### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 14, 200 3 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KIMBE RLYJEAN NIN E C OX

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Montgom ery C ounty

No. 40200158 Michael Jones, Judge

No. M2002- 01849-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 27, 2004

Hay es, David G., J udg e, dissenting

Iam unable to join with my colleagues in conc luding that the de fenda nt’s consent “ was ob ta ine d d

ur inga pe ri od of lawf ul d e te nti on .” F ind ingthe sear ch unr e a so na ble un de r F ourt

h Amendment prote ctions, Iwould suppress the e vidence

. At the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , th e of

fi c e r te sti fi e d that he sto pp e d the ve hic le “ fo r f a ilure to u se a turn sig nal” a

nd, afte r findinga mar ijuana flake and se ed in the floorboa rd, q u es t i o n ed the de fe nd ant a s f

oll ow s:
A. I asked [t he defe ndant] whe re she was coming from. She told me she was c oming from the Tr avel Inn. Iasked he r whe re she was going to in Sunny dale. She sa id she ha d a tr a ile r t he re . I a sk e d h e r i f s he ha d a

tr a ile r wh y

wo uld sh e , you kn ow , s tay

in
a ro om. She sa id t

he re wa s a lot of c omm oti on g oin g on a t he r tr a ile r that ni g ht s o her a nd her boy friend just g ot a room up at the Tr avel Inn. Q. Well, what did y ou decide to do once y ou rea liz ed she had a room at the Tra vel I nn?

A. I asked [ the defendant] if there wer e any drug s or we apons in the room; and she said - - she said no. And I asked [the def

endant] i f s h e would mi nd if we w ent up there and - - to make sure there was no drug s or wea pons in the room. Q. And how did she a

nswer that question?
A. She said - - she said okay . She g ave c onsent.-2-

Fo l l o wi n g t h e ab o v e qu es t i o n s , t h e o ff i ce r t es t i fi edth at , atth at p o i n t , h e h ad d ec i d ed n o tt o ch ar ge the def endant with any offe nse and had advised her of that fac t. He then returne d the def endant’ s driver lice nse and f

ollowed her

to the motel.

I t is w i t h o u t dispute that, when police stop a moving ve hicle, a se izure impli catingthe protec t i o n of the F ourth Amendment of the Fe dera l Consti tution and Article I , section 7 of the Tenne ssee Constitution has occ urre d. See Sta te v . G arc ia , 123 S.W .3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2003) . “An ordinary traff ic stop . . . is more akin to an investi g ative detention rathe r t han a c ustodial arre st, and the princ i p l es announced in Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. C t. 1868 (1968), apply to define the scope of rea sonable police conduct.” Un ite d Sta te s v . H ill , 195 F.3d 258, 264 ( 6 Cir. 1999) (citing th United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 449 ( 6 Cir. 1996)). th

I n Te rry v . O hio , the S u p re m e C ourt adopted a two-prong ed inquiry

for e valuatingthe
rea sonablene ss of an investig ative stop. Unde r t h i s approa ch, we examine “whethe r the off icer ’s acti o n wa s justified at its inception, and whethe r it was re asonably related in scope to the circ umstances whic h justified the i nterfe renc e in the first place . “ United States v. Sharpe , 4 70 U. S. 6 7 5 , 6 8 2 , 1 0 5 S

. C t

. 1 5 6 8 , 1 5 7 3 (1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g Te rry v . O hio , 39 2 U. S. a t 20 , 8 8 S. Ct. a t18 79 ). With
re g ard to the fi rs t pro ng of the inq uir y , th e de fe nd ant d oe s n ot c on te st the le g a lity of the ini tia l tr a ff

ic stop. W ith reg ard to the se cond prong , questioning by the offic er during the defe ndant’s extended p e r i o d o f d e t e n t i o n yi e l d e d n o i n f o r m a t i o n th at th e d e f

e n d an t w a s i n v o l v e d i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i ty. I ndeed, the proof fails to e stablish a ny rea sonable or articula

ble suspicion that the defe n d an t was eng ag ed in drugtraff

icking or that any

kind of criminal activity was afoot. The facts deve loped at the s cene establish no nexus to a mot el room approximately one-qua rter of a mi le away . Clearly , the
e xpe c tatio n o f p ri va c y

in a n a uto mob ile , d

ue to t he a uto mob ile’s read y

mob ili ty , is dis tin c tly differ ent from the ex pectation of privac y within a home. Ra k

as v . I lli no is , 4 39 U. S. 1 28 , 1 48 , 9 9 S. Ct. 421, 433 (1978). The testimony

of the off

icer est ab l i s h es t h at, at the time the de fenda nt consented to the
sear ch, the pur

pose for the stop had bee n serve d and the defe ndant should ha ve been fre e to leave. Under the holding of State v. Daniel , the def endant, however , rema ined s eized until the return of he r driver lice nse. See State v . Daniel , 12 S.W .3d 420 (Tenn. 2000). Thus, the de fenda nt’s detention, which extended beyond the valid re ason for the stop, violated her Four th Amendment rig ht to be fre e from unlawf

ul seizure. “To hold ot herw ise would endorse police seiz ures that are not limit ed to the scope of the officer’ s rea sonable suspi cion and that extend bey ond a re asonable duration.” United States v. Dortch , 1 99 F .3 d 1 93 , 1 99 -2 00 (5 Cir . 1 99 9) . Ind e e d, the fa c ts h e re are pe ri lou sly akin th to permitting the police to r andomly stop a citizen a nd sear ch their home if consent c an be g ained. The findingthat the def

endant’ s detention exceede d th e p er missibl e scope of a Terry- stop do e s n ot e nd

the inq uir y . O ur su pr e me c ourt

a do pte d th e “ fr

uit of the po iso no us tr e e ” ana ly sis in deter mining whether or not a statement obtained dur ing a n illega l detention must be suppressed, i.e. , whether the statement wa s obtained by exploi tation of the F ourt h Am en d m ent i lleg ality

. State v. Huddleston , 9 2 4 S

. W

. 2 d

6 6 6 , 6 7 4 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g W ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 4 71, 488, 83 S. Ct

. 407, 417 (1963)) . I n this case, no Miranda war nings w ere provided to the de fenda nt-3-

prior to her

arr ival at the motel r o o m , an dthe conse nt by the def endant immediately

followed the i l l e g a l s e i z u r e

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, t h e o f f i c e r n e v e r a dv i s e d t h e d e f e n d an tt h a ts h e w a s f

r e e t o g o

. L a s t l y, in consideration of the flag ranc y of the off

ici al co n d uct, I

would note that the off

icer was a drug ag ent with the major c rimes unit. The re cord r efle cts that the investig ation of t h e improper turn vio lation, which occ urre d at appr ox imately 12:15 a.m., resulted in thre e additional off icer s being dispatched to the sc ene pr ior to any sear ch of the vehicle. Mor eover , as previously noted, the sea

rch
o f t h e d ef en d an t ’s m o t el ro o m wa s n o t h i n g m o re th an a f i s h i n g ex p ed i t i o n

. T h e ab o v e f ac t s we i gh ag ainst a findingof attenuation. Ga rc ia , 123 S.W .3d at 3 4 6 -48. F inding that the de fenda nt’s detention constituted a defac to arr est at the time conse nt was g iven, I find t h e s ea rc h t o be
unrea sonable unde r F ourth Amendment prote ctions and would suppre ss the evidenc e.

________________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE