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Home : Media : Speeches / Testimony

# PACOM Before the House Appropriations Committee Remarks 

By Commander, US Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, III

Presenter: Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander, U.S., Pacific Command:  Chairman Frelinghuysen, Congressman Visclosky, anddistinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to address the committee.This will be my fourth and final opportunity to provide an Indo-Asia-Pacificassessment since taking command of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) inMarch 2012. For over three years, I have had the extraordinary privilege tolead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civiliansselflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men and women and their familiesare doing an amazing job and I am proud to serve alongside them.
In concert with allies and partners, USPACOM balanceshistorical and cultural factors against modern day political and economicevents in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and conflict in the mostmilitarized region in the world. These actions are designed to defend thehomeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships, maintainaccess to areas of common interest, counter aggression, prevent theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat violent extremism.
What follows is my assessment of the region’s securityenvironment, including the current and future challenges and opportunities forUSPACOM forces. My testimony includes an update on major areas of concern inthe security environment, allies and partners in the region, building andstrengthening relationships, and maintaining an effective and assured presence.

**Security Environment
The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains one of the most dynamicregions on earth. It is vital to U.S. economic and security interests, andactivities in the region will shape much of our nation’s future. The regionencompasses 52% of the earth’s surface and is composed of 83% water and 17%land. Over half of the people on the planet reside on that 17% of land, and bythe middle of the century, the Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70%of the world’s population. This high population density coupled withdestabilizing factors such as natural disasters, climate change, ideologicalradicalism, and population migration will continue to put immense pressure onregional governments. Contained in the thirty-six nations in USPACOM’s area ofresponsibility are the world’s two largest economies after the U.S. (China andJapan), and five smallest economies. The region also contains the world’s mostpopulous nation (China), the largest democracy (India), the largest Muslim-majority(Indonesia), and the smallest republic (Nauru). It contains seven of the tenlargest standing militaries, five nuclear nations, and five of the U.S.’s sevenmutual defense treaty alliances. The socioeconomic diversity and populationdensity throughout the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) create strategiclong-term challenges. These challenges include: political instability, socialinequality, poverty, increased sensitivity to climate change and naturaldisasters, risk of pandemic disease, and epidemic drug use and distribution.
In addition to these challenges, the U.S. must continue todeter North Korean provocation, ensure access to air and sea lanes, encouragepeaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South ChinaSeas, respond to natural disasters and theater health issues, check the flow ofviolent extremists from the Middle East to violent extremist organizations(VEOs) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, address transnational crimes, monitor anincreasingly active Russia, and constructively engage a rising China. Despiteall of the challenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., itsallies, and its partners. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, fosterthe region’s economic potential, and provide the security and stabilitynecessary to protect areas of common interest, USPACOM remains engaged.
The Indo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutionsto effectively govern and prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions, thecountries of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are more politically stable than inprevious years. The general health of democratic institutions across the regionis evidenced by several critical leadership transitions which occurred lastyear. Successful, peaceful participatory elections occurred in India andIndonesia. Sri Lanka achieved a peaceful transition of power following itsJanuary election. Fiji took a major step toward moving past its 2006 militarycoup by holding elections last September. Citizens in many countries were ableto peacefully protest without fear of oppressive action. While these activitiesare reassuring, challenges remain. For example, Thailand’s military coupremoved a democratically elected administration, and interim leaders have yetto restore a democratic government.
**North Korea:**North Korea remains the most dangerous and unpredictable security challenge.The regime continues its aggressive attitude while advancing its nuclearcapability and ballistic missile programs. While the international communitycontinues to urge North Korea to live up to its international obligations andreturn to authentic credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework,North Korea has unfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss itsdenuclearization commitments and obligations, and additional nuclear testsremain possible. It is expected that North Korea will continue to showcaseballistic missile development (to include mobile intercontinental ballisticmissiles and intermediate range Musudan missiles) and conduct launches indirect violation of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (suchas the short-range ballistic missile launches in March 2015). North Koreaalready announced its intent to conduct “annual and regular” drills to advancethis prohibited capability.
Additionally, North Korea demonstrated the will to employcyber techniques to impose costly damage to civilian companies, as wasdemonstrated in the high-profile attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. NorthKorean cyber actors continue to conduct cyber actions against South Koreanmilitary and civilian networks. USPACOM remains concerned about the destructivenature of this state sponsored cyber-attack targeting a commercial entity andits employees in the United States. These actions demonstrate North Korea’sdisregard for international norms. North Korea’s actions are beyond the boundsof acceptable state behavior in cyberspace.
**Territorial andMaritime Issues:** Territorial and maritime issues in the East and SouthChina Seas, if not handled properly, may negatively impact stability in theregional and the security environment. The claimants' use of maritime lawenforcement vessels to enforce their claims has largely kept these issues outof the military sphere, despite a steady increase in military air and seapatrols. While no country appears to desire military conflict, an escalationdue to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out.
In the East China Sea, Japan and China both claimsovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. While the United States does not take aposition on ultimate sovereignty over the islands, it has long recognizedJapanese administration of them. China’s behavior in the area has resulted inclose encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts of Japanesereconnaissance flights, inflammatory strategic messaging, and the no-noticedeclaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea.
The South China Sea issues are complex. Six claimants(China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines) haveoverlapping claims in the South China Sea. As the South China Sea claimants’populations and economies continue to grow, access to the oil, gas, minerals,and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes more important. Claimantsappear to be asserting their claims through increased maritime patrols, outpostand facility construction, and land reclamation.
China has the broadest claim with its self-proclaimed“Nine-Dash line” that covers almost the entire South China Sea. China’s lack ofclarity with regard to its South China Sea claims, and China’s attempts tounilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims, has created uncertainty in theregion. Any use of the nine-dash line by China to claim maritime rights notbased on claimed land features would not align with international law. Theinternational community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dashline claim and bring it into accordance with the international law of the sea,as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.
To achieve its long-term goals in the region, China isexecuting a strategy that includes expanding outposts in contested areasthrough land reclamation on South China Sea features, taking actions to preventother nations from establishing / maintaining outposts, exploring for naturalresources in disputed waters, and increasing its naval and air forces’ presencethrough exercises and patrols. China’s aggressive land reclamation andconstruction projects at eight South China Sea military outposts include newbuildings, more capable berthing space for ships, and presumably an airfield onthe Fiery Cross Reef (China’s largest reclamation project). Although landreclamation cannot, for example, change a submerged feature into a naturalisland that generates any legal entitlements to maritime zones, the completionof these projects will give China the ability for greater presence, increasedwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered bysurveillance and area-denial systems. Examples of activities supporting China’slong-term strategy include attempts to block resupply missions to the smallPhilippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal and exclude Philippine and otherfishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Last year, China also moved aChina National Offshore Oil Corporation drilling platform into Vietnam’sclaimed Exclusive Economic Zone resulting in a tense standoff betweenVietnamese and Chinese maritime assets substantially increasing the possibilityof miscalculation between the two countries.
The U.S. does not take a position on issues of sovereigntywith respect to territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, but we doinsist that all maritime claims must be derived from land features inaccordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the SeaConvention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize the importance that maritimeand territorial disagreements be resolved peacefully in accordance withinternational law and opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force toassert claims. An example of such an attempt at peaceful resolution is thePhilippines’ arbitration against China under the Law of the Sea Convention thatis being heard by a tribunal in The Hague. Of note, China has refused toparticipate in this arbitration to date.
**Natural Disasters**:The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted for over 40% (1,690 incidences) of the world’sreported natural disasters during the period between 2004 and 2013, and,because of the region’s coastal population density, these disasters wereparticularly deadly, claiming more than 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim'stectonic plate structure produces its well-known Ring of Fire, which regularlytriggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Weather extremes and anomaliescontinue to plague the region. Understanding the scope and severity oflong-term climate change, unexpected climate shocks, and climate variabilityevents such as El Nino are shared global challenges.
In addition to seismic and climate challenges, areas oflarge populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in theregion create optimal conditions for the rapid spread of human- or animal-bornediseases. To address these challenges, USPACOM focuses on pre-crisispreparedness with training and exercises. For example, many of the lessonslearned and preparedness measures implemented after Typhoon Haiyan (OperationDamayan, November 2013) resulted in less damage and loss of life when TyphoonHagupit passed over the Philippines last December. U.S. forces regularly trainwith allies and partners on humanitarian assistance and disaster reliefoperations and stand ready to respond in support of interagency partners to anatural disaster or the frequent vectors of disease that plague the region.Regional information sharing and rapid response to health crises are improving,but the danger remains high. USPACOM will continue to focus on improvingpre-crisis preparedness and working with allies and partners in the region toensure an effective response when an event occurs.
**Violent Extremism:**The ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq attracts foreign fighters from countriesthroughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Current assessments indicate approximately1,300 foreign personnel fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State ofIraq and the Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of thesecombat-experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability ofregional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of theworld. In South Asia, partner nations maintain pressure on extremist networksbut face a persistent threat from transnational groups that continue adaptingto shifting geopolitical factors, competition among global extremist groups,and counterterrorism actions by the U.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa’ida’sincreased rhetoric focused on South Asia and the announcement of a newaffiliate, “Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent,” suggest Al-Qai’da will focusresources on uniting established terrorist groups to engage in jihad in SouthAsia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other Pakistan-based groups continue fighting inAfghanistan, but they will likely shift some of their operational focus to theIndian Subcontinent in the next one to three years as Coalition forcesdrawdown. In Southeast Asia, regional partners maintain persistent pressure onextremist networks; however, competing security priorities in the region,coupled with the sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, havepressurized counter-terrorism attention. Extremist groups are increasinglyinterconnected and the region remains a potential safe haven, facilitation hub,and area of operations for extremists.
Proliferation Issues: Rapidly developing technologymanufacturing sectors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have in many statesoutpaced the concurrent development of those states’ effective export controls.The region includes some of the busiest maritime and air ports in the worldwith shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through these portsalmost daily. These shipments include dual-use items—commercial itemscontrolled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weaponscontrol regimes, others covered by associated catch all controls—manufacturedin or re-exported from states with spotty export control enforcement.  
Iran built its robust nuclear infrastructure and advancedits ballistic missile systems with materials that passed through the USPACOMAOR; North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and ballistic missileprograms—and proliferate conventional arms for revenue generation—using anetwork of individuals and entities throughout the region. PACOM engagesregional partners in capacity-building activities designed to improve exportcontrols and interdiction capabilities in the region. In August 2014 PACOMhosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation SecurityInitiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the beginning of asix-year series of exercises that various “expert” nations in the region willhost. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and the UnitedStates) Exercises such as Fortune Guard provide nations a forum to demonstratethe intention to act and share the best tactics against proliferators,emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this complex challenge.
**TransnationalCrime:** There is a growing trend for regional human and drug traffickingorganizations to operate as global enterprises. In addition to the devastatingimpact widespread drug use has on a society, the revenue generated from theseillicit activities fund terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations.Methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drugthreat in the USPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in theUnited States comes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border Region,and an estimated 90% of the precursor chemicals used to produce MexicanMethamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual volume of Methamphetamineseizures made along the United States South West Border Region has exceededCocaine seizures in the past three years.
Nearly 21million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide and nearlytwo-thirds are from Asia, with India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailandamong the countries with the highest number of victims. Women and children –especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are the mostvulnerable demographics. Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sex trade,while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories,farms, or as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families as domesticservants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional abuseand social stigmatization while being denied their basic human rights andfundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much remains to be done tocombat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM forces build partnershipcapacity and share intelligence in order to combat these transnational threats.
**Russian Intent:** Russia is reasserting itselfpolitically and militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy andLong Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly,but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and logisticalissues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have increased theiroperations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent ships to supportoperations in the Middle East and Europe, while Russian ships from the Balticand Black Sea Fleets deployed into the Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers andreconnaissance aircraft regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continueoperations as far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. Theanticipated fielding later this year of Russia’s newest class of nuclearballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to Russia’sland-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow’s nuclear capability in theAsia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain active inour region. Russia aims to demonstrate military capabilities commensurate withits Pacific interests: ensuring Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, andjurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, andprojecting a credible deterrent force.
**Chinese Military Modernization andStrategic Intent:**Recent statements by senior PRC leaders, such as PRC President XiJinping, suggest that the PRC may be attempting to advance a vision for analternative security architecture in Asia that affords Beijing increasedinfluence in the region and diminishes the role of the United States. ThisChinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summer at the Conference onInteraction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. At the conference,President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to support the development of a newsecurity order centered on China. The proposed new order also requires acurtailment of alliance-strengthening diplomacy, of which the “U.S. Rebalanceto Asia” is noted as the greatest offender. China is proposing an alternativestrategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, at best, adeferential role.    China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernization program totransform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting complexoperations. Many of China’s initiatives are intended to develop capabilities todeter or counter third-party intervention in regional contingencies. Theseanti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are focused on controlling accessand freedom of operations in vast portions of the air and maritime domains, aswell as space and cyberspace. These include a series of sophisticated andincreasingly long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kineticcounter-space systems. China is also making significant advances in electronicwarfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge.

China continues an aggressive ship building program toproduce and field advanced frigates, destroyers, and the first in-classcruiser-sized warship. Chinese shipyards are also producing newer, more capablesubmarines as they inactivate older submarines, resulting in a fleet that isnot growing substantially in number but is significantly more capable. Advancesin China’s strategic capabilities remain significant. China now has threeoperational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (Type 094), and up to fivemore may enter service by the end of the decade. The JIN-class submarinecarries the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile with a range capable ofreaching the U.S. and will give China its first credible sea-based nucleardeterrent. Nuclear deterrence patrols will likely commence this year. Lastly,we expect China to soon begin constructing an indigenous aircraft carrier.
China is using computer network exploitation capabilities tosupport intelligence collection to advance its defense and high-techindustries. Through a sophisticated cyber program, China is generating insightson U.S. security policies, defense networks, logistics, and militarycapabilities.
As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities andexpands its presence in Asia, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and morefrequent contact and the risk of an accident or miscalculation increases. Thisplaces a premium on efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust in orderto reduce risk. The Chinese Navy is more frequently operating in the IndianOcean, expanding the area and duration of operations and exercises in theWestern and Central Pacific Ocean, and periodically venturing into othernon-traditional areas, as exemplified by recent port visits to Europe. Thecomplexity of the regional and global security environment, as well as China’smilitary advancements, necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. andChinese militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interestsconverge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during periods offriction.
**Allies and Partners
The U.S.’ five treaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are:Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In addition toU.S. treaty alliances, the U.S. continues to strengthen existing partnershipsand build new relationships to advance common interests and address sharedconcerns. U.S. allies and key partners in the theater play a fundamental rolein addressing the security challenges. Strengthening and modernizing alliancesand partnerships is a top USPACOM priority.
**Australia:**Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, and effective ally in theIndo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace and stability in the region, andAustralia has taken a leading role in addressing regional security andcapacity-building issues, including lead roles in Humanitarian Assistance andDisaster Relief events. Australia is also a key contributor to global security,including counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the Resolute Support mission inAfghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives,which provide expanded opportunities for bilateral and multilateral engagement,the Marine Rotational Force- Darwin successfully completed its third rotationwhile increasing its presence from 250 to 1,177 U.S. Marines. The U.S. AirForce is increasing its rotation of aircraft to Australia. In addition to theForce Posture Initiatives, the U.S. and Australia are identifying additionalopportunities to increase collaboration in counter-terrorism, space, cyber, andintegrated air missile defense and regional capacity building. Australia isprocuring a number of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperabilitysuch as the F-35 Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18GGrowler aircraft as well as Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensuregreater synchronization and integration, the Australian Government provides aGeneral Officer and a Senior Executive to USPACOM, as well as another GeneralOfficer to U.S. Army Pacific, as tangible examples of a mutual commitment tothe alliance.
**Japan:** TheU.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productive through both countries’shared commitment to a full range of military capabilities with expandingresponsibility for training, exercises, interoperability, and bilateralplanning. Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinetdecision on collective self-defense are positive developments and indicators ofJapan’s ability and willingness to assume a greater role in the regionalsecurity architecture. The Abe administration will submit implementinglegislation to the National Diet during its spring session, and debate isexpected to conclude in summer 2015. The US-Japan Guidelines for DefenseCooperation are being revised, and that process will conclude with publicpresentation of the Guidelines in the near future. We are hopeful that Japan’supcoming legislative changes support new and expanded forms of cooperation.
U.S. Forces Japan continues to build its close relationshipwith the Japanese Joint Staff to enhance interoperability and informationsharing through realistic training, exercises, and bilateral planning. USPACOMwill continue to maintain a robust military presence in Japan to meet futuresecurity challenges and encourage greater trilateral military engagements withthe Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia.
Efforts continue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateralcoordination in response to North Korean provocative behavior. The December2014 signature of the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangementis a positive first step toward greater information sharing on North Koreanmissile and nuclear threats.
As Japan increases its defense spending, it is procuring anumber of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability such as theF-35 Lightning II aircraft, MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as well asupgrading existing AEGIS destroyers with the latest BMD capability andconstructing two additional AEGIS destroyers (for a total of eight BMD capableplatforms). Each North Korean ballistic missile provocation validates theinvestment of the AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan to provide ISR against missilethreats. Last year's addition of the second radar in Japan and forwarddeploying two additional BMD capable ships will enhance our ability to defendour ally and the region, as well as provide early warning of missile threats tothe U.S. homeland. Lastly, Japan continues to make significant infrastructureinvestments in country that complement the realignment of U.S. Marines fromOkinawa to Guam including expanding the airfield and associated facilities atMarine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and construction of the Futenma ReplacementFacility. It is important that these initiatives remain on track.
**Philippines:**The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive source of strength and regionalstability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Enhanced DefenseCooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and the Government of thePhilippines was signed last April. Through enhanced U.S. rotational presence,the EDCA provides expanded opportunities to conduct theater securitycooperation activities and supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)as it shifts focus from internal security to external defense. Full EDCAimplementation awaits the outcome of a case before the Philippine SupremeCourt, where deliberations could last into this summer.
After more than a decade, the Joint Special Operations TaskForce created to counter Violent Extremist Organizations in the Philippineswill stand down and the AFP will sustain that mission. Training and advisingobjectives that were set to address organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Groupand Jemaah Islamiyah have been met. Although the Task Force is standing down, asmall USPACOM footprint will remain embedded in the Philippines to continueworking with the AFP leadership and planning staffs. The AFP has demonstratedan increased capacity and capability to handle domestic threats inside theircountry, but USPACOM will remain committed to supporting and advising the AFPat the operational level.
Competing claims in the South China Sea continue to be asource of friction and instability. China continues large-scale landreclamation around disputed features. Furthermore, periodic resupply and trooprotations to the small Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also known asAyungin Shoal) are well-known points of contention with the Chinese government.
**Republic of Korea:**The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance remains strong and vital, andenduring for over six decades. Our militaries integrate complementarycapabilities and enhance the relationship with honest and frank dialogue.During the most recent annual discussions, the U.S. and ROK agreed to delaywartime operational control transfer and adopt a conditions-based approach,rather than a calendar-based deadline. The U.S. and ROK intend to modernize thealliance to better inform the development or acquisition of Alliancecapabilities required to address future threats from North Korea.
USPACOM will continue to work with the ROK to address theNorth Korean threat. North Korea continues to be a challenge due toprovocations and uncertainty, which are viewed as a threat to peace andstability in the region. The ability to rapidly respond to aggression withcombined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best way to ensure deterrence andmaintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperation will improve eachparticipant’s understanding of the mutual challenges and shared opportunitiesthat exist in and around the Korean Peninsula.
**Thailand:**As Thailand is the oldest U.S. alliance partner(182 years), the U.S. values itsfriendship with the people of Thailand. The Thai military’s decision to suspendits constitution and assume control of the civilian government has impactedthat relationship. Military engagements and exercises have been appropriatelyadjusted in a whole of government response to the coup, pending a return to ademocratically-elected government. USPACOM will continue to demonstratecommitment to the U.S.’ ally while reinforcing democratic values and ideals.The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored with the Royal Thai Armed Forces isan important multi-lateral warfighting training event. This year’s exercise wassignificantly limited in scope and scale in response to the Thai coup, andheavily focused on humanitarian assistance activities.
**India:**Last year, India held the largest election in its history. With new leadershipin place, India is energizing the U.S.-India strategic partnership. PrimeMinister Modi has focused India’s foreign policy on building strong regionalcohesion in South Asia. India’s two decade-long “Look East Policy” has resultedin growing partnerships with Southeast Asian countries.
The U.S. military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi’smilitary, having conducted 69 major exercises in the past five years. TheIndian Navy continues its strong participation in multilateral exercisesincluding INDRA with Russia, MALABAR with the U.S. and Japan, and RIMPAC with23 navies from across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. India’s participation in theseexercises signals their commitment as a regional security provider.Additionally, over the past three years the U.S. has been India’s largestdefense trading partner. Through military modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s,C-130Js, and P-8Is, among other items), and a growing network of defensepartnerships, India is asserting its role as an important regional actordetermined to protect common interests and ensure free access to economicallyvital sea lanes, although with respect to military activities, India stillasserts a security interest in its EEZ that does not conform to the law of thesea.
**Indonesia:**Indonesia is a capable security partner in Southeast Asia, and is increasinglyfocused on its role as a regional power, which USPACOM continues to support asa main pillar of mil-mil engagement. Presidential elections last Julydemonstrated a commitment to democratic principles, and the August opening ofIndonesia’s new Peace and Security Center to train regional partners onpeacekeeping operations reinforces its position as a leader in securityassistance. A growing area of cooperation with Indonesia is defense trade,which includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters and initial delivery ofF-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concerned about maintainingsecurity and stability in the South China Sea. While their Chief of Defense hasarticulated a zero-war policy in the South China Sea, there are signs they areincreasingly concerned over China’s so-called nine dash line overlapping withpart of their claimed EEZ. While Indonesia continues a foreign policy rooted inthe Non Aligned Movement, USPACOM has seen significant gains in securitycooperation activities. Indonesia will continue to balance its partnership withthe U.S. with other nations such as Russia and China, but security cooperationwith the U.S. remains a top priority.
**New Zealand:**New Zealand is a respected voice in international politics and a recognizedleader in Oceania that shares common security concerns with the U.S., such asterrorism, transnational crime, and maritime security. Military-to-militaryrelations and defense engagements with New Zealand continue to improve, and theU.S. and New Zealand executed the second series of annual bilateral defensedialogues last year. New Zealand’s establishment of a Consulate General inHonolulu has also provided additional opportunities for USPACOM and New Zealandto engage on issues of mutual interest. This new Consulate General addition to Hawaiiis timely as the U.S. celebrates the 100th Anniversary of ANZAC with NewZealand and the Australians this year.
**Oceania:**Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania is important to nationalsecurity. The provisions included in the Compacts of Free Association with theFederated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and theRepublic of Palau are important mechanisms that guide the relationships. TheU.S. meets its defense obligations to these nations through defense planningand preparation. In return, these compact agreements provide assured access tothe three Compact Nations and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers ofPacific in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grantor deny access to another nation’s military forces, which allows themaintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. TheU.S.’s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner withother Pacific island countries sends a strong message throughout the region andreinforces its commitment to the Pacific Rebalance.
Fiji currently has its first democratically electedgovernment since its military coup in 2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter intoregional forums (e.g., Pacific Island Forum) and have new opportunities forengagement with the U.S. Several other countries (Papua New Guinea, the SolomonIslands, and Vanuatu) may face government reorganizations over the next year.These events may set back specific projects but will not likely impact stabilityor affect overall U.S. engagement.
Climate change will continue to be an important issue acrossthe Oceania region. This year’s forecasted El Nino event will likely result indrought and increased tropical cyclone activity. The Republic of MarshallIslands will almost certainly face water shortage resulting in requests for aidor disaster declarations under the Compact of Free Association. Fiji, Kiribati,the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga willlikely face similar situations. The December 2014 United Nations Climate ChangeConference addressed the impact of rising sea levels - a keen interest toPacific Island Nations.
**Singapore:**Singapore continues its important role in regional security initiatives.Singapore’s role as a ‘Major Security Cooperation Partner’ is underscored bylongstanding support of U.S. naval forces. For example, USS Freedom completed aten month deployment in 2013, and USS Fort Worth is currently on a 16 monthdeployment. These forward forces contribute to naval readiness and partnercapacity building and enable rapid response to many crises, including OperationDamayan in the Philippines and Air Asia recovery efforts. Additionally,Singapore’s Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler to providing criticalsupport to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operating forces.
**U.S. – China:**In light of an increasingly complex regional and global security environment,including advances in China’s military capabilities and its expanding militaryoperations and missions, the overall U.S. approach to China calls for acontinuous dialogue between the armed forces of both countries to expandpractical cooperation where national interests converge and to constructivelymanage differences through sustained and substantive dialogue. As a keyelement, the U.S.’s military engagement with China, within the guidelines ofthe 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improves transparency, and reduces risk ofunintended incidents, contributing to overall regional stability. The U.S.military has increased the depth of engagement with China in recent years andexecuted over 50 bilateral and numerous multilateral engagements last year.While these engagements are critical to improving transparency and reducingrisk, the U.S. military must continue to take a pragmatic approach as the U.S.attempts to help integrate China into the existing security architecture.China’s military investments, including A2AD capabilities, focused on theability to control access and deny freedom of operations in vast portions ofthe air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains raise concerns. The U.S. willneed more transparency and understanding of Chinese intentions in order tominimize friction and avoid miscalculation or conflict in the future. Absentgreater transparency from China, its ambiguous dashed-line claim, militarymodernization efforts and aggressive land reclamation in the South China Seahave significant implications for regional stability and the current securityarchitecture.
Over the past year, the U.S. and China have agreed tomechanisms such as the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on Notification ofMajor Military Activities and Rules of Behavior (RoB) for Safety of Air andMaritime Encounters, designed to underscore and reinforce existinginternational law and standards while improving transparency, building trust,and reducing risk of unintended incidents. The surface-to-surface encountersannex of the RoB CBM was signed last year and the air-to-air annex is scheduledto be completed by the end of this year. These new Rules of Behavior arenon-binding and capture existing legal rules and standards. Additionally, theU.S. and China continue to use the Military Maritime Consultative Agreementmeetings to discuss safety in the maritime domain and avoid crises. As Chinacontinues to grow its military capacity and capability and operate further fromits territory, these mechanisms become more important.
Both militaries have had success addressing areas of commoninterest, such as counter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of themost successful engagements were focused on military medical cooperation andshared health concerns. For example, the USPACOM surgeon hosted Chinesecounterparts in Hawaii and Washington, DC, which resulted in concreteopportunities for continued military medical cooperation focused on DisasterResponse, Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January2015, the PLA hosted the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highlysuccessful reciprocal visit. Demonstrating China’s increasing ability tooperate beyond the Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area ofcommon concern, last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter piracyexercises in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. China’s participationin international efforts to address these problems and to operate and exercisewith the U.S. and its allies and partners in a manner consistent withinternational law and standards is welcomed.
**Building and Strengthening Relationships
The future security and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacificdepends upon building bilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong relationships,facilitated by a U.S. forward presence, advance common interests and addressshared threats. USPACOM strengthens relationships with U.S. allies and partnersthrough security cooperation and capacity building, bilateral and multilateralapproaches, and senior leader engagement.
**SecurityCooperation and Capacity Building:** USPACOM enhances interoperabilityand information sharing with allies and partners in order to cooperativelyaddress regional challenges. USPACOM’s Security Cooperation approach is focusedon building partner readiness, assisting with partner capability gaps,identifying partner shortfalls, and addressing the most critical capacityshortfalls. Last year, USPACOM identified C4ISR as a top priority for SecurityCooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and contributed to the U.S.supporting the ROK purchase of Global Hawk – a High Altitude UAV platform thatwill help close the gap in some of the security challenges on the KoreanPeninsula. Supporting USPACOM’s approach to addressing partner capability andcapacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively use Security Cooperation andAssistance resources, and maintain the momentum to bring the right capabilitiesinto the AOR.
As mentioned earlier, the progress the Republic of thePhilippines continues to make in addressing violent extremists groups insidetheir country is a testament to building capacity in USPACOM’s foreign internaldefense efforts. USPACOM is also building capacity to counter drug traffickingin the AOR through Joint Interagency Task Force – West (JIATF-W) engagementswith China. Through a partnership with the Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-Whas leveraged Department of Defense counternarcotic authorities to open up anadditional avenue of cooperation with Chinese officials by providing anti-moneylaundering training linked to counterdrug efforts. These efforts are only justbeginning, but show promise in improving communication, cooperation, andinformation sharing on significant criminal enterprises operating in both theU.S. and China.
Lastly, increasing international representation at theUSPACOM headquarters has improved collaboration with allies and partners andcreated a more agile and effective command and control architecture. The newUSPACOM model integrates sixteen foreign exchange officers and liaison officersfrom six countries and facilitates a seamless transition from routine businessto crisis. Included in these numbers are three foreign exchange Flag Officersand Senior Executives in key billets on the USPACOM staff.
**Bilateral andMultilateral Approaches:** With the exception of North Korea, USPACOMcontinues to build and strengthen bilateral relationships with all of thenations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM maintains a close link with the fiveU.S. treaty allies and other partners in the region through a series of formalbilateral mechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treatyobligations, guided by USPACOM’s premier bilateral event with Australia, theMilitary Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM’s military to militaryrelationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior Leader Seminar,which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan remains strong. USPACOMcontinues to rely on the alliance with the Republic of Korea to maintain peaceand stability in Northeast Asia, and the annual Military Committee and SecurityConsultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide thisalliance forward. Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board andSecurity Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discussways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21st-century challenges.Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to addressshared regional security concerns while reinforcing U.S. commitment todemocratic principles.
Similar bilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughoutthe USPACOM AOR, including Bilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia,Vietnam, and others, as USPACOM continues to foster bilateral ties to enhanceregional stability. Bilateral mechanisms with allies and partners form thestrategic foundation of the security architecture that ensures peace andstability while defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

Whilebilateral mechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to emphasizemultilateral approaches. USPACOM works with regional forums such as theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage multilateralrelationships that build trust, prevent misperceptions that can lead toconflict, and reinforce international standards of conduct. For example,USPACOM arranges an annual Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference as its premiermultilateral engagement tool for candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs ofDefense in the region. Each year the CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOMand a co-host country; Brunei hosted last year’s successful conference. The2015 CHOD Conference will be held in Hawaii and is designed to promotemultilateral cooperation and provide a forum for the theater’s military leadersto share regional and global perspectives on common challenges. USPACOM alsoparticipated in other multilateral events in the region, such as the FullertonForum and Shangri-La Dialogue, to encourage multilateral solutions to sharedchallenges, as well as provide a venue for continued dialogue and strengtheningsecurity partnerships in the region.  
One of themost important multilateral forums in the theater is ASEAN. The ten memberstates in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Myanmar last year and Malaysia thisyear, seek to improve multilateral security activities and advance stability inthe Indo-Asia-Pacific. Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2trillion is U.S.) passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten memberstates of ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth majortrade partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the regionincluding Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber Security,and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN demonstrated duringpast disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the Malaysian Flight 370 searchoperations, that practical cooperation among member states can enable civilianand military agencies to be more effective and efficient.
LastApril, Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense Ministers, theUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA),and other non-government organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster responseand maritime security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military RegionalResponse Planning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief lastOctober and the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security dialogue byhosting a Maritime Domain Awareness discussion this May. USPACOM will continuesupporting ASEAN as it builds regional tools and forums such as the ASEANEconomic Community by the end of 2015. Additionally, there is hope that theASEAN members and China can conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conductmechanism for the South China Sea. 

The Daniel K.Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) also contributes tomultilateral engagements and rules-based security governance. Through itsexecutive education courses, workshops, and sustained alumni engagementactivities, the Center contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan bybuilding U.S. and partner nation capacities. Success stories include theAPCSS-facilitated development of Papua New Guinea’s first-ever national securitypolicy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and Bangladesh’sfirst comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal. Additionally, APCSShelped with the successful completion of Nepal’s disarmament, demobilization,and reintegration program for dealing with Maoist ex-combatants, and thesigning of an inter-party agreement to overcome political crisis—both led by acore group of APCSS alumni. 

**Senior LeaderEngagement:** USPACOM and its components leverage senior leader visits toincrease dialogue on issues of shared concern, build and strengthenrelationships, and convey U.S. commitment to the region. Each year, hundreds ofsenior military and government leaders address security challenges throughcounterpart visits which greatly enhance understanding, interoperability, andtrust. Examples of senior leadership engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific overthe past year include:
• The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, theRepublic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum inChina, and the East Asia Summit in Burma.
• The President also increased engagements in the theater tostrengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, andto deepen ties with Malaysia.
• The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea; China;and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5th Strategic DialogueConference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions; Australia for annualMinisterial Consultations; and the Solomon Islands.
• The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a 2+2meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington.
• The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateralsecurity discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership meetings; Indiafor defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to sign the Force PostureAgreement; and China for Confidence Building Measure discussions.
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changifacilities in Singapore; participated in security and military discussions inVietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for the Defense ChiefsStrategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events; and both Japan and theRepublic of Korea for key counterpart visits.
These senior leader engagements are critical to identifyingopportunities and addressing security challenges in the region. Additionally,Congressional delegations to the theater are of significant benefit.
**Effective and Assured Presence
Effective and assured presence of USPACOM forces is requiredto meet the challenges and opportunities within USPACOM’s AOR. As strategicwarning timelines decrease, early identification of potential crises is key torapidly assessing and shaping events. It also places a premium on robust,modern, agile, forward-deployed forces, maintained at high levels of readiness.Assured presence is supported by posturing forward-deployed forces, fieldingnew capabilities and concepts, addressing critical gaps, and maintainingreadiness in order to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize ouralliances and partnerships, maintain access in the air and maritime domains,counter aggression, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and violent extremism.
**Posture:**Sustaining effective and forward presence begins with having the necessarymilitary infrastructure and access to support forward-stationed and rotationalforces. USPACOM’s posture effectively communicates U.S. intent and resolve tosafeguard U.S. national interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships,maintain an assured presence in the region, prevent conflict, and if necessary,respond rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations.
USPACOM faces three key challenges related to force posture.The first is operating in an AOR that covers 52% of the earth’s surface. Thevast distances complicate ISR, movement/maneuver, and sustainment, and requirea geographically distributed force laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. Thesecond challenge is the growth of military capabilities in the region. TheIndo-Asia-Pacific is the most militarized region in the world. Maintaining theability to defend strategic national security interests in an increasinglycomplex and lethal environment requires a force posture that is operationallyresilient. Finally, expanding access to regions in South and Southeast Asiarequires access and forward staging arrangements that are politicallysustainable. In support of USPACOM’s objectives, the military services and ourallies and partners are making investments to improve U.S. force posture.Examples of these investments are:
• Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air wingto relocate from Atsugi
• Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa forFutenma replacement
• Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreementwith the Philippines
• Expanding future capabilities through construction at CampHumphreys, ROK
• Reinforcing Guam’s munitions and fuels piers at ApraHarbor
• Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through trooprotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in Darwin,Australia
• Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at AndersenAFB, Guam
• Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and linesin Guam and Japan
• Implementing rotational forces through USFK
• Developing divert options and training ranges in theNorthern Marianas Islands
• Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow pieroperations in Naha, Japan
These posture investments are part of USPACOM’s holisticinfrastructure investment strategy and are key to continued mission success.
Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and onthe West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II andduring the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure now requiresinvestment to extend its service life. The military services continue to investin sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) to provide qualityfacilities to support service members and their families; however, during timesof austere budgets, the military services struggle to maintain infrastructureSRM funding levels. These forced decisions undermine the significant investmentin facilities made by DoD and Host Nation Funded Construction programs overpast decades.
Reduced SRM funding will negatively impact the ability tobring new forces and capabilities into the theater and maintain criticalinfrastructure. The U.S. and the theater benefit from the significant levels ofinvestment made by allies and partners. For example, the Republic of Korea issignificantly contributing to the cost of keeping U.S. Forces on the KoreanPeninsula. The Government of Japan has committed up to $3.1 billion to helprealign U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations and $4.5 billionto expand the airfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air StationIwakuni.
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)Joint Military Training initiative (CJMT) is an important posture undertaking.CNMI remains strategically important as a forward and sovereign U.S. locationwith lease rights until 2033 and extendable to 2083. When the U.S.-JapanDefense Policy Review Initiative moves approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines fromJapan to Guam, the CJMT will enable this U.S. Marine force to train andmaintain operational readiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMTinitiative will provide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT willoptimize future training ranges for joint and combined exercises with alliesand foreign forces. As a part of aviation resiliency initiatives, divert andalternate air fields are also being explored on the islands of Saipan andTinian along with other locations in the broader Western Pacific.
**Forward DeployedForces:** The tyranny of distance, which defines the USPACOM AOR,requires forward deployed forces to engage with allies and partners, respondrapidly to crisis or contingencies, defend the homeland, and reinforce U.S.commitment to the region. To increase USPACOM’s forward deployed forces andcapabilities, the military services are:
• Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships intoSingapore
• Forward deploying two additional ballistic missiledefense-capable surface ships to Japan
• Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater
• Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capableUSS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan
• Installing an advanced radar in Australia
• Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater
• Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar inJapan
• Stationing additional submarines in Guam
• Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines,Singapore, and Australia
**New Systems andOperating Concepts:** Crafting new concepts and fielding new systems isfundamental to employing a credible force. For example, the military servicesare:
• Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and morecapable P-8s
• Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and SpecialForces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR
• Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile LandingPlatforms in the USPACOM AOR
• Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter AirAegis Destroyers
• Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deploymentconcept
• Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment withmaintenance hubs in Japan and Australia
**AddressingCritical Capability Gaps:** The most technical, high-end militarychallenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and are growing. While many improvements toposture, forward deployed forces, capabilities, and concepts have been made toaddress these challenges, there are a number of mission sets and enablers thatrequire continuous focus and attention. These include areas such as UnderseaWarfare, Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management,command and control, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and IntegratedAir and Missile Defense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater enablerssuch as petroleum redistribution and lift.
Undersea Warfare is a mission set that requires constantattention to maintain a decisive advantage. Of the world’s 300 foreignsubmarines, roughly 200 are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which, 150belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. Countries operating these systemsview the platforms as a mechanism to affect the balance of power in theirfavor. Even small navies that possess submarines hold a distinct advantage overa navy without the capability.
There is a significant leap underway in theIndo-Asia-Pacific in undersea capability as newer submarines replace older variants.In the past few years, Singapore, India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all receivedmodern diesel submarines and China is on a modernization path to improve thelethality and survivability of its attack submarines with the introduction ofquiet, high-end, diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia is alsomodernizing its existing fleet of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclearsubmarines (SSGNs) and producing their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs.
In addition to attack submarines, there are importantdevelopments underway that will increase Chinese and Russian strategicdeterrent patrol capability and capacity. China has three operational JIN-classballistic missile submarines and up to five more may enter service by the endof the decade. Additionally, Russia is planning to field its newest Borei-classnuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific later this year. Submarinedetection and tracking is a complex problem set and will continue to be one ofthe most important functions of naval forces. A continued and sustainedinvestment in the U.S. nuclear submarine force, advanced Undersea Warfaretechnologies, capabilities and capacity, and readiness is necessary to outpacethe growing challenges.
Persistent and deep-look ISR capabilities and supportingarchitecture are required to prevent strategic surprise, assess the securityenvironment, and support actions that impose cost or defeat potentialadversaries. Although ISR capacity and capabilities have increased, significantcapacity issues remain. Efforts to mitigate ISR capacity issues, as well asdevelop new capabilities, are ongoing. Additionally, an ISR processing,exploitation, and dissemination enterprise that is interoperable and sharedwith Allies and Partners is important. Without a concerted effort to continueadvancing U.S. capabilities, the U.S. risks missing key indications andwarnings in an environment where situational awareness affects decision space.
Satellite communications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler toexercise Command & Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space continuesto grow increasingly congested and contested, and adversaries continuedeveloping means to curtail access to space-enabled capabilities. A resilientspace-based command, control, and ISR architecture remains a USPACOM priority.
There is a growing need to sustain and modernize airborneearly warning systems to execute multi-mission, multi-domain integrated commandand control. The cruise missile, air, and UAV threats in the USPACOM AOR requirerobust, long range Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2) and Wide-AreaSurveillance (WAS) platforms capable of operating in a contested environment.Developing and modernizing the capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platformsto track and operate in a communications contested or degraded environment isnecessary to meet the challenges of future operational environments in thePacific; these platforms must be interoperable with military services,partners, and allies.
Related, the Joint Information Environment (JIE) incrementsI and II have the potential for consolidation of each military services’command, control, communication, and computers programs. JIE II will furtherstrengthen collective cyber security and defense posture in the region, improvestaff efficiency and support, and strengthen interagency and internationalrelationships. JIE II will require an information infrastructure adaptableenough to accommodate multiple security classification levels with theinteroperability and sharing capability to maximize mission effectiveness. JIEII is a necessary next step to mitigate the risk posed by persistent cyberthreats. These threats continue to grow.
Increased cyber capacity and use, especially by China, NorthKorea, and Russia, underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command,control, and operational structure authorities. In order to fully leverage theCyber domain, Combatant Commanders require an enduring theater cyberoperational command resourced to provide regional cyber planning, integration,synchronization, and direction of cyberspace forces. The theater cyberoperational command will provide direction of operations against increasinglycapable threats in coordination with USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and alliesand partners. USPACOM sees a future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command(JFCCC) are aligned regionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will providestaffing and expertise required to oversee persistent operations and defense oftheater information networks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments andintelligence, and development of flexible cyber effects.
Munitions are a critical component of combat effectivenessand readiness. A number of munitions improvements in lethality, production, andprecision are required. There is a growing need for ship-to-ship andair-to-ship munitions to allow U.S. forces to defeat an aggressor from greaterrange. Specifically, there are troubling gaps in Anti-Surface Warfarecapability and readiness that compel the accelerated fielding of a long rangeanti-ship missile. A long-range stand-off weapon, such as the Defense AdvancedResearch Programs Agency / Office of Naval Research developed Long RangeAnti-Ship Missile, will meet the urgent need for an offensive anti-surface warfarecapability against combatants in a contested environment. There is also a needfor advancements in the air-to-air realm and for Hard Target Munitionscapabilities to engage hardened targets that are growing in numbers andcomplexity. Area Effects Munitions are required to prevent open spaceaggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethal capabilities canprove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM’s strategy and deterrence.
With North Korea continuing to advance its ballistic missilecapabilities, USPACOM will continue its efforts in maintaining a credible,sustainable ballistic missile defense. The recent deployment of long rangesecond TPY-2 radar to Japan (December 2014) along with THAAD on Guam achievingfull Fully Operational Capability further enhanced U.S. homeland defensecapabilities which are required to protect key regional nodes from aggressiveaction. In addition, over the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea,and Australia have had better coordination and information sharing. USPACOMlooks forward to continuing our work with our regional IAMD partners andexpanding our ballistic missile defense cooperation and information sharing.
Equally important to having the right equipment andcapabilities is the capacity of critical logistics. The time and distancerequired to move assets across the Pacific make it an imperative to prepositionand secure munitions. Dedicated sealift must be adequately funded to posturemunitions, fuel, and other supplies within theater. Agile, responsive, andsustained operations demand a resilient network of capabilities to deploy andsustain USPACOM forces. USTRANSCOM’s prepositioning strategy has emphasizedpositioning equipment and materiel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapidresponses to crises, and provide force presence; however, USPACOM still doesnot have enough lift to satisfy all operational requirements.
**Readiness:**Fundamental to USPACOM’s mission is the ability to deter aggression and prevailin crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluated against its ability to executeoperational and contingency plans, which places a premium on forward-deployed,ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations’militaries and follow-on forces able to respond to operational contingencies.
USPACOM maintains forward-deployed ready forces as credibledeterrents, to support and defend national security interests, and to provideassurance and protection to allies and partners. Forward deployed forces, westof the International Date Line, remain responsive and relevant to mitigatingrisk in the event of escalating regional security events and greatly benefitfrom training with allies and partners in a complex environment. Ready,forward-deployed forces increase decision space and decrease response time,bolster allies’ and partners’ confidence, and reduce the chance ofmiscalculation by potential adversaries. However, redistribution of globalforces that lead to moving forces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishesUSPACOM’s impact and effectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment ofUSPACOM’s ready, forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements to otherareas of operation increases risk to our nation’s Indo-Asia-Pacific interestsand objectives.
In addition to concerns with the forward deployed forces,there are troubling readiness trends associated with follow-on forces. Theability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces hashistorically been an asymmetric advantage that is now diminishing. Over thepast year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize the readiness offorward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-forcesand critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A lack of readysurge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed maintenanceperiods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness to emergentcontingencies and greatly increases risk.
Budget reductions and uncertainty directly impact operationsand combat readiness. Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable, persistentfunding needed to organize, train, and equip a ready force. Fiscal uncertaintydegrades and disrupts long-term engagement opportunities with strategicconsequences to U.S. relationships and prestige. Resource pressures havetriggered deferrals in exercises, operations, and senior leader engagementopportunities; have introduced regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S.interests in the region. As the Service Chiefs recently testified, continuationof sequestration will further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reducereadiness of forces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of newplatforms and weapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity...all of whichare required for success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in full agreement with theirassessments and remain deeply concerned about the growing risk to U.S.interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
**Conclusion
It has been over three years since the President announcedthe U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The Rebalance is focused on modernizingand strengthening treaty alliances and partnerships through cooperativeagreements, building partner capacity, and increasing regional cooperation,interoperability, and security capabilities. From the military perspective, theU.S. is accomplishing what it set out to do and the Rebalance is working.However, fiscal uncertainty resulting from the Budget Control Act could arrestprogress and place some initiatives at risk. Building on the positive momentumof the Rebalance to the Pacific is critical to protecting U.S. interests in theregion. Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and women,and their families, who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
 

 
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