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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 118,608

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

COTY RYLAN NEWMAN,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

When reviewing a district court's consideration of a motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea before sentencing, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence or reassess witness 

credibility, but will reverse the lower court only for an abuse of discretion.

2.

A sentencing court has no authority to impose lifetime postrelease supervision on 

an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence.

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; EVELYN Z. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed February 14, 

2020. Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant. 

Kristafer R. Ailslieger, deputy solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the 

brief for appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSEN, J.: Coty Newman pleaded guilty to first-degree felony murder and 

attempted second-degree intentional murder. Before sentencing, Newman moved to 

withdraw those pleas. The district court denied his motions and imposed a life sentence 

for the first-degree murder conviction and a consecutive 59 months' imprisonment for the 

second-degree murder conviction. The district court also ordered lifetime postrelease 

supervision for the first-degree murder conviction and 36 months of postrelease 

supervision for the second-degree murder conviction. Newman appeals the denials of his 

motions to withdraw his pleas and the imposition of lifetime supervision. We affirm the 

denials of his motions but vacate the lifetime postrelease supervision.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 27, 2010, the State charged Coty Newman with first-degree felony 

murder; alternative counts of attempted second-degree intentional murder or aggravated 

battery; attempt to distribute marijuana; and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The State 

later amended the complaint to add first-degree intentional murder as an alternative to 

first-degree felony murder. 

Newman agreed to plead guilty to first-degree felony murder and attempted 

second-degree intentional murder and, in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 

alternative and remaining counts. The parties agreed to recommend a life sentence for the 

first-degree murder charge and a consecutive 59 months' imprisonment for the seconddegree murder charge. They further agreed that Newman would not be eligible for parole 

until he served 20 years and 59 months in prison and that neither party would request a 

departure sentence.
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On March 22, 2013, the district court held a plea hearing. Newman pleaded guilty 

to first-degree felony murder and attempted second-degree intentional murder. The 

district court found that Newman voluntarily entered into the agreement and accepted his 

pleas.

On July 18, 2013, Newman filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. He argued that 

the court should allow the withdrawal for two reasons: his mother had been hospitalized

during the plea hearing, which caused him to experience extreme physical and emotional 

distress; and he had newly discovered evidence that would exonerate him. The State 

responded to this motion, arguing that Newman had not indicated he was distressed 

during the hearing and that the newly discovered evidence was not credible. 

At a hearing on Newman's motion, Newman's mother testified that she had been 

hospitalized on March 21, 2013, due to complications related to diabetes and had spent a 

day and a half in the intensive care unit. She also testified that she and Newman 

discussed over the phone ways to withdraw his plea. The district court admitted State 

exhibits that both parties stipulated represented recorded jail calls between Newman and 

his mother.

James Martin also testified at the hearing. He stated that he met Newman while 

incarcerated at the Ellsworth Correctional Facility while Newman was there as a result of

the charges in this case. Martin stated that he had been present at the time of the alleged 

killing and that Newman, while present, had not shot anyone. 

After this hearing, the State filed a supplemental response and motion to strike 

Martin's testimony. In this motion, the State alleged that Martin had been incarcerated at 
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the time of the alleged crimes and, consequently, could not have been a witness to those 

crimes. At a second hearing, a records clerk with the Ellsworth Correctional Facility 

testified that a man named James Martin with the same date of birth, social security 

number, and DOC number as the James Martin who testified had been in custody at the 

time of the alleged crimes. 

On October 17, 2013, the district court denied Newman's motion to withdraw his 

pleas.

On October 25, 2013, Newman filed a pro se "Motion to Vacate Plea Bargain Due 

to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel." 

At a hearing on this motion, Newman testified that Jon Whitton had been his 

counsel at the time he was considering a plea and that he had told Whitton on the day of 

the plea hearing that he did not want to plead guilty. Newman stated that Whitton had 

informed him he could plead guilty and then "pull it back" if he "g[o]t cold feet" and 

wanted to go to trial. Newman said that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had 

known he could not withdraw the plea for any reason. Newman also testified that, before 

pleading, he told Whitton about some possible exculpatory witnesses and Whitton told 

him he would look into them after he entered his plea. During the State's crossexamination of Newman, Newman testified that he remembered telling his mother on a 

phone call that, if his original motion to withdraw his plea did not work, he was going to 

have to claim his counsel had been ineffective. 

Newman's wife also testified at the hearing. She stated that she had not wanted 

Newman to plead guilty but Whitton had informed her and Newman on the day of the 
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plea hearing that Newman only had an hour to decide whether to accept the plea and 

could later withdraw it. 

Whitton also testified at the hearing. He stated that he never told Newman he 

could withdraw his plea based on "cold feet." He informed Newman that it is possible to 

withdraw a plea but it very rarely happens and that Newman should not enter a plea based 

upon an understanding that he could withdraw it at a later time. Newman asked for an 

example of when a defendant can withdraw a plea, and Whitton told him a court will 

permit the withdrawal based on ineffective assistance of counsel or newly discovered 

evidence. Whitton also stated that he told Newman it is much more difficult to withdraw 

a plea after sentencing. Whitton testified that he did not believe Newman mentioned any 

exculpatory witnesses during this conversation with whom Whitton had not already 

spoken.

On June 10, 2014, the district court denied Newman's second motion to withdraw 

his pleas.

On July 23, 2014, the district court sentenced Newman to life in prison with no 

chance of parole for 20 years for the first-degree murder conviction and 59 months in 

prison for the attempted second-degree murder conviction, to be served consecutively. 

The court also imposed lifetime postrelease supervision for the first-degree murder 

conviction and 36 months of postrelease supervision for the second-degree murder 

conviction. 

Newman appealed the denials of his motions to withdraw his pleas and the district 

court's imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision to this court.
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ANALYSIS

Withdraw of pleas

Newman argues that the district court erred when it denied his motions to 

withdraw his pleas.

A district court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for good cause 

any time before sentencing. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1). In determining whether 

the defendant has shown good cause, the court generally considers the following three 

"benchmark" factors: "(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; 

(2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage 

of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made." State v. Edwards, 309

Kan. 830, 836, 440 P.3d 557 (2019).

When reviewing the district court's consideration of such a motion, we will reverse 

the lower court only for an abuse of discretion. We will not reweigh evidence or reassess 

witness credibility. Edwards, 309 Kan. at 836.

First, Newman argues that the district court abused its discretion when it 

concluded that he had not shown good cause to withdraw his plea based on his claims of 

emotional distress. Newman insists that the stress and pressure caused by his mother's 

health condition and pressure from his attorney to plead guilty "combined to overwhelm 

him" and rendered his plea involuntary.

In its ruling, the district court found that Newman had probably been under "some 

significant pressure at the time of the plea hearing because trial was fast approaching," 
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but that this pressure was "inevitable." The court also found that Newman had assured the 

court several times that "he was able to think clearly, was able to understand the 

proceedings, and had taken enough time to consider whether he wanted to enter a plea of 

guilt." The court also found that "[a]t no time did [Newman] mention any tension caused 

by his mother's medical condition" and that nothing in the recorded calls suggested that 

Newman was "nervous, tense, or in any way upset at the time of the plea because of his 

mother's condition or hospitalization." Based on these findings, the district court 

concluded that Newman had failed to show that he was misled, coerced, mistreated, or 

unfairly taken advantage of. 

The district court also found that Newman had an extensive plea hearing, his 

mental health had not been questioned, and he had not raised any new issues. 

Consequently, the court concluded that Newman's plea was fairly and understandingly 

made. 

Newman has offered no authority suggesting that the district court abused its 

discretion when it concluded that neither his mother's hospitalization nor the pressures of 

impending trial led to a coerced, misunderstood, or otherwise unfair plea. He simply 

disagrees with the district court's assessment of the evidence. We will not reweigh that

evidence. We affirm the district court's decision. 

Next, Newman argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion 

because his counsel was ineffective. Newman avers that his counsel told him he could 

withdraw his plea if he decided he wanted to go to trial and that the evidence does not 

support Whitton's testimony that he did not make this statement. 
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In regard to this claim, the district court found that Whitton's testimony was more 

credible than Newman's, and, consequently, that Whitton had not informed Newman he 

could withdraw his plea if he had second thoughts. Accordingly, the court concluded that 

Newman had failed to show good cause to withdraw his plea based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

Newman acknowledges that we defer to the district court's credibility 

determinations but insists we cannot do so here because the evidence is more supportive 

of his version of events. 

As we noted above, we will not reassess the credibility of evidence. The district 

court concluded that Whitton was more credible than Newman and we defer to that 

finding. 

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Newman's motions to withdraw his pleas. 

Lifetime Postrelease Supervision

The parties agree that the district court erred when it sentenced Newman to 

lifetime postrelease supervision on the first-degree murder conviction. They are correct. 

"'[A] sentencing court has no authority to order a term of postrelease supervision in 

conjunction with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence.'" State v. Summers, 293 Kan. 

819, 832, 272 P.3d 1 (2012). Newman received an off-grid, indeterminate life sentence 

for his first-degree murder conviction. See K.S.A. 21-4706(c). Consequently, he becomes 

eligible for parole after serving 20 years of that sentence. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-

3717(b)(2); K.S.A. 21-4706; K.S.A. 21-3401; see also State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 
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997-98, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019). The district court had no authority to impose lifetime 

postrelease supervision. Accordingly, we vacate the order for lifetime postrelease 

supervision.

CONCLUSION

The district court's decision denying the motions to withdraw Newman's pleas is 

affirmed. The portion of the district court's sentencing order imposing lifetime 

postrelease supervision is vacated. 

HENRY W. GREEN, JR., J., assigned.1

STEVE LEBEN, J., assigned.2

 

1REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Green, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was 

appointed to hear case No. 118,608 under the authority vested in the Supreme 

Court by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the 

retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson.

2REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Leben, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was 

appointed to hear case No. 118,608 under the authority vested in the Supreme 

Court by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the 

retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.