[Cite as Coleman v. KBO, Inc., 2018-Ohio-763.]

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

MICHELE COLEMAN 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

KBO, INC., et al. 

Defendants-Appellees 

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Appellate Case No. 2017-CA-82 

Trial Court Case No. 17-CV-145 

(Civil Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 2nd day of March, 2018. 

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MICHAEL J. MULDOON, Atty. Reg. No. 0034007, 1375 Dublin Road, Columbus, Ohio 

43215 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 

 

BRIAN C. THOMAS, Atty. Reg. No. 0074043, 312 Walnut Street, Suite 1800, Cincinnati, 

Ohio 45202 

 Attorney for Defendants-Appellees 

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FROELICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Michele Coleman appeals from a judgment of the Clark County Court of 

Common Pleas, which entered summary judgment in favor of KBO Inc., d.b.a. 

Klosterman’s Bakery, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that 

Coleman was ineligible for workers’ compensation for a psychiatric condition diagnosed 

five years after a workplace injury. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial 

court will be reversed, and the matter will be remanded for further proceedings. 

{¶ 2} The underlying facts are undisputed. In September 2009, Coleman was 

involved in an accident at her workplace, KBO, as a result of which she sustained physical 

injury to her right wrist. Her claim for workers’ compensation with respect to this injury 

(a sprain) was allowed, and her claim was amended to include right wrist synovitis and 

ulnocarpal abutment syndrome in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Coleman had surgeries 

as a result of these conditions in June 2010 and April 2013. 

{¶ 3} In January 2015, Coleman sought workers’ compensation for an additional 

condition of “major depression, single episode, non-psychotic, moderate” (hereinafter, 

“depression”), which she related to the same injury. A district hearing officer of the 

Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the addition of this condition, and a staff hearing 

officer affirmed the district hearing officer’s decision. Coleman appealed to the Industrial 

Commission, which refused her appeal without a hearing. 

{¶ 4} On March 7, 2017, Coleman appealed to the Clark County Court of 

Common Pleas, in the form of a complaint, pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. KBO and the 

Bureau of Workers’ Compensation filed answers. KBO served Coleman with a set of 

requests for admissions, and Coleman’s admissions were filed with the court. These 
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admissions evinced a lack of treatment for and Coleman’s failure to report symptoms of 

depression between 2009 and 2014. 

{¶ 5} On July 21, 2017, KBO filed a motion for summary judgment on Coleman’s 

claim that she was entitled to workers’ compensation for the additional claim of 

depression. KBO asserted that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether 

Coleman’s depression arose from her previously-allowed physical conditions, and 

therefore that KBO was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Coleman opposed the 

motion for summary judgment, relying on a psychologist’s affidavit which stated that her 

depression “was directly caused by her workers’ compensation injury” in 2009. 

{¶ 6} On August 22, 2017, the trial court granted KBO’s motion for summary 

judgment. The trial court concluded that, due to the five years between the physical 

injury and the diagnosis of a psychiatric condition and to Coleman’s assertions that she 

was not suffering from depression during the intervening period, reasonable minds could 

only conclude that the psychiatric condition did not arise from the physical injury. The 

trial court further found that Coleman’s expert’s affidavit attesting to a causal connection 

did not create a genuine issue of material fact, because it was “self-serving” and 

contradicted Coleman’s prior “testimony” that she was not depressed. 

{¶ 7} Coleman appeals, raising one assignment of error. 

Summary Judgment Standard 

{¶ 8} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when (1) there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds, after construing the evidence most strongly in 

favor of the nonmoving party, can only conclude adversely to that party. Zivich v. Mentor 
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Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998). The moving 

party carries the initial burden of affirmatively demonstrating that no genuine issue of 

material fact remains to be litigated. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 526 

N.E.2d 798 (1988). To this end, the movant must be able to point to evidentiary materials 

of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in rendering summary 

judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). 

{¶ 9} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not 

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings. Dresher at 293; Civ.R. 

56(E). Rather, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond, with affidavits 

or as otherwise permitted by Civ.R. 56, setting forth specific facts that show that there is 

a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. Throughout, the evidence must be 

construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

{¶ 10} We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de 

novo. Schroeder v. Henness, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2012 CA 18, 2013-Ohio-2767, ¶ 42. 

De novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should 

have used, and we examine the evidence, without deference to the trial court, to 

determine whether, as a matter of law, no genuine issues exist for trial. Ward v. Bond,

2d Dist. Champaign No. 2015-CA-2, 2015-Ohio-4297, ¶ 8. 

Compensability of Mental Condition Under Workers’ Compensation 

{¶ 11} The purpose of Ohio’s workers’ compensation system is to provide 

compensation to employees and their families for injuries or death that occur while on the 

job. Section 35, Article II, Constitution; Schramm v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 162 Ohio 

App.3d 270, 2005-Ohio-3663, 833 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.); Lynch v. Mayfield, 69 Ohio 
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App.3d 229, 233, 590 N.E.2d 351 (2d Dist.1990). For purposes of workers’ 

compensation, an “injury” includes “any injury, whether caused by external accidental 

means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, 

the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C). Both the “received in the 

course of” and the “arising out of” components in this formula must be satisfied, and the 

statute must be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits. Fisher v. Mayfield, 49 

Ohio St.3d 275, 277-278, 551 N.E.2d 1271 (1990); R.C. 4123.95. 

{¶ 12} Psychiatric conditions are excluded from the general definition of “injury,” 

“except where the claimant’s psychiatric conditions have arisen from an injury or 

occupational disease sustained by that claimant.” R.C. 4123.01(C)(1); Armstrong v. 

John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 10. To 

be compensable, a psychiatric condition must have been started by and therefore result 

from a physical injury or occupational disease the claimant suffered, and there must be a 

causal connection between a claimant’s physical injury and the claimant’s mental 

condition. Armstrong at ¶ 17. 

Analysis 

{¶ 13} In support of its motion for summary judgment, KBO argued that Coleman’s 

depression did not “arise from” the 2009 injury. KBO did not submit its own expert or 

similar evidentiary materials; rather, it relied on Coleman’s admissions and the fact that 

more than five years had passed between Coleman’s physical injury and her claim related 

to depression. In her admissions, Coleman stated that: 1) prior to January 2015, she 

received no psychiatric treatment or psychotropic medications and had not been 

hospitalized for any psychiatric condition; 2) in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, 
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no medical professional had diagnosed her with depression because of her wrist injuries; 

3) she completed patient medical histories in August 2013, September 2013, and 

December 2013 in which she marked a box “No” regarding depression; 4) the first medical 

professional to diagnose her with “major depression” was Dr. Michael Glenn Drown, 

Ph.D., in January 2015. Coleman also admitted that the Industrial Commission 

terminated her entitlement to temporary total disability benefits in January 2014. 

{¶ 14} In her Motion Contra KBO’s Request for Summary Judgment, Coleman 

relied on an affidavit from Dr. Drown in which he stated that, in his professional opinion, 

“she was suffering from a diagnosis of major depression, single episode, non-psychotic, 

moderate” and that this psychological diagnosis “was directly caused by her workers’ 

compensation injury which occurred on September 30, 2009” while she was employed 

with KBO. Dr. Drown attached to his affidavit a copy of his “Psychological Evaluation,” 

other reports and “diagnostic evidence,” and a letter detailing specific criticisms of KBO’s 

expert’s methodology and conclusion that Coleman did not “have a psychological 

diagnosis that could possibly be work related.”1 

{¶ 15} KBO argues that, because Coleman did not report and, in fact, expressly 

disclaimed any depression from the time of her wrist injury in 2009 through 2014, there 

was no genuine issue of material fact that her “2009 industrial injury did not start her 

psychiatric condition.” In its motion, KBO relied on Armstrong, 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-

Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 10, in support of its position. 

 

1 According to Coleman’s brief, Dr. Michael Murphy, KBO’s expert, opined in the 

administrative proceedings that Coleman’s psychological condition was not related to 

her work injury, but Dr. Murphy’s opinion was not presented in support of KBO’s motion 

for summary judgment. 
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{¶ 16} In Armstrong, the claimant sought workers’ compensation for a psychiatric 

injury (post-traumatic stress disorder) after he witnessed a fatality in a traffic accident in 

the course of his employment, as well as for physical injuries that he suffered in the same 

accident. The claim for his physical injuries was allowed, but the claim for PTSD was 

not, and the denial of benefits for PTSD was appealed to the court of common pleas. 

The experts for both parties agreed that Armstrong experienced PTSD, but they 

disagreed about whether his physical injuries were causal factors in the development of 

PTSD. The employer’s expert testified that the PTSD “was caused by witnessing the 

accident and ‘the mental observation of the severity of the injury [to another driver], the 

fatality, [and] the fact that it could have been life-threatening’ ” to Armstrong. After a 

bench trial, the court credited the employer’s expert’s testimony in concluding that the 

PTSD did not arise from Armstrong’s physical injuries, but rather from his observations of 

the accident and its injuries to others. 

{¶ 17} The court of appeals and the supreme court affirmed. In affirming the 

denial of Armstrong’s benefits for PTSD, the supreme court held that Armstrong’s mental 

condition had not “arisen from an injury * * * sustained by th[e] claimant,” as required by 

R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), and that there was no causal connection between his physical injury 

and his mental condition. The court declined to adopt a more expansive definition of 

“injury” that “embraced[d] the entire episode or accident giving rise to a claimant’s 

physical injuries,” as Armstrong had urged. In this context, the supreme court stated that 

“to be compensable, a psychiatric condition must have been started by and therefore 

result from a physical injury or occupational disease the claimant suffered.” (Emphasis 

added.) Id. at ¶ 17, quoting the court of appeals decision in the same case, 2d Dist. 
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Clark No. 2011-CA-6, 2011-Ohio-6708, ¶ 35. 

{¶ 18} KBO relied on the language in Armstrong that the psychological injury 

“must have been started by * * * the physical injury” in support of its argument that too 

much time had elapsed between Coleman’s physical injury and her depression to 

conclude that there was a causal connection. We disagree with this interpretation. 

Armstrong holds that there must be a causal connection between the physical and 

psychological injuries in order to obtain workers’ compensation for the psychological 

injury, but it does not discuss or in any way suggest that the psychological injury must 

occur contemporaneously with or within a certain period of time of the physical injury to 

be compensable. Of course, the passage of time is one factor to be considered in 

factually determining whether a causal connection has been established, and may make 

it more difficult for the claimant to establish such a connection. But Armstrong does not 

stand for the proposition that the absence of a psychological injury at the time of the 

physical injury, or sooner thereafter, is determinative. 

{¶ 19} KBO also cites in its brief two cases in which a substantial amount of time 

had passed between the physical injury and the claimed psychological injury, and no 

causal connection between the physical and psychological injury was found. 

{¶ 20} In Hippely v. Lincoln Elec. Holdings, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96439, 

2011-Ohio-5274, the claimant was injured in 2001 in a physically demanding job. He 

refused a recommended surgery out of concern about the risks and side effects and, in 

light of his physical limitations, was eventually given a job in the employer’s cafeteria. 

He worked in the cafeteria for six years, but he stated that he “hated” it, found it 

“degrading,” and felt “worthless”; he was eventually awarded temporary total disability. 
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{¶ 21} In 2009, almost eight years after the physical injury, Hippely sought 

workers’ compensation for “major depressive disorder.” At trial, the parties presented 

conflicting expert opinions as to the cause of Hippely’s depression. Hippely’s expert 

found that the 2001 injury was the cause, along with Hippely’s loss of employment. Id. 

at ¶ 12. The employer’s expert attributed Hippely’s depression to his loss of work, his 

continuing unemployment, his negative feelings about how his employment had ended, 

and the death of his father around the time he stopped working; he found no causal 

relationship to the injury and opined that, if there were a connection, he would have 

expected the depression to manifest itself closer to the time of the injury. Id. at ¶ 13. 

The jury found in favor of the employer, and Hippely’s motions for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied. The Eighth District Court of 

Appeals affirmed on appeal. 

{¶ 22} In Phipps v. Internatl. Paper Co., 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2013-02-003, 

2013-Ohio-3994, the claimant, Phipps, was injured in a slip-and-fall accident at work in 

1984; workers’ compensation was allowed for numerous conditions, and she underwent 

several surgeries as a result of the fall, including a knee replacement in 2010. In 2011, 

she applied for workers’ compensation for a depressive disorder, diagnosed in 2010, 

which she and her expert believed was caused by her physical injury in 1984. However, 

at trial, the employer’s expert stated his conclusions that Phipps was “strongly disposed 

to depression” based on her “childhood and family history,” which included dropping out 

of school in 10th grade, becoming pregnant at age 16, marrying as a teen, and two close 

relatives who had died by suicide. Id. at ¶ 17. The jury found that Phipps was not 

entitled to workers’ compensation for her depression, and the trial court overruled her 
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motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Twelfth District affirmed on appeal. 

{¶ 23} Unlike Armstrong, the claimants in Hippely and Phipps alleged a provable 

direct connection between their physical injuries and their subsequent psychological 

conditions. But all of these cases emphasize the need to establish a causal connection 

between a physical injury and an alleged psychological injury. However, these cases 

are distinguishable from Coleman’s case in that they were decided at trial and not on 

summary judgment. They do not stand for the proposition that, as a matter of law, 

“psychological conditions [are] not proximately caused by workplace injuries when the 

psychological conditions [are] diagnosed years after the accident,” as KBO’s brief seems 

to suggest. 

{¶ 24} In Coleman’s case, Dr. Drown stated by affidavit that, in his opinion, 

Coleman’s depression “was directly caused by her workers’ compensation injury” in 2009. 

KBO argued that Coleman’s admissions that she had not experienced depression in the 

several years following her injury undercut her assertion that there was a causal 

connection. But Coleman need not have continuously experienced depression from the 

time of her physical injury to establish that the depression she experienced in 2015 was 

caused by the injury. Notwithstanding that Coleman acknowledged that she had denied 

being depressed in 2009 through 2014, Dr. Drown’s affidavit created a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether her depression in 2015 was caused by her injury. As such, 

summary judgment was not appropriate. Accord Hoelscher v. KBO, Inc., 2d Dist. Clark 

No. 2017-CA-25, 2017-Ohio-5756, ¶ 8 (where experts disagree about cause of 

employee’s psychological conditions, and claimant’s expert connects those conditions to 

a workplace injury, eligibility for workers' compensation may not be resolved by summary 
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judgment). 

{¶ 25} Moreover, the trial court improperly concluded that it could not consider Dr. 

Drown’s affidavit, because the affidavit “contradicted” Coleman’s “former deposition 

testimony” without sufficient explanation, in an effort to defeat summary judgment. The 

trial court did not cite any authority for this position, but Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 

2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, is instructive. 

{¶ 26} In Byrd, the supreme court considered a certified question regarding the 

effect of a party’s conflicting statements by affidavit and deposition when ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment. Byrd, who had been injured in a car accident while driving 

his employer’s vehicle, sought coverage under his employer’s uninsured/underinsured 

motorist policy. In a 2001 deposition, Byrd stated that he had been on a personal errand 

to his father-in-law’s home at the time of the accident. Id. at ¶ 14. But when the 

employer filed a motion for summary judgment, in which it relied on the fact that Byrd was 

not within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, Byrd attached an 

affidavit to his motion contra in which he contradicted his deposition testimony. Byrd’s 

affidavit stated that “while he was employed by [the company], he wore a pager, he 

received and responded to pages both during and outside ‘normal’ working hours, he 

drove a truck with a sign that stated that [the company] was available for 24-hour service, 

and, as long as he was driving a company vehicle with such signage, he considered that 

he ‘was working and advertising for [the company].’ ” Id. at ¶ 5. 

{¶ 27} The supreme court considered whether “it is proper for courts to disregard 

an affidavit inconsistent with or contradictory to prior deposition testimony when ruling on 

a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 8. In resolving this issue, the court reiterated 
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its holding in Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 617 N.E.2d 1123 (1993), that a moving 

party’s contradictory affidavit may not be used to obtain summary judgment; “[w]hen a 

litigant’s affidavit in support of his or her motion for summary judgment is inconsistent with 

his or her earlier deposition testimony, summary judgment in that party’s favor is improper 

because there exists a question of credibility which can be resolved only by the trier of 

fact.” Byrd at ¶ 22, citing Turner, paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 28} The court noted, however, that with respect to evidence offered by a nonmoving party, the analysis “is a bit different,” and the court “must look to any explanation 

for the inconsistency.” Id. at ¶ 27. This is because, unlike the moving party, the nonmoving party “receives the benefit of all favorable inferences when evidence is reviewed 

for the existence of genuine issues of material facts.” Id. at ¶ 25, citing Temple v. Wean 

United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). See also Pettiford v. 

Aggarwal, 126 Ohio St.3d 413, 2010-Ohio-3237, 934 N.E.2d 913 (holding that an expert 

witness’s statement in opposition to summary judgment that contradicts that expert’s 

former deposition testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact unless the 

expert sufficiently explains the contradiction). 

{¶ 29} In Coleman’s case, the trial court misapplied this rule in two respects in 

concluding that it could not consider Dr. Drown’s affidavit. First, the rule set forth in 

Turner, Byrd and Pettiford applies to contradictory sworn statements made by the same 

person, and Dr. Drown did not make any self-contradictory statements. Further, 

because Dr. Drown was not a party to the case, the trial court also erred in concluding 

that his statements were “self serving.” 

{¶ 30} Moreover, although not directly relevant to the question of the trial court’s 
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consideration of Dr. Drown’s affidavit for purposes of summary judgment, we also note 

that Dr. Drown’s affidavit did not, in fact, contradict Coleman’s statements. Dr. Drown’s 

opinion related to Coleman’s condition in 2015, and Coleman’s statements related to 

whether she had received treatment for, been diagnosed with, or reported symptoms of 

depression in prior years. 

{¶ 31} In granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court also 

concluded, based on the passage of five years and without further elaboration on its 

reasoning, that reasonable minds could not conclude that Coleman’s 2015 condition 

arose from the 2009 injury. This finding implies the existence of a bright-line rule as to 

the time for filing claims for psychological injuries, when no such rule exists. For 

example, Hippely and Phipps, discussed above, each involved the passage of more time 

than in this case before the claim for psychological injury was asserted, and those claims 

did not fail as a matter of law due to the passage of time. 

{¶ 32} On the record before us, the trial court erred in finding that there was no 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Coleman’s psychological condition in 2015 

was causally related to her prior physical injury in the workplace and in granting summary 

judgment in favor of KBO. 

{¶ 33} The assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶ 34} The judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the matter will be 

remanded for further proceedings. 

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WELBAUM, P. J. and DONOVAN, J., concur. 
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Copies mailed to: 

Michael J. Muldoon 

Brian C. Thomas 

Lisa Miller 

Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter