Despite these agreements, the Department of Energy failed to give 

a formal 7-day advance notification. The shipment went through 

the State of Missouri despite stating in its official notice that the 

waste would go through Iowa, not Missouri. A number of Missouri 

officials stated that the DOE’s response to this dilemma was that 

it was simply a typo. This is unacceptable. 

The DOE has failed to avoid rush hour traffic in St. Louis and 

any of you who have visited that community know about the multiple beltways and the rush hour traffic dilemma and also the DOE 

has failed to address major public events. Recently, in the Kansas 

City area, the Royals were playing a baseball game. Their stadium 

is right on I-70 and 40,000 fans attended. Prior notice of special 

12

events was provided to the DOE and yet they failed to avoid this 

event when transporting a truck shipment of nuclear waste. 

The State of Missouri and DOE had agreed to safe parking areas 

that would be designated along the routes through Missouri in case 

of delays, accidents of bad weather or other concerns. However, the 

DOE shipped nuclear waste on trucks without even bothering to 

set up safe parking areas with the Missouri State officials. Safe 

parking areas are designed for truck shipments to make stops in 

case of emergencies in order to protect the public’s welfare from 

any accidents that may occur and we do have incidents of storms 

and accidents on our highways that occurred during these shipments. 

Summer thunderstorms have caused numerous and serious problems arising on I-270 and I-70. At least once a rainstorm was reported during a DOE truck shipment through Missouri. The State 

of Missouri had previously advised the DOE to identify severe 

weather before sending out shipments in order to prevent any hazards occurring or having to halt the shipment due to road and 

weather conditions. 

Although DOE agreed to follow all these simple guidelines in 

order to assure the safety of the public, unfortunately, it failed to 

meet any of the agreements. I think the DOE needs to reevaluate 

its practices of shipping spent fuel and other high level radioactive 

waste through densely populated areas. 

I agree we must dispose of our spent nuclear fuel and it’s critical 

we reduce the risk associated with this disposal as much as possible. We must continue to work to find the safest, most environmentally sound and most fiscally responsible solution for our constituents. The future and health of our community depends on this. 

I understand that language is not allowed in the measure before 

us to address these concerns, but I do urge the Commission to assure us that strict safety measures and the cooperation with State 

emergency response officials and Governors be adhered to for the 

safety of all concerned. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentlelady from Missouri and I’m sure 

that that typo will not occur again. It’s hard to get Missouri out 

of Iowa, no matter how you type it. It just doesn’t work, does it? 

The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Ganske, is recognized for an opening statement. 

Mr. GANSKE. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. A year ago, this committee 

held a hearing on nuclear energy. Much has happened since then, 

but it is still true that nationwide, nuclear power plants produce 

approximately 20 percent of the electricity consumed in the United 

States and I am still acutely aware of the need to establish a permanent repository for spent fuel. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 

1982 required that a site be established no later than January 31, 

1998 and still we wait. 

This has caused local facilities to build more onsite storage which 

has never been the best public policy option. The current goal of 

the Department of Energy for opening the permanent site is now 

2010, 12 years past the original deadline. I believe the President 

made the right choice on this issue and that Congress should afVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
13

firm his decision regarding a permanent storage facility and move 

forward with steps for its implementation. 

Even long-time opponents of the permanent storage site have 

come around to see the merits of the President’s position. The Des 

Moines Register, on March 17 this year, ran this editorial with the 

headline, ‘‘Move Ahead on Yucca Mountain’’. This is after years of 

opposing Yucca Mountain. The Register said it would be shortsighted to oppose the permanent storage of nuclear waste, calling 

the risks associated with the permanent storage and the transfer 

of material overstated and saying that the greater danger from nuclear waste is leaving it where it is currently being stored. 

I quote from the Register: ‘‘Any concerns about the safety of 

Yucca Mountain pale in comparison to the risk of letting the waste 

continue to pile up at scores of sites around the country.’’ Mr. Chairman, for years I have agreed with that statement. It 

is long past time to act on this issue. I yield back my time. 

Mr. BARTON. We thank the gentleman from Iowa. We would welcome the gentleman from Maryland for an opening statement. 

Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 

leadership on this issue. I believe it is critical that we resolve the 

issue of finding a suitable site for nuclear waste disposal. Currently 

spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste are temporarily 

stored at 131 above-ground facilities in 39 States; 161 million 

Americans live within 75 miles of these sites. One central site provides more protection for this material than due the existing 131 

sites. 

We have spent $7 billion studying this issue over 20 years. American consumers have committed $18 billion since 1983 to the 

Federal Trust Fund to fund the storage of this spent fuel. We need 

to make a decision. We need to uphold the decision that has been 

recommended to us and I certainly urge us to do so as quickly as 

possible. 

Let me talk for a moment about my own State, Maryland. The 

Maryland use of nuclear energy pay a fee for disposal of nuclear 

waste. As of September, Maryland had paid a total of $257 million 

into the Nuclear Waste Fund since 1983. We are expecting that 

this fuel will be stored in a long-term facility. Right now, facilities 

store this fuel on a temporary basis. They are not designed for permanent storage. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has determined these facilities to be hard targets. We need to minimize this. 

While the fuel is safe, when it is producing electricity, it represents 

a serious threat if it remains at 131 sites. 

After 45 years of experience and 3,000 shipments of nuclear—

used nuclear fuel by rail/truck, no radiation release, fatalities or injuries or environmental damage has occurred. I believe it’s time to 

make a decision and I strongly urge the committee and all of my 

colleagues to adopt the Yucca Mountain site. 

I relinquish the balance of my time. 

Mr. BARTON. We thank the gentleman from Maryland. We’d now 

recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I note that we have four panels 

and about 12 witnesses and I really can’t think of much else to say, 

so I’ll waive my opening statement. 

14

Mr. BARTON. That’s the best opening statement we’ve heard so 

far. 

I would recognize the gentleman from Mississippi for another excellent opening statement. 

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Chairman, with that fine example, I’ll yield 

back the time, but it’s long past due that we solve this problem. 

Thank you for your leadership. 

Mr. BARTON. We’re going to recognize the gentleman from Arizona, the man with a heart, Mr. Shadegg, for an opening statement. 

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, some of us are slow learners, so I 

won’t give quite as good an opening statement as the preceding 

two. 

Mr. BARTON. Somehow I guessed that. 

Mr. SHADEGG. I do want to thank you for your quick action on 

House Joint Resolution 87 in both scheduling a hearing and a subcommittee markup. Time is, of course, of the essence and since 

Congress has by statute only 90 legislative days to override the 

veto issued by Nevada’s Governor. Because we do have 13 witnesses I will be brief. 

Let me just note that Yucca Mountain has been under study as 

a site for permanent disposal for nuclear waste for some 24 years. 

During this time we have spent, according to my numbers, $4 billion, over $4 billion to produce roughly 600 different studies of the 

site. Indeed, it is without a doubt, this is the most heavily studied 

piece of ground in the world. Today’s action does not end the study 

process, it simply allows the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 

begin the licensing process during which it will evaluate the studies done to date, as well as studies performed during the 4 years 

that the license process itself will take. Most importantly, it allows 

the process which has already taken significantly longer than 

planned to proceed. 

Mr. Chairman, I concur wholeheartedly. We need to move forward. I concur in the remarks of my colleague from Maryland. It 

is time that we conclude this process and I look forward to the testimony to today’s witnesses. 

Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentleman. Does Mr. Buyer wish to 

make a brief opening statement? 

Mr. BUYER. No. 

Mr. BARTON. Okay. All those members not present will have the 

requisite number of days to put their opening statements in the 

record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HEATHER WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this first hearing in the Congress to receive 

testimony on the President’s decision to recommend the Yucca Mountain site as the 

geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high level nuclear waste and the objections to that recommendation from the State of Nevada. 

Nuclear energy is a vital component of our nation’s electricity supply; contributing 

over 20% of electricity generated. Its strong presence diversifies our nation’s energy 

portfolio, reducing our dependence on foreign oil, dirty coal, and natural gas with 

its volatile prices. 

We are obligated to responsibly manage the spent nuclear fuel that remains in 

interim storage locations throughout the country. Temporary facilities, many near 

15

waterways and major cities, are not the solution for long term storage. Protection 

of the public’s health and safety without harming the environment are the key 

issues for designing a system, including transportation and containment, for long 

term storage of this material. Per the National Academy of Sciences—geological disposal remains the only long-term solution available. 

Certainly, as with the opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, 

sound science must be the foundation for this decision to move forward in developing the Yucca Mountain repository. Science provides the basis for understanding 

the challenges faced by ensuring long-term safety and engineering provides the solutions based upon the science. The ratepayers for nuclear generated electricity and 

the federal government have invested several billion dollars in the scientific understanding of the repository site and design, resulting in the DOE issuing a positive 

Site Suitability Evaluation. 

Moving the spent fuel from sites around the country to the repository will be done 

by truck and rail transport in specially designed containers proven to withstand 

stringent safety tests. We have a 30-year record demonstrating that we can safely 

transport nuclear material in this country. In over 2700 shipments of nuclear material that have already occurred in this country, there have been but a handful of 

accidents with none of those releasing any radioactivity. The same, engineered features that protect shipping casks from accidents limit their vulnerability to potential 

terrorist strikes. These design features are combined with rules governing physical 

surveillance and protection during shipment. 

While New Mexico does not have any commercial nuclear power plants, we do 

have research nuclear reactors and high level waste at the laboratories that will require material storage in the future. I mentioned the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, 

which is near Carlsbad, New Mexico. This facility went through an arduous site 

characterization and licensing process filled with scientific and political debate. 

Today it is safely receiving shipments of transuranic waste from several sites. New 

Mexico is doing its part. Mr. Chairman, the science shows that Yucca mountain is 

suitable for long-term spent nuclear fuel storage, experience shows that we can safely transport it, and if we don’t move forward on this basis I’m not sure we’ll ever 

be able to responsibly deal with long-term storage for used nuclear fuel. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH M. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee—this is a watershed moment for 

those of us who have been a part of this siting process for many years. I vividly 

recall that the decisions on the siting process that this Committee and the Congress 

made in the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1987 were painful ones. 

It was clear from the beginning that some state needed to be the host for the repository, and of course, that turned out to be Nevada. 

I believe we know enough now about the site to be confident that the proposed 

Yucca Mountain repository is safe and secure enough to move to the licensing process. I have the confidence that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission possesses the 

skills, talent and the wisdom to fairly and impartially review the Department of Energy’s licensing application and issue a license for the project and the courage to 

reject it if it doesn’t. As a regulatory agency, the NRC is better equipped and qualified than the Congress to evaluate the complex technical arguments for and against 

the licensing and operation of the repository. 

This is not perfect site. As with any geologic formation there are some risks that 

that things will not remain the same for the next 25,000 years as they are now. 

The experts tell us that these risks are extremely low. The NRC licensing process 

will affirm or refute the DOE’s conclusions about the site. 

What I do know is that even though Yucca Mountain is not entirely risk free, it 

is far, far less risky to store the fuel in a single, secure location than to leave it 

in place where it’s now located at hundreds of sites around the country. 

I hope that Yucca Mountain proves to be that site, and I will vote to approve the 

resolution to move the project to the licensing process. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

16

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DOYLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for conveneing this hearing to examine the issues informing the recommendation of Yucca Mountain as the site for the nation’s longterm repository for the disposal of radio active waste. 

During the Subcommittee’s first hearing on nuclear energy policy last March and 

its subsequent consideration of Price Anderson, it was established that not only 

should we remain mindful of the important near-term and long-term role that nuclear energy plays, but we can not afford to be distracted from making the necessary 

commitments to ensuring its safety and longevity. I believe we made progress in addressing near-term concerns through the Committee’s energy bill. And the passage 

of Price Anderson enables the Subcommittee to address perhaps the most critical 

of long-term concerns—the designation of Yucca Mountain as a repository for spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 

As we all know, Yucca Mountain has been studied for a significant amount of time 

by a wide range of scientific experts. The data produced from these studies is, as 

is evidenced by the array of testimony we will hear today the subject of varied interpretations. And, therefore, I believe it is important that we keep in mind there are 

disparate objectives and starkly different modes of assessments to be found in the 

statements we will hear today. What will be discussed during this hearing will not 

only address nuclear energy policies, the strengths of the Yucca site, and the NRC 

licensing process, but it will also point out the importance of reliable testing and 

appropriate assessment. Thus, in many instances the conclusions reached on the different aspects of the Yucca debate are at times no more significant than the degree 

to which the manner of information gathering may have inadvertantly contributed 

to a flawed conclusion. 

I think we would all agree that the more information the better and that obtaining information from numerous sources is also beneficial to producing an accurate 

conclusion. In this regard, it would appear that those who would advocate halting 

the entire process over proceeding to deal with nuclear waste are overly narrow in 

their approach. If we are to effectively address the concerns posed by nuclear waste, 

we must provide the process with adequate support and necessary oversight. DOE 

should be—and must be—responsive to the input from the Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board and the NRC. Only through these interactions will we continue to 

learn more and ensure the safety of Yucca Mountain. 

In Pennsylvania, nuclear power supplies 37.9 percent of its power. This is significant given that nationally nuclear power accounts for 20 percent of electricity production. Since 1983, Pennsylvania consumers have committed well in excess of $1.4 

billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund. As you can imagine, I have concerns about the 

accees to, and affordability of, nuclear energy. Pennsylvania also has 9 nuclear units 

at 5 sites. There is over 3,000 metric tons of nuclear fuel stored in the state. And 

according to testimony we will hear later, my congressional district may have waste 

transported through it on its way to Yucca. Thus, it is no surprise that I am concerned about safety issues and support developing new technologies. But it is my 

concerns about these nuclear energy issues that lead me to believe that moving forward with the process of establishing Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste repository 

is the best option. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Thank you Mr Chairman for holding today’s hearing on the designation of Yucca 

Mountain as a repository for nuclear waste. I am hopeful that today’s hearing will 

bring us closer to resolving an issue that has been before the Congress, and the scientific community for over 20 years. 

Despite a continuous, 13 year devotion of over 6 billion dollars in resources to the 

study of Yucca Mountain, some in the public have continued to raise doubts over 

its suitability as a repository. And while the fears expressed by critics are understandable, I am concerned that no matter how much research is conducted on the 

subject of Yucca Mountain, there will always be those who object to the movement 

and storage of nuclear waste at any facility. 

Armed with the recently released reports by the General Accounting Office and 

the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, opponents to Yucca Mountain, point to 

the less-than-glowing review of the research yielded on the suitability of the project. 

Admittedly, I too had concerns, especially over the Technical Review Board’s less 

than encouraging characterization of the DOE basis for repository assessment as 

17

‘‘weak to moderate.’’ However, after putting this relatively early pre-licensing stage 

into perspective, I have grown confident that the simple recommendation by the Department of Energy, that Yucca Mountain will likely be sufficient for a license application—is warranted. 

Still, many oppose Yucca Mountain on the basis of uncertainties in transport and 

storage. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that short of waiting ten thousand years to 

see what happens with regard to the durability of the natural and engineered barriers to environmental contamination, there will be no guarantees. And while some 

individuals search and debate for that ten thousand year guarantee, our immediate 

problems stare us all in the face. Short of absolute inaction, nuclear waste must be 

transported somewhere. Inaction cannot be the solution. 

Mr. Chairman, while the debate rages over whether a Yucca Mountain repository 

could possibly contaminate the water table beneath the desert repository within the 

next ten thousand years—over 45 thousand metric tons of nuclear fuel sit in 131 

facilities nationwide—none of which have seen a fraction of the testing and scrutiny 

that Yucca Mountain has undergone. Incidentally, these are 131 facilities which 

threaten the drinking water of 30 million Americans. 

While the debate continues to rage over whether transporting nuclear waste to 

Yucca Mountain will create moving targets for terrorists, there are 131 stationary 

targets for terror sitting in our back yards. 

Mr. Chairman, some would like to turn back the hands of time to a world without 

nuclear energy or waste, but we must deal with reality. Simply put, the door of nuclear energy has already been opened in this country, and around the world. And 

the benefits overall, have been tremendous. However, the potentially harmful byproduct of our cleanest and arguably most beneficial source of energy MUST be 

dealt with. And Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that our best chance of doing that 

is through Yucca Mountain, and the best time is now.

Mr. BARTON. We now want to go to our first panel, our congressional panel. We have two excellent Congresspersons, the gentleman from Nevada, the gentlelady from Nevada. 

Before Mr. Gibbons is recognized, I say Nevada, some of these 

folks say Nevada. Is it Nevada or Nevada? 

Mr. GIBBONS. Nevada. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Nevada. 

Mr. BARTON. Nevada. I hope all my subcommittee will take note 

of that I pronounced it correctly. 

Mr. GIBBONS. I want you to know we have a Ramada Hotel, but 

it’s in Nevada. 

Mr. BARTON. A Ramada in Nevada. Okay. Well, the gentleman 

from Nevada is recognized for an opening statement. Try to keep 

it less than 7 minutes, if at all possible. 

STATEMENTS OF HON. JIM GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA; HON. SHELLEY 

BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 

STATE OF NEVADA; AND HON. JOHN ENSIGN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA 

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I 

want to thank you greatly for allowing us to testify on this very 

important issue. The disposal of the Nation’s high level nuclear 

waste has been and remains and important issue for many Americans. However, for the past 20 years it has been the single most 

important issue for the State of Nevada. And just as a historical 

note, Mr. Chairman, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as 

amended, in 1987, selected Nevada and Yucca Mountain as the sole 

site to be studied for consideration of nuclear repository. 

It’s very important to note, Mr. Chairman, under this law and 

its subsequent amendment, a finding that the site is suitable to become a high level waste repository for the next 10,000 years would 

18

require, and I repeat, would require that the site be determined 

geologically sound. 

Mr. Chairman, as a person who holds a Master of Science degree 

from the University of Nevada in geology, I’m probably one of the 

few geologists in Congress, but I can tell you having looked at this 

Yucca Mountain is not, nor will it ever be, geologically sound. Now 

whether Americans support a sole permanent repository for high 

level nuclear waste or whether they don’t is an issue that can be 

debated, but nobody in this room can predict what the next 10,000 

years will bring at Yucca Mountain, no matter whether we are discussing seismic activity, volcanic activity, meteorological activity or 

otherwise. Regardless of what the DOE’s crystal ball may show, the 

future stability of Yucca Mountain is in question even by its own 

scientists. 

Mr. Chairman, the DOE has a duty to ensure the safety and 

suitability of this repository and the area surrounding Yucca Mountain. The Nevadans I represent deserve promises that can be kept 

by the DOE, and frankly they don’t have a great deal of credibility 

in our State when it comes to being truthful with our citizens. Just 

look at the billions of dollars that have been spent by the DOE at 

Yucca Mountain. They are trying to spend their way into ensuring 

compliance with a Nuclear Waste Policy Act and that alone, Mr. 

Chairman, begs the question if the site is geologically sound, why 

so much cost on the engineering aspect of this project? The answer 

is you cannot spend enough money to make a mountain geologically 

sound. 

What will the DOE realize is that they can spend enough to 

make the man-made engineering barriers sound. The problem is 

that is not what the law requires. 

If you look at the fine print and if you look hard enough you’ll 

see that the DOE has failed to prove Yucca Mountain geologic suitability and they have made promises that they cannot keep. How 

do I know this and how do the American people know this? Because once DOE started digging and actually studying Yucca 

Mountain, they realized they would have to change the rules in 

order to meet the suitability standards mandated by Congress in 

the Act. And what the DOE found out was this: (1) rates of water 

infiltration into the mountain are on the order of 100 times higher 

than previously thought; (2) credible studies indicate a significant 

presence of balsatic volcanism in and around Yucca Mountain; (3) 

with Nevada ranking third in the Nation in seismic activity has 

been determined that there have been nearly 700 cases of earthquake or seismic activity of 2.5 magnitude on the Richter Scale or 

more near Yucca Mountain since 1976. That’s 700 occurrences. In 

fact, about 10 years ago, a 5.6 level earthquake occurred less than 

10 miles from Yucca Mountain and actually caused some damage 

to nearby DOE facilities. So what has been the DOE response to 

these findings, findings that even the DOE themselves acknowledge? They retroactively change the rules for site suitability. They 

moved the goal post. 

You see, the DOE cannot prove Yucca Mountain’s capability of 

serving as a long-term high level nuclear waste repository that is 

geologically sound. Their response: adopt new rules permitting the 

Agency to rely entirely on man-made waste packages. 

19

Mr. Chairman, I ask is this what Congress intended? I don’t 

think so. As Members of Congress, we have an oversight role in 

this process. We have a responsibility to reign in such administrative abuse. Congress wrote the law clearly to State that the site 

must be—not shall be, not will be, not should be, but must be geologically suitable. 

As with any legislation we debate and eventually pass in Congress, we have a responsibility to ensure that all of our laws are 

thoroughly and responsibility carried out. Congress must not allow 

ourselves to be motivated by carelessness, convenience or political 

expediency. Unfortunately, this is what the DOE has done. 

Again, the Yucca Mountain project has become focused on nothing more than an array of engineered waste packages, that just 

happen to be intended for burial at Yucca Mountain. This policy 

has more to do today with the man-made capabilities in storing 

this waste and far less to do with the natural geologic capabilities 

that was mandated by Congress. 

If this was the intent of Congress some 20 years ago why then has the DOE spent $8 billion even studying Yucca Mountain? Mr. 

Chairman, we can and should be debating the future of nuclear 

power in this Nation. As a matter of fact, I’d like to be part of that 

debate because I see nuclear power as being a valuable part of our 

overall energy portfolio in America. We can and should be debating 

a waste disposal policy in this Nation so long as we consider today’s technological advancements and how these technologies can 

assist us in our disposal efforts. Instead, we’re pushing headlong 

toward a policy that doesn’t come close to even passing the smell 

test and it is severely outdated by today’s scientific standards. The 

DOE continues to rely on several decades old science to push for 

deep geologic burial of high level nuclear waste. 

Mr. Chairman, bright, innovative minds and scientists all across 

this Nation and in fact, across the world are proving that there are 

better ways, cleaner ways and safer ways to dispose of high level 

waste. Unfortunately, the DOE offers nothing but a 25 year old entrenched and outdated philosophy of geologic burial. Here, in America, we pride ourselves on being a beacon of technological advancements, scientific advancements and medical advancements, yet we 

find ourselves cemented in a policy that offers us nothing but a policy of 30 years of transporting high level waste to a whole in a 

desert mountain for burial where we expect, and I repeat, we just 

expect it to remain safe to the next 10,000 years. Mr. Chairman, 

the State of Nevada, our Governor issued a notice of disapproval 

of the President’s recommendation. Above all the rhetoric and the 

different reasons why many of us oppose the Yucca Mountain 

project, this committee and this Congress must ask itself whether 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act has been followed as Congress intended. 

As a proponent of nuclear power and its use in this country, I 

would without hesitation take the opportunity to discuss with this 

committee some of the innovative technological advancements that 

I’ve had the opportunity to study. These advancements can provide 

a more reasonable, less costly, more expedient solution to dealing 

with the tens of thousands of metric tons of high level waste piling 

up at our nuclear power plants. 

20

Mr. Chairman, I want to be part of the solution and I believe the 

dangerous, costly and irresponsible path to Yucca Mountain does 

not and should not represent the best that this country has to offer. 

My only request is that the Members of this committee and of Congress as a whole take one last look at the law and ask yourself 

whether you think the DOE has met the standards mandated to 

them by this body. 

I trust you will realize that we as a Nation can do much better 

in solving the waste disposal problem. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, once again thank you for allowing us to testify. I appreciate the opportunity to present Nevada’s case to you 

today. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jim Gibbons follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM GIBBONS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to testify at this important hearing. 

The disposal of our nation’s high-level nuclear waste is an important issue to 

many Americans. However, for the past 20 years, it has been the most important 

issue to the State of Nevada. 

As you know, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 was amended in 1987—selecting Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole site to be studied for construction of a nuclear repository. Under this law and its subsequent amendment, a finding that the 

site is ‘‘suitable’’ to become a high-level waste repository for the next 10,000 years 

would require that the site be determined ‘‘geologically’’ sound. 

Mr. Chairman, I hold a Masters of Science Degree in Geology, and I must tell you, 

Yucca Mountain is not, nor will ever be, geologically sound. 

Now, whether Americans support a sole, permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste or not is an issue that can be debated. But nobody in this room can 

predict what the next 10,000 years will bring at Yucca Mountain—no matter whether we are discussing seismic activity, volcanic activity, meteorological activity, or 

otherwise. 

Regardless of what the DOE crystal ball may show, the future stability of Yucca 

Mountain is in question—even by its own scientists. Mr. Chairman, the DOE has 

a duty to ensure the safety and suitability of this repository and the area surrounding Yucca Mountain. The Nevadans I represent deserve promises that can be 

kept by the DOE—and frankly, they don’t have much credibility in our State when 

it comes to being truthful with our citizens. 

Just look at the billions of dollars that have been spent by the DOE at Yucca 

Mountain. They are trying to spend their way into ensuring compliance with the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act. That alone begs the question—if the site is geologically 

sound, why so much cost on the engineering aspect of this project? 

The answer is that you cannot spend enough money to make a mountain geologically sound. What the DOE realizes is that they can spend enough to make the 

man-made, engineering barriers sound. Problem is, that is not what the law requires. 

If you look hard enough, you will see that the DOE has failed to prove Yucca 

Mountain’s geologic suitability, and they have made promises that they cannot keep. 

How do I know this—and how do the American people know this? 

Because once the DOE started digging and actually studying Yucca Mountain, 

they realized they would have to change the rules in order to meet the suitability 

standards mandated by Congress. 

What the DOE found out was this:

1) Rates of water infiltration into the mountain are on the order of 100 times higher 

than previously thought. 

2) Credible studies indicate a significant presence of basaltic volcanism in and 

around Yucca Mountain. 

3) With Nevada ranking third in the nation in seismic activity, it has been determined that there have been nearly 700 cases of seismic activity of 2.5 magnitude or more, near Yucca Mountain, since 1976. 

21

In fact, about 10 years ago, a 5.6 level earthquake near Little Skull Mountain—less than 10 miles from Yucca Mountain—actually caused some damage 

to a nearby DOE facility. 

So what has been the DOE response to these findings—findings that even the 

DOE themselves acknowledge? They retroactively change the rules for site suitability. You see, the DOE cannot prove Yucca Mountain’s capability of serving as 

a long-term, high-level waste repository that is geologically sound. 

Their response: Adopt new rules permitting the agency to rely entirely on manmade waste packages. Mr. Chairman, is this what Congress intended? I think not. 

As Members of Congress, we have an oversight role in this process—and we have 

a responsibility to rein-in such administrative abuse. Congress wrote the law clearly 

to state that the site must be... not should be . . . or ought to be... but must be geologically suitable. As with any legislation we debate and eventually pass in Congress, we have a responsibility to ensure that all of our laws are thoroughly and 

responsibly carried out. Congress must not allow ourselves to be motivated by carelessness, convenience or political expediency. 

Unfortunately, this is what the DOE has done. 

Again, the Yucca Mountain project has become focused on nothing more than an 

array of engineered waste packages—that will just happen to buried at Yucca 

Mountain. This policy has more to do today with the man-made capabilities in storing this waste, and far less to do with the natural geologic capabilities—as was mandated by Congress. If this was the intent of Congress some 20 years ago, why 

have we spent nearly $8 billion even studying Yucca Mountain. 

Mr. Chairman, we can and should be debating the future of nuclear power in this 

nation. As a matter of fact, I would like to be a part of that debate because I see 

nuclear power as being a valuable part of our overall energy portfolio in America. 

We can, and should be debating a waste disposal policy in this nation . . . so long as 

we consider today’s technological advancements, and how these technologies can assist us in our disposal efforts. 

Instead, we are pushing head-long towards a policy that doesn’t come close to 

passing the ‘‘smell-test’’ and is severely out-dated by today’s scientific standards. 

The DOE continues to rely on several decades-old science to push for deep, geologic 

burial of high-level waste. Bright, innovative minds all across this nation—and in 

fact the world, are proving that there are better ways, cleaner ways, a safer ways 

to dispose of high-level waste. 

Unfortunately, the DOE offers nothing but roadblocks. 

Here in America, we pride ourselves on being a beacon of technological advancements, scientific advancements, and medical advancements. Yet, we find ourselves 

cemented in a policy that offers us nothing but a policy of 30 years of transporting 

high-level nuclear waste to a hole in a desert mountain for burial—where we expect 

it to remain safe for the next 10,000 years. 

Mr. Chairman, the State of Nevada and our Governor issued a Notice of Disapproval of the President’s recommendation. Above all the rhetoric and the different 

reasons why many of us oppose the Yucca Mountain Project, this committee and 

this Congress must ask itself whether the Nuclear Waste Policy Act has been followed . . . as Congress intended. 

As a proponent of nuclear power and its use in this country, I would, without hesitation, take the opportunity to discuss with this committee some of the innovative, 

technological advancements that I have had the opportunity to study. These advancements can provide us a more reasonable, less costly, and more expedient solution to dealing with the tens of thousands of metric tons of high-level nuclear waste 

piling up at our nation’s nuclear power plants. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to be a part of the solution... but I believe the dangerous, 

costly and irresponsible path to Yucca Mountain does not—and should not—represent the best that this country has to offer. My only request is that members of 

this committee, and of Congress as whole, take one last look at the law, and ask 

whether you think the DOE has met the standards mandated to them by this body. 

I trust that, in your gut, you will realize that we as a nation can do much better 

in solving the waste-disposal problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentleman. Do you remember the old 

television commercial ‘‘is it real or is it’’——

Mr. GIBBONS. Memorex. 

Mr. BARTON. Memorex. Well, I’m watching you on TV and in real 

life and of course they’re watching you on the camera. It’s a pretty 

close call, but I think you’re better real than you are on TV. Or 

you’re good both places. 

22

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Either way I take it as 

a compliment. 

Mr. BARTON. Mr. Boucher and I couldn’t remember the commercial though. 

Mr. GIBBONS. It’s Memorex. 

Mr. BARTON. We knew this audience would have it. 

We’d now like to hear from the gentlelady from Nevada, the Honorable Congresswoman Shelley Berkley for a statement and try to 

hold it to 7 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY 

Ms. BERKLEY. I’d like to thank you, Chairman Barton and Ranking Member Boucher for offering me the opportunity to testify 

today. I particularly would like to thank my colleague, Mr. Gibbons. He’s done an extraordinary job presenting our case and I 

know the people of the State of Nevada appreciate his efforts. As 

Mr. Gibbons, I may go over the allotted 7 minutes because I’m sure 

you understand how important this issue is to the people I represent. 

Let me begin by expressing the outrage felt throughout Nevada 

about this ill-advised project. Over 83 percent of the people that 

Mr. Gibbons and I represent vehemently oppose Yucca Mountain. 

We don’t want the dump and our country doesn’t need this dump. 

Yucca Mountain is not the solution to what is the problem of disposal of the by-product of nuclear energy, nuclear waste. There is 

a myth that the approval of Yucca Mountain as a high-level nuclear waste repository will somehow solve the problems of onsite 

storage. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yucca Mountain’s 

former Acting Director, Lake Barrett, recently testified that nuclear waste will always be stored at or near reactor sites. The 

United States currently produces 2,000 tons of nuclear waste a 

year. By the time a repository opens somewhere between 2010 and 

2016, there will be 62,000 tons of nuclear waste stored at onsite reactors around the country. The maximum amount of transport per 

year will be 3,000 tons. At sites where the waste is produced, there 

will be as much waste there 50 years from now as there is today. 

The claims that Yucca Mountain reduces the threat of terrorism 

by eliminating waste at the 131 sites in favor of one site is a lie. 

Yucca Mountain will not reduce the threat of terrorism at operating reactors. It adds one more site to protect. 

The real dirty secret that the DOE has tried desperately to ignore is the immense vulnerability of nuclear waste transports. Of 

the 33 members of this committee, the DOE plan calls for transport 

of nuclear waste through 30 of your Districts. According to the 

DOE, Ohio will have more than 12,000 shipments with 13 of the 

19 Congressional Districts affected. 

According to experts who have analyzed the DOE’s transportation data, more than 123 million people live in the 703 counties 

traversed by DOE’s proposed highway routes and 106 million live 

in counties along DOE’s rail routes. DOE predicts that between 10 

and 16 million people will live within just one half mile of a transportation route in the year 2035. Given the frequency of these shipments, even routine radiation from the casks given off while passing on the highway or stuck at a red light would be a health conVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
23

cern for people living and working in the vicinity of the transportation routes; roughly 16 million Americans who own homes and go 

to schools and pray at houses of worship in the communities immediately alongside these routes. 

Of even greater concern is the threat of an accident or even 

worse, a terrorist attack. If Yucca Mountain is approved, there 

could be more than 108,000 cross country truck shipments of spent 

nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste over the next 38 

years. There will be between 957 and 2800 shipments per year over 

38 years depending on whether and how much rail access is developed. For comparison, over the past 40 years there have been less 

than 100 shipments per year in the United States. A terrorist attack or accident would release radioactive materials from the casks 

that would prove disastrous to the environment and human health 

and cost billions of dollars to try to clean up. The DOE acknowledges in their environmental impact statement that we can expect 

anywhere from 50 to over 300 accidents. Additionally, two separate 

tests, one done at Sandia National Laboratory and the other at Aberdeen Proving Ground demonstrates that readily available munitions can breach a nuclear waste canister. Currently casks are only 

licensed through a combination of scale model testing and computer simulations. Do we really think it’s a good policy to ship 

108,000 shipments in casks that have never actually be tested? 

According to independent studies the risks of transportation 

could result in massive economic costs to communities along transportation routes. Even without an accident or incident, property 

values near routes could decline by 3 percent or more and in the 

event of an accident or terrorist attack, residential property values 

along shipping routes could decline between 8 percent and 34 percent, depending upon the severity of the accident. 

The DOE does not publicize the transportation routes or the 

transportation problems related with the project because they know 

that if members know how much waste is going to be transported 

through their Districts, we would more likely oppose this project. 

More significant, when our constituents find out that they live 

along the transportation routes, they will demand that we oppose 

this project. Make no mistake about it, this is our last chance to 

vote on the Yucca Mountain issue. If we learn a few years from 

now that our District is a transportation hub, our hands are tied. 

We will not be able to unring this bell. 

An honest evaluation of the Yucca Mountain project suggests 

that the rewards simply don’t match the risks. Yucca does nothing 

to alleviate onsite storage problems across the country and creates 

a tremendous amount of concern for national security. The projected costs of this boondoggle is anywhere from $56 billion to $309 

billion. The Nuclear Waste Fund has $11 billion in it. How are we 

going to pay for this? Raise taxes? Dip into the Social Security 

Trust Fund? And once Yucca Mountain is full, what do we then do? 

After spending hundreds of millions of dollars, we will be exactly 

in the same place we are today. 

A recent GAO report concluded that there are 293 unfinished scientific and technical studies that cannot be concluded until the 

year 2006. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, a congressionally mandated, scientific oversight board said when the DOE’s 

24

technical and scientific work is taken as a whole, the board’s view 

is that the technical basis for the DOE’s repository performance estimates is weak to moderate and that because of the gaps in data 

and basic understanding, the board has limited confidence in current performance estimates generated by the DOE’s performance 

assessment model. 

As early as 1987, the Representative Mo Udall, one of the main 

architects of the original 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act said, ‘‘the 

public and many of us in Congress have lost faith in the integrity 

of the process.’’ That was the case in 1987 and it remains the case 

today. Yucca Mountain is a political solution to a problem that requires real science. We should empower our Nation’s scientific community to find real solutions to this serious problem and give them 

the resources and political freedom they need to discover the safest, 

most effective way of solving our nuclear dilemma. 

Nevadans were promised, we were promised that sound science 

and not politics would drive this process. Sound science, while 293 

scientific studies have not been concluded? Sound science, when we 

still can’t guarantee the safe transport of nuclear waste? Sound 

science, when the canisters needed to transport the nuclear waste 

have yet to be invented? 

I ask you to joint the State of Nevada and vote to protect your 

own constituents by opposing this foolhardy proposal. Oppose 

Yucca Mountain. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Shelley Berkley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

I would like to thank Chairman Barton and Ranking Member Boucher for offering 

me the opportunity to testify today. 

Let me begin by expressing the outrage felt throughout nevada about this ill-advised project. Over 83% of the people I represent vehemently oppose Yucca Mountain. We don’t want the dump, and our country does not need this dump. Yucca 

Mountain is not the solution to what is the problem of disposal of the bi-product 

of nuclear energy... .nuclear waste. 

There is a myth that the approval of Yucca Mountain as a high-level nuclear 

waste repository will solve the problems of on-site storage. Nothing could be further 

from the truth. Yucca Mountain’s former acting director Lake Barrett recently testified that nuclear waste will always be stored at, or near, reactor sites. The U.S. currently produces 2,000 tons of nuclear waste a year. By the time a repository opened 

(somewhere between 2010 and 2016) there will be 62,000 tons of nuclear waste 

stored at on-site reactors around the country. The maximum amount of transport 

per year will be 3,000 tons. At sites where waste is produced, there will be as much 

waste there 50 years from now as there is today. 

The claims that Yucca Mountain reduces the threat of terrorism by eliminating 

waste at 131 sites in favor of one site is completely untrue. Yucca Mountain will 

not reduce the threat of terrorism at operating reactors. It adds one more site to 

protect. 

The real dirty secret that the DOE has tried desperately to ignore is the immense 

vulnerability of nuclear waste transports. Of the 33 members of this committee, the 

DOE plan calls for transport of nuclear waste through 30 of your districts. According to the DOE, Ohio will have more then 12,000 shipments, with 13 of the 19 Congressional districts affected. According to experts who have analyzed the DOE’s 

transportation data, more than 123 million people live in the 703 counties traversed 

by DOE’s proposed highway routes, and 106 million live in counties along DOE’s 

rail routes. DOE predicts that between 10 and 16 million people will live within just 

one-half mile of a transportation route in 2035. Given the frequency of these shipments, even routine radiation from the casks, given off while passing on the highway, or stuck at a red light, would be a health concern for people living and working 

in the vicinity of the transportation routes—roughly 16 millions americans who own 

25

homes, and go to school, and go to houses of worship in the communities immediately alongside the routes. 

Of even greater concern is the threat of an accident—or even worse, a terrorist 

attack. If Yucca Mountain is approved there could be more then 108,000 cross-country truck shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste over 38 

years. There will be between 957 and 2,855 shipments per year over 38 years, depending on whether and how much rail access is developed. For comparison, over 

the past 40 years, there have been less than 100 shipments per year in the United 

States. 

A terrorist attack or accident would release radioactive materials from the cask 

that would prove disastrous to the environment and human health, and cost billions 

of dollars to try to clean up. The DOE acknowledges in the environmental impact 

statement that we can expect anywhere from 50 to over 300 accidents. Additionally, 

two separate tests, one done at Sandia National Laboratory and the other at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, demonstrate that readily available munitions can breach a 

nuclear waste canister. Currently, casks are only licensed through a combination of 

scale-model testing and computer simulations. Do we really think it is good policy 

to ship 108,500 shipments in casks that have never actually been tested? 

According to independent studies, the risks of transportation could result in massive economic costs for communities along transportation routes. Even without an 

accident or incident, property values near routes could decline by 3% or more. And 

in the event of an accident or terrorist attack, residential property values along 

shipping routes could decline between 8% and 34%, depending upon the severity of 

the accident. 

The DOE does not publicize the transportation routes or the transportation problems related with the project because they know that if members know how much 

waste is going to be transported through their districts, we would be more likely 

to oppose the project. More significant, when our constituents find out that they live 

along the transportation routes, they will demand that we oppose this project. Make 

no mistake about it, this is our last chance to vote on the Yucca Mountain issue. 

If we learn a few years from now that our district is a transportation hub, our 

hands are tied. We will not be able to unring this bell. 

An honest evaluation of the Yucca Mountain project suggests that the rewards 

simply don’t match the risks. Yucca does nothing to alleviate the on-site storage 

problems across the country, and created a tremendous amount of concern for national security. The projected cost of this boondoggle is any where from $56 billion to $309 billion. The nuclear waste fund has $11 billion. How are we going to pay for this? Raise 

taxes? Dip into the Social Security Trust Fund? And once Yucca Mountain is full, 

what then do we do? after spending hundreds of billions of dollars we will still be 

exactly where we are today. 

A recent GAO report concluded that there are 293 unfinished scientific and technical studies that cannot be concluded until 2006. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, a Congressionally mandated scientific oversight board said, ‘‘when the 

DOE’s technical and scientific work is taken as a whole, the board’s view is that 

the technical basis for the DOE’s repository performance estimates is weak to moderate.’’ And that because of ‘‘gaps in data and basic understanding...the board has 

limited confidence in current performance estimates generated by the doe’s performance assessment model.’’ As early as 1987, Representative Morris Udall, one of the main architects of the 

original 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act said, ‘‘the public and many of us in congress 

have lost all faith in the integrity of the process.’’ That was the case in 1987, and 

it remains the case today. Yucca Mountain is a political solution to a problem that 

requires real science. We should empower our Nation’s scientific community to find 

real solutions to this serious problem, and give them the resources and political freedom they need to discover the safest, most effective way of solving our nuclear dilemma. 

Nevadans were promised that sound science and not politics would drive this 

process. Sound science? While 293 scientific studies have not been concluded? Sound 

science? When we still can’t guarantee the safe transport of nuclear waste? Sound 

science? When the canisters needed to transport the nuclear waste have yet to be 

invented? 

I ask you to join the State of Nevada and vote to protect your own constituents 

by opposing Yucca Mountain.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Congresswoman Berkley. 

We’d now like to hear from a former House Member, the Honorable John Ensign who is unfortunately gone to the other body 

26

where he is doing an excellent job representing his state, but you 

are welcome. We would ask that you give your statement in approximately 7 minutes. We’re expecting a series of votes in the next 

10 minutes or so. But welcome back to the House of Representatives. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN 

Mr. ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Somebody said when I 

first went over there that the intelligence of both bodies went up, 

so—that’s a House joke. 

Mr. BARTON. We won’t comment on that. But we don’t see the 

humor of it. 

Mr. ENSIGN. I am pleased to be with you today and I’m going to 

summarize my full statement. Without objection, I would ask that 

it be made part of the record. And I want to summarize my testimony——

Mr. BARTON. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. ENSIGN. And try to appeal to you based on some common 

sense, based on if you are a person who supports nuclear power to 

make nuclear power more viable for the future, based on where the 

taxpayer have to end up holding the bag here of money that is 

going to cost to build this boondoggle in the desert and I also want 

to give you some thoughts on transportation in a post-9-11 era that 

we really do need to take a fresh look at. 

I believe that——

Mr. BARTON. If you could just spend a second, Senator, until we 

get those bells. We’ll let you give your statement and then we will 

recess the hearing to go vote and then we’ll come back with the 

Secretary. 

Please continue. 

Mr. ENSIGN. This bill, when it was originally set out by Congress, 

envisioned a geologic repository. What that meant was that when 

it was put into the ground, these canisters were put into the 

ground, over time they would deteriorate. The geology was then to 

provide the protection. Well, over time that geology has proven to 

be not so good and so DOE has had to make this a man-made repository. The reason that I bring that up is because that man-made 

repository has now dramatically increased the cost. If you look at 

where the costs started to where the cost estimates are today to 

where they could potentially go, this thing keeps adding billions 

and billions and billions more in dollars. 

For those of you have nuclear power plants or receive nuclear 

power, your ratepayers are either going to have to increase dramatically their rates for power to pay for Yucca Mountain or it’s 

going to have to come out of general revenues. You have to get the 

money from some place because the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund is 

not going to meet the needs of the costs for Yucca Mountain. So 

for those who claim to be fiscal conservatives, you really need to 

take a look at this from a cost standpoint. 

The other thing, if you believe in nuclear power, one of the reasons nuclear power plants are not being built is because frankly it’s 

very expensive to build them. Part of that is because of the cost of, 

obviously, of dealing with the waste issue, the uncertainty in liVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
27

censing, that’s certainly a factor, but the main issue is whether 

Wall Street is going to finance these things. 

If you believe in nuclear power and you want more nuclear power 

plants to be built, you need to look at the alternatives that are 

much cheaper than Yucca Mountain. 

If you notice, in my testimony you won’t hear anything about Nevada. I’m going to talk about why I think it’s bad for the country, 

why it’s bad for your constituents. We know why it’s bad for our 

constituents. We want to talk why it’s bad for your constituents. 

The cost of doing onsite dry cask storage which most of you are 

familiar with is significantly, not even close to the cost of doing 

Yucca Mountain. And yet, according to the DOE, onsite dry cask 

storage is safe for at least 100 years, probably closer to 200 years. 

We see the problems with transportation, that transportation has 

not been studied adequately. And I think post-9/11 it absolutely 

has not been studied adequately. We used to think that skyscrapers were safe. We didn’t think about a plane going into a skyscraper. Now I don’t mention that just to scare us, but I mention 

it that we need to relook at the transportation of nuclear waste 

which we’ve heard that the terrorists are looking for ‘‘dirty bombs.’’ Well, these are potential ‘‘dirty bombs.’’ We know that the canisters 

can be breached with a TOW missile. We know that, unless they’re 

surrounded by concrete, they can be breached with a TOW missile. 

Well, when you’re transporting them, they can’t be surrounded by 

the adequate protections that you need to protect them from a 

TOW missile, at least under current technology. I just bring that 

up to show you that we need to study the transportation issue 

more. 

The other aspect of why I think that this Yucca Mountain issue 

is bad for your constituents as well is that—and for America as 

well, is that we’re going to be wasting a very valuable resource by 

burying it in the ground. I believe strongly that we need to look 

at technology to recycle this waste, to gain a lot of the energy because our current reactors are so inefficient, we need to look at 

modern technology on recycling. There’s all kinds of different 

things out there. Other countries are reprocessing. We’ve decided 

not to do that. But there’s modern recycling technology that we are 

currently investing in and we have time to do it. If dry cask storage 

onsite is good for 100 years, at least a 100 years—you guys are 

planning these bells purposely, is that the——

Mr. BARTON. We have 10 minutes. 

Mr. ENSIGN. Yes, I know. I remember the bells. 

Mr. BARTON. Remember in the House we time the speeches, it’s 

not like the Senate where you can go on forever. So about three 

more minutes. 

Mr. ENSIGN. Okay. The—I completely forgot where I was, but 

that’s okay. It was good, wasn’t it. 

Mr. BARTON. Let me ask you a question. When you were in the 

House, I never saw a silk handkerchief in your coat pocket. 

Is there a dress code in the Senate? 

Mr. ENSIGN. You know I live with six other House Members and 

I catch this grief every night when I go home, so I’m kind of used 

to it. 

Mr. BARTON. It was just a question. 

28

Mr. ENSIGN. It was just a question. The point I was making was 

about time. If we know that these onsite dry cask canisters are 

good for 100 years, what is the rush? Why do we want to spend 

$58 billion thereabouts to build Yucca Mountain? That’s probably 

a minimum estimate today. Why do we want this kind of a boondoggle? 

Recently, you saw that South Carolina is trying to stop transportation of some plutonium. This is a big issue everywhere, stopping 

transportation. There is State after State after State is going to put 

up lawsuits trying to stop transportation. It is a political issue. It 

is also a terrorism issue. We need to look at this thing and the bottom line is we have time to do it. 

We are imploring you to take the time, be responsible, fiscally responsible, as well as other ways to do the right policy. 

Last, I will tell you because this was a political process, we know 

realistically we’re probably not going to be able to win this vote in 

the House of Representatives. The battle is going to come down to, 

and we appreciate our colleagues and the great job they’re doing 

over here trying to make our case and we need a strong enough 

vote that we can possible get over here, but we realize the battle 

ground is going to be in the U.S. Senate. This was done on a purely 

political move when it was stuck, Nevada got stuck with it and 

we’re hoping that we win this and it may be a purely political move 

that we win this on. We’ve got some parliamentary tricks up our 

sleeve that you will that we will pull. That’s one thing nice about 

the U.S. Senate and we plan on winning this battle this year and 

not just because we think it’s bad for the State of Nevada. We 

think it’s bad for the entire country to be building this boondoggle 

in the desert. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. John Ensign follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

NEVADA

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the 

people of Nevada. 

Nevada is a diverse state, with people of many races, religions and political persuasions. But no single issue unites Nevadans—no single issue transcends region, 

political party, or industry—like our fight against becoming the nation’s nuclear 

dumping ground. 

Nevada’s slogan is Battle Born. It is on our state flag. It reflects the firmness of 

purpose and the willingness to fight for what is right that is so much a part of the 

character of Nevadans. This is as true today as it was when our state entered the 

Union during the Civil War. And when it comes to Yucca Mountain, we intend to 

fight. 

HISTORY

From the beginning of this process, our state has been the victim of Washington 

power politics. 

The 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act gave the Energy Department until 1998 to 

open a permanent underground geologic repository for high-level nuclear waste. By 

the late 1980s, the Energy Department had narrowed its search to just three western states: Nevada, Washington, and Texas. The DOE had not reached a scientific 

determination as to which location was most suitable, but, truth be told, science 

really was not the issue. At the time, the House Speaker was a Texan, Jim Wright, 

and the Majority Leader was from Washington—Tom Foley. 

Guess which state got picked as the dump site? 

29

In 1987, Congress directed the Energy Department to study a single site: Yucca 

Mountain. Even supporters of the deal conceded that Nevada was a victim of a raw 

power play. ‘‘We’ve done it in a purely political process,’’ former Washington Rep. 

Al Swift said at the time. ‘‘We are going to give somebody some nasty stuff.’’

That ‘‘somebody’’ is the people of Nevada. They are not happy—and rightly so. 

WHY YUCCA?

Since then, successive Administrations, Democrat and Republican, have spent billions of dollars trying to justify this blatantly political decision. Having come to their 

predetermined conclusion, they commissioned all sorts of junk science to justify 

using a site like Yucca Mountain—which is obviously such a poor geologic repository, and thus would have been disqualified under the 1982 Act. 

Only junk science could explain the logic of storing thousands of tons of dangerous, radioactive waste on a earthquake fault-line. There are 32 known active 

faults at or near Yucca. In 1992, an earthquake that measured 5.6 on the Richter 

scale occurred just eight miles from Yucca—damaging DOE’s Yucca Mountain 

Project office. 

There also appears to have been recent volcano activity near Yucca. And we now 

know that the rock at Yucca Mountain—which the scientists promised was so solid 

that water could not possibly reach the underground storage tunnel for 1,000 

years—is in fact quite porous. Rainwater, the scientists now tell us, could reach the 

stored waste in just 50 years—about 20 times more quickly than expected. 

With all this information, DOE was in a quandary. The science they had depended on to justify choosing Nevada as America’s nuclear dumping ground had 

come apart like a cheap suit. But instead of doing the honest thing—admitting their 

mistake and disqualifying the site—DOE decided to do a typically Washington 

thing: move the goal posts. They retroactively changed the site suitability rules to 

rely not on geology but instead on ‘‘man-made’’ barriers. 

In other words, they could no longer justify discarding the nation’s nuclear refuse 

in Nevada on scientific and geological grounds. But they decided to go ahead and 

do it anyway. 

John Bartlett, who used to head the Yucca Mountain project, has said that, at 

this point ‘‘the project has become simply an array of engineered waste packages 

that happen to be 1,000 feet underground.’’ In other words, there is nothing unique 

about Yucca Mountain that requires us to dump the waste there. It could be stored 

anywhere. But the politics dictates that the people of Nevada get the short straw—

so their children get to grow up in the warm glow of the nation’s radioactive refuse. 

But even the man-made solutions DOE came up with are faulty. The U.S. General 

Accounting Office has criticized DOE’s decision to move ahead with recommending 

the Yucca Mountain site as unfounded and premature. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission had advised DOE that there are 293 unresolved technical issues that 

directly impinge upon the suitability of the site. And the Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board, an independent agency, reported, ‘‘ the technical basis for DOE’s repository design is weak to moderate at this time.’’

TRANSPORTATION

Aside from the safety and suitability of Yucca mountain is the safety of transporting the waste. The Department of Energy and the nuclear industry want Americans to believe that taking tens of thousands of tons of dangerous radioactive nuclear waste, removing it from reactor sites around the country, putting it on trucks 

and trains and barges, and moving it through cities and towns and waterways 

across America so it can be buried on an earthquake fault line in southern Nevada 

is a good idea. 

It’s not. 

The government is trying to convince us that this project is going to be safe—more 

than safe; the government would have us believe that it is the key to keeping our 

children safe from radioactive waste that’s going to be dangerous for 10,000 years. 

Anyone who believes the argument that this dangerous waste can be transported 

without incident only needs to look at what happened last July in the Baltimore 

tunnel, when a CSX freight train carrying hazardous waste derailed and set off fires 

that burned for five days. Imagine a similar incident, only the waste is radioactive. 

But forget an accident—what about a terrorist attack? In the midst of a global 

war on terrorism that could last for years, and perhaps decades, trucks and trains 

carrying radioactive fuel would be prime targets for terrorists. Consider this: Some 

3,000 people died when terrorists hijacked planes and crashed them into the Pentagon and World Trade Towers on September 11. Hijacking or blowing up a truck 

30

of nuclear waste would be an easy way for terrorists to kill not just thousands, but 

tens of thousands of our citizens. 

Nuclear power plant sites are among the most secure commercial facilities in the 

country. Following the events of September 11, they are being made even more secure, and there are even proposals for military protection at these sites. Modest infrastructure improvements can further increase the level of protection against any 

conceivable terrorist threat. 

After building up all that security, what is the logic of removing spent fuel from 

this safe and secure storage and putting it on the nation’s roads and railways within 

easy reach of terrorists? Secretary Abraham asserts these shipments will be ‘‘a se- cret.’’ They will not—they will be extremely high profile and, because of the long 

duration of the campaign and large numbers of repetitive shipments, they will be 

easily predictable. 

And even if they were ‘‘secret,’’ let’s all reflect for a moment about what it means 

to the people of the towns and communities that will play temporary host to this 

radioactive refuse. The federal government intends to take highly dangerous nuclear 

waste and bring it through your towns and cities, without your even knowing about 

it. No warnings to local governments. No opportunities for local communities to prepare safety precautions. No chance for parents to protest the shipment routes. An 

accident or terrorist incident in their backyard would be the first time they learned 

that their children were in proximity to radioactive waste. 

In other words, the federal government is treating every community in America 

with the same contempt as they are the people of Nevada. In fact, they are treating 

them with even greater contempt. At least they have had the decency to tell us that 

we Nevadans will be exposed to radioactive material—the rest of the country will 

just have to wait for disaster before they find out. 

THE GOVERNMENT’S BIG LIE

Not only is the government’s plan dangerous for both Nevada and the rest of 

America—it also won’t solve the problem. 

The government’s big lie is that we Americans have a choice: to have one central 

nuclear waste storage site at Yucca Mountain or to have waste stored at reactor 

sites all around America. 

That sounds like an easy choice—except that it’s not true. 

Even if, by some stroke of luck, waste is shipped across the country safely to 

Yucca Mountain, there will continue to be nuclear waste stored at all operating reactor sites. 

You see, even if it were possible to immediately and magically remove all of the 

existing spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plant locations, there would still 

continue to be spent fuel stored at each and every operating reactor in the country. 

That’s because nuclear waste is highly radioactive and thermally hot and must be 

kept at the reactor sites in water-filled cooling pools for at least five years. The only 

way spent fuel storage can be eliminated from a reactor location is to shut down 

the reactor. 

The DOE only plans to transport to Yucca Mountain 1,000 metric tons a year 

more nuclear waste than our reactors produce. Plus there’s going to be a backlog 

of around 62,000 tons of waste by the time Yucca opens. All that moving waste to 

Yucca will do is create one more large storage facility. But to do that, the cost will 

be tens of thousands of shipments of deadly radioactive waste on the nation’s highways and railroads, day after day, month after month, that will travel constantly 

through cities and communities in 45 states—a permanent convoy of nuclear refuse 

that will never end. 

COST

So Yucca Mountain isn’t safe, and it doesn’t solve the problem. But here’s the 

kicker—it’s also a multi-billion dollar boondoggle. 

To date, the U.S. government has spent about $8 billion on this fiasco—$4 billion 

evaluating sites and another $4 billion on Yucca Mountain itself. So admitting they 

were wrong would amount to an awfully expensive mistake. 

But not half as expensive as proceeding with this dangerous, ill-considered and 

flawed storage plan. The DOE current cost estimate for Yucca Mountain is $58 billion—a dramatic increase from the 1998 estimate of $46 billion and over double 

Yucca Mountain’s projected cost in 1983. According to a December 2001 GAO report, 

we have no idea what it will really cost by the time it is ready to receive waste. 

When bureaucrats come up with plans that have those kinds of numbers attached 

to them, the contractors and industry-types start salivating—and the bureaucratic 

and commercial self-interests take over. 

31

Either way, the American taxpayers get the bill. If industry were to carry the 

cost, nuclear power could become much more expensive and ratepayers would be 

forced to take on that burden. If not, the taxpayers will be on the hook for the most 

expensive public works project in the history of our country—equal to the cost of 

our entire fleet of aircraft carriers. It’s a sobering picture, either way you look at 

it. 

ALTERNATIVES

So if Yucca Mountain isn’t the answer, what is? 

The federal government should offer to take title and liability to the waste stored 

on site at nuclear reactors, just as it did in Pennsylvania under the PECO settlement. The NRC has stated fuel can be stored safely on site for at least 100 years 

in dry cask storage. That leaves plenty of time to continue to develop new technologies at our national labs to reprocess the waste without producing weaponsgrade plutonium as a byproduct. Accelerator technology and new fuels are promising 

alternatives to burying this valuable resource. 

A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that the Department of Energy’s own 

scientists from Argonne National Laboratory have come up with a way to recycle 

nuclear waste called pyroprocessing. And a scientist from Los Alamos in New Mexico agreed that process is possible. 

Nuclear waste is going to be a valuable resource; we shouldn’t bury it. Once it 

is buried, the opportunity will be lost forever to reduce its hazards through recycling. Nuclear waste is one of the most deadly substances known to man, and our 

nation needs to find a long-term solution that will protect the American people, our 

land, and our water from its harmful effects. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, our Founding Fathers established a complex set 

of procedures in Congress. It is not easy to take legislation and turn it into law. 

They did this with an explicit reason in mind—to prevent what they called the ‘‘tyranny of the majority.’’ There are all sorts of procedures available to us as members 

of the House and Senate that allow us to prevent a bunch of bigger states from getting together and ganging up on us to do something that would harm the interests 

of our constituents. 

That is what is happening today with Yucca Mountain. But with the help of my 

colleagues and the Senate Majority Leader, I am going to try to stop it. Yucca 

Mountain was originally chosen because of a political power play. How fitting that 

it could die because of one too. 

People have been asking me whether it is tough to go against my President and 

many of my colleagues on this issue. I had to fight the Republican leaders in the 

House in 1998 on this issue, and I have to fight the Republican leaders in the Senate right now. That doesn’t matter. When it comes to choosing between the interests 

of my party and the interests of my state, I always will choose my state. 

I am a fourth-generation Nevadan. I know that the fighting spirit of our settlers 

has been passed on from one generation of Nevadans to the next. Our battle-born 

state was formed by facing up to difficult challenges. And we are up for the challenge of making sure that, when it comes to nuclear waste, it’s not going to go in 

Yucca Mountain. 

Thank you.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Senator. All joking aside, we do appreciate you coming over from the other body and the good work that 

you’re doing with Senator Reid to make sure that all the issues are 

put on the table. 

We’re going to recess this hearing and when we reconvene in approximately 25 minutes, we’ll have the Secretary of Energy. So we 

stand in recess. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. BARTON. The hearing will come to order. Our audience will 

find their respective seats. Before we recessed for the series of 

votes we had heard from the Nevada delegation, both their Congressmen and one of two of their Senators about their position on 

the decision to locate the repository at Yucca Mountain. 

32

We’re now going to hear from the Secretary of Energy, the Honorable Spencer Abraham, former Senator from the great State of 

Michigan and doing an outstanding job as Secretary in a very difficult time for energy policy. 

Mr. Secretary, we really appreciate you coming today, knowing 

that what’s going on in the other body and what’s going on internationally and what’s just happened in Venezuela, what’s happening as we speak in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf. We’ll recognize you for such time as you may consume and then I’m sure 

we’ll have a number of questions for you. So welcome to the subcommittee. Your statement is in the record in its entirety and we 

would recognize you to elaborate on it as you see fit. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having 

this hearing, for your interest in moving this resolution forward for 

consideration and for the work we’ve done together. I very much 

appreciate your support of our efforts in the Department of Energy 

and the great working relationship we have with the subcommittee. 

Mr. Chairman, this committee in Congress should vote to override Nevada’s veto and allow a full and objective final decision on 

Yucca Mountain by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The history, I think, is very important to note today. In 1982, Congress 

passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and committed to take responsibility for radioactive waste disposal. In 1987, Congress 

amended that Act to direct the focus of the Department of Energy 

on consideration of the site at Yucca Mountain. And in 1992 the 

Congress adjusted the standards for determining site suitability. 

Subsequently, EPA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and our 

Department, in turn, adjusted their regulations to conform to those 

policies outlined by Congress. 

During 24 years of research on this project, at a cost of about $4 

billion, the Department of Energy has studied Yucca Mountain. Let 

me just put that in perspective. That’s five times longer than it 

took to build the Hoover Dam. That is six times longer than the 

entire duration of the Manhattan Project. It’s twice as long as it 

took to plan and complete the first moon landing. The science on 

this issue has been well studied. 

My responsibility as Secretary was to evaluate that research and 

to make some decisions. I reached two major conclusions in determining to recommend Yucca Mountain. First, that the site is suitable for the development of a repository based on an evaluation of 

the extensive body of sound science. That determination was my 

principal responsibility. 

Let me talk about that decision. In reaching it, we had to consider two things. First, we conducted a preclosure safety evaluation. Based on the extensive body of research that has been done, 

I have concluded the repository at Yucca Mountain can be operated 

safely for what’s called the preclosure period, that’s a span of 50 

to 300 years. To my knowledge, virtually no scientific organization 

disputes this conclusion that during that preclosure period, this 

33

site can be operated safely, because the task is very similar in 

many ways to the operation of current nuclear facilities. 

In that period, Yucca will be a controlled, secure, operating environment, and it is, of course, proximate to Nellis Air Force Range, 

near its protected air space. 

Let me just focus on that 300 year period for a moment. The way 

this project will proceed is that after a decision is made, and if one 

is made to move forward with this project, and if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses Yucca Mountain, after it is constructed 

and after it is filled, we will continue to monitor what is happening 

there for as much as 300 years—or longer than the United States 

has existed, and we will be in a position to adjust in any ways necessary during that timeframe. 

And, I would just say to the committee that it’s sometimes the 

case when we throw around large numbers like 10,000 years, the 

period after closure that we had to assess, that a number like 300 

years seems small. But as I said, if one were just to look backward 

and consider the scientific progress that’s been made since the year 

1700, one gets a feel, I think, for the opportunities that we have 

as we move forward. Once the facility, in fact, is constructed, we 

can, in any way we might need to, perfect its performance. 

In addition to deciding whether or not the facility would be safe 

for that 50 to 300 year preclosure period, we also conducted extensive analysis of what we call the post-closure period. That is a period, as I already indicated, that ranges 10,000 years into the future. The scientific observations obtained during our 24 years of research were fed into extremely sophisticated computer models. 

State-of-the-art approaches were taken. These models considered 

hundreds of thousands of factors and events and simulated combinations of factors and events. 

Let me tell you what we were required to do. We were required 

to determine whether in 10,000 years Yucca Mountain could meet 

radiation standards that would limit the exposure annually to people within an 18 kilometer radius of the mountain, limit, in terms 

of the groundwater, to a standard equivalent to drinking water 

standards of today; and in terms of radiation exposure, limit to no 

more than 15 millirems annually of radiation. To put it in perspective, and I don’t mean here to compare elective versus unelective 

exposure, but a round-trip cross country plane trip from Washington to San Francisco exposes people on that aircraft to about 6 

millirems. So our job was to determine whether or not in 10,000 

years someone living in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain would be 

exposed to no more than 15 millirems anually. Twenty-four years 

and $4 billion later, the answer is yes. 

And let me say, Mr. Chairman, we can guarantee, based on our 

analysis, that we can protect people from being exposed to that 

level of radiation. We not only tested normal circumstances, but we 

also looked at factors that were very difficult to approximate but 

which constituted a set of uncertainties that we wanted to evaluate. For instance, in addition to determining whether or not water 

might seep down from the top of the mountain to the underground 

area, in which we would store the waste, we considered whether 

or not 10,000 years from now human intrusion in the form of somebody drilling for oil at the top of the mountain might somehow penVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
34

etrate the casks down at 1,000 feet below the surface and emit radiation. We took into consideration whether or not if a glacier, as 

part of a subsequent ice age on the planet, were to envelop the 

western United States and then recede to produce more water flow 

into the underground storage area would produce an outcome that 

would force a situation in which the radiation standard that we 

have to meet could be exceeded. And after $4 billion of research 

into these sorts of circumstances, we have accounted for these 

things and concluded that the site is suitable and that it will meet 

even those very difficult tests. 

And so I am convinced, Mr. Chairman, of the soundness of the 

scientific basis for this recommendation. I visited the site. I’ve 

talked to the scientists who conducted these experiments. I’ve obviously poured through a lot of documents that have been collected 

over the years and reviewed the results of 116 hearings that have 

been conducted, producing somewhere in the vicinity of 37,000 public comments. We have summarized those comments and we have 

responded to them. 

In addition to the fact that this project meets the scientific test 

for safety, I believe it is also quite clear that Yucca Mountain is 

important because of the national interest it serves. Energy security is an important national priority. A site designation here will 

encourage investment and continuing production of nuclear energy 

in this country which I think the committee is well aware, produces 

currently approximately 20 percent of our electricity mix. Building 

this repository will allow the nuclear energy share of the energy 

production in this country to continue. It will allow existing facilities to operate through their life expectancies, including possible license renewals. I think it also will have the potential to bring 

about investment in new facilities as well. 

Yucca Mountain is also important to our national security. The 

most strategic vessels in our Navy, the largest ships and submarines, are dependent on nuclear power for propulsion. Naval 

spent fuel is temporarily stored in Idaho. That was never intended 

to be the permanent place for the waste to be left and I have to 

say it’s occurring under an agreement with the State that is, at 

best, tense. We have, of course, told people we would build this facility years ago, and that spent fuel will go to a repository. To do 

otherwise, will place this agreement, in an uncertain condition. 

The repository is important for homeland security. We believe 

that consolidating the storage of nuclear waste in an isolated repository, 1,000 feet below the desert is a better way to protect that 

waste from any possible vulnerability. 

It’s also important that we build Yucca Mountain for environmental purposes. A repository is necessary to complete the environmental cleanup of the World War II and cold war defense complex 

which contributed to our national defense. Nearly 100 million gallons of liquid waste in Washington and South Carolina awaits solidification and ultimate disposal in a repository. In addition, nuclear material that currently sits at sites in Colorado, New York 

and Idaho will eventually find its way to the repository. 

This program is important for nonproliferation reasons as well. 

As I think the committee is well aware, our agreement to move forward with the disposition of weapons grade plutonium with Russia 

35

is, in part, dependent on the United States moving ahead with a 

program to dispose of our plutonium in an ultimate resting place. 

The MOX fuel, which would be our means of disposition, would 

eventually have to be disposed of in a repository. So, there are an 

overwhelming number of very compelling national interest reasons 

for us to move ahead. 

Now the choice is for Congress to make. Obviously, Nevada’s decision to veto our recommendation to move ahead places this issue 

squarely before you to override that veto. I want to talk about what 

this means. An override of Nevada’s veto does not mean that tomorrow trucks will begin moving to Nevada. What it means is that 

all of the issues that relate to whether or not we can safely proceed 

with this facility will be brought before the NRC for an objective 

and neutral decision by experts. That is all that we are asking for. 

The chance to have this research, which we believe is accurate, be 

ultimately tested by the authorities who are best able to make a 

decision during the licensing process. 

Failure to override, however, ends the Yucca Mountain project. 

Yet it still leaves Congress and the United States with the statutory responsibility for the waste, as well as creating the various 

problems in terms of energy security, national security, homeland 

security, environmental cleanup. I believe a decision to oppose the 

override is a decision clearly to abandon the repository program 

and subject the country to the negative consequences that I mentioned without even letting the neutral experts at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decide whether it’s, in fact, possible for us to 

do this. In my judgment, nothing that has been advanced in terms 

of criticism of the project comes close to meeting what I think 

would be a very high burden of proof that would have to be required at this point to simply abandon the project without subjecting it to a final determination by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, failue to overide would leave waste stranded at 131 sites 

in 39 States. 

Opposition, in my judgment, to the joint resolution, to at least 

submitting this question to the NRC, seems warranted only if one 

is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is such overwhelming evidence that a repository at Yucca Mountain cannot 

meet the EPA and NRC standards, that it would be a waste of time 

and money to allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission processes 

to reach a final decision. And in my judgment, there is overwhelming scientific support for the project and for our capacity to 

obtain a license. So I urge Congress to act promptly and favorably 

on the proposed Joint Resolution, so the next stage of addressing 

the merits of all remaining issues, by applying the independent expertise of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can begin. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to be here today and of 

course, would be glad to try to answer questions of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before 

you today. 

On February 14, I forwarded a recommendation to the President, based on approximately 24 years of federal research, that Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is suitable 

for development as the nation’s geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and highVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
36

level radioactive wastes. The President officially recommended the site to Congress 

on February 15, and pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), the 

State of Nevada has exercised a disapproval of the President’s recommendation. As 

a result, this issue is again before the Congress for disposition, this time for expedited consideration under the framework Congress established in the NWPA. 

I am encouraged that Congress is considering this Joint Resolution without delay, 

and ask that you continue your hard work to see this Resolution through to its final 

passage, so the Department may enter the next phase of repository development—

an expert and independent scientific and technical examination of the safety of the 

site by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The significance of passing this Joint Resolution, thus overriding the State of Nevada’s disapproval, hardly needs emphasis. Twenty years ago, Congress established 

in law the Federal government’s responsibility for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste. In doing so, Congress foresaw the fundamental national security and energy policy considerations that weigh heavily in favor of proceeding with a geologic repository, and mandated that a repository program be 

based upon a thorough scientific evaluation of several candidate sites. In 1987, the 

Congress limited that evaluation to the site we consider today: Yucca Mountain. 

In formulating this recommendation, I first considered whether sound science supported a determination that the Yucca Mountain site was scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a repository. The scientific evaluation of the 

Yucca Mountain site had been conducted over a 24-year period; as part of the study, 

some of the world’s best scientists examined every aspect of the natural processes—

past, present, and future—that could affect the ability of a repository beneath Yucca 

Mountain to isolate radionuclides released from any spent fuel and radioactive 

waste disposed of there. 

The Department’s scientific inquiries and modeling clearly demonstrate that a repository at Yucca Mountain can meet the Environmental Protection Agency’s standards for protecting the health and safety of our citizens. These extremely stringent 

standards were based on the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. 

What they mean, in terms of the Yucca Mountain site, is that a person living 11 

miles away from the site cannot receive more annual radiation exposure during the 

10,000-year regulatory period than a traveler receives today from natural sources 

in three round trip flights from Las Vegas to New York. 

In evaluating whether the repository can comply with the Agency’s standards, our 

scientists employed extremely conservative assumptions and considered the impact 

of events with extremely low probability of occurrence, all erring on the side of public safety. For example, earthquakes were assumed to occur, and volcanic eruptions 

were evaluated—even though the likelihood of a volcanic event affecting the repository during the first 10,000 years is just one in 70 million per year. Even with these 

unlikely events analyzed into the Agency’s 10,000 year compliance period, Yucca 

Mountain still meets the EPA standards. 

A review of the documentation that accompanied the recommendation clearly reveals that the Department has carefully evaluated the extent to which Yucca Mountain’s substantial natural geologic barriers work in concert with the robust engineered systems. We know that Yucca Mountain is in a closed hydrologic basin, a 

geologic feature that greatly limits the potential migration of radionuclides. Between 

the emplacement tunnels and the water table, which is approximately 2000 feet 

below the surface, the geology provides natural adsorption retarding any potential 

radionuclide movement. The hydrologic features at this site suggest that more than 

ninety percent of the annual rainfall runs off or is evaporated, meaning less than 

a half an inch of water travels beneath the surface. Our studies indicate that the 

vast majority of water samples taken from the mountain are thousands of years old. 

Even with this robust geology, our scientists again conservatively considered how 

engineered barriers 1,000 feet below the surface and 1,000 feet above the water 

table might corrode by analyzing what would happen during an ice age, if Nevada’s 

climate changed and rainfall increased dramatically. Even including these scenarios, 

Yucca Mountain still meets the EPA standards. 

After thoroughly examining the relevant scientific and technical materials, I have 

concluded that they demonstrate that the site is scientifically and technically suitable for construction of a repository. As I stated in my recommendation to the President: 

‘‘Irrespective of any other considerations, I could not and would not recommend 

the Yucca Mountain site without having first determined that a repository at 

Yucca Mountain will bring together the location, natural barriers, and design 

elements necessary to protect the health and safety of the public, including 

those Americans living in the immediate vicinity, now and into the future.’’

37

Having reached this conclusion, I went on to evaluate whether compelling national interests counseled in favor of moving forward with a geologic repository at 

Yucca Mountain, and if so, whether there were countervailing arguments so strong 

that I should nonetheless decline to proceed. This evaluation argued strongly in 

favor of proceeding, and certainly that there was no basis for abandoning the policy 

decisions made by the Congress in enacting the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and 

the 1987 amendments to that Act. In short, the relevant considerations are as follows. 

First, Yucca Mountain is critical to our national security. Today, over forty percent of our Navy’s combatant vessels, including aircraft carriers and submarines, 

are nuclear powered. The additional capabilities that nuclear power brings to these 

platforms is essential to national security. To maintain operational readiness, we 

must assure disposal of spent fuel to support refueling of these vessels. We are in 

the midst of advancing the non-proliferation objectives that have been the welcome 

result of the end of the Cold War. A geologic repository is an integral part of our 

disposition plans for surplus weapons grade materials. 

Yucca Mountain is an important component of homeland security. More than 161 

million people live within 75 miles of one or more nuclear waste sites, all of which 

were intended to be temporary. We believe that today these sites are safe, but prudence demands we consolidate this waste from widely dispersed, above-ground sites 

into a deep underground location that can be better protected. 

A repository is also important to our nation’s energy security. Nuclear power provides 20 percent of the nation’s electricity and emits no airborne pollution or greenhouse gases. The reactors we have today give us one of the most reliable forms of 

carbon-free power generation, free from interruptions due to international events 

and price fluctuations. This nation must develop a permanent, safe, and secure site 

for disposal of spent nuclear fuel if we are to continue to rely on our 103 operating 

commercial reactors to provide us with electricity. 

And a repository is important to our efforts to protect the environment. A repository is indispensable to implementing an environmentally sound disposition plan for 

high-level defense wastes, which are located in Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, 

New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and Washington. The Department must move 

forward and dispose of these materials, which include approximately 100 million 

gallons of high-level radioactive waste and 2,500 metric tons of defense production 

spent nuclear fuel. 

Finally, I carefully considered the primary arguments against locating a repository at Yucca Mountain. None of these arguments rose to a level that outweighs the 

case for going forward with the site designation. 

Of these, the only one I shall address in my prepared testimony is the concern 

critics of the project have raised about the ‘‘transportation issue.’’ I wish to address 

this issue briefly, not because I believe there is any real basis for believing these 

concerns are warranted, but rather, because I believe that simply by incanting the 

words ‘‘transportation of nuclear waste,’’ opponents are hoping they can incite public 

fear, without any basis in fact, and that this hope has become the last refuge for 

opposition to the project. The facts, however, are these. 

First, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, working with the Departments of 

Transportation and Energy, has overseen approximately 30 years of safe shipment 

of spent nuclear fuel in this country. The Department and commercial nuclear industry have substantial experience to date—some 1.6 million miles—without any

harmful radiation release. And the successful and extensive European experience in 

transporting this type of nuclear material corroborates our experience. The transportation of this material will involve approximately 175 shipments per year, not 

the 2,800 that the opponents allege. It would also constitute 0.00006% of the annual 

hazardous material shipments, and 0.006% of the annual radioactive material shipments that occur in this country today. 

Second, because the site has not yet been designated, the Department is just beginning to formulate its preliminary thoughts about a transportation plan. There is 

an eight-year period before any transportation to Yucca Mountain might occur. This 

will afford ample time to implement a program that builds upon our record of safe 

and orderly transportation of nuclear materials and makes improvements to it 

where appropriate. Thus any suggestion that the Department has chosen any particular route or mechanism is completely fictitious. Those decisions have not been 

made, and cannot possibly start to be made until the site has been designated and 

the Department has the opportunity to work with affected States, local governments, and other entities on how to proceed. 

Third, even without a repository at Yucca Mountain, the need to find a place to 

put the spent fuel that is continuing to accumulate will lead to the transportation 

of these materials, and likely quite soon. On-site storage space is running out and 

38

not all utilities can find new adjacent land where they can put this material. Therefore, they will devise ad hoc off-site consolidated storage alternatives. Already a consortium of utilities is working on a facility that they have presented to the NRC. 

Whether or not this effort ultimately succeeds, it is likely that some similar effort 

will. Thus the transportation of nuclear materials is not a function of a repository 

at Yucca Mountain, but rather is a necessary consequence of the material that continues to accumulate at the 131 sites in 39 States that are running out of room for 

it. 

Finally, Yucca Mountain critics argue that nuclear materials in transit could be 

a terrorist target. But they are forgetting the obvious: spent fuel in secure transit 

to a permanent repository is certainly less susceptible to terrorist acts than spent 

fuel stranded at the temporary, stationary sites—many very close to major cities 

and waterways—where it now resides. 

Let me close with one last thought. The critics of this program would have Congress overturn the fundamental decisions it legislated 15 years ago—that a single 

underground repository located at Yucca Mountain holds the greatest promise for 

the long-term safety and security for the Nation. The great body of scientific work 

done since then has confirmed the fundamental soundness of the Yucca Mountain 

site. The only issues remaining are the type that only can be resolved in a Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission licensing proceeding. 

The critics who would upend this path to resolution of the remaining issues have 

a heavy burden of proof in urging that the policy decision made by Congress in 1987 

and the findings of the body of scientific work that examined Yucca Mountain both 

be abandoned before the NRC has even had the opportunity to pass on whether a 

repository can safely be sited there. Given the history and the work to date, their 

burden would be substantial even if this project were not critical to many important 

national interests. But it is. Rejection of the proposed resolution would leave the 

country with no ultimate destination for our spent naval fuel, no adequate path for 

disposing of our own surplus plutonium, thereby making it hard for us to press 

other countries to dispose of theirs, and no means to complete the environmental 

cleanup of our defense complex. Utilities may have to start planning to decommission existing nuclear reactors and figuring out how to replace them. Congress would 

still have to formulate an alternative in view of the statutory obligation that the 

Government dispose of commercial spent fuel that was legislated in 1982, but that 

would be no easy task. 

In short, a decision to oppose this project’s going forward at this stage is a decision to abandon the repository program and subject the country to these consequences without ever letting neutral experts at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decide whether that is the right course. Nothing the critics of this project have 

advanced comes close to meeting the burden of proof they should have to satisfy to 

warrant proceeding in this fashion. Opposition to nuclear power is not a sufficient 

ground, since we all, and the United States Government in particular, have an obligation to safely dispose of this waste regardless of any such policy view. Nor are 

concerns about transportation, for all the reasons outlined above. Rather, opposition 

to this resolution, and to submitting this question to the NRC, seems warranted 

only if one is convinced that there is such overwhelming evidence that a repository 

at Yucca Mountain cannot meet the NRC and EPA standards that it would be a 

waste of time and money to use the ordinary NRC processes to find out. 

Support for the proposed resolution, on the other hand, does not require being 

convinced that the Department of Energy is right in believing that a repository at 

Yucca Mountain will meet the applicable standards or that the NRC will decide it 

should be licensed—although in my judgment the scientific work to date provides 

ample basis for reaching that conclusion. Indeed, it doesn’t even require being convinced that this outcome is the most likely. Rather, all that is required to support 

the resolution is to believe there is enough of a serious possibility that $4 billion 

and 24 years of scientific research have produced a sufficient basis for our conclusion that the site can be safely developed as a repository. That conclusion will then 

subject the extensive scientific basis for the President’s recommendation to objective 

testing in the only official context it can be—an NRC licensing proceeding. 

I urge the Congress to act promptly and favorably on the proposed joint resolution 

so that the next stage of addressing the merits of all remaining issues, by applying 

the independent expertise of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can begin in earnest.

Mr. BARTON. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, before I recognize 

myself to ask questions, the Chair would ask unanimous consent 

that three different documents be put in the record. The first is a 

39

copy of the DOE document entitled ‘‘Yucca Mountain Project Site 

Recommendation Material’’ which includes the Secretary’s recommendation to the President, the President’s recommendation to 

the Congress. The second document is a copy of the State of Nevada’s Formal Disapproval on Yucca Mountain which was submitted to the House of Representatives Speaker, Mr. Hastert, on 

April 8, 2002. The third is the written testimony of the Governor 

of Nevada, Governor Kenny Guinn, who could not be here today. 

These have been precleared by staff on the Minority side. Is there 

objection to these documents being put into the record? Hearing 

none, so ordered. 

[The material referred to follows:]

40


g:\graphics\79469.001
41


g:\graphics\79469.002
42


g:\graphics\79469.003
43


g:\graphics\79469.004
44


g:\graphics\79469.005
45


g:\graphics\79469.006
46


g:\graphics\79469.007
47


g:\graphics\79469.008
48


g:\graphics\79469.009
49


g:\graphics\79469.010
50


g:\graphics\79469.011
51


g:\graphics\79469.012
52


g:\graphics\79469.013
53


g:\graphics\79469.014
54


g:\graphics\79469.015
55


g:\graphics\79469.016
56


g:\graphics\79469.017
57


g:\graphics\79469.018
58


g:\graphics\79469.019
59


g:\graphics\79469.020
60


g:\graphics\79469.021
61


g:\graphics\79469.022
62


g:\graphics\79469.023
63


g:\graphics\79469.024
64


g:\graphics\79469.025
65


g:\graphics\79469.026
66


g:\graphics\79469.027
67


g:\graphics\79469.028
68


g:\graphics\79469.029
69


g:\graphics\79469.030
70


g:\graphics\79469.031
71


g:\graphics\79469.032
72


g:\graphics\79469.033
73


g:\graphics\79469.034
74


g:\graphics\79469.035
75


g:\graphics\79469.036
76


g:\graphics\79469.037
77


g:\graphics\79469.038
78


g:\graphics\79469.039
79


g:\graphics\79469.040
80


g:\graphics\79469.041
81


g:\graphics\79469.042
82


g:\graphics\79469.043
83


g:\graphics\79469.044
84


g:\graphics\79469.045
85


g:\graphics\79469.046
86


g:\graphics\79469.047
87


g:\graphics\79469.048
88


g:\graphics\79469.049
89


g:\graphics\79469.050
90


g:\graphics\79469.051
91


g:\graphics\79469.052
92


g:\graphics\79469.053
93


g:\graphics\79469.054
94


g:\graphics\79469.055
95


g:\graphics\79469.056
96


g:\graphics\79469.057
97


g:\graphics\79469.058
98


g:\graphics\79469.059
99


g:\graphics\79469.060
100


g:\graphics\79469.061
101


g:\graphics\79469.062
102


g:\graphics\79469.063
103


g:\graphics\79469.064
104


g:\graphics\79469.065
105


g:\graphics\79469.066
106


g:\graphics\79469.067
107


g:\graphics\79469.068
108


g:\graphics\79469.069
109


g:\graphics\79469.070
110


g:\graphics\79469.071
111


g:\graphics\79469.072
112


g:\graphics\79469.073
113


g:\graphics\79469.074
114


g:\graphics\79469.075
115


g:\graphics\79469.076
116


g:\graphics\79469.077
117


g:\graphics\79469.078
118


g:\graphics\79469.079
119


g:\graphics\79469.080
120


g:\graphics\79469.081
121


g:\graphics\79469.082
122


g:\graphics\79469.083
123


g:\graphics\79469.084
124


g:\graphics\79469.085
125


g:\graphics\79469.086
126


g:\graphics\79469.087
127


g:\graphics\79469.088
128


g:\graphics\79469.089
129


g:\graphics\79469.090
130


g:\graphics\79469.091
131


g:\graphics\79469.092
132


g:\graphics\79469.093
133


g:\graphics\79469.094
134


g:\graphics\79469.095
135


g:\graphics\79469.096
136


g:\graphics\79469.097
137


g:\graphics\79469.098
138


g:\graphics\79469.099
139


g:\graphics\79469.100
140


g:\graphics\79469.101
141


g:\graphics\79469.102
142


g:\graphics\79469.103
143


g:\graphics\79469.104
144


g:\graphics\79469.105
145


g:\graphics\79469.106
146


g:\graphics\79469.107
147


g:\graphics\79469.108
148


g:\graphics\79469.109
149


g:\graphics\79469.110
150


g:\graphics\79469.111
151


g:\graphics\79469.112
152


g:\graphics\79469.113
153


g:\graphics\79469.114
154

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KENNY C. GUINN, GOVERNOR, STATE OF NEVADA

Honorable Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Kenny C. 

Guinn and I am Governor of the State of Nevada. I appreciate the opportunity to 

submit written comments for the Committee’s consideration. Due to conflicting commitments, I am unable to be present in person, and I apologize for that. I am disappointed, however, that the Committee was unable to accept Mr. Steven Molasky 

to testify for Nevada in my place. Mr. Molasky, a respected Nevada businessman, 

is a senior member of the Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects and would have 

made a valuable contribution to your deliberations. I am likewise disappointed that 

your Committee was unable to accept the testimony of Mr. Robert Loux, the longstanding Director of Nevada’s Agency for Nuclear Project, and perhaps the most 

knowledgeable Nevadan when it comes to Yucca Mountain issues. 

Nevada considers the Yucca Mountain project to be the product of extremely bad 

science, extremely bad law, and extremely bad public policy. Moreover, implementing this ill-conceived project will expose tens of millions of Americans to unnecessary nuclear transport risks. For that reason, we believe Congress should take no 

further action with respect to the Yucca Mountain project. 

Attached to this statement are the Notice of Disapproval and an accompanying 

Statement of Reasons I recently filed with the U.S. Congress pursuant to Section 

116 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Please consider the Statement of Reasons to 

represent my written testimony to the Committee. In addition, I would like to supplement this testimony with the following: 

More on the Unsound Science of Yucca Mountain 

Yet another document, perhaps the key document, has now appeared from within 

the scientific community that excoriates the scientific work of the Department of 

Energy (DOE) in connection with Yucca Mountain. Numerous independent scientific 

reviewers have now evaluated the project during the past year, and all have reached 

the same conclusion: There is nowhere near enough information to certify the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for high-level nuclear waste disposal, and the information that is available suggests the site is woefully unsuitable geologically. 

This latest report, however, reaches shocking new conclusions. It is a peer review 

report commissioned by DOE from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 

Nuclear Energy Agency (IAEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development (OECD). These agencies assembled some of the world’s leading scientists to evaluate, over several months, the total system performance of Yucca 

Mountain as represented by DOE and its computer models. Among other things, 

these leading scientists concluded that DOE lacks sufficient information even to 

build a model to predict the suitability and hydrogeologic performance of the proposed repository. According to the peer review group, the water flow system at 

Yucca Mountain is ‘‘not sufficiently understood to propose a conceptual model for a 

realistic transport scenario.’’ Moreover, according to the peer review group, DOE’s level of understanding of the 

hydrogeology of the site is ‘‘low, unclear, and insufficient to support an assessment 

of realistic performance.’’ DOE’s sensitivity studies in its computer models ‘‘do not 

give any clues to the important pathways for the water in the system.’’ Perhaps 

most troubling of all, in DOE’s performance model of Yucca Mountain, ‘‘increased 

ignorance leads to lower expected doses, which does not appear to be a sensible 

basis for decision-making.’’ It is truly amazing to me, as an elected executive official, that DOE commissioned 

this peer review report many months ago, and then made a final ‘‘site suitability’’ determination to the President and the Congress in spite of its stunning conclusions. 

It shows once again, in my view, that politics has long prevailed over science when 

it comes to Yucca Mountain. This is another reason for Nevada to redouble its efforts to stop this project - government bureaucrats seem unable to pull the plug, 

even in the face of shocking independent evidence that the science is bad or nonexistent. 

A copy of the IAEA/NEA peer review report is attached, together with a brief 

summary of its findings. 

The PECO Solution and the Myth of Proliferating Storage Sites 

It is almost certain that, even if Yucca Mountain proceeds, every nuclear utility 

in the United States will nonetheless have to build an interim dry storage facility 

for their inventories of spent nuclear fuel, if they have not already done so. This 

is because Yucca Mountain will not be ready to receive high-level radioactive waste 

until long after spent fuel pools at reactor sites have been filled to capacity. Moreover, as I have explained in my Statement of Reasons, Yucca Mountain will not reduce the number of storage sites across America for 60 to 100 years, even if no new 

155

plants are built, and Yucca Mountain will never reduce the number of storage sites 

as long as nuclear reactors continue to be built and operated. 

Attached to this statement is a copy of the agreement DOE signed with PECO 

Energy in June 2000. As explained in my Statement of Reasons, the PECO deal is 

the safe, practical, economic alternative to a severely flawed Yucca Mountain 

project. It represents what utilities are planning to do, and will do anyway, in the 

real world. The only question about the PECO solution is whether it will be implemented using funds from the Nuclear Waste Fund, or from some alternative funding 

source. I urge the Committee to explore the PECO deal carefully, and to question 

DOE and the nuclear industry as to why it has recently been ignored, or even hidden from public view. 

Transport Issues 

The final issue I want to bring to your attention again is the nuclear transportation issue. Some have accused Nevada of fear mongering simply for honestly and 

sincerely raising the many questions that nuclear waste shipments to Yucca Mountain pose for our nation’s citizens. But these are extremely legitimate questions, and 

they deserve legitimate answers. 

In its Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain, DOE’s own numbers 

point to as many as 108,000 high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel shipments to 

Yucca Mountain. Almost every state, and most major metropolitan areas, will be affected by these shipments. More than 123 million citizens reside within one-halfmile of the proposed transport routes. The modes and methodologies for shipment 

have not yet been determined, much less analyzed. For example, we recently 

learned from DOE that as many as 3,000 barge shipments may be involved, traversing numerous port cities and harbor areas. According to DOE’s own analyses, 

a single accident scenario could produce thousands of latent cancer fatalities and 

lead to many billions of dollars in cleanup costs. 

DOE has never done an analysis of the terrorism risks associated with mass 

transport to Yucca Mountain. In a recent brief filed in NRC license proceedings by 

nuclear utilities for the proposed Private Fuel Storage facility in Utah, the nuclear 

industry took the position that it is essentially no one’s jurisdiction, other than the 

U.S. military, to evaluate terrorism risks in spent fuel transport. According to the 

utilities, this is not a proper subject for analysis by DOE, the NRC, the Department 

of Transportation, or the industry itself. In short, if you believe the industry, this 

is an area that only Congress can now evaluate, or direct others to evaluate. Put 

another way, if Congress does not order such an analysis to be done, none will be 

done. In the wake of September 11th, failure to perform such an analysis would appear unwise. 

And there is something else our experts now tell us: DOE has never done an evaluation of the nuclear criticality risk of a spent fuel cask getting struck by a stateof-the-art armor-piercing weapon. In recent nuclear industry advertisements and 

press statements, it was suggested that if a warhead penetrated a cask, authorities 

would simply dispatch an emergency crew to ‘‘plug it up.’’ This assumes the dose 

rate in the vicinity of the cask is not a lethal one. It assumes that the warhead does 

not essentially liquefy the contents of the cask, if it is not already liquid. It assumes 

that any inner explosion in the cask would not so alter the geometry of the contents 

that the contents would go critical, obliterating the cask. It assumes that the cask 

is not over a river or on a barge and will not subsequently fill with water, a neutron 

moderator. It assumes that the cask is not filled with U.S. or foreign research reactor spent fuel, which is usually comprised of highly-enriched, or weapons-grade, uranium. 

Finally, there are questions regarding the casks that will be used for shipping 

high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel to any repository. First of all, very few casks 

exist today, so the ones that would be used for a 38-year shipping campaign to 

Yucca Mountain are still in various stages of development. That might be acceptable 

if we knew they were going to be subjected to rigorous physical testing prior to use, 

but that is not intended. Instead, computer- and some limited scale-model testing 

is the planned method of assessing cask integrity. Those ancient tapes we have all 

seen of discarded shipping casks being dropped from helicopters, run into cement 

walls and hit by trains—none of that is planned for the new generation of casks. 

No, instead we are being asked to believe recent industry claims that the new, notyet-built casks can withstand ‘‘all but the most advanced armor-piercing weapons’’

and a ‘‘direct hit by a fully fueled Boeing 747.’’ These wild claims are not based on 

actual testing, and we know from tests conducted at Sandia National Laboratories 

in the 1980s and by the U.S. Army at Aberdeen Proving Grounds as recently as 

1998 that even very robust casks are vulnerable to attacks from small missiles. 

Shouldn’t the new generation of casks be subjected to full-scale physical testing 

156

under a range of conceivable scenarios, including an attack by terrorists willing to 

give their own lives? 

These are but a few of the many legitimate questions that remain about high-level 

waste and spent nuclear fuel transport. As a nation, we deserve clear and honest 

answers. Industry claims and a ‘‘trust me’’ attitude are simply not enough. 

Thank you for your consideration.

Mr. BARTON. The Chair would recognize himself for 5 minutes for 

questions and then we’ll go on to Mr. Boucher and members of the 

majority and minority side. 

Mr. Secretary, I believe you’re aware that under the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended in 1987, that the government 

of the United States was required to begin to accept the high level 

waste generated by our civilian reactors beginning on January 1, 

1998. I’m sure you’re aware of that. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I am. 

Mr. BARTON. So in fact, if we’re not to move forward with Yucca 

Mountain, the taxpayers of the United States will be subjected to 

billions and billions of dollars in claims by the operators of these 

reactors who have been waiting patiently for the last 4 years for 

us to begin to move forward on the repository. Is that not correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, obviously, I don’t want to speculate as to the possible litigation liability of the Federal Government 

in the situation that you’ve outlined. But as you know already, lawsuits have been brought because we have already failed to meet the 

initial time table. 

Mr. BARTON. As we move forward and hopefully we will move 

forward, if in fact, the House and the Senate override the veto of 

the Governor of Nevada, the next big issue, once we have a site selected is going to be a transportation plan and numerous Members 

of Congress have got serious questions about the ability to transport this waste. I’m going to briefly describe what the design criteria area and then ask you a question about the ability to transport the waste safely. 

Under the law, any cask that’s used to transport high level nuclear waste has to withstand a 30-foot free fall on to an unyielding 

surface which would be equivalent to a head on crash of the cask 

at 120 miles an hour into a concrete bridge. It also has to be able 

to withstand a puncture test allowing the container to fall 40 

inches onto a steel rod, 6 inches in diameter. It also has to be able 

to withstand 30 minutes exposure to a fire at 1,475 degrees Fahrenheit that engulfs the entire container and then that container 

has to be able to withstand submergence underwater for 8 hours. 

Now the Department of Energy has conducted tests at Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico and the District of the Congresswoman Heather Wilson, who is a member of the subcommittee in 

which they had a flatbed truck loaded with one of these casks 

which smashed into a 700-ton concrete wall at 80 miles an hour. 

They subjected another cask to a rocket assisted broadside by 120 

ton locomotive train traveling at 80 miles an hour. They dropped 

a cask from 2,000 feet onto soil as hard as concrete. That must 

have been my backyard that they dropped it onto which was traveling 235 miles an hour at impact. In Great Britain, Great Britain’s 

equivalent of the Department of Energy ran an unmanned locomotive at 100 miles an hour into a cask in front of 2,000 spectators. It was shown on British National Television. The cask surVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00160 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
157

vived with minimal damage. And finally, 4 years ago, one of the 

proprietary producers of these casks shot a TOW anti-tank missile 

into the side of one of these casks, first with the cask unprotected 

by its proprietary material. That did create an indentation into the 

side of the cask, but there was no—there would have been no resultant loss in radiation. They then fired another anti-tank TOW 

missile into the cask with their proprietary protection and there 

was no damage done at all. 

Do you as Secretary of Energy have any doubt that once we work 

through the transportation issues about the routes and the locations with the various governments, that the casks themselves are 

going to be unsafe in any way to the American people? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I’m confident, Mr. Chairman, that first of all, we 

will use only casks which have been certified for these purposes by 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and I’m confident that there 

will be casks to meet the tests. I would point out the issue of transportation is one that gets raised and legitimately so, but that there 

has been ample amount of evidence compiled about our capabilities 

to transport waste, including nuclear waste, both here in the 

United States and in Europe, for over 30 years without any harmful radiation effects or releases. In fact, in Europe, I believe the 

amount that’s already been transported is approximately the total 

amount which would be transported to Yucca Mountain. 

So there is a very successful track record of doing this, both here 

and in Europe, we’re confident that based on not only that record, 

but also on the work that was done in preparing our environmental 

impact statement, that we can continue that excellent track record 

into the future. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, my time is expired. I 

would now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher, for 

5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Secretary Abraham, thank you for your appearance here today and 

your very able testimony and I also want to say thank you to you 

and to your staff for the very careful and thorough work that your 

Department has done in analyzing the Yucca Mountain site, forwarding your Department’s recommendation to the President. 

Mr. BARTON. Would the gentleman yield, please? 

Mr. BOUCHER. I’ll be happy to yield. 

Mr. BARTON. Would you care to introduce the members of your 

staff that are here because I understand you have some of your 

senior staff with you today. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We have a number of them. I believe—too many 

of them, maybe. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, the senior staff. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Let me introduce Bob Card, Undersecretary of Energy. Let me introduce our General Counsel, Lee Otis. Let me also 

introduce the very recently confirmed appointee Dr. Margaret Chu, 

who will lead our Civilian Radioactive Waste Program and will 

oversee this project in the future. There are probably a variety of 

others here who I should be introducing and to them my apologies 

are extended. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you. 

158

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, again, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you 

and the individuals you’ve introduced and others who have worked 

with you and with them for the thorough and careful work that 

you’ve done. 

The critics of the Yucca Mountain decision allege that this decision is not based on sound science. Your review has looked at the 

scientific work that has been done during the course of the last 20 

years and I would welcome this morning your response to that criticism. What about the argument that this project is not based on 

sound science? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, as I’ve said to the committee, this Depart- ment has over 24 years invested $4 billion in scientific research. 

We have researched almost anything people raised as concerns. As 

I said earlier, not only did we consider whether for the first 300 

years we could build and operate in a preclosure period, but we 

also have investigated whether 10,000 years from now we could 

meet a groundwater standard equivalent to the current drinking 

water standards and a total pathways radiation standard of 15 

millirems per year, which is a very small level of exposure. We 

have done a variety of tests and a variety of total system performance assessments, both through computer modeling as well as actual tests inside Yucca Mountain itself. 

I visited the mountain. It’s a very isolated place, as you know. 

I am confident that the men and women who have worked on the 

science have done their job exceedingly well. And, I would note that 

while when you have a debate like this, it’s entirely expected that 

you will have people on both sides—whether it’s the nuclear energy 

industry or it’s the State of Nevada with their own experts, who 

would make the case either way—a variety of independent groups 

who have looked at this have confirmed what we’ve said. The International Atomic Energy Agency said that an adequate basis exists 

for supporting a statement of likely compliance within the regulatory period of 10,000 years, and accordingly, for the site recommendation. The U.S. Geological Survey said that it believes that 

the scientific work performed to date supports a decision to recommend Yucca Mountain for development as a nuclear waste repository. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself has extended 

a sufficiency letter based on their assessment of the work done, 

saying that we will have met the sufficiency standard for a license 

application. I believe with strong conviction, as I’ve said already, 

that the science is sound and we can move to the next stage. But 

again, the next stage is letting the NRC’s team of independent objective experts review the competing claims and make the final adjudication. I think we’re confident enough to go to that stage. Those 

who opposed this wouldn’t even allow the next stage to test it. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you very much. It’s also true, is it not, that 

even after construction begins on the site and waste is received at 

the site, that prior to permanent closure of the site there will be 

a period of time during which even further scientific learning can 

come forward and there will be an even additional opportunity to 

apply whatever knowledge is gained from that process to additional 

protections? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Absolutely. As I said, we’re talking about a 

preclosure period of 50 to 300 years. If you look backward a similar 

159

time period that would be the year 1700. Consider the progress 

science has made in that period. If you go back just 50 years, you’re 

talking about the dawn of the nuclear age. So it’s my strong belief 

that in that period in which we would be monitoring the facility in 

which we would obviously be making great advances in terms of 

issues that relate to safety and security, that the opportunities will 

be available to perfect what we already believe is a satisfactory design. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Mr. Secretary, we’ve spent now 20 years analyzing 

the Yucca Mountain site. It has taken us that long to get from 

where we started to the present day. We are now on the verge of 

approving, and I think we will approve it—legislation that moves 

this process forward with regard to Yucca Mountain. But let me 

ask you what your alternatives are in the event that we do not 

take that step, if Congress were not to pass this bill, if the disapproval announced by the Governor of Nevada of this site should 

stand, what alternatives then does the Department of Energy have 

for disposing of waste? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, there is no alternative. Obviously, Congress 

would be in a position, with the executive branch, to presumably 

work together to try to go back to square one and to make a decision as to what comes next. But the way the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act is established sets in motion a clear set of decision milestones, 

the first of which was my decision to recommend to site, the second 

of which was the President’s recommendation. The third step was 

obviously the actions that Nevada has taken. Now Congress has 

this decision before it. 

Again, I would remind the members the decision you have is 

whether or not to allow this to move to the stage at which the 

NRC’s independent, neutral, objective, expert organization will decide whether or not the claims we’ve made in fact can be met. Failure to do this leaves us with the responsibility for the waste with 

no plan to move forward to address that responsibility. The potential consequences that I mentioned earlier are adverse in nature to 

our national security, nonproliferation programs, and the like. 

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate you 

being here this morning, thank you. 

Mr. BARTON. The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from 

Georgia, Mr. Norwood, for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. NORWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Secretary, thank you for being here and your staff. I think I’m 

going to be fairly brief. 1998, as you recall, DOE missed the statutory deadline to begin removing fuel from reactor sites and at that 

point provided a revised schedule, as you remember and at that 

point committed to start receiving fuel at Yucca Mountain by 2010. 

Do you still agree with that? Is that still a commitment? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. It is, and we believe that the 2010 date can be 

met, assuming that this process moves forward. 

Mr. NORWOOD. Is there anything that Congress can or should do 

to help you reach that goal? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, I think that the first decision process obviously relates to moving ahead to the next step by overriding the 

veto of Nevada. Certainly there will be the need for sufficient funds 

to be able to finish the licensing process of Congress. I believe both 

160

the 01 and 02 appropriations process focused our resources on the 

science research as opposed to putting resources into the licensing 

process. It’s one of the reasons that we now have more to do on the 

licensing side and as we move ahead, we will need to have those 

resources. 

We will also need to address, I think, some issues that pertain 

to the site itself. But, I think it would be premature to speculate 

on all of those unless we move to the next step nothing can happen. 

Mr. NORWOOD. Anything that comes to mind that we might do 

to improve on that date? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think it would be very hard to move quicker 

than 2010. I wouldn’t want to leave the committee under any misunderstandings. We think that’s not an overly ambitious deadline. 

We think it’s a reasonable one. It would be our belief that if Congress acts to override the State of Nevada’s veto that it can be met. 

Mr. NORWOOD. A question earlier was what happens if, in fact, 

we don’t use Yucca Mountain and I’d like to ask that question too. 

Specifically and narrowly tailored in is if we don’t Yucca Mountain, 

what’s going to happen or what do you think might happen to the 

Nation’s overall energy supply situation if we don’t use Yucca 

Mountain? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think there are a couple of things that might 

occur. First, I think we will see an array of makeshift alternatives 

developed by people who currently are storing spent nuclear waste 

in temporary conditions. They’re running out of storage space. They 

lack confidence in the future in terms of how much space they’re 

going to have and the timeframe in which they will exceed whatever their limits are. We’ve already had one very recent application 

before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in which a group of energy companies and the Goshute Indian tribe in the State of Utah 

are working together to build a facility on the tribal land to store 

waste. And by the way, Mr. Chairman, this goes back to the transportation issue you raised. I believe you’ll see an array of ad hoc, 

makeshift alternatives developed in which transportation of waste 

is going to happen—not in the kind of coordinated programs we are 

recommending, but in an ad hoc fashion. So I think that’s one thing 

that will happen. Another thing will be that it would probably affect decisions with respect to license extension of nuclear facilities. 

Existing facilities will reach the point where we don’t have the 

same level of nuclear energy in our energy mix as we do today just 

because people will run out of storage. They’ll have to either cease 

operations or not seek new license extension. 

Mr. NORWOOD. When’s the last time you’ve been to Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I was there in early January. 

Mr. NORWOOD. I had the privilege of being there in 1996 and I 

came away impressed with a number of things: the tunnel digging 

machine, the scope of this entire thing was unbelievable and the 

amount of dollars that the taxpayers were spending particularly on 

science to try to have this right and I came away very impressed 

with the amount of dollars we were spending to make sure that the 

mountain or desert turtles would be all right. How are the turtles 

out there? Are they okay? 

161

Mr. ABRAHAM. I’m not sure, but I’ll take that question for the 

record. 

Mr. NORWOOD. My point there is, of course, that you can make 

science say anything, but it is my observation that this has been 

not only very expensive, but very complete and I don’t think there’s 

much else really that I could imagine that you might study at this 

point and we do need to move our material from around the country out there and hopefully before 210. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, gentlemen. I had heard that most of the 

turtles had moved into Las Vegas and were dealing blackjack. 

That’s what I had heard. Doing very well at it too, by the way. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Sawyer is recognized. 

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. The question that you’re dealing with has 

been a thorny one for a very long period of time. 

Let me ask you about procedure. The DOE is obligated under the 

law to once we have designated a repository site to make application to the NRC within 90 days. My understanding is that you and 

the NRC have drawn up a list of nearly 300 technical issues that 

confront that application process. 

Are you going to be able to meet the 90 days, first of all, and I’m 

assuming you knew the difficulty of doing that when you initiated 

this process with the Congress. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think, that first of all, there’s been some confusion as to the interpretation of that 90-day provision. I think it 

would be turning the statutory provision on its head to treat it as 

a basis for delay, for not going forward with the project. I think the 

provision’s purpose was really to speed up repository siting and licensing by trying to urge the Department—once we got to a point 

where the President had acted and Congress had acted—to move 

ahead with the license. 

Mr. SAWYER. I’m not suggesting that. What I’m getting to is the 

point of whether or not you need more time in order to resolve the 

issues so that you don’t have to do gymnastics around the law. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. No, I don’t think we need to go that route. The 

sufficiency letter which has been provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is consistent with that. The NRC recognizes, 

and we agree, that most of the remaining work has to be done as 

a natural part of the licensing process. In fact, I think Congress 

was probably correct in limiting the funds available for pre-license 

or license-related activities until we decided we could make the decision to recommend the site. I think—and in fact, I know that 

we’ve actually reduced the number of remaining issues substantially since this past fall. 

Mr. SAWYER. The Technical Review Board made a number of recommendations in its report in January. Do you agree with the findings of the report? How do you plan to respond to the recommendations? I’m particularly interested in the Board’s strong recommendation to reverse previous thought on this and use a low 

temperature storage procedure. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I’ve met with both the chairman and other members of the Board. We take very seriously all of the recommendations they make, obviously recognizing that their role is to be a 

162

part of this process, giving advice and counsel to the Department. 

Remember, as I said, there is this preclosure period in which we 

have plenty of time, I think, to further perfect what we think is the 

correct design. As I said, it’s a duration potentially longer than the 

United States has been a country. Regarding some of the concerns 

that have been expressed, I would just say this. We are confident 

and we believe the tests that we have done allow us, with the 

present design and the information we have, to meet the very, very 

stringent standards of the EPA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It is not surprising, I don’t think, that reasonable people 

can differ as to the conclusions that we’ve reached far into the future: 10,000 years. But most of the issues, such as the one you 

mentioned, the storage design in terms of hot versus cold, are ones 

which we tried to factor into the design plan at this point, so that 

we have the flexibility to go either way. We have been, in no small 

measure at the Technical Review Board’s urging, engaged in extensive testing and will continue to do that. We have time to make 

that ultimate decision as to what, in fact, is the preferable course. 

We’ve left that as an open issue, recognizing that in terms of the 

design, we can go in either direction and we do have to do more 

science research to decide which one is better, although I’m convinced that both would allow us to meet the standard. Now the 

question is how do we not only meet the standard, but what do we 

do to go the extra steps to do the best, most perfect approach. 

Mr. SAWYER. One last question, Mr. Chairman. There are all 

kinds of conflicting numbers about the numbers of shipments that 

would be involved. I’ve seen it range from 10 to 40,000 and I suppose it all comes down to the size and concentration of shipments 

on a particular shipment. Have you developed thought on the concentration of waste that would be permitted on any given—— Mr. ABRAHAM. We have. It’s our estimate, and I think that this 

number would be very accurate, that there would be less than one 

shipment per day. It’s obviously part of the on-going process as we 

move through licensing, toward construction, and shipping to decide what is the right configuration. But, one shipment—less than 

one shipment per day is our current estimate—I don’t mean to 

compare apples to oranges, but I do think that it’s important to 

know that in this country somewhere in the vicinity of 300 million 

hazardous waste shipments per year take place. We have somewhere in the vicinity of 3 million shipments that involve some type 

of radiological material. We’re talking about something less than 

365 shipments to the repository at this point, perhaps substantially 

less. 

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. We’d now recognize the full committee chairman, Mr. Tauzin for 5 minutes for 

questions. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 

thank you so much for being here to help us resolve this issue. Let 

me first point out that I’m aware, as I know the committee is 

aware, that there’s been an attempt to characterize the Department of Energy’s review of this important issue as being one sided. 

I’m reading from one report that indicated that by golly, you were 

meeting consistently with people who support the burial site in NeVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00166 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
163

vada and not meeting with those who opposed it and it refers specifically, in fact you met eight times with Republican lawmakers 

who support nuclear waste burial in Nevada. Will you describe 

those meetings? I was at one of those. I know about them. Would 

you tell us what those meetings were about? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, the subcommittee chairman, I think, was at 

two of those that were referenced. As both of you know, we talked 

about other matters. I think there’s a tendency to want to extrapolate substantially, but I think—— Chairman TAUZIN. Were they meetings about Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. No, they were not. 

Chairman TAUZIN. They were not. I think some of those were 

simply your courtesy visits to come meet us after you had been 

nominated—— Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s correct. 

Chairman TAUZIN. And approved as Secretary of the Department. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s correct. 

Chairman TAUZIN. So these courtesy meetings have now been 

blown up into Yucca Mountain meeting when they never were, 

were they? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I find that, as far as I can tell, any meeting that 

took place with anyone who has had at some point expressed support for the project is characterized as a Yucca Mountain meeting——

Chairman TAUZIN. Whether you talked about it or not. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Right. 

Chairman TAUZIN. In most cases, you tell me you didn’t. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s correct. 

Mr. BARTON. Will the gentleman yield? 

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes. I’ll be happy to yield. 

Mr. BARTON. The toughest question I asked in the first courtesy 

meeting was whether he was a Wolverine or a Spartan. 

Chairman TAUZIN. How did he handle it? 

Mr. BARTON. He said he had friends on both sides. 

Chairman TAUZIN. He’s still a Senator, for heaven’s sake. 

The other thing I want to point out was I have with me a copy 

of a letter dated September 5, 2001 from you to Representative 

Berkley in which you make it very clear that you’re very interested 

in the views and comments of the citizens of Nevada. You set up 

a video conference link of the Las Vegas Public Hearings with locations in Carson City, Elko and Reno. You agreed to have the feed 

provided to the Senate recording studios so that any one of us 

could sit in and listen to those views, including Ms. Berkley. More 

importantly, you issued an invitation. I will be happy to meet with 

you, the Governor and the Members of the Nevada congressional 

delegation to hear your and their views directly. 

Did Ms. Berkley take you up on that invitation? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Congresswoman Berkley—— Chairman TAUZIN. Ms. Berkley, I’m sorry. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. No, she did not. I have met twice with Governor 

Guinn, but not with any of the delegation members. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes, but you did offer to meet with the delegation. Ms. Berkley was the one you directed the letter to. 

164

Mr. ABRAHAM. Actually, all the members received an invitation. 

Chairman TAUZIN. A similar letter. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Right. 

Chairman TAUZIN. And I think you got to meet with the Governor, who did agree to meet with you and that’s it, right? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Right, well, there were local elected officials. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Isn’t it kind of hard—I mean how do you feel 

when you read from Ms. Berkley’s statement that the Administration had a pro Yucca inclination from the beginning and the people 

they met with were all pro Yucca supporters and they threw in a 

meeting with the Governor as though you wouldn’t meet with him. 

That wasn’t true, was it? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, that is not true. We offered the 

delegation the opportunity to meet, and sincerely extended that invitation. I actually have had meetings during the timeframe in 

which our decision was made with members of the delegation in 

which, as was the case with the meetings I had with you and Congressman Barton, other topics were discussed, but this topic was 

not——

Chairman TAUZIN. We can argue about whether your decision 

was a good one, whether we should vote to override the veto of Nevada on its substance without this kind of stuff. I mean 

mischaracterizations of the process are just not very helpful and I 

wanted to point that out. These were mischaracterizations of the 

process. 

But there is a process ongoing and I understand that one of the 

things you have yet to do is to hold hearings and I understand public hearings on the licensing process if we do overrule the State of 

Nevada. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, the licensing hearings would be part of the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s process. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Right. And in those public hearings and in 

that process, people from Nevada, anyone can attend and those 

comments and those public hearings leading to license renewal—

there will be further attempts to make sure the site does indeed 

pass the stringent test for health and safety, is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s right. 

Chairman TAUZIN. And the public will have a chance to comment 

at those hearings, correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That is correct. 

Chairman TAUZIN. I noted, as did the State of Nevada, that the 

NRC has identified 293 unresolved technical issues in the 9 critical 

areas, could you give us just a brief idea of what those were about? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Most of these are confirmatory of the research 

which we’ve already conducted and it is our belief and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s belief, these are the sorts of actions that 

are part of the licensing process, and therefore, they are not actions 

that would be predecisional in terms of the site recommendation. 

They are part of what you do as part of the licensing. 

Chairman TAUZIN. So it’s not like you haven’t done your job at 

this point. Those are things that are resolved in the licensing——

Mr. ABRAHAM. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as I said 

earlier, already has provided us with a sufficiency letter saying 

165

that we have met what would be needed to move to a licensing 

stage already. 

Chairman TAUZIN. In that regard, DOE has resolved some of 

those questions already, have they not? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think, well, of the—— Mr. BARTON. This will be your last question. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes, I believe that some 35 to 40 already have 

been resolved in the period since that number was identified. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

your courtesy. 

Mr. BARTON. This will be my last chairing of a hearing so I just 

cutoff the full committee chairman, but I am going to go by the 

rules. 

The Chair would recognize the distinguished ranking member 

from Michigan, Mr. Dingell, for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Congressman. 

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Secretary, we’ve got a great deal of fuss going 

on about this process. I’d like to try in the brief time I have available today to try to lay this out so that we can all understand what 

we’re looking at here. 

First of all, we spent about $12 billion characterizing the site up 

to this time, is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I don’t know if it’s $12 billion, I think it’s closer 

to the $4 billion range. 

Mr. DINGELL. It’s close. I’ll not argue with you if you come in 

with a larger or lower number. 

The next thing is you have at this time completed your statutory 

responsibilities under the legislation to define whether it’s safe 

enough to proceed to the next step. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. This is a part of an orderly and ordinary congressional process, is it not? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes, it is. 

Mr. DINGELL. So now having said that, there are now other steps 

which have to be taken also by you before you can submit the matter to NRC for the completion of the then licensing process which 

starts then at the NRC at the time you submitted it to the NRC, 

is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now approximately how long will it be before you 

are going to be able to submit that to the NRC? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We believe that, assuming congressional action to 

override the veto occurred, that timeframe would probably be into 

the later part of the year 2004. 

Mr. DINGELL. So we have between now and 2004 to continue 

scrutiny of this site to make sure that we’re ready then to move 

to the licensing process, is that right? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, I believe that obviously some decision could 

be made in the interim. I think Congress’ next action is to allow 

us to go to that next stage to prepare the license and submit it. 

Mr. DINGELL. So you will then prepare that license and will submit that license——

166

Mr. ABRAHAM. The application, right. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now what do you have to do between now and the 

time that you prepare the license and submit it to NRC? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Basically, we would be in a license application development process. It would be to address issues that would, and 

I would prefer to submit for the record the specific—— [The following was received for the record:]

License Application Development Process Work required between now and submittal of the Yucca Mountain License Application for a Construction Authorization 

includes the following: 

The Department must provide a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) that will enable NRC to assess whether the proposed repository 

design within the Yucca Mountain geological setting can perform safely during the 

pre-closure and post-closure periods and whether the repository can meet NRC performance objectives. To accomplish this, we plan to close out our key technical issue 

(KTI) agreements, update our technical documentation, prepare a license application, and develop the necessary license review and documentation infrastructure. 

For example, the Department will implement a licensing support network to facilitate electronic review and docketing as required by 10 CFR 2. We expect this system 

to be operational in June 2004. 

We will refine and conduct another iteration of the total system performance assessment for the license application. This will include refining our models and incorporating new scientific data that will further enhance our understanding of longterm repository performance.

Mr. DINGELL. I think that would be fine. But you will be addressing a number, including questions which have been raised this 

morning, is that not so? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Among others. Some of these issues that we’ve 

talked about, in terms of the unresolved issues which are ‘‘closed 

pending’’ are not ground breaking, new areas. They will be finalized so that the preliminary work will be completed. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now Mr. Secretary, if the Congress votes your request to us down today, that stops the whole process? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Absolutely. 

Mr. DINGELL. We’ve then wasted $12 billion. We’ve got to proceed forward with some new mechanism for storing this nuclear 

waste. Is that not so? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. At that point, there would be no statutory process 

in place whatsoever. I suppose that Congress would have to then 

work with the executive branch to consider new legislation, new 

mechanisms for addressing the nuclear waste issue. As I said earlier, the responsibility for the waste does not expire if Congress 

fails to override. That responsibility stays with the Federal Government. 

Mr. DINGELL. I want to come to that because what you’re telling 

us if you’re going to have a hell of a mess on your hands and the 

country is. 

Now having said this what is the process that occurs in connection with the licensing undertaking? At that time you have to file 

a petition for a license before the NRC, is that right? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. DINGELL. You have to comply with all of the laws and you 

have to see to it that you’ve submitted an application which 

assures that all the requirements of the statute are met and also 

that there is safety for the public, protection for the environment, 

compliance with all of your environmental and all of your applicable environmental and other statutory requirements. 

167

Mr. ABRAHAM. Right, as you know, Congressman, the licensing 

process is very open. I believe it was referenced already that public 

comment and public participation of interested parties and others 

will occur. It’s a process involving public hearings and discussions, 

so that all of these concerns that we’ve had presented about issues 

of safety and so on will be open for further discussion. 

Mr. DINGELL. Now you’ve just made a very important point. 

Open process and the NRC then goes in to all of these questions, 

is that not correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Correct. 

Mr. DINGELL. And they can impose whatever conditions that they 

feel are necessary to protect the public interest at that time, can 

they not? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. They would have that option, of course. 

Mr. DINGELL. And——

Mr. BARTON. This will have to be gentleman’s last question. 

Mr. DINGELL. I’m sorry? 

Mr. BARTON. This will have to be the gentleman’s last question. 

Mr. DINGELL. Okay. Then why in the name of common sense are 

we sitting there other than voting for the bill and getting it moving 

forward so that the open process at NRC can be considered in a 

suitable and proper fashion? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, as I said in my opening statement, I think 

there’s an overwhelming burden on those who oppose this at this 

stage to make the case that we shouldn’t allow this open process 

conducted by an independent agency with expertise to do exactly 

the analysis that needs to be conducted. I think unless a member 

was convinced that there was no possibility, and convinced at very 

high level of burden or beyond a reasonable doubt, than the NRC 

would not approve this license, unless you have reached that conclusion, it would be inappropriate to vote no. 

Mr. DINGELL. So the NRC will ultimately make, after an open 

process, a full decision on what it is that’s going to happen on this 

matter and this is just a step or a way station on the travel to that 

particular point. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Correct. The choice is——

Mr. DINGELL. All questions will be considered in connection 

with——

Mr. ABRAHAM. I just want to state that we are strongly convinced, and I am convinced, beyond doubt that we will succeed in 

that process. So it’s not a situation where it’s simply a jump ball. 

However, you have correctly stated that the next step, if we move 

ahead, is to have a new independent analysis take place. Failing 

to move ahead ends the project, and ends literally an entire process 

here with no alternatives available, but with the Federal Government retaining the responsibilities that it assumed when it passed 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. 

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman’s time——

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman’s time is expired. The Chair would 

recognize the vice chairman, Mr. Shimkus for 5 minutes for questions. 

168

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome, Mr. Secretary. We do have the responsibility for the nuclear waste today, 

is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes, the Federal Government assumed that 

through the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Illinois’ energy portfolio is approximately 40 percent nuclear, 40 percent coal and 20 percent natural gas and/or 

some renewables. 

When the temporary storage sites at the nuclear facilities are 

full, what are the options for those nuclear generating facilities? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, as I indicated before, I think the options primarily focus on either ceasing operations and thus, producing no 

additional waste or finding an alternative location for waste storage, which as I indicated already is being investigated by companies who are working on an ad hoc basis rather than through the 

approach we’re proposing, perhaps because they have a lack of confidence or perhaps because they want to have an alternative in 

case Congress doesn’t act. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And what is the status, we don’t have to be particular, but in general, most of the nuclear generating facilities, 

how much storage site availability left do they have before they 

close? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I can’t say. I can provide you——

[The following was received for the record:]

The general status varies with each facility. Currently, 16 sites have dry storage 

and another 28 are projected to need dry storage by 2010. However, on-site storage 

can encounter challenges such as space limitations and state restrictions. For example, Minnesota has enacted a law restricting the amount of spent nuclear fuel that 

can be placed in dry storage at the Xcel Energy’s Prairie Island nuclear plant. Without changes to the law, or other alternatives, Prairie Island will have sufficient storage capacity to operate only through 2007. Current efforts by Private Fuel Storage 

LLC (a consortium of eight utilities including Xcel Energy) to establish a private 

spent fuel storage facility in Utah reflect concerns by nuclear power generators that 

developing on-site storage can be increasingly difficult and could potentially jeopardize continued operation of their facilities.

Mr. SHIMKUS. If I may, we do have some in Wisconsin that in 

a year or do will be full and will have to make the decision. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think it’s in Minnesota, but I think there’s another one very close to having no alternatives. Part of the challenge 

is that some facilities are in areas where they’ve got a lot of extra 

space and are in a position to seek and obtain whatever permits 

they need and the resources to build additional facilities. Others 

are constrained. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. This whole debate should not just be a micro issue 

of Yucca Mountain, but also we should include it in the whole national energy debate. One of the concerns is if this resolution fails 

is that nuclear generating facilities have to go offline. If that’s the 

case for a State like Illinois, if 40 percent of the power that we generate is nuclear, what would that do to our national energy policy 

and the pocketbook issues, what would it do to the price for the individual consumers? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Well, obviously, it has an immediate effect of requiring areas in which nuclear energy is a substantial provider of 

electricity to either build new alternative forms of electricity generation or find other mechanisms to purchase electricity. That 

169

would obviously create a supply/demand problem for the ratepayers 

in those areas. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I would also like to follow up, I have my good 

friend from the State of Missouri, Karen McCarthy, who although 

we’re on opposite sides of both States, she’s on the western side of 

the State of Missouri, I’m on the southwestern side of the State of 

Illinois, we do have a couple of things in common. One is Interstate 

70 and I have a great respect for her concerns. The questions that 

she’s raised have not seemed to be a problem in the State of Illinois 

and we have a very good record of our relationship with the movement of high level nuclear waste. And I would also request, respectfully, that we work together so that she has as much confidence in the moving of nuclear waste that I do through the State 

of Illinois and I do know that the Governor of the State of Missouri 

actually changed his tune somewhat against the movement of nuclear waste when the nuclear reactor that services the University 

of Missouri at Columbia had an onsite storage problem that was 

going to require that medical reactor to close down. Then it was 

then in the State of Missouri’s best interest to work with you all 

to move the nuclear waste and without any incident. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We have worked, and under very clear guidelines, 

with the Governor of any State in which there is going to be transportation. It’s a very clearly structured approach. I just would reemphasize that we have a variety of safeguards in place: from escorts, to satellite monitoring of the movement, of shipments to prior 

work with the States and their first responder teams. Each step of 

the process is, I think, adequately safeguarded. 

Clearly, as we move ahead with this, additional consideration 

will be given to perfect transportation even more. Ultimately, 

transportation routes must be approved by the NRC. So, I think 

that there are plenty of safeguards. I know that the congresswoman raised some questions. We have some disagreement on the 

interpretation of what has happened and why. But, we will provide 

to anybody who’s interested what I think is a satisfactory resolution, addressing those concerns. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you and thank you for your time. Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. We would now 

recognize the other distinguished gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Rush for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. RUSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, again, 

I also join with my other colleagues in welcoming you here to this 

hearing. 

Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a lot of fear mongering going 

on, particularly among the opponents of this piece of legislation 

and fear is a strong motivator to either act or not to act and in 

most cases to act, I’m somewhat intrigued by your comments a little earlier as it relates to the ad hoc efforts of some parties as it 

relates to making alternative plans and taking alternative steps in 

the event that this legislation fails. 

Can you expound upon it more so? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Sure. I don’t mean to be prejudgmental about 

those alternatives, or how they will work out. I’m not saying people 

170

won’t try to do things as safely as they can or won’t get the proper 

licenses and permits. But, my point was that if people think that 

by not going forward with Yucca Mountain all the waste is going 

to stay put where it’s at, in perpetuity, in temporary facilities 

above ground, and in many instances, at sites where long-term 

storage was never contemplated, they’re wrong. That isn’t going to 

be the end of the story. As I said a moment ago, it’s going to mean 

that people will engage in their own self-help approach. That undoubtedly means, and it has already taken the form of, people 

seeking to find new alternative locations where they can store 

waste, either temporarily or permanently, but probably temporarily. That means it’s going to start moving. It’s going to be moving under the ownership or under the management of individual 

companies or entities, who have been put together to take this 

waste. This will presumably be profitable for those who agree to 

storage. So it doesn’t mean, in other words, that there will be no 

transportation. There will be transportation. The question is do we 

want to do it in a coordinated national plan, or do we want it to 

take place on an ad hoc basis, with Company A and Indian Tribe 

B, or do we want to do it in a more coordinated national plan? I 

think the appropriate coordinated and safer approach is preferable. 

Mr. RUSH. With that in mind, recently Governor Ridge basically 

gave a pretty enlightening response to a question that he received 

about homeland security and the Yucca Mountain program which 

included the transportation of material to Yucca Mountain. 

Can you give us a little bit of your—the characterization of your 

interaction with Governor Ridge and his program and can you 

elaborate a little bit about homeland security issues as it relates 

to this program and can you also give us some kind of a glimpse 

into the effect of the homeland security issues as it relates to the 

ad hoc pursuit of these individual companies? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I would start by saying that at the request of the 

Office of Homeland Security, we provided, at the time we made the 

initial recommendation, extensive briefings to them as to what the 

plan was. Governor Ridge, having governed a State that has nuclear energy, already knows a lot about these issues. I think 

they’ve concluded that to the extent we can move a substantial 

amount, ultimately thousands of metric tons of waste, into one underground secured location next to an Air Force base in the middle 

of nowhere. We can better protect that waste. I don’t want to suggest at all that we believe the current storage situations are insecure. But, we also have to think about the future, and I think prudence demands that we would move in a direction where we could 

protect more waste in a more effective, centralized fashion. 

In a similar sense, I think it’s the case that Congress and others 

have questioned how well private entities engaged in running nuclear reactors are doing. We think, according to everything I’ve 

seen from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, they’re doing a 

good job. But, the more places that emerge because of this ad hoc 

approach in which waste is stored, the more challenges will be presented. 

We also have a number of places where former nuclear facilities 

have been decommissioned, but the waste is still there. We also 

have to worry about the protection of waste in those places. For exVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00174 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
171

ample, up in the northern part of my State of Michigan, the Big 

Rock facility is no longer operating as a nuclear reactor, but the 

waste is still there from its past operation. The idea—and it’s right, 

is to move the fuel away from Lake Michigan. 

The idea is that we could remove that waste and permanently 

store it in Yucca Mountain and no longer have to worry about security at that decommissioned facility. Big is pretty remote and is not 

necessarily something you want to be worrying about decades from 

now. Also, the waste that’s stored at DOE facilities would be much 

more safely stored if we could move it to Yucca Mountain. Those 

are the considerations which we’ve taken. 

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair would 

recognize the distinguished gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Ganske for 

5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. GANSKE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today. In 

my opening statement I quoted from a Des Moines Register editorial of March 17 which was in favor of the Yucca Mountain repository. This was noteworthy because this represented an 180 degree 

shift from the Register’s earlier position. A few weeks later another 

editorial was written and let me just read some of it. 

‘‘We forgot to mention something in a recent editorial about the 

proposed nuclear waste storage site at Yucca Mountain. We failed 

to point out that the editorial represented a change in position for 

the Register. Previous editorials in the Register opposed the nuclear repository at Yucca Mountain and urged that waste continue 

to be kept in temporary storage at the 130 or so nuclear power 

plants around the country. In the most recent editorial on March 

17, we urged the government to move ahead with establishing the 

single repository. Our position changed because circumstances 

changed. First, the U.S. Department of Energy after many years of 

study, finally came out with a definitive recommendation for storing nuclear waste underground at Yucca Mountain. The Department offered satisfactory answers to all of the objections to the site. 

Second, the September 11 attacks suddenly made it seem far less 

wise to have radioactive material scattered at 130 above-ground 

sites near population centers, rather than at one highly secure underground site in the desert.’’

Now for years I’ve been talking to editorial boards around my 

State about this issue and advocating for Yucca Mountain. It’s fair 

to say that I listen and learn as well as the editorial boards, but 

I thought it was noteworthy that at the end of this article, the editor said ‘‘not only do we change positions occasionally, we’re sometimes even open to persuasion.’’ I think that’s something that is 

noteworthy. 

My question to you is this, I have a sense of my District and my 

State and where they stand on this. We have a nuclear power plant 

very close to Cedar Rapids. What is your sense about where people 

stand in your travels around the country on this issue? Has there 

been a change in attitudes by other editorial boards, or by the public on this? I know that you’re looking at making this decision 

based on science, or whether it’s a safe place or not, but I’m curious 

as to what your sense is of where the country is standing on this 

issue. 

172

Mr. ABRAHAM. Congressman, I haven’t done any polling. I guess 

my view is that the national interests were so compelling that any 

member, I think, can go to their district and make an overwhelming strong case for moving forward, because, moving forward 

is important for our national security and our energy security reasons. It’s important for homeland security reasons. It’s important 

for environmental reasons. If you can make a case for anything 

based on all four of those pillars, I think it’s a pretty hard case to 

refute. Again, had we done sort of a cursory study of this, rather 

than 24 years and $4 billion worth of study, if we confined our 

study to a small number of factors rather than the extraordinarily 

broad range of considerations and possibilities that might happen 

in 10,000 years, then maybe you could refute the arguments we’ve 

made. I don’t know the answer to the polling question, but I think 

the arguments for moving forward are ones that are going to cause 

people who study this at all to agree with our conclusion. 

Mr. GANSKE. Do you sense a change, though, in wanting to get 

this done in a satisfactory method sooner rather than later because 

of September 11 due to the fact that people are more concerned 

about attacks? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Clearly, there have been editorials since that date 

that have been focused on those kinds of concerns and probably on 

ones that might not have happened but for the events of that day. 

I think the American public expects us to look at the security 

issues and take immediate action rather than postponement. One 

of the things which I take very seriously in my job is that when 

it’s time to make a decision, we’ve got to make it and this is one 

decision that had been obviously delayed for a long period of time. 

There’s no question that you could continue research on this. The 

science research could continue potentially for 5 more Congresses 

or 10 more Congresses. But to me, we’ve reached the point where 

we have sufficient scientific support to move ahead and I was able, 

based on that scientific support, to conclude the time had come to 

stop and make that decision. Now we can move forward to perfect 

the research as I outlined here today. 

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. GANSKE. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTON. I would announce to the committee that we’re expecting a series of two votes in the next 10 minutes. There’s an 

outside chance that we can get all members present a chance to 

ask their questions and then let the Secretary go and not have to 

have him come back after our votes, if we act expeditiously. 

The Chair would recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Doyle for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and in the interest of 

time so that we can accommodate that, I’ll try to be brief and not 

use my 5 minutes. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for coming here today. I just 

want to very quickly piggyback on a question that my good friend 

Chairman Barton had talked about with regards to the transport 

of waste and he talked a little bit about the safety factors, but I 

want to jump ahead to post-NRC licensing. I know that you continue to work on the transport issue, but what’s the Department 

doing to fashion a plan for determining who will be afforded the 

173

first opportunities to actually move their waste to the repository? 

I know you’re well aware of some of the capacity constraints faced 

by many operators such that the storage issue can fundamentally 

alter daily operations. What kind of procedures do you envision to 

ensure that the transport of waste occurs in a timely and responsible manner? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think we have contractual issues that come into 

play here. After the Congress acts, the Department could then 

begin negotiating agreements with different companies. Those contracts are obviously a basis on which a timing of transportation decisions will be made. Obviously, we will take into account emergency constraint problems as that’s appropriate, but I don’t think 

we’re at a point yet to give a blueprint for how we would factor 

those kinds of considerations. Obviously, we’ve had our focus primarily on the issues that relate to the science. 

Mr. DOYLE. So those determinations haven’t been made yet. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Not final. 

Mr. DOYLE. But obviously will. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We are governed by agreements that have been 

reached. But now we can move ahead, Congress and the Department can move ahead. Then the target was 1998 and so agreements were entered into consistent with that. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, many of my other questions have already been answered so in the interest of time, I’ll 

yield back. 

Mr. BARTON. We thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I 

would recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, we’re delighted that you’re here today and appreciate your taking time to 

visit with us on this important issue. I think it’s been made quite 

clear that most of us believe that this override will pass the House 

relatively easy and the real difficulty will probably be in the Senate. Senator Ensign testified this morning on the first panel and 

he raised some issues in my mind that I would like to just discuss 

with you briefly. 

One, how many other countries are there around the world that 

have a repository for the long-term storage of high level nuclear 

waste? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. This would be the first of this type. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. This would be the first? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes. Although it’s in discussion, obviously, and 

frankly, much of the world, I think is actually looking at whether 

we decide to go down this route. I think it could have implications 

for other decisions. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And it’s my understanding that in Europe they 

do reprocessing of high level waste. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Although I don’t know the details of it, it’s also 

my understanding that the U.S. sort of moved away from reprocessing during President Carter’s Administration. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. During that timeframe, the focus on reprocessing 

as an option has been reduced. 

174

Mr. WHITFIELD. And could you provide a synopsis of why the decision was made to move away from reprocessing? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I think that at that time and it’s my impression 

that in the debates since that have focused on reprocessing, concern about issues that relate to proliferation were a principal reason for the policy. I think the decision was made by Congress, obviously, in 1982 that a preferable alternative is the deep underground storage approach which we’ve taken. I would note that reprocessing does not end the storage issue. There still is a byproduct 

that has to be stored permanently somewhere. While it could substantially reduced amounts, it does not eliminate the question of 

permanent long-term storage. It also raises the question of where, 

how much, how expensive, who pays and so on. Reprocessing is not, 

in my judgment, an option that would dispense with all that we 

have done. Given the challenges of siting and permitting and going 

forward, leaving aside other issues, I don’t see it as a viable alternative, nor is it one that can permanently address the issue of 

waste. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 

Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentleman from Kentucky. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hall is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Mr. Secretary, and 

your backup group. I thank you for what you’re doing. I want to 

be practical. I remember back when we passed the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act in 1987 that it was a painful one to pass because it was 

clear from the beginning some State needed to be the host of the 

repository. It was clear from the testimony we had then and it’s 

been borne out that that State would be Nevada. All of us have 

high regard for those that represent that State and they’ve done a 

good job. They’ve done a bruising job of it. And we’re friends. And 

it’s not easy to cast a vote we’re about to cast now. But we just 

have to pull our hat down over our ears and call them like we see 

them and I think that’s what we’re going to do. 

Let’s get some things out of the way though that have been bothering me and maybe you’ve answered them and I’ve not been here, 

but I want to accentuate them one more time. The people of my 

State have paid more than $334 million into the Nuclear Waste 

Fund with the understanding that the Federal Government would 

meet its obligation to dispose of the spent nuclear fuel. Now I think 

you’ve probably answered that for Dr. Norwood and I think Mr. 

Dingell alluded to it too as to what your intentions are and I’m satisfied with that. When we get down to the shipping of the radioactive waste, that’s going to be the next battlefield and if they can’t 

defeat where the waste is going to be stored. It’s got to get there 

somehow. I’ve heard a lot of scare tactics about how you’re going 

to be shipping radioactive waste around the clock every day of the 

week through the main streets of every town in America and I 

think someone said there would be 100,000 shipments. I live in 

Rockwell, a small town outside of Dallas and a Dallas guy used to 

come out there all the time looking for frog legs. He liked to gig 

frogs and this old farmer said, ‘‘come out to my tank, I got hundreds of frogs out there.’’ The guy came out there and killed every 

frog there, gigged them all, but there weren’t but five, they just 

sounded like a hundred. Don’t you think that’s the story that kind 

175

of illustrates all the complaints? I don’t mean I want to gig anybody that doesn’t agree with us on this, but it’s a thought. 

Can you tell me, as close as you can, how many shipments DOE 

is going to make each year, if the repository is licensed? Have the 

routes have already been determined? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. The projections are that the total number of shipments each year would be less than one per day, although the 

routes have not been finalized. 

Mr. HALL. And I’d like to put this in the record, Mr. Chairman, 

if I might. These are the site storing nuclear spent fuel, high level 

radioactive waste and/or surplus plutonium destined for geologic—— Mr. BARTON. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. HALL. I’d like to have that into the record to show that for 

all of those here that vote, they’re voting to get rid of this stuff out 

of their own State and this shows how many sites are in each state. 

We have five in Texas. I think there are five in Massachusetts. 

There are twice that many, in Illinois, of any other State, so that’s 

why we’re here and that’s why we need to listen to testimony like 

yours. I plan to vote aye and I hope everybody else uses the same 

common sense that I’m going to use.


g:\graphics\79469.166
176

Mr. BARTON. Will the gentleman yield back the balance of his 

time? 

The Chair would recognize the gentleman from North Carolina 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURR. I’m a little intimidated to go after Ralph, but I’ll try 

to. 

Mr. Secretary, welcome and I’ll try not to gig you. Since I’ve been 

here I have heard Yucca Mountain described as a repository, a depository and a suppository. 

I think that explains it, it’s a different meaning to everybody. 

But I just want to—I think I’m last, so I want to try to recap facts 

relative to this site and DOE’s participation. 

Is there any misunderstanding whether the Federal Government 

has made a commitment to the consolidated storage of nuclear 

waste? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. The Federal Government has clearly made a commitment to accept responsibility for the waste. The Congress obviously has decided that the course of action to pursue is the one in 

which we would characterize and determine whether this specific 

site, which Congress chose among many that were initially examined, could be safely used for that purpose. So whether or not we 

go ahead here, Congress retains responsibilities for the waste that 

is generated around the country. 

Mr. BURR. Is there any doubt in the minds of the Department of 

Energy whether there has been sufficient science to suggest that 

this is the right course of action? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I have concluded—and I’ve studied this at some 

length—that we have done more than sufficient research to move 

to the next step. We have, in fact, as I said earlier, tested not just 

whether or not this was something that could meet the very stringent standards that we’ve been asked to meet for the next foreseeable period during which we would build and monitor the site, but 

into the future; the 10,000-year period as well. 

Mr. BURR. Is there any additional science that you think needs 

to be done or have we done it all? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I believe we have done sufficient science to be able 

to make the recommendation and to build the repository in a fashion that can safely meet the standards that have been set forth. 

I believe it is also appropriate for us to seek to perfect, even further, how we would design the repository, how we would design the 

storage methods and so on because I think our goal should be to 

come as close as we can to perfection. Time will allow us, because 

of new advances, to improve on what we already think can be done 

to meet a very stringent standard. 

Mr. BURR. Some suggest that we’re not under a sense of urgency 

relative to moving nuclear waste from the interim sites that they’re 

currently at spread across this country. Is there any nuclear plant 

that you can think of that built their interim storage pad with the 

intent of having it 100 years as Senator Ensign suggested it could 

withstand? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. I am not aware that anybody anticipated that. 

The interesting thing about some of those contentions is that people are saying that without any significant research we can say 

just as a matter of course that a 100 years from now it will be safe 

177

where it’s at, but with $4 billion of research, we still need more 

study and more research to move to a licensing phase of this repository. To me that’s not a very consistent approach. I think that it 

would be really off the track to just simply reach those kinds of 

conclusions about existing storage when we haven’t come close to 

conducting the kind of scrutiny that the Yucca Mountain repository 

has been subjected to. It may or may not stand up. I don’t know. 

Mr. BURR. The likelihood is 10 years ago none of these sites 

would have thought they still would have had storage onsite, that 

we would have already been in a permanent facility. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. That’s why we already have evidence of people 

seeking alternative procedures to maintaining the storage on their 

existing facilities. I mentioned already the Goshute Indian Nation 

which is in the process of working with energy companies to build 

a storage facility on their reservation land in Utah. That, I think, 

is what we would quickly see develop if we don’t move forward 

here. 

Mr. BURR. Well, I think it’s important that we understand, everybody understands, we have a commitment. You feel the science 

is sufficient to make the recommendation and there is a sense of 

urgency that we move forward and not rely on the current storage 

methods for the foreseeable future. I’m confident that this committee will do the right thing and I thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. BARTON. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair would 

recognize Mr. Markey for 5 minutes. We’re going to continue the 

hearing to give every member present an opportunity to question 

the Secretary, but the Secretary has a 1 p.m. appointment that he 

cannot fail to appear at, so Mr. Shimkus is going to chair the rest 

of the hearing and then we’ll—for this witness, and as soon as we 

finish with Mr. Markey, adjourn until approximately 1 to 1:15. 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Secretary, you’ve got a tough job. I was on the 

committee in 1982 and 1987. I was here when this committee 

eliminated New Hampshire, Louisiana, Texas and Washington 

State because their politicians did not want it there. So that left 

us with one site, this committee picked Yucca Mountain, so if there 

are no other options, this committee decided there would be no 

other options. It picked Yucca Mountain in the Reagan Administration and insisted upon it. 

So now we’ve reached this situation where there are many unresolved environmental questions in a site which Congress picks, a 

congressional expert is an expert only compared to other congressman, not compared to real experts, so as a result there are many 

unresolved scientific questions. 

Now you said there are no harmful radiation releases in the last 

50 years, 3,000 shipments, but there have been 72 accidents that 

have occurred. Now there’s going to be 3,000 shipments in the first 

2 years, once this Act goes into place. So my question is this, since 

the transportation security division of DOE which transports nuclear weapons fails about 85 percent of their security tests, if we 

can’t ensure that nuclear weapons are safe from attack as they’re 

being transported, how can we sure that nuclear waste is safe as 

it moves through hundreds and hundreds of communities with al 

Qaeda vowing to make ‘‘dirty bombs’’ from nuclear materials which 

178

will harm American people, what gives you confidence that that 85 

percent failure rate for nuclear weapons——

Mr. ABRAHAM. First of all, I’d be glad to, on another occasion, 

discuss the security of the nuclear weapons complex and transportation. I would not want to get into those discussions in an open 

forum because I think there’s some information which would require clearance. But, let me just say this. The presumption in your 

question is that somehow or another if al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization were intent on doing something to nuclear 

waste, they would wait 10 years until it is moving secretly under 

very stringent security conditions and then try to figure out which 

box car out of hundreds of box cars or which truck out of hundreds 

of trucks it’s in when they already know where it is today at 131 

sites that are stationary. I think, very honestly, even at those 131 

sites nuclear waste is secure. But, it is certainly a stretch to argue 

that somehow it is less secure when it’s moving under the conditions I’ve mentioned. 

Mr. MARKEY. If I may reclaim my time. I disagree with you. I 

think these materials are much more vulnerable in trucks, on 

trains than they are secure inside a nuclear power plant facility. 

So I totally disagree with you. I think these mobile Chernobyls out 

on the highways, byways and railways of our country are much 

more vulnerable and it’s not a short distance from box cutters to 

box cars. It’s a long distance getting inside a nuclear power plant 

facility. I disagree with you. 

Next question. NRC has said there are 293 technical issues that 

must be resolved before DOE submits its license application. Do 

you intend to submit the license application to NRC in 90 days as 

is required by law? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. As I answered earlier, first of all, the NRC has 

not only identified, working with us, those remaining issues, which 

by the way have been reduced since that number was publicly indicated, but they have provided a sufficiency letter which indicates 

that they believe we have established sufficient basis to move forward to the licensing process, notwithstanding the fact that those 

‘‘closed pending’’ issues remain to be resolved. They are the normal 

sorts of things, we believe, that would be resolved in the licensing 

process. 

Mr. MARKEY. Do you intend on submitting the application before 

resolving the hundreds of——

Mr. ABRAHAM. No, we will be resolving them in the period of 

time ahead. We would expect, as I testified before, to submit the 

application formally probably in the end of the year 2004. 

Mr. MARKEY. Will it be before or after all environmental questions from the NRC are answered? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We will address those which are appropriate in a 

licensing application and then after that, of course——

Mr. MARKEY. No, will you answer all of the environmental questions the NRC raises before you submit the license? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We will answer all those that are appropriate to 

a licensing application. 

Mr. MARKEY. So the answer is no, you are not going to answer 

all of the——

179

Mr. ABRAHAM. I don’t know that there are any that won’t be answered. 

Mr. MARKEY. You’re saying that you are going to decide which 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety questions you’re going to 

answer and you’re going to determine which ones you’re going to 

answer. Is that correct? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. The fact is that we will submit an appropriate license——

Mr. MARKEY. I understand that. Will you answer all of the safety 

and health and environmental issues which the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission asks you to resolve before you submit an application? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We will answer all of those that are appropriate——

Mr. MARKEY. I appreciate that. That’s what we’re afraid of. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. No, it’s not. I think, Congressman, that you’re 

standing the procedure on its head. I mean there is no requirement, nor would there be legitimately one in which we would address every issue that’s part of the licensing, open licensing process 

unless we want to deny the public an opportunity to participate in 

the licensing process that we would answer every single contention 

before we engaged in that open process. Now if you want a closed 

process that doesn’t include the public, we could go down that 

route. Our choice is to make it a more public approach. And that’s 

what we intend to do. 

Mr. MARKEY. Well, I don’t think that’s what I’m hearing from 

you. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. All right, let me just calm your concerns. We will 

answer all questions. 

Mr. MARKEY. Excellent answer. Now the next one I want to 

make is I think we should be abundantly clear to the American 

public that spent fuel needs 5 years to cool down as it sits next to 

nuclear power plants, so that every American who lives near a nuclear power plant who things that all of the nuclear waste is going 

to be removed from their nuclear power plants and they won’t have 

it outside their plants any more should know that for 5 years after 

all spent fuel is created, it has to sit next to the plant. So as long 

as nuclear power plants are in operation, all of those plants are 

going to have, for at least 5 years, spent fuel sitting next to them, 

is that true? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Yes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Yes. So this is not going to be any permanent solution. There is going to be an on-going risk in communities that the 

nuclear waste——

Mr. ABRAHAM. I would note, though, in just one final comment, 

that we already have a number of facilities that are no longer in 

operation where spent fuel is sitting now and could be moved as 

we close down those facilities. Failing to go ahead with this process——

Mr. MARKEY. Are you bumping them up in the priority list so 

they handled first? 

Mr. ABRAHAM. We will make a decision later. 

Mr. MARKEY. So you’re creating a problem and you can’t solve it, 

but you’re not——

180

Mr. SHIMKUS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has more than 

expired. Thank you. Because of my great admiration for my friend 

of Massachusetts, I do not want you to miss your vote on the floor, 

so be expeditious and move rapidly and with that, Mr. Secretary, 

we want to thank you for coming. 

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. We’re going to recess the hearing until 1 o’clock 

p.m. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. BARTON. If the subcommittee will come to order. As soon as 

we get our third panel assembled, we’ll reconvene the hearing. We 

have our Commissioner here and we have Ms. Jones here and Dr. 

Cohon here. Mr. Holmstead. And here he comes, looking very serious. 

The subcommittee will come back to order. We’re now going to 

hear from Panel III. We have the Commissioner of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, the Honorable Greta Dicus. We have the 

Chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Dr. 

Cohon. We have the Assistant Administrative for Air and Radiation 

for the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Honorable Jeffrey Holmstead. And we have the Director of the Natural 

Resources Environment Team at the U.S. General Accounting Office, Ms. Gary Jones. 

The Chair is going to recognize Congressman Doyle to make an 

introduction and then we’ll hear from our panel. 

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me 

the opportunity to introduce Dr. Jared Cohon. Since becoming a 

member of this subcommittee, I’ve had the pleasure of introducing 

a number of distinguished individuals from Pennsylvania, specifically from the Pittsburgh to my colleagues and in that regard, I 

want to compliment the chairman for recognizing the region’s highly skilled individuals from academia, the research community and 

industry who are concerned about energy issues and are actively 

involved in shaping solutions and developing new opportunities. 

Dr. Cohon was appointed to the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board in 1995 and was appointed chairman in 1997. Dr. 

Cohon is President of Carnegie Mellon University and I’ve had the 

pleasure of knowing Dr. Cohon in this capacity since 1997. Dr. 

Cohon, who is a registered professional engineer has more than 25 

years of teaching experience, is widely published and has been recognized with numerous prestigious engineering awards and Mr. 

Chairman, I am proud to report that most recently he was named 

Pittsburgher of the year, a very prestigious award in our part of 

the country. 

Mr. BARTON. Is that Pittsburgh, Texas? 

Mr. DOYLE. That’s Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. That’s with an H on 

the end. 

Mr. BARTON. If it’s Pittsburg, Texas, that would be something. I 

think that’s in Congressman Hall’s district. 

Mr. DOYLE. His research interest focused on multi-objective programming, a technique for decisionmaking in situations with multiple conflicting objectives. He’s also focused on water resource 

planning and management in the United States, South America 

and Asia and on energy facilities siting including nuclear waste 

181

shipping and storage. He began his teaching career at Johns Hopkins and went on to become Dean of Yale University’s School of 

Forestry and Environmental Studies. But I’m most pleased that he 

currently serves as President of Carnegie Mellon. He is a shining 

star in the Pittsburgh Region and I’m proud to call him my friend. 

Mr. Chairman, it’s my pleasure to introduce Dr. Jared Cohon. 

Mr. BARTON. It’s an excellent introduction and Dr. Cohon, we’re 

delighted to have you before the subcommittee. 

Mr. COHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Congressman Doyle. Do I have any time left? 

Mr. BARTON. Well, we won’t take that time away from you. My 

guess is he’s going to ask you to do something back in Pittsburgh. 

Mr. COHON. That was a very generous introduction and much appreciated, thank you very much. 

Mr. BARTON. We’re going to start with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There is a small protocol. We’re 

going to go with Commissioner Dicus and then the Assistant Secretary for Air and Radiation, I’ve probably got that wrong. Assistant Administration for Air and Radiation, Mr. Holmstead, and then 

you, Dr. Cohon, and then you, Ms. Jones. Commissioner Dicus, 

you’re welcome, your statement is int he record. We recognize you 

to elaborate on it for 7 minutes. 

STATEMENTS OF HON. GRETA JOY DICUS, COMMISSIONER, 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; HON. JEFFREY R. 

HOLMSTEAD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; 

JARED L. COHON, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL 

REVIEW BOARD; AND GARY JONES, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Ms. DICUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly members of 

the subcommittee. Dr. Richard Meserve, the Chairman of the NRC 

is on travel on a previous commitment. He sends his regrets he is 

not here. In his absence he designated me as Acting Chairman, so 

I’m very pleased to join you to testify on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning the NRC’s regulatory oversight role 

in the U.S. program for management and disposal of high level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. If the President’s recommendation becomes a final decision, several important steps 

must be taken before the Commission can decide whether or not to 

authorize construction of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain. 

First, DOE must submit a high quality application. Second, our 

staff at the NRC must conduct an independent safety review and 

issue a safety evaluation report. And third, we must conduct a full 

and fair public hearing on the DOE application. Only after these 

steps are complete will the NRC be in a position to determine 

based on all of the information before us, whether the DOE’s license application complies with our regulations. 

Last November, the NRC promulgated the Health and Safety 

Regulations that will guide any licensing decision on Yucca Mountain. As directed by Congress, our regulations are consistent with 

the dose-based environmental standards that have been established 

by the EPA. In forwarding his recommendation to the President, 

182

Secretary Abraham included the Commission’s preliminary comments on DOE’s examination of Yucca Mountain. In offering these 

comments, the NRC drew no conclusions about the suitability of 

Yucca Mountain site. Rather, we commented on whether sufficient 

information will exist to begin a potential licensing review if DOE 

submits an application. 

The DOE and the NRC have reached and documented numerous 

agreements regarding additional information and have discussed 

the quality of information that will be needed for a licensing review 

should that happen. In addition, NRC provided comments to DOE 

on the final environmental impact statement that was forwarded to 

the President. 

The NRC staff recently published a draft of the review plan for 

public comment. As our preparation for possible licensing progresses, NRC will continue to conduct public, technical exchanges 

between members of the NRC and DOE technical staffs and with 

the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. 

Federal regulation of spent fuel transportation safety is shared 

by the U.S. Department of Transportation, the DOT and the NRC. 

DOT regulates the transport of all hazardous materials including 

spent fuel and has established regulations for shippers and carriers 

regarding radiological controls, hazard communication, training 

and other aspects. For its part, the NRC establishes design standards for the cask used to transport license spent fuel and we review 

and certify cask designs prior to their use. Further, cask design, 

fabrication, use and maintenance activities must be conducted 

under an NRC approved quality assurance program. NRC also conduct an inspection and enforcement program and reviews and approves physical security plans for spent fuel shipments. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE to utilize NRC certified casks for spent fuel shipments to a repository; follow NRC’s 

advanced notification requirements; and to provide emergency response training along shipments routes. The NRC believes the safety protection provided by the current transportation regulatory system is well established. Nonetheless, we continually examine the 

transportation safety program. For example, over two years ago, 

the NRC began the package performance study to study cask performance under severe impact and fire accident conditions. The 

study plan calls for full-scale testing of a cask to confirm computer 

models of cask response to severe accident conditions. The NRC is 

also supporting several other studies that I did discuss in my full 

statement. 

The NRC plans to utilize the results of these studies as input 

into its rather comprehensive review of security in light of the 

events of September 11 and Mr. Chairman, that completes my 

statement. At the appropriate time, I’d be pleased to, of course, answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Greta Joy Dicus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GRETA J. DICUS, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to join you to testify 

on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning the NRC’s regulatory oversight role in the U.S. program for management and disposal of high-level 

radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. 

183

The Commission believes that a permanent geologic repository can provide the appropriate means for the United States to manage spent nuclear fuel and other highlevel radioactive waste in a safe manner. We also believe that public health and 

safety, the environment, and the common defense and security can be protected by 

deep underground disposal of these wastes. However, the Commission takes no position on whether such a repository should be located at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

Our views on that question must be shaped by the results of the Congressionally 

mandated licensing process. 

As you know, Congress provided in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) 

and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that the NRC would serve as an independent 

regulator to ensure that any repository adequately protects the public health and 

safety and the environment. I am pleased to state that the NRC has consistently 

met the obligations established by these Acts. We are now in the midst of preparations for an important transition—from the pre-licensing role defined for NRC in 

statute, to the role of regulator and licensing authority—if a decision is made to authorize the Department of Energy (DOE) to submit a license application for Yucca 

Mountain. 

THE PRESIDENT’S RECOMMENDATION

As you know, just weeks ago, President Bush accepted the Secretary of Energy’s 

recommendation that the Yucca Mountain site be developed as a potential repository for the disposal of high-level nuclear wastes and spent nuclear fuel. Also, on 

April 8th, Governor Kenny Guinn of Nevada provided the Congress with the State’s 

‘‘Notice of Disapproval of the Proposed Yucca Mountain Project.’’ The President’s 

recommendation will become a final decision if, within 90 calendar days of continuous session, Congress approves a resolution of siting approval. If the President’s 

recommendation becomes a final decision, it represents a determination that DOE 

may apply to the NRC for a construction authorization. If that is the case, several 

important steps must be taken before the Commission can decide whether to authorize construction of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain. First, DOE must submit a high-quality application. Second, our staff at the NRC must conduct an independent safety review and issue a safety evaluation report. Third, we must conduct 

a full and fair public hearing on the DOE application. Only after these steps are 

complete, will NRC be in a position to determine whether the DOE’s license application complies with NRC regulations. Our decision will be based on the information 

before us at that time. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides that it is NRC’s responsibility to establish 

licensing criteria for a potential repository, to provide our preliminary views on the 

sufficiency of certain DOE information collected during site characterization, and to 

comment, along with other federal agencies, on the Environmental Impact Statement prepared by DOE for Yucca Mountain. It is also the Commission’s obligation 

to be prepared to make a fair, informed, and timely licensing decision, if the Congress should approve the President’s recommendation. I will discuss each of these 

activities in turn. 

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

was given the responsibility for establishing dose-based environmental standards for 

Yucca Mountain. Congress directed EPA to base these standards on the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. The NRC was directed to modify its regulations to be consistent with final EPA standards within one year of their 

issuance. Because of the short period given to NRC to issue final implementing regulations, the Commission initiated its own rulemaking in parallel with that of the 

EPA. 

Immediately upon publishing our proposed regulations at 10 C.F.R. Part 63 for 

public comment in February 1999, our staff embarked on a series of public meetings 

to encourage involvement by members of the public in Nevada. From these meetings, together with written submittals, we received more than 1000 comments on 

our proposed criteria. The Commission carefully considered and analyzed these comments, and last November promulgated the health and safety regulations that will 

guide any licensing decision on Yucca Mountain. Our regulations are consistent with 

the health and safety standards established by the EPA. We are confident that any 

repository that can be shown by DOE to comply with these demanding standards 

and regulations will protect the people living near the proposed repository today and 

in the future. 

184

DOE’S COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

In forwarding his recommendation to the President, Secretary Abraham included 

the Commission’s preliminary comments on DOE’s examination of Yucca Mountain. 

As required by the NWPA, our comments addressed ‘‘. . . the extent to which the atdepth site characterization analysis and waste form proposal... seem to be sufficient 

for inclusion in [a license application to the NRC].’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1)(E). In 

offering these comments, the NRC drew no conclusions about the suitability of the 

Yucca Mountain site. Rather, we commented on whether sufficient information will 

exist to begin a potential licensing review, if the President’s recommendation becomes a final decision and if DOE submits an application. To evaluate the adequacy 

of DOE’s information for this purpose, the NRC staff reviewed all major program 

documents for Yucca Mountain, as well as the available supporting technical documents. Our staff’s reviews of DOE’s program documents and technical material were 

performed over many years of extensive pre-licensing interactions with DOE staff 

and various stakeholders, including the State of Nevada, Indian Tribes, affected 

units of local government, representatives of the nuclear industry, and interested 

members of the public. 

Based on our technical reviews and pre-licensing interactions, we believe that sufficient information can be available at the time of a license application. The DOE 

and NRC have reached and documented numerous agreements regarding additional 

information that will be needed for a licensing review. Approximately two-thirds of 

these agreements call for DOE to document the bases for assumptions or conclusions. The remainder oblige DOE to perform specific tests or analyses, to document 

prior tests or studies, or to provide other information. As DOE completes the actions 

necessary to fulfill these agreements, NRC will review the results promptly and notify DOE of our findings. Based on these agreements, we are confident that DOE 

can assemble the information necessary for an application that NRC can accept for 

review. 

It is important to note that NRC is as concerned about the quality of documentation supporting the recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site as about the quantity of information. Over the course of our pre-licensing interactions we have discussed with DOE the need to verify the quality of the documents it has generated 

to support the site recommendation. We are aware that DOE performed extensive 

reviews of this documentation, including dedicated reviews to determine the root 

causes of any errors. We acknowledge DOE’s intention to qualify all data, software, 

and models fully if they are to be used to support a license application. Quality 

management continues to be a challenging program area for DOE, one which the 

NRC staff routinely monitors. 

DOE’S FINAL ENVIRONMENT IMPACT STATEMENT

As required by the NWPA, Secretary Abraham included a final Environmental 

Impact Statement (EIS) with his recommendation to the President along with the 

comments agencies on the final EIS, including those of NRC. Our comments were 

developed on the basis of reviews of DOE’s draft EIS for Yucca Mountain, the supplement to the draft EIS and the final EIS. Like the sufficiency comments I discussed earlier, our reviews were supported and informed by extensive pre-licensing 

interactions with DOE, the State of Nevada, Indian Tribes, affected units of local 

government, representatives of the nuclear industry, and interested members of the 

public. 

As a result of our reviews, we believe that the final EIS contains sufficient information about the environmental impacts of the proposed action to provide a foundation for a site recommendation. The analyses provided in the EIS appear to bound 

appropriately the range of environmental impacts. We expect that DOE’s commitment to refine the repository design and define transportation modes and routes will 

allow for more precise estimates of impacts and possibly result in future revisions 

to the National Environmental Policy Act analyses. We expect that any such additional reviews will be completed in support of a license application. If the President’s recommendation becomes a final decision, NRC will, of course, continue interactions with DOE and other interested stakeholders, to resolve outstanding technical and environmental issues, as needed. 

NRC PREPARATIONS FOR LICENSING

As part of our overall pre-licensing strategy, our staff has applied the experience 

gained in the reviews of DOE documents and pre-licensing interactions to the preparation of a Yucca Mountain review plan that will eventually guide the NRC’s review 

of any license application. The NRC staff recently published a draft of the review 

185

plan for public comment. As our preparation for possible licensing progresses, NRC 

will continue to conduct public technical exchanges between members of the NRC 

and DOE technical staffs and with NRC’s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. 

In addition, our Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel has begun to evaluate 

hearing-related aspects, including location, and the development of the automation 

tools necessary to meet the time restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act. These activities include development of an electronic hearing docket to expedite 

a possible hearing and completion of an Internet-based Licensing Support Network 

(LSN) that will provide access to all the key documents. Noting delays in entering 

key licensing documents due to security concerns after the events of September 11, 

it is important that DOE, which is the stakeholder with the most documents, enters 

its documents into the system as soon as possible. The NRC staff also is working 

to provide guidance to DOE on developing an electronic High Level Waste repository 

license application. 

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF SPENT FUEL TRANSPORTATION

Federal regulation of spent fuel transportation safety is shared by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the NRC. DOT regulates the transport of all 

hazardous materials, including spent fuel, and has established regulations for shippers and carriers regarding radiological controls, hazard communication, training, 

and other aspects. For its part, NRC establishes design standards for the casks used 

to transport licensed spent fuel, and reviews and certifies cask designs prior to their 

use. Further, cask design, fabrication, use and maintenance activities must be conducted under an NRC-approved Quality Assurance program. 

NRC also conducts an inspection and enforcement program, and reviews and approves physical security plans for spent fuel shipments. These plans provide information on how shippers and carriers comply with NRC spent fuel shipment protection requirements, including advance notification of each shipment to Governors, the 

establishment of redundant communication capability with the shipment vehicle, 

the arrangement of law enforcement contacts along the route, and provision of shipment escorts. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE to utilize NRC-certified casks for 

spent fuel shipments to a repository, follow NRC’s advance notification requirements, and to provide emergency response training along shipment routes. NRC has 

reviewed and certified a number of package designs intended to be used for transport of spent fuel to a repository, and has additional designs under review. 

The NRC believes the safety protection provided by the current transportation 

regulatory system is well established. Nonetheless, we continually examine the 

transportation safety program. In FY 2000, NRC reevaluated its generic assessment 

of spent fuel transportation risks to account for the fuel, cask and shipment characteristics likely to be encountered in future repository shipping campaigns. Over two 

years ago, NRC began the Package Performance Study to study cask performance 

under severe impact and fire accident conditions. The study plan calls for full-scale 

testing of a cask to confirm computer models of cask response to severe accident 

conditions. NRC is also supporting a study by the National Academies’ Board on Radioactive Waste Management that will examine radioactive material transportation, 

with a primary focus on spent fuel transport safety. As a part of its evaluation, the 

NRC staff is analyzing appropriate national transportation accidents, such as the 

2001 train accident in Baltimore, Maryland, to determine if lessons learned from 

that event should be included in our transportation requirements or analyses. Finally, NRC is sponsoring a study to update its evaluation of cask response to acts 

of sabotage. NRC plans to utilize the results of these studies as input into its comprehensive review of security in light of the events of September 11. These studies 

should be available at the time possible licensing is being considered. 

CONCLUSION

The Commission believes that deep geologic disposal is appropriate for high-level 

radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel. We take no position, however, on whether 

the site recommendation for a Yucca Mountain repository should be approved. Our 

role is to put in place a licensing system that will ensure adequate protection of 

public health and safety and the environment and to review and evaluate any license application submitted, to ensure its compliance with regulatory requirements. 

As I believe this statement makes clear, we take that obligation very seriously. 

I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Commissioner. 

186

We’d now like to hear from Assistant Secretary Holmstead for 7 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFFREY R. HOLMSTEAD 

Mr. HOLMSTEAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think I’ll 

need my full 7 minutes. As you indicated, I’m Jeffrey Holmstead 

and I currently serve as the Assistant Administrator for Air and 

Radiation at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and I am 

very pleased to be here today to discuss EPA’s role in setting radiation protection standards for the proposed repository at Yucca 

Mountain. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss EPA’s responsibilities related to this important national project. 

EPA’s role and responsibilities in the Federal Government’s establishment of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste are described generally in the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act and more specifically for the Yucca Mountain site in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. These statutes assign EPA the task of developing public health and environmental radiation protection 

standards for the repository. As you’ve already heard earlier today, 

the same statutes assign other roles and responsibilities to other 

government agencies and departments. 

EPA issued its final standards for the Yucca Mountain repository 

on June 13 of last year. These standards, I should point out, were 

developed through extensive consultation with DOE, NRC, the Office of Science and Technology Policy and were the subject of significant public comment. 

As you’ve heard, DOE must address these standards in its license application and NRC may issue a license for the proposed repository only if it determines that DOE has shown that the repository will comply with all the provisions of the EPA standards. EPA 

believes that disposal in compliance with EPA’s stringent standards will be protective of public health and the environment. 

Under EPA standards, DOE must demonstrate compliance with 

three separate provisions. First, an individual protection standard; 

second, a human intrusion standard; and third, standards that are 

specifically intended to protect groundwater as a natural resource. 

The individual protection standard is the core element of EPA’s 

regulation. It is the most basic measure of how well the repository 

will operate. 

To meet this standard, DOE must demonstrate that the reasonably maximally exposed individual or the RMEI, as we call it, will 

not receive an annual dose of radiation about 15 millirem from all 

exposure pathways combined. The RMEI is a typical individual 

whose location and lifestyle would place him or her among the 

most highly exposed members of the population. Although NAS recommended using something called a critical group approach, it has 

also agreed that EPA’s approach was ‘‘broadly consistent with its 

recommendation.’’

We strongly believe that this approach is preferable to 

hypothesizing unrealistic scenarios to protect those whose lifestyles 

may lead to unusually high exposures and that this approach is 

consistent with NAS’ recommendation to use ‘‘cautious, but reasonable assumptions.’’

187

The human intrusion standard accounts for the possibility that 

future, human activity could compromise the integrity of the repository and cause releases of radioactive material. NAS found that 

there is no credible means of predicting whether, when or how 

often such an intrusion might occur at Yucca Mountain, so analyzing a simple event to determine how well the repository responds would be appropriate according to the NAS. 

In accordance with this recommendation, EPA’s human intrusion 

standards require DOE to meet the same RMEI standard as in the 

individual protection analysis. 

Finally, EPA adopted a separate groundwater protection standard because it is long standing agency policy to protect groundwater as a natural resource, particularly where that resource is either a significant current resource or likely future source of drinking water. This is particularly important in arid regions such as 

southern Nevada where groundwater is scarce and precious and 

cleaning up the aquifer would be challenging and costly. Therefore, 

EPA’s standards for Yucca Mountain require DOE to meet very 

stringent groundwater limits that are consistent with EPA’s radiation standards for drinking water. 

Although EPA’s statutory role was complete with the issuance of 

its final standards, it continues to be involved in many of the ongoing activities. First of course, EPA is defending its standard in 

court against challenges brought by several parties. EPA has also 

reviewed and provided comment on NRC’s licensing requirements 

for the Yucca Mountain repository, DOE’s site evaluation guidelines and DOE’s draft, supplemental and final environmental impact statements. EPA is currently reviewing NRC’s draft Yucca 

Mountain review plan and we also plan to comment throughout the 

licensing process as appropriate. 

EPA also expects to review DOE’s plant for transportation, even 

though the selection of transportation modes and routes is DOE’s 

responsibility. 

Finally, EPA continues to receive and respond to questions from 

the public, not only about EPA standards, but on the other repository-related activities that I’ve mentioned before. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today before the 

subcommittee to present EPA’s views. This concludes my statement 

and I would also be happy to address any questions you may have 

at the appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeffrey R. Holmstead follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY HOLMSTEAD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIR

AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Good morning. My name is Jeffrey Holmstead and I currently serve as the Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss EPA’s role in setting public health and environmental radiation 

protection standards for the proposed spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss EPA’s responsibilities related to this important national project. 

INTRODUCTION

EPA’s roles and responsibilities in the federal government’s establishment of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste are described generally in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and more specifically for the Yucca MounVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
188

tain site in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. These statutes assign EPA the task of 

developing public health and environmental radiation protection standards for the 

repository. These same statutes assign other roles and responsibilities to other governmental entities. The Department of Energy (DOE) has the responsibility to determine whether the site is suitable for a repository; The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the responsibility to review DOE’s application for a license for 

the repository; and Congress has the responsibility for final approval or denial of 

DOE’s suitability recommendation. EPA issued its final standards for the Yucca 

Mountain repository on June 13, 2001 (40 CFR 197). These standards were developed through extensive consultation with DOE, NRC, the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy, and were the subject of significant public comment. DOE must 

address these standards in its license application. NRC may issue a license only if 

it determines that DOE demonstrates a reasonable expectation that the repository 

will comply with all provisions of the EPA standards. EPA believes that disposal 

in compliance with the EPA standards will be fully protective of public health and 

the environment. In fact, EPA’s standards are both implementable and among the 

most stringent in the world. 

NAS REPORT

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 also directed EPA to contract with the National 

Academy of Sciences to provide findings and recommendations on reasonable public 

health and safety standards for establishing a repository for spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste. NAS issued its report in 1995. I will refer to the NAS 

report as I discuss the EPA standards further. NAS has provided formal comments 

to EPA stating that our standards for Yucca Mountain are generally consistent with 

the NAS recommendations. 

OVERVIEW OF EPA STANDARDS

Under EPA’s standards, DOE must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of compliance with three separate provisions: an individual-protection standard, a human 

intrusion standard, and standards that are specifically intended to protect ground 

water as a natural resource. 

The Individual Protection Standard is the core element of EPA’s regulation. It is 

the most basic measure of how well the repository will operate. To meet this standard, DOE must demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the ‘‘Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual,’’ or RMEI, will not incur an annual dose of radiation 

above 15 millirem, from all exposure pathways combined. The RMEI is a typical individual whose location and lifestyle would place him among the most highly, but 

not necessarily the highest, exposed members of the population. (Although NAS recommended using a ‘‘critical group’’ approach, it agreed that EPA’s approach was 

‘‘broadly consistent’’ with its recommendation.) EPA’s view is that, by meeting the 

standard for the RMEI, public health and safety, including the health and safety 

of those living in the immediate vicinity of Yucca Mountain, will be protected now 

and for future generations. This approach is preferable to postulating unrealistic 

scenarios to protect hypothetical individuals for whom lifestyles could be constructed 

that might lead to unusually high exposures, and thus is consistent with the NAS 

recommendation to use ‘‘cautious, but reasonable’’ assumptions. 

The Human Intrusion Standard accounts for the possibility that future human activity could compromise the integrity of the repository and cause releases of radioactive material. NAS found that there is no credible means of predicting whether, 

when, or how often such an intrusion might occur at Yucca Mountain, so analyzing 

a simple event to determine how well the repository responds would be appropriate. 

In accordance with the NAS recommendation, EPA’s Human Intrusion Standards 

requires DOE to meet the same RMEI standard as in the individual-protection analysis. 

EPA adopted separate ground-water protection standards because it is long-standing Agency policy to protect ground water as a natural resource, especially when 

that resource is a source of drinking water. EPA believes that ground water should 

be protected to ensure that the Nation’s drinking water resources do not present adverse health risks and are preserved for present and future generations. This is particularly important in arid regions, such as southern Nevada, where ground water 

is precious, and cleaning up the aquifer would be challenging and costly. Therefore, 

EPA’s standards require DOE to demonstrate that ground water will not be radioactively contaminated above certain standards, which are consistent with EPA’s radiation standards for drinking water. 

To determine the location where the three basic provisions of EPA’s disposal 

standards must be met, EPA’s standards set the point of compliance south of the 

189

repository at the Nevada Test Site boundary, about 18 kilometers (11 miles) from 

the repository. EPA used regional ground water flow patterns, current population 

patterns, and near-term local plans, to identify this location and to calculate potential exposure scenarios. EPA’s standards apply at the location outside this boundary 

where radionuclide concentrations in ground water could be highest. 

DOE must demonstrate compliance with each of these provisions for a period of 

not less than 10,000 years after disposal. In addition, EPA’s standard requires that 

DOE include analyses showing the performance of the repository after 10,000 years 

in its Environmental Impact Statement, so that the public will have the full record 

before it. 

Finally, although DOE must demonstrate compliance with these standards to the 

NRC, EPA recognizes that absolute proof in the conventional sense will be impossible to attain for analyses extending ten thousand years into the future. Therefore, 

EPA requires that DOE demonstrate a ‘‘reasonable expectation’’ that the standards 

will be met. This standard should not be construed as requiring a less rigorous or 

scientific process. It is simply a recognition that there will inevitably be significant 

uncertainties in projecting the performance of natural and engineered systems over 

very long time periods, and that these uncertainties must be understood and managed accordingly. 

EPA’S ROLE NOW THAT THE STANDARD IS COMPLETE

Although EPA’s statutory role was complete with the issuance of its final standards, it continues to be involved in many of the ongoing activities of other agencies. 

First, EPA is defending its standard in court against challenges brought by several 

parties. EPA has also reviewed and provided comment on NRC’s licensing requirements for the Yucca Mountain repository, DOE’s site evaluation guidelines, and 

DOE’s Draft, Supplemental, and Final Environmental Impact Statements. EPA is 

currently reviewing NRC’s draft Yucca Mountain Review Plan, and plans to comment as appropriate. EPA also expects to review DOE’s evolving plans for transportation, though the selection of transportation modes and routes is DOE’s responsibility. Finally, EPA continues to receive and respond to questions from the public, 

not only on EPA’s standards, but on the other repository-related activities listed 

above. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today before the Subcommittee to 

present the EPA’s views. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to address any questions that you may have.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, sir. 

Now we’re going to hear from Dr. Cohon and we’ll give you 2 

minutes since the introduction took about 5. 

You’re recognized for 7 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JARED L. COHON 

Mr. COHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for being 

over eager before and my thanks again to Congressman Doyle for 

that wonderful introduction. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like my full statement to be included in the record and I will summarize. 

Mr. BARTON. Without—I should have said that. All the written 

statements are in the record in their entirety without objection. 

Mr. COHON. Thank you very much. Congress created the Nuclear 

Waste Technical Review Board in the 1987 Act which amended the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act. In that Act, in creating the Board, the 

law provides that our members will be appointed by the President 

based on a list provided by the National Academy of Sciences. As 

you heard from Congressman Doyle, I also serve as President of a 

major university in Pittsburgh. All of our members, similarly, are 

engaged in other professions and serve on this Board in a part-time 

capacity. 

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence because some of my colleagues from the Board are with us today, I’d like to tell you their 

names and ask them just to rise and we’ll be very brief. 

190

Mr. BARTON. We’d be honored to recognize them. 

Mr. COHON. Thank you. Daniel Bullen. Dan, would you stand? 

Mr. BARTON. He’s standing. Let the record show, he’s standing. 

Mr. COHON. Dr. Bullen is a professor at Iowa State University. 

Paul Craig, Dr. Craig is Professor Emeritus at University of California-Davis. 

Debra Knopman is a Senior Scientist at the RAND Corporation, 

a former scientist at U.S. Geological Survey. 

We’re also assisted by a wonderful staff and I’d like to introduce 

Bill Barnard, the Executive Director. Bill, if you’d stand. 

Mr. BARTON. He’s making a face behind your back. 

Mr. COHON. Well, I’d like them all to stand so that we can at 

least acknowledge them. 

Mr. BARTON. They all did stand and they’re very welcome in the 

hearing. 

Mr. COHON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, our Board was created specifically to provide on-going advice 

to Congress and the Secretary, especially with regard to the scientific and technical aspects of the Yucca Mountain project. Indeed, 

this is just what the Board has done since its creation in 1987. 

As part of that on-going advice and on-going study of the Yucca 

Mountain project, we submitted a letter to the Secretary and to 

Congress on January 24 providing our comments on the Secretary’s 

recommendation for Yucca Mountain. 

We reviewed in great detail the various aspects of that project. 

Overall, taken as a whole, we found that the technical basis for the 

DOE’s repository performance estimates is weak to moderate at 

this time. We pointed out in that letter and I will point out now 

the Board has made and makes no judgment on whether the site 

should be recommended or approved. We recognize that that is a 

judgment for policymakers who quite appropriately have to factor 

into their decision policy considerations that are beyond the technical and scientific issues that the Board deals with. 

A key aspect of that decisionmaking is the degree of uncertainty, 

technical uncertainty Congress and other policymakers are prepared to accept. 

DOE’s estimates of the performance of the Yucca Mountain repository are based primarily on a complicated model called the 

Total System Performance Assessment or TSPA for short. This is 

a method the Board endorses. It’s a very good method. It’s especially useful because it takes a systems view of the problem, that 

is, it looks at the entire repository system, not just one part of it 

and we think that is appropriate. 

While at this point no individual technical or scientific factor has 

been identified that would automatically eliminate Yucca Mountain 

from consideration, uncertainties due to gaps in data and basic understanding result in the Board having limited confidence in current performance estimates that are the products of the DOE TSPA 

model. 

We believe, as a Board, that confidence in performance estimates 

can be increased and we lay out in our letter report several specific 

things that we recommend DOE continue to pursue specifically to 

increase confidence. We recommend continued scientific study, specifically to create a better basic understanding of Yucca Mountain 

191

as a system, not just as a modeling exercise, not just to show compliance, but basic understanding of the system. We point out that 

high temperatures in the base case repository design increase uncertainties in estimates of the performance of the repository and 

therefore decrease confidence in the performance of the waste package materials, in particular. 

Considering a low temperature design is something we recommend that DOE do. And it may, they might find that it reduces 

uncertainties and it would be worth pursuing. 

We’ve also recommended several other things that we think DOE 

can and should pursue to reduce uncertainties and increase confidence. We’ve indicated before that it’s very important that uncertainties be identified, appropriately quantified and appropriately 

communicated to all of those who need that information; that DOE 

seek other supporting material other than TSPA as a way to make 

their case at Yucca Mountain is likely to work as predicted; and 

that defense-in-depth, the idea that if one part fails, one part of the 

system fails, another part won’t, these arguments need to be further developed. 

These and other activities, we believe, would increase confidence 

in DOE’s estimates of the performance of a Yucca Mountain repository. 

As we pointed out in the past and I want to emphasize now, it 

is not possible, ever, to reduce all of the technical uncertainty at 

Yucca Mountain or at any other proposed repository site. It is the 

policymaker’s role, your role, to decide how much uncertainty is acceptable at the time that you make your decision. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d be happy to respond to questions 

at the appropriate time. 

[The prepared statement of Jared L. Cohon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JARED L. COHON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE

TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am Jared 

Cohon, Chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. All members of the 

Board are appointed by the President and serve on a part-time basis. In my case, 

I also am president of Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

I am pleased to be here today to present the Board’s technical and scientific evaluation of the Department of Energy’s work related to the recommendation of a site 

at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the location of a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The Board hopes that the Subcommittee 

and other policy-makers will find its technical and scientific evaluation useful as 

you consider the various issues that will affect a decision on whether to proceed 

with repository development. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize the Board’s findings, and I request that my full statement and the Board’s January 24, 2002, letter report to Congress and the Secretary be included in the hearing record. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, Congress created the Board in the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Congress charged the Board with performing an ongoing independent evaluation of the technical and scientific validity 

of activities undertaken by the Secretary of Energy related to disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The Board also reviews the DOE’s activities related to transporting and packaging such waste. Since the Board was established, its primary focus has been the DOE’s efforts to characterize a site at Yucca 

Mountain in Nevada to determine its suitability as the location of a potential repository. 

Early last year, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham indicated that he would 

make a decision at the end of 2001 on whether to recommend the Yucca Mountain 

site for repository development. As the Secretary’s decision approached, the Board 

decided it was important to comment to the Secretary and Congress, within the conVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00195 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
192

text of the Board’s ongoing evaluation of the technical and scientific validity of DOE 

activities, on the DOE’s work related to a site recommendation. So, in November 

2001, the Board met to review comprehensively the DOE’s efforts in this area. In 

December 2001, the Board sent a letter to the Secretary indicating that the Board 

would provide its comments within a few weeks. The Board conveyed those comments in a letter, which included attachments with supporting details, that was 

sent to Congress and the Secretary on January 24, 2002. 

I will now summarize the Board’s review procedures and the results of the 

Board’s evaluation. 

The Board’s evaluation represents the collective judgment of its members and was 

based on the following:

• The results of the Board’s ongoing review of the DOE’s Yucca Mountain technical 

and scientific investigations since the Board’s inception 

• An evaluation of the DOE’s work on the natural and engineered components of 

the proposed repository system, using a list of technical questions identified by 

the Board 

• A comprehensive Board review of draft and final documents supplied by the DOE 

through mid-November 2001

• Field observations by Board members at Yucca Mountain and related sites. 

To focus its review, the Board considered the following 10 questions for components of the repository system and for the disruptive-event scenarios:

1. Do the models used to generate input to the total system performance assessment 

(TSPA) and the representations of processes and linkages or relationships 

among processes within TSPA have a sound basis? 

2. Have uncertainties and conservatisms in the analyses been identified, quantified, 

and described accurately and meaningfully? 

3. Have sufficient data and observations been gathered using appropriate methodologies? 

4. Have assumptions and expert judgments, including bounding estimates, been documented and justified? 

5. Have model predictions been verified or tested? 

6. Have available data that could challenge prevailing interpretations been collected 

and evaluated? 

7. Have alternative conceptual models and model abstractions been evaluated, and 

have the bases for accepting preferred models been documented? 

8. Are the bases for extrapolating data over long times or distances scientifically 

valid? 

9. Can the repository and waste package designs be implemented so that the engineered and natural barriers perform as expected? 

10. To the extent practical, have other lines of evidence, derived independently of 

performance assessments, been used to evaluate confidence in model estimates? 

In evaluating the DOE’s work related to individual natural and engineered components of the proposed repository system, the Board found varying degrees of 

strength and weakness. For example, the Board considers the DOE’s estimates of 

the probabilities of volcanic events and earthquakes at Yucca Mountain strengths, 

while the lack of data related to corrosion of materials proposed for the waste packages under conditions that would likely be present in the repository and the very 

short experience with these materials are considered weaknesses. 

This kind of variability is not surprising, given that the Yucca Mountain project 

is a complex, and in many respects, a first-of-a-kind undertaking. An important conclusion in the Board’s letter is that when the DOE’s technical and scientific work 

is taken as a whole, the Board’s view is that the technical basis for the DOE’s repository performance estimates is weak to moderate at this time. 

The Board made no judgment in its January 24 letter on the question of whether 

the Yucca Mountain site should be recommended or approved for repository development. Those judgments, which involve a number of public-policy considerations as 

well as an assessment of how much technical certainty is necessary at various decision points, go beyond the Board’s congressionally established mandate. 

Let me explain in a little more detail, Mr. Chairman, the bases for the Board’s 

conclusion on performance estimates. The DOE uses a complex, integrated performance assessment model to project repository system performance. Performance assessment is a useful tool because it assesses how well the repository system as a 

whole, not just the site or the engineered components, might perform. However, 

gaps in data and basic understanding cause important uncertainties in the concepts 

and assumptions on which the DOE’s performance estimates are now based. Therefore, while no individual technical or scientific factor has been identified that would 

automatically eliminate Yucca Mountain from consideration at this point, the Board 

193

has limited confidence in current performance estimates generated by the DOE’s 

performance assessment model. As I will discuss in just a moment, the Board believes that confidence in the DOE’s projections of repository performance can be increased. 

But first let me clarify the comment I just made on the current state of knowledge 

of technical and scientific factors that could potentially eliminate Yucca Mountain 

from consideration. The Board considers the very precise statement in its letter that 

at this point, no individual technical or scientific factor has been identified that 

would automatically eliminate Yucca Mountain from consideration a necessary condition for a discussion of site suitability to take place. But this threshold condition, 

by itself, is not necessarily sufficient for a definitive determination of site suitability. 

How can confidence in the DOE’s performance estimates be increased? As noted 

in the Board’s letter, the Board believes that a fundamental understanding of the 

potential behavior of a proposed repository system is very important. Therefore, if 

policy-makers decide to approve the Yucca Mountain site, the Board strongly recommends that, in addition to demonstrating regulatory compliance, the DOE continue a vigorous, well-integrated scientific investigation to increase its fundamental 

understanding of the potential behavior of the repository system. Increased understanding could show that components of the repository system perform better than 

or not as well as the DOE’s performance assessment model now projects. In either 

case, making performance projections more realistic and characterizing the full 

range of uncertainty could increase confidence in the DOE’s performance estimates. 

The DOE’s estimates of repository performance currently rely heavily on engineered components of the repository system, making corrosion of the waste package 

very important. As the Board has mentioned in many of its previous reports and 

letters over the last 11 years, we believe that high temperatures in the DOE’s basecase repository design increase uncertainties and decrease confidence in the performance of waste package materials. It is possible that confidence in waste package 

and repository performance could increase if the DOE adopts a low-temperature repository design. However, the Board continues to believe that the DOE should complete a full and objective comparison of high- and low-temperature repository designs before it selects a final repository design concept. 

Over the last several years, the Board has made several other recommendations 

that could increase confidence in the DOE’s projections of repository performance. 

For example, the Board recommended that the DOE identify, quantify, and communicate clearly the extent of the uncertainty associated with its performance estimates. The Board also recommended that the DOE use other lines of evidence and 

argument to supplement the results of its performance assessment. Moreover, the 

DOE could strengthen its arguments about how multiple barriers in its proposed repository system provide ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ (or redundancy). Although the DOE has 

made progress in each of these areas, more work is needed. 

Other actions that might be considered if policy-makers approve the Yucca Mountain site include systematically integrating new data and analyses produced by ongoing scientific and engineering investigations; monitoring repository performance 

before, during, and after waste emplacement; developing a strategy for modifying or 

stopping repository development if potentially significant unforeseen circumstances 

are encountered; and continuing external review of the DOE’s technical and scientific activities. 

Mr. Chairman, eliminating all uncertainty associated with estimates of repository 

performance would never be possible at any repository site. Policy-makers will decide how much scientific uncertainty is acceptable at the time various decisions are 

made on site recommendation or repository development. The Board hopes that the 

information provided in this testimony and in its letter report to Congress and the 

Secretary will be useful to policy-makers faced with making these important decisions. 

Not surprisingly, Mr. Chairman, people have drawn from the Board’s January 24 

letter the points that support their case. The Board is concerned, however, that lifting individual statements from the letter and using them without context can be 

confusing for policy-makers and the public. Therefore, we urge those charged with 

making decisions about Yucca Mountain to consider the full text of our 3-page letter. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to respond to questions.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Dr. Cohon. 

We’d now like to hear from Ms. Gary Jones with the Natural Resources Environment Team at the GAO. Your statement is in the 

194

record in its entirety and we recognize you for 7 minutes to elaborate on it. 

STATEMENT OF GARY JONES 

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’re pleased to be here 

today to discuss DOE’s project to develop a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. This afternoon, I would like to 

focus on three points. First, DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within the statutory limits that 

would take effect if the site were approved. Second, DOE is unlikely to achieve its goal of opening a repository by 2010; and third, 

DOE needs to reestablish a cost and schedule baseline for the 

project and use the baseline as one of the major tools to manage 

the project. 

The President’s recommendation of Yucca Mountain site to the 

Congress on February 15 triggered specific statutory timeframes 

for the next step in the repository project. On April 8, Nevada disapproved the site, so the Congress has 90 days in continuous session to enact legislation overriding the state’s disapproval. If the 

Congress enacts such legislation, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE to then submit a license application to NRC within 90 

days. Thus, the process gives DOE about 5 to 8 months from the 

date of the President’s recommendation to submit the license application. However, in a September 2001 detailed reassessment of the 

work required to submit a license application that would be acceptable to NRC, DOE’s managing contractor concluded that DOE 

would not be in a position to submit the application to NRC until 

January 2006 or about 4 years from now. This is because DOE has 

entered into 293 agreements with NRC for DOE to collect more scientific data and/or improve it’s technical assessment of the data in 

preparation for a license application that NRC would accept. These 

agreements generally relate to uncertainties about three aspects of 

long-term performance of the proposed repository. One, the expected lifetime of engineered barriers, particularly the waste containers; two, the physical properties of the Yucca Mountain site; 

and three, the supporting information for the mathematical models 

used to evaluate the performance of the plan repository at the site. 

Minimizing uncertainties about the waste containers is especially 

critical because DOE’s estimates that the repository system’s performance depends heavily on the waste containers in addition to 

the natural features of the site. 

According to NRC, as of March 4, 2002, DOE had satisfactorily 

completed work on 38 of these agreements and could resolve another 22 by September 30 of this year. DOE is also continuing to 

address technical issues raised by the Board. As Dr. Cohon noted, 

the Board has consistently raised issues and concerns over DOE’s 

understanding of the expected lifetime of the waste containers, the 

significance of the uncertainties involved in the modeling of the scientific data and the need for an evaluation and comparison of a repository design having a higher temperature with a design having 

a lower temperature. The Board continues to reiterate these concerns. For example, its most recent report on January 24, concluded that when DOE’s technical and scientific work is taken as 

a whole, the technical basis for DOE’s repository performance estiVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00198 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
195

mates is ‘‘weak to moderate’’ at this time. The Board added that 

gaps in data and basic understanding cause important uncertainties in the concepts and assumptions on which DOE’s performance 

estimates are now based, providing the Board with limited confidence in current performance estimates generated by DOE’s performance assessment model. 

The September 2001 contractor reassessment of the technical 

work agreed to with NRC also impacts the goal of opening repository by 2010. Based on that reassessment, a license application 

would not be ready until 2006. According to program estimates, 7 

years would then be needed until the facility was operational, 3 

years to obtain a license and four to construct a facility. This would 

extend the operating date until about 2013. However, even 2013 

may be questionable. A repository at Yucca Mountain would be a 

first of a kind facility, meaning that any schedule projections may 

be optimistic. The contractor’s reassessment said that the proposed 

schedule to reach license application did not include any cost or 

schedule contingencies. Further, a contractor hired by DOE to independently review the estimated costs and schedule for the nuclear 

waste program reported that the 4-year construction period was too 

optimistic and recommended that the construction phase be extended by a year and a half. 

Finally, in its August 2001 report on alternative means for financing and managing the program, DOE stated that unless the 

program’s funding is increased, the budget might become the determining factor whether DOE will be able to accept waste in 2010. 

Because of the uncertainty of opening the Yucca Mountain repository in 2010, DOE is examining alternative approaches that would 

permit it to meet that date, such as storing waste on the surface 

until the capacity to move waste into the repository has been increased. This would be a modular approach where relatively modest size initial surface facilities to handle waste could be expanded 

later to handle larger volumes of waste. 

DOE currently does not have a reliable estimate of when and at 

what cost a license application can be submitted, including the late 

2004 date in its fiscal year 2003 budget request that the Secretary 

mentioned this morning. It also does not have a date when a repository can be opened because DOE stopped using its cost and schedule baselines to manage the site investigation in 1997. At least 

three extensions for the license application date have been proposed and used by DOE in program documents, but none of these 

proposals have been approved as required, nor was the baseline updated to reflect these changes. 

Further, DOE has accepted only the fiscal year 2002 portion of 

the baseline Bechtel proposed in its September 2001 reassessment 

and then directed them to prepare a plan for submitting a license 

application to NRC by December 2004. The contractor has submitted such a plan and it is under review within DOE. 

DOE needs to reestablish a baseline for the repository program 

that accounts for the outstanding technical work needed to prepare 

an acceptable license application and the estimated schedule and 

cost to achieve this milestone. In conjunction, DOE needs to use 

the baseline as a tool for managing the program in accordance with 

196

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: Technical, Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties 

of the Yucca Mountain Repository Project, GAO02191 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2001). 

the Department’s policies and procedures for managing major 

projects. 

Therefore, our December 2001 report on the Yucca Mountain 

project recommended that the Secretary of Energy reestablish the 

baseline to the submission of a license application and follow the 

Department’s management requirements including a formal procedure for changing program milestones. DOE is in the process of establishing a new baseline which should be completed according to 

them by the end of September 2002. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Gary Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY JONES, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND

ENVIRONMENT, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here 

today to discuss the Department of Energy’s (DOE) project to develop a nuclear 

waste repository. As required by law, DOE has been investigating a site at Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada, to determine its suitability for disposing of highly radioactive 

wastes in a mined geologic repository. On February 14, 2002, the secretary of energy 

recommended to the president approval of this site for the development of a nuclear 

waste repository. The next day, the president recommended approval of the site to 

the Congress. The president’s recommendation began a statutory review process for 

the approval or disapproval of the site, including action by the state of Nevada, the 

Congress, DOE, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within specified 

time frames. If the site is approved, DOE must apply to NRC for authorization (a 

license) to construct a repository. If the site is not approved for a license application, 

or if NRC denies a license to construct a repository, the administration and the Congress will have to consider other options for the long-term management of existing 

and future nuclear wastes. 

Our testimony, which is based on our recent report on the Yucca Mountain Repository Project,1 addresses (1) DOE’s readiness to submit a license application within 

the statutory time frame, (2) the extent to which DOE can meet its goal of opening 

a repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010, and (3) the extent to which DOE is managing the project consistent with applicable departmental procedures. 

SUMMARY

DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within 

the statutory limits that would take effect if the site is approved. The president’s recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site to the Congress triggered specific statutory time frames for the next steps in the repository project. Nevada, which had 60 

days from February 15 to disapprove the site, did so on April 8. The Congress now 

has 90 days (of continuous session) from that date in which to enact legislation overriding the state’s disapproval. If the Congress enacts such legislation, the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act requires DOE to then submit a license application to NRC within 

90 days of the effective date of the legislation. Thus, the process gives DOE about 

5 to 8 months from the date of the president’s recommendation to submit the license 

application. However, in a September 2001 detailed reassessment of the work required to submit a license application that would be acceptable to NRC, DOE’s managing contractor concluded that DOE would not be in a position to submit the application to NRC until January 2006, or about 4 years from now. Moreover, while a 

site recommendation and a license application are separate processes, essentially 

the same data are needed for both. Waiting until DOE was closer to having the additional information needed to support an acceptable license application would have 

put DOE in a better position to submit the application within the time frames set 

out in the law, and to respond to questions and challenges that may emanate from 

the statutory review process subsequent to the president’s recommendation. 

DOE is unlikely to achieve its goal of opening a repository at Yucca Mountain by 

2010. On the basis of DOE’s managing contractor’s September 2001 reassessment, 

sufficient time would not be available for DOE to obtain a license from NRC and 

construct enough of the repository to open it in 2010. Another key factor is whether 

DOE will be able to obtain the increases in annual funding that would be required 

197

2The Energy Policy Act of 1992 required EPA to establish specific health and safety standards 

for a repository at Yucca Mountain. 3The acceptance of a license application is not the same as approving an application. A decision to approve or disapprove any application would be made by NRC following extensive review 

and testing. 

to open the repository by 2010. Because of the uncertainty of meeting the 2010 goal, 

DOE is exploring alternative approaches, such as developing surface facilities for 

storing waste at the site until sufficient underground disposal facilities can be constructed. Had DOE elected to defer a site recommendation until it was closer to having an acceptable license application, it could have ensured that the site recommendation was based on the approach to developing a repository that it intends 

to follow. This would have enabled DOE to develop an estimated schedule to design 

and build the preferred approach and to estimate its cost, including the annual 

funding requirements, as part of the information on which to make a site recommendation. 

DOE currently does not have a reliable estimate of when, and at what cost, a license application can be submitted or a repository can be opened because DOE 

stopped using its cost and schedule baselines to manage the site investigation in 

1997. DOE needs to reestablish a baseline for the repository program that accounts 

for the outstanding technical work needed to prepare an acceptable license application and the estimated schedule and cost to achieve this milestone. In conjunction, 

DOE needs to use the baseline as a tool for managing the program, in accordance 

with the department’s policies and procedures for managing major projects. Therefore, our December 2001 report recommended that the secretary of energy reestablish the baseline through the submission of a license application and follow the department’s management requirements, including a formal procedure for changing 

program milestones. According to DOE, it is currently in the process of establishing 

a new baseline for the nuclear waste program. 

BACKGROUND

Recognizing the critical need to address the issue of nuclear waste disposal, the 

Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to establish a comprehensive 

policy and program for the safe, permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel and 

other highly radioactive wastes in one or more mined geologic repositories. The act 

created the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within DOE to manage its nuclear waste program. Amendments to the act in 1987 directed DOE to investigate only the Yucca Mountain site. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act also set out important and complementary roles for 

other federal agencies:

• The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to establish health and 

safety standards for the disposal of wastes in repositories. EPA issued standards for the Yucca Mountain site in June 2001 that require a high probability 

of safety for at least 10,000 years.2

• NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating repositories to ensure their compliance with EPA’s standards. One prerequisite to the secretary’s recommendation was obtaining NRC’s preliminary comments on the sufficiency of DOE’s site 

investigation for the purpose of a license application. NRC provided these comments on November 13, 2001. If the site is approved, then NRC, upon accepting 

a license application from DOE, has 3 to 4 years to review the application and 

decide whether to issue a license to construct, and then to operate, a repository 

at the site.3

• The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (the board) reviews the technical and 

scientific validity of DOE’s activities associated with investigating the site and 

packaging and transporting wastes. The board must report its findings and recommendations to the Congress and the secretary of energy at least twice each 

year, but DOE is not required to implement these recommendations. 

DOE has designated the nuclear waste program, including the site investigation, 

as a ‘‘major’’ program that is subject to senior management’s attention and to its 

agencywide guidelines for managing such programs and projects. The guidelines require the development of a cost and schedule baseline, a system for managing 

changes to the baseline, and independent cost and schedule reviews. DOE is using 

a management contractor to carry out the work on the program. The contractor develops and maintains the baseline, but senior DOE managers must approve significant changes to cost or schedule estimates. In February 2001, DOE hired Bechtel 

SAIC Company, LLC (Bechtel), to manage the program and required the contractor 

198

4See General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories; 

Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines (preamble), 66 Fed. Reg. 57298, 57322 (Nov. 14, 

2001). 

to reassess the remaining technical work and the estimated schedule and cost to 

complete this work. 

DOE WILL NOT BE READY TO SUBMIT A LICENSE APPLICATION WITHIN THE STATUTORY

TIME FRAME

1DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within 

the statutory limits that would take effect if the site is approved. Specifically, DOE 

has entered into 293 agreements with NRC to gather and/or analyze additional technical information in preparation for a license application that NRC would accept. 

DOE is also continuing to address technical issues raised by the board. In September 2001, Bechtel concluded, after reassessing the remaining technical work, 

that DOE would not be ready to submit an acceptable license application to NRC 

until January 2006. DOE did not accept the 2006 date. Instead, it directed the contractor to prepare a new plan for submitting a license application to NRC by December 2004. DOE’s current plan is that, by the end of September 2002, Bechtel will 

develop, and DOE will review and approve, a new technical, cost, and schedule baseline for submitting a license application to NRC in December 2004. 

Moreover, while a site recommendation and a license application are separate 

processes, DOE will need to use essentially the same data for both.4 Also, the act 

states that the president’s recommendation to the Congress is that he considers the 

site qualified for an application to NRC for a license. The president’s recommendation also triggers an express statutory time frame that requires DOE to submit a 

license application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months. 

DOE LACKS INFORMATION FOR A LICENSE APPLICATION

The 293 agreements that DOE and NRC have negotiated address areas of study 

within the program where NRC’s staff has determined that DOE needs to collect 

more scientific data and/or improve its technical assessment of the data. According 

to NRC, as of March 2002, DOE had satisfactorily completed work on 38 of these 

agreements and could resolve another 22 agreements by September 30 of this year. 

These 293 agreements generally relate to repository: (1) the expected lifetime of engineered barriers, particularly the waste containers; (2) the physical properties of 

the Yucca Mountain site; and (3) the supporting information for the mathematical 

models used to evaluate the performance of the planned repository at the site. 

The uncertainties related to engineered barriers revolve around the longevity of 

the waste containers that would be used to isolate the wastes. DOE currently expects that these containers would isolate the wastes from the environment for more 

than 10,000 years. Minimizing uncertainties about the container materials and the 

predicted performance of the waste containers over this long time period is especially critical because DOE’s estimates of the repository system’s performance depend heavily on the waste containers, in addition to the natural features of the site, 

to meet NRC’s licensing regulations and EPA’s health and safety standards. 

The uncertainties related to the physical characteristics of the site center on how 

the combination of heat, water, and chemical processes caused by the presence of 

nuclear waste in the repository would affect the flow of water through the repository. 

The NRC staff’s concerns about DOE’s mathematical models for assessing the performance of the repository primarily relate to validating the models; that is, presenting information to provide confidence that the models are valid for their intended use and verifying the information used in the models. Performance assessment is an analytical method that relies on computers to operate mathematical 

models to assess the performance of the repository against EPA’s health and safety 

standards, NRC’s licensing regulations, and DOE’s guidelines for determining if the 

Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a repository. DOE uses the data collected during 

site characterization activities to model how a repository’s natural and engineered 

features would perform at the site. 

According to DOE, the additional technical work surrounding the 293 agreements 

with NRC’s staff is an insignificant addition to the extensive amount of technical 

work already completed—including some 600 papers cited in one of its recently published reports and a substantial body of published analytic literature. DOE does not 

expect the results of the additional work to change its current performance assessment of a repository at Yucca Mountain. 

199

5DOE’s budget request for fiscal year 2003 is about $527 million, or $72 million more than 

assumed in Bechtel’s reassessment. The preliminary amounts for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 are 

$538 million and $550 million, respectively. 

From NRC’s perspective, however, the agreements provided the basis for it to give 

DOE its preliminary comments on the sufficiency of DOE’s investigation of the 

Yucca Mountain site for inclusion in a future license application. In a November 13, 

2001, letter to the under secretary of energy, the Chairman of the NRC commented 

that 

‘‘[a]lthough significant additional work is needed prior to the submission of a 

possible license application, we believe that agreements reached between DOE 

and NRC staff regarding the collection of additional information provide the 

basis for concluding that development of an acceptable license application is 

achievable.’’

The board has also consistently raised issues and concerns over DOE’s understanding of the expected lifetime of the waste containers, the significance of the uncertainties involved in the modeling of the scientific data, and the need for an evaluation and comparison of a repository design having a higher temperature with a 

design having a lower temperature. The board continues to reiterate these concerns 

in its reports. For example, in its most recent report to the Congress and the secretary of energy, issued on January 24, 2002, the board concluded that, when DOE’s 

technical and scientific work is taken as a whole, the technical basis for DOE’s repository performance estimates is ‘‘weak to moderate’’ at this time. The board added 

that gaps in data and basic understanding cause important uncertainties in the concepts and assumptions on which DOE’s performance estimates are now based; providing the board with limited confidence in current performance estimates generated by DOE performance assessment model. 

As recently as May 2001, DOE projected that it could submit a license application 

to NRC in 2003. It now appears, however, that DOE may not complete all of the 

additional technical work that it has agreed to do to prepare an acceptable license 

application until January 2006. In September 2001, Bechtel completed, at DOE’s direction, a detailed reassessment in an effort to reestablish a cost and schedule baseline. Bechtel estimated that DOE could complete the outstanding technical work 

agreed to with NRC and submit a license application in January 2006. This date, 

according to the contractor, was due to the cumulative effect of funding reductions 

in recent years that had produced a ‘‘. . . growing bow wave of incomplete work that 

is being pushed into the future.’’ Moreover, the contractor’s report said, the proposed 

schedule did not include any cost and schedule contingencies. The contractor’s estimate was based on guidance from DOE that, in part, directed the contractor to assume annual funding for the nuclear waste program of $410 million in fiscal year 

2002, $455 million in fiscal year 2003, and $465 million in fiscal year 2004 and 

thereafter.5 DOE did not accept this estimate because, according to program officials, the estimate would extend the date for submitting a license application too 

far into the future. Instead, DOE accepted only the fiscal year 2002 portion of 

Bechtel’s detailed work plan and directed the contractor to prepare a new plan for 

submitting a license application to NRC by December 2004. 

ESSENTIALLY THE SAME INFORMATION IS NEEDED FOR A SITE RECOMMENDATION AND

A LICENSE APPLICATION

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE’s site characterization activities are to 

provide information necessary to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site’s suitability for 

submitting a license application to NRC for placing a repository at the site. In implementing the act, DOE’s guidelines provide that the site will be suitable as a 

waste repository if the site is likely to meet the radiation protection standards that 

NRC would use to reach a licensing decision on the proposed repository. Thus, as 

stated in the preamble (introduction) to DOE’s guidelines, DOE expects to use essentially the same data for the site recommendation and the license application. 

In addition, the act specifies that, having received a site recommendation from the 

secretary, the president shall submit a recommendation of the site to the Congress 

if the president considers the site qualified for a license application. Under the process laid out in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, once the secretary makes a site recommendation, there is no time limit under which the president must act on the secretary’s recommendation. However, when the president recommended, on February 

15, that the Congress approve the site, specific statutory time frames were triggered 

for the next steps in the process. Figure 1 shows the approximate statutory time 

needed between a site recommendation and submission of a license application and 

the additional time needed for DOE to meet the conditions for an acceptable license 

200

6 U.S. Department of Energy, Independent Cost Estimate Review of the Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management Program, 2001 Total System Life Cycle Cost (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001). 

application. The figure assumes that the Congress overrides the state’s disapproval 

of April 8, 2002. As shown in the figure, Nevada had 60 days—until April 16—to 

disapprove the site. The Congress now has 90 days (of continuous session) from that 

date in which to enact legislation overriding the state’s disapproval. If the Congress 

overrides the state’s disapproval and the site designation takes effect, the next step 

is for the secretary to submit a license application to NRC within 90 days after the 

site designation is effective. In total, these statutory time frames provide about 150 

to 240 days, or about 5 to 8 months, from the time the president makes a recommendation to DOE’s submittal of a license application. On the basis of Bechtel’s September 2001 program reassessment, however, DOE would not be ready to submit a license application to NRC until January 2006.

DOE IS UNLIKELY TO OPEN A REPOSITORY IN 2010 AS PLANNED

DOE states that it may be able to open a repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010. 

The department has based this expectation on submitting an acceptable license application to NRC in 2003, receiving NRC’s authorization to construct a repository 

in 2006, and constructing essential surface and underground facilities by 2010. However, Bechtel, in its September 2001 proposal for reestablishing technical, schedule, 

and cost baselines for the program, concluded that January 2006 is a more realistic 

date for submitting a license application. Because of uncertainty over when DOE 

may be able to open the repository, the department is exploring alternatives that 

might still permit it to begin accepting commercial spent fuel in 2010.

EXTENSION OF LICENSE APPLICATION DWILL LIKELY POSTPONE 2010

REPOSITORY GOAL

An extension of the license application date to 2006 would almost certainly preclude DOE from achieving its long-standing goal of opening a repository in 2010. 

According to DOE’s May 2001 report on the program’s estimated cost, after submitting a license application in 2003, DOE estimates that it could receive an authorization to construct the repository in 2006 and complete the construction of enough surface and underground facilities to open the repository in 2010, or 7 years after submitting the license application. This 7-year estimate from submittal of the license 

application to the initial construction and operation of the repository assumes that 

NRC would grant an authorization to construct the facility in 3 years, followed by 

4 years of construction. Assuming these same estimates of time, submitting a license application in January 2006 would extend the opening date for the repository 

until about 2013. 

Furthermore, opening the repository in 2013 may be questionable for several reasons. First, a repository at Yucca Mountain would be a first-of-a-kind facility, meaning that any schedule projections may be optimistic. DOE has deferred its original 

target date for opening a repository from 1998 to 2003 to 2010. Second, although 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act states that NRC has 3 years to decide on a construction license, a fourth year may be added if NRC certifies that it is necessary. Third, 

the 4-year construction time period that DOE’s current schedule allows may be too 

short. For example, a contractor hired by DOE to independently review the estimated costs and schedule for the nuclear waste program reported that the 4-year 

construction period was too optimistic and recommended that the construction phase 

be extended by a year-and-a-half.6 Bechtel anticipates a 5-year period of construction between the receipt of a construction authorization from NRC and the opening 


g:\graphics\79469.167
201

7 U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Means of Financing and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0546 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001). 8DOE’s 2003 budget request states that DOE now expects to submit the license application 

between October and December 2004. 

of the repository. A 4-year licensing period followed by 5 years of initial construction 

could extend the repository opening until about 2015. 

Finally, these simple projections do not account for any other factors that could 

adversely affect this 7- to 9-year schedule for licensing, constructing, and opening 

the repository. Annual appropriations for the program in recent years have been 

less than $400 million. In contrast, according to DOE, it needs between $750 million 

and $1.5 billion in annual appropriations during most of the 7- to 9-year licensing 

and construction period in order to open the repository on that schedule. In its August 2001 report on alternative means for financing and managing the program, 

DOE stated that unless the program’s funding is increased, the budget might become the ‘‘determining factor’’ whether DOE will be able to accept wastes in 2010.7

In part, DOE’s desire to meet the 2010 goal is linked to the court decisions that 

DOE—under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and as implemented by DOE’s contracts 

with owners of commercial spent fuel—is obligated to begin accepting spent fuel 

from contract holders not later than January 31, 1998, or be held liable for damages. Courts are currently assessing the amount of damages that DOE must pay 

to holders of spent fuel disposal contracts. Estimates of potential damages for the 

estimated 12-year delay from 1998 to 2010 range widely from the department’s estimate of about $2 billion to $3 billion to the nuclear industry’s estimate of at least 

50 billion. The damage estimates are based, in part, on the expectation that DOE 

would begin accepting spent fuel from contract holders in 2010. The actual damages 

could be higher or lower, depending on when DOE begins accepting spent fuel.

DOE IS REVIEWING ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO ACCEPT WASTES IN 2010

Because of the uncertainty of achieving the 2010 goal for opening the Yucca 

Mountain repository, DOE is examining alternative approaches that would permit 

it to meet the goal. For example, in a May 2001 report, DOE examined approaches 

that might permit it to begin accepting wastes at the repository site in 2010 while 

spreading out the construction of repository facilities over a longer time period. The 

report recommended storing wastes on the surface until the capacity to move wastes 

into the repository has been increased. Relatively modest-sized initial surface facilities to handle wastes could be expanded later to handle larger volumes of waste. 

Such an approach, according to the report, would permit partial construction and 

limited waste emplacement in the repository, at lower than earlier estimated annual 

costs, in advance of the more costly construction of the facility as originally planned. 

Also, by implementing a modular approach, DOE would be capable of accepting 

wastes at the repository earlier than if it constructed the repository described in the 

documents that the secretary used to support a site recommendation. 

DOE has also contracted with the National Research Council to provide recommendations on design and operating strategies for developing a geologic repository in stages, which is to include reviewing DOE’s modular approach. The council 

is addressing such issues as the (1) technical, policy, and societal objectives and 

risks for developing a staged repository; (2) effects of developing a staged repository 

on the safety and security of the facility and the effects on the cost and public acceptance of such a facility; and (3) strategies for developing a staged system, including the design, construction, operation, and closing of such a facility. In March 2002, 

the council published an interim report on the study in which it address a conceptual framework for a generic repository program. The Council plans to issue a final 

report this fall, in which it intends to provide specific suggestions for incorporating 

additional elements of staged repository development into DOE’s repository program.

DOE’S CURRENT LICENSE APPLICATION MILESTONE DATE IS NOT

SUPPORTED BY THE PROGRAM’S BASELINE

As of December 2001, DOE expected to submit the application to NRC in 2003.8

This date reflects a delay in the license application milestone date last approved by 

DOE in March 1997 that targeted March 2002 for submitting a license application. 

The 2003 date was not formally approved by DOE’s senior managers or incorporated 

into the program’s cost and schedule baseline, as required by the management procedures that were in effect for the program. At least three extensions for the license 

application date have been proposed and used by DOE in program documents, but 

none of these proposals have been approved as required. As a result, DOE does not 

202

9DOE estimated that the program cost $4.1 billion, on the basis of year-of-expenditure dollars 

from the program’s inception in 1983 through March 2002. The $5.5 billion estimate for the license application is based on year-of-expenditure dollars from 1983 through January 2006. 

have a baseline estimate of the program’s schedule and cost—including the late 

2004 date in its fiscal year 2003 budget request—that is based on all the work that 

it expects to complete through the submission of a license application. 

DOE’s guidance for managing major programs and projects requires, among other 

things, that senior managers establish a baseline for managing the program or 

project. The baseline describes the program’s mission—in this case, the safe disposal 

of highly radioactive waste in a geologic repository—and the expected technical requirements, schedule, and cost to complete the program. Procedures for controlling 

changes to an approved baseline are designed to ensure that program managers consider the expected effects of adding, deleting, or modifying technical work, as well 

as the effects of unanticipated events, such as funding shortfalls, on the project’s mission and baseline. In this way, alternative courses of action can be assessed on 

the basis of each action’s potential effect on the baseline. DOE’s procedures for managing the nuclear waste program require that program managers revise the baseline, as appropriate, to reflect any significant changes to the program. 

After March 1997, according to DOE officials, they did not always follow these 

control procedures to account for proposed changes to the program’s baseline, including the changes proposed to extend the date for license application. According to 

these same officials, they stopped following the control procedures because the secretary of energy did not approve proposed extensions to the license application milestone. As a result, the official baseline did not accurately reflect the program’s cost 

and schedule to complete the remaining work necessary to submit a license application. 

In November 1999, the Yucca Mountain site investigation office proposed extending the license application milestone date by 10 months, from March to December 

2002, to compensate for a $57.8 million drop in funding for fiscal year 2000. A proposed extension in the license application milestone required the approval of both 

the director of the nuclear waste program and the secretary of energy. Neither of 

these officials approved this proposed change nor was the baseline revised to reflect 

this change even though the director subsequently began reporting the December 

2002 date in quarterly performance reports to the deputy secretary of energy. The 

site investigation office subsequently proposed two other extensions of the license 

application milestone, neither of which was approved by the program’s director or 

the secretary of energy or incorporated into the baseline for the program. Nevertheless, DOE began to use the proposed, but unapproved, milestone dates in both internal and external reports and communications, such as in congressional testimony 

delivered in May 2001. 

Because senior managers did not approve these proposed changes for incorporation into the baseline for the program, program managers did not adjust the program’s cost and schedule baseline. By not accounting for these and other changes 

to the program’s technical work, milestone dates, and estimated costs in the program’s baseline since March 1997, DOE has not had baseline estimates of all of the 

technical work that it expected to complete through submission of a license application and the estimated schedule and cost to complete this work. This condition includes the cost and schedule information contained in DOE’s budget request for fiscal year 2003. 

When DOE hired Bechtel to manage the nuclear waste program, one of the contractor’s first assignments was to document the remaining technical work that had 

to be completed to support the submission of a license application to NRC and to 

estimate the time and cost to complete this work. The contractor’s revised, unofficial 

baseline for the program shows that it will take until January 2006 to complete essential technical work and submit an acceptable license application. Also, DOE had 

estimated that completing the remaining technical work would add about $1.4 billion to the cumulative cost of the program, bringing the total cost of the Yucca 

Mountain project’s portion of the nuclear waste program to $5.5 billion.9 As noted 

earlier, DOE accepted only the fiscal year 2002 portion of the proposed baseline and 

then directed the contractor to prepare a plan for submitting a license application 

to NRC by December 2004. 

Because of these management weaknesses, we recommended in our December 

2001 report that the secretary of energy reestablish the baseline through the submission of a license application and follow the department’s management requirements, including a formal procedure for changing program milestones. According to 

DOE, it is currently in the process of establishing a new baseline for the nuclear 

waste program. 

203

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy to respond to any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Ms. Jones. 

The Chair would recognize himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

There’s another great Pennsylvanian who made the statement 

back in the late 1700’s, I believe, that only one thing is certain in 

life and that’s death and taxes. I think that was Benjamin Franklin. Now I may be wrong about that, but I’m going to attribute it 

to him and Poor Richard’s Almanack. 

Dr. Cohon, you’re another great Pennsylvanian and you’re here 

on behalf of the Nuclear Technical Review Board, your testimony 

is replete with illusions to uncertainty. In your mind, is the Yucca 

Mountain site so uncertain that we should stop consideration of it? 

Mr. COHON. Well, Mr. Chairman, that’s not a determination that 

Congress asked our Board to make. Rather, we see our role as 

making sure that the scientific and technical basis on which DOE 

has made its recommendation and on which you make your judgment is as strong as possible and to evaluate that technical basis 

for you. 

As to whether or not the uncertainty is too great or not, that 

truly is a policy matter and we defer to you on that. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, you’re the president of a great engineering institution. I’m a registered professional engineer in the great State 

of Texas. I remember statistical analysis and what we call the normal bell curve and reasonable risk and acceptable risk and probability regression analysis. 

Do you think that the risk in the Yucca Mountain site as currently configured is within the ranges of acceptable risk for policymakers to consider? 

Mr. COHON. Well, clearly, the Chairman of the Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board is no match for the chairman of this subcommittee. 

Mr. BARTON. Oh now. 

Mr. COHON. In terms of trying to find the right spot. Having said 

what I did in response to your first question about the inherent 

policy nature of this issue, I will acknowledge that it certainly has 

a technical component as well. It is both a policy matter and a 

technical matter. The Board is on record as conveying its view that 

overall the scientific and technical basis is weak to moderate and 

that there is substantial uncertainty associated with the estimates 

of performance. 

We’ve also indicated in our three page letter with long attachments several things that we believe are very important for DOE 

to continue to pursue in order to reduce that uncertainty. Our 

Board overall feels that its confidence in the technical basis would 

be moderate to high if all of those recommendations in that letter 

were completely followed and put into place. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, I’ll accept that. I mean there’s an uncertainty 

when I hop on a plane to Texas, here hopefully in about an hour 

and a half that it may fall out of the sky or a terrorist may 

highjack or the pilot may decide he wants to go to Cuba, but the 

probability is that that plane is going to take off and 3 hours later 

land safely in Houston, Texas. I’ll hop in a car and drive at a reaVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
204

sonable rate of speed to College Station, Texas where I’ll be given 

an award tonight by the Engineering Department at Texas A&M. 

Mr. COHON. Congratulations. 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you. I just wanted to put that in, you know. 

Ms. Jones, you’ve talked quite a bit about time tables and license 

application periods and things of this sort. Would it not be common 

sense on behalf of the Congress if, in fact, we vote to override the 

Governor in Nevada’s veto, we do have this 90-day statutory requirement to submit an application and I believe that Congressman Markey has some questions about that to the Secretary when 

I was not in attendance. But wouldn’t it be common sense if we do 

decide that Yucca Mountain is suitable by overriding the Governor’s veto that we give the Department sufficient time to submit 

a complete application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? If 

you were a Congressman, would you cut them off if they don’t get 

the application in its totality in in the 90-day period? 

Ms. JONES. I think that was the point of our comment in our report in December, Mr. Barton, that we did feel that the Department needed additional time to finish some of these technical 

issues before they submitted the license application. 

Mr. BARTON. But we want them to right, rather than on time. 

Ms. JONES. Absolutely, yes sir. 

Mr. BARTON. It pains me to say that, but our good friends at the 

EPA are in noncompliance with several parts of the Clean Air Act 

10 years later, but we want them to be right too, rather than to 

comply in a technical sense. 

On our next panel we have a witness who has said either in the 

written testimony or in public comments that the Department of 

Energy’s and I quote ‘‘underhanded decisions cannot mask the fact 

that this site is not suitable as the GAO, IG and Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board have made clear.’’ Now, Ms. Jones on behalf of the GAO, admittedly you’re not the 

top dog at the GAO, but you’re the best we have here today and 

you’re doing a good job. Has the GAO said that the Yucca Mountain site is not suitable? 

Ms. JONES. No sir. We have not. 

Mr. BARTON. Okay, and Dr. Cohon, you are the top dog of the 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, has your Board said on the 

record that the Yucca Mountain site is not suitable? 

Mr. COHON. No sir. 

Mr. BARTON. Okay. My time has expired. I recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Cohon, I’ll not put 

you on the same spot that my Chairman did being from the District where the doctor resides, but I do want to ask some followup questions. 

Dr. Cohon, we know that your Board has been charged with the 

technical and scientific review on DOE’s efforts to characterize the 

site at Yucca Mountain and now that that site has been recommended, what do you see as the future role of the Board? 

Mr. COHON. We believe and I believe and I speak for the whole 

Board here that the Board has a very important continuing role to 

play as this program proceeds if it does proceed, if Congress indeed 

overrides Nevada’s veto. And we see three particular roles that we 

205

have to play. One is continuing to provide the kind of scientific and 

technical review that we have of DOE’s continuing scientific research which we strongly recommend should proceed. And all of 

that contributing to increased confidence in the estimates about the 

Yucca Mountain performance. 

A second dimension of this is that again if the site proceeds, 

there will be by necessity be a performance confirmation plan 

worked out between DOE and NRC. This is another thing that requires, would benefit from the kind of technical and scientific review that our Board provides. 

And finally, I’ll point out that our Board was charged by Congress of looking at the nuclear waste management system overall, 

not just the repository at Yucca Mountain. As DOE turns to transportation and packaging and management and storage issues, our 

Board will surely increase its activities in that area as well. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thanks, Dr. Cohon. Also, we know that your Board 

has been providing a great deal of information about the process 

that you’ve used to evaluate DOE’s technical and scientific work, 

but I’m curious to hear more about the methodology. How did you 

determine the final list of 11 disruptive event scenarios and the 10 

subsequent lines of questioning and as you reached your conclusions, were these areas of assessment prioritized or weighted in 

some way? Was the weak or moderate or strong rubric the only one 

used for your evaluation? 

Mr. COHON. Thank you. It’s a very good question and one that’s 

rather involved, but I’ll give you the short version. The eleven 

areas and ten questions were a product of—it’s fair to say 15 years 

of study by our Board. It was sort of the natural conclusion of all 

that we’ve done over the years reacting and reviewing what DOE 

has done. So it was a product, really of the collective review by the 

Board Members and the staff to try and understand what the key 

issues were, and very much consistent with the way DOE had defined key issues in the past as well, but it came from the Board. 

It wasn’t delivered to us or given to us. 

In general, our conclusions, that is trying to evaluate how a particular factor stood against those 10 years, that was done by considering the entire written record that DOE has produced that’s 

thousands of pages of reports, the public meetings we have at 

which DOE and others come to testify and where we can ask questions; and our own discussion and review using the technical backgrounds that we bring to the Board. 

And it was that overall that led us to those conclusions. 

To your question with regard to weighting, no, we did not attempt to weight. We took each of the critical factors and judged 

how they stood against the questions we posed and then overall 

came to this overall assessment of where we thought the technical 

basis was. 

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony 

today. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTON. Seeing no other members present, we’ll give all 

members the requisite number of days to submit written questions 

to this Panel. We do thank you for your attendance. If we weren’t 

in the process of finishing up today and heading out of town, I 

206

would ask a second round, but especially to the Nuclear Technical 

Review Board, we appreciate your good work and to Commissioner 

Dicus, we wish you Godspeed in the work that’s ahead of you in 

looking at the application process as is presented to you and your 

Commissioners. 

This Panel is relieved and we will ask our fourth and last Panel 

to come forward. 

If everyone could find their seat. We have the Honorable Laura 

Chappelle who is the Chairwoman of the Michigan Public Service 

Commission. She is testifying on behalf of the National Association 

of Regulatory Utility Commissioners or NARUC. We have Mr. Joe 

Colvin who is the President of the Nuclear Energy Institute. We 

have Mr. Jim Dushaw who is the Director of the Utility Department of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. And 

we do not yet have Ms. Joan Claybrook who is the President of 

Public Citizen. Is there a representative of Ms. Claybrook’s in the 

audience? Do you know where she might be? Is she on her way. 

Okay, we’re going to go ahead and begin to let the other three testifiers testify and when she appears, we’ll encourage her to come 

to the witness desk. 

Welcome, lady and gentlemen. Your testimony is in the record in 

its entirety. We’ll give each of you 7 minutes to elaborate on it and 

we’ll start with Chairwoman Chappelle. 

STATEMENTS OF HON. LAURA CHAPPELLE, CHAIRWOMAN, 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; JOE F. COLVIN, 

PRESIDENT AND CEO, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE; AND 

JIM DUSHAW, DIRECTOR, UTILITY DEPARTMENT, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 

Ms. CHAPPELLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor to be 

here today. I appreciate the committee letting me come forward on 

behalf of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions, commonly known as NARUC, the State of Michigan and the 

Michigan Public Service Commission. 

I have submitted a written statement this afternoon and I kindly 

request that that be included in today’s record. I will attempt to 

keep my comments brief. We certainly have heard lots of testimony 

today regarding Yucca Mountain and I do just want to highlight 

NARUC and the State of Michigan’s thoughts and position on this 

very important topic. 

First, we want to reiterate that NARUC, the State of Michigan 

and the Public Service Commission strongly support the President’s decision to approve the site at Yucca Mountain for this geologic repository. Over at the Michigan Public Service Commission 

we have been working on this issue in one form or another for 

about 19 years. Prior Chairman of the Michigan Public Service 

Commission have been before Congress to testify in support of finding a permanent repository and I am proud to continue in that position today. 

We further encourage Congress to vote in support of Chairman 

Barton’s resolution allowing DOE to submit its license application 

to NRC to begin the construction phase of Yucca Mountain. 

Very quickly, first as Secretary Abraham has stated, the analysis 

clearly shows that the repository at Yucca Mountain can be deVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00210 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\79469 79469
207

signed, built, operated, monitored and eventually sealed by meeting 

all statutory and regulatory requirements to protect the public 

health and the environment. While the scientific research about 

Yucca Mountain will certainly continue enough is known at this 

point to support the site designation today and to move the process 

forward. 

We’ve heard a lot today about the transportation of the nuclear 

material. Certainly we’ve been hearing a lot about that through 

various forums. We’re starting to hear that issue in Michigan. I 

was just out the other day when somebody found out I was coming 

before Congress and they started asking how are we going to ensure the safe transportation of this material when we are surrounded by Great Lakes? So certainly this is a very important 

issue. 

We reiterate those comments that have been made that the Nation does have an excellent safety record of transportation of nuclear materials over the past 30 years and certainly the State of 

Michigan like very many other States, I agree, we do both license 

and make sure that we are diligent in various forms of transportation of other hazardous waste materials. 

The State of Michigan and the other States involved through 

NARUC will certainly want and expect to work very closely with 

all various Federal agencies in determining the most appropriate 

and safe transportation routes. 

Let me turn quickly to say obviously unless the Federal Government finds a way to dispose of spent nuclear fuel, some nuclear 

plants will need to shut down if they are unable to meet their license requirements to store used fool in pool or dry storage. 

In Michigan, we do have one operating nuclear plant. We actually have three plants. One such plant, their pool storage has already been exceeded. They have extended their storage on a bluff 

overlooking Lake Michigan. I would submit that although that’s a 

secure site, it’s not the best site to store this nuclear material 

above a bluff over Lake Michigan. 

Most importantly, NARUC represents ratepayers in 41 States 

who have in good faith paid over $17 billion into the Nuclear Waste 

Fund including interest and have little to show for it. Worse, they 

have also had to pay utilities and have had to bear additional onsite waste storage expenses because the 1998 date to begin removing the fuel was missed. In my State of Michigan alone, ratepayers 

have paid over $430 million into the Fund and it’s very difficult to 

explain to ratepayers that we have at least another 8 years before 

they begin to see a return on their investment. 

Finally, I just want to note that there has been some discussion 

about a possible settlement to use money to store waste material 

again in temporary above-ground locations. I would submit this is 

not an appropriate settlement. It is not an appropriate answer to 

this very important issue. 

I’d just close with recognizing Ranking Member Dingell’s comment that what you have before you today is a necessary part of 

a fair progress and I echo Congressman Norwood’s call to get this 

job done. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Laura Chappelle follows:]

208

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAURA CHAPPELLE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Good Morning. My name is 

Laura Chappelle. I am the Chairman of the Michigan Public Service Commission. 

I am here today on behalf of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, commonly known as NARUC, and the Michigan Public Service Commission. 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Air Quality and I respectfully request that NARUC’s written statement be included in today’s hearing record as if fully read. 

NARUC is a quasi-governmental, nonprofit organization founded in 1889. Its 

membership includes the State public utility commissions for all States and territories. NARUC’s mission is to serve the public interest by improving the quality and 

effectiveness of public utility regulation. NARUC’s members regulate the retail rates 

and services of electric, gas, water and telephone utilities. Each State Commission 

and my Commission have the obligation under State law to ensure the establishment and maintenance of such energy utility services as may be required by the 

public convenience and necessity, and to ensure that such services are provided at 

rates and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory for all consumers. 

NARUC has had a direct stakeholder interest in the civilian radioactive waste 

management program ever since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) established that the federal government is responsible for safe, permanent disposal of 

high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear reactors, as well as making certain that the utilities pay their share of these disposal 

costs. The primary reason for NARUC’s interest is that the fees paid by nuclear utilities to the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) are passed along to ratepayers through 

their electric bills. We would submit that passing the costs of the NWF on to the 

ratepayers has been the only aspect of the NWPA to begin on schedule. 

We strongly support the President’s decision to approve the site at Yucca Mountain for the geologic repository. It is a historic milestone for this troubled program 

and it is legally and scientifically sound. 

I say ‘‘troubled’’ because, as the Subcommittee members know well, there have 

been a series of technical, political, legal and financial hurdles that have had the 

cumulative effect of delay to the point where, even under the most optimistic schedule, nuclear waste will not begin to be emplaced in the repository until 2010—

twelve years after the mandate set in the NWPA. 

The Department of Energy (DOE) has spent over four billion dollars studying the 

site at Yucca Mountain for suitability for repository use, in what I have heard described as the most studied piece of real estate on earth. On behalf of NARUC and 

the State of Michigan, we praise the dedication and professionalism of the inter-disciplinary public and private sector team of scientists who have worked on this unprecedented venture and upon whose analytic investigations the President can rely 

upon with confidence. 

The science is right. Analyses by the DOE team show that a repository at Yucca 

Mountain can be designed, built, operated, monitored and eventually sealed while 

meeting all statutory and regulatory requirements to protect public health and the 

environment. Principle among those requirements is the radiation standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency. While the scientific research about 

Yucca Mountain continues, more than enough is known at this point to support the 

site designation today. 

The time is right. Yucca Mountain is the right place. While we can never have 

perfect information, it is hard to imagine a better site. We know there are questions 

that remain to be addressed to the fullest extent required to support a license approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but extensive findings support the 

President’s decision to advance toward that next step. Secretary of Energy Abraham 

put it in the right context in his site recommendation when he observed that Yucca 

Mountain has been studied for a longer amount of time than it took to plan and 

complete the moon landing. Let us move on. 

First and foremost, let us continue to focus on sound scientific facts surrounding 

the site designation, not the fear campaign being conducted in particular, on the 

subject of nuclear waste transportation. It ignores the excellent safety record of 

transportation of nuclear materials over the past 30 years. Each of those shipments, 

and all future shipments to Yucca Mountain, are and will be carefully planned and 

conducted under NRC, as well as other federal and State agency regulatory oversight. The public is largely unaware of that record, however, and is often predisposed to believe the worst about anything nuclear. The public may not realize, 

that despite claims of ‘‘100,000 shipments through 43 States and many large cities 

209

over 40 years,’’ DOE has yet to choose either the mode (truck or rail) of shipments 

or any of the routes. In the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain, DOE states a ‘‘preference for the mostly rail scenario,’’ which would involve 

more like 11,000 shipments over 24 years. If the ‘‘mostly truck’’ alternative is more 

feasible, it would involve 53,300 shipments over the same period. We join others in 

urging that DOE consult with federal, State, tribal and local governments—as DOE 

has said it will—to coordinate these important decisions so that all will be prepared 

to ensure that the past safety record is sustained or exceeded. DOE is working today 

with the transuranic shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New 

Mexico and we believe that States and local governments, with the assistance to 

public safety officials provided for in Section 180 of the NWPA, can be prepared so 

that waste can be safely moved to Yucca Mountain. 

In Michigan, we have been preparing for the eventual shipment of spent nuclear 

fuel from the plant sites for a number of years, and we believe that this material 

can be safely shipped, beginning tomorrow, if the opportunity arose. 

The Secretary of Energy’s Site Recommendation to the President is compelling. 

While NARUC did not join the flurry of press releases that were unleashed the day 

the report was out, because we chose to read the recommendation first, we did issue 

a release praising the recommendation and the President’s acceptance of it the following Monday. The Secretary carefully examined the statutory and regulatory requirements and summarized the analyses, derived from a plethora of supporting 

technical documents. As a result of this exhaustive examination of the data, the Secretary presented the conclusion that the scientific basis exists to meet the requirements. Additionally, he developed and added the five ‘‘compelling national interests’’ that are found in the recommendation. It is often lost in the discussions of this subject, for example, that a geologic repository would still be needed for defense-related 

materials even if there never were nuclear power plants. Secretary Abraham is to 

be commended for the diligence with which he applied his own evaluation of the site 

qualifications and need, including addressing the arguments against recommending 

the site. 

We support the President’s decision to accept the recommendation. He is aware 

of the likely criticism and expected reactions from those who either oppose anything 

to do with nuclear energy or the actions taken by Congress in 1987 to designate 

a single site to examine for suitability. In our opinion, President Bush has the sound 

science basis to support the decision he has made. 

I would like to return to what I mentioned at the outset of my remarks. NARUC 

and its members have a direct interest in the disposal of spent fuel from commercial 

power plants for two reasons:

1. Unless the government finds a way to dispose of spent nuclear fuel, some nuclear 

plants may need to shut down if they are unable to meet their license requirements to store used fuel in pool or dry storage. That will have heavy financial, 

environmental or energy supply consequences—probably all three. And it likely 

rules out any utility being willing to invest in a new nuclear plant. 

2. Most importantly, we represent ratepayers in 41 States who have, in good faith, paid over $19 billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund (including interest) and have 

little to show for it. The $19 billion consists of $17 billion that has been paid 

by the utilities into Federal Nuclear Waste Fund, and a little more than $2 billion in debt to the Fund that some utilities have elected to hold until a future 

date. Under any circumstances, the utility ratepayers that are represented by 

NARUC’s members have paid the fees required to pay for this program. Worse, 

they have also had to pay utilities that had to bear additional on-site waste 

storage expenses when DOE missed the 1998 date to begin removing the fuel. 

In my State of Michigan, ratepayers have paid over $430 million into the Fund 

and I have to explain to them that it will be at least another eight years before 

they see any return on that investment. In fact, among the States, we often ask, 

‘‘Why, after DOE failed to meet its contracted 1998 deadline, are we still paying 

that fee?’’ Therefore, it is a matter of equity to those who are paying for this program that 

we move forward to the next step. Let the technical and legal experts of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission make the decision that really counts, whether to issue a 

construction license for the repository. That is the role the NWPA assigns to the 

independent Commission which bears the mission to protect the public health, safety, and the environment for all nuclear activities in this country, in a rigorous and 

adjudicative public process. 

The equity is pretty simple. When you make an obligation, you honor it or you 

face the consequences. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act set the policy that the 

disposal of the Nation’s high-level radioactive waste must be the Federal Government’s responsibility, the utilities can hardly switch to another removal agent. SimiVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00213 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
210

larly, the electric utility ratepayers or consumers have upheld their part of the deal. 

The money has been paid to the utilities to pay the Federal Government to pay for 

the program. Given the sound scientific basis for the Secretary and President’s decisions to recommend the site, it is now time for the U.S. Congress to do the right 

thing, honor its commitment and move this program to the next step of the license 

application process. 

A final issue I would like to address is the so-called ‘‘PECO Alternative.’’ In his 

notice of disapproval for the repository, Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn asserts that 

there is a ‘‘viable alternative to Yucca Mountain’’ by which he refers to the example 

of a settlement agreement reached between PECO Energy and the Department of 

Energy (DOE) over expenses already incurred by PECO at its Peach Bottom Nuclear 

Plant. Those expenses have already been incurred and were due solely to DOE’s failure to meet the NWPA mandate to begin accepting commercial spent nuclear fuel 

in 1998 and as contractually bound with PECO. Governor Guinn has misinterpreted 

the stopgap measure to recover costs of waste acceptance delay as a substitute for 

geologic disposal. In short the ‘‘PECO Alternative’’ is not an alternative at all. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act sets national policy for geologic disposal as the permanent solution for all high-level radioactive waste disposal. It does not allow for 

temporary on-site storage costs to be paid from the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is 

why several utilities are suing DOE over the Peach Bottom settlement. The settlement agreement basically allows the utility to forgo required payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund up until the amount agreed in the settlement. This has the effect 

of diverting NWF payments that are intended for permanent disposal to cover onsite storage costs that are due solely to the government’s ongoing failure to begin 

waste acceptance. If all utilities were to enter into similar settlements, there would 

be no revenue flowing to the NWF and the repository could never be built. Moreover, for those plants already shut down there are no payments to credit against 

the storage costs. 

Leaving spent fuel at current commercial and government storage sites indefinitely is not the solution to the waste disposal problem that the NWPA contemplated, over twenty years ago, by geologic disposal at a suitable site. The PECO 

settlement does not provide for geologic disposal nor has the Peach Bottom site or 

any of the other 71 reactor locations been studied for suitability for indefinite storage. The Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement did a comparison of 

leaving nuclear waste at 77 commercial and government sites for the same 10,000 

year period of isolation from the human environment as the geologic repository and 

found that two variations of the ‘‘No Action’’ approach were either going to cost $5 

trillion dollars or have intolerable human and environmental consequences, depending on what assumptions were made about regulatory compliance for the sites once 

the reactors reach the end of their productive operating lives. There is no need for 

Congress to ‘‘explore’’ the PECO approach: the Environmental Impact Statement 

has already done that and the financial or environmental consequences are simply 

unacceptable. 

In conclusion, NARUC has been frustrated in the past with all the delays, but 

we are encouraged that the President has recommended that the program move forward and we urge the Congress to enable that. 

Thank you for this opportunity to present our views. We would like to come back 

at a future point to lend our support to the goal that the Subcommittee tried to 

achieve through H.R. 4 last year, to reform the Nuclear Waste Fund so it is fully 

available for its intended purpose. Without such reform the repository may never 

be built, even if approved.

Mr. SHIMKUS [presiding]. Thank you very much also. 

And now we’ll recognize Mr. Joe Colvin from the Nuclear Energy 

Institute, President and CEO. Welcome. You have 5 minutes for 

your statement and your full statement is in the record. 

STATEMENT OF JOE F. COLVIN 

Mr. COLVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good afternoon. I 

had to change my good morning to good afternoon, but we’re 

glad——

Mr. SHIMKUS. It’s pretty normal around here. 

Mr. COLVIN. Pretty normal and we appreciate the opportunity to 

testify. As you may well recognize I represent the over 275 companies that are involved in the nuclear energy industry both in the 

211

United States and internationally, including all the companies that 

operate our Nation’s 103 nuclear power plants. 

With the Secretary’s recommendation and the President’s decision, we have really moved to an important milestone in our Nation that will now take after two decades or over two decades of 

scientific study, move this process from the decision of suitability 

into the licensing phase and toward ultimately solving our Nation’s, one of our Nation’s most oppressing environmental and energy security issues. 

I think the important point too that we have discussed today 

overall is that the science necessary to make the decision on suitability is complete. There’s been some discussion about that. I 

think it’s been interesting that the discussion from the Nuclear 

Waste Technical Review Board and Chairman Barton in that context and I don’t intend to get into that per se, but the issue here 

is not, in my view, whether Congress has the role to determine 

whether the uncertainties, the technical uncertainties are sufficient 

for suitability or not, that is the decision that was made by the Department of Energy and in fact, by virtue of the Nuclear Waste 

Technical Review Board, they made in their statement, in fact, that 

at no point there is no individual technical or scientific factor that 

has been identified that would, in fact, prevent the site from moving forward from the standpoint of suitability. 

I think that’s an important distinction we need to recognize and 

now it’s up to Congress to take this, the next step and move us into 

the licensing phase where we will, in fact, finalize the design of the 

repository and try to eliminate the uncertainties that exist and 

move forward to these processes. 

I think as has been indicated, these are important issues from 

the standpoint of our energy security, national security and environment, but I need to recognize, Mr. Chairman, that electricity 

consumers in the United States in 1 out of 5 homes and businesses 

have paid for the government to, in fact, deal with this issue and 

to manage this. We have committed over $18 billion with interest 

to the Federal Government to deal with this issue. They expect a 

solution and deserve a solution to this issue. 

Mr. Chairman, we fully support the efforts of the DOE and of the 

President to move forward on this issue. Thank you very much for 

the opportunity to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Joe F. Colvin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOE F. COLVIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE

Chairman Barton, ranking member Boucher and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I am Joe Colvin, president and chief executive officer of the Nuclear 

Energy Institute. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify regarding the 

President’s recommendation of the Yucca Mountain, Nev., site as our nation’s repository for used fuel rods from commercial nuclear power plants and high-level radioactive waste from our country’s defense programs. 

NEI coordinates public policy on issues affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the management of used nuclear fuel from 103 commercial nuclear power 

plants that produce electricity for one of every five homes and businesses in the 

United States. The Institute represents nearly 275 companies, including every U.S. 

company licensed to operate a commercial nuclear reactor, industry suppliers, fuel 

fabrication facilities, architectural and engineering firms, organized labor, law firms, 

radiopharmaceutical companies, research laboratories, universities and international nuclear organizations. 

212

The nuclear energy industry strongly supports the decision by President George 

Bush that Yucca Mountain be further developed as a disposal facility to manage 

used nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive waste. 

The industry appreciates this opportunity to provide its perspective on this important program. Building a specially designed repository at Yucca Mountain will begin 

the process of moving used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste now stored 

at 131 sites(including Department of Energy facilities, university reactors, defense 

sites and commercial nuclear plants(to one safe and secure facility under a remote 

Nevada desert ridge. 

Used fuel is safely stored at nuclear power plant sites, either in steel-lined, concrete vaults filled with water or in steel or steel-reinforced concrete casks or bunkers 

with steel inner canisters. Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determined that used fuel could be stored safely at plant sites for 100 years, scientific 

consensus supports disposal in a specially designed underground repository. The 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 codified this longstanding federal policy, and the 

1987 amendments to the law required the Energy Department to study Yucca 

Mountain solely as a specially designed underground repository. 

Nonetheless, more than four years ago, the federal government defaulted on its 

obligation—under the law and in contracts between utilities and DOE—to begin 

moving used fuel from the nation’s nuclear power plants. Because of the government’s default, electricity consumers still are paying for additional on-site storage 

over and above the $18 billion already committed to the federal repository program. 

DOE’s delay in managing the federal nuclear fuel program has forced nuclear power 

companies to store more used fuel than expected for longer than originally intended. 

By the end of 2006, about 60 reactors will run out of their original storage space, 

and by the end of 2010, 78 reactors will have exhausted their original storage capacity. Companies that have not added on-site storage capacity by those dates would 

have to do so at that point. 

As a result of the Energy Department’s default on its January 31, 1998, obligation 

to begin moving used nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants, electricity consumers 

will have to pay an additional $5 billion to $7 billion for used fuel management, assuming the repository is available in 2010(and much more if repository operation 

does not begin by 2010. Nuclear power plant owners are suing the federal government in the U.S. Federal Claims Court due to DOE’s failure to meet the 1998 obligation. The court has reaffirmed the federal government’s obligation and the lead 

cases are in the damages phase. The Department of Energy must move forward 

with the Yucca Mountain project, under the current schedule, to meet its legal commitment to consumers to begin receiving used nuclear fuel at a federal disposal facility and to limit the federal liability for missing the 1998 deadline to a minimum. 

Nevada’s April 8 notice of disapproval of the President’s Yucca Mountain recommendation brings the federal government to the next step in the deliberative 

process established in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It is now up to the Congress 

to approve Yucca Mountain and advance the program from the study phase to the 

license application phase. The nuclear energy industry calls on Congress to fulfill 

its responsibility to advance the national interest and approve the site. 

Approval of a repository at Yucca Mountain is key for U.S. energy security, our 

national security, future growth of our economy and nuclear energy, and absolutely 

essential for environmental protection. 

SCIENTIFIC BASIS SUPPORTS YUCCA MOUNTAIN RECOMMENDATION

Deep geologic disposal, like the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, has been 

identified by the world’s leading scientists as the best way to isolate radioactive byproducts while protecting public safety and the environment for thousands of years. 

Twenty years of world-class study by hundreds of expert scientists and engineers(36 

million hours in all(have produced an indisputable body of evidence supporting the 

designation of Yucca Mountain as a repository site. 

The scientific evaluation of Yucca Mountain is unmatched by any other comparable endeavor in the United States. Teams of the world’s best scientists examined every aspect of the natural environment at Yucca Mountain—including collecting and examining more than 75,000 feet of core rock and 18,000 geologic and 

water samples, mapping and modeling various features of the mountain, and conducting an array of scientific experiments in six and one-half miles of tunnels in 

an underground laboratory. One of those experiments is the largest known test in 

history to simulate heat effects of a repository on the rock at Yucca Mountain. 

Scientists have used this vast collection of data to develop computer simulations 

of the natural features, events and processes that exist at Yucca Mountain. They 

also have used these models to forecast how the facility will perform hundreds and 

213

thousands of years from today. In addition to the natural systems that would protect the public and the environment, a series of man-made safety features—including corrosion-resistant alloy containers that will hold the reactor fuel rods—will be 

incorporated in the repository design to further protect public safety and the environment. Numerous oversight groups have thoroughly reviewed the results of DOE’s 

scientific studies, including the NRC, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 

the University of Nevada system, as well as international groups. These scientific 

studies also have been subject to extensive scientific peer review. 

In Secretary Abraham’s recommendation to the President, he said: ‘‘The first consideration in my decision was whether the Yucca Mountain site will safeguard the 

health and safety of the people, in Nevada and across the country, and will be effective in containing at minimum risk the material it is designed to hold. Substantial 

evidence shows that it will.’’

A broad spectrum of experts, including the International Atomic Energy Agency 

and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, agree that there is scientific information to support the President’s recommendation of Yucca Mountain as a safe repository site. 

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, a scientific advisory panel to the U.S. 

Congress, reported to Congress in a January 24 letter that research at Yucca Mountain indicates that ‘‘no individual technical or scientific factor has been identified 

that would automatically eliminate Yucca Mountain from consideration as the site 

of a permanent repository.’’ Although pointing out issues where further DOE attention should be focused, the NWTRB said that there is no reason that the Yucca 

Mountain program should not move forward. The outstanding issues identified by 

the NWTRB will be resolved during the DOE licensing process with the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. In fact, several of these issues already have been resolved 

to NRC’s satisfaction. 

We urge Congress to join the scientific community and a far-reaching group of bipartisan governors, state legislators and local officials across the nation who have 

endorsed the Yucca Mountain repository program. 

Despite the comprehensive record of science, some opponents of this project continue to call for additional study. Their claims are thinly veiled attempts to delay 

this important national facility. The President’s recommendation is consistent with 

the National Academy of Sciences’ conclusion in 1990 that a deep geologic repository 

is ‘‘the best option for disposal of high-level radioactive waste.’’ There is no need for 

additional study on the mode of disposal, or the Yucca Mountain site in particular, 

in advance of the site selection. 

SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS CONTINUES DURING NRC LICENSING PHASE

I want to clarify an important point regarding Yucca Mountain. The site approval 

process is a first, but necessary, step that starts the formal design and safety evaluation process for a repository at Yucca Mountain. Scientific evidence supports the 

approval of the Yucca Mountain site for an underground repository, where used nuclear fuel can be securely managed. After congressional approval of the President’s 

decision, DOE will continue a multi-year scientific process through an extensive licensing review process and, if the license is approved, operation of the facility. The 

NRC, through its exacting licensing process, must ensure that the repository meets 

stringent regulatory requirements to protect public safety and the environment. 

This independent licensing review process will require the resolution of outstanding 

scientific issues identified in the siting process. 

No repository construction can proceed at Yucca Mountain without first being licensed by the NRC. If new scientific issues arise in the process of the licensing review or operation of the repository, they must be resolved or DOE cannot continue. 

The nuclear energy industry, as a stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain project, will 

participate in this program with safety as our foremost consideration—just as it is 

with operation of the nation’s nuclear power plants. 

Although some 600 scientific and technical reports have been completed on Yucca 

Mountain over the course of the Reagan, Bush, Clinton and current administrations, 

scientific research will continue. This ensures that the best scientific insight will 

continue to be provided in combination with cutting edge engineering and the natural features of Yucca Mountain to protect public safety and the environment. 

The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report last December reviewing the 

Yucca Mountain project. Instead of investigating the site using scientific reports assembled in the course of 20 years of study, the GAO relied extensively on conversations with DOE’s contractor about the project schedule and budget. Remarks by this 

contractor regarding the licensing schedule for the repository have since been retracted. 

214

The GAO report stated that there are 293 technical items that DOE should resolve with the NRC before a site recommendation could be made. This reflects a fundamental lack of understanding by the GAO about the repository siting process. 

Neither the law nor the NRC licensing process requires that these items be resolved 

before a site recommendation can be made. Rather, regulations require that any scientific issues related to assuring protection of public health and safety be resolved 

during the NRC licensing process and DOE has plans to do so. This requirement 

has been satisfied. 

The NRC stated that it ‘‘believes that sufficient ‘‘analysis and waste form proposal 

information, although not available now, will be available at the time of a potential 

license application such that development of an acceptable license application is 

achievable.’’

ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS DESERVE RETURN ON $18 BILLION INVESTMENT

Mr. Chairman, the time to move forward with licensing and building a repository 

has never been more appropriate. The Department of Energy has spent more than 

$7 billion on scientific and engineering studies that demonstrate that the site is 

suitable for disposal of used nuclear fuel and that the site is ready to proceed to 

the license phase. It is important to note that the Yucca Mountain project is funded 

largely by a tax on the millions of consumers who benefit from the use of nuclear 

energy. Last year, nuclear power plants generated a record 767 billion kilowatthours of electricity. The tax for the Yucca Mountain program collected by the U.S. 

Treasury totaled more than $728 million. Since 1983, more than $18 billion, including interest, has been committed by consumers solely for DOE’s used nuclear fuel 

management program. 

The federal Nuclear Waste Fund has a balance of more than $10 billion because 

consumer payments into the fund have far exceeded appropriations by Congress for 

this important environmental program for decades. For example, consumers committed well over $500 million more for the Yucca Mountain program in 2001 than 

was spent on the project. The industry greatly appreciates the Energy and Commerce Committee’s and this subcommittee’s commitment to consumer fairness embodied in your efforts to take the Nuclear Waste Fund ‘‘off budget’’ in last year’s 

energy policy legislation. 

Yet, delays in the repository program can no longer be tolerated. Although the 

federal government was to start accepting used nuclear fuel on January 31, 1998, 

no fuel has been moved to a federal fuel management facility, and DOE projects 

that no fuel will start moving until 2010 at the earliest. 

The Energy Department’s delays have resulted in dual payments by electricity 

consumers for used nuclear fuel management(one to fund the Yucca Mountain 

project and a second to pay for additional temporary storage at nuclear plants because of DOE’s default. Operation of a federal repository at Yucca Mountain would 

begin the process of removing used fuel rods from commercial nuclear power plants 

and the radioactive byproducts from the nation’s defense facilities in 39 states—

where it was never intended to be stored for the long term. Electricity consumers 

deserve a solution to this issue that is based on sound science and that protects public safety and the environment. 

CONCLUSION

The federal government must continue on schedule with its program to site, license, and build a used nuclear fuel repository to provide the nation with continued 

energy security, environmental protection, economic growth and national security. 

Used nuclear fuel and radioactive defense waste is safely stored at nuclear power 

plants in 39 states, but the federal government has a legal obligation to consolidate 

this material at a central location where it can be efficiently managed for the long 

term. 

A repository 1,000 feet below the surface of Yucca Mountain is the safest and 

most secure place for the permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel from commercial 

reactors and high-level radioactive byproducts from our U.S. defense programs. The 

vast scientific record supports the site designation, and domestic energy security, 

environmental protection and national security considerations should compel Congress to support the President’s recommendation and provide the funding needed to 

proceed with licensing and construction of a specially designed repository at Yucca 

Mountain. 

There is broad support for congressional approval of the Yucca Mountain repository from a myriad of groups, including: African-American Environmentalist Association; American Public Power Association; Council for Citizens Against Government Waste; Covering Your Assets Coalition; Edison Electric Institute; Frontiers of 

215

Freedom; Hispanic Business Roundtable; International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers; The Latino Coalition; National Association of Manufacturers; National Association of Neighborhoods; National Black Chamber of Commerce; Nuclear Energy 

Institute; 60 Plus Association, Inc.; The Seniors Coalition; United Seniors Association, Inc.; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce; and 

Utility Workers Union of America. 

In the press, editorial pages by a margin of 7 to 1 support the Yucca Mountain 

project, including: Albuquerque Journal; Chicago Sun-Times; Chicago Tribune; 

Cleveland Plain Dealer; The (Allentown, Pa.) Morning Call; The New York Times; 

Tennessean; The Wall Street Journal; The Washington Times; and Wilmington 

(N.C.) Morning Star. 

In his letter forwarding the Yucca Mountain site recommendation to the President, Energy Secretary Abraham said, ‘‘First, and most important, I have considered 

whether sound science supports the determination that the Yucca Mountain site is 

scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a repository. I am convinced that it does.’’ Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, scientists and 

policymakers alike are convinced that the Yucca Mountain site is scientifically and 

technically suitable to be the nation’s repository for used nuclear fuel from nuclear 

power plants and high-level radioactive waste from Defense Department programs. 

It is imperative that Congress support continued timely progress toward development of a national repository at Yucca Mountain. 

A repository is imperative for our energy security, given that nuclear energy provides 20 percent of all U.S. electricity and is the largest emission-free source of electricity. 

A repository is imperative for our national security because about 40 percent of 

our Navy’s most essential vessels, such as aircraft carriers and submarines, are nuclear-powered ships. 

A repository is imperative for future growth of our economy and nuclear energy, 

which is the only large source of electricity that is readily expandable and does not 

produce greenhouse gasses or other harmful emissions. 

A repository is imperative for environmental protection, particularly at facilities 

in Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina and Tennessee where 

defense waste is stored, and in Maine, Connecticut, Oregon, Illinois, California and 

other states where sites with decommissioned reactors cannot be returned to greenfield status without a repository to accept used fuel rods stored at those plants. 

And, a repository is imperative to promote U.S. non-proliferation objectives by 

providing a disposal facility for surplus weapons grade plutonium. 

Mr. Chairman, an editorial in the March 9 New York Times summarizes, I believe, the prevailing notion held by many regarding Yucca Mountain. The Times 

said, ‘‘It is time to determine, once and for all, whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable disposal site, or whether the nation will need to look elsewhere—The Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, the chief guardian of the public’s health, has ruled that 

enough information will be available to support a licensing application. The reason 

to proceed now is that it will force all parties to come up with final answers to a 

problem that has been allowed to fester too long.’’

After 20 years of scientific and engineering study and billions of dollars from consumers used to fund this research, a large, indisputable body of research results 

supports the President’s decision. 

Thank you

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you and thank you for being clear and concise. 

We’d now like to recognize Mr. Dushaw of the Utility Department of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. We 

appreciate your attendance and your full statement is in the record 

and you can begin. 

STATEMENT OF JIM DUSHAW 

Mr. DUSHAW. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of our 

International President, Ed Hill and IBEW members, especially 

those who are working in the commercial nuclear power industry, 

thanks for the opportunity to present our views here on the Yucca 

Mountain repository. We’ve heard a lot about that today so I won’t 

repeat, hopefully, some of the information you’ve already had. 

216

The IBEW is a labor union with approximately 780,000 members 

including many workers at nuclear facilities. Of the 70,000 union 

jobs within the nuclear industry the IBEW represents 15,000 fulltime workers at 74 nuclear stations and thousands more IBEW 

members rotate through the nuclear plants with refueling outages 

and maintenance. The IBEW’s history with the nuclear industry 

goes back to the test reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, around 

the corner from Carnegie Mellon University, I might say. 

So we say without reservation that this is an industry with a 

proven record of exceptional safety and it’s among the safest industrial work environments in the United States. The commercial nuclear industry is a source of high quality, safe, well paying jobs for 

tens of thousands of IBEW members and many others as well. Does 

it follow then as a set up that our union is biased in favor of sustaining nuclear power? Absolutely. But that’s not the exclusive reason for our support for moving forward with the development of 

Yucca Mountain. 

IBEW members want common sense to be heard on this issue. 

We applaud President Bush’s decision to move forward with the development of a spent fuel repository at Yucca Mountain and urge 

Congress to approve the President’s decision over the State of Nevada’s objection. 

We support the President’s decision on several counts, most importantly, the IBEW has at least since the late 1970’s had consecutive resolutions at our international conventions that went to expediting the establishment of a Federal repository for nuclear waste 

and accountability of the Federal Government for it’s responsibilities. 

We engage in energy policy issues often and we do so from many 

perspectives. The development of public policy with respect to energy, environmental protections and the well-being of the Nation 

now and in the future is of great concern to the IBEW. Our Union’s 

view is that there’s a compelling need for the Nation to develop in 

a thoughtful, accelerated and safe fashion all domestic energy resources including nuclear in order to fuel economic growth, provide 

jobs for a growing population, protect our environment and ensure 

energy and security. 

For all these reasons the Nation can now ill afford indecisive outcomes on vital energy issues in such threatening times that have 

come upon us. We are satisfied, of course, to leave the technical 

discussion of Yucca Mountain of which it’s overflowing to the experts as we heard in the earlier panel. 

The IBEW has confidence that the President of the United States 

has made a fully informed decision on the scientific merits of approving the Energy Secretary’s recommendation of Yucca Mountain. We believe that in the range of alternative solutions, none 

compare well with the Yucca Mountain plan which intends to place 

fuel and nuclear waste with the potential for any harm and any access to it is tightly controlled. 

Well, if plants start closing down due to a lack of spent fuel storage place, jobs will disappear, consumers for no compelling reason 

will lose the real contender for low cost electricity in this newly 

competitive electric supply industry. It is clear the Nation needs to 

217

have a place to put the used nuclear fuel to ensure continued operation of our nuclear power plants. 

Of course, we know how much money has been spent and how 

long this has been studied. We need not repeat that. It clearly 

makes sense that used nuclear fuel should be stored at one centralized storage facility. Fuel is currently stored at more than 130, remember that, 130 long-term storage facilities in 39 States. As we 

heard earlier, there is no show stopper with respect to the DOE 

recommendation. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to skip on and say yesterday I received 

a letter or became aware of a letter from our local union, IBEW 

Local Union 357 in Las Vegas, Nevada. I would like to read the 

punch line on that letter, skipping through the testimony. It’s new, 

but we presented a copy of this to committee staff this morning and 

it will be sent to all Representatives and Senators. 

From Local 357 in Las Vegas this is ‘‘no one wants a waste site, 

but everyone expects electricity. No one wants a chlorine plant next 

door, but everyone wants safe drinking water. No one wants a tank 

farm nearby, but we all drive cars. Today, we will light our homes, 

sip water and drive the kids to soccer games in well placed confidence. However, none of this would be possible without the basic 

infrastructure that supports our society. Nuclear power at Yucca 

Mountain are important parts of this continuum which we simply 

must depend on. Speaking as electricians, Nevadans and Americans, we believe that an aggressively managed repository at Yucca 

Mountain can make a meaningful and safe contribution to our 

country.’’ Many of our members just aren’t saying this, they’re living it because they work there. 

Mr. Chairman, the IBEW submits that this issue is a challenge 

to the Nation’s will and determination to preserve and further develop all safe energy options. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of James L. Dushaw follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES L. DUSHAW, DIRECTOR, UTILITY DEPARTMENT, 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS

My name is Jim Dushaw and I am the Utility Department Director for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the IBEW. 

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of IBEW President Ed Hill, and IBEW members, especially worker members who are associated with the commercial nuclear power industry, thank you for the opportunity to present our views on the Yucca Mountain 

nuclear waste repository issue. 

The IBEW is a labor union with approximately 780,000 members, including many 

workers at nuclear facilities. Of the 70,000 union jobs within the nuclear industry, 

the IBEW represents 15,000 full-time workers at 74 nuclear stations. Thousands 

more IBEW members rotate through the plants with the contractor work force as 

needed for maintenance and refueling outages. With a history of work in the commercial nuclear industry dating back to the 1950s, and the test reactor at 

Shippingport, Pennsylvania, IBEW nuclear workers can say without reservation 

that this is an industry with a proven record of exceptional safety. It is among the 

safest industrial work environments in the United States. 

The commercial nuclear industry is a source of high quality, safe, well-paying jobs 

for tens of thousands of IBEW members and many others as well. Does it follow 

then that our union is biased in favor of sustaining nuclear power? Yes, but that 

is not the exclusive reason for the IBEW’s support for moving forward with development at Yucca Mountain. 

I am not an engineer, physicist, geologist, nor do I profess to have any special 

technical knowledge relevant to the Yucca Mountain issue. However, IBEW members want common sense to be heard on this issue. We applaud the President’s deciVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00221 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
218

sion to move forward with development of a spent fuel repository at Yucca Mountain, and urge Congress to approve the President’s decision over the state of Nevada’s objection. 

We support the President’s decision on several counts; most importantly, the 

IBEW has, at least since the late 1970s, adopted formal resolutions during several 

consecutive IBEW International Conventions, the union’s highest governing body, 

that deal particularly with the need for ‘‘expediting’’ the establishment of a federal 

repository for nuclear waste. A similar resolution was passed without exception by 

delegates to the 36th IBEW International Convention September 12, 2001. 

Mr. Chairman, the IBEW is by name and fact an organization associated with the 

energy industry. We are also consumers, environmentalists and working folks. We 

engage in energy policy issues often, and we do so from many perspectives. The development of public policy with respect to energy, environmental protections, and 

the well-being of the nation now and for the future, is of great concern for IBEW 

members. 

The IBEW view is that there is a compelling need for the nation to develop in 

a thoughtful, but accelerated and safe fashion, all domestic energy resources, including nuclear, in order to fuel economic growth, provide jobs for a growing population, 

protect our environment, assure energy and, therefore, economic security. For all of 

these reasons, the nation can ill afford indecisive outcomes on vital energy issues 

in such threatening times as have come upon us. 

We are satisfied to leave the technical discussion, of which the Yucca Mountain 

debate is overflowing, to the qualified experts. The IBEW has confidence that the 

President of the United States has made a fully informed decision on the scientific 

merits in approving the Energy Secretary’s recommendation of Yucca Mountain as 

a permanent nuclear waste storage site. We believe that in the range of alternative 

solutions, none compare well with the Yucca Mountain plan, which intends to place 

spent fuel and nuclear waste where the potential for any harm and any access is 

tightly controlled and monitored. 

If plants start closing down due to a lack of spent fuel storage space, jobs will 

disappear, and consumers, for no compelling reason, lose a real contender for lowcost electricity in the newly competitive electric supply industry. If even one plant 

is forced to shut down because of a lack of spent fuel storage space, hundreds, possibly thousands, of jobs will be irretrievably lost. Forcing higher than necessary 

costs on plant operation with on-site storage makes no sense, as consumers suffer 

the consequences. 

It is clear the nation needs to have a place to put the used nuclear fuel to ensure 

continued operation of our nuclear power plants. Scientists have been studying 

Yucca Mountain for more than a decade. This mountain is the most extensively defined piece of property in the world. DOE’s viability assessment shows that based 

upon the scientific studies of Yucca Mountain, there are no ‘‘showstoppers’’ to continuing development of this urgently needed facility. We are now twelve years behind the goal Congress set forth in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

It clearly makes sense that used nuclear fuel should be stored at one centralized 

storage facility. Fuel is currently stored at more than 130 long-term storage facilities in 39 states. According to the DOE Environmental Impact Statement of 1999, 

there is significantly more protection for the American public and the environment 

if we have one central federal repository. We should not pass this problem onto our 

children and grandchildren, especially since science has proven that we can safely 

transport and store the fuel at Yucca Mountain. 

It is a fact that the spent nuclear fuel can be transported safely. Our existing laws 

and regulations provide for the safe loading, packaging, transportation and unloading of all kinds of nuclear materials today. There is no reason to believe that the 

continued transportation of radioactive materials will be any less safe. Union workers are justifiably proud of their safety record in transporting radioactive cargo—

both by rail and by truck. 

The federal government has a legal obligation to manage and dispose of the used 

fuel created by the nation’s electric utilities. For twenty years, consumers of electricity, including union workers, have paid more than $17 billion into a federal trust 

fund to pay for the disposal of used nuclear fuel. Only about six billion of these dollars have been spent on the Yucca Mountain project. Congress should move expeditiously to see that the federal government lives up to its lawful responsibility and 

begins managing the used nuclear fuel as promised. 

Science shows that Yucca Mountain is a suitable repository for the used nuclear 

fuel. In addition, we have proven that we can transport radioactive cargos without 

harming American citizens or the environment. It just makes sense that we continue forward with Yucca Mountain as the repository for our nation’s used nuclear 

fuel. There’s much more than jobs at stake here. The IBEW submits that this issue 

219

is a challenge to the nation’s will and determination to preserve and further develop 

all safe energy options. 

Thank you.


g:\graphics\79469.115
220

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you and I ask unanimous consent that that 

letter be included into the statement and I will turn to the chairman of the subcommittee. 

I will state that Ms. Claybrook is not in attendance yet, but she’s 

already submitted her full statement for the record and then I’ll 

turn to the chairman of the full committee. 

[The prepared statement of Joan Claybrook follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC CITIZEN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify on the president’s February 14th recommendation that a nuclear waste repository be developed at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. I am President of Public Citizen, 

a national non-profit public interest organization with 150,000 members nationwide. 

Public Citizen works to protect citizens and the environment from the dangers posed 

by nuclear power and advocates for safe, affordable, and sustainable energy policies. 

In the coming months, Congress will face an unprecedented decision about whether to support or override the Governor of Nevada’s Notice of Disapproval to prevent 

establishing a Yucca Mountain repository for 70,000 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power plants and Department of Energy 

(DOE) weapons activities. 

Public Citizen urges the Committee to decisively reject Energy Secretary Spencer 

Abraham’s unscientific site recommendation, support the Notice of Disapproval and 

stop the Yucca Mountain Project, in order to protect public health and safety. The 

DOE has a long record of investing in wasteful ventures and white elephants at a 

cost of tens of billions of dollars to the U.S. taxpayer. No private business could survive operating with such a string of misjudgments and failures. It is time for the 

Congress to insert a dose of reality and pull the plug on the hazardous Yucca Mountain venture. Just look at the DOE’s mishandling of military nuclear waste projects, 

some of which were highlighted by 60 Minutes on Sunday, March 17, 2002 (transcript attached). Yucca Mountain is poised to become another contaminated DOE 

site if the repository proposal moves forward. 

THE SITE IS UNSUITABLE

After fifteen years of site characterization studies at a cost exceeding $5 billion, 

DOE scientists have been unable to demonstrate that a repository at Yucca Mountain could effectively isolate high-level nuclear waste throughout the quarter million 

years it remains dangerously radioactive. Having originally instructed the DOE to 

assess the suitability of the site for a geologic repository, Congress should now consider this question answered in the negative, and terminate repository activities at 

Yucca Mountain. 

The geology of the site is ill-suited to the task of containment. Yucca Mountain 

is a ridge of porous volcanic tuff, highly fractured as a result of seismic activity. 

Thirty-three earthquake faults are known to exist within and adjacent to the Yucca 

Mountain site, with additional fault lines expected to develop over time. The proposed repository would lie about 1,000 feet above a freshwater aquifer, which currently provides the only source of drinking water for area residents in Amargosa 

Valley, Nevada, and parts of Inyo County, California. If radioactivity from the proposed repository reaches the aquifer below, it not only will contaminate this important source of drinking water, which is in short supply, but also will provide a pathway for potentially dangerous levels of radioactivity to reach the accessible environment. 

Although the climate at Yucca Mountain is generally dry, evidence points to relatively rapid movement of water through the rock. Elevated levels of the tracer isotope Chlorine-36 found in the DOE’s test tunnel at Yucca Mountain indicate that 

water traveled from surface- to repository-level (about 1,000 feet) in 50 years or faster. The original siting guidelines (10 CFR 960) would have disqualified the Yucca 

Mountain site on the basis of water flow time alone. 

To prevent the site from being disqualified, the government changed the rules. 

The DOE inappropriately rewrote the repository siting guidelines in November 2001 

to accommodate the deficiencies in the Yucca Mountain site. The revised guidelines 

(10 CFR 963) are a dangerous departure from the concept of geologic containment 

and offer an inadequate basis for site recommendation. The new performance-based 

siting guidelines permit a reliance on ‘‘engineered barriers’’ in an attempt to mask 

the many problems that should disqualify the Yucca Mountain site. DOE’s reposiVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00224 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
221

1 Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office analysis of DOE presentation to Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 1/25/99. 2The presidential-appointed Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board is an independent agency 

of the U.S. Government. The Board provides independent scientific and technical oversight of 

the civilian high-level radioactive waste management program. 3 Nuclear Waste: Technical, Cost and Schedule Uncertainties of the Yucca Mountain Project 

(December 2001). 

tory design proposals rely more than 99% on engineered barriers for containment. 

The geology of Yucca Mountain contributes less than 1%.1

Given the difficulties in accurately predicting, on the basis of very limited experience, the performance of engineered barriers over tens of thousands of years, coupled with the inadequacies of the ‘‘natural barriers’’ at Yucca Mountain, it is only 

a question of when—not if—the proposed repository’s isolation systems would fail. 

High-level nuclear waste is intensely radioactive and very long-lived. It is one of 

the most hazardous substances ever created. The waste’s dangerous radioactivity 

will outlast any engineered barriers employed at Yucca Mountain. The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) site-specific radiation protection standards for 

Yucca Mountain (40 CFR 197) arbitrarily established a 10,000-year limit on containment requirements at the repository, which has been subsequently adopted by the 

DOE in its siting guidelines and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its 

Yucca Mountain licensing rule. 

Yet high-level nuclear waste will remain dangerously radioactive for much longer. 

For example, Plutonium-239, which accounts for approximately 1-4% of high-level 

nuclear waste by weight, has a half-life of 24,400 years and remains dangerously 

radioactive for close to a quarter-million years. If DOE’s optimistic predictions are 

correct and the underground nuclear waste storage containers at Yucca Mountain 

do not begin failing from corrosion for 40,000 years, peak radiation dose rates from 

the proposed repository are expected 100,000-200,000 years into the future—outside 

EPA’s inadequate regulatory timeframe. 

The EPA’s radiation standards (40 CFR 197) also establish a lower level of environmental protection for Yucca Mountain than the generic rule applicable elsewhere, by expanding the unregulated zone to 18 kilometers from the repository 

boundary. This site-specific rule allows the DOE to rely on dilution and dispersion 

in groundwater, rather than containment of radioactivity, and as such sets an inadequate benchmark for performance assessment evaluations. Public Citizen, together 

with the Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental and public interest organizations, filed a lawsuit last June challenging these aspects of the EPA 

rule. 

But even projections of the proposed repository’s compliance with this inadequate 

standard are inconclusive. The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 2 advised 

Congress on January 24, 2002, that ‘‘the technical basis for the DOE’s repository 

performance estimates is weak to moderate.’’ Also, a December 2001 report by the 

General Accounting Office highlighted 293 unresolved technical issues, identified by 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that require further study and analysis.3 As 

the GAO report suggests, Secretary Abraham’s site recommendation is premature 

at best. 

THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WASTE TRANSPORTATION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED

Intrinsic to any assessment of Yucca Mountain’s suitability as a national nuclear 

waste repository is the feasibility of transporting waste to the site. Yet the DOE has 

consistently downplayed the transportation impacts of the Yucca Mountain proposal. 

Secretary Abraham’s site recommendation does not detail a specific plan for transporting waste from the 77 nuclear power plants and DOE weapons sites across the 

country where it’s currently stored to Nevada. Basic decisions about the mode of 

transportation (truck, train, or barge) and routes have not yet been made. 

The maps of potential Yucca Mountain transport routes, included in the project’s 

final Environmental Impact Statement, indicate that tens of thousands of high-level 

radioactive waste shipments would likely pass through 44 states and the District 

of Columbia en route to Yucca Mountain. Recognizing the explosive nature of route 

designations, the DOE refuses to announce a specific proposal for transporting nuclear waste until after Yucca Mountain is licensed. But based on the Environmental 

Impact Statement, I have attached a list of members of this committee through 

whose districts high-level nuclear waste likely will be transported in route to Yucca 

Mountain We urge the full committee not to vote on the Yucca Mountain Project 

until DOE reveals precisely which routes would be used for nuclear waste transportation. 

222

4Large Truck Crash Facts, 1999, Analysis Division, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (April 2001). 5Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety, http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/, 

viewed 3/16/02. 6Why Is There a Train Accident Every 90 Minutes? RailWatch (revised March 1999). 7 Reported Incidents Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments, 1949 to Present, Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office (1996). 8 Radiological Consequences Of Severe Rail Accident Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments 

To Yucca Mountain: Hypothetical Baltimore Rail Tunnel Fire Involving SNF, Radioactive Waste 

Management Associates (September 2001). 

Transporting nuclear waste is inherently dangerous because it increases the likelihood of radioactive release and introduces this risk to densely populated areas 

where the emergency response/public health infrastructure may lack the capacity to 

respond effectively to a nuclear emergency. The Department of Transportation 

(DOT) recorded 453,000 crashes involving large trucks in 1999, the most recent year 

for which statistics are available, including 8,857 hazardous materials shipments.4

Over the same period, the Federal Railroad Administration reported 2,768 train 

crashes.5 According to RailWatch analysis of accident reports, a train carrying hazardous materials in the U.S. runs off the tracks, spills some of its load, and forces 

an evacuation about once every two weeks.6

Since the dawn of the Nuclear Age, approximately 3,000 shipments of high-level 

nuclear waste have traveled on U.S. roads and rails. This number would be exceeded within the first two years of shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. While the nuclear industry frequently refers to an accident-free shipping history, a 1996 analysis of DOE accident reports 7 documents 72 ‘‘incidents’’ since 1949 

involving nuclear waste shipments, including four involving ‘‘accidental radioactive 

material contamination beyond the vehicle,’’ four with radiation contamination confined to the vehicle, 49 of accidental container surface contamination, 13 traffic accidents with no release or contamination, and 2 incidents with no description. Extrapolating on the basis of this past history and considering, statistically, general 

traffic crash rates along probable nuclear waste transportation routes, crashes involving Yucca Mountain shipments are certain to occur if the repository program 

moves forward. 

Given the statistical certainty of crashes involving Yucca Mountain nuclear waste 

shipments, the DOE and nuclear industry safety assurances rest upon the 

robustness of shipping containers, or ‘‘casks,’’ and their ability to contain radioactivity even in the event of a crash. However, we are concerned that in the event 

of a severe crash, casks may not perform as expected. DOE accident analyses fail 

to consider the statistical likelihood of manufacturing and human error and its impact on cask performance. Also, NRC license requirements for high-level radioactive 

waste transport casks rely on computer modeling. Amazingly, currently licensed 

casks have never had full-scale, dynamic tests. Limited dynamic tests in the 1970s 

were performed on now-obsolete casks and have not been repeated. In those tests, 

cask valves and shielding failed during extended fire tests. 

Furthermore, the NRC’s performance requirements for nuclear waste casks (10 

CFR 71.73), established in the 1970s, are outdated and dangerously underestimate 

the conditions of today’s worst-case accident scenario:

• The drop test requires casks to withstand a fall from 30 feet onto an unyielding 

surface, which simulates a crash at 30 miles per hour. Yet no regulations are 

in place to limit to 30 mph the speed at which nuclear waste shipments can 

travel. This test condition could easily be exceeded, if, for instance, a cask traveling at regular highway speeds (now 65-75 miles per hour) crashed into oncoming traffic or a virtually unyielding structure such as a bridge abutment. 

• The burn test requires casks to withstand an engulfing fire at 1475 degrees Fahrenheit for 30 minutes. Other materials routinely transported on our roads and 

rails could spark a hotter fire (diesel burns at 1850 degrees) and could potentially burn for longer than half an hour. Last summer’s fire in Baltimore’s Howard Street train tunnel—which the DOE has identified as a potential Yucca 

Mountain shipment route—burned for more than 3 days and likely reached 

temperatures of at least 1500 degrees. If a nuclear waste cask had been on the 

train involved in that accident, its containment would have been breached, exposing 345,493 people in the area to radiation and costing at least $13.7 billion 

dollars to clean up.8

• The puncture test requires casks to withstand a free-fall from 40 inches onto an 

8 inch-long spike. A train derailment or a truck crash on a bridge could result 

in a fall from much higher than 40 inches and potentially result in puncture 

damage to the cask’s shielding. 

223

9 ‘‘Potential Consequences of a Successful Sabotage Attack on a Spent Fuel Shipping Container: An Analysis of the Yucca Mountain EIS Treatment of Sabotage,’’ Radioactive Waste 

Managemet Associates, April 2002. 10The Boston Globe March 12, 2002 and The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel March 12, 2002 

quoting the Associated Press. 

• The same cask is required to withstand submersion in 3 feet of water, and a separate test requires an undamaged cask to withstand submersion in 200 meters 

of water (656 feet) for 1 hour. If a crash involving a nuclear waste shipment 

occurred on a bridge or barge, a damaged cask could be submerged in depths 

greater than 3 feet. Furthermore, given the weight of nuclear waste transport 

casks, it is not reasonable to assume that a submerged cask could be rescued 

within one hour. Licensed truck casks weigh 24-27 tons, loaded, and train casks 

can weigh up to 125 tons, loaded. In the case of a barge transport accident, if 

a crane capable of lifting such a massive load out of the ocean were not immediately available, water pressure over longer periods could result in cask failure 

and radiation release. 

The prospect of transporting high-level nuclear waste across the country through 

major population centers also poses a security risk, particularly in the current context of heightened national security concerns. Immediately following the September 

11th terrorist attacks, at least 10 people were arrested on charges of possessing 

fraudulent permits for transporting radioactive and hazardous materials. 

Regulatory requirements are also inadequate to protect against the risk of terrorist attacks. Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not require transportation casks to be tested against this vulnerability, tests and studies have demonstrated that an anti-tank weapon could easily penetrate a nuclear waste transportation cask and result in a potentially catastrophic release of radiation. In a 1998 

demonstration at Aberdeen Proving Ground, a TOW anti-tank missile shot at a Castor V-21 storage cask blew a hole through the wall of the cask. Analysis by the state 

of Nevada indicates that a successful terrorist attack on a GA-4 truck cask using 

a common military demolition device could cause 300 to 1,800 latent cancer fatalities, assuming 90% penetration by a single blast. Full perforation of the cask, likely 

to occur in an attack involving a state-of-the art anti-tank weapon such as the TOW 

missile, could cause 3,000 to 18,000 latent cancer fatalities. Cleanup and recovery 

costs would exceed $17 billion.9

Yet just last month, on March 11, 2002, CIA national intelligence officer Robert 

Walpole told the Senate Government Affairs Committee that while the chance that 

a missile with a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead will be used against U.S. 

forces or interests is greater today than during most of the Cold War, the agency’s analysts believe there is an even greater threat that such a weapon will be delivered 

by truck, ship or airplane ‘‘because non-missile delivery means are less costly, easier 

to acquire, more reliable and accurate’’.10

On September 11, 2001, and again in October when U.S. forces entered Afghanistan, Secretary Abraham suspended all nuclear shipments because of the security 

risks they pose. Yet his Yucca Mountain site recommendation, issued only 5 months 

later, failed to acknowledge or address this security concern in relation to the tens 

of thousands of nuclear shipments that would be launched by the Yucca Mountain 

Project. 

The unintentional and non-accident risk of nuclear waste transportation is also 

a concern. NRC regulations allow nuclear waste shipping casks to emit 10 millirem 

of radiation—the equivalent of a chest X-ray—per hour from a distance of 6.5 feet. 

The cumulative impact of routine radiation exposure from Yucca Mountain nuclear 

waste shipments on other motorists (maximized in gridlock traffic scenarios) and 

people who live or work along transport routes has not been adequately examined. 

The multiple risks associated with transporting large volumes of nuclear waste 

over long distances to an unsuitably sited repository in Nevada simply cannot be 

justified. Since a repository at Yucca Mountain necessarily involves an unprecedented program of nuclear transportation, we urge the Committee to fully consider 

the impact of the many transportation dangers in its evaluation of the Yucca Mountain Site Recommendation. 

THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS HAS BEEN UNDERMINED

The dramatically flawed process railroading the Yucca Mountain Project toward 

approval undermines the credibility of Secretary Abraham’s site recommendation. 

The downgrading of environmental regulations (EPA’s more lenient site-specific radiation protection standards and DOE’s revised siting guidelines that prevent Yucca 

Mountain from being disqualified) has set a dangerous precedent of sacrificing public health and environmental safety to nuclear industry interests. And yet even 

224

11 8. The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land, National Research Council (1957). 

these underhanded decisions cannot mask the fact that this site is not suitable, as 

the GAO, IG, and Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board have made clear. 

A Public Citizen report released April 1, 2002, indicates that nuclear industry interests may have directly biased Secretary Abraham’s site recommendation. The report is attached. According to our research, the nuclear industry contributed $82,728 

to Secretary Abraham’s failed bid for re-election during the 2000 election cycle, and in 2000 alone, top nuclear contributors to his campaign spent more than $25 million—nearly half a million dollars each week—on lobbying efforts that included support for the repository proposal. Public Citizen, in January 2002, requested that Secretary Abraham recuse himself from Yucca Mountain site recommendation activities, based on the precedent of Attorney General John Ashcroft recusing himself 

from the Justice Department’s Enron investigations because the failed energy trad- ing company had contributed $75,000 to his election campaign. Our letter to Secretary Abraham is attached. We have received a legalistic response that doesn’t deal 

with the issue of the appearance of impropriety. 

As another indication of pro-industry bias in the Yucca Mountain Project, a November 2001 report by the DOE Inspector General disclosed that the law firm Winston & Strawn was simultaneously employed as counsel to the DOE, working on the 

Yucca Mountain Project, and registered as a member of and lobbyist for the Nuclear 

Energy Institute between 1992 and 2001. The executive summary of this report is 

attached. The DOE, as a federal agency, is supposed to be objective and unbiased 

in its evaluations of the repository proposal and to uphold the same standards of 

integrity for its contractors. Yet it hired a member of the Nuclear Energy Institute, 

the lobbying arm of the nuclear industry that specifically advocates in favor of the 

proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, which would serve the narrow financial interests of its nuclear industry members. The involvement of Winston 

& Strawn lawyers in both shaping the DOE’s Yucca Mountain activities and advising and lobbying on behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute on nuclear waste legislation undermines the integrity of the recent site recommendation. After this conflict 

was publicly disclosed, Winston & Strawn resigned from the Yucca Mountain 

Project. But even in the wake of this scandal, but the firm’s work was not withdrawn. 

The same Inspector General report notes that TRW, Inc., hired by the DOE as 

the managing and operations contractor for the Yucca Mountain Project until February 2001, was simultaneously engaged in lobbying activities on nuclear waste 

storage issues. TRW was additionally implicated in December 2000 as the author 

of a memo attached to a leaked overview of the DOE Yucca Mountain Site Recommendation Considerations Report (later released as the Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation and the Science and Engineering Report). The memo indicated 

that the overview was intended to help supporters of the Yucca Mountain Project 

express their support for a favorable site recommendation and that ‘‘the technical 

suitability of the site is less of a concern to Congress than the broader issue of 

whether the nuclear waste problem can be solved at an affordable price in both financial and political terms.’’

Clearly, the DOE has failed to exercise necessary and proper oversight of its contractors, resulting in an obvious pro-industry bias in the agency’s site characterization and site recommendation activities. In January, Public Citizen joined 232 public interest and environmental groups calling on Congress to suspend consideration 

of the Yucca Mountain Project pending a thorough review of the causes and consequences of contractor conflict of interest in the DOE’s site characterization and 

site recommendation activities. This letter is attached. The public cannot—and lawmakers ought not—have confidence in Secretary Abraham’s site recommendation, 

which has arisen out of such a conflicted and compromised process. 

CONCLUSION

The 1957 National Research Council report, commissioned by the Atomic Energy 

Commission and which marked the beginning of this government’s continuing process to identify ‘‘disposal’’ options for high-level nuclear waste, stated in its summary, 

‘‘Unlike the disposal of any other type of waste, the hazard related to radioactive 

waste is so great that no element of doubt should be allowed to exist regarding safety.’’ 11 Numerous unresolved technical, environmental, and policy issues plague the 

Yucca Mountain Project. To approve the repository proposal would directly threaten 

the health and safety of current and future residents of Nevada and more than 50 

million people who live along likely nuclear waste transportation routes. Furthermore, the failed Yucca Mountain Project serves as a distraction from the serious polVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00228 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
225

icy examination and scientific study that is needed to more appropriately address 

the increasingly urgent issue of high-level nuclear waste management. 

We recommend that:

• the Committee uphold Nevada’s anticipated Notice of Disapproval of the Yucca 

Mountain Project and reject any siting approval resolution; 

• the Committee hold additional hearings in all major cities along nuclear waste 

transportation routes identified in the final Environmental Impact Statement 

for the Yucca Mountain Project to give the public a voice in this decision; 

• Congress and its Committees maintain vigorous legislative oversight of the nuclear waste transportation program that accompanies any repository proposal; 

and 

• Congress initiate a complete review of the civilian nuclear waste management 

program.


g:\graphics\79469.116
226


g:\graphics\79469.117
227


g:\graphics\79469.118
228


g:\graphics\79469.119
229


g:\graphics\79469.120
230


g:\graphics\79469.121
231


g:\graphics\79469.122
232


g:\graphics\79469.123
233


g:\graphics\79469.124
234


g:\graphics\79469.125
235


g:\graphics\79469.126
236


g:\graphics\79469.127
237


g:\graphics\79469.128
238


g:\graphics\79469.129
239


g:\graphics\79469.130
240


g:\graphics\79469.131
241


g:\graphics\79469.132
242


g:\graphics\79469.133
243


g:\graphics\79469.134
244


g:\graphics\79469.135
245


g:\graphics\79469.136
246


g:\graphics\79469.137
247


g:\graphics\79469.138
248


g:\graphics\79469.139
249


g:\graphics\79469.140
250


g:\graphics\79469.141
251


g:\graphics\79469.142
252


g:\graphics\79469.143
253


g:\graphics\79469.144
254


g:\graphics\79469.145
255


g:\graphics\79469.146
256


g:\graphics\79469.147
257


g:\graphics\79469.148
258


g:\graphics\79469.149
259


g:\graphics\79469.150
260


g:\graphics\79469.151
261


g:\graphics\79469.152
262


g:\graphics\79469.153
263


g:\graphics\79469.154
264


g:\graphics\79469.155
265


g:\graphics\79469.156
266


g:\graphics\79469.157
267


g:\graphics\79469.158
268


g:\graphics\79469.159
269


g:\graphics\79469.160
270


g:\graphics\79469.161
271

Mr. BARTON. Thank you. Mr. Colvin, if for some reason we were 

to not override the Governor of Nevada’s veto, what would be the 

practical impact on that on the nuclear power industry in this 

country? 

Mr. COLVIN. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s a very complex issue to 

look at from the standpoint of our electricity supply, but we’re in 

a time of renaissance in nuclear energy. It’s a time that we’re moving to deregulate and make our electricity supply more competitive 

in the United States and to look for energy sources that, in fact, 

preserve and protect the environment. And nuclear energy is an 

important part of our Nation’s energy mix, both for now and the 

future. If we, in fact, cannot resolve this issue in the United States 

and I think it will not only have a negative impact on our industry 

and on our future investment into this technology and our benefits 

that society will derive from that, but will have a similar effect in 

other countries in the world. The U.S. is the leader in this technology. We have been from the beginning. We created the commercial part of the industry that is used around the world and the 

world looks to the U.S. for continuing leadership and is very, very 

supportive of us moving forward. 

I think we need to look at this in a very important fashion and 

I commend this committee and I commend the leadership for taking this issue on and dealing with it in the context of our national 

energy security and our national security, in general. 

Mr. BARTON. Is it not reasonable that if you make the assumption that we begin to generate electricity in commercial nuclear reactors in the 1950’s, and if we override the veto and if the Department of Energy submits a suitable application and if the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission approves it, that would mean somewhere 

around the year on a permanent basis probably 2015 to 2020 we 

would actually begin to store the waste in a centralized location, 

that’s approximately 70 years. Isn’t that a reasonable time for policymakers and engineers of the greatest engineering and economic 

society the world has ever known to come to some solution on this 

issue? 

Mr. COLVIN. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, without exception. 

Mr. BARTON. Now Ms. Chappelle, you’re here on behalf of the 

NARUC Commissioners. I am certain that if and when we certify 

Yucca Mountain as a site, the transportation issue of moving the 

waste from the existing decentralized locations to the one central 

repository are going to take a fair amount of your contemporaries’ time. Do you have confidence that the various Federal agencies will 

work with the State PUCs and regulatory agencies to develop 

transportation routes and systems and time tables that will protect 

the public that you represent? 

Ms. CHAPPELLE. We do, Chairman, and I think again on behalf 

of States, because all of the various States are quite unique, I think 

the States are going to play a crucial role in the transportation 

issue and I do think that they will be aggressive and I have no 

doubts that we will work hand in hand with the Federal Government to again determine the most appropriate safe routes for the 

transportation. 

Mr. BARTON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any other questions at 

this time. 

272

Mr. SHIMKUS. And I thank the chairman and I’ll just ask a few 

follow-up questions. 

Mr. Colvin, on the whole transportation debate, it does make 

common sense that the fact that we have transported over 3,000 

shipments safely that we will work in conjunction with our States 

to make sure that all their requests, except for those that are 

meant to stop any passage of transportation would be met. Do you 

think that’s safe to say? 

Mr. COLVIN. Yes sir, Mr. Chairman. And quite honestly, if you 

look at the transportation, the United States, the Congress and our 

regulatory agencies, in fact, have put in place a tremendous set of 

regulations that are in place today to protect the public from transportation issues dealing with hazardous materials including radioactive materials. And those, in fact, have been the foundation, if 

you may, for the type of protection and rigor that we’ve had in the 

transportation to date. So as we move forward to look at the Yucca 

Mountain issue and we look forward to going through the licensing 

process, there may be issues arise, perhaps issues that have been 

identified post-9/11 that will, in fact, be evaluated and be dealt 

with in the context of the regulatory bodies that exist. And NRC 

clearly will, in fact, deal with those issues and if there’s a need to 

make adjustments to that they will be made. They cannot go forward without those being made. So your assertion is completely 

correct, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, and I want to follow up and Ms. 

Chappelle, you may have mentioned this in your opening statement 

and I apologize if I was in another meeting, but Big Rock Point on 

the banks of Lake Michigan, there was discussion earlier in this 

hearing in reference to the 5-year timeframe of once you use spent 

nuclear fuel to have to sit. But that’s not an issue for Big Rock 

Point, is it? 

Ms. CHAPPELLE. I defer to the exact mechanisms of how they are 

storing that. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. But the fact is Big Rock Point is a closed facility. 

Ms. CHAPPELLE. It is, it is. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So if they’re not producing electricity, then that 5-

year wait period is not an issue. 

Ms. CHAPPELLE. Sure. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So to make a blanket statement that we’re not 

going to reduce the number of sites around the country by moving 

it is not a correct statement? 

Ms. CHAPPELLE. Agreed, absolutely. And I would just also reiterate the comments that even though that’s a closed facility, even 

though it is in a temporary secured site, again, that is still now a 

site that will need security, that will need to be observed and further secured, so the fact that it’s closed and not operating and the 

fuel is spent does not take it out of the equation of using due diligence to find a permanent repository. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Colvin? 

Mr. COLVIN. Mr. Chairman, if I might just add to that. There 

was quite a bit of confusion in the earlier interchange with questions on this issue. If I might just clarify that. When we first take 

fuel out of the reactor, we put it into the spent fuel pool which is 

in effect a swimming pool that’s inside the power plant and we let 

273

it cool for a period of about 5 years before we then can transfer it 

either—the intent was to keep it in the pool for a period of time 

and then transfer it to the ultimate repository. That was the agreement that we reached with the government under the Atoms for 

Peace Program and into the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended. 

So the issue today is that many of the plants have been running 

out of space in the spent fuel pool as originally designed and in 

fact, by 2010, about 78 of the 103 units in the U.S. will have run 

out of that capacity. So even with the program moving forward 

with a date of 2010, the companies have had to, in fact, deal with 

this in alternate means that is typically a dry cask storage process 

which has been an additional cost to both the consumer and to the 

company, above that which we initially anticipated. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you and I want to ask my final question to 

Mr. Dushaw on the whole national energy debate, job creation, low 

cost power needs. Moving forward, is it safe to say it’s a net plus 

for an energy policy, economic development and growth and job creation? 

Mr. DUSHAW. A net plus would be passage of the energy policy. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And moving this——

Mr. DUSHAW. Absolutely, keeping nuclear alive is an absolute for 

the United States at this point in time and to keep nuclear alive, 

we need to have Yucca Mountain or an alternative answer which 

does not appear to be in the offing. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Great. I will make one pass over to the minority 

side. We don’t make expect any members to follow up and with 

that I appreciate your patience, I appreciate you all waiting until 

the afternoon and changing your statements to reflect that. 

Mr. BARTON. Will the Chair yield briefly? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTON. I just want to announce that we will have a markup of this resolution next Tuesday afternoon, I think at 4 p.m., 

but—4:30, all subcommittee members should be aware that the series of votes is going to begin on the floor at 6 so we’d like to convene at 4:30 for opening statements and if we have a quorum, we’ll 

move to markup. If not, we’ll recess until after the votes on the 

floor and then come back and mark the bill up. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And I’m correct to say no amendments will be——

Mr. BARTON. The rules of the law do not allow amendments to 

be in order on this particular resolution. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And with that information I call this hearing to 

adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 2:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN MARKEY

Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments 

Q1. After September 11, you halted all shipments of nuclear waste because of the 

security risks they pose. President Bush just warned on April 17, 2002 that he expects Al Qaeda to try to strike the U.S. again. Can you point to the sections of the 

site recommendation that address the additional consideration DOE has given since 

September 11th to the possibility that terrorists might attempt to attack a nuclear 

274

waste shipment? What new security measures do you expect to take as a result of 

the events of September 11th? 

A1. Additional consideration to possible sabotage scenarios as a result of the 

events of September 11, 2001, was given in the site recommendation documents. In 

the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), Section 4.1.8.3 addresses sabotage at the repository, and Section 6.2.4.2.3 addresses the impacts of acts of sabotage for transportation. Appendix J of the EIS, Section 2.4.3.1, contains a post-September 11 analysis of radiological impacts related to sabotage. In the Comment-Response Document for the EIS, Section 7.4.1 addresses sabotage at the repository, 

and Section 8.10.1 addresses sabotage for transportation. In both the Site Recommendation Comment Summary Document and the Supplemental Site Recommendation Comment Summary Document, Sections 4.6.3 address sabotage at the 

repository, and Sections 4.8.7 address sabotage for transportation. In the ‘‘Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy Regarding the Suitability of the Yucca 

Mountain Site for a Repository Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,’’ Section 8.6 (Assisting Anti-Terrorism at Home) addresses the events of September 11. 

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE, and other agencies are conducting a comprehensive security review that will include reexamining the protections built into our physical security 

and safeguards systems. If the results of this reexamination indicate enhancements 

are needed, the Department will modify its methods and systems as appropriate. 

Q2. Are shipments of high-level waste undertaken with the same levels of security 

as shipments of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials? 

A2. No. The Department and NRC have established a graded regulatory approach 

for physical protection of nuclear material shipments. The requirements for strategic 

special nuclear materials (e.g., weapons-grade) are more stringent, because they are 

more attractive for theft than irradiated reactor fuel. 

The Department, NRC, and other agencies review their security requirements periodically to assess their adequacy and effectiveness. A comprehensive review has 

been ongoing as a result of the attacks on September 11. DOE will comply with all 

regulations applicable to the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 

(OCRWM) program. 

Q3. Have force-on-force security exercises been conducted on shipments of high 

level nuclear waste? If so, what were the results? If not, why not, since these materials could be used to construct and detonate dirty bombs? 

A3. The Department routinely conducts force-on-force security exercises on strategically significant nuclear materials (e.g., weapons-grade). Although DOE has not 

conducted force-on-force exercises for shipments of high-level wastes, it will continue 

to evaluate security needs for various shipments. In transporting high-level waste 

to a geologic repository, DOE will comply with any NRC physical protection requirements, including those concerning force-on-force security exercises. 

Nuclear Waste Shipments 

Q4. Your testimony states that there has never been a harmful radiation release 

associated with the shipment of nuclear waste. There have been an estimated 3,000 

shipments of high-level nuclear waste in the past 50 years or so. 

A. Isn’t it true that this number would be exceeded within the first two years of 

shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository? 

B. Is it true that according to DOE’s accident reports, there have been 72 ‘‘incidents’’ involving nuclear waste shipments since 1949? Is it true that four of these 

accidents involved ‘‘accidental radioactive material contamination beyond the vehicle,’’ four with radiation contamination confined to the vehicle, 49 of accidental container surface contamination, 13 traffic accidents with no release or contamination, 

and 2 incidents with no description? 

A4. A. In the EIS for Yucca Mountain, DOE has stated its preference for mostlyrail transport of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. Under the mostly-rail scenario, 

DOE estimates about 175 shipments to Yucca Mountain per year over the 24 year 

shipping period. 

B. As you cited, there have been 72 reported incidents involving nuclear waste 

shipments since 1949. In all the above reported incidents, there was never an injury 

as a result of the radioactive nature of the cargo. 

Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments 

Q5. The Transportation Security Division at DOE transports nuclear weapons and 

weapons-grade material from site to site within the DOE complex. It is my understanding that this group failed six out of seven force-on-force security simulations 

in December 1998. 

275

A. If the shipments of nuclear weapons fail the security tests, how can we be assured that all of the many thousands of shipments of nuclear waste will be safe 

from terrorist attack? 

B. Do you agree that in event of a real and successful terrorist attack on a shipment of high level nuclear waste, a suicidal and knowledgeable group of terrorists 

could quickly assemble and detonate a dirty bomb? If not, why not? 

C. Are shipments of high level nuclear waste secure against armor piercing incendiary rounds? If so, how has this been verified? If not, why not, since a June 1999 

General Accounting Office report entitled ‘‘Weaponry: Availability of Military .50 

Caliber Ammunition’’ concluded that more than 100,000 rounds of Pentagon-surplus 

armor-piercing incendiary rounds have been sold on the civilian market? 

D. I have been told of two separate tests, one done at Sandia National Laboratory, 

and one at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, that experimentally demonstrated that readily available munitions can breach a nuclear waste canister. Will you require whatever canisters are ultimately chosen to be capable of withstanding attacks using 

readily available munitions? If not, how will you assure that the nuclear waste canisters won’t be successfully attacked, at great risk to the surrounding communities? 

A5. A. In December 1998, the Office of Transportation Safeguards (OTS) (previously the Transportation Safeguards Division) conducted computer simulations, 

not force-on-force exercises. Force-on-force validation exercises were conducted in 

1999, 2000, and 2001 and indicate that OTS is operating at ‘‘Low Risk.’’ The objective of many security tests is to evaluate the effectiveness of plans and procedures. 

Many tests are designed to specifically identify vulnerabilities in security measures, 

which will result in a more effective security. 

The Department conducts such exercises to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of its physical security systems and measures for safe transportation of strategic material. Therefore, these tests will actually benefit the security and safeguards of nuclear materials. 

For current spent fuel shipments, NRC has imposed a security advisory that requires armed escorts to accompany the shipment. NRC is evaluating that advisory 

and is considering moving it to a regulation. Current shipments of spent fuel to 

DOE sites are following the NRC advisory. For shipments to a repository, NRC sets 

stringent physical security and safeguards requirements. NRC reviews its security 

regulations periodically to assess their adequacy and effectiveness. A comprehensive 

review has been ongoing as a result of the September 11 attacks. DOE will comply 

with any additional security requirements that are identified by NRC’s review. With 

shipments not anticipated for at least eight years, DOE has time to fully analyze 

and prepare for any changing threat environment. 

B. The spent nuclear fuel is transported in heavy, robust casks that are designed 

to contain their contents under severe accident conditions. The weight of the casks, 

the robust metal shielding that protects the spent nuclear fuel, and the high radiation field of unprotected spent nuclear fuel all would inhibit the process of obtaining spent nuclear fuel and assembling a dirty bomb. Further, because the spent nuclear fuel itself is not explosive, it would have to be incorporated with a conventional explosive. Thus, even if a terrorist attack were successful in diverting spent 

nuclear fuel, law enforcement agencies would have adequate time to respond due 

to the difficulty in assembling a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ made of spent nuclear fuel. 

C. Yes, shipments of high-level nuclear waste are secure against armor-piercing 

incendiary rounds. According to Army Field Manual FM 23-65, an M8 .50 caliber 

armor-piercing incendiary round is for use against ‘‘lightly armored vehicles.’’ Data 

from field manuals suggest that this ammunition should not penetrate the thick 

walls of a transportation cask. Additionally, because the cask content material is not 

flammable, the incendiary part of the munition is not effective even were it to penetrate the cask body. 

D. Casks are designed and built to prevent release of their contents in all but the 

most severe attacks or accidents. Transportation casks are already capable of withstanding attacks from ‘‘readily available’’ ammunition. 

Tests of transportation casks for assault from ‘‘not readily available munitions’’

(e.g., anti-tank weapons) have been conducted to determine their robustness. In the 

case of an attack by a military anti-tank weapon, tests and analyses conducted at 

Sandia National Laboratories show that only a very small fraction of the radioactive 

material would be released to the environment if the shield wall of a spent fuel 

transportation cask were penetrated by a military anti-tank weapon. Such a scenario has been analyzed in the Final EIS. 

In the case of attack using a simulated tube launched, optically tracked, wire 

guided (TOW) missile, a test performed at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds is often 

cited. It is important to recognize that the test at Aberdeen was not indicative of 

testing for NRC-licensed transportation casks. First, the Aberdeen demonstration 

276

used a storage cask, not a transportation cask. Second, the explosive device was attached to the side of the storage cask, not fired at it. Third, the storage cask was 

made of a material, nodular cast iron, which NRC has steadfastly refused to certify 

for transportation casks for many years. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers also has refused to approve this material as suitable for containment structures in spent fuel shipping casks. 

Q6. It is my understanding that as part of the DOE’s transportation plans there 

might be as many as 3000 barge shipments of nuclear waste, into major ports 

throughout the Northeast, and other sites throughout the country. Why does the 

DOE plan on using barge shipment? How does the DOE plan on doing this safely 

without risking a terrorist attack? 

A6. DOE has stated a preference for mostly-rail transport. The EIS assumes that 

sites being served by a railroad would use rail and that the 24 sites that do not 

have rail service, but that can handle large rail casks, would move the casks to the 

nearest rail facility using heavy-haul trucks. Of the 24 sites that do not have rail 

service, 17 are on navigable waterways, so the EIS also contains a sensitivity analysis to understand the impacts if all 17 of these sites shipped casks to nearby rail 

facilities via barge instead of heavy-haul truck. 

As evaluated in this sensitivity analysis, there could be up to 1,575 barge shipments during the 24 years of shipments to a Yucca Mountain repository. 

The sensitivity analysis for this limited use of barge in no way commits the 

OCRWM to using barge transport, nor does it indicate any current intention to do 

so, but was included to ensure that the Final EIS contained all reasonably foreseeable actions. Although OCRWM has expressed a preference for the use of rail for 

shipping, detailed decisions such as how to move casks from the 24 sites without 

rail access have not been made. These decisions would reflect agreements reached 

between OCRWM and the utilities and consultations with stakeholders, including 

representatives of States, tribes and local communities. In any event, because there 

would be limited use of barges over short distances, the likelihood of an accident 

would be small. In addition, because shipping casks are designed to withstand severe transportation accidents, an accident severe enough to release radioactive materials into a waterway is not reasonably foreseeable. 

The safety of barge shipments, including consideration of sabotage, is addressed 

through requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard and NRC. In current barge or water 

shipments, the Coast Guard provides an exclusion zone, which prevents other ships 

from entering a space around a ship or barge. The Coast Guard has enforcement 

authority and can arrest or use force to prevent other ships from encroaching on 

that exclusion zone. Because of the attacks on September 11, 2001, Government 

agencies are reexamining the protections built into physical security and safeguards 

systems. The Department will meet requirements that result from this reexamination. 

GAO Report 

Q1. If Congress over-rides Nevada’s disapproval of Yucca Mountain, DOE is required to submit a license application to the NRC within 90 days of the site recommendation becoming effective. You stated during the hearing that you would resolve all of the technical issues prior to submitting a license application. 

A. Will DOE be prepared to submit a license application to the NRC for Yucca 

Mountain within the next several months? 

B. If so, how, since the NRC has indicated that 293 complex technical issues must 

be resolved before it would be able to accept a license application? 

C. Is it DOE’s intention to submit a incomplete license application that cannot be 

accepted by the NRC, or is it your intention to submit the application once you have 

resolved all 293 of the outstanding technical issues? 

D. Bechtel has indicated that at least 10 of the 293 technical issues will not even 

be resolved by 2004. Will you wait until all of the 293 technical issues are resolved 

prior to submitting the license application to the NRC? 

A1. A. Our current plans call for filing a license application at the end of 2004, 

assuming that Congress acts to override the State of Nevada’s notice of disapproval 

this summer. This schedule was presented in my comprehensive statement that accompanied my February 14, 2002, recommendation to the President and in my Fiscal Year 2003 budget submittal to Congress. 

B. Many have misrepresented these ‘‘complex technical issues.’’ I am happy to 

clarify them for you. NRC’s November 2001 Sufficiency Letter, required by section 

114(a)(1)(E) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, stated that, based on agreements and 

interactions with DOE, it believes that ‘‘sufficient at-depth site characterization 

analysis and waste form proposal information, although not now available, will be 

available at the time of a potential license application such that development of an 

277

acceptable license application is achievable.’’ NRC reached this conclusion through 

extensive consultation and review of our scientific and technical work. 

This interaction identified nine ‘‘key technical issues’’ that we agreed to address 

by the time of license application. To address these nine issues, 293 technical agreements were made with NRC. These agreements are largely documentation and data 

confirmation that will be submitted to NRC within the next two years. 

C. Much progress has been made to address these issues. When my recommendation was sent to the President, my staff completed one-third of the necessary work 

to fulfill these agreements, and closed 23 agreements. Today, just two months later, 

21 additional agreements have been documented as closed. We have submitted the 

information to close an additional 10 agreements. By the end of this fiscal year, 58 

agreements will be closed. We will continue working with NRC to close the remaining agreements and expect to submit a license application that will be accepted by 

NRC. 

D. The 10 agreements that we expect to remain open involve efforts to monitor 

performance and to obtain additional scientific and technical data. NRC has agreed 

to our disposition plan for this work. 

Q2. According to the GAO report, DOE stopped using the cost and schedule baseline for Yucca Mountain in 1997. For example, when the FY 2000 appropriation for 

Yucca Mountain was $57.8 million less than the request, DOE did not adjust the 

baseline costs and schedule, but instead deferred some planned technical work. 

A. Isn’t it typical for DOE to require program managers to alter the baseline for 

a large project when it substantially changes? If so, why haven’t you done so for 

this project? 

B. When will the baseline costs and schedule been adjusted to reflect shortfalls 

in the expected appropriations levels and other unexpected changes? 

C. What would the new schedule for submitting the license application have been 

if the baseline had been changed appropriately? 

D. If you don’t adjust the baseline to reflect major changes, how can you know 

when you will be ready to submit the license application? Are you just planning on 

submitting whatever you have completed at the time your original baseline estimated you’d be ready, even if that baseline no longer applies? 

E. My understanding is that because of the uncertainties in the baseline, cost esti- mates for Yucca Mountain range from $54 billion to a high of hundreds of billions 

if you factor in costs such as transportation and security factors. How can you provide Congress with an accurate cost estimate if you don’t make the necessary 

changes in the baseline? 

A2. A. The Program has not had substantial changes. Since 1989, we have forecasted a 2010 date for waste acceptance at a repository at Yucca Mountain. The Director of OCRWM submits quarterly project performance reports to the Office of the 

Secretary that measure performance against the original baseline. These quarterly 

reports describe congressional and other external impacts on cost and schedule performance including forecasts of both schedule slips and cost overruns. Since 1997 

these quarterly project performance reports have accurately forecasted cost and 

schedule for the site recommendation decision and license application submittal. 

B. We are awaiting Congress’ decision on overriding the State’s disapproval. If a 

decision to proceed is made, I expect a revised baseline for the Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management Program to be completed in early FY 2003. 

C. When a projected milestone completion date slips, it is common practice to report a variance against the previously forecast milestone date prior to revising the 

baseline. The Program has been reporting variance against the baseline on a quarterly basis. The current forecast milestone completion date is not affected by the 

procedural step of revising the baseline. The Program will revise the baseline for 

the Yucca Mountain repository design and licensing phase once a decision to proceed 

is made by Congress. 

D. As stated above, the Director of OCRWM submits quarterly project performance reports to the Office of the Secretary that measure performance against the 

original baseline. These quarterly reports describe congressional and other external 

impacts on cost and schedule performance including forecasts of both schedule slips 

and cost overruns. Since 1997 these quarterly project performance reports have accurately forecasted site recommendation and license application cost and schedules. 

E. The current Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost, published in May 

2001 (Document #DOE/RW-0533), presents a $57.5 billion cost estimate for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program. This estimate includes repository, 

waste acceptance, storage and transportation, program integration, and institutional 

costs over the life of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program from inception in 1983, site recommendation in 2002, through repository construction and 

start of operations by 2010, to decommissioning in 2119. 

278

Q3. According to the GAO report, NRC’s Advisory Committee on nuclear waste 

has raised concerns about the models that DOE is using to predict how water and 

radionuclides might travel through the repository and therefore how quickly radioactivity would be released to the environment. The Advisory Committee believes 

that DOE has used inconsistent assumptions and assumptions that are not supported by experimental evidence. 

A. Do you plan to redo these models to correct the problems prior to submitting 

a license application to the NRC? If not, why not, since the rate at which radioactivity is released into the environment is central to whether the Yucca Mountain 

site can be operated in a manner that is consistent with protecting public health 

and the environment? 

B. How long will it take to develop accurate models? 

A3. A. In its November 2001 letter, NRC stated that existing work and work that 

is planned to be completed would be sufficient for inclusion with a license application. We do not agree with the assertion that there is a problem that needs to be 

corrected. The process models used by the Yucca Mountain Project to predict water 

movement and radionuclide transport employ a mixture of conservative and realistic 

(i.e., supported by experimental data) assumptions. As additional information and 

experimental data becomes available, DOE plans to incorporate these refinements 

into the models for the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) for the License Application (LA). The TSPA-LA will provide a range of predicted responses 

that will cover the range of expected system behavior. 

B. As indicated above, we do not agree that the models are inaccurate. Additional 

data inputs and model refinements to the updated TSPA-LA will be completed in 

the Spring of 2003. The final TSPA-LA shall be included with the LA scheduled for 

submittal in December 2004. 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Reports 

Q1. You recommended Yucca Mountain to the President on January 10th. The 

Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) submitted its comments on the 

DOE’s scientific and technical work on January 24th. 

A. Isn’t it true that the NWTRB told DOE it was nearly ready to submit its comments on December 11, 2001? 

B. Why did you make your recommendation prior to receiving the NWTRB’s comments? Weren’t the independent scientific advisory board’s comments important to 

consider prior to recommending the Yucca Mountain site? 

A1. A. Yes. In a December 11, 2001, letter, the NWTRB informed DOE that comments would be submitted within a few weeks. Those comments were received on 

January 24, 2002. 

B. In fact, the Secretarial decision to recommend the site was provided to the 

President on February 14, 2002. In their letter of January 24, 2002, the NWTRB 

recognized ‘‘The Board makes no judgment on the question of whether the Yucca 

Mountain site should be recommended or approved for repository development. 

Those judgments, which involve a number of public policy considerations as well as 

an assessment of how much technical certainty is necessary at various decision 

points, go beyond the Board’s congressionally established mandate.’’

Q2. In your testimony you state that the DOE’s scientific inquiries and modeling 

clearly demonstrates that a repository at Yucca Mountain can meet the EPA radiological exposure standards. However the January 24th report of the NWTRB notes 

that the DOE has not published updated calculations of radiological doses based on 

the recent travel time estimates in the Technical Update Impact Letter report. 

A. Have these calculations been done? 

B. If so, why haven’t they been published? Have they been independently reviewed? By whom? 

C. If not, when will they be completed? Without these calculations, how can we 

know that Yucca Mountain can meet the EPA standard? 

A2. A-B. Updated calculations of the expected impact of radiological dose will be 

included in the License Application-Total System Performance Assessment. 

C. The travel time calculations presented in the Technical Update Letter Report 

indicate that refinements to the transport model result in longer travel times. As 

a result, Yucca Mountain would still meet the EPA standard because longer travel 

times delay and reduce the expected radionuclide dose due to an increased potential 

for matrix diffusion and sorption. Consequently, performance of the calculations 

would result in a decreased dose, not an increase, and so confidence in the ability 

of the site to still meet the EPA standard would not be compromised. Updated dose 

calculations will be part of our preparation for submittal of a license application to 

NRC and these calculations will include refinements to the transport model. 

279

Q3. You have expressed great confidence in the ability of the canisters to contain 

the radioactive waste over long periods of time. Peak temperatures in the repository 

could reach 350 degrees but, as the NWTRB report notes, DOE has essentially no 

data on canister corrosion for temperatures above 275 degrees. Why have these 

studies not been undertaken prior to recommendation? Isn’t it true that without this 

data we really have no idea how the engineered barriers will perform in the repository? 

A3. The Yucca Mountain Project has conducted extensive testing and modeling of 

these waste packages and engineered barriers and has a strong technical basis for 

understanding their behavior. DOE has conducted corrosion tests on both spent fuel 

and waste package containment barrier materials at relevant temperatures. Peak 

temperatures in the repository will occur in the spent nuclear fuel rods contained 

within the waste packages. We have used temperature limits for waste disposal system design so that the spent fuel rod cladding cannot exceed 350 °C to maintain 

cladding integrity. For the reference Site Recommendation waste disposal system 

design, peak spent fuel rod cladding temperatures are expected to be about 285 °C. 

A much lower peak temperature of 180 °C is expected in the waste package containment barriers that surrounds the spent fuel assemblies. This peak temperature of 

180 °C is the relevant value for the waste package containment barrier surface. 

Consistent with these anticipated peak temperatures, we have conducted corrosion performance tests on spent fuel specimens, including the cladding, at temperatures from 175 °C to 325 °C. In addition, we have conducted corrosion tests on waste 

package containment barrier materials at temperatures under which corrosion is 

most likely (60 °C to 120 °C). At temperatures above 120 °C, a significant amount of 

corrosion is not expected because liquid phase water is not anticipated. Even for 

conditions where salts would facilitate the formation of water on the waste package 

surface, this would most likely occur below 120 °C. We are continuing short-term 

and long-term corrosion tests to improve our understanding and decrease uncertainties about how the engineered barriers will perform in the repository. 

Q4. In your testimony, you state that the geology of Yucca Mountain provides natural adsorption, retarding any potential radionuclide movement. But a 1999 study 

at the Nevada Test Site by scientists from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

has shown that plutonium can migrate in a short amount of time (50 years or less) 

and a 2001 study from Los Alamos National Laboratory has shown that the zeolite 

minerals adsorb only a few of the radioactive elements and that these are the elements with the shortest half-lives. In light of these studies, how can you be sure 

that the radionuclides will be contained in the geological barriers? 

A4. The results reported by the Lawrence Livermore scientists regarding the detection of plutonium at the Nevada Test Site must be considered in their proper context. The study deals with the detection of plutonium in association with colloids 

following sampling of groundwater down-gradient from a large nuclear weapons test 

detonated ‘‘beneath the water table.’’ However, the portion of the down-gradient distance that can be attributed to the effects of ‘‘prompt injection’’ is unknown. 

It was never expected that all radionuclides would adsorb on minerals at Yucca 

Mountain. However, the natural system would indeed provide potential retardation 

through adsorption for many radionuclide species. 

The Project has considered the potential effects discussed above and addressed the 

impact of colloid-facilitated transport through its unsaturated zone and saturated 

zone transport modeling. The results indicate that, even when conservative assumptions (i.e., those tending to promote the most rapid transport) are applied, the site 

still performs satisfactorily and the EPA radiological dose standard can be met. 

QUESTION FROM CONGRESSMAN ED MARKEY

General Question 

1. A November 2001 report by the DOE Inspector General reported that Winston 

and Strawn was simultaneously employed as counsel to the DOE working on the 

Yucca Mountain project, and as a lobbyist working for the Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Winston and Strawn has since resigned from their DOE role due to the obvious conflict-of-interest. What have you done to independently verify the work Winston and 

Strawn did for DOE on Yucca Mountain? 

A1. In its report, the Office of Inspector General did not reach any final conclusion 

as to whether Winston and Strawn’s representation of the Nuclear Energy Institute 

constituted a conflict-of-interest. Moreover, the report did not find any indication 

that Winston and Strawn’s activities for, or relationships with, the Nuclear Energy 

Institute caused it to compromise the contract on the Yucca Mountain Project or in 

any way influenced the legal advice it provided to the DOE. As the inquiry report 

states: ‘‘Department officials did not identify to the Office of Inspector General any 

280

evidence of compromise’’ and in fact ‘‘stated that Winston and Strawn had urged the 

Department to be more thorough than it had been concerning the Yucca Mountain 

Project.’’ On November 29, 2001, there was a mutual agreement between the DOE 

and Winston and Strawn to discontinue the contract. 

DOE does not believe that the information developed during the period of time 

of Winston and Strawn’s services is suspect or should be discarded as potentially 

biased. The scientific and technical activities associated with the characterization of 

the Yucca Mountain site were performed by leading scientific and technical experts 

in their respective fields, including numerous representatives of national laboratories and the U.S. Geological Survey. These activities and the results thereof were 

reviewed by numerous independent oversight agencies and peer groups, including 

the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), and were made available for public review and comment during the site recommendation consideration process. 

Winston and Strawn had a limited and indirect involvement in the entire site recommendation process. Key factors in the site recommendation decision involved scientific and technical judgments, not legal interpretations. In any event, the Department’s Office of General Counsel supervised Winston and Strawn’s work for the Department very closely and would, I am confident, have detected any effort to misrepresent the law had it occurred. 

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN RADANOVICH

Nuclear Waste Shipments 

Q1. Can you explain how the number of sites at which nuclear waste is stored 

will be reduced from 131 to 1 with the opening of Yucca Mountain, and under what 

time-frame this might happen? 

A1. It has never been the intent that 131 sites would be eliminated. Rather, the 

question is whether these commercial and DOE sites should continue storing spent 

nuclear fuel (SNF) on site, even after operations cease, thus providing no benefit 

while continuing to be burdened with storing waste near our population centers and 

waterways. 

For commercial power reactors, all spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cannot be removed 

from the site until all reactors on that site are shut down. At the present time, there 

are 10 such sites from which SNF removal can begin shortly after the opening of 

Yucca Mountain. As additional reactors reach the end of their operating lives and 

are shut down, the operation of Yucca Mountain will allow the SNF to be removed 

from those sites as well. Substantial amounts of SNF would also be removed from 

operating reactors, allowing continued safe operations while limiting the need for 

on-site dry storage. 

Similarly, SNF and high-level waste (HLW) would be removed from DOE sites 

such as Savannah River, the Idaho National Environmental and Engineering Laboratory, and Hanford for consolidation at Yucca Mountain, reducing costs for operation and maintenance and allowing cleanup to be completed at those sites. Disposition of some DOE SNF and HLW could begin soon after Yucca Mountain is scheduled to open, and DOE’s current plans are to disposition all DOE SNF and HLW 

to a geologic repository by 2040. DOE is continuing to look at ways to expedite this 

schedule. Operation of Yucca Mountain would provide a destination for the SNF 

generated through beneficial operation of the numerous research and isotope production reactors in the United States and final removal of SNF after final reactor 

shutdown, allowing those sites to be shut down. 

Nuclear Waste Storage 

Q2. If we assume that DOE’s most optimistic predictions are realized (and that 

it transports 4,000 tons to Yucca Mountain by 2014 and 3,000 tons a year thereafter), it will be 2038 when Yucca Mountain is filled to capacity. Do you agree that, 

using DOE’s own projections, the amount of waste left at nuclear power plants 

around the country in 2038—when Yucca Mountain is filled to capacity—will be almost identical to the amount currently stored at those locations? 

A2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act currently limits the licensable capacity of Yucca 

Mountain to 70,000 MTU. However, the actual physical capacity of the mountain 

is believed to be considerably larger than this statutory limit. 

We provided our projection of 105,000 MTU of civilian spent fuel by 2038 in the 

Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Yucca Mountain repository. 

This is how others have derived how an amount equivalent to the 45,000 MTU 

present today would still be stored on site in 2038. However, these simplistic analogies ignore the reality that would exist without a repository at Yucca Mountain. The 

281

entire inventory of 105,000 MTU would be stored at these sites, and many of these 

sites would have been permanently shut down by that point in time. 

Rail Transportation 

Q3. According to the Federal Railroad Administration, there were 176 train accidents last year in my state of California alone. This is an alarming number. We 

have a struggling industry that is starving for revenue to maintain its trains and 

tracks. At the same time, we want to increase by thousands the number of freight 

trains, carrying high-level radioactive waste, throughout the country. This is an important contradiction. Mr. Secretary, DOE’s Environmental Impact Statements predicts that there will be 10 additional train accidents carrying spent fuel. Does the 

EIS statement assume that current problems with train infrastructure will be resolved? 

A3. Our Final EIS estimated that there could be eight train accidents over a 24-

year shipping campaign using the mostly rail option preferred by DOE. Over a 24-

year shipping campaign for the mostly rail option, there would be approximately one 

rail shipment every other day. 

In calculating the likelihood of accidents under a mostly rail scenario, we incorporate data on railway safety from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The 

FRA is the agency responsible for enforcing Federally mandated safety standards 

for ensuring railroad safety throughout the Nation. According to FRA, the U.S. rail 

system experienced an accident rate of less than 4.2 accidents per million train 

miles in 2001. 

The FRA establishes safety standards concerning the design, maintenance and inspection of our Nation’s rail track. The FRA reviews the railroads’ inspection records 

on both a routine, random, and programmed basis to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the railroads’ own inspection program. DOE expects that its accident experience with rail operations will be at least as good as that experienced in commercial rail service under the FRA’s standards and enforcement. 

RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD OF HON. GRETA JOY DICUS, COMMISSIONER, U.S. 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

QUESTIONS BY HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question 1. How long, and at what temperature, can a transportation cask withstand exposure to fire before it fails? Has this been determined experimentally? If 

not, why not? 

(A) The Baltimore Tunnel fire that occurred last summer burned for more than 

3 days and reached temperatures of 1500 degrees. Do you plan on conducting experiments that subject casks to hotter and longer burning fires before certifying 

them? If not, why not? 

Answer. NRC requires that all Type B radioactive materials transportation packages, such as those used to transport spent nuclear fuel, be evaluated for a fully 

engulfing fire accident with an average flame temperature of no less that 1475°F 

(800°C) for a period of no less than 30 minutes (10 CFR 71.73). Transportation casks 

must be subjected to an open pool fire test or analyzed for a fire event meeting the 

aforementioned criteria. Casks must maintain shielding and criticality control functions throughout the fire event and post-fire cool down. The basis for these requirements is a postulated transportation accident. While an analysis or experiment has 

not been performed to determine precisely when and at what temperature a transportation canister would fail, analyses have been undertaken to examine spent fuel 

cask behavior in severe fire environments resulting from transportation accidents. 

The NRC has evaluated the Baltimore tunnel fire to see whether changes to these 

requirements are needed. Based on media reports on the Baltimore tunnel fire, and 

information provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the fire 

in the tunnel was fueled by a derailed tanker car carrying liquid tripropylene (car 

#52). When fire fighters were able to enter the tunnel, approximately 12 hours after 

the fire started, they observed that the tripropylene tanker car was no longer burning. This indicates that the most severe portion of the fire in the tunnel could not 

have lasted more than 12 hours. 

In addition, the fire in the tunnel was most likely oxygen starved, due to the fact 

that the tunnel is poorly ventilated. This means that the fire did not have enough 

oxygen to burn efficiently. Therefore, the fire in the tunnel most likely burned 

longer and at a lower temperature than a well ventilated (open air) fire would have. 

For a comparable (open air) pool fire of 27 feet in diameter (the tunnel is 32 feet 

wide), the amount of tripropylene in the tanker car (28,800 gallons) would have 

282

burned for approximately 61⁄4 hours, achieving a maximum temperature in the 

range of 1475°-1830°F. 

The time-to-failure of a spent fuel transportation cask due to a fire exposure is 

heavily dependent on the temperature of the fire exposure and whether the fire is 

fully engulfing or not. The information that the staff has received on the Baltimore 

tunnel fire has provided a time (duration) of fire exposure, but has not provided the 

maximum temperature, temperature distribution, or how the temperature changed 

with time. The staff is currently pursuing an analysis to determine the temperatures in the Baltimore tunnel fire. 

A preliminary analysis by the staff has sought to bound the Baltimore tunnel fire 

by assuming a uniform temperature of 1500°F. The spent fuel transportation cask 

used in the analysis is an NRC approved cask design that utilizes a welded stainless 

steel canister. The analysis assumed that the cask was immersed in a 1500°F fully 

engulfing fire for 12 hours, followed by a 20 hour cool-down period, and determined 

the maximum temperatures of the cask and fuel. Based on the maximum canister 

temperatures (which occurred during the cool-down period following the fire), the 

staff calculated the maximum stresses in the canister. The calculated stresses were 

below the failure limits for the stainless steel canister. The staff concluded that the 

analyzed transportation cask would have survived a 12 hour, 1500°F fully engulfing 

fire with no failure of the canister and no release of radioactive material. The staff 

will continue to investigate cask performance under severe accident conditions, and 

will determine whether a time-to-failure analysis is necessary. 

Question 2. Are shipments of high level nuclear waste secure against armor piercing incendiary rounds? If so, how has this been verified? If not, why not, since a 

June 1999 General Accounting Office report entitled, ‘‘Weaponry: Availability of 

Military .50 Caliber Ammunition’’ concluded that more than 100,000 rounds of Pentagon-surplus armor-piercing incendiary rounds have been sold on the civilian market? 

Answer. Various types of weapons that would produce damage much larger than 

expected from .50 caliber ammunition have been evaluated by NRC and DOE. The 

specific types of weapons and the results are considered sensitive information. These 

experiments demonstrated that military-type weapons that might possibly be available to a terrorist could produce a small hole in a single side wall of the cask such 

that a small fraction of the contained fuel might be released in a respirable form. 

The calculation indicated that this would be a relatively small release and that it 

would not result in any early fatalities. The consequences of such release would 

roughly parallel a severe transportation accident involving spent fuel. 

The extensive security measures required by the NRC minimize the likelihood of 

sabotage events. First, the NRC currently has in place a set of regulatory requirements specifically for the physical protection of irradiated reactor spent nuclear fuel 

in transit (10 CFR 73.37). These regulations specify security requirements to protect 

these shipments. The NRC maintains a threat assessment capability that includes 

close and ongoing contacts with the Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition, since the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC has issued several advisories to augment physical protection measures such as a need for armed 

guards throughout a shipment, not just in populated areas. The Commission is currently preparing Orders that will place these requirements in our normal regulatory 

framework. 

Question 3. A test conducted at Sandia National Laboratory, and another conducted at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, experimentally demonstrated that readily 

available munitions can breach a nuclear waste canister. Will you require whatever 

canisters are ultimately chosen to be capable of withstanding attacks using readily 

available munitions? If not, how will you assure that the nuclear waste canisters 

won’t be successfully attacked, at great risk to the surrounding communities? 

Answer. Readily available munitions do not breach nuclear waste canisters. Antitank munitions of the type needed to breach a canister are not widely available. 

Nonetheless, as discussed previously, canisters have been tested against these types 

of weapons and the consequences were not severe. 

Following the events of September 11, the NRC has recognized the need to reexamine basic assumptions underlying the current NRC security and safeguards 

programs. The NRC Chairman, with full agreement of the Commission, has directed 

the staff to undertake a thorough review of these programs. As the NRC completes 

these reviews, we will consider whether changes to our regulations are needed. 

Physical protection consistent with NRC requirements for spent nuclear fuel in 

transit serves to minimize the possibilities for radiological sabotage. The Commission will supplement or revise its requirements, as warranted. 

Question 4. The drop test used to test whether the casks can survive a crash reportedly use a crash speed of 35 miles per hour. Will you repeat these tests at 

283

speeds of 65-70 miles per hour, the speed at which the trucks are likely to drive, 

prior to licensing? 

Answer. NRC requires that casks be designed to survive a sequence of tests including a 9-meter (30-foot) free drop onto an unyielding surface in the most damaging orientation. The speed of a falling object after a 30-foot free fall from rest is 

30 miles per hour. In an impact with an unyielding surface, essentially all of the 

impact energy is transferred to the cask, which maximizes the cask damage. In contrast, during real transportation collision accidents, much of the energy of the impact is not transferred to the cask, but absorbed by the vehicle and the impacted 

object. The free drop test, therefore, results in damage that would be expected in 

a vehicle crash at a much higher speed. NRC believes these tests do not need to 

be repeated at higher speeds because earlier studies have encompassed an extremely high fraction (over 99%) of realistic accident scenarios involving vehicle impacts. 

Question 5. The puncture test used to certify casks reportedly tests a 40 inch drop 

of a cask onto a spike. Wouldn’t a cask that, for example, fell off a bridge, be expected to drop further than 40 inches? Will you be testing a more realistic scenario 

before certifying any cask design, and if not, why not? 

Answer. The hypothetical accident test sequence defined in NRC regulations (10 

CFR Part 71) includes a 1-meter (40-inch) drop onto a 15 centimeter (6-inch) diameter puncture bar. This test is conducted for a cask design after the analysis of the 

results of dropping the same cask design, 9-meters (30-feet) onto an unyielding surface. The free drop and puncture tests must be performed in sequence and must consider the most damaging drop orientation. In addition the puncture test is designed 

to compound the damage from the drop test. Risk and accident analyses support 

NRC’s conclusion that the regulatory test sequence for spent fuel casks encompass 

an extremely high fraction (over 99%) of realistic accident scenarios involving vehicle impacts. 

Question 6. If Congress over-rides the state of Nevada’s disapproval of Yucca 

Mountain as the permanent waste repository, DOE is required to submit a license 

application to the NRC within a few months of the site recommendation becoming 

effective. In your testimony, you state that it must be a ‘‘high-quality application.’’ NRC has indicated that 293 complex technical issues must be resolved before it 

would be able to accept a license application, and the GAO report said that it would 

be years before this could be completed. 

Would NRC accept a license application that was incomplete? 

Answer. If the license application lacked information needed to begin a licensing 

review, we would regard the application as incomplete and would not accept and 

docket it. However, based on our interactions with the Department of Energy 

(DOE), it is our understanding that DOE has no intention of submitting an application which we would regard as incomplete. 

Question 6. If Congress over-rides the state of Nevada’s disapproval of Yucca 

Mountain as the permanent waste repository, DOE is required to submit a license 

application to the NRC within a few months of the site recommendation becoming 

effective. In your testimony, you state that it must be a ‘‘high-quality application.’’

NRC has indicated that 293 complex technical issues must be resolved before it 

would be able to accept a license application, and the GAO report said that it would 

be years before this could be completed. 

Would NRC act upon a license application that was incomplete? 

Answer. As noted in response to the prior question, we would regard an application that lacked necessary information as incomplete and would not accept and 

docket it. 

Question 6. If Congress over-rides the state of Nevada’s disapproval of Yucca 

Mountain as the permanent waste repository, DOE is required to submit a license 

application to the NRC within a few months of the site recommendation becoming 

effective. In your testimony, you state that it must be a ‘‘high-quality application.’’

NRC has indicated that 293 complex technical issues must be resolved before it 

would be able to accept a license application, and the GAO report said that it would 

be years before this could be completed. 

For the unresolved technical issues for which the NRC and DOE have agreed 

about what information still needs to be submitted, would the NRC ever act upon 

a license application that did not include that information, even if that information 

was not going to be available until after 2004? 

Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE) will need to provide enough information on the agreements for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to be able 

to commence a licensing review. For example, portions of a few agreements concern 

long-term studies related to performance confirmation, and as such, we expect that 

DOE will continue to collect certain information supporting these agreements for 

284

some time after license application, should an application be filed. In these cases, 

initial test results, together with DOE’s plans, procedures and schedules for the 

longer-term collection and review of such confirmatory information should suffice for 

us to begin a meaningful review and analysis of the license application. We expect 

that, in addition to the information included in the potential license application, 

DOE would continue to provide additional confirmatory information before NRC 

reaches a licensing decision. 

Question 7. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, allows the NRC 3 to 4 

years in which to decide whether to license the repository after receiving the license 

application from DOE. If DOE submits an incomplete license application, how much 

longer than the 3 or 4 years allotted do you think it will take the NRC to complete 

its work? 

Answer. The procedural regulations that govern submission of a license application for a potential high-level waste repository are contained in Subpart J (Procedures Applicable to Proceedings for the Issuance of Licenses for the Receipt of HighLevel Radioactive Waste at a Geologic Repository) in 10 CFR Part 2. The 3-4 year 

schedule outlined in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix D (Schedule for the Proceeding on 

Application for a License to Receive and Possess High-Level Radioactive Waste at 

a Geologic Repository Operations Area), would not start until the NRC’s Director 

of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards determines that the application is complete and acceptable for docketing. 

Based on our technical reviews and pre-licensing interactions, we believe that sufficient information can be provided at the time of a license application. The Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have reached 

and documented numerous agreements regarding the submission of additional information. Based on these agreements, DOE has committed to assemble the information necessary for an application that NRC can accept for review. 

QUESTIONS BY HON. GEORGE RADANOVICH

Question 1. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the DOE shall file its license 

application with the NRC within 90 calendar days after the selection of the Yucca 

Mountain site (assuming Congress were to override Governor Guinn). Are you 

aware that DOE has now acknowledged that it will not be able to file a license application until at least December 2004? Do you believe that NRC may legally accept 

an application after expiration of the 90 days and must this application be complete, 

or may it be a partial application? 

Answer. As noted above, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is aware that 

the Department of Energy (DOE) does not plan to submit a license application for 

a high-level waste repository until December 2004. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) does not prohibit the NRC from considering an application after expiration of the 90 days. The NWPA states that in 

§114(d) the Commission ‘‘shall consider an application for a construction authorization for all or part of a repository in accordance with the laws applicable to such 

applications.’’

Question 2. You stated in your testimony that DOE must complete actions necessary to fulfill a large number of agreements with NRC for scientific work as well 

as back up information for prior assumptions. Will NRC require all of these agreements to be fulfilled prior to the submission of a license application by DOE? 

Answer. No. The Department of Energy (DOE), however, will need to provide 

enough information on all the agreements for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) to commence a licensing review. Portions of a few agreements concern longerterm studies related to performance confirmation, and as such, we expect that DOE 

will continue to collect certain information supporting these agreements for some 

time after submitting the license application. In these cases, initial test results, together with DOE’s plans, procedures and schedules for the long-term collection and 

review of such confirmatory information should be sufficient for us to begin a review 

of the license application. We expect that, in addition to the information included 

in the potential license application, DOE would continue to provide additional confirmatory information before NRC reaches a licensing decision. 

RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD OF GARY L. JONES, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES

AND ENVIRONMENT. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN ED MARKEY: 

Question 1. Your report states that it will take until 2006 for DOE to be able to 

submit an acceptable license application to the NRC. DOE’s response is that it will 

285

submit a ‘‘shell’’ NRC license application, filling in the missing information in the 

years to come. 

A. Do you believe that submitting a ‘‘shell’’ application that is missing hundreds 

of technical details that relate directly to whether the repository can be safely constructed is legal under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act? 

Response: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, sets out the timing 

of DOE’s submission of a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), but does not specify the information that must be included. NRC has issued 

regulations establishing the requirements for a license application for the Yucca 

Mountain site, including a detailed list of the information that must be included in 

the application. The regulations state that information to be provided to NRC by 

a license applicant must be ‘‘complete and accurate in all material respects’’ and ‘‘must be as complete as possible in light of the information that is reasonably available at the time of docketing.’’ In this regard, NRC commented on November 13, 

2001, on its expectations for a license application. In its preliminary comments to 

DOE, NRC stated that, although significant additional work is needed prior to the 

submission of a possible license application, the 293 agreements reached between 

DOE and NRC staff regarding the collection of additional information and analysis 

provided the basis for concluding that development of an acceptable license application is achievable. When DOE submits the license application, it will be up to NRC 

to determine whether the application is acceptable under the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act and NRC’s regulations. 

B. Do you believe that it will be possible for NRC to consider such an application, 

or are the unresolved issues just too fundamental? 

Response: If the Congress approves the Yucca Mountain site for a repository license application this summer, DOE would then have 90 days to submit a license 

application to NRC. However, on the basis of NRC’s comments, discussed above, it 

does not appear that DOE could provide an application that would be acceptable to 

NRC in that time frame. By the end of September, for example, NRC’s staff expects 

that only about 60 of the 293 agreements with DOE on additional information needed for an acceptable license application may be complete. DOE recognizes that it 

would not be ready to submit an acceptable license application by the end of this 

year. In fact, DOE and its management contractor for the repository program— Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC—are attempting to develop a new baseline for the repository project that would result in submission of a license application in December 

2004. According to the contractor’s draft baseline proposal, and assuming adequate 

funding, DOE would complete the work required for all but 10 of the 293 agreements by that time. DOE is reviewing, but has not approved, the contractor’s latest 

proposal. Under this scenario, it would be up to NRC to determine if the license application is sufficiently complete for NRC’s acceptance and initiation of its formal 

review of the license application. 

Question 2. Testimony that has been submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute 

states that there is a ‘‘fundamental lack of understanding by the GAO about the 

repository siting process’’ because GAO reported that there are 293 technical issues 

that DOE should resolve prior to making a site recommendation. However, my understanding is that GAO did not say that a site recommendation could not be made 

without resolution of those 293 issues, but that a license application could not be 

submitted. Can you please clarify this matter for me? 

Response: In our December 2001 report, we recommended that the Secretary of 

Energy consider (1) deferring a site recommendation for the Yucca Mountain site 

until DOE could meet the express statutory time frames that are triggered by a site 

recommendation by the President to the Congress and (2) including the results of 

DOE’s ongoing technical work for NRC and the results of analyses of alternative approaches to the proposed repository in the Secretary’s comprehensive statement of 

the basis for a site recommendation. Although we explicitly recognized that a site 

recommendation to the president was within the Secretary’s discretion, we also concluded that such a recommendation at that time might be premature because of 

statutory timing requirements, the work remaining to be completed for an acceptable license application, and the relationship between the information required to 

support a site recommendation and a license application. Specifically, once the 

President, on the basis of the Secretary’s recommendation and comprehensive statement, finds the Yucca Mountain site qualified for a license application and recommends the site to the Congress, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE to 

submit a license application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months (assuming final approval of the site). DOE was not, and is not, in a position to meet that statutory 

timing requirement. Also, DOE was gathering and analyzing technical information 

required to satisfy 293 agreements with NRC. Completion of this work, according 

to NRC, was essential for it to accept a future license application from DOE. FiVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00289 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
286

nally, while a site recommendation to the president and a license application to 

NRC are separate processes, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and DOE’s guidelines for determining if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a repository, DOE 

will need to use essentially the same data for both processes. 

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN GEORGE RADANOVICH: 

Question 1. In your report on the Yucca Mountain program, the GAO recommends 

that DOE defer a site recommendation until it has completed the work needed to 

submit a license application. Can you give some indication of the nature of the work 

that remains to be done in the view of GAO? 

Response: As discussed in our December 2001 report, DOE and NRC have negotiated 293 areas of study within the repository program where NRC’s staff has determined that DOE needs to collect more scientific data and/or improve its technical 

assessment of the data before DOE could submit an acceptable license application. 

As of March 2002, according to NRC, DOE had satisfactorily completed work on 38 

of these agreements. These 293 agreements generally relate to uncertainties about 

three aspects of the long-term performance of the proposed repository:

• The expected lifetime of engineered barriers, particularly the waste containers. 

DOE currently expects that the waste containers would isolate the wastes from 

the environment for more than 10,000 years. Minimizing uncertainties about 

the container materials and the predicted performance of the waste containers 

over this long time period is especially critical because DOE’s estimates of the 

repository system’s performance depend heavily on the waste containers, in addition to the natural features of the site, to meet NRC’s licensing regulations 

and EPA’s health and safety standards. • The physical properties of the Yucca Mountain site. Uncertainties related to the 

physical characteristics of the site center on how the combination of heat, water, 

and chemical processes caused by the presence of nuclear waste in the repository would affect the flow of water through the repository. • The supporting information for the mathematical models used to evaluate the performance of the planned repository at the site. The NRC staff’s concerns primarily relate to presentation of information that would provide confidence that 

the models are valid for their intended use, as well as verification of the information used in the models. Performance assessment is an analytical method 

that relies on computers to operate mathematical models to assess the performance of the repository against EPA’s health and safety standards, NRC’s licensing regulations, and DOE’s guidelines for determining if the Yucca Mountain 

site is suitable for a repository. DOE uses the data collected during site characterization activities to model how a repository’s natural and engineered features 

would perform at the site. 

The 293 agreements on work that DOE would complete before submitting a license application provided, from NRC’s perspective, one of the bases for the Commission to state, in its preliminary comments on the sufficiency of DOE’s investigation of the Yucca Mountain site, that the development of an acceptable license application is achievable. 

Question 2. The report prepared by GAO concludes that DOE cannot meet its 

longstanding goal of opening a repository in 2010. What, in your view, is a more 

realistic estimate for the opening of a repository? 

Response: In our view, a more realistic estimate of an achievable date for opening 

a repository at Yucca Mountain is as early as 2012 to as late as 2015—assuming 

that adequate funding is provided each year to make this estimate achievable. Our 

estimate is based on the following three factors

• submission by DOE of a license application to NRC in January 2006, as estimated 

by DOE’s managing contractor in its September 2001 detailed reassessment of 

the repository program; 

• issuance of a construction license by NRC after the 3- to 4-year licensing period 

specified in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act; 

• construction of enough of the repository to open it in the 4-year period projected 

by DOE or the 5-year period estimated by a DOE contractor that independently 

reviewed the cost and schedule for the project; the potential effect on the repository schedule of future annual appropriations. 

Furthermore, our estimate could be optimistic for several reasons. First, the repository project is the first of its kind, and thus subject to relatively high levels of 

technical, cost, and schedule uncertainties. Second, according to DOE’s managing 

contractor, its September 2001 detailed reassessment, the proposed schedule for 

completing outstanding work and submitting a license application in January 2006 

did not include any cost and schedule contingencies. Finally, if DOE does not reVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00290 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
287

quest and obtain funds in the amounts that it projects will be required to complete 

future site investigation, licensing, and construction activities on its schedule. In 

this regard, DOE stated, in an August 2001 report (Alternative Means of Financing 

and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW0546), that unless the program’s funding is increased, the budget might become the ‘‘determining factor’’ in whether DOE will be able to accept wastes in 2010. 

More recently, DOE and its managing contractor have developed another preliminary reassessment of the cost, schedule, and technical baseline for the repository 

program that, if approved and followed, could result in submission of a license application to NRC in December 2004, or 13 month earlier than the contractor’s September 2001 preliminary reassessment. Achievement of this timing objective could, 

all other conditions remaining the same, lead to operation of the repository in the 

2011 to 2014 time period. 

NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD

May 22, 2002

Honorable JOE BARTON

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2125 RHOB 

Washington, DC 20515-6115

DEAR MR. BARTON: Thank you very much for the opportunity to present the views 

of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board at a hearing before the Subcommittee 

on Energy and Air Quality on April 18, 2002. Enclosed are responses to questions 

from Representatives Ed Markey and George Radanovich that were enclosed in your 

letter of April 22, 2002. The questions follow up on issues raised during the hearing. 

As you know, the Board is charged by Congress with conducting an ongoing and 

independent review of the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken 

by the Secretary of Energy associated with the management of the country’s com- mercial spent nuclear fuel and defense high-level radioactive waste. The Board provides its technical views to help inform the larger consideration of issues that face 

the Department of Energy and Congress related to nuclear waste disposal. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me or have your staff contact Bill Barnard, 

Board Executive Director, if you have questions related to the Board’s responses or 

any other issue related to the Board’s technical and scientific review. 

Sincerely, 

JARED L. COHON

Chairman 

Enclosure 

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN ED MARKEY: 

Question 1. In addition to the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB), 

the International Atomic Energy Agency/Nuclear Energy Agency has reviewed the 

scientific and technical work of the DOE. They state in their review that ‘‘In general, the level of understanding of the hydro-geology of the site . . . is low, unclear 

and insufficient to support an assessment of the realistic performance.’’ They continue ‘‘Until these questions are answered, it is not possible to develop a realistic 

conceptual model of the site, or to build a probabilistic saturated zone local model.’ Do you agree with their assessment? Is the DOE’s model unrealistic because of lack 

of data and basic understanding of physical process? 

Answer: We agree generally with the concerns expressed by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency/Nuclear Energy Agency Peer Review Panel (International 

Panel) but would like to make several observations to put their comments in perspective. The International Panel comment cited above includes three elements: (1) 

an assessment of the realistic performance, (2) a realistic conceptual model of the 

site, and (3) a saturated zone local model. (In the context of this question, realism 

may be viewed as the set of models and assumptions that most nearly describes the 

natural and engineered repository system and produces neither overly pessimistic 

nor overly optimistic predictions of waste isolation.) The three elements are interlinked: A realistic performance assessment requires a realistic saturated zone sitescale model, and that requires a realistic conceptual model. Although the general 

concepts of the Yucca Mountain hydrogeologic system are understood, important details remain unresolved. Consequently, the performance estimates for the saturated 

zone in the Total System Performance Assessment for Site Recommendation (TSPAVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00291 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
288

SR) may not be realistic. The TSPA-SR was the sole focus of the International 

Panel. Since that time, results released by the DOE in subsequent documents indicate that some progress has been made in addressing questions raised by the International Panel and in developing a credible conceptual model of the site. Those results have not been incorporated in performance assessments, however, and substantial work remains to be done to develop a realistic saturated zone site-scale 

model on which a realistic assessment of performance attributable to site 

hydrogeology could be based. 

In answer to your question on the DOE’s model, the Board stated in its January 

24, 2002, letter report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy that it has limited 

confidence in current DOE performance estimates because of uncertainties created 

by gaps in data and basic understanding of the proposed repository system (including the saturated zone). The Board has recommended that, if policy-makers decide 

to approve the Yucca Mountain site, the DOE should continue a vigorous, well-integrated scientific investigation to increase its fundamental understanding of the potential behavior of the repository system. Increasing understanding could show that 

components of the repository system, including the saturated and unsaturated 

zones, perform better than or not as well as the DOE’s performance assessment 

model now projects. In either case, making performance projections more realistic 

and characterizing the full range of uncertainty could improve the DOE’s performance estimates. 

Question 2. The DOE is relying heavily on the ability of the canisters to withstand 

corrosion and contain the radioactive waste for long periods of time. The NWTRB 

report states that essentially no corrosion data exists for conditions above 275 degrees (120° C), despite the fact the repository could reach temperatures as high as 

350 degrees (165° C). In your opinion, can the DOE make any real assessment of 

the engineered barriers above 275 degrees? What are some of the effects that elevated temperatures could have on the canisters? 

Answer: To answer your second, more general, question first: The severity of corrosion tends to increase with increasing temperatures. In fact, some forms of corrosion are not even observed unless the temperature exceeds a certain threshold 

value. This applies to essentially all alloys and metals used as construction materials, including Alloy 22, the material that the DOE has chosen to provide corrosion 

resistance for its waste package. In addition, and perhaps more important, predicting the chemistry (composition and strength) of salt solutions contacting the 

waste packages becomes more difficult and more uncertain with increasing temperature. The type and severity of corrosion depend on the makeup of those solutions. 

Regarding your first question, data on the chemistry of salt solutions that may 

contact the waste package as well as data on corrosion of Alloy 22 exposed to such 

waste package environments are both essentially nonexistent for temperatures 

above 120° C. These key data needed to assess the likelihood that corrosion could 

penetrate waste packages during the 10,000-year regulatory period. This absence of 

information weakens the technical basis of the DOE’s performance estimates for its 

high-temperature, base-case repository design. Uncertainty about waste package 

performance decreases, however, with lower repository temperatures because more 

corrosion data and more data on the chemistry of salt solutions that may contact 

waste package surfaces are available. Uncertainty also is reduced with low temperatures because corrosion severity generally decreases as temperatures decrease. The 

Board believes, therefore, that confidence in waste package and repository performance potentially could increase if the DOE adopts a low-temperature repository design. However, a full and objective comparison of high- and low-temperature repository designs should be completed before the DOE selects a final repository design 

concept. 

Question 3. The DOE only has 2 years of corrosion data for alloy 22 based canisters, yet they are extrapolating this data to 10,000 years. Is this acceptable? Is 

there currently any way to adequately determine the integrity of these canisters 

10,000 years in the future? 

Answer: Alloy 22 relies on the formation of an ultrathin passive (i.e., nonreactive) 

film for its corrosion resistance. The DOE’s models predict that corrosion will not 

penetrate Alloy 22 waste packages for at least 10,000 years, perhaps for longer than 

a million years. However, experience with Alloy 22 and comparable alloys spans 

only several decades, and experience with alloys that rely on passive films for corrosion resistance spans only about a century. Although a few natural or man-made 

materials have been identified that might provide insights into the long-term passivity of metals, none has been confirmed yet as a suitable analogue. Thus, this type 

of corrosion resistance over many thousands of years can be extrapolated only by 

using theories and assumptions. At this point, on the basis of the information developed by the DOE and others, Board members believe that claims of minimum waste 

289

package durability of a few thousand years to a few tens of thousands of years are 

not out of the question. Underlying this belief are the following suppositions: that 

temperatures and chemical conditions on the waste-package surface will be no more 

severe or uncertain than those in the DOE’s preliminary analysis of the low-temperature operating mode; that supporting research will be continued to fill in data 

gaps and to rule out unexpected modes of failure; that research, development, and 

demonstration of waste-package welding, fabrication, and inspection are completed 

successfully; and that no major ‘‘surprises’’ are found. 

Question 4. The Chlorine-36 ‘‘fingerprints’’ of above ground nuclear testing have 

been found in the interior of Yucca Mountain, suggesting that water from the surface can migrate 1000 feet to the repository level of the mountain within 50 years. 

What are the implications of this data for contamination of the ground water below 

the repository? What are the implications for corrosion of the canisters? 

Answer: The discovery of elevated amounts of chlorine-36 (a product of nuclear 

testing in the 1950’s) at the depth of the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain 

would provide direct evidence of the existence of ‘‘fast paths// through which rainwater could travel from the surface of Yucca Mountain to the repository horizon 

within about 50 years. However, questions have been raised about the validity of 

the results of the original chlorine-36 study that showed evidence of such fast paths. 

In 1999, the DOE sought to validate the original tests. Scientists using different 

testing procedures have shown differing estimates of the amount of chlorine-36 

present in the underground rocks. The validation study is still under way, and the 

DOE has not reached any conclusions. The DOE’s current models of repository performance are based on the general assumption that some fast-flow paths do exist 

in Yucca Mountain. 

To answer the question on the effects of possible fast paths on groundwater contamination, it would be necessary to verify that they exist and to estimate the volume of water being transported along the pathways under current and future climate conditions. The chlorine-36 validation study may resolve the question of the 

presence or absence of fast pathways for water flow. Estimation of the volumetric 

flux associated with fast pathways requires additional investigations, some of which 

are ongoing and some of which are planned. 

In terms of the effects of fast paths on waste package corrosion rates, if the assumption is (as the DOE’s is) that corrosion proceeds as rapidly under high-humidity conditions as under dripping conditions (a reasonable assumption), whether fast 

paths are present or absent has essentially no effect on waste package corrosion 

rates. However, larger fluxes of water generally result in shorter times of radioactive waste isolation. Current models, based on multiple lines of evidence, do not 

allow for large volumes of water to flow through these fast pathways. If the current 

thinking is found to be incorrect, then radionuclide transport predictions may need 

to be revised. 

Question 5. Secretary Abraham said in his testimony that Yucca Mountain will 

meet the EPA radiological exposure standard. But the NWTRB report notes that 

DOE has not published updated calculations of radiological doses based on the recent travel time estimates. Is the Secretary’s statement premature? Can DOE be 

confident that Yucca Mountain will meet the EPA’s standard without having completed these calculations? 

Answer: The DOE’s performance calculations should be updated to take into account new information on travel-time estimates. However, because many things, in 

addition to groundwater travel times, affect the DOE’s projections of compliance, the 

effect of revised travel-time estimates on judging compliance with the EPA standard 

may not be large. For example, current DOE models show that the waste package 

will last longer than the 10,000-year compliance period. 

The Board believes that the technical basis for the DOE’s current repository performance estimates is weak to moderate. The question of whether the Secretary’s 

statement is premature depends on how much uncertainty one finds acceptable at 

this decision point. That is a policy question, which is outside the Board’s technical 

and scientific mandate. 

Question 6. Spent fuel—uranium dioxide—will be the majority of the stored waste 

in Yucca Mountain. What will happen to the fuel rods as they sit in the repository? 

Will they rust? Has the DOE considered the effect of rusting in their assessment 

of Yucca Mountain and containment of the radioactive waste? 

Answer: The spent-fuel rods consist of uranium dioxide pellets enclosed in metallic cladding. The cladding for the vast majority of the rods is zircaloy, a very corrosion-resistant alloy of zirconium. Once the cladding is exposed to aqueous or highhumidity environments (e.g., after penetration of the waste package), the cladding 

will begin to corrode. Eventually, corrosion will cause the cladding to fail after thousands of years. The DOE has considered cladding corrosion in its performance asVerDate Jan 31 2003 15:27 Jun 02, 2003 Jkt 086459 PO 00000 Frm 00293 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\79469 79469
290

sessment models. However, the Board believes that the DOE’s current level of understanding of cladding performance is incomplete and should be improved. 

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN GEORGE RADANOVICH: 

Question 1. Would you agree with the statement ‘‘Geologic isolation cannot and 

will not play any significant role at the Yucca Mountain repository?’’

Answer: No, the statement is too strong. Although the DOE’s current estimates 

of repository performance rely heavily on components of the engineered barrier system, the natural barriers do play a role. Further analysis and the reduction of uncertainties will permit a more realistic assessment of the relative significance of the 

contribution of the engineered and natural barriers in the proposed repository system. 

Question 2. What is the NWTRB opinion of the ability of the man-made containers 

to meet the NRC and EPA standards for radioactive release into the environment? 

Answer: At this point, on the basis of the information developed by the project 

(and others), Board members believe that claims of minimum waste package durability of a few thousand years to a few tens of thousands of years are not out of 

the question under relatively mild and less uncertain (lower temperature) in-drift 

conditions. Underlying this belief are the following suppositions: that temperatures 

and chemical conditions on the waste-package surface will be no more severe or uncertain than those in the DOE’s preliminary analysis of the low-temperature operating mode; that supporting research will be continued to fill in data gaps and to 

rule out unexpected modes of failure; that research, development, and demonstration of waste-package welding, fabrication, and inspection are completed successfully; and that no major ‘‘surprises’’ are found.

291


g:\graphics\79469.162
292


g:\graphics\79469.163
293


g:\graphics\79469.164
294


g:\graphics\79469.165