# EUR-Lex - 52014PC0340 - EN

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# 52014PC0340

**Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 as regards the establishment of a Controller of procedural guarantees /* COM/2014/0340 final - 2014/0173 (COD) */**

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1.           CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

Grounds and objectives

The objectives of the proposal are to
further strengthen the procedural guarantees in place for all persons under investigation
by the European Anti-Fraud Office (referred to in the regulation as “persons
concerned”) and to take into account the special way in which members of EU
institutions were elected or appointed as well as their special
responsibilities which may justify specific provisions aimed at ensuring the
proper functioning of the institutions to which they belong. To this end, Regulation
No 883/2013 on investigations by OLAF is to be amended.

These objectives will be achieved by
establishing a Controller of procedural guarantees, tasked with two functions:

· 
Reviewing complaints lodged by persons under investigation
about violation of their procedural guarantees,

· 
Authorizing OLAF to conduct certain
investigative measures in respect of members of EU institutions.

General context

In 2013, after many years of intense negotiations,
the institutions agreed on a new legal framework for OLAF investigations. This
resulted in Regulation 883/2013 on OLAF investigations which entered into force
on 1 October 2013. The Regulation brought substantial changes to OLAF's
organisation and investigative procedures, in particular as regards reinforcing
OLAF's governance and strengthening the procedural guarantees of persons
concerned by OLAF investigations. These changes are currently being
implemented.

In July 2013, the Commission adopted its
proposal on the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) which includes a
series of Union-level procedural safeguards. Together with that proposal, the
Commission adopted a Communication on improving the governance of OLAF and
reinforcing the procedural safeguards in investigations (COM(2013)533 final).
The Communication called for a step-by-step approach to accompany the
establishment of the EPPO and further measures to strengthen OLAF's governance
and enhance procedural safeguards in its investigations, even before the
establishment of the EPPO.

Existing provisions in the area of the
proposal

The proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU,
Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning
investigations conducted by the OLAF. Other legal acts regulating the
protection of the financial interests of the EU are:

– 
Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/1996
concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in
order to protect the European Communities' financial interests against fraud
and other irregularities,

– 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 on
the protection of the European Communities financial interests,

– 
The Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999
between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the
Commission of the European Communities concerning internal investigations by
the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF).

2.           RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
OF IMPACTS

Analysis of Impacts

The proposal is accompanied by a Staff
Working Document (Analysis of Impacts), which weighs several possible scenarios
as a mean to achieve the policy objectives of this initiative. These policy
objectives are to achieve the highest possible level of protection of
fundamental rights for EU citizens while maintaining the highest possible level
of protection of EU financial interests and safeguarding the reputation of the
EU institutions. The analysis looks at the impact of each option in terms of its
effectiveness in meeting the policy objectives, its financial cost, its impacts
on the institutional framework and its acceptability to stakeholders.

This Analysis of Impacts found that the
policy objectives could be reached most effectively by appointing an external
Controller of procedural guarantees who would act on complaints and authorise
certain investigative measures related to members of the institutions. This
would allow, at an acceptable budgetary cost, the procedural safeguards to be
strengthened, while still respecting the need for effective protection of the
EU financial interests.

3.           LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE
PROPOSAL

Summary of the proposed action

The proposal provides for the establishment
of a Controller of procedural guarantees, who would be tasked with reviewing
complaints lodged by persons concerned in OLAF investigations about the
potential non-respect of their procedural guarantees. The Controller would also
be responsible for authorising certain investigative measures related to members
of EU institutions.

When examining a complaint, the Controller
would review whether procedural guarantees provided for in Article 9, Regulation
No 883/2013 were respected. For example, he would review whether the notice
period for inviting persons concerned to an interview was respected, without,
however, taking any position on whether and how to conduct this interview. He
would listen to both parties involved before issuing a non-binding
recommendation to the Director-General of OLAF. If the Director-General chooses
not to follow the Controller’s recommendation, he should state the reasons for
doing so in a note attached to the final investigation report submitted to the
national authorities or, where relevant, to institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies of the European Union concerned. Given the nature of the tasks the
Controller will be entrusted with, the position should be held by a person with
senior legal expertise in the fields of fundamental rights and criminal law,
and eligible to be appointed to judicial office in at least one Member State or in an EU Court. He should be able to perform his duties in complete
independence and within the time limits foreseen in this Regulation.

This new complaints procedure does not
affect any of the other existing complaint procedures, such as the procedure
offered by the EU Staff Regulation, the European Ombudsman or the European Data
Protection Supervisor. The Controller will also be subject to the requirements
of Regulation 45/2001 on data protection, in particular its Articles 2, 4, 25
and 26.

Regarding the use of certain investigative
measures towards members of EU institutions, a new measure is proposed, whereby
the Director-General of OLAF must ask for the Controller’s authorisation if
OLAF intends to carry out an inspection of the professional offices of these
members. This includes taking of copies of documents or any other form of data
storage located in their professional offices. This requirement is inspired by
the proposal for a European Public Prosecutor's Office as the future EPPO will
require similar authorisation from the competent judicial authorities in Member
States. This is to reflect the special way in which members of EU institutions
have been appointed or elected, as well as their particular responsibilities
and their status, which may justify specific provisions to ensure the proper
functioning of the institutions to which they belong.

Legal basis

The proposal is based on art. 325 TFEU on
combating fraud.

Subsidiarity and proportionality
principles

This proposal has no impact on Member States’ powers and
responsibilities for combating fraud affecting the financial interests of the
EU. It concerns only OLAF's investigations, which are currently laid out in an
EU Regulation. In addition, the above-mentioned actions are limited to what is
necessary in order to attain the proposed objectives, which is compliant with
the principle of proportionality.

4.           BUDGETARY IMPLICATION

The budgetary implications of this proposal
are mainly related to human resources. It requires the establishment of the
Controller of procedural guarantees and members of his secretariat. It is
envisaged that the Controller would have the status of a Special Advisor remunerated
at the level of an AD15, which  appears as the most appropriate status in view
of the expected tasks. With regard to the term of office of five years, the
underlying contracts would in this case be issued for administrative reasons in
compliance with Article 123 (1) of the Conditions of Employment of Other
Servants. The obligations under Article 123 (2) CEOS would be deemed fulfilled
through the appointment procedure. He would work
part-time (25 per cent in the first year and 50 per cent thereafter) and would
be assisted by a secretariat initially composed of two persons in the administrators’
function group and one secretarial assistant in the assistants/secretarial
clerks’ function group, which could be expanded or reduced in view of its
workload. The Controller would also have a substitute, who would have the same
status and grade as the Controller and would be called upon to act only in case
the Controller is not available. For administrative purposes, they would all be
attached to the Commission, while benefitting from specific guarantees ensuring
their full independence in the exercise of their functions.

2014/0173 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL

amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No
883/2013 as regards the establishment of a Controller of procedural guarantees

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 325 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the
European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative
act to the national Parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the Court
of Auditors[1]

Acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)       The Union's institutions
and Member States attach great importance to the protection of the financial
interests of the European Union and to the protection of the fundamental rights
of the citizens. Procedural guarantees of persons concerned by OLAF’s
administrative investigations should be strengthened without obstructing OLAF in
the exercise of its powers and responsibilities.

(2)       Regulation (EU, Euratom)
No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council brought substantial
changes to the conduct of OLAF’s investigative activities, as regards, in
particular, clarifying OLAF’s investigative procedures, strengthening the
procedural guarantees of persons concerned by OLAF’s investigations and clarifying
the general monitoring role of the Supervisory Committee.

(3)       In its Communication
COM(2013)533 of 17 July 2013 on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing
procedural safeguards in investigations, the Commission has put forward
concepts for further strengthening the procedural guarantees of persons
concerned by OLAF administrative investigations, even before the establishment
of the European Public Prosecutor's Office on which the Commission has proposed
a Regulation[2].

(4)       In its opinion No 2/2013
of December 2013, OLAF’s Supervisory Committee, expressed the view that the
remedies offered to persons concerned by OLAF’s investigations against
potential violation of their rights and procedural guarantees should be
strengthened and that a transparent and efficient complaints procedure should
be put in place within OLAF.

(5)       In order to ensure a
consistent high level of protection of procedural guarantees, all persons concerned
by OLAF investigations should be offered enhanced remedies against potential
violations of their rights. A Controller of procedural guarantees, external to
and independent from OLAF, should therefore be established and be tasked with
reviewing OLAF’s compliance with the procedural guarantees of the persons
concerned by OLAF investigations laid down in Article 9 of Regulation No
883/2013.

(6)       In order to review
complaints in due time and enable effective protection of the defence rights, complaints
related to notice periods or time limits provided for in the Regulation, such
as the notice period for invitation to an interview, should be lodged before
the expiry of the ordinary period foreseen in the Regulation.

(7)       The Controller should be
recruited from outside the EU institutions. For administrative purposes, the
Controller should nevertheless be attached to the Commission, while benefitting
from sufficient guarantees to ensure his full independence. In agreement with
the Controller, the Commission should provide for his supporting staff. The
call for applications for the post should specify the eligibility requirements
and the selection criteria applicable to the position. The post entails
functions normally entrusted to persons appointed to judicial office and candidates
must be persons who are able to perform the duties in complete independence and
within the time limits foreseen in this Regulation.

(8)       The mandate of the
Controller should be established without prejudice to the already existing complaints
mechanisms. However, in order to streamline the procedures, if an official or
other servant of the EU lodges a complaint with the Controller while a
complaint on the same issue is being examined in accordance with Article 90a of
the Staff Regulations, the Director-General shall await the recommendation of the
Controller before taking a decision in accordance with Article 90a. Times limits
provided for under Article 90a should apply.

(9)       In order to avoid any
unnecessary complaint procedure, OLAF should be immediately informed by the
Controller when a complaint is lodged and be given the opportunity to remedy
the issue or explain why it cannot comply with the complainant’s request.

(10)     The Controller should
examine the complaint in a swift and adversarial procedure, which should, in
principle, not be longer than fifteen working days, verifying the legality of
the investigative measure concerned. However, the Controller should respect
OLAF’s discretion to conduct the investigation under way as this may compromise
OLAF’s independence. In order to be able to fulfil his function, OLAF should
communicate to the Controller any information relevant to the complaint. The
Controller should give the complainant and the Office the opportunity to
provide comments on the issue submitted to him. In order to comply with its
duty to conduct the investigation continuously, OLAF should not be prevented
from continuing the investigation while a complaint is being examined. The
review of the complaint should not unduly prolong OLAF’s investigation and
procedures.

(11)     In the procedures governing
OLAF investigations, the specificities of the status of the members of the EU
institutions defined in the Treaty on the European Union should be recognised
and reflected in specific provisions aimed at ensuring the proper functioning
of the institutions to which they belong. Indeed the political mandate,
independent status, special responsibilities and/or special procedure of
election or appointment of the members of the EU institutions distinguish them,
not individually but functionally, from other persons concerned by OLAF’s
investigations. Inspection by OLAF’s staff of the professional office of
members of EU institutions, with a view to taking copies of documents or any
other data support, should therefore be made subject to prior authorisation by
the Controller. The Controller should carry out an objective assessment of the
legality of the investigative measure OLAF intends to conduct and whether the
same objective could be achieved by less intrusive means.

(12)     Regulation No 45/2001 of 18
December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies is applicable to the
processing of personal data for the purposes of this Regulation.

(13)     This Regulation in no way
diminishes the powers and responsibilities of the Member States to take
measures to combat fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting
the financial interests of the Union. Entrusting to an independent Controller
the task of examining complaints and issuing prior authorisations to OLAF is
accordingly in full compliance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond
what is necessary in order to step up the fight against fraud, corruption and
any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union.

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendment to Regulation 883/2013

Regulation No 883/2013 is amended as
follows:

1) In Article 2, the following
paragraph (8) is added after paragraph (7):

“(8) “member of an EU institution” shall mean a
member of the European Parliament, a member of the European Council, a
representative of a Member State at ministerial level in the Council, a member
of the European Commission, a member of the Court of Justice of the European
Union, a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank and a
member of the Court of Auditors.”

2) In Article 9(2) fourth
sub-paragraph, the following second sentence is inserted:

“The person concerned shall however be informed
of his rights at the beginning of the taking of the statements, in particular
of the right to be assisted by a person of his choice.”

3) The following Articles 9a, 9b and 9c
are inserted after Article 9:

"Article
9a

The Controller
of procedural guarantees

1.           Any person concerned by an
investigation by the Office shall be entitled to lodge a complaint with the
Controller of procedural guarantees (hereinafter “the Controller”) regarding
the respect by the Office of the procedural guarantees provided in Article 9.

2.           Complaints may be lodged at
the latest one month after the complainant becomes aware of the relevant facts
that constitute the alleged violation of his procedural guarantees. No
complaint may be filed later than one month after the closure of the investigation.
Complaints related to the notice period referred to in Article 9(2) and 9(4)
shall be filed before the expiry of the period of notice laid down in these
provisions.

3.           When receiving a
complaint, the Controller shall inform the Director-General of the Office
immediately and give the Office the possibility to resolve g the issue raised by
the complainant, within 15 working days.

4.           The Office shall transmit to
the Controller, without prejudice to Article 10 of this Regulation, any
relevant information necessary to issue a recommendation.

5.           The Controller shall issue
a recommendation on the complaint within one month of the communication by the
Office of relevant action to remedy the issue or from the expiry of the period
referred to in Article 9a(3). The recommendation shall be submitted to the
Office and communicated to the complainant. In exceptional cases, duly
motivated in a letter addressed to the Director-General, the Controller may
decide on extending the period for issuing the recommendation by a further 15
days. The absence of a recommendation by the Controller within the time limits
set out in this paragraph shall be deemed closure of the complaint without a recommendation.

6.           Without interfering with
the conduct of the investigation under way, the Controller shall examine the
complaint in an adversarial procedure. Upon their consent, the Controller may
ask witnesses to provide written or oral explanations he considers relevant in
ascertaining the facts.

7.           The Director-General shall
not be obliged to follow the Controller’s recommendation on the issue. However
without prejudice to Article 7(5), if he decides not to follow the
recommendation, he shall communicate to the complainant and to the Controller
the main reasons for that decision, inasmuch as it does not affect the on-going
investigation. He shall state the reasons for not following the Controller’s
recommendation in a motivated note to be attached to the final investigation
report.

8.           The Director-General may
request, indicating a time limit, the opinion of the Controller on any matter
related to the respect of procedural guarantees in his mandate,
including on the decision to defer information of the person concerned referred
to in Article 9(3).

9.           (Without prejudice to the time
limits provided for in Article 90a of the Staff Regulations, where a complaint
has been lodged with the Director-General by an official or other servant of
the EU in accordance with Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and the official
or other servant has lodged a complaint with the Controller related to the same
issue, the Director-General shall await the recommendation of the Controller
before replying to the complaint.)

Article 9b

Prior authorisation for certain investigative measures

1.           Without prejudice to the
independence of the Office with respect to the discretion to conduct the
investigation under way, the Director-General shall first obtain the
authorisation of the Controller when the Office intends to exercise its power to
inspect the professional office of a member of an EU institution at the
premises of an EU institution during an internal investigation or to take copies
of documents or of any data support located in this office, irrespective of the
nature of the support on which the data is stored. To this end, the Office
shall transmit any relevant information necessary to assess the request for
authorisation. This procedure is to be regarded as confidential and the
Controller shall not disclose any information concerning it.

2.           In taking his decision on
whether or not to grant authorisation for the aforementioned investigative
measures, the Controller shall carry out an objective assessment of their
legality and examine whether the same objective could be achieved with less
intrusive investigative measures. The Controller shall reply to the request for
an authorisation promptly and no later than 48 hours after receiving the
request. The absence of a reply by the Controller within this time limit shall
be deemed to be an authorisation.

3.           In duly justified urgent cases,
the Office may request that the time limit referred to in paragraph 2 is
shortened to 24 hours, in agreement with the Controller. The time limit may
also be extended to a maximum of 72 hours at the duly motivated request of the
Controller.

Article 9c

Appointment and status of the Controller

1.           The Controller and his
substitute shall be appointed by common accord of the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission for a non-renewable term of five years. On expiry of
their terms, they should remain in office until they are replaced.

Following a call for applications in the
Official Journal of the European Union, the Commission shall draw up a list of
suitably qualified candidates for the positions of the Controller and of the
substitute, after a favourable opinion on the selection procedure has been
given by the Supervisory Committee.

The decision to appoint the Controller and his
substitute shall also include a reserve list of potential candidates to replace
the Controller for the remainder of his term of office in the event of
resignation, death, permanent incapacity or removal from office.

The Controller and his substitute shall be
administratively attached to the Commission. Their Secretariat shall be
provided by the Commission, in close consultation with  the Controller.

2.           The Controller and his
substitute shall exercise their functions in complete independence and shall
neither seek nor take instructions from anyone in the performance of their
duties. They shall not perform any functions within the Office. In exercising their
functions they shall take account of the need for effective application of the
rules on the protection of the financial interests of the European Union and on
the fight against fraud laid down in Union legislation.

3.           If the Controller or his
substitute cease to fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their
duties, or if they are found guilty of serious misconduct, the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission may, by common accord, relieve them of
their duties.

4.           The Controller shall report
on his activities, on an annual basis, to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Commission, the Supervisory Committee and the Office. His reports shall not
refer to individual cases under investigation and ensure the confidentiality of
investigations even after their closure.”

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on
the [one year after its publication in the Official Journal of the European
Union].

This Regulation shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament                        For
the Council

The President                                                 The
President

LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

1.           FRAMEWORK OF THE
PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

1.1.        Title of the
proposal/initiative

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 as regards the establishment of a
Controller of procedural guarantees

1.2.        Policy area(s) concerned
in the ABM/ABB structure[3]

Policy area: to be determined

1.3.        Nature of the
proposal/initiative

 ̈ The proposal/initiative relates to a new action

 ̈ The proposal/initiative relates to a new action
following a pilot project/preparatory action[4]

ý The proposal/initiative relates to the extension of
an existing action

 ̈ The proposal/initiative relates to an action
redirected towards a new action

1.4.        Objective(s)

1.4.1.     The Commission's
multiannual strategic objective(s) targeted by the proposal/initiative

Fight against fraud – Article 325 TFEU

1.4.2.     Specific objective(s) and
ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned

Specific objective No 7.1.a

ABM/ABB activity(ies) concerned

24.01. Administrative expenditure of policy area Fight against fraud

1.4.3.     Expected result(s) and
impact

Specify the effects
which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries/groups targeted.

The establishment of a Controller of procedural guarantees is
expected to lead to:

- Enhanced protection of the procedural rights of persons concerned
by OLAF investigations;

- Improved monitoring of compliance with the procedural requirements
for investigations;

- Ex-post control of the respect of the procedural guarantees of any
person concerned by an OLAF investigation by the Controller of procedural
guarantees, acting on complaint;

- Prior authorisation by the Controller of certain investigative
measures concerning members of EU institutions (verification of the legality
and whether the same objectives could be achieved by less intrusive means).

1.4.4.     Indicators of results and
impact

Specify the
indicators for monitoring implementation of the proposal/initiative.

- Prompt handling of the complaints by the Controller;

- Prompt delivering by the Controller of the authorisation requested
by OLAF to inspect offices and/or take copies of documents of members of the EU
institutions;

1.5.        Grounds for the
proposal/initiative

1.5.1.     Requirement(s) to be met in
the short or long term

The establishment of the Controller of procedural guarantees should
offer persons concerned in OLAF internal and external investigations an
additional complaints procedure against the potential violation of their
procedural rights. It will also raise OLAF’s perceived accountability.

The Controller will also authorise OLAF to carry out inspections of
offices and taking of copy of documents and thus take into account the special
way in which they were elected or appointed.

1.5.2.     Added
value of EU involvement: Requirement(s) to be met in
the short or long term

OLAF is an EU body and therefore any additional mechanism of control
should be placed at the same level. The Controller of procedural guarantees
would ensure the highest level of protection of procedural rights, with the
lowest possible impact on the duration and effectiveness of OLAF
investigations. It would also check the legality of certain investigative measures
related to members of EU institutions and whether the same result could be
achieved by using less intrusive means. This approach is justified by the
special status of the members of EU institutions, the way they were elected or
appointed, as well as their statutory independence.

1.5.3.     Lessons learned from
similar experiences in the past

The Hearing Officer for competition proceedings provides
companies under investigation with an effective way of complaining against
possible non-respect by the Commission of certain procedural rights. The
Controller of procedural guarantees should provide persons concerned in OLAF
investigations with a review mechanism inspired by the one in place in the
field of competition, and adapted to the legal framework of anti-fraud
investigations.

Proposals to establish such a complaints
procedure, external to OLAF, have already been discussed in the past. The
Commission had introduced in its previous proposal to amend Regulation No.
1073/1999 on investigations conducted by OLAF - COM(2006) 244 final - the
concept of a “Review adviser”, while in its 2011 amended proposal - COM(2011)
135 - the concept a of “review procedure”. Both proposed functions were
designed to ensure a swift control of the compliance with procedural rights of
persons concerned by OLAF investigations. However, neither of the two proposals
was acceptable to the legislator because of difficulties to reconcile a high
degree of independence from OLAF with the need for cost-efficiency and
cost-neutrality.

The Commission now proposes the establishment of a Controller of
procedural guarantees, who would be independent, but administratively attached
to the Commission. The office of the Controller would be expressly endowed with
guarantees of complete independence vis-à-vis OLAF, the Commission and the
other EU institutions.

The revised OLAF Regulation which has entered into force in
October 2013 provides for a set of procedural rights for the persons concerned
by OLAF’s internal and external investigations, as well as for witnesses.

1.5.4.     Compatibility and possible
synergy with other appropriate instruments: Requirement(s)
to be met in the short or long term

OLAF Regulation 883/2013 was designed to strengthen the governance
of OLAF, reinforcing procedural rights in internal and external investigations
and OLAF's exchange of information both with the institutions and with the
Member States’ authorities. The Office of the Controller completes Regulation 883/2013
with an independent handling of complaints concerning the rights provided for
in this Regulation.

The initiative is also compatible and coherent with the Regulation
on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (COM(2013) 534
final). The establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO)
will bring about a substantial change in the way investigations concerning
fraud and other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the
European Union are carried out in the Union. In the future, for criminal
conduct falling within the remit of the EPPO, the ensuing investigations would
be conducted by the EPPO as a prosecutorial body, rather than – as today – by
OLAF which carries out administrative investigations. This change would entail,
for the persons under investigation by the EPPO, the application of procedural
guarantees typical of a judicial body. The reinforcement of procedural
guarantees of persons concerned by OLAF investigations through the
establishment of a Controller of procedural guarantees represents, to a certain
extent, a preparatory step in the direction of establishing the EPPO.

1.6.        Duration and financial
impact

 ̈ Proposal/initiative of limited
duration

– 
 ̈  Proposal/initiative in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY

– 
 ̈  Financial impact from YYYY to YYYY

ý Proposal/initiative of unlimited
duration

– 
Implementation with a start-up period from YYYY
to YYYY,

– 
followed by full-scale operation.

1.7.        Management mode(s) planned[5]

From the 2014 budget

ý Direct management by the Commission

– 
ý by its departments, including by its staff in the Union
delegations;

– 
 ̈  by the executive agencies;

 ̈ Shared management with the Member States

 ̈ Indirect management by delegating implementation tasks to:

– 
 ̈ third countries or the bodies they have designated;

– 
 ̈ international organisations and their agencies (to be specified);

– 
 ̈the EIB and the European Investment Fund;

– 
 ̈ bodies referred to in Articles 208 and 209 of the Financial
Regulation;

– 
 ̈ public law bodies;

– 
 ̈ bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the
extent that they provide adequate financial guarantees;

– 
 ̈ bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with the implementation of a public-private partnership and that
provide adequate financial guarantees;

– 
 ̈ persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in
the CFSP pursuant to Title V of the TEU, and identified in the relevant basic
act.

– If more than one management mode is
indicated, please provide details in the "Comments" section.

Comments

2.           MANAGEMENT MEASURES

2.1.        Monitoring and reporting
rules

2.1.1.     Specify frequency and conditions. Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term

The Controller of procedural guarantees should report annually on
its activity to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the
Supervisory Committee, and to the Office.

2.2.        Management and control
system

2.2.1.     Risk(s) identified.
Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term

- The possible lack of independence of the Controller.

- The possible understaffing of his Secretariat.

2.2.2.     Information concerning the
internal control system set up. Requirement(s) to be
met in the short or long term

Given the requirement of independence, the Controller should be
subject to the 16 Internal Control Standards of the Commission, with special
focus on data protection. He would then be subject to verifications and
assessments by the Commission Internal Audit Service. Finally, an ex-post
control could be performed by the European Court of Auditors.

2.2.3.     Estimate of the costs and
benefits of the controls and assessment of the expected level of risk of error.
Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term

To be determined after agreement on the control system (IAS).

2.3.        Measures to prevent fraud
and irregularities

Specify existing or
envisaged prevention and protection measures.

There is a clear separation between the activities of the Controller
of procedural guarantees and of the Supervisory Committee, and between the
secretariats of the two structures.

3.           ESTIMATED FINANCIAL
IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE

3.1.        Heading(s) of the
multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) affected

· Existing budget lines

In order of
multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines.

Heading of multiannual financial framework || Budget line || Type of expenditure || Contribution

Number [...][Heading..........................................................]– To be completed after agreement of the DG to which the Controller will be attached || Diff./non-diff. ([6]) || from EFTA countries[7] || from candidate countries[8] || from third countries || within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation

|| [...][XX.YY.YY.YY] || Diff./non-diff. || NO || NO || NO || NO

· New budget lines requested

In order of multiannual financial framework
headings and budget lines.

Heading of multiannual financial framework || Budget line || Type of expenditure || Contribution

Number [...][Heading..........................................................] || Diff./non-diff. || from EFTA countries || from candidate countries || from third countries || within the meaning of Article 21(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation

|| [...][XX.YY.YY.YY] || || YES/NO || YES/NO || YES/NO || YES/NO

3.2.        Estimated impact on
expenditure

[This section
should be filled in using spreadsheet on budget data of an administrative nature (second document in annex to this
financial statement) and uploaded to CISNET for interservice consultation
purposes.]

3.2.1.     Summary of estimated impact
on expenditure

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Heading of multiannual financial framework || Number || [...][Heading...........................................................................................]

DG: <.......> || || || Year N[9] || Year N+1 || Year N+2 || Year N+3 || Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6) || TOTAL

Ÿ Operational appropriations || || || || || || || ||

Number of budget line || Commitments || (1) || || || || || || || ||

Payments || (2) || || || || || || || ||

Number of budget line || Commitments || (1a) || || || || || || || ||

Payments || (2a) || || || || || || || ||

Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes[10] || || || || || || || ||

Number of budget line || || (3) || || || || || || || ||

TOTAL appropriations for DG <....> || Commitments || =1+1a +3 || || || || || || || ||

Payments || =2+2a +3 || || || || || || || ||

Ÿ TOTAL operational appropriations || Commitments || (4) || || || || || || || ||

Payments || (5) || || || || || || || ||

Ÿ TOTAL appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope for specific programmes || (6) || || || || || || || ||

TOTAL appropriations for HEADING <....> of the multiannual financial framework || Commitments || =4+ 6 || || || || || || || ||

Payments || =5+ 6 || || || || || || || ||

If more than one heading is affected by the proposal /
initiative:

Ÿ TOTAL operational appropriations || Commitments || (4) || || || || || || || ||

Payments || (5) || || || || || || || ||

Ÿ TOTAL appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope for specific programmes || (6) || || || || || || || ||

TOTAL appropriations under HEADINGS 1 to 4 of the multiannual financial framework (Reference amount) || Commitments || =4+ 6 || || || || || || || ||

Payments || =5+ 6 || || || || || || || ||

Heading of multiannual financial framework || 5 || " Administrative expenditure "

EUR million (to three decimal places)

|| || || 2015 || 2016 || 2017 || 2018 || 2019 || 2020 || TOTAL

DG: <...> - to be determined ||

Ÿ Human resources || 0.198 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 2.178

§ Other operating cost (Special Adviser and substitute) || 0.045 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.495

Ÿ Other administrative expenditure || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.06

TOTAL DG <...> || Appropriations || 0.253 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 2.733

TOTAL appropriations for HEADING 5 of the multiannual financial framework || (Total commitments = Total payments) || 0.253 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 2.733

EUR million (to three decimal places)

|| || || 2015 || 2016 || 2017 || 2018 || 2019 || 2020 || TOTAL

TOTAL appropriations under HEADINGS 1 to 5 of the multiannual financial framework || Commitments || 0.253 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 2.733

Payments || 0.253 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 2.733

3.2.2.     Estimated impact on
operational appropriations

– 
 ̈  The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational
appropriations

– 
 ̈  The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational
appropriations, as explained below:

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three
decimal places)

Indicate objectives and outputs ò || || || Year N || Year N+1 || Year N+2 || Year N+3 || Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6) || TOTAL

OUTPUTS

Type[11] || Average cost || No || Cost || No || Cost || No || Cost || No || Cost || No || Cost || No || Cost || No || Cost || No total || Total cost

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 1[12] ... || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

- Output || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

- Output || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

- Output || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

Subtotal for specific objective No 1 || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE NO 2 ... || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

- Output || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

Subtotal for specific objective No 2 || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

TOTAL COST || || || || || || || || || || || || || || || ||

3.2.3.     Estimated impact on
appropriations of an administrative nature

3.2.3.1.  Summary

– 
 ̈  The proposal/initiative does not require the use of appropriations
of an administrative nature

– 
ý  The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an
administrative nature, as explained below:

EUR million (to
three decimal places)

|| 2015 || 2016 || 2017 || 2018 || 2019 || 2020 || TOTAL

HEADING 5 of the multiannual financial framework || || || || || || ||

Human resources || 0.198 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 0.396 || 2.178

Other operating cost (Special Adviser and substitute) || 0.045 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.090 || 0.495

Other administrative expenditure || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.01 || 0.06

Subtotal HEADING 5 of the multiannual financial framework || 0.253 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 2.733

TOTAL || 0.253 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 0.496 || 2.733

The human resources
appropriations required will be met by appropriations from the DG that are
already assigned to management of the action and/or have been redeployed within
the DG, together if necessary with any additional allocation which may be
granted to the managing DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the
light of budgetary constraints.

The figures in the
“Human resources” line correspond to the cost involved by the recruitment of 2
AD grade and 1 AST/SC grade staff, with the figure for the first year reduced
to half, to reflect the reduced workload expected in the first year of
existence of the Controller.

The figure in the
“Other operating cost” line reflects the cost of the Controller, who would be
an AD15 grade Special Adviser remunerated according to the number of days of
actual work. The line also includes the cost of the substitute, but this does
not have to be reflected separately and neither it implies additional cost,
since he would be called on only to replace the Controller, who would then not
be remunerated.

Given the expected
workload, the part-time work foreseen for the Controller (and his substitute)
is estimated to amount to 25 per cent of the ordinary monthly full-time work
time in the first year of activity (5,5 days per month), and 50 per cent thereafter
(11 days per month).

There are also foreseen
2 days of mission per month.

3.2.3.2.  Estimated
requirements of human resources

– 
 ̈  The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human
resources.

– 
ý  The proposal/initiative requires the use of human resources, as
explained below:

Estimate to be expressed in full time
equivalent units

|| 2015 || 2016 || 2017 || 2018 || 2019 || 2020

XX 01 01 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation Offices) || 1.5 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 3 || 3

XX 01 01 02 (Delegations) || || || || || ||

XX 01 05 01 (Indirect research) || || || || || ||

10 01 05 01 (Direct research) || || || || || ||

Ÿ External staff (in Full Time Equivalent unit: FTE)[13] ||

XX 01 02 01 (CA, SNE, INT from the "global envelope") || || || || || ||

XX 01 02 02 (CA, LA, SNE, INT and JED in the delegations) || || || || || ||

XX 01 04 yy[14] || - at Headquarters || || || || || ||

- Delegations || || || || || ||

XX 01 05 02 (CA, SNE, INT - Indirect research) || || || || || ||

10 01 05 02 (CA, INT, SNE - Direct research) || || || || || ||

Other budget lines 25 01 02 03 || 0.25 || 0.5 || 0.5 || 0.5 || 0.5 || 0.5

TOTAL || 1.75 || 3.5 || 3.5 || 3.5 || 3.5 || 3.5

XX is the policy
area or budget title concerned.

The human resources
required will be met by staff from the DG who are already assigned to
management of the action and/or have been redeployed within the DG, together if
necessary with any additional allocation which may be granted to the managing
DG under the annual allocation procedure and in the light of budgetary
constraints.

Description of
tasks to be carried out:

Officials and temporary staff || Receiving and reviewing complaints about their procedural rights lodged by persons concerned in OLAF investigations.

External staff ||

3.2.4.     Compatibility with the
current multiannual financial framework

– 
ý  Proposal/initiative is compatible the current multiannual
financial framework.

– 
 ̈  Proposal/initiative will entail reprogramming of the relevant
heading in the multiannual financial framework.

Explain what reprogramming is required,
specifying the budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts.

– 
 ̈  Proposal/initiative requires application of the flexibility
instrument or revision of the multiannual financial framework[15].

Explain what is required, specifying the
headings and budget lines concerned and the corresponding amounts.

3.2.5.     Third-party contributions

– 
ý The proposal/initiative does not provide for co-financing by third
parties.

– 
The proposal/initiative provides for the
co-financing estimated below:

Appropriations in EUR million (to 3 decimal places)

|| Year N || Year N+1 || Year N+2 || Year N+3 || Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6) || Total

Specify the co-financing body || || || || || || || ||

TOTAL appropriations cofinanced || || || || || || || ||

3.3.        Estimated impact on
revenue

– 
ý  Proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue.

– 
 ̈  Proposal/initiative has the following financial impact:

– 
 ̈         on own resources

– 
 ̈         on miscellaneous revenue

EUR million (to three decimal places)

Budget revenue line: || Appropriations available for the current financial year || Impact of the proposal/initiative[16]

Year N || Year N+1 || Year N+2 || Year N+3 || Enter as many years as necessary to show the duration of the impact (see point 1.6)

Article ............. || || || || || || || ||

For miscellaneous
‘assigned’ revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected.

Specify the method for
calculating the impact on revenue.

[1]               OJC,
, p

[2]               COM(2013)
534 final, 17 July 2013.

[3]               ABM:
activity-based management – ABB: activity-based budgeting.

[4]               As
referred to in Article 54(2)(a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation.

[5]               Details
of management modes and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on
the BudgWeb site: http://www.cc.cec/budg/man/budgmanag/budgmanag_en.html

[6]               Diff.
= Differentiated appropriations / Non-Diff. = Non-differentiated
appropriations.

[7]               EFTA:
European Free Trade Association.

[8]               Candidate
countries and, where applicable, potential candidate countries from the Western
Balkans.

[9]               Year
N is the year in which implementation of the proposal/initiative starts.

[10]             Technical and/or administrative assistance and
expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions
(former "BA" lines), indirect research, direct research.

[11]             Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.:
number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.).

[12]             As described in point 1.4.2. ‘Specific objective(s)...’

[13]             CA= Contract Staff; LA = Local Staff; SNE= Seconded
National Expert; INT = agency staff; JED= Junior Experts in Delegations).

[14]             Sub-ceiling for external staff covered by operational
appropriations (former "BA" lines).

[15]             See points 19 and 24 of the Interinstitutional
Agreement (for the period 2007-2013).

[16]             As regards traditional own resources (customs duties,
sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net amounts, i.e. gross amounts
after deduction of 25% for collection costs.