Cite as 2022 Ark. 191

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CR-22-176

CHRIS ANTHONY ARNOLD

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS 

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: October 27, 2022

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 60CR-17-534]

HONORABLE HERBERT T. WRIGHT, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice

On September 20, 2017, a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury convicted appellant, 

Chris Anthony Arnold, of first-degree murder in the death of Maureen Jones and sentenced 

him to life imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction and sentence in Arnold v. State, 2018 

Ark. 343, at 1–3, 561 S.W.3d 727, 728–29. The relevant facts as we recounted in Arnold’s 

direct appeal are as follows: 

Pauline Arnold (“Pauline”), Arnold’s mother and Maureen’s friend, regularly 

attended a bible study at Indianhead Baptist Church in Sherwood on Wednesday 

nights. Pauline stated that she and Maureen sat together at the bible study on 

Wednesday, November 30, 2016, and then Maureen headed home. The next 

morning, Pauline received a call from Lois Olsen (“Lois”), the church secretary, 

because Maureen had not attended a church breakfast meeting. Pauline proceeded to 

Maureen’s home to check on her. When Pauline arrived at the residence, she entered 

through an unlocked back door and found Maureen in the hallway lying face down 

and partially clothed with a feminine-hygiene pad between her legs. Pauline stated 
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that Maureen’s body felt cold, and she called 911. Lois and Gary Brewer (“Gary”) also 

entered the home. Pauline and Gary covered Maureen with a blanket because “she 

[wasn’t] decent.”

Officers from the Sherwood Police Department were dispatched to the 

victim’s home to investigate a homicide. Detective Kisha Slaton testified at a pretrial 

hearing that Pauline stated, “Well, my son was just over here [at the house fishing] 

last night, and he didn’t say there was anything wrong with her.” Detective Slaton 

asked Pauline to call Arnold and then told Arnold to meet the officers at the police 

department for an interview. Emergency personnel later arrived and pronounced 

Maureen dead at the scene. Officers observed bruising, blood, and possible trauma 

to Maureen’s face. A dark-colored scarf was tied around her neck, and her 

undergarments were found lying approximately five feet away. Officers also noticed a 

chemical odor consistent with bleach. They retrieved an off-white piece of a latex glove 

and a small blue piece of plastic and sent the two objects to the Arkansas State Crime 

Laboratory for testing. An autopsy revealed that Maureen’s cause of death was ligature 

strangulation. Subsequent testing revealed that Arnold’s DNA was present on both 

of Maureen’s hands. Tests also confirmed the presence of Arnold’s DNA on the 

pieces of latex glove and plastic.

Detective Slaton and Detective Frank Spence interviewed Arnold at the 

Sherwood Police Department. In a statement to police, Arnold related that Maureen 

had allowed him to use her flat-bottomed boat and that he had been fishing at her 

house on the night of the murder. Arnold stated that he had seen Maureen feed her 

cats and then fall down the back-porch steps. He also stated that her face was bleeding 

and that he picked her up, carried her onto the porch, and placed her in front of a 

chair so that she could sit down. He claimed that Maureen slapped him and said, 

“[Y]ou don’t need to do this. I don’t need help[.]” According to Arnold, Maureen 

walked into the house and began arguing with someone. He told the officer, “[S]he 

was arguing with somebody, I don’t know who the hell it was. But I told Maureen I 

was getting the hell out of there because she was getting cranky.”

On February 23, 2019, Arnold filed his Rule 37 petition alleging five grounds for 

relief. Also on February 23, Arnold filed a motion for leave to file amended petition for 

postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 stating that counsel had recently been retained and 

the petition was filed as a “placeholder” petition in order to meet the deadline and requested 

a 120-day extension. On April 9, the circuit court granted Arnold’s motion for leave to file 
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an amended petition until May 15. On April 17, Arnold filed a motion to reconsider his 

motion for leave requesting the full 120 days to file an amended petition. On April 24, the 

circuit court denied Arnold’s motion to reconsider, and May 15 remained the deadline. On 

June 13, the State responded to Arnold’s February 23rd Rule 37 petition. On June 18, the 

circuit court granted Arnold an extension to file his reply. On July 3, Arnold filed a motion 

to strike the State’s response or, alternatively, for extension of time to reply to the State’s 

response. On July 8, Arnold filed a second motion to reconsider the circuit court’s April 9 

order granting eighty-one days to file his amended petition. In the motion, Arnold stated 

that he suspected prison officials were interfering with legal mail to Arnold, trial counsel had 

not acted expeditiously in responding to Arnold’s requests, and counsel’s out-of-the-country 

trip and professional obligations afforded him little time to comply with the May 15 

deadline. On July 25, the circuit court denied Arnold’s second motion to reconsider and 

motion to strike the State’s response and granted an extension of time for Arnold to reply. 

On October 3, without holding an evidentiary hearing, based on Arnold’s petition 

and the State’s response, the circuit court denied the following claims: (1) trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and present testimony by an independent DNA expert; 

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present proof of Arnold’s physical disabilities 

and limitations; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an improper closing 

argument for the State;1and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to 

 

1Arnold did not appeal the circuit court’s denial of relief on this claim. 
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testify regarding Arnold’s character. The circuit court set a hearing for Arnold’s remaining 

claim alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate other possible 

suspects, Robert Ozments and Tasha Bowling. 

On November 8, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on Arnold’s remaining claim 

and on November 30, the circuit court entered an order denying Arnold’s claim regarding 

counsel’s failure to investigate Ozments and Bowling as possible suspects. Arnold brings this 

timely appeal and presents three points: (1) the circuit court erred in refusing to grant 

Arnold’s repeated requests for a reasonable period of time to file an amended petition for 

Rule 37 relief; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that Arnold received effective assistance 

of counsel; and (3) the circuit court erred in denying three of Arnold’s claims without 

holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. 

I. Standard of Review

“On appeal from a trial court’s ruling on a petitioner’s request for Rule 37 relief, this 

court will not reverse the trial court’s decision granting or denying postconviction relief 

unless it is clearly erroneous. Kemp v. State, 347 Ark. 52, 55, 60 S.W.3d 404, 406 (2001). A 

finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate 

court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed. Id.” Prater v. State, 2012 Ark. 164, at 8, 402 S.W.3d 68, 74.

“The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be 

‘whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ Strickland [v. Washington, 
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466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)].” Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 

at 3–4, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58. Pursuant to Strickland, we assess the effectiveness of counsel under 

a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must show 

that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007). A petitioner making an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim must show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Springs v. State, 2012 Ark. 87, 387 S.W.3d 143. A court must 

indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. Id.

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced 

petitioner’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. Id. The petitioner must show there is 

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a 

reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent 

the errors. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). A reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Unless a 

petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a 

breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. Additionally, 

conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction 

relief. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, 385 S.W.3d 783. Hinton v. State, 2019 Ark. 136, 7–

8, 572 S.W.3d 381, 386–87. 
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With respect to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding the decision of 

trial counsel to call a witness, such matters are generally trial strategy and outside the purview 

of Rule 37.1. Banks v. State, 2013 Ark. 147, 2013 WL 1491272. When a petitioner alleges 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call witnesses, it is incumbent on the petitioner 

to name the witness, provide a summary of the testimony, and establish that the testimony 

would have been admissible into evidence. Wertz v. State, 2014 Ark. 240, at 4, 434 S.W.3d 

895, 900 (citing Moten v. State, 2013 Ark. 503, 2013 WL 6327549 (per curiam)). To 

demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner is required to establish that there was a reasonable 

probability that, had counsel performed further investigation and presented the witness, the 

outcome of the trial would have been different. Hickey v. State, 2013 Ark. 237, 428 S.W.3d 

446. Trial counsel must use his or her best judgment to determine which witnesses will be 

beneficial to the client. Id. Nonetheless, such strategic decisions must still be supported by 

reasonable professional judgment. Id. Finally, “[w]hen assessing an attorney’s decision not to 

call a particular witness, it must be taken into account that the decision is largely a matter of 

professional judgment which experienced advocates could endlessly debate, and the fact that 

there was a witness or witnesses that could have offered testimony beneficial to the defense 

is not in itself proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Johnson v. State, 325 Ark. 44, 49, 924 

S.W.2d 233, 236 (1996) (internal citations omitted). “To review the circuit court’s order and 

correctly determine this issue, we must look at all the evidence adduced at trial and at the 

Rule 37 hearing. Howard, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24.” Hinton v. State, 2019 Ark. 136, at 

8–9, 572 S.W.3d at 387–88.
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With regard to a circuit court’s denial of an extension of time to file an amended 

petition, “our rules of criminal procedure do allow for the amendment of a Rule 37 petition, 

but only with leave of the court. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(e). Our standard of review as to the 

denial of leave to amend is abuse of discretion; we determine whether the circuit court’s 

decision was arbitrary or groundless.” Adams v. State, 2013 Ark. 174, at 11–12, 427 S.W.3d 

63, 70 (internal citations omitted). Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not 

simply require error in the trial court’s decision, but requires that the trial court act 

improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Grant v. State, 357 Ark. 91, 161 

S.W.3d 785 (2004); O’Neal v. State, 356 Ark. 674, 158 S.W.3d 175 (2004). 

Finally, “when a Rule 37 petition is denied without a hearing, the circuit court ‘shall 

make written findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied 

upon to sustain the court’s findings.’ See Marshall v. State, 2020 Ark. 66, 594 S.W.3d 78; 

Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(a). Failure to make such findings is reversible error except when it can 

be determined from the record that the petition is wholly without merit or when it is 

conclusive on the face of the petition that no relief is warranted. Id.” Rayburn v. State, 2021 

Ark. 98, at 8, 622 S.W.3d 155, 161–62. With these standards in mind, we turn to Arnold’s 

appeal. 

II. Points on Appeal

A. The Circuit Court Erred in Refusing to Grant Arnold’s Repeated Requests for a 

Reasonable Period of Time to File an Amended Petition for Rule 37 Relief
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For his first point on appeal, Arnold contends that the circuit court erred in refusing 

to grant Arnold’s requests for additional time to amend his Rule 37 petition. Arnold 

requested 120 days, and the circuit court granted Arnold 81 days to amend his petition. In 

its order denying postconviction relief, the circuit court denied Arnold’s request for 

additional time:

If the Defendant had actual issues, he was given time to present them simply. 

If they had merit, the Court would consider them and allow Defendant and counsel 

to present evidence and facts in a Rule 37 hearing. . . . [I]nstead, counsel wished to 

conduct a fishing expedition for cognizable issues that he might discover–not ones 

that were already apparent. . . . The Court gave him a limited amount of time in 

which he could have developed these “other potential issues as well.” Counsel for the 

Defendant ultimately made no use of the additional time . . . nor did he file any reply 

to the State’s Response. . . . The Court is convinced by counsel’s failure to make use 

of the time given him–though it was less than requested–that he has identified no 

additional issues beyond those presented in his initial Petition. 

On appeal, Arnold contends that the time allotted was insufficient in a first-degree 

murder case that was tried to a jury with multiple lawyers and involves a life sentence. Arnold 

asserts the following to support his argument: his initial petition was filed by counsel without 

the benefit of a review of the trial transcript; the eighty-one days granted is “bizarre”; and the 

circuit court held firm to its deadline for his amended petition to be filed by May 15, 2019,

but then permitted the State to file its response in violation of the twenty-day deadline 

imposed by Rule 37.2(f) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Arnold further 

contends that his counsel provided legitimate reasons why additional time was needed,

including, but not limited to, counsel being contacted to represent Arnold six days before 

the deadline for the petition to be filed; counsel prepared and filed Arnold’s placeholder 
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petition two days prior to the deadline without reviewing the transcript; counsel was hired 

on March 7, 2019; counsel mailed Arnold multiple release forms for records from Arnold’s 

trial counsel to sign and return which were delayed in transit and counsel did not receive 

access to those files until June 17; and the circuit court granted time for Arnold to reply to 

the State’s response but declined to allow Arnold to raise new issues or a “backdoor 

expansion of the petition.” Based on this, Arnold contends that the circuit court abused its 

discretion when it imposed an unreasonable deadline for counsel to file an amended 

petition. 

The State responds that despite being afforded additional time to file his amended 

petition and additional time to file a reply to the State’s response, Arnold did not file an 

amended petition or a reply. Further, the State responds that Rule 37.2(b) of the Arkansas 

Rules of Criminal Procedure does not provide for placeholder petitions; rather, pursuant to 

the rule, grounds for relief must be raised in the original petition unless the petition is denied 

without prejudice. Finally, the State responds that, notwithstanding counsel’s reliance on 

having been recently hired, counsel is an experienced attorney in this area, and the eightyone additional days was a reasonable amount of time to prepare an amended petition, and 

the circuit court did not abuse it discretion. 

Rule 37.2(b) provides in pertinent part: “[a]ll grounds for relief available to a 

petitioner under this rule must be raised in his or her original petition unless the petition 

was denied without prejudice.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2 (2021) (emphasis added). Further, in 

Walker v. State, 367 Ark. 523, 525, 241 S.W.3d 734, 737 (2006), we explained that in 
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preparation of a postconviction petition, “a defendant’s own knowledge of discussions with 

trial counsel, in combination with the record, would seem to provide a sufficient basis to 

articulate any areas of concern as to counsel’s performance.” We held that the circuit court 

did not abuse its discretion by requiring Walker to state with specificity the areas of concern 

about trial counsel’s performance before it requires trial counsel to provide the files. In 

Walker, Walker did not gain access to trial counsel’s files at all. 

Here, counsel met with Arnold multiple times. Also, despite eventually obtaining 

trial counsel’s files, Arnold failed to identify any claim that could have been brought if he 

had been granted more time. Despite extensions of time to file an amended petition and a 

reply to the State’s response, Arnold did not file additional pleadings after his initial petition,

nor did he identify how additional time would have aided in his preparation. Finally, Arnold 

contends that the circuit court played favorites by allowing the State to file a response 110 

days after he filed his original petition. However, the State was not required to file a response,

and the State’s response was filed twenty-nine days after the deadline for filing the amended 

petition. Based on the record before us, we do not find merit in Arnold’s argument that the 

circuit court abused its discretion when it granted Arnold eighty-one days to file his amended 

petition. We affirm the circuit court on this point. 

B. The Circuit Court Erred in Finding that Arnold Received Effective 

Assistance of Counsel and the Circuit Court Erred in 

Denying Claims Without an Evidentiary Hearing

We now turn to Arnold’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. For his second 

and third points on appeal, Arnold asserts that the circuit court erred in denying relief by 
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finding that Arnold received effective assistance of counsel on four claims and also asserts 

that the circuit court erred when it denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing on 

three of the four claims. 

1. Claim A: DNA expert

For his first subpoint, Arnold contends that the circuit court erred in finding that he

failed to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to present an independent DNA expert 

to support Arnold’s third-party-guilt theory. Arnold further contends that the circuit court 

erred when it denied his claim without holding a hearing. The circuit court denied the claim 

as follows:

Defendant does not suggest who this DNA might have belonged to. He simply 

asserts that calling a rebuttal expert would have met both prongs of Strickland. The 

Court is not convinced that it meets either prong. . . . Defendant has not named any 

potential DNA expert who would have testified to what he alleges, he provides no 

summary, and he offers nothing to show that this theoretical testimony would have 

been admissible. This claim fails the first prong of Strickland . . . Without showing 

what this testimony would have been beyond simply pointing to an illusory third 

party, the Court finds that any further such testimony would simply have been 

cumulative. It would not have changed the result at trial, and thus the second prong 

of Strickland is likewise not satisfied.

Arnold asserts that DNA evidence was crucial to the State’s case; that defense counsel 

had a professional duty to investigate the presence of the DNA that was not Arnold’s; and 

that counsel had a duty to seek DNA testing and utilize the results to demonstrate to the 

jury that Arnold was not the only person present at the victim’s home the night of the 

murder. Arnold contends that if counsel had done this there is a reasonable probability that 

the result of the trial could have been different. Finally, Arnold asserts that the circuit court 
12

engaged in speculation that counsel made a strategic decision on this claim and urges this 

court to reverse the circuit court. 

Here, a review of the record demonstrates that defense counsel hired an independent 

DNA expert, Dr. Robert Reese. The record further demonstrates that Dr. Reese was 

identified and consulted during the trial, specifically during the testimony of the State’s DNA 

expert witnesses. Further, Arnold has failed to explain how further investigation or 

presentation of additional testimony may have supported his argument. Based on this, 

Arnold has failed to meet his burden under the first Strickland prong because he has not 

demonstrated that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. The record demonstrates that counsel did, in fact, consult with an 

independent DNA expert. Because we conclude that the performance of Arnold’s trial

counsel was not deficient, we need not address the prejudice requirement, which is the 

second prong under Strickland. Hinton, supra.

Finally, Arnold contends that the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on this issue. We do not find merit in this argument. Here, based on the record and 

our discussion above, the circuit court specifically referred to the record relied upon. 

Accordingly, the circuit court’s decision to deny Arnold’s petition on this point was not 

clearly erroneous because the record demonstrates that Arnold’s claim is wholly without 

merit and we affirm.

2. Claim B: other possible suspects
13

For his second subpoint, Arnold contends that the circuit court erred when it rejected 

his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate other possible suspects, 

specifically Robert Ozments and Tasha Bowling. Arnold alleged that Ozments and Bowling 

lived near Maureen and the church; up until the murder, the two had been borrowing money 

from Maureen which Maureen had recently put an end to; and after Maureen’s murder, the 

two asked the pastor questions about what was found at the crime scene. Ozments and 

Bowling also asked the pastor for funds to travel, and both left the State the day after the 

murder. Arnold contends that both individuals informed church members that they would 

not be returning to the state. Arnold alleges that trial counsel was made aware of these 

suspicious activities but failed to conduct any independent investigation. Arnold further 

alleged that additional unidentified individuals had been going to Maureen’s house in the 

weeks prior to her death—harassing her by knocking on her windows and doors at night—

and trial counsel did not investigate this either. Arnold contends that trial counsel’s alleged 

lack of investigation into other possible suspects was ineffective representation and that he 

was prejudiced. After a hearing on this claim, the circuit court denied Arnold relief:

Defendant’s counsel at trial, . . . Qualls . . . testified that he made multiple 

calls to the Defendant and visited him in the jail thirteen times during trial 

preparations. His co-counsel [Lott Rolfe] generally accompanied him on these visits. 

. . . He testified that he did investigate the Defendant’s claims about Ozments and 

Bowling. . . . [Qualls] interviewed the deacon and pastor of the church about them. 

Neither pastor nor deacon tied the couple to the red truck the Defendant claimed 

was seen at the time of the crime. The Defendant’s mother informed Qualls the 

couple had gone to a town in Mississippi that Qualls discovered did not exist. He 

found a town with a very similar name where a church was located that the couple 

were alleged to be attending or involved with in some manner. The pastor of this 

church had never heard of the couple, and he received no useful information. 
14

. . . 

Qualls [also] testified that he [investigated] . . . the victim’s alleged harassment 

by an unknown party. He and co-counsel canvassed the neighborhood interviewing 

the victim’s neighbors trying to find information about this harassment but were 

unsuccessful. . . . Qualls testified that the details given by the Defendant regarding 

[a] red truck changed constantly and that the neighbors never saw any truck other 

than the Defendant’s which was parked behind the home around the time of the 

murder instead of his customary practice of parking in front of the house. 

. . .

[Rolfe’s] testimony matched Qualls’ in that he stated he made many visits to 

the Defendant . . . that he canvassed the neighborhood with Qualls, and that nobody 

had seen any red truck. Rolfe testified that Qualls investigated the couple and hit a 

dead-end in Mississippi. Rolfe testified that they considered every scenario but none 

of the Defendant’s theories of the case lined up with the evidence or struck them as 

credible. 

The circuit court also found Arnold’s counsel’s decision not to procced further was a 

reasonable strategic decision and even if counsel had proceeded, the outcome would not 

have been different. 

Arnold contends that his counsel should have conducted a more thorough 

investigation and traveled to Mississippi where it was alleged the couple were residing. 

Arnold alleges that despite visiting with Arnold multiple times in jail prior to trial, counsel’s 

investigation consisted of one phone call, and such was not a strategic or reasonable decision. 

Rather, Arnold contends that counsel’s investigation was negligent, that it was not effective 

representation, and that Arnold suffered prejudice and but for counsel’s errors and 
15

omissions, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found there were other 

likely suspects in this case. 

Here, counsel testified that they investigated Ozments and Bowling and other 

suspects by canvassing Maureen’s neighborhood multiple times and interviewing witnesses. 

Counsel also testified that they contacted the church in Mississippi where the two individuals 

were reportedly going and spoke with two different church personnel who reported not 

knowing Ozments and Bowling or their whereabouts. Counsel further testified that they 

followed up on Arnold’s mother’s report of individuals harassing Maureen at night and 

Arnold’s report about the red truck. Counsel testified that after multiple attempts to identify 

information about Ozments, Bowling, and other witnesses, they reached a dead end on their 

investigation. Based on the record before us, we cannot say the circuit court erred. Arnold 

has failed to prove that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Because we conclude that the performance of Arnold’s trial counsel was not 

deficient, we need not address the prejudice requirement. See Hinton. Accordingly, we affirm 

the circuit court on this point. 

3. Claim C: Arnold’s physical disabilities

For his third subpoint, Arnold contends that the circuit court erred in denying his 

claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to present 

evidence of Arnold’s physical disabilities. The circuit court denied Arnold’s claim, stating in 

pertinent part, 
16

[T]he testimony presented at trial was that the Defendant did odd jobs around 

the house for the victim, that he could drive and fish, and that he occasionally 

performed caretaking duties at the church he attended with the victim. Additionally, 

the victim herself was in frail condition. . . . It strains credulity that the Defendant 

would not have been able to strangle a frail, elderly woman, regardless of his own 

alleged infirmities. The only allegation regarding the Defendant’s current physical 

condition in the Petition is that he sometimes walks with a cane. The Defendant has 

provided no further evidence of this purported physical disability. The Court cannot 

say that failure to advance this theory, if a failure at all, would have changed the result 

at trial.

Arnold claims that his counsel failed to present proof of Arnold’s physical disabilities 

and limitations, which would have prevented him from inflicting the type of attack that 

occurred in this case. Arnold asserts that the evidence in this case suggested that the attack 

on Maureen required physical strength that Arnold did not have. Arnold asserts that trial 

counsel was aware of Arnold’s physical limitations but, inexplicably, never followed up on 

the issue; never explored the possibility that his physical limitations prevented him from 

attacking Maureen; and never looked at Arnold’s medical records or consulted with Arnold 

or a medical expert to render an opinion. Arnold alleges that his counsel’s failures in this 

case were therefore not based on reasonable strategy or trial tactics, and regardless of whether 

the jury believed Arnold was present that evening, proof of Arnold’s physical condition 

would have created reasonable doubt as to whether Arnold was physically capable of 

committing the crime. The State responds that the record establishes Arnold performed odd 

jobs, operated Maureen’s flat-bottom boat and fished on the lake and helped Maureen—

whom Arnold described as “quite heavy”—up onto the porch after she had fallen. 
17

Here, the record demonstrates that Arnold failed to present witnesses or evidence 

regarding his physical disabilities. Instead, the only allegation regarding Arnold’s current 

physical condition is that at times, Arnold walks with a cane. Arnold provided no further 

evidence of his alleged physical limitations. It is incumbent on the petitioner to name the 

witness, provide a summary of the testimony, and establish that the testimony would have 

been admissible into evidence. See Wertz. Accordingly, based on our standard of review and 

the record before us, Arnold has failed to meet the first prong of the Strickland standard. 

Because we conclude that the performance of Arnold’s trial counsel was not deficient, we 

need not address the prejudice requirement. See Hinton. 

Finally, Arnold contends that the circuit court should have conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on this issue. We are unpersuaded. Here, based on the record and our discussion 

above, the circuit court specifically referred to the record relied upon. Accordingly, the 

circuit court’s decision to deny Arnold’s petition on this point was not clearly erroneous, 

and we affirm.

4. Claim E: Arnold’s character

For his fourth subpoint, Arnold contends that the circuit court erred when it denied 

relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to testify 

regarding Arnold’s character. Arnold contends that if counsel had called witnesses 

“including Gary Brewer, Pastor Mike Boyd, and others[,]” they all could have testified that 

Arnold worked at the church; that he had a good relationship with Maureen; Maureen was 

a close friend of Arnold’s mother; that he often took care of Maureen ’s husband prior to 
18

his death; and that Arnold had no violent tendencies. Arnold contends that his counsel’s 

failure to call these character witnesses was ineffective representation, and but for counsel’s 

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result. 

In denying this claim, the circuit court found in pertinent part: “Defendant names two 

witnesses and speculates about others, recites what their testimony ‘could’ have been, and 

makes no showing that it would have been admissible. . . the Defendant has not overcome 

his burden in showing that such testimony, if presented, would have changed the outcome.”

Here, the record demonstrates that Arnold named two witnesses and identified what 

their testimony could have been but did not provide a summary of their testimony or address 

admissibility. Further, the witnesses would have been subject to cross-examination as prior 

evidence of Arnold’s bad acts would have been allowed on cross-examination. Reel v. State, 

288 Ark. 189, 702 S.W.2d 809 (1996). Although Arnold contends that the circuit court’s 

comments about the existence of any such bad acts is “rank speculation and conjecture,” a 

forensic evaluation revealed that he had methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug

paraphernalia in his home and that Arnold pled no contest to theft by receiving in 2004. 

We also note that during the guilt phase at trial, the jury heard from Lisa Olsen, who testified 

that Maureen was Pauline’s best friend. During the sentencing phase, Pauline Arnold, 

Arnold’s mother, testified regarding Arnold’s peaceful nature, that he was a member of the 

church, that Arnold had helped Maureen’s disabled husband get in and out of bed prior to 

his death; and that he had never hurt anyone. Ritchie Arnold, Arnold’s brother, also testified 

during sentencing that Arnold was a good person, would help anybody and do anything for 
19

people, and was trustworthy and a hard worker. Jeanine Arnold, Arnold’s wife, testified that 

Arnold was a good father and a good, sweet person. Accordingly, based on our discussion 

above, Arnold has failed to meet his burden under the first Strickland prong because he has 

not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Finally, Arnold contends that the circuit court should have conducted an 

evidentiary hearing on this issue. We disagree. The record demonstrates that the circuit court 

specifically referred to the record relied upon. Accordingly, based on the record before us, 

we do not find error and affirm the circuit court on this point.

Based on our standard of review, the circuit court did not err in denying Arnold’s 

petition for post-conviction relief, and we affirm.

Affirmed.

Craig Lambert, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.