SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2190-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

EMILE G. CONSTABLE, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________ 

Submitted November 6, 2023 – Decided February 20, 2024 

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 16-08-

1292.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated 

Counsel and on the briefs).

Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Joie D. Piderit, Assistant

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2190-21

Defendant, Emile Constable, appeals from an October 20, 2021, order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing and denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant argues 

the PCR court improperly found he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of 

ineffective assistance of counsel on multiple claims. Discerning no error, we 

affirm. 

I.

On February 24, 2016, Edison police arrived at Hillcrest Avenue, where 

officers found an unresponsive male — later identified as Aniq Ali (decedent) 

— in a vehicle still running. The decedent had no pulse, and ten empty bags 

marked "Magoo" surrounded his body. The bags later tested positive for heroin 

and fentanyl. Upon searching decedent's phone, officers observed a text 

conversation between decedent and "Oatmeal" organizing a drug sale for earlier 

that night. Officers also found an unsent message from decedent to "Oatmeal," 

stating "[y]o, brah, I'm going to keep six, and . . . a thousand percent . . . that 

shit had barely anything in it, and . . . three bags were pretty much empty, and . 

. . it wasn't even dope. That shit was some white epoxy crushed up." 

Although defendant was known by various aliases, he was positively 

identified by a former high-school classmate, a confidential informant/buyer 
3 A-2190-21

(CI), and two of his associates as "Oatmeal," and as the owner of the phone 

number ascribed to "Oatmeal" in decedent's phone. Additionally, the CI told 

police she purchased heroin stamped "Magoo" from defendant on the same day 

decedent died. One day after decedent's death, the CI arranged for defendant to 

sell her drugs at a motel. As police tracked "Oatmeal's" phone, they found it 

was moving in the direction of the same motel. Officers intercepted the vehicle 

defendant was traveling in and searched him incident to his arrest. They found 

twenty-three bags containing an unknown substance, some stamped "Magoo." 

One bag later tested positive for fentanyl and heroin. 

Although the medical examiner did not complete an internal autopsy of 

decedent because of decedent's family's religious beliefs, he conducted an 

external exam and toxicology assessment. The decedent's cause of death was 

determined to be acute combined drug toxicity due to fentanyl and heroin. 

Defendant was charged with the following offenses: first-degree strict 

liability for drug induced death, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 (count one); thirddegree distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(13)(counts

two and four); third-degree possession of controlled substance, contrary to 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1)(count three); fourth-degree hindering apprehension, 
4 A-2190-21

contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(1)(count five); and third-degree hindering 

apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4)(count six). 

Approximately one month before defendant's rescheduled trial date, his 

trial counsel filed a motion to be relieved, stating there was a "total lack of 

cooperation" from defendant over the previous four months. As the PCR court 

noted, trial counsel attempted to schedule multiple meetings and telephone 

conversations with defendant to no avail, and defendant failed to respond to any 

of trial counsel's requests to meet and prepare. Days before trial was set to 

commence on the rescheduled trial date, and approximately one month after trial 

counsel's motion to be relieved had been denied, defendant accepted a plea offer. 

Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree 

strict liability for drug induced death, and third-degree possession with intent to 

distribute a controlled substance. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining four 

counts and recommended an eight-year sentence on count one, subject to the No 

Early Release Act (NERA),1 to run concurrent to a three-year sentence on count 

four. 

Following extensive questioning, the trial court accepted the plea, finding 

the plea was entered "knowingly, freely, and intelligently" and grounded in 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 
5 A-2190-21

sufficient factual basis. The trial court later sentenced defendant in accordance 

with the plea agreement to eight years, subject to NERA, with a five-year parole 

supervision period, a concurrent term of three years on count four, and dismissed 

the four remaining counts. The trial court found aggravating factors three and

nine and no mitigating factors. 

Defendant challenged his sentence pursuant to Rule 2:9-11 on the 

Sentencing Oral Argument ("SOA") calendar, arguing the sentencing court 

failed to find any mitigating factors, although five factors were present. We 

affirmed the sentence. State v. Constable, No. A-2189-21 (App. Div. Jan. 9, 

2023) (slip op. at 1). 

In 2019, defendant filed a PCR petition asserting numerous claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, he claimed he successively 

asserted a colorable claim of innocence, requiring withdrawal of his guilty plea. 

The trial court applied the two-prong test established in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and the four factors in State v. Slater, 198 

N.J. 145 (2009), and entered an order denying defendant relief. This appeal 

followed. 
6 A-2190-21

II. 

 A PCR judge's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and where, as here, 

the judge declines to hold an evidentiary hearing, we may "conduct a de novo 

review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions" of the PCR judge. 

State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419, 421 (2004). 

A. Ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 In a petition for PCR asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, we are 

guided by the standards set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 and State v. Fritz, 

105 N.J. 42 (1987), which adopted the Strickland standard in New Jersey. 

Moreover, the PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only where

defendant has established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel 

pursuant to Strickland. See R. 3:22-10(b). 

A defendant will be entitled to PCR for ineffective assistance of counsel 

if he shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) "[defendant's] counsel's 

performance was deficient," and (2) this "deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); State v. 

Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 (2009). When the matter involves a guilty plea, the 

second prong requires defendant establish "a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have 
7 A-2190-21

insisted on going to trial." State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) 

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)). 

Moreover, the defendant must show "that a decision to reject the plea bargain 

would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 

U.S. 356, 372 (2010); State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 

2011). 

Defendant claims several errors made by trial counsel prejudiced him, 

including: 1) failure to consult an independent forensic pathologist to determine 

whether defendant had a causality defense as to decedent's cause of death; 2) 

failure to advise defendant about the strengths and weaknesses of the State's case 

and the probability of success of a lack of causality defense; 3) failure to seek a 

lower sentence and advocate for mitigating factors; and 4) failure to investigate 

and file a suppression motion for evidence seized during the search incident to 

defendant's arrest. 

The trial court detailed the dates and times of trial counsel's repeated 

attempts to meet or speak with defendant to establish a defense, then ruled: 

Based upon this prior history, [defendant] cannot be 

heard to complain about the performance of plea 

counsel since he, himself, abdicated his opportunity and 

responsibility to engage with plea counsel in 

developing a defense. There is no basis upon which

[defendant] can now assess the adequacy of plea 
8 A-2190-21

counsel’s performance since plea counsel, due to 

[defendant's] absence, was left to his own decisionmaking regarding choices to be made in preparation for 

trial, in addition to the development of certain legal 

contentions to be advanced on behalf of the defense

without input from [defendant]. Through his willful 

absence and void of any attempts to meet with plea 

counsel, it seems clear that [defendant] entrusted all 

such determinations to the sound discretion of plea

counsel, a choice which this [c]ourt will not now second 

guess as "unreasonable" given the circumstances 

leading up to the [defendant's] plea. This is in keeping 

with the understanding that a reviewing court must not 

"second guess" what, on its face, were reasonable and 

professional judgments by plea counsel, evaluating the 

challenged conduct from plea counsel’s perspective at 

the time. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382

(1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690

(1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987). 

The court also found trial counsel's performance was effective, in light of 

the evidence and circumstances, and benefitted defendant: 

[N]one of the decisions made by plea counsel inured to 

the detriment of [defendant], since the filing of a

motion without consulting [defendant] would trigger 

the State's escalating plea offer policy and prevent 

[defendant] from being able to negotiate a more 

favorable sentencing recommendation just as he did on 

the [rescheduled trial date]. This would also include 

the choice by plea counsel not to retain an expert to 

contest the State's failure to conduct a full autopsy of 

the victim. 

We agree. Defendant cannot voluntarily abstain from interacting with his 

appointed trial counsel, refuse to participate in the preparation of any legal 
9 A-2190-21

strategy or defense, then claim ineffective assistance of counsel after a carefully 

negotiated and properly allocuted plea deal is entered. 

Additionally, even if trial counsel's performance had been deficient in 

some regard, defendant fails to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability he 

would have rejected the offered plea pursuant to the second prong of Strickland. 

See State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 369-70 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting 

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). The trial court aptly noted trial 

counsel negotiated a plea agreement which presented defendant with less than 

half the exposure he would have faced at trial, and the decision to negotiate a 

favorable plea offer was an informed strategic choice based on the evidence 

presented. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. 

The record shows, prior to the adjournment of the first trial date for 

unrelated reasons, trial counsel and defendant initially discussed a plea with the 

State in exchange for cooperation, but those efforts did not result in a plea deal. 

Ultimately, defendant pleaded guilty to only two counts of the indictment in 

exchange for dismissal of the four remaining counts, for a maximum term of 

eight years subject to NERA, although he was facing an exposure of a possible 

thirty years. Defendant fails to demonstrate a rational person would have 

rejected this plea deal. 
10 A-2190-21

At his plea colloquy, defendant confirmed he reviewed all discovery with 

his trial counsel, was satisfied by the representation he received, and did not 

need additional time to confer with trial counsel. On appeal, defendant makes 

bald assertions regarding trial counsel's ineffective performance, stating he 

would not have pleaded guilty to strict liability for drug-induced death if he 

knew he could have challenged the decedent's cause of death. In doing so, he

ignores the weight of the evidence against him, including the text messages to 

and from decedent on decedent's phone, the CI information and identification, 

his identification from three other witnesses as "Oatmeal," and the positive 

toxicology results for the drugs found in decedent's body and on defendant's 

person. A suppression motion, even if successful, would have suppressed the 

drugs found on defendant's person, relevant only to the plea for possession. 

Because that sentence ran concurrently with the eight-year sentence on count 

one, it would not have affected the overall length of the sentence. We conclude 

defendant's failure to demonstrate a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel did not warrant an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 

451, 462-63 (1992); R. 3:22-10(b). 
11 A-2190-21

B. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea. 

The decision to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea lies within the trial 

court's discretion, Slater, 198 N.J. at 156, and we review for abuse of discretion. 

State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999). 

A court must consider and balance four factors when evaluating a motion 

to withdraw a guilty plea: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable 

claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for 

withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal 

would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." 

Slater, 198 N.J. at 157-58. 

Defendant argues he met the four factors required to necessitate a plea 

withdrawal pursuant to Slater, and the court's denial of his withdrawal motion 

was in error. Specifically, he contends: (1) "even if [he] did [what] he admitted 

to [doing in] his plea hearing, his conduct did not cause [the] decedent's death," 

proving a colorable claim of innocence; (2) there is reasonable probability his 

conduct did not cause the decedent's death; (3) the third factor should "receive[]

the least weight in the overall analysis[,]" State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 443 

(2012); and (4) "the passage of time is an insufficient reason not to correct an 

injustice[,]" State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 197 (2004). 
12 A-2190-21

The PCR court disagreed, finding: 

[Defendant] does not assert a colorable claim of 

innocence for several reasons. First, [defendant] 

provided this [c]ourt with a factual basis for guilt 

wherein he admitted to meeting with Aniq Ali to sell 

him a quantity of heroin Mr. Ali had solicited from him 

by way of text message communications. Having sold

him the heroin as he had arranged to do, [defendant] 

also admitted that he knew that said heroin caused Mr. 

Ali’s death when Mr. Ali consumed the substance after 

the purchase. [Defendant] also admitted to being in 

possession of heroin on the day of his arrest, which was 

found on his person by way of a search incident to his 

arrest. He clarified that he had the heroin with the 

purpose to distribute it to others. He also confirmed 

that he knew the drugs found on his person were tested 

by the laboratory and came back as a combination of

heroin and fentanyl. [Defendant] concluded his plea 

voir dire by admitting that he sold Mr. Ali, whom he 

knew from middle school and high school, heroin that 

was tested by the laboratory with positive results for a 

mixture of fentanyl and heroin combined. As per 

photographs and text messages that he reviewed, 

[defendant] concluded that he was aware that Mr. Ali 

was ingesting those drugs as he was attempting to 

contact [defendant] about the quality of his purchase, 

and as he died as a result of ingesting those drugs. 

[Defendant] confirmed that he understood that though 

he sold what was believed to be heroin to Mr. Ali, 

because that heroin was also mixed with fentanyl 

[defendant] was “strictly liable” for causing Mr. Ali’s 

death. [Defendant], during this voir dire, also admitted 

that a review of his cellphone messages on his IPhone 

contradicted his attempt to call another individual as an 

alibi witness because those messages confirmed that he 

was never with that individual at the time and date

proposed in support of said alibi. His final statement 
13 A-2190-21

was that he was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, 

guilty to the charges and that he was entering his plea 

in lieu of continuing with his trial. 

In the end, it is clear that [defendant] did commit 

the crimes to which he [pleaded] guilty based on his 

own admissions under oath, admissions which he 

asserted were made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, and upon the advice of counsel with whom 

he was satisfied, and after reviewing all of the State’s 

discovery. His attempt to demonstrate otherwise by

alleging in his petition for relief that he did not have the 

phone utilized to arrange the transaction with Mr. Ali, 

and that the drugs he possessed at the time of his arrest 

were not for purposes of distribution, are without merit 

and belied by his plea voir dire. He fails to identify the 

requisite specific and credible facts in the record

required to support a colorable claim of innocence, thus 

he is not innocent of the charges and has failed to

satisfy the first prong of Slater. 

We agree with the trial court defendant is unable to satisfy any of the 

elements set forth in Slater. Defendant cannot demonstrate a colorable claim of 

innocence on this record. Even if Xanax was also found in decedent's system, 

his own after-retained medical expert did not opine Xanax caused decedent's 

death, only that acute combined drug toxicity, including the fentanyl and heroin, 

caused his death, which is consistent with the medical examiner's report. Given 

the timing of decedent's death, immediately after ingesting the fentanyl, in a car 

still running, with an unsent text to defendant on his phone complaining of the 
14 A-2190-21

drugs defendant sold him, defendant cannot colorably claim the fentanyl was 

not the cause of decedent's death. 

In sum, we affirm the denial of PCR, the denial of an evidentiary hearing, 

and the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. To the extent 

we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments, we find they are without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.