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# Tailoring and Critical Thinking - Key Principles for Acquisition Success

By  Mike Kotzian, D.M., Michael Paul, and Jesse StewartDefense Acquisition University

Based on recent Department of Defense (DoD)acquisition guidance, programs now have the opportunity to approach acquisitionprogram management in ways previously viewed as nontraditional. Unfortunately,many programs are hesitant to veer too far from accepted routines, thereby nottaking advantage of opportunities to explore new acquisition approaches. In onepartnership between the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) andU.S. Navy, however, such opportunities have been fully embraced and may providefuture programs with touchstones on how to increase program cost-effectivenessand efficiency as well as program success.
**The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile Opportunity
To ensure DARPA maintains its ability todeliver outsized impact by focusing on breakthrough technologies, the agencyseeks active engagement with its technical community and users as sources ofinspiration. One approach DARPA uses to better understand warfighter needs isto visit Service and Combatant Command organizations and listen to customerdesires that require innovative solutions in a short time period. In 2008, onesuch visit with ADM Robert Willard (Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet) resulted ina request for a technical capability that became the Long Range Anti-ShipMissile (LRASM) program.
The LRASM program started in 2009 as a jointdesign and demonstration initiative between DARPA and the Office of NavalResearch. With DARPA as the lead organization, the LRASM program was toleverage the state-of-the-art Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile ExtendedRange (JASSM-ER) airframe, and incorporate additional sensors and systems toachieve a survivable subsonic cruise missile (click here to see artist’s concept).

In 2013, DARPA conducted two successful flightdemonstrations that initially proved the technical approach. Concurrent withthese technical accomplishments came two important programmatic decisions.First, a Resource Management Decision was issued that officially providedresources for a joint DARPA-Service transition effort to mature the technologyand deliver an early operational capability (EOC) by Fiscal Year (FY) 2018.Second, an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) was signed by Under Secretaryof Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) FrankKendall in February 2014 that approved the Navy’s request to implement anaccelerated acquisition approach with streamlined guidance and delegated theMilestone Decision Authority to Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navyfor Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN/RDA).
This effort was one of many to come upon thetransitional “Valley of Death”—an effort moving from technologydemonstration/maturation to formal Program of Record status—resulting inprograms encountering both challenges and opportunities depending on the chosenacquisition philosophy. According to CAPT Carl Chebi, the U.S. Naval AirSystems Command (NAVAIR)’s Precision Strike Weapons program manager (PMA-201)in 2009–2013, the early recognition of the high risk yet high potential of thiseffort by senior leadership helped set the foundation for a successfultransition.
**Establishing the Foundation
A key outcome from the ADM was establishmentof the LRASM Deployment Office (LDO), which was given the responsibility toimplement the accelerated acquisition approach with the streamlined governance.At this point, the LRASM program began an LDO restructure based on the need tocontinue technical development while transitioning from DARPA to the U.S. Navy.The subsequent LDO restructuring discussions were influenced largely alongcultural tendencies—that is, merging people with different perspectives onmanaging a weapon system acquisition program. On one hand there was the DARPAworldview: Modify and tailor guidelines to achieve outsized impact as quicklyas possible, which leads to acceptance of some high-risk options.Alternatively, there was NAVAIR’s worldview: Adhere to a rigorous andmethodical approach in close alignment with existing Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD) and Navy guidance and oversight.
Realizing that a traditional acquisitionprogram approach was impractical with an FY 2018 deployment timeline, thecooperatively led DARPA/Navy LDO was a very close teaming arrangement withco-leads: Dr. Arthur Mabbett from DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office and NavyCAPT Jaime Engdahl, PMA-201 program manager from the Program Executive Officefor Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons (PEO [U&W]).
When establishing the LDO, Mabbett describedtwo LDO characteristics thought necessary to meet the LRASM program goals: “TheLDO required an approach ensuring focused and dedicated collaboration betweenthe S&T [Science and Technology], Acquisition, and T&E [Test andEvaluation] communities. Also, the organization needed to be given a highdegree of autonomy while unhampered from the normal acquisition programbureaucracy. Therefore, we wanted the LDO to incorporate a principled programexecution approach: Time is of the essence, flatter/leaner organization,decision timing aligns with program execution, and streamlined processes.”
**Key Principles for Success
To achieve a successful transition resultingin a warfighter capability by FY 2018, the LRASM team relied upon two powerfulacquisition principles—tailoring and critical thinking.
**Tailoring
The new DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02(Operation of the Defense Acquisition System) dated Jan. 7, 2015, includes morethan 50 references to the principle of “tailoring.” As stated in theInstruction: “The structure of a DoD acquisition program and the proceduresused should be tailored as much as possible to the characteristics of theproduct being acquired, and to the totality of circumstances associated withthe program including operational urgency and risk factors.”
This concept is illustrated by the four basicand two hybrid defense acquisition program models presented in DoDI 5000.02.These models are intended to serve as examples of program structures tailoredto the type of product being acquired or the need for accelerated acquisition.The explicitly stated expectation for every acquisition program is to view themost relevant model (i.e., hardware focused, software focused, etc.) as aninitial baseline approach, which then should be tailored to the uniquecharacter of the product being acquired. In the DoDI 5000.02 cover memorandum,Kendall stressed the importance of program managers using these models “... asreferences to assist their thought processes and analysis of the best structureto use on a given program.”
In the case of the LRASM program, the LDO wasstructured when the new DoDI 5000.02 was released. This timing turned out to befortuitous. Navy CAPT Kevin Quarderer, LRASM principal deputy program managerduring the technology demonstration effort, remarked: “The LDO team viewed thenew DoDI 5000.02 to be more permissive than previous versions. We felt this newguidance provided justification—and formally sanctioned backing—for the team todo what they felt necessary to meet the LRASM program time lines. We recognizedthat we were now in a position where we could tailor our program to onlyaccomplish the absolutely essential statutory, regulatory and milestonerequirements while, at the same time, negotiating out from other processes,reviews, documents, etc., that did not provide any ‘value-added’ contribution.”Since the LRASM program was acknowledged as an accelerated acquisition program,the LDO team embraced the tailoring concept afforded by Model 4 (AcceleratedAcquisition Program) as its acquisition framework starting point (Figure 1).
**********Figure 1. Model 4: Accelerated Acquisition Program** ****Engdahl described the LRASM team’s challengeof taking this new accelerated acquisition construct that was very flexible andtailorable: “The team wrote a ‘clean-sheet’ acquisition strategy that tailoredthe systems engineering process and milestones that we defined as ‘knowledgepoints’ to clearly articulate the points in the program where we expected tohave enough knowledge to make specific program decisions. We then tailoreddocumentation and requirements strategies to move as quickly as possiblethrough the program.”
**Critical Thinking
A basic principle for improved defense acquisitionoutcomes is to expect program managers and their team to think critically.Kendall has highlighted critical thinking as a cornerstone to improvedacquisition outcomes. As one of the four key overarching principles associatedwith the Better Buying Power initiative, he wrote: “The first responsibility ofthe acquisition workforce is to think. ... Our workforce should be encouraged byleaders to think and not to automatically default to a perceived ‘schoolsolution’ just because it is expected to be approved more easily.”
The LRASM program was based on theunderstanding that critical thinking was necessary for program success; theprogram could not afford to blindly follow well-worn paths used by otherprograms. The program management team needed to think in terms of beingtrailblazers in challenging the norm—and critical thinking was a skill thatwould help the team do so. Fortunately, with the influence of DARPA’slong-established culture that seeks out critical thinking, this skill becamepart of the LRASM “way of life” from the beginning.
Mabbett identified the principle of criticalthinking as one of the keys to success for not just the LRASM program but forany acquisition program: “Always challenge the norm or typical way of doingbusiness. Yes, programs have guidelines and processes to consider; but programsshould not take these guidelines and processes as things that have to befollowed unquestioned. Add logic and thought. Think about what processes existto help—as program manager, IPT [Integrated Product Team] lead, or teammember—to make the right decisions. Processes are simply one piece of aprogram’s tool set. Learn to challenge and question assumptions and datapresented until you’re convinced the most cost-effective and efficient decisionis being made.”
According to Mabbett, “Team empowerment wasabsolutely essential to the daily progress and success of the program. We didnot treat ‘empowerment’ as a cliché. Rather, leadership challenged the team tomake decisions and solve problems using a critical thinking approach. Our jobas leadership was, in turn, to engage the team members on their decisions toverify they had thought the problem and solution through. We had a mutualexchange to confirm the thought process and decision, and then moved on.”
Critical thinking is a key part of all LRASMprocesses. As one example, the program tailors its system engineering processto the specific systems engineering event. The large number of technicalexperts who typically show up at such events is drastically reduced to ensure afocus on the technical review boards, where approximately a half-dozenindependent participants come in to provide experienced consultation. Sosystems engineering events such as Preliminary Design Reviews and Critical DesignReviews become important learning events about where technical risks may lie.This approach relies upon a more critical-thinking approach and provides a moreuseful outcome for the team (click here to view the link) 

**Key Success Enablers
LRASM then used these two keyprinciples—tailoring and critical thinking—in conjunction with interrelated keysuccess enablers in order to best structure the program for a successfulacquisition outcome.
**Senior Leadership Access
LRASM benefited from senior leadership accessbased on direct support to a Combatant Commander and Numbered Fleet Commanderin order to counter adversaries’ use of emerging technologies. The LRASMprogram used this access to coordinate senior leadership support for thetailoring and critical thinking approaches being developed; this established asolid program foundation at the very beginning.
With this foundation, the LRASM program leangovernance approach then included the establishment of an Executive SteeringBoard (ESB) with Stackley and DARPA Deputy Director Steve Walker as theprincipals. Monthly ESB meetings became the core means for LRASM seniorleadership to regularly and quickly inform stakeholders of ongoing progress andkey decisions. The ESB approach was able to minimize staffing churn andperceived bureaucratic obstacles. The objective was to keep the program movingforward, and the ESB’s streamlining of the oversight process turned out to bean effective means to accomplish this goal.
**Stakeholder Buy-In
Constant communication was absolutelyessential to educate stakeholders at all levels as to how the LRASM program wasstructured and managed. As this acquisition program differed from the norm,clear messaging and continuous engagement were of paramount importance.Expectations were communicated explicitly and unambiguously. The LRASMleadership team also took on an instructor role to educate those comfortablewith the more traditional acquisition process: It was not only acceptable—butexpected—to take more nontraditional approaches in an accelerated fashion.
**Streamlined Decision Making
The LDO decision-making process was developedvery early in the program: Decision making was considered fundamentallyimportant to keep the LRASM program successfully moving forward. Not only didthe DARPA/Navy interface have to be managed, but the Air Force JASSM-ER and B-1and Navy F/A 18 programs had extensive equities affecting daily programexecution—and these also required attention.
The LRASM program employed as little formalstaffing as possible. Weekly decision boards were scheduled to discuss programstatus. These meetings concentrated on decision criteria, or decisions thatwere needed in order to maintain program momentum. Team leads came preparedwith background, options and recommendations for each of their decisioncriteria topics so LRASM leadership could make decisions. Such an approachcreated transparency and resulted in much discussion. As a result, there was nouncertainty about coming issues that could hold back the program if there was nodecision.
“I insisted on a succinct decision-makingprocess since we didn’t have the time to continuously analyze every problemover and over,” Mabbett stated. “The philosophy was for LRASM leadership toverify critical team decisions in order to maintain progress.”
**Risk Management
One of the LRASM program frameworks isreliance on a fundamental systems engineering process woven into the program’sintegrated master schedule (IMS). Once a week, the IMS is reviewed with theteam leads and prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, to evaluate program status interms of identified metrics inside the systems engineering process. Wrappedinto this activity is an integrated risk process. As a result, allrisk-mitigation steps are quantified as they relate to the systems engineeringprocess and are rolled into the IMS. Therefore, the program managers can seehow risk mitigation is executed inside the IMS and, in turn, actually reducethe formal risk associated with the program.
Careful consideration ensured that risk managementwas steeped in systems engineering principles—but not driven by the systemsengineering process. This approach has become an important ESB tool from anoversight perspective—specifically, in terms of how risk can be used whenfocused within the context of the systems engineering process and IMS tomitigate risks as much as possible.
**The Right People
LRASM leadership kept the initial LDO smallwith no more than 12 subject-matter experts—all of them unquestioned experts.These highly skilled team members were handpicked for openness, agility andmotivation to lean forward and succeed. Subsequently, the LDO has incorporatedNavy personnel as functional leads alongside DARPA subject-matter experts nowthat the transition effort is under way. But the tenet of the program has notwaivered: Use only the right person with the right skills in the right job.
The importance of keeping to this fundamentaltenet is borne out in the risk-management process. Having chosen the rightpeople in the right place with the right skills, LRASMleadership empowered the team members to come up with their own processes andproducts that they used to manage the program—in this case, the risk-managementprocess. Such an approach helps create team buy-in and is an example of applyingthe necessary rigor and then using it for speed in the program.
Such empowerment of the right people allowsthe LRASM program to maintain a flat, lean organizational profile. LRASMleaders view this situation as a leadership opportunity in that their peopleare chartered not only to execute the program but to invent rapid andinnovative processes and keep the program moving forward. In this regard,Quarderer remarked: “Management’s main challenge was to keep up with each ofour teams as they made progress, but that’s fine—that’s what management shouldwant.”
**Inspired by the Mission
Quarderer explained that his time in the Fleethelped him to stay motivated and to motivate others while part of the LDO. “Iremember feeling that I did not have the upper edge that I wanted, and that ifwe went to combat, I didn’t feel that the end outcome was going to be where Iwanted it to be,” he said. In sharing his experience and the fact that ADMHarry B. Harris Jr., then commander, U. S. Pacific Fleet, had taken time toaddress the LDO about the importance of its efforts, Quarderer felt that theteam members understood the sense of urgency in meeting their commitment.   **Operational Pause
While the recognized sense of urgency wasdriving the team to move quickly, Engdahl and Mabbett recognized the need totake time to assess the effectiveness of the LDO. They approached the DefenseAcquisition University to conduct interviews and a Team Effectiveness Survey toprovide an assessment of the organization, individual satisfaction, teameffectiveness, communications and command climate of the LDO. While it seemedthe effort would take precious time away from the many things the LDO needed todo to make aggressive progress, the effort proved critical for the leadershipteam’s ability to address the LRASM challenges and opportunities. Quarderercommented: “We needed to take a pause and figure out what was going well, whatwere long-term challenges, and what needed to be corrected. We needed to do allthat very quickly before we got too far down the road in any of thosenonstandard organizational pieces that were not working well before theyfestered too long. We needed the team to be a well-functioning group so that wecould focus completely on the mission if we were going to make our timeline.”
**Maintain Focus
Like any acquisition program, the LRASMprogram was buffeted by a multitude of expectations that were not always inalignment with each other. From the very beginning, the LRASM leadership kept asingular laser focus on the stated and original requirements. Efforts to expandLRASM’s capabilities through requirements creep were continually andsuccessfully rebuffed. This message was strongly conveyed to the LRASM team toensure a “one voice” approach to expectations management. The schedule was tootight for anything to be entertained but the originally stated requirements;anything different was recognized as a near-certain reason to miss the FY 2018EOC date.
**Not “The” Answer
Can the initiatives and approaches used by theLRASM program be replicated by all acquisition programs? No. A one-size fitsall approach would not lead to the successes realized by the LDO. Can otheracquisition programs examine LRASMs initiatives and approaches for potentialapplicability? Absolutely.
And that’s the point: The LDO construct is not“the” answer for how to further improve government acquisition processes. Butit illustrates that all programs have the opportunity to develop their owntailored initiatives and approaches. DoD senior leadership has given everyprogram the ability to aggressively use the critical thinking capabilities ofits workforce in order to tailor a program approach that best fits thatprogram’s unique set of requirements, challenges and opportunities.
All programs need to eagerly embrace such amindset. Threats to our national security are accelerating while budgetsdecline, and therefore we all need to challenge existing processes andprocedures so we can produce and deliver weapon systems in the mostcost-effective and efficient manner possible. Anything less is a disservice tothe warfighters and taxpayers.
 
 
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