115th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Averting All-Out War in 

Nagorno-Karabakh: The Role 

of the U.S. and OSCE 

OCTOBER 18, 2017 

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington: 2018 
(2) 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

202–225–1901 

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

@HelsinkiComm 

Legislative Branch Commissioners 

HOUSE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

Co-Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, TEXAS

STEVE COHEN, TENNESSEE

RICHARD HUDSON, NORTH CAROLINA

RANDY HULTGREN, ILLINOIS

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, TEXAS

GWEN MOORE, WISCONSIN

SENATE 

ROGER WICKER, MISSISSIPPI, 

Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. MARYLAND

JOHN BOOZMAN, ARKANSAS

CORY GARDNER, COLORADO

MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA

JEANNE SHAHEEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE

THOM TILLIS, NORTH CAROLINA

TOM UDALL, NEW MEXICO

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

Executive Branch Commissioners 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

[II]
(3) 

ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

[III]
(4) 

Averting All-Out War in Nagorno-Karabakh: 

The Role of the U.S. and OSCE 

OCTOBER 18, 2017 

Page 

PARTICIPANTS 

Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe ................ 1 

Magdalena Grono, Europe & Central Asia Program Director, International Crisis Group ..... 3 

Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, Professor of Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, University 

of Kentucky; Former U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (1999–2001) ....................... 7 

Ambassador James Warlick, Partner and Senior Policy Advisor, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev 

& Partners; Former U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group (2013–2016) ......................... 12 

[IV]
(1) 

Averting All-Out War in Nagorno-Karabakh: 

The Role of the U.S. and OSCE 

October 18, 2017 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington, DC 

The briefing was held at 2:02 p.m. in Room 188, Russell Senate Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe, presiding. 

Panelists present: Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Magdalena Grono, Europe & Central Asia Program Director, International 

Crisis Group; Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, Professor of Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, University of Kentucky; Former U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group 

(1999–2001); and Ambassador James Warlick, Partner and Senior Policy Advisor, Egorov 

Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners; Former U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group 

(2013–2016). 

Mr. TIERSKY. Good afternoon, everybody. My name is Alex Tiersky. On behalf of the 

U.S. Helsinki’s Commission’s Chairman, Senator Roger Wicker, and our Co-Chairman, 

Congressman Chris Smith, I’d like to welcome everybody to today’s briefing, which has 

been titled, ‘‘Averting All-Out War in Nagorno-Karabakh: The Role of the United States 

and the OSCE.’’ 

Last year the conflict surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh saw its worst outbreak of 

violence in more than two decades. The so-called Four Day War in April 2016 claimed 

approximately 200 lives and demonstrated that this conflict, which has persisted in a 

state of no war and no peace since the 1994 ceasefire, is not ‘‘frozen’’ at all. Instead, the 

line of contact separating the parties sees numerous ceasefire violations annually. Each 

one risks igniting a larger-scale conflict that could draw in major regional players, such 

as Russia, Turkey, and Iran. 

Many of you know that since 1997 the United States, France, and Russia have cochaired the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 

OSCE. This is the principal international mechanism aimed at reaching a negotiated solution to the conflict. The fragility of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire underscores the 

importance of United States engagement in this Minsk Group process. 
2 

Under its mandate to monitor compliance with the articles of the Helsinki Final Act 

of 1975, the U.S. Helsinki Commission has demonstrated a long-term interest in monitoring this conflict, and exploring strategies for its sustainable resolution. For example, 

most recently the Commission published in June of 2017 a background report, which you 

can find at our website at www.CSCE.gov. I’m very pleased that today we can bring 

together two former United States co-chairs of Minsk Group process, as well as a 

renowned independent expert on the conflict, to assess the current state of this issue, of 

the Minsk Group format, and prospects for achieving a lasting peace. Above all, this 

discussion is intended to focus on the past, present, and future of relevant U.S. policy. 

Let me briefly introduce each of our speakers today. You should know that their 

extremely impressive biographies are available in full in the packets that you’ve gotten. 

We will first hear from Magdalena Grono, to my right. She’ll be providing us with a 

review of the conflict itself and the stakes involved. Magdalena directs the Europe and 

Central Asia Program at the International Crisis Group. Besides having lived in the 

Caucasus for nearly a decade, she has lent her expertise on the region to an impressively 

broad range of governmental and nongovernmental organizations seeking to make a positive difference in the region. And I just want to say, personally, how much all of us who 

work on issues of conflict and peace rely on the Crisis Group’s reporting and the quality 

of that reporting, which I commend to all of you. We’re very grateful Magdalena could 

join us today from Brussels. 

Our second speaker will be Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh to my left, whose brilliant 

article in the journal Security and Human Rights on the OSCE and the NagornoKarabakh peace process was in many ways the origin of this briefing. He’ll provide us 

with something of a historical overview of the international engagement to address this 

conflict, of course discussing the Minsk Group co-chair process that was the focus of his 

recent paper. Ambassador Cavanaugh is truly the embodiment of a scholar practitioner, 

as he currently serves as a professor of diplomacy and conflict resolution at the University 

of Kentucky. In his earlier career as a Foreign Service Officer at the Department of State 

he held a great number of extremely impressive posts but, of course, none of greater 

interest to us today than his service as the U.S. OSCE Minsk Group co-chair from 1999 

to 2001, when he managed the Key West peace talks between the three co-chairs and the 

presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Our third speaker will be Ambassador James Warlick. He will describe his views on 

recent developments and diplomatic initiatives and on prospects for any negotiated settlement going forward. Ambassador Warlick is currently a partner and senior policy advisor 

at the leading Russian law firm of Egorov, Puginsky, Afanasiev & Partners. But of course, 

for our purposes, more importantly, he is, of course, the most recent full-term U.S. cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, serving from 2013 to 2016. I couldn’t begin to summarize 

Ambassador Warlick’s extremely impressive diplomatic career in the Foreign Service, so 

let me only here thank him publicly for the opportunity to have worked with him as I 

began my own career in foreign affairs many years ago. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I very much look forward to our discussion on what is, like 

so many other topics that the Commission tackles, a subject on which views can differ 

quite strongly. We will have an opportunity for input from the members of our distinguished audience. And I’ll look forward to offering the floor to the audience after I’ve had 

a chance to ask a few of my own questions as the moderator. I will remind everyone, 

lastly, that this event is streaming live on the Helsinki Commission’s Facebook page. If 
3 

you are tweeting about this event, please feel free to use our handle @HelsinkiComm. And 

the video and unofficial transcript of this event will be available on our website, probably 

within the next few days. 

So let me first turn the floor over to Magdalena Grono. Thank you very much. 

Ms. GRONO. Thank you very much, Alex. Thank you very much for the kind introduction. Thank you also for the invitation. It’s an honor to be here, and to also be on such 

a distinguished panel. 

I’ve been asked to set the stage and say a little about the background of the conflict 

and the current state of play. I would probably start by saying that other than the conflict 

in eastern Ukraine and the PKK conflict in Turkey, I think that Nagorno-Karabakh is, 

indeed, the deadliest conflict currently in Europe. It is also among the most intractable 

and risky. An escalatory trend has been evident in the region since the past five years 

or so, possibly even longer. Concentrations of weapons in the region are among the 

highest in Europe. And the line of contact is among the most militarized in the world. 

And of course, the ceasefire is basically self-regulated, with six unarmed OSCE monitors conducting pre-agreed visits. The settlement process has been stalled, though this 

Monday’s summit between Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan is a long-awaited opening for 

the first time since over a year. The April 2016 escalation that Alex has already mentioned has shown in no uncertain terms that the conflict has a serious potential to flare 

up, with possible significant humanitarian consequences. That escalation galvanized, for 

a short while, the settlement process, but also highlighted the entrenched zero-sum positions the parties espouse. 

I would say that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also quite so dangerous because 

of its possible regional implications. It has the potential to draw regional powers—Russia 

and Turkey—into a direct confrontation, given their respective military alliances with 

Armenia and Azerbaijan. If an escalation were to occur, though, it could also have broader 

regional implications. Here, I’m thinking mainly of Iran. After all, the 2016 escalation saw 

shells land on Iranian territory. But also Georgia, whose Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic 

minorities, of course, found themselves in 2016 drawn in two different directions— 

although this did not necessarily have a broad resonance in the region. Lastly, of course, 

an escalation that could occur in the region would be very close to the EU’s borders. And 

living in Brussels, I must say that the EU takes that very seriously. 

I have been asked to set the stage. And I thought I would say a couple of words on 

the background and the basic parameters of the conflict, and then a few words on the 

state of play today including, indeed, the risks that had fueled the 2016 escalation and 

that, on many counts, are still in place today and, in some ways, possibly have even 

exacerbated since last year. I hope we can then address policy recommendations and 

options in the discussion. I think that that probably would be the best way to go. 

Firstly, on the background and the basic parameters of the conflict. Of course, the 

conflict’s roots go back decades, arguably centuries. But the parameters of the current dispute were formed as the USSR began to fray in the late 1980s. Nationalist sentiments 

swelled and led to violence. By 1991–92, moves by the majority Armenian population of 

the then–Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region of Azerbaijan to break away from Baku’s 

control had taken on the character of a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijani 

sides. By 1992, the CSCE, later the OSCE, sought to convene a conference in Minsk to 

seek a peaceful solution. This is what then, of course, developed, by 1994–1995, into the 
4 

OSCE Minsk Group that in 1997 started to be co-chaired by, indeed, the three co-chairs: 

the United States, Russia, and France. 

In 1994, when the ceasefire was reached, Azerbaijan lost control of NagornoKarabakh, as well as all or part of seven districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Thanks to the topography, of course, positions in these areas have given Armenian forces 

an important security advantage. The conflict claimed 20,000 casualties and over 1 million 

people were displaced. Over 700,000 of those were Azerbaijanis who were displaced from 

Karabakh and the surrounding districts, mainly two districts. Communities have been 

torn apart and people-to-people contacts were, indeed, severed. The conflict also resulted 

in closures of Armenian and Azerbaijani and Armenian and Turkish borders, leaving 

Armenia connected to the outside world only by Georgia and Iran. Nagorno-Karabakh unilaterally declared independence, a move that has not been recognized by any state, not 

even Armenia, though there are, of course, deep links between the two. 

Now, in terms of basic positions, I of course realize that it’s very difficult to sum up 

the basic positions, but let me give it a try. In many ways, of course, the conflict is a 

classical clash between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. And 

this is where it squarely falls in the mandate of the Helsinki Commission. Azerbaijan, 

therefore, insists on territorial integrity, claiming Armenian forces occupy up to 20 percent of its territory, although independent experts assess this at about 14 percent. For 

Baku, it’s essential to return under its control the districts surrounding NagornoKarabakh, and to reintegrate Karabakh itself. 

Often Baku refers to possible autonomy arrangements. To support its case, Baku also 

recalls four U.N. Security Council resolutions of 1993, which were adopted at the height 

of the fighting, calling for Armenian withdrawals, but that have not been implemented. 

Especially since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, I would say that Baku has intensified its calls on the U.S. and the EU to treat the Karabakh conflict like they treat conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, whose territorial integrity they support unequivocally, including in the context of future conflict settlement options. The right of displaced 

persons to return to their homes is another key consideration for Azerbaijan. 

Now, if we move towards the Armenian side, of course, the Armenian side insists on 

self-determination. And we should stress here, indeed, the self-determination of peoples, 

as per the Helsinki Final Act—so not self-determination of communities as others suggest, 

arguing that Karabakh needs to have the possibilities to seek self-determination outside 

of Azerbaijan. Another important consideration for the Armenian side is, of course, security. The lands around Karabakh have, in fact, served as a certain security buffer. This 

position and the need for security have, I would say, strengthened with the deteriorating 

conflict dynamic of the past years. 

President Sargsyan has previously said that Agdam and the territories surrounding 

Nagorno-Karabakh was not Armenia’s, but there are barely any constituencies in Armenia 

and Karabakh today that would support this claim. We will get back to that when we 

discuss the state of play today. The territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh have also 

traditionally been an important negotiating chip. It’s also worth mentioning, in terms of 

looking at the different positions, that an essential consideration for the Armenian side 

is ensuring a land corridor between Armenia and Karabakh. 

Now, the settlement process, led by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs from the U.S., 

Russia and France, is predicated on the three principles of the Helsinki Final Act: the 

non-use of force; territorial integrity; and self-determination of peoples. The so-called basic 
5 

principles for the settlement of the conflict—and we will hear later from Ambassadors 

Cavanaugh and Warlick about this—that co-chairs have developed, I think that as seen 

from the outside, are a balanced formula for political settlement. 

In their 2007 iteration, the Madrid Principles call for—and we all know them, but 

I will reiterate—the return of territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani 

control; interim status for the region providing guarantees for security and selfgovernance; a corridor linking Armenia and Karabakh; future determination of the final 

legal status of the region through a legally binding expression of popular will; the right 

of return of all displaced persons; and international security arrangements, including a 

peacekeeping operation. I see these principles as providing a possible workable roadmap 

for a sustainable political settlement. And I would say this is something that we see in 

short supply in many of the other conflicts in the post-Soviet space. 

But of course, while the parties in principle agree to these principles as a basis for 

negotiations, in practice the principles are very far away from the reality that currently 

shapes the society and from discussions in these societies. We see a big disconnect there. 

So, indeed, efforts to get to an agreement have consistently failed. And post 2016, the parties have taken a dramatic departure from any compromise-based solution. The relationship between Baku and Yerevan is firmly anchored in a zero-sum logic. And maximalist 

positions have, indeed, gained currency after 2016. 

Here, I would like to shift a few years down the line to the state of play today and 

after 2016. And I think it’s important today to really think through the escalation of 2016 

and its lessons. The dynamic today is very directly shaped by that. And many factors that 

had contributed to that so-called Four Day War are still valid today. In fact they have 

even been exacerbated. I will mainly focus on two of those factors—sort of big-ticket factors, confidence or the lack thereof, and militarization of the region. 

Confidence is in short supply. There is no confidence between the sides, but there’s 

also very little confidence in the mediation process itself and in its ability to deliver 

progress. I would even say that there is little confidence in the international system that 

frames the settlement effort. This has become especially evident also after 2014. Azerbaijan in particular fears the process is cementing the status quo on the ground, which 

Baku, of course, finds unacceptable. And in the absence of confidence in the settlement 

mechanism, the use of force—at least tactically—to perhaps shake up the status quo, has 

become a part of calculations, which is something that many in Baku are fairly open 

about. 

On the Armenian side, on the other hand, there is quite little confidence in the international system’s ability to provide any meaningful security guarantees, for Yerevan to 

be then able to engage in substantive talks. 

The second big factor has been the arms race in the region. I think that we all have 

followed the increase of that. Of course, it has not stopped since 2016. So, if we roll back 

prior to 2016, we just look at the sort of increase that has been on the rise for the last 

decade or more. 

Let me start with Azerbaijan. It has pursued a massive increase in military expenditure over the past decade. Three billion U.S. dollars were invested in defense in 2015 

alone, which was a 165 percent increase over 2006. And of course, Azerbaijan has also 

sought to diversify its weapons acquisitions. We’ve seen a lot of cooperation not only with 

the Russian Federation, but also Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel. 
6 

The Armenian side has worked hard to catch up, although in the year that I cited, 

2015, the country’s overall annual budget was smaller than Azerbaijani defense spending 

alone. Having said that, Yerevan is benefitting in many ways from the alliances and the 

close cooperation that it has with the Russian Federation, both bilaterally and in the 

CSTO. Many argue that, indeed, preferential tariffs for weapons purchases have probably 

helped close the gap. 

The upshot is that the military balance has probably not been decisively tipped. 

There are many different factors that play into this, but the dangers are no less small. 

After all, both sides have access to midrange missiles that could reach civilian areas and 

infrastructure deep into each other’s territory—something that raises the stakes. The 

region also saw a progressive deterioration of security already since 2012. I won’t bore 

you with the trajectory of that deterioration, but in 2016 it reached a qualitatively new 

level through that year’s escalation. 

I will say a couple of words on the escalation and on the main logic of the deadlock 

and obstacles now. So 2016 came as a surprise—a surprise it probably shouldn’t have 

been—with over 200 casualties and acquisitions, importantly, by Baku of two strategic 

heights, which was the first time that land changed hands since 1994. And this has very 

important implications. It gave Azerbaijan a morale boost. It also in a sense burst the 

myth of Armenian forces’ invincibility. It fueled a desire for a more significant departure 

from the status quo, which had become unacceptable. 

On the Armenian side, it initially caused shock. But of course, it caused also a very 

strong upsurge of popular support for Nagorno-Karabakh and the cause. And Armenians 

from all walks of life and many different places started traveling to Karabakh to provide 

support. It led to an important revision of Karabakh’s security, with new trench and fortifications systems built, new command and control put in place, and a strong restructure 

of Armenia’s armed forces. Armenia also experienced a backlash against Russia following 

April and, indeed, a querying of Russia’s role as, on the one hand, a co-chair, but on the 

other hand, Armenia’s main ally, who simultaneously happens to be a provider of weapons 

to Azerbaijan as well. 

The escalation seriously polarized the nations. On both sides maximalist positions got 

deeper and more entrenched. And on both sides, we hear calls for the ‘‘final settlement’’ 

of the conflict, which do not preclude the use of force. On the contrary, many call for the 

use of force and have given backing to a possible military option. Our research on this 

in all these locations has been very instructive. There seems to be no appetite on the 

Armenian side to countenance the notion of the return of territories adjacent to Karabakh. 

I think that’s been, for me, a really important point, that this distinction between the 

Karabakh and the territories seems to have been erased from the public discourse. 

And on the Azerbaijani side, on the other hand, there is an insistence that the only 

settlement option that would be acceptable would be to reintegrate Karabakh into the 

territorial integrity framework of Azerbaijan. 

We have already said that the escalation galvanized the settlement process briefly, 

with the two meetings of the presidents last May and June. But basically, the process 

ground to a halt by the autumn of 2016, and there have since then been serious security 

incidents, which have claimed dozens of casualties during the course of this year alone. 

Last couple of words on the renewed deadlock and the obstacles today—the main 

obstacles can probably best be summarized as a tension between security and substantive 
7 

progress in the talks. Armenia, of course, insists on more security. We’ve seen the calls 

for the investigative mechanism, for increased capacities of Mr. Kasprzyk’s office, and, 

indeed, confidence and security building measures [CSBMs] before substantive talks can 

start. An official in Yerevan told me, ‘‘No one in Armenia is ready to engage in negotiations if we’re under fire.’’ I think this captured the logic very well. 

But Baku, of course, feels that these various CSBMs will make it more comfortable 

for Yerevan to just continue with the status quo that is there, and that is so deeply 

unsatisfactory for Baku. And again, basic confidence is lacking. 

The last three months have been much calmer on the line of contact, very interestingly, after a serious deterioration of security earlier this year. I think that this in a way 

allowed also for the meeting of the two presidents to take place earlier this week. 

I would say it’s absolutely essential that negotiations continue to dispel risks of escalation. And in fact, a lack of contact between the sides is very dangerous. Both the 

absence of political contacts, but also the continued lack of contact between militaries on 

both sides. In contrast with other post-Soviet conflicts, there’s barely any contact between 

the sides at all in this conflict—both in terms of the political negotiations but also in 

terms even of track two efforts. I know that some are underway, but they’ve been fairly 

limited. 

Of course, it’s excellent that the meeting took place. And hopefully it will manage 

the conflict better. But it will be interesting, whether it manages to bring a change in 

the party’s calculations. I would say there’s also a risk that if the renewed process does 

not manage to tackle both substance on the one hand and, indeed, the concerns about 

security on the other hand, we are possibly entering a phase where there will be a 

renewed risk of escalation. 

Very last word: If there is a renewed risk of escalation, and indeed if that escalation 

were to occur, I think it’s important to think also about the humanitarian consequences 

it could have. I don’t think that a huge escalation is in the interest of any of the parties. 

But if an escalation were to spiral out of control, it probably would lead to significant 

humanitarian consequences. We can discuss that during the debate. It’s been interesting 

to see that humanitarian actors on the ground are very concerned about this. They’re 

making contingency planning. And I think that—again, our research showed that this is 

something that is very important because the humanitarian contingency capacities on the 

ground are exceedingly limited. 

I would probably stop right here. Thank you very much. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Magdalena, thank you. You’ve put a tremendous amount of information 

on the table for us to chew over. 

I’ll now turn to Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh for some thoughts on the engagement 

of the international diplomatic process as regards this conflict. 

Amb. CAVANAUGH. Thank you. First, I want to thank the Commission for bringing 

us together here today to talk about Nagorno-Karabakh. I think this is an important conflict that does not get the attention that it needs. And I think there’s a consensus, at least 

among those of us presenting today, that this past year has really driven this point home. 

The title of today’s presentation, ‘‘Averting All-Out War,’’ I think is a legitimate one. And 

we’ve talked about the dangers of this dispute getting out of hand in research that 

Magdalena has put out and that I have put out. We will touch on that as well today. 
8 

I want to blend some of my comments with what she said to build a base for where 

we are with the negotiation process and the conflict itself. I couldn’t agree more with 

Magdalena’s comments. This is not a frozen conflict. People who use that expression are 

wrong. This conflict has thawed, and I think, at this point, has become very dangerous. 

There really have been three marked changes in recent time that make it more 

problematic. 

First and foremost, as she eloquently described, positions have hardened on all sides. 

I think it’s fair to say, from every perspective the parties are farther apart from an agreement today than they were in the past. 

The armaments that Magdalena detailed have also changed the dynamic in the 

region. There has been a problem with fighting in this region for decades, at this point. 

But the amount of arms that have been brought into the region on all sides have made 

this a much more delicate situation. The clash that occurred in April 2016 was a significant one and it happened quickly. When I think about averting all-out war, there’s a concern not only of a deliberate move toward military action but also a concern about an accidental one. It would be very easy to envision things happening along the line of contact 

that very quickly get out of hand, given the intensification of armaments and the qualitative changes in the type of armaments that are arrayed both along the line of contact 

and along the Armenian and Azerbaijani border. 

The third piece that’s important to keep in mind is that the South Caucasus itself 

has not been static. There has been tremendous development and change in this region. 

Anyone in this room who has been recently to Yerevan or to Baku sees these are not the 

Yerevan and Baku of the former Soviet Union. If you have been to Tbilisi, this Georgia 

does not look like the Georgia of before. There are dramatic changes in the economic 

integration of the region. There’s dramatic changes in the growth and political change in 

the countries of the region. And that has put a greater premium on ensuring that peace 

is maintained in this region. 

So, with that as a backdrop, let me give you a sense of how the OSCE Minsk Group 

itself came about and go back into some of that history. As Alex said earlier, I wrote a 

piece for Security and Human Rights that was published this month that gives a history 

of this [‘‘OSCE and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,’’ 27 (2016) pp. 422–441]. In a 

shortened form, the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh is the embryonic peace effort of 

OSCE. The conflict broke out in the Soviet Union. It was an internal conflict originally. 

Then the Soviet Union fell apart, making it an international conflict. It became dealt with 

immediately by CSCE, so in fact it pre-dates OSCE. And at the time it arose, the issue 

from the international perspective was, how do you deal with this? 

The U.N. had already found it was being swamped around the world with other conflicts. And the U.N. approach was that regional organizations should increasingly deal 

with regional problems. And CSCE/OSCE was a new organization. This was an appropriate new effort for it to undertake. And it embraced it readily. And the U.N. immediately supported that embracement. Briefly, the U.N. maintained an envoy for NagornoKarabakh too. Not a mediator, but a special envoy, Cyrus Vance [the former U.S. Secretary of State], was sent out to the region to look at what was going on for the Secretary 

General. The U.N. agreed with the approach that was being taken by CSCE [later OSCE] 

and from that point on, it has been the focus for mediation and negotiation efforts. It 

hasn’t, however, been static. Just as this conflict has changed its dynamic over time, so 

too has the mediation process. 
9 

Initially the thought at CSCE was, this will be really quick. We’re going to have a 

meeting. We’re going to bring together people. We’ll just cut a deal. Belarus was the 

newest member of the OSCE at that point and they volunteered to host the peace conference. That’s why it’s called the Minsk Group. It was nothing more than that. Italian 

diplomat Mario Raffaelli was in charge of the initial effort. And he gathered other 

interested parties in Rome and started kicking around how CSCE might do this. In fact, 

at that point there was no Minsk Group. There was to be a Minsk conference. That conference would be the officials meeting in Belarus with the parties to the conflict—undefined. They would quickly sort out the problem and it would be done. We never would 

have had this meeting today or the past 20 some-odd years of conflict. 

As we all know, that didn’t work out. In Rome they created a subgroup, a Minsk 

Group, that evolved into the current negotiating mechanism. Initially that mechanism 

was led by a single European country—Italy, then Sweden, then Finland—with a separate 

negotiation effort going on at the same time by Russia. And it turned out, that did not 

help this process. What we saw happen in 1996 and 1997 is a dramatic change in that 

there becomes a fused negotiation process, where there will be a neutral European 

country and Russia and, very quickly, the United States. So a troika—triple co-chairmanship emerged in 1997 to focus on this conflict and really to give it, I think, the type of 

attention it deserves. 

The third party is France. So France, Russia, and the United States become the lead 

mediating parties in this dispute, all three veto-wielding members of the United Nations, 

all three significant global powers. And countries with the ability to provide the military, 

political, and economic support to back a solution if a solution could be found. 

Now, Magdalena said, quite properly, there is a question about confidence in the 

negotiation mechanism. And I think that question arises because there’s a misunderstanding, in part, of how that negotiation mechanism works. OSCE is an amazing institution. It is a consensus institution. It can do anything that all its members agree to do. 

And any action that one member that doesn’t support—and we saw this recently with the 

closure of OSCE’s offices in Armenia—they cannot do. 

The intent was not to create a mediation format that would force the parties into an 

agreement that had been brokered by outsiders. The intent was to create a mediation format that would help the parties to the conflict find a solution that was acceptable to all 

of them, and that those mediators would have, behind them, the political, economic and 

military power to ensure that the parties could be confident, if you found an agreement, 

that agreement would be supported. And what we have seen from 1997 on is repeated 

iterations—some with me as a co-chair, some with Ambassador Warlick as a co-chair— 

where almost every imaginable solution has been brought to the table. 

There is a frustration there that this mechanism has not yet yielded success. But I 

would add, repeatedly the parties have come fairly close to some agreements. There was 

significant progress in Key West in 2001. There was significant process in Kazan. There 

have been times the conflicting parties indeed have approached compromise in a much 

more thorough fashion than they are today. So I do not believe you can fault the mechanism. The mechanism, in fact, has functioned the way it is supposed to. 

And I would add, OSCE had delivered in a way that would be, for many, the envy 

to have a negotiating process like that. Three U.N. veto-wielding members of your negotiating team is already pretty cool. The power that Russia, the United States, and France 

possess is significant in all those dimensions that I mentioned. The attention that this 
10 

conflict gets is substantial. You will not have an American President since 1987 that 

doesn’t know about Nagorno-Karabakh. Many American Presidents don’t know about conflicts of this scope in other corners of the world. They know about this one. Secretaries 

of state, foreign ministers of almost all European countries know about NagornoKarabakh. OSCE has delivered an enormous amount of political attention that I think is 

part of the reason why we also haven’t seen even more violence and loss of life in this 

region. 

So there is a benefit that has come out of this mechanism that is useful. The structures to support a peace settlement have also evolved. Today, we see there’s an OSCE 

Chairman in Office. It’s rotated, so every year we get a new European government in 

charge of OSCE, a new series of visits by presidents and foreign ministers to the region, 

a new learning curve where all the European countries—and I include in that the United 

States and Canada, the OSCE/CSCE countries—are all acquainted with this conflict and 

this problem, and all focused on it. The Chairman in Office [CIO] also has a personal representative in the region who helps deal with problems along the line of contact and 

reports back and provides the permanent presence in the region. The Minsk Group cochairs do travel to the region, but they can’t be there all the time. In fact, the OSCE has 

a full-time presence there all the time. Also, in Vienna, there is a High-Level Planning 

Group to deal with peacekeepers or monitors, if you ever get close enough to a solution. 

And finally there is the Minsk Group itself, three co-chairs and a group of supporting 

nations, all of whom track more intensely this conflict. So we see what’s developed at 

Vienna, at OSCE, is really a fairly complex and flexible institution to help support peace 

efforts in this region. 

Lack of success—if you’re a diplomat, part of your job is taking blame for lack of success. The Minsk Group is very good at that. We keep trying. All the Minsk Group cochairs will say that. The current co-chairs will say that. We are always trying. But the 

intent is to find a solution the parties themselves can embrace. I mentioned that the negotiation mechanism did not work well before 1996–1997. There was a real change then in 

the dynamic between the United States and Russia and the other European players. And 

I will attest, and I suspect Ambassador Warlick will as well, that there has been a level 

of cooperation within the co-chairs on addressing this conflict that has surprised most 

people. 

Despite problems between the United States and Russia periodically, we find very 

solid cooperation on dealing with the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. The French tend to 

be consistent all the time. We’ve seen this solid level of cooperation. That’s made a difference too. I think it’s provided the tools—OSCE is offering the tools that are needed to 

deal with this kind of problem. And it should give us some hope on the ability to move 

forward more toward a solution. The challenge is—back to where I started—that today 

Nagorno-Karabakh is not a frozen conflict. The positions have hardened. The parties have 

moved further away from being comfortable with making fundamental compromise. And 

I think there’s an understanding, this can only get solved if there is fundamental compromise. 

Magdalena started with three principles enshrined both in the Helsinki Final Act, 

but also the U.N. Charter. The question about territorial integrity and sovereignty—it’s 

a fundamental international principle. The question about ethnic self-determination, also 

a fundamental international principle. And very much embraced in the modern era, thank 

God, non-use of force. And when you take these three principles together, it does not offer 
11 

an easy solution to this problem. This problem is not unique to the South Caucasus. We’ve 

seen votes in the past weeks, in Catalonia about ethnic determination. We’ve seen votes 

in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq. These problems exist in many different places. 

So I don’t think it’s an easy problem to solve. But this is a problem that’s getting attention 

of the international community in a way that it needs to. 

There is concern about averting all-out war, and some question why does NagornoKarabakh—with the size of the population it has, with the size of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s population—why does it get all the attention that it does? In part it is the region 

in which it’s located. A conflict here runs the risk of spilling over into Iran, as Magdalena 

said, bringing in Turkey, bringing in Russia, potentially bringing in NATO. It’s an area 

where no one feels comfortable that you could have the potential for a significant clash. 

So it guarantees attention at high levels to deal with that problem. I think that attention 

will continue. What’s sad, and what we’ve not seen lately, is more ability or willingness 

to move forward toward these political compromises. 

I had commented before the meeting on Monday in Geneva between President Aliyev 

and President Sargsyan that there were three easy things they could do there. Two of 

them were to agree once again to what they had agreed to twice last year: expand monitors for Ambassador Kasprzyk’s team. I would note, that’s an expansion of only about 

seven or eight people. That would make their monitors roughly the size of this side of 

the room for the entire region. Agree to an incident investigations mechanism, because 

we have constant claims back and forth who started something, and no ability to say. And 

again, this was raised in Vienna and raised in St. Petersburg with President Vladimir 

Putin. The parties agreed to those. You know, three easy things would have been those 

two and to agree on the date of the next meeting. What we have seen coming out of the 

meeting so far, and maybe there’s more, is agreement to meet again . . . sometime. 

Two other things I’d hoped to see, that would have been much harder but I think 

are important—first, military confidence and security building measures. This ties back 

to the point Magdalena made, and I did too, about the intensification of armaments. The 

region’s gotten too dangerous. It would be useful to have more ability, if things happen 

accidentally, for one side to communicate with the other. We know that can exist. It’s 

existed before. You can have a hotline, in effect, between Baku and Yerevan, that if something starts getting out of control, you know if you pick up that phone and dial the 

number somebody will answer it at the other end. For a while they even had that, but 

nobody would answer at the other end. If we could have that kind of agreement today, 

that would help. 

If the parties aren’t able to do that, we probably should look at having some military 

confidence and security-building measures between others: between Turkey and Russia, 

to make sure if things do get out of hand, their forces don’t conflict or collide. Perhaps 

between the United States and Russia sharing intelligence information on what we see 

happening in the region, and where problems could arise. Last week, an official of the 

CSTO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, said the most important question 

here, in his mind, is balance, because Russia’s providing armaments to both sides. Maybe 

we should have some CSBMs talking about whether there is a real balance? Because as 

you introduce new systems—and we saw this past year several new armaments were 

introduced in both Armenia and Azerbaijan—you may inadvertently tip the balance and 

cause a problem that had not been anticipated. So that’s one thing I think that’s harder, 
12 

could be done hopefully with the parties doing it. But some of that could be done from 

outside. 

A second harder piece is to begin laying this groundwork for civil cooperation among 

the countries. Presidents of both countries say repeatedly they want a political solution. 

They don’t want to use military force. That’s there’s an understanding that there would 

be a solution. If there will be a solution, several things call for greater cooperation. How 

do you manage water? How do you build a logical electrical grid? Why build something 

one way this year if you’re saying you support a solution, and next year it’s in the wrong 

place? Those kind of questions can be dealt with quite easily and quite readily and, I 

think, don’t raise the specter of intensifying the status quo or making it harder to move 

ahead. 

I remember when I was co-chair visiting the HALO Trust and looking at the great 

work they were doing with demining in this region. If Azerbaijan’s hope is all the land 

comes back to Azerbaijan, why would you want landmines in it? The day you get it back, 

you want no mines in it. The day whatever solution is brokered between the parties with 

the support of OSCE, you want no landmines in it. So why not cooperate on those civil 

steps to remove those? 

And then the last item I would raise I think is the hardest—greater signals from the 

presidents of both countries on being prepared to accept a political compromise. It’s very 

easy to say if things don’t go well we’re prepared to fight. It’s really hard to say we’re 

prepared to find a way to solve this problem. And it isn’t 100 percent of what I want 

versus nothing of what the other side wants. It’s something in the middle. And I think 

that signal has not been conveyed effectively for the last 15 years. 

So let me stop. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Ambassador, thank you for what was not only an extremely instructive 

overview of the historical engagement by outside parties in this process, but also an 

extremely, I think, practical set of potential next steps in the conflict. 

I’ll now pass it to Ambassador James Warlick. 

Thank you. 

Amb. WARLICK. Good afternoon, everybody. Many thanks to the Helsinki Commission 

for organizing a public briefing on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I believe the Commission staff has made available a speech I delivered at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace three years ago. In my comments today, I will draw from that speech, 

which is as relevant today as it was then. 

When I started as U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group in 2013, the situation 

along the line of contact was unstable and dangerous. The threat that needed to be 

addressed was the presence of snipers, which would regularly fire across the line of contact, resulting in deaths and injuries, despite the existence of a ceasefire. My predecessors 

in the Minsk Group, including my colleague Ambassador Cavanaugh, sought ways to 

reinforce the ceasefire and prevent the actions of these snipers. 

Today, the threat is vastly greater. The sides have positioned heavy weapons along 

the line of contact, including mortars, grenade launchers and artillery. Use of these 

weapons has brought an increase in the death toll, including among innocent civilians. 

The risk of miscalculation and escalation are higher than ever. We need to redouble our 

efforts towards a lasting peace. And peace is within reach. 
13 

The sides have come to a point where their positions on the way forward are not that 

far apart, despite what you may see in the media. They’ve almost reached agreement on 

several occasions, as my colleagues have just said, most recently in 2011. And when they 

inevitably return to the negotiating table after each failed round, the building blocks of 

the next big idea were similar to the last time. There is a body of principles, understandings and documents already on the table that lay out a deal. And no one has suggested that we abandon them. 

The challenge is to find a way to help the sides take the last bold step forward to 

bridge their remaining differences and deliver the peace and stability that their populations deserve. For two decades, however, peace has been elusive. All parties distrust 

each other and a generation of young people has grown up in Armenia and Azerbaijan 

with no first-hand experience of each other. As many have noted, older generations 

remember a time when Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived side-by-side and differences did 

not need to be resolved through the barrel of a gun. 

Of course, the benefits of peace far outweigh the costs of continued stalemate and 

avoid the catastrophic consequences of renewed hostilities. Armenia would immediately 

benefit from open borders, greater security, and new opportunities to trade, travel and 

engage with all its neighbors. Azerbaijan would eliminate a key impediment to its growth 

as a player on the world stage, regional trade hub, and strong security partner, while 

giving hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons a prospect or 

reconciliation and return. The thousands of people living in Nagorno-Karabakh would be 

freed from the prison of isolation and dependence. 

The presidents met again last Monday in Geneva. While we do not know the details 

of that conversation, it appears that there is simply not the political will to move forward 

with a settlement at this time. While we should welcome such face-to-face meetings, without progress on substance they risk frustrating the sides and continuing the stalemate 

on the ground. Following the escalation of hostilities in April 2014, a set of proposals was 

developed that could form the basis for progress. We, as co-chairs, worked hard to advance 

ideas for a way forward, but the process stalled. 

While the work of the co-chairs is held in confidence, I am personally familiar with 

these proposals and believe they could be a starting point for the sides to seek a settlement. I would urge the presidents to engage with each other, if not on these proposals, 

then on the principles they know will be the basis for peace. Perpetual negotiations, periodic outbreaks of violence, the isolation of Armenia and the people living in NagornoKarabakh, frustration in Azerbaijan and anger among its populations of internally displaced persons [IDPs]—this is not a recipe for peace or stability, and is certainly not the 

path to prosperity. The people of the region deserve better. 

Let me walk you through the key elements of that well-established settlement—all 

of which have been in the public domain since appearing in joint statements by the presidents of Russia, France, and the United States on numerous occasions. At the heart of 

the deal are the U.N. Charter and relevant documents, and the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act. In particular, we focus on those principles and commitments that pertain 

to the non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 

Building on that foundation, there are six elements that will have to be a part of any 

peace agreement if it is to endure. While the sequencing and details of these elements 

remain the subject of negotiations, they must been seen as an integrated whole. Any 
14 

attempt to select some elements over others will make it impossible to achieve a balanced 

solution. In no particular order, these elements are: First, in light of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 

complex history, the sides should commit to determining its final legal status through a 

mutually agreed and legally binding expression of will in the future. This is not optional. 

Interim status will be temporary. 

Second, the area within the boundaries of the former Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous 

republic that is not controlled by Baku should be granted an interim status that, at a minimum, provides guarantees for security and self-governance. 

Third, the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh should be returned to 

Azerbaijani control. There can be no settlement without respect for Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, and the recognition that its sovereignty over these territories must be restored. 

Fourth, there should be a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. It must be 

wide enough to provide secure passage, but it cannot encompass the whole of Lachin district. 

Fifth, an enduring settlement will have to recognize the right of all IDPs and refugees to return to their former places of residence. 

Sixth, and finally, a settlement must include international security guarantees that 

would include a peacekeeping operation. There is no scenario in which peace can be 

assured without a well-designed peacekeeping operation that enjoys the confidence of all 

sides. 

The time has come for the sides to commit themselves to peace negotiations, building 

on the foundation of work done so far. It is up to the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan to take the first step. They should consider measures, even unilateral ones, that 

will demonstrate their stated commitment to making progress, reducing tensions, and 

improving the atmosphere for negotiations. They should reduce the hostile rhetoric and 

prepare their populations for peace, not war. Let’s work together towards a lasting peace. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Ambassador Warlick, thank you very much for what I think was a 

tremendously powerful call to action. I would now like to take the moderator’s prerogative 

to ask you all about elements of what you’ve been discussing. And really, given that our 

briefing is focusing on U.S. policy, I want to stick to U.S. policy and the policy of its negotiating partners, essentially, as opposed to the parties directly involved in the conflict. 

And let me direct one question principally to each of you, but have you each comment. 

So Magdalena in passing reminded us that this conflict is on the EU’s doorstep. And 

yet, the EU has not been featured prominently in the panelists’ discussion of the main 

players in a potential eventual solution to this conflict. I’d like Magdalena to talk a little 

bit about what she sees as the EU’s role today and going forward. 

For Ambassador Cavanaugh, you informed us about the evolution of the co-chair 

process, partially as a result of a moment of negotiations in which Russia was leading 

its own negotiations in the region. I’d like you to comment a bit on what Russian interests 

are in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. And in particular, you mentioned there is excellent 

cooperation in the context—or productive cooperation in the context of the co-chairs 

process. To what extent does Russia still—and on what occasions—does Russian bilateral 

engagement also occur, and to what end? How should we see the Russian role in this 

negotiation process? 
15 

To Ambassador Warlick, given your call to action and given that you are the most 

recent full-term U.S. co-chair, I wonder if you could speak a bit to the role of the United 

States today. In particular, there have been public reports of what the status of the U.S. 

co-chair will be going forward, given the State Department reorganization process. Can 

you give us a sense of—and really, I suppose this is a question for all of the panelists— 

are you calling for additional attention by the U.S. executive branch today? And what 

would that look like? 

So, please, if we could start with Magdalena. If anyone else would like to jump on 

this question of Europe, and then we’ll move to Russia and then the United States. And 

then—ladies and gentlemen, then I’ll ask for some questions from the audience. 

Ms. GRONO. Thank you very much, Alex. 

It’s a tricky question about the EU’s role. In its 2015 revision of the European 

Neighborhood Policy that targets in the east both Armenia and Azerbaijan, in addition 

to Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, the EU has emphasized security and stability 

as one of the key elements. 

I would also say that 2016 came as a very unexpected and dangerous wakeup call. 

For the four days of that short war, many in Brussels were scratching their heads trying 

to understand what exactly was happening in that neighborhood, which is in fact quite 

so close. So, I think for the EU de-escalation is an essential consideration. 

The EU of course is not formally a player in the conflict settlement process. And 

though there have been different sorts of opinions about that and some experts have 

called for a greater EU role, I agree with what Ambassador Cavanaugh said, that the 

OSCE is a consensus-based organization—and there is very little appetite for changing 

the format. I think that there is no sense of need, or indeed wish in the current setup 

of that format, to bring in the EU in a formal way. But I think that the EU still has 

a very important contextual role to play. 

Now what can a contextual role like that look like? The EU has a lot of currency 

at the moment in its bilateral relations with the region, and in particular, indeed, we’ve 

seen a lot of dynamism in the bilateral EU-Armenia and EU-Azerbaijan relations over the 

past couple of years with progress on the so-called new agreements that are being negotiated and will hopefully soon be finalized. The one with Armenia, in fact, has been finalized. 

There is interest on the part of the EU’s partners to see these relationships blossom, 

and I think that it’s important therefore for the EU also to emphasize in the context of 

these bilateral relations the necessity for certain steps to be taken towards a de-escalation 

of tensions. Of course, that may not have a direct implication for the settlement process, 

but there is the case to be made for developing constituencies for peace, for insisting that 

we have de-escalatory rhetoric coming from the leadership, et cetera—some of these issues 

that have been very difficult to address for the past 15, 20 years, but they really need 

a lot of attention. 

Secondly, the EU pursues a lot of people-to-people contact and indeed supports the 

so-called track two initiatives. There have been three iterations of a program called the 

European Partnership for Nagorno-Karabakh, EPNK; such initiatives are aimed at supporting or developing confidence-building measures across the conflict divide. It has been 

very, very difficult to see such initiatives get off the ground over the past two years. I 

would say that there has been in fact a trend whereby many actors in the region haven’t 
16 

been so keen on seeing this progress. But it’s very important that these types of initiatives 

help build constituencies that can in fact advocate for the benefits of peace. And this is 

what the EU has been doing, but I think that it can bring more political weight to this. 

And lastly, of course, France, as one of the co-chair countries, is an important EU 

Member State. And I think there the EU can—and as it does—give a lot of its own 

backing to France. Last year, it was quite interesting in the first summit of the presidents 

in Vienna, in May, High Representative Mogherini did meet also with Azerbaijani and 

Armenian leaderships prior to their own meetings and prior to the meetings with cochairs. This was an important political signal. There are many high-level political dialogue opportunities in the EU context—for instance, with the Armenian and Azerbaijani 

presidents each traveling to Brussels for meetings with President Tusk this February. 

These are all fora in which a lot of political messaging can and should be delivered. 

Last comment on what Ambassador Cavanaugh said earlier. I could underwrite what 

he said; with Ambassador’s unparalleled experience with that process it’s difficult to disagree on certain elements. But I would say there is one element on which I disagree. I 

think Ambassador alluded to a sense that there is a lot of political focus on the process, 

but I wonder: Is there really a substantive political push at a sufficiently high level? I 

sometimes feel with many of the protracted conflicts, not just Karabakh, we can fall into 

a trap of almost a bureaucratic inertia whereby administrations know that this is an issue 

that is going to be difficult to resolve, there is not a great likelihood that we will have 

progress, so we have known positions that are being reiterated. And I think this is a great 

risk, and that after the April 2016 escalation, we really need to walk away from bureaucratic inertias. That’s why the initiative to discuss the conflict today is very timely. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you. 

I’d like to give either of our ambassadors a chance to comment on the question on 

Europe, or shall we move directly to Russia? Would you like to comment on Europe? 

Amb. CAVANAUGH. I’ll do Europe, please. Let me comment a little on Europe and then 

move into Russia. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Great. 

Amb. CAVANAUGH. One, Armenia’s expected to sign a partnership agreement with the 

EU next month. It’s clear there’s an interaction, a relationship here. It’s valued and 

important. Another item worth noting is the European Union also has a special envoy for 

this dispute—not a mediator, but someone keeping an eye on it, what’s happening, what 

could be done, how might Brussels help this process? So it has been engaged, I think, in 

a very positive way. 

And I want to strengthen what Magdalena said. The efforts the EU has made on civil 

society, to use NGOs, to bring people together, it has been essential. What Ambassador 

Warlick said is very true. I saw this firsthand visiting refugee camps in Azerbaijan. There 

is not contact in this next generation of populations in the region with one another. Those 

minimal contacts can make an enormous difference. And again, if we’re looking toward 

a future with a solution—a political solution where this region becomes integrated again 

as one—you shouldn’t have magic day 2020, the first meetings between Armenian and 

Azerbaijani journalists and engineers and air traffic controllers and highway engineers 

and hydro experts. These things should be being developed, being worked out, now. Youth 
17 

groups should have contact, now. Sports groups should have contact, now. The EU has 

played a role there others couldn’t. 

And that leads into responding to your question about Russia. I think Russia saw 

in 1994 it wasn’t going to be able to solve this itself. It put its best effort in it. It had 

a very solid negotiating team. It had very high-level political attention. It did all it could. 

There was not sufficient confidence that that would be a solution that was a solution that 

was best for the region. And there wasn’t sufficient confidence that Russia was going to 

be prepared to back that economically to the degree that it would be necessary. 

And I think what we’ve seen that has evolved is very much a sharing of responsibilities. The EU is doing things it can do best. Russia is doing things it can do best. When 

the April skirmish broke out, Russia was a central player on bringing about a ceasefire. 

I suspect Russia would always be the central player on bringing about the ceasefire. It 

has a history of contacts with the militaries of both countries, right down to supplying 

arms to both of them, so those contacts continue. And it’s there. The European Union, 

France are farther away. The United States, even farther away. So there’s a division of 

authority and responsibilities here that I think has been very helpful. 

Russian involvement in this region, I think, is complex. And many people question— 

you hear this in Armenia and Azerbaijan—if Russia has ulterior motives. They were 

always our ally, now you can’t trust them. Both sides say that. It becomes a difficult position to deal with. 

But I think what Russia has seen is, one, it couldn’t solve this problem on its own; 

and two, other areas with similar problems haven’t gone all that well. Georgia is not a 

good solution, where Georgia stands today. Crimea is not a good solution. Eastern 

Ukraine is not a good solution. It is not in Russia’s interest to have yet another problem 

like that emerge in the South Caucasus. If there’s a way to cooperate with France and 

the United States in the OSCE negotiating format to find a solution, that Armenians and 

Azerbaijanis can embrace and are comfortable with, that’s a good solution for Russia. And 

I think Russia sees that. 

It has now growing—and this is not helpful—a vested interest in selling arms to both 

Armenia and Azerbaijan. I think it recognizes the danger in that. I cited a Russian officer’s comment on that, the importance of trying to keep a balance in that. But I think 

Russia would see the value of a solution would outweigh the value of the arms sales. So 

I don’t think that would be an impediment to Russia helping move a solution forward if 

the groundwork is there for a solution to be made. 

I think it’s a sincere effort. And I think that really has led, as I said earlier, to a 

degree of cooperation among us—between France, the United States, and Russia—that 

surprises people, because it’s an area where it is in no one’s interest for a loss of life in 

the South Caucasus, no one’s interests for greater instability here, and certainly no one’s 

interest in all-out war. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Ambassador, thank you. I realize others may want to comment on 

Russia, but I’m also conscious that unfortunately we are running out of time, and I certainly would like to give members of the distinguished audience a chance to have their 

brief say. Let’s move to perhaps one of the really key elements that I wanted to talk 

about, which is, what is the panel’s view on U.S. engagement today and tomorrow? 

Ambassador Warlick, would you like to start on that? 
18 

Amb. WARLICK. Sure. Just one word on Russia. Despite the strained relations 

between the U.S. and Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was and is one of the areas 

where we have worked together with Moscow closely and collaboratively. My counterpart 

Ambassador Popov is a true professional. I consider him not only a colleague but a friend. 

Foreign Minister Lavrov invited the co-chairs to come to Moscow, and met with us in New 

York. President Putin included us in his summit meeting in St. Petersburg with the two 

presidents. So I would say that this is one issue where we have truly cooperated. And 

I sincerely believe that the Russians are committed to a peaceful settlement and are 

working towards that. 

The U.S.—of course, I don’t have any inside view of this administration, but I’ll just 

say in the last administration, there was no question that Secretary Kerry was personally 

involved and deeply committed to a settlement. He brought the presidents together on the 

margins of the NATO Summit in Wales for a very productive discussion. He also met with 

them in co-chair format, together with Foreign Minister Lavrov and the French then-state 

secretary on the margins in Vienna. What struck me was that Secretary Kerry, despite 

all that was going on in the world, was very knowledgeable about the conflict and deeply 

committed to finding a solution. 

For this administration, I believe all of you know that here is a new U.S. co-chair 

of the Minsk Group. He has the same status that I had and that Carey had. I hope that 

is a signal to the region that this administration will continue to work towards a negotiated settlement. I do believe that the senior leadership in this administration needs to 

be directly involved in addressing the conflict. As I said in my statement, the risks of 

renewed conflict and instability in the region should be a concern to all countries. The 

potential loss of life and the risk of a much more serious conflict—and we saw in April 

2016—should be of great concern to the administration. And I hope as time goes on we 

will see leaders in this administration engage actively together with Andrew Schofer as 

co-chair. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Would anyone else like to add to that particular point, U.S. engagement? No? OK. 

Here’s what I propose, ladies and gentlemen, for the audience questions. We unfortunately are going to have to vacate the room in not very long, so I propose to take those 

who would like to intervene, at least two or three at a time. There is a microphone in 

the back of the room. If I could ask who in the audience might want to ask a question 

or make a statement, please make it brief and direct it to the panelists. I see someone 

in the back of the room. Let’s start with those three together, please. And please be brief 

so that we can get in a second round immediately after yours. 

QUESTIONER. Hello. My name is Hayk [ph]. I am a journalist from Armenia, working 

for Armenian television. 

I’ll try two brief questions. First question is, is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the only 

and the last conflict, international issue in which the United States and Moscow cooperate 

in a friendly manner, as allies? Because we have conflicts in Georgia, and we know that 

the parties pursue different perspectives here or, same refers to Crimea. But is Karabakh 

conflict unique in that manner when we can track almost alliance-type of cooperation 

between Moscow and Washington, D.C.? 

And my second question is about the deterioration of civil liberties and democracy 

in Azerbaijan, which we have been witnessing recently. The scandal with Azerbaijani 
19 

Laundromat that poked out recently in Europe is known. And do you think that this 

problem of the deterioration of democracy and civil liberties in Azerbaijan should be 

considered as a factor for renegotiation? Because those international lobbyists or politicians who called for return of Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani control technically 

called for less democracy for Karabakh, because Karabakh is seen as relatively freer visa`-vis Azerbaijan. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you very much. 

Next question, please. 

QUESTIONER. Hi, my name is Alex Raufoglu. I’m an Azeri-origin journalist. I have two 

questions. 

One is, Ambassador Warlick mentioned the importance of engagement between the 

presidents. Please remind me, if I am mistaken, just two days before 2016 April war, we 

had two presidents in the White House, and one of them, I think it’s safe to say, pressed 

that button. If having this highest-level summit in Washington between the presidents 

doesn’t help them refrain from fighting back at home, then what else does? 

And number two question is about you mentioned, Ambassador Warlick, that the 

U.S. side was always present during the meetings in Russia. I’m remembering a meeting 

in Sochi which was supposed to be an ice-breaking moment—I think Russian president 

was hosting that meeting, and you were not invited. Can you just remind us of the details 

or any insight about that meeting? Why wasn’t the U.S. part of that meeting? 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you very much, and thank you for your brevity. 

QUESTIONER. Hello. I am Vugar Gurbanov from the Embassy of Azerbaijan. 

I would like to thank distinguished panel for their presentations. And indeed, it’s so 

true. And I would gladly be a student of Professor Cavanaugh, and I’m sure in Kentucky 

we would have extensive discussions, and that will be probably interesting to all other 

students. 

Actually, while listening to you, to your thought-provoking and deep analysis of the 

situation, and looking into the previous background of the situation, I got an impression 

that rather than to treat the disease, most attention is to try to treat symptoms. While 

the disease itself is known—and I’m very thankful to Madam Grono for highlighting it— 

fact of occupation, hundreds of thousands civilians displaced—all of these issues. And 

hundreds of thousands of people are still suffering. And of course, you mentioned about— 

and in your writings you put much focus, Ambassador Cavanaugh, on meeting of the 

presidents, which in itself was a very, very nice development. But 20 minutes after that 

meeting, President Sargsyan made a statement which actually killed every hope it has 

created—I mean, the meeting has created—about saying that, no, Karabakh should be out 

of Azerbaijan and that’s our only solution. 

And, Ambassador Warlick—and thank you very much for highlighting the components of the peaceful settlement, and which is a result of decade-long efforts of all 

involved. And now this shows—and this was not surprising to Azerbaijan side—that 

Armenian side is not sincere in the negotiation. They can come back and then walk away. 

And actually, what they are trying to do is, first of all, try to cement the status quo and 

then try to also promote the unilateral narrative to legitimatize the results of occupation. 

I’m coming to my questions. But my main point is that while you clearly underlined 

co-chairs’ role, I think it’s utmost important to put pressure on two sides, not to walk 
20 

away from the negotiations. They’re a peaceful plan and there are three principles: territorial integrity, non-use of force, and self-determination. And this should be treated as an 

integral—[inaudible]. No one can say that Karabakh should be out of Azerbaijan. 

And here is a fundamental question I would like your comment, is, I mean, 

abstracting from the position of Azerbaijan and Armenia, can a country go and grab a 

country’s territory, and then say, let’s negotiate and my only position will be—it’s going 

away? And I am thankful to the Helsinki Commission report, which clearly shows that 

Armenia’s intention is to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh within its boundaries. That’s 

actually all the questions that I had. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

I will ask the panelists to take those questions that they would like to address, and 

I think I’ll start with Ambassador Cavanaugh. And then if we could try to be brief from 

the panelist side, then I’ll be able to get in a second round of questions, which I would 

dearly like to do in the interest of the audience, and we will press our luck by keeping 

the room for a few minutes extra. 

Please, Ambassador Cavanaugh. 

Amb. CAVANAUGH. Sure, OK. Is Nagorno-Karabakh unique in U.S.-Russian cooperation? No. There are a number of areas that the United States needs to cooperate with 

Russia on, a number of areas. In recent years, we’ve been quite successful in cooperating 

with Russia on North Korea, Iran, some of the steps that have been taken in Syria. So, 

no, we have the ability to cooperate on a wide variety of issues. I think that’s important. 

The question of civil liberties, I think this is a legitimate question. More democracy, 

in the view of the United States of America, is always better—better spread of information, better spread of knowledge, greater confidence in the democratic structures of 

governance. So the more of that you see, that helps. So I think, no, anywhere where civil 

liberties are restricted becomes a negative influence on moving things ahead. 

And I think treating symptoms, not disease, goes back to the question on the limits 

of what OSCE can do. There’s not an intent here to force a solution. If somehow the 

people of Armenia and Azerbaijan came and said to Washington or Moscow or Paris, just 

tell us what to do and we’ll do it, we could give them something tomorrow. Actually, I 

know where something at State Department that exists that both sides came close to 

being comfortable with, we could pull that out. You [Ambassador Warlick] probably know 

where another one is. We could pull that out. But that’s not how the OSCE works. So, 

indeed, we’ll treat the symptoms, because the symptoms make it worse. Greater loss of 

life makes it harder to get a peaceful solution. If you were to have significant fighting 

today, with the ramifications that would cause for society across the South Caucasus— 

not simply Armenia and Azerbaijan, but Georgia as well—I think this would not make 

it easier to reach a solution. And so, of course we treat the symptoms. We push on the 

disease itself. But we don’t have the key to resolving the disease. 

Amb. WARLICK. I’ll just address the two questions that were directed to me. The first 

one on the high-level meeting that, at least as the questioner said took place at the White 

House in April 2016—there was no effort to host a bilateral summit meeting by the White 

House. I would say that the two presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia often do attend 

international events, and sometimes they do converse on the margins of that, but there 

was no U.S.-hosted summit in Washington during my tenure. 
21 

The Sochi meeting hosted by President Putin was not intended to be a full-fledged 

summit meeting. In fact, it was an invitation for both of the presidents to come together 

informally with President Putin, and that is what occurred. And we were pleased that the 

two presidents actually did talk under President Putin’s auspices, on the substance of 

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. My view is that whenever we can bring the presidents 

together, formally or informally, it’s healthy for them to meet face-to-face and one-on-one 

where they can have an honest conversation, as we say, under four eyes. I am disappointed that so long went between meetings of the two presidents, and I was glad to 

see on Monday in Geneva that the two presidents were once again able to meet again. 

Ms. GRONO. I just have a couple of quick points, but I thought it was more appropriate for the two ambassadors to start since they have much more direct views on the 

U.S. engagement. But I wanted to say on the question of civil liberties, I think that the 

way the question was posed was quite interesting, because of course it linked the civil 

liberties to the possible options in the settlement talks. I don’t see it necessarily as a useful way of phrasing the question. What I would have thought, though, is that of course 

the trend of retreating civil liberties in the region is important, but I see it as more 

directly important especially in terms of the possibilities of building constituencies for 

peace. And I think this is really important. We’ve been talking about the fact that it’s 

very hard to get an honest debate in the countries about what compromise-based solutions 

will look like. It’s very hard for people to engage with those ideas, and it’s very hard to 

really see civil society efforts reach across the conflict divide and build on those ideas. And 

it is in that context I see the possibly insufficient pluralism as a great risk. 

Now, in terms of the disease versus the symptoms, I actually feel that the principles 

on which a future compromise-based solution should be based go straight to the core of 

the disease. I really think that is what that set of principles is about. And the fact that 

it has been impossible to really work towards a compromise then creates a set of symptoms that, indeed, the international community is fire-fighting to address. But I think 

that the great disagreement is precisely around the disease. And so, if we manage to 

address the symptoms in the interim, that’s very good. But again, coming back to what 

the two ambassadors have highlighted—the principles are the basis for the settlement. 

Also, Armenia and Azerbaijan are very important members of the OSCE community, and 

this is where I feel that indeed the ownership of those principles is in part theirs, and 

they will indeed have to play a strong role in pushing towards the compromise-based solution. And that compromise, unlike very often iterated in the press, will not be one-sided. 

Compromise indeed, by definition, will have to come from both sides and will be mutual. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you. We are a little bit over time. I would like everyone’s indulgence in order to get as many perspectives on the table as possible. I will take—I see one 

in the back, two, and all the way in the back, three. Please be as brief as possible. 

Please, start, yes. 

QUESTIONER. Yes, my name’s Efgan Niftiyev. I’m with the Caspian Policy Center. 

I would like to thank all the panelists for very insightful views on the conflict, and 

it was very well summary of what happened, and the perspectives as well. 

First, I will disagree on one thing with Ambassador Cavanaugh on that. Yes, it is— 

there are efforts by the OSCE and others to resolve the conflict, but it’s not only up to 

Azerbaijan and Armenia to resolve the conflict. There is enough reason to be, let’s say, 

involved in a higher degree in the resolution of the conflict. There are much bigger 
22 

implications for the region and the globe as well. That’s why we have, like, big powers 

as mediators on the table. I know we have talked a lot about compromises and the political will, lack of political will. I just wanted to pose these questions to the panel saying 

that what, let’s say, if you were to name one step from each side, what is it that Armenia 

or Azerbaijan has to make politically, as a show of political will to resolve the conflict? 

What is one step that they have to take on that? 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thanks very much. 

And, next. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you very much. My name is Aykhan Hajizada. I am from the 

Embassy of Azerbaijan. I express my gratitude to the panelists for their thought-provoking statements and speeches. 

Ambassador Cavanaugh referred to basic mechanisms and other proposals, co-chair 

countries in order to achieve a confidence between the two parties, Armenia and Azerbaijan, on the ground. I would like to refer to the Budapest Summit document, which 

actually gave an impetus to the renewed negotiation policies and directed co-chairs to 

achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict would—which would eliminate the consequences of the conflict. And at the same time, there was an agreement to intensify and 

to strengthen the ceasefire, which currently is the same approach which are provided 

during the negotiations. How do you think how we can make an impetus on those two 

lines which should not be singled out, like confidence building measures [CBMs] and 

intensified negotiations—[inaudible]—political solution to the conflict? 

Mr. TIERSKY. Great. Thank you for your question. 

Let’s try to, again, be brief so that we can have the panelists give a response. Thank 

you. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you. My name is Rasha Tashan [ph]. I’m from the Embassy of 

Armenia. And thank you very much for the panel, for your presentations. 

I have short question. I would rather like to comment on the presentation made by 

Madam Magdalena Grono and question raised by my Azerbaijani colleague about the roots 

and the origins of the conflict. It’s really very important to define and to clearly understand the roots of the conflict. As you mentioned in your presentation, the region of 

Nagorno-Karabakh broke out from Azerbaijan in 1992. But let me disagree with you— 

sorry—Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence in 1991, still when the Soviet Union 

existed, and declared its independence in the same way as Azerbaijan self-determined and 

declared its independence from the Soviet Union, in full compliance with that time legislation and laws. So the conflict itself is about the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh 

to self-determination. 

The second point in this regard is that, look, three principles of international law lays 

at the foundation of the negotiation and the settlement of the conflict. And one of them 

is the self-determination. It means that the international community recognizes the right 

of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination, and provides for the opportunity to express 

its will through, as Ambassador Warlick mentioned, legally binding referendum or plebiscite as the final stage of the settlement. 

And another point—my colleague from Armenian Public Television mentioned about 

the civil societies and the difference between Armenia and Azerbaijani societies that we 

are now witnessing. I mean, all panelists mentioned in their presentation the importance 

of dialogue between two societies, the importance of context. In this regard, just according 
23 

to my friend, I would like to ask you—I mean, in Armenia we have flourishing, very active 

civil society. You can see lively discussion, lively public discourse in our society, both in 

the parliament and among the NGOs. But what is—and it varies in our counterpart in 

this regard, in Azerbaijan. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you. 

So I’d now like to ask the panelists to pick and choose what they would like to 

respond to—some of these were questions, some of these were not so much questions as 

remarks and comments—and any final thoughts you would have to leave us with. Perhaps 

I will go in the same order that we presented with to begin with, and ladies first. 

Ms. GRONO. Thank you very much. I will first respond to our Armenian embassy colleague. Thank you for your comments. I don’t actually think that I did go into the specific 

history of the conflict. So I don’t think that there is—I particularly didn’t go into that 

because, of course, there are a lot of elements that one would have to bring in and narratives differ, et cetera. So I think that in my presentation I tried to sum it up by saying 

that by 1991, 1992, the conflict took on the character of a full-scale war, and I think that 

probably is indeed something that you could agree with. 

I agree, though, with you that—and this is in reference to a previous round of questions—that it’s important to indeed say always all the elements because things that are 

said are as important as things that are unsaid. So, for instance, this is in reference to 

an Azerbaijani’s colleagues comment about the displaced persons. I did cite that over a 

million people were displaced. I did say that 700,000—over 700,000 of those were displaced from Karabakh and adjacent districts. But it’s important really to underline also 

that over 400,000 were displaced—of Armenians were displaced from Azerbaijan itself. I 

don’t want to go into great details, but I just wanted to clarify this. 

I will answer the question about the one issue that would need to happen today so 

that we improve chances for peace in the future—I think that was your question—I’ll say 

two things that would be priority. I think that, first, presidents would really need to start 

talking seriously with their publics about what the benefits of peace would be, but also 

what kind of steps towards settlement would be necessary and what compromise could 

entail. 

And secondly, I really would second what Ambassador Cavanaugh said earlier. I 

think it’s very important to have a hotline among the militaries, at least in the short 

term, for the moment, to work towards prevention of large-scale incidents. 

Amb. CAVANAUGH. Let me pick up with that, it has always been disheartening in this 

conflict that presidents from both sides will talk about the willingness to fight, the maximalist positions they would like to achieve, when in fact at the bargaining table they talk 

about compromise. After Key West, many of you are aware, my biggest complaint was 

that the presidents had done nothing to prepare their populations for a compromise, that 

they were getting very close to agreeing to. This has happened repeatedly. 

And I think what Magdalena said is true. Probably the foremost step that needs to 

be taken is to start being more frank with your populations. This is a problem that needs 

to be solved, and the way to solve it will require giving up ‘‘something.’’ You don’t even 

necessarily need to detail what that ‘‘something’’ is. But some days you look at the positions coming out of Baku: ‘‘Nagorno-Karabakh can have the highest autonomous status 

possible within Azerbaijan.’’ It’s the same as the Soviet Union. That’s that status. You 

hear in Armenia, ‘‘All the conquered territories should remain Armenian. We can find 
24 

maps that show that at some point in history they were Armenian.’’ This isn’t a way to 

move forward towards a negotiated political settlement. I can believe there’s political 

salience in making such positions, but it’s not helpful in crafting a solution. 

In response to the question about—I raised the incidence investigation mechanism 

and monitors. In part, I raised those because those were already agreed to by both presidents. There should be nothing simpler than agreeing to something you agreed to a year 

ago. And other CBMs, a hotline between militaries could be set up in a day. What argument is there that ‘‘in extremis, in an emergency I don’t want to be able to talk to the 

other side and know what’s going on’’? I don’t understand that. I think these are simple 

steps to take. 

And I recognize—and I heard this repeatedly in Baku—there’s a concern CBMs make 

the status quo more palatable, and there’s truth in that. But the status quo being more 

palatable makes a better environment or atmosphere for a peaceful solution, and there’s 

value in that. And while the co-chair countries can’t force the settlement on the parties, 

and OSCE itself can’t force the settlement on the parties, there are CBMs they can do 

that are independent of the parties. And I raised several, and I think that may be an 

approach that should be pursued: a military-to-military context between the Turks and 

the Russians; the potential intelligence sharing about the region between the United 

States and Russia. You know, that doesn’t need a yes vote from Baku or Yerevan. 

And I want to say one other thing about the incidents investigation mechanism, 

because I’ll be frank. Originally, I was opposed to this. My fear of this was it would lead 

to more death. Right now, whenever there are skirmishes, each side claims we’ve killed 

more than the other side. And I was always scared to death that if you could prove how 

many died, you may create an incentive to kill more people. And maybe we were better 

off not being able to prove it. But I think both sides are at a point now where—and you 

see these press releases every day in the Caucasus—158 violations yesterday, 2,760 violations last week. If that’s going to be the news, then we should start figuring out how to 

be able to tell where they’re coming from, and maybe that will deter the snipers that 

Ambassador Warlick spoke about. But as I said, even there, I worried about that as a 

CBM. 

Amb. WARLICK. I’ll also address this question of what is the one step that the sides 

could take that would be meaningful in resolving the conflict. It’s just not sufficient for 

the two presidents to meet once a year or once every two years. We’re not going to make 

progress towards a settlement without greater engagement by the presidents and structured negotiations. And if I can recommend, we need that kind of process of sustained 

diplomacy to make progress towards a negotiated settlement. 

Mr. TIERSKY. I think it’s a measure of the extraordinary quality of the panelists we 

had today that all of you remain here despite the fact that we’ve now long run out of time. 

Please join me in thanking the panel in a traditional manner. I would also like to thank 

my colleagues who helped me organize this, and in particular my colleague Everett Price 

who could not be here with us today, but hopefully he’s watching on Facebook. 

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes our briefing. Thank you all for your 

participation. 

[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the briefing ended.] 

Æ 

This is an official publication of the Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

★ ★ ★ 

This publication is intended to document 

developments and trends in participating 

States of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. 

★ ★ ★ 

All Commission publications may be freely reproduced, 

in any form, with appropriate credit. The Commission 

encourages the widest possible dissemination of its 

publications. 

★ ★ ★ 

www.csce.gov @HelsinkiComm 

The Commission’s Web site provides access 

to the latest press releases and reports, 

as well as hearings and briefings. Using the 

Commission’s electronic subscription service, readers are 

able to receive press releases, articles, and other 

materials by topic or countries of particular interest. 

Please subscribe today.