# C_2017378EN.01021801.xml

| 9.11.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 378/218 |
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9.11.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 378/218

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P7_TA(2014)0249

Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon with respect to the European Parliament

European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2014 on the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon with respect to the European Parliament (2013/2130(INI))

(2017/C 378/25)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
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—

having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to its decision of 20 October 2010 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (1), |
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having regard to its decision of 20 October 2010 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (1),

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| — | having regard to its resolutions of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (2), and of 4 July 2013 on improving the practical arrangements for the holding of the European elections in 2014 (3), |
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having regard to its resolutions of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (2), and of 4 July 2013 on improving the practical arrangements for the holding of the European elections in 2014 (3),

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| — | having regard to the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (4), |
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having regard to the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission (4),

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| — | having regard to the ongoing negotiations on the revision of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information in the field of security and defence policy (5); |
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having regard to the ongoing negotiations on the revision of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information in the field of security and defence policy (5);

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| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2009 on Parliament’s new role and responsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon (6), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 May 2009 on Parliament’s new role and responsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon (6),

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| — | having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A7-0120/2014), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A7-0120/2014),

| A. | whereas the Treaty of Lisbon deepens the European Union’s democratic legitimacy by strengthening the role of the European Parliament in the procedure leading to the election of the President of the European Commission and to the investiture of the European Commission; |
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A.

whereas the Treaty of Lisbon deepens the European Union’s democratic legitimacy by strengthening the role of the European Parliament in the procedure leading to the election of the President of the European Commission and to the investiture of the European Commission;

| B. | whereas, according to the new procedure for the election of the President of the European Commission provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, Parliament elects the President of the European Commission by a majority of its component members; |
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B.

whereas, according to the new procedure for the election of the President of the European Commission provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, Parliament elects the President of the European Commission by a majority of its component members;

| C. | whereas the Treaty of Lisbon lays down that the European Council should take into account the result of the elections to the European Parliament and should consult the new Parliament before it proposes a candidate for President of the European Commission; |
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C.

whereas the Treaty of Lisbon lays down that the European Council should take into account the result of the elections to the European Parliament and should consult the new Parliament before it proposes a candidate for President of the European Commission;

| D. | whereas each of the major European political parties is in the process of nominating its own candidate for the Presidency of the Commission; |
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D.

whereas each of the major European political parties is in the process of nominating its own candidate for the Presidency of the Commission;

| E. | whereas the elected President of the new Commission should make full use of the prerogatives conferred on him by the Treaty of Lisbon and take all appropriate steps to ensure the efficient functioning of the next Commission despite its size, which, due to the decisions of the European Council, will not diminish as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon; |
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E.

whereas the elected President of the new Commission should make full use of the prerogatives conferred on him by the Treaty of Lisbon and take all appropriate steps to ensure the efficient functioning of the next Commission despite its size, which, due to the decisions of the European Council, will not diminish as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon;

| F. | whereas the Commission’s accountability to Parliament should be strengthened through the Union’s annual and multiannual programming as well as by creating symmetry between the majorities required for the election of the President of the Commission and for the motion of censure; |
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F.

whereas the Commission’s accountability to Parliament should be strengthened through the Union’s annual and multiannual programming as well as by creating symmetry between the majorities required for the election of the President of the Commission and for the motion of censure;

| G. | whereas Parliament’s role as an agenda setter in legislative matters needs to be strengthened and the principle that in legislative matters Parliament and Council act on an equal footing, which is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, has to be fully implemented; |
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G.

whereas Parliament’s role as an agenda setter in legislative matters needs to be strengthened and the principle that in legislative matters Parliament and Council act on an equal footing, which is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, has to be fully implemented;

| H. | whereas, on the occasion of the investiture of the new Commission, the existing interinstitutional agreements should be reviewed and improved; |
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H.

whereas, on the occasion of the investiture of the new Commission, the existing interinstitutional agreements should be reviewed and improved;

| I. | whereas Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) is to regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy, and inform it of how these policies evolve; the High Representative is to ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration; |
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I.

whereas Article 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) is to regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy, and inform it of how these policies evolve; the High Representative is to ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration;

| J. | whereas the Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability (7), made upon the adoption of the EEAS Council Decision, states that the High Representative will review and where necessary propose to adjust the existing provisions (8) on access for Members of the European Parliament to classified documents and information in the field of security and defence policy; |
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J.

whereas the Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability (7), made upon the adoption of the EEAS Council Decision, states that the High Representative will review and where necessary propose to adjust the existing provisions (8) on access for Members of the European Parliament to classified documents and information in the field of security and defence policy;

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| K. | whereas Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that the European Parliament is to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for negotiating and concluding international agreements and whereas that provision also applies to agreements relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy; |
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K.

whereas Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that the European Parliament is to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for negotiating and concluding international agreements and whereas that provision also applies to agreements relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

Legitimacy and political accountability of the Commission

Legitimacy and political accountability of the Commission

(Investiture and removal of the Commission)

(Investiture and removal of the Commission)

| 1. | Stresses the need to strengthen the Commission’s democratic legitimacy, independence and political role; states that the new procedure whereby the Commission President is elected by Parliament will strengthen the Commission’s legitimacy and political role and will make the European elections more important, by linking the voters’ choice in the elections to the European Parliament more directly to the election of the Commission President; |
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1.

Stresses the need to strengthen the Commission’s democratic legitimacy, independence and political role; states that the new procedure whereby the Commission President is elected by Parliament will strengthen the Commission’s legitimacy and political role and will make the European elections more important, by linking the voters’ choice in the elections to the European Parliament more directly to the election of the Commission President;

| 2. | Stresses that the potentialities for the strengthening of the European Union’s democratic legitimacy provided by the Treaty of Lisbon should be fully implemented, inter alia through the designation of candidates for the office of Commission President by the European political parties, thus conferring a new political dimension on the European elections and further connecting the citizens’ vote to the election of the Commission President by the European Parliament; |
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2.

Stresses that the potentialities for the strengthening of the European Union’s democratic legitimacy provided by the Treaty of Lisbon should be fully implemented, inter alia through the designation of candidates for the office of Commission President by the European political parties, thus conferring a new political dimension on the European elections and further connecting the citizens’ vote to the election of the Commission President by the European Parliament;

| 3. | Urges the next Convention to consider the way in which the Commission is formed with a view to reinforcing the Commission’s democratic legitimacy; urges the next Commission President to consider in what way the Commission’s composition, construction and political priorities will strengthen a policy of closeness to the citizens; |
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3.

Urges the next Convention to consider the way in which the Commission is formed with a view to reinforcing the Commission’s democratic legitimacy; urges the next Commission President to consider in what way the Commission’s composition, construction and political priorities will strengthen a policy of closeness to the citizens;

| 4. | Reaffirms that all European political parties should appoint their candidates for President of the Commission sufficiently in advance of the scheduled date for the European elections; |
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4.

Reaffirms that all European political parties should appoint their candidates for President of the Commission sufficiently in advance of the scheduled date for the European elections;

| 5. | Expects candidates for President of the Commission to play a significant role in the campaign for the European elections, by distributing and promoting in all Member States the political programme of their European political party; |
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5.

Expects candidates for President of the Commission to play a significant role in the campaign for the European elections, by distributing and promoting in all Member States the political programme of their European political party;

| 6. | Reiterates its invitation to the European Council to clarify, in a timely manner and before the elections, how it will take account of the elections to the European Parliament and honour the citizens’ choice when putting forward a candidate for President of the Commission, in the framework of consultations to be conducted between Parliament and the European Council under Declaration 11 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon; in this context, renews its call on the European Council to agree with the European Parliament the arrangements for the consultations referred to in Article 17(7) TEU and to guarantee the smooth functioning of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission, as provided for in Declaration 11 on Article 17(6) and 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union; |
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6.

Reiterates its invitation to the European Council to clarify, in a timely manner and before the elections, how it will take account of the elections to the European Parliament and honour the citizens’ choice when putting forward a candidate for President of the Commission, in the framework of consultations to be conducted between Parliament and the European Council under Declaration 11 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon; in this context, renews its call on the European Council to agree with the European Parliament the arrangements for the consultations referred to in Article 17(7) TEU and to guarantee the smooth functioning of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission, as provided for in Declaration 11 on Article 17(6) and 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union;

| 7. | Requests that as many Members of the next Commission as possible be chosen from among elected Members of the European Parliament; |
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7.

Requests that as many Members of the next Commission as possible be chosen from among elected Members of the European Parliament;

| 8. | Is of the opinion that the President-elect of the Commission should act more autonomously in the process of selecting the other Members of the Commission; calls upon the governments of the Member States to make gender-balanced proposals for candidates; urges the President-elect of the Commission to insist with the governments of the Member States that the candidates for the office of Commissioner must enable him/her to compose a gender-balanced college, and allow him/her to reject any proposed candidate who fails to demonstrate general competence, European commitment or unquestionable independence; |
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8.

Is of the opinion that the President-elect of the Commission should act more autonomously in the process of selecting the other Members of the Commission; calls upon the governments of the Member States to make gender-balanced proposals for candidates; urges the President-elect of the Commission to insist with the governments of the Member States that the candidates for the office of Commissioner must enable him/her to compose a gender-balanced college, and allow him/her to reject any proposed candidate who fails to demonstrate general competence, European commitment or unquestionable independence;

| 9. | Takes the view, further to the political understanding reached at the meeting of the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008 and following the decision of the European Council on 22 May 2013 concerning the number of Members of the European Commission, that additional measures, such as the appointment of Commissioners without portfolio or the establishment of a system of Vice-Presidents of the Commission with responsibilities over major thematic clusters and with competences to coordinate the work of the Commission in the corresponding areas, should be envisaged for the more effective functioning of the Commission, without prejudice to the right to appoint one Commissioner per Member State and to the voting right of all Commissioners; |
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9.

Takes the view, further to the political understanding reached at the meeting of the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008 and following the decision of the European Council on 22 May 2013 concerning the number of Members of the European Commission, that additional measures, such as the appointment of Commissioners without portfolio or the establishment of a system of Vice-Presidents of the Commission with responsibilities over major thematic clusters and with competences to coordinate the work of the Commission in the corresponding areas, should be envisaged for the more effective functioning of the Commission, without prejudice to the right to appoint one Commissioner per Member State and to the voting right of all Commissioners;

| 10. | Calls on the next Convention to revisit the question of the size of the Commission, as well as that of its organisation and functioning; |
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10.

Calls on the next Convention to revisit the question of the size of the Commission, as well as that of its organisation and functioning;

| 11. | Considers that the composition of the European Commission must ensure stability in the number and content of portfolios and at the same time guarantee a balanced decision-making process; |
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11.

Considers that the composition of the European Commission must ensure stability in the number and content of portfolios and at the same time guarantee a balanced decision-making process;

| 12. | Stresses that, as mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, the candidate for President of the Commission should be requested to present to the European Parliament, after his or her designation by the European Council, the political guidelines for his or her mandate, followed by a comprehensive exchange of views, before Parliament elects the proposed candidate for President of the Commission; |
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12.

Stresses that, as mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, the candidate for President of the Commission should be requested to present to the European Parliament, after his or her designation by the European Council, the political guidelines for his or her mandate, followed by a comprehensive exchange of views, before Parliament elects the proposed candidate for President of the Commission;

| 13. | Urges the future President-designate of the Commission to take due account of the proposals and recommendations for European Union legislation previously made by Parliament on the basis of own-initiative reports or resolutions which received the support of a wide majority of the Members of the European Parliament and which the former Commission had not satisfactorily followed up by the end of its mandate; |
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13.

Urges the future President-designate of the Commission to take due account of the proposals and recommendations for European Union legislation previously made by Parliament on the basis of own-initiative reports or resolutions which received the support of a wide majority of the Members of the European Parliament and which the former Commission had not satisfactorily followed up by the end of its mandate;

| 14. | Considers that, in a future revision of the Treaties, the majority currently required under Article 234 TFEU for a motion of censure against the Commission should be lowered so as to require only a majority of the component Members of the European Parliament, without putting the functioning of the institutions at risk; |
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14.

Considers that, in a future revision of the Treaties, the majority currently required under Article 234 TFEU for a motion of censure against the Commission should be lowered so as to require only a majority of the component Members of the European Parliament, without putting the functioning of the institutions at risk;

| 15. | Considers that, notwithstanding the collective responsibility of the college for the actions of the Commission, individual Commissioners may be held accountable for the actions of their Directorates-General; |
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15.

Considers that, notwithstanding the collective responsibility of the college for the actions of the Commission, individual Commissioners may be held accountable for the actions of their Directorates-General;

Legislative initiative and activity

Legislative initiative and activity

(Parliamentary competence and scrutiny)

(Parliamentary competence and scrutiny)

| 16. | Emphasises that the Lisbon Treaty was intended as a step forward in ensuring that decision-making procedures were more transparent and democratic, reflecting the Treaty commitment to a closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen, by strengthening the role of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments, thus providing more democratic and transparent procedures for the adoption of Union acts, which are essential in the light of the impact these acts have on citizens and businesses; points out, however, that the achievement of this democratic aim is undermined if EU institutions do not respect one another’s competences, the procedures laid down in the Treaties and the principle of loyal cooperation; |
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16.

Emphasises that the Lisbon Treaty was intended as a step forward in ensuring that decision-making procedures were more transparent and democratic, reflecting the Treaty commitment to a closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen, by strengthening the role of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments, thus providing more democratic and transparent procedures for the adoption of Union acts, which are essential in the light of the impact these acts have on citizens and businesses; points out, however, that the achievement of this democratic aim is undermined if EU institutions do not respect one another’s competences, the procedures laid down in the Treaties and the principle of loyal cooperation;

| 17. | Stresses the need for sincere cooperation between the institutions involved in the legislative procedure in relation to the exchange of documents, such as legal opinions, so as to allow a constructive, frank and legally valid dialogue between institutions; |
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17.

Stresses the need for sincere cooperation between the institutions involved in the legislative procedure in relation to the exchange of documents, such as legal opinions, so as to allow a constructive, frank and legally valid dialogue between institutions;

| 18. | Notes that since the TFEU entered into force, Parliament has proved to be a committed and responsible co-legislator and that interaction between Parliament and the Commission has, overall, been positive and based on fluid communication and a cooperative approach; |
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18.

Notes that since the TFEU entered into force, Parliament has proved to be a committed and responsible co-legislator and that interaction between Parliament and the Commission has, overall, been positive and based on fluid communication and a cooperative approach;

| 19. | Takes the view that, while the overall assessment of interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the Commission is positive, there are still a number of issues and shortcomings, which call for closer attention and action; |
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19.

Takes the view that, while the overall assessment of interinstitutional relations between Parliament and the Commission is positive, there are still a number of issues and shortcomings, which call for closer attention and action;

| 20. | Stresses that the drive for efficiency must not mean poorer quality of legislation or giving up Parliament’s own objectives; takes the view that, alongside this drive for efficiency, Parliament must maintain appropriate legislative standards and continue to pursue its own objectives, while ensuring that legislation is well designed, responds to clearly identified needs and complies with the principle of subsidiarity; |
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20.

Stresses that the drive for efficiency must not mean poorer quality of legislation or giving up Parliament’s own objectives; takes the view that, alongside this drive for efficiency, Parliament must maintain appropriate legislative standards and continue to pursue its own objectives, while ensuring that legislation is well designed, responds to clearly identified needs and complies with the principle of subsidiarity;

| 21. | Stresses that the challenge of transparency is ever-present and common to all institutions, especially in first-reading agreements; notes that Parliament responded properly to this challenge by adopting the new Rules 70 and 70a of its Rules of Procedure; |
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21.

Stresses that the challenge of transparency is ever-present and common to all institutions, especially in first-reading agreements; notes that Parliament responded properly to this challenge by adopting the new Rules 70 and 70a of its Rules of Procedure;

| 22. | Is concerned about the problems that still exist in applying the ordinary legislative procedure, especially in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘Stockholm Programme’) as well as in aligning the acts of the former Third Pillar with the hierarchy of norms of the Lisbon Treaty, and in general with regard to the continuing ‘asymmetry’ regarding the transparency of the Commission’s involvement in the preparatory work of the two branches of the legislative authority; in this regard, underlines the importance of the Council’s working methods being adapted so as to make it possible for Parliament representatives to participate in some of its meetings when this is duly justified under the principle of mutual sincere cooperation between the institutions; |
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22.

Is concerned about the problems that still exist in applying the ordinary legislative procedure, especially in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (‘Stockholm Programme’) as well as in aligning the acts of the former Third Pillar with the hierarchy of norms of the Lisbon Treaty, and in general with regard to the continuing ‘asymmetry’ regarding the transparency of the Commission’s involvement in the preparatory work of the two branches of the legislative authority; in this regard, underlines the importance of the Council’s working methods being adapted so as to make it possible for Parliament representatives to participate in some of its meetings when this is duly justified under the principle of mutual sincere cooperation between the institutions;

| 23. | Points out that the choice of correct legal basis, as confirmed by the Court of Justice, is a question of a constitutional nature, as it determines the existence and extent of EU competence, the procedures to be followed and the respective competences of the institutional actors involved in the adoption of an act; regrets, therefore, the fact that Parliament has repeatedly had to bring actions before the Court of Justice for annulment of acts adopted by the Council because of the choice of legal basis, including against two acts adopted under the obsolete ‘third pillar’ long after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (9); |
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23.

Points out that the choice of correct legal basis, as confirmed by the Court of Justice, is a question of a constitutional nature, as it determines the existence and extent of EU competence, the procedures to be followed and the respective competences of the institutional actors involved in the adoption of an act; regrets, therefore, the fact that Parliament has repeatedly had to bring actions before the Court of Justice for annulment of acts adopted by the Council because of the choice of legal basis, including against two acts adopted under the obsolete ‘third pillar’ long after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (9);

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| 24. | Warns against circumventing Parliament's right to legislate by including provisions which should be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure in proposals for Council acts, by using mere Commission guidelines or non-applicable implementing or delegated acts or by failing to propose the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or international trade and investment agreements; |
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24.

Warns against circumventing Parliament's right to legislate by including provisions which should be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure in proposals for Council acts, by using mere Commission guidelines or non-applicable implementing or delegated acts or by failing to propose the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or international trade and investment agreements;

| 25. | Asks the Commission to make better use of the pre-legislative phase, in particular of the valuable input collected on the basis of Green and White Papers, and routinely inform the European Parliament of preparatory work carried out by its services, on an equal footing with the Council; |
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25.

Asks the Commission to make better use of the pre-legislative phase, in particular of the valuable input collected on the basis of Green and White Papers, and routinely inform the European Parliament of preparatory work carried out by its services, on an equal footing with the Council;

| 26. | Takes the view that Parliament ought to further develop and make full use of its autonomous structure for assessing the impact of any substantial changes or modifications to the original proposal submitted by the Commission; |
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26.

Takes the view that Parliament ought to further develop and make full use of its autonomous structure for assessing the impact of any substantial changes or modifications to the original proposal submitted by the Commission;

| 27. | Emphasises that the European Parliament should also strengthen its autonomous assessment of the impact on fundamental rights of legislative proposals and amendments under consideration as part of the legislative process and establish mechanisms to monitor human rights violations; |
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27.

Emphasises that the European Parliament should also strengthen its autonomous assessment of the impact on fundamental rights of legislative proposals and amendments under consideration as part of the legislative process and establish mechanisms to monitor human rights violations;

| 28. | Deplores the fact that while the Commission is formally fulfilling its responsibilities by replying within three months to Parliament’s requests for legislative initiatives, it has not always proposed a real and substantial follow-up; |
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28.

Deplores the fact that while the Commission is formally fulfilling its responsibilities by replying within three months to Parliament’s requests for legislative initiatives, it has not always proposed a real and substantial follow-up;

| 29. | Requests that, at the next revision of the Treaties, Parliament’s right of legislative initiative be fully recognised by making it mandatory for the Commission to follow up all requests submitted by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU by presenting a legislative proposal within an appropriate time limit; |
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29.

Requests that, at the next revision of the Treaties, Parliament’s right of legislative initiative be fully recognised by making it mandatory for the Commission to follow up all requests submitted by Parliament under Article 225 TFEU by presenting a legislative proposal within an appropriate time limit;

| 30. | Considers that, at the next revision of the Treaties, the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative proposals should be limited to those cases where, after the adoption of Parliament’s position at first reading, Parliament agrees that the proposal is no longer justified due to altered circumstances; |
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30.

Considers that, at the next revision of the Treaties, the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative proposals should be limited to those cases where, after the adoption of Parliament’s position at first reading, Parliament agrees that the proposal is no longer justified due to altered circumstances;

| 31. | Points out that Parliament welcomed, in principle, the introduction of delegated acts in Article 290 TFEU as providing greater scope for oversight, but stresses that the conferral of such delegated powers or implementing powers under Article 291 is never an obligation; recognises that the use of delegated acts should be considered where flexibility and efficiency are needed and cannot be delivered by means of the ordinary legislative procedure, provided that the objective, content, scope and the duration of that delegation are explicitly defined and the conditions to which the delegation is subject are clearly laid down in the basic act; expresses concern at the Council’s tendency to insist on using implementing acts for provisions where only the basic act or delegated acts should be used; stresses that the legislator may decide to allow implementing acts to be used only for the adoption of elements which do not amount to further political orientation; recognises that Article 290 explicitly limits the scope of delegated acts to non-essential elements of a legislative act and that delegated acts may not therefore be used in relation to rules essential to the subject matter of the relevant legislation; |
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31.

Points out that Parliament welcomed, in principle, the introduction of delegated acts in Article 290 TFEU as providing greater scope for oversight, but stresses that the conferral of such delegated powers or implementing powers under Article 291 is never an obligation; recognises that the use of delegated acts should be considered where flexibility and efficiency are needed and cannot be delivered by means of the ordinary legislative procedure, provided that the objective, content, scope and the duration of that delegation are explicitly defined and the conditions to which the delegation is subject are clearly laid down in the basic act; expresses concern at the Council’s tendency to insist on using implementing acts for provisions where only the basic act or delegated acts should be used; stresses that the legislator may decide to allow implementing acts to be used only for the adoption of elements which do not amount to further political orientation; recognises that Article 290 explicitly limits the scope of delegated acts to non-essential elements of a legislative act and that delegated acts may not therefore be used in relation to rules essential to the subject matter of the relevant legislation;

| 32. | Draws attention to the need to distinguish properly between the essential elements of a legislative act, which can only be decided upon by the legislative authority in the legislative act itself, and non-essential elements, which can be supplemented or amended by means of delegated acts; |
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32.

Draws attention to the need to distinguish properly between the essential elements of a legislative act, which can only be decided upon by the legislative authority in the legislative act itself, and non-essential elements, which can be supplemented or amended by means of delegated acts;

| 33. | Understands that delegated acts can be a flexible and effective tool; stresses the importance of the choice between delegated acts and implementing acts from the point of view of the respect of the Treaty requirements while safeguarding the rule-making prerogatives of Parliament, and reiterates its request to the Commission and the Council to agree with Parliament on the application of criteria for the use of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, so that implementing acts are not used as a substitute for delegated acts; |
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33.

Understands that delegated acts can be a flexible and effective tool; stresses the importance of the choice between delegated acts and implementing acts from the point of view of the respect of the Treaty requirements while safeguarding the rule-making prerogatives of Parliament, and reiterates its request to the Commission and the Council to agree with Parliament on the application of criteria for the use of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, so that implementing acts are not used as a substitute for delegated acts;

| 34. | Urges the Commission to involve Parliament adequately in the preparatory phase of the delegated acts and to provide its Members with all relevant information, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission; |
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34.

Urges the Commission to involve Parliament adequately in the preparatory phase of the delegated acts and to provide its Members with all relevant information, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission;

| 35. | Asks the Commission to comply with the Framework Agreement concerning access for Parliament’s experts to the Commission’s expert meetings by preventing them from being regarded as ‘comitology’ committees provided that they are dealing with issues other than implementing measures within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011; |
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35.

Asks the Commission to comply with the Framework Agreement concerning access for Parliament’s experts to the Commission’s expert meetings by preventing them from being regarded as ‘comitology’ committees provided that they are dealing with issues other than implementing measures within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011;

| 36. | Emphasises the particular significance and consequence of the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty; points out that the Charter has become legally binding upon the EU institutions and upon the Member States when implementing Union law, thereby transforming basic values into specific rights; |
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36.

Emphasises the particular significance and consequence of the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty; points out that the Charter has become legally binding upon the EU institutions and upon the Member States when implementing Union law, thereby transforming basic values into specific rights;

| 37. | Recalls that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the new right to launch a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI); stresses the need to remove all the technical and bureaucratic barriers still hindering the effective use of the ECI, and encourages active participation by citizens in shaping EU policies; |
| --- | --- |

37.

Recalls that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the new right to launch a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI); stresses the need to remove all the technical and bureaucratic barriers still hindering the effective use of the ECI, and encourages active participation by citizens in shaping EU policies;

| 38. | Highlights the greater role given to national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty and stresses that, alongside the role which they play in monitoring respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, they can and do make positive contributions in the framework of the Political Dialogue; considers that the active role which the national parliaments can play in guiding the members of the Council of Ministers, together with good cooperation between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, can help to establish a healthy parliamentary counterbalance to the exercise of executive power in the functioning of the EU; refers also to the reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments under Article 7(2) of Protocol No 2, which states that the broad scope of delegation under Article 290 TFEU in a proposed act does not make it possible to assess whether or not the concrete legislative reality would be in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Highlights the greater role given to national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty and stresses that, alongside the role which they play in monitoring respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, they can and do make positive contributions in the framework of the Political Dialogue; considers that the active role which the national parliaments can play in guiding the members of the Council of Ministers, together with good cooperation between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, can help to establish a healthy parliamentary counterbalance to the exercise of executive power in the functioning of the EU; refers also to the reasoned opinions submitted by national parliaments under Article 7(2) of Protocol No 2, which states that the broad scope of delegation under Article 290 TFEU in a proposed act does not make it possible to assess whether or not the concrete legislative reality would be in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity;

International relations

International relations

(Parliamentary competence and scrutiny)

(Parliamentary competence and scrutiny)

| 39. | Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty increased the role and powers of the European Parliament in the field of international agreements, and points out that international agreements now increasingly cover areas which concern the everyday lives of citizens and which traditionally, and under EU primary law, fall within the scope of ordinary legislative procedures; considers that it is imperative that the provision in Article 218(10) TFEU, which stipulates that Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for concluding international agreements, is applied in a way which is compatible with Article 10 TEU, pursuant to which the functioning of the Union is based on representative democracy, which requires transparency and democratic debate on the issues to be decided; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Recalls that the Lisbon Treaty increased the role and powers of the European Parliament in the field of international agreements, and points out that international agreements now increasingly cover areas which concern the everyday lives of citizens and which traditionally, and under EU primary law, fall within the scope of ordinary legislative procedures; considers that it is imperative that the provision in Article 218(10) TFEU, which stipulates that Parliament must be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for concluding international agreements, is applied in a way which is compatible with Article 10 TEU, pursuant to which the functioning of the Union is based on representative democracy, which requires transparency and democratic debate on the issues to be decided;

| 40. | Notes that the rejection of the SWIFT and ACTA agreements were demonstrations of Parliament using its newly acquired prerogatives; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Notes that the rejection of the SWIFT and ACTA agreements were demonstrations of Parliament using its newly acquired prerogatives;

| 41. | Underlines, on the basis of Article 18 TEU, the HR/VP’s responsibility for ensuring consistency of the EU’s external action; underlines, furthermore, that the HR/VP, under Articles 17 and 36 TEU, is accountable to, and has Treaty obligations towards, Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Underlines, on the basis of Article 18 TEU, the HR/VP’s responsibility for ensuring consistency of the EU’s external action; underlines, furthermore, that the HR/VP, under Articles 17 and 36 TEU, is accountable to, and has Treaty obligations towards, Parliament;

| 42. | Recalls, with regard to international agreements, Parliament’s prerogative to ask the Council not to authorise the opening of negotiations until Parliament has stated its position on a proposed negotiating mandate, and believes that consideration should be given to a Framework Agreement with the Council; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Recalls, with regard to international agreements, Parliament’s prerogative to ask the Council not to authorise the opening of negotiations until Parliament has stated its position on a proposed negotiating mandate, and believes that consideration should be given to a Framework Agreement with the Council;

| 43. | Emphasises the need to ensure that Parliament is informed in advance by the Commission of its intention to launch an international negotiation, that it has a genuine opportunity to express an informed opinion on the negotiating mandates, and that its opinion is taken into account; insists that international agreements should include the appropriate conditionalities to comply with Article 21 TEU; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Emphasises the need to ensure that Parliament is informed in advance by the Commission of its intention to launch an international negotiation, that it has a genuine opportunity to express an informed opinion on the negotiating mandates, and that its opinion is taken into account; insists that international agreements should include the appropriate conditionalities to comply with Article 21 TEU;

| 44. | Attaches great importance to the inclusion of human rights clauses in international agreements and of sustainable development chapters in trade and investment agreements, and expresses satisfaction with Parliament’s initiatives with a view to the adoption of roadmaps regarding key conditionalities; reminds the Commission of the need to take into account Parliament’s views and resolutions and to provide feedback on how they have been incorporated into the negotiations on international agreements and into draft legislation; expresses its hope that the instruments needed to develop the EU's investment policy will become operative in due time; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Attaches great importance to the inclusion of human rights clauses in international agreements and of sustainable development chapters in trade and investment agreements, and expresses satisfaction with Parliament’s initiatives with a view to the adoption of roadmaps regarding key conditionalities; reminds the Commission of the need to take into account Parliament’s views and resolutions and to provide feedback on how they have been incorporated into the negotiations on international agreements and into draft legislation; expresses its hope that the instruments needed to develop the EU's investment policy will become operative in due time;

| 45. | Demands, in line with Article 218(10) TFEU, that Parliament be immediately, fully and accurately informed at all stages of the procedures for concluding international agreements, including agreements concluded in the area of CFSP, and be given access to the Union’s negotiation texts subject to the appropriate procedures and conditions, so as to ensure that Parliament can take its final decision with an exhaustive knowledge of the subject matter; emphasises that for this provision to be meaningful, the committee members concerned should have access to negotiation mandates and other relevant negotiating documents; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Demands, in line with Article 218(10) TFEU, that Parliament be immediately, fully and accurately informed at all stages of the procedures for concluding international agreements, including agreements concluded in the area of CFSP, and be given access to the Union’s negotiation texts subject to the appropriate procedures and conditions, so as to ensure that Parliament can take its final decision with an exhaustive knowledge of the subject matter; emphasises that for this provision to be meaningful, the committee members concerned should have access to negotiation mandates and other relevant negotiating documents;

| 46. | Points out, while respecting the principle that Parliament’s consent to international agreements cannot be conditional, that it is entitled to make recommendations as to the application in practice of the agreements; asks, to this end, that the Commission present regular reports to Parliament on the implementation of international agreements, including the human rights and other conditions of the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

46.

Points out, while respecting the principle that Parliament’s consent to international agreements cannot be conditional, that it is entitled to make recommendations as to the application in practice of the agreements; asks, to this end, that the Commission present regular reports to Parliament on the implementation of international agreements, including the human rights and other conditions of the agreements.

| 47. | Recalls the need to avoid the provisional application of international agreements before Parliament’s consent has been given, unless Parliament agrees to make an exception; stresses that the rules needed for the internal application of international agreements cannot be adopted by the Council alone in its decision on the conclusion of the agreement and that the appropriate legislative procedures under the Treaties must be fully complied with; |
| --- | --- |

47.

Recalls the need to avoid the provisional application of international agreements before Parliament’s consent has been given, unless Parliament agrees to make an exception; stresses that the rules needed for the internal application of international agreements cannot be adopted by the Council alone in its decision on the conclusion of the agreement and that the appropriate legislative procedures under the Treaties must be fully complied with;

| 48. | Reaffirms the need for the Parliament to adopt the necessary measures in order to monitor the implementation of international agreements; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Reaffirms the need for the Parliament to adopt the necessary measures in order to monitor the implementation of international agreements;

| 49. | Insists that Parliament should have a say in decisions regarding the suspension or termination of international agreements whose conclusion needed the consent of Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

49.

Insists that Parliament should have a say in decisions regarding the suspension or termination of international agreements whose conclusion needed the consent of Parliament;

| 50. | Calls upon the HR/VP to enhance, in line with the Declaration on Political Accountability, a systematic ex-ante consultation with Parliament on new strategic documents, policy papers and mandates; |
| --- | --- |

50.

Calls upon the HR/VP to enhance, in line with the Declaration on Political Accountability, a systematic ex-ante consultation with Parliament on new strategic documents, policy papers and mandates;

| 51. | Calls, in line with the commitment made by the HR/VP in the Declaration on Political Accountability, for the urgent conclusion of the negotiations on an Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning access by the European Parliament to classified information held by the Council and the European External Action Service in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; |
| --- | --- |

51.

Calls, in line with the commitment made by the HR/VP in the Declaration on Political Accountability, for the urgent conclusion of the negotiations on an Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning access by the European Parliament to classified information held by the Council and the European External Action Service in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy;

| 52. | Reiterates its call for political reporting by Union delegations to key Parliament office-holders under regulated access; |
| --- | --- |

52.

Reiterates its call for political reporting by Union delegations to key Parliament office-holders under regulated access;

| 53. | Calls for the adoption of a Quadripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the coherent and effective provision of information in the area of external relations; |
| --- | --- |

53.

Calls for the adoption of a Quadripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the coherent and effective provision of information in the area of external relations;

| 54. | Recalls that the European Parliament is now a fully fledged institutional actor in the field of security policies, and is therefore entitled to participate actively in determining the features and priorities of those policies and in evaluating instruments in this field, a process to be conducted jointly by the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Council; believes that the European Parliament should play a crucial role in the evaluation and definition of internal security policies, as they have a profound impact on the fundamental rights of all those living in the EU; emphasises, therefore, the need to ensure that such policies fall within the remit of the only directly elected European institution as regards scrutiny and democratic oversight; |
| --- | --- |

54.

Recalls that the European Parliament is now a fully fledged institutional actor in the field of security policies, and is therefore entitled to participate actively in determining the features and priorities of those policies and in evaluating instruments in this field, a process to be conducted jointly by the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Council; believes that the European Parliament should play a crucial role in the evaluation and definition of internal security policies, as they have a profound impact on the fundamental rights of all those living in the EU; emphasises, therefore, the need to ensure that such policies fall within the remit of the only directly elected European institution as regards scrutiny and democratic oversight;

| 55. | Points out that the TFEU has expanded the scope of the Union’s exclusive competences in the field of the CCP, which now embraces not only all aspects of trade, but also foreign direct investment; highlights the fact that Parliament is now fully competent to decide, together with the Council, on law-making and on the approval of trade and investment agreements; |
| --- | --- |

55.

Points out that the TFEU has expanded the scope of the Union’s exclusive competences in the field of the CCP, which now embraces not only all aspects of trade, but also foreign direct investment; highlights the fact that Parliament is now fully competent to decide, together with the Council, on law-making and on the approval of trade and investment agreements;

| 56. | Highlights the importance of the EU institutions’ cooperating in a loyal and effective manner, within their respective competences, when considering legislation and international agreements with a view to anticipating trade and economic trends, identifying priorities and options, establishing mid- and long-term strategies, determining mandates for international agreements, analysing/drafting and adopting legislation and monitoring the implementation of trade and investment agreements, as well as long-term initiatives in the field of CCP; |
| --- | --- |

56.

Highlights the importance of the EU institutions’ cooperating in a loyal and effective manner, within their respective competences, when considering legislation and international agreements with a view to anticipating trade and economic trends, identifying priorities and options, establishing mid- and long-term strategies, determining mandates for international agreements, analysing/drafting and adopting legislation and monitoring the implementation of trade and investment agreements, as well as long-term initiatives in the field of CCP;

| 57. | Underlines the importance of continuing the process of developing effective capacities, including the allocation of the necessary staff and financial resources, in order to actively define and achieve political objectives in the field of trade and investment, while ensuring legal certainty, the effectiveness of the EU’s external action and respect for the principles and objectives enshrined in the Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

57.

Underlines the importance of continuing the process of developing effective capacities, including the allocation of the necessary staff and financial resources, in order to actively define and achieve political objectives in the field of trade and investment, while ensuring legal certainty, the effectiveness of the EU’s external action and respect for the principles and objectives enshrined in the Treaties;

| 58. | Stresses the need to ensure a continuous flow of timely, accurate, comprehensive and impartial information for the purpose of enabling the high-quality analysis needed to enhance the capabilities of Parliament’s policymakers and their sense of ownership, leading to greater interinstitutional synergy in respect of the CCP, and at the same time to ensure that Parliament is fully and accurately informed at all stages, including by means of access to the Union's negotiation texts under appropriate procedures and conditions, with the Commission being proactive and doing its utmost to guarantee such an information flow; underlines, furthermore, the importance of information being provided to Parliament with a view to preventing undesirable situations from arising that could potentially lead to misunderstandings between the institutions, and welcomes in this regard the regular technical briefing sessions organised by the Commission on a number of topics; regrets the fact that on a number of occasions relevant information has reached Parliament through alternative channels rather than from the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

58.

Stresses the need to ensure a continuous flow of timely, accurate, comprehensive and impartial information for the purpose of enabling the high-quality analysis needed to enhance the capabilities of Parliament’s policymakers and their sense of ownership, leading to greater interinstitutional synergy in respect of the CCP, and at the same time to ensure that Parliament is fully and accurately informed at all stages, including by means of access to the Union's negotiation texts under appropriate procedures and conditions, with the Commission being proactive and doing its utmost to guarantee such an information flow; underlines, furthermore, the importance of information being provided to Parliament with a view to preventing undesirable situations from arising that could potentially lead to misunderstandings between the institutions, and welcomes in this regard the regular technical briefing sessions organised by the Commission on a number of topics; regrets the fact that on a number of occasions relevant information has reached Parliament through alternative channels rather than from the Commission;

| 59. | Reiterates the need for the institutions to work together in the implementation of the Treaties, secondary legislation and the Framework Agreement and the need for the Commission to work in an independent and transparent manner throughout the preparation, adoption and implementation of legislation in the field of CCP, and considers that its role is key throughout the process; |
| --- | --- |

59.

Reiterates the need for the institutions to work together in the implementation of the Treaties, secondary legislation and the Framework Agreement and the need for the Commission to work in an independent and transparent manner throughout the preparation, adoption and implementation of legislation in the field of CCP, and considers that its role is key throughout the process;

Constitutional dynamic

Constitutional dynamic

(Interinstitutional relations and interinstitutional agreements)

(Interinstitutional relations and interinstitutional agreements)

| 60. | Stresses that, under Article 17(1) TEU, the Commission is to take initiatives with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements on the Union’s annual and multiannual programming; draws attention to the need to involve at an earlier stage not only Parliament but also the Council in the preparation of the Commission’s annual work programme, and stresses the importance of ensuring there is realistic and reliable programming that can be effectively implemented and provide the basis for interinstitutional planning; takes the view that, in order to increase the political accountability of the Commission to Parliament, a mid-term review to assess the overall fulfilment by the Commission of the announced mandate could be envisaged; |
| --- | --- |

60.

Stresses that, under Article 17(1) TEU, the Commission is to take initiatives with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements on the Union’s annual and multiannual programming; draws attention to the need to involve at an earlier stage not only Parliament but also the Council in the preparation of the Commission’s annual work programme, and stresses the importance of ensuring there is realistic and reliable programming that can be effectively implemented and provide the basis for interinstitutional planning; takes the view that, in order to increase the political accountability of the Commission to Parliament, a mid-term review to assess the overall fulfilment by the Commission of the announced mandate could be envisaged;

| 61. | Points out that Article 17(8) TEU expressly enshrines the principle that the Commission is politically accountable to the European Parliament, which is crucial to the proper functioning of the EU’s political system; |
| --- | --- |

61.

Points out that Article 17(8) TEU expressly enshrines the principle that the Commission is politically accountable to the European Parliament, which is crucial to the proper functioning of the EU’s political system;

| 62. | Stresses that, under Article 48(2) TEU, Parliament has the competence to initiate Treaty changes and will make use of this right to present new ideas for the future of Europe and the institutional framework of the EU; |
| --- | --- |

62.

Stresses that, under Article 48(2) TEU, Parliament has the competence to initiate Treaty changes and will make use of this right to present new ideas for the future of Europe and the institutional framework of the EU;

| 63. | Considers that the Framework Agreement concluded between Parliament and the Commission, and its regular updates, are essential with a view to strengthening and developing structured cooperation between the two institutions; |
| --- | --- |

63.

Considers that the Framework Agreement concluded between Parliament and the Commission, and its regular updates, are essential with a view to strengthening and developing structured cooperation between the two institutions;

| 64. | Welcomes the fact that the Framework Agreement adopted in 2010 considerably strengthened the political accountability of the Commission vis-à-vis Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

64.

Welcomes the fact that the Framework Agreement adopted in 2010 considerably strengthened the political accountability of the Commission vis-à-vis Parliament;

| 65. | Underlines the fact that the rules on dialogue and access to information allow for more comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the Commission, thereby contributing to the equal treatment of Parliament and the Council by the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

65.

Underlines the fact that the rules on dialogue and access to information allow for more comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the Commission, thereby contributing to the equal treatment of Parliament and the Council by the Commission;

| 66. | Notes that certain provisions of the current Framework Agreement still need to be implemented and developed; suggests that the outgoing Parliament adopt the general lines of this improvement so that appropriate proposals can be considered by the incoming Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

66.

Notes that certain provisions of the current Framework Agreement still need to be implemented and developed; suggests that the outgoing Parliament adopt the general lines of this improvement so that appropriate proposals can be considered by the incoming Parliament;

| 67. | Invites the Commission to reflect constructively with Parliament on the existing Framework Agreement and its implementation, paying particular attention to the negotiation, adoption and implementation of international agreements; |
| --- | --- |

67.

Invites the Commission to reflect constructively with Parliament on the existing Framework Agreement and its implementation, paying particular attention to the negotiation, adoption and implementation of international agreements;

| 68. | Takes the view that this mandate should fully explore the possibilities under the current Treaties to strengthen the political accountability of the executive and to streamline the existing provisions on legislative and political cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

68.

Takes the view that this mandate should fully explore the possibilities under the current Treaties to strengthen the political accountability of the executive and to streamline the existing provisions on legislative and political cooperation;

| 69. | Recalls that a number of issues, such as delegated acts, implementing measures, impact assessments, the treatment of legislative initiatives, and parliamentary questions, need an update in the light of the experience gained during this legislative term; |
| --- | --- |

69.

Recalls that a number of issues, such as delegated acts, implementing measures, impact assessments, the treatment of legislative initiatives, and parliamentary questions, need an update in the light of the experience gained during this legislative term;

| 70. | Regrets that its repeated calls for the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking to be renegotiated in order to take account of the new legislative environment created by the Treaty of Lisbon, consolidate current best practice and bring the agreement up to date in line with the smart regulation agenda remain unanswered; |
| --- | --- |

70.

Regrets that its repeated calls for the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking to be renegotiated in order to take account of the new legislative environment created by the Treaty of Lisbon, consolidate current best practice and bring the agreement up to date in line with the smart regulation agenda remain unanswered;

| 71. | Invites the Council of Ministers to express its position on the possibility of participating in a trilateral agreement with Parliament and the Commission with the aim of making further progress on the issues set out so far in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking; |
| --- | --- |

71.

Invites the Council of Ministers to express its position on the possibility of participating in a trilateral agreement with Parliament and the Commission with the aim of making further progress on the issues set out so far in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking;

| 72. | Considers that matters solely connected to the relations between Parliament and the Commission should continue to be the subject of a bilateral framework agreement; stresses that Parliament will not settle for less than what has been achieved under the existing Framework Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

72.

Considers that matters solely connected to the relations between Parliament and the Commission should continue to be the subject of a bilateral framework agreement; stresses that Parliament will not settle for less than what has been achieved under the existing Framework Agreement;

| 73. | Considers that one of the major challenges to the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional framework is the risk of intergovernmentalism jeopardising the ‘community method’, thus weakening the role of Parliament and the Commission to the benefit of the institutions representing the Member States’ governments; |
| --- | --- |

73.

Considers that one of the major challenges to the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional framework is the risk of intergovernmentalism jeopardising the ‘community method’, thus weakening the role of Parliament and the Commission to the benefit of the institutions representing the Member States’ governments;

| 74. | Points out that Article 2 TEU contains a list of the common values on which the Union is founded; believes that respect for those values should be properly ensured by both the Union and the Member States; points out that a proper legislative and institutional system should be established in order to protect the values of the Union; |
| --- | --- |

74.

Points out that Article 2 TEU contains a list of the common values on which the Union is founded; believes that respect for those values should be properly ensured by both the Union and the Member States; points out that a proper legislative and institutional system should be established in order to protect the values of the Union;

| 75. | Calls on all the EU institutions and the Member States’ governments and parliaments to build on the new institutional and legal framework created by the Treaty of Lisbon in such a way as to devise a comprehensive internal human rights policy for the Union which ensures effective accountability mechanisms at national and EU level with which to address human rights violations; |
| --- | --- |

75.

Calls on all the EU institutions and the Member States’ governments and parliaments to build on the new institutional and legal framework created by the Treaty of Lisbon in such a way as to devise a comprehensive internal human rights policy for the Union which ensures effective accountability mechanisms at national and EU level with which to address human rights violations;

o

o o

| 76. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

76.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

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(1)  OJ C 70 E, 8.3.2012, p. 98.

1

(2)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0462.

2

(3)  Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0323.

3

(4)  OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47.

4

(5)  OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 1.

5

(6)  OJ C 212 E, 5.8.2010, p. 37.

6

(7)  OJ C 210, 3.8.2010, p. 1.

7

(8)  Interinstitutional agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy (OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 1).

8

(9)  See Council Decision 2013/129/EU of 7 March 2013 on subjecting 4-methylamphetamine to control measures, and Council Implementing Decision 2013/496/EU of 7 October 2013 on subjecting 5-(2-aminopropyl) indole to control measures.

9

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