# EUR-Lex - 52014JC0009 - EN

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# 52014JC0009

**JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy /* JOIN/2014/09 final */**

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JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

For an open and secure global maritime
domain:
elements for a European Union maritime security strategy

I           Introduction

Europe’s maritime interests
are fundamentally linked to the well-being, prosperity and security of its
citizens and communities. Some 90 % of the EU’s external trade and 40 %
of its internal trade is transported by sea. The EU is the third largest
importer and the fifth global producer of fisheries and aquaculture. More than 400
million passengers pass through EU ports each year. It depends on open, safe
seas and oceans for free trade, transport, tourism, ecological diversity, and
for economic development. Failing to protect against a wide array of maritime
threats and risks may result in the seas and oceans becoming arenas for
international conflicts, terrorism or organised crime.

It is against this backdrop that the European
Union is under pressure to do more, to act quicker and with fewer resources, by
strengthening cooperation between different sectors and national authorities.
As the internal and external dimensions of maritime security are increasingly
interlinked, a shared unity of purpose and effort by all involved is necessary
to achieve coherence between sector-specific and national policies and to
enable civil and military authorities to react effectively together. The European
Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) — Operation Atalanta combined with the EU’s
substantial cooperation assistance has shown the effectiveness of a joined-up
approach.

In December 2013, the European Council
stressed the importance of safeguarding the EU’s strategic maritime security
interests against a broad range of risks and threats. In terms of specific
goals,
the EU’s Limassol Declaration of 2012 stressed the ‘importance
of improved maritime governance including increased cooperation’.[1] An EU maritime security
strategy could lay the groundwork for the EU to contribute to rules-based good
governance at sea, be it in territorial waters or on the high seas.

An EU maritime security strategy would
facilitate a strategic, cross-sectoral approach to maritime security[2]. EU coordination and
the development of further synergies with and amongst Member States, and cooperation with international partners should be the starting point in line with existing
treaties and legislation, as well as the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the cornerstone of that approach.

Such a strategy would not seek to create
new structures, programmes or legislation, but would strive to build upon and
strengthen existing achievements. Consistency with existing EU policies should
be ensured.[3]

Cooperation with existing intergovernmental
and international initiatives should be strengthened.[4] Finally, the development
of a coordinated approach to maritime security would also enhance the growth
and jobs potential of our seas as set out in the EU’s growth strategy — Europe
2020.[5]

II         Maritime security interests

The key strategic maritime security
interests of the EU are:

· 
The prevention of conflicts, the preservation of
peace and the strengthening of international security through engagement with
international partners. This promotes international maritime cooperation and the
rule of law, facilitates maritime trade and contributes to sustainable
development.

· 
The protection of the EU against maritime
security threats including the protection of critical maritime infrastructure
such as ports and terminals, off-shore installations, underwater pipelines,
telecommunications cables, scientific research and innovation projects and
other economic activities at sea.

· 
Effective control of the Union’s maritime
external borders to prevent illegal activities.

· 
The protection of the global EU supply chain,
the freedom of navigation, right of innocent passage of ships flying the flags
of EU Member States and the safety and security of their seafarers and
passengers.

· 
The prevention of illegal, unregulated and
unreported (IUU) fishing.

III        Maritime security threats

Maritime security threats are multifaceted,
pose a risk to European citizens and are detrimental to the EU’s strategic
interests. These maritime security threats have a range of impacts across
several policy sectors. Social, economic and environmental phenomena such as
climate change and the degradation of marine ecosystems and depletion of
natural resources impacting on EU Member States’ and other countries’ coastal
areas, seas and on the oceans have direct and indirect consequences for
maritime security. The following maritime security threats have been
identified:

· 
Territorial maritime disputes, acts of
aggression and armed conflict between States.

· 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

· 
Maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea.

· 
Terrorism and other intentional unlawful acts
against ships, cargo and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical
maritime infrastructure, including cyber-attacks on information systems.

· 
Cross-border and organised crime including
seaborne trafficking of arms, narcotics and human beings, as well as IUU
fishing.

· 
Potential consequences to the environment of illegal
discharges or accidental marine pollution.

· 
Potential impacts of natural disasters, extreme
events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on
the maritime infrastructure.

· 
Conditions at sea and in the coastal zone that
weaken the potential for growth and jobs in the marine and maritime sectors.

IV        Purpose of this strategy

Given the complexity of existing political
instruments and the myriad of actors and legislation involved at national and
EU levels, this strategy should be inclusive, comprehensive and build upon
existing achievements.

A good example is the EU’s comprehensive
approach to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. This requires multilateral
action integrating civil and defence cooperation; capacity building and the
development of partnerships; financial and judicial investigation; and local,
regional and international diplomatic efforts and political commitments as well
as research and innovation and cooperation with industry.

The purpose of this strategy is to
facilitate a cross-sectoral approach to maritime security. This would be
achieved by pursuing the following four strategic objectives:

a. Make best use of existing
capabilities at national and European level

Each Member State has, over time, developed
its own systems, structures and approach to its maritime security, with no
single method for success. These efforts are supported by EU agencies such as the
European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) as
well as the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) and the
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), which have developed sector-specific
systems and capabilities for maritime surveillance. To ensure an optimal
response to threats, this strategy should support the relevant authorities and
agencies at all levels in their efforts to enhance the efficiency of maritime
security and to facilitate cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation among
maritime security stakeholders.

b. Promote effective and credible
partnerships in the global maritime domain

Given the genuinely international nature of
sea links, global supply chains and shipping, the EU’s strategic maritime
interests are best safeguarded by partnerships with other stakeholders or
international organisations. The Union’s capacity to cooperate with
international partners has a direct impact on its ability to safeguard its
interests. The strategy should position the EU as a credible, reliable and
effective partner in the global maritime domain, ready and able to take on its
international responsibilities.

c. Promote cost efficiency

At a time when public spending is under
pressure and resources are limited, this strategy should result in a
cost-efficient approach to maritime security. The EU’s maritime security is
largely organised around national systems and sector-specific approaches that potentially
render operations more expensive and less efficient. Maritime operations should
be made more efficient by improving cross-sectoral cooperation, enabling better
communication between national and EU-systems, creating effective
civil-military interfaces and by translating results from research and
technological development into policy.

d. Enhance solidarity among Member
States

A single seaborne terrorist attack or the
disruption of one or more of the major shipping lanes could have a catastrophic
impact on several Member States, the EU as a whole or third countries.
Preventing, detecting and responding to incidents require the cooperation of
all maritime security stakeholders.

A lack of agreement on maritime zones, such
as the delimitation of exclusive economic zones, could present an additional
threat in certain areas, such as the Mediterranean Sea.

This strategy should aim to foster mutual
support between Member States and to allow for joint contingency planning, risk
management, conflict prevention and crisis response and crisis management.

V         Organising the EU response:
building and improving on existing achievements

A strategy seeking to achieve better
maritime governance should have four cornerstone principles:

· 
A cross-sectoral approach: all partners from civilian and military authorities (law
enforcement, border control, customs and fisheries inspection, environmental
authorities, shipping supervision, research and innovation, navies) to industry
(shipping, private security, communication technology, capability support,
social partners) need to cooperate better.

· 
Functional integrity: there should be no change of mandate, responsibilities or
competences for each stakeholder. The focus should instead be on which specific
functions or tasks can better be achieved by working together with other
stakeholders.

· 
Maritime multilateralism: a key principle when dealing with complex issues requiring an
international response and cooperation in the maritime domain is
multilateralism. The EU is stronger, and its interests are best protected, when
speaking with one voice to international partners.

· 
Respect for rules and principles: the EU promotes respect for international law, human rights and
democracy, and full compliance with UNCLOS and the goals enshrined therein as
the key elements for rules-based good governance at sea.

These four principles are applied in five
areas of better cooperation.

a.         External action

The EU external action in support of maritime
security and governance ranges from political dialogues with international
partners to supporting maritime capacity building and military operations to
deter piracy and armed robbery at sea. The EU could improve the way and the degree
in which it capitalises on the best practices of internal policies related to
maritime security aspects in order to promote better ocean governance. This
could be used for example when supporting partner countries to raise the
standards of their ports and port facilities and ship security to meet the
requirements laid down in the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the
requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention and the Seafarers’ Identity
Documents Convention of the International Labour Organisation to ensure the
safety and security of seafarers.

The success of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta
in deterring piracy off the coast of Somalia combined with the substantial
cooperation assistance provided by the EU, both on land and at sea, has contributed
to the reduction of the underlying causes of maritime insecurity. This should
be analysed to identify the lessons that can be applied elsewhere. Another
model which has produced positive results in the fight against piracy in South
East Asia — and that has seen the involvement of individual EU Member States —
is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). These examples demonstrate the value of cooperate
action in the field of maritime security.

Regional aspects

Some maritime zones or areas within the
global maritime domain are, because of their strategic value or potential for
crisis or instability, of particular importance to the EU and its Member States.

The Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the
global network of shipping lanes to and from Asia, Africa and the Americas are of critical importance.

The waters surrounding the African
continent, including the Gulf of Guinea, must receive increased attention and
an internationally coordinated approach.[6]
Increasing levels of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea underline the need for coordinated EU action, including the linking of existing
and future EU capacity building assistance to the actions taken by the states
in the region.

The Gulf of Aden has become an important
area for cooperation, due to the presence of international partners protecting
vulnerable shipping and fighting piracy. The EU’s presence in the Gulf of Aden
through EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, combined with the extensive support
provided by other EU cooperation instruments, has a positive effect on other
policy areas and fosters better civil-military cooperation. The success of
Operation Atalanta combined with the longer-term cooperation actions should be
preserved to ensure that any future resurgence of piracy is avoided.

The EU supports the development of the 2050
Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy and stands ready to cooperate with the
African Union and its Member States on maritime matters.

East and Southeast Asia’s maritime areas
contain a multitude of challenges. Strong but unevenly distributed economic
development, a growing population and competing claims on territory and
maritime resources create a potent mix of disputes, instability and crises.

The opening of possible transport routes
through the Arctic and the exploitation of its natural and mineral resources
will pose particular environmental challenges which must be managed with the
utmost care, and cooperation with partners will be paramount.[7]

Areas of better cooperation

The Union

· 
should ensure a coordinated approach on maritime
security issues in international fora such as the G8, the UN, IMO, ILO, NATO, the
African Union and its sub-regional organizations, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), INTERPOL and with third
countries.

· 
should plan, on a regular basis, ‘EU-flagged’
maritime exercises with third countries in the context of a Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) operation or EU exercise, in order to improve the
visibility of the EU in the global maritime domain.

· 
should seek to strengthen and support EU
regional responses in other maritime piracy affected areas around the world,
notably by making best possible use of initiatives under Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), as well as reinforcing the preparation for future
maritime contingencies through wider external action.

· 
should, building on existing EU cooperation,
conduct maritime security capacity building activities with third countries and
regional organisations in order to continue improving 1) maritime governance
and rule of law, including criminal justice and maritime law enforcement; 2)
port and maritime transport security to international agreed standards; 3)
capabilities to manage their own borders; and 4) to combat IUU fishing.

· 
should support third countries in establishing
and upgrading their capabilities for Search and Rescue in line with
international obligations.

· 
should endeavour to improve information-sharing
arrangements with international partners, including neighbouring countries as
promoted by the EU in the wider Indian Ocean region.

b.         Maritime awareness,
surveillance and information sharing

Access to timely and accurate information
and intelligence is crucial for the establishment of a common maritime
awareness ‘picture’ which in turns leads to better operations and a more
efficient use of scarce resources. Progress has already been made through a
number of EU systems serving different policy areas and in some cases going
beyond one sector.

These systems include: SafeSeaNet, a Union maritime traffic monitoring and
information system for EU-waters, managed by EMSA, to ensure the implementation
of EU legislation; the Common Emergency
and Information System (CECIS) facilitating communication during
maritime incidents and disasters managed by the Commission’s Directorate-General
for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO); the Vessel Monitoring System, managed by EFCA and
Member States, supporting the Common Fisheries Policy; the Maritime
Surveillance network (MARSUR) managed by EDA supporting the Common Foreign and
Security Policy; the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)[8] improving the
situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States and of the EU
Border Agency Frontex at the external borders; additionally the Common
Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for the EU maritime domain currently
being jointly developed by the EU and EU/EEA Member States will further enhance
and create an interoperability framework between national and EU systems using
in particular a common data model.

Maritime surveillance is still largely
organised along sectoral and national lines. This may result in a suboptimal
use of available surveillance capabilities. EU Member States’ authorities are
supported by EU-sectoral systems and approaches. Exemplary solutions for
improving civil-military cooperation at national and European level have been
developed in the framework of EUROSUR. Civilian and military authorities are
required to share information on incidents and patrols via the national
coordination centres for border surveillance as well as intelligence
via national situational pictures and to coordinate their activities when
responding to threats at the external borders.

In line with the
objectives of the EU maritime security strategy , the European Earth Observation programme
Copernicus is already developing a comprehensive approach for a more coordinated use of space systems and remote sensing technologies
and their derived applications for cross-sectoral maritime surveillance
services.

Space and air-based surveillance
technologies enable observation of areas difficult to access as well as
contribute to improved detection and tracking of small vessels used for drug
smuggling, piracy and migration. Since 2013 Frontex, EMSA and the EU Satellite
Centre (EUSC) are establishing a service for the combined application of
surveillance tools, including ship reporting systems, satellite imagery and
manned surveillance planes. Earth Observation components of this service will
be supported under Copernicus as of 2014.

Maritime awareness,
surveillance and information sharing should be supported by research and
innovation activities in order to improve and enhance its effectiveness.

Areas of better cooperation

· 
The Member States should be invited to ensure
that by the end of 2014 all civilian and military authorities with
responsibility for maritime border surveillance share information via the
EUROSUR national situational pictures and cooperate via the EUROSUR national
coordination centres on a regular basis.

· 
The Commission and the High Representative, in
coordination with the Member States, should continue to improve civil-military and
cross-border cooperation and the interoperability of systems for maritime
surveillance and maritime security, with a view to establishing comprehensive ‘maritime
awareness’ to improve early warning and facilitate a timely response.

· 
The Commission and the High Representative should
ensure a consistent approach within the ongoing work by EDA, EFCA, EMSA, ESA,
EUSC, Frontex, as well as the Earth Observation programme (Copernicus) and
GALILEO/EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), with a view
to supporting maritime surveillance in the EU and the global maritime domain
and the conduct of CSDP missions.

c.         Capability development and
capacity building

A consistent approach is required to
develop necessary and cost effective capacities. This should include the further
engagement of public and private actors including social partners, and build on
existing achievements. The European border management agency Frontex
coordinates the use of resources and personnel provided by border authorities
of different Member States in joint operations. The
improved capacity to respond to terrorist attacks on vessels in EU waters and
the sharing of best practices as developed by the ATLAS Network of special
police intervention units from Member States, demonstrate other examples of capacity
building.

The ‘Pooling and Sharing’ initiative
advocated by the EDA is aiming to pool and share a greater level of military
capabilities among EU Member States and contributes to the better use of scarce
(military) capabilities. This improves the effectiveness, sustainability,
interoperability and cost efficiency of these capabilities.

Areas of better cooperation

· 
The Commission and the High Representative
should identify capability areas and technologies that could benefit from
harmonisation for improved interoperability and develop technical roadmaps,
mapping the process and milestones to achieve this.

· 
The Commission, in coordination with the High
Representative should explore the added value of EU-owned, managed or leased
dual-use capabilities in an area of critical capability such as maritime
surveillance for the benefit of Member States.[9]

· 
The Commission should explore how closer
cooperation between and with national authorities carrying out maritime
surveillance activities can contribute to strengthening border control,
maritime law enforcement and Search and Rescue within the existing concept of Integrated
Border Management.

· 
Existing legislation on the security of ports,
port facilities and ships within the EU/under EU flag should be fully applied
and, where appropriate, be upgraded or further developed. The Commission and Member States shall promote greater sharing of best practices, risk analysis and threat
information, in cooperation with social partners acting in the ports and
maritime transport sectors where necessary.

· 
The Commission, in coordination with Member
States should coordinate their research efforts to develop their knowledge
base, technologies and other means to increase their capacities for prediction,
surveillance and risk mitigation.

d.         Risk
management, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response

Whilst the main aims remain risk mitigation
and the prevention of incidents, the protection of the EU ́s marine
environmental status, its critical maritime infrastructure and its capacity for
crisis response depend on a high degree of preparation, anticipation and
responsiveness. A set of interlocking actions is already in place but the EU
can improve its responsiveness. This can be achieved by building on existing capabilities
and arrangements such as the Ship and Port Facility Security legislation which
lays down the minimum security requirements for ships, ports and government
agencies. Private sector engagement is also a key success factor in this
regard.

EU customs authorities conduct security
risk assessment of incoming cargo before the cargo is loaded on a vessel in a
foreign state. The Commission Communication on risk management and the security
of the supply chain stresses the importance of further cross-sectoral
cooperation.[10]
It calls for increased risk management capacity to monitor the risks associated
with cargo movements by strengthening the EU risk management framework
including the comprehensive advance cargo information
systems and the reliance on Authorised Economic Operators to ensure
uninterrupted trade.

Another example is the Common Integrated
Risk Analysis Model developed by Frontex, which allows for faster
identification and response to challenges faced at the external sea borders.

As part of the protection of vessels at
sea, the use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASPs) has
increased. Several nations have set national rules governing the use and
conduct of PCASPs. It is desirable to aim for a common, binding standard for
the PCASPs on board EU-flagged vessels.

Areas of better cooperation

· 
The Commission and the High Representative, in a
coordinated approach with Member States should pursue a shared and
comprehensive approach to maritime security risk management to achieve a common
risk analysis. This would help to identify areas of maritime security interest
in the global maritime domain and facilitate the change from a patrol-driven to
an intelligence-driven approach.

· 
The Commission and the High Representative
should take initiatives on enhanced civil-military and cross-border cooperation
for maritime crisis response and contingency planning in relation to defined
security threats.

· 
Member States and relevant stakeholders should assess the resilience of
maritime transport to natural disasters and climate change, and take
appropriate actions, and share best practices in order to mitigate the related
risks.

· 
The Commission should consider proposing EU
requirements governing the use of PCASPs to ensure a common standard for
security companies from Member States and on board EU-flagged vessels. The EU should
seek mandatory standards for PCASPs at the international level via the IMO.

· 
The Commission undertakes to ensure
complementarity and coherence of legislation and measures to improve maritime
security and the security of the supply chain.

e.         Maritime security research
and innovation, education and training

Innovative technologies and processes are
contributing to the improved efficiency, sustainability and effectiveness of
operations. Socio-economic research and innovation can help reduce situations
leading to social conflicts or maritime crime. Maritime security research could
benefit from a clear vision of cross-sectoral needs and dual use capabilities.

Research and knowledge development
innovation, as well as education and training can contribute to achieving the
goals set in the Blue Growth agenda.[11]
The EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development (FP7), and in
particular, its security research theme, already yielded extensive results. These
results should be better used in policy development and to achieve market
uptake, exploiting also synergies with the programmes of Member States and the European Structural and Investment Funds. The Commission will continue to support
the research and development (R&D) activities related to maritime security.

A maritime security strategy needs global
research and development partners. Horizon 2020 is open for international
partners. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission has established
cooperative relations with international R&D partners for specific maritime
surveillance related research activities.

Areas of better cooperation

· 
The Commission, the High Representative and Member States should seek to bring together available maritime security-related training
courses in a common Maritime Training Calendar and consider opening up these
courses to third countries in order to agree minimum common training standards.

· 
The Commission and the High Representative
should establish a joint civil-military agenda for maritime security research
(incl. dual use capabilities) to avoid duplication and improve effectiveness of
the research efforts, in coordination with Member States.

· 
The Commission and the High Representative should
establish, in close cooperation with industry stakeholders, including social
partners, a network for knowledge and competence development in the field of
maritime security which includes research institutes and centres for
postgraduate studies and provide support to the Maritime Labour Academy of the International Labour Organisation.

· 
The Commission, in close coordination with Member States and other relevant actors, should continue its efforts to improve the operational
and technical ability of the Union and the national authorities to better
detect and track small vessels.

VI        Conclusions and follow-up

Improving EU maritime security cooperation
is an enormous, yet vitally important undertaking. The EU needs cross-sectoral
cooperation to strengthen the response to maritime security threats. This
involves many and diverse partners at national, EU and international level.
This is a long-term process, building on existing working methods and
achievements, which will be more of an evolution rather than a revolution.

The EU's maritime security will be
fundamentally strengthened if the duty of sincere cooperation is taken as a
guiding principle. It will be further strengthened by partnerships between all
maritime security stakeholders, at EU level and between and within Member
States. This should also include industry, social partners and civil society.

The increasing security role of the EU
should be in line with worldwide developments. Strong support and commitment
are also needed from the private sector and research establishments which are
key players in enhancing maritime security and safeguarding the EU’s strategic maritime
interests. Specific action plans for better cooperation should be drawn up for
each area identified.

The Commission and the High Representative
will work together with the Council on the areas identified to draw up a more
detailed roadmap. Mainstreaming maritime security into EU policies is in this
regard crucial for turning policy objectives into achievements.

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[1]               By European ministers responsible for the Integrated
Maritime Policy.

[2]               ‘Cross-sectoral’ refers to actions or cooperation
between different marine or maritime functions (e.g. maritime safety, marine
environment protection, fisheries control, customs, border control, law
enforcement and defence).

[3]               For example: Regulation (EC) No 725/2004 on enhancing
ship and port facility security; Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port
security and Regulation (EC) No 324/2008 on procedures for conducting
Commission inspections in the field of maritime transport security.

[4]               Such as the European Union Coast Guard Functions
Forum, the International Maritime Organisation or the Chiefs of European Navies
(CHENs) Forum.

[5]               COM(2010) 2020 final.

[6]               Cf. the ‘Elements for the EU‘s Strategic Response to
the Challenges in the Gulf of Guinea’, JOIN (2013)31 final, 18.12.2013.

[7]               Maintaining good international cooperation in the
Arctic region and supporting the region stability has been identified as a
strategic interest of the European Union. Cf. the Joint Communication on
developing an EU policy towards the Arctic region, JOIN(2012) 19 final dated 26.6.2012.

[8]               Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of 22 October 2013
establishing EUROSUR, OJ L295/11 of 6.11.2013.

[9]              In close conformity with the
approach set out in the Commission Communication on Defence,                      COM(2013) 542final.

[10]             The Commission has been requested by the Council to
elaborate the communication on risk management, COM(2012) 793 final, into a
Strategy and Action Plan in 2014.

[11]             COM(2012) 494 final.